

ACC

10000/136/286

1136/286

ADMINISTRATION OF PIEDMONT & LOMBARDY  
SEPT. - NOV. 1944

1013/CC

## LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the  
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1013 ADMINISTRATION OF PIEDMONT &amp; LOMBARDY

UNTIL: 15 Nov 1944 FOR  
SUBSEQUENT MATERIAL, See 1007~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Ltr 805/3/CA Stone	1 Sep 44	CinC AAI	Admin of Piedmont & Lombardy. Pls advise on how they are to be administered to avoid disorder.
2	Ltr 16/1/G(Ops) AAI Gen Harding	6 Sep 44	ACC, A/CC	Principles for conduct of civil affairs in Piedmont & Lombardy
3	Ltr 805/12/CA Lush	9 Sep 44	G-5 AMHQ	Proposing scheme of infiltration of CA officers with fwd troops.
4	Ltr 805/14/CA Stone	11 Sep 44	AAI	Details of infiltration with fwd forces, & spearhead plans
5	Ltr MA/536 Alexander, Gen	11 Sep 44	Gen Wilson	Allied Occupation of Western Italy: proposed principles etc
6	Ltr 16/1/G(Ops) AAI CinC	16 Sep 44	ACC	Provision of transport, ACC -for carrying out infiltration plans.
7	Ltr 805/19/CA Stone	17 Sep 44	AMHQ	Informing AMHQ; request for concrete directives to AMG officers
8	Ltr G-5 014.14-10	19 Sep 44	A/CC ACC	Procedure contemplated (directive is enclosed. INCL.
9	Ltr 805/28/CA Lush	23 Sep 44	Reg Commissioners	Officer not to be sent with each SCE team, as contemplated. 2 INCLS
10	Ltr 805/29/CA Stone	29 Sep 44	AAI	Further contemplated directives for infiltrating officers
11	Ltr MAIA T.S./G/12	4 Oct 44	AAI	Future disposition of Ital Army upon liberation of NW Italy
12	Ltr 503/46/COS MSL	13 Oct 44	A/CC	Administration - NW Italy. Further details after mtg with Robertson
13	Ltr Stone 503/67/ COS	13 Nov 44	AAI	Final draft plan for AMG in NW Italy forwarded. INCL: AMG in NW Italy-503/66/COS.

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON THIS SUBJECT, SEE CC 1007

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By *AS*Date *8/22/72*

J. Miller

A Office copy

TOP SECRETRef: 503/67/CAS15th November 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria.

TO : Advance Headquarters  
Allied Armies in Italy. (2)

1. I refer to your letter 16/1/0(Cps) dated 6th September 1944, and I forward for your approval the final draft of a plan drawn up for Allied Military Government in North-West Italy. This plan was drawn up before I knew of the Operation "CINDERS." If you approve, it will now serve as the alternative plan which Allied Force Headquarters have ordered to be drawn up, in paragraph 3 of their letter No. 81534 of 30th October.

2. The planning for Operation "CINDERS" has been delegated by you to the Commanding General, 2 Independent Paratroop Brigade Group, and I am making arrangements with him that a suitable Allied Military Government plan is included in his plan for that operation.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Allied Force Headquarters.

HENRY W. STONE  
Commodore, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

ENCL.

Copy to: Allied Force Headquarters  
D.C.C.A.G.  
Commanding General, 2 Independent  
Paratroop Brigade Group  
and Fifth Army

1461

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) (1) (i)  
JCS Jan. 7, 1974  
By A. B. NARS, Date 8/22/77  
J. Miller

(13)

D R A P ETOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner

AWO 394  
+++++

Ref: 503/66/309

9th November 1944

**SUBJECT:** Allied Military Government in N.W. Italy.

**TO :** Allied Force Headquarters.

1. TACTICAL APPRECIATION, AAI.

The tactical appreciation as viewed by AAI is that one of two situations will probably develop:-

Case "A": The Allies succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western Italy and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B": The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western Italy.

In Case "A" considerable forces will be needed to clear up Western Italy; in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum forces commensurate with the task will be diverted to the West.

2. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PLAN, AAI.

Military occupation of EMILIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA and the setting up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum armed forces will be left to support the Government. A static Headquarters will

be installed & immediately organised resistance has ceased so that the field



and will have to be mopped up.

Case "F": The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western Italy.

In Case "A" considerable forces will be needed to clear up Western Italy; in Case "F" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum forces commensurate with the task will be diverted to the West.

## 2. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PLAN, AAI.

Military occupation of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA and the setting up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum armed forces will be left to support the Government. A static Headquarters will be installed immediately organized resistance has ceased so that the formation headquarters and troops engaged in quelling it can be released for further operations. All fighting units and formations will be replaced as quickly as possible by garrison troops under the static Headquarters. A British administrative district will be set up to command and administer the garrison of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA as soon as they have been cleared of hostile troops. The Commander will be allotted sufficient L of O and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of AIG until such time as it is decided that the Provinces concerned should be handed over to A.C. or the Italian Government. Commanding General, 5th Army, will remain in control of such zones of communications as he may require for the support of

5 Army.

INCU

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and will have to be mopped up.

Case "M": The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western Italy.

In Case "A" considerable forces will be needed to clear up Western Italy; in Case "M" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum forces commensurate with the task will be diverted to the West.

## 2. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PLAN, A.I.

Military occupation of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA and the setting up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum armed forces will be left to support the Government. A static Headquarters will be installed immediately organized resistance has ceased so that the field formation headquarters and troops engaged in quelling it can be released for further operations. All fighting units and formations will be replaced as quickly as possible by garrison troops under the static Headquarters. A British administrative district will be set up to command and administer the garrison of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA as soon as they have been cleared of hostile troops. The Commander will be allotted sufficient L of C and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of ASG until such time as it is decided that the Provinces concerned should be handed over to A.C. or the Italian Government. Commanding General, USMCUSA, will remain in control of such zone of communications as he may require for the support of

5 Army.

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### 3. CO-RELATION BETWEEN A.M.C. AND BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION.

Civil Affairs Section, AAI will arrange for the immediate coordination of planning between SCAO 5 Army ABZ, Regional Commissioners LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA, and G.O.C., British Administrative District and its subordinate military administrative formations.

