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ORGANIZATION, AC, ITALIAN GOV'T RECOMMENDATIONS
SEPT. - NOV. 1944

1012/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 1012 ORGANIZATION, AC, ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS~~SECRET~~

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
0	Memo, Stone	4 Sept 44	A/CC	Stone-Ronconi meeting 4 Sept 44 Do not endorse Ital proposal of Italians serving on the commission
1	Memo Lush COS	4 Oct 44	A/CC	
2	Ltr 1/860 Visconti Venosta	4 Oct 44	Stone	Proposals of Ital Govt for changes in AC. Incl: Memorandum
3	321-1 Stone	9 Oct 44	SACLED	Enclosed are recommendations of Ital Govt for changes in AC
4	321-1 Stone	10 Oct 44	Visconti Venosta	Your ltr has been passed to SAC
5	301/9/CCS Stone	13 Oct 44	Visconti Venosta	Pls clarify statement about SC's
6	Memo, Stone	13 Nov 44	Filea	Stone-Ronconi mtg/9 Nov might be discontinued by AC.
7	Ltr, Quayle	14 Nov 44	Alex Kirk, Charles	Stone-Ronconi mtg re what AC func- tions might be discontinued.
8	Memo, Quayle	14 Nov 44	COS & Sections	Stone-Ronconi mtg 9 Nov discontinc- uance of AC functions, comments.
8a	Ltr Venosta 1/861	16 Nov 44	Stone	Suggestion for 'demobilization of Subcommissions', etc.
9	Ltr Stone 301/60/ COS	24 Nov 44	Venosta	Macmillan to discuss in London & Washington.

1635

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Ref: 502/60/005

24 November 1946

Dear Marchese Visconti Venosta: ⑥

The matters which I discussed with the Prime Minister and yourself on 9 November and later again with yourself on 11 November, have been the subject of a meeting with the Acting President, The Rt. Hon. Mr. Harold Macmillan. At this meeting there was full discussion on your proposal that Allied Commission personnel in the areas South of Salerno should be withdrawn, on the discontinuation of the supervision of education, and on the question of the review of Government appointments.

Mr. Macmillan will be discussing these matters in London and Washington, and when he returns I hope to be able to inform you of the decisions reached.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief CommissionerHis Excellency Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta,
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

1012/ccc

100/100

⑨

FILES

16 NOV 1944

Al Sottosegretario di Stato
per gli Affari Esteri

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Dear Admiral,

I have received your Note dated 15th October (N.301/9 Cos.) wherein you ask me to amplify paragraph 6-C of the Memorandum on the transformation of the Allied Commission, which reads: "Pronta smobilitazione di Sottocommissioni, Uffici e uomini della Commissione Alleata".

I would like to note in the first place that in the English rough translation of this paragraph the term "suppression" has been inappropriately used as translation from the Italian "smobilitazione"; it would, namely, have been better to say "a speedy demobilisation of Sub-Commissions, Sections and Officers depending on the Allied Commission". I wish to emphasize, thereby, that it was not intended to suggest, *sic et simpliciter*, the total elimination of all the Sub-Commissions, Sections and Officers of the Allied Commissions. What was meant was the elimination of certain Sections and the substantial reduction of others.

Amplifying further, I am of opinion that the general principles should be the following:

a) - A gradual transformation of the Allied Commissions

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English rough translation of this paragraph the term "suppression" has been inappropriately used as translation from the Italian "smobilitazione"; it would, namely, have been better to say "a speedy demobilisation of Sub-Commissions, Sections and Officers depending on the Allied Commission". I wish to emphasize, thereby, that it was not intended to suggest, *sic et simpliciter*, the total elimination of all the Sub-Commissions, Sections and Officers of the Allied Commissions. What was meant was the elimination of certain Sections and the substantial reduction of others.

Amplifying further, I am of opinion that the general principles should be the following:

- 1012/CC
- a)- A gradual transformation of the Allied Commissions from a military into a civil body.
 - b)- The elimination of those Sub-Commissions and Sections which, as mentioned in paragraph 3) of the Memorandum "have no direct and immediate connection with the war effort, nor aim at a direct, substantial and concrete assistance thereto". For instance, it is obvious that Sub-Commissions and Sections connected with the Ministries of Justice and Public Education, the activities of which, except very indirectly in the field of pure legislation, have no relation with the conduct of the war, should be comprised in this category.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,

R O M E

FILE

Il Sottosegretario di Stato
per gli Affari Esteri

- 3 -

c)- The substantial reduction of all other Sub-Commissions and pertinent Sections, together with the speedy and progressive elimination of all local offices whose task is almost exclusively that of exercising that "control" which it is intended to eliminate. The basic principle, in this field, should be that of limiting the functions of the Allied Commission to a direct cooperation, at the centre, with the highest Italian authorities, responsible for each field of activity. Once the guiding principles on the activities that these Italian authorities are called upon to perform have thus been agreed upon at the centre, any interference should cease in the executive stage and in all questions of detail, eliminating the present practice of a continuous interference exercised through direct contacts between Allied officers and local Italian offices. The latter should receive their orders exclusively from the Italian central authorities.

In other words, the responsibility of carrying out whatever is, in common agreement, decided upon at the centre between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government, should fall entirely on the latter and its competent authorities. The central Italian authorities would, in their turn, be directly responsible to the Allied Commission for the execution of the agreed directions.

In this connection I wish to add, in a general way, that if, at times, Allied interferences, whether local or in the strictly technical field, answer a well-intentioned purpose of meeting the all-mentioned deficiencies of the Italian Administration, it is also

field of activity. Once the guiding principles of the activities that these Italian authorities are called upon to perform have thus been agreed upon at the centre, any interference should cease in the executive stage and in all questions of detail, eliminating the present practice of a continuous interference exercised through direct contacts between Allied officers and local Italian offices. The latter should receive their orders exclusively from the Italian central authorities.

