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ADM
JULY

ADMINISTRATION, FRONTIER AREAS IN DISPUTE
JULY 1944 - JULY 1945

287

1014/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 1014 ADMIN, FRONTIER AREAS IN DISPUTE
(Northern Italy, border zone problems)From: 28 Jul 44
To: 9 Jul 45

Vol. I

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NB: file contains NE It until 1 Jan
45 (w Venezia & Trieste) and North
Italy generally.~~TOP SECRET~~

SE- RIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
76	CC 1014, Stone	11 Jun 45	RCs NW It	CC Rep in N.It - Col Wiske.
77	Cbl AC EXC 9652	12 Jun 45	5,15, Ven Reg	"Re-Italianization of Bolzano."
78	Cbl AFHQ FX-95744	19 Jun 45	AMC(A)SHAEP, 15, USCCC, AC	Committee suggested for Indigenous resources, Austria. (food resources).
79	Cbl 5A, Cite 598	26 Jun 45	AC, AFHQ	Policy requested re disposal German civilians (in Bolzano area).
80	Cbl 5A, 2949, Cite 597	26 Jun 45	AC, AMC Bolzano	Italians who opted German nationality
81	595/9/EC, Norden	29 Jun 45	RC Lombardia	Treatment of Germans.
81a	Cbl AC CAS, 956	30 Jun 45	RC Ven Reg	Replacement of GO 35 in Bolzano.
82	Memo, VP CA Sec	1 Jul 45	CC	Italians who opted German nationality.
83	Minutes-Decisions, CA Sec	3 Jul 45		Italians who opted German nationality; conditions in Bolzano, 100% ^{100%} only.
84	Aide-Memoire, (CC)	5 Jul 45	(Parri)	Italians who opted German nationality; education & emigration in Bolzano.
84a	Ltr, Montanari	5 Jul 45	Stearns	Prof. Dusio's report on N.Mission.
85	Cbl AC CAS, 1243	5 Jul 45	AFHQ C-5	Italians who opted German nationality.
86	Article, Libera Stampa	7 Jul 45		Return of Alto Adige to Austria move- ment; trip by Sindaco of Bolzano, prefect
86a	Cbl AC 1436	8 Jul 45	AMC Ven Reg	Pls send Prefect Bolzano here.
87	Cbl AC CC, 1449	9 Jul 45	RC Ven, 8	Return of Alto Adige to Austria move- ment; trip by Sindaco, prefect of Bolzano

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
60	Cbl AC EXG, 8391	24 May 45	5,15, Ven Reg	"Re-Italianization of Bolzano".
61	Cbl 8A, M-1044 (Austria)	26 May 45	AFHQ, AC, 15 etc	Sitrep on Austria AMG.
62	Cbl Keychain, 4056	26 May 45	AC	Sitrep on Bolzano & Trento fr Hookson
62a	Memo, Lush	28 May 45	Dist	EC Tour - Emilia Reg (PS & Agric)
63	Cbl RXII/25 fr Lush	29 May 45	AC for Stone	Submit CCAO shd be consulted before dispositions Allied-It top determined.
64	Cbl 8A, M-1053 (Austria)	30 May 45	AFHQ, AC(A) etc	Sitrep on Austria AMG.
64a	806/EC, Talbot	30 May	Econ, CA Secs	Tour notes by Ex Comm
65	Cbl 8A, 1062-M (Austria)	31 May 45	AFHQ, AC(A) etc	Sitrep on Austria AMG.
66	Cbl 'A, M-1062 (Austria)	31 May 45	AFHQ, ACA, etc	Sitrep on Austria AMG.
67	Cbl METUSA, FX-84698	1 Jun 45	SHAEP, 15	Air elements in US Zone Austria.
68	542/125/EC, Talbot	1 Jun 45	Emilia Reg	Parties, personalities, dumps, Regio Area
69	806/EC, Lush	2 Jun 45	Dist	Notes of EC Tour - Lombardia Region.
69a	Memo, Hopkinson	2 Jun 45		Report on visit to Trento & Bolzano.
70	806/EC, Lush	2 Jun 45	Dist	Notes of EC Tour - AMG 5th Army.
71	Cbl Lush & Fiske fr Milan No. 1082	2 Jun 45	AC for CC	Materiel in Bolzano area - guards needed - replacement US 88th Division.
72	Cbl 1083, Milan, fr Lush & Fiske	2 Jun 45	AC for CC	Replacement of US 88th Div by It Volghera Div - materiel in Bolzano area.
73	6519/EC, Stone	4 Jun 45	Bonomi	Thanks for econ/pol report on N.It.
74	Cbl MG(A) M-1087	8 Jun 45	AFHQ, ACA, AC	Sitrep on Austria AMG.
75	Cbl 15 AG, CAS-597	8 Jun 45	AFHQ, AC	Purchase of foodstuffs by Germans.
75a	Cbl IV Hopkinson 141	9 Jun 45	AC	Incidents between Folgore Group & German-speaking population of Bolzano.

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CC 1013 & CC 1007 series

FOR NE ITALY (After 1 Jan 45):--

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NE Italy until 1 Jan 45 (with
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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
47	501/76/EC, Stone	1 May 45	DCCAO, SCAO, RC	AMG Policy - Northern Italy.
48	501/EC, Stone	2 May 45	Various Cmdrs	AMG Policy - Northern Italy.
49	Memo, ExC	5 May 45		Subjects for discussion with CAO, AFHQ
50	Aide Memoire, 503/EC	5 May 45	CAO AFHQ	Change to Phase II in N. Italy.
51	Cbl AC ExC, 7162	7 May 45	AFHQ G-5	Sitrep - Bolzano up to 7 May.
52	Cbl 15AGP LO, AC-10	9 May 45	15 AG, AC	Toni Ducia wishes visit Rome discuss Austrian politics & ret Bolzano to A.
53	Ltr G-5 Sec 5 Army	10 May 45	SCAO 5 Army	Mynors report of trip to Brenner and Dolomite (and Adige) Area, 7/8 May.
53a	Cbl CAS 15 AG, CAS/506	11 May 45	AC, AMG 5A	Toni Ducia wishes visit Rome
54	Cbl AC ExC, 7376	11 May 45	AFHQ	Sitreps of North, generally, 10 May.
54a	Cbl AC ExC, 7459	12 May 45	AFHQ	8A Sitrep: Japanese diplomats in custody; German diplomats - disposal instrs. Repairs to Railroad in Brenner area (?) and general sitrep in North.
55	Cbl II Corps, fr Fiske	12 May 45	AC	Repairs to railroad in Brenner OK'd? IG alarmed over sitn in Bolzano.
56	Cbl AC ExC, 7512	13 May 45	II for Fiske	Toni Ducia may not visit Rome.
56a	16872, Bonomi	14 May 45	Stone	Diary, Col White, visit to North It
56b	Cbl AC ExC, 7539	14 May 45	15 AG, AMG 5A	Desirable change over to Phase II.
56c	Report Lt Col White	14 May 45		Toni Ducia may not visit Rome.
57	Cbl AFHQ, FX-76659	16 May 45	15, AC, 2Dist	Sitrep on North generally.
57a	Cbl 15 AG, CAS-526	16 May 45	5A, AC	MFAA Sitrep - Ward-Perkins itinerary.
57b	Cbl 5A LG fr Fiske	16 May 45	AC	Position of RCs if Phase 2, civil, is introduced before Phase 2 mil occurs.
57c	Cbl AMG 5/A	16 May 45	AC for MFAA	
58	Memo, Lush	18 May 45	CC	
59	504/EC, Stone	20 May 45	Bonomi	IG need not be alarmed over sitn Bolzano
59a	Cbl 5/A, 9418, Cite P-168	20 May 45	AC, Ven Reg, 15	"Re-Italianization of Bolzano."

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34a	PC(44) 32nd Mtg	15 Nov 44	--	SAC directs redraft of cable under paper 132- for next meeting. AMG for Venezia Giulia and related matters.
35	PC(44) 132(Annexe)	20 Nov 44		
36	PC(44) 33rd Mtg	22 Nov 44		SAC directs G5 dispatch redrafted cable to CCS.
37	Ltr Stone (Luch) 504/105/CCS	27 Nov 44	Venosta	Request possibility of disturbances in Venezia Giulia de envisagés APP: Ltr Venosta 04071/13, 16 Nov.
38	Ltr CAO, AAI 5003/7/CAO	1 Dec 44	CGS, AAI	Responsibility, development and operation for Port of Genoa.
39	Ltr Stone CC-1014	28 Dec 44	G-5 Sec AFHQ	ISLD Report on Political Developments in Trieste - Venezia Giulia.
40	Ltr AFHQ G-5	8 Jan 45	Hq AC for CC	AMG for Bolzano, Trento & Belluno
41	Memo US Poled & Brit RESmin	?		Re occupation of N. Italy: recommend division into NE & NW Italy
42	AFHQ G-3 Plans/134	30 Jan 45		Minutes of mtg at Caserta 29 Jan re Occupation of N. Italy 1527
43	11103, Bonomi	2 Apr 45	Stone	IG stands ready to cooperate w AC on liberation of North.
44	9/10.E/CA, Stone	7 Apr 45	Bonomi	IG stands ready to cooperate with AC on liberation of North.
45	Cbl Resmed Rome	16 Apr 45	AFHQ for SAC	SHAEP entrusted with larger portion of US occupation of Austria.
46	6519/EC, Talbot	18 Apr 45	AFHQ G-5	Attachment of Pol advisers to occupational forces in North Italy.

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19	A/CC 321-1 Stone	22 Sep 44	AFHQ Gammell	Forwarding of correspondence.
20	Ltr Bonomi	26 Sep 44	Stone	Would like to form occupation committee for problems of No Italy
21	Ltr 808/20/CA A/CC 321 Stone	30 Sep 44	AFHQ COS	Admin of frontier provinces; request for details of admin & person
22	Cbl AAI Q 2083	3 Oct 44	ACC	Key plan for Venice & Trieste
23	Memo 504/COS Lush	3 Oct 44	A/CC	Pls have G-5 delay answer to our requests for decisions in north
24	Ltr 502/COS Stone	4 Oct 44	Bonomi	Lush & Antolini will represent AC
25	504/62/COS Lush	18 Oct 44	AAI	Arrangements for Yugoslav border
26	504/66/COS Lush	21 Oct 44	AAI	For provinces of Bolzano, Trento
27	Ltr AAI Harding	26 Oct 44	A/CC ACC	Decision on machinery for north
28	Ltr COS/459 AAI Harding	26 Oct 44	A/CC ACC	Problems of NE Italy: fol principles to be heeded.
29	Ltr 504/85/COS Stone	29 Oct 44	AFHQ	Problems in setting up admin of NE frontier provinces
30	504/83/COS Stone	29 Oct 44	AFHQ	Admin of Frontier provinces, NE Italy. Machinery to be set up.
31	PWB ITHQ	3 Nov 44		Plan for propaganda campaign to northern Italy
32	PC(44) 31st Mtg	7 Nov 44	(Extract)	Liberation Committee suggest publicising agreements between Ital Govt & Tito; postpone to next mtg.
33	PC(44) 132 Paper AFHQ Pol Comm	11 Nov 44		Allied Military Government for Venezia Giulia and Related matters 3 APPENDICES
34	Ltr 504/92/COS	14 Nov 44	RC Venezia Region	Planning - Port of Trieste. INCLS: Ltrs M HQ Balkans 4 Oct, 10 Nov.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Ltr A/CC 321 Stone	28 Jul 44	G-5 AFHQ	Guidance pls on what northern provinces will be administered by AMG/ACC. Note treaty problems
2	Ltr 1/236 Visconti-Venosta	15 Aug 44	Stone	Ital Govt concerned about possible disturbances in Venezia Giulia
3	A/CC 250.1 Stone	18 Aug 44	Pol Sec & RC & MG	Pls recommend action re VV's ltr
4	Ltr A/CC 321 Stone	19 Aug 44	Visconti Venosta	Will inform you about question
5	Ltr A/CC 321 Stone	19 Aug 44	G-5 AFHQ	Re my ltr of 28 July, encl shows how important Ital Govt holds matter
6	Ltr 9/150/1 Nekin	26 Aug 44	Caccia	Comments on political aspects of admin of boundary provinces. AMG
7	Ltr Lush	31 Aug 44	A/CC	Notes on admin problem, north
8	Ltr Gen Gammell AFHQ COS	2 Sep 44	DCC ACC	For info, memo fr SACMED to Tito Pls inform Ital Govt of AMG to be imposed on certain provinces. INCL
9	Cbl ACC S-318	5 Sep 44	AFHQ	Pls fwd encl to ltr of 2 Sept.
10	Memo Stone	7 Sep 44	Lush	For info, ltr 2 Sep AFHQ. Draft.
11	Ltr Stone	7 Sep 44	Kirk	Fwdg copy of ltr 2 Sep Gammell
12	Ltr Stone	7 Sep 44	Charles	Fwdg copy of ltr 2 Sep Gammell
13	Ltr AFHQ	8 Sep 44	ACC	Fwdg copy of enclosure to ltr 2/
14	Ltr A/CC 321 Stone	11 Sep 44	Visconti Venosta	SACMED intends to establish ¹⁰²⁵ AMG in certain border territories
15	Ltr A/CC 308/13/04 Stone	11 Sep 44	AFHQ COS	Further considerations, pls, e.g. use of Ital govt personnel, O & EM.
16	Ltr MA/536 AAI Gen Alexander	11 Sep 44	Gen Wilson	Allied Occupation of Western Italy: plans for.
17	Ltr I/555 Bonomi	16 Sep 44	Stone	Thx for your ltr 11 Sep
18	Ltr A/CC 3-1-1 Stone	22 Sep 44	Bonomi	Am seeking decision on your request for strong measures Venezia

TO: AMI VENEZIE REGION

1436

8 Jul 45

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD PRIME MINISTER HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO SEE PREFECT OF BOLZANO PD CHIEF COMMISSIONER HAS AGREED PD

PARIN TO AMI VENEZIE REGION FROM ALCOM CITE ACCAS PARIN

PARA TWO PD PLEASE ARRANGE TO SEND PREFECT AND PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER TO ROME IMMEDIATELY CMA YOU TAKING FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING TRANSPORT BY FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS PD

PARA THREE PD SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS WILL BE ELECTIONS IN BOLZANO PD PERSONAL PRESENCE OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONER IS PURELY OPTIONAL

Internal Distribution: Executive Commissioner,
Chief Commissioner,
Local Government Sub-Commission,
Polad (A)
Polad (B)

See (88)

Civil Affairs Section

437



NICHOLAS PIOMBINO,
OWO USA,
Asst. Adjutant.

1027
10/14/45

(86) a



*Segreteria Particolare
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Dear John,

could you show
urgently
the Admiral the
enclosed article, which
I spoke to him about.

Thank you

Frances

1983

(86)

DFR/53/G-II (DP)

FOR ACTION GEORGE FIVE SECTION ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

2243

5 July 1945

PRIORITY

87

RESTRICTED PD

SUBJECT IS RETURN TO BOLZANO PROVINCE OF ITALIANS WHO ACQUIRED GERMAN NATIONALITY UNDER HITLER MUSHOLINI AGREEMENT OF ONE NINE THREE NINE PD
PARAH TO FOR ACTION GEORGE FIVE SECTION ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS FROM ALCOM CITE ACCAS PARAH

PARA ONE PD DIFFICULTIES ARE BEING CAUSED BY RETURN OF ITALIANS WHO OPTED FOR GERMAN CITIZENSHIP TO BOLZANO CMA TRENTO CMA BELLUNO AND UDINE PROVINCES PD WOULD YOU REQUEST SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO CAREFULLY SCREEN ITALIANS FOR THESE AREAS AND STOP RETURN OF THOSE WHO HAVE BECOME GERMAN CITIZENS

DISTRIBUTION (By Hand)

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85



*Segreteria Particolare
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Dear Major Stearns

I am enclosing a copy for your files of the report by Prof. Dussio, of the Presidency of the Council, on his trip in the North of Italy.

As you may remember, his mission was arranged through your office.

Cordially

Francesco Montanari

Major L.W. STEARNS
Chief Commissioner's office
Commissione Alleata

Note by CC:

E.C. I think the attached should be distributed to all R.C.'s - pointing out that while ~~not~~ ^{out-} of date in some respects (French opposition in Val d'Aosta), the report indicates some sore spots requiring correction.
10/7/45. EWS
cc

TranslationReport on the Mission in the North

The mission in the North of two observers, who were to ascertain, in a general way, the repercussion brought by the latest events on the life of the population, took place between May 16th and June 7th, at least for what concerns the undersigned. The journey had been planned in agreement with the Allied Commission which kindly put at his disposal for three weeks a car with an Italian driver; the instructions given in writing by the Commission included the prohibition of going to Trieste, Val d'Aoste, and any place at less than 20 Km. from the frontier; and the obligation of presenting himself to the representatives of the Allied Government in Padova and to the Headquarters of the 9th Army. Having paid these visits and having left in Padova Prof. Melito who will make his own report on the regions he was to visit (Veneto, Emilia and part of Lombardia), the undersigned went to the following centres, without mentioning minor localities: Cremona, Como, Varese, Bergamo, Parma, Piacenza, Vercelli, Biella, Ivrea, Cuneo, Asti, Alessandria, Genoa, Savona, Spezia, sometimes going back to Milan and Turin for gasoline supplies.

Though a trip of 5,000 kms in three weeks can give but a glimpse of the numerous problems of the present moment, it is nevertheless possible to make a synthetic judgement. As this journey chiefly aimed at ascertaining how these problems, which are in themselves of an economic and political nature at the same time, were understood and judged in their most immediate aspects - working possibilities, work of the various Committees for liberation, relations with the Allies, strength of the Parties - observations and the sounding of public opinion were made by listening to workmen and professional workers, peasants and small tradespeople, participating in manufacturers and local C.L.N.S meetings, speaking and discussing with them to obtain well defined opinions through exchange of ideas. Broader and more precise views which completed the previous ones were obtained by means of interviews with the Prefects, Prefecture officials, Questori and other authorities. If the man in the street had his large share, yet not such as to turn him into a dull and meaningless symbol, all those who exercise any form of authority whatever have had theirs. Thus, comparing and adding the various impressions obtained, it is possible to make a few observations which have a common character for the three Regions visited.

For what concerns the problems of a normal resumption of life first, and then those of reconstruction, the population is still in good form, with its traditional spirit of activity and ~~highly~~ remarkable force of adaptation; however, the hard months of German and fascist domination have left them shaken and tired. The need most felt by everybody is to stand on solid ground, now that the war is over. The moral lesson of the defeat which is weighing on our shoulders is understood as in perhaps no other part of Italy, thanks to the systems which the fascists have been able to use for too long. For honest people who form the majority, prevarication about fascism is no longer possible. The summary judgements and imprisonment ~~which~~

though a trip of 5,000 kms in three weeks can give but a glimpse of the numerous problems of the present moment, it is nevertheless possible to make a synthetic judgement. As this journey chiefly aimed at ascertaining how these problems, which are in themselves of an economic and political nature at the same time, were understood and judged in their most immediate aspects - working possibilities, work of the various Committees for liberation, relations with the Allies, strength of the Parties - observations and the sounding of public opinion were made by listening to workmen and professional workers, peasants and small tradespeople, participating in manufacturers and local C.L.N.S meetings, speaking and discussing with them to obtain well defined opinions through exchange of ideas. Broader and more precise views which completed the previous ones were obtained by means of interviews with the Prefects, Prefecture officials, questori and other authorities. If the man in the street had his large share, yet not such as to turn him into a dull and meaningless symbol, all those who exercise any form of authority whatever have had theirs. Thus, comparing and adding the various impressions obtained, it is possible to make a few observations which have a common character for the three Regions visited.

For what concerns the problems of a normal resumption of life first, and then those of reconstruction, the population is still in good form, with its traditional spirit of activity and ~~the~~ remarkable force of adaptation; however, the hard months of German and fascist domination have left them shaken and tired. The need most felt by everybody is to stand on solid ground, now that the war is over. The moral lesson of the defeat which is weighing on our shoulders is understood as in perhaps no other part of Italy, thanks to the systems which the fascists have been able to use for too long. For honest people who form the majority, prevarication about fascism is no longer possible. The summary judgements and imprisonments which took place at the time of the liberation, even in some of their extreme forms, have contributed to clear up the air, and for this reason, they have had the support of public opinion, which on the other hand, is most glad that lawfulness should more and more decidedly resume its powers. The acts of violence which keep on happening sporadically more or less all over the place, though less and less frequently are considered as acts of banditism, without any political aspect.

Everyone is anxious to find out the working possibilities in the near future. This is the fundamental point; work to give them means of subsistence, supply the Centre and the South and maybe also foreign countries, to be a pledge of union and good understanding. The industries are waiting for raw materials; most of the workers are anxious to resume their work, naturally with salaries adapted to the cost of living and with guarantees quite different from the ones they had in the past. But the main problem remains always that of work. In comparison, the current of the workers satisfied with enforced idleness and the salaries they get simply for coming to the plant, who get more excited than necessary, is small in proportion and has few followers, for most of them understand that this is not the way to reach a solution, which it will be easier to reach, at least in part, if it is possible to overcome without delay the threat of great unemployment. The fact that the

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 Big Station plus 3 copies
 of translation passed
 H.E.C. 10/7/45

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stocks are very small when there are any, and that raw materials and coal can only come from abroad, is too obvious for anybody to ignore it. The consequence is that only a country which proves to be socially capable of working - and in the case of a country which finds itself in our present international relations, the question is even more delicate - may claim to be taken in consideration for the allotment of supplies, if it is fully understood by the industrial world finds an ever increasing comprehension among the workers. Therefore, if it is true that the attitude of the workers in the industrial centres appeared and still appears to be extreme left, this is rather fortuitous, for the working class has its claims to make, for which it shows great decision and which it will not give up, however, it always considers the real aspect of things and is far from ready to try new experiments of any kind whatever.

The owners of the small and middle sized industries are usually willing to make many concessions, but they do not agree to be turned out of their plants, keeping only the responsibility of the management. Not only they, but also the bourgeoisie, professional workers, small farmer, and an important part of the workers themselves, hope for a Government which will take in great consideration the results obtained by the Committees for National Liberation, which will not be stifled by the weight of a bureaucratic and centralizing mentality like the fascist one, which will make the most of the possibilities for rehabilitation within order and lawfulness.

All the various classes of the population have great esteem for the Committees for National Liberation of the larger centres. Respect for the men of which they are composed, for the work they did, especially at the time of the insurrection; the C.L.N. of small or middle sized villages are often strongly criticized, for their very composition is not satisfactory from the democratic point of view, and the orders of the C.L.N.A.I. have not always been obeyed; this caused arbitrary acts which everyone regrets, and which are, fortunately, greatly decreasing. Much more criticized was the epuration work of the C.L.N. of the plants; though also in this field there is a tendency towards a greater sense of measure, the phenomenon which took place was that of a 'technical' rather than political epuration, if it is possible to call it so.

In this way, many people who were not compromised, or only very slightly compromised were arbitrarily dismissed from their post of work. Public opinion remained upset by these abuses, and many people openly fear the danger of a 'neo-squadrist' also because of the problem made by the participants of the eleventh hour.

For what concerns epuration, common opinion says it should be rapid, clear and definitive, to be ready to start working also from this point of view. The Tribunals of the people which are now in full swing fulfil their duty with efficiency and energy. It must be observed that among the large number of the people who have been arrested, imprisonment would be too much for the supposed offences of many of them, from a purely legal point of view, even if they are punishable in 1946. After

of a bureaucratic and centralizing mantle, within order and lawfulness.

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In this way, many people who were not compromised, or only very slightly compromised were arbitrarily dismissed from their post of work. Public opinion remained upset by these abuses, and many people openly fear the danger of a 'neo-squadrist' also because of the problems made by the partisans of the eleventh hour.

For what concerns epuration, common opinion says it should be rapid, clear and definitive, to be ready to start working also from this point of view. The Tribunals of the people which are now in full swing fulfil their duty with efficiency and energy. It must be observed that among the large number of the people who have been arrested, imprisonment would be too much for the supposed offences of many of them, from a purely legal point of view, even if they are punishable in fact. After examination; instead of that, because of the great number of cases and their inevitable slowness, they remain in jail for a duration of time which is beginning to be too long.

As for the partisans, the people that saw them coming from among them, that knew them to be brave soldiers during so many hard months, saw many of them out to death, saw them victorious at the time of the insurrection, feels a great solidarity towards them; but those who pretend to be partisans and who simply made the most of the easily understandable confusion of so many exceptional situations, and concerning whom no one might swear that they have laid down their arms, are a cause of worry. For what concerns this question also, hope lies in a greater request for work and in a greater authority of the law: as always, those who gave most are now asking less, and especially when they are peasants, they have already gone back to their houses or have enlisted in the formations of the police of the people. Those who will go on living as outlaws represent one of the many disastrous inheritances of fascism.

The feelings of the average man are very favourable to the allies; he has appreciated their first relief, he is now appreciating their work of government, often very difficult, their moralizing tendencies, and their spirit of justice; he enjoys the cordiality of the relations wherever there are any. Greater than the necessity for collaboration enforced by the present situation, is the traditional sympathy of the North for the Anglosaxon world, and, as a rule, the attitude of

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the Allied representatives contributed to increase popular consideration and respect.

Almost everywhere, the transformation of the Committees for National Liberation in advisory 'Giunte' took place in a satisfactory way, with the obvious approval of public opinion which thinks its interests will be better safeguarded by the prefect, emanation of the C.L.N. and appointed by the Allies, also because it no longer fears the heaping up of orders from various authorities, often in contradiction with each other. Relations with the Allies were understood in a rather narrow minded way by some C.L.N.s of secondary importance, especially by the representatives of the Corps of the Volunteers for Liberty, as in our Country was not to answer for its past, and with it, also those who, thanks to their personal effort, fortunately managed to give back some dignity to the country, but these were only isolated and youthful opinions which could easily be reasoned away.

The activities of the political parties are followed with great interest, but only a minority participates directly in their life, especially for what concerns listed members. As it is well known, the communists and socialists seem to be the strongest in industrial centres, though Christian Democracy, well organized in the country, has also important forces among the workers, whose more moderate elements it collects. For the rest, considering that these are the only parties which can count on a mass of followers, there is great solidarity among the representatives of all the parties which form the Committees for National Liberation. In Liguria, the Italian Republican Party is making most successful propaganda.

Politically speaking, the people of Lombardy, Liguria, and also of Piedmont, without class distinction, and including a great part of the aristocracy, have lost their faith in the House of Savoy, and at present at least, they all firmly agree in considering the republic.

Other political

But above these and similar problems, the immediate attention of all is turned, as I said above, towards those which are more definitely considered as political problems. Everybody fears an increase of the cost of living, though up to now, in small centres, the average level of prices has not increased enough to cause preoccupation; it rose far less than in the big centres, where the rise of prices has had and is having very noticeable results. In relation with this, the question of the value of the lire, and of the stabilization of the currency is followed everywhere with great apprehension. The blocks, whenever part they may come from, after those of the fascists and Germans, are seen disfavouredly by the producers as well as by the consumers, who consider them to be the main cause of black market.

To conclude, the serious and conscientious men in the street, typical of the North, sincerely wishes for the exceptional situation created by the last events to go back to normal as soon as possible; work and exchanges to start again without falling back into the gigantic and inefficient bureaucracy of fascism; the character of the citizens to be made strong of the political idea they are

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We add a few details concerning special situations in the various places we visited, which will help to render more definite what we have exposed above:

In Cremona, one of the most typical examples of false partisans: 200-300 young men, formerly imprisoned for common offences, have formed an armed band called 'The Scarlet Pimpernel', which is infesting the neighbouring countryside and even tried to take the prefect and the justices. The scarcity of the available regular police forces, prevented from taking any strong action against them about a month after the liberation of the town.

In Como took place the final concentration of many republican fascists, and reaction was very strong. Now, the situation is normalized, and the tribunals of the people work with energy, and calm has returned and many arbitrary acts have been set right in various villages where chaos was reigning, this thanks to the moderation of the socialist and communist Authorities.

8/12

-4-

In Verese, the plants have remained entirely closed for three weeks, and are now waiting for coal, before anything else. The direct intervention of the prefect of the town, at a time when there was some unrest among the workers because of some operations as usual more 'technical' than political, succeeded in convincing the members of the C.L.N. of the plants that a greater moderation was necessary.

In Biella, all textile industries are intact and have stocks for two or three months. Biella was a great centre of partisan activity and now extreme left elements are very strong. The local C.L.N. expressed the wish of not depending from Verceelli for alimentation and showed a strong spirit of autonomy. There are no carabinieri for they have all been deported to Germany, and the police of the people is functioning to the obvious satisfaction of the population. There also, any attempt at depriving the C.L.N. of its authority would meet with strong resistance.

In Ivree, a great manufacturer confirmed the general opinion, in responsible milieu, on the Committees for National Liberation; they represent such a new impulse, and so to speak, a conquest of national life of such importance, that to think of replacing them with the usual bureaucratic machine would be a very great mistake. It would be better to increase their democratic spirit and frame them in the normal organisms of the central Government; thus, what good there is in them will go on bearing fruit, while the superstructures of a period of exception disappear little by little.

The province of Cuneo gave the largest number of partisans, and suffered there-
bridges fore strong reprisals and damages. 260 were blown up and the crops will be 50% inferior to what it usually is because of the frost and drought; this is a cause of great preoccupation for next winter. The Communes of Briga Marittima and Tenda have been occupied by the French Authorities, and it seems, immediately annexed to France, by means of a plebiscite which took place while food tickets and what salt had been found on the spot were being distributed. The new mayors are French, the currency in circulation is French; it seems that the Allied Authorities inter-vene only to control the timber allotment for the timber of this zone supplies the requirements of half the province, and also three large electric power plants which supplied Genoa with electric power; it appears that this electric power has now been deviated for Toulon and Marseilles. No Italian is allowed to go in the above mentioned communes; the Allied authorities advised the Italian authorities of Cuneo to get precise documents, and direct evidence proving the action taken by the French; this is what the prefect of the chief town is now doing.

In Turin, during a manufacturers meeting, most of them pronounced themselves in favour of the C.L.N.S., to have them carry on their work till the Costituente, but they were unanimous in asking legality to be respected; they want the people to rely on an atmosphere of confidence encouraging the private initiative of the manufacturer and guaranteeing work; they wish the value of the currency and the

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In Piedmont, Turin and Ivrea chiefly, the situation in Val d'Aosta is followed with eager interest. From informations obtained from attendable elements which had attended political meetings in Aosta, it appears that the people hoped that the Central Government, taking as a basis the points expressed by the Aoste C.L.N., would study the question and issue without delay orders to calm the population and check French propaganda. At present, this propaganda has an easy success for it is making the most of the resentment felt by the inhabitants of the Val d'Aosta, in a rather confused way, after the many wrongs and vexations of the past regime, but it would collapse in front of concrete concessions in the field of autonomy, the fiscal burden, the making use of the waters, the parity of language, and the granting of a free zone. The fact that the Government sent a communique on this subject without delay seems to have made a good impression; the situation keeps however all its character of extreme urgency. In the Val d'Aosta the Allied Authorities show a great comprehension of the legitimate interests of the Italians.

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In Asti, while the greatest part of the partisans of the autonomous formations have laid down their arms and gone back home, a certain number of them, not exceeding 200, is wandering through the countryside and doing a most profitable trade in horses. There are only few elements of the former police forces, and the new ones have still got to be framed. The C.L.N. is doing very well as Advisory Giunta; it includes a representative of the clergy and one of the tradespeople.

In Alessandria; the fact of giving the ridiculous sum of L. 1.000 as a bonus to every partisan is considered as a mistake. On the other hand, the new Administration of the province is in difficult circumstances because it lacks funds. The population is still under the impression of ferocious personal vengeance on the part of extremist elements, which escape all control from the responsible political authorities.

In Genoa, The food situation begins to improve little by little. Sympathy and confidence towards the Allies are felt by everyone, and people expect that thanks to them, the harbour will be able to resume its work. The political situation is not very clear, for while the Genoa C.I.N., composed of greatly esteemed people, goes on acting with intelligence, some local C.L.M.S and manufacture C.L.N. act on their own initiative. Public opinion agrees to ask that something be done to promote rehabilitation with the help of the Allies.

In Savona, the harbour is blocked and the Albisola tunnel has collapsed, so that the town is almost isolated; it is only possible to communicate with Genoa only through the hinterland. Alimentation is the problem which comes first. Among all the localities which showed they didn't appreciate the royal carabinieri, Savona showed the greatest hostility. The whole zone is extremely republican. During the last few days, the situation of the P.C.C., which at one time was unbetterable, has improved because of the intervention of the local secretaries of the communist, socialist and Christian democrat parties in collaboration with the Allies

Spazia, as it is well known, suffered a great deal, because of the bombardments as well as because it was near the front line, and also because of the retreat of the Germans who blew up even the small industries. Next winter the food situation will be serious. The inhabitants have the impression that they are abandoned to themselves, without anyone taking any kind of initiative.

In Perno, it was pointed out that a few trucks might be taken from the allied motor pools which are full of Italian and German vehicles, belonging to the war booty of the region, and lent to the province for four or five months. They would be used for timber transport, most important because the town has no gas, and for foodstuffs transport.

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In Parma, it was pointed out that a few trucks might be taken from the allied motor pools which are full of Italian and German vehicles, belonging to the war booty of the region, and lent to the province for four or five months. They would be used for timber transport, most important because the town has no gas, and for foodstuffs transport.

A widely spread trade unions movement and the great success of communist propaganda must be reported from Piacenza. The situation is quiet; people are only complaining because the questura is rather disorganized and the special Court too slow to start functioning.

In the Bergamo province, we must also report acts of violence from so called patriots; in Monza di Lombardia, for instance, some of them made the sindaco prisoner, had two ex fascist gerarchi who were in jail delivered to them by force and killed them on the spot.

In this province, the communes are setting funds aside to fight unemployment by plans of work.

Prices are increasing and the situation of the employees is critical.