### 4. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLAN, A.O.

Allied Military Government in N.S. Italy will be under the orders of the general officer commanding the Fifth Army during the time that he is in command of that area. He has authority to call forward for duty in their respective regions, the Regional Commissioners of Liguria, Piemonte and Lombardy, with their officers and other ranks. Such Regional Commissioners will be under the Fifth Army Commander as long as they are serving within the limits of the Fifth Army. He may attach such Regional Commissioners to task force commanders serving under his orders. As soon as the general officer commanding the Fifth Army is no longer responsible for N.S. Italy, the Regional Commissioner will come directly under A.O.

### 5. POLITICAL.

As regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the Government of Signor Boncadi which includes representatives of the six principal parties in the State who have pledged themselves to maintain unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. The Allies are supporting this Government because (a) it has formally accepted and is bound by the terms of the Armistice (b) it is the only government which can hope to

1059



the Fifth Army Commander as long as they are serving within the limits of the Fifth Army. He may attach such Regional Commissioners to task force commanders serving under his orders. As soon as the general officer commanding the Fifth Army is no longer responsible for N. Italy, the Regional Commissioner will come directly under A.C.

5. POLITICAL.

As regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the government of Signor Bonad which included representatives of the six principal parties in the State who have pledged themselves to maintain unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. The Allies are supporting this Government because (a) it has formally accepted and is bound by the terms of the Armistice (b) it is the only government which can hope to command the general acceptance of the Italian people as a whole (c) it is pursuing a policy of maximum Italian participation in the war effort (d) in internal affairs it is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods and influences. The Government is also pledged to postponement of the question of the institutional problem of Italy until such time as the whole Italian people are in a position freely to express their opinion. The National Committee of Liberation and its local branches have accepted the authority of the Bonad Government.

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- 3 -

It should be pointed out to the various political elements in Western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the full with the Allied Military Government officials, who will seek to restore civil administration and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political action which would hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government of Signor Bonomi. This will not prevent free expression of political opinion to the extent which considerations of security allow.

Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged.

Italian Government should be encouraged.

4:RS

(13) NW



SECRET.a/cc 615  
14/10/44HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394Office of the Chief of Staff  
\*\*\*\*\*Ref: 50346/COS.13 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration - N.W. Italy.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

1. CAO AAI (Maj.Gen.Robertson) held a meeting yesterday at AAI HQ at which his senior officers, SCAO and G-4 5 Army, RC's NW Italy, DCOS and myself were present.
2. The CAO explained the tactical appreciation for the occupation of NW Italy which he explained would be carried out by 5 Army troops who would probably find resistance limited to a few Italian divisions already decimated by the partisans and a small nucleus of German troops.
3. He stated that as soon as occupation was completed, by agreement with CG 5 Army and the C-in-C, a British static HQ (No.2 District) would be set up with several subordinate military HQs (Areas and Sub-Areas). The HQ of the District had not yet been determined but would probably be ALESSANDRIA.
4. He explained that in this area in his opinion the duty of the military District was to assist AMG in the administration of NW Italy. The military interests were so small that in this area the roles would be reversed and military interests would probably be subordinate to AMG.
5. After the withdrawal of 5 Army occupational troops the garrison troops of the area would probably be British and Italian. Minimum forces of British troops would be two battalions and one armoured car regiment; the maximum, two tired British divisions with an undetermined number of Italian troops.
6. He laid stress on the difficulties of communications, particularly at the outset before the opening of the port of GENOA and emphasised the fact that it would be impossible to carry much food into the area before that port was open. At this point General Tait, G-4 5 Army, asked it to be made perfectly clear that 5 Army could NOT provide transport for the haulage of food for civilians.
7. General Robertson stated that he intended to give great weight to the distribution of local resources in the area. A Local Resources Board (Forward) would be set up on which ACC would have the strongest representation. He hoped

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12  
15 Oct

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to set up an Industrial Coordination Committee, loaded on the ACC with an ACC Chairman whose proposals would carry sufficient weight to be acceptable to the main Board. CAO stated that Major-General Nares, Commanding General designate of the District would set up his Forward HQ near FLORENCE and agreed that it was most desirable that Regional Commissioners should be located near him. DCCAO AAI is trying to arrange this.

8. I gave an appreciation of the entry of AMG into this area. Subject to agreement by Commanding General, 5 Army the Regional Commissioners would accompany the task forces with their Provincial teams under the general direction of 5 Army AMG. General Nares proposed and I agreed that it would be necessary for him to have a small AMG liaison staff at his District HQ if it was not located near one of the Regional HQs.

9. General Robertson explained shortly that the role of HQ No.2 District would be as follows:-

- (a) To command the Allied and Italian troops placed in the District for the preservation of order.
- (b) To assist ACC and the Italian Government in the preservation of order, prevention of sabotage, etc.
- (c) To coordinate the utilization by the armed forces of local resources.
- (d) Local administration of all British troops in the District.
- (e) Organization of the overland L of C to FRANCE.

MSL/JG.



Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: VPs. Pol Sec  
DCOS, CA Sec  
DCOS, Econ Sec  
DCOS, Est Sec  
DCCAO, AAI

1058

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TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Allied Occupation of Northern ITALYMilitary Mission Italian Army  
ROMET.S./G/12  
4 October 44

HQ AAI

1. GENERAL

(2) I have been shown by ACC the C-in-C's letter, MA/536 dated 11 Sep and your 16/1/G(Ops) dated 6 Sep on the above subject, which is intimately bound up with the future disposition of the Italian Army when Northern Italy is occupied.

\* \* \*

For copy, see file 503/CCS folio 44

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(11)

4 Oct

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner  
APO 394

Ref: 805/29/CA.

29th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE & LOBARDY.

TO : AAI Adv HQ.  
Attn: C.G.S.

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1. I refer to my letter 805/14/CA of 11th September and C-in-C's letter MA/536 of 11th September addressed to S.A.C., A.P.H.C., copy to me.
2. After further consideration I would like to amend para 6 of my letter to read as follows:-

"In consultation with B.G.S(Ops) plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of trying to persuade the local committees and bands to preserve law and order pending the arrival of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied Military Government. The officers have, however, been specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of Liberation at MILAN whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate three officers from P.F.B. who, with the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist those officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."

321-1

Hq ACC Secy Gen.  
DISPATCHED  
Date-Time 30 SEP 1944  
via *[signature]*  
Initials *[initials]*

ELLERY W. STONE  
Captain, USHR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

1454

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ  
British Resident Minister, AFHQ  
US Political Adviser, AFHQ.  
British High Commissioner to Allied Advisory Council.  
Political Section.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)  
By *[signature]* Jan. 4, 1977  
By *[signature]* NARS, Date 8/22/77  
J. Miller

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REC -  
RC x MG Sec.

