

ACC

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10000/136/299

RUSSIAN RELATIONS & POLITICS, GENERAL
MAR. 1944 - OCT. 1946

LEALLERAND

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1050/03

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 1050 RUSSIAN RELATIONS & POLITICS - GENERAL

From: 8 Mar 44
To: 19 Jul 45~~TOP SECRET~~

Vol. I Page 9

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM -	DATE	TO -	SYNOPSIS
90	Cbl AC Ex E, 335	22 Jun 45	AFHQ G-5	Disposal of "White Russians" & other Russian nationals not wishing repat.
91	CG 1001, Stone	23 Jun 45	SACMED	"Future Policy Toward Italy" - proposals to combat spread of Communism.
92	Cbl AC Talbot, 460	23 Jun 45	AFHQ, 8, XIII	Woyevodsky's Russian Mission in VG.
93	Cbl AFHQ, P-98326	23 Jun 45	AC	Disposal of "White Russians" & other Russian nationals not wishing repat.
94	Cbl AFHQ, FX-14693	29 Jun 45	8, XIII, AC	No justification for employing 3 additional Russian Officers with Rome Mission.
95	Cbl AFHQ, FX-15360	30 Jun 45	Troop, 30, AC	Disposal of "White Russians" & other Russian nationals not wishing repat.
96	Ltr, COS AFHQ	3 Jul 45	CG	Russian Mission to Greece.
97	516/153/EC, Stone	9 Jul 45	COS AFHQ	Russian Mission to Greece.
98	516/153/EC, Stone	9 Jul 45	Russian Mission	Russian Mission to Greece.
99	Ltr Russian Mission	12 Jul 45	Stone	Greece & Greece not within our sphere
100	Cbl AFHQ VI 21625	13 Jul 45	1st Air Army	Russians can go visit Ukrainians
101	Ltr CG 1050 Stone	14 Jul 45	COS, AFHQ	Russian Mission to Greece
102	Cbl Hr Embassy Belgrade	17 Jul 45	AFHQ, AC	More Russians, now fr Ljubljana (Yugoslavia), now wish join Vasiliev in Rome.
103	Cbl AC Ex C, 2108	19 Jul 45	AFHQ	No reason approve Russian request increase Rome ACI Mission.
104	Ltr, Vasiliev	19 Jul 45	Stone	Col Iakovlev replaces Hummas' head of Russian repatriation mission.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM--	DATE	TO--	SYNOPSIS
77	799/15/EC, Stone	3 May 45	COS AFHQ	Visits of Soviet officers to Army areas and PW Camps.
78	Ltr Col Rumin, Russian Mil Mission on Repat	4 May 45	CC	Visits of Soviet officers to Army areas and PW Camps.
79	799/24/EC, Lush	9 May 45	Russian Mis	Visits of Soviet officers to Army areas and PW Camps.
80	DEF/17/6-II/DP) Lush	10 May 45	AFHQ, COS	Visits of Soviet officers to Army areas and PW Camps.
80a	Ltr, Kislenko	10 May 45	Stone	Bologna quarrels, FWD-USSR Reps on film
81	799/39/EC, Stone	12 May 45	USSR Rep, AC	Channels of Communication for USSR Rep and also Col Rumin, of MIL Min, Repat
82	Cbl AC ExC, 7532	14 May 45	AMG Armies, Venezia Reg	Info needed on concentrations of Russian Nationals in Northern areas.
83	Ltr, Quayle	14 May 45	Arnoldy	CC directs Vasiliev request for trip North go AFHQ with recommendation.
84	Cbl 5A, 4322	22 May 45	AC	Concentrations of Russians in NW It.
85	Cbl AFHQ, FX-82672	26 May 45	AC, RAAC	Soviet Citizens in 159 Transit Camp.
86	DEF/13/G-2(DP), Stone	6 Jun 45	AFHQ G-5	Disposal of "White Russians" & other Russian nationals not wishing repatriation.
87	11E/PRE, Stone	11 Jun 45	Kislenko	Bologna quarrel, FWD-USSR Film Reps.
88	Cbl AOC Bulgaria 1823	15 Jun 45	AFHQ, AC, HEMA	Russians refuse Swiss diplom courier.
89	Cbl AFHQ, FX-95628	19 Jun 45	1, 15, 8, AC	Soviets wishing repat to be transferred to Soviet Union in Austria.
89a	Cbl AFHQ, FX-95936	19 Jun 45	Troopers, AC	Soviets not wishing repat - Case of 55

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
65	Ltr Push 6513/CCS	18 Oct 44	Soviet Rep AGC	Distribution in Italy of films produced by Soviet industries
66	Cbl 8Army UI/783	9 Dec 44	Alcom	Travel restrictions Soviet Missions in Italy
67	Cbl AFHQ F-66091	9 Dec 44	Alcom	Travel restrictions Soviet Missions in Italy
68	Cbl AC 7990	10 Dec 44	8 Army	Travel restrictions Soviet Missions in Italy
69	Cbl AC 8003	10 Dec 44	AFHQ	Travel restrictions Soviet Missions in Italy
70	Cbl AC 8005	10 Dec 44	AFHQ	Travel restrictions Soviet Missions in Italy
71	SAC(P)(45) 7	17 Feb 45		Privileges & facilities accorded Soviet delegations in Italy.
72	SAC(P)(45) 1st Mtg	20 Feb 45		Privileges & facilities accorded Soviet delegations in Italy.
73	SAC(P)(45) 7 Revised	26 Feb 45		Privileges & facilities accorded Soviet delegations in Italy.
74	MEMOUSA AG 091.112/480 A-O	30 Mar 45	Russian Mil Min	Visits of Soviet Officers to Army areas and PW Camps.
75	Ltr AFHQ G-1B	31 Mar 45	Russian Mil Min	Visits of Soviet officers to Army areas and PW Camps.
75a	CCS AFHQ 3491/31B	26 Apr 45	CC AC	Visits of Soviets to Army areas.
76 76a	799/14/EC, Stone Ltr, CCS AFHQ	2 May 45 2 May 45	Russian Mil Min Kislenko	Visits of Soviet officers to Army areas and PW Camps.

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000.1-1

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1-1 POLITICS, (COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS)

000.1-1

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
54	IS Ltr Stone A/CC 000.7	27 Aug 44	Col Spofford	Associated Press interview given by Baldanzi & Antonini
55	Ltr Bonomi	28 Aug 44	Capt Stone	Happenings 'fosse Ardeatine' & Piazza Farnese during popular manifestation
56	Ltr A/CC 000.1 Stone	30 Aug 44	Brig Hirsch	Further re Communist Party INCL: 1) Ltr SH/260.05 fr Sec Br ACC with Memo (2) & Trend copy (3)
57	Memo A/CC 250 Stone	31 Aug 44	Pub Safety EC	Incident at Piazza Farnese. INCL: Bonomi's ltr of 28 Aug
58	Ltr Vasiliev	8 Sep 44	Capt Stone	Delegation Soviet Trade Unions coming to Italy
59	Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 040	10 Sep 44	AFHQ G-5	Delegation Soviet Trade Unions coming to Italy
60	Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 000.7-1	15 Sep 44	Gen Vasiliev	Action taken cartoon Il Popolo no similar occurrence
61	Cbl ACC Stone S329	15 Sep 44	AFHQ	Soviet labor delegates left Moscow for Italy not authorized by SACMED but informed by me
62	Cbl AFHQ F26749	17 Sep 44	ACC Stone	Visit Soviet labor delegates Italy approved ACC responsible
63	Trans "Avanti"	17 Sep 44		The Romanian Armistice
64	Ltr ACC Liaison Dv	21 Sep 44	AFHQ	Russian nationals in Italy, list.

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Q. M. C. Form 355 (OM No. 400)
Revised July 25, 1948

DSG ACC

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1 POLITICS, RUSSIAN (Cen + Sol)

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM--	DATE	TO--	SYNOPSIS
45	Cbl AFHQ #72125	14 Jul 44	ACC ADV	Arrange shipment 8 long tons of Bergamot oil to Russia via UK
46	Ltr Capt Stone	18 Jul 44	Gen Tully	Enclosing correspondence re the work with Soviet Representative on Advisory Council
47	Cbl AFHQ P83637	16 Aug 44	ACC	Info re Deputy Soviet Ambassador protest re Polish exhibition Rome
47a	Ltr Schott Pol Sec	17 Aug 44	Capt Stone	Communist Activities in the Black Market
48	Ltr Capt Stone	18 Aug 44	Brig Lush & Pol	Forwarding ltr & report for appropriate reply re Communist Activities Italy Allied Occupation
48a	Ltr Col Pollock Public Safety (Hinted trouble on 15th Aug 1944 but none)	18 Aug 44	Poletti, Lush & Kirk then A/CC	Incl 1 - Ltr AAI/BGS(I)/DO 15 Aug Incl 2 - Report 13 Aug fr RAAC
49	Ltr Maj AJS/JG	18 Aug 44	Exec Comm	Closing down of shops by bands of Communists charging high prices
50	Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 000.1	19 Aug 44	Vasiliev	Closing of Polish Exhibition in Rome App a - Vasiliev 16 Aug to RAAC
51	Memo Stone A/CC 000.1	20 Aug 44	Brig Lush	Communists Activities Incl 1 - AAI BGS(I)/DO 19 Aug EWS
52	Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 000.1	21 Aug 44	Brig Hirsch	Result secret meeting Communist & Socialist Parties activating a revolution to Govt power in Rome App a - Poletti R/2214 16 Aug EC App b - Lush 167/CA 14 Aug Reg 4
53	Ltr RAAC	18 or 22 Aug		Correspondence re question of incidents of Polish Exhibition ENCLOSURES: Brown 17 Aug AFHQ, Vasiliev 16 Aug RAAC, RAAC 15 Aug Freedom, RAAC 16 Aug & Skorupeki 16 Aug RAAC

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Q. M. C. Form 453 (Old No. 420)
Revised July 26, 1943

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File under No. 000.1 POLITICS, RUSSIAN~~TOPSEC~~

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM--	DATE	TO--	SYNOPSIS
33	Ltr CC/G/270 MacFarlane	7 May 44	Gen. Solodovnik	Text of ltr Hq AAI 5 May 44, in reply to Solodov.'s ltr referred to in CC/P/260 of 3 May 44 to AAI.
34	Ltr Badoglio	8 May 44	Gen. MacFarlane	Russians captured on Ital. front Re finding accommodations at Salerno for Russian diplomatic representatives.
35	Cbl M205 MacFarlane	20 May 1944	AFHQ	Accommodations for Kostylev et al. Bogomolov urging stronger support for Italian war effort.
36	Ltr 2118/INFO Info Div	23 May 44	DEC	Reference possibilities for accommodations of Russians at Sal.
37	Ltr Ministry of For. Affairs	27 May 44	ACC	Communist Propaganda and Declarations in French North Africa.
38	Cbl M221 MacFarlane	1 Jun 44	AFHQ	1. Bogomolov wants info on Allied engineers work in Italy; 2. Wants 3 small ships for Med. run. 3. Wants to obtain Yugoslav soldiers from Italian army. I said no.
39	Ltr CC 383.6 MacFarlane	3 Jun 44	AAI	Bogomolov wants to visit 250 prisoners claiming to be Russians.
40	Ltr A.J. Perry	5 Jun 44	Bogomolov	As Solodovnik has left, please have this msg fr Alexander transmitted to him at Moscow.
41	Cbl F 57202 AFHQ	9 Jun 44	AAI rpt ACC	No objection to proposals of CC/383.6 of 3 June.
42	Cbl F 59697 AFHQ	15 Jun 44	CG SOS Natousa	Gen Sudakov to be informed of German pris. war claiming to be Russians & to be able to interview.
43		16 Jun 44		Roster of Russians.
44	Memo DS	3 Jul 44		Notes on meeting 28 Jun 44 with Bogomolov re: Yugoslav govt. & move to Rome.

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~~TOPSEC~~

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Q. M. C. Form 308 (OM No. 49)
Revised July 26, 1943

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1 POLITICS, RUSSIAN

Page Three

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
20	Ltr CC/G/193 MacFarlane	13 Apr 44	AFHQ C of S	Further to CC/G/180: Recommendations for handling explanation to Russian govt of disposal of It captured war materials.
21	Cbl Freedom F31347	13 Apr 44	Fatima	Report being played up by German propaganda on agreement between It Govt & Tito. Facts please.
22	Cbl Freedom F31320	12 Apr 44	Fatima	Ref M19: Inform Badoglio no agreements of any kind with any for power unless through ACC & AFHQ.
23	Cbl Fatima 3205 Caccia	13 Apr 44	Freedom	Ref 31347: no truth at all in press story you relate.
24	Cbl Fatima M149 MacFarlane	13 Apr 44	Freedom	Bogomolov's opinions of present political situation. Calls for more unity.
25	Cbl Fatima M151 MacFarlane	15 Apr 44	Freedom	Bad. says Russians have not approached him re Allied status.
26	Ltr Gen Gammell	23 Apr 44	CC ACC	Reply to Russian queries on disposal of Ital. war material.
27	Ltr CC/G/239 FROM	28 Apr 44	Pol Sec ACC	Sol. will drop Yug. recruiting
28	Ltr CC/G/240 FROM	28 Apr 44	Gen Solodovnik	Herewith reply from AFHQ re your request for info on disposal of captured Ital. war material.
29	Ltr CC/G/242 FROM	28 Apr 44	AFHQ C of S	Sol. informed re Ital. war material captured by the Allies.
30	Cbl ACC Main M181 MacFarlane	29 Apr 44	Freedom	Sol. says definitely will drop question of insisting on recruiting of Yugo. for Tito.
31	Ltr CC/P/260 MacFarlane	3 May 44	Brig. Airey AAI	Solodovnik wants info re Russians captured on Ital front.
32	Ltr AAI/BOS(I)/DO Brig. Airey	5 May 44	Gen MacFarlane	Have gotten a few PW who claim to be Russian. Usual treatment.

0507

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Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 20, 1958

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1 POLITICS, RUSSIAN

Page Two

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
10	Cbl Fatima M119 MacFarlane	22 Mar 44	Freedom	We do not understand on what basis of Armistice to base your in- structions in 67463 of 21 Mar.
10a	Cbl Freedomal2612	22 Mar 44	AGWAR	Relay forward of M119 of 22 Mar.
11	Cbl Fatima M121 MacFarlane	23 Mar 44	Freedom	New Russian relations with It Govt having a direct effect on in- ternal political situation.
12	Cbl Fatima M122 MacFarlane	24 Mar 44	Freedom	Ref M121: Now have confirma- tion of the king's plan; re Junta.
13	Cbl Fatima M124 MacFarlane	26 Mar 44	Freedom	Badoglio has promised to make no further commitments to any foreign power without consulting ACC.
14	Cbl Fatima M125 MacFarlane	26 Mar 44	Freedom	Isper saw Badoglio. Kostelev is new ambassador. Plans. Badoglio was asked by Bogomolov to release all slaves in It Army to Tito.
15	Cbl Fatima M126 MacFarlane	28 Mar 44	Freedom	MacFarlane's talk with Bogo- molov. Covers most points.
16	Article from "Investizia"	31 Mar 44		9206 Semi-official statement on Russian policy & attitudes re Ita- ly.
17	Cbl Fatima M133	2 Apr 44	Freedom	Russian pressure charging mis- treatment of Slavs in It Army.
18	Cbl Fatima M139 MacFarlane	6 Apr 44	Freedom	Ref M133: Badoglio has made to Moscow all points he made to me. He took a firm stand.
19	Ltr CC/G/180 MacFarlane	6 Apr 44	AFHQ C of S	Have rec'd memo from Solodovnik asking reasons for certain deci- sions reference ACC disposal of It war material.

~~TOPSEC~~

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Q. M. C. Form 358 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1915

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1 POLITICS, RUSSIAN

Page One

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1				
2	Fatima 1820	8 Mar 44	Gen. Wilson	Know fr Ital govt that Bogomol saw Badoglio this morning about exchanging representatives; also re use of air fields. We didn't know.
3	Cbl Fatima M101 MacFarlane	7 Mar 44	Freedom	Bogomolov has asked for Russ'n air bases in Italy. Told him would refer matter to you.
4	Cbl Freedom 62453	9 Mar 44	For All chiefs of Staff Br & Am	Para of Fat 1820; Wilson recommends acceptance of air bases to avoid serious complications later if we desire use of Russian bases.
5	Cbl Fatima M108 MacFarlane	12 Mar 44	Freedom	Ref 1820; Bogomolov saw Bad., said Moscow responded favorably to exchange of diplomats. Communique to come out shortly.
6	Cbl Freedom 65046	15 Mar 44		2565
7	Cbl Fatima M113 MacFarlane	16 Mar 44	Freedom	Ref #65046; M108; Any protest over exchange of diplomats made now to Ital. Govt would be really a protest against Russian Gov't.
8	Cbl Fatima M115 MacFarlane	19 Mar 44	Freedom	Badoglio's explanations to Gen. MacFarlane on how Russian agreement had come about.
9	Cbl Fatima M118 MacFarlane	20 Mar 44	Freedom	Prunes tipped us off that this was forerunner of other Russian efforts at closer relations with It.
9a	Cbl Freedom 67463	21 Mar 44	Fatima for FNM	Ref M118; Tell Prunes Italy not to enter any agrmt except thru ACC

~~TOPSEC~~

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

18 October 1946

My dear Mr. Key:

Thank you very much for your letter of 17 October with reference to the travel of the Soviet Representatives in Italy.

I am pleased to see the position taken by the State Department in concert with the British Foreign Office.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Mr. David McK. Key
Charge d'Affaires ad interim
American Embassy
Rome

1050/20

2581

Key

SURPLUS

1050/20

HWZ:FBP:leb
Memo No. 23

10 July 1946.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Italy.

Subject: Two Russian Officers in Venice - Information regarding.

1. In accordance with your verbal request, there is submitted herewith a report on the Subject persons, received from the Northeast Italy Representative of this command.
2. The two officers are: Capt. SAMOILLOV
Lt. ROMANOV (Female interpreter).
3. The above officers are members of the Russian Mission ostensibly to screen displaced Russian nationals.
4. Major REEVES, G-2, 36th Area, claims that they are operating out of 36th Area HQ. Building and living at the DANIELI HOTEL with the permission and cognizance of 13th Corps.
5. Authority for sending Mission - AFHQ.
6. No information as to length of stay.
7. Mission arrived February 1946.

H. W. ZIEGLI.

2563

[Signature]
1050/6

HWZ:PEP:lab
Memo No. 23

10 July 1946.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM to Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Italy.

Subject: Two Russian Officers in Venice - Information regarding.

1. In accordance with your verbal request, there is submitted herewith a report on the Subject persons, received from the Northeast Italy Representative of this command.
2. The two officers are: Capt. SAMOILOV
Lt. ROMANOV (Female interpreter).
3. The above officers are members of the Russian Mission ostensibly to screen displaced Russian nationals.
4. Major REEVES, G-2, 86th Area, claims that they are operating out of 86th Area Hq. Building and living at the DANIELI HOTEL with the permission and cognisance of 13th Corps.
5. Authority for sending Mission - AFHQ.
6. No information as to length of stay.
7. Mission arrived February 1946.

H. W. ZIROLI.

2562

8 March 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5, AFHQ

The attached letter received from Major General Vasiliev
is passed to you for information.

~~X~~
L. W. STEARNS
Lt Col, AGD
Staff Officer to CG

2561

Stearns
1050/11

LSE/afe

CG 1050

12 October 1945

Subject: Transmitted of Correspondence

To: Major General L. L. Lomikow, Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Headquarters, APO 512

The enclosed three letters dated 12 October 1945 are forwarded at the request of Major General Rasailoff, Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate for Registration.

For the Chief Consideration:

L. W. STEPHENS
Major, AGO
SO to CG

3 Incls:

- 1 - Ltr, 12 Oct 45, fr Gen Rasailoff to Gen Lomikow, requesting admission to camp "5-0" for 14 Col Pashol to contact Soviet citizens (orig in Russian, 4 copies of translation)
- 2 - Ltr, 12 Oct 45, fr Gen Rasailoff to Gen Lomikow, requesting delivery of Soviet citizens from Polish registration camps (orig in Russian, 4 copies of translation)
- 3 - Ltr, 12 Oct 45, fr Gen Rasailoff to Gen Lomikow, presenting scheme of reception centers for Soviet citizens (orig in Russian, 4 copies of translation)

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Lomikow

TRANSLATION

TO: Rear Admiral E.W. STONE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Dear Admiral,

I am sending you three letters addressed to Maj Gen Lemnitzer,
which I beg you kindly to transmit to him without delay.

Sincerely yours

MAJOR GENERAL /s/ Basiloff
/v/ BASSILOFF

12 October 1945.
12

2569

10/27/45

E.

Lemnitzer

TRANSLATION

TO: Rear Admiral R.W. STONE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Dear Admiral,

I am sending you three letters addressed to Maj Gen Lemnitzer,
which I beg you kindly to transmit to him without delay.

Sincerely yours

MAJOR GENERAL /s/ Basileff
/t/ BASILOFF

12 October 1945.
12

2558

Luft

TRANSLATION

TO: Rear Admiral E.W. STONE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Dear Admiral,

I am sending you three letters addressed to Maj Gen Lemnitzer,
which I beg you kindly to transmit to him without delay.

Sincerely yours

MAJOR GENERAL /s/ Basiloff

/t/ BASSILOFF

12 October 1945.
12

2557

Encl.

TRANSLATION

TO: Rear Admiral F.W. STONE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Dear Admiral,

I am sending you three letters addressed to Maj Gen Lemnitzer,
which I beg you kindly to transmit to him without delay.