T H E E N D

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SECRET

AIDE MEMOIRE

On conditions in Bolzano Province from the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission to the President of the Council of Ministers

1 A number of problems have arisen in connection with the German speaking proportion of the population of BOLZANO and of certain other small areas - MENA in Trento Province, CORTINA D'AMPELLO in Belluno Province and TARVISIO in Udine Province - and I should be glad to receive the views of the Italian Government thereon at the earliest possible moment.

Election Registers

2 As you are no doubt aware, the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939 made provision for Italian subjects of German descent, resident or originating in those parts, to opt for German nationality and to emigrate to the Reich.

Broadly speaking there are four classes to be considered:

- a) Those who exercised their option and emigrated, but have now returned to Italy;
- b) Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
- c) Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian registers, but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
- d) Those whose names appear in both the Italian and German registers.

The views of the Italian Government are requested as to which of these classes should be included in the electoral rolls about to be compiled in BOLZANO.

Educational Policy

3 Inasmuch as well over 50% of the population in BOLZANO are German speaking, it is a matter for determination as to what educational policy should be followed with regard to them. The schools are at present closed for the summer vacation but the views of the Italian Government are urgently requested.

Expiration

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It has been pointed out that Allied Military Government General Order

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Expatriation

4 It has been pointed out that Allied Military Government General Order No. 35 (which adopts the principles of DML 459) is not entirely appropriate to meet the situation in BOLZANO as many persons are Nazis rather than Fascists and accordingly an amendment is being made to this Order to cover this point. The Government may also consider it desirable to amend DML 459 so as to ensure that in this area no loophole exists which may prevent Nazis from being expatriated.

The Commission's amendment to GO 35 will be handed to the Italian Government for its guidance as soon as completed.

CA Section
5 July 45

- cc: CHIEF Commr
- EXEC. Commr.
- CA SEC.
- POL ADVSR (A)
- POL ADVSR (B)

See 416

GO 35 + amendment of 5 July 45
forwarded to Italian Govt
10/7/45
814

CONFIDENTIALMINUTEScc 1540
JUL 8 1945CONDITIONS IN BOLZANO PROVINCE - DECISIONS

23

ACTION

I refer to my Memorandum dated 1 July 45 on Conditions in BOLZANO Province.

This Memorandum was considered by the Chief Commissioner at his Political Advisers' Conference on Monday 2 Jul 45 and the following decisions on para 4 of the Memorandum are recorded:

- (a) R.C., VENEZIE Region will be instructed to prepare Electoral Lists in BOLZANO, commencing 15 Jul 45 but supplementary instructions will be issued to him when the views of the Italian Government, mentioned below, have been ascertained.

L.C. S/C: to Dispatch Exec. Memo No. 5 dated 1 Jul 45 forthwith.

L.G. S/C: to prepare Aide Memoire for presentation to the Prime Minister.

The Chief Commissioner will ask for the view of the Prime Minister as to what classes, set out in para 2 of the Memorandum should be included on the Electoral Lists.

- (b) and (c) On paras (b) and (c) the British and American Political Advisers have agreed to send forthwith for instructions from their Governments on this point.

- (d) The Chief Commissioner decided that no steps should be taken at the moment with regard to the transfer to Germany of any of the classes mentioned in para 2 of the Memo but the Political Advisers will include this problem in the instructions they propose to obtain from their Governments.

D.P. & R. S/C: to prepare a signal to AFHQ for my approval.

With regard to the class set out in para 3 of the Memorandum the Chief Commissioner decided that the matter should be taken up through AFHQ with SHAEF with a view to the return to Germany of this class.

- (e) The policy as to Education in BOLZANO is one for the Italian Government and this question should be raised in the Aide Memoire to be prepared under (a) above.

L.G. S/C:

D.P. & R. S/C: to prepare a draft signal for my approval.

- (f) SHAEF is to be asked to stop the flow of those returning from Germany, through AFHQ.

- (g) The Italian Government to be advised to amend D.L.L. 159 so as to include Nazis as well as Fascists. This is to be included in the Aide Memoire under (c) above.

L.G. S/C:

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the Prime Minister.

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L.G. S/C. :

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D.P. & R. S/C : to prepare a draft signal for my approval.

(f) SHAEF is to be asked to stop the flow of those returning from Germany, through AFHQ. **1027**

L.G. S/C. :

(g) The Italian Government to be advised to amend D.L.L. 159 so as to include Nazis as well as Fascists. This is to be included in the Aide Memoire under (e) above.

Legal S/C. :

CIA to prepare letter for my approval.

R.C., VENEZIE Region to be instructed to set up Special Assize Courts in BOLZANO as soon as possible.

[Signature]
G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.,
VP CA Section.

DISTRIBUTION : Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
Polad (A)
Polad (B)
Chief Legal Adviser,
Local Government Sub-Commission,
Displaced Persons & Repatriation S/C.

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SECRET

CC 1525-

JUL 1 RECD

MEMORANDUM ON CONDITIONS IN BOLZANO PROVINCE

- 1 The Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939 was intended to eliminate the German-speaking minority south of the Italo-Austrian border. It therefore made provision for Italian subjects of German descent, resident or originating in those parts, to opt for German nationality and to emigrate to the Reich. Although the text of this Agreement has not yet been studied by the Chief Legal Adviser it would appear likely that in order to lose Italian Nationality and to acquire German Nationality it was necessary not only to exercise the option for German nationality but to transfer physically to Germany (See Arts. 8 and 12 of the Accordo). The foregoing also applies to the Provinces of TRENTO, BELLUNO and UDINE where there are small areas (EGNA in Trento Province, CORTINA D'AMPEZZO in Belluno Province and TARVISIO in Udine Province) to which the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement also applies and where the same problems may arise to some extent.
- 2 Numbers, however, exercised their option but did not emigrate; others emigrated but have now returned to their former homes. There appear to be four main classes of people to be considered:
- Those who exercised their option and emigrated but have now returned; (The Provincial Commissioner also complains that large numbers are daily returning and claiming to be Italian citizens.)
 - Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
 - Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian Registers but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
 - Those whose names appear in both the Italian and the German registers. It has been said that about 220,000 persons exercised the option but only 75,000 actually emigrated to Germany, many of whom have since returned. These figures are not, however, authoritative but are given merely to indicate the size of the problem.
- 3 In addition about 4,000 German civilian administrators are in BOLZANO Province, many of them living in the houses of Italians who are now returning.
- 4 In these circumstances the following problems arise:

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- (a) Those who exercised their option and emigrated but have now returned; (The Provincial Commissioner also complains that large numbers are daily returning and claiming to be Italian citizens.)
- (b) Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
- (c) Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian Registers but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
- (d) Those whose names appear in both the Italian and the German registers. It has been said that about 220,000 persons exercised the option but only 75,000 actually emigrated to Germany, many of whom have since returned. These figures are not, however, authoritative but are given merely to indicate the size of the problem.

3 In addition about 4,000 German civilian administrators are in BOLZANO Province, many of them living in the houses of Italians who are now returning.

1014/12

In these circumstances the following problems arise:

- (a) Are electoral lists to be prepared in BOLZANO and if so, what instructions are to be given with regard to the inclusion of the various classes included in para 2 above?
- (b) Ought the Italian Government to be advised to denounce the Hitler-Mussolini pact?
- (c) Ought any fresh offer to permit inhabitants to emigrate to Germany or Austria be made?
- (d) Ought any immediate steps to be taken to transfer to Germany any of the classes in paras 2 and 3 above?
- (e) What policy should be laid down as to the treatment of these persons pending solution of these problems and particularly what educational policy should be followed, as well over 50% of the population in BOLZANO are German speaking.

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- 2 -

ATHQ(f) Should any attempt be made to stop the return from Germany of those in para 2 above? See 85

(g) Epuration has not commenced, Special Assize Courts have not been introduced and it is believed that Italian legislation has not been implemented - should this state of affairs continue?

5 Many of these problems have been considered at a number of conferences during the past week which have been attended by some or all of the following: Executive Commissioner, Poled (A), Poled (B), VP CA Section, C.L.A., and R.C. VENEZIE Region and Local Government Sub-Commission, and it is considered that the Chief Commissioner should preside over a meeting as soon as possible to lay down policy in these matters. The matter is urgent because the preparation of electoral lists is due to start on 15 July 45.

6 The following recommendations are made:

As to (a) - It is felt especially by Polads that electoral lists should be prepared in BOLZANO and other affected communes as in all the rest of the North of Italy. Any differentiation would give rise to alarm and unrest as to the eventual fate of this province. The question as to who should be included on the electoral list is a matter of Italian municipal law but in view of the urgency and delicacy of the matter it is recommended that AMG instruct the Prefect to order Sindaci to include all those in para 2 who were of Italian nationality immediately prior to the Hitler-Mussolini pact; they can always be subsequently struck off the list but they cannot, under Italian law, subsequently be put on. The Polads propose that they should signal their respective Governments stating what is being done and asking for urgent instructions as to the advice which should be given to the Italian Government in this matter.

As to (b) and (c) - These are matters on which the advice of the U.K. and U.S. Governments should be sought. The R.C. VENEZIE Region believes that denunciation of the pact is most advisable but obviously many considerations arise which can only be determined by the U.K. and U.S. Governments.

If you agree, the Polads propose to send a signal to their respective Governments, asking for an urgent decision on these matters. 1022

As to (d) - It is felt that no steps should be taken at the present except with regard to those mentioned in para 6.

As to (e) - It is felt especially by Polads that electoral lists should be prepared in BOLZANO and other affected communes as in all the rest of the North of Italy. Any differentiation would give rise to alarm and unrest as to the eventual fate of this province. The question as to who should be included on the electoral list is a matter of Italian municipal law but in view of the urgency and delicacy of the matter it is recommended that AMG instruct the Prefect to order Sindaci to include all those in para 2 who were of Italian nationality immediately prior to the Hitler-Mussolini pact; they can always be subsequently struck off the list but they cannot, under Italian law, subsequently be put on. The Polads propose that they should signal their respective Governments stating what is being done and asking for urgent instructions as to the advice which should be given to the Italian Government in this matter.

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If you agree, the Polads propose to send a signal to their respective Governments, asking for an urgent decision on these matters.

As to (d) - It is felt that no steps should be taken at the present except with regard to those mentioned in para 3. There seems no reason why, after consultation with SHAEF, they should not be treated as displaced persons and returned to Italy under the existing scheme. If so, immediate instructions for the registration of this class must be given.

As to (e) - Trouble may be expected but a liberal policy of tolerance to German speaking inhabitants is being adopted by A.M.G. and the Prefect and this policy should be continued. Teaching in schools should be as in other provinces but German should be permitted in those schools where the proportion of German speakers justifies it.

As to (f) - It is recommended that SHAEF be asked to stop the return of this class pending clarification of policy. It is a matter on which the Governments should be consulted.

✓
P.F.H.

Alfred
Gardner

P.F.H.

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- 3 -

As to (E) - Instructions for the issue of a revised G.O. 35 so as to include Nazis have been given. The reason given for the failure to constitute Special Courts of Assize is that someone who had collaborated with the enemy might claim to be a German citizen under the Hitler-Mussolini pact and this question might come up for debate before the Court of Cassation. Until the Governments have decided their policy on nationality it may be better to leave the matter in abeyance though there is much to be said for the setting up of these Courts. No reason is given by R.C. VENEZIA for the non-implementation of Italian legislation and I do not see any reason why such legislation should be excluded.

1 Jul 45

U.S. Benvenuti 1/6/45
 h G.R. UPJOHN, Brig..
 VP CA Section.

Distribution : Chief Commissioner,
 Executive Commissioner,
 Poland (A)
 Poland (B)
 Chief Legal Adviser,
 Local Government Sub-Commission,
 Displaced Persons & Repatriation Sub-Commission.

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1 Jul 45

G.R. DEJOHN, ERIS.,
VP CA Section.

Distribution : Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
Polad (A)
Polad (B)
Chief Legal Adviser,
Local Government Sub-Commission,
Displaced Persons & Repatriation Sub-Commission.

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RC VENEZIA REGION

956

30 June 45

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD YOUR LETTER ROGER ZRAY ONE SLANT LOVE EASY SLANT BAKER OBOE LOVE SLANT
CHARLIE SLANT ZERO ONE OF TWO ZERO JUNE PD

PARA TWO PD YOU ARE AUTHORISED TO DRAW UP AND PUBLISH SUITABLE ORDER TO REPLACE GENERAL
ORDER THREE FIVE IN BOLZANO PD

PARA TO RC VENEZIA REGION FROM ALCOH CITE ACCAS PARA

PARA THREE PD PARAGRAPH ELEVEN OF THAT LETTER DOES NOT AGREE WITH PARAGRAPH FOUR OF YOUR
MONTHLY REPORT FOR MAY IN SAYING THAT NO ITALIAN LEGISLATION HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED PD
LEGAL SUBCOMMISSION HAVE RECEIVED NO RECEIPTS FOR OFFICIAL GAZETTES FROM TRENTO CMA BELLUNO
CMA BOLZANO PD PLEASE CLARIFY POSITION AND STATE REASONS FOR NON IMPLEMENTATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

437

A.D. Bonham-Carter Lt Col

NICHOLAS FODIN@20
CWO USA
Ass Adjutant

812

1014/22

JUN 29 1945

cc

Tel: 456201

29 June 1945.

Ref: 595/9/SC.

SUBJECT: Treatment of Germans.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
LIGURIA Region.

1. Reference to your letter R/0183 dated 15 June 1945, I have caused inquiries to be made as to the treatment of Germans in BOLZANO, MERANO and CORTINA and Venetia Region inform me, I am glad to say, that the situation portrayed in your letter, if it existed at all, is now long out of date.
2. German wounded are being removed from the hotels and I understand that generally speaking Allied officers are living in comfortable quarters and have transport which is well up to standard.
3. Regional Commissioner Venetia Region adds that visitors to BERGAMO and BELLUNO Provinces need entertain no doubt as to who won the war.


 Brigadier,
 Executive Commissioner.

1019

1014/ce




RESTRICTED

2949
JUN 261708B

E/6985
JUN 271555B
PRIORITY

AMG 5 ARMY CITE 597
ACTION ALOOM FOR DISPER RPTD AMG BOLZANO INFO

RESTRICTED.

1. Provincial Commissioner ZANON advises that numerous Italians who took option of German nationality in 1939 are now returning to ALTO ADIGE area stating to Allied authorities that they are Italian.
2. Provincial Commissioner reports this causing unfavourable repercussions and requests SHAEF asked to prohibit.

DIST

ACTION: Disper & Rep S/C
INFO: Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
File 2
Float

1014/10

1018

~~RESTRICTED~~

80

~~RESTRICTED~~

JUNE NPT

E/6961
JUNE 27 1040B
PRIORITY

5 ARMY CITE OUR 598

ALCOM FOR DISPER INFO: FREEDOM FOR G5

RESTRICTED

1. Approx 4000 German civilians in BOLZANO area many in houses of Italians who are coming back.
2. Please give policy regarding disposal of German civilians as Provincial Commissioner BOLZANO wishes to have them removed.
3. Presume this is question for higher authorities.

Dist

Action - Disper SC
 Info - Chief Commissioner
 CA Sec
 File 2
 Float

1017

1014/cw

79

~~RESTRICTED~~

CONFIDENTIALFX 95741
JUN 191820BR/5856
JUN 201140B
ROUTINE

AFHQ, SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHGEG

MAIN 8TH ARMY FOR AMG AUSTRIA, INFO SHAEP MAIN FOR G-5, 15 ARMY GROUP FOR
USCCC, ALCOM ROME

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. Indigenous resources AUSTRIA.
2. Letter R-16-AU dated 7 April 1945 from this HQ addressed to USCCC and G-5 Task Force AUSTRIA, British and American, suggested a coordinating committee for indigenous food supplies be set up in AUSTRIA to adjust local resources available in different zones.
3. In order to utilize local resources to a maximum it is believed that such a committee consisting of AMG supply officers of US/French and British zones should now be established to screen requirements for both areas with a view to ensuring that the ration scales utilized are similar and that all local surpluses in US/French and British zones are used to best advantage.
4. Request SHAEP to instruct USA AMG along similar lines. Committee could be finalized at conference CASERTA 25 June.

1018

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Econ Sec 4
 INFO: Chief Commissioner
 Food S/C 2
 File 2
 Float

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78

1014/CC

JUN 13 RECD

FOR ACTION FIVE ARMY RPTD FOR INFO 15 ARMY GROUP AND VERSES SECTION

9652

12 June 45

OF PRIORITY

59a

1118 2

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD URGENT DELAY IN RESPONDING YOUR SIGNAL HIGH ONE ONE EIGHT OF MAY TWO ZERO BUT POINTS RAISED REQUIRED REPARATION OTHER AUTHORITIES PD

PARA TWO FOR ACTION FIVE ARMY FOR ONE RPTD FOR INFO 15 ARMY GROUP FOR OFFICE FIVE COM AND VERSES SECTION FROM HQ ALCON WITH AGEXO PAREN

PARA TWO PD AS INTERIM POLICY CONSIDERED WE SHOULD AID-PT FOLLOWING MEASURES CLN YOUR PARA ONE DASH ITALIAN SHOULD BE FIRST LANGUAGE IN ALL SCHOOLS PD GERMAN MAY BE USED IF ASKED FOR BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS AN ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE PD YOUR PARA TWO PAREN ALE PAREN AND PAREN BAKER PAREN DASH SHOULD BE INTERMIXED WITH OTHER GERMAN CIVILIANS PD CHARLIE ITEM CHARLIE OR FOX SUGAR SUGAR TO ARRANGE PD YOUR PARA TWO PAREN CHARLIE PAREN AND PAREN FDOG PAREN DASH TO BE TREATED AS 1845 PERSONS REQUIRING EVACUATION TO GERMANY PD THIS MAY TAKE SOME TIME TO ARRANGE PD EXEMPTION CAN BE GIVEN TO INDIVIDUALS IN TWO PAREN DASH PAREN ON RECOMMENDATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES PD

PARA THREE PD THE INDIGENOUS INHABITANTS SHOULD BE TREATED AS ITALIAN CITIZENS AND ALL QUESTION OF SEPARATION AND CHANGE OF NATIONALITY SHOULD BE FIRMLY SUPPRESSED PD

1014/101

Cont'd Page 2.

77

9692

Page 2

YOUR PROVISIONAL DIRECTIVE IN THIS RESPECT APPEARS SOUND PD
PARA FOUR PD INFORM ME BY SIGNAL MESSAGE APPROVED UNDER YOUR PARA TWO

1014

Office of Base Commissioner

735

/s/ E. TALBOT
LT Col.

77

EWS/BJD

CC 1014

11 June 1945

TO : Regional Commissioners,
 LOMBARDIA Region,
 PIEMONTE Region,
 LIGURIA Region.

In the interim period before Phase II comes into operation, I am sending Colonel FISKE, Deputy Executive Commissioner, as my representative to interpret the policy of the Allied Commission to the Commanding Generals of 5th Army and IV Corps, and to assist them in every way possible in connection with the coordination of civil affairs in the Army Area.

He will work in close contact with the Regional Commissioners but the channels of communication will be from the Allied Commission direct to Regional Commissioners and vice versa, with copies to 5th Army and IV Corps.

Until Phase II is established, RCs in North Italy will be in the same position as AMG 5th and 8th Armies; that is to say, they will be under the military command of the Commanding Generals, 5th and 8th Armies and will receive their functional directions from the Allied Commission through the channels of communication set forth in the preceding paragraph.

1st Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief Commissioner

1013

Copy to: SCAO, AMG 5th Army
 SCAO, AMG IV Corps
 EXEC. COMM. R.
 CA SEC.
 ECON. SEC.
 CC FILE
 SCAO, 8 ARMY

SCAO, 13 CORPS
 RC, EMILIA REGION
 RC, VENEZIA REGION
 DIRECTOR, AIR FORCES S/C
 DIRECTOR, LAND FORCES S/C
 CHIEF, NAVAL S/C

N.B. All correspondence on this subject is filed in 100/00.

76

COMMUNICATIONS S/C
 WMD & IPOW S/C

(copy to file)
 10/14/45

SECRET

P.D to C.C.

141
JUN 091458B

E/4337
JUN 091705B
PRIORITY

HQ IV CORPS FROM HOPKINSON
HQ AL COM

JUN 9 1951
Cc 1812

SECRET.

Col FISKE reports that there have been minor incidents between troops of FOLGERE GRUPPO who were recently moved into BOLZANO Province and German speaking population. Although it appears to be nothing serious at present I think it is a good instance of a case in which ALLIED COMMISSION ought to have been consulted by Allied command before and on political aspects of movement of Italian troops. You may care to take up question of principle using above as example.

DIST


- ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
- INFO: Chief Commissioner
- SO to Chief Commissioner 2
- CA Sec
- Econ Sec
- Polad (A)
- Polad (B)
- File

U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador

1014/c



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RESTRICTEDCAS/597
JUNE 081130BE/4175
JUNE 081735B
ROUTINE15 ARMY GROUP
AFHQ CITE FHGEG INFO ALGOM

RESTRICTED

1. Reference your FX 87168.
2. Following reported by 5th ARMY:

Further Reurad CAS/589. Additional and complete investigation discloses purchases except fresh vegetable for diabetic hospitalized patients stopped over 2 weeks ago. BOLZANO all shops marked off limits to Germans. Provincial Commission BOLZANO Province reports as follows: Three and one half weeks ago Germans in 2 towns in question were purchasing considerable amounts merchandise. All shops were immediately closed for period 2 weeks. Upon opening were placed off limits to Germans. No purchase by Germans since that date. Commanding General 88 Division confirms no purchase by Germans in BOLZANO and MERANO or elsewhere in this area. Provost Marshall reports no purchases by Germans in BOLZANO or MERANO. No Germans allowed to circulate between hospitals in town MERANO without proper pass. Germans found in either BOLZANO or MERANO without pass are arrested. No Germans allows (allowed?) in shops and cards in shop windows indicate off limits to Germans. Hospitals town MERANO necessitate traffic by Germans between facilities which cover most of town.

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

10/14/44

75

RESTRICTED

2. Report cited of large purchases by Germans is considered either outdated or erroneous. Action being continued to insure to unauthorized purchases will be made by Germans.'

Dist

Info-Action - Public Safety SC
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm
Econ Sec
CA Sec
Finance SC
File

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RESTRICTED

SECRETM 1087
JUN 082010BE/4220
JUN 090830B
OF PRIORITY

MAIN 8 ARMY FROM MIL GOVT STAFF (AUSTRIA)

ACTION FREEDOM FOR G-5 SECTION, ROME FOR ALLIED COMMISSION (AUSTRIA), HQ
ALCOM FOR ACEXC, FILFOT FOR USGCC (AUSTRIA) ALCOM PLEASE PASS TO ALLIED
COMMISSION

SECRET.

Sitrep AUSTRIA.

1. POLITICAL. Reference sitrep 30 May. Position of Austrian FREIKORPS under MACKH has been further considered by MACKH raised difficulties about the disbandment of the FREIKORPS because he could not get round to see all the members. It has now been arranged that a German speaking officer will escort him round and take with him copies of a statement disbanding the FREIKORPS and offering its members employment in the police. Full investigations being made following request from FREEDOM.

2. PTT. The post offices in KARPEN are being reopened on 4 June for savings bank and limited financial services.

3. DP. The total DPS in camps on 2 June BAS 16,803. 8,100 DPS have been evacuated to ITALY during the week end in addition 5,600 Russians have been despatched to WOLFSBERG through DP camps.

4. STOCKPILE. Stockpile in AUSTRIA is now 1,000 tons approx.

5. AGRICULTURE. 2,000 surrendered persons are now working on farms.

6. LABOUR. Approx 15,000 persons are in receipt of penitions.

1014/100

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SECRETDISTINFO-ACTION: ACABRIT
Ex Commissioner
INFO: Chief Commissioner, CASEC
FROM: SAC. File

Ref: 6519/EC.

4 June 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

file
225-7

Thank you for your letter 4452 of 28 May 1945 enclosing reports on the political and economic situation in Northern Italy.

I have read these reports with great interest and I am most grateful to your Excellency for having sent them to me.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

1014/ce
(copy in 225-7)

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

1014/ce

73

JUN 3 1946
1632.

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

S.D. to C.C.

Originator's Reference: 1083
 Date/Time of Origin: JUN 021000B
 Message Centre No: E/3486
 Date Time Rec'd: JUN 031400B
 Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: LOMBARDIA REGION FROM LUSH AND FISKE
 TO: ALLIED COMMISSION PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL STONE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. We are disturbed at news of replacement of 88 United States Division by Italian VOLIGHERA Division. Letter although welcomed townspeople will be resented by large rural Tyrolean population. Suggest matter be discussed at high level with object of maintaining 88 Division in Tyrolean area for present. See also my cable No reference 1082.

①
 71
 HEADQUARTERS
 3 - JUN 1946
 A.I.C.

DIST

ACTION: SC to Chief Commissioner
 INFO: Executive Commissioner 2
 File

1014/can

1507

ACTION

Forward Gen Spafford.

②

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

JUN 3 1945
cc. 1030

S.O. T.C.C.

Originator's Reference: 1082
Date/Time of Origin: JUNE 021000

Message Centre No: E/2487
Date Time Rec'd: JUNE 031400
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: BOMBARDIA REGION FROM JASH AND PISLE
TO : ALLIED COMMISSION FOR ADMIRAL STONE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. There is in area centred on BOLZANO Province a vast amount of Italian material both industrial plant and consumable goods removed from all over ITALY and stored here by Germans. This is now rapidly disappearing. The problems facing us are fourfold (A) guarding the dumps, (b) making inventories, (c) deciding distribution, (d) effecting distribution.

3. Question of guarding is a local problem which demands presence of Allied troops. We understand that 88 DIV is about to be replaced by VOLGHERRA Italian Division. This will mean more rapid disappearance of much material.

4. The other 3 problems demand in our opinion the immediate despatch of a large permanent and competent Italian Mission with Allied components, self supporting as regards clerical assistance and transport preferably this should be installed by GRONCHI. This mission would effect full inventory in conjunction with German experts now here and would then proceed with problems. (c) and (d) Provincial Commissioner would arrange accomodation up to 50 but the work should be taken out of his hands and placed fully on to the Mission. 5 ARMY would welcome immediate visit GRONCHI.

5. The problem is urgent and most important for the future economy of ITALY.

71

HEADQUARTERS
3 - JUN 1945
A. C.

See 72

DIST

ACTION - SO TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER 2
INFO - EX COMMISSIONER 2
FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1014 / 7101
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CONFIDENTIAL.

JUN 5 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
• APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner
+++++

Ref: 806/EC

2 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Notes on Tour - AMG 5th Army.

TO : Distribution below.

1. Public Safety. Lieut.Colonel BYE, Chief Public Safety Officer, will probably have to go to hospital for long treatment for some affection of his back. Colonel Sutherland asks for a replacement. In my opinion a replacement should not be necessary in view of the fact that the Regions should control their own public security machinery. Civil Affairs Section to decide.

2. Displaced Persons. Col. Sutherland asks for an authoritative member of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission to be attached to 5th Army. It is questionable whether he should be at MILAN or 5th Army but it is obvious that a coordinating officer is necessary with the power to take decisions somewhere.

3. General Order No.41. Colonel Sutherland raised the question of General Order No.41 which was issued with an explanatory note that it was to be applied in accordance with instructions issued or about to be issued. Colonel Sutherland has received no instructions and is at a loss how to apply the order.

1084/EC

MSL/JG.

MSL 1905
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION: Chief Commissioner
AMG 5th Army
CA Section
Econ Section
File
Float

70

JUN 7 RECD
CC 1228Report on visit to Provinces of Trento and Bolzano.1. BOLZANO

The Province of Bolzano today contains about 320,000 inhabitants apart from the German troops still remaining there and Allied Occupying Forces. This is necessarily a rough estimate as there are a certain number of refugees coming through and a very large number of wives and families of German officials still living there who would not normally be classified as residents. Of this figure it is estimated that about two-thirds are of German stock; the remainder are Italians. The country folk are mostly of German race and language though there are a fair number of Italian landowners. Bolzano city itself contains a large majority of Italians and the Italian flag is prominently displayed throughout the town. The other towns are about half and half. From reliable reports received it appears that after the signature of the Armistice in September 1943 a very considerable effort was made by the German to Germanize the Province. This work was entrusted to the "German Commission for the Italo-German Accords for the Emigration of Local German-speaking Citizens" made up of local Nazis. The Italian prefect was replaced by a Nazi gauleiter, Joseph Hofer, and the Italian mayors were substituted by German Commissioners all chosen from the German-speaking inhabitants of the Province (Allogeni) who had opted for Germany before the war. In addition to these administrative offices, appointments of Allogeni were made to all municipal and economic posts including the Bank of Italy and the Financial and Fiscal administrations. The three Provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno were united under the heading of "Zone for the Defense of the Pre-Alps" and placed under the High Commissioner Franz Hofer, the Nazi gauleiter of Innsbruck. The German language was imposed as the official language, the use of Italian being only permitted in the larger centres where the majority of the population were Italian. The names of the streets were substituted by German names and German was used for all administrative and commercial purposes.

2. Of the 185,000 persons of German race who had opted for emigration to the Reich in 1937 only a part had gone and with the imposition of direct German rule on the Province a considerable number returned. Conversely, a large number of Italians are reported to have been ^{100%} sent from the Province for work in the Reich. It is expected that most of these will return in the near future.

3. General compulsory service was imposed by the Germans in the Province. A large contingent are said to have been enrolled directly in the Wehrmacht and the remainder of the Allogeni were embodied in a local militia known as the Landwehr, who were responsible for police functions and who were also organized in battalions against Italian partisans. The members of the Italian population were forced to work on German war production. I enclose a copy of a report from the Psychological Warfare Branch on the relations of the Germans with the inhabitants of Bolzano.

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/s/

- 2 -

4. Apart from this, the treatment by the Germans of the inhabitants of the Province, both German and Italian, appears to have been reasonably good. They were well supplied with food and although there were certainly exceptions the Italians do not appear to have been molested. The main object of the Germans was to keep the Province as quiet as possible so as to safeguard their lines of communication and to enable them to turn it, as they did, into a vast repository of loot of every variety brought up from Italy. In this connection it may be of interest to note that the head of the local German Armaments Organisation before leaving Bolzano informed the Provincial Commissioner, Lieut. Colonel McBratney, that he estimated that the total volume of Italian machinery imported into the Province by the Germans amounted to the vast sum of three billion dollars.
5. On the liberation of the territory, the first duty of Allied Military Government was to replace the existing Nazi gauleiter, mayors and other functionaries by Italians and non-Nazi Germans. This was accomplished fairly rapidly in the case of the higher posts, but took some time in the lower grades. The Prefect, Colonel de Angelis, had been selected by the CHAI Milan to approach the difficult problem of German and Italian relations in the Province in a wise and liberal manner. A German-speaking sub-Prefect was appointed, and on 24th May when I visited Bolzano the Prefect handed in to the Provincial Commissioner a list of appointees for subordinate posts in the Province. Over 50 per cent of the appointees were German-speaking. The Provincial Commissioner and the Prefect sanctioned the appearance of a German newspaper "Bolzener" alongside of the Italian paper run by the five Italian parties of the CHAI. Authority was given for the re-opening of German language schools and it was laid down that signs should be posted in both German and Italian languages. In Bolzano city itself a large number of the streets were changed back to Italian names but I noticed that in most of the smaller towns the German names were allowed to remain. The Prefect informed me that in his opinion this policy was the only means of preserving Bolzano Province for Italy.
6. The Allogeni were allowed to form their own party, known as "The South Tyrolean People's Party". A translation of the party programme is annexed. The only condition laid down by the Provincial Commissioner in authorising the formation of the party was that no separatist agitation could be permitted during the period that the Province remained under AMG administration.
7. According to reports received the majority of the German-speaking inhabitants desire the re-union of the Province with Austria, but part of them would be prepared to remain under some form of local autonomy in a democratic Italy. The Italians naturally wish to retain the Italian connection. Considering the dangers inherent in the situation there have been remarkably few clashes between Germans and Italians though there was some trouble with local Italian partisans in the early stages who resented what they regarded as being the too favourable treatment accorded to the German forces. I enclose a copy of the programme put forward by the local Committee of Liberation presided over by the Prefect, issued on the 23rd May. Since that date two representatives of the South Tyrolean People's Party have been added to the Committee. I enclose a copy of a memorandum addressed to the Provincial Commissioner by the Head of

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- 3 -

the party setting forth their views on the situation. I believe the situation described therein, insofar as it concerns the measures said to have been taken by the local Italian authorities against the German-speaking members of the population, to have been to a great extent remedied by the action taken by the Prefect in consultation with the whole CIV referred to in paragraph 5 above. Colonel McFateley has asked that a special officer should be attached to him for the purpose of watching and reporting on the political situation. I am endeavouring to arrange this.

2. TRENTO

1. The position in Trento is entirely different. Except for ten German-speaking Communes which since 1936 have been administered as part of Bolzano province, the vast majority of the 400,000 inhabitants are Italian. The Provincial Commissioner, Major Levin, informed us that he had had no racial problems. The CIV, which consists of the usual five parties under a locally selected Prefect, is functioning satisfactorily and except for a tendency to continue to issue orders, which he is tactfully discouraging, they have cooperated very satisfactorily. Communism in both Trento and Bolzano provinces appears to be weak.

B. H. H. H.
 FOR S. L. G. A. HOPKINSON
 Political Adviser (SR)
 HQ Allied Commission.

2nd June 1945

Distribution:

British Ambassador,
 U.S. Ambassador,
 Chief Commissioner, AC, ✓
 Executive Commissioner, AC,
 Vice-President, CA Bochn.,
 U.S. Polad,
 British Resident Minister,
 British Political Adviser (Austria).

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Information of S.
Special Party

XIX-35

ALTO ADIGE

XIX -37

Typewrite -

XIX - 4D

APPENDIX ASecretAppendix VIII to report on Patriot Activities in Region XIITHE ATTITUDE OF THE ALTO ALESSINI (DELEGATES OF THE ALTO ARCE) TOWARDS ITALY.