(A) B

TOP SECRET.

AFPO 394  
855  
1630 25/9  
By *RM*

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 805/28/CA.

23rd September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY (Vacuum Period).

TO : Regional Commissioner,  
LIGURIA REGION.  
PIEMONTE REGION.  
Region XI.

1. It has been decided to drop the proposal of sending an AMG officer with each SOE team into German occupied Italy. For your information four officers were selected and sent to MONOPOLI but they will be withdrawn in the next few days and reposted to the Regions concerned for normal duty. The reason for this change of policy is that it was considered most important that ACC should not be in any way concerned with whatever local government might be set up during the period before the arrival of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military Government.

- 2. There are attached for your information:
  - (a) Copy of instructions to SOE officers in the field.
  - (b) Copy of instructions to FWB representatives.

*see* 

*M*


*M. S. Lusk*

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner

GWIS/JG.

321-1

Copy to: HQ. AAI Adv (G(Ops)).  
G-5 Sec, AFHQ.  
Acting Chief Commissioner.  
R.C., Region IX.  
R.C., Region XII.  
Patriots Branch.



FILES  X

23 Sep

TOP SECRET.

Subject: Administration of PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY.

No.....A...

No.1 Special Force,  
C. M. E.

S.O.E. Officers in the Field.

22. September, 1944.

1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your headquarters before putting them into operation.
2. Allied military Government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military Government officers and you should so inform the local committees of liberation and patriot bands.
3. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty should be so far as possible to protect public utilities and electric power installations from destruction. Their third duty, in common with that of all Italians, should be to preserve law and order until Allied military Government is established.
4. You should make it clear to the committees and bands that the length of time which Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied forces. It is the duty of all Italians to maintain the maximum amount of order. The success of the committees and bands in carrying out General Alexander's operational orders, in guarding utilities from destruction and in preserving law and order will not, however, entitle the committees and bands as such to their recognition as a local or governmental authority on the part of the Allied military authorities when they arrive, and you should scrupulously avoid making any statements to the committees or bands which might be construed as commitments of this kind. This warning applies not only to the smaller bands and committees, but also to the Committee of National Liberation in Milan whose representative character is still purely conjectural even though it has been encouraged to some extent by the Italian Government regard itself as their agent.
5. Your Sitreps should in future include

652







TOP SECRET.

TO : FWE Regts (LIGURIA, PEMONTE & LOMBARDY).

1. You will work under the instructions of the Commanding Officer, No.1 Special Force mission.
2. You will assist No.1 Special Force mission, particularly in that aspect of their work which is related to Psychological Warfare activities.
3. The Psychological Warfare activities which it will be your duty to organise to as great an extent as you are able, include:-
  - (a) The monitoring and dissemination of news in English where required, for example for E.L.Os.
  - (b) The monitoring and dissemination of news in Italian so that the local patriots and Committee of Liberation have accurate and up to date information, thus discrediting rumours.
  - (c) The collection of intelligence for transmission to base which will be of assistance in providing our material for propaganda output and also for providing guidance for the lines which our output should take.
  - (d) The surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable.
4. You will make any preliminary<sup>in</sup> preparations which seem necessary to you for the setting up of a P.W.B. outpost when P.W.B. officers reach your area.

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23rd September, 1944.

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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
AFU 312

DSJ/mlc

G-5: CIA.14-10

19 September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of FIDBONNE & LOHARDY

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner, HQ ACC, AFU 354.

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"Cura"

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1. Reference is made to your letter of 805/14/CA of 7 September to Advanced Headquarters AAI and to letter of the same date, reference 805/12/CA from Executive Commissioner to this Section. Contents of these letters and their enclosures have been fully considered by the Political Council.

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2. As a result certain amendments of the procedure contemplated and suggested and this Section is directed to send you the enclosed extract from the British Resident Minister's memorandum dealing with the matter.

22

3. Your letter of September 17 under reference 809/15/CA, delivered by hand of Brigadier Lush yesterday, also refers.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

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*DSJ*

D. S. JACKING  
Lieut. Colonel

321-1

Incl. as above.

*Exec. Com. has the original of this ltr and incl.*

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FILES (A) B

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*[Handwritten mark]*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)  
By *JGS* *TM* 1/17/74  
Date 2/22/77  
*J. Miller*

19 4/2

27

EXTRACT FROM RAS. LIN'S MEMORANDUM TO C-5 (9/150/0) OF 16 SEPT. 1944

5. We suggest:-

(a) That Captain Stone should be asked to write a further letter to the C.G.S. amending Paragraph 8 of his letter of September 9th so as to read as follows:-

"In consultation with R.C.S.(Ops) plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in these areas with the patriot forces with the object of trying to persuade the local committees and bands to preserve law and order pending the arrival of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied Military Government. The officers have however been specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of Liberation at Milan, whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate three officers from T.F.B. who, with the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist these officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."

(b) That the directive to S.O.L. and C.S.S. officers in the field should be amended to read as follows:-

"1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your headquarters before putting them into operation.

2. Allied military government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government.

it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate three officers from P. B. who, with the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist these officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."

(b) That the directive to S.O.M. and O.S.S. officers in the field should be amended to read as follows:-

"1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should commandeer any such withdrawal to your headquarters before putting them into operation.

2. Allied military government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government officers and you should inform the local committees of liberation and patriot bands.

3. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their security should be so far as possible to protect public utilities and electric power installations from destruction. Their third duty, in common with that of all Italians, should be to preserve law and order until Allied government is established.