Sincerely yours

MAJOR GENERAL /s/ Basiloff

/t/ BASSILOFF

12 October 1945.
12

2556

Emilio

SECRET

JUL 19 1945

1700

Major S
1. Advise all concerned
2. Advise all concerned
including G-5

Plenipotentiary
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Advisory Council for Italy

N. 212

19 JULY 1945

To: Admiral Stone

I have the honor to inform you that as of 18 July of this year the duties as representative of S.S.R. for Repatriation of Soviet citizens in Italy is vested in Colonel O. G. Iakovlev. The former representative, Colonel A. E. Riumin, because of reasons of health is returning to the Soviet Union.

(sgd) Major General Vasiliev

See 105

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1050/cu

104

С Е К Р Е Т Н О .

ПОЛНОМОЧНЫЙ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬ
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК
В КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНОМ СОВЕТЕ ПО ВОПРОСАМ ИТАЛИИ

PLENIPOTENTIARY
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY

N. 818

18 июля 1955

5 VIA GARIBOLDI, ROME - TEL. 061 389

ВЕРХОВНОМУ УПОЛНОМОЧЕННОМУ СОВЕЩАЮЩЕЙ КОМИССИИ В ИТАЛИИ
КОНТРА-АДМИРАЛУ ЗАХАРЬ СТОУН.

Имею честь довести до Вашего сведения, что с 18 июля с/г
обязанности Представителя Уполномоченного СМК СССР по делам
репатриации советских граждан в Италии возложены на полков-
ника Яковлева, П.Р.

Вышесказанный Представитель - полковник Рязань, А.И., в виду
ухудшившегося состояния здоровья, выезжает в Советский Союз.

Уполномоченный Вас

генерал-майор

Засим

2551

14

AFHQ

2108

19 July 45

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

107
REFERENCE SIGNAL BRITISH EMBASSY BELGRADE DATED SEVENTEEN JULY REQUESTING PERMITS
FOR RUSSIANS TO PROCEED TO ROME FROM LJUBLJANA PD
PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE AND GEORGE TWO FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACEXC PAREN
SEE NO REASON WHY APPROVAL SHOULD BE GIVEN PD THIS CONFIRMS TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION BRIGADIER HENN TODAY

Int Dist

Chief Commissioner
D.P. & R. S/C

Office of Exec Commissioner

735

Maj.

See 107

1050/22

2552

103

ec

JULY 170445

E/9957

JULY 170830

PRIORITY

BRITISH EMBASSY BELGRADE

AFHQ, AOS ROME

REMYBCHD.

For G2 from Military Attache Officer from Soviet Mission called today and stated following Russians who are now in LJUBLJANA wish leave proceed ROME soonest they are members "Consultative Assembly" in Rome and wish to join Major General VASILIEVS Staff Capt Lieut (Naval rank) FREDOR PAVLEVICH KOPETS Major ALEXANDER POMEL BOGACHOFF Capt VASIL VASILJEVICH BOJECOFF Sjt Major (Naval) NIKOLAI NIKOLAEVICH MALIBAROFF Lieut OK YASHCHOUY 1 other skilled rank Second Lieut name not known also Mrs. KOPETS and Mrs BOJECOFF and 2 children of one of these women.

May we issue above with entry permits for ITALY they will return from LJUBLJANA to BELGRADE before proceeding ITALY. Grateful your reply soonest.

DLST

Action
Info
 Dissem Sec
 Chief Commr
 G A Sec
 File 2
 Fleet

2552

103

(Our signal 2108 of 19 July refers)
 ENCL.

108

1050/6

1203

785015

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION.

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

CC 1050

14 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Russian Mission to DISPER.

TO: Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Your secret letter of 3 July, same subject, refers.
2. Your letter was received on 7 July. On 9 July I wrote the Russian Military Mission here as per the attached copy.

3. On 11 July the Head of the Russian Mission replied as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to your letter of 9 July 1945 referring to the Soviet Mission in Greece.

"Inasmuch as Greece and Crete are not within the zone of activity of our mission for repatriation, I am compelled to return your letter as I have no means by which I can take the necessary measures to effect your request."

4. Based on telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff this date, it is understood that the Supreme Allied Commander will communicate directly with the Russian Mission to Greece.

See

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ALBERT W. STARR
Rear Admiral, USMC
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: C-4 AFHQ
C-5 AFHQ
Russian AFHQ
British AFHQ AFHQ
EXEC Commr
DISPER S/C

2551

101

~~SECRET~~

APC 394

5461 Ave. 97

To : Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Your secret letter of 3 July, same subject, refers.
2. Your letter was received on 7 July. On 9 July I wrote the Russian Military Mission here as per the attached copy.
3. On 12 July the Head of the Russian Mission replied as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to your letter of 9 July 1945 referring to the Soviet Mission in Greece.

"Inasmuch as Greco and Crato are not within the scope of activity of our mission for repatriation, I am compelled to return your letter as I have no means by which I can take the necessary measures to effect your request."

4. based on telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff this date, it is understood that the Supreme Allied Commander will communicate directly with the Russian Mission to Brussels.

Copy to: Q-2 AFHQ
Q-5 AFHQ
Liaison AFHQ
British Liaison AFHQ
Exec Comm
Disper 5/c

ELLEN M. STONE
Navy Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No

785015

2. Your letter was received on 7 July. On 9 July I wrote the Russian Military Mission here as per the attached copy.

3. On 12 July the Head of the Russian Mission replied as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to your letter of 9 July 1945 referring to the Soviet Mission in Greece.

"Inasmuch as Greece and Crete are not within the zone of activity of our mission for repatriation, I am compelled to return your letter as I have no means by which I can take the necessary measures to effect your request."

4. Based on telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff this date, it is understood that the Supreme Allied Commander will communicate directly with the Russian Mission to Greece.

Copy to:

G-2 AFHQ

G-5 AFHQ

Liaison AFHQ

British Mission AFHQ

EX-EC Commr

DISPER S/C

MILLY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

CC 1050

14 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Russian Mission to GREECE.

TO : Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Your entire letter of 3 July, same subject, refers.

2. Your letter was received on 7 July. On 9 July I wrote the Russian Military Mission here as per the attached copy.

3. On 12 July the Head of the Russian Mission replied as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to your letter of 9 July 1945 referring to the Soviet Mission in Greece.

"Inasmuch as Greece and Crete are not within the zone of activity of our mission for repatriations, I am compelled to return your letter as I have no means by which I can take the necessary measures to effect your request."

4. Based on telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff this date, it is understood that the Supreme Allied Commander will communicate directly with the Russian Mission to Greece.

Copy to: 0-2 AFHQ
0-5 AFHQ

Liaison AFHQ
British Mission AFHQ
EXEC Comm
DISPER 5/C

ALEX H. STONE
Major General, USA
Chief Commissioner

2. Your letter was received on 7 July. On 9 July I wrote the Russian Military Mission here as per the attached copy.

3. On 12 July the Head of the Russian Mission replied as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to your letter of 9 July 1945 referring to the Soviet Mission in Greece.

"Inasmuch as Greece and Crete are not within the zone of activity of our mission for repatriation, I am compelled to return your letter as I have no means by which I can take the necessary measures to effect your request."

4. Based on telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff this date, it is understood that the Supreme Allied Commander will communicate directly with the Russian Mission to Greece.

Copy to:

G-2 AFHQ

G-5 AFHQ

Liaison AFHQ

British Liaison AFHQ

EXEC. COMM.

DISPER S/C

15/ July 1945
HARRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

~~SECRET~~

101

1050/2

2351

065

SECRETFX 21625 (FX21627 ?)
JUL 131230BE/9496
JUL 131615B
OP PRIORITYFREEDOM SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGAB
21 ARMORED BDE FORCE INFO DISTONE, ALCOM**SECRET.**

Your A/229 of 10 July not to all addressees.

1. Russian representatives may visit UKRAINIANS if request made.
2. Stressed that no repeat no forced may used to return Soviet citizens unwilling to be repatriated. Russian Mission is aware of this fact.

DISTINFO-ACTION: Disper
INFO: Chief Commissioner
Ex Commissioner 2
CA Sec
Legal SC
File

(M/C Note: No trace of reference quoted)

~~**SECRET**~~

2550

TRANSLATION

I have the honor to refer to your letter of 9 July 1945 referring to the Soviet Mission in Greece.

Inasmuch as Greece and Crete are not within the zone of activity of our mission for repatriation, I am compelled to return your letter as I have no means by which I can take the necessary measures to effect your request.

2cc

(101)

(99)

12 July

2519

1050/11

JUL 13 1945

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬ УПОМОЩЕНОГО СНК СССР ПО
РЕПАТРИАЦИИ СОВЕТСКИХ ГРАЖДАН ИЗ ИТАЛИИ

СН 125

"12" июля 1945 г.

ВОПРОС: Русская Военная Миссия в Греции.

КОМУ : Адмиралу В.В. СТОГУН
Штаб Соединенной Комиссии

Господин Адмирал,

Имею честь подтвердить получение Вашего письма
от 9 июля 1945 года по вопросу о Советской Миссии в Греции.

В связи с тем, что Греция и Крит не входят в
зону действия нашей миссии по репатриации, я вынужден воз-
вратить Вам письмо, т.к. не имею возможности предпринять
какие-либо меры к его реализации.

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬ УПОМОЩЕНОГО
СНК СССР ПО ДЕЛАМ РЕПАТРИАЦИИ
СОВЕТСКИХ ГРАЖДАН ИЗ ИТАЛИИ
ПОДКОМАНД

Решение!

С.С.С.С.С.

(50)

СН 185

"12" июля 1948 г.

ВОПРОС: Русская Военная Миссия в Греции.

КОМУ : Адмиралу Э.В. СТОУН
Штаб Совенной Команды

Наследие Адмирал,

Князь волею подтверждает получение Паспорта Миссии
от 9 июля 1948 года по вопросу о Советской Миссии в Греции.

В связи с тем, что Греция и Крит не входят в
зону деятельности Миссии по репатриации, ввиду этого пов-
нритель Рано Миссия, т.к. не имея возможности предпринять
какие-либо меры к его реализации.

ПРЕСТАВЛЯТЕЛЬ УПОМОЩНОГО
СНК СССР ПО ДЕЛАМ РЕПАТРИАЦИИ
СОВЕТСКИХ ГРАЖДАН ИЗ ИТАЛИИ
ПОЛКОВНИК

Решен!

Грумин

(55)

Ref: 946/153/EO.

7 July 45.

Subject: Russian Military Mission in Greece.

To: Russian Military Mission,
via Nomentana, 150,
Villa Thai,
Rome.

(96)

I am instructed to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, in view of the fact that all Soviet Citizens have now been repatriated from Greece and Crete, the Russian Mission in Greece, Captain BRILEY and the Staff of the Repatriation Corp, have completed their work. In the circumstances it would be appreciated if arrangements could be made for their return to Russia as soon as possible.

HENRY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

(97)

249 (59)

1050/101

2547

Copy to Displaced Persons & Repatriation S/C (for attention Major Gimcock).

(98)

SECRET

Ref: 516/153/30.

7 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Russian Mission to Greece.

TO : Chief of Staff,
Allied Force Headquarters.

Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum
of 5 July on the above subject, and the Head of the
Russian Military Mission has been informed of the
Supreme Allied Commander's decision.

Wm. Henry H. Stone

WILLY H. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

1050/w

2516

97

See 98

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

3 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Russian Mission to GREECE.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

It is desired that you inform the Head of the Russian Military Mission, accredited to the Displaced Persons Repatriation Sub - Commission, Allied Commission, that the Supreme Allied Commander has decided that in view of the fact that all Soviet Citizens having been repatriated from GREECE and CRETE the Russian Mission in GREECE, Captain BRIEFF and the Staff of the Repatriation Camp, have completed their work, and should be returned to RUSSIA as soon as possible.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

W. D. MORAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: ✓ Commander, Land Forces, GREECE.
* Sir Desmond MORTON.
G-2. ~~FMHQ~~
G-5.
Liaison.
British Resident Minister.

Ex. Comm.


1. Ack. to L. 5
2. Prepare letter
to Head of Russian
Military Mission
as per attached.

3/7

JWD

cc

SECRET



2515

105015

Chief
Commissioner
Copy No. 1

4800

CC 1745

JUL 6 1945

JUL 7 1945

516

TOP SECRET C. v No. 3FX 15360
JUNE 301820ZE/7609
JULY 011405
CP-PRIORITYFREEDOM SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE PHGAB
TROOPERS, 30 MILKIS MOSCOW, ALCOM, RAAG.**TOP SECRET.**

Your 557360A(DP) of 28 June 45.

1. Russians formally in general labour camps in south GERMANY and AUSTRIA. Released during 3 months previous to capitulation and sent down to northern ITALY.
2. Present location Transit Camp ROME.
3. Request ruling soonest.

DISTCOPY NO 1 - 2
3
4
5
6ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER 2
INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
DISPER
FILEM/C NOTE:

(No trace of quoted reference.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

25/1

1050/110

rec'd by W/S

CONFIDENTIAL

PK 14693
JUN 29 13130

2/7/59
JUN 30 15308
PRIORITY

AFMC STORIED SIGNED CITE FRO323
MAIN 8TH ARMY FOR AND INFO XIII CORPS, ALCON ROME

CONFIDENTIAL

Rear U295.

No justification for employing 3 additional Russian officers with Russian Military Mission Rome. Request inform 27 Military Mission that is regretted application for escort and transport cannot therefore be approved.

DISE

INFO-ACTION: Disper
INFO: Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
File 2
Front

1050/CC

2549

CONFIDENTIAL

Rear U295.

No justification for employing 9 additional Russian officers with Russian Military Mission RMB. Request inform 37 Military Mission that is regretted application for escort and transport cannot therefore be approved.

DISC

INFO-ACTION: Disper
INFO: Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
File 2
Float

CONFIDENTIAL

(74)

COPY 16.3
TOP SECRET

cc 1155

JUN 24 1950

F98326
 JUNE 232245

E/6488
 JUNE 24 1146
 ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHGAB
 ACTION ALCOM.

TOP SECRET. 90

Your 335 of 22 June.

Disposal of Soviet Citizens unwilling to return to SOVIET UNION
 has been referred to War Office for ruling. No authority can be
 given pending decision.

DIST

COPY NO 1 - 2 ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER
 3 INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER ✓
 4 CA SEC
 (FOR DISPER & REPS)
 5 FILE

93

~~TOP SECRET~~

24 cc
 Came off 12 file
 on 6.

1050/10

COS AMHQ

COPY TO 8TH ARMY, XIII CORPS

460

23 June 45

Priority.

TOP SECRET PD

IT HAS COME TO MY KNOWLEDGE THAT A CAPTAIN WOYEVODSKY CMA OF ACA CMA ATTACHED TO EIGHTH ARMY CMA IS ACTING AS ESCORT TO SEVEN RUSSIAN OFFICERS AND THAT THE PARTY LEFT FOR FLORENCE YESTERDAY ON THEIR WAY BACK TO THIRTEEN CORPS CMA WHERE THEY ARE TO REPORT NO EARLIER THAN TWENTYSIXTH JUNE PD

PAREN TO CHIEF OF STAFF AFTER REPEATED EIGHTH ARMY AND THIRTEEN CORPS FROM HEADQUARTERS ALSO SIGNED STONE PAREN

CAPTAIN WOYEVODSKY EXPLAINED THAT GEORGE ITEN THIRTEEN CORPS HAD GIVEN HIM INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THESE OFFICERS AND HAD STATED THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF A SMALL MILITARY MISSION WHICH WOULD BE ACTING AS OBSERVERS IN TRIESTE PD HAVE YOU ANY INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER QUOTE I CONSIDER THE PRESENCE OF A RUSSIAN MISSION IN VENEZIA GUILIA POLITICALLY DANGEROUS PD

SEE 1008/LL

Office of Executive Commissioner

308

E. Talbot
Lieut Col.

(92)

2541

1050/LL
Copy in 1008/LL

EXTRACT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Demobilization
APO 394

CO 1001

23 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Future Policy Toward Italy.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

1. Italy is at the parting of the ways. Defeated in 1919, she has been fought over and occupied by Allies or Germans for two years; she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 per cent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, she stands in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an unbridled movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph -- possibly by force.

2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or

Since the conditions which attend it are

2540

1050/0

years; she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 per cent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered displacement of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to seven million; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph -- possibly by force.

2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are both material and moral, the only hope of restraining it in Italy is to ameliorate these conditions -- to assist Italy economically, and to lift her morally by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

3. It can be argued that the expiration of Italy's crime of 1940 must rightly be prolonged; indeed, her defeat and the end of her battle since 1943 have tended to ensure that. Circumstances, if

16
SECRET

SECRET

Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

23 June 1945.

not the will of the United Nations, will see to it that she will not revert again to the artificial position of a great power which Mussolini's regime achieved. But already her people have shown, by their profession and acts of co-belligerency with the Allies, not only in the armed forces of the post-armistice Italian Government, but among the Partisans in the North, that they are willing to abandon totalitarianism and work for the same freedoms as the Allies who liberated them. The great majority of Italians desire to see a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear -- since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country -- or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others: they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military, political and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly two years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they have ensured freedom from hunger; they have not yet provided freedom from fear. Posterity would judge harshly if the endeavors of two great democratic states were to result in the institution of a second dictatorship in the first European country to be liberated from Fascism and Nazism.

(91)

2529

JUN 22 1945

G 5 AMHQ.

335.

22 June 45.

Priority.

TOP SECRET PD

86

SUBJECT IS REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS FROM ITALY PD I REFER TO MY
 DPR/13/52 (DM)
 DOG PETER ROBERT DELIQUE THIRTEEN DELIQUE GEORGE TWO PAREN DOG PETER PAREN
 OF SIXTH JUNE AND TO THE RECOMMENDATION MADE IN PARA FOUR THAT THE SOLE
 TEST IN APPLYING THE DIRECTIVES ON THIS SUBJECT BE WHETHER A PERSON CLAIMS
 RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP AND THAT IF HE DOES NOT HE BE TREATED AS STATELESS PD
 PAREN TO GEORGE FIVE AMHQ FROM HEADQUARTERS ALCON CITE ACORN PAREN
 THIS RECOMMENDATION PERHAPS WENT TOO FAR AS THE POLICY ON STATELESS PERSONS
 HAS WE UNDERSTAND NOT YET BEEN DECIDED PD
 REQUEST THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO RETAIN IN ITALY ALLTHOSE RUSSIANS NOT
 WISHING TO RETURN TO SOVIET RUSSIA UNTIL THE POLICY HAS BEEN DECIDED VIDE
 YOUR FOX XRAY NINE FIVE NINE THREE SIX OF TWENTIETH JUNE PD

Int Dist

Chief Commissioner

C.A. Sec (form Displaced Persons & R.S/C)

Office of Executive Commissioner.

300

Lieut. Col.

See 93

7528

1050/12

90

TOP SECRET

C. Commissioner

Copy No 2. JUN 20 1968
CC 1053FX 95936
JUN 192036BE/5835
JUN 201010B
PRIORITYAFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHOAB
ACTION TROOPERS, INFO 30 MILITARY MISSION, ALCOM, RAAG**TOP SECRET.**

1. 55 Soviet citizens including 16 women 11 children majority of whom state they are political refugees screened in accordance with terms of YALTA agreement are refusing to return willingly to SOVIET UNION.
2. Soviet Mission have requested their transfer. This would require use of force including handcuffs and travel under escort in locked box cars.
3. We believe that the handing over of these individuals would almost certainly involve their death.
4. There are likely to be many more such cases.
5. Request your ruling earliest possible as to how these personnel should be disposed of as local Soviet Mission will certainly press for them to be handed over.

DIST

Copy No 1	INFO-ACTION: Disper & Rep S/C
" 2	INFO: Chief Commissioner
" 3	Ex Commissioner
" 4	CA Sec
" 5	File

2527

See (95)

Return to CC files

(89a)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

Ref: DER/13/G-2 (DP)

6 June 1945

SUBJECT: Disposal of Soviet Citizens.

TO : G-5 Section,
A.P.H.Q.

1. A very strong plea has been addressed to this Commission on behalf of persons of Russian nationality who do not wish to be repatriated. A number of these people have been avoiding the Soviet Regime and their escape from Russia during the war has given them hope for the future. A number of others are what is known as "White Russians," that is to say, Russian citizens who escaped from Russia between 1917 and 1930.

2. Both these classes are at the present time being repatriated to Russia under the policy regarding the disposal of Soviet citizens as covered by HQ MTOUSA letter AG 383.7/4.14 A-G dated 9 March 1945 and AFHQ letter CH/3.91/2/G1(Br) dated 15 March 1945.

3. In both these letters the term "Soviet Citizen" is defined as including all who claim citizenship. No mention is made of persons who do not claim citizenship, although it may be that, in fact, they hold it.

4. I recommend for your urgent consideration that the sole test in applying the directives mentioned in paragraph 2 above be whether a person claims Russian citizenship and that if he or she does not do so, he or she be treated as stateless.

ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

2530

~~TOP SECRET~~

RESTRICTED1823
JUNE 151920BE/3223
JUNE 160836B
ROUTINEAGC BULGARIA US SIGNED CRANE
ACTION AFHQ INFO USSR BELGRADE, ALCON ROME

RESTRICTED

Reur FX 92362.

Swiss have been refused diplomatic courier by Russians.
Believe not advisable complicate our clearances under present
conditions. Message filed 151500B.

Dist

Action - Liaison Div 2
Info - Chief Commissioner
File 2
Communications SO
Float

RESTRICTED

88

2526

10501

SECRETEX 95628
JUNE 19/1610ZR/5792
JUNE 20/0900Z
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FREAB

DISTONE INFO: 15 ARMY GROUP EIGHTH ARMY ALCOM

SECRET.

1. All SOVIET citizens held by you determined as such in accordance with this HQ letter CR/3491/A2 of 6 March and who are willing to be repatriated may be transferred to SOVIET UNION in AUSTRIA. Conversation Major MAY- Staff Captain A(A) refers.
2. Essential that 48 hours notice be given in order that SOVIET Mission be informed.
3. For ALCOM. Please pass to SOVIET Mission

DISK

ACTION : DISPER & REP SC

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
FILE (2)
FLOAT**SECRET**

(89)

11B/PBS

11 June 1945

My dear General Kislenko:

On receipt of your letter of May 10th protesting an incident in Bologna between the film representatives of P.W.B. and the Soviet Union, I asked for a complete report from P.W.B. Because of events in the north it has taken some time to obtain this information.

