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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/WND No. 785015

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WITHDRAWN
MAY - SEPT

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/RND No. 785015

10000/136/292

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY
MAY - SEPT. 1945

LIST OF PAPERS

1018/CO

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1018 WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY

From: 11 Jun 45

To:

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
A	8251/100/EC Stone	7 Jun 45	AFHQ COS	Use of Italian Army
1	AFHQ MTPS F/299 Final	11 Jun 45		
2	Aide-Memoire, Lush	13 Jun 45		
3	CC 1018, Stone	15 Jun 45	COS AFHQ	AC's stand - recommendations.
4	CC 1001, Stone	23 Jun 45	SACMED	"Future Policy Toward Italy"; recommendations as to number of Allied tps to be left in Italy.
5	Ltr AFHQ Lemitzer	16 Jul 45	CC AC	Reply from COS awaited, on use of IA.
6	Memo, Stone	18 Jul 45	Ex C	Parri requests interim strength be increased by 2 divisions.
7	8251/197/EC, Stone	20 Jul 45	AFHQ COS	Parri requests, AC supports, increase in strength of interim Army by 2 divs.
7a	Cbl AC CC, 3748	15 Aug 45	AFHQ	Retention Allied tps, especially Udine until turn-back to IG.
8	Report, M1 Attache, Ambassador Rome.	16 Aug 45		Reale & Cadorna offer views on further occupation of Italy by Allied Forces.
9	2806/EC, Lush	4 Sep 45	CC	Retention of Allied tps in It "as rep of the democracies" in Ital elections.
10	Cbl AFHQ, MEDCOS-272	4 Sep 45	BCS, JCS, AC	SACMED's recommendations to number/use of Allied troops in Italy.

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Copy No 3

FK 40927
SEPT 4/1652B

R/6542
SEPT 5/1115B

PRIORITY

FREEDOM STATED ALEXANDER CIFE DIRECT

AMISO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: BRITISH WASHINGTON FOR US JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF ALGCM

TOP SECRET.

This is MEDCOS 272. reference your COMED 236.

1. My views regarding the forces to be retained in ITALY were set out in MAPS 1013 and 1030. In these signals I recommended that,

A. An Allied corps of 2 divisions should be retained in VENETIA GIULIA until the peace settlement.

B. One infantry division and 1 armoured regiment should be retained in ITALY as a mobile reserve.

2. The above estimate was based on the assumptions that,

A. Almost the whole of ITALY would be returned to the Italian government by about 30 September.

B. The Italian government would be given sufficient armed forces to enable them to exercise a reasonable degree of control.

C. Owing to transport and other limitations there would in fact be considerable Allied forces available in ITALY during the period of handing over to the Italian government and for some time thereafter.

3. My recommendation regarding the date for handing over of the whole of ITALY less certain special areas to the Italian government were contained in MAP 1069.

4. My recommendations regarding the Armed forces required by the Italian government to enable them to assume effective responsibility for territory returned to them were sent

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CONTINUATION PAGE 2

EX 40927

SEE FILE 8253/44

in NAFS 1051 and 1059 and provided for an "interim" Italian Army of 140000 which will include 10 internal security brigades 5 combat groups and 1 independent regiment.

5. As far as can be foreseen at present and apart from a corps of 2 divisions in VENEZIA-GIULIA the following Allied formations will probably be available in ITALY for internal security,

A. until end October, 1 British division 1 N. 2. division 1 Indian division 2 Polish divisions. Total 5 divisions.

B. until end December 1 British division 2 Polish divisions. Total 3 divisions.

6. There is no doubt that the morale of the Italian army is still low desertion high and discontent over question of pay and demobilisation prevalent. All possible steps are being taken to improve this state of affairs but it will take time and if my recommendations regarding dates for handing over to Italian Government are accepted the critical transitional period will take place while maximum number of Allied troops remain in the country.

7. Political complications connected with the use of Polish troops for internal security are fully appreciated but I consider if serious disorders take place we should be prepared to use Polish rather than keep further Allied troops in ITALY.

8. serious internal disorder is not likely while forces shown in para 5 remain in ITALY. In any case these forces with those of Italian Government should be adequate to deal with any situation likely to arise. From New Year onwards until final effective settlement I consider forces shown in para 1 together with a rehabilitated "interim" Italian Army should be adequate.

9. I would add that Admiral STONE's memorandum CO1001 of 23 June was considered

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CONTINUATION PAGE 3

EX 40927

Q SEE FILE 1507/c

on an Allied basis at this HQ and covering letter 27 July was signed by general
MCNARNEY in his capacity acting as Supreme Allied Commander during my absence

DIST

Copy No 1 & 2 INFO-ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2

"	"	3	INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
"	"	4	POLAD (A)
"	"	5	POLAD (B)
"	"	6	CA SEC
"	"	7	LAND FORCES
"	"	8	FILE

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SECRET
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 2806/EC.

4 September 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

1. In your aide memoire of 13th June you recommended the retention of five divisions of Allied troops whose role "at all times" and especially during the election period would be as representatives of the democracies". In your letter of 23rd June you repeated the recommendation stating that they should be used as a last resort to prevent the imposition of undemocratic methods by force. In the same letter you stressed the duty of the Allies in educating the minds of Italians towards a democratic way of life. At the Regional Commissioners' meeting of 30th June you stated that careful consideration would be given to the views of the Regional Commissioner, Lombardia Region who urged that a statement should be issued by US and UK Governments which would state definitely and publicly that the US and UK Governments were prepared to do all in their power to see that the elections were free. You will remember that Colonel Poletti thought that with the backing of this statement even a relatively small number of mobile troops would go a long way to raise the morale of the Italian police agencies and would help the Italians to follow true democratic procedure at the polling booths.

2. I submit that the time has now come when we must decide whether we should follow up these recommendations, and if so, how. At your Executive Commissioner's meeting this morning, Colonel Densmore voiced, what I think is a feeling among many officers, and certainly is shared by myself, that we as representatives of democracy must do all we can to see that the Italian people have a free opportunity to express their wishes and that Italians should know that we Allies are not only interested but intend to do all we can to ensure it.

3. I think that we should follow up Colonel Poletti's recommendation and ask the US and UK Governments to issue a statement and that we should ask AFHQ to implement such a declaration with the Allied troops at their command (a) by taking an active and sympathetic part in the training and rehabilitation of the CCIR and police agencies, and (b) by explaining to them the situation in Italy particularly with regard to the elections and the role which (according to our recommendations) they have to play in the country. We should make it clear that we do not ask that Allied troops should function as policemen before or on polling day but should repeat the argument of the psychological value of troops, a value which will be enhanced if they have knowledge of the situation.

4. A further matter in which a decision is needed is the action now to be taken vis à vis the Italian Government in the light of their failure to reply to or act on our letter and constant reminders to Bonomi (27 February) and Parri (7th July and 29th August) with regard to electoral laws. The 1915 law which affects communal elections is very unsuitable. The 1912 and 1919 laws which affect the national election are less noxious, and we have not yet protested

RETURN TO
Chief Commissioner

-2-

against them. We do not know if the Italian Government intends to use the latter laws. Constant verbal pressure has also been maintained on the Italian Government without success. Has the time arrived for the Allied Governments, urged by the Embassies, to take up the matter? While in process of framing the Peace Treaty they must be fully acquainted with the situation about the elections, and it might be politic to bring pressure on the Italian Government in connection with the Peace Treaty.