4. You should make it clear to the committees and bands that the length of time which Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied forces. It is therefore to the advantage of all Italians to maintain the maximum amount of order. The success of the committees and bands in carrying out General Alexander's operational orders, in guarding utilities from destruction and in preserving law and order will not however entitle the committees and bands as such to their recognition as a local or governmental authority on the part of the Allied military authorities when they arrive, and you should scrupulously avoid making any statements to the committees or bands which might be construed as commitments of this kind. This warning applies not only to the smaller bands and committees, but also to the Committee of National Liberation in Milan whose representative character is still purely conjectural, even though it has been en-

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- couraged to some extent by the Italian Government to regard it-  
self as their agent.
5. Your Sicreps should in future include information on the political, administrative and economic situation as well as reports on public opinion.
6. Three officers from I. L. are being sent to the chief centres to work under the authority of S.S.S. and C.S.S. officers to assist and advise them on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence to help them in providing material for propaganda output and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as the Allied forces arrive.
- (c) That there should be no directive to A.C.S. representatives (since it is not proposed that there should be any A.C.S. representatives in the area in question before Allied forces arrive), and
- (d) That the directive to the three P. B. representatives should be amended to read as follows:-
1. You will work under the instructions of the Commanding Officer Number One Special Force mission.
  2. You will assist Number One Special Force mission, particularly in that aspect of their work which is related to psychological warfare activities.
  3. The Psychological Warfare activities which it will be your duty to organise to as great an extent as you are able include:
    - (a) The monitoring and dissemination of news in English where required, for example for R.I.Gs.
    - (b) The monitoring and dissemination of news in Italian so that the local committee and Committee of Liberation have accurate up to date information, thus discrediting rumours.
    - (c) The collection of intelligence for transmission to base which will be of assistance in providing our material for propaganda output and also for providing guidance for the lines.

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- (d) That the directive to the three I.F.B. representatives should be amended to read as follows:-
- 6171
1. You will work under the instructions of the Commanding Officer Number One Special Force mission,
  2. You will assist Number One Special Force mission, particularly in that aspect of their work which is related to Psychological Warfare activities.
  3. The Psychological Warfare activities which it will be your duty to organize to as great an extent as you are able include:
    - (a) The monitoring and dissemination of news in English where required, for example for R.I.Ce.
    - (b) The monitoring and dissemination of news in Italian so that the local patriots and Committee of Liberation have accurate up to date information, thus discrediting rumours.
    - (c) The collection of intelligence for transmission to base <sup>1018</sup> which will be of assistance in providing our material for propaganda output and also for providing guidance for the lines which our output should take.
    - (d) The surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable.
  4. You will make any preliminary preparations which seem necessary to you for the setting up of a I.F.B. outpost when F.I.B. officers reach your area."

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

Ref: 805/19/CA

17 September 44.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEDMONT & LOMBARDY.

TO: AFHQ

(5)

I refer to the Commander-in-Chief's letter of September 11th. (MA 536)

(4)

1. The general plan for establishment of Allied Military Government was outlined in my 805/14/CA of September 11th. In case B of the Commander-in-Chief's letter (para. 1) I should assume that A.M.G. 5th Army would be occupied elsewhere and I should employ the Regional Staffs to set up the initial stages of A.M.G.; they would then enter the areas with the light mobile columns and would come under the command of the task force commander.

2. Para 8 of my letter of September 11th defines the action proposed in any vacuum period which may elapse between withdrawal of enemy forces and occupation by Allied troops. A copy of the proposed directive to Allied officers now or then in those areas was attached to my 800/12/CA of September 9th.  
*Comm 805*

(3)

3. In the absence of any other instructions from you I would suggest that the attitude of A.M.G. officers to the various political parties or organizations in Western Italy (vide 7c of the Commander-in-Chief's letter) should be that followed in the past and in operations now, namely immediate contact with and use of Italian local government's administrative machine, taking the advice of the National Committee of Liberation in the appointment of temporary (Italian) officials wherever these committees are found to be satisfactory. Care will be taken, as is now done, to prevent these committees setting themselves up as alternative government and every effort will be made to preserve the structure and machinery of Italian local government.

321-1

*COPY*

ELLEHY W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: A.A.I.  
Political Section  
Captain Stone  
CA Branch (thru RC & MG Section)

*Turin Coms*  
*Milan*

SG 2410  
10:07  
DISPATCHED  
Hq ACC, Secy Gen  
18 Sep 1930

(7)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
JCS Jan 1974  
By A.G. NARS, Date 8/22/77  
J. Miller

1105 (A) 3

17 Sept

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETSUBJECT:- Provision of Transport - A.C.C.Adv Headquarters,  
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/G(Ope)

16 Sept 44

Allied Control Commission

1. In reply to your letter No. 805/14/CA of 11 Sept 44, the plans put forward by you are approved in principle.

2. With regard to the need of a large number of vehicles for the transport of food mentioned in para 6, it is pointed out that provision for supply of vehicles is made by the War Office and War Department, on the basis of troop entitlement and does not admit of large scale issues to A.C.C. You should therefore pursue this question direct with A.F.H.Q.

3. In connection with the transport of food, requests for help to this or either Army H.Qs should whenever possible be made in terms of tonnage to be lifted from A to B, and not in terms of G.T. or Truck Coys etc.

4. Requests for assistance over the transport of extra personnel mentioned in para 7 of your letter should be made to the H.Q. of the Army responsible for the military occupation of the area concerned.

/s/ ? ?

General,  
Commander in Chief

RE

Copy to: A.F.H.Q. with request that the questions raised in para 2 be taken up with the War Office and War Department as a matter of urgency. Lack of adequate transport for the distribution of food will almost certainly

46

- 3. In connection with the transport of food, requests for help to this or either Army H.Q.s should whenever possible be made in terms of tonnage to be lifted from A to B, and not in terms of G.T. or Truck Coys etc.
- 4. Requests for assistance over the transport of extra personnel mentioned in para 7 of your letter should be made to the H.Q. of the Army responsible for the military occupation of the area concerned.

/s/ ? ?

General,  
Commander in Chief

PH

Copy to: A.F.H.C. with request that the questions raised in para 2 be taken up with the War Office and War Department as a matter of urgency. Lack of adequate transport for the distribution of food will almost certainly increase the risk of disorders, and hence has a direct bearing on the military commitment, which it is essential to keep down to a minimum.

CAO  
G(SD)Main 441.

6

16 Sept

416



COPYTOP SECRET.MA/526

Advanced Headquarters,  
Allied Armies in Italy.

11th September 1944.

Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief,  
Allied Force Headquarters.

Allied Occupation of Western ITALY.

1. I appreciate that when it becomes clear to the enemy that he cannot hope any longer to hold the APPENINE position against the attacks of the Eighth and Fifth Armies, he will endeavour to withdraw his forces including those in Western ITALY to the line of the ALPS, the MINCIO and the PO. I hope to prevent this withdrawal by a rapid advance over the PO. In any case one of two situations seems likely to develop, viz:-

Case "A"

We succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal, in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western ITALY and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B"

The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western ITALY before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat, and only weak German forces, and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western ITALY.