Attached herewith is the pertinent information which we have received from P.W.B. As you will see the facts in the case were misinterpreted by the owner of the cinema in Bologna and as a consequence the Soviet film representative received an erroneous impression of the action of P.W.B. As you are probably aware the Supreme Allied Command has given P.W.B. the responsibility for the distribution of films in Italy.

Yours very truly,

s/ Elmer V. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Maj. Gen. R. A. Kislenko
Soviet Union Representative
to the Allied Commission
Rome

Encl.

Copy to: CC Files
EX. C Files (2)
Liaison Division, Att: Capt. Arnoldy
PBS Files (2)

(81)

2534

1050/cv

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

Unit 12

APO 512

4 June 1945

To : Mr. Stewart Brown - Allied Commission
From : Capt. P. Levi - PWB, Film Section

Subject : Soviet Union Representative's complaint
regarding P.W.B. action, Imperial Cinema,
Bologna.

In reply to your letter dated May 22, we enclose
translation of a letter in this connection received from
our Film Officer in Bologna which we believe clears up
this situation.

(Sgd)

Filade Levi Capt. AC.

Encl.

2523

(87)

26 May 1945

To : PWB, Film Section - Unit 12

From : PWB, Film Section - Unit 15

Subject: Cinema Imperiale, Bologna.

In making plans for the release in first run of Bologna of the various films distributed by this Film Section, we approached the manager of the Cinema Imperiale. He agreed to the inclusion of his cinema in our proposed release plan.

Just prior to playing the first film scheduled for release, the Cinema Imperiale informed us that they had another film to play at this time. We pointed out that we would have to substitute his theatre with another and that our first run release plan would have to be changed so as to temporarily exclude his theatre in view of his theatre not being at our disposal for playing our films as agreed to.

The manager of the Cinema Imperiale, not wishing his cinema to be excluded from our circuit, told us he would postpone the date of showing of the film in question (we later learned that this was a Russian film being distributed by G.D.B.).

A few days later, Mr. De Berardinis arrived in Bologna and lodged a strong complaint against the manager of the Cinema Imperiale for this postponement. The manager, to excuse himself, gave an interpretation of what had taken place entirely different from actual facts and this of course provoked an unjustified resentment against us on the part of Mr. De Berardinis.

To prove that the above statements are exact we enclose a letter received from the cinema Imperiale.

We regret that what was a normal business transaction on our part was source of this incident, an incident which was due solely to the attitude taken by the manager of the cinema Imperiale toward G.D.B.

On our part we can assure you that in all our dealings with other film distributors and particularly with G.D.B., our policy has always been one of friendship and fair play.

(Signed) Francesco Battaglia
Film Officer
PWB, Film Section
Unit 15.

Encl.

On the occasions of the re-opening of movie houses in Bologna immediately after the liberation of the town by Allied troops, the PWB locale representative, Sig. Franco Battaglia, gave me to understand that his superiors had directed that the first-showings of PWB films in Bologna were to take place in the following houses:

MODERNISSIMO - FULGOR	)
IMPERIALE - CENTRALE	) Simultaneously
MEDICA	)

thereby taking advantage of three possibilities of exploitation. He offered the film CORVETTE K. 225 simultaneously for the IMPERIALE and CENTRALE. I objected for the reason that I had already the Russian film STALINGRADO from the Soyuzintorgkino exchange. Sig. Battaglia explicitly declared that, not being able to book for simultaneous showing of the PWB film at the Imperiale, he would have to scout for another solution, that is, choosing another centrally located house for the need.

Misinterpreting the statement to mean that the Imperiale would be excluded from any future bookings of PWB's American pictures, and not wishing to have my employers faced with that possibility, I preferred to transpose the STALINGRADO booking.

I referred the case in exactly the same terms to the Soyuzintorgkino agent, Sig. De Bernardinis, who acted in consequence.

In truth, I would like to state that shortly afterwards Sig. Battaglia freed for me a booking date, Sunday included, with another film, not PWB's. I was able to book for a period which included two Sunday dates an Italian film - ADEIO AMORE - because of an official order clearly indicated to the agent for Soyuzintorgkino films.

CINEMA IMPERIALE BOLOGNA
La Direzione

23 Maggio 1945

2531

(87)

PI 82572
MAY 26 1946

~~SECRET~~

E/2523
MAY 27 0950
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FNGAB
ALCOM INFO: RAAC.

SECRET.

1. Reference telephone conversation Major STEARNS-Captain FERGUSON.
2. Request you ask Russian Mission to make further strong effort to move 120 Soviet Citizens in 159 TRANSIT CAMP peaceably.
3. It should be explained to them that unless they move in the normal manner they will be sent to TARANTO under armed guard.

DIST

ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER2
INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER
DISPER
FILE

~~SECRET~~

2529

85

105-0/10

~~SECRET~~

4322

MAY 221330B

E/1968

MAY 230830B

PRIORITY

5 ARMY

CG HQ ALCON

~~SECRET.~~

Reference 7532, 14 May cite ACRXC.

There is a concentration of Russians at MODENA and several groups in the vicinity BOLZANO, ORA, and CORTINA DI AMPEZZO. Occasionally individuals and small groups show up in the MILAN area although IV Corps reports no concentrations of Russians in NORTHWESTERN ITALY.

DISC

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
File 2
Float

~~SECRET~~

2528

JAQ/hjp

14 May 1945

TO: Captain Arnoldy, Office of the Executive Commissioner, Hq A.C.

The Admiral has seen the attached letters, as they were sent to him direct, but they should now go through channels. The Chief Commissioner states that in view of General Vasiliev's position he considers that the reasons which he advances for his trip North are sufficient and he directs that the request goes forward to AFHQ with our recommendation.

/s/ J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

cc: E.A.C.
CC FILES

10550/ea 121

8527

83

CC

AND FIFTH ARMY, AND NINTH ARMY, IN VIETNAM REGION

7532

14 MAY 65

PRIORITY

URGENT 10

URGENT RUSSIAN INTERVALS 10

URGENT FOR ACTION TO CIN AND FIFTH ARMY CMA AND NINTH ARMY CMA AND AND NINTH
ARMY FOR AND VIETNAM REGION FROM HQ ALONG WITH AGENT PART

INFORMATION REQUIRED AT ONCE AS TO LOCATIONS OF GERMAN CONCENTRATIONS IN
 VIETNAM IN YOUR AREA. TO THIS IS URGENTLY REQUIRED SO THAT RUSSIAN INTERESTS
 HANDLING THIS PROGRAM MAY BE IMMEDIATELY DIRECTED TO BEST RESULTS PLACED WITH
 MINIMAL LOSS OF TIME.

See (4)

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(82)

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Major L. W. STEARNS
 Major, AGO

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
AFO 394

Ref: 799/39/EC.

12 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Channels of Communication.

TO : U.S.S.R. Representative, Allied Commission.

1. I have been instructed by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters, to bring to your notice certain points which may be regarded as an elaboration of my letter, reference 799/14/EC dated 2 May 1945. (76)

2. I am requested to emphasize that, except for matters connected with your status as Soviet Representative on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy, your channel of communication with superior Allied authority is through the Allied Commission, so that any communication you may wish to make to the Allied authorities should be forwarded through this Commission.

3. Will you please bring this direction to the notice of Colonel RUMIN who, I am informed, is communicating direct with Allied Force Headquarters on questions relating to the repatriation of Soviet citizens.

Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: External
US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
US Polad
Br Romin
G-5, AFHQ (Your letter of 5 May refers)

Internal
A/President
Colonel Rumin, Delegate of the Representative, CPC, USSR.
Civil Affairs Section
War Material Disposal & IPW Sub-Comm
Public Safety Sub-Comm
P.E.O.
Liaison Division.

(81)

1050/45

3223

COPY

SOVIET UNION REPRESENTATIVE
ALLIED COMMISSION.TO: Rear Admiral Ellery Stone,
Chief Commissioner AC.

Rome. 10 May 1945.

Dear Admiral,

I dare to bother you, proceeding from the facts described in the attached letter. To me it looks rather indiscreet and very strange the behaviour of the Representative of FWB who, threatening the owner of the cinema - of "Imperial" in Bolonia, deprives of even insignificant possibility our movie organisation, which is Allied also, to show films.

I ask you, Admiral, to pay attention to the causeless and unreasonable action of Mr. Camarota. For my part, I categorically protest and in case certain steps not be taken, I shall inform my Government about.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ KISLENKO

(t) A. Kislenko
Major Gen. R.A.

Enclosure: letters.

See (87)

2524

10550/CC

(80a)

COPY

Soyuzintorgkino
Soviet State Film Corporation
Branch in Italy

7 May 1945

TO: U.S.S.R. Representative on the Allied Commission
Major General Kislenko
Rome

The Branch of the Soviet Film Corporation (Soyuzintorgkino) for the distribution of Soviet Films in Italy in which, Signor De Berardinis went to Bologna where he made an agreement with the owner of the cinema theater, Imperiale, regarding the distribution of Soviet films as soon as the city will be once more provided with electricity. The Representative of PWB, Sig. Camorata, and the Head of the Film Section of PWB, Mr. Franco Battaglia, who was employed in Bologna, have in a roughest manner violated our interests, threatened Signor Aldo Ciaccaglia, the owner of the above-mentioned theater, with economic repressions, have forced him to refuse to show the film "Stalingrad" in order to show instead in the numerous theaters of Bologna films of Anglo-American production.

The latter exposed above was referred to me in a letter of Signor De Berardinis who once more on the 4th May returned to Bologna and getting acquainted with the situation made an energetic protest to the Head of the Film Section of PWB in Bologna.


The copies of the letters exchanged after the declaration of protest between Signor De Berardinis and the Head of the PWB Film Section, Mr. Franco Battaglia, who threatened the owner of the Cinema Imperiale, as well as the correspondence exchanged between Signor De Berardinis and Signor Aldo Ciaccaglia were sent to me. These, translated into Russian are attached herewith. I also attach the copies in Italian.

The above stated case is an unprecedented violation of rights of a Soviet State Commercial Organization and has no justification whatsoever.

I refer this matter to you and beg you to take energetic steps in order to put an end to unlawful action on the part of apparently not very experienced employees of the Film Section of PWB and also that the guilty persons be brought to answer for their misdeeds. 2223

/s/ Representative of Soyuzintorgkino
in Italy

Biasi



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

Ref: HFR/17/6-II(HP)

10, May 1945.

SUBJECT: Visits of Russian Officers to Army Areas and
Prisoner of War Camps.TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. In compliance with your CR/3491/3/0-1(Br) dated 26 April 1945, attached hereto is copy of application from the Delegate of the Representative C.P.C., U.S.S.R. for permission to visit places in Northern Italy.
2. Permission is requested for the undermentioned officers to visit the Areas mentioned in their proposed itineraries for the purpose of dealing expeditiously with the Repatriation of Russian Nationals:

(a) Col. P.G. LAKOVLEV	}	GENOVA, TORINO and MILAN.
(b) Lt. T. GINSBURG		
(c) Major K. CHLOVSKI	}	BOLOGNA, REGGIO EMILIA, TRENTO and VENEZIA.
(d) Major P. BLOBOKOV		
3. It is suggested that their presence in the above mentioned Regions would greatly assist the various Groups dealing with Displaced Persons in Northern Italy.
4. It would be much appreciated if authority could be granted to the above mentioned members of the Russian Military Mission, accredited to Displaced Persons & Repatriation Sub-Commission, A.C. to proceed to the proposed destinations by 15 May 1945.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.Incl:
as above

1240

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Ref: 799/24/EO.

Tel: 4/8201

9 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Visits of Russian Officers to Army Areas
and Prisoner of War Camps.

TO : Colonel A. I. Rumin,
Delegate of Representative
CFO USSR.

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 4 May
1945 making application to visit localities in the North of
Italy. In accordance with instructions this has been forwarded
to AFHQ and as soon as a reply is received you will be informed.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

See (80)

(79)

2521

DELEGATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE CPC USSR
for Repatriation of the Soviet Citizens

SUBJECT : Visits of Russian Officers to Army
Areas and Prisoner of War Camps.

4 May 45

TO : E. V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

Sir,

1. We have received your letter of 2nd May 45 with the instructions of visiting by Russian Officers 5th and 8th Army Areas and Prisoner War Camps.
2. Your Staff and the Soviet Ex. POW, who came to our Mission, informed us that on the North of Italy in the regions of Genova, Torino, Milano, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Trento, and Venezia there is a great amount of Soviet citizens, who have to be repatriated. Among them there are many women and children and persons who need pecuniary assistance.
3. In connection with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander I kindly ask you to intercede with AFHQ to permit us to visit several areas of North Italy in order to give necessary assistance to the Soviet people, to collect and send them in the nearest time to the principal Camps in Bari and Tarento.
4. I shall be very grateful to you if you help us to receive permission to visit the regions of Genova, Torino and Milano for Colonel P. G. Yakovlev, my Assistant, and Lt. T. Ginsburg interpreter, and to visit the regions of Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Trento and Venezia for Majors K. Gholovskiy and P. Belobokov, my Assistants as well.
5. I will be very much obliged to you, Sir, if the a/m officers receive such permission for visiting those places in the nearest future. It would be desirable if they get them not later than 10th May 1945.
6. The assistance of a liaison officer who will be appointed by Army Headquarters and who will accompany our officers will be greatly appreciated.

Colonel A. I. RUBIN
Delegate of Representative
CPC USSR

1242

cc

Ref: 799/15/RC.

3 May 1945.

Subject: Visits of Russian Officers to
Army Areas and Prisoner of War Camps.

To: Chief of Staff,
Allied Forces Headquarters.

I refer to your letter CR/3401/2/01(R) of
26 April, and enclose copy of my letter 799/14/RC of 2 May
addressed to the Head of the Russian Military Mission.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

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TOP SECRET

2 May 1945

SUBJECT: Entry for Soviet Officers to Northern ITALY
for Work on Prisoner of War Repatriation.

TO : Major General Kislenko,
Soviet Union Representative,
Allied Commission.

1. Your letter dated 30 April 1945 on the subject of obtaining permission for Soviet Officers to go into Northern ITALY, was clearly written before Admiral Stone had an opportunity to talk to you regarding the procedure which has been established for clearing such visits.
2. We recently had this matter under very detailed review here and as a result have set up a system which we hope will meet both your requirements and ours.
3. It is necessary, therefore, that you should give the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, certain particulars regarding the proposed tour of Colonel Rumin and the three other officers you mentioned. Arrangements will then, unless there is some objection which I do not at all foresee, be made for permits to be granted as quickly as possible.
4. I am sorry to have to ask you to comply with these formalities, but we like to clear the matter with our Armies in the forward areas before allowing any such visits.

W. D. MORGAN
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff.

Copies to:

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission }
G-1 (B) (AFHQ) }
Liaison }

Reference CR/3491/3/G-1(Br)
dated 26 Apr 45.

25181

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 799/14/BC.

2 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Visits of Russian Officers to Army Areas
and Prisoner of War Camps.

TO : Head of the Russian Military Mission,
130, Via Montana,
ROME.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander directs me to inform you that he has reviewed the existing arrangements for visits by Russian officers to 5th and 8th Army Areas and Prisoner of War Camps.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that all previous arrangements (including those set out in letters AG 094.112/L80 A-O of 30 March 1945 and CR/3491/2/G-1(Br) of 31 March 1945, addressed directly to the Russian Military Mission, copies of which are attached for your information) be superseded and that the following procedure be complied with in future:

- (a) No Russian officer is to enter 5th or 8th Army Areas or any Prisoner of War Camp without the written permission of Allied Force Headquarters.
- (b) Applications for such visits are to be addressed by you through the Allied Commission to Allied Force Headquarters.
- (c) Such applications to visit either Army Area are to be made well in advance of the time of the desired visit, giving details of the purpose of the visit, proposed dates, itinerary, and names of personnel concerned. Allied Force Headquarters will then, if the visit is approved, arrange with the appropriate Army Headquarters for a liaison officer to meet the visiting Russian officer on the Rear Army Boundary and to escort and offer every assistance to him throughout his visit.
- (d) Visits shall only be for the purpose stated in the application.

3. I am further directed by the Supreme Allied Commander to inform you that the establishment of and compliance with this procedure will be of mutual benefit to all concerned in expediting the solution of questions arising from the urgent problems of repatriation.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander directs me to inform you that he has reviewed the existing arrangements for visits by Russian officers to 5th and 8th Army Areas and Prisoner of War Camps. (74)

2. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that all previous arrangements (including those set out in letters AF 091.112/450 A-O of 30 March 1945 and CR/3491/2/G-1(Br) of 31 March 1945, addressed directly to the Russian Military Mission, copies of which are attached for your information) be superseded and that the following procedure be complied with in future:

- (a) No Russian officer is to enter 5th or 8th Army Areas or any Prisoner of War Camp without the written permission of Allied Force Headquarters.
- (b) Applications for such visits are to be addressed by you through the Allied Commission to Allied Force Headquarters.
- (c) Such applications to visit either Army Area are to be made well in advance of the time of the desired visit, giving details of the purpose of the visit, proposed dates, itinerary, and names of personnel concerned. Allied Force Headquarters will then, if the visit is approved, arrange with the appropriate Army Headquarters for a liaison officer to meet the visiting Russian officer on the Rear Army Boundary and to escort and offer every assistance to him throughout his visit.
- (d) Visits shall only be for the purpose stated in the application.
- 3. I am further directed by the Supreme Allied Commander to inform you that the establishment of and compliance with this procedure will be of mutual benefit to all concerned in expediting the solution of questions arising from the urgent problems of repatriation.

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W. W. Stone

WILLIAM W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: External
US Ambassador
British Ambassador
US Poland
Dr Resain
G-5 AMHQ (2)
No. 1 District
No. 2 District
No. 3 District
DCCAO, 15th Army Group,
SCAO, AMG 5 Army
SCAO, AMG 8 Army
PES

Internal
Acting President
Soviet Representative to AG
CA Section
WED & IPW Sub-Com
P.R. Branch
Liaison Division

Cos AFHQ

(76)

(78)

SECRET

C O P Y
O
P
YALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

OR/3491/3/GI(Br)

26 April 1945

SUBJECT: Visits of Russian Officers to Army Areas
and Prisoner of War Camps.TO: Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

1. It is desired that you inform the Head of the Russian Military Mission, accredited to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, that the Supreme Allied Commander has reviewed the existing arrangements for visits by Russian officers to Fifth and Eighth Army Areas and Prisoner of War Camps. The Supreme Allied Commander has accordingly decided that all previous arrangements (including those set out in letters AG 091.112/480 A-O of 30 March 1945 and OR/3491/2/GI(Br) dated 31 March 1945, addressed directly to the Russian Military Mission and copies of which are attached for your information) be superseded and that the following procedure be complied with in future:

a. No Russian officer is to enter Fifth or Eighth Army Areas or any Prisoner of War Camp without the written permission of this Headquarters.

b. Applications for such visits are to be addressed by the Russian Mission through you to this Headquarters.

c. If a visit to either Army Area is concerned, such applications are to be made well in advance of the time of the desired visit, giving details of the purpose of the visit, proposed dates, itinerary, and names of personnel concerned. This Headquarters will then, if the proposed visit is approved, arrange with Army Headquarters for a Liaison Officer to meet the visiting Russian Officer on the Rear Army Boundary and to escort and offer every assistance to him throughout his visit.

d. Visits shall only be for the purpose stated on the application.

e. You should further inform the Head of the Russian Military Mission that the Supreme Allied Commander trusts that the establishment of and compliance with this procedure will be of mutual benefit to all concerned in expediting the solution of questions arising from the urgent problems of repatriation.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

SECRET

W. D. MORGAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

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C O P Y.SUBJECT: Visits to Prisoner of War Camps.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

OR/3491/2/61(Br).The Russian Military Mission,
R O M E.31 Mar 45.

1. On the request of Col. RIUMIN at the time of his visit to AFHQ on 19 Mar 45 passes were issued permitting certain named members of the Russian Military Mission to enter Prisoner of War Camps in ITALY.
2. The attention of the Russian Mission is called to the fact that the possession of this pass only confers on its holder the right of entry into the perimeter of the Prisoner of War Camps concerned, and does not confer other privileges such as circulation within or entry to the Army area.
3. The Russian Mission should accordingly make the usual application to and obtain the permission of the Army whose area it desires to enter for the purpose of the visit.
4. Such applications should be made well in advance of the time of the desired visit, giving details of proposed dates and itinerary.
4. A liaison officer will be provided by the Army concerned to accompany the Russian Mission in order to afford them every assistance.

(Signed) M.W.M. BOLLOD,
Major General,
DAG, G.1(Br).

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COPI.

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
United States Army
APO 512

SECRET.

In reply refer to
AG 091.112/430 A-0

30 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Russian Representatives to Fifth Army.

TO : Colonel A. I. RIUMIN,
Delegate of Representative Council of Peoples
Commissariat for Repatriation of Soviet Citizens,
130, Via Romantova, Rome, Italy.

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 22 March 1945.

2. This headquarters has been informed by the United States military authorities in Moscow that Soviet Government interpretation of the areas in which repatriation contact personnel are to be permitted in the rear of Russian Red Army formations preclude presence of United States military personnel in Red Army or Red Army group headquarters. In view of this interpretation by the Soviet Government of the terms of the recent agreement entered into between Soviet Government and United States Government in matters pertaining to the repatriation of each government's citizens by the other government, it will be necessary for this headquarters to suspend the authority for Soviet Government representatives to be present in the United States Fifth Army area pending further clarification of this matter and the intent of the Soviet Government.

3. You are still authorized and requested to dispatch a representative to the Adriatic Base Command, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, at Bari, Italy, for liaison and administrative duties in connection with the collecting camp for Soviet citizens at Bari, Italy.