5. On the general score of educative publicity I believe that we should take more initiative and that P.R.O. should, by frequent and regular meetings with press attaches of both Embassies, ensure that your recommendations are being implemented.

6. I would suggest this be discussed at your political meeting tomorrow.

MSL/EC.

M.S.L.
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Polad (A)
Polad (B)

EC
*Ambassadors favor
both your proposals,
as do I.
Please implement.*

*EWS
CC
7/9/45*

818

(9)

I. G. File No. _____

Report No. **8-2-45**

CONFIDENTIAL
(CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No. _____

Enclosures _____

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

FOR GENERAL USE BY ANY U. S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

From Military Attaché Date **16 August 1945**

Source Personal conversations with individuals named Eval. **A-1**

Area Reported On ITALY BID **3200 BID 3144.01**

Subject **ALLIED MILITARY OCCUPATION**

Reference _____

(Directive, correspondence, previous report, etc., if applicable)

SUMMARY: Enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated. Answer questions where, when, what, how, how many, and give date of event. In a final one sentence paragraph give significance. Begin text on page 2.

The Chief of Staff, Italian Army, and a Communist leader, the former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs give diametrically opposed views as to the necessity for further occupation of Italy by the Allied forces. The Chief of Staff of the Army believes further occupation is necessary. Mr. Eugenio Henle, a Communist leader believes that further occupation is not at all necessary. It is believed these opposing views points have particular significance when it is considered the Chief of Staff of the Army, who has a primary responsibility for the preservation of law and order throughout the country, desires continued occupation of Allied forces, while the Communist leader states it is not at all necessary.

1. On August 14, 1945, General Raffaele Cadorna, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, in the course of a visit to the undersigned at the American Embassy in Rome, stated substantially as follows: "Continued occupation with presence in demographic and industrial centers of Allied forces - British and American - is necessary if law and order are to be maintained in Italy during the critical period."

2. Later on the same day during a luncheon given at the American Embassy in Rome, Mr. Eugenio Henle, one of the Communist Party leaders in Italy, who has been Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and who recently has been named Ambassador to Poland stated substantially as follows: "No new fuel that law and order has been restored in Italy and that further occupation of Italy by Allied troops is not at all necessary."

3. It might well be stated that the opinion of General Cadorna as to the necessity for continued occupation by Allied forces, American as well as British, is shared by the American Ambassador, Mr. Alexander Kirk, Admiral Ellery W. Stone, Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Lt. General Leslie K. Trumbull and other Allied military and diplomatic personnel.

101

The Chief of Staff, Italian Army, and a Communist leader, the former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs give diametrically opposed views as to the necessity for further occupation of Italy by the Allied forces. The Chief of Staff of the Army believes further occupation is necessary. Mr. Eugenio Reale, a Communist leader believes that further occupation is not at all necessary. It is believed these opposing views points have particular significance when it is considered the Chief of Staff of the Army, who has a primary responsibility for the preservation of law and order throughout the country, desires continued occupation of Allied forces, while the Communist leader states it is not at all necessary.

1. On August 24, 1945, General Raffaele Cadorna, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, in the course of a visit to the undersigned at the American Embassy in Rome, stated substantially as follows: "Continued occupation with presence in demographic and industrial centers of Allied forces - British and American - is necessary if law and order are to be maintained in Italy during the critical period."

2. Later on the same day during a luncheon given at the American Embassy in Rome, Mr. Egidio Reale, one of the Communist Party leaders in Italy, who has been Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and who recently has been named Ambassador to Poland stated substantially as follows: "We now feel that law and order has been restored in Italy and that further occupation of Italy by Allied troops is not at all necessary."

3. It might well be stated that the opinion of General Cadorna as to the necessity for continued occupation by Allied forces, American as well as British, is shared by the American Ambassador, Mr. Alexander Kirk, Admiral Ellery E. Stone, Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott and other Allied military and diplomatic personnel acquainted with general conditions in Italy.

FRANCIS M. BRADY,
Brig. Gen. USA
Military Attache

Distribution by Originator: ~~As Ambassador's Chairman, Vice Allied Commission~~
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Balance of space is to be used for indicating distribution given report by the Military Intelligence Service.

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CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Cbl AC 3748

15 Aug 45

To: AFHQ for G-5

From: AC from Stone

- References:
- 1) Aide-Memoire of 13 June on retention of Allied troops in Italy.
 - 2) Ltr 1001/CC of 23 June, "Future Policy Towards Italy".
 - 3) FAN 487
 - 4) Cbl AC 2960 of 1 Aug 45 on handover of territory.

Admiral Stone recommends that AMG terr. in No. Italy less Province of UDINE be handed back to Ital. Govt. on 15 Sept 45. Recommend Udine be returned on 1 Dec 45.

Decision taken because view held that this territory (i.e., UDINE) is not yet tranquill enough to warrant its return being returned sooner.

Please consider retention of Allied troops for security reasons.

Publicity and preparation will be needed.

DOCUMENT FILED IN 2503/CC

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22/6

1018/CC

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2088

Ref: 8251/197/EC

20 July 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army and its effect on redeployment of Allied Troops from ITALY

TO : Allied Force Headquarters
Attn: Chief of Staff

1. I note from your letter of 16 July that the whole question of the future of the Italian Army has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I wish to make it abundantly clear, however, that it is essential for the Italian Government, to whom we intend to hand over the whole of Italy with a few exceptions on September 1st, should have on that date its own Army at a strength recommended by them, to be at their disposal. Without an army no government can govern.

2. In my letter 8251/180/EC I recommended that the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding C.G.R.R., should be 140,000. The President of the Council feels strongly that in view of the period of uncertainty in public safety upon which the country appears to be entering, the interim strength of the Army should be increased by two additional divisions, thus raising the proposed strength from 140,000 to 160,000. I support this view.

3. I should be glad, therefore, if a decision could be given to me before the end of this month and, if necessary, arrangements could be made for the units of the Italian Army to be located during the month of August according to the requests of the Italian Government reflected in my letter of June 7th.

Te/ Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Communications

1018/22
(8253/22)

7

18 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

This is just a reminder to stress, in any comments you make on the recent paper from AFHQ on Employment of Italian Troops, the point that the President of the Council feels strongly that the size of the interim Army should be increased to include two additional divisions, raising the proposed strength, therefore, from 140,000 to 160,000 men.

76/ Elery W. Stone
ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

See (7)

1018/c

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CC 1715

JUL 17 1945

16 July 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army and its Effect on Redeployment of Allied Troops From ITALY.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

1. I am instructed by Field Marshal ALEXANDER to acknowledge your letters of the 7th and 15th of June on the above subject. It is regretted that no reply has previously been made but the whole question is dependent on receipt of a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to a signal from this Headquarters dealing with the withdrawal of Allied forces from ITALY and the maintenance of a reserve in that country. In the meantime the matter of the organization of the Italian Army is also under study here.