1. At the outbreak of war between Germany, France, and England the Fascist Government freely consented to the Alto Alessini joining the German army, keeping the same rank held in the Italian army.
2. When Italy subsequently entered the war they were employed as interpreters or as liaison duties with Italian departments, but in reality they were used as informers. From 1933 until the signing of the Steel Pact, Germany used all her propaganda to destroy all their sympathy with Italy and even after that date the propaganda continued (in more veiled form) to show Italy up, and all things concerning her, in the worst possible light.
3. Germany made use of all A.A., including civilians, useful on account of their perfect knowledge of Italian, and scattered them in various towns so forming very active "cells". Many of these people Italianised their names so that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain their true origin by their documents.
4. After July 25th, all German Division massed on the Italian frontier and those in transit from Lubiana were essentially composed of A.A. Speaking to Italian soldiers the latter were told that if they continued the war until the spring, victory would be theirs!
5. From July 25th until September 8th the command of the XI Army Corps issued various orders: To bar all frontier passes so as to prevent the entry of German troops. The deployment of Artillery was considerable. 1^o Artillery Scaziatoridelle Alpi with the batteries 2^o and 3^o of 100/17 7^o 8^o 9^o of 75/18 were assigned objectives in German territory and ordered to open fire at the first German attempt to enter Italy. **1901** In obedience to a second order (given by whom?) the batteries retired to their barracks and there on September 8th fell into German hands.
6. The Alto Alessini were then employed in concentration camps as guards and as interpreters and their behaviour towards internees was far worse than that of any German soldier. They were also employed in Italy at all operational commands at OF and as Gestapo Agents.
7. Their knowledge of Italian made it easy for them to get in contact with Italians and also to infiltrate into various underground patriot movements. They then proceeded to denounce all names of members and particulars of the organisations. It is a fact that the A.A. more than other soldiers were very keen on finding civilian clothing and it is believed that the Germans let them get out of fighting in order to use them as "saboteurs" and to get information. Many have identity cards taken
/from

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...have been ...
...any ...

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(P/W)

APPENDIX B

BOZEN 7th May 1945

Memorandum on the foundation of the "Party of the South Tyrolean People".

The spokesmen of the South Tyrolean people founded the "Party of the South Tyrolean People" on the 7th May at Bozen with the object of uniting in this party all the South Tyrolean people with the exception of Fascist and Nazi elements.

2. The programme of this party is as follows:

(i) To defend the rights of the South Tyrolean people as regards their culture, language and economy on a basis of democratic principles after 25 years of Fascist and Nazi oppression.

(ii) To assist in maintaining peace and order in the country.

(iii) To authorise its representatives to lay before the Allied Governments in a legal manner the claim of the South Tyrolean people to the right of self-determination.

3. The following were unanimously elected as representatives:

Leader of the Party: Erich MOHR, Bozen.

Committee members:

Josef WENZ of Marling
 Doctor Franz EGGER, of Lana
 Alois RUFF, Bozen
 Leo Von FASSA, Mitterwald
 Hans BEASLER, Niederdorf

The party has its seat at Bozen.

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APPENDIX BTo the Directorate of the Parties represented in the CEMAI

ALTO ADIGE: The fundamental premise for the study of the position is that the Brenner Frontier is not a matter for discussion by the Governments of the United Nations.

2. In Alto Adige the CEM of Bolzano has at the present time achieved the status of provisional government as a result of the military (partisan) activities of the clandestine liberation movement. The political and social conditions which obtain in the other provinces of Northern Italy according to the directives of the Federal Government do not correspond however to the needs of this situation.
3. The composition of the population which now consists of two South Tyrolean to every one Italian is a determining factor in the policy which the Bolzano CEM has adopted from the beginning and is now submitted for approval to the CEMAI.
4. It should be born in mind that the South Tyrolean and Italian elements have not yet elaborated the organic form of an agreed democratic action. Both retain their respective positions as opposing nationalities only now obliged to work in common under the orders of the Allied authorities within the limits of the economic and administrative needs of the area. After the centuries old rule of the Hapsburgs and the 20 years of Fascist oppression and Nazi reaction, the temper of the inhabitants is still too high to permit the consideration of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta decisions as the sole real basis of the Europe of tomorrow.
5. The Bolzano CEM proposes to lead the Alto Adige Region through the difficulties arising from the co-existence of these two nationalities in a territory exhibited by the excesses and the sufferings of war towards a democratisation of both the Italian and South Tyrolean groups in a strictly European sense.
6. The Bolzano CEM is convinced that it is the strict duty of every truly democratic organization of Government to approach and solve the problem of German minorities not on the basis of national compromises but by a juridical régime which will assure all European minorities absolute equality of rights and obligations under the control of Federal international guarantees.
7. It is in this sense that the CEM of Alto Adige has acted and is continuing to act under the vigilant control of the ~~19708~~ Allied Military Government but such action is far removed from the activities of the Government for Northern Italy. It is now essential on the other hand that this Government should give its active support to this local policy which has put the problem of Alto Adige on the international rather than the national level.
8. Such support is particularly necessary in order to overcome the understandable local opposition which in the continuance of a moral atmosphere impregnated with Fascism takes on the specific form of the defamation of the personal characters of the exponents /of

699a

of our policy. Given therefore the premises of its own notions regarding federation, the Bolzano CEN proposes to tackle the problem in the following manner:

- (i) To promote a policy of union amongst the parties including the South Tyrolean parties aiming at the suppression of nationalistic recriminations by either party during the period of Allied control and to weld the energies of both parties into a conscious common effort for the reconstruction of Alto Adige;
 - (ii) To proceed within the framework of the union of the parties, and therefore on a level higher than the individual parties, to the constitution and development of truly democratic organisations comprising first and foremost cultural bodies (even including athletic ones) which will energetically prepare the ground for that spiritual re-education without which the defeat of Fascism and Nazism is impossible;
 - (iii) Through the constitution of a provincial technical council which will support the best responsible elements amongst Italian and South Tyrolean in the fields of agriculture, industry and commerce, to prepare and realise an organic economic and financial plan for the earliest and most complete administrative and social reorganisation of Alto Adige;
 - (iv) To proceed, bearing in mind Allied directives in the matter, to the most thorough expatriation of Fascist and Nazi elements which even today control various trends of local politics. Each of the two parties, whether Italian or South Tyrolean, will proceed respectively to the purging of Fascists and Nazis; but their work will be controlled by means of a mixed commission which shall give decisions, in controversial cases, ratify proven cases, raise and pass judgment on such cases as have been overlooked.
9. The Bolzano CEN, in the belief that sound democratic forces can substantially contribute to the formation of the political atmosphere in the Alto Adige of tomorrow, trusts that such forces will orientate themselves in the desired democratic sense and leave out of account such historical prejudices as have caused dissension in the past.
10. In the certainty that the aforementioned lines of ¹⁷⁰⁷proceeding correspond to the premises which the Italian Government are preparing to apply within the framework of the new international order desired by the United Nations, the Bolzano CEN proposes to proceed with its task.
- For the Bolzano CEN: Bruno de ANSELIS,
 Ferdinando Visco GHARESI.

Milan 13th May 1945.

69a

South Tyrolese Party

APPENDIX DTo the Allied Military Government,
BOZEN.

Bozen May 19th 1945

Sir,

The status of the South Tyrolese at present has been defined by Colonel Gray indicating that the South Tyrolese should form a party having equal rights with the Italians, with equal prerogatives and duties for both sides and with no ascendancy of one group over the other.

This principle is being continually disregarded by the Italians. The state of affairs formerly created by the Fascist Government and party has not been abolished as we had a right to expect, it has, on the contrary, been reconstructed and reinforced: South Tyrolese officials are being removed without further ado from public and private offices and are being replaced by Italians without the least regard being given to their specific knowledge of the branch of business concerned.

This is the case in banks, provincial and communal offices, public and economic administrations and enterprises such as the Electricity Works of Bozen and Meran. The same situation obtains in the juridical authorities. Italians today are found holding offices of practically all the branches of public life. We have not been consulted before these mostly ex-Fascist Italians were put into office.

The promise of the right to use both languages in this province is not being kept in any branch of public life. People who speak our language in the street, in shops or in transit are continually being insulted by Italians. Our people threaten businessmen with violence and arrest if bi-lingual public notices are not immediately removed. Letters addressed in our language are being crossed out by the postal authorities, placards and inscriptions in our language are being coiled and torn up. In the Prefecture itself all placards in both languages have been substituted by only Italian inscriptions. Offices of any branch do not accept letters in our language. The courts of law do not forward any legal decisions, such as sentences, in our language, with the obvious result that prescription terms and so on are unintentionally disregarded by the people concerned.

The Italian Authorities apparently assume that the Fascist laws and regulations as to the suppression of the local language have to continue.

For the same reason hundreds of Italians are poured into the province from the South, in an attempt to outnumber the local population.

69

population. This tendency is supported by the old Fascist mayors who have been put back into office in many places, for instance in Faleschnafen and Deutschnefen (Nova Levante and Nova Tonente).

Up till now we have passively observed these proceedings, because although we represent a two-thirds majority in this province, we did not want to disturb the public peace. But we cannot continue without making ourselves heard whilst these acts are proceeding under our very eyes. We did not put these facts before you without having tried in single cases to change matters by pointing them out to the Italian authorities, but without any result.

To have the principles fixed by yourselves regarding the treatment of both parties respectively, we propose the following action:

- 1) The UN Leader and Prefect Dr. de Angelis and his advisers may meet the representatives of the South Tyrolean Party under your presidency to consider and establish the following questions.
- 2) A list of all provincial and communal offices, institutions and administrations should be fixed. It should be established in each individual case if the Italian or the South Tyrolean economic and public interests are predominant. The percentage of population in the communes, towns and villages would be considered.
- 3) According to the results either an Italian or a South Tyrolean would take over the office, administration or institution in question; the second place being reserved for a member of the other group.
- 4) The use of both languages in public and economic life, in offices, schools and courts of law, should be officially recognised.

We are looking forward to a decision in this matter as we are certain that the settling of these questions will greatly help to reestablish confidence between the two groups of the population and thus to maintain peace and order.

I am, Sirs,
Yours very respectfully,

1205

(Sgd) E. AMON
Leader of the South Tyrolean Party.

69a

C CONFIDENTIAL.

JUN 5 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 806/KC.

2 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Notes of Tour - LOMBARDIA REGION.

TO : Distribution below.

1. Personnel.

(a) Lieut. Colonel FRANCIS, RPSO, applies for early release. Regional Commissioner recommends and states he can be relieved by Major Fowler. He should be allowed to go.

(b) Lieut. Colonel GILES wishes to be released by 1st Sept. to attend Municipal Elections. He should be allowed to go.

(c) Major DUNCAN also applies but cannot be allowed to go unless he can be replaced.

(d) Colonel HANCOCK tells me that there are several heads of divisions who deserve promotion by virtue of their position. I have told him to put in an overall recommendation.

(e) LOMBARDIA Region has only 50-60 British ORs and require another 25-30. I have given no hope but should like to help them.

2. Industry and Labour. Colonel HANCOCK in discussing the industry and labour situation suggested that it should be possible to arrange for industries to work on commission for such organisations as the Federation of British Industries, some US equivalent, Allied Governments, and UNRRA. The latter, for instance, instead of importing finished goods could import raw materials and have them manufactured here. This should be followed up.

3. Consiglii di Gestione. The Regional Commissioner has had no reply to his letter of 19 May * concerning "Consiglii di Gestione". The North was considerably perturbed the other day by the appearance in the press of an order emanating from Scoccimarro setting up such "consiglii". The RC rightly referred this to HQ and a reply is urgently needed.

*Ref. No. ROO46

MSL/JG.

M. S. [Signature]
— Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION: Chief Commissioner,
RC, LOMBARDIA Region.
CA Sec
Est Sec
Eoon Sec
File
Float

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1004/KC

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

~~SECRET~~ *CC*

JUN 2 RECD

1 June 1945.

Ref/542/125/EC.

SUBJECT: Reports.

TO : R. C. Emilia Region.

Attached are copies of reports received from a secret source on

- (a) Strength of Parties in the Reggio and Parma Areas.
- (b) Personalities in the Reggio and Parma Areas.
- (c) Hidden dumps in the Reggio-Parma Area.

E. Taibot
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

104/ce

[Signature] 1793

(68)

ITALY
POLITICAL

Strength of Parties in the Reggio and Parma Areas.

1. A source who lives in the Reggio area has been given the following figures of Party strengths by Dr. ZANONI, General Secretary of the Deputazione Provinciale :

COMMUNIST PARTY : About 16,000 counting both inscribed members and sympathisers.

SOCIALIST PARTY : About 7,000 counting both inscribed members and sympathisers.

ACTION PARTY : About 200.
2. The same source has been informed by Professor Giuseppe DOSSETTI, an executive member of the Christian Democrat Party that the number of members and sympathisers of his party is 11,000.
3. Another source describing the position of the Parties in PARMA states that as in REGGIO the most powerful are the Christian Democrat and Communist Parties. The Republican Party is small, its membership confined to town dwellers. The Action Party has little following. The Liberal Party, though small is composed of members who are held in esteem by the population. The Socialists are not numerically strong.
4. Many of the Leftist Patriots have not yet joined any particular party but the Communist Party is very active and carrying out substantial recruiting.
5. The Communist Party is also urging mass enrolments of Partisan units in the Italian army. It is the general opinion that the aim of this is to avoid the handing over of arms and disarming of the partisans.

1202

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ITALYPOLITICALSome Personalities in the Reggio Parma Area.1. Provisional Questore Dr. Pietro LOTTI

Dr. LOTTI belongs to no political party but according to source he is suspect owing to his dealings with fascism.

Provisional Vice-Questore Colonel BOTTAPELLI.

Is described by source as a well balanced and serious man. Member of no party.

Provisional Vice-Questore Valeriani DAVIDE.

Member of the Communist Party. Source describes him as an indefatigable organizer of Communist cells among the partisan formations in the mountains.

2. Ferrari DIDIMO (EROS).

Lives in COMPIGNE. General Commissar of the Corps Volontari Liberta. Medium height, strongly built, red hair slightly bald, blue eyes, ruddy complexion. Described by source as a very cunning man, violent, clever but not cultured. Is considered the best Communist propagandist in the area. For a month before the liberation of the Reggio Parma area was spreading anti-British propaganda through the Communist cells he had set up amongst the partisans.

3. Ing. PIANI.

Democratic Christian member of the Reggio C.L.N. Described by source as the most competent man on the Committee and one who has the confidence of the whole people in the area.

4. Aberto Augusto SIDAWIN.

Secretary of the Socialist Federation and member of the ~~the~~ ^{the} working to bring about a fusion between the Socialists and the Communists.

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Democratic Christian member of the Reggio C.I.M. Described by source as the most competent man on the Committee and one who has the confidence of the whole people in the area.

4. Aberto Augusto SIMONIN.

Secretary of the Socialist Federation and member of the ³⁹¹ ~~291~~ Working to bring about a fusion between the Socialists and the Communists.

(68)

ITALYPOLITICAL/MILITARYHidden Arms Dumps in the Reggio - Parma Area.

1. A source in Parma states that Captain RAMIL of 145th Garibaldi Brigade has hidden four 75mm guns and a quantity of ammunition in Castel NOVO MONTI. He is said also to have concealed there large quantities of automatic arms, ammunition and material abandoned by the Germans during their retreat.
2. The parish priest at FOIANO, Don ORLANDINI di SATURNIO, who was leader of the Christian Democrat Brigade "ITALO" has told another source in Reggio that there are ammunition dumps in the old religious hostel at RUMIERO and in a cave at SUCCISO. The parish priest of SUCCISO is said to know the exact location of the latter dump.
3. It is the ^{opinion} ~~xxxx~~ of the senior member of the local O.L.N. that it would be possible to arm 10,000 men in the Parma area and provinces with hidden arms and "arms acquired from other sources."

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TOP SECRET

C. Commissioner

Copy No 2. JUN 2 RECD
CC 1150FX 84698
JUNE 21 10B
1st?E/3288
JUNE 020915B
IMPORTANTAPHQ SIGNED MENARNEY CITE NAGOT
ACTION SHAEF FWD INFO 15 ARMY GROUP

TOP SECRET

Reporting status of plans concerning air elements in US zone AUSTRIA is purpose of this message.

1. AAF/MTO is providing Air Division USGCC AUSTRIA (144 officers and 133 enlisted men) which is being redesignated "Headquarters Occupational Air Force AUSTRIA". This should not be confused with the Tactical Headquarters referred to in (B) below. Reference our F 78145 dated 19 May current, understand USSTAF providing other air elements required in AUSTRIA including following:

(A) Tactical units and supporting service units.

(B) Wing or similar Hq unit as Hq for elements listed in (A) above.

(C) Disarmament, disbandment and intelligence teams.

2. Supply and maintenance for all air elements to be provided by USSTAF which is understood will later become USAFIE.

3. The Hq Occupational Air Force, AUSTRIA, which replaces the old Air Division USGCC will be introduced into VIENNA from MTO and personnel, grades and ratings will be furnished by MTO.

4. During SACMED period, operational control of air elements in AUSTRIA will be vested in SACMED but supply and maintenance of these air elements to continue as a function of USSTAF.

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

E/3288

TOP SECRET

5. When boundary of ETO is changed to include AUSTRIA all air units, personnel, grades, ratings and Hq in US Zone AUSTRIA then under operation control of SACMED will then be passed to you intact.

6. Request early confirmation above procedures since preparations on this basis now in progress.

Dist

Copy No 1 Info-Action - Air Forces SC
 2 Info - Chief Commissioner
 3 ~~Exec Comm~~ ACA BIT
 4 File

M/C Note.

This copy was passed
 to AIGOM by HQ 15 A. Group.

1988

(67)

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET*C. Commissioner**Copy No 3 JUN 2 RECD
cc 1152*M 1062
MAY 312201BE/3254
JUNE 020830B
IMMEDIATE

MAIN 8 ARMY FROM M G S AUSTRIA

FREEDOM FOR G5 SEC INFO: ROME FOR ALCOM (AUSTRIA), HQ ALCOM FOR
ACEXU, FIIPOT FOR USGCC (AUSTRIA), MAIN 8 ARMY FOR C OF S GSI2,
MAIN 8 ARMY BRIG A/Q MAIN 8 ARMY DDST, REAR 8 ARMY MIL GOVT STAFF
(AUSTRIA) REAR

TOP SECRET

Sitrep AUSTRIA.

1. Political. Ref Sitrep of 26th May. Proposals for Advisory Committee in KLAGENFURT agreed by PIESCH who has accepted chairmanship. Slovene minority have been given one seat on the Committee. Reports from GRAZ state that Russians have recognised SMIERNMARK local government corresponding to PIESCH so called government before latter was recognised by Mil Govt. Applications for trade union meetings in KLAGENFURT have been refused.

2. Public safety. Ex-NOSTAL District president and other officials located at HEILIGENBLUT. All suspended and being investigated.

3. Finance. 23 banks opened in 10 towns. No heavy withdrawals or deposits in KLAGENFURT.

4. Industry. WEITERSDOFER cement works has stock of five thousand tons cement. Maximum output ordered. Tanning works KNACH found in good condition and work being recommenced. Coal mine at FORNSDORF can produce 3,000 tid class one brown coal and mine at KOSLACH 5,000 Qpd class two brown coal. Mine also at S STEFAN producing low grade coal.

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

E/3254

TOP SECRET

5. Labour. Situation re civilian labour improved and 500 persons have reported at KLAGENFURT Labour Exchange.

Dist

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - Exec Commissioner
- 2 ACABRIT
- 3 Info - Chief Commissioner
- 4 CA Sec
- 5 Econ Sec
- 6 File

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~~TOP SECRET~~

M1062
MAY 312201B

TOP SECRET

C. Commission

Copy No 3 JUN 1 REGD
E/3207 CC 1456
JUNE 011350
OP-PRIORITY

MAIN 8TH ARMY FROM MIL GOV STAFF AUSTRIA
FREEDOM FOR G5 SECTION INFO BOMB FOR ALLIED COMMISSION AUSTRIA
HQ ALCOM FOR ACEXC FILPOT FOR USGCC (AUSTRIA) MAIN 8 ARMY FOR
GSI MAIN 8 ARMY BRIG A/Q MAIN 8 ARMY DBST REAR 8 ARMY MIL GOV
STAFF AUSTRIA (REAR).

TOP SECRET.

WA

Sitrep AUSTRIA.

1. Political. Ref sitrep of 26 May. Proposals for Advisory Committee in KLAGENFURT agreed by PIESCH who has accepted chairmanship. SLOVENE minority have been given one seat on the committee. Reports from GRAZ state that Russians have recognised STEIERMARK Local Government corresponding to PIESCH so called government before latter was reorganised by MIL GOV. Applications for Trade Union meetings in KLAGENFURT have been refused.

2. Public Safety. Ex postal district president and other officials located at HEILIGENBLUT, all suspended and being investigated.

3. Finance. 23 banks opened in 10 towns. No heavy withdrawals or deposits in KLAGENFURT.

4. Industry. WEITERSDORFER cement works has stock of 5000 tons cement. Maximum output ordered. Tanning works at KNACH found in good condition and work being recommenced. Coal mine at FORNSDORF can produce 3000 tpd class 1 brown coal and mine at KOFLACH 5000 tpd class 2 brown coal. Mine also at S STEFAN producing low grade coal.

1014/CC

5. Labour. Situation re civilian labour improved and 500 persons have reported at KLAGENFURT Labour Exchange.

		<u>DIST</u>	
COPY NO	1	INFO-ACTION	- BX COMM
"	"		ACA BRIT
"	"	INFO	- CHIEF COMM
"	"		CA BSC
"	"		ECOM SEC
"	"		FILE

65

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tel: 343

30 May 1945

Ref: 206/AC.

SUBJECT: Four Notes by Executive Commissioner.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

The following four notes have been received from the Executive Commissioner and are passed to you for information and appropriate action:

1. German Disbanded Army. Discussed with Colonels KRAMSKY and BOWMAN, total numbers 174,000 in about 15 camps. Great care has been taken with local population and less than 1,000 will be evicted.
2. Brigadier Denny, in command of 21st Tank Brigade, is the operating officer and has the matter entirely in hand.
3. There appears to be no necessity for a proclamation on fraternisation but use will be made of the notice issued by 5th Army which is in the hands of Emilia Region.
4. Medical Supplies. There is a shortage of disinfectants and also chlorine compound for water treatment. Chlorine has been supplied but in penny packets and as an example at FONLI alone the consumption is estimated at 1 1/2 quintals per week. There are disadvantages to the chlorine solution which has been offered as it is contained in cylinders which have to be returned and for some technical reason it is not such a simple process as the use of compound.

Reference para 10 of Executive Commissioner's Notes on Four of Emilia Region dated 23 May 1945, Major Morden's notes therein referred to are repeated below.

1. Public Safety. 400 CO.BR reinforcements are scheduled for Emilia Region, 200 of which have now arrived, but nearly all are badly clothed and shod. For example, of 100 allotted to BOLOGNA City

1014

2. Brigadier Dawney, in command of 21st Tank Brigade, is the operating officer and has the matter entirely in hand.
3. There appears to be no necessity for a proclamation on fraternization but use will be made of the notice issued by 5th Army which is in the hands of Emilia Region.
4. Medical Supplies. There is a shortage of disinfectants and also chlorine compound for water treatment. Chlorine has been supplied but in penny packets and as an example at POMI alone the consumption is estimated at 1 1/2 quintals per week. There are disadvantages to the chlorine solution which has been offered as it is contained in cylinders which have to be returned and for some technical reason it is not such a simple process as the use of compound.

Reference para 10 of Executive Commissioner's Notes on Tour of Emilia Region dated 28 May 1945; Major Spryden's notes therein referred to are repeated below.

1. Public Safety. 400 CC.RR reinforcements are scheduled for the Region, 200 of which have now arrived, but nearly all are badly clothed and shod. For example, of 100 allotted to BOLOGNA City it is doubtful if more than 50 can be made fit for duty as the remainder are without boots. There is also a shortage of arms and ammunition. An endeavour was made to obtain weapons from those handed in by the patriots but out of 3 truck-loads only 6 suitable weapons were retrieved, the majority being German rifles and other rather heavy weapons. I understood that all CC.RR reinforcements sent North were to have been properly equipped in all respects.
2. There is the problem of the "recuperati". These are the CC.RR who drifted Northwards, some hundreds of which are now returning. Not only do they need reclothing but it is thought that they are no longer suitable for duty in the North as (a) many of them have been working with the patriots and (b) some are at an equal disadvantage because they have not joined the ranks of the patriots. It is suggested that these should be exchanged with CC.RR from the South.

646 A

1014/ce
 J. H. H. H.
 Chief Staff Officer,
 To Executive Commissioner.

Tel: 343

30 May 1945.

Ref: 806/BG.

SUBJECT: Your Notes by Executive Commissioner.

TO : Economic Section.

The following four notes have been received from the Executive Commissioner and are passed to you for information and appropriate action:

1. Lignite from TRIESTE. At FERRARA is a synthetic rubber factory which is in working order and has all the raw materials necessary for production except coal. It is designed to use lignite fuel, large supplies of which are understood to be at TRIESTE and which is normally carried by barges and taken up by river and canal to FERRARA. There is also at FERRARA a sugar beet factory designed to use lignite. Arrangements should be made as soon as possible for the transport of lignite from TRIESTE to get these two important factories working. The use of tugs will be required for the barges.
2. Wamp. There is said to be in the Region 15,000 tons of heaps a large amount of which has already been located but there is no transport to move it to warehouses, to NAPLES and to MILAN. Bids have been made to Transportation Sub-Commission but so far with no result.
3. Cattle Manure. To save their cattle, farmers for miles around MILANO drove their cattle into the city where thousands have been retained for the last six months. There are very large quantities of cattle manure which is now a menace to health on account of flies. It is estimated that there is no less than 10,000 cubic yards awaiting removal. Transport is the problem but none is available for the purpose. If transport could be made available mechanical loading equipment would also accelerate removal.

1014/cc
1723

Lignite fuel, large supplies of which are understood to be at TRIESTE and which is normally carried by barges and taken up by river and canal to FERRARA. There is also at FERRARA a sugar beet factory designed to use lignite. Arrangements should be made as soon as possible for the transport of lignite from TRIESTE to get these two important factories working. The use of tugs will be required for the barges.

2. Hemp. There is said to be in the region 15,000 tons of hemp, a large amount of which has already been located but there is no transport to move it to warehouses, to NAPLES and to MILAN. Steps have been made to Transportation Sub-Commission but so far with no result.

3. Cattle measure. To save their cattle, farmers for miles around BOLOGNA drove their cattle into the city where thousands have been retained for the last six months. There are very large quantities of cattle manure which is now a menace to health on account of flies. It is estimated that there is no less than 10,000 cubic yards awaiting removal. Transport is the problem but none is available for the purpose. If transport could be made available mechanical loading equipment would also accelerate removal.

1014/cc
1783

Eratta UCA

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: C.A. Section (reference para 3 above)

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B

TOP SECRET

C. COMMISSIONER

Copy No 5

cc 0931

MAY 31 1953

E/3012

MAY 31/0830B

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

M1053

MAY 30/2015B

MAIN EIGHTH ARMY FROM MIL GOV STAFF AUSTRIA

FREEDOM FOR G5 SECTION INFO: ROME FOR ALLIED COMMISSION(AUSTRIA) HQ ALCOM FOR
 ACEMC, FILPOT FOR USCCC(AUSTRIA, MAIN EIGHTH ARMY FOR C OF S BRIG A/Q MAIN 8 ARMY DDST
 REAR 8 ARMY MIL GOV STAFF(AUSTRIA) REAR, MAIN EIGHTH ARMY F

TOP SECRET.

Sitrep AUSTRIA.

1. political. Members of Austrian FREIKORPS in LAGENFURT under leader MACKH disarmed though still wearing red white armbands. Police Director LICHEN arrested for internment.
2. displaced persons. Original figures of DPS now thought to be considerably exaggerated except in case of french who are coming through from Russian line into KARTEN. Definite figures of all displaced persons will be given when definite confirmation of numbers is received. Accommodation in KARTEN for DPS will take approximately 1800. Further accommodation being prepared.
3. Agriculture. General agricultural survey shows no cultivated land unseeded or unplanted. Shortage exists however of artificial fertilizers grass clover and vegetable seeds animal feeding stuffs all of which will have to be imported. Except for pigs and poultry there does not appear to have been any extensive slaughter of stock for human consumption. Considerable excess of German Army horses exists. As many as possible have been farmed out to local farmers, army are slaughtering and ~~the~~ is being transferred to Allied Commission ITALY for use in ITALY.
4. Timber. Overcutting in forestry last year appears to have been negligible. Estimated that 700000 cubic metres can be cut this year without harm to forests.

1014/CC

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE 2

R/3012

5. Industry. KARNTNERISCHE MASCHINEN BAU AG (BAU AG) of POITTSCHACH have been producing wing tips and tails for MESSERSCHMITZ and their director HERR KLEINBERGER has requested permission to turnover works to repair and manufacture of agricultural machinery. Further investigation disclosed 2 new jet propulsion units together with complete working drawings in caves behind the firms factory. One of the directors is HERR MEINDL suspected of ill treatment to foreign employers and due for arrest. All directors are being investigated with view to arrest

DIST

Copy 1, 2, 3	INFO-ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER
" 4	ACABRIT
" 5	INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
" 6	CA SEC
" 7	ECON SEC
" 8	FILE

1781

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SECRETCC 0923
MAY 30 RECDRXII/25
MAY 29 1000BE/2881
MAY 30 0845B
CP PRIORITYHQ VENEZIE REGION
ALCOM

SECRET

Personal from LUSH to STONE.

I submit that it is important you as CCAO should be consulted before dispositions of Allied and Italian troops in N. ITALY are determined. We could then avoid difficulties which may arise for instance from location of Italian troops in BOLZANO and near French frontier. HOPKINSON will clarify on arrival ROME tomorrow.

Dist

Action - S.O. to Chief Comm
 Info - Chief Commissioner
 Exec Comm
 File

4580

(63)

SECRET

MAY 30 RECD
CC 01/4/4

CHIEF COMMR

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

AFO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner.

28 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Notes of Tour - EMILIA REGION.

TO : Distribution below.

1. PUBLIC SAFETY.

As usual on the occupation of a Region, in the initial stages public security seemed to be good. Then came reports in increasing number of killings. These reports have not yet reduced nor is Public Safety in a position to tackle them. The reason for this is that the 1628 CC.RR, some of them local, some of them imported, are not yet properly organised to tackle the abnormal situation. The graph of crime, therefore, is going up but as experience shows, as the CC.RR organisation improves and cases of killing are brought to court, the graph will go down slowly and Public Safety should be on top of the situation.

2. The R.F.S.O's chief problem at the moment is the quality of the CC.RR. They have not yet got confidence in themselves and are unwilling to stand up to physical violence.

3. One of the main reasons for this is the inadequate state of their equipment. They are badly clothed and badly shod. Some of them cannot go on duty for lack of shoes. The RFSO was particularly disappointed to find that the CC.RR brought up from the South came totally unequipped.

4. If we can repair this, and we must repair it, then the RFSO has confidence that he can get the CC.RR really to do their job.

5. He suggested that it might be wise to introduce into this Region some of the Sicilian CC.RR who are used to dealing with physical violence.

6. The RFSO is not yet fully satisfied with Colonel COTSA, the Regional Commander, but is satisfied with his Italian junior officers. He would very much like to raise the confidence of the CC.RR by having a Regional inspection on the lines of Field Marshal Alexander's inspection

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to tackle the abnormal situation. The R.P.S.O. shows, as the CC.RR organisation improves and cases of up but as experience shows, the CC.RR organisation improves and cases of killing are brought to court, the graph will go down slowly and Public Safety should be on top of the situation.

2. The R.P.S.O.'s chief problem at the moment is the quality of the CC.RR. They have not yet got confidence in themselves and are unwilling to stand up to physical violence.
3. One of the main reasons for this is the inadequate state of their equipment. They are badly clothed and badly shod. Some of them cannot go on duty for lack of shoes. The RPSO was particularly disappointed to find that the CC.RR brought up from the South came totally unequipped.
4. If we can repair this, and we must repair it, then the RPSO has confidence that he can get the CC.RR really to do their job.
5. He suggested that it might be wise to introduce into this Region some of the Sicilian CC.RR who are used to dealing with physical violence.
6. The RPSO is not yet fully satisfied with Colonel COTSA, the Regional Commander, but is satisfied with his Italian junior officers. He would very much like to raise the confidence of the CC.RR by having a Regional inspection on the lines of Field Marshal Alexander's inspection in ROME.
7. The BOLOGNA Questora is of doubtful quality but the RPSO is not yet prepared to condemn him at present. RPSO is quite satisfied with the metropolitan police and the GG.FF who are adequate in quality and quantity.
8. RPSO told me the interesting fact that where there are Poles very few read ~~papers~~ appear among the partigiani.
9. The immediate help which HQ can give this Region is to equip their CC.RR adequately with clothing, shoes, and arms.
10. See also notes by Major MORDEN.
11. AGRICULTURE.
Major Hough is doing an excellent job of work and his Regional Commissioner strongly recommends him for promotion. He obviously has a firm grasp of his problem. He tells me that land tenure is one of the chief problems here. There is considerable political pressure emanating from BOLOGNA and other cities to carry out a reform of the "mezzarina" whereby the "contadini" would receive 70% instead of the present 50%. Absentee landlordism is a pressing problem. Major Hough recommends heavy taxation on absentee land and is surprised that Gulli has not yet ~~introduced~~ introduced this. He does not think that the pressure on agricultural reform comes from the "contadini" themselves but is being worked up in political circles in the city.

-2-

12. In this vast agricultural Region the question of land tenure is bound to come to the fore. It will be interesting to know the views of the Agricultural Sub-Commission and the Italian Ministry on this problem throughout Italy. It may vitally affect Italian local production for as is the case in BOLOGNA Province, some of the landlords are afraid to go out to their estates.
13. Major Hough is not dissatisfied with the ~~market~~ state of the grain harvest and does not think that we shall lose the 40% predicted locally. There will be a drop in rice production owing to irrigation difficulties.
14. 6000 horses have been brought into the Region and more are to come. They have been loaned to communes. Their arrival brought down the price of local produce by nearly 50%. A quantity of them were rightly slaughtered and have been used for meat. There is a cattle surplus and Major Hough is trying to arrange distribution both of horses and cattle to other Regions. He is most anxious that the Ministry should give directions as to the movement of livestock throughout Italy and clearly the Agricultural Sub-Com should encourage this.
15. Major Hough has persuaded the Ministry to advance the sum of 6 million lire for the purchase of motor transport for agriculture inspectors.
16. Major Hough is disturbed at the high price of grain. He would prefer a differential in the North and would like to see the price of grain fixed at 700 to 750 lire.