FOR THE THEATER COMMANDER:

G. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General.

Copies furnished:

CG Fifth Army
CG 15th Army Group
G-1(A) PAB
G-5 C-2
USPOLAD Liaison
G-1(B)

See (16)

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COPY

~~SECRET~~

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 7 (Revised)
26th February 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET
DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

In accordance with conclusion 11 of SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, paragraph 7 has now been revised to take account of the propaganda facilities afforded by FWB to the Russians.

Copies of the revised paper have been forwarded to the British Resident Minister and the US Political Adviser for despatch to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied Missions elsewhere.

This paper supersedes Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should now be destroyed.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

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22

DECLASSIFIED
IN 1985
BY 1043
DATE 11/11/72

PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET
DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

In accordance with conclusion 11 of SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, paragraph 7 has now been revised to take account of the propaganda facilities afforded by FWB to the Russians.


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This paper supersedes Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should now be destroyed.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL

SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~



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PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET
DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

In accordance with conclusion 11 of SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting,
paragraph 7 has now been revised to take account of the propaganda
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
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This paper supersedes Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should now
be destroyed.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL

SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~



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SECRET

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PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET
DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

K 65

For reference in connection with determining what privileges and facilities should be expected for British and US personnel accredited to the Allied Control Commission in COMINTL and BUCGAL, there is presented herewith a summary of information concerning the privileges and facilities accorded to the various Russian delegations in ITALY. The information given applies to the Russian Embassy only to the extent so stated.

1. PERSONNEL

Soviet personnel (not including wives or children) are assigned or attached to the respective delegations in ITALY as follows :-

- (a) Allied Commission: 1 Representative, 5 Officer Assistants,
1 Other Rank - Total 7 persons.
- (b) Advisory Council: 1 Representative (temporarily the same as for
the A.C.), 1 Officer Assistant, 6 Civilian
Assistants, 10 Other Ranks - Total 20 persons.
- (c) Military Mission (to the Displaced Persons
and Repatriation Sub-Commission of A.C.): 2 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants
(2 more about to be accredited), 4 Civilians,
15 Other Ranks - Total 39 Persons.
- (d) Embassy: 13 Civilians.

2. FUNCTIONS

(a) Under directive of the A.C. dated 26 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the A.C. are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.

(b) In addition to their observational functions, the personnel of the Military Mission to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission screen Soviet refugee and ex-prisoners of war, visit camps and arrange for repatriation of Soviet nationals.

(c) The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council participates on equal basis with other representatives in presiding at meetings and in the recommendations formulated by the Council.

(d) It follows from the fact that the function of the Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission is merely consultative, that no procedure is provided to ensure that he will have an opportunity to consult with his Government prior to the taking of decisions by the Commission, or even to ensure that he or his

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- (a) Allied Commission:
 - 1 Representative, 3 Officers
 - 1 Other Rank - Total 7 persons.
- (b) Advisory Council:
 - 2 Representative (temporarily the same as for the A.C.), 1 Officer Assistant, 8 Civilian assistants, 10 Other Ranks - Total 20 persons.
- (c) Military Mission (to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission of A.C.):
 - 2 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants (2 more about to be accredited), 4 Civilians, 15 Other Ranks - Total 38 persons
- (d) Embassy:
 - 13 Civilians.

2. FUNCTIONS

(a) Under directive of the S.O. dated 26 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the A.C. are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.

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(c) The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council participates on equal basis with other representatives in presiding at meetings and in the recommendations formulated by the Council.

Section 1
2

(d) It follows from the fact that the function of the Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission is merely consultative, that no procedure is provided to ensure that he will have an opportunity to consult with his government prior to the taking of decisions by the Commission, or even to ensure that he or his staff are aware of contemplated decisions before they are taken, except insofar as this occurs through attendance at meetings.

3. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

(a) Meetings. The Soviet representative on the Allied Commission attends the Vice President's meetings (attended by heads of sections and sub-commissions) which are presided over by the Deputy President. For these he is permitted to be accompanied by an A.C. and an interpreter. No agendas are circulated for these meetings. Members of the Military Mission attend meetings of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission when invited to do so in connection with matters affecting Soviet interests. The Staff Officers assigned to the other Sub-Commissions have the privilege of attending Sub-Commission meetings but do not frequently do so. Prior to each meeting of the Advisory Council, an agenda is circulated, but it is not the practice to circulate prior to the meeting papers for consideration.

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(b) Documents. All documentary information relative to the work of the Commission is made available on the initiative of the Commission to the Soviet Representative. He and his staff do not see (1) unperfected copies of cypher messages and (2) matter which is likely to prejudice relations with the Soviet Government. Top Secret matter which it would be inadvisable to show to junior officers is shown only to the Soviet Representative. Soviet officers assigned to Sub-Commissions are not permitted to observe the work of Sub-Commissions other than those to which they are assigned. They are, upon request, shown documents at the discretion of the head of their Sub-Commission, but do not frequently avail themselves of this privilege.

All information affecting the Advisory Council that the delegation to it requires is made available to it on request.

(c) Information from Italian Sources. The extent to which the Soviet members of the various delegations interview personnel of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

4. MOVEMENT.

(a) Freedom of Movement.

(1) South of the line MONA - SIEN. - PIERBINO, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within Italy. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Liaison officer at Rome, and issued by Headquarters, Allied Commission.

(2) For travel north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group (Administrative Memorandum No. 55, AFHQ, 6 December 1944 now requires concurrence of JFM also) is obtained for Soviet personnel, likewise through the appropriate Liaison officer. No such visits have been made north of the line by members of Soviet delegations at Rome during the last six weeks. The Military Mission has on at least one occasion sent officers into the forward areas without US or British authority.

(3) For inter-theatre travel, including that of Soviet diplomatic couriers, authority to travel is obtained by the appropriate British or US Liaison officer at Rome from AFHQ, and travel orders are issued by HQ Allied Commission. Authority has in every case been obtained, though there have been some delays due to the filing of applications at the last minute. Such authority consists of travel orders for use within the theatre, or when US or British facilities are used. No authorization for the unit itself is required for Allied service personnel on duty, or for accredited diplomats and consular officials. (Letter, AFHQ, G 371.2/015 (MSG-0, 7 November 1944). As to travel to Italy from the Soviet Union, an Allied Force Permit for the trip, which may be issued by 30 Military Mission or the US Military Mission in Moscow with AFHQ concurrence, is now theoretically required, except as to diplomatic and consular officials (Letter AFHQ, G 371.2/011 (GSI-0, 5 January - Aug 1945) but this requirement has not yet actually been enforced.

(4) Entry of Soviet planes into the theatre requires clearance by HQ AFHQ, which, however, is immediately given as a matter of routine.

(b) TRANSPORTATION

(a) Freedom of Movement.

(1) South of the line 38°00'N. - 51°00'W. - PLOMBINO, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within IRL. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Liaison officer at POM, and issued by Headquarters, Allied Command.

(2) For travel north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group (Administrative Memorandum No. 55, HQ, 5 December 1944) now requires concurrence of JFH (also) is obtained for Soviet personnel, likewise, through the appropriate Liaison officer. Two such visits have been made north of the line by members of Soviet delegations at POM during the last six weeks. The Military Mission has on at least one occasion sent officers into the forward areas without US or British authority.

(3) For inter-theatre travel, including that of Soviet diplomatic couriers, authority to travel is obtained by the appropriate British or US Liaison officer at POM from JFH, and travel orders are issued by HQ Allied Command. Authority has in every case been obtained, though there have been some delays due to the making of applications at the last minute. Such authority consists of travel orders for use within the theatre, or when US or British facilities are used. No authorization for the exit itself is required for Allied service personnel on duty, or for accredited diplomats and consular officials. (Letter, JFH, 371.2/015 EEC-0, 7 November 1944). As to travel to Italy from the Soviet Union, an Allied Force Permit for the trip, which may be issued by 30 Military Mission or the US Military Mission in Moscow with JFH concurrence, is now theoretically required, except as to diplomatic and consular officials (Letter JFH, 371.2/011 GSI-0, 5 January - Aug 1945) but this requirement has not yet actually been enforced.

(4) Entry of Soviet planes into the theatre requires clearance by HQ JFH, which, however, is immediately given as a matter of routine.

(b) TRANSPORTATION

(1) Vehicles permanently assigned to the Soviet delegations by US and British authorities are only two in number - one for the delegation to the JFH and one for the Military Mission.

(2) The following Russian-owned vehicles are maintained:

Military Mission	4
Delegation to Advisory Council	5
Embassy	1

(3) All of the above vehicles except the Embassy vehicle receive maintenance, motor fuel and lubricants from JFH.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

K 63

(4) The Soviet Representative on the AC has the Soviet Military Mission also have the use of vehicles in the AC HQ Compound's pool.

(5) ~~Inter-communication is provided whenever requested, on the same basis as for other allied personnel.~~

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Radio. The Soviet authorities maintain a transmitter in Rome, with which they can communicate directly with MOSCOW. The Soviet delegations can send signals by US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Liaison Officer, AC, but it is only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services. US and British services are made available through the AC, but the Soviet Delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communication inside and outside the theatre.

6. SUPPLY

(a) Supply for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (1) Allied Commission: | US rations; N.M.F.I. facilities for all, PA facilities for 2. |
| (2) Advisory Council: | A British and 2 US rations; N.M.F.I. facilities for 10, PA facilities for 5. |
| (3) Military Mission: | British rations; N.M.F.I. facilities |
| (4) Embassy: | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(b) The AC has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet authorities have, however, made arrangements for their own aircraft.

7. PROPAGANDA (Revised)

(a) Official Facilities Given

RWP includes Russia in its general propaganda programme covering the United Nations. On occasions the Russians have asked RWP for special assistance and paper was given them for the publication of pamphlets celebrating the Defence of Stalingrad and Red Army Day. The Russians were also permitted to exhibit in ROME a Red Army Day documentary film. Extracts from the Tass Agency news file were included by RWP in news releases to the Italian newspapers and radio when such release was under RWP control. Since the admission of private news agencies to ROME, Tass has been permitted to supply its file to the Italian News agency and paper. The Soviet Embassy

SECRET

K 65

(4) The Soviet Representative on the AC and the Soviet Military Mission also have the use of vehicles in the AC HQ Compound's pool.

(5) ~~air transportation is provided whenever requested, on the same basis as for other personnel.~~

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Radio. The Soviet authorities maintain a transmitter in Rome, with which they can communicate directly with MOSCOW. The Soviet delegations can send signals by US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Liaison Officer, AC, but have only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter-Delivery Services. US and British services are made available through the AC, but the Soviet Delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communication inside and outside the theatre.

6. SUPPLY

(a) Supply for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (1) Allied Commission: | US rations; MAFI facilities for all, PA facilities for 2. |
| (2) Advisory Council: | 1 British and 1 US rations; MAFI facilities for 10, PA facilities for 3. |
| (3) Military Mission: | British rations; MAFI facilities |
| (4) Embassy: | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(b) The AC has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet authorities have, however, made arrangements for their own aircraft.

7. PROPAGANDA (Revised)

(a) Official Facilities Given

RWB includes Russia in its general propaganda programs covering the United Nations. On occasions the Russians have asked RWB for special assistance and refer was given them for the publication of pamphlets celebrating the Defense of Stalingrad and Red Army Day. The Russians were also permitted to exhibit in Rome a Red Army Day documentary film. Extracts from the Press Agency news file were included by RWB in news releases to the Italian newspapers and radio when such release was under RWB control. Since the admission of private news agencies to Rome, there has been permitted to supply its file to the Italian News agency and press. The Soviet Embassy

correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain contact with their families inside and outside the theatre.

6. SEVEN

(a) Special for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (1) Allied Commission: | US rations; N.M.F.I. facilities for all, PA facilities for 2. |
| (2) Advisory Council: | 1 British and 1 US rations; N.M.F.I. facilities for 10, PA facilities for 3. |
| (3) Military Mission: | British rations; N.M.F.I. facilities |
| (4) Embassy: | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(b) The J.C. has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet authorities have, however, made arrangements for their own aircraft.

7. FOUR (Revised)

(a) Official Facilities Given

P.W.B. includes Russia in its general propaganda programme covering the United Nations. On occasions the Russians have asked P.W.B. for special assistance and paper was given them for the publication of pamphlets celebrating the Defence of Stalingrad and Red Army Day. The Russians were also permitted to exhibit in HCMZ a Red Army Day documentary film. Extracts from the Tass Agency news file were included by P.W.B. in news releases to the Italian newspapers and radio when such release was under P.W.B. control. Since the admission of private news agencies to HCMZ, Tass has been permitted to supply its file to the Italian News agency and paper. The Soviet Embassy is allowed to import films for private showings to Italians.

(b) Other Russian Activities

There is little doubt that the Russians have given support, behind the scenes, to the Communist newspaper, UNITA. The Russians also distributed on one occasion moving pictures to the Italian public through a commercial agency, without previously obtaining permission from Allied authorities.

(73)

(73)

~~SECRET~~

signals by US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Liaison Officer, AC, but have only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services. US and British services are made available through the AC, but the Soviet delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communication inside and outside the theatre.

6. SUBJECTS

(a) Supply for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| (1) Allied Commissions: | US rations; M.A.P.I. facilities for all, RA facilities for 2. |
| (2) Liaison Council: | 2 British and 2 US rations; M.A.P.I. facilities for 10, RA facilities for 3. |
| (3) Military Mission: | British rations; M.A.P.I. facilities |
| (4) Embassy: | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(b) The AC has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet authorities have, however, made some importations by their own aircraft.

7. PROPAGANDA

AMENDED

Officially there are no facilities given to the Russians for dissemination of propaganda, except insofar as RUSSIA is one of the United Nations and P.R.B. therefore covers it in its propaganda. Outwardly the Russian delegates do no propaganda, but there is little doubt that they give support, behind the scenes, to the Communist newspaper UNIT. The Soviet Embassy imports Soviet film 9599 prior to showings to Italians, and these films are lent to, and shown in, Italian cinemas in Rome. The Tass Agency handles outgoing news and films some news files into Italy, although it has as yet made no application to sell news to the Italian newspapers.

8. SOVIET INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE HOME

(a) No aircraft or airforce personnel are now maintained in Italy by the Soviet Union.

(b) A part of the St. Andrews' Camp, Trianon, is under Soviet control, for repatriation of POWs.

(c) One officer is attached to the Allied Repatriation Unit, M.P.L.S.

9. EXISTING UNIT

The privileges and facilities enjoyed by the respective national components of the various Allied Commissions vary depend on some extent upon the armistice provisions establishing each Commission. For comparison, these are briefly summarized:-

(72)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

K 65

(a) The Italian armistice does not name the nations to be represented on the Commission, but simply provides for a Control Commission "representative of the United Nations" and places the commission "under orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief".

(b) The Romanian armistice provides for an "Allied Control Commission" which will undertake until the conclusion of the peace the control over the execution of the armistice terms "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers". The nations to be represented on the Commission are not named, but the fact that the armistice is signed on behalf of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the US implies the representation of all three.

(c) The Bulgarian armistice expressly provides for the participation of representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and further provides that during the whole period of the armistice the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command shall be chairman, and that until the cessation of hostilities with Germany the Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

(d) The Hungarian armistice contains the same provisions as those described in (c) above.

9508

(c) The Bulgarian Committee expressly provides for the participation of representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and further provides that during the whole period of the existence of the Committee the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command shall be chairman, and that until the cessation of hostilities with Germany the Committee shall be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

(d) The Hungarian Committee contains the same provisions as those described in (c) above.

SUS

73

SECRET

-4-

SECRET

EXTRACTTOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (E) (45) 1st Meeting
20th February, 1945

K 77

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

11. PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a memorandum summarising the facts regarding the privileges and facilities accorded to the Soviet Delegations in ITALY.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that copies of this paper should be sent to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to the American and British sections of the Allied Commissions in ROMANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONAGHAN suggested that the paper might also be sent to the military missions in MOSCOW.

MR. BARNES, referring to paragraph 7 of the paper, said that certain facilities had in fact been given to the Russians in ITALY, notably the provision of paper for leaflets.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR drew the attention to paragraph 4(a) (4) of the paper, indicating the ease with which Soviet aircraft were able to enter the Mediterranean Theatre, and compared this with the difficulties encountered by Allied aircraft endeavoring to enter ROMANIA and BULGARIA. He had previously opposed any suggestion that the Russians in ITALY should be accorded the same treatment as they accorded the Allied in the BALKANS, but if the present inconvenience in the BALKANS persisted he felt that consideration should be given to this course.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that, irritating as the treatment accorded to the Allies in the BALKANS was, he did not consider reciprocal treatment of the Russians in the Mediterranean would help matters, since the BALKAN situation was mainly due to the inherent defects of the Russian administrative system, and in particular to its great rigidity.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the amendment of paragraph 7 of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7 to take account of the propaganda facilities accorded by FWB to the Russians in Italy.

1050/00

11. PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7)

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AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR drew the attention to paragraph 4(a) (4) of the paper, indicating the ease with which Soviet aircraft were able to enter the Mediterranean Theatre, and compared this with the difficulties encountered by Allied aircraft endeavoring to enter ROMANIA and BULGARIA. He had previously opposed any suggestion that the Russians in ITALY should be accorded the same treatment as they accorded the Allied in the BALKANS, but if the present inconvenience in the BALKANS persisted he felt that consideration should be given to this course.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that, irritating as the treatment accorded to the Allies in the BALKANS was, he did not consider reciprocal treatment of the Russians in the Mediterranean would help matters, since the BALKAN situation was mainly due to the inherent defects of the Russian administrative system, and in particular to its great rigidity.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the amendment of paragraph 7 of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7 to take account of the propaganda facilities accorded by FWE to the Russians in Italy.
- (b) Took note of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7 and instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the despatch of copies (amended in accordance with (a) above) to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied missions elsewhere, as suggested by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the British Resident Minister.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 65

SAC (F) (45) 7
17th February 1945SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS
IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The attached memorandum summarizing the facts regarding the privileges and facilities accorded to the Soviet Delegations in ITALY was prepared at the request of the British Resident Minister for comparison with the treatment accorded by the local Soviet authorities to the parallel Allied Delegations in BULGARIA and ROMANIA, where considerable difficulty has been encountered.
2. It is not at present proposed to base any action on this memorandum, of which the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is merely requested to take note.

J. H. LASCELLIES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.INCL: Memo atchd, will be found
in CC File 1002-2/CC, folio #6~~SECRET~~

(71)

1050/CC

2506

SECRET

AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE

8005

10 Dec 44

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS YOUR FOX DASH SIX SIX ZERO NINE, ONE OF NINE DECEMBER PD
OUR EIGHT ZERO ZERO THREE OF TEN DECEMBER REFERS PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM ALOOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD MEMBERS OF SOVIET MISSIONS SUBJECT TO NORMAL MILITARY RESTRICTIONS
REGARDING TRAVEL WITHIN ITALY PD PROPER TRAVEL ORDERS SHOULD BE PUBLISHED IN
EVERY INSTANCE AND FOR TRAVEL INTO ARMY AREAS CONSENT OF ARMY CONCERNED SHOULD
BE OBTAINED PREVIOUS TO PUBLICATION

Internal Dist: Chief Commissioner
COS

~~SECRET~~

Liaison Div - COS

478001

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

70

1050/CC

2505

SECRET

AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE

8003

10 Dec 44

ROUTINE

SECRET PD

(66)

PARA ONE PD MAIN EIGHT ARMY HAS INFORMED ALCOM THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFHQ INSTRUCTIONS LT SORAKHIN MEMBER OF RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION IS BEING RETURNED TO ROME OFFICIALLY FOR REGULARISATION OF HIS POSITION AND HAS ASKED THAT HIS COMPANION LT MALISCHEF AT PRESENT IN ROME BE TOLD TO STAY IN ROME PD RUSSIAN MISSION HAS BEEN INFORMED ACCORDINGLY PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD SORAKHIN PROCEEDED TO EIGHT ARMY AREA BY ORDER OF HEAD OF RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION PD

PARA THREE PD HEAD OF MISSION PREVIOUSLY INSTRUCTED THAT HE MAY NOT SEND OFFICERS INTO ARMY AREA WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM ARMY PD

PARA FOUR PD BOTH RUSSIAN OFFICERS ARE EX PRISONERS OF WAR AND ARE NOT ACCREDITED MEMBERS OF RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION PD

PARA FIVE PD SUGGEST MAKING STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO HEAD RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION TO PREVENT SUCH IRREGULARITIES

Internal Dist: Chief Commissioner
COS
Political Section
DP & R S/C (Maj Simcock)

See (70)

10570/100

2504

Liaison Div - COS

478001

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

(69)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Main Eight Army

7990

10 Dec 44

ROUTINE

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS YOUR UNCLE IDLE SLANT SEVEN EIGHT THREE OF NINE
 DECEMBER PD RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION HAVE BEEN INFORMED PD
PAREN TO MAIN EIGHT ARMY FROM ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD BOTH RUSSIAN OFFICERS ARE EX PRISONERS OF WAR AND ARE NOT
 ACCREDITED MEMBERS OF RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION PD

PARA THREE PD OFFICER COMMANDING RUSSIAN MISSION PREVIOUSLY INSTRUCTED THAT
 HE MAY NOT SEND OFFICERS INTO ARMY ARE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM ARMY PD

PARA FOUR PD AFHQ IS BEING INFORMED OF THESE IRREGULARITIES PD

Info: Chief Commissioner ✓
 COS
 Political Section
 DP & R S/C (Maj Simcock)

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Liaison Div - COS

478001

RUSSIAN FILE
 NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
 CWO, USA
 Asst Adjutant

SECRET

C/3466

F-66091
DEC 09/2257ADEC 10/1010
PRIORITYAFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE: FRGEG
ALCOM

SECRET.