2. As soon as the position is clarified you will be further informed.

By Command of the Supreme Allied Commander:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Major General, G.S.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Copies to:

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

9-13

EXC DIST

ACTION - Exec Commr
INFO - Chief Commr

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SYNOPSISSECRET

Ltr Hq AC CC 1001

23 June 1945

TO: SACMED

FROM: Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Future policy toward Italy

** ** *

13. To save Italy, in order to prevent Italy from becoming another Italy, and according to its influence, an expression of positive, non-inductive policy by the U.S. and its Government is necessary. This policy should make Italy a useful partner of the Allies in the Mediterranean and to create a healthy Italy. Important conditions are: the rebuilding of her morale by restoring to her the control

of her fleet and a non-punitive policy with regard to her colonies; — the retention of 5 divisions of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military and Police Missions to enable her to regain internal security under a democracy; and practical economic assistance. More must be done to encourage the education of the Italians towards the democratic way of life: the Allied Commission should be replaced by an Allied Mission.

14. In short, neither a laissez-faire attitude toward Italy by the U.S. and the U.K. nor the imposition of a harsh peace is compatible with a policy of preserving Italy as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean area.

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13. To sum up, in order to prevent Italy from leaning toward the Axis and succumbing to its influence, an impression of positive, non-violent policy by the U.S. and U.K. Governments is necessary. This policy should make Italy a useful partner of the Allies in the Mediterranean and so create a healthy Italy. Important conditions are: the rebuilding of I.R. morale by restoring to her the control

of her fleet and a non-punitive policy with regard to her colonies; — the retention of 5 divisions of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military and Police Missions to enable her to regain internal security under a democracy; and practical economic assistance. More must be done to encourage the education of the Italians towards the democratic way of life: the Allied Commission should be replaced by an Allied Mission.

14. In short, neither a laissez-faire attitude toward Italy by the U.S. and the U.K. nor the imposition of a harsh peace is compatible with a policy of preserving Italy as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean area.

SEE FILE CC 1001 for complete document & further planning

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GC 1018

15 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Allied troops in Italy.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

Confirming the position taken by me at your operational conference yesterday on the subject of redeployment of Allied troops in Italy, I desire to place formally before you the following recommendations:

1. In examining the question of the redeployment and distribution of Allied troops in Italy, consideration must be given to external and internal security and the undoubted duty of the Allied Governments to ensure so far as possible that free elections are held so that the population may express its opinion on (a) the institutional question; and (b) the constitutional government of the country, without fear.

2. Consideration must also be given to the size and location of the Italian land forces.

3. If the proposals for the maintenance of an interim Italian Army of 140,000 submitted in HQ AC memorandum 8251/180/20 of 7 June 1945 are approved, then the following distribution of the troops is recommended:

<u>Combat Groups:</u>	One each in TURIN, MILAN, BRESCIA, UDINE and BOLOGNA.
<u>Internal Security Divisions (Strength 2500 each):</u>	2 Divisions in SICILY. 1 Division in SARDINIA. 1 Division in each of the Military Regions; viz. PALERMO, BARI, NAPLES, NOME, FLORENCE, BOLOGNA, GENOA, TURIN, MILAN, BOLZANO, UDINE.

4. The primary functions of the Combat Groups are for frontier defence and control. The Group at BOLOGNA could be used as a reserve.

5. If the above distribution of the Italian Army is approved, then the maintenance of five Allied Divisions is recommended in addition to the administrative and service units employed in redeployment of personnel and material and exclusive of any Allied forces in

SECRET

CG 1018

15 June 1945.

Subject: Redeployment of Allied troops in Italy.

VENEZIA GIULIA. Consideration has been given to the fact that Italian troops will not be maintained within 15 miles of the French frontier.

6. It is recommended that one division be placed in each of the following areas: MILAN, PADUA, FLORENCE-BOLOGNA, ROME-NAPLES, BARI.

7. The distribution of troops within these areas is a matter for military consideration. It is obvious, however, that a small force will be needed on the Franco-Italian frontier and possibly in the Southern Tyrol and UDINE. Mobility would be a prerequisite and during the weeks preceding the elections it would be expedient to allow a very wide distribution of troops in order to cover the larger towns and some of the more important rural areas. This would naturally take the form of a special exercise or operation and need not be considered in detail in this memorandum.

8. It is considered that it would be retrogressive to station Allied troops in SARDINIA or SICILY even during the election period. SARDINIA can very well be left to Italian troops and in SICILY, particularly during election times, the employment of Allied troops would be unwise.

9. The role of the Allied troops at all times and especially during the election period would be as representatives of the democracies, and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs except in the gravest emergency would have to be avoided and the greatest care would have to be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation, requisitioning, etc. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government; to strengthen by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of radical methods by force.

10. The Allied troops should be maintained in this country until such time as the Italian Army and the forces of public security in Italy can play a competent role in the preservation of security. It is estimated that at the earliest this cannot take place before September 1st, 1946.

cc: U. S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
Exec Commissioner
Col. Fiske (2)
GA SECTION

9040
/s/ Eliery W. Stone
ELIERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

- 2 -

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AIDS MEMOIRE.

1. In examining the question of the redeployment and distribution of Allied troops in Italy, consideration must be given to external and internal security and the undoubted duty of the Allied Governments to ensure so far as possible that free elections are held so that the population may express its opinion on (a) the institutional question; and (b) the constitutional government of the country, without fear.

2. Consideration must also be given to the size and location of the Italian land forces.

3. If the proposals for the maintenance of an interim Italian Army of 140,000 submitted in HQ AG memorandum 8251/180/EC of 7 June 1945 are approved, then the following distribution of the troops is recommended:

<u>Combat Groups:</u>	One each in TURIN, MILAN, BRESCIA, UZINI and BOLOGNA.
<u>Internal Security Divisions (Strength 2500 each):</u>	2 Divisions in SICILY. 1 Division in SARDINIA. 1 Division in each of the Military Regions, viz., PALERMO, BARI, NAPLES, ROME, FLORENCE, BOLOGNA, GENOA, TURIN, MILAN, BOLZANO, UZINI.

4. The primary functions of the Combat Groups are for frontier defence and control. The Group at BOLOGNA could be used as a reserve.

5. If the above distribution of the Italian Army is approved, then the maintenance of five Allied Divisions is recommended in addition to the administrative and service units employed in redeployment of personnel and material and exclusive of any Allied forces in VENETIA GIULIA. Consideration has been given to the fact that Italian troops will not be maintained within

-2-

15 miles of the French frontier.

6. It is recommended that one division be placed in each of the following areas: MILAN, PADUA, FLORENCE-BOLOGNA, ROME-NAPLES, BARI.

7. The distribution of troops within these areas is a matter for military consideration. It is obvious, however, that a small force will be needed on the Franco-Italian frontier and possibly in the Southern Tyrol and UDINE. Mobility would be a prerequisite and during the weeks preceding the elections it would be expedient to allow a very wide distribution of troops in order to cover the larger towns and some of the more important rural areas. This would naturally take the form of a special exercise or operation and need not be considered in detail in this memorandum.

8. It is considered that it would be retrogressive to station Allied troops in SARDINIA or SICILY even during the election period. SARDINIA can very well be left to Italian troops and in SICILY, particularly during election times, the employment of Allied troops would be unwise.

9. The role of the Allied troops at all times and especially during the election period would be as representatives of the democracies, and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs except in the gravest emergency would have to be avoided and the greatest care would have to be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation, requisitioning, etc. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government: to strengthen by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of radical methods by force.