In other words, the responsibility of carrying out whatever is, in common agreement, decided upon at the centre between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government, should fall entirely on the latter and its competent authorities. The central Italian authorities would, in their turn, be directly responsible to the Allied Commission for the execution of the agreed directions.

In this connection I wish to add, in a general way, that if, at times, Allied interferences, whether local or in the strictly technical field, answer a well-intentioned purpose of meeting the ~~allied~~ deficiencies of the Italian Administration, it is also true that such interferences stifle all spirit of initiative and sense of responsibility, besides reflecting, in the majority of cases, methods and habits that do not correspond to those of the Italian people and are therefore doomed to remain unproductive.

In this same field I wish also to refer to the particularly delicate aspect of the interferences exercised, not only at the centre but also locally in matters of appointment, removal, transfer and substitution of personnel, and to point out that whilst from the technical standpoint these interferences have an absolutely contrary effect, they are also to be considered superfluous from the political aspect, in view of the wide and determined epuration measures that are being taken by the Italian Government.

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Il Sottosegretario di Stato
per gli Affari Esteri

- 3 -

d)- The transformation (in relation to be above outlined) of the Allied Commission and of its Sub-Commissions in one single body of joint Italo-Allied cooperation with the participation, therefore, of an Italian Authority, to which should be attached all other Italian officials within the Sub-Commissions, and which would act as their natural coordinating body.

The status of this central Italian Authority and of these officials should, furthermore, be transformed from the present one of liaison officers into that of actual representatives of the various Ministries within the Allied Commission. This should lead to the elimination of the Allied Offices within the individual Ministries.

e)- This transformation of the Allied Commission in a prevalently civilian body would bring to the fore the problem of how to most appropriately fit within the new framework all the important activity carried on up to now by the Military Sub-Commissions.

In view of the fact that the Italian Government is more than ever anxious to develop its contribution in the field of the military effort, which it has foremost at heart, I would like to suggest that the above Sub-Commissions should, for the duration of the war, be transformed and brought together into a "Military Mission". Once the hostilities over, it would be superseded by Military Attachés. The time, the conditions and ~~the~~ ways and means of such a transformation might be worked out together between the competent Allied Authorities and the Italian General Staff.

e)-

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I am perfectly aware that these further explanations are still of a general character. But the complexity and vastness of the subject render, a greater circumstantiation extremely difficult, specially if it should be attempted only from our side. I should therefore like to remind you of the proposal outlined in my previous Memorandum, namely, a joint examination of all the questions connected with the transformation of the Commission with a view to reaching an agreed solution. Such an examination, would allow a practical clarification of the respective points of view and, moreover bring

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Il Sottosegretario di Stato
per gli Affari Esteri

- 4 -

to light the reasons both of certain, often not fully understood, Allied interferences, as of much apparent impatience on our side.

As we are on this subject, I should like to insist on one particular aspect of the question. If it is really intended to effect a transformation of the present control system which, albeit progressive not only as to form but as to the substance, would lighten the already grave burdens weighing on the Country, it is absolutely necessary to break, determinately, the innate tendency of all bureaucracies; namely, that of expanding and taking root, creating the function in order to maintain the organ. For these same reasons, having framed a plan, it will also be necessary to take great care that the offices that will be eliminated or reduced in one place will not tend to reappear elsewhere under different form. In other words, once the cuts are decided upon they should be applied clearly and definitely. Otherwise, any reduction or elimination will remain purely academic and the Allied Commission will continue to be what it was in the past, an Allied Control Commission.

Before closing this letter I wish to emphasize, dear Admiral, that the above remarks and proposals are not framed in any controversial spirit but purely in a spirit of friendship and in the best formula that will

would lighten the already grave burdens weighing on the Country, it is absolutely necessary to break, determinately, the innate tendency of all bureaucracies; namely, that of expanding and taking root, creating the function in order to maintain the organ. For these same reasons, having framed a plan, it will also be necessary to take great care that the offices that will be eliminated or reduced in one place will not tend to reappear elsewhere under different form. In other words, once the cuts are decided upon they should be applied clearly and definitely. Otherwise, any reduction or elimination will remain purely academic and the Allied Commission will continue to be what it was in the past, an Allied Control Commission.

Before closing this letter I wish to emphasize, dear Admiral, that the above remarks and proposals are not framed in any controversial spirit but purely in a spirit of ~~friendship~~ ^{of 30} friendship and with the positive aim of searching for the best formula that will lead to a fruitful co-operation. We fully appreciate the efforts made by the A.C.C. ever since the distant days of its inception at Brindisi, and not only in respect of "control" in its restrictive sense, but also in its aims to give a concrete and valuable contribution towards the solution of the infinite problems that faced and still face our Country. We know that in this task we have found, in you all, real friends who have taken to heart the needs of the people and those of our rehabilitation. Just as we know that the further cooperation of the Allied Commission is and

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Al Sottosegretario di Stato
per gli Affari Esteri

- 5 -

will be of inestimable value not only in the immediate task of furthering the war effort for the defeat of the common enemy and the complete liberation of our territory, but also in the forthcoming work for the economic and financial rehabilitation of the Country. I repeat, however, that it is in the interest of these very tasks that the direct responsibility, without which there cannot be a healthy revival, should be returned to the Italian Government, according with the generous intentions expressed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill as far back as September last at Hyde Park.

Believe me, dear Admiral

Cordially yours,

Signed Vincenti Vucelja

P.S. Since writing this letter, I have learned of the appointment of Mr. MacMillan as Head of the Allied Commission. It appears to me that the nomination of a political personality in the stead of a military one, is indicative of the intention, also on the part of the Allies, to transform the Commission along the lines envisaged in the present letter. This beginning is for us cause of sincere pleasure, as is no less the confirmation as Chief Commissioner of an old

turned to the Italian Government, according to intentions expressed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill as far back as September last at Hyde Park.