Information desired immediately as to any restrictions regarding travel within ITALY imposed on members of SOVIET MISSIONS including those on duty with the Allied Commission.

A.P. Dist

Action: Liaison Div ②

info: Chief-Consolidation

See ⑦⑩

P.O. S.

File

2502

~~SECRET~~

⑥⑦

SECRETUI/783
DEC 091130AC/3404
DEC 091800A
IMMEDIATEMAIN 8 ARMY
HQ AFCON

SECRET.

In accordance with AFHQ instructions Lt BORAKHIN member of Russian Military Mission being returned to ROME officially for regularization of his position. Understand his companion Lt MALISCHEF at present in ROME may be about to return to 917 Area. Request you inform Russian Mission that MALISCHEF should stay in ROME.

DintAction - Liaison Div (2)
Info - Chief Commissioner
C o S
Political Sec
File

See (68)

2501

SECRET

1270

785015

Information

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of Chief of Staff
APO 394

Ref: 6513/COS

18 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Distribution in liberated Italy of
films produced by the Soviet
Cinematographic Industries

TO : Soviet Representative, A.C.C.

1. The Commission has received an application from an Italian citizen, Dr. Giovanni de Bernardinis, for circulation permits for two automobiles to be used in connection with the distribution in Italy of films produced by the Soviet cinematographic industries.
2. Applications have also been received from Lt Commander Grishchinsky of your office for circulation permits for five automobiles, one of which was also included in the request from Dr. de Bernardinis.
3. Applications have also been received at Igls from Peter and Nadia Snolov for entrance into Italy in connection with the proposed distribution of Russian films.
4. This letter, addressed to you in thought that perhaps it has not been called to your attention that the distribution of films in liberated Italy is controlled by the Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Forces Headquarters, which supervises the dissemination of all the films and arranges for the deposit of film rentals into a special account with the Allied Control Commission.
5. The Commission will be pleased to transmit any official request which you may care to make in this regard to the authorities concerned, who I am sure will give it sympathetic consideration.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Chief of Staff

Copy to:

A.P.H.Q. - G-5 Section

(65)

FILE

Copy 2. To Chief Commissioner
for Information.

TOP SECRETTOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Liaison Division
APO 394

HQ ACC, APO 394
270 Sec Y Gen
Rec'd 21 Sept. 1950
By *ASH*

21 September 1944

SUBJECT: Russian Nationals in Italy

TO : AFHQ - G-3 Section, APO 512
Lt Col T.B. Jackson

1. Ref your letter of 16th Sept on the a/m subject.
2. Office of the Soviet Union Representative.

List of Personnel

M. Alexander BOGOMOLOV
Maj Gen A.P. VASILIEV
Sen Lt Anatoly P. MITSKEVICH
AKHOV
URAEVSKI
Boris A. KAPITANOV
Boris NOVGORODOV

Soviet Union Representative
Deputy Soviet Union Representative
ADC to Gen Vasiliev
Expert on economic questions
Secretary
Secretary - Attache
Attache

Clerical & Auxiliary Staff of S.U. Representative

I. KAPITANOVA
N. GOLJAEV
M. SAVLAKOV
A. MAKUSHEIN
V. BOLSHAKOV
M. ZIKOV
M.I. STEPANOV

- 1 -

FILES (X)

(64)

21 Sept

1-1000

2409

3. Office of Soviet Union Representative on A.C.G.+

List of Personnel

Maj Gen I.A. SUSLOPAROV
Col V.V. SAVKO
Maj N.G. LEONIDOV
Lt Col K.K. GRISHCHINSKY
Lt Col M.V. GOLUBEV
Sen Lt U.S. FILATOV
Lt ZUBKOV
Sgt GRISHIN

Soviet Representative on AOC
Deputy Representative
Assistant to Soviet Representative
AOC to Soviet Representative
1st Secretary
2nd Secretary
3rd Secretary
Driver

4. Soviet Delegates on Displaced Persons Sub-Commission AOC.

Maj Gen SUDAKOV
Maj VELOVOKOV

5. The above are the only official Russians in Italy known to this HQ, excluding those connected with the Russian Air Base at Bari.

Ranfury Capt.

LORD RANFURLY
Captain

BR/ac

2408

translation made by L.O. to A/Cc.

(PROMNELL)

"Avanti!", Socialist Party, Sunday 17 Sept. 1944

THE ROMANIAN ARMISTICE.

The Author, "Zimareas", describes the latest successes of the Russians in the Balkans as a political & military masterpiece. He goes back to the times of Roumanian indecision after the Soviet armistice terms had been made known to King Michael. "In the meantime Moscow waits. Without impatience. She does not threaten. She does not condemn the Roumanian people to a desperate fate if ~~they~~ ^{their} ~~do~~ not make up ~~the~~ mind. She knows she masters the situation; she does not need help; on the other hand, she is ready to give help. And, what matters most, she is not in a hurry; she is not looking for an immediate success to uphold her propaganda with. She has a greater interest in the actual results than in the appearances of a victory".

The Russian attitude has given Roumania the possibility of reversing her foreign policy without the inconveniences of sudden & improvised decisions, avoiding the paralysis of her economic & administrative life. This has made much easier for the Russians the prosecution of war on Roumanian soil.

"Today the Roumanian people already know their future, & they can proceed on their way without uncertainties or doubts, without any fear of the unknown.

"By not adopting the system of unconditional surrender, the Soviet Union has thrown among the rubbish of the old world also the method of secret diplomacy, the abolition of which had already been preached by Wilson 25 years ago, as a basis for a world "safe for democracy".

"Armistice conditions are truly generous. All clauses that could have sounded offensive or humiliating for the national feeling of a country driven into war by a small clique of criminals, have been avoided.

"Roumania takes at once her place side by side with the United Nations in order to continue the war. Without hesitations, without discriminations. The Armed Forces have not been compelled to surrender to the Russian commands."

The author draws a brief sketch of the mild military & territorial conditions contained in the armistice terms. He concludes:

"When we read the short text of the armistice we have the feeling that we are being transported in a different world. After so much propaganda for hatred, after so many enraged & revenger words, now we are being reminded of times of the past, when yesterday's enemy was considered as tomorrow's friend; when at the tables of diplomatic negotiations the wartime spites were forgotten, and

17 Sept

A-10

efforts ~~were~~ joined to establish the basis of future peace in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. When intelligence and human understanding prevailed in politics, and the ancient method of Brennus' sword had not been adopted once more".

8496

FILE UNDER NO. 000.1-1 COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

Cbl AFH; SIGNED P26679 bc 17 Sep 44 to ACC Stone.

Visit Soviet labor delegates to Italy approved responsibility completely ACC submit info here.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 000.1-1 LABOR

2105

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on to consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

FILE UNDER NO. 000.1-1 COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Obt ACC Store S-329 of 15 Sep 44 to AFHQ.

Soviet delegation advised Soviet labor delegates left Moscow but informed by me should not arrive Italy until authorized by SACRED.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 040 LABOR

3494

INSTRUCTIONS - Under "Synopsis" make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on a consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

FILE UNDER NO. 600.1-1 COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Capt Stone A/CO O&O of 10 Sep 44 to AFHQ G-5.

Delegation of the Soviet Trade Unions to Italy.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. O&O - LABOR

3493

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on to consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

59

FILE UNDER NO. 000.1-1 COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS

**INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS**

Ltr Vasiliev of 8 Sep 44 to Capt Stone.

Delegation of Soviet Trade Unions coming to Italy thru
invitation General Federation of Labor in Rome.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 000 - LABOR

2492

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on to consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

EWS/dfc

Acting Chief Commissioner

Incident at Piazza Farnese

Public Safety Sub-Commission
(thru: Administrative Section)

A/CC 250.

21 August

1. Reference attached letter dated 28 Aug 44 from H.E. Bonomi
relative incident at "Piazza Farnese".

2. Forwarded for acknowledgment and necessary action.

SAC Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED

1.3727 1000

Stone.

FILES

(A) 8
R. H. 1

(57)

31 Aug

000.1-1
X-250.1

TRANSLATION

THE
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS

HQ ACC. APO 394
881 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 29 Aug 1944
By _____

Rome, 26 August 1944

A 52
30 AUG 1944

Dear Admiral,

After what happened in Piazza Farnese, I sent to the Head of the Public Safety and to the Comando of the Carabinieri Corps the instructions contained in the enclosed note.

I wanted you to know.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ I. Bonomi

CAPTAIN KILERY W. STONE
Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission

R O M E

Trans. E.C.

FILES

(A-8)
100

2490

55

600.1
250.1
Sum of the Italian

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS

TO THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE P.S. &
TO THE COMANDO OF THE CARABINIERI CORPS.

What happened in front of the 'fosse Ardentine' where some people tore part of the Italian flag, is a symptom of alarming lack of discipline and of dangerous seditiousness.

While the Communist Ministers Togliatti and Cullo accompanied the Lieutenant of the Kingdom in his visit to the 'fosse Ardentine', thus ratifying the truce on which is based the political coalition which has now the power, a few fanatics tried to break the truce and to act violently.

A similar episode which took place in Piazza Farnese, during the recent popular manifestation, shows even more eloquently, that an intolerant group will not wait for the Italian people to express freely and in its own good time its judgement on the institutional form of the state, and will from now on impose by violence its own solution.

The Government, which is responsible guardian of the freedom of the country cannot but oppose these attempts to bully and to forestall its judgement.

Therefore, I draw the attention of Your Excellencies, so that should there be public demonstrations, they should be able to maintain order and discipline and to prevent any act against them.

Rome, 27 August 1944

(55) Inc 1

2489

FILE UNDER NO. 000.1 - POLITICS (COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS)

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Capt Stone 4/00 000.7 of 27 Aug 44 to Col Spofford.

Copies message filed Associated Press reporting interview
given by 2 American labor leaders, Baldemar & Antonini.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 000.7 - PENALTY & TUNING INDEX

INSTRUCTIONS - Under "Synopsis" make brief entry showing date of communication
and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these
index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on to consolidated
index sheets and then destroyed.

18th August 1944.

Executive Commissioner.

A 2258
22 AUG 1944

1. I have spoken to Colonel Poletti this morning and he has given the following information.
2. Some time ago Colonel Poletti informed Lt. Col. Pollock and Lieut. Lipcius that bands of Communists were going round the shops that were charging high prices and closing them down. The Regional Commissioner would not have any party or group taking the law into their own hands and he gave instructions that a stop must be put to these activities.
3. Lieut. Lipcius tried to make some of the junior officials take action but with no success and at last, after many attempts, he asked Fogliatti to come and see him. Fogliatti instead asked Lipcius to visit him. Eventually after being unable to see Fogliatti he ordered Fogliatti to come and see him.
4. I understand that Fogliatti did call and that Lieut. Lipcius explained to him the reason for summoning him as the other officials of the Communist Party were unable to stop the illegal action.
5. Colonel Poletti fully approved of the action taken by Lieut. Lipcius.

ATS/SC.

Major.

2487

Files AH3/4

000.1 Russian Police

Brig. Lush. Please c me

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION

17 August 1944

SUBJECT: Communist Activities in the Black Market

A 2257
22 AUG 1944

TO : Captain E. W. Stone, Acting Chief Commissioner, Hq A.C.C.

Dott. Grifone, who introduced himself as the private secretary to Togliatti, called at 6 p.m. on August 15 to say that two military police had called at Togliatti's office for the purpose of conducting him to the Black Market Control Office. They were told that Togliatti was a member of the Government and at that moment occupied in official affairs. They replied that his presence was desired at the Black Market Control Station where he should present himself before noon on the subsequent day or be apprehended by the military police. Grifone went on to say that he thought Lt. Lipsius of the Black Market Control wished to speak to Togliatti concerning illegal communist activities in the black market which Grifone inferred actually were going on. I attempted to communicate until 7 o'clock but unsuccessfully with the offices of Colonel Poletti, Colonel Polluck and Lt. Lipsius.

On the subsequent morning I reported the matter to Brigadier Lush who in turn communicated with Colonel Ames, Poletti's Deputy, to request him to investigate the matter. Later in the morning Dott. Grifone telephoned to me to say that Lt. Lipsius again was in quest of Togliatti. I thereupon telephoned to Lt. Lipsius to enquire into the matter. He said that there were illegal communist activities being carried on in the black market and that all attempts to obtain some information regarding them from minor members of the Communist Party led to no result, and to obtain the information desired he was obliged to appeal to Togliatti. He latter, however, refused either to receive Lipsius or to call upon him. Whereupon Lipsius acting, as he says, within the scope of his orders, virtually ordered Togliatti to report to him. Ultimately, he said, Togliatti agreed to call on the morning of August 16, failing which Lipsius agreed to telephone me again before taking further action. This he has not done.

Toward noon of August 16, Sig. Winspeare of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called to discuss this matter regarding Togliatti and I told him what had transpired and that I reported the entire matter to you for your information in the event that the matter was brought to his attention by the Italian Government.

/s/ W. W. Schott

/t/ WILLIAM W. SCHOTT

Vice-President, Political Section

(47) a

*File 472/28**000-1 Russian Politics*

2486

SECRET AND PERSONAL

RMS/hjp

27 JUL 1944

18 July 1944

Brigadier General T. J. Tully, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief Signal Officer
Allied Force Headquarters
APO 512

Dear General Tully:

In connection with other information already furnished you, enclosed are: copy of Notes of Meeting between Captain Stone and M. Bogdanov held on June 29th; copy of message P-39697 of June 15th; memorandum from the Soviet Representative on the Advisory Council, 8 July 1944, announcing changes and new appointments in the Soviet Representations to the Advisory Council for Italy; and copy of Proceedings of the Advisory Council in Rome, July 15, 1944.

Personal regards,

WILLIAM F. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

H B Incls.

(46)

Delivered by hand
by Col. H. H. H. 26 July '44.
H. H. H.

18 Jul 44

SECRET AND PERSONAL

000.1 Russian

2/85

files H. H. H.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

EWS/hjp

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

0513 1504
3 JUL 1944NOTES ON MEETING WITH M. BOGOMOLOV, 28 JUNE 1944

M. Bogomolov called on me at 1700 hours on 28 June, accompanied by his Naval Aide. The purpose of his visit was to discuss the agenda and procedure for the meeting of the Advisory Council for Italy scheduled to be held at 11:00 AM on Friday, June 30th, since postponed to 10:30 AM, Saturday, July 1st.

He stated that in the past it has been customary for General MacFarlane to give a resume of the political situation. He asked if a similar presentation would be made at the next meeting at which he will preside as President, and who would give it. I replied that I would deal with the subject.

He further stated that the Advisory Council desired to have a report on the economic situation and asked who would present it. I stated that Mr. Grady, Vice President of the Economic Section, would be present and deal with the subject.

He asked if I could give him any information on the strength and disposition of ships of the Yugoslav Navy. I informed him that Yugoslav Navy matters did not come under the cognizance of this Commission. He then asked if I could personally advise him how he could secure information on this subject and where such ships were likely to be based. I replied that the C-in-C Med (Admiral Cunningham) would be the appropriate authority to approach on this matter. I added that I understood that Yugoslav ships coming to Italy were based at Monopoli.

M. Bogomolov asked if there was any information as to the move of the Italian Government and the Commission to Rome. I replied that we have made vigorous representations on this matter but so far have not received any reply. He stated that personally he was in complete accord. The Government and Commission should move to Rome forthwith but he was unable to take an official position on the matter since he as yet had received no instructions from his government. He stated that if the matter was raised at the Advisory Council meeting by either Ambassador Kirk or Sir Noel Charles, he would support it unofficially and would so recommend it to his government. 2/8/44

E.W.S.

144
3 JulyFile
D
Russo per

File/Las

000.1 Russian Activities

RUSSIANS

054 1326
21 JUN 1944

LWS/lws

16 June 1944

Major General Nestor Semyonovich Solodovnik, USSR
Soviet Representative with A.C.C.

Senior Lieutenant K. Grischinski, Russian Navy
Member of Gen. Solodovnik's Staff.

(or: Grishinski)

Lieutenant Mikhail Vesilapovich Golubev
Aide to Gen. Solodovnik.

Alexander Bogomolov
Soviet Representative, Advisory Council for Italy.

Mikhail Kostilev
USSR Representative to Italy.

Andre Vyshinski (Also - Vyshynsky, Vishinski, Vishinsky)
Chairman, Russian Advisory Council for Italy.

Youdayev
Secretary to Vyshinski.

Veacheslov Molotov
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Povel Belobokec
PA to Gen. Solodovnik.

Ivan Sudakov (Major General)
Displaced Persons Sub-Commission.

Other members of the Russian Advisory Council (who arrived with Vyshinski):

Golunski
Rykunov
Belyenov
Yudayev

0001 Russian Files

2783

43

16 June

File

~~SECRET~~

1590

DCC

ACTION CG 808 NATOUSSA INFO CG PBS FOR GENERAL SUDAKOV

N23/16

D54 1323

20 JUN 1944 SECRET

SGD CG NATOUSSA

PRIORITY

F 59697

CITE/NAGAP

JUN151553B

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION WITH THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
 REPRESENTED BY MAJOR GENERAL SUDAKOV AT BARI, IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY
 INFORMED WHEN GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR CLAIMING TO BE RUSSIAN ARE RE-
 CEIVED IN CAGES AND IS TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW SUCH PRISONERS
 TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE TO BE TURNED OVER TO HIM OR NOT. GENERAL
 SUDAKOV SHOULD BE INFORMED THROUGH ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION MAPLES OR
 THROUGH NUMBER 2 DISTRICT BARI.

ACC DISTAcc Dist

Action - Super Bari 2

Info - DCC

CIB

File

Float

JUN16 0027B

~~SECRET~~

(42)

F59697

159

000.1 Incoming Postcard

2502

SECRET

1177

DSN 1194
16 JUN 1944

ACTION AAI INFO ACCRPT ACC MAIN

12/10

AFHQ

F57202

JUN091928B

SECRET
PRIORITY
CITE/NONE

(39)

NO OBJECTION TO PROPOSALS IN ACC LETTER CO/383/6 DATED 3 JUNE.
CITE PHGAB

ACC DIST

Action - Deay Gen.
Info - J. & Z -
file

JUN100155B

2481

(41)

F57202
9 June

SECRET

5th. June, 1944.

Dear Sir,

OS 1062
7 JUN 1944

Encloses the attached message.

As General Solodovnik has returned to Moscow, and as there is at present no Soviet representative with A.C.C., I should be obliged if you would have this greeting from General Alexander signalled to General Solodovnik in Moscow.

I understand miss writing that Captain Goheller is attached to ACC but I have been unable to contact him.

Yours respectfully,

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 6 June AM
Via AG m/c
Incls OFE

A.J. PERRY,
Squadron-Leader, R.A.F.,
Personal Assistant to Chief
Commissioner.

M. Bogomolov,
Soviet Representative
Advisory Council for Italy,
Villa Rivalta,
55. Via Posillipo,
NAPLES.

40

5 June

000.1 Russian Voluntas

2480

file/1000

SF 1944/14

DSB 1023
4 JUN 1944

CC 383.6

3 June 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: A.A.I.

1. Bogomolov asked me today whether he might visit the 250 prisoners claiming to be Russians recently captured on the Italian front.
2. He said that a representative of his had already apparently visited these prisoners and had satisfied himself that they were Russians.
3. Bogomolov was most anxious to contact these men, but wished to visit them informally, without their knowing that he was a Russian ambassador. He was quite satisfied that they should in the meantime continue to be treated as prisoners of war.
4. I would be glad if you would let me know what answers I should give to Bogomolov.

✓

NOEL BUCHAN MACDONALD
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

Copies to:

✓

G-5, APM
General Wilson
British Resident Minister
American Political Adviser

DSC VCC

2 JUN 1944

RECEIVED

file/100

(39)

CC 383.6

3 June

CC 383.6

TOP SECRET

1221

TOP SECRET

SF

1st. June, 1944.

ACC MAIN (GMR MACFARLANE C COMMO)

TOP SECRET

1019
4 JUN 1944

v16

GMR MACFARLANE

PROPERTY

J.F.H.C.

DOGORLOV ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON PD PAUSE IN APR. FOR 25 GMR BRITISH RESISTANCE
MINISTER AND / AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FROM AND MAIN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FARM
 HE RAISED THESE QUESTIONS PD ONE PD HE SAID THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN MUCH
 IMPRESSED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE ALLIES HAD DEALT WITH THE RAPID REPAIR OF ROAD AND
 RAIL BRIDGES DURING THEIR ADVANCE PD HE ASKED IF I COULD LET HIM HAVE STATISTICS AS TO
 THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED AND ANY TECHNICAL INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT BE OF VALUE TO SOVIET
 ENGINEERS PD I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD GIVE HIM SOME INTERESTING STATISTICS AND THAT I
 WOULD REFER THE QUESTION REGARDING THE PRODUCTION OF THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION HE
 REQUESTED PD THE PD DOGORLOV ASKED HOW HE COULD GET ABOUT PROCURING THESE SMALL SHIPS
 OF ABOUT A THOUSAND TONS WHICH HE WISHED TO EMPLOY BETWEEN ITALY AND THE PERSIAN GULF PD
 I TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REFER THIS REQUEST TO THE CINC MED PD THE PD
 DOGORLOV RAISED AGAIN A QUESTION OF OBTAINING REINFORCEMENTS FOR TITO'S ARMY FROM
 YUGOSLAV PERSONNEL IN THE ITALIAN SERVICES PD I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM
 SOLODOVNIK THAT IT HAD BEEN INTENDED TO DROP THIS QUESTION PD DOGORLOV SAID THAT THE
 HAD REPRESENTED ONLY SOLODOVNIK'S PERSONAL VIEW AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE
 REMAINED UNCHANGED PD I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

000.1 Russian Politics

TOP SECRET

file/402

11221

1 June

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1221 - 2

COULD AGREE TO GIVING UP SLAV ITALIAN SERVICE PERSONNEL UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE WAS
 BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THEM BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN CONSENT TO I INFERRED THAT IF
 HE WANTED TO BEGIN THE QUESTION IT HAD BETTER BE DONE ON GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL TO
 BOKROSLAV MENTIONED INCIDENTALLY THAT IT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT
 TO REPLACE SOLODOVNIK IN THE ACC BUT THAT HE DID NOT YET KNOW WHO THE SUCCESSOR WOULD

SE

RECEIVED
 3 JUL 1946

24
 ACC 24

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2477
 2477
 MAJL MAJON MANTARLANE
 Lieutenant-General,
 Chief Commissioner.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade.