MSL/JG.

M.S.M.
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:
Chief Commissioner
Civil Affairs Section (2)
Economic Section (2)
~~BOLOGNA Region.~~
File

1228

15. Major Hough is disturbed at the high price of grain. He would prefer a differential in the North and would like to see the price of grain fixed at 700 to 750 lire.

6 million lire for the purchase of motor transport for agriculture Libya 1951.

M.S.A.
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JG.

DISTRIBUTION:
Chief Commissioner
Civil Affairs Section (2)
Economic Section (2)
~~10, 2nd Lt. Region.~~
File

1258

670

MAY 27 1945

IN

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. 370.

From KEYCHAIN.

Orig. No. 4056 PT ONE.

Date 26.5.45.

FOUR ZERO FIVE SIX OF TWO SIX STP ROLL FOR AICON FR HOPKINSON STP PSE
 PASS AGREED RECIPIENTS STP I VISITED BOLZANO AND TRENTO MAY TWO FOUR
 TWO FIVE STP DESPITE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF LARGE NOS OF GERMAN TPS
 SIT IN BOTH PROVINCES APPEARS SATISFACTORY STP I WILL SUBMIT DETAILED
 REPORT ON MY RETURN TO ROME BUT BRIEFLY POSITION IS AS FOLLS STP IN
 BOLZANO PROVINCE THERE IS ROUGHLY TWO THIRDS GERMAN SPEAKING MAJORITY
 AND IN BOLZANO CITY LARGE ITALIAN MAJORITY STP PERFECT A SOCIALIST
 SELECTED BY CLNAI MILRN IS ADOPTING SENSIBLE LIBERAL POLICY TOWARDS
 GERMAN SPEAKING POPULATION EG RPT ET THERE IS A GERMAN NEWSPAPER
 GERMAN SCHOOLS AND TWO REPS OF SOUTH TYROLESE PARTY ON THE LOCAL
 CLN STP END PT ONE

1014/ce

Decoded by
Checked by
Time Rcvd.

67

Time

Time

G. M. T.

G. M. T.

G. M. T.

Distribution

American Embassy
British Ambassador
Admiral Stone
Et cetera.

TOP SECRET

IN

MESSAGE FORMFrom KEYCHAINOrig. No. 4056 (pt2)Serial No. 371
Date 26th MAY '45

FOUR ZERO FIVE SIX PT TWO LAST.
 ACTIVE ACITATION IN FAVOUR OF SEPARATION OR UNION WITH GUSPRIA^A
 IS HOWEVER WANTED. IN TREMPO POSITION IS QUITE DIFFERENT.
 EXCEPT FOR TEN COMMUNES WHICH ARE ADMINISTERED AS PART OF
 BOLZANO POPULATION PROVINCE IS OVERWHELMINGLY ITALIAN AND
 THERE IS NO RACIAL PROBLEM. CLN CONSISTING OF USUAL FIVE
 PARTIES IS FUNCTIONING WELL.

67

Decoded by JWTime 1930

G. M. T.

Distribution

Checked by

Time

G. M. T.

1278

Time Rcvd. 1730

G. M. T.

Copy No. 3

TOP SECRET

C. Comm.

cc 1230

MAY 27 1948

E/2501

MAY 27 0940B

OF PRIORITY

CITE M 1044
MAY 261729B

MAIN 8TH ARMY FROM MIL GOVT STAFF AUSTRIA

ACTION FREEDOM FOR G-5 SECTION, INFO HQ ALCOM FOR ACEXC, COPY TO 15 ARMY
GROUP FOR USCCC AUSTRIA, MAIN 8TH ARMY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF BY HAND, BRIG A/Q
MAIN 8TH ARMY, DDST NEAR 8TH ARMY, MIL GOVT STAFF AUSTRIA RENU

TOP SECRET.

Sitrep AUSTRIA.

1. Political. Withdrawal of Yugoslav troops has induced an increased MNASFRE (?) of confidence amongst civilian population who are now calmer and happier.

2. 3 Austrian civilians with movement permit signed by Minister of Interior VIENNA arrived DLAGENFURT from VIENNA 24 May. Stated they had no official connection with RENNER Government but conversation elicited fact they had come with knowledge and approval of member of RENNER Government who had suggested they offer themselves as LANDESHAUPTMANN and head of public security. They reiterated their wish not to be returned to VIENNA and stated their main object had been to leave that city. Being held as private citizens pending further investigations.

3. PIESCH and his committee being recognised purely as an advisory and not executive board. PIESCH himself will be titled head of committee and supervisor of local administration. He will not be known as LANDESHAUPTMANN.

4. Deputation made by Doctor PETEK on behalf Slovene minority in KARNYEN. He was advised that M G (AUSTRIA) were the sole government and that Slovenes would receive fair and impartial treatment equally with remainder of population of nationality. ^{irrespective}

5. Search for Gauleiter RIENER so far unavailing but 2 of his lieutenants arrested. Population in area of arrest were not actively hostile but made no effort

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

(M 1044 cont'd)

to assist the search. Search continues.

6. Legal. Military courts functioning at KLAGENFURT, VILLACH, HEHMAGOR and SPITTAL but only minor cases such as curfew infringement have been heard.

7. Public Safety. Security arrests now total 189.

8. Displaced Persons. Evacuation from AUSTRIA to ITALY up to maximum rate of 2000 daily in order of priority (a) Italians (b) French, Belgians and Dutch (c) Poles (d) Greeks. Croats, Russians, Hungarians, Bulgars and Slovenes being held in Austrian camps. DPS being fed from KREISE food stocks and captured enemy supplies.

9. Finance. AM Schillings have been introduced and SWTE (?) banks will open in 2/3 days.

10. Sups. Withdrawal of Yugoslav troops has caused increase of confidence resulting in declaration of stocks of flour hitherto kept hidden. Civilian bread ration scale being reinstated at 170 grms as from 29 May. Storage space for 8500 tons already found and further space for 7500 tons being investigated.

11. Transport. Civilian organisation cutting out all private haulage functioning under M G staff orders. FOL adequate at present but spares in short supply. Approx 40% of vehicles so far listed use wood fuel.

12. Labour. In short supply for agriculture and essential industries which are sawmills, cutting manufacture, wire and nails, cement and building materials. Army are making Germans PW available and transfer of civilians from non-essential or war production work is being arranged.

DIST

Copy No 1 - 2	INFO-ACTION: Executive Commissioner
" " 3	INFO: Chief Commissioner
" " 4	CA Sec
" " 5	Econ Sec
" " 6	Est Sec
" " 7	PR Br
" " 8 (skel)	File

61

HQ FIFTH ARMY

8371

24 MAY 1945

ROUTINE

59a

SECRET ID

4 1 1 5 / 2 0

REGARDING YOUR MEMO ONE COPY BEING OF TWO SENT MAY 18

SUBJECT IS RE-INSTALLATION OF BOLLARD ID

PARIS TO HQ FIFTH ARMY FOR BRIDGE CASE FILE NO VARELIA REGION

PARIS ONE FIVE AMM CORP FROM HQ ALON CITE QUIN PARIS

MATTER IS BEING TAKEN UP WITH HEADQUARTERS ID WILL ADVISE YOU FURTHER

10/14/10

1273

1273

60

Office of Executive Commissioner

300

Lt. Col.
G.S.O.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION -- INCOMING MESSAGE

9118

MAY 20 1601B

E/1647

MAY 20 2020B

ROUTINE

FROM: HQ 5 ARMY FROM G-5 CITE FL68

TO: ACTION HQ ALCOM RIT TO RC VENEZIA REGION PADUA INFO TO 15 ARMY GROUP

SECRET.

Many questions arising in connection with re-Italianization of BOLZANO and parts of TRENTO Provinces which require decisions on highest level on account of possible international political repercussions at some future time. Would stress importance from outset of wise statesmanship in handling such problems examples of which are given below.

1. Languages in schools CIN during last few years German was compulsorily taught in all schools. Previously it is understood Italian was compulsory. It is urgently desired to reopen schools but decision first required on language question.
2. What disposition is to be made of German nationals not resident in the area before 1939. These fall into the following categories.
 - a. Former German army civilian employees not accorded prisoner of war status and possessing no permanent home in Italian territory.
 - b. Former German army civilian employees now settled down as residents in Italian territory.
 - c. Dependents of German military personnel now resident in Italian territory.
 - d. Wives of German military personnel, formerly Italian citizens, who have acquired German nationality since marriage and their children.
3. Many persons of the categories mentioned in para 2 have been on ration strength of German army but are not accorded prisoner of war status. Should they be given Italian ration cards or treated as displaced persons and evacuated to a concentration area pending decision as to their ultimate disposal.
4. Provincial Commissioner BOLZANO has been given following directive by this HQ pending other instructions on the Italianization of local government, namely to

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4. Provincial Commissioner BOLZANO has been given following directive by this HQ pending other instructions on the Italianization of local government, namely to proceed on following scale of priorities:
 - a. Efficiency of administration.
 - b. Maximum possible conformity to normal Italian forms.
 - c. Reasonable protection for minority interests.
5. Request advice from ALCCM their specific points also directive on procedure to be adopted if questions of this kind arise in future.

DISTRIBUTION:

Action: Executive Commissioner 2
 Info: A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 CA Sec
 Econ Sec
 File

~~SECRET~~

59/w

See 77

1572

1014/4

Ref: 504/ED.

20 May 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am in receipt of your letter No. 10372 dated 14 May 1945 with reference to the situation in Bolzano Province.

I have had a number of reports on the state of affairs there and would ask you to realize that a very unnatural situation exists at present. In this Province there was a heavy concentration of German troops and materials because, as you are no doubt aware, it was intended by the Germans that it should form part of the Southern Redoubt which they were intending to defend. The Allies, of course, are making arrangements for the disposal of the Germans who are there but you will appreciate that this will take a little time. When this has been accomplished so that AMG is capable of functioning normally, I feel sure that the situation will be restored.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

1771

59

1014/CC

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

MAY 18 1945
CC 181518th May 1945.Chief Commissioner.

1. You have asked me for clarification of the position of Regional Commissioners if Phase 2 is introduced for the civil administration before Phase 2 military occurs.
2. In this interim period we should have 5th Army in charge of ground forces, the Regional Commissioners reporting direct to HQ AC.
3. The situation will be exactly the same as that in AMG Regions last summer behind the Army line. These Regions were in AAI territory and C-in-C, AAI was in fact Commander of the land forces. As such, Regional Commissioners came under the direct command of the CCAO and rested on sub-para 3 of para III of AFHQ General Order No.5 which stated "A Regional organisation on the present lines will be maintained until further orders. The responsibility for all territory now under Headquarters Allied Military Government passes to Headquarters, Allied Control Commission".
4. You will remember that a Civil Affairs Section was established at HQ AAI under the control of a DCCAO and was at the disposal of the C-in-C, AAI for consultation. I suggest that the position of 5th Army is the same as AAI was then and that the G-5 Section of 5th Army can remain in the same relationship as the DCCAO to C-in-C, AAI. His functions and relations can be the same as those of the DCCAO.
5. When Phase 2 military occurs, there will be no further need for G-5, 5th Army. If the Commanding General, 5th Army wishes to retain him he should lose any executive powers on urgent matters which would be afforded him if he followed the precedent of the DCCAO.

MSL

MSL/JG.

1070

58

✓

CONFIDENTIAL4119
MAY 16 1601BE/1061
MAY 17 0845
PRIORITY

AMG 5 ARMY SIGNED WARD PERKINS CITE OUR 207.
HQ ALCON FOR MFAA S/C FOR DE WALD.

CONFIDENTIAL.

5 ARMY insist that I remain here until morning 19 May Eta ROME evening 20 May. Most important that I discuss complex situation with you, suggest therefore you arrange to leave 22 May. Report on arrival AMG 5 ARMY duration at least one week visit to include MILAN and BOLZANO. German experts all located and under control awaiting plan as to disposal. Main Archives of KUNSTSCHUTZ in ITALY are in custody 5 ARMY. Great majority of works of art from TUSCANY recovered in good condition. Inventories are being checked. Arrangements are being made for their return to FLORENCE in collaboration with Italian authorities. HARTT returning to FLORENCE Eta evening 17 May. Contact him for details. I shall be at AMG 5 ARMY forward night 18 May 19 May.

DIST

ACTION - M & FAA S/C
INFO - A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
FILE 2
FLOAT

1769

CONFIDENTIAL

57c

CONFIDENTIAL372
MAY 161500BE/1120
MAY 171305B
ROUTINE5 ARMY LIAISON GROUP CINC SOUTH WEST FROM FISKE
ALCOM

CONFIDENTIAL.

Of German military police and restriction of German troops to billets when not duty have greatly relieved tension. However large numbers of the population are armed, the Germans having bartered or sold large quantities of small arms and munitions especially to their sympathizers here. Pro-Partisan activity is not great at the moment but may be expected to increase when German armed troops are withdrawn. Some French Partisans (possibly ex Vichyites) have been operating in the area and are now being rounded up. Work on BRENNER railroad is progressing satisfactorily. CLN intransigence abated. Roundup of suspected war criminals is making some progress with limited personnel available.

DIST

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
 * CA Sec
 " Econ Sec
 INFO: A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 PFB
 File

1728

CONFIDENTIAL

576

1014101

SECRETCAS 526
MAY 16 1948E/1071
MAY 17 0830
ROUTINE15 ARMY GROUP
CG 5TH ARMY INFO ALCOM.

566

SECRET.

Please convey to your Liaison Group at BOLZANO instructions that TONY DUCIA leader of Austrian Freedom Movement is not to be permitted to go to ROME to discuss return of part of province of BOLZANO to AUSTRIA. This request was initiated by DUCIA through the old 15TH ARMY GROUP Liaison at BOLZANO and was forwarded to ALCOM who have denied the request and advised that DUCIA be sent to his province.

DIST

INFO-ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER 2
 INFO - A/PRESIDENT
 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
 FILE 2
 FLOAT

1014/CC

57a

SECRET

1287

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

AFHQ Cable FX 76659
to 15 AG & AC

16 May 1945

Request change to phase 2 (See AFHQ Opns Instr of 21
Dec 44 Title: "Occupation of NW Italy") in NORTHWEST ITALY

DOCUMENT FILED IN 1007/CC

1014/CC

1288

57

15 Army Group Liaison Mission

Diary Lt Col WITTS

5 - 13 May 45

Saturday 5 May

visited prefecture. Tolarno population is 60% Austrian and 40% Italian (150,000 - 100,000). There is an emigrery of Ecomi here, Dr. Angelis, who also visited General Clark before taking up his appointment; he is recognized by German Army and his appointment is countersigned by General Veitlinghoff. He is President of CIL and has taken over General Supervision of local government. The prefect is of Austrian birth, Dr. Gintl. Dr. Angelis speaks very well of him. He has been prefect for some 7 years, is impartial and liked by both Italians and Austrians; he has shown no signs of ex-Fascism or Nazism. The town has been under control of CIL for three days. Run by joint patrols of German Military Police and CIL. It is quite orderly; no troubles; Prefect and Commissioner both report such less trouble than they anticipated; everybody seems to be trying to co-operate. Apartments are all under revision; effort is being made to re-occupy both all parties and both nationalities. Most services are already being run by joint committees of both nationalities, 2 Austrian and 2 Italian - people are largely bilingual. Food situation sufficient until July. Health good.

Police - 200 Carabinieri will suffice; do not desire police from Gintbart south, local CIL have been advised in CIL and serve as OSS's therein but not in uniform they would report. Special police are mostly youths who they think would be invaluable to be with it on their own house coupling with German police and OSS work.

When OSS arrives they will replace German half of police. Hint of proposed appointments will be submitted.

I outlined to the Prefect and CC (Italian) the contents of the letter on Special Advice Courts and CC 25 and CC 159 and instructed them to get busy getting out their lists of 100 key judges and the names of persons for Duration Commissions. I told them neither would function until Military Government was formally established.

I was informed that 2 French Officers have already been seen in the neighbourhood - informant could not say from where they came. Frenchmen in multi also reported to me. Certain French and other prisoners are said to be here, e.g. Leon Blum and Capt. Jack Churchill.

An OSS envoy reported and wished to contact OSS.

Commander CIL patrols wishes to contact CC Troops to inform him of conditions and whereabouts his patrols in action.

4: (I) proposes to close banks to Germans except for hospital purposes on Monday.

I have arranged our accommodation in Prefettura and have an interpreter at my disposal.

FBI will supply lists of all appointments.

1765

1014/

658
F. 10/15

It is quite obvious that everybody seems to be trying to cooperate... trouble than they anticipated; everybody seems to be trying to cooperate... means are all under revision; effort is being made to present both all parties and both nationalities. Most services are already being run by joint committees of both nationalities, 2 Austrians and 2 Italians - people are largely bilingual.

Food situation sufficient until July. Health good. Police - 200 Carabinieri will suffice; do not desire police from distant south, local units have been alerted in DM and some 5000's Maxon but not in uniform they would revert. Special police are mostly Jewish who they think would be inclined to be high up in their own hands dealing with German police and OCIA/PCOs.

When over arrive they will replace German half of patrols. List of proposed appointments will be submitted.

I outlined to the Prefect and 2 (Italians) in contents of the notes on Special Advice Courts and 50 35 and 25 158 and instructed them to get busy getting out their lists of 100 lay judges and the names of persons for Nuptation Commissions. I told them neither would function until Military Government was formally established.

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RS (I) proposes to close banks to Germans except for hospital purposes on Monday.

I have arranged our accommodation in Prefettura and have an interpreter at my disposal.

IOI will supply lists of all appointments. President of Court of Appeal is Fascist and not recommended for retention; he cannot therefore appoint Special Assistants. President of Tribunal not satisfactory. Conference Gols Erisac, Livermore, Threlfall and self with Pr. Angelis and Dr. Tinkl.

There had been a outsch in German Army and certain extreme Nazi Officers had been removed. General Veitinghoff himself had been arrested. There had been extreme provocation of the population to provoke incident. General Veitinghoff had on release signed an agreement with the Partisans. Austrian Patriots had infiltrated into N. Italy and had been sent in by the Russians. Patriots who had been captured by the Germans had been tortured; particulars would be submitted. Aim of 10 Army wanted Patriots disarmed. 15 Army Gp had ordered Patriots in hills to be brought down to keep peace in valley. Dr. Angelis thought that this was not wise as these were not headed and difficult to control. Arbitrary disarmament piecemeal was likely to cause incident; preferable to hold parade and thank Patriots for their efforts and receive their arms. Meanwhile Patriots would not carry their arms in public.

Also as there was no police force it was necessary to improvise one; these men would have to be armed.

525
14 Army

Dr. Angelis had arranged with German Staff for combined patrols of German Military Police and GMI each to deal with own nationals and asked that some arrangement should be continued with own police when organized.

Prefect was asked to prepare lists of villages and police requirements and to agree list of persons selected with Dr. Angelis.

Dr. Angelis had arms for 1,200 but had only issued 400/450; he thought 200 police might suffice. Dr. Tinal thought this too low; he had 109 commies he might manage at a pinch.

It was agreed that he should engage 250 to be issued with special type arm band - temporary police to be replaced when permanent police arrived. They would be armed from patriot sources.

Dr. Angelis also desired to hold a reserve of partisans in case of eventualities. He was asked to submit his proposals. Meanwhile arms would not be carried by patriots.

There was a report of a clash between patriots and Germans in Trento. This was not in this province. The Chief of the Patriots there was Kenio Visentin, an escaped inmate of the Republican Fascist Government and a Communist. OSS and AC would visit Trento to stop.

It was agreed that disarmament should not be piecemeal but a victory parade for Province to be held by a distinguished officer at an early date when patriots would be thanked for their services and surrender their arms. (Though agreed this was not in fact carried out when AMG arrived - disarmament was piecemeal and sporadic).

Dr. Tinal reported position of Province as highly satisfactory, very little disorder, two nationalities were co-operating, everything was working more smoothly than he could ever have expected; the only trouble was transport, he asked for use of 70 vehicles by Germans (their requirements now operations had ceased, were far smaller) and they had more than that number of ex Italian vehicles on charge. He would organize a body to use that transport, to move food and essential supplies.

Dr. Tinal was asked and agreed to supply short summary of condition of mills factories and principal industries, position as to labour raw materials and machinery (supplied and handed to AMG).

Dr. Tinal also agreed to make a list of recommended appointments to be agreed with GMI; those not agreed to be submitted to AMG and list of appointments considered impossible to fill (supplied and handed to AMG).

Dr. Tinal was instructed to order censor of all remission of funds from banks to any area outside province: to limit drawings to 1,000 lire per head per week; business desiring to draw more wages or raw materials to obtain permit from him. Safes and deposits to be closed.

Report received of Detention Camp at Prag on Wilder See (110 km) in which confined Leon Blum, nephews of Molotov and Churchill, Kiemuller, Schusening, Schacht and 160 other. Arranged to inspect and report.

Many escaped prisoners reporting, 3 French, 2 Indian, 3 German etc **478/1** to send down line.

Report 2 French Officers in plain clothes, with wireless contact to Paris require papers and uniform - refer to G2.

District has been organized by Germans for return to Austria (it was Austrian);

It was agreed that disarmament should not be piecemeal but a victory parade for Province to be held by a distinguished officer at an early date when patriots would be thanked for their services and surrender their arms. (Though agreed this was not in fact carried out when MG arrived - disarmament was piecemeal and sporadic).

Dr. Tinal reported position of Province as highly satisfactory, very little disorder, two nationalities were co-operating, everything was working more smoothly than he could ever have expected; the only trouble was transport, he asked for use of 50 vehicles by Germans (their requirements now operations had ceased, were far smaller) and they had more than that number of ex-Italian vehicles on charge. He would organise a body to use that transport, to move food and essential supplies. Dr. Tinal was asked and agreed to supply short summary of condition of mills factories and principal industries, position as to labour raw materials and machinery (supplied and handed to AMF).

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Many escaped prisoners reporting, 5 French, 2 Indian, 3 German etc ~~425~~ to send down line.

Report 2 French Officers in plain clothes, with wireless contact to Paris require papers and uniform - refer to G2.

District has been organised by Germans for return to Austria (it was Austrian); place names and signs all changed

e.g. Egna to Neumarkt

Bolzano Boren

Street names are now German and Communists are all "Gemeinde". All place and street and shop names etc in Gothic lettering.

TRETO - Sunday 6 May

Thanks for liberating. Last moment incidents with Germans; will submit report.

Dr. Giuseppe Ottolini appointed 2 May by CIL. Avv. Oscar Mantovani.

Previous Prefect Avv. de Bertolini appointed by German on 9 Sep.

Previous Italo Foschi appointed by Fascist Govt about 4 or 5 years ago non career - Political appointment.

Head of CIL Prof. Giovanni Gosser. Commandant of Town Kenio Visentin.

Population 50,000.

Food situation good (except for fats, only few days supply) if primary Riva di Garda not destroyed. Food supply ample for considerable time, say two months.

DPR - Refugees are passing through from Germany at rate of 2000 per day; yesterday 5000 and are being fed and this greatly affects food position; slow transit is devouring local resources, rapid transport would relieve strain.

Transport - no transport - transport urgently needed for supply purposes.
Railways - Conference yesterday. Only an engine in work, another sometimes freight car no passenger cars. Railway can work on Bassano line to Padua and Venice so far as their province is concerned, line is OK but bridges may be mined. Railway personnel absented themselves from work; ordered to return, not to do so sabotage.

Police - 156 JRM.

Finance - 800 million lire with Banca d'Italia Bolzano for 3 Provinces, Bolzano, Belluno and Trento. (Appears later this was not true).

Three provinces Belluno, Bolzano and Trento organized as Gau "Alpen Vorland" with HQ at Bolzano Gauleiter Franz Hoffer.

At this point SMO 2 Corps (Col Gray) arrived. Informed him of what I had learned and left him to carry on. As he knew nothing of Special Assignees I informed Prefect and CML how counts were organized and the functions of all concerned. Communications - Roads little damaged. Railways to Brenner badly damaged in isolated spots; most can be re-instituted in relatively short time.

At Prefettura Bolzano - requested list of

1. Total creditor a/cs in Banks
2. Balances German army
3. " " other than military
4. Balances Italian or Provincial Govts.

Monday 7 May

Maj. Mc Arthur SMO II Corps arrived. Taken to AMG to explain Patriot position Merano. Request by Germans Merano for release 20 million lire for pay and supply; instructed them to submit through their own HQ. Wived 15 Army Group for instructions.

Handed reports on Food - Industry to AMG - informed them report on banks, promised that morning.

Tuesday 8 May

Contents of Bolzano museum in basement of villa. AMG informed. Wire from 15 Army Group. 50 trucks cannot be taken from Germans (these are admitted by Germans to be surplus their requirements).

Interview Col Kappler SS on two additional armistice terms: (1) as to retention of prisoners guilty of offences against German Army - (2) as to arresting or detaining Members of Italian Rep. Govt.

as to (1) all prisoners had been released; so far as he was aware none are detained anywhere - he could not speak of conditions in Turin, Milan etc with which communications had been severed.

as to (2) the German army no longer had any power.
 Informed by Capt Moscovitz that German Army is spreading rumour that they have ceased to fight British and US forces by friendly arrangement and will, with Allies

1283

1. Total creditor c/cs in Banks
2. Balances German Army
3. " " other than military
4. Balances Italian or Provincial Govts.

Monday 7 May

Major Mc Arthur SOAO II Corps arrived. Taken to AME to explain Patriot position Merano. Request by Germans Merano for release 20 million lire for pay and supply; instructed them to submit through their own HQ. Wired 15 Army Group for instructions. Handed reports on Food - Industry to AMG - informed them report on banks, promised that morning.

Tuesday 8 May

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as to (2) The German Army no longer had any power.

Informed by Capt Kocovits that German Army is spreading rumour that they have ceased to fight British and US forces by friendly arrangement and will, with Allies fight Russia, causing bad effect.

Also received message from von Hartner (Int. Red Cross) regarding Art deposits. Wired Alcom.

Interview Consul General Muller who requested pass to assist necessitous Germans in Merano - it appeared that Germans regard German speaking Italians as Germans. He claims that under treaty of St. Germain they retained their Austrian Nationality as well as acquired an Italian one and that on the Anschluss they became Germans. I told him they would be dealt with as Italians and knew how to obtain any assistance required under Italian law.

He then wished to arrange to pay dependants allowances to families of the above men who had been called to the German Army. He was informed that if he would supply lists and funds the Allies (Welfare or DRF) would undertake the payments.

He then asked whether he could pay the families of Soldiers or Diplomats for which he was responsible and was given the same answer if he would supply lists and funds the Allies would see the recipients did not want. He then dealt with the question of German refugees here from the South and was told they would be dealt with as were refugees of other nations - they would not starve.

1283

He then asked if he could go to Merano to obtain instructions from the German Legation and was told no. He gave the address as Villa Paolina. His application for a pass was refused.

Application for pass received from German Foreign Office diplomatic Rep at German HQ - he was informed that it would be necessary for him to attend in person before a pass could be issued.

CNL being disarmed in streets by joint patrols German and US, most undesirable, informed Col Gwelfall who is seeing General Lewis thereon and Dr. Angelis.

Parked copy of Report on Waterworks to AG.

Visited Office German Embassy, Villa Paolina, Merano - ordered it to be closed. Removed wireless (monitoring and Morse writing) set. Handed the same to Signals for investigation.

Was informed Ambassador Dr. Kahn was at the Praterhof. I went to see him and told him that he and his staff would be probably be moved South shortly. He was personally responsible that all his staff remained available and accompanied him when he was moved.

Capt Davies in charge platoon taking over Merano, on arrival there. Had arranged to disarm patriots that night. Had found Japanese Ambassador and his staff and had the lot in custody.

Wednesday 9 May

Col Solmists reported that the Italians were interfering with Railway repairs. Saw AGC and asked them to instruct the Italians to co-operate.

Deputation (Lt General Hockfeld - Air; Maj General Badelitski - Army; Commander Keiler - Navy; Major Noser - Navy).

Requested release 1,000 million lire Italians now required payment for everything in cash, also to pay past bills for cattle, milling, fodder, medical supplies, pay.

Will supply summary of Army funds and estimate of expenditure probably 1000 million lire every 10 days.

Funds available probably about 2,000 lire.
Toni Ducia - Bolzano head of Austrian movements wished to place his views, on return of Bolzano to Austria, in proper quarters. Wired 15 Army Group. Secretary Gumpert of Embassy Staff.

The Embassy Staff was originally 170; it has been reduced to 70 exclusive of clerks, messengers and servants; 50 are located at Suss in Austria near lake Constance and about 20 in Merano.

He desired to know if the staff could when they were moved take their cars and all their baggage and food. He was told instructions on those points would be given. He hoped that they would have two or three days notice and was told that he would

have no more but it might not be as long.

(156)

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The Embassy normally recruited its junior staff from this area as the staff were bilingual, hence a large part of the staff were near their homes - those had been sent home - would these people have to be moved South with the Embassy.

He next enquired as to German refugees from South Italy; many of these had lived in Italy for years and wished to go to their homes. He was told that they would be dealt with by our organization for refugees which would decide whether they could stay in Italy or be sent to Germany.

General Kanstein - General in charge of Administration, requested and was granted a pass to enable him to perform his duties.

Loman Reinhold - a Yugoslav asked to be passed to Russian HQ; he had information for them, he states he is an agent. He was told to come back. He will be handed to CIC to pass back. (G2 dealt with him and passed him back through SA channels).

Col von Kussebecke was questioned about the Austrian Breidach movement. He said that except for large towns the country was 100% Austrian origin, that in general the two races got on well. There was very definitely an Austrian feeling, so much so that Hitler and Mussolini had discussed the matter and agreed gradually to move all German speaking people into Austria and 0,000 had been so moved. The population was now 170,000 Germans and 100,000 Italians. A large proportion of the 60,000 would however, have met if they got the chance.

25

the South Tyrol Movement was Catholic and anti-Nazi. No ill feeling had been shown between the two races until fairly recently when there had been some oppression by fascists.

It was quite common for the Tyrol flag to be flown, also but less frequently the Austrian flag.

Dr. Karl Berger of the Embassy Staff was questioned as to his request for a pass which was not given to him. He was told that AMI would arrange.

He was interested in RUX and organization for developing the War Industry of Italy.

As the records of firm potentials may be of interest to Industry. I propose therefore for an AIC Officer to accompany him to see what records exist and to see they are not destroyed.

I then asked for certain information with regard to Italian Officials etc which he said he had not got but the Embassy itself had.

Thursday 10 May

At about 2230 evening 2 May I received message that persons were at HQ who wished to see me. I found there two peasants and a priest; they told me that some days ago a German vehicle had been shot up and they had obtained a chest of money; they asked that the Allies should take charge. I phoned 88 Div who said the location was outside their area and suggested 10 Htm. Div. to which I replied that I did not think the latter had any unit in the vicinity. I then rang 2 Corps who were sceptical of the story but said they would attend to it. I asked when and was met rather evasively. I said I could myself arrange to get the money in.

I left next morning at 9 and arrived at Clos about 10 to find whole village in church. Waited until 11 conclusion of High Mass (Ascension Day) and then went to the Priest's House who produced woolenrate for which I handed over order in name of GCG and receipt. Returned to Bolzano when I knocked up Bank Italia it being a holiday and requested them take in money located Lt. Raquette and returned to Bank of Italia. Money counted; 8½ million lire in notes and 1½ million lire in bankers orders, obtained receipts from Lt Raquette. Also handed him receipt 10 million lire taken to Mendola by Gen. ans.

Spoke General Hume and Col Burrell who approved suggestion of reward to village. (Letter to GOC 15 Army Group sent by Col Burrell).

Friday 11 May

Took to Clos as memento for them, list in box showing contents (the contents agreed with the list), informed them that recommendation for reward would be forwarded, obtained name leader of band, Francis Francisco, who captured the money. Heard stories of Allied soldiers having been saved by Angelo Clauser, Stephan Clauser and others.

Proceeded Morano where asked ambassador for certain informations required by armistice terms; he said he had not all but such as he could supply he would provide the money. The remainder should be supplied by General Woolf who was **31461** he had

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I asked if von Ribbentrop was in Meran and was told so far as HE knew no; he had not heard of his whereabouts for 6 weeks, had no reason to suppose he was in Merano.

I asked for names of distinguished Germans and was told the Embassy had only been in Merano ten days and had hardly left their own buildings; they knew of none and suggested that enquiry should be made of the Wohnungs Amt.

I asked what funds were in possession and was told that 1½ thousand million lire had been made over to German HQ; none was in local banks.

I said that I particularly referred to cash and was told that some 4½ million lire were on charge. I asked for particulars and on receiving same said I would take charge 14 million lire (½ cash, 9½ bankers drafts).

I also asked what transport was available if Embassy had to move itself. If it could not move itself would it supply particulars of transport required. This was promised for to-morrow.

Saw Maj Mc Key who would arrange to obtain particulars from Wohnungs Amt and who would also obtain particulars of bank balances and reich funds from banks. HQ phone 1322/4 Meran.

Paid funds received from Ambassador into Bank of Italia where met Lt Raquette who furnished receipt.

Met Col Piske and informed him of work on which I had been engaged on that day. Col Schmiets again complained non co-operation Italian Railway Service. Attended conference and arranged to call Fontana, Chief Railway Engineer and Acting Prefect Dr. Angelis also head of MIL for 0900 12th.

Received information of whereabouts King Victor Emmanuel's coin collection reputed value 3 mill. sterling. MIL reported asked that it should be handed over to them. Informed General Woolf to be responsible for same and hold at Allied disposal.