In case "A" I should be compelled to divert considerable forces to clear up Western ITALY, whereas in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case it is essential to divert the minimum forces commensurate with the task from the much more important role of continuing the advance with the least possible delay and in the greatest possible strength into AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

2. Conflict between Partisans and Fascists, internal political factors, and economic dislocation consequent upon a German withdrawal will constitute, in my opinion, a fertile seed bed for serious disorder in Western ITALY. As the military commitment can only be kept to the minimum by preventing disorders or nippling them in the bud, I have come to the conclusion that whatever the circumstances, military occupation of PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY and the setting up of Allied Military Government, at any rate in the first instance, will be necessary. At the same time I consider it most important that only the minimum armed forces should be



We succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal, in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western ITALY and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B"

The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western ITALY before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat, and only weak German forces, and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western ITALY.

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2. Conflict between Partisans and Fascists, internal political factors, and economic dislocation consequent upon a German withdrawal will constitute, in my opinion, a fertile seed bed for serious disorder in Western ITALY. As the military commitment can only be kept to the minimum by preventing disorders or nipping them in the bud, I have come to the conclusion that whatever the circumstances, military occupation of PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY and the setting up of Allied Military Government, at any rate in the first instance, will be necessary. At the same time I consider it most important that only the minimum armed forces should be left to support that government. How long it will be necessary to continue this military occupation cannot be foreseen, but it might well be prolonged. For this reason it is, I am sure, desirable to install a static headquarters immediately organized resistance has ceased so that the field formation H.Q.s and troops which had been engaged in quelling it, could be released to continue the battle, all fighting units and formations being replaced as quickly as possible by garrison troops under the static H.Q.

3. Consideration of these problems bring to light the need for an early decision for planning purposes as to the system of military administration eventually to be set up in Western ITALY; whether it should be British, American or inter-Allied, what form it should take, and how it should be controlled.

4. The country between LAKE GARDA and the Swiss Frontier is unsuitable for active operations, and the troops employed there would be the minimum required for blocking and reconnaissance purposes. The area west of the FIACENZA - MILAN - COMO road would therefore be of no interest to Fifth Army from an operational point of view, except for the route from GEMO to supply points in the army area. Responsibility for such a large non-operational area would in fact be an encumbrance to an Army H.Q. in the field.

5. Responsibility for....  
DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 315 and 510 of (E)

By *[Signature]* MARS, Date *8/19/72*

*J. Miller*

32

5

11 Sep

- 2 -

5. Responsibility for opening and working the port of GENOVA will, I understand, be accepted by CG, NATOUSA, but I imagine that he is hardly likely to wish to extend his responsibilities for territorial administration beyond the actual port and the road and rail routes from it to Fifth Army areas. The only alternative therefore appears to be to set up a British Administrative District to take over the responsibility for Western ITALY as soon as it has been cleared of hostile forces, and to allot to the commander sufficient L of C and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of A.M.G., until such time as it is decided that the provinces concerned should be handed over to A.C.C. or the Italian Government.
6. There is one other matter which is connected with the question of the military government and military administration of Western ITALY on which it seems to me that a decision of policy is required now if serious disorders are to be avoided. It is the question of the attitude to be adopted by officers of the Allied Military Government to the various Italian political parties in Western ITALY. According to my information there are three main parties, viz:- The Army Patriots (Monarchists), the Action Party (Republicans) and the Communists who are numerically the strongest and almost certainly the best organised. There is also the Committee of National Liberation to whom many thousands of armed patriots owe allegiance in greater or lesser degree. Naturally I have no wish to intervene in any way in local politics, but I am very much interested in their effect on the possibilities of disorders which, as I have already pointed out directly affect the military commitment. For that reason I consider that firm and clear instructions on this subject are required to make sure that disorders do not break out by reason of uncertainty on the part of the Italian people as to the attitude of the Allied Governments to their various political functions.
7. To summarise, I should be grateful for the earliest possible instructions and information on the following points:-
- (a) Your acceptance of my proposal that a static H.Q. should be set up to command and administer a garrison in FIEDMONTE and IOMBARDY as soon as possible after occupation.
  - (b) Confirmation that, if my proposal under (a) above is accepted, the static H.Q. should take the form of a British District H.Q., CG, SOS NATOUSA remaining in control of such zone of communications, as he may require for the support of Fifth Army.
  - (c) What should be my attitude and that of my A.M.G. officers to the various political parties and organisations in Western ITALY.

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7. To summarise, I should be grateful for the earliest possible instructions and information on the following points:-

- (a) Your acceptance of my proposal that a static H.Q. should be set up to command and administer a garrison in PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY as soon as possible after occupation. **✓✓✓**
- (b) Confirmation that, if my proposal under (a) above is accepted, the static H.Q. should take the form of a British District H.Q., CG, SOS NATOUSA remaining in control of such zone of communications, as he may require for the support of Fifth Army.

(c) What should be my attitude and that of my A.H.G. officers to the various political parties and organisations in Western ITALY.

(sgd) H. R. ALEXANDER.  
General,  
Commander-in-Chief.

Copy to: C.G., Fifth Army.  
Chief Commissioner, A.C.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.5  
Date: 4.19.77  
By: J.F.S. N.R.S. Date: 8.12.77  
Jim Miller

(5)

144

COPY

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner  
APO 324

Ref: 305/14/CA11th September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY.

TO : Advance Headquarters,  
Allied Armies in Italy.  
Attn: C.G.S.

1. I have to acknowledge your 16/1/G(Ops) dated 6. Sept. 44 and note the principles laid down for the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY.
2. Plans will be made to meet, so far as is possible, the varying conditions which may be found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the number of troops to be employed must be closely related, in inverse proportion, to the amount of food for the civil population which can be made available in these areas.
3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of Allied Military Government in the same manner as has been done throughout this campaign. That is to say, civil affairs officers will accompany the occupying troops and set up the preliminary stages of government. These civil affairs officers would normally be drawn from AMG 5 Army if the occupying troops are to be found from that Army. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and light mobile columns only are used, it will be appreciated that the AMG staff of 5 Army will also be fully occupied with the Army and that only a small number of advanced civil affairs officers will be available from that source. I should be grateful, therefore, for the earliest information possible as to the composition of the occupying force to be employed and the sources from which it will be drawn.
4. Following up the spearhead forces, three Regional organizations are in process of formation. These will be employed in place of 5 Army AMG if those officers are not available.
5. These organizations or AMG task forces will be directed towards GENOVA the center of LIGURIA, TURIN the center of PIEDMONT, and MILAN the center of LOMBARDY. Their total strength will amount to approximately 250 officers.
6. Steps have already been taken to furnish the minimum amount of food required for the urgent operations but so far as is known at present no transport will be available to move this food into the areas. For this purpose it will be



necessary for the AMG task forces to be provided with:-

120	3-ton trucks for	LIIGURIA
360	" " "	PIEDMONT
360	" " "	LOMBARDY

This fact has already been brought to the notice of G-5 AFHQ with the suggestion that in the event of the employment of mobile columns entering the country in the face of weak and comparatively docile enemy forces, certain units with their transport should be allotted to the task of carrying food for civilian needs.