10. The Allied troops should be maintained in this country until such

-3-

time as the Italian Army and the forces of public security in Italy can play a competent role in the preservation of security. It is estimated that at the earliest this cannot take place before September 1st, 1946.

The above is predicated upon the import into this country of a sufficiency of coal.

13th June 1945.

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P/299 (Final)

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Copy No. 35

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

11 June 1945

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY

In accordance with Terms of Reference received from the Deputy Chief of Staff, the attached final paper has been prepared by the JPS.

[Signature]

J. G. NICHOLSON
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Plans

[Signature]

R. J. PAPERHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

[Signature]

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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US Polad
Br Resmin

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Staff, the attached final paper has been prepared by the staff.

[Handwritten signature]

J. G. NICHOLSON
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Plans

[Handwritten signature: R. B. Deaneham]

R. B. DEANEHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

[Handwritten signature: W. A. Adair]

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

11 June 1945

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALYOBJECT

1. We have been instructed to examine the effect of withdrawal of US and British troops from ITALY, as now planned, on the availability of forces necessary:
 - a. To meet Allied occupational requirements in VENEZIA GIULIA west of the Morgan Line until the Peace Treaty. (*)
 - b. To provide security forces in ITALY, particularly in those areas at present occupied by the French in NW ITALY and in the industrial areas of Northern ITALY.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. Major aggression with a view to territorial annexation by either the Jugoslavs in NE ITALY or the French in NW ITALY will be a matter to be dealt with in the first instance by diplomatic action and economic sanctions, and subsequently by such armed forces as the US and British Governments (and possibly the Russian Government) may decide to allocate for the task. In assessing the forces required to meet the commitments referred to in para 1 the problem therefore resolves itself into the plain issue of what is the size and type of Allied occupational forces which should be retained in ITALY until the final Peace Settlement. We have assumed that this is unlikely to be concluded within one year from now, i.e. before May 1946.
3. The main tasks of the Allied occupational forces during the ensuing months will be:
 - a. To back AMG and maintain law and order in those parts of ITALY in Allied occupation.
 - b. To secure the frontiers of ITALY against minor incursions and infiltration until this commitment can be assumed by the Italians themselves.
 - c. To ensure the security of our communications in ITALY.
 - d. To guard and administer PW and surrendered enemy personnel.

The fourth of the above tasks is quite separate from the others. It will be a decreasing one and its extent will depend on decisions which will have to be taken in the near future on the disposal of all PW and surrendered enemy personnel held by the Anglo-American forces in EUROPE.

It is not therefore considered further in this paper.
4. With regard to the first three tasks, the position is that we propose to hand back to the Italian Government, as fast as circumstances permit, the following:
 - a. To back AMG and maintain law and order in those parts of ITALY in Allied occupation.
 - b. To secure the frontiers of ITALY against minor incursions and infiltration until this commitment can be assumed by the Italians themselves.
 - c. To ensure the security of our communications in ITALY.
 - d. To guard and administer PW and surrendered enemy personnel.

troops from ITALY, as now planned, on the availability of forces necessary:

- a. To meet Allied occupational requirements in VENEZIA GIULIA west of the Morgan Line until the Peace Treaty. (*)
- b. To provide security forces in ITALY, particularly in those areas at present occupied by the French in NW ITALY and in the industrial areas of Northern ITALY.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. Major regression with a view to territorial annexation by either the Yugoslavs in NE ITALY or the French in NW ITALY will be a matter to be dealt with in the first instance by diplomatic action and economic sanctions, and subsequently by such armed forces as the US and British Governments (and possibly the Russian Government) may decide to allocate for the task. In assessing the forces required to meet the commitments referred to in para 1 the problem therefore resolves itself into the plain issue of what is the size and type of Allied occupational forces which should be retained in ITALY until the final Peace Settlement. We have assumed that this is unlikely to be concluded within one year from now, i.e. before May 1946.

3. The main tasks of the Allied occupational forces during the ensuing months will be:

- a. To back AMG and maintain law and order in those parts of ITALY in Allied occupation.
- b. To secure the frontiers of ITALY against minor incursions and infiltration until this commitment can be assumed by the Italians themselves.
- c. To ensure the security of our communications in ITALY.
- d. To guard and administer PW and surrendered enemy personnel.

The fourth of the above tasks is quite separate from the others. It will be a decreasing one and its extent will depend on decisions which will have to be taken in the near future on the disposal of all PW and surrendered enemy personnel held by the Anglo-American forces in EUROPE.

It is not therefore considered further in this paper.

4. With regard to the first three tasks, the position is that we propose to hand back to the Italian Government, as fast as circumstances permit, responsibility for the administration and control of all Metropolitan ITALY except that portion of VENEZIA GIULIA west of the Morgan Line, the occupied area about POJA the province of BOLZANO, the area about TARVISIO, PANTELLARIA, LAMPEDUSA and LINOZA. Once the Yugoslav and French situations in NE and NW ITALY respectively are reasonably stabilized (and this appears likely in the immediate future) there should be no long delay in completing the hand-over of all remaining Italian territory (other than that excepted above) to the Italian Government. Subject to any unforeseen developments, the hand-over should be completed by

(*) We have assumed that this is the final European Peace Settlement.

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the end of September, with the possible exception of the Province of UDINE. Once territory has been handed back to the Italian Government, responsibility for maintaining law and order and securing the frontiers is that of the Italian Government. On the other hand, so long as there are Allied occupational forces in ITALY we shall be concerned to ensure that the internal situation is kept under adequate control. Widespread and extensive strikes and riots would interfere with military maintenance and movement and could not be tolerated. In this connection the mere presence of Allied forces in ITALY will give some moral backing to the Italian administration. In the last resort such forces would of course be available to restore law and order in territory which has been handed back to the Italian Government. This may even necessitate the re-establishment of AMG.

5. Turning more particularly to Northern ITALY the general situation once the Yugoslav and French problems have been stabilized is likely to be:

a. NE ITALY

The atmosphere will inevitably be one of uneasiness and uncertainty as to the future disposal of the territory. The Yugoslavs will attempt by all possible means such as intimidation of the populace, infiltration of agents and agitators, exploitation of local unrest resulting in riots and strikes, and general subversive activities, to ensure as far as possible the eventual incorporation in JUGOSLAVIA of the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA and certain other areas of NE ITALY, i.e. the Province of UDINE. In the worst case, small scale guerrilla warfare may result. The extent of such activities and general unrest will depend primarily on the strength of the Allied forces in the disputed areas and the consequent effectiveness of Allied occupation and control.

b. NW ITALY

This is the main industrial area of ITALY and the internal security situation will be influenced principally by the extent to which Italian industry is rehabilitated and the problem of employment is solved. The present position is that lack of coal is likely to prevent the early rehabilitation of industry, and it is possible that there may be some three million unemployed Italians in the area during the ensuing months. General unrest and civil disturbances are therefore probable. There is also the possibility of some French agitation in the Franco-Italian frontier areas.