Believe me, dear Admiral

Cordially yours,

Signed Visconti Venosta

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APC 394

JAQ/afe

14 November 1944

TO: Chief of Staff
DCOS, Political Section
DCOS, Economic Section
DCOS, Civil Affairs Section

6

Reference attached "memorandum for files" dated 13 Nov 44, the Chief Commissioner requests your comments as early as possible.

J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

1012/CC

cc: 'A' Files ✓

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JAQ/afe

14 November 1944

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am instructed by the Chief Commissioner to forward to you the attached memorandum dated 13 November in reference to this morning's political meeting.

Yours very truly,

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

The Honorable Alexander Kirk
U.S. Representative to the
Advisory Council for Italy
Via Vittorio Veneto 119
R O M E

1 Incl.

cc: *Sir Noel Charles (in orig.)*

*Cof 5
"A" Files ✓*

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1012/cc

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/dfe

13 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES

In my meeting with the Prime Minister and Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs on November 9, I stated that I should like to explore with them the questions as to what functions of AC might be discontinued in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, what further withdrawals of AC personnel might be made from AC Regions as distinct from AMG Regions, and the various dates on which both steps might be taken.

It was agreed that the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and I would informally discuss the question of the suspension of functions on the following day. It was also agreed that we would discuss a relaxation of the present review of Governmental appointments which AC now exercises.

As to withdrawal of AC personnel from AC Regions, the Prime Minister reiterated the view which he expressed in September that he desired AC not to withdraw further from Sicily for the time being and until the political situation in Sicily had clarified.

As to the Mainland, he suggested that it might be satisfactory, as a start, to withdraw AC personnel in the area south of Salerno. He advised that the Undersecretary would propose a date when this might become effective at our subsequent meeting.

The Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs met with me on November 11. As to suspension of functions, he suggested that as a beginning we should discontinue any supervision of education in territory under the Government's jurisdiction and that this should become effective immediately. He stated that he was not prepared to recommend the elimination of supervision by any other Sub-Commission at this time.

As to withdrawing AC personnel in the area south of Salerno, he suggested January 1, 1945. I promised to advise him.

As to the relaxation of review of Government appointments, he submitted for consideration and discussion a list, herewith attached, of those appointments which the Government proposes should not be made without AC approval. With reference to the various Chief of Staff appointments, I told him that I felt the Commission was not prepared to relax its present supervision of the Army, Navy and Air Force in any degree, since these were essentially military matters and not political. He quite willingly accepted the point of view that our present degree of supervision of personnel in the Italian armed forces by the three Service Sub-Commissions would remain unaltered.

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CONFIDENTIAL

During our discussion he suggested that we might both want to consider making the appointments of the High Commissioners for Sicily and Sardinia subject to AC approval.

I promised to give the Undersecretary our reaction to all his proposals as soon as possible.

The discussion was conducted in an atmosphere of the greatest cordiality.



ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore
Chief Commissioner

1 Incl: List

cc: CofS
DCOS, Political Section } - (8)
DCOS, Economic Section }
DCOS, Civil Affairs Section }
Sir Noel Charles } - (7)
Hon. Alexander Kirk }

1925

CONFIDENTIAL

(6)

Ministri e Sottosegretari di Stato
Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale dell'Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Marina
Capo di Stato Maggiore Aviazione
Principali Rappresentanti diplomatici
Alto Commissario per l'Epurazione
Vice Alti Commissari per l'Epurazione
Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza
Comandante Generale dei Carabinieri.

Added Suggestion

High Commissioners for Sicily and Sardinia

1824
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(6)

Ref. 301/9/003.

13th October, 1944

His Excellency Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government.

Dear Marchese Visconti Venosta:

I refer to your letter No. 1/660 of the 4th of October.

As I told you in my letter A/CC 321-1 of the 10th of October, your memorandum is under consideration by the President of the Commission. While waiting to hear from the President on this, it would, I think, be useful if you will amplify paragraph 6 - C of the memorandum which reads:

"A prompt suppression of Sub Commissions and Offices depending from the Allied Commission."

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

G-5, AMIA
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Hon. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles

(5)
13 Oct

1499

file
ps

'A'

EWS/dfc

A/CC 321-1

10 October 1944

22

Dear Marchese Visconti Venosta:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 1/660 of 4 October 1944 and the enclosed memorandum. Your letter and memorandum have been passed to the President of the Commission for consideration, and we shall write you further when we receive his reply.

Yours very truly,

(3)

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USN
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government

321-1

See (2)

cc: CofS
"A" files

1022

(4)

10 Oct 44

EWS/dfc

N/CC 321-1

9 October 1944

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
 Allied Force Headquarters
 APO 512

(2)

1. There is forwarded herewith copy of letter and attached memorandum received from the Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.

2. It is not proposed to submit comments on the Undersecretary's memorandum until some indication of CCA policy has been received in response to your telegram EXM291 of 4 October, except that it may be of interest to note that while the Undersecretary proposes the elimination of MCC officers in Provinces turned back to the Italian administration, the Prime Minister recently requested that we not remove our Regional Commissioner and his staff from Sicily, as we were proposing to do, until affairs had become more settled.

3. The letter has been acknowledged with the statement that it was being forwarded to the President of the Commission for consideration.