7. The mobility of the AMG task forces is by no means assured. Requests for extra personnel vehicles have not yet been met and I have been advised that in the event of rapid occupation, I should request your Headquarters to provide personnel vehicles.

8. In consultation with BGS(Ops), plans have been made to send directions to Allied Officers now operating in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of ensuring that during any period which may elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied forces, law and order should be preserved by the National Committee of Liberation. In accordance with these plans it is proposed to infiltrate into the area three officers from ACC and three officers from PWB who, under the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise both these officers and the National Committee of Liberation, during any such period. It is not intended to set up Allied Military Government through the means of these officers who will have no executive powers. Allied Military Government will not be set up until the arrival of Allied troops with their accompanying civil affairs officers.

9. I trust these plans have your approval in principle. A copy of this letter is being sent to AFHQ.

313 175  
 HQ ACC  
 DISPATCH  
 Date: 12 Sept 1945  
 via  
 initials WRR

4012

ELMER W. STONE  
 Captain, USMR  
 Acting Chief Commissioner

Copies to: G-5 AFHQ  
 British Resident Minister, AFHQ  
 US Political Adviser, AFHQ  
 British High Commissioner to Allied Advisory Council  
 Political Section  
 RC & MG Sec

(4)



TOP SECRETHEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
AFC 394

C O P Y

Regional Control and Military Government Section  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 805/12/CA

9 September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEDMONTE &amp; LOMBARDY.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ  
Attn: Colonel Charles Spofford

My dear Spofford:

As we come under you tomorrow I am sending you copies of the Acting Chief Commissioner's reply to the CCS outlining his plans for the setting up of Allied Military Government in N.W. Italy, including his plans for the period of vacuum which may take place before Allied Military Government can be established.

2. In this connection we have had various meetings with General Alexander's EGS(Ops), the Political Section, S.C.E. and P.W.B. With the approval of the CCS it is proposed to act in accordance with Para. 8 of Captain Stone's letter to the CCS, that is to say, three ACC officers will be infiltrated into the chief centres of the territory in an advisory role and NOT repeat NOT as executive AMG officers. I enclose a directive which it is proposed to send to S.C.E. and C.S.S. officers in the field and a directive for the ACC and PWB officers which it is proposed to infiltrate.
3. As Mr. MacMillan and Mr. Kirk were brought into the initial discussions on this matter I am sending a copy by hand to Mr. MacMillan and am seeing that a copy is sent to Mr. Kirk. You may care to discuss with them.
4. If there are any objections to the plan as outlined from any source, would you kindly let me know immediately because it is essential that we should set the plans in operation without delay.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Maurice Lusk

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JC

cc. Brit Res Minister AFHQ  
US Pol Adviser AFHQ  
Brit High Comm on Adv Council  
Political Section  
A/CC

9 Sept

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY.

A 200  
6 SEP 1944

Adv Headquarters,  
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/G(Ops)

Acting Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Control Commission.  
-----

6 Sep 44

1. In reply to your 805/3/CA of 1 Sep 44 the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problems raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
  - (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
  - (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
  - (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.
2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

321

16.40

321-1

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
  - (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
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  - (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.
2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once. *4-10*
  3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.
  4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

*copies to:*  
*RC & M G Sec*  
*Admin Sec*  
*P & L Sec*  
*Comm Sec*  
*Mr Charles*  
 Copy to:- A.F.H.Q. and *return*

/s/ A. F. Harding  
 /t/ A. F. HARDING  
 Lieutenant-General  
 Chief of General Staff.

AFH/bps

Copy to:- A.F.H.Q.

(COPY)

*See 13*  
 FILES (A) B  
*for*

*2*  
*6 copies*

TOP SECRET.

Ref: 805/3/CA.

1st September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of FIDUCIARY AND LOGISTICS.

TO : Commander-in-Chief,  
Headquarters,  
Allied Forces in Italy,  
C. M. P.

1. In forwarding the attached record of a meeting held yesterday at which your BCS(Ops) was present, I feel it my duty to present to you the important political and administrative issues which will be at stake in FIDUCIARY and LOGISTICS in whatever manner they are liberated. It is not improbable that the outcome of events in this area may affect the political future of Italy for a considerable period.
2. I have consulted Mr. Ambassador Kirk and Sir Noel Charles who are in full agreement with me as to the importance of this matter and who are greatly concerned at the possibility that no Allied Forces may be available to preserve order. I would add my own recommendation that without the presence of Allied Forces it would be most impracticable to attempt to establish Allied Military Government in this area. If no such attempt can be made, it will be realised that grave risks of disorder will arise.
3. I should be grateful, not only from the point of view of the Allied Control Commission but also on behalf of Mr. Ambassador Kirk and Sir Noel Charles, for an opportunity to ascertain your views.

321-  
X-000

ELDERY V. STONE 16-19  
42-01

1. In forwarding the attached record of a meeting held yesterday at which your BGS(Ops) was present, I feel it my duty to present to you the important political and administrative issues which will be at stake in FIDELITY and LONGBAY in whatever manner they are liberated. It is not improbable that the outcome of events in this area may affect the political future of Italy for a considerable period.
2. I have consulted Mr. Ambassador Kirk and Sir Noel Charles who are in full agreement with me as to the importance of this matter and who are greatly concerned at the possibility that no Allied Forces may be available to preserve order. I would add my own recommendation that without the presence of Allied Forces it would be most impracticable to attempt to establish Allied Military Government in this area. If no such attempt can be made, it will be realized that grave risks of disorder will arise.
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MILBURN W. STONES <sup>16-11-49</sup>  
 Captain, USAR  
 Acting Chief Commissioner

321-1  
 X-000.1-2

SA 434  
 No. 500 500  
 DISPATCHED  
 1 Sept  
 Head Office  
 1949

FILES (A-B)  
*[Signature]*

21

1 Sept



COPY

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

1st September, 1944.