ALLIED OCCUPATIONAL FORCES REQUIRED AND THEIR PRESENT AVAILABILITY

6. Since the occupational commitment in ITALY is primarily a matter of internal security, support of AMG and protection of communications, the main burden falls on the land forces. In certain circumstances, naval support would be of material assistance and could be given by the timely arrival of warships in ports such as TRIESTE and GENOA. The presence of powerful air forces would also have a stabilizing effect, particularly in VENEZIA GIULIA; and in the event of anti-guerrilla operations in this area, air support of the land forces would be necessary. The position regarding naval and air support is:

a. Naval

re-establishment of AMG.

5. Turning more particularly to Northern ITALY the general situation once the Yugoslav and French problems have been stabilized is likely to be:

a. NE ITALY

The atmosphere will inevitably be one of uneasiness and uncertainty as to the future disposal of the territory. The Yugoslavs will attempt by all possible means such as intimidation of the populace, infiltration of agents and agitators, exploitation of local unrest resulting probably in riots and strikes, and general subversive activities, to ensure as far as possible the eventual incorporation in JUGOSLAVIA of the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA and certain other areas of NE ITALY, i.e. the Province of UDINE. In the worst case, small scale guerrilla warfare may result. The extent of such activities and general unrest will depend primarily on the strength of the Allied forces in the disputed areas and the consequent effectiveness of Allied occupation and control.

b. NW ITALY

This is the main industrial area of ITALY and the internal security situation will be influenced principally by the extent to which Italian industry is rehabilitated and the problem of employment is solved. The present position is that lack of coal is likely to prevent the early rehabilitation of industry, and it is possible that there may be some three million unemployed Italians in the area during the ensuing months. General unrest and civil disturbances are therefore probable. There is also the possibility of some French agitation in the Franco-Italian frontier areas.

ALLIED OCCUPATIONAL FORCES REQUIRED AND THEIR PRESENT AVAILABILITY

6. Since the occupational commitment in ITALY is primarily a matter of internal security, support of AMG and protection of communications, the main burden falls on the land forces. In certain circumstances, naval support would be of material assistance and could be given by the timely arrival of warships in ports such as TRIESTE and GENOA. The presence of powerful air forces would also have a stabilizing effect, particularly in VENEZIA GIULIA; and in the event of anti-guerrilla operations in this area, air support of the land forces would be necessary. The position regarding naval and air support is:

a. Naval

In the foreseeable future there are likely to be 5 British and 1 US cruisers and 16 British and 2 US destroyers in the Mediterranean. From these resources, adequate naval support should be available as required.

b. Air

On the British side the present allocation is 4 SEF and 1 TAC/R squadrons for occupational duties in AUSTRIA and NE ITALY. On the US side 3 heavy bomber and 1 fighter groups now in ITALY have been allocated as occupational air forces for the SIC. These could provide support in ITALY, particularly while they remain stationed in this country. Later there should be little difficulty in switching such air forces from Northern EUROPE to ITALY as circumstances may require.

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We consider that the air forces listed above are barely adequate. We suggest that they should be increased by retaining in ITALY 5 fighter squadrons, 25 and 3 light bomber squadrons which it is at present intended to redeploy to MIDDLE EAST.

7. As regards land forces, once the greater portion of Metropolitan ITALY has been handed back to the Italian Government the main responsibility will be that of the Carabinieri and Italian army. It is important therefore that the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff be obtained on future Allied policy regarding these forces, their strength, organization and equipment.

8. The commitment for Allied occupational land forces can be summarized as under:

a. ✓ NY ITALY will remain an Allied commitment until handed over to the Italian Government, probably by the end of September. For this we consider that one Allied division in addition to such Italian Gruppi as can be made available (which we estimate at 3 out of the present 5 Gruppi) will be adequate.

To meet this requirement either the redeployment of 6 SA Armoured Division must be so regulated as to ensure that the division remains operationally efficient until the end of September, or a US or a Polish division must be allocated. The future disposal of the Polish forces in this theatre has not yet been decided but if necessary it should be possible to find one US division from those still in this theatre.

b. The whole of NE ITALY will remain an Allied commitment until the greater portion is handed over to the Italian Government, probably also by the end of September. For this we consider that the minimum requirement will be a corps of two divisions.

To meet this requirement Headquarters XIII British Corps and 56 British Division will be available throughout the period. There will be no difficulty in producing the second division of the corps during the next three months, but thereafter present redeployment plans for US and British Imperial divisions will result in increasing difficulty in finding the second division. A decision is required on the source from which this formation is to be found. The only possibilities are a US division, a Polish division, 2 NZ and 10 Indian Divisions. Under present redeployment plans, none of these (except possibly a Polish division) will be available after the end of the year.

c. From the end of 1945 until the final Peace Settlement (i.e. until about May 1946) the Allied occupational commitment will be:

(1) To support AMG and to maintain law and order in ~~VENEZIA~~ VENETIA west of the Morgan Line, the occupied area about FOLA, the province of BOLZANO the area about TARVISIO, PANTERLARIA, LAMPEDUSA and LINOZA.

(2) To provide moral backing to the Italian Government in maintaining law and order throughout the remainder of ITALY and to intervene to restore the situation if necessary, particularly on our communications. This situation may be affected by the terms of any intermediate Italian

To meet this requirement either the redeployment of 5 SA Armoured Division must be so regulated as to ensure that the division remains operationally efficient until the end of September, or a US or a Polish division must be allocated. The future disposal of the Polish forces in this theatre has not yet been decided but if necessary it should be possible to find one US division from those still in this theatre.

To meet this requirement Headquarters XIII British Corps and 53 British Division will be available throughout the period. There will be no difficulty in producing the second division of the corps during the next three months, but thereafter present redeployment plans for US and British Imperial divisions will result in increasing difficulty in finding the second division. A decision is required on the source from which this formation is to be found. The only possibilities are a US division, a Polish division, 2 NZ and 10 Indian Divisions. Under present redeployment plans, none of these (except possibly a Polish division) will be available after the end of the year.

c. From the end of 1945 until the final Peace Settlement (i.e. until about May 1946) the Allied occupational commitment will be:

- (1) To support AMG and to maintain law and order in VENETIA, MOLISIA west of the Morgen Line, the occupied area about POLA, the province of BOLZANO the area about TARVISIO, PANTELLARIA, LAMPEDUSA and LINCEA.
- (2) To provide moral backing to the Italian Government in maintaining law and order throughout the remainder of ITALY and to intervene to restore the situation if necessary, particularly on our communications. This situation may be affected by the terms of any intermediate Italian peace treaty.

To meet this requirement we consider that the corps of two divisions referred to in above will be adequate, and arrangements made for the provision of that corps should therefore also cover the period up to the signing of the final Peace Settlement.

29. The foregoing has dealt broadly with the provision of formations. In addition to these, the requirement in ancillary arms and services needs to be assessed. It is particularly important that this is done as early as possible since both US and British redeployment plans are affected to a very great extent; unless

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Immediate action is taken, a situation will arise in the near future when it will not be possible to meet requirements. These cannot however be worked out until approval is given to the general type and size of the occupational forces. When this is done an order of battle should be compiled and recommendations can then be submitted on what modifications are required in current redeployment plans.