ELLENY W. STONE
 Commodore, USMC
 Acting Chief Commissioner

Comdr Stone
Brig Lusk
 cc: G-5, AFHQ
 U.S. Political Adviser
 British Resident Minister
 Hon. Alexander Kirk
 Sir Noel Charles

"A" File
C/S

2 Incls:

Ltr No. 1/660, 4 Oct 44,
 with attached memorandum

321-1

1012

1001
1002File
1012

(3)

9 Oct

ITALIA

IL RIFORMULARE IL STATO
PER GLI AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

No. 1/660

Rome, October 4th, 1944.

Dear Admiral:

Following upon our recent conversation on the subject, I enclose a brief memorandum in which are traced the general principles which in our opinion should inform the transformation of the "Allied Control Commission" in the more simple "Allied Commission" provided for in the Joint Churchill-Roosevelt declaration. Please note that these are simply general principles which deserve a closer and more careful study. Naturally we are quite ready, if you think it the case, to examine the question in greater detail and to state in more practical terms our point of view on the matter. Point of view which, as you will see, can in short be summed up as follows: Transformation of the Allied tutelage and control in a cordial and close collaboration between the Italians and the Allies in view of reaching those objectives that are in common to both parties; increase in our war effort; elimination of fascism; building up of a vigorous democratic society; reconstruction of the country in view of bringing it progressively and as soon as possible to a position of autonomy and complete independence along side of the United Nations for the furtherance of peace in Europe and in the world. I believe that these points faithfully reflect the spirit and the letter of the Churchill-Roosevelt declaration.

It is needless for me to add that the Italian Government are fully aware of an appreciation in their true value the assistance and the aid furnished by the United States and Great Britain and that the transformation they have asked for, far from being provoked by a spirit of criticism or of opposition, is solely due to their desire for a cordial and open collaboration.

Believe me dear Admiral,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Visconti Venosta

cordial and close collaboration between the Italians and the Allies in view of reaching those objectives that are in common to both parties; increase in our war effort; elimination of fascism; building up of a vigorous democratic society; reconstruction of the country in view of bringing it progressively and as soon as possible to a position of autonomy and complete independence along side of the United Nations for the furtherance of peace in Europe and in the world. I believe that these points faithfully reflect the spirit and the letter of the Churchill-Roosevelt declaration.

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Believe me dear Admiral,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Visconti Venosta

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.A.
Acting President
Allied Control Commission
ROME

See document 20

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1. - The joint statement issued by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, as regards the concession of an increasing measure of autonomy to the Italian Government, is couched in the following terms:

"The American and the British people feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own Government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts. An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian administration subject of course to that administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed the Allied Commission".

The words of the statement imply therefore a limitation and a change in the nature of the duties carried out until now by the A.C.C.: the omission of the word "control", if it has, as it must have, special significance, should not only coincide with the suppression of a certain number of functions exercised until now by the Commission, but also with a different outlook and conception of those which the said Commission will continue to carry out. Limitation of duties therefore on the one hand, and different spirit and outlook on the remaining functions on the other.

2. - This different spirit, in the opinion of the Italian Government, ought to be expressed not in terms of tuition and authoritative control, but in terms of cooperation on the basis of solutions discussed and agreed upon between the Parties. The best and perhaps the only way of realizing such a collaboration is that of consenting to the appointment of an Italian member both on the central commission as on the different sub-commissions. The Italian member of the Control Commission could and should be the natural coordinator of the activities of all the other Italian representatives on the sub-commissions. He should harmonize their work, guide it according to uniform aims and principles, keep himself in close touch with the directing Allied authorities on the Commission so as to facilitate and aid them in their work and contribute in giving it that unity of purpose and of action

proving that it can maintain administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed the Allied Commission".

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2. - This different spirit, in the opinion of the Italian Government, ought to be expressed not in terms of tuition and authoritative control, but in terms of cooperation on the basis of solutions discussed and agreed upon between the Parties. The best and perhaps the only way of realizing such a collaboration is that of consulting to the appointment of an Italian member both the central Commission as on the different sub-commissions. The Italian member of the Control Commission could and should be the natural coordinator of the activities of all the other Italian representatives on the sub-commissions. He should harmonize their work. Aside it according to uniform aims and principles, keep himself in close touch with the directing Allied authorities on the Commission so as to facilitate and aid them in their work and contribute in giving it that unity of purpose and of action as well as that coordination which at present threaten to remain fragmentary, disjointed and often contradictory.

3. - In the Italian Government's opinion the functions and ¹⁶¹⁸ duties that the Commission could continue to exercise, naturally besides those that have direct and immediate connections with the war effort, should broadly comprise also those in which Allied assistance is applied in substantial, direct and concrete form. All these functions should however, as it has already been pointed out, be planned and carried out as the fruit of a close collaboration rather than as the consequence of coercion or imposition. All the other functions and duties that the Commission now exercises and that do not obey the fundamental principles of "direct and immediate connection with the war effort and of substantial, direct and concrete assistance", should be returned in "toto" to the Italian Government and Administration.

The joint Churchill-Roosevelt statement would appear to contain a precise indication in this sense where it says that the Italian Administration must prove "that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice". So as to give the said proof

It is evidently necessary to be in a condition and position to do so without being hindered by those interferences and obstacles that automatically proceed from the co-existence of two authorities both empowered with the right of governing. Allied intervention should therefore cease as regards the exercise of the above quoted functions. If these functions were should undoubtedly be added, for example, those others that are connected with public and private education as well as those that seem to hinder rather than help the autonomous reconstructive effort of the Italians.

It could be certainly advantageous if a discrimination of those functions which ought, wholly or in part, be returned to the Italian Government, should be carried out after a close examination of the question by experts especially appointed by the Allies and by the Italians to this end. The solution reached in this manner would have in addition the advantage of being fruit of an agreement freely discussed and accepted by both sides. In the same fashion all the agreements relating to the transfer of the different provinces to Italian Administration should be equally reconsidered so as to bring them into the framework of the new spirit and letter of the Joint Churchill-Roosevelt statement. It is pointed out that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are already in a position to furnish all necessary evidence as to the Allied interests and intervention in the different Italian Administrations which, in their opinion, represent a major obstacle to the normal activities of the Italian Authorities. This evidence can be forwarded to the Commission should they see fit to take it into consideration.