Subject: Communist Propaganda and Declarations in French North Africa.

The recent reform in the constitution of the Soviet Union has given rise to the most lively comments and the greatest interest in official and unofficial circles of Algeria, while having great resonance in the North African press.

In communist circles the recognition of the Soviet Republics as independent states is considered to be the prelude to the incorporation in the Soviet Union of other territories among which, according to the most extreme elements, French North Africa could easily be one after some suitable adaptations.

Anyway, it is not surprising to see the great repercussions caused in this region by the announcement by the U.S.S.R. of this reform, when we consider that, at the time of previous Soviet reforms, such as the dissolution of the Comintern, the abolition of the International, the reconstitution of the Holy Synod, and a pronouncement on the part of bolshevism toward a more bourgeois in way of life, French North Africa revealed itself to be particularly adapted for the dissemination of Soviet propaganda.

Communist propaganda at the present time is pivoted around one main theme: giving reassurance to the bourgeoisie about the intentions and methods of communism. It tries to show that communism has evolved a great deal; that it is going to save western culture; that there is a close tie between communism and capitalism; that in France a moderate communism will be established, corresponding to the needs and the sentiments of the country; that Franco-Russian friendship is indispensable to the new European order.

It admits that in Russia communism has gone to extremes but it justifies this by referring to the vastness of the territory where only terror could impose obedience, and by pointing to the semi-oriental character of the majority of the Russian people. In regard to this the weekly publication, "Paris" wrote: "To understand the Russian problem, in order to adjust our post-war policy to it, is for France and for the other nations a categorical imperative. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to understand the Russian spirit which, in the course of many centuries, has taken into a worldwide way western influence, outside the influence of Roman law which shaped our civilization; outside the catholic religion which for centuries assumed the task of tempering the instincts of violence, and taught humility and resignation supreme virtues. The orthodox religion, on the other hand, found inspiration in the Eastern prophets who in these times spoke in favor of peoples' vengeance. . . . It is in these holy books that the orthodox religion, which is the basis of Russian unity, has found the first communist cry. It is here that we must seek the roots of bolshevism.

The "Nelle Murosin" published an article, "A Propon da Comissao" in which the author states that the team of engineers in the "Nelle Murosin" had

500.1 Russians

unofficial circles of Algeria, while having great resonance in the Arab African press.

In communist circles the recognition of the Soviet Republics as independent states is considered to be the prelude to the incorporation in the Soviet Union of other territories among which, according to the most extreme elements, French North Africa could easily be one after some suitable adaptation.

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Communist propaganda at the present time is pivoted around one main theme: giving reassurance to the bourgeoisie about the intentions and methods of communism. It tries to show that communism has evolved a great deal; that it is going to save western culture; that there is a close tie between communism and catholicism; that in France a moderate communism will be established, corresponding to the needs and the sentiments of the Country; that Franco-Russian friendship is indispensable to the new European order.

It admits that in Russia communism has gone to extremes but it justifies this by referring to the vastness of the territory where only terror could impose obedience, and by pointing to the semi-austatic character of the majority of the Russian people. In regard to this the weekly publication, "Paris" writes: "To understand the Russian problem, in order to adjust our post-war policy to it, is for France and for the other nations a categorical imperative. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to understand the Russian spirit which, in the course of many centuries, has taken shape outside any western influence, outside the influence of Roman law which shaped our civilization; outside the catholic religion which for centuries assumed the task of tempering the instincts of violence, and taught humility and resignation as supreme virtues. The orthodox religion, on the other hand, found inspiration in the Hebrew prophets who in these times spoke in favor of peoples' vengeance. . . . It is in these holy books that the orthodox religion, which is the basis of Russian unity, has found the first communist cry. It is here that we must seek the roots of bolshevism."

The "Petit Marocain" published an article, "A Propos du Communisme" in which the author states that the fear of communism is the result of Axis propaganda, trying to find fallacies in France, where the great and the petit bourgeoisie might consider German occupation preferable to the bolshevik terror. According to this propaganda, for the Frenchman, "the image is very vivid of a Mongolian bandit, a savage, armed with dagger and pistol, running across the world, ravaging, destroying and killing."

The same article makes clear the difference between the situation in France, which is a country of small land-owners who till the soil, one that is well advanced in industry, and that in tourist Russia, poor of individually-owned property, with a backward agriculture, and limited in industry. From such differences the article deduces that it is impossible for communism to have the same force in France that it has in Russia. After having pictured communism as the religion best adapted to the needs of France, the article points to the question of the "resistance" and states that in the Metropolis the communists fight like Frenchmen and not, like communists; "the ideal of the safety of the Fatherland and a profound patriotic sentiment come before"

political sentiment".

The clandestine paper, "L'avenir", writes that the bolshevik regime has "changed considerably in recent years, "and states that Stalin himself "realizes that if the soviet principles in their absolute form were necessary to carry out the revolution and forge a strong and disciplined country, it is necessary, in the long run, to temper such regime and apply some modifications to it". "The Marshal realizes that bolshevism, in its extreme and revolutionary form, is neither necessary nor desirable in a such a developed country as France.

The revolutionary and anarchic form of communism will hit only the countries which will come out of the war, ruined, disorganized and demoralized from defeat.

Communist propaganda attempts to show also that there is no incompatibility between communism and catholicism, and between communism and intellect alike. The weekly magazine, "Paris", states that the great forces which will both take hold of the future destiny of France are communism and the catholic movement, and anticipates that both these will be the great forces of the France of tomorrow. To the author these forces are not contrary or opposed to one another. In the first place, because of the evolution of catholicism which has many points in common with socialistic objectives, and secondly because Stalin's policy "has repudiated anti-clericalism and has restored the orthodox religion with the same rights and privileges as before". Therefore the author maintains that "it would be premature to say that it is impossible to unite the Cross of Lorraine with the hammer and sickle, Jean of Arc with Danton". He ends by saying: "From the fusion of these two tendencies of the masses, one represented by communism and the other by neo-catholicism, a French form of socialism may come forth, one that is original and humane, recalling the teachings of Fourier and Proudhon".

As regards common points between intellectualism and Communism the publishers of "Liberte" have put out two pamphlets with comments by Marcel Savage in the weekly publication, "Vie".

These are entitled "Le Communisme et L'Homme" by Etienne Fajon and "Les Droits de l'Intelligence" by Roger Gervay. Their objective is to refute the defects attributed to Communism, and state that the communists are the only elements capable of insuring the future of the intellect and of French culture. After making some criticism of the mind which, if it detaches itself from men and the soil, it will sooner or later lose itself in abstract ideas and conventionalities to become a wise hostility, foreign to the masses". Fajon refutes anti-bolshevik slanders and the slogans of "a certain primitive communism which, on the other hand, did not even evolve according to the ideas of Marx. Communism, conscious of its power, and of its mission to the spirit in a social system wherein the justice of distribution becomes a reality for all". And he adds: "The main complaint directed against us is that we want to establish a vulgar equalitarianism, to create a standard man, to stifle the originality of the individual". According to the author, a new individualism will bloom forth from socialism, which will be a stimulation and a sublimation of man, above elementary necessities. "We are told that socialism does away with the liberty of the individual; on the contrary, socialist society is the only society which can

Communist propaganda attempts to show also that there is no incompatibility between communism and catholicism, and between communism and intellectualism. The weekly magazine, "Paris", states that the great forces which will both take hold of the future destiny of France are communism and the catholic movement, and estimates that both these will be the great forces of the France of tomorrow. To the author these forces are not contrary or opposed to one another. In the first place, because of the evolution of catholicism which has many points in common with socialistic objectives, and secondly because Stalin's policy "has repudiated anti-clericalism and has restored the orthodox religion with the same rights and privileges as before". Therefore the author maintains that "it would be premature to say that it is impossible to unite the Cross of Lorraine with the hammer and sickle, Jean of Arc with Danton". He ends by saying: "From the fusion of these two tendencies of the masses, one represented by communism and the other by neo-catholicism, a French form of socialism may come forth, one that is original and humane, recalling the teachings of Fourier and Proudhon".

As regards common points between intellectualism and communism the publishers of "Liberte" have put out two pamphlets with comments by Marcel Saragat in the weekly publication, "Tige".

These are entitled "Le Communisme et l'Intelligence" by Etienne Fajon and "Les Droits de l'Intelligence" by Roger Gerveny. Their objective is to refute the defects attributed to Communism, and state that the communists are the only elements capable of insuring the future of the intellect and of French culture. After making some criticisms of the mind which, if it attaches itself from man and the soil, it will sooner or later lose itself in abstract ideas and conventionalities to become a mere hostility, foreign to the senses". To an author anti-bolshevik slanders and the slogans of "a certain primitive communism which, on the other hand, did not even correspond to the ideas of Marx. Communism, enemies of its power, and 2175 evolving according to some well-defined biological laws, returns some rights of movement to the spirit in a social system wherein the justice of distribution becomes a reality for all". And he adds: "The main complaint directed against us is that we want to establish a vulgar equalitarianism, to create a stunted man, to stifle the originality of the individual". According to the author, a new individualism will bloom forth from Socialism, which will be a stimulation and a sublimation of man, above elementary necessities. "We are told that socialism does away with the liberty of the individual, on the contrary, socialist society is the only society which can guarantee such liberty. Indeed, freedom exists only where the material security of the individual is assured, and consequently where there is no economic exploitation of individuals by other individuals. That feeling of liberty can then be in a man who fears every day the loss of his job? Fajon at the same time tries to eliminate the fear that can be caused by an authoritarian, expansive and oppressive socialization. "To us communists the thought of man, his happiness, his liberty, his future, demands that we go further than that state where man does not yet control the forces created with his labor and his ideas. . . . In front of this immense world our economic and social ideal is that of a France where small property (that which is the fruit of personal labor) will be respected, but where the main means of production will return to the Nation, where the exploitation of man will, as a result, come to an end". On these basis and these conditions the author finds common grounds between communism, intellectualism and individualism.

Another apparent contradiction between nationalism, patriotism and communism is refuted too. On this subject the Communist Party, in a report on the resistance in France, points out that the number of dead reaches 15,000. "Such a figure gives irrefutable testimony to the fact that in the French communist the patriot comes before the political follower and that consequently, this same spirit will one day permit French communism to be a conservative one, without permitting dangerous deviations". It is known fact how the Communist Party looks to the resistance in the Metropolis, since it sees in such a movement the army of tomorrow that will impose its own ideas on France.

Faced with such state of affairs, if we admit that communism has made great progress in Russia, that it recognizes religious freedom, that it will give back to French culture and intelligence all its lustre, that French communists are patriots above all, and place the interest of the Fatherland above those of the Party, that communism does not intend to abolish property but simply limit it to fixed proportions, that communism does not intend to impose an equalitarian conception of life but a just scale of individual values, that communism does not intend to have all the economic activity absorbed by collectivism, but only a part, and especially the heavy industries which are financed by anonymous capital, then the conclusion of Andre Marty, who directs the communist political activity in North Africa seems to be justified. He pronounced it during a great meeting held in Algiers; namely, that it is necessary that all fears and prejudices regarding communism disappear completely. In this regard an article in the weekly publication "Vendredi" is interesting. The article comments on a meeting held in Casablanca and in which spoke various communist orators, among which were Green, Grenier, Sultan, etc. "In all these speeches" the author says, "there was no doctrinaire sectarianism, but on the contrary, a deep desire for solidarity."

Moreover, there is no Frenchman who could not subscribe to the limited and immediate program outlined by the representatives of the Communist Party: As regards the struggle, they demand the intensification of the war effort; as regards domestic policy, they insist with insistence the speed up of the operation movement; as regards the social field, they show courageously the strongest hostility toward the trust and international financial forces which are responsible for our national misfortune". And further on: "The public is assured when it is assured that the leadership of the U.S.S.R. is a great gentleman, with distinction and finesse, that the officials of the Soviet Navy, at present in North Africa, are perfect gentlemen. And we arrive at this conclusion: political terminology needs very much to be revised and clarified, if for no other reason than for the constitution of future alerting colleges".

2157
This revision of the communist concept from the point of view of the domestic policy has a direct effect on the foreign policy. "We must learn toward the U.S.S.R. and seek its friendship, its support, its alliance" says the communist deputy, Florimond Rute. "In Leningrad, deputy to the Lorraine Consultative Assembly, said: "France must not repudiate the glorious Russian people, nor his flag or his national anthem. . . There is no doubt that if, thanks the Russian victory and to the revolution of the peoples of our continent, cynicism will invade Europe, it will be necessary for France, automatically, to turn Russian Communist to be Soviet too. If it will be

French communists are particularly interested in the fact that communism does not intend to limit the property but simply limit it to fixed proportions, that communism does not intend to impose an equalitarian conception of life but a just scale of individual values, that communism does not intend to have all the economic activity absorbed by collectivization, but only a part, and especially the heavy industries which are financed by anonymous capital, then the conclusion of Andre Marty, who directs the communist political activity in North Africa seems to be justified. No pronounced it during a great meeting held in Algiers, namely, that it is necessary that all fears and prejudices regarding communism disappear completely. In this regard an article in the weekly publication "L'Unité" is interesting. The article comments on a meeting held in Casablanca and in which spoke various communist orators, among which were Guesst, Grenier, Sultan, etc. "In all these speeches" the author says, there was no doctrinaire sectarianism, but on the contrary, a deep desire for solidarity.

Moreover, there is no Frenchman who could not subscribe to the limited and immediate program outlined by the representatives of the Communist Party: to renounce the struggle, they demand the intensification of the war effort; to renounce domestic policy, they want with impetuosity the speed up of the operation movements; to renounce the social field, they show congenitally the strongest hostility toward the trust and international financial forces which are responsible for our national misfortunes. And further on: "The public is amazed when it is assured that the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. is a great gentleman, with distinction and finesse, that the officials of the Soviet Navy, at present in North Africa, are perfect gentlemen. And we arrive at this conclusion: political terminology needs very much to be revised and clarified, if for no other reason than for the constitution of future electing colleges".

2151
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One of the most interesting questions to be clarified is the position of the Communist Party toward De Gaulle and the French Committee of National Liberation. The negotiations between De Gaulle and the Communist Party, in view of a participation in the C.F.L.N., go back as far as August of last year. At that time De Gaulle offered the Communists a portfolio considered of small importance; that of Production. The communists then presented a program of action which should have been executed by that Ministry and which included: the complete revision of the functions of the Commissariat of Production; granting full powers to the Commissariat; total fusion of the incomes of all the territories of the Empire; abolition of persons under sanctions, pure and simple confiscation of property belonging to persons under sanctions, (forced residence, internments or prisons); confiscation of all property of persons and societies which have collaborated with the enemy, confiscation of all concerns and lands of those who hampered production; organization of work and farm labor under the control of central syndicate bodies; organization of enterprises of production committees elected by the workers, clerks and technicians. As it appears clearly, this program attributed very high importance to a Ministry the functions of which were normally secondary, and it is not improbable that it contributed to the ceasing at that moment of the negotiations for bringing the Communists at Party into the Government. Later, during the first days of November 1943, when De Gaulle reorganized the French Committee of National Liberation, the communists were not invited, at first, to form part of the new government, but De Gaulle launched publicly such state of affairs and expressed the hope that the question of whether the communists would be accepted might soon be solved. On November 16th, the Communist Party, in fact informed that, following De Gaulle's wishes, it had intended the following members to form part of the C.F.L.N.: Lucien Mical, deputy of the Seine & Oise, for the Commissariat of Industrial Production; Blaise Fajon, for that of Public Hygiene and Sport. This proposal was not answered, however, and the Government made no further allusions to communist participation, nor gave any explanations. The communists, in return, widely publicized what had happened both during the meeting held at Algiers on 14th, December and in the Press Conference of 26th November.

In both these meetings a letter from De Gaulle to the Communist Party, dated 8th November, was made public. In the letter he made proposals to the Communists to take part in the Government, adding that he would himself adhere to and realize the various points of the communist program (maximum effort for the war, rapid punishment of all traitors, advanced democratic and social policy, unity of all Frenchmen, solution to the legitimate revenge of both the European and Moslem peoples, strengthening of France's position in the block of the United Nations. The Communist Party in reply to this better proposed, we have said above, the names of Mical and Fajon.

The reason that these men were not, in spite of this, made to take part in the French Committee of National Liberation is to be found, on one hand, in the fact that De Gaulle, impressed by the deadly and increasing influence of the Communist Party, himself red the two designated men to enter the C.F.L.N. and on the other hand, in the fact that the Communists, not greatly encouraged by the positions offered them, decided to renounce it and wait for better results. The Communist Party in fact, faithful to its tactics, does not wish to weaken itself by going into the Government until it succeeds in

pure and simple (forced resistance, intermediates or political); contribution of persons and societies which have collaborated with the enemy; organization of all congresses and lands of those who hampered production; organization of work and farm labor under the control of central committees; bodies, clerks and technicians of enterprises of production elected by the workers, clerks and technicians. As it appears clearly, this program attributed very high importance to a Ministry the functions of which were normally secondary, and it is not impossible that it contributed to the coming at that moment of the negotiations for bringing the Communists into the Government. Later, during the first days of November 1943, when De Gaulle recognized the French Committee of National Liberation, the communists were not invited, at first, to form part of the new Government, but De Gaulle lamented publicly such state of affairs and expressed the hope that the question of whether the communists would be accepted might soon be solved. On November 16th, the Communist Party, in fact informed that, following De Gaulle's wishes, it had intended the following members to form part of the C.F.N.L.: Lucien Kidel, deputy of the Seine & Oise, for the Commissariat of Industrial Production; Abraham Fajon, for that of Public Hygiene and Sport. This proposal was not answered, however, and the Government made no further allusion to communist participation, nor gave any explanations. The communists, in return, widely publicized what had happened both during the meeting held at Algiers on 14th, December and in the Press Conference of 26th November.

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The reason that these men were not, in spite of this, made to take part in the French Committee of National Liberation is to be found, on one hand, in the fact that De Gaulle, impressed by the seeds and increasing influence of the Communist Party, hindered the two designated men to enter the C.F.N.L., and on the other hand, in the fact that the Communists, not greatly encouraged by the positions offered them, decided to renounce it and wait for better results. The Communist Party in fact, faithful to its tactics, does not wish to weaken itself by going into the Government until it succeeds in gaining power. It prefers meanwhile to dedicate itself to the more profitable and fertile activity of political propaganda.

By ending this survey of communist activities in French North Africa it will be interesting to list the points of the communist program that have already been realized or are about to be realized. They are the following: abrogation of the laws made before the armistice and, consequently, the official recognition of communist activities in French North Africa (March 1943); the coming to Algiers of elements of the Popular Front, who accompanied De Gaulle; designation of general Giroud who on June 1 was elected to president of the C.F.N.L.; in August was charged with the command of the Army; in November was expelled altogether from the C.F.N.L. and confined to the military command; recognition of the Committee on the part of the Allies who were pressed to do so by Russia (as it is known the recognition by the U.S.S.R. was much wider than that of the Allies); appointment of the Russian

representatives in the P.S.M.L. participation of Russia in the Mediterranean Commission, today the Consultative Council for Italy; reorganization of the Communist Party and arrival of Marty to direct its political activities; participation of the communists in the Consultative Assembly; stimulus given by these individuals to the purge of those who had collaborated with Vichy, and neutral devalourment and conquests of the Communist Party, such as Portovenet, Etieri, Buzgaret, Pashan and Flandin.

The whole communist activity in French North Africa allows us to foresee that the Algiers Government or that of Praside of tomorrow cannot but take serious account of this movement which has great vitality and initiative.

Notes After this report was sent, a communication informed us of the admission into the Algiers Committee of the two Communists, Francois Billoux, as "State Commissioner", and Fernand Grenier as "Air Commissioner", the official communique of the Communist Party declared that "the admission of two communists in the Committee of Liberation gives more vigor to the movement to function in the name of France". The two new Commissioners also have declared that "everything must be subordinated to the war effort".

2472

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2172

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INFORMATION DIVISION

DSB 929
25 MAY 1944

2118/INFO
23 May 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Property, SALERNO

TO : Deputy Executive Commissioner

In reference to the requisitioning of properties at Salerno for the Soviet Representative the u/m report is submitted, as requested.

1. (i) The TORTORELLA property would appear to be suitable and the easiest to requisition.
(ii) One observation - there are no windows or doors.
(iii) This villa is at present occupied by the CRE as HQ, Officers and ORs messes and billets.
2. (i) The properties Nos 30 34 38 40 and 42 Via Pio would no doubt be equally suitable.
(ii) The windows and doors do exist in these villas.
(iii) All properties are at present occupied by civilians with one exception - No 30 is the HQ of the EFI. No. 40 is the best building and well appointed - it is understood that Colonel DENSMORE and Capt. DRAGE of ACC are billeted at this Villa.
(iv) It would seem that quite a problem would arise to find alternative accommodation and carry out the removal of the families in occupation.
3. (i) It is suggested that it would be easier to find alternative accommodation for the CRE.
(ii) Capt. DRAGE is in a strong liaison position with the Town Major (Major HEWITT) and with the Sub Area HQ and it is suggested that it is quite possible that he may be able to obtain agreement, if desired.

F. E. GILLET
Capt. 5 Innis D.G.
Deputy Director,
Information Division

Copy to Capt. Drage.

(36)

2118/INFO

23 May

(COPY)

no more letters from

2171

TOP SECRET

M205

18 MAY 1944

GEN MACFARLANE (CHIEF COMS)

V. 16

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

A.F.H.Q.