CONCLUSIONS

10. To meet Allied occupational commitments in ITALY during the ensuing period up to the final Peace Settlement, Allied land force requirements are:
 - a. In NW ITALY, one Allied division until the area is handed over to the Italian Government, probably about the end of September. This requirement can be found either by regulating the rate of redeployment of 6 SA Armoured Division, or allocating a US or Polish division.
 - b. For the remainder of ITALY, and in particular for the support of AUG, maintenance of law and order and security of the frontiers in VENEZIA GIULIA west of the Mergan Line, the occupied area about FOLA, the Province of UDINE, the area about TARVISIO, and certain Mediterranean islands, and for the protection of communications, one corps of two divisions. This requirement can be found in part by Headquarters XIII Corps and 56 Division. A decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the provision of the second division. The only possibilities in this theatre are a US division, a Polish division, 2 NZ or 10 Indian Divisions. Under present redeployment plans, none of these (except possibly a Polish division) will be available after the end of the year.
 - c. In connection with the requirement in b above, appropriate ancillary arms and services must be allotted. Unless present US and British redeployment plans are modified in the near future, these will not be available from theatre resources. Detailed requirements can not be worked out until the composition of the corps is decided.
11. Present arrangements provide adequate naval support of the occupational land forces.
12. Air forces at present allocated to occupational duties in AUSTRIA and ITALY are barely adequate. They should be increased by retention in ITALY of 5 fighter squadrons RAF and 3 light bomber sqns RAF which it is at present intended to redeploy to MIDDLE EAST.
13. Since the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in ITALY and the defense of the frontiers will be that of the Italian Government, it is important that an early decision be given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on future Allied policy regarding the Italian armed forces and in particular the strength, organization and equipment of the Carabinieri and the Italian army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. That the rate of redeployment of 6 SA Armoured Division be so regulated as to ensure that it remains operational up to the end of September.
15. That the signal attached at Appendix A be approved and dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

- b. For the remainder of ITALY, and in particular for the support of AMG, maintenance of law and order and security of the frontiers in VENETIA GIULIA west of the Morgan Line, the occupied area about FOLA, the Province of TRIESTE, the area about TARVISIO, and certain Mediterranean islands, and for the protection of communications, one corps of two divisions. This requirement can be found in part by Headquarters XIII Corps and 56 Division. A decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the provision of the second division. The only possibilities in this theatre are a US division, a Polish division, 2 NZ or 10 Indian Divisions. Under present redeployment plans, none of these (except possibly a Polish division) will be available after the end of the year.
- c. In connection with the requirement in b above, appropriate ancillary arms and services must be allotted. Unless present US and British redeployment plans are modified in the near future, these will not be available from theatre resources. Detailed requirements can not be worked out until the completion of the corps is decided.
11. Present arrangements provide adequate naval support of the occupational land forces.
12. Air forces at present allocated to occupational duties in AUSTRIA and ITALY are barely adequate. They should be increased by retention in ITALY of 5 fighter squadrons RAF and 3 light bomber sqns RAF which it is at present intended to redeploy to MIDDLE EAST.
13. Since the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in ITALY and the defense of the frontiers will be that of the Italian Government, it is important that an early decision be given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on future Allied policy regarding the Italian armed forces and in particular the strength, organization and equipment of the Carabinieri and the Italian army.
- RECOMMENDATIONS
14. That the rate of redeployment of 6 SA Armoured Division be so regulated as to ensure that it remains operational up to the end of September.
15. That the signal attached at Appendix A be approved and dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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APPENDIX A

TO : AGNAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
 ALSSO for British Chiefs of Staff

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RPTD: SHANT FWD

This is MAP.

1. Allied occupational requirements in ITALY up to conclusion of the final peace settlement in EUROPE have been examined in relation to effect which present US and British redeployment plans will have on theatre resources.
2. With handover to Italian Government of responsibility for administration and control of all Metropolitan ITALY except that portion of VENEZIA GIULIA west of Morgan Line, the occupied area about POLA, province of BOLZANO, the area about TREVISO, PANTHELLARIA, LAMPEDUSA and LINOZA (FAN 536 refers) the main burden of maintaining law and order and securing Italian frontiers will fall on Italian Government. I anticipate that all Metropolitan ITALY except those areas mentioned and possibly the province of UDINE, will have been handed back to Italian Government by end of September. It is therefore of great importance that Allied policy regarding Carabinieri and Italian army, navy and air force, their strength, organization and equipment should be laid down without delay.
3. Main task of Allied occupational forces in ITALY after handover of Metropolitan ITALY as above to Italian Government will be maintenance of AMG, law and order and security of Italian frontiers in those areas specified in para 2 preceding and security of Allied communications in ITALY. General situation in these areas (other than islands) is likely to be unsettled. In VENEZIA GIULIA and adjacent territories Yugoslavs are likely to foment agitation and exploit unrest with view to eventual incorporation in JUGOSLAVIA. In addition since extensive and widespread disorders in remainder of ITALY would prejudice security, maintenance and movement of the Allied occupational forces, such forces must in last resort be adequate to intervene in support of Italian Government. To meet this

- and British redeployment plans will have on theatre resources.
2. With handover to Italian Government of responsibility for administration and control of all Metropolitan ITALY except that portion of VENEZIA GIULIA west of Morgan Line, the occupied area about POLA, province of BOLZANO, the area about TREVISO, FANTANELLA, LAMPEDUSA and LIMOZA (FAN 536 refers) the main burden of maintaining law and order and securing Italian frontiers will fall on Italian Government. I anticipate that all Metropolitan ITALY except those areas mentioned and possibly the province of UDINE, will have been handed back to Italian Government by end of September. It is therefore of great importance that Allied policy regarding Carabinieri and Italian army, navy and air force, their strength, organization and equipment should be laid down without delay.
3. Main task of Allied occupational forces in ITALY after handover of Metropolitan ITALY as above to Italian Government will be maintenance of AMG, law and order and security of Italian frontiers in those areas specified in para 2 preceding and security of Allied communications in ITALY. General situation in those areas (other than islands) is likely to be unsettled. In VENEZIA GIULIA and adjacent territories Yugoslavs are likely to foment agitation and exploit unrest with view to eventual incorporation in JUGOSLAVIA. In addition since extensive and widespread disorders in remainder of ITALY would prejudice security, maintenance and movement of the Allied occupational forces, such forces must in last resort be adequate to intervene in support of Italian Government. To meet this ~~total commitment~~ I estimate that minimum Allied occupational land forces required until conclusion of final peace settlement will be one corps of two divisions. Adequate naval support will be available from the naval forces which are likely to be stationed in Mediterranean. I consider that US and British occupational air forces which will be available under present plans in ITALY and AUSTRIA will be barely adequate. I accordingly recommend that the ~~5~~ fighter squadrons RAF and

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APPENDIX A

3 light bomber squadrons ~~and~~ which it is now proposed to redeploy to MIDDLE EAST be retained in ITALY for the time being.

4. Corps Headquarters and one division can be found by Headquarters XIII Corps and 56 British Division. By the end of the year, however, all other divisions both US and British now in this theatre will either have embarked or become non-operational owing to effect of redeployment plans, release and repatriation arrangements. Assuming your approval to retention of Headquarters XIII Corps and 56 British Division in ITALY until the final peace settlement, your decision is required regarding source from which second division of the corps is to be found. If present redeployment plans are adhered to, Polish corps appears to be only source.

5. In addition to the Corps headquarters and two divisions referred to in para 4 above, there will be a requirement for ancillary arms and services. Details cannot be assessed until broad composition of the corps is decided. Effect of present redeployment plans is however particularly heavy on these units and unless a decision is taken in near future a stage will soon be reached when it will be impossible to provide requirements from resources remaining in this theatre.