4. - A fundamental condition in reaching the new situation provided for in the joint statement, seems to lie in the necessity that the Allies shall promptly and drastically reduce the number of those officers which will be recognized as useless and superfluous. For instance the Commission is now divided in 26 Sub-Commissions and its dependent offices continue to function more or less everywhere, naturally including those provinces which have already been returned to the Italian Administration. Such an excess of Sub-Commissions and of dependent offices seems to lead not only to an excessive fragmentariness of work but also to the artificial creation of separate compartments that disregard and therefore act independently of each other with grave prejudice to the comprehensive study of the different problems under consideration. It seems therefore necessary that to a limitation of duties there should correspond a parallel and rapid suppression of Sub-Commissions and Offices. Should not such a suppression be promptly carried out, no doubt can be entertained that all those functions which it should now be decided to abolish would again develop there in the

should be equally reconsidered so as to bring them into the framework of the new spirit and letter of the joint Churchill-Roosevelt statement. It is pointed out that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are already in a position to furnish all necessary evidence as to the Allied interference and intervention in the different Italian administrative activities of the Italian Authorities. This evidence can be forwarded to the Commission should they see fit to take it into consideration.

4. - A fundamental realisation in reaching the new situation provided for in the joint statement, seems to lie in the necessity that the Allies shall promptly and drastically reduce the number of those officers which will be recognized as useless and superfluous. For instance the Commission is now divided in 20 Sub-Commissions and its dependent offices continue to function more or less everywhere, naturally including those provinces which have already been returned to the Italian Administration. Such an excess of Sub-Commissions and of dependent offices seems to lead not only to an excessive fragmentariness of work but also to the artificial creation of separate compartments that disregard and transpirent independently of each other with grave prejudice to the comprehensive study of the different problems under consideration. It seems therefore necessary that to a limitation of duties there should correspond a parallel and rapid suppression of Sub-Commissions and Offices. Should not such a suppression be promptly carried out, no doubt can be entertained that all those functions which it should now be decided to abolish would again develop thanks to the activity of the surviving offices and men, owing to the natural and automatic tendency common to all bureaucracies to ~~spread~~ ^{expand} and develop.

5. - The Italian Government believes that if the measures adopted for the transformation of the A.C.C. in "Allied Commission" shall be taken in accordance with these general principles, the work of the Allies in Italy will be made much easier; Allied activities will be concentrated only in those fields where they can produce the maximum of reciprocal utility; Italian Government will reacquire that progressive authority and prestige without which it is impossible to restore the country to order and stability and above all the Allied and Italian authorities will enter into a regime of loyal, open and cordial collaboration desired by all and that alone can lead to the foundation of a vigorous society democratically progressive and solidly organized.

6. - Owing up, the Italian Government suggests:

a. - That the Commission should continue to exercise only those functions which have close and immediate connection with the war effort

and those in which Allies assistance is carried out in a substantial direct and concrete form and that all other attributions be transferred to the Italian Government.

b.- That the exercise of those functions which will continue to appertain to the Commission should reflect a spirit not of imposition but of collaboration realized by means of an Italian participation to the central and local activities of the Commission.

c.- A prompt suppression of Sub-Commissions and Offices depending from the Allied Commission.

d.- An exam carried out on equal basis of all the questions concerning the transformation of the Commission with a view to reaching a solution agreed upon between the two sides.

e.- The submission to the examination of the Allied authorities of all the evidence concerning the interferences and interventions which now hinder in the different Administrations the normal activities of the Italian Administration.


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Al Segretario di Stato

per gli Affari Esteri

N. 1/660

Roma, 4 OTT. 1944

Caro Ammiraglio,

A seguito della nostra recente conversazione sull'argomento, Le accludo un breve promemoria ove sono accennati i criteri e le direttive di massima ai quali dovrebbe, a nostro avviso, essere informata la trasformazione della "Commissione Alleata di Controllo" in quella pura e semplice "Commissione Alleata" prevista dalla dichiarazione congiunta Roosevelt-Churchill. Badi che si tratta di semplici accenni, che meriterebbero cioè più larghi ed attenti approfondimenti. Naturalmente siamo pronti, se Ella lo crede opportuno, a scendere a maggiori particolari e a precisare in concreto il nostro punto di vista. Il quale in sostanza, com'Ella vedrà, può riassumersi in pochissime parole: trasformazione cioè del-

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Evms
 Frank
 Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.
 Presidente Interinale
 Commissione Alleata di Controllo

ROMA

File

potenziamento dello sforzo bellico ; eliminazione del fascismo ; organizzazione di una sana società democratica; ricostruzione del Paese in vista di riportarlo progressivamente e sollecitamente all'autonomia e alla completa indipendenza a fianco delle Nazioni Unite, per la pacificazione dell'Europa e del mondo. Credo che tutto ciò interpreti fedelmente lo spirito e la lettera della dichiarazione Roosevelt-Churchill.

E' superfluo aggiungere che il Governo italiano si rende perfettamente conto ed apprezza al giusto valore l'assistenza e gli appoggi dati dagli Stati Uniti e dalla Gran Bretagna e che la trasformazione da esso invocata, lungi dall'essere ispirata a spirito di critica o di opposizione, è mossa soltanto da volontà di cordiale ed aperta collaborazione.

Mi creda, caro Ammiraglio, molto cordialmente

G. L. Wilson

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G. L. S. T. B. S. T.