111

5 F

DSH 880
20 MAG 1944

M 2 0 4

AFTER THE MEETING REPORTED IN MY MESSAGE M TWO ZERO FOUR BADOGLIO SPOKE TO ME PRIVATELY PD PAREN TO ASK FOR MGS BRITISH MINISTER RESIDENT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FROM SOC MAIN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN HE TOLD ME THAT BOGOMOLOV AND KOSTILIEV HAD BEEN HIM THIS MORNING PD AFTER CONGRATULATING BADOGLIO ON THE WAY IN WHICH HIS NEW GOVERNMENT WAS PULLING TOGETHER BOGOMOLOV ASKED FOR THE EARLY PROVISION OF A RESIDENCE FOR KOSTILIEV IN SAIERNO AND ADDED THAT HIS RUSSIAN STAFF WOULD TOTAL TWENTY PERSONS PD BOGOMOLOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TOLLATPI THAT BADOGLIO HAD SPOKEN TO AMBASSADORS KIRK AND CHARLES ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLIES DOING SOMETHING TO IMPROVE THE POSITION OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO ENABLE IT TO SUPPORT THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT MORE EFFECTIVELY PD BOGOMOLOV TOLD BADOGLIO THAT HE WAS IN COMPLETE SYMPATHY WITH BADOGLIO'S REQUEST AND THAT HE HAD TRANSMITTED AND STRONGLY RECOMMENDED IT TO MOSCOW

000.1 Russian letter

2/70

✓ ✓ file/po

RECEIVED

35-20 MAG 1944

GACC

NOAL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

TOP

SECRET

TRANSLATION

Salerno, 8 May 1944

CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT

Dear General:

The pressing exigencies relative to an adequate arrangement of the State Departments and the agencies which must be in contact with the Royal Government induce me to bring to your attention personally the necessity to depend upon a better understanding on the part of the Allied Authorities in the matter of occupying public and private buildings in Salerno.

Salerno and the surrounding communes last January had very little to offer in the matter of lodging and my Government has met with many difficulties in setting up the offices of the various Ministries with serious sacrifices for the functionaries and for the people of Salerno.

The city is now literally overcrowded and I must appeal to your kindness to obtain the collaboration of the English Armed Forces to render available in Salerno a modest villa and two small adjacent buildings.

The Representative of the U.R.S.S., Mr. Kostylev, has in fact informed me that it is the desire of his government that the soviet representatives in Italy reside in Salerno, at least as long as the city shall remain the seat of the Italian Administration.

From a survey made of the buildings which might serve the purpose, it appears that the only ones which meet with the requirements are the three properties owned by Tortorella located at Via Donato Scarna.

However, at the present time, they are occupied by British units. In particular, the largest of these is being used by the Third A.C.C. Command while in the other two there are lodged groups of Palestinian drivers.

In view of the impossibility to find in Salerno any other building which could be used for the purpose and whose proprietor is in position to effect restoration and repair, I beg of you to ask the English Command of the troops who are presently occupying the buildings in question to offer their kind collaboration in order to permit my Government to fulfill the desire expressed by the Government of the U.R.S.S. placing the buildings in question at the disposal of the representative of Soviet Russia.

I would be grateful to you, dear General, if you would kindly reply promptly as to your decision in the matter which I hope will be favorable, certain of your understanding.

I take this occasion, dear General, to renew the expression of my high esteem.

/s/ Badoglio

Lieutenant General
Sir Noel F. N. Mason MacFarlane
Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission
NAPLES

34

8 May

✓ file 798

000-1 Rm 1000

SECRET AND PERSONAL

m/rj

DSH 763
9 MAY 1944

SF

Ref. CC/6/270.

7th. May, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: General N.S. Solodovnik, USSR,
Soviet Representative to A.C.C..

- (30) (32)
1. I have made enquiries regarding the allegation that Russian units had appeared fighting for the Germans on the Italian front.
 2. It appears that we have recently taken a few prisoners of war and deserters from certain German infantry units who claim to be Russians.
 3. The Commander-in-Chief has asked for instructions whether these individuals should be treated in any way differently from other German soldiers. Pending a reply they are being dealt with in the same way as other German prisoners of war and deserters.

0001 Russian

✓

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

2/28/44

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fulg...

(33)

CC/6/270

7 May

COPY

SECRET

DSR 762
9 MAY 1944Headquarters,
A.A.I.

AAL/EGS(I)/DO

5 May 44

My dear General,

In reply to your letter No. CC/P/260 dated 3 May '44 the matter has been referred to the C. in C. who has decided that General Solodovnik should be told that we have recently had a few prisoners of war and deserter from certain German infantry units who claim to be Russians.

We have asked for instructions whether these individuals are to be treated in any way different from other German soldiers. Pending a reply they are being dealt with in the same way as other German prisoners of war and deserters.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Terence Airey

Lieut-General Sir F. Noel Mason MacFarlane, KCB, DSO, MC.
Chief Commissioner,
H.Q. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

000.1 Russian

2487

(32)

AAL/EGS(I)/DO
5 May

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

FHM/rj

DSM 773
9 MAY 1944Ref. CG/P/260.

3rd. May, 1944.

General Golodovnik has asked me if he could visit G2., A.A.I. to obtain information regarding a report which he had received regarding the presence of Russian units employed by the Germans on our 8th. Army front. I gather that this information got to him through P.W.B..

2. I told him that I could not permit him to bother your G.2. Section but that I would find out for him any information on the subject that may be available.

3. I would be grateful if you could let me know in as much detail as you think fit for communication to Golodovnik what substance there is in the report in question.

Brigadier T. Airey,
D. H. I.,
Headquarters, A.A.I..

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

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MAY 10 1944
D2G ACC

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(31)

CG/P/260

3 May

ACC M 181

SF 154692
2 MAG 1944

ACC MAIN (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

APRIL 29, 1944

SECRET

ROUTINE

CACCIA

FREEDOM

GENERAL SOLODOVNIK TELLS ME THAT AS A RESULT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO BARI AND OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE RUSSIAN MISSION WITH TITO HE HIMSELF WAS GOING TO RECOMMEND STRONGLY TO BOGOMOLOV THAT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING ITALIAN SOLDIERS OF SLAV ORIGIN FROM THE ITALIAN FORCES FOR SERVICE WITH THE PARTISANS SHOULD BE DROPPED PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM ACC MAIN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL REFERENCE MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION MEMORANDUM ZERO NINE ONE POINT SEVEN ONE ONE PAREN YUGOSLAVIA ENPAREN OF TWO ZERO APRIL PAREN THE REASON THAT HE GAVE WAS THAT THE PARTISANS NEEDED STORES AND EQUIPMENT BUT NOT REINFORCEMENTS OF MAN POWER PARA MEANWHILE THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ADVISORY COUNCIL HAS ALSO INFORMALLY RAISED THE QUESTION WITH ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PD IF HE PERSUAS THE MATTER I SHALL RECOMMEND THAT HE BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL

(30)

M 181

29 Apr

file/2000 ✓

MORRISON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

FHM/rj

OS 8 679
1 MAG 1944

SF

Ref. CG/G/242.

28th. April, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
(ATTENTION: Chief of Staff)

26

1. Your unnumbered memorandum of 23rd. April, subject - Disposal of Italian War Materials.
2. I have communicated the reply of the S.A.C. to General Solodovnik in accordance with Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of your above quoted memorandum.
3. I have made it clear to Solodovnik that the S.A.C. does not propose to discuss the question with the Russian representatives in Algiers.

NORL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

2/18/44

222.1 Political - Russian

file/1000

29

cc/G/242

28 Apr

SECRET

PMB/rj

DS 4 678
1 AUG 1944

Ref. CC/G/240

28th. April, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Major-General H.B. Solodovnik, USSR,
Soviet Representative with A.C.C..

1. Reference the question of the disposal of captured Italian army war material.
2. I have now been instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander to communicate his reply direct to you.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander asks me to inform you as follows,
 - (a) Article 11 of the Additional Conditions of Armistice entitles the Allied Commander-in-Chief to make such use of this war material as he thinks fit so long as hostilities continue, and it is only the ultimate disposal of the material, or of what remains of it, which is left for final decision by the United Nations. There is, therefore, no need for the Commander-in-Chief to consult the Allied Control Commission before using the material.
 - (b) In accordance with Article 38 the Allied Commander-in-Chief will act through the Commission, or through such officers or representative, or directly as he may find most convenient.
 - (c) All material in the hands of the Italian authorities at the time of the Armistice was assigned by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Italian army for its use, with the exception of some material found in Corsica which was made available to the French units located there for their use in maintaining the security of the Island.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

28

CC/G/240

28 Apr

000.1 Petition - Russian

SECRET

PMB/rj

SF: 677
11 MAR 1944Ref. CC/G/239

28th. April. 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Political Section, A.C.C..

1. I hinted to Golodovnik today that if the Russians wished to pursue the question of getting reinforcements for Tito from the Italian services it might be helpful in getting some ruling on the subject if they raised the matter at an early meeting of the Advisory Council.
2. Golodovnik told me that as a result of his recent visit to Bari, and also as a result of the experiences of the Russian Mission with Tito, he himself was going to recommend strongly to M. Bogomolov that the whole question should be dropped.

Comment. Almost too good to be true.

Please put up draft
signal to AFHQ. I think
they should know.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

(27)

CC/G/239

28 Apr

200.1
PMB/rj

2/82

file/270

DSB
29 APR 1944ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

23 April 1944

SUBJECT: Disposal of Italian War Materials.

TO: Allied Control Commission,
(Attention: Chief Commissioner).

1. Attention is drawn to your Memorandum of 6 April 1944, Ref. CC/C/180, on the above subject, with the note of the Soviet Member of the Allied Control Commission enclosed, and to your further Memorandum of 13 April.

2. It has been decided upon consideration that the reply of the Supreme Allied Commander should be communicated by you direct to General Solodovnik. It is not considered appropriate to discuss the question either with M. Bogdanov or with General Vasiliev.

3. Although you refer in the second paragraph of your Memorandum of April 13th to "captured Italian Army war material" it is supposed that General Solodovnik was referring in both cases to the Italian war material of which the Italian Government were required to furnish lists to the Allied authorities under Article 11 of the Additional Conditions of Armistice. You should point out to General Solodovnik that the Article entitles the Allied Commander-in-Chief to make such use of this war material as he thinks fit so long as hostilities continue and that it is only the ultimate disposal of the material, or of what remains of it, which is left for final decision by the United Nations. There is, therefore, no need for the Commander-in-Chief to consult the Allied Control Commission before using the material, as suggested by General Solodovnik.

4. The provision in Article 38 to the effect that the Allied Commander-in-Chief shall be taken to include the Allied Control Commission and such other officers and representative as he may designate is construed at this Headquarters as contemplating that the Allied Commander-in-Chief will act through the Commission, or through such officers or representative, or directly, as he may find most convenient.

5. You may, however, inform General Solodovnik in case his Government should be interested, that the Supreme Allied Commander did in fact direct that all material in the hands of the Italian authorities at the time of the Armistice should be assigned to the Italian Army for its use, with the exception of some material found

000.1
Politics - Economic

26

23 Apr.

file/200

-2-

in Corsica which was made available to the French units located there for their use in maintaining the security of the island.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

J.A.H. GAMBOLL
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

3/60

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M151

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COLON)

15th. April. 1944.

~~TOP SECRET~~

v16

URGENT

GEN MACFARLANE

FURZON

I SAW BADOGLIO IN PRIVATE THIS MORNING PD PAHEN TO AFHQ FOR EYES ONLY OF GENERAL WILSON
CHAS MAGNILLAN AND MURPHY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I ASKED HIM IF THERE
 WAS ANY TRUTH IN THE REPORT WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED THAT THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES HERE
 HAD APPROACHED HIM ON THE QUESTION OF GRANTING ITALY ALLIED STATUS PD HE ASSURED ME ON
 HIS WORD OF HONOUR THAT THERE WAS NO VESTIGE OF TRUTH IN THE REPORT AND PROMISED ME
 AGAIN CATEGORICALLY THAT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE TO ME AT ONCE ANY PROPOSAL OF ANY SORT
 MADE TO HIM BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTING ME

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.4(a) 220 5101 or (2)
 BY *[Signature]* DATE *4/17/24*

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General
 Chief Commissioner

(25)

15 Apr

2459

TOP SECRET

FATIMA 1049

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

13th. April. 1944.

TOP SECRET

116

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

FIREDOOM

DURING LONG TALK WITH BOGDANOV THIS MORNING HE DISPLAYED GREAT INTEREST IN THE PARTY OF ACTION PD PARIS TO APPEAL FOR GENERAL WILSON ONA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAPER ON THE WHOLE HE SEEMS TO CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE TOO LITTLE INFLUENCE AND BACKING TO AFFECT THE PRESENT SITUATION APPRECIABLY IN SPITE OF THEIR INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE PD HE IS HOWEVER CONSIDERABLY IMPRESSED BY THE PARTY'S CONNECTION WITH THE FRENCH PD PARA TWO PD BOGDANOV MADE A GREAT POINT OF THE URGENT NECESSITY FOR INVOLVING THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND ARMY WITH THE WILL TO FIGHT PD THIS WAS A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TASK IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY THAN IN THE COMPARATIVELY SMALL AND SELF-CONTAINED NAVY AND AIR FORCE PD IF COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY GIVING THE COUNTRY A REPRESENTATIVE COALITION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT PD PARA THREE PD BOGDANOV STARTED TO MAKE ENQUIRIES ABOUT OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE KING BUT HE DESISTED AS SOON AS HE REALIZED THAT I WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION PD PARA FOUR PD IN THE COURSE OF A LONG DISCUSSION IN WHICH HE TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS WHY FOREIGNERS IN RUSSIA WERE TREATED WITH SO MUCH SUSPICION HE VOICED VERY PROPER SENTIMENTS REGARDING THE NECESSITY FOR POSTERIOR COLLABORATION AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN RUSSIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES PD HE STATED THAT "WE MUST COME TO

24

13 April

FATIMA M249 - 2

DESTROY NATIONAL SOCIALISM AS HITLER'S DOCTRINE DESTROYED FAMILY LIFE AND RELIGION

2157

(24)

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOEL MARION MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

SECRET

TINA 3205

131745

FATIMA

13 APRIL 1944

SECRET

25

PRIORITY

CACCIA

FREEDOM

THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THE PRESS STORY REFERRED TO IN YOUR FOX
THREE ONE THREE FOUR SEVEN APRIL ONE TWO PD PARA TO AFHQ FROM
FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION PARA
ITALIAN
OFFICIAL STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINKS IS BEING ISSUED TO THE
PRESS FOR PUBLICATION IN TOMORROW MORNING'S NEWSPAPERS PARA BEGINE
REPORTS IN PRESS HAVE STATED THAT AN AGREEMENT FOR MILITARY AND
POLITICAL COOPERATION HAS ALLEGEDLY BEEN NEGOTIATED BETWEEN MARSHAL
TITO AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PARA THERE IS NO FOUNDATION TO THIS
STATEMENT WHATSOEVER PARA AS IS WELL KNOWN THE TRUTH IS THAT ONE
ITALIAN DIVISION IS FIGHTING DAUNTLESSLY BY THE SIDE OF MARSHAL
TITO'S TROOPS AGAINST THE GERMAN ENDS

2456

L. T. MONTANT JR
2nd Lieutenant AGD
Acting Adjutant

SECRET

2/13
SECRET
PRIORITY
FREEDOM 33D CINC
FATIMA REPEATED HQ NAAP

AFM120030
" 121910B
F31320
FHMIS

10
YOUR MESSAGE 1519 OF 22 MARCH WAS REPORTED TO COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF WITH REQUEST FOR THEIR INSTRUCTIONS. PARA. REPLY FROM COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF NOW RECEIVED AS FOLLOWS: CONFIRM YOUR ACTION IN
DIRECTING GENERAL MAGPARLANE TO INFORM MARSHALL BADOGLIO THAT ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION WITH FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT, NEUTRAL OR ALLIED, WITHOUT CONSENT OF SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER, MTO, WHICH SHOULD BE SOUGHT THROUGH ALLIED CONTROL
COMMISSION

C.P.

DCC

2155

SECRET

24
F31320

12 ap

SECRET

7154
Rep CC.

H 5/13
SECRET
PRIORITY
PRIORITY SIGNED CINC
PAYMA REPEATED HQ MSG

APRIL 13/0128
APRIL 12/1957
7-31347
PRIORITY

REUTERS IS CIRCULATING REPORT FROM THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH CORRESPONDENT AT GENEVA THAT MADOLIO AND TITOS FOREIGN MINISTERS, SMOLENA, HAVE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL COOPERATION, PROVIDING AMONG OTHER THINGS: PARA. RECOGNITION BY MADOLIO OF TITOS ORGANIZATION AS DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA, WITH EXCHANGE OF REPRESENTATIVES; PARA. PROMISE TO TITOS DISPOSAL OF ITALIAN TROOPS FIGHTING WITH PARTISANS IN YUGOSLAVIA; PARA. ITALIAN RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS TO DALMATIA, INCLUDING PORT OF PLOCE; PARA. RENUNCIATION BY BOTH COUNTRIES OF "STRATEGICAL FRONTIERS", WITH ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS TO BE DECIDED AFTER THE WAR ON THE BASIS OF FREE PLURALITIES OF SURVEY POPULATION, THE QUESTION OF TRIESTE SPECIFICALLY REMAINING IN AWEYANCE UNTIL END OF THE WAR. PARA. REPORT MENTIONS SEVERAL OTHER SECRETCLAUSES PERTAINING TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA IN EVENT OF ALLIED LANDING IN BALCAN. PARA. THIS REPORT HAS BEEN KEPT OFF BBC AND UNITED NATIONS RADIO HERE, BUT GERMAN RADIO IS MAKING MUCH OF IT WITH ABBEY PROPAGANDA LINKING SUCH AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET DESIRES. PARA. IN VIEW OF INSTRUCTIONS, APPROVED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF (SEE OCM F 31320), THAT MADOLIO SHALL MAKE NO FOREIGN AGREEMENTS WITHOUT MY APPROVAL, PLEASE INVESTIGATE AND REPORT WHETHER THERE IS ANY BASIS IN FACT FOR THIS REPORTED AGREEMENT. PARA. IF THERE IS NOTHING TO IT CAN YOU MAY IN YOUR DISCRETION REQUEST MADOLIO TO ISSUE PUBLIC DENIAL

SECRET

ADD DIST

action - Secy Gen
INFO - D. CC
- POL Sec.
- CABR
FILE
FLOAT

24
F-31347
12/7/57

Ref. CC/G/123

Capt. Stone
SECRET

FMH/rj

13th. April, 1944.

MEMORANDUM,

To: Allied Force Headquarters.
(ATTENTION: Chief of Staff)

Reference my No. CC/G/180 of 6th. April.

1. General Solodovnik spoke to me about this question yesterday.
2. He told me that he had had instructions from the Soviet Government to find out from the Allied Commander-in-Chief through me how it was that the Soviet Government were not consulted regarding the allocation of captured Italian army war material and what were the reasons for the decisions taken regarding the distribution of this war material.
3. I told him that I had nothing to add to my previous remarks which you will find in Para. 3. of my above quoted memorandum.
4. I told Solodovnik that as his request emanated from his Government I would pass it in due course to the Commander-in-Chief.
5. If you think fit to pursue this question I suggest that it were better handled at A.F.H.Q. between you and either Bogomolov or General Vasiliev.

2453
NOEL MAISON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

C, O, P, X
SECRET*Capt. Stone*

Ref. CC/G/130.

FRSM/rj

6th April 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
ATTENTION: Chief of Staff

1. I have received a memorandum from General Solodovnik, U.S.S.R. representative with ACC, in which he complains that the disposal of Italian war materials has been made without the participation of the representatives of all Allied Nations represented in the ACC.

2. He has apparently reported this to the Soviet Government who have told him to request me to inform you that in their opinion:

(i) All problems which according to the Armistice Terms should be examined by the United Nations should be decided with the participation of the Soviet representative on the ACC, and.

(ii) That the Soviet representative on the ACC should be given the reasons for the above mentioned distribution of Italian war materials.

3. I have informed General Solodovnik that the distribution of Italian war materials captured in this theatre was made by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff. I have also told him that questions of this sort would best be handled between AFHQ and the Soviet representatives in Algiers. I have also asked him to let me know how the Soviet High Command have disposed of the Italian war materials captured by them on the Eastern front. I have also told him that I have passed on this communication to you.

4. If there is anything further you would like me to do in this matter will you please let me know. I enclose Solodovnik's memorandum in original and although I was able to translate and deal with it I have asked him to make future similar communications in English. I enclose also an English translation of the document provided later by Solodovnik which, however, he wishes regarded as unofficial text.

NOEL M. SCH. MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.*19* ENCL. 2.*5 Apr*
SECRET

- COPY -

Capt. Stone
SECRET

To: Lieutenant-General MASON MACFARLANE,
Chief Commissioner of A.C.C.

5th April, 1944.

In accordance with Your request I have the honour of
sending You the approximate translation of my memorandum
of 3rd. April.

The translation can be regarded nor official neither
accurate, it only gives a general idea on the subject.

With respect -

N.S. SOLODOVNIK,
Major General,
Soviet Representative.

2151

(19) 10001

SECRET

Capt. Stone
April 3, 1944

According to War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission's brief summary of 17th. March Italian War Materials were disposed of by HQ of C-in-C and that a part of them was handed over to the Italian Government and to the Fighting French troops. Thus, the War Materials received their final assignment.

As a representative of the U.S.S.R. in the ACC I came to know about it only then when the distribution of the Italian War Materials was completed. However, in conformity with 11th clause of the Armistice terms the disposal of the Italian War Materials requires "final decision of the United Nations." According to 38th clause of the same Armistice terms the term "United Nations" includes C-in-C and the ACC.