6. My summarised conclusions and recommendations are therefore -

a. Allied occupational commitments in ~~Italy~~ ^{France & Sicily} will necessitate retention of a corps of two divisions until final peace settlement, ~~which I assume unlikely~~

~~before May 1945~~ I propose that this corps be found in part by HQ XIII Corps and 56 Division. Your approval to this proposal and decision on provision of second division are requested.

b. As soon as your directions under a above are received, detailed order of battle will be prepared and your approval requested to retention of necessary units of ancillary arms and services and consequent modification of present US and British redeployment plans.

c. Naval support available in the Mediterranean will be adequate but I recommend that occupational air forces in ITALY and AUSTRIA be increased by

and SS British Division in ITALY until the final peace settlement, your decision is required regarding source from which second division of the corps is to be found. If present redeployment plans are adhered to, Polish corps appears to be only source.

5. In addition to the Corps headquarters and two divisions referred to in para 4 above, there will be a requirement for ancillary arms and services. Details cannot be assessed until broad composition of the corps is decided. Effect of present redeployment plans is however particularly heavy on these units and unless a decision is taken in near future a stage will soon be reached when it will be impossible to provide requirements from resources remaining in this theatre.

6. My summarised conclusions and recommendations are therefore -

a. Allied occupational commitments in ^{Italy} ~~Italy~~ will necessitate retention of a corps of two divisions until final peace settlement ~~which I assume unlikely~~ ^{and supporting troops}

~~before May 1948~~ I propose that this corps be found in part by HQ XIII Corps and 56 Division. Your approval to this proposal and decision on provision of second division are requested.

b. As soon as your directions under a above are received, detailed order of battle will be prepared and your approval requested to retention of necessary units of ancillary arms and services and consequent modification of present US and British redeployment plans.

c. Naval support available in the Mediterranean will be adequate but I recommend that occupational air forces in ITALY and AUSTRIA be increased by the retention in ITALY of 5 fighter squadrons RAF and 3 light bomber squadrons ^{RAF} which it is now proposed to redeploy to MIDDLE EAST.

d. Your policy and instructions regarding Italian armed forces including Carabinieri, their strength, organisation and equipment, are urgently required.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner.

Ref: B251/480/DC.

7. June 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to my letter of 24 May 1945, B251/170/ED, I have now received a memorandum on this subject from GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MILA), a copy of which I enclose.

2. I am in general agreement with this memorandum and make the following recommendations:

- (a) That the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops, which may be required by the Allies, and excluding G.C.R.R., should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.
- (b) That complete administrative control of the "Interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:
 - (i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;
 - (ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and
 - (iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.
- (c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.
- (d) That A.F.H.Q. accept responsibility for supplying Italian troops working for them as in (c) above.

Your early consideration of the above recommendations is requested.

3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to my letter of 24 May 1945, 8251/170/EC, I have now received a memorandum on this subject from GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MLL), a copy of which I enclose.

2. I am in general agreement with this memorandum and make the following recommendations:

- (a) That the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding CC.RR, should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.
- (b) That complete administrative control of the "interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:
 - (i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;
 - (ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and
 - (iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.
- (c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.
- (d) That AFHQ accept responsibility for supplying Italian troops working for them as in (c) above.

Your early consideration of the above recommendations is requested.

3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

W. L. Stone
ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: C-5 AFHQ (2) (with copy of relevant correspondence).
Land Forces Sub-Com (MLL)

GA Sec
Econ Sec
WAD & IFW Sub-Com
File
Float
Spars (3)

-do- (For action in accordance with para 3 above).

See 5

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COPY

MEMORANDUMSubject: Relaxation of Control of the Italian ArmyLand Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(H.M.I.A.)6/3
30 May 45PREAMBLE

1. Chief Commissioner, A.C. envisages the handing over of all ITALY to the Italian Government in due course, tentative date being 1 Sep 45. In order that the Italian Government may then be able to fulfil its functions, it is to be assumed that it must control its own army.

OBJECT

2. The object of this Memorandum is to examine to what extent and how the control of the Italian Army may be handed over, subject to the Allied interests involved.

FACTORS

3. Ceiling. The whole problem is conditioned by the ceiling of 513,000 (excl. CC.RR) authorized by the G.C.S. which in turn is dependent on world wide supply availability. Presumably this ceiling is not to be increased and may even be reduced in view of world wide shortage of supplies.

4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organization and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.

5. Interim Force. This falls into two broad subdivisions:-

(a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfil its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied manpower,

(b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a

6. Capacity for self-support.

(c) The Italian Army is NOT at present capable of supporting itself. Basic rations are provided by the Allies. Clothing and boots are supplied largely by the Allies, either in the form of new articles or worn items which are renovated by the repair organisation set-up. The Italians have relatively small stocks of arms and equipment; this is particularly evident in the

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the Italian Government in due course, tentative case. In order that the Italian Government may then be able to fulfill its functions, it is to be assured that it must control its own Army.

OBJECT

2. The object of this Memorandum is to examine to what extent and how the control of the Italian Army may be handed over, subject to the Allied interests involved.

FACTORS

3. Ceiling. The whole problem is conditioned by the ceiling of 515,000 (excl. CC.RR) authorized by the C.C.S. which in turn is dependent on world wide supply availability. Presumably this ceiling is not to be increased and may even be reduced in view of world wide shortage of supplies.
4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organization and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.
5. Interim Force. This falls into two broad subdivisions:-
 - (a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfill its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied manpower,
 - (b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a variable and constantly decreasing figure.
6. Capacity for self-support.
 - (c) The Italian Army is NOT at present capable of supporting itself. Basic rations are provided by the Allies. Clothing and boots are supplied largely by the Allies, either in the form of new articles or worn items which are renovated by the repair organization set-up. The Italians have relatively small stocks of arms and equipment; this is particularly evident in the Combat Groups which are equipped throughout by the British.
 - (b) There are, therefore, two aspects of this:-
 - (i) what steps can the Italians take by 1 Sep (and thereafter) to make their Army self-supporting?
 - (ii) what will or can the Allies provide or leave with the Italians to make up the deficiency?

On this will depend the size and composition of the Interim Force. It is also bound up with the Peace Treaty matter as to whether the Italians shall maintain any armament industry or whether they shall be dependent on the Allies for such armaments as are necessary.

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7. Type of Control.

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(a) The administration of the Italian Army is ~~being~~ ^{being} out by the central plan and procedure produced by the Ministry of War, under Allied direction (through M.M.I.A.) and depending (see para 6) on the supplies made available by the Allies. Administratively therefore it would be impracticable to hand over to the Italians complete Administrative Control or responsibility for their own supply or part of their Army, while the Allies retained such functions for the remainder. This would result in complications such as separate supply depots, a different ration scale for the two parts and difficulties in allotment of personnel; officers removed for delinquency or inefficiency from the Allied part could be transferred to the Italian part, comparison would be drawn by the troops between the two parts etc. In fact the actual working of two parallel yet different systems within the same Army is a possibility and a complication in an already difficult situation that we can NOT contemplate. Any relaxation of control therefore must be applied in respect of the Army as a whole and NOT of parts of that Army.