P R O - M E M O R I A

1. La dichiarazione diramata in comune dal Primo Ministro Churchill e dal Presidente Roosevelt è, per quanto riguarda la maggiore misura di autonomia prevista a favore del governo italiano, concepita in questi termini :

"Il popolo americano e quello britannico ritengono che la maggiore responsabilità affidata al popolo italiano e al suo governo sarà il migliore mezzo per impedire disordini e violenze. Una sempre maggiore autorità sarà gradatamente concessa all'amministrazione italiana, purchè tale amministrazione dia prova di poter mantenere l'ordine, far rispettare le leggi, assicurare il funzionamento regolare della giustizia. Per tali motivi la "Allied Control Commission", muterà il suo nome in "Allied Commission"."

Le parole della dichiarazione presumono dunque una limitazione ed un mutamento dei compiti sin qui svolti dalla Commissione: la scomparsa della parola "controllo" se ha, come evidentemente deve avere, un significato, deve cioè coincidere non solo con la parallela scomparsa di tutta una serie di funzioni sin qui svolte dalla Commissione, ma altresì anche con una diversa concezione ed orientamento di quelle funzioni che essa continuerà ad esercitare e a svolgere. Limitazione di compiti dunque, da una parte, diverso spirito ed orientamento delle funzioni residue, dall'altra.

2. Il diverso spirito che dovrebbe informare l'esercizio delle funzioni e dei compiti che la commissione continuerà a svolgere, dovrebbe, nel pensiero del governo italiano, essere improntato,

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2. Il diverso spirito che dovrebbe informare l'esercizio delle funzioni e dei compiti che la commissione continuerà a svolgere, dovrebbe, nel pensiero del governo italiano, essere improntato, piuttosto che in termini di tutela e controllo ~~statistici~~ ^{economici}, in termine invece di cooperazione, cioè sulla base di soluzioni discusse e concordate fra le parti. Il mezzo migliore e probabilmente il solo per attuare una collaborazione siffatta è quello di consentire la partecipazione di un membro italiano, sia nella commissione centrale, sia nelle diverse sottocommissioni in cui essa è suddivisa. Il membro italiano nella commissione centrale potrebbe e

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dovrebbe essere il naturale coordinatore dell'attività di tutti gli altri rappresentanti italiani in seno alle sottocommissioni. Esso dovrebbe armonizzare il loro lavoro, indirizzarlo secondo criteri e direttive uniformi, mantenersi in stretto contatto con gli organi direttivi alleati della commissione stessa per facilitarne e agevolare l'opera e contribuire a dare a quest'ultima quell'unità di indirizzo e di azione a quella organicità che oggi rischia di restare frammentaria, slegata, e spesso contraddittoria.

3. Il governo italiano è d'avviso che le funzioni e i compiti che la commissione potrebbe continuare ad esercitare dovrebbero grosso modo essere, oltre naturalmente quelli che hanno diretta ed immediata attinenza e connessione con lo sforzo bellico, anche quelli in cui l'assistenza alleata si espliciti in forma concreta, sostanziale e diretta. Anche tutte codeste funzioni dovrebbero tuttavia, come si è detto, essere concepite ed attuate come fatto collaborativo, piuttosto che di imperio e di imposizione. Tutte le altre funzioni e compiti che oggi la commissione esercita e svolge e che non obbediscono ai criteri fondamentali di "diretta e immediata connessione con lo sforzo bellico e di assistenza diretta, sostanziale e concreta", dovrebbero dunque essere ridate in toto al governo e all'amministrazione italiana.

La dichiarazione congiunta Roosevelt-Churchill sembra contenga al riguardo una indicazione precisa quando essa afferma che da parte italiana si deve dar prova "di sapere mantenere l'ordine, far rispettare le leggi, assicurare il funzionamento della giustizia". Per poter dare una prova siffatta, è infatti evidentemente ne-

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ca e privata e tutte quelle che sembrano destinate ad ostacolare piuttosto che agevolare e favorire lo sforzo ricostruttivo autonomo degli italiani. Metterebbe certamente conto che codesta discriminazione delle funzioni che dovrebbero in toto/in parte essere restituite al governo italiano, potesse aver luogo attraverso un esame approfondito della questione, da compiersi da esperti specialmente designati da parte alleata e da parte italiana. La soluzione cui in questo modo si arriverebbe; avrebbe, oltre tutto, il grandissimo vantaggio di essere soluzione concordata, cioè liberamente discussa e accettata dalle due parti. Dovrebbero in questa sede essere rivisti anche tutti gli accordi relativi agli avvenuti trasferimenti delle diverse provincie all'amministrazione italiana per adeguarli al nuovo spirito ed alla lettera della dichiarazione congiunta Roosevelt-Churchill. Si aggiunge che il Ministero degli Esteri è sin d'ora in grado di segnalare e documentare tutte le specifiche ingerenze e interventi alleati nelle singole amministrazioni italiane che, a suo giudizio, ostacolano più o meno gravemente il normale funzionamento ed attività degli organi e delle autorità italiane. Tale documentazione potrà essere trasmessa alla Commissione se questa ritenesse opportuno procedere utilmente al suo esame.

4. Condizione fondamentale per adeguare la nuova situazione prevista dalla dichiarazione congiunta, sembra essere quella che da parte alleata si proceda subito e con energia alla riduzione di tutti quegli organismi che risulteranno inutili o parassitari. La Commissione è, ad esempio, attualmente suddivisa in 26 sottocommissioni

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funzionare

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che si ignorano a vicenda ed agiscono in conseguenza, con grave pregiudizio della visione di insieme dei diversi problemi in trattazione. Tutto sommato sembra necessario che alla limitazione dei compiti debba duncue corrispondere una parallela e rapida smobilitazione di sottocommissioni ed uffici. Se a tale smobilitazione non si provvedesse e rapidamente, non sembra dubbio che tutte quelle funzioni che oggi si decidesse di abolire, rinascerrebbero attraverso l'attività di uffici ed uomini che si fossero lasciati sopravvivere, per la naturale ed automatica tendenza insita in tutte le burocrazie di lentamente espandersi ed accrescersi.