Informed Consul his staff must declare money in possession, reasonable amount in their possession might be retained, rest would be withdrawn and held to their credit so far as they were entitled to the same.

Discussed repair of Railways with G4 Staff and Col Piske - latter to arrange for Prefect and Chief Railway engineer to attend Conference next day at 9.

Saturday 12 May

Conference on Railway repairs attended by G 4, German staff officers and self but Col Piske and Railway staff and Prefect did not attend.

Saw Col Piske; arranged for another meeting at 1145. I did not attend having other appointments. (Was informed by G 4 that Col Piske supported the Italians in their attitude of non-cooperation. Their position had resolved itself into their wanting to be in charge of the Germans).

Saw Lt General Hoefeld by appointment on his statement of financial position "needs of Army"; pointed out that the 2,000 million balance which he claimed proved on enquiry to consist largely of open credits at the banks; no doubt these would, had circumstances not changed, have been honoured but there was now no chance of that. It was also possible that the credits here were represented by assets elsewhere but until that position was investigated he could not draw against credits but only against actual funds; requested that he and officers of the other services would investigate and report upon the actual cash position as distinct from the credits. General Hoefeld pointed out that his representatives held 500 million lire in cash at Merano.

He promised to submit a report as requested.

Saw General Woolf.

Ascertained position regarding King Victor Emmanuel's collection and received letter to 88 Div confirming his handing over collection to them and passed letter to AIG to deliver.

Discussed civilian organisation of N. Italy and particularly War Industry. There were three main branches RUK which dealt with requirements of the Army, boots and clothing as well as munitions. This organisation was under General Leyers, it had complete records of potentialities etc. of Italian Industry; these records were principally in Milan and at Como which was the HQ. He understood Leyers was in our hands.

The second branch was Labour and the third was the production of food. Inquired as to funds available. General Woolf stated that he had no chest, he worked only through banks and we had closed his accounts.

Saw AIG and suggested it was their function to take charge of Art Treasures and

other appointments. (Was informed by C 4 that Col Piske supported the Italians in their attitude of non-cooperation. Their position had resolved itself into their wanting to be in charge of the Germans).

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Saw AIG and suggested it was their function to take charge of Art Treasures and that they should get 88 Div to hand King Victor's coin collection to them and that they should lodge it in the Bank of Italy (which was later done).

Saw Consul General Muller; asked him what funds he had and told him to prepare a statement and be ready to hand over this evening.

Told him also to make list of his staff (handed to Col Fiske) and of families to which he paid allowances.

Instructed Capt Moscovits to collect and bank 3 million from Muller and to continue to trace 10 million recovered by Germans from Cioz. (The 3 million recovered and paid, progress made in tracing movement of the German in whose possession the 10 million was alleged to be).

Went to Merano, traced the officers in possession of the 500 million lire. Got a company of US troops (of 10 Mtn. Div.) to provide car and escort, went to vaults and took possession of 542 million lire, transferred the same to Merano and paid them into bank.

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Sunday 13 May

Obtained my receipt from AAJ for 542 million lire. Capt Moscovits reported that the Reichsbank (Barrock Engineer department) carried cash balances in various centres, informed Col Fiske with a view to his arranging tracing. Also informed Col Fiske of the position with regard to the recovery of the 40 million lire.

Went through all papers with Col Fiske. We reply to be sent to wire enquiring in what form funds existed. Necessity for getting in German funds. Col Fiske wired for financial officer. We caches of industrial machines and RUK's records (at Milan) and that I had asked for an industrial officer. Col Fiske wired for Economics officer.

Drew attention to replies required from German Commander in Chief. He had the answers from the Ambassador, the other answers were all in. Asked whether it was possible for me to have a complete set of replies to bring back to AC.

Went to see Ambassador to ascertain what replies had been made to my question as to private funds. Found that he had supplied the figures to Col Fiske. I enquired what the figures were and was informed 1/2 million for the Ambassador and that the remaining members of the staff had something like 1/4 million each. My intention had been to leave them with only what was sufficient for immediate needs and bank the rest. Matter in Col Fiske's hands.

Informed ambassador that orders had been received for their movement and that the Commander at Merano was responsible for moving them; he wished to use their own cars; enquired as to the sufficiency, they had eight private cars, two officials cars, a lorry and a light van it would suffice though another car would make matters easier.

I enquired whether they would be leaving behind any articles of value such as radios, typewriters etc so that I could take protective custody. They said they had none - much had been abandoned in the retreat and the remainder had gone on with the rest of the staff to Sines in Austria.

Asked Col Fiske to obtain for General Hume some German franking labels and information as to a German branch of the Knights of Malta.

Monday 14 May

Informed Lt Paquette TO at Bolzano of extent ambassadors alleged private funds and that I considered it too great. On arrival Florence informed Col Friend James the one and of expected arrival ambassadors cars at Pontecatini.

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1969

52

White's Diary, 10-13 May
XIX - 30

Summary of War Booty

10 May	captured by village of Cloz and handed over	
	Cash	8,425,650
	Bankers drafts	11,441,050
	Pass book	159,000

11 May	Ambassadors Chest	
	Cash	4,492,500
	Bankers drafts	9,189,300

12 May	German Consul-General's Chest	
	Cash	3,532,092

13 May	General i/c Admin-Mereno	
	Cash	512,006,000
		<u>549,045,592</u>

Receipt from Germans handed over by Cloz

Cash (not yet recovered)	<u>10,250,000</u>
	<u>559,295,592</u>

Various other Mil. boxes and formations have treasure chests and should be investigated.

12 May German Consul-General's Chest

Cash 3,552,092

13 May General's Admin-Merano

Cash 512,006,000

549,045,592

Receipt from Germans handed over by Cloz

Cash (not yet recovered) 10,250,000

559,295,592

Various other Mil. bodies and formations have treasure chests and should be investigated.

1958

57 c

304/EC

CC

15th ARMY GROUP *opta 5 Army ANG*

7339

14 May

PRIORITY

53a

RESTRICTED PD

C A S SLANT 150 C 11

SUBJECT IS YOUR CHARLES ABLE SUGAR/FIVE ZERO SIX OF ONE ONE MAY PD
PAREN TO FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE *opta 5 Army ANG* SECTION FROM HQ

ALCOM CITE AGENC PAREN

CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN THE PROPOSED VISIT AND WOULD ASK THAT HE BE
SENT BACK TO HIS PROVINCE

Q

1014/EC

Executive Commissioner
343

See 57a

NICHOLAS POMBINO
OWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1757

56a

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 16872

Rome, 14 May 1945

Dear Admiral,

the abnormal situation of the Bolzano province has been pointed out to the Italian Government and may be summed up as follows:

- 1) While the German Prefect and the German Sindaco of the Bolzano Comune have already been replaced by elements trusted by the Allied Command and by the local Committee for Liberation, in the other Communes of the province, the podesta' appointed by the German authorities, who are all ex-nazis, are still in charge.
- 2) In the province of Bolzano, police duty is still entrusted to German troops.
- 3) In the communes of the province, Italian flags have been burnt and replaced by Tirolian flags.
- 4) Property ceded to Italian citizens by German citizens who had transferred themselves to Germany are being forcibly re-taken by foreign elements.
- 5) The jurisdiction of the Bolzano province now extends to 18 Communes of the Trento and Belluno Provinces, transferred to the competence of that of Bolzano by the German authorities after September 8th, 1943.

Considering all this, I ask for your kind intervention, my dear Admiral, to reestablish in the Bolzano province as normal as possible a state of things, and in harmony with the criterions followed by the Allied Military Government in the other provinces under its administration.

I must also emphasize the need for no initiative tending to lessen the 'state of right' of this territory which belongs to the Italian State, to be made.

The Italian Government asks:

- 1) for the Authorities formerly appointed by the German command or by its representatives in the Bolzano province ought to be replaced.
- 2) regular allied or Italian police forces should be put in charge of the police service.

56a
Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

1014101
1256

- 3) for the flags and emblems of the Italian State to be respected; it should be forbidden to expose Tirolian or Austrian flags and coat of arms in public offices.
- 4) ^{for} no coercive action to be taken to take the property of citizens of Italian nationality.
- 5) for the jurisdiction of the Bolzano province to be limited to the Communes which were part of it before German occupation, (8 September 1943).

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Truly yours,

s. I. Bonomi

e.c.

1255.

56a

HQ II CORPS

7512

13 MAY 45

ROUTINE

RESTRICTED PD

REFERENCE YOUR SIGNAL DATED TWELVE MAY PD

PAREN TO HQ II CORPS FOR COLONEL FISKE FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACEXC PAREN PD

ACTION APPROVED

EC DIST - 14 May

Ex Commissioner

289

Chief Comm ✓
C A Sec
Econ Sec
A/Pres
Disper
Tn S/C

1014/cc

1254

56

SECRET

MAY 121647B

E/ABA

MAY 121700B

ROUTINE

HQ II CORPS (COL PICKS)

HQ ALCOH

SECRET

1. After visit to INNSBRUCK refugee situation appears not serious. There are only 5000 Italians and their return is controlled by 6 US CORPS with 5 ARMY. Chief problems here at present are political Germans are in complete control, retaining arms and exercising authority. This is potentially a most dangerous and serious situation and may well result in clashes between Italians and Germans if not quickly corrected. I understand that 5 ARMY will take over Military Mission with German command from 15 ARMY GROUP tomorrow. Repairs to Italian railroad can be effected within a few days using German labour. 15 ARMY GROUP has ordered that this work be done by German command. This order is meeting with understandable resistance from Italians who have for 20 months been repairing this rail road at the point of German pistols under Allied bombardment. Germans cannot repair railroad without Italian cooperation which in the circumstances will not be forthcoming because Italians will not now work under German armed direction.

1014/CC

- 1 -

1753

55

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

2. I feel this situation can be readily resolved (?) and expect to do it tomorrow by proposing:

- (A) Railroad to be immediately rebuilt by Germans.
- (B) Allied engineers to be in charge of work.
- (C) Any German personnel involved in rebuilding of rail road will not bear arms.
- (D) Ultimate operation rail road, as soon as possible, will be Italian responsibility
- (E) American guards must be provided, if necessary protection, in view para C.

3. A meeting is being held tomorrow at 9 o'clock and I expect this programme will be put into effect and trust that it bears ALCON approval. If not please advise.

Dist

Action - Exec Comm 2
CA Sec
Econ Sec

Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Disper
Tn SO 2
File

SECRET

55

AFHQ

7:59

12 May 1945

IMPORTANT

IN CLEARLY ANY MEANS PD
 AMG EIGHT ARMY IN SIGNAL EIGHT MAY REPORTS QUOTE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND HIS
 NAVY ARMY AND AIR FORCE ATTACHES IN CUSTODY MERANO REQUEST DISPOSAL INSTRUCTIONS PD
PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM CITE AGEKO PAREN
 GERMAN AMBASSADOR AND STAFF AT MERANO URGE EARLIEST POSSIBLE REMOVAL SOME EVIDENCE
 OF PHAL AUSTRIA MOVEMENTS IN REMOTE VILLAGES GERMAN DIPLOMATIC STAFF IS LUCKY
 CENTRE INFLECTION MERANO ALSO CENTRE TO WHICH VERY LARGE NUMBER OF GERMAN CIVILIANS
 HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM ALL OVER ITALY HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT ALL THESE BE REMOVED
 EARLIEST POSSIBLE AS POPULATION HERE SIXTY PER CENT GERMAN SPEAKING AND OF AUSTRIAN
 ORIGIN PRESENCE LARGE NUMBER OF GERMANS MOST DISTURBING PD RECOMMEND FRONTIER
 SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER MOVEMENT OTHER REFUGEES PD PROPAGANDA STORY HERE IS
 THAT GERMANS HAVE CEASED TO FIGHT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BRITISH BY
 ARRANGEMENT SO ALL THESE CAN FIGHT RUSSIA POINT IS MADE SUBSTANTIAL DISARMING
 PATRIOTS PD ALLEGED SOME VILLAGES DISPLAYING AUSTRIAN FLAG AND ARMED GERMAN
 SPEAKING PEASANTS IN CONTROL PD UNQUOTE PD WE UNDERSTAND MINISTER TO HOLY SEE
 HAS ALREADY INFORMED FOREIGN OFFICE

1024/ce

Office of Exec Commissioner

735

1752

Maj.

54a

AFHQ

7376

11 May 45

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL PD

SITREPS DATED TEN MAY REPORT PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACEXC PAREN

PARA ONE PD AMG LIGURIA REGION PD SPECIAL COURTS BEING ORGANISED IN IMPERIA CMA
 GENOA AND SAVONA PROVINCES PD ARMS BEING TURNED IN SATISFACTORILY PD MINOR
 INCIDENT SAVONA REFERRED TO IN SIGNAL SEVEN TWO SIX FIVE OF TEN MAY RESULTED IN NO
 VIOLENCE PD

PARA TWO PD AMG FIVE ARMY PD VENEZIA PD AMG ESTABLISHED IN ALL PROVINCES IN FIVE
 ARMY AREA ALTHOUGH GREAT NUMBER OF GERMAN TROOPS IN BOLZANO CMA BELLUNO AND TRENTO PD
 FOOD SHORTAGE SOME AREAS BELLUNO PD BOLZANO POLITICAL SITUATION COMPLICATED OWING
 PROLONGED GERMAN OCCUPATION CMA REPORT FOLLOWING BY MAIL PD LARGE NUMBERS TOPT
 ORGANIZATION CONSCRIPTED WORKERS MOVING HOME FROM BOLZANO AREA BUT SITUATION BEING DEALT
 WITH PD NO REFUGEES NOW CROSSING BORDER PD GOLD BULLION AT LA FORTEZZA AND PART
 DEPOSITS BEING INVESTIGATED PD WHOLE SITUATION IN FRONTIER ZONE WILL EASE WHEN
 GERMANS EVACUATE PD PARTISANS ACTIVE IN SOME AREAS AND CLASHING WITH GERMANS

L.
 Office of Exec Commissioner
 735

J.C.A.

1014/100
1951

54

SECRET

CAS/506
MAY 11/0900B

E/366
MAY 11/1840B
ROUTINE

15 ARMY GROUP

ACTION: AICOM

INFO: 5TH ARMY AMG

SECRET.

G-5/11/16.1 this headquarters dated 6 May subject: "Political situation province of BOLZANO refers. CAC 10 has been received from 15 Army Group liaison" TONI DUCIA a leader of Austrian Freedom Movement desires visit ROME to discuss political situation in AUSTRIA and also submit arguments for return of part province BOLZANO to AUSTRIA. Maintains villages are 100 percent German speaking flags of TYROL are fairly numerous". This headquarters have no objection to this visit to ROME. If you concur please advise 5TH ARMY direct to issue the necessary permit.

DIST

ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE

See 566

10/14/60

Q

30

1750

SECRET

COPY

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
G-5 SECTION
APO 464 US ARMY

DREM:hdo

10 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Brenner and Dolomite Area
7/8 May 1945.

TO : S.C.A.O., AMG Fifth Army.

I - REFUGEES.

1. From Verona I proceeded up to the west side of Lake Garda to Torbole (A5803) thence to Rovereto (A7104) and north to Bolzano on Route 12. There were large numbers of refugees on the road walking home; all were fit young men and there were no carts or movement of a character to cause any disturbance to military traffic except at the Bailey Bridges and tunnels at the north-west corner of Lake Garda. The Provost Marshal of the 10 Mountain Division stated that in order to make the movement as orderly as possible he had issued instructions for all empty trucks proceeding south in the divisional area to stop at the collecting points at cross-roads on the main supply routes and carry refugees as far south as the trucks were going. In this area there is said to be no feeding problem as individuals manage to live on what they can pick up at wayside farms and at simple communal kitchens run by the CLN's in the communes. The CAO, 10th Mountain Division stated that the daily flow of refugees through Rovereto was estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 2,000 per day.

2. In this same area I saw a convoy of seven motor buses and four lorries which had been captured from the Germans by Partisans proceeding southwards in convoy with some 400 refugees on board; this was the only occasion on the whole trip in which I saw any sign that German vehicles were being looted on a large scale by the Partisans.

3. North of Rovereto there was no great movement on the road: this may have been due to the fact that I was travelling at the hottest time of day, for in the main squares of Trento there were some two or three thousand people resting in the shade of the trees.

4. North of Trento the roads were again almost clear but on arrival in Bolzano I was told that there are many hundreds in Bolzano itself and in MERANO (A8391) and in the villages in the valley of the Upper Adigo.

5. I discussed with every Headquarters which I visited the question of sign-posting a special route over which refugees coming southwards would pass with the exception of the 10th Mountain Division, through whose area the road is comparatively narrow, there seemed to be a unanimous agreement

1014
(X-2)

main supply routes and carry refugees as far south as the villages where they can live on what they can pick up at wayside farms and at simple communal kitchens run by the GLN's in the communes. The CAO, 10th Mountain Division stated that the daily flow of refugees through Rovereto was estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 2,000 per day.

2. In this same area I saw a convoy of seven motor buses and four lorries which had been captured from the Germans by Partisans proceeding southwards in convoy with some 400 refugees on board; this was the only occasion on the whole trip in which I saw any sign that German vehicles were being looted on a large scale by the Partisans.
3. North of Rovereto there was no great movement on the road: this may have been due to the fact that I was travelling at the hottest time of day, for in the main squares of Trento there were some two or three thousand people resting in the shade of the trees.
4. North of Trento the roads were again almost clear but on arrival in Bolzano I was told that there are many hundreds in Bolzano itself and in MERANO (A6391) and in the villages in the valley of the Upper Adigo.
5. I discussed with every Headquarters which I visited the question of sign-posting a special route over which refugees coming southwards would pass with the exception of the 10th Mountain Division, through whose area the road is comparatively narrow, there seemed to be a unanimous agreement that the movement of persons walking on the roads was not sufficient to interfere with military traffic. However, it was universally requested that Fifth Army lift the ban on the carriage of casual civilians in returning empty trucks; apart from humanitarian reasons such a dispensation would accelerate the movement of refugees down the Brenner route and would thus keep the roads clear of stragglers.
6. Colonel Wray, S.C.A.O. II Corps, told me that feeding was no problem provided communes could be given some extra rations; every commune has organised a simple soup kitchen.
7. North of Trento there were hardly any persons on the road moving south but a few small groups were moving northwards towards the Brenner Pass. I called on the Provost Marshal of the 349th Infantry in Vipiteno (W0515) who told me that he had no problem of civilian refugees at all; he estimated that about 50 people per day passed through the village in each direction and he thought that a few of these succeeded in crossing the pass. In general, however, there was no movement across the Pass as the frontier had been sealed for 48 hours. This was confirmed by the Regimental Executive of the 339th Infantry stationed at Dobbiaco (B6495) who also stated that they had the frontier completely closed and civilian refugees were not presenting him with any problem at all.

1014/CC
(X-220/CC)

8. My conclusions were as follows:

- (i) Between Verona and Bolzano there were an estimated number of 10,000 on the road.
- (ii) That although there was undoubtedly civilian movement over the Brenner and other passes some days ago there is no appreciable travel at this time; if anything the travel is heavier northwards than southwards.
- (iii) That the bulk of the refugees are workers who were taken north by the Germans to their installations in the Bolzano area, which source can be expected to dry up fairly soon.
- (iv) That it would be wise for plans to be started to deal with the rush that can be expected when the frontiers of Austria are no longer closed to travel.

II. POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN BOLZANO.

1. No attempt was made by the Germans to incorporate the Province as a whole into the Greater Reich. However, I saw signs that a few communes in the Brunick area had been reorganized under the German administrative system; proof of this was the use of such terms as Kreis, Gemeinde and Bezirk in certain notices in the streets. It is also understood that under German auspices there was some re-adjustment of the inter-provincial boundary between Bolzano and Belluno.
2. In general it may be said that the population of Bolzano is largely Italian in sympathy but that the country districts definitely do not want to be incorporated in the Italian State. There were few signs of Partisan activity outside the town of Bolzano though this is easily explained by the extreme density of German troops in every village. The Committee of Liberation in Bolzano is an entirely Italian affair containing representatives of the usual parties but contains two persons to represent the Austrian interests, these two mean are pledged not to raise the international question at the present time and say that personally they favour an independent republic of Bolzano.
3. In Bolzano the CLN have nominated Bruno de Angelis for Prefect who is stated by all who have business with him to be an outstandingly able and pleasant person. The administration has been reorganized and appears to be working as smoothly as is possible at the present time, in view of the number of German troops still walking about the city armed. In the Brunick area the population have proposed well known German collaborators for the office of Sindaco. CEOs are in every case appointing Italians for the time being.

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4. The population though not actually hostile are far from friendly to the Allies. One difficult problem is the treatment of German civilians who have moved in during the German occupation and have settled down as ordinary residents; there has also been much inter-marriage between soldiers and the local population. It is doubtful whether the order that the civilian population must not fraternize with the German Army can be enforced.
5. It is stated by members of the CLN that since the armistice German forces have smuggled away large quantities of small arms into the hands of the pro-German elements of the population.
6. The CC.PP are all present and operating; they all took the oath to the Republican Fascist Government and epuration will be essential; the same is true of Trento (where there are no signs of any attempt at Germanisation of the district).
7. There appears to have been no move to make Reichsmarks legal tender; bank officials stated at the first meeting held with them by Colonel Wray that the circulation of German currency in the district was extremely

small but that a small amount was accepted by individuals from soldiers in country districts. While I could not ascertain any official exchange rate the manager of the hotel in Bolzano informed me that the rate had been ten lire to one Reichsmark but that in the last few days "quotations were purely nominal."

1747

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III - "THE GERMAN CITADEL"

1. The north-east part of BOLZANO had been included in the plans for the German Redoubt in Austria. The elaborations of some of the concrete fortifications which have already been completed is striking. The whole area is one vast munition dump containing gigantic stocks of war materials of all kinds. The density of German troops in the area is exceedingly high and Allied Military Government cannot be expected to get into its stride until these troops have been removed. The Adige Valley running north-west from Bolzano to Morano, which I did not visit, was said to be equally full of small munition factories, dumps etc. On the Brenner rail route there are many hundreds of stranded railway trucks containing amongst other things, coal, machine tools and other items of industrial equipment. There are very large stocks of sawn timber by the roadside in all districts.

In addition there are in the area the following:

(i) Art Deposits.

There are numerous deposits of art treasures notably in Bolzano, Sluderno, (A3993) and in German military depots between the two places, the acting Prefect in Bolzano has full details of the location and inventories of each deposit which he will hand over to the Fine Arts Officer. I visited the Deposit in a fine 16th Century Schloss at Campo Tures (W4417) which contains works by Rembrandt, Michael Angelo, and others and a large quantity of sculpture including works by Michael Angelo and Donatello. This deposit is guarded by a Company of the 339th Infantry and is in excellent condition: the most valuable pictures are well crated and those that are not crated are carefully labelled: each room has a notice on the door in German "These articles are under the custody of the Commanding General of the German Armed Forces in Italy having been brought to safety from battle areas." The deposit at Campo Tures has already been visited by two Italian super-intendants from Venice: an inventory of the deposit is with the ~~sup~~ CP of the 339th Infantry.

(ii) Gold Reserves.

The gold bullion and coin from the Bank of Italy estimated at about 25 tons in weight, is located in the vaults of La Fortezza, (W1803) a fortress beside the main road a few miles from the Brenner Pass. The upper part of the fortress was used by the Germans as a shell filling factory and ammunition dump. Immediately above the gold are a large quantity of 170 mm and 88 mm shells. This deposit is under the guard from the 249th Infantry: the Guard Commander told me that of the three keys to the vault, one is at the Regimental CP, one at the Bank of Italy in Brixen and the third he did not know about. I was also informed that the deposits have been visited by the Commanding General of II Corps amongst others and that the Allied Financial Agency has already been given details of the deposit.

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(iii) Political Hostages.

The political hostage camp south of Welsberg (B5597) is being cleared through command channels and the Regimental Executive of the 339th Infantry informed me that although our interest in the matter is appreciated no help from AMG is required in this connection.

IV - OTHER POINTS

1. In the Upper Adige Valleys of Belluno Province Partisans elements appear to be very strong: the population appeared to be enthusiastic about the arrival of the Allies and it was clear that if any attempt had been made at Germanisation it was extremely unpopular.
2. The area of Peltre in Belluno Province is probably, unlike the rest of the area, short of food, since in that area I saw two or three places where women and children were carrying away old cans of surplus food which they had collected from the kitchens of Allied units bivouaced beside the road.

D.R.B. MINORS,
Major, Scots Guards.
Operations Officer.

1718

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CONFIDENTIAL

AO 10
MAY 091545B

E/140
MAY 100830B
IMPORTANT

15 ARMY GROUP LIAISON
15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCOM

CONFIDENTIAL.

TONI DUELA a leader of Austrian Freedom Movement desires visit ROME to discuss political situation in AUSTRIA and also to submit arguments for return of part province BOLZANO to AUSTRIA. Maintains villages are 100% German speaking flags of TYROL are fairly numerous.

See (53)

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Liaison Div 2
File

1014/22

(52)

CONFIDENTIAL

1745

04814

7362

7 May 45

ROUTINE

IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS PD

SUBJECT FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP LIAISON DETACHMENT STRIKE OF ZERO EIGHT THREE AND FOUR

SEVEN MAY ON IRELAND PD

BASED TO AREA FOR CHECKS FIVE FROM THE ALONG WITH OTHER MATTER

ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND OF THE POPULATION OF ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND STRIKE

GERMAN PD LOCAL GOVERNMENT SO FAR SATISFACTORY PD ESTIMATED SUFFICIENT FOOD

UNTIL JULY AT LEAST PD TRANSPORT SHORT PD CARABINIERI NOW EXISTING TWO HUNDRED

AND FIFTY PATRIOTS RECALLED TEMPORARILY AS SPECIAL CONSTABLES PD PATRIOTS OR

NO DIFFICULTY REPORTED IN REMAINING AS THEY ARE COOPERATIVE AND WELL CONTROLLED PD

GENERAL OPINION CARABINIERI FROM SOUTH UNACCEPTABLE

1014/cc

51

Office of the Base Commissioner

735

Ju. Jellato

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17/4

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref: 503/EC.5th May 1945.AIDE MEMOIR FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON.CHANGE TO PHASE II IN N. ITALY.

It is strongly recommended that, particularly in NW Italy, the change from Phase I to Phase II be effected as rapidly as possible. It is impossible for the civil administration of NW and NE Italy to be continued in present circumstances by one AMG Headquarters at each Army. In NE Italy this AMG Headquarters is already concerned with the advance into Austria. The Regional staffs are in position in all four Regions and it is essential for the proper functioning of civil administration that full delegation should be made by the Armies to the Regional Commissioners in order to make effective Allied Military Government by decentralisation.

DISTRIBUTION: Lt.Gen. Robertson, CAO, AFHQ.
Chief Commissioner
CA Section
Econ Section
Est Section
File 504/EC
File

1014/ce

1743

50

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

5th May 1945.

Subjects for discussion with General Robertson.

ARE MEMOIRS IN FILE

- 1. Industrial Planning Advisory Board. _____
- 2. Location and administration of disbanded German Army: _____
 - (a) Accommodation.
 - (b) Judicial Procedure.
- 3. Displaced Persons: _____
 - (a) Implementation of instructions on American side.
 - (b) Freezing of captured German transport for this work.
- 4. Management of returned Italian POW. Recommend that this be turned over entirely to the Minister of War with instructions that the Italian Army is to be used. Order to this effect will have to be sent to MMIAx _____
- 5. Rapid change to Phase II in N. Italy, especially NW. Italy. _____
- 6. U.S. Troops for V-F

1112/cc

2201/cc

7001/cc

1014/cc

1014/cc

(49)

Major Q —
 Also advised's of the 5
 are (Memories given to Gen R)
 for my files. My Done Q

1742

Ref: 501/20.

2 May 1945.

b.6.

My dear General,

I enclose a copy of a memorandum I issued yesterday for distribution to all AFM officers now operating in Northern Italy, and I am instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander to inform you that the policy contained therein has his approval.

Yours sincerely,

HARRY W. SEXTON
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Addressed to:

General Mark W. Clark, USA,
Commander, 15th Army Group,
APO 777.

Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.,
Commanding General,
Ninth Army.

Lieutenant General Sir Richard L. McCroskey, KCB, DSO, MC, MB,
Commanding General,
Eighth Army.

Major General Willis D. Crittenger,
Commanding General,
IV Corps.

Major General H.P. Hares, GCM, MB,
Commanding General,
No. 2 District.

48

P

1014/CC

1741

XIX - 57

5 May

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 501/76/EC.

1st May 1945.

SUBJECT: AMG Policy - Northern Italy.

TO :	DCCAO, 15th Army Group.	(2)
	SCAO, AMG 5th Army.	(10)
	SCAO, AMG 8th Army.	(10)
	Regional Commissioner, LIGURIA Region.	(25)
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	(43)
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	(55)
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	(73)
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	(45)
"	" " " " " " " " " " " "	(48)

1. I think it may be helpful to explain the policy of the Allied Commission with regard to Allied Military Governments in newly liberated (Northern) Italy in the light of the conditions which we are finding at present.
2. While it is still the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to set up Allied Military Government in the whole of Northern Italy, the application of Government must be regulated in accordance with circumstances.
3. The outstanding successes of the patriots in liberating their towns from Nazis and fascists, the good administration, according to initial reports, set up by the CLN's, the execution of Mussolini and many of his accomplices, and the surrender, in some cases to the patriots, of a great bulk of the German forces, make a review of our policy necessary.
4. The greatest delegation possible should be made to the Italian authorities who will, in many cases, be members of the CLN's. At the same time every effort should be made to impress upon the people and the authorities that Allied Military Government is the temporary forerunner of the Italian Government, and that Allied Military Government is working in the closest cooperation with that Government at the Headquarters of this Commission.
5. We may well be approaching in Northern Italy a state of affairs somewhat similar to that was found in France, and it should be our endeavour to help the Italians to make of Italy one administrative entity, and to allow them to take over the management of their own affairs as early as possible.
6. The conditions at present prevailing both

1014
Cory

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5. We may well be approaching in Northern Italy a state of affairs somewhat similar to what was found in France, and it should be our endeavour to help the Italians to make of Italy one administrative entity, and to allow them to take over the management of their own affairs as early as possible.
6. The conditions at present prevailing, both political and economic, indicate the probability of a rapid transition from Allied Military Government to Italian Government.
7. The implementation of this policy will not be easy. The greatest tact, the greatest patience will be necessary. We should all remember that it is for the Italians to determine their own destiny, and that military government in circumstances prevailing now is necessary only for the protection of Allied troops and installations. A light rein with a firm hand should be the order of the day.
8. Above all, we must remember that it is our duty to administer rather than to intervene in the political future of Italy.

(17)

Robert W. Stone

ROBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

-2-

Copy to: External
 US Ambassador
 British Ambassador
 US Polad
 British Resemb
 G-5 AFHQ
 No. 1 District
 No. 2 District
 PDS
 Umbria-Mareche Region

Internal
 Acting President
 Pol Adv (A)
 Pol Adv (B)
 VP, Economic Sec
 VP, CI Sec
 VP, East Sec
 Navy Sub-Com
 Land Forces Sub-Com (MILF)
 Air Force Sub-Com
 Communications Sub-Com
 WMD & EW Sub-Com
 P.A. Branch
 Mile
 Plans
 Source (10)

Also to - see (48)

6 5 1948

C O P Y

TOP SECRETHEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

6519/EC

NEF/ojl
18 April 1945Subject: Attachment of Political Advisers
to Occupational Forces.

To: G-5 Section, AFHQ

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject as above, of 2 April 1945, enclosing Memorandum of 31 March. The Commission is of the opinion that the attachment of political advisers with the occupational forces, both in the northwest and in the northeast of Italy, is highly desirable, provided suitable personnel can be made available. The British Ambassador has agreed to make available one or two officers and the American Ambassador has also offered to supply one or two officers either from the POLAD office, AFHQ and/or American Embassy.

2. In order to provide for their billeting, rationing and transport, the political advisers designated to accompany the Allied occupational troops into Milan should be attached administratively to the Allied Commission and on call and moved forward by the Commission to the headquarters of the occupying troops in accordance with the operational pattern as it may develop. The Allied Commission is presently dealing direct, for planning purposes, with the task force designate with this mission.

3. Similar arrangements might be carried out with respect to political advisers who may be designated to accompany the occupational troops into Northeast Italy. Any special arrangements could be made by the Commission with 15th Army Group or any task force which may be specially designated.

/s/ Major E. Talbot

for NORMAN EL FISKE
Colonel
Acting Executive CommissionerCopy to: Political Adviser (B)
Political Adviser (A)
Civil Affairs Section
CC Files

1729

TOP SECRET

FILE UNDER NO. 1014/CC

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

D.1350 16/4/45

Outgoing cable, From RESMED ROME to CASERTA, No. 31 Resmed of 16/4/45.
from Macmillan to SAC personal.

Decision to entrust greater part of American sphere of Austrian occupation
in SHAEF - and orders to McNarney to send AC/AMG officers to SHAEF for
that purpose.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 107/CC

1014/CC

1738

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication
and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these
index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on te consolidated
index sheet and then destroyed.

45

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

CC 1012
APR 12 1945

Originator's Reference: **F 58754** Message Centre No: **D/7423**
 Date/Time of Origin: **APRIL 11/0010B** Date Time Rec'd: **APRIL 12/0957**
 Precedence: **PRIORITY**

FROM: **AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHED**
 TO : **ACTION: ALCOM ROE**

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

SECRET.

Reur 5000 of 7 April.

Approval is given to appointment General TREZZANI as head Italian General Staff
 Vice Marshal MESSE. Confirmation given your action in approving proposed decree.

DIST

ACTION : SO to CHIEF COMMISSIONER (2)
 INFO : A/PRESIDENT
 EX-COMMISSIONER (2)
 AIR SC
 NAVY SC
 LAND FORCES SC
 CA SEC
 FILE



3

1727

SECRET

J. J. P. H.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

9/10.B/GA

7 April 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister, 43

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 11103 dated 4 April 1945 and note with satisfaction the instructions which you have issued to your Ministers with regard to close cooperation in matters concerning planning for the North.