(b) (i) There are two types of general control as regards the Army as a whole viz, operational and administrative.

(ii) Operational control of their Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA is a function of the Italians, no Allied troops being present in these limited areas surrounded by water. The matter of operational control is more complex on the Mainland, where large numbers of Allied troops will remain for a long time to come and where Allied interests are more concerned and more affected in the event of disorder.

(iii) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Operational Control under these circumstances

secondly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain, if such Operational Control is handed over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strengths, the three III categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficient etc. (see F.091.711/169 GCF-0 dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies (particularly in view of para 6 (c) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate expiration of the point mentioned in 6 (b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

part, comparison would be drawn by the troops between the two parts etc. etc. In fact the actual working of two parallel yet different systems within the same army is a possibility and a complication in an already difficult situation that we can NOT contemplate. Any relaxation of control therefore must be applied in respect of the army as a whole and NOT of parts of that army.

(b) (i) There are two types of general control as regards the army as a whole viz. operational and administrative.

(ii) Operational control of their Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA is a function of the Italians, no Allied troops troops being present in these limited areas surrounded by water. The matter of operational control is more complex on the mainland, where large numbers of Allied troops will remain for a long time to come and where Allied interests are more concerned and more affected in the event of disorder.

(iii) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Operational Control under these circumstances

secondly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain, if such Operational Control is handed over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strength, the three III categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficients etc. (see X-09L.711/169 GCT-O dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies (particularly in view of para 6 (c) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate examination of the point mentioned in 6 (b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control, or only the latter.

thirdly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain if such Administrative Control is handed over.

7. (c) In any event, it seems clear that no matter what degree of relaxation of control is granted, the Allies must retain the power to ensure that ITALY carries out the terms of the Peace Treaty without evasion.

8. Phasing.

(a) If the reasoning outlined in para 7 is accepted and decisions are in the affirmative, it follows that either operational control or administrative control or both must be handed over complete on a given date. That is the only phasing possible.

(b).....

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(b) The date or dates depend on:

(i) the speed with which the Peace Treaty is signed. If this is before 1 Sep., presumably the hand over takes place then, subject to safeguards such as confirming the existence of Italian service units as long as the Allies require the assistance of these.

(ii) the speed with which the necessary decisions can be given and the plan thus worked out, particularly as regards the supply aspect.

(iii) the internal conditions in ITALY and the general international situation on her frontiers, e.g., TRIESTE, BOLZANO and AOSTA.

(iv) the extent to which the hand over is kept simple and on broad lines.

(c) In general, I consider that the earlier the hand over takes place the better. It would give the Italians longer and more experience to set their military house in order while the allies "hold the ring" in ITALY. Moreover it would be a gesture of trust and would conduce towards the atmosphere of a friendly Italy which is so desirable and which may not be easy if the Italians consider the terms of the Peace Treaty to be severe. Despite the fact that removal of Allied control will undoubtedly result in a loss of Italian military efficiency and of value for supplies rendered, we should accept this. ITALY has got to make a start on her own sometime and, within reason, the sooner the better.

For these reasons and also on the grounds of simplicity, the hand over of complete operational and administrative control (subject to safeguards) on a definite date seems the correct answer.

9. Position of Allied HQs and Troops.

(a) (i) Assuming hand over of complete operational and administrative control, Allied HQs and troops would become "free priority tenants" - a self-controlled organization superimposed on the self-controlled Italian State.

(ii) The Allied right of reassuming control in the event of disturbances to Allied interests; of priority use of accommodation, requisition and rail and port facilities; of receiving full and advance information and consultation on Italian projects; and finally of veto; would be safeguarded in the hand over.

(iii) The Ministry of War would work through its Territorial Regional HQs. Allied Areas, Districts and Base Sections would work in conjunction with these Regional HQs; Ministry of War with AFHQ, through ISLL.

(b) Assuming hand over of operational control only, the Italian forces authorized for this (Combat Groups, I.S. Divs, Guard Bns).

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(iii) The Ministry of War would work through its Territorial Regional HQs. Allied Armies, Districts and Base Sections would work in conjunction with these Regional HQs; Ministry of War with AFHQ, through ITALY.

(b) Assuming hand over of operational control only, the Italian forces authorized for this (Combat Groups, I.S. Divs, Guard Bn) would operate similarly to the CC.RR under the War Ministry through Territorial Regional HQs, Allied HQs being consulted beforehand.

(c) For efficient and economical effort to ensure Allied priority it would seem that Movement Control should still be retained by the Allies, the Italians bidding for what they require in this respect on a national (not military alone) basis.

10. German P.W.

The respective functions of the Italian Government and the Allies as regards these would need to be specified.

11. Patriots.

The pre-requisite of any plan must be a solution of the difficulties between the CLM.I and the existing Italian Government, with, as a corollary, the complete patriot military organization being made subservient to the official Italian War Ministry.

12. Position of MLI.

(a) Should the hand over of operational control only be permitted, MLI will still require its full staff, as its duties will remain virtually unchanged.

(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, MLI can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, information and inspecting staff, in order to ensure that nothing contrary to Allied interests occurs until the Peace Treaty and that after signature of the latter its terms are faithfully observed by ITALY.

PLAN.

13. Bearing in mind the Preamble, the Object and the above Factors, I suggest the following Plan:-

(a) Complete operational and administrative control to be handed over (subject to safeguards) on 1 Sep 45, except for Movement Control which will be retained by the Allies.

(b) "Interim Force" to be authorized, to be replaced by the "Peace Treaty Army" when known.

(c) A forecast of Italian Service Units required by the Allies on 1 Sep (and thereafter) to be obtained by AFHQ from Armies, Districts and Base Sections. Meanwhile these units can be progressively reduced when no longer necessary.

(d) An examination by JIC in conjunction with the Italian Government as to the extent to which the Italian Economy can support the authorized "interim force" on 1 Sep (and thereafter) in order to ascertain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies and equipment, excluding armaments.

(e) A decision on the question of armaments.

(f) Acceptance by the Allies of the liability to supply the service units working for them.

(g) The functions and position of Allied HQs and troops and of MLI in the new set-up, to be defined - MLI establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesignated.

NOTE.

I have specified 1 Sep 45 as the hand

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(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, AMIA can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, information and inspecting staff, in order to ensure that nothing contrary to Allied interests occurs until the Peace Treaty and that after signature of the latter its terms are faithfully observed by ITALY.

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(g) The functions and position of Allied HQs and troops and of AMIA in the new set-up, to be defined - AMIA establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesigned.

NOTE. I have specified 1 Sep 45 as the hand over date, as requested by Chief Commissioner, AG. I do not know whether the necessary decisions or the economic examination necessary can be made in time to work out the detailed plan and implement it by 1 Sep 45. I would stress that very early decisions will be necessary, so that a comprehensive directive may be issued by AFHQ, allowing adequate time to work out all details and inform all concerned, without rush.

(Signed) L. BROWNING,
Major General
M.M.I.A.

204/CC

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Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
15	Ltr Bonomi	1 Jun 45	Stone	Electoral lists for Florence, Pisa, Lucca, Pistoia, Apuania and Livorno Provinces.
16	Cbl AMHQ PX-90370	8 Jun 45	Troopers, AC	Civilian DD Ind SC still required.

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