5. Il governo italiano è d'opinione che se i provvedimenti e le misure previste per la trasformazione della "Commissione di Controllo" in pura e semplice "Commissione Alleata", saranno ispirati a questi criteri e direttive di massima, i compiti alleati in Italia ne risulteranno grandemente alleggeriti, l'attività alleata verrà accentrata soltanto in quei settori ove essa potrà effettivamente condurre ad un massimo di utilità reciproca; il Governo italiano riacquisterà quella progressiva autorità e prestigio senza i quali non è possibile riportare il Paese all'ordine e alla stabilità; e, sopra tutto, andrà stabilendosi fra autorità italiane e alleate quel regime di leale, aperta, cordiale collaborazione che è nei voti di tutti e che solo può condurre alla creazione di una sana società democraticamente progressiva e saldamente organizzata.

6. Riassumendo, il Governo italiano propone :

a)- conservazione da parte della Commissione dei soli compiti che hanno stretta e immediata attinenza con lo sforzo bellico e di

quelli in cui l'assistenza alleata si esprime.

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b)- l'esercizio delle funzioni che continueranno ad essere attribuite alla Commissione deve essere improntato a spirito non di imposizione, ma di collaborazione, da attuarsi attraverso la partecipazione italiana al centro e alla periferia.

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- c)- smobilitazione rapida di sottocommissioni ed uffici della commissione alleata.
- d)- Esame paritetico di tutte le questioni relative alla trasformazione della Commissione in vista di giungere ad una soluzione concordata fra le due parti.
- e)- Trasmissione all'esame delle autorità alleate di tutta la documentazione in nostro possesso relativa alle interferenze e interventi che ostacolano oggi, nelle singole amministrazioni, il normale funzionamento dell'amministrazione italiana.

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normale funzionamento dell'amministrazione italiana.

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4th October, 1944.

Acting Chief Commissioner.

1. You mentioned at the last V.P.'s meeting indications that the Italian Government would shortly ask for the appointment of Italians to various Sub-Commissions of the Commission.

2. I would submit for consideration that in pursuing our policy of delegation of responsibility to the Italian Government it would be consistent with our proposals for the post hostilities organisation of the Commission that we should rather consider the proposal on the lines of seconding officers of the Commission to the Italian Government, to sit in the Departments of the Government, working in close liaison with the Commission but not members thereof. Our policy must be to strengthen the Government not only politically in the eyes of the public but practically in its administration of the country. The appointment of Italians to the Commission would, I fear, be a mere facade and would mean a duplication of posts. My proposal would reduce the officers in the Commission, increase the efficiency of the Government, and might meet the Government half way - provided it was made clear that such officers or civilians were servants of the Italian Government.

MSL/JG.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

EWS/hjp

4 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

A 165
5 Sep 1944

I had a conference with Premier Bonomi from 4:35 to 5:45 P.M. today. Dr. Montanari was present as interpreter.

I first mentioned for his secret information that the Greek Government was being brought to Italy beginning September 7th, stating that I imagined their residence here would be but temporary. I stated that since the question of requisitioning a villa near Cava had been raised in this connection, I imagined that the Greek Government would be located at Salerno or Cava. The Premier stated that he would welcome the presence of the Greek Government here and could only wish that they might have been brought to some which would have facilitated resuming their past friendly relations with that country. I replied that I believed the reason for not bringing them here was because of the housing and food problem in Rome.

I raised the question of the case of the frozen bank account of the Marchese Giacomo Medici del Vascello, stating that Marchese Visconti Venosta had raised it with the Political Section. Bonomi stated that he was not very familiar with the matter but that he did not have much sympathy for Marchese Medici del Vascello. I said that the Commission had no interest in the matter and would be guided by his views. He stated that he would like to discuss the situation with Siroga and would advise me further.

I then had a long discussion with Bonomi, presenting in detail to him General O'Dwyer's program of August 16th recommending the appointment of a commission to bring forward as quickly as possible a concrete and detailed program of relief and rehabilitation, as set forth in para 3 of General O'Dwyer's letter of 16 August. Based on my discussions with General O'Dwyer of this morning, I stated that the Commission felt that emphasis on relief should be placed on food and clothing (to be supplied by the Allies if necessary), rather than on increasing monetary payments which would do little good to alleviate distress and would do a great deal of harm in speeding up inflation. Bonomi agreed unreservedly with this viewpoint. He said that he would proceed with this problem and hoped to have a commission appointed within the next two weeks. I advised that the commission should be composed of industrial, medical and relief experts rather than politicians, and he agreed. I stated that the preparation of such a comprehensive program might well be helpful in supporting his government's request for external aid such as Lend-Lease. I stated that the program could well be divided into two parts--that which is necessary to see the country through the winter,

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and a separate program directed toward long-term rehabilitation, but the emphasis should be on the first part of the program.

I asked his reaction to my personal views as to the most effective help which the Allies could give Italy after the ACC is dissolved, listing my preferences in the following order:

1. A group of say five U.S. and 5 U.K. experts in the industrial and financial fields to be made available by the U.S. and British Governments who would be hired by the Italian Government as advisors to the ten more important ministries. With such men on the payroll of the Italian Government, the government would not feel that they were being controlled or supervised by outsiders as is now the case. On the other hand, the presence of such experts in the Italian ministries would lend confidence to the Allies that any money or supplies furnished post-war would be effectively used. Thus we could hope to avoid our experience in Germany after the last war, and our experience in certain South American republics, where money supplied from the U.S. had not been employed in the best interest of either the local country or the U.S.