I have instructed various Sub-Commissions of Allied Commission concerned and informed them of the contents of your letter.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

10/14/60

His Excellency Ivance Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
Italian Government
Rome.

1726

Copy to Chief Commissioner

44

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
 Minister of the Interior
 n. 11103

Rome, 2 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

the developments of the military operations, and the great victories of the valiant armies of the United Nations make us believe that the liberation of North Italy is now imminent.

This event, which fulfills the wishes of all the Italians, renders urgent the questions which concern the various political and administrative problems which interest these territories.

My Government follows therefore with great interest the work and the plan drafted for this end by the Allied Commission and its Regional Commissioners, to give us the greatest possible support and the most diligent and useful collaboration.

While informing you, my dear Admiral, about our comprehension and good will, I must also tell you that I gave strict orders to all the Ministries for them to answer without delay the requests of the Allied Commission and collaborate, each of them within the limits of its competence, to the solution of the problems that the liberation of North Italy will bring.

For what concerns the organization of the Prefecture and of the Justice, the Interior Department has already made plans for the assignation of the personnel, in agreement with the competent Allied sub-commissions.

The other Ministries have also drafted plan for what concerned their respective services.

I trust that this Commission will see its requests answered without delay; among these requests, as it was done before, those of a general character can be sent to the Presidency of the Council, those concerning the prefects and the personnel of the public safety to the Interior Department; the technical and administrative problems will be sent to the various other Ministries of whose competence they are.

I remain,

Yours very truly,

B. I. Bonomi

E.C. DIST - APR 4 1945

ACTION - CA SEC (2)
 INFO - C. COM.
 Ex. COM.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
 Chief Commissioner
 Allied Commission
R o m e

(43)

See (44)

1725

COPY

G-3 Plans/134

TOP SECRET

:TOP SECRET
:Auth: SAC
:Initials:JCS
:30 Jan 45
:Copy No. 11

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 DIVISION

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD AT CASERTA
1430 hours, 29 January 1945

PRESENT

- Brigadier General Eberle
- Brigadier Nicholson
- Brigadier Anderson
- Brigadier Lush
- Brigadier Jeffries
- Colonel Torrence
- Colonel Nichols
- Colonel Milne
- Colonel Butterworth
- Colonel Marshall
- Colonel King
- Lt. Colonel Birch
- Lt. Colonel Stapleton
- Lt. Colonel Boyd
- Lt. Colonel Jackling
- Lt. Colonel Craig
- Lt. Colonel Pleydell-Bouverie
- W/Comd Sharpe
- Mr. Gffie
- Mr. Broad
- Mr. Raynor

- G-3 Plans
- G-3 Plans
- G-3 Org (B)
- Chief of Staff, Allied Commission
- FWB
- G-3 Ops
- G-2
- Log Plans
- G-5
- Allied Commission
- G-3 Sp Ops
- G-3 Plans
- Log Plans
- G-4 Plans
- G-5
- Allied Commission
- SOM Liaison
- G-3 Sp Dps
- Office of US Pol. Ad.
- Office of Br. Res. Min.
- FWB

SECRETARY

Major Sweetman

G-3 Plans

OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

GENERAL

1. The meeting had before them a note by the Chief of Staff calling for the completion of plans for the occupation of Northern ITALY, together with a joint minute by the Political Advisers setting out the political situation likely to exist in Northern ITALY. The Chairman pointed out that the purpose of the exist in Northern ITALY. It was intended to be an opportunity to bring to

1014

Lt. Colonel Blroh
 Lt. Colonel Stapleton
 Lt. Colonel Boyd
 Lt. Colonel Jackling
 Lt. Colonel Craig
 Lt. Colonel Pleydell-Bouverie
 W/Comd Sharpe
 Mr. Offie
 Mr. Broad
 Mr. Raynor

G-3 Plans
 Log Plans
 G-4 Plans
 G-5
 Allied Commission
 SOM Liaison
 G-3 Sp Dps
 Office of US Pol. Ad.
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 PWB

SECRETARY

Major Sweetman

G-3 Plans

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CIRCUMSTANCES OF OCCUPATION

2. G-4 Plans pointed out that the occupation of Northern ITALY could occur in a variety of circumstances, namely:
- a. Enemy collapse or surrender on his present line.
 - b. Enemy withdrawal to the ADIGE or ALPS.
 - c. Enemy surrender in the course of such a withdrawal.

It was not possible at present to forecast which of the foregoing circumstances was most likely. Plans must therefore be capable of being adapted to any of them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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G-3 Plans/134

TOP SECRET

PARTISAN AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTHERN ITALY

3. It was considered likely that we should have to deal with the following numbers of partisans in Northern ITALY.

- a. Northwest ITALY - 75,000 of which 50,000 were armed and at present active.
- b. Northwest ITALY - 25,000 of which 10,000 were at present armed and active.

The total commitment was therefore 100,000.

4. G-2 considered it probable that the Fascist divisions would disintegrate and that elements of them would take to the hills as anti-Allied partisans.

5. The Political Advisers stressed the need for speed in establishing occupational forces and Allied military government, otherwise there was a danger, especially in Northwest ITALY, that the partisans would regard themselves as the rightful government of ITALY, whereas the Allies were pledged to support the ROME government. Allied Commission in agreeing with this view concluded that as a result it would be necessary for AMG personnel to move in at the same time as the occupational task forces.

NORTHWEST ITALY.Occupational Forces - Requirements and Availability.

6. It was considered that forces of the order of 2 Allied divisions with supporting Italian troops would be required for occupational duties in Northwest ITALY. These forces would be additional to those necessary to deal with any German threat to the area, existing at the time of its occupation.

7. G-3 Plans and G-3 Ops pointed out that in the event of German withdrawal, the diversion of forces to a purely occupational task in Northwest ITALY would be most undesirable from the operational point of view. In the event of such withdrawal, all our available forces are likely to be required to seize the opportunity of achieving our military object -- the destruction of the maximum enemy forces. As soon, however, as the enemy falls back or is driven back to a general line ADIGE - ALPS, considerable forces could be made available for the occupation of Northwest ITALY without prejudice to further operations against the enemy in this theatre. In any case, we are likely to have to accept some delay in carrying out the effective occupation of Northwest ITALY (see paragraph 11 below), and in the event of a rapid enemy withdrawal to the ADIGE - ALPS line, the time taken in such withdrawal might correspond reasonably closely to such delay.

8. On the other hand, the political necessity for early and rapid occupation of Northwest ITALY may compel the diversion of forces from the main battlefront this

the occupational task forces.

NORTHWEST ITALY.

Occupational Forces - Requirements and Availability.

- X-1027/10
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 8. On the other hand, the political necessity for early and rapid occupation of Northwest ITALY may compel the diversion of forces from the main ^{of} ~~battle~~ task. In these circumstances, it appears that while all plans and arrangements (including the earmarking of the appropriate formations) for the occupation of Northwest ITALY should be made now, the actual decision to carry out this operation should be made by SACMED in the light of the whole situation existing when the opportunity to occupy Northwest ITALY arises.
 9. Key Points and Priorities.
 10. It was agreed that the establishment of occupational forces and AMG should be a steady process, being effected area by area as the advance into Northwest ITALY progressed. Undue dispersion of troops in the early stages was to be avoided.

It was considered that the key areas in order of priority were:

MILAN
TORIN
GENOA

To establish ourselves in any of these areas it would first be necessary to secure PIACENZA.

the occupational task forces.

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G-3 Plans/134

TOP SECRET

Factors Affecting Speed of Occupation.

11. The time required for the establishment of occupational forces by land would depend on the degree of demolition carried out by the enemy. In the event of German withdrawal, a delay of three weeks, before TURIN could be reached, was likely. In the event of enemy collapse or surrender, the scale of demolitions would be less and a more speedy occupation could be expected. G-2 agreed to examine this further.
12. The introduction of occupational forces by air was limited by the availability of 2 Para Brigade and no such operation was possible in the near future. It would be desirable to prepare a modified plan for Operation CINDERS for a landing in the MILAN area as an alternative to TURIN.

NORTHEAST ITALY.Occupational Forces.

13. In the event of German withdrawal, all key points in Northeast ITALY would necessarily be occupied in the course of continued operations. In event of German collapse the area would be occupied in the course of FREEBORN operations. No special occupational task forces were therefore required in this area. It was however, essential that AMG personnel should move forward and establish military government immediately.
14. Although there was some doubt as to the treatment of VENEZIA GIULIA, 15th Army Group should be prepared to establish occupational forces and AMG up to the 1939 frontier.

Cooperation with TITO.

15. The disarmament of partisans and establishment of forces in Northeast ITALY would require the cooperation of TITO.

PROVISION FOR PARTISANS.

16. Provisioning for partisans in Northern ITALY should be based on a commitment for 100000 for three months. In view of the partisans' services to the Allies, which should be rewarded, and because of the absence of civil supplies, the provisioning of food and clothing should be undertaken as a military commitment.
17. By offering food, clothing and money, the partisans should be induced to concentrate in convenient areas as soon as, but not before, we would be ready to supply them. They would then be disarmed, a proportion would be enlisted into the Italian Army and others would be formed into labor units for employment by AMG and for military purposes. The balance would need to be cared for until they would be absorbed into normal employment. Arrangements would be made for partisans reporting at the concentration areas to be screened.

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18. It was considered that except when they were enlisted into the Italian Army, partisans treated in accordance with paragraph 17, should not be held against any of the existing ceilings for the Italian Army, but should form a fresh category of Italians, the military responsibility for whom would be shared equally between BRITAIN and the U.S.
19. Authorization for feeding and clothing Italians on this basis would need to be obtained from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
20. The availability of rations and clothing to meet this commitment was doubtful but Log Plans and G-4 Plans agreed to examine it further.
21. Money for the partisans would be provided by the Italian Government and issued through AMG. No difficulty was foreseen in this respect.

ORDERS TO PARTISANS.

- 22. G-3 Special Ops in conjunction with Allied Commission agreed to prepare a draft or orders which would need to be issued to the partisans instructing them to:
 - a. Carry out anti-scorch and harassing activities during the Germans withdrawal.
 - b. **Concentrate** in agreed areas at such times as the Allies would be ready to supply them.
- 23. The channels for issue of orders to partisans when necessary would be
 - a. Through special operational channels to LOs who would pass the instructions to the partisan bands.
 - b. By FNB means (including the use of the broadcasts and leaflet dropping).

/s/ J. G. SWEETMAN
 J. G. SWEETMAN,
 Major,
 Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

- G-2
- G-3 Org (A)
- G-3 Org (B)
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- G-3 Sp Ops
- G-4 Plans
- Log Plans
- G-5
- Allied Commission, ROME (2)

- FWE
- US Pol. Ad.
- Br. Res. Min.
- SOM Liaison
- SO Plans
- G-4 Mov & Tr
- IS & PS
- Engrs.

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- IS & PS
- Engrs.

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CCFY.

Minute from the Offices of the United States
Political Adviser and British Resident Minister.

In connection with the occupation of Northern Italy, it would seem desirable to give consideration to the division of that part of the country into two areas: North-western Italy and North-eastern Italy. This is necessary because, in the case of the latter, other interests, particularly Yugoslav, are involved, whereas in the case of the former we need only take Italian interests into consideration.

Our first thoughts should be the conditions which will probably exist when the Germans leave the territory in which CLNAI is operating now as delegate of the Italian Government, in accordance with the Agreement recently concluded. It is our policy to establish Allied Military Government in those areas, and for the period that Allied Military Government is in operation, Italian sovereignty will be in suspense.

The Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command shall be to support the policies of the Boromi Government, which has pledged itself to maintain national unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. Therefore no action must be taken in these areas which might tend to weaken the authority of the central Government. Speed in getting ourselves firmly established is the essential factor; without this there is a real danger of extreme Communist elements taking control regardless of Allied Military Government or the Italian Government.

It should be made clear to the various political elements (there are at least six different political parties represented with CLNAI) which we may find in North-western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the fullest extent with Allied Military Government officers who will seek to restore public administration and public services, and that they will be expected to refrain from any political actions which might hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government.

In North-eastern Italy the situation is complicated by the fact that there are Yugoslav claims to territory hitherto recognised as Italian. For some time past the Yugoslav Partisans have been building up an organization in this area with the obvious intention of staking out a claim as soon as the moment is convenient. If, therefore, Allied Military Government is to function in these areas, it is essential that it should not come into conflict with these partisan elements, which are particularly strong in the country as opposed to the towns. It follows that some degree of understanding must be established in advance with Marshal Tito. This should not prove impossible, if, as now seems likely, a united Yugoslav Government is established in the very near future. There is a suggestion that a formal agreement should be concluded with Tito on this subject, but it is submitted that Tito should be informed, well in advance, of our intentions.

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1014/C
 It should be made clear to the various political elements (there are at least six different political parties represented with CLN/MI) which we may find in North-western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the fullest extent with Allied Military Government officers who will seek to restore public administration and public services, and that they will be expected to refrain from any political actions which might hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government.

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Copy on: File 503/COS
 File 504/COS
 File 6519/COS.
 "A" File

(41)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

8 January 1945

SUBJECT: AMG for BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
(Attention: Chief Commissioner)
A.P.O. 394

1. Reference is made to your 504/85/COS of 29 October 1944.
2. The program outlined by you is approved for interim guidance for planning purposes only. No definite plan should be committed until replies are received from State Department and Foreign Office channels, which have the matter under current consideration.
3. Importance is attached to the principle enunciated by you, particularly relevant in the case of Bolzano and the German speaking areas of Trento, that outside officials should not be imported into these provinces.
4. Reference paragraph 12 of your paper, the civil government in Bolzano should be reconstituted under AMG auspices along Italian rather than along German/Austrian lines.
5. The following considerations are set out as being pertinent in the case of planning in Bolzano:
 - a. It may be assumed that the province will not be detached from Italy notwithstanding the case which can be put forward on historical or ethnical grounds. Nor is the policy of forced emigration along the lines of the Italo-German agreement of 1939 likely to be pursued after the war. On the other hand, it may be assumed that provision for the protection of the German speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol (as a minority within the Italian State) will be included in the final settlement with Italy.
 - b. Direct control by AMG methods will probably be continued until permanent provision for the minority protection envisaged under a. above is assured.
 - c. The AMG policy, in the light of the above, should ~~not~~ encourage separatists hopes or the creation of local government institutions which cannot be expected to survive the return to Italian rule. On the other hand, while reconstituting the Italian system of local government in name and form, AMG policy should encourage the substance of local self-government. As proposed by you, only indigenous officials

8 Jan 45

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should be employed and emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connection of candidates should be avoided.

d. The use of Italian troops and Carabinieri should be avoided but if a special police force cannot be recruited locally which is free of Nazi taint then they may be employed.

e. It should be contemplated that after the initial occupational phase Allied troops will not be available for police duties in Bolzano.

6. Intelligence so far as Bolzano, Trento and Belluno are concerned indicates:

a. Since the Italian collapse in the fall of 1943 these provinces have been under German military and civilian control to the exclusion of Italian Neo-Fascist influence.

b. The provinces have been administered on German lines, every effort having been made to supersede Italian institutional forms and news organs.

c. They have been given, under the name of "Alpenvorland" a special status clearly pointing towards annexation by Germany.

d. The positions of Reich Commissioner in the Alpenvorland and Gauleiter of the adjacent Austrian Gau (Voralberg i.e. Innsbruck) have been combined in one individual.

7. Reference to paragraph 13 of your paper, intelligence material as set out in the attached sheet, is forwarded for your information.

T. R. Heinn

T. R. HEINN, Colonel
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

Incl:
as above

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TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

1. One copy of OSS, R & A Report No. 2208, dated 1 Sept 1944.
2. Two copies of OSS paper, "Memorandum on the Upper Adige", dated 6 November 1944.
3. Two copies of paper, "Manifesto to the Germans and Italians of the Upper Adige".
4. Two copies of OSS paper, "Report concerning the Activities of Patriot Groups and Anti-Fascist Parties of Northern Italy", dated 26 October 1944.
5. Two copies of OSS paper, "General and Military Situation in Trentino up to 30 September 1944, CNL Report No. 6.", dated 26 October 1944.

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CC 1014

28 December 1944

Subject: Political Developments in Trieste.

To: G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.

There is enclosed herewith copy of a report received from ISLD dealing with recent political developments in Trieste.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Incls.

cc: U.S. Polad
British Esmin
Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk

Political Section
Chief of Staff
CC Files

1014/cc

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all copies despatched
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FILES A

SECRET

To: B.G.S.(I), 15 Army Group
Admiral Stone, A.C.

No. 0730

From: I.S.L.D. (Major Page),
c/o R.A.A.C.

23 December 1944.

The enclosed reports are from SAND/C, who is in TRIESTE, and who is reported to have presided at the meetings in question.

It is suggested that these reports should be considered together with recent information on the formation of new units of the 10th MAS Flotilla and their departure to the TRIESTE area in order eventually to oppose any attempted coup d'etat by Jugoslavs in the city.


Major, R.M.

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Report A

I.

Three recent meetings of TRIESTE's National Committee of liberation culminated in the passing of the following resolution:

We, the VENEZIA GIULIA representatives of the PARTITO D'AZIONE, PARTITO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO, PARTITO LIBERALE DEMOCRATICO and PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO, all members of the VENEZIA GIULIA C.L.N. which at this moment is responsible for the direction and organization of the struggle against the Germans and Fascists in VENEZIA GIULIA, have met in this month of December 1944, at TRIESTE, to discuss the urgent national and economic problems of the region, and have reached complete agreement on the following points:-

1. We are unanimous in our belief in the sacred and inmutable principle of Italian unity, a unity which has been achieved in VENEZIA GIULIA by the highest sacrifices and the rightful necessity of which was recognized by the western democracies in the 1914-1918 war of liberation, which closed the cycle of our wars of unification. We consider, therefore, the adherence of VENEZIA GIULIA to ITALY as a definite, basic principle of the well-being of the European family of nations.

2. We are resolved to remove every obstacle standing in the way of friendly and complete collaboration between Italian and Slav by proposing an arrangement which will dispose of any valid reason for the existence of nationalist movements between the Italian and Slav peoples and enable them to live in a just and equitable harmony, while fully respecting their separate nationalities. This will be a true and concrete application of the four Freedoms proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, drawn up for the New Europe which is arising.

3. We are in favour of the granting of the widest possible autonomy to VENEZIA GIULIA, within the post-war Italian Constitution, for we believe that such an autonomy can be the only solution to the nationalist and economic problems affecting the commercial future of TRIESTE and Fiume. This autonomy must be established in accordance with democratic principles and the economic ^{and political} requirements peculiar to VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. We propose, therefore:-

(a) The administrative autonomy of VENEZIA GIULIA and of its various local communities (Italian: "comuni"), in the interests of the VENEZIA GIULIAN people, who will benefit directly from such measures. This, however, without compromising Italian national unity.

(b) The establishment of juridical, cultural and economic equality amongst the citizens of the two different nationalities, with, at the same time, the guarantee of the preservation of their respective cultural and language characteristics, thus recognizing the sacred right of peoples to the use of their own language, to the following of their own ideology and to the founding of their own cultural, religious, recreational and economic institutes.

(c) The co-operation and consorting of the two races on a basis

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- 2 -

which will eliminate all question of minorities and thus enable each people to regard the other as an equal and not as an inferior.

5. It is our conviction that, in the New Europe - freed from all national and imperialistic prejudices which have brought the world to disaster and sealed off nations one from the other behind the absurd and unbeneficial barriers of self-sufficient economics and falsely proclaimed rights to Lebensraum - its peoples will overcome all obstacles in the way of the establishment of Free Trade. We consider it, therefore, our especial duty to promote the highest economic and financial development of TRIESTE, which is the natural centre of the VENEZIA GIULIA region, and whose prosperity is essential to the life and well-being not only of the town's inhabitants but also of those in the whole of an area so poor in natural resources. TRIESTE must become a truly Free Port, that is a trading centre open to the ships of every nation and governed in administrative and commercial matters by a Port Committee, with proportionate numbers of representatives from the TRIESTE Municipality, the appropriate civil authorities and the industrial and commercial firms of all nationalities concerned in the functioning of the port. In this way all nations using the port of TRIESTE will be sure of every facility for navigation and all possibilities for industrial and commercial enterprise within the TRIESTE area. Merchants of all nations will thus find in an enlightened and democratic ITALY a generous hospitality and complete freedom to participate industrially and commercially in the rapid post-war recovery of Central EUROPE.

6. We urge the people of VENEZIA GIULIA, and in particular those of TRIESTE, to take the most active interest in their national and economic future. Only by the courageous and generous contribution of all concerned will it be possible to achieve those principles of justice and democracy to which they have the good right to aspire after so many cruel sufferings and so much bitterness and subjugation.

II.

1. At these three meetings of the TRIESTE C.L.N. the Communists were absent, although a seat was kept for them.
2. Amongst other matters the possibilities of organising Italian units to counter-balance existing Slav formations were examined, but the proposal was rejected as impracticable. Instead a motion recommending the organisation of groups of TRIESTE youth was passed unanimously. These groups were to be ready to act at the opportune moment, putting themselves at the disposal of the nuclei of Italian soldiers landing at TRIESTE together with, or before, Allied troops.
3. The members of the C.L.N. beg that such a proposal be given favourable consideration since they believe it might well alter the situation radically.
4. It was decided to place the organisation of these groups in the hands of a regular army officer and not of a political leader.

34 / N.L.

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Report B.

1. The position of Italian nationals in the VENEZIA GIULIA region is undoubtedly serious. The conviction is general that the United Nations have agreed to a request from TITO that territories in that area should pass into the Yugoslav sphere of influence. The result is that the majority of Italians in TRIESTE await events in an attitude of complete apathy.
 2. Attempts to organize Italian units in the CARSO area have been opposed by the Slav partisans who have even, on occasions, disarmed units thus formed. Moreover, the lack of food supplies and the co-operation of the people has been a great problem.
 3. It is believed certain that the Slav partisans will descend upon the towns in VENEZIA GIULIA the moment the Germans begin to withdraw from the area.
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1 Dec 44.

C.S.S.Copies to: DCAO
DCCAO
DOMG
DOMG(M)

1. I attach a copy of a paper Log.P.164 dated 29 Nov 44 which has just been received from AFHQ. I understand that this paper has been prepared somewhat hurriedly but it is useful in bringing out some of the main difficulties in regard to civil relief.

2. It was intended that it should be discussed at a conference between AFHQ, AAI and AC in ROME on 2 Dec. This has been postponed. Before it takes place, we should get our own ideas into finer shape.

3. There is one point of principle on which I feel in disagreement with the paper. It places responsibility for all matters, including the development and operation of GEMOA, on AC. This is going too far. The Italians cannot open a blocked and mined port nor repair quickly a heavily damaged railway without a very large degree of assistance from us. If we are going to afford large scale assistance, it is much better that we should retain control.

Instead of holding out nebulous offers of assistance I am in favour of giving a definite undertaking to do certain things while making it clear that no further large scale assistance will be forthcoming.

4. I suggest that we might consider this paper at the same conference as that which will be summoned for consideration of the directive to FIFTH ARMY and HQ 2 District. To save time at this conference I will table some draft comments on the paper for consideration at it.

(Sgd) B.H. ROBERTSON, Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

TOP SECRET

FILES A

(38)

A FILE

Ref: 504/105/008.

27 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration - VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Italian Government.

attached

In reply to your letter 04071/13 of 16 November signed by Visconti Venosta, I have to inform you that the subject has been given the fullest consideration at the highest levels and that adequate steps have been arranged to meet the circumstances envisaged in the letter.

M. S.

HELMY W. STONE,
Commodore, USN
Chief Commissioner

A

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COPYrough Translation16
Rome, ~~21st~~ November 1944

No. 04071/13

Dear Admiral,

with letter n.1/236 of August the 15th and in relation on the present military events, I pointed out to you the anxiety caused to the Italian Government and to the whole Italian nation by the possibility of clashes between armed bands and peaceful citizens on occasion of the departure of the German troops from Venezia Giulia. In the same letter, through your influential authority, I drew the attention and the interest of the Allied Governments on the eventuality of acts of violence and of massacres being carried out in those provinces with a view to them already pre-arranging the necessary countermeasures.

You have been so kind to inform me, on August the 19th, and H.E. the President of the Council, on September 22nd, that this anxiety had been brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Allied Command and that the matter was being kept in sight by the competent Allied Authorities.

In consideration of the further developments of the military operations, and in the eventuality that the victories of the Allied Armies should cause a general withdrawal of the Germans from the Adriatic zone, I take the liberty, my dear Admiral, of newley requesting you to interpose your authority in the proper quarters so that the matter should continue to be held in due consideration.

Believe me, dear Admiral, cordially yours. 1719

/s/ Visconti Venosta

(37)

APP

1014/CC

S E C R E T

AFHQ Political Committee

33rd Meeting

22 November 1944

EXTRACT

7. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

(Paper No. PC(44) 132 (Annex))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper covering a draft telegram for despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff incorporating the modifications recommended at PC(44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 10.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that G-5 despatch the telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the NAF series as amended further in discussion.

S E C R E T

1718

1014/00

36

33 APP 'C' ?

FILE UNDER NO. 1014/CC

INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS

PC (44) 132 (Armeze)

TOP SECRET

20 November 1944

Political Committee

;

SUBJECT: ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR
VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS.

32

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 1002-2/CC

1014

1717

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

35

TOP SECRET

AFHQ Political Meeting

32nd Meeting

15 November 1944

EXTRACT

10. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

(Paper No. PC(44) 132) - 33

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper embodying a plan for the Allied military government of Venezia Giulia and recommending that a telegram explaining the main features in the plan be despatched to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER remarked that the government of VENEZIA GIULIA would raise considerable political complexities and queried whether it would not be preferable to await developments in BELGRADE before making any firm decisions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that it was desirable to obtain an interim policy in order that planning should proceed. It was for this purpose that it was proposed to seek the views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. KIRK objected to the statement in paragraph 3 of the draft telegram, proposing that the Supreme Allied Commander should undertake negotiations with Tito and representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government. He submitted that this matter should more properly be dealt with on a governmental level and suggested that the draft telegram be amended accordingly.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EYRES MONSELL pointed out that the Carabinieri had done much useful work as security police in ITALY. He appreciated the objections to their use in VENEZIA GIULIA, but it might be found necessary to station small numbers there owing to the lack of any suitable substitutes. He suggested, therefore, that the first sentence of paragraph 2(b) in the draft telegram under discussion be amended to read: "Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian Carabinieri or troops".

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

1718

Directed that G-5 re-draft the telegram circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 132 in the light of the comments made during discussion and submit it at the next meeting of the Committee.

TOP SECRET

34a

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET.

'A' FILE

Ref: 504/92/008.

14 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Planning - Port of TRIESTE.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
VENEZIA Region.

Attached correspondence in connection with the operation of the Port of TRIESTE is forwarded for your information. There is no record that you have been consulted by ASD HQ Yugoslavia and you may wish to comment on this correspondence.

GWIS/JG.

[Handwritten signature]
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

[Handwritten mark]

1945

1008/CC

34

[Handwritten mark]

COPY.SECRET.Subject: Port of TRIESTE.M HQ (BALKANS)
Att G-5 Section.
AFHQ, CMF.
B/2001/2/L.ML HQ (Yugoslavia) CMF.

10 November 1944.

Ref your YS/412/6/A of 4 Oct 44 on above subject.

1. It is agreed in principle that there should in due course be a detachment from ML HQ (Yugoslavia) at TRIESTE, that it should be under Capt TERRY and be comprised as suggested.
2. The functions of this detachment should be approximately as suggested, but modified in accordance with the following minutes:-

G-3 Minute. The recommendation contained in attached planning paper YS/412/6/A is agreed to, except that it is suggested that the words "to take any necessary executive action" in para 3(o) may prove misleading, in that the detachment would not in fact have any executive duties. Suggest the words "to render any necessary assistance" might be substituted.

G-4 (Mov & Tn) Minute: Comments on the attached planning paper are as follows:-

- (a) Suggestion by G-3 is agreed. It does not appear that the ML HQ detachment could take any executive action in connection with the handing over of supplies.
- (b) The action outlined in the first sentence of para 3(d) could not be part of the detachment's functions. Notification of future port acceptance to bidding agencies is the responsibility of G-4 (Mov & Tn), AFHQ, and could not be dealt with on a Port Commandant/detachment ML HQ level. Further it is our understanding that bids for the import of civil supplies for YUGOSLAVIA will be placed on AFHQ by HQ BALKANS so long as the present relationship exists between that HQ and ML HQ YUGOSLAVIA. Should the connection between the two HQ's be severed, however, ML HQ YUGOSLAVIA would necessarily bid direct to AFHQ.
- (c) Subject to the above comments, this Section has no objection to the procedure suggested in the planning paper.

(Sgd)??????

for Maj-Gen
Comd.

Copy to: Capt. Cotton (with copy of letter under reply).
Col. Jackson (2) for Allied Commission (with copy of letter under reply).

(34) 11/11/44

COPY.Subject: Planning - TRIESTE.

AM HQ (BALKANS)

Copy to: HQ Liaison.
Mov: Tn: S & R.TOP SECRET.AML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), COMF.
Tel: Bari 71.

Ref: YB/412/6/A.

4 Oct 44.

1. It seems probable that the port of TRIESTE will, in due course, be under Allied Military control. It is understood that it is intended that this area will form No.12 District of Allied Military Government.
2. It is within your knowledge that from the communication point of view, it is highly desirable that a large quantity of stores, possibly up to 40,000 tons per month should be received at TRIESTE and be moved into YUGOSLAVIA on the TRIESTE-LJUBJANA-ZAGREB-BELGRADE line.
3. In view of the above, it would appear desirable for a Detachment from AML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) to be attached to District HQ, AMG, with the following objects:
 - (a) To be in close liaison with AMG and the Port Authorities, TRIESTE, with a view to facilitating the transit of Civil Supply through that port.
 - (b) To act as liaison between District HQ AMG ACC and YUGOSLAV authorities in connection with the above transit of supplies.
 - (c) To take any necessary executive action in connection with the handing over of these supplies, whether this be done in TRIESTE port or warehouse, or on the YUGOSLAV frontier.
 - (d) To take any necessary action as initiated by Movement Control, TRIESTE, to inform HQ AML of the quantities of supplies receivable, on YUGOSLAV account, in the port, in any future period. Bidding for supplies for YUGOSLAVIA would remain the business of HQ AML (YUGOSLAVIA) wherever that HQ may be situated.
4. It is intended that the party attached to No.12 District HQ AMG should be constituted as under:

Officer IC: Capt. J.A. TERRY, RASC.
Total: Officers - 2; ORs - 1; Vehs - 1.
5. It is requested that if you agree you will take the necessary action to bring this matter to the attention of AMHQ (G-3 and G-5) in order that the proposal may be integrated with any plans now being considered for TRIESTE, and, further, that you arrange for the leader of this party, Capt J A TERRY, to be called into consultation in connection with the detailed planning.

(Sgd) CF FORESTIER-WALKER
Brig.
Comd (Des).

CFW/egl.

34/100

TOP SECRET

K-407

APPENDIX "C" TO FC (44) 192DRAFT CABLE TO AGWAR FOR C.C.S.

Subject is Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA.

1. In August 1944 Marshal Tito was informed that it was SAC's intention to establish and maintain Allied Military Government there until its disposition could be determined by negotiation between the governments concerned. Tito objected to this while agreeing fully to and pledging assistance in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and L of Cs required by Allied Forces occupying AUSTRIA or HUNGARY. Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.
2. It is approved that Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are planned, as follow:
 - (a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.
 - (b) No Italian Carabinieri or troops will be employed. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops

2. It is approved that Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are planned, as follows:

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) No Italian Carabinieri or troops will be employed. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the areas in L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops may have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.

(c) The basic law will be Italian, but all laws discriminating against the Yugoslav and the right of recourse beyond local courts will be suspended and certain Italian national legislation may be excluded from the area.

(d) Similarly, a certain degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters might evolve. Italian lire will continue legal tender but new supplies of currency will be Allied Military lire.

(e) Local advisory committees consisting of indigenous Italians and Slavs, which the Allied regional authorities could consult at their discretion, might be formed.

See 36

AVC

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K-407

3. If local Slav partisans and/or outside contingents of Tito's forces are in effective control of VENEZIA GIULIA before the Allied forces arrive, we might not be in a position or might not find it expedient to superimpose Allied Military Government. We propose to undertake a negotiation with Tito and representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout the whole area. This is desirable to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and in AUSTRIA. Also absence of agreement increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslavs in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. If necessary, however, the August agreement with Tito would afford an adequate working basis from the military security angle. In summary, our decision to raise this sensitive issue with the Yugoslavs is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make a public declaration to the effect that that area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 2, the creation of an

Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from

with Tito would afford an adequate working
In summary, our decision to raise this sensitive issue with the Yugoslavs is
largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite
political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout

VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in
negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make
a public declaration to the effect that that area will be held in trust by the
Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection
we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to
the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 2, the creation of an
Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from
in ITALY and possibly even admitting Yugoslavs and Italian participation at the
top as well as at the local level. Aside from certain practical difficulties,
it is possible that such a step might be interpreted as a prejudgement of the
territorial issue and might constitute a precedent in other situations where
mixed nationalities or minorities are involved.

5. Your approval is requested of the plan for Allied Military Government in
VENEZIA GIULIA outlined in paragraph 2 and the course proposed in paragraph 3.

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6. The above relates to VENEZIA GIULIA proper, ZARA and Italian Adriatic islands in dispute were not specifically subject of discussion with Tito in August. Allied Military Government is not envisaged there although operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav. It is assumed that ZARA and Italian Adriatic islands, in dispute will, in default of Allied action, pass to Yugoslav administration, as also CCFEU to the Greeks. Your approval of our negative course in these subsidiary matters is requested.