RECORD OF MEETING HELD AT ACC HQ ON  
31st AUGUST 1944.

Present: Brigadier M. S. Lush - Executive Commissioner, HQ ACC  
Brigadier H.S.K. Mainwaring - MIS (Ops), Hq AAI.  
Mr. Harold Caccia - Political Section, HQ ACC  
Colonel C. T. McCarthy - Patriots Branch, Hq ACC  
Colonel A. N. Hancock - R.C. Designate, Region XI.  
Comd. Holdsworth -  
Lt. Colonel C. C. Feasey - A.C. Designate, Region I.  
Mr. Rayner - P.W.B.

1. The meeting was held in order to discuss:
  - (a) the measures to be taken with regard to civil affairs in PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY in the event of a German withdrawal from those areas without simultaneous entry of Allied troops;
  - (b) the form of administration to be set up (AMG or Italian Government under ACC):-
    - (i) in the preliminary stages;
    - (ii) in the final stages.
2. It appeared possible that:-
  - (a) The German and Italian forces would be withdrawn from the area before it would be physically possible for Allied troops to enter;
  - (b) the German forces would be withdrawn leaving behind the Italian divisions.
3. In the case of (b) the Fascist Republic Government would presumably remain in nominal authority and although it appeared probable that the Italian divisions would be gradually destroyed by the patriots, the situation would be one in which the Allies might not be able to intervene in certain areas until Allied forces entered

Colonel D. G. Taylor  
Mr. Payner  
- P.W.D.

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  - (b) the German forces would be withdrawn leaving behind the Italian divisions.
3. In the case of (b) the Fascist Republic Government would presumably remain in nominal authority and although it appeared probable that the Italian divisions would be gradually destroyed by the patriots, the situation would be ~~see~~ in which the Allies might not be able to intervene in certain areas until Allied forces entered and occupied. ↑ 4008
4. In the case of (a), however, a state of affairs would come about which might last for two or three weeks in which the area would be devoid of any troops. The meeting discussed the measures to be taken to cover this period.
5. It was decided that:
  - (a) the Central National Committee of Liberation in Northern Italy, which is already in touch with the Italian Government and the Allied authorities, should be regarded as the central authority and should be used for the purpose of government;
  - (b) the meeting recommended that a small team headed by an experienced (preferably AMG) officer, should be dropped by air to get in touch with this Committee as soon as possible, that is to say, before the German withdrawal. This officer's duty would be to advise the Central Committee and to guide them as far as possible in the management of affairs.
6. The meeting decided to recommend that for the guidance of local committees, particularly in the larger towns, Special Service Officers already destined for that

- 2 -

area, should be briefed by ACC and should be used for that purpose preferable to sending other AMG officers.

7. It was decided to prepare a direction to cover the political administrative and economic issues which will arise during the period of vacuum. This direction would be given to such officers as were sent in and sent to those already in the area.

8. On the political side this direction would stress the importance of the Central Committee assuming temporary control as the representative of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Italian Government. The administrative part would give general directions with regard to the establishment of law and order through the Patriots and the Carabinieri, of courts and local government, and control of the press. It was noted that FWE would wish to send a team at the same time or later and it was suggested that they might arrange to take control of the more important papers. It was realized that on the economic side the direction would be confined to a survey of the position.

9. It was arranged for Commander of Special Forces (SOF and OSS) and Colonels Hancock and Feasey to discuss arrangements for briefing the officers and for dropping the ACC team; Political Section and Colonel Hancock to prepare draft directive for submission; for Brigadier Meinwaring to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the recommendations.

10. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the desirability of setting up Allied Military Government in the area after the period of vacuum, i.e., when Allied troops can enter, or of turning over the two regions over immediately to the Italian Government.

11. The operational importance of avoiding, if possible, the necessity of having to send any troops to the area was fully realized. At the same time the definite possibility of grave disorder which might arise as a result of the continued absence of troops raised political and administrative problems of the highest order which could not be disregarded. BGS stated that the Italian Army would not be in a position to send any units for more than a month. At the same time it appeared to the meeting that whatever form of government was set up, having regard to the probable almost total absence of Carabinieri, it would be necessary for that government to have two divisions in the case of Allied troops and 3 divisions in the case of Italian troops. It was agreed that unless Allied troops were sent to the area no attempt should be made to set up AMG and incur the direct administrative responsibility which this would entail. If it was turned over to the Italian Government, Italian troops would be suitable, but would have to be provided. In the latter event, of course, the Italian Government should be consulted particularly as regards the necessity for Italian troops. In either case law and order could only be maintained if adequate food supplies were issued and this in turn would depend upon transport being available.



Colonels Hancock and Feesey to discuss arrangements for briefing the officers and for dropping the ACC team; Political Section and Colonel Hancock to prepare draft directive for submission; for Brigadier Mainwaring to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the recommendations.

10. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the desirability of setting up Allied Military Government in the area after the period of vacuum, i.e., when Allied troops can enter, or of turning over the two regions over immediately to the Italian Government.
11. The operational importance of avoiding, if possible, the necessity of having to send any troops to the area was fully realised. At the same time the definite possibility of grave disorder which might arise as a result of the continued absence of troops raised political and administrative problems of the highest order which could not be disregarded. BGS stated that the Italian Army would not be in a position to send any units for more than a month. At the same time it appeared to the meeting that whatever form of government was set up, having regard to the probable almost total absence of Carabinieri, it would be necessary for that government to have two divisions in the case of Allied troops and 3 divisions in the case of Italian troops. It was agreed that unless Allied troops were sent to the area no attempt should be made to set up AMG and incur the direct administrative responsibility which this would entail. If it was turned over to the Italian Government, Italian troops would be suitable, but would have to be provided. In the latter event, of course, the Italian Government should be consulted particularly as regards the necessity for Italian troops. In either case law and order could only be maintained if adequate food supplies were issued and this in turn would depend upon transport being available.
12. The advantages of handing over to the Italian Government were:-
- (a) The avoidance of the use of Allied troops;
  - (b) political - both internally in Italy and internationally.
- The disadvantages appeared to be that there would be a grave risk, especially if no or only a few Italian troops were employed, of disorder, food riots, and great delay in the return to normal life, particularly in industry. It seemed that even if the area was handed back to the Italian Government, the responsibility for such disorder and delay would rightly or wrongly be attributed to the Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Allied Commander.
13. The advantages of Allied Military Government were that it ensured a better and more orderly return to normality and reduced the risk of disorder; provided that Allied troops were available to back it, and that adequate food supplies could be transported to the area. The disadvantages were that it entailed the detachment of two divisions of Allied troops.
14. It was decided that BGS and Executive Commissioner should represent the views of the meeting to the Commander-in-Chief and the Acting Chief Commissioner respectively.