2. A joint economic mission of U.S. and U.K. personnel, similar to the North African Economic Joint Mission (NAJEM), which would look after imports and exports and the general economic needs of the country, similar to the agencies functioning in North Africa, Mideast, and French West Africa. Italian technicians should be included on the mission.

3. Either FEA or UNRRA. I stated that speaking purely unofficially, one could not be certain of continuity of operation in the case of FEA for political reasons in the U.S., and that as to UNRRA, I felt the reaction of the Italians would apt to be similar to that of the French--i.e., they would prefer not to receive relief in the form of charity.

Bonomi expressed himself as being in complete accord with my thinking which I stressed repeatedly as being purely personal and not official. I added that I had stated my preferences to General O'Dwyer this morning and informed Bonomi that he expected to see the President late this week. Bonomi asked if I could communicate to General O'Dwyer before he left the country that he was in complete accord with ~~the~~ ^{my} views and I promised to do so.

I asked Bonomi's reaction to the proposal that the Regional Commissioner and his staff be withdrawn from Sicily, leaving only a handful of specialists and liaison officers, and giving Colonel Spofford's arguments for and brigadier Lush's objections. He agreed emphatically with Colonel Spofford's point of view and said he would welcome it as an experiment.

W
MELBY W. STONE
Captain, USNR

Acting Chief Commissioner

SECRET

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 210COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
& CIVILIAN OFFICIALS

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
1)	CAPT. STONE	20 JAN.	GEN. MAC F.	COL. YOUNG - RECOMMENDED FOR T'FER TO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB.COM.
2) DP/P/3	GEN. MAC F.	23 JAN.	COL. PDSLEY	COL. PDSLEY - AM TRYING TO FIND PLACE FOR YOU.
3) DP/P/4	GEN. MAC F.	23 JAN.	COL. MARWELL	MAJ. MUCKLOW - COULD EMPLOY HIM HERE.
4)	AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR	25 JAN TO: 321	AIR MINISTRY	COM. DAGRE - LITTLE NEED FOR HIM HERE.
5) DP/G/28	GEN. MAC F.	25 JAN TO: 321	AFHQ	BRIGS. GUETERBOCK, HAMLYN & VENABLES NOW SURPLUS DUE TO REORG.
6) DP/G/11	GEN. MAC F.	26 JAN	HQ. A.C.M.F.	BRIG. LUSH & LT. COL. LELL - BOTH RECOMMENDED FOR LOCAL P'MOTION.
7) DP/P/15	GEN. MAC F.	28 JAN.	BRIG. DUCHESNE	COL. ROSSI - SERVICES NOT NEEDED.
8)	COL. MAXWELL	31 JAN.	GEN. MAC F.	MAJ. MUCKLOW - HAVE ASKED HE BE POSTED TO YOU
9) DP/P/30	GEN. MAC F.	31 JAN.	GEN. ALEXANDER	GEN. BROCKS BURROWS - COULD USE HIM HERE.
10) FARGO 682	BRIG. LUSH	3 FEB	FREEDOM	BRIG. HAMLYN - REQUEST HIS RECALL DUE TO ILL HEALTH.
11) FARGO	GEN. MAC F.	3 FEB	FREEDOM	COL. SPORFORD - CAN YOU USE HIM IN E.T.O.?
12) CGS 211	A.C.M.F.	4 FEB	GEN. MAC F.	GEN. BROCKS BURROWS - GEN. ALEXANDER WANTS HIM FOR GEN. MAC F.
13)	CAPT. STONE	4 FEB.	GEN. MAC F.	COL. ROSSI - FWDS. COM SUP. 10912 JOP RECOMMENDING COL. RUGGERI AS RE- PLACEMENT FOR ROSSI.
14)	A.C.M.F.	5 FEB	GEN. MAC F.	REPEATS No (12)
15) FARGO 764	GEN. MAC F.	5 FEB	TROOPERS	DALLISON - COULD USE HIM HERE.
16) CC/P/40	GEN. MAC F.	5 FEB	COL. MAXWELL	MAJ. MUCKLOW - THANK YOU FOR TAKING ACTION.
17) CC/G/52	GEN. MAC F.	13 FEB	MARSHAL MESSE	COL. RUGGERI - AM TAKING UP LATTER'S REPAT. WITH AFHQ
18) CC/G/53	GEN. MAC F.	13 FEB	AFHQ	COL. RUGGERI - PLEASE MAKE ARRANGIE- MENTS FOR HIS REPAT.
19) 8101/23/MS	GEN. ALEXANDER	13 FEB.	GEN. MAC F.	BRIG. LUSH - STATE REASONS FOR HIS LOCAL P'MOTION.
20)	" "	14 FEB.	" "	" " " " " " " "
21) CC/G/62	GEN. MAC F.	17 FEB.	A.C.M.F.	BRIG. LUSH - REASONS FOR HIS LOCAL P'MOTION.
22) CC/G/68	GEN. MAC F.	18 FEB.	BRIG. LUSH	COL. HUTTENBACH - RECOMMEND HIS T'FER TO E.T.O.
23)	GEN. MAC F.	18 FEB.	AFHQ	VARIOUS OFFICERS - PRVSLY. RECOMD. FOR T'FER, REQUEST THEY BE RE- TAINED & OTHER. OR SUBSTITUTED.
24) SB 928	DODD	9 FEB	SMITH, PWD, NAPLES	COMING TO NAPLES TO CONTACT GEN. MAC F w/ MRS. LYONS & MR. HOWARD
25) FARGO 930	GEN. MAC F.	13 FEB	ADM. McGRIGOR	COULD YOU & MAYNE MEET ME FOR SHORT TALK AT GROTTALIA AIRFIELD

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