1708

TOP SECRET

(33) APR C

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-407

FC (44) 132

11th November 1944

TOP SECRETCOPY NO 40POLITICAL COMMITTEEALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA
GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS
-----Notes by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The establishment of occupational forces of Allied Military Government is envisaged in Venezia Giulia, in connection with Freeborn Operations in AUSTRIA (Freeborn-Directive 11 October 1944. AC 281/679-0).
2. SAC's intention in this matter, also to the effect that Allied Military Government would be maintained until the question of post-war territorial jurisdiction has been settled, was communicated to Marshal Tito in August 1944 and subsequently to both the Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments. Marshal Tito objected to the imposition of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA, while agreeing to end fledging co-operation in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and I of CE to AUSTRIA. (SAC (44) Special (5) 13 August 1944 and annexure).

3. The Allied Commission has submitted a definitive programme for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (Appendix A). The basic administrative pattern will be as elsewhere in ITALY except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside will be avoided and responsible local officials, Italian or Slav, will be retained in office. No Italian troops will be employed. Recriment will be exercised in the employment of Carabinieri and Italian provincial police; and the local police will be directly controlled by the Allied authorities. A considerable autonomy in legal, fiscal and currency matters is envisaged. Generally, the stamp of Allied control will be emphasised. The plan as above contemplates minor variations depending upon the situation found upon Allied entry, in which connection three major possibilities are envisaged :-

- (a) Allied troops enter before partisan control has crystallised;
- (b) Local Slav partisans have assumed localised control; or 1712
- (c) Anticipated Yugoslav force has entered and established military government.

while agreeing to and pledging co-operation in the command and control of the port of TRIESTE and I of Cs to AUSTRIA. (SAC (44) Special (5) 13 August 1944 and annexure).

3. The Allied Commission has submitted a definitive programme for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (Appendix A). The basic administrative pattern will be as elsewhere in ITALY except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside will be avoided and responsible local officials, Italian or Slav, will be retained in office. No Italian troops will be employed. Restriction will be exercised in the employment of Carabinieri and Italian provincial police; and the local police will be directly controlled by the Allied authorities. A considerable autonomy in legal, fiscal and currency matters is envisaged. Generally, the stamp of Allied control will be emphasised. The plan as above contemplates minor variations depending upon the situation found upon Allied entry, in which connection three major possibilities are envisaged :-

- (a) Allied troops enter before partisan control has crystallised;
- (b) Local Slav partisans have assumed localised control; or 1712
- (c) ~~As~~ Organised Yugoslav force has entered and established military government.

To ensure transition to Allied Military Government in the last case above, the Allied Commission foresees the need for agreement in advance with the Yugoslav authorities and recommends that this take the form of an understanding that any Yugoslav forces which may cross the 1939 frontier into ITALY shall operate as an expeditionary force under Allied command.

4. General Alexander's comments on the Allied Commission programme are attached (Appendix B). He takes the view that, to ensure Allied control of requisite ports and communications in VENEZIA GIULIA and in the interests of administrative continuity, Allied Military Government on Italian lines should extend up to the 1939 frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustment has been arrived at. If any part of VENEZIA GIULIA is previously occupied by Marshal Tito's troops, control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to AAI upon arrival. General Alexander also suggests some under the operational control of AAI. He considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the above lines should be taken in hand promptly with Marshal Tito and the Russian Government.

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cc. C of S wry in 1002/ce

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5. This section approves the plan submitted by the Allied Commission for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA. We are fully in accord that the basic objective should be to retain all the special advantages of preceding along familiar administrative lines, and at the same time to provide appropriate local adaptations and safeguard to ensure impartial administration. We propose, however, greater rigidity in adherence to the following principles:

- (a) The administrative status quo found upon Allied entry, Italian or Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be preserved provided it affords responsible government and is responsive to local public opinion;
- (b) Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office; and
- (c) No Italian troops or Carabinieri will be employed in police duties, for which a special force will have to be recruited locally to take over part of the burden initially assumed by Allied Garrison troops.

The plan approved by this section for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is set forth in somewhat greater detail (para 2 of Appendix C) for consideration and submission to CCC.

6. This section also concurs in the recommendation that negotiations be undertaken with the Yugoslav authorities to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. In our judgement, such agreement need not of necessity be in the form suggested by the Allied Commission, and we do not feel in a position to comment on General Alexander's remarks, insofar as they raise the question of the military command relationship between Allied and Yugoslav/Russian forces operating in VENEZIA GIULIA.
7. In recommending negotiations as above, we accept the view that, to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and AUSTRIA, the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA is desirable. We also appreciate that anything short of this increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslav in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. However, if necessary, the August agreement with Marshal Tito would afford an adequate modus operandi from the military security standpoint. In summary, our recommendation in favour of negotiation is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Unless they are prepared to make a public declaration to the effect that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute, we do not think there is much chance of success in negotiation with Marshal Tito on this sensitive issue. It is submitted, accordingly, that the matter be presented in the above light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (paras 5 and 4 of Appendix C). It is also suggested that the question of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA might appropriately be raised as a subsidiary issue in negotiations which will have to be undertaken with Marshal Tito in respect of the area.

6. This section also concurs in the recommendation that negotiations be undertaken with the Yugoslav authorities to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. In our judgement, such agreement need not of necessity be in the form suggested by the Allied Commission, and we do not feel in a position to comment on General Alexander's remarks, insofar as they raise the question of the military command relationship between Allied and Yugoslav/Russian forces operating in VENEZIA GIULIA.

7. In recommending negotiations as above, we accept the view that, to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and AUSTRIA, the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA is desirable. We also appreciate that anything short of this increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslav in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. However, if necessary, the August agreement with Marshal Tito would afford an adequate means of ensuring the military security standpoint. In summary, our recommendation in favour of negotiation is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Unless they are prepared to make a public declaration to the effect that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute, we do not think there is much chance of success in a negotiation with Marshal Tito on this sensitive issue. It is submitted, accordingly, that the matter be presented in the above light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (paras 2 and 4 of Appendix C). It is also suggested that the question of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA might appropriately be raised as a subsidiary issue in negotiations which will have to be undertaken with Marshal Tito in respect of important Military operations now under consideration.

8. The above discussion concerns VENEZIA GIULIA proper. Related questions are submitted, for consideration and presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (para 6 of Appendix C) in the matter of ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute. Allied Military Government is not envisaged in these areas, which it is assumed will pass to Yugoslav administration in default of Allied action, although it is appreciated that operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav.

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9. It is recommended :-

- (a) That the plan for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (para 2 of Appendix C) be approved.
- (b) That the cable substantially as attached (Appendix C) be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(intd) C.M.S.

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 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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33

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

FC (44) 31st Meeting
7th November 1944

COPY NO. 40

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 7TH NOVEMBER 1944.

* * * * *
E X T R A C T
* * * * *

6. POSITION IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND ISTRIA FOLLOWING GERMAN WITDRAWAL

(Paper No. FC (44) 130) ← *submitted at 20 11/4/44*

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the U.S. Political Adviser indicating that the Liberation Committee for Northern ITALY was apprehensive of the situation which might arise in the provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA and ISTRIA after the German withdrawal and that they recommended as a possible remedy the strengthening and publicising of the direct agreements between the Italian Government and Marshal Tito.

MR. KIRK stated that since submitting the paper he had received new information on the subject. He would therefore prefer this subject discussed at a forthcoming meeting in the light of this new information.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that a decision regarding the action desired would have to be made in agreement with Marshal Tito and that this along with other subjects pending would probably have to await recognition of his government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :-

- (a) Invited the U.S. Political Adviser to bring this subject forward for consideration at a forthcoming meeting of the Committee in the light of his new information.
- (b) Directed that G-2, in conjunction with G-3, take steps to ascertain and report to him on the extent of the relations obtaining between the Italian National Liberation Committee and Marshal Tito.

* * * * *

1705

10/14/44

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PWB ITHC.

COPI.

TOP SECRET.

PLAN FOR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO NORTHERN ITALY.

TOP SECRET

Object.

To reduce to a minimum the calls upon Allied Armies in Italy to maintain order in North-West Italy as soon as the Germans withdraw from it by preparatory propaganda directed at North-West Italy immediately.

Information:

There is the possibility of unrest in North-West Italy when the Germans withdraw, because of the factions between the various parties, who may be striving to gain predominance to take the responsibility of government in their own hands.

Of the five parties, the two strongest are the Communist and the Socialist. The indications are that they could not be likely to depart from the directives given them respectively by Togliatti, Communist Minister without portfolio, and Nenni, Secretary of the Socialist Party.

The people of North-West Italy as a whole are more developed politically and more capable of discipline than those of the south. This factor could work adversely or in our favour.

The present indications of rivalry would seem to be due to lack of confidence in the Italian Government in Rome, and to some extent in the intentions of the Allies.

This lack of confidence is due partly to lack of knowledge of what is happening in liberated Italy, increased by German and Fascist propaganda attacking the Italian Government and the Allied administration.

Plan:

To undertake a campaign of propaganda directed to North Italy generally, but in fact specifically aimed at North-West Italy, to build up the confidence in the Italian Government, emphasizing that it is a coalition government supported by all parties and emphasizing also the support given to it by the Allies.

Methods:

The methods at our disposal are:

- (a) Leaflets
- (b) Radio
- (c) Agents

and more capable of discipline than those of the Axis.

The present indications of rivalry would seem to be due to lack of confidence in the Italian Government in Rome, and to some extent in the intentions of the Allies.

This lack of confidence is due partly to lack of knowledge of what is happening in liberated Italy, increased by German and Fascist propaganda attacking the Italian Government and the Allied administration.

Plan:

To undertake a campaign of propaganda directed to North Italy generally, but in fact specifically aimed at North-West Italy, to build up the confidence in the Italian Government, emphasizing that it is a coalition government supported by all parties and emphasizing also the support given to it by the Allies.

Methods:

The methods at our disposal are:

- (a) Leaflets
- (b) Radio
- (c) Agents

(a) Leaflets will be dropped on the principal centres in the form of a newspaper published and edited by P.W.B. and containing articles by members of the Italian Government with news of their activities and those of A.M.C. and of the Allied Commission, together with general war news. This will be supplemented where necessary by leaflets in the name of the Commander-in-Chief A.A.I. giving instruction

(b) Leaflets will be backed up by radio programmes from the B.B.C. and the new 20 kw. short wave transmitter from Rome which covers the whole of Northern Italy, giving talks by members of the Italian Government aimed specifically at Northern Italy and giving news of Italian Government and A.C. activities in liberated Italy.

(c) Agents. (a) and (b) will be supported by the activities of F.W.B. agents in the principal centres in N.W. Italy: who will also provide intelligence from their respective areas on which propaganda lines can be based.


Proviso:

This propaganda plan will not concern itself in any way with the activities of Italian patriots in the North. Propaganda to patriots will continue to be conducted independently through Italia Combatta programmes and leaflets.

31.10.44.

Distribution:

- AAI Adv. Branch
- Brig. Lush, A.C.
- Mr. Caccio, A.C.
- Mr. Schott, A.C.
- Major Fielder, A.C.
- Patriot Branch, A.C.



- No. 1 Special Force (2)
- ISLD.
- P.W.B. ATHQ (3)
- P.W.B. ITHQ (20)
- Cutposts (F.V.I.)
- 5 and 8 Armies (F.V.I.)

File

31

3 Ann

TOP SECRET

Copy to.....

12

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER
AND SOA

TOP SECRET

A FILE

Ref: 504/31/224

29 October, 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces - N.E. ITALY,

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attn: G-5 Section.

21

30

1. On 18 Sept 1944 under reference 503/20/CA - A/OC FM I wrote you a letter setting forward certain aspects of the problem of applying military government in the provinces of FUMI, POLA, TRENTO and SORENTA, forming together the area known as VENETIA GIULIA.
2. Since the despatch of that letter further conferences have been held and it now appears desirable to put forward for your consideration plans based on a series of possible eventualities. At the same time I shall ask your assistance in preliminary negotiations.
3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the Annexure to SAC(44), Special 5, memorandum of 13 Aug wherein was declared the policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four provinces of VENETIA GIULIA.
4. It is clear that Togo Slav national aspirations cannot be left out of account. I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Togo Slav annexation.
5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids unduly likely to exacerbate local feelings. The incorporation of other Italian or Togo Slav officials might have such results. The central and declared aim of the Allied administration should be impartial dealing to Italian and Slav alike.
6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged:-

1703

it now appears desirable to... At the same time I...
 series of possible eventualities. In preliminary negotiations.
 3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the Agreement to...
 in regard of 1) and therein was declared the policy of the Allied Governments to...
 impose an Allied Military Government upon the four provinces of Venezia Giulia.

4. It is clear that Yugo Slav national aspirations cannot be left out of...
 account. I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is...
 not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a...
 de facto Yugo Slav unification.

5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up...
 will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to...
 exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugo Slav...
 officials might have such results. The central and declared aim of the Allied...
 administration should be impartial dealing to Italian and Slav alike.

1703

6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged:-
 Situation "A" - "Allied Military Forces" - that is to say, forces under...
 any or all - enter the country after a rapid advance, before any entry of...
 organized Yugo Slav formations has taken place, and before there has been...
 any crystallization of partisan control. Local administration based on the...
 Italian system continues to function to a greater or lesser degree.

Situation "B" - "Allied Military Forces" enter the country after a period...
 of vacuum during which local Yugo Slav partisans have assumed localized...
 control.

Situation "C" - A formal Yugo Slav military force enters the country in...
 advance of any other "Allied Military Force".

It is clear that all three situations may exist at one time within the...
 confines of Venezia Giulia.

7. In the circumstances of situation "A" it is proposed that Allied Military...
 Government should generally follow normal lines with the following special...
 features:-

- (a) The continued operation of existing Italian administration would be...
 subject to the non-introduction of officials from other parts of Italy,
 and would be dependent solely on those already found within the territory.
- (b) No Italian troops will be used as such in the area. The use of G.I.s and...
 G.I.s will be left to the discretion of the Regional Command.
- Local municipal police will be used under direct orders of A.M.

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24 Oct

TOP SECRET

- (a) Italian law would be applied, and local courts would be re-opened under existing approved judges, but the Court of Appeal at Milan and the detached section at Turin would be final courts. The right of recourse to the Court of Cassation in Rome would be suspended.
- (d) Italian legislation since 8 September 1943 would not be implemented as is now done in other parts of Italy. Any legislation deemed necessary would be achieved by publication of General or Regional Orders. However, they might follow current Italian legislation.
- (e) The Provinces would be financed entirely by AM Funds. Pending orders would be used but Italian Government funds would not be introduced from outside.
8. In the circumstances of attention "A" a similar policy will be adopted with the differences that:-
- (a) No Italian police would be re-employed in particular areas.
- (b) That any working de facto administrative machinery whether using Italian or Yugoslav law officials or both would be kept in being.
- (c) As with "A", transportation of officials from outside would be avoided.
- (d) Courts of law would be initially closed and re-opened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioners. Offences against Allied proclamations would be tried by AM Courts. Any courts permitted to re-open would, under international law, have to apply the Italian Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "A", final appeal would be to the local Courts of Appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at Rome being suspended.
9. The essential consideration in class "B" and class "C" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of services inside the territory that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a visible indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.
10. In the case of "D", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Yugoslav Army having any operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugoslav administration set up, with loyal sanction under international law, under Yugoslav Army officers. It would be extremely difficult, if not totally impossible, for AM officers on the spot to carry out such an administration of locality to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Yugoslav Government that any Yugoslav Army operating the 1939 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining the Allied troops under command of General Alexander.

- (b) That the majority of these assemblies be primarily military in character, Italian or Yugoslav officials or both would be kept in Seidra.
- (c) As with "A", transportation of officials from outside would be avoided.
- (d) Courts of law would be initially closed and reopened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Offenses against Allied proclamations would be tried by AMI Courts. Any courts permitted to reopen would, under international law, have to apply the Italian Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "B", final appeal would be to the local Courts of appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at Rome being suspended.

9. The essential considerations in Class "A" and Class "B" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of parties inside the territory that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a viable indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

10. In the case of "C", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Yugoslav Army invading any operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the military governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugoslav administration set up, with legal sanction under international law, under Yugoslav law officers. It could be extremely difficult, if not wholly impossible, for all officers on the spot of 2000 men such an administration of loyalty to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Yugoslav Government that any Yugoslav Army exceeding the 1939 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining the Allied troops under command of General Alexander. This formula would cover the legal position of the installation of an Anglo-American AG under the authority of General Alexander. It is, however, clear that some agreement must be made with the Yugoslav authorities which will include a clause to the effect that civil administration will be carried out by Anglo-American Military Government officers, in order to avoid dualism, embarrassment, and probably unfortunate incidents in the area, and I would like that at the agreement moment this be done. It is also clear that a token force of American or British troops or both, should be sent into the area at the earliest possible opportunity. An undertaking should also be obtained from the Yugoslav authorities that in the event of a Yugoslav force occupying any part of the territory in attempt would be made to allow loss in force as on 8 Sept 1943. In all three cases the Regional Commissioners and his staff will have full discretion to consult local opinion in the conduct of civil affairs.

11. It is evident that the imposition of Allied Military Government, whether under conditions "A", "B" or "C", will require a considerably higher concentration of officers and men than has been available lately. Moreover, a substantial prerequisite for the execution of this plan under "A", "B" or "C", is the provision of an adequate force of Allied Military Police to be placed at the disposal of the Regional Commissioners. In any event it is proposed to concentrate available resources on these main centers.

* The minimum numbers desired necessary for this are shown in Appendix "A".

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-3-

- (a) The port of TRINTE.
- (b) The port of GOLA and the coast and hinterland areas of Southern TRINTE.
- (c) The port of FUMI.

It is felt that a fair, firm and consistent Allied administration in these three important centers will have a steady effect on the remainder of the area, much of which is sparsely populated and will be, under various conditions, difficult to access.

12. It is further requested that, should circumstances permit, full opportunity be taken of Allied naval power to make rapid and substantive landings in the three ports of TRINTE, FUMI and GOLA.

13. The small Province of ZARA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Palastian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organization for VENETIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six Frontier Provinces, the four of VENETIA GIULIA and the two of VENETIA TRIDENTINA, rests not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UMBRIA and MARCHE and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-arching upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Anglo-Slav and Italian peoples that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENETIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, having regard to our very limited establishment, I am anxious to avoid the additional overhead that must arise from the formation of new regions. Therefore, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle the organization of administration for VENETIA GIULIA as for VENETIA TRIDENTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region III with sub-regions for VENETIA GIULIA and VENETIA TRIDENTINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Togo Slav authorities that in the event that any Togo Slav troops cross the 1939 frontier into Italy they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI.

16. I enclose letter containing views of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

1401

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a concrete Regional organization for VENEZUELA GUAYANA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier provinces, the four of VENEZUELA GUAYANA and the two of VENEZUELA TRINIDADINA, rest not only on each other but upon the neighbouring provinces of ULLINO and BAZILAND and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Togo Slav and Italians precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENEZUELA GUAYANA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, having regard to our very limited establishment, I am anxious to avoid the additional overhead that must arise from the formation of new regions. Therefore, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRINIDADINA, I propose to handle the organization of administration for VENEZUELA GUAYANA as for VENEZUELA TRINIDADINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII with sub-regions for VENEZUELA GUAYANA and VENEZUELA TRINIDADINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Togo Slav authorities that in the event that any Togo Slav troops cross the 1939 frontier into Italy they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI.

16. I enclose letter containing views of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

OCS/459

1401

ELMER W. SCOTT
Commander, USAF
Acting Chief Constabulary

Copy to: Chief of Staff, ANSO.
The Hon. Alexander Kirk.
Sir Noel Charles, Bt, KCB, MC.
HQ, Region XII.
SCHO AAI 8 Aug
Pol Sec
Ch Sec
Lt Col WGO
DCCAO AAI
CDS, AAI
"AV FILE
FILE

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETAnnexure "A" to 504/83/GDS dated 29 Oct 48.

It is considered that to carry out the above policy, the following additions to normal AGO strength would be required.

- (a) Military Police: For TRINITE - 4 Provost Companies
For GORIZIA, POLA and FIUME - 1 Coy each
- (b) Additional AGO Legal Officers: For TRINITE - 6
For GORIZIA, POLA and FIUME - 2 each.
- (c) GAO's to be on the basis of:

TRINITE Province	(30 Communes)	
City of TRINITE		4
Remainder		5
GORIZIA Province.	(42 Communes)	7
POLA Province		
City of POLA		2
Remainder		7
FIUME Province		
City of FIUME		2
Remainder		3
	Total...	30

- (d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other Commissions will be submitted at an early date.

10/11/48
1700

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
400 294

TOP SECRET

COPY 100.....

Ref: 504/85/OCS.

29 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of N.E. Frontier Provinces.

TO: 1. Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: G-5 Sec.

A FILE

211

30

1. With further reference to my 808/80/OCS - NOV 221 of 28 September 1944, I wish to bring to your notice certain further considerations in respect of the three provinces of TRIESTE, TREVISO and UDINESE.

2. All available evidence indicates that, since the capitulation of Italy, the control of these three provinces has been taken over by GERMANY. The phrase used by one of our informants is that these three provinces have been "administratively annexed to the Reich".

3. Therefore, it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The holders of office under the German regime may have fled taking with them all available records.

4. In considering the restoration of an administrative system, it appears likely that a varying method of approach may be found necessary in the case of each of these three provinces.

5. The Province of TRIESTE, though included by the Germans in "their Pro-Alpine Operational Zone", does not form part of VERONA TRIDENTINA, nor is it one of the six frontier provinces listed in the Chief of Staff's memorandum (Annexure to SAC (Ad) Special 5 of 13 August).

6. It is therefore, proposed that in the case of the Province of TRIESTE the normal policy will obtain, and that the return to normal Italian administration will be carried out as rapidly as possible.

7. In the case of the two remaining provinces of TREVISO and UDINESE, I am preparing plans for the application of AF rule in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, AFHQ. I consider it necessary to bring to your notice certain practical differences which exist between the northern and southern of the two provinces.

8. In the case of TREVISO, its largely Italian population and **Italian** government should render easy a return to the Italian administrative system, and there should be no difficulty in using Italian officials under AFH direction. I propose, therefore, to carry out a replacement of the German administrative machinery by the normal Italian administrative machinery. In order to avoid any obvious differentiation between the policy adopted in the case of TRIESTE

321-1

3. Therefore, it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The holders of offices under the German regime may have fled taking with them all available records.
4. In considering the restoration of an administrative system, it appears likely that a varying method of approach may be found necessary in the case of each of these three provinces.
5. The Province of **TRIESTE**, though included by the Germans in "their Pro-Alpine Operational Zone", does not form part of **VENEZIA TRIDENTINA**, nor is it one of the six frontier provinces listed in the Chief of Staff's memorandum (Annexure to SAC (44) Special 5 of 13 August).
6. It is therefore, proposed that in the case of the provinces of **TRIESTE** the normal policy will obtain, and that the return to normal Italian administration will be carried out as rapidly as possible.
7. In the case of the two remaining provinces of **TREVISO** and **UDINESE**, I am preparing plans for the application of AF rules in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, AFHQ. I consider it necessary to bring to your notice certain practical differences which exist between the Northern and Southern of the two Provinces.
8. In the case of **TREVISO**, its largely Italian population and **Italian** gentilement should render easy a return to the Italian administrative system, and there should be no difficulty in using Italian officials under AF direction. I propose, therefore, to carry out a replacement of the German administrative machinery by the normal Italian administrative machinery. In order to avoid any obvious differentiation between the policy adopted in the case of **TRIESTE** and that adopted in the other five frontier provinces of **VENEZIA GIULIA** and **TRIDENTINA**, I do not propose in principle to import Italian officials, or Carabinieri. I consider, however, that in certain cases such an importation may be desirable and if carefully controlled will not give rise to difficulties. I intend, however, to take care that no prior commitment in this direction is made with the Italian Government.
9. In the case of the Province of **UDINESE** there are special considerations. Over 80% of the population is German speaking. Most of them are passionately attached to Austrian tradition and their recent period of administrative incorporation in the Reich may well have revived aspirations of union with a new Austria. The majority of the inhabitants may be expected to view with disappointment and disfavour the return of Italian law and administration in the wake of Allied armies; especially will they dislike the return of Italian officials. For precisely these reasons it may be expected that the Italian Government may press for the return of Italian officials to administrative and other posts in **UDINESE**.

10. The problem/...

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

-2-

10. The problem is not one of great magnitude. The total population of the Province is in the neighbourhood of 277,000. There are only three towns over 10,000 inhabitants. The country is sparsely peopled and the most important position is traversed by the MURTER ROAD and Railway which may be expected to be held by Allied troops.
11. I therefore propose that in setting up Allied Military Government in BOLZANO officials will not be brought into this Province to fill any gaps caused by the departure of the previous officials. Such vacancies will be made up from the local inhabitants. I propose to avoid emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connections.
12. Within a short time, however, it will be necessary to reconstitute civil machinery if a complete stagnation of local life is to be avoided. I therefore seek your guidance as to whether such reconstituted civil machinery is to be based on the Italian system, or whether the German machinery which has been running for two years, is to be continued. I appreciate that this proposal will itself depend to some extent on the existence of an AG rule in AUSTRIA.
13. In the meantime I ask your assistance in securing the fullest information as to the state of affairs now obtaining in the Province of BOLZANO. I am taking steps to ensure that the Regional and Provincial Commissioners' designs are put in close touch with the Austrian Section at G-5, AMHQ.
14. I enclose letter containing views of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

HELMUTH W. STAMM
Comodoro, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to:
Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
The Hon Alexander Kirk.
Sir Noel Charles, KCB, MC.

1008

13. In the meantime I ask your assistance in securing information as to the state of affairs now obtaining in the Provinces of IRLAND. I am taking steps to ensure that the Regional and Provincial Commissioners' reports are put in close touch with the Austrian Section at C-5, AFHQ.

14. I enclose letter containing views of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

10

ELIOT W. STONE
Commander, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

- Chief of Staff, AFHQ.
- The Hon Alexander Kirk.
- Sir Noel Charles, KCMG, MC.
- R.C. Region XII.
- SCAG EIGHTH Army.
- Political Section.
- Civil Affairs Section.

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A' file

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CCS/AS9

Advanced Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy.

26th October, 1944.

Acting Chief Commissioners,
Allied Central Commission.

25

1. In reply to your letter No. 304/62/005 dated 16 Oct 44, regarding problems likely to be encountered in the administration of N.S. Italy, the C-in-C wishes to emphasize the following principles:

- (a) When TRIESTE and Fiume have been captured our troops will be maintained through these ports and the road and rail communications radiating from them. These ports and communications must therefore be under the direct operational and administrative control of the C-in-C. This was accepted by Marshal TITO when he visited the C-in-C in August.
- (b) To provide the measure of control required to give full effect to the principle stated in (a) above, the Allied Military Government in the areas concerned must also be under the C-in-C's control. For continuity the system of government must be in extension of the A.M.G. for Italy, not a separate organization superimposed to deal with these areas. The A.M.G. for Italy should therefore extend up to the 1939 Italian frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustments in that area have been accepted by the Allied Governments.
- (c) If any part of the area in question is occupied by Central Italy's forces before the arrival of A.M.G. control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to AAI on the arrival of our troops.
- (d) If any of Central Italy's forces or Russian forces enter the Italian zone of A.M.G., they should automatically come under the operational control of General AUSALES.

considerations relating from them. Plans parts and communications must therefore be under the direct operational and administrative control of the C-in-C. This was accepted by Marshal EMO when he visited the C-in-C in August.

(b) To provide the measure of control required to give full effect to the principle stated in (a) above, the Allied Military Government in the areas concerned must also be under the C-in-C's control. For continuity the system of government must be in extension of the A.M.G. for Italy, not a separate organization superimposed to deal with these areas. The A.M.G. for Italy should therefore extend to the 1939 Italian frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustments in that area have been accepted by the Allied Governments.

(c) If any part of the area in question is occupied by Marshal Tito's forces before the arrival of A.A.I., control for purpose of military administration and government should pass to AAI on the arrival of our forces.

(d) If any of Marshal Tito's forces or Russian forces enter the territorial zone of A.A.I. they should automatically come under the operational control of General ALLENBY.

2. The C-in-C considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the lines of para 1 above with Marshal Tito and the Russian Government should be taken in hand now, and completed as quickly as possible, to ensure there are no unfortunate disadvantages when the occasion arises.

(sig) Harding.

Lieut. General,
C.I.C.S.

Copy to: CMO,
BMS(Ops)
BMS(I)

28

26 Oct

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETCOPITOP SECRETAdvanced Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

26th October 1944.

Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

(25)

1. In reply to your 504/66/COS dated 21 Oct 44, the C-in-C agrees generally with the proposals contained in the memorandum attached to your letter referred to.
2. He considers that the question whether the Italian or German system of civil machinery should be reconstituted in the province of BOLZANO should be related to the political future of that province. If this is in doubt the C-in-C suggests that as long as the province is administered by A.M.G. in Italy the Italian civil system should be adopted for the sake of uniformity and simplicity.

(Signed)

Harding

Lieut-General,
C.G.S.

1408 ..

(27)

26 Oct

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff
+++++

Ref: 504/66/CCS.

21st October, 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of NE Frontier Provinces (BOLZANO).

TO : HQ. Allied Armies in Italy.

1. I forward by hand of Colonel Monfort, DCCAO, copy of a memorandum which has been drawn up in consultation with officers of this HQ, setting forth the problems which it is expected to encounter in the three frontier Provinces of BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO.

2. I should be grateful for any comments you have to make before submitting this letter to AFHQ.

G. W. I. SHIPP, Lt. Col.

for Brigadier,
Chief of Staff,
for Acting Chief Commissioner.

GWIS/JG.

Copy to: DCCAO, AAI.

1005

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21 Oct

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff
+++++

Ref: 504/62/COS.

18 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces - NE Italy

TO : HQ. Allied Armies in Italy.

1. I forward by hand of Colonel Monfort, DOCAO, copy of a memorandum which has been drawn up in consultation with officers of this HQ, setting forth the problems which it is expected to encounter in NE Italy.
2. You will see that in Situation "C" a very difficult situation will arise and in order to overcome this I would like to put forward to AFHQ a suggestion that any Yugo Slav Army crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining Allied troops under command of General Alexander.
3. Before submitting this letter to AFHQ for consideration I would be glad of your comments.

/s/ H. S. LUSH
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff,
for Acting Chief Commissioner.

MSI/JG

Copy to: DOCAO, AAI.

1604

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TOP SECRET

18 Oct

400 511 - 6/10/44

'A' FILE

Ref: 502/CCS.

4th October 1944.

20

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of 26th September.

I have delegated my Chief of Staff, Brigadier M.S. Lush, and Mr.A.Antolini, Acting Head of the Economic Section, to represent this Commission and meet a committee of Italian Ministers for exchange of views regarding the problems which will have to be faced on the liberation of Northern Italy.

ELLERY W. STONE,
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

H.E. Ivance Bonomi,
President of Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.

51175

1003

24

4 Oct

Ab

Acc 511 - 6/10/44

'A' FILE.

Ref: 502/COS.

4th October 1944.

20

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of 26th September.

I have delegated my Chief of Staff, Brigadier M.S. Lush, and Mr.A.Antolini, Acting Head of the Economic Section, to represent this Commission and meet a committee of Italian Ministers for exchange of views regarding the problems which will have to be faced on the liberation of Northern Italy.

ELLERY W. STONE,
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

321-1

H.E. Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.

1003

24

4 Oct

As

Ref: 505/COS.

3rd October, 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of VENEZIA.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

see [circled]

After discussion with V.P. Political Section and having read the memorandum by Brigadier Dunlop, I should be grateful if you would ask G-5 AMHQ to delay replying to our requests for direction on procedure in ISTERIA until they have heard further proposals from us. I will have these proposals drafted and submitted to you in the course of the next two or three days.

3211

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Copy of this forwarded to G-5. EWS

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff. 1692

3 Oct
MEL/JG.
cc: A files

SECRET

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ACC

72/3

HQ MAIN AAI

Q 2083

PRIORITY

OCT 03

SECRET. FOLLOWING IS REPEAT OF OUR Q 2010 OF 25TH SEPT.

"KEY PLAN FOR ADMIN LAY OUT AT VENICE AND TRIESTE NOW BEING PREPARED THIS HQ. REQUEST YOU SUBMIT EARLIEST POSSIBLE FULL DETAILS OF ALL ACC REQUIREMENTS. POLICY FOR BRITISH ARMY GIVEN IN THIS HQ BRITISH ADMIN INSTRUCTION 204."

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE IMMEDIATELY.


List

(Act) Lem (C)

(M7) P/S Sect

A/RQ -

File



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~~SECRET~~

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OCT 040830A

3 Oct

TOP SECRET.Ref: 808/20/CA - A/CC 521.30th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. Since writing my letter A/CC 521 - 808/13/CA of 11th September (to which I await a reply), further information has come to hand, which may also have reached you, regarding the present form of administration in the frontier Provinces of North Eastern Italy.
2. Reports have been received to the effect that the Provinces of BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO have been amalgamated by the German authorities, given the name of "Pre-Alpine Operational Area", and administered under German administration. The political, administrative and military authorities are all German. German ration cards have been issued and the quantity of rationed goods are the same as in Germany. German law is used and enforced.
3. The Provinces of UDINE, TRIESTE, CORTINA, POLA and FIUME, are said to have been organised as the "Litorale Adriatico" group under the German command. It appears, however, probable that in these Provinces the assimilation of the German administration system is not so complete as in the case of the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area".
4. I should be glad to know if this information is confirmed.
5. In this connection it is to be remembered that the Provinces of BELLUNO and UDINE included by the Germans, one in the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area" and the other in "Litorale Adriatico", have been under Italian rule since 1866. They are not included in the six Provinces mentioned in your letter of 2nd September and it is therefore assumed that in the case of these Provinces normal Allied Military Government practice will be followed of restoring them as quickly as possible to Italian administration. I should be glad of confirmation on this point.
6. In the case of the Provinces of BOLZANO and TRENTO, I request direction as to whether the existing German administration as may be found on our arrival is to be continued under AMG control, or if it is to be replaced by the administrative system of Metropolitan Italy. You will appreciate that the population is largely German-Austrian; the political implications which may arise from the introduction of Italian police and other administrative machinery; also the practical difficulties of doing anything else.