LSL/JC. Dist: C-in-C, HQ AAI  
BGS (Ops), HQ AAI

/s/ M. S. Lush

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner

Col McCarthy, Col Hancock, Lt Col Feesey, Mr Caccia, Comd Holdsworth

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)  
Revised July 26, 1948

## LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 210COMMISSIONED OFFICERS  
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(2)

B-0788

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM--	DATE	TO--	SYNOPSIS
26) CC/P/83	GEN MACF.	21 FEB	GEN. WILSON	RE LT. JOACHIM, MUSICIAN
27) S/8.0/621	FANO	17 FEB	A.C.C.	RE PROMOTION FOR MR. SALVATORE CAMMAROTA.
28)	ROGER MAKINS	15 FEB	GEN. MACF	MR. CACCIA: HIS RANK, PAY & ALLOWANCES.
29) TROOPERS 240		15 FEB	GEN. MACF.	DALLISON: NO SECOND TO SEND. NO VAC'CY.
30) CC/P/90	GEN. MACF	28 FEB.	ROGER MAKINS	MR. CACCIA: HIS WORK MERITS PROMOTION.
31) CC/P/91	GEN. MACF	23 FEB	LT. COL. J.A. JENNY	LT. COL. J.A. JENNY: GLAD TO HAVE A MAN WITH YOUR ABILITY WITH US.
32) FARVO 1216	GEN MACF	24 FEB	FREEDOM	COL. U. JOHN: CANNOT SPARE HIM REPLIES TO (39).
33) FREEDOM 54567	CINC	21 FEB	GEN MACF	" " : CAN HE BE RELEASED FOR NW EUROPE DUTIES?
34) FARVO 1310	GEN. MACF.	25 FEB	FREEDOM	COL. PIDSLEY: V' STAND HE IS IN ALLIERS ANX. TO HAVE HIM HERE.
35) 210 + 220	MAJ. DOE.	25 FEB	CAPT. STONE	RE: MATOUSA FREEZING PROMOTIONS OF OS & EM
36)		22 FEB		RATHBONE: TO BE OPENED ONLY BY JG OR CC
37) --	MAJ. DOE	26 FEB	GEN. JOYCE	FWDs LTR EXPLG. FRZG. OF PROMOTIONS.
38) CC/P/102	GEN. MACF	26 FEB	GEN. ALEXANDER	VON RANDEN: RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD AND USE OF BEHIND GERMAN LINES
39) DCC 210.31	CAPT. STONE	29 FEB.	MR. GRADY	LT WADLEIGH: NEEDED TO HEAD TRANSLATION POOL AT SALERNO.
40) CC/C/117	GEN. MACF.	29 FEB.	CDS AFHQ	LT. SITARZ: AM GRATEFUL FOR HIS WORK WHILE FLYING ME
41) FREEDOM 58589	CINC	1 MAR.	GEN. MACF.	LT. COL. JOHN DE SALIS: CAN YOU USE HIM FOR ROME PLANNING?
42)	BISHOP OF MESSINA	2 MAR	GEN. MACF.	CAPT. ANTHONY PINO: WE LIKE TONY AS HEALTHY, SO PL. DON'T TFER HIM.
43) AG 201	CAPT. STONE	2 MAR.	CG, ACC.	LT COL. DENSMORE: RECOMMENDED FOR PROMOTION
44) FATIMA 1641	GEN. MAC F.	4 MAR	FREEDOM	NEGATIVE REPLY TO (41)
45) 123 (570.1)	GEN. MACF.	5 MAR.	BADOLIO	DINO PHILIPSON: VARIOUS PAPERS RE HIS APPTMT
46) 129 (210)	GEN. MACF.	8 MAR	LT COL. POLETTI	GIUSEPPE CENZATO: SHOULDN'T BE REMOVED. VARIOUS PAPERS ON
47) 210	MAJ. DOE	10 MAR	CAPT. STONE	FWDs EXTRACT FM D.B. #44 ON PROMOTIONS
48) CC/P/136	GEN. MACF.	11 MAR.	LORD STANSLATE	ALLIED PUEL ACCEPTING ITAL. DECORATIONS
49) MGS 353.6	MAJ. JACKMAN	9 MAR	HQ, A.C.C.	REPORTS ON GEN. GAZZERA & OTHER PW OS WHO WERE REPATRIATED
50) 8823/4/MS	ACMF	11 MAR	ACC	M/GEN BROWNING: WILL BE CMDR. #37 MIL. MISSION
51) 0-2284	AAI	? MAR	ACC	GEN. BENCAS BURROWS: O'LINES ITAL. ITINERARY
52) FATIMAR 2479	CAPT. STONE	17 MAR	SEARS FOR INC	CAPT. LOMBARDO: SUG. HE BE REPLACED IMMED.
53) AL 210.3-P	WO PIOMBINO	9 "		Asst. of Cmer. Butler to Naval Sub. Com.
54)	Commo. Pelmer	17 "	C.C.	Butler has joined ms. Capt. Cronther will join me soon.
55) PA 348 SL 210	CAPT. CLARKE, AAI MAJ. DOE	18 " 20 "	A.C.C. RECTOR UNIV./NAPLES	Gen. Alexander cannot accept honorary degree at this time.
56) AFHQ 60#12	Gen. Gammill	9 "		Mr. Little for Wilson & Durra
57) DCC 210.31	Capt. Stone	18 "	AFHQ, INC	Illustrative in (52).
58) PA 349 PA/P/145	Capt. Clarke, Mr. Perry	? Mar. 20 Mar.	The Perry Capt. Clarke	Col. Varvill: Cannot use him
59) CC/P/141	Gen. Mac F.	20 Mar.	Brig. Hunt	MORLEY-FLETCHER: Am keeping my eye on him.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.