-2-

7. With regard to the four Provinces of *VENEZIA GIULIA*, it may be possible to continue the existing form of administration (whatever that may be) so long as we do not find that this in turn has been replaced, before our arrival, by some form of Yugo Slav authority. I should be glad of guidance as to whether this is desired.

8. Furthermore, I should be glad to know what steps are to be taken if it is found that in spite of the memorandum handed to Marshall Tito, a Yugo Slav form of administration has already been set up. I understand that the underground authority of the Yugo Slavs in this area is extremely strong and that, with any breakdown of the existing Government, they may be expected to come forward and take over authority very rapidly.

9. I am sure you will appreciate the administrative difficulties which will arise at once in the other six frontier Provinces. In addition to the points raised in my letter of 11th September, such matters as Post Offices, the hospitals and their staffs and the re-establishment of the service of *Medico Provinciale*, the re-establishment of *SEPRAL* and *Consorzio Agrario*, the organisation of the *Genio Civile*, the re-opening of schools, and the distribution of C.I.P., all pressing problems which will be far more difficult to solve if the basic plan of administration is different from that in the rest of Italy.

10. I must again remind you that the numbers of officers estimated for the administration of these Provinces was based on the possibility of employing some kind of local administrative machinery and that if this does not exist or cannot be employed, many more officers and large forces of Allied police or troops will be necessary.

11. Whatever may be your decision the matter will need a great deal of detailed study and planning and for this reason I must ask you for a very early indication ~~of~~ and if possible an early reply to the points raised in this letter and my communication of 11th September.

cc. Chief of Staff

59 420

Hq A C C	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date - Time	1 OCT 1944
Via	119 1730
Initials	GA

1689
 HENRY W. STONE
 Captain, USNR
 Acting Chief Commissioner

21

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

HQ. ACC. APO 394
404
Rec'd 27/9
By

Rome, 26 September 1944

Dear Admiral Stone,

The liberation of North Italy being imminent and considering the grave problems that the authorities of occupation will have to solve, the Italian Government would like the Allied Control Commission to delegate a representant to take part in an exchange of views with a Committee of Italian Ministers, exchange of views which will be particularly sensible at the time of the reunion of North Italy with Central and South Italy.

I remain,

Yours very truly,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
Rome

091.1

1409

FILES A (B)

20

TRANS. E.O.

26 27

SECRET

BIS/hd

A/CO 321-1

22 September 1944

Subject: Administration of Areas Which May be in Dispute at the Time of the Peace Settlement

To: Allied Force Headquarters
(Attn: Lieut. General J.A.H. Cassell, Chief of Staff)

I attach for your information copies of correspondence relative to the above subject and subsequent to your directive to this headquarters dated 2 September 1944.

8

14
17
18

- (1) Letter written in the light of your directive to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (A/CO 321 of 11 Sept 44).
- (2) Translation of reply received from the President of the Council of Ministers (N. 1/555 of 16 Sept 44).
- (3) Acknowledgement of (2) above (A/CO 321-1 of 22 Sept 44).

321-1

KILBY W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

3 Incls
as listed above

cc: British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
G-5 Section, AFHQ
British High Commissioner
U.S. Representative to Advisory Council
Political Section

Files ✓

Hq ACC 1207
DISPATCHED
Date Time 23 SEP 1944
By MIA
Initials

19

FILES (A-B)

SECRET

22 Sep

CC's reply
to Bonomi

2003/nd

A/OS 321-1

22 September 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I thank you for your letter # 1/555 of 16 September.

The point you make, stressing the need for such measures as will ensure stability and peacefulness in Venetia Julia on the withdrawal of the enemy, is being brought to the notice of the Supreme Allied Commander--as is also the contents of your last paragraph referring to the re-establishment of a peaceful atmosphere between your own country and that of Yugoslavia.

Yours very truly,

ELLIOT W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government

cc: C/S AFHQ
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
G-5 Section, AFHQ
British High Commissioner
U.S. Representative, Advisory Council
Political Section

A 516
Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen. AFHQ
DISPATCHED
Date Time 23 SEP 1944 88
via *mail* 1130
Initials *en*

FILES (A-B)

18



IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO
DEI MINISTRI

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Rome, 16 September, 1944

R. C/555

HO ACC. APO 394
263 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 19 Sept 1944
By: WRC

Dear Admiral,

(14) I have taken due notice of your letter dated 14th inst. (A/CO 321), addressed to the Under Secretary of State, Marchese Visconti Venosta, wherein you state that, owing to military necessities, it is the intention of the Allied High Command to maintain under Allied Military Government the Provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

I earnestly hope that at the moment of the withdrawal of the enemy troops from Venetia Julia all measures planned by the Allied High Command will be applied with all the necessary speed in order to avoid that to the many disasters already experienced by the Italian people, others might be added, just in the hour of total liberation of the Country and of ultimate victory, in the form of fresh acts of violence and destruction, which would give rise not only to renewed sufferings but also to feelings of rancour and dissension.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.
R O N E.

Reply: (18)

Bonomi's
Reply
(18th Sept '44)

(17)
to Jy

As you have mentioned frontier questions, I am glad of this opportunity to inform you that the Government I have the honour to preside, inspiring their foreign policy, as well as their internal policy to those principles of freedom and democracy that are the very reason of the common fight, consider that only a direct understanding between the Italian and Yugoslav people can ensure the re-establishment of a veritable atmosphere of peace between the two Nations, eliminating for all times any reason of disagreement.

Believe me, dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

sgd. IVANCO BOFONI



IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO
DEI MINISTRI

Roma, 10 SET. 1944

1/555

HO ACC. APO 324
263 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 19 SEP 1944
By _____ PER

Caro Ammiraglio,

prendo atto della Sua lettera A/CC 321 dell'11 settembre diretta al Sottosegretario di Stato Marchese Visconti Venosta con la quale Ella comunica che, per necessità di carattere militare, è intenzione del Supremo Comando Alleato mantenere sotto il Governo Militare Alleato le Province di Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste e Gorizia.

Mi auguro ardentemente che al momento del ritiro delle truppe nemiche dalla Venezia Giulia le misure predisposte dall'Alto Comando Alleato possano attuarsi con quella rapidità indispensabile per evitare che, a tante sventure già sofferte dal popolo italiano, vengano ad aggiungersi proprio nell'ora della completa liberazione della Patria e della definitiva vittoria, nuovi eccidi e nuove rovine da cui deriverebbero fatalmente non solo rinnovate sofferenze, ma altresì ragioni di rancore

Admiral Ellery W. STONE, U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

./.

R O M A

12

e di dissenso.

E poichè Ella ha accennato a questioni di frontiere desidero subito dirLe che il Governo da me presieduto, ispirando la sua politica estera come la sua politica interna a quei principi di libertà e di democrazia che sono la ragione stessa della lotta comune, considera che solo un'intesa diretta fra popolo italiano e popolo jugoslavo può assicurare il ristabilimento di un vero spirito di pace fra le due Nazioni eliminando per sempre ogni ragione di dissenso.

Mi creda, caro Ammiraglio, cordialmente

Luigi Einaudi

COPY

MA/536

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

Advanced Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

11th September 1944.

Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

A 358
FOR DETAILS SEE
FILE 1013/c

Allied Occupation of Western ITALY.

1. I appreciate that when it becomes clear to the enemy that he cannot hope any longer to hold the APPENINE position against the attacks of the Eighth and Fifth Armies, he will endeavour to withdraw his forces including those in Western ITALY to the line of the ALPS, the MINCIO and the PO. I hope to prevent this withdrawal by a rapid advance over the PO. In any case one of two situations seems likely to develop, viz:-

Case "A"

We succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal, in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western ITALY and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B"

The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western ITALY before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat, and only weak German forces, and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western ITALY.

In case "A" I should be compelled to divert considerable forces to clear up Western ITALY, whereas in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case it is essential to divert the minimum forces commensurate with the task from the much more important role of continuing the advance with the least possible delay and in the greatest possible strength into AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

2. Conflict between Partisans and Fascists, internal political factors, and economic dislocation consequent upon a German withdrawal will constitute, in my opinion, a fertile seed bed for serious disorder in Western ITALY. As the military commitment can only be kept to the minimum by preventing disorders or nipping them in the bud, I have come to the conclusion that whatever the circumstances, military occupation of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY and the setting up of Allied Military Government, at any rate in the first instance, will be necessary. At the same time I consider it most important that only the minimum armed forces should be left to support that government. How long it will be necessary to continue this

321-1

Case "B"

The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western ITALY before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat, and only weak German forces, and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western ITALY.

In case "A" I should be compelled to divert considerable forces to clear up Western ITALY, whereas in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case it is essential to divert the minimum forces commensurate with the task from the much more important role of continuing the advance with the least possible delay and in the greatest possible strength into AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

2. Conflict between Partisans and Fascists, internal political factors, and economic dislocation consequent upon a German withdrawal will constitute, in my opinion, a fertile seed bed for serious disorder in Western ITALY. As the military commitment can only be kept to the minimum by preventing disorders or nipping them in the bud, I have come to the conclusion that whatever the circumstances, military occupation of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY and the setting up of Allied Military Government, at any rate in the first instance, will be necessary. At the same time I consider it most important that only the minimum armed forces should be left to support that government. How long it will be necessary to continue this military occupation cannot be foreseen, but it might well be prolonged. For this reason it is, I am sure, desirable to instal a static headquarters immediately organized resistance has ceased so that the field formation H.Q.s and troops which had been engaged in quelling it, could be released to continue the battle, all fighting units and formations being replaced as quickly as possible by garrison troops under the static H.Q.

3. Consideration of these problems bring to light the need for an early decision for planning purposes as to the system of military administration eventually to be set up in Western ITALY; whether it should be British, American or inter-Allied, what form it should take, and how it should be controlled.

4. The country between LAKE GARDA and the Swiss Frontier is unsuitable for active operations, and the troops employed there would be the minimum required for blocking and reconnaissance purposes. The area west of the FIACENZA - MILAN - COMO road would therefore be of no interest to Fifth Army from an operational point of view, except for the route from GENOA to supply points in the army area. Responsibility for such a large non-operational area would in fact be an encumbrance to an Army H.Q. in the field.

/5. Responsibility for....

11/17
 RELEASED

321-1

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

5. Responsibility for opening and working the port of GENOVA will, I understand, be accepted by CG, NATUSA, but I imagine that he is hardly likely to wish to extend his responsibilities for territorial administration beyond the actual port and the road and rail routes from it to Fifth Army areas. The only alternative therefore appears to be to set up a British Administrative District to take over the responsibility for Western ITALY as soon as it has been cleared of hostile forces, and to allot to the commander sufficient L of C and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of A.M.G., until such time as it is decided that the provinces concerned should be handed over to A.C.G. or the Italian Government.

6. There is one other matter which is connected with the question of the military government and military administration of Western ITALY on which it seems to me that a decision of policy is required now if serious disorders are to be avoided. It is the question of the attitude to be adopted by officers of the Allied Military Government to the various Italian political parties in Western ITALY. According to my information there are three main parties, viz:- The Army Patriots (Monarchists), the Action Party (Republicans) and the Communists who are numerically the strongest and almost certainly the best organised. There is also the Committee of National Liberation to whom many thousands of armed patriots owe allegiance in greater or lesser degree. Naturally I have no wish to intervene in any way in local politics, but I am very much interested in their effect on the possibilities of disorders which, as I have already pointed out directly affect the military commitment. For that reason I consider that firm and clear instructions on this subject are required to make sure that disorders do not break out by reason of uncertainty on the part of the Italian people as to the attitude of the Allied Governments to their various political functions.

7. To summarise, I should be grateful for the earliest possible instructions and information on the following points:-

- (a) Your acceptance of my proposal that a static H.Q. should be ^{set up} to command and administer a garrison in FIEDMONTE and LOBBARDO ^{as} soon as possible after occupation.
- (b) Confirmation that, if my proposal under (a) above is accepted, the static H.Q. should take the form of a British District H.Q., CG, SOS NATUSA remaining in control of such zone of communications as he may require for the support of Fifth Army.
- (c) What should be my attitude and that of my A.M.G. officers to the various political parties and organisations in Western ITALY.

Patriots (Monarchists), and almost certainly the best organized. They are numerically the strongest and almost certainly the best organized. They are also the Committee of National Liberation to whom many thousands of armed patriots owe allegiance in greater or lesser degree. Naturally I have no wish to intervene in any way in local politics, but I am very much interested in their effect on the possibilities of disorders which, as I have already pointed out, directly affect the military commitment. For that reason I consider that firm and clear instructions on this subject are required to make sure that disorders do not break out by reason of uncertainty on the part of the Italian people as to the attitude of the Allied Governments to their various political functions.

7. To summarise, I should be grateful for the earliest possible instructions and information on the following points:-

- (a) Your acceptance of my proposal that a static H.Q. should be ^{set up} ~~located~~ in FIEDEMONTE and LOMBARDY as soon as possible after occupation.
- (b) Confirmation that, if my proposal under (a) above is accepted, the static H.Q. should take the form of a British District H.Q., CG, SCS NATOUSA remaining in control of such zone of communications as he may require for the support of Fifth Army.
- (c) What should be my attitude and that of my A.M.G. officers to the various political parties and organisations in Western ITALY.

(sgd) H.H.ALEXANDER.
 General,
 Commander-in-Chief.

Copy to: C.G., Fifth Army.
 Chief Commissioner, A.C.C.

(16)
 [Handwritten signature]

TOP SECRET

EWS/hjp

A/CC 321
USF/13/CA

11 September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement

To : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
Attention: Chief of Staff

1. I have taken note of your unnumbered direction dated 2 September with regard to the administration of the compartimento of Venezia Giulia. I should be glad if you would give further direction on the following points:

a. Is it the intention that the Italian personnel who now form the bulk of the machinery of local government should be retained and employed by AMG? If not, by whom should they be replaced? You will realize that the numbers will be considerable.

b. Is it the intention to open Italian Courts (as well as AMG Courts)? You will realize that failure to do so will increase very materially the number of officers required for AMG Courts.

c. Is it the intention to employ Italian Carabinieri for purposes of public safety? If not, by whom should they be replaced?

2. It will be, of course, appreciated that unless use is made of the existing Italian Government machinery found in these provinces the local government will be extremely difficult to maintain. It will also be appreciated that the retention of Italian officials will be deeply resented by the Yugoslavs who will see in AMG a continuance of Italian rule.

3. Meanwhile I have notified the Italian Government as requested in paragraph 3 of your direction.

4. I should be glad of an immediate reply.

cc: G-5, AFHQ

ERBERT W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

11 Sept 15 1944

H/6

DHR.

Draft submitted by:

~~BRITISH~~
Executive Commissioner

321-1

FILED (A) B

15

11 Sept.

EWS/hjp

A/CC 321

11 September 1944

2

My dear Marchese Venosta:

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.

Yours very truly,

15

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

A/CC 321 11 Sept
224/13702

Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government

answered: (17)

321-1

Drafted by Mr. Schott, Political Section

Italian Gov.
Notified
11th Sept 44

FILES (A-B)

14
11 Sept

Hq A.C.C. Secy Gen.
DISP
Date 11 Sept 1944
Via HQ.
APR

TOP SECRET

8283,

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Inter-Service and Political Secretariat

HQ ACC, APO 394
135 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 9 Sept 1944
By PER

*File 321-1
acc 224*

A 215
12 SEP 1944

8th September 1944.

SUBJECT : Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement.

TO : Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

9

Reference your ACC S-318 of 5th September.

Attached is copy of memorandum issued by the Supreme Allied Commander on the subject of administration of frontier areas.

J. H. LAGGERS Capt.
for J. H. LAGGERS,
COLONEL.

1080

321-1

*(A+B)
EJS
Y-1*

13

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

7 September 1944

My dear Sir Noel:

I hand you herewith a copy of a letter received from the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, dealing with military government for the provinces on the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy.

Sincerely,

EG 124

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time <i>7 Sept. 16.45</i>
Via <i>Capt. Slaughter</i>
Initials <i>JS</i>

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Encl.

Sir Noel Charles, Bt., K.C.M.G.
British High Commissioner in Italy
British Embassy
84 Via Venti Settembre
Italy

FILES (A-B)
7579

12

TOP SECRET

321-1

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

7 September 1944

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I hand you herewith a copy of a letter received from the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, dealing with military government for the provinces on the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy.

SS 125

Sincerely,

(8)

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 7 Sept 1710
via *Capt Slaughter*
Initials *ES*

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Encl.

321-1

The Honorable Alexander Kirk
United States Delegate to the
Advisory Council for Italy
Via Vittorio Veneto, 119
Rome

FILES *(A) B*
100 1028

(11)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

7 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner
Political Section

1. I enclose for your information copy of a letter dated 2nd September from General Gammell, dealing with Military Government of the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy. The copy of the memorandum from SACMED to Marshal Tito dated August 13th was not enclosed as stated and we have telegraphed for it.
2. In the meantime, the Executive Commissioner will please implement paragraph 2 by necessary instructions to Brigadier Dunlop.
3. The Political Section, ^{will} kindly draft for my signature a letter to implement paragraph 4 of the enclosed.

ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
as per para 1 above

54120

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time <i>7 Sept. 1944</i>
Via <i>Magt</i>
Initials <i>EL</i>

FILES (A-B)

TOP SECRET

(10)

1637

321-1

EL

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

AFHQ

ACC

S-318

SEP 05

8

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY
ACTING CHIEF COMB.

ENCLOSURE YOUR TOP SECRET LETTER TWO SEPTEMBER RE ADMINISTRATION FRONTIER AREAS
NOT REPEAT NOT RECEIVED PD PARCE TO AFHQ FOR GABRIEL FROM ACC FROM STONE PERSONAL
PARCE PLEASE FORWARD SOONEST

see Encl

Contents & Classification Authenticated by:

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.

321-1

9

16:28
FILES *AF*

1758
S-318
5 Sept

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

98
Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 5 Sept 1758
via Hand to Signals
RRR

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF SACSSM

AFHQ - C/S
Ltr. 2nd Sept '44
AMG Control
Venezia-Giulia

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

52

5 Sept 1944

DRR

2nd September 1944

A 193

8 SEP 1944

SUBJECT : Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement.

TO : Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

5

Your memorandum ACC/321 of 15th August 1944.

Enclosure not rec'd
Original envelope intact
and opened by
Robert E. Dow
May 15, 1948

1. As regards liberated areas on the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy, I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum communicated by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tito on August 13th. This memorandum was subsequently communicated to the Yugoslav Prime Minister as well.

2. You will observe from this document that it is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose and maintain direct military government on all these frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the peace settlement. You should make your plans accordingly.

3. As regards the communication dated August 15th which you received from the Italian Government, it is requested that you should reply in the following sense :-

4. "In view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Trieste, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia, Venezia-Giulia

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement".

By command of General WELSON :

Copy handed to Gen Spofford 7/4/45

J. A. P. O. ...
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff

8

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - United States Political Advisers
- 1 - British Resident Minister
- 1 - G-5
- 2 - Addressee

TOP SECRET

1A-11-11A

ANNEXURE TO SAC (111) SPECIAL (5)
MEMORANDUM

1. In the event of Allied forces occupying Northern ITALY, AUSTRIA or HUNGARY it is the Supreme Allied Commander's intention to impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. This automatically suspends Italian Sovereignty. The Military Governor will be the General Officer Commanding the Allied armies in the area. It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned.
2. This direct Allied Military Government is necessary in order to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central EUROPE.
3. As the Allied forces of occupation will have to be supplied through the Port of TRIESTE, it will be necessary for them to have secure lines of communication protected by British troops on the route through LJUBLJANA - MARIBOR - GRAZ.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander looks to the Yugoslav authorities to co-operate with him in carrying out this policy, and he intends to maintain the closest liaison with them.

321-1

1074

8 INCL

13th August 1944.

TOP SECRET

COPY

TOP SECRET

31st August 1944

Acting Chief Commissioner

A 115
2 SEP 1944

1. I believe telegrams have passed with regard to the future administration of ISTRIA, that is to say, the present Italian Provinces of GORIZIA, TRIESTE and POLA.

2. I understand from the SAC that this area is to be administered by Allied Military Government in toto, that Italian officials are not to be used and presumably Yugo Slavs are not to be used.

3. It is probable that a small holding force will be stationed in the area to carry communication from TRIESTE to the North. These forces, however, would be kept at a very low figure.

4. We may be faced with the occupation of the area by Marshal Tito's forces and presumably administrative officials. Instructions will be needed as to how to deal with that situation at the outset.

5. But whatever we find there we are faced with the administration of a large area containing 884,642 people with no native machinery of government on which to depend. Every cog in the machine will have to be filled by Allied Officers or Other Ranks. This will demand a strength of officers far greater than that envisaged in Appendix "C" and will probably demand some 70 - 100 Officers and 300 Other Ranks.

6. I think the whole problem should be brought to the notice of AFHQ without delay in order that they may realise the full implications of the SAC's verbal direction and in order that they may furnish the necessary staff.

M.S.L.

Brigadier,

Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JG

X-000-1-2
X-0911.1
321-1

1073

Think you should prepare letter from me to G-5, asking for confirmation that we cannot use Italians. If not, the requirements will probably greatly exceed 100 officers.

E.W.S.

+++++

Acting Chief Commissioner: In view of Roger Makins' letter (tabbed), I think we should await arrival of instructions before raising this point.

M.S.L. 1/9/44

7

OK : E.W.S.

+++++

TOP SECRET

31 Aug

100

TOP SECRET

COEYOffice of the Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean.

26th August, 1944.

TOP SECRET
9/150/1

My dear Harold,

Your file A/CC 321 deals with the administration of provinces on the boundaries of Italy and Ellery Stone has requested a ruling on this matter from A.F.H.Q.

Owing to the demands of the tourist season it will not be possible for the Political Committee formally to settle this question until the middle of next week but I can give you advance information to the effect that Tito has been told that it is the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose Allied Military Government in all those areas which were under Italian rule at the outbreak of war, i.e. up to the 1939 frontier of Italy, and to maintain under direct Allied administration all areas which may be in dispute until their disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned. The State Department have expressed their full agreement with this policy.

Pending the arrival of the formal communication to Stone, I hope this may be of some use as unofficial guidance to your planners.

Yours every,

/s/ Roger Makins
/t/ Roger Makins.

H.A. Caccia, Esq.,
Political Section
Allied Control Commission.

Brig. Lush: What do you think we should suggest to AFHQ this area is - the area between the 1918 & 39 frontiers? or even further west?

H.A.C. 31/8

Seen by Captain Stone.

TOP SECRET

6

FILES
100

26 Aug

222/15e

A/CC 321

19 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-3, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
British Resident Minister
U. S. Political Adviser

1

1. In my memorandum A/CC 321 of the 25th July I requested a ruling as regards the policy to be pursued over the administration of provinces on the boundaries of Italy, and I pointed out the danger that unfortunate incidents were most likely to occur in those provinces which lie towards the Italo-Rumanian frontier of 1939.
2. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has now sent me a letter, of which I enclose a copy, drawing attention to this danger in Venezia Giulia. I shall be glad, therefore, if the ruling requested in my previous memorandum may be expedited and if at the same time I may be authorized to make some communication to the Italian Government regarding Allied intentions in this matter. Meanwhile I have acknowledged H.A.'s letter and said that he may rest assured that this is a matter of which the Allied authorities will not lose sight.
3. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to A.G.S. (Ops), AAI advanced as well as to Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Alexander Kirk.

2

ELIAS W. BIRN
Captain, USAF
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl: Copy of translation of
letter No. 1/230 of 15 Aug 44
from Under-Sec'y for Foreign Affairs

cc: A.G.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Adv
Mr. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles
Political Section
Files (A) - 1/2

1271

5

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time <u>20 Aug 1944</u>
Via <u>HO 4 msg</u>
Initials <u>RRP</u>

Files (A) 1/2

X 214
X 2000
X 2001
X 2002
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X 2100

EWS/dfe

A/CC 321

19 August 1944

My dear Marchese Venosta:

2

I am writing to acknowledge your letter 1/236 of the 15th August in which you draw attention to the possibility of unfortunate incidents when Venezia Giulia is liberated. I have not failed to pass on what you said to the proper quarter but in the meantime you may be sure that this is a matter of which the Allied authorities concerned have not lost sight.

Yours very truly,

5

EMERY W. STONE
Captain, USIA
Acting Chief Commissioner

Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government

cc: Political Sec.

1470

4

54828

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 20 Aug 1030
VIA 174
Initials PRR

321
x - 000.1
x - 250.1
Office of the Chief Commissioner

0

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
 Date-Time 18 Aug 1950
 Via Wage
 Initials DRR

Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

Public Order - "Venezia Giulia"

A/CC 250.1

18 August 4

- 1. Political Section)
- 2. RC & NC Section : IN TURN

X-250.1
 X-250.1
 321
 2001

1. Reference attached letter No. 1/236 from Visconti Venosta, dated 15 Aug 44 relative to the possibility that at the moment when the "Venezia Giulia" is liberated conflicts may break out.

2. Request your comments as to appropriate action and reply to be made.

3. Since reference has not been acknowledge, may this matter be expedited?

5/22/50
 Filed
 10/9/50

Incl- as in para 1 above.

Stone.

13

File

No. 1/236

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Rome, August 15th, 1944

HQ. ACC. AFO SPA

669
17 Aug 1944

By BRK

A 2215

~~19~~ AUG 1944

Dear Admiral,

The present military achievements, so glorious for the Nations that together are fighting against Germany, lead to believe that the day, when all the invaded lands will finally be liberated, is not too far away.

The Italian Government is very concerned regarding the possibility that at the moment when the "Venezia Giulia" will be liberated, conflicts may break out between armed bands and peaceful citizens, causing bloodshed in the towns and villages of a region that already has been sorely tried.

In order to avoid the possibility of violence and slaughter we consider it our duty to draw the attention of the Allied Governments on such painful eventuality, so that whatever measures may be deemed suitable shall be taken in useful time.

The Italian Government is inspired by a sense of high human solidarity, by the desire to avoid violence and disorder as well as to prevent fresh reasons of antagonism and grievance amongst populations which in future should, in their own interest and in

*It appears only to be that in
this case for 3/2 years if you would only
forward information concerning it.
Pep. Stone*

not too far away.

The Italian Government is very concerned regarding the possibility that at the moment when the "Venezia Giulia" will be liberated, conflicts may break out between armed bands and peaceful citizens, causing bloodshed in the towns and villages of a region that already has been sorely tried.

In order to avoid the possibility of violence and slaughter we consider it our duty to draw the attention of the Allied Governments on such painful eventuality, so that whatever measures may be deemed suitable shall be taken in useful time.

The Italian Government is inspired by a sense of high human solidarity, by the desire to avoid violence and disorder as well as to prevent fresh reasons of antagonism and grievance amongst populations which in future should, in their own interest and in that of European peace, forget ancient strife and knit ties of fruitful cooperation.

etc. etc. etc.

(sgd) VISCONTI VENOSTA

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

ROME

*Capt. Stone
If Capt. Stone says he has
this over in the name of the
present information concerning*

(Handwritten initials)

Magistrati's Telegram No. 103 dated April 13
for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Royal Charge d'Affaires to the Holy See has communicated that he has been approached by outstanding personages from Venezia Giulia with the request that their strong concern regarding the situation which might arise in the case of the withdrawal of the Germans be communicated to you. They desire to inform Your Excellency that, since they fear actions by Slav Partisans against Italian population, the timely arrival of Anglo-American units on that Adriatic littoral could possibly give the necessary protection, especially in the ports of Trieste and Fiume.

(For cover see 102 from Rome)

385.04

1007

24 APR. 1947

ESPENITO

(2)

15 AGO. 1944

Al Sottosegretario di Stato
per gli Affari Esteri

K. 1/236

HQ ACC. APO 594
667 Supply Cen.
REC'D 17 Aug 1944
BY *SKR.*

Aug 15
19 AUG 1944

Caro Ammiraglio,

Gli avvenimenti militari in corso, così gloriosi per le Nazioni che insieme combattono contro la Germania, lasciano prevedere come non lontano il giorno in cui le terre tuttora invase potranno finalmente essere liberate.

Il governo italiano molto si preoccupa della possibilità che nel momento della liberazione della Venezia Giulia, conflitti fra bande armate e pacifici cittadini possano insanguinare città e villaggi di una regione che già ha tanto sofferto.

Ad evitare la possibilità di violenze e di eccidi reputiamo dover nostro di richiamare l'interesse del Governo alleati su tale dolorosa eventualità, nelle misure che essi reputassero di dover prendere.

A ciò' ci guida un senso di alta solidarietà umana, l'ansia di veder evitate violenze e disordini ed altresì di prevenire nuove ragioni di dissenso e nuove cau-

no prevedere come non lontano il giorno in cui
 tora invase potranno finalmente essere liberate.

Il Governo italiano molto si preoccupa della possibilità che nel momento della liberazione della Venezia Giulia, contrasti fra bande armate e pacifici cittadini possano insanguinare città e villaggi di una regione che già ha tanto sofferto.

Ad evitare la possibilità di violenze e di eccidi possiamo dover nostro di richiamare l'interesse dei Governi Alleati su tale dolorosa eventualità ~~per~~ ^{per} quelle misure che essi reputassero di dover prendere.

A ciò ci guida un senso di alta solidarietà umana, l'ansia di veder evitate violenze e disordini ed altresì il desiderio di prevenire nuove ragioni di dissenso e nuove cause di rancore fra popolazioni che dovranno nell'avvenire,

./.

(12)
 Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.
 Acting Chief Commissioner
 Allied Control Commission

R O M A

C O P Y

EWS/afe

A/CC 321

28 July 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
 British Resident Minister
 U. S. Political Adviser

1. In order that A.C.C. may issue the appropriate instructions to the A.M.G. officers concerned we shall be grateful for guidance on what provinces should be included within ACC/AMG administration on the boundaries of Italy.
2. In the case of those areas which abut on France, Switzerland and Austria, we should be glad to know whether the provinces which ACC/AMG must be prepared to administer should include all those territories up to the frontier of Italy as drawn in 1939.
3. Those provinces which lie towards the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939 present what seems likely to be a more immediate and more difficult problem. There is already indication that Yugoslav forces under the control of General Tito are preparing to make a bid at the earliest possible moment to take over certain areas to the West of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939. In such circumstances various possibilities are open:
 - a. Allied authorities might insist that until a peace treaty has been drawn up, it is the duty of Allied military government to function in all those territories which were under Italian sovereignty at the time of the Italian declaration of war.
 - b. At the other extreme Allied authorities might be prepared to accept as a purely temporary and provisional arrangement Yugoslav military government over those Italian territories which Yugoslav forces had already occupied and were controlling at the time that contact was made between Allied forces and Marshal Tito's forces.
 - c. Various other courses could be followed, such as ^{de facto} acceptance of the Italian Eastern boundary as it existed before 1918, or negotiation with the Yugoslavian Government, or Marshal Tito as its military commander in the field, of some other arbitrary line accepted for reasons of practical convenience but without any commitment insofar as the future boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy was concerned.
4. It will be appreciated that unless some clear ruling is given on the policy to be pursued, unfortunate incidents and complications between

①

28 July 1944

A/CC 321, 28 Jul 44, to G-5 AFHQ (continued):

Allied authorities and the Yugoslav forces are likely to occur. We should therefore be grateful for the earliest possible instructions on this point so that the appropriate orders can be issued to all Allied officers concerned.

5. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to B.G.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Advanced, as well as to Mr. Alexander Kirk and Sir Noel Charles.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: B.G.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Adv
Mr. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles

cc P. L. Sec.

1004

COPY

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1

POLITICS

(3)

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
291. CC 000.1	Chief Comm.	16 June	Badoglio	Uniform system for defascisti- zation in Naples.
292. M254	Chief Comm.	18 "	AFHQ Adv. C. P.	Bonomi's Govt. approved by Allied Govts. subject to his signing two undertakings
293.	Gen. Wilson, SAC, Inc	18 "	H.E. M. Jean Politis	Acknowledges receipt of resolution passed by Advisory Council. Accepts recommendation.
293.	Bonomi	18 "	Chief Comm.	Copies of two undertakings signed by Bonomi.
293. B12960	AFHQ Adv. C. P.	18 "	AGHAR, CCS	Advisory Council resolution ref Bonomi's new govt.
293. CC/G/406	Chief Comm.	19 "	G-5, AFHQ	Furds copies of 2 undertakings ref obligations to Allies.
294. 13708	Marano, Vice Secy Prov., Bari	20? "	Chief Comm.	Ref. exclusion of demo- liberal party from provincial & communal administrations
295.	Sforza	13 "	Chief Comm.	His speech on radio "Italia Combate."
296. 1/226/44	Sir Noel Charles	16 "	Chief Comm.	Togliatti's speech to German occupied Italy in behalf of Communist party.
297.	-	-	-	Romita resigns. Min. of Public Works to Pietro MANCINI
298.	-	-	-	Authoritative English text of Italian Govt. communique on constitution of new Govt.
299.	-	-	-	List of Undersecretaries } Govt. List of Ministers }
300. M255	Chief Comm.	21 June	AFHQ, Adv AAI	Discussion with Badoglio of political situation & recent events.
301. M256 A/c 000.1	Chief Comm. Stone	21 " 11 July	AFHQ, Adv AAI Bonomi.	Ref Raimondi & Feno added to Bonomi's Govt. Also ref Gen. Tracchini as Air Minister.
302.	Social Democratic Party	14 June	ACC	Notes that all Italian parties be given equal representation.
2799 CC/PA/000.1	Prof. D'Ambrosio	14 "	Chief Comm.	
	Col. Monfort	22 "	Prof. D'Ambrosio	
303.	Mr. Caccia for C.C.	22 "	Sir Noel Charles } Mr. Alex. Kirk }	Cabinet takes oath of office. Bonomi did not take tradi- tional oath to Crown.
9) F62952	AFHQ SAC	22 June	ACC Main	Request views on publishing long terms of Armistice.
ADV 57	ACC Advanced	24 "	AFHQ	Advantages & disadvantages
6738	ACC Main	26 "	AFHQ	Italian Govt. has no objection.
5264	ACC Main	1 July	AFHQ	
5174	Bonomi	30 July	A/C, ACC	Views of US Dept of State
471	Kirk	7 July	ACC	
	Stone	14 July	ACC	