Thus, the final decision about the disposal of the Italian War Materials should have been done through the ACC with the participation of the representatives of all United Nations represented in the ACC.

I consider the procedure applied in this case to be contradictory to the above mentioned clauses of the Armistice terms with Italy.

The Soviet Government commissioned me to ask you to inform C-in-C about it and to raise the question before him so that:

1. In the future all problems which according to the Armistice terms are to be examined by the United Nations should be decided with the participation of the Soviet Representative on the Acc, and
2. The Soviet Representative on the ACC should be given the reasons of the above mentioned distribution of the Italian war materials.

✓ Solodovnik 3/50

(15) INCC 1

~~SECRET~~

Capt. Stone
Copy
SECRET

Ref: CC/G/174

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

FMM/rj

MEMORANDUM:

4th April, 1944.

TO: Major-General N.S. Solodovnik, USSR.

I have received your memorandum of 3rd. April.

2. The decision regarding the allocation of Italian army war material was not made by the A.C.C. Before replying specifically to your memorandum I would be glad if you would furnish me with a translation in English so as to avoid any possibility of my having misunderstood any portion of it.

3. As you have raised the question of captured Italian Army war material I would be interested to know how much of such material has been captured on the Eastern front by the Armies of the U.S.S.R. and how it has been disposed of.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

✓

(19) 1155 2

3449

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M139

Capt. Stone

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

6th. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET

V16

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

PREXION

(11)

M 1 3 3

REFERENCE MY FATIMA MIKE ONE THREE THREE PAREN FOR AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH
RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN
BAGGIOLO SHOWED ME YESTERDAY A COPY OF A LETTER HE HAD SENT TO KOSTILEV PD THE LETTER
CONTAINED ALL THE POINTS MADE VERBALLY TO ME BY BAGGIOLO AND REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE PD IT IS WORTHY OF NOTE THAT BAGGIOLO TOOK A DEFINITELY FIRM AND TOUGH
LINE IN HIS WRITTEN REPLY TO KOSTILEV

(18)

M139

6 Apr

TOP SECRET

2448
7/1/44NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M133

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

2nd. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET

V16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

BADOLIO TOLD ME TODAY THAT KOSTILEV HAD SHOWN HIM THIS MORNING A COPY OF A TELEGRAM FROM MARSHAL TITO TO MOSCOW COMPLAINING STRONGLY OF THE TREATMENT ACCORDED TO SOLDIERS OF SLAV ORIGIN IN THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD REQUESTING FURTHER THAT THESE SOLDIERS SHOULD BE RELEASED TO FIGHT FOR TITO PD PARA TITO PD BADOLIO TOLD ME THAT HE STOUTLY DENIED THE CHARGES OF ILL ^{dash} SLANT TREATMENT AND STATED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HE SURRENDER SOLDIERS OF SLAV ORIGIN SERVING IN THE ITALIAN ARMY IF THEY ~~WERE~~ ~~DOWN IN ITALIAN TERRITORY AND~~ WERE ~~THEY~~ ITALIAN NATIONALS PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL ELSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN HE WAS PREPARED TO PERMIT A COMMISSION COMPRISING ONE REPRESENTATIVE EACH OF THE AMERICAN BRITISH RUSSIAN AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS TO INVESTIGATE THE QUESTION AND TO RELEASE ANY SOLDIERS OF SLAV ORIGIN OTHER THAN ITALIAN NATIONALS NOW SERVING IN THE ITALIAN ARMY TO FIGHT FOR TITO IF THE COMMISSION SATISFIED THEMSELVES ON THEIR NON SLANT ITALIAN STATUS

2117
 ROBERT E. DOR
 Major. AGP.
 Secretary General

TOP SECRET

1328

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NWD No. 785015

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

POLITICAL FORNS

31 March 1944
(morning)

ROCCO BALLO, "L'Avvenire," publishes an important article entitled, "The Italian question"; this is the text:

"Following the victorious offensive of the Russian army, war for Germany has entered into a critical stage, and the Germans are attempting in every possible way to delay their downfall and using desperate means to that end. As the result is approaching for the opening up of operations, decided by the Allied Powers which will definitely knock out Hitler's Germany, an agreed at Wehrmacht, and as these operations will be carried out not only from the east but also from the west and the south, the Italian question assumes a certain amount of political importance. The existing political situation in Italy is the following: The southern Italian regions have been delivered by the Anglo-American troops of all fascist domination and they constitute a very important base of operations for the enemies of our Allies; however, two-thirds of Italian territory is still under the heel of the Germans and their accomplices, the hordes of Mussolini. In the liberated portion of Italy exists the Government of Field-Marshal Badoglio backed by certain strata of the Italian population, which has more than once declared to be ready to participate along with the Allies in the common fight against the Hitlerite invaders and their Italian accomplices. After the fall of fascism and especially after the activities certain anti-fascist and democratic parties and groups have sprung up which are supported by a large portion of the Italian population and are hoping to participate actively in the fight against Nazi Germany. Until January of this year these antifascist parties were few; they were badly constituted and lacked cohesion and their activities were limited to certain important centers, and a few secondary ones. The union of these groups became a reality only after the Congress of Bari which was held at the end of January and where were convened the representatives of the following parties: Liberal, Christian-Democratic, Action party, of Democracy and Work, Socialistic, and Communist. The Congress created a permanent executive Committee, the task of which was to unite all anti-fascist and democratic forces of Italy in the fight against Hitler. Therefore it is clear that both the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Committee declare to be ready to fight in the common cause, together with the Allies, to drive out the Germans and their Italian slaves; yet the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Committee not only, are they not united, but on the contrary, they are warring themselves out by fighting between themselves and in the meantime the political and economical situation of Italy is getting worse and has entered into a cul-de-sac. This cannot not help, at the same time, the common cause of the Allies, which is the fighting against Hitlerite Germany to speed up the hour of its downfall. This therefore is the situation which is at present existing in Italy and it cannot be overlooked if one has in mind the higher interests of the United Nations' fight against Germany. All the experience of these last years, prove that a similar situation will bring Italy to the inevitable exhaustion of her strength, she is threatened with her doom. But have the Allies any interest in letting Italy to her downfall? Certainly not. The Union of Soviet, nor, in general, the Allies cannot want to see Italy on the brink of an abyss, which is the way out for a similar situation? The way out consists principally in providing the union of the Allied Powers, in the developments of Italian politics, with an orientation corresponding to the tasks of the Allies in their fight against a common enemy, Hitlerite Germany, and therefore the policy of the Allies in the Italian question must have

the truth, the Italian question assumes a certain amount of political importance. The existing political situation in Italy is the following: The southern Italian regions have been delivered by the Anglo-American troops of all fascist domination and they constitute a very important base of operations for the forces of our Allies; however, approximately two-thirds of Italian territory is still under the heel of the Germans and their accomplices, the hordes of Mussolini. In the liberated portion of Italy exists the Government of Field-Marshal Badoglio backed by certain strata of the Italian population, which has more than once declared to be ready to participate along with the Allies in the common fight against the Hitlerite invaders and their Italian accomplices. After the fall of fascism and especially after the armistice certain anti-fascist and democratic parties and groups have sprung up which are supported by a large portion of the Italian population and are hoping to participate actively in the fight against Nazi Germany. Until January of this year these antifascist parties were few; they were badly constituted and lacked cohesion and their activities were limited to certain important centres, and a few secondary ones. The union of these groups became a reality only after the Congress of Bari which was held at the end of January and where were convened the representatives of the following parties: Liberal, Christian-Democratic, Action party, of Democracy and Work, Socialistic, and Communist. The Congress created a permanent executive Committee, the task of which was to unite all anti-fascist and democratic forces of Italy in the fight against Hitler. Therefore it is clear that both the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Committee declare to be ready to fight in the common cause, together with the Allies, to drive out the Germans and their Italian allies; yet the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Committee not only, are they not united, but on the contrary, they are bearing themselves out by fighting between themselves and in the meantime the political and economical situation of Italy is getting worse and has entered into a cul-de-sac. This cannot not harm, at the same time, the common cause of the Allies, which is the fighting against Hitlerite Germany to speed up the hour of its downfall. This therefore is the situation which is at present existing in Italy and it cannot be overlooked if one has in mind the higher interests of the United Nations' fight against Germany. All the experience of these last years, prove that a similar situation will bring Italy to the inevitable exhaustion of her strength, she is threatened with her doom. But have the Allies any interest in letting Italy go to her downfall? Certainly not. The Union of Soviet States, nor, in general, the Allies cannot want to see Italy on the brink of an abyss, which is the way out for a smaller ally. The way out consists principally in providing the union of the Allied Powers, in the developments of Italian politics, with an orientation expressing working to the tasks of the Allies in their fight against a common enemy, Hitlerite Germany, and therefore the policy of the Allies in the Italian question must base itself on a common point of view elaborated concordantly. It is apparent that until now the problems of the Italian political life have not formed the subjects of any exchange of views between the allied powers. Certainly Great Britain and the United States have undertaken definite political measures towards Italy and British and American official representatives have voiced their views; however, it is quite clear that these measures and declarations have not originated from positions taken by the Allies. The official representatives of our Allies have declared that the existing Government in Italy cannot be substituted by any other government and the reconstruction of the entire political situation of Italy must wait until the end of Allied troops in Rome. It is easy to prove that this point of view has not been the subject of conversations between the Allies nor at the Moscow conference, nor the Consulting Council for Italy nor through ordinary diplomatic channels.

File USSR

(Cont'd)

Prime Minister Churchill talking in the House of Commons on the 22 February expressed the opinion that only after the liberation of Rome could an Italian Government be formed supported on strong foundations. Even this statement was not a result of conversations between the allies. Furthermore both British and United States statesmen have declared that it is too early now to raise the problem of the existing monarchy in Italy or the problem of King Victor Emmanuel's abdication. Neither have these problems been discussed by the three Powers, nor at the Moscow conference, nor by the Consulting Counsel for Italy nor through diplomatic channels. But though it is not possible to deny that the solution of this problem which concerns the internal life of Italy should be left to wait until a more propitious moment, when all the Italian people will be able to choose freely its own form of government, notwithstanding, however, one should have agreed that for a certain period of time the decision regarding the future of the Italian Government should not create obstacles for the unification of the Italian anti-fascist forces and therefore be an obstacle to the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany. [It is easy to understand that the democratic parties in Italy, which have often pronounced themselves in favor of the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and for a new government instead of Badoglio's, are naturally not pleased by this state of affairs which, as mentioned above, found its expression in the declarations of the British and American representatives. This circumstance is not only harmful to Italian Unity, but far more so to the fundamental interests of the struggle against the common enemy, interests which demand the elimination of all causes which tend to lengthen the war. It is clear therefore that the Allied should find a way to unite all the Italian anti-fascist forces in the fight against Germany. It is obvious that in its present state the Government of Badoglio is not capable of uniting around it all the anti-fascist and democratic elements in Italy for the struggle against Hitler, but on the other hand this same Badoglio Government, through its more important spokesmen, has declared several times that it was quite ready to accept in its government new elements capable of exercising a more efficacious action towards uniting together all Italians. It is not clear therefore why such a measure tending to modify the Badoglio Govt. should find in its path such unsurmountable obstacles, as it is also the wish of the Allied Powers to see the Government of Badoglio take a more democratic attitude; such a measure would help eliminate the reasons which are determining the present negative attitude of the Executive Committee towards the Govt. of Badoglio and it will allow numerous Italian anti-fascist and democratic elements to participate more actively in the common struggle against the German invader. In respect of all this the attitude of Minister Eden in the House of Commons on the 22 March gave rise to surprise; a member of Parliament Thomas asked him if the Government of Moscow was thinking of rendering the Govt. of Italy more democratic, Minister Eden answered simply: "The enquiring member should address himself to the Soviet Government for an answer. I cannot understand why Mr. Eden was not able to find an answer in a clear-cut or put in a recognized and legitimate fashion. Is it not the wish of the British Government to decide on decisions taken at the Moscow conference, to render the Badoglio Govt. more democratic? Perhaps that this problem was not yet mature in the summer of 1941 when the liberation of Italy from the horde of Hitler and Mussolini started? Perhaps that this problem has nothing to do with the politics of Great Britain? Or perhaps the British political men are not favorable to the democratic Govt. of Badoglio's Government? One cannot not point out the circumstances that a certain portion of the British and American press instead of seeking for measures apt to normalizing the Italian political situation, considered from a point of view of the fundamental interests of the Allied in their war against Hitler, in these latter days, is swelling artificially another problem and precisely the one of re-establishment of direct relations between the Soviet Union and the Government of Badoglio and the exchange of representatives between the two countries. Certain elements of the British and American

but though it is not possible to deny that the solution of this problem which concerns the internal life of Italy should be left to wait until a more propitious season, when all the Italian people will be able to choose freely its own form of government, notwithstanding, however, one should have agreed that for a certain period of time the decision regarding the future of the Italian Government should not create obstacles for the unification of the Italian anti-fascist forces and therefore be an obstacle to the common struggle against Hitlerite Germany. [It is easy to understand that the democratic parties in Italy, which have often pronounced themselves in favor of the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and for a new government instead of Badoglio, are naturally not pleased by this date of affairs which, as mentioned above, found its expression in the declarations of the British and American representatives. This circumstance is not only harmful to Italian unity, but far more so to the fundamental interests of the struggle against the common enemy, interests which demand the elimination of all causes which tend to lengthen the war. It is clear therefore that the Allied should find a way to unite all the Italian anti-fascist forces in the fight against Germany. It is obvious that in its present state the Government of Badoglio is not capable of uniting around it all the anti-fascist and democratic elements in Italy for the struggle against Hitler, but on the other hand this same Badoglio Government, through its more important spokesmen, has declared several times that it was quite ready to accept in its government new elements capable of exercising a more efficient action towards uniting together all Italians. It is not clear therefore why such a measure tending to modify the Badoglio Govt. should find in its path such unaccountable obstacles, as it is also the wish of the Allied Powers to see the Government of Badoglio take a more democratic attitude; such a measure would badly eliminate the reasons which are determining the present negative attitude of the Executive Committee towards the Govt. of Badoglio and it will allow numerous Italian anti-fascist and democratic elements to participate more actively in the common struggle against the German invader. In respect of all this the attitude Minister Eden in the House of Commons on the 22 March gave rise to surprise; a member of Parliament Thomas asked him if the Government of Moscow was thinking of rendering the Govt. of Italy more democratic, Minister Eden answered simply: The enquiring member should address himself to the Soviet Government for an answer. cannot understand why Mr. Eden was not able to find an answer to a clear-cut question put in a recognized and legitimate fashion. Is it not the wish of the British Government to decide on a more democratic attitude? Perhaps the Moscow conference, to render the Badoglio Government more democratic? One cannot not point out the circumstances that a certain period of the British and American press instead of seeking for measures apt to normalizing the Italian political situation, considered from a point of view of the fundamental interests of the Allied in their war against Hitler, in these latter days, is swelling artificially another problem and precisely the one of re-establishment of direct relations between the Soviet Union and the Government of Badoglio and the exchange of representatives between the two countries. Certain elements of the British and American press express their perplexity, their astonishment and even their worry in respect of this situation. It is evident however that there is no earthly reason to be afraid. Since the Soviet Govt. had no direct contacts with the Italian Govt. whereas our allies are in constant contact with it through numerous military and civilian channels, our Govt. has deemed it necessary to institute a direct form of contact with Badoglio's Govt. It should be remembered that the ABCOF organization which is functioning in Italy contains a few thousand representatives of British and American authorities, whereas the Soviet Union was only in contact with in the Sultive Consul for Italy. Owing to this the Soviet Union found itself in a state of inequality as compared to Great Britain and the United States; now this inequality disappears to a certain extent as the Soviet Union is enabled to have direct contact with the Italian Government, like our allies. This however does not constitute re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two states but only the establishment of factual relations.

It seems therefore unaltered for that so much noise be created in certain portion of the Allied press which went so far as to recommend this step as being directed by the Soviet Union towards the non-democratical elements of Italy. Everyone now knows that the position of the Soviet Union is not an obstacle at all to the democratization of the Badoglio Government and it is still more clear that the Soviet Union is quite ready to contribute with all the means at its service in order that this task be solved with success in the shortest of times. One should therefore remember the answer given by Minister Eden in the House of Commons on the 2nd March to a question as to whether the USSR had agreed to the formation of the Badoglio Govt. after the fall of Rome; the Ministers' answer was as follows: "The Soviet Government should not be displeased by the line of conduct to follow in this respect." It is hereby stressed that the present scope of the Soviet Union's efforts is to make it possible for all Italian antifascist forces to unite around Badoglio's Government in the fight against Hitlerite Germany. The Italian question has acquired a very great importance and this question awaits its solution, and it cannot be delayed until the fall of Rome; it must be solved with in mind, the present point of view which is to clear of every obstacle the road which leads to victory against Hitlerite Germany.

2411

1333

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

has achieved a very great importance and this question awaits its solution, and it cannot be delayed until the fall of Rome; it must be solved with in mind, the present point of view which is to clear of every obstacle the road which leads to victory against Hitlerite Germany.

2411A

(40)

TOP SECRET

FATIMA #126

H

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

28th. March, 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREDERICK

BOGOMOLOV AGED TO SEE ME YESTERDAY EVENING AND TALKED FOR NEARLY AN HOUR PD PARSON TO
APPR FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND MR REINHARDT EYES ONLY FROM
FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARSON HE WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO BE FIRMLY PD HE GAVE
 THE IMPRESSION OF A PENITENT COBRA BEING MATEY PD
PARA TWO PD HE CONTENDED THAT WE HAD ATTACHED MUCH TOO GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE RECENT
 AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE REPRESENTATIVES BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS PD HE
 ASSURED ME THAT THIS DID NOT INVOLVE REOPENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY PD THE SOLE
 OBJECT WAS TO ENSURE CLOSER LIAISON PD HE STATED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED TO DO ANY
 ABNORMAL BUSINESS WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO STUPID AS TO
 EXCHANGE REPRESENTATIVES PD THEY HAD QUITE DIFFERENT AND MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS OF DOING
 THAT SORT OF THING PD
PARA THREE PD HE TOLD ME AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF THE MEMORANDUM WHICH THE RUSSIAN
 GOVERNMENT HAS JUST PRESENTED TO HQ AND USG PD HE HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO MACMILLAN PD HE
 EXPLAINED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE POLITICAL PROBLEM IN ITALY PD
 I UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ATTACH LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO WHETHER THE KING

15

1412-6

28 March

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ENTIMA M126 - 2.

REMAINS OR NOT AND THAT THEY WISH THE BANGLIC GOVERNMENT TO BROADEN ITS STRUCTURE BY INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT PD BOGOMOLOV SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH ON THE NECESSITY FOR PRODUCING A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING MORE EFFECTIVE HELP FROM ITALY FOR THE ALLIED OPERATIONS PD I AM REASONABLY SATISFIED THAT THE RUSSIANS INTEND TO TAKE A STRONG LINE WITH THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT IN ITALY AND THAT THEY INTEND TO ENSURE THAT THESE PARTIES DO NOTHING TO UPSET THE WAR EFFORT BY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT DISLOCATE THE ADMINISTRATION PD

PARA FOUR PD BOGOMOLOV FREQUENTLY STRESSED THE FACT THAT IN SPITE OF THE GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND RUSSIAN IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND IN SPITE OF INEVITABLE OCCASIONAL MINOR FRICTION SUCH AS THE RECENT CASE OF THE EXPANSION OF REPRESENTATIVES WITH ITALY IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE THREE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD COLLABORATE FULLY AND THAT SUCH COLLABORATION SHOULD CONTINUE FOR MANY YEARS PD

PARA FIVE PD BOGOMOLOV EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT REMARKS IN THE HOUSE ABOUT THE ITALIAN OPPOSITION HAD BEEN POLITICALLY MOST INERT PD HE ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT USG WAS PROPOSING TO ESTABLISH CONSULAR REPRESENTATION IN ²⁴⁴² ~~2442~~ ²⁴⁴² ~~2442~~ PD

FATIMA M126 - 3

I BIT HIM HEAVILY ON BOTH POINTS PD

PARA SIX PD BOGOMOLOV CONCLUDED THE INTERVIEW BY INVITING ME TO DINE SHORTLY TO
DISCUSS LOCAL POLITICS AND PARTICULARLY OPPOSITION PERSONALITIES IN QUOTE MORE INTIMATE
SURROUNDINGS UNQUOTE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE 3421
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Latina E 175

PATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

26 MARCH 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

4 / 2 4 1 6

PART ONE PD REFERENCE BY E ONE TWO FIVE MARCH TWO SIX PD PAREN TO
 AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA CIVIL AFFAIRS AND OFFICE OF BRITISH
 RESIDENT MINISTER FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN WHEN REBER SAW
 BADOLIO THIS MORNING THE LATTER SAID THAT DOGOMOLOV HAD APPROACHED
 HIM YESTERDAY TO INFORM HIM THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS APPOINT-
 ING AS ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN ITALY KOSTILEV AT PRESENT THE SENIOR
 MEMBER OF AMBASSADOR DOGOMOLOVS STAFF PD IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO BADOLIO
 WHAT GRADE KOSTILEV WOULD HAVE CMA BUT HE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT
 KOSTILEV WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE APPOINTED MINISTER PD WHEN DOGOMOLOV
 ASKED FOR THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE CMA BADOLIO HAD
 TOLD HIM THAT SIGNOR QUARONI WOULD BE THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE PD
 QUARONI IS AT PRESENT ITALIAN MINISTER AT KABUL PD DOGOMOLOV INDICATED
 THAT SUCH AN APPOINTMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PD
 BADOLIO SAID THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THESE APPOINTMENTS WOULD BE MADE
 SHORTLY PARA DOGOMOLOV HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(19)

4/26

16 Feb

✓ M

2/40

Palmyra M 125 -

PAGE TWO

TOP SECRET

RELEASE THOSE ITALIANS OF SLAV ORIGIN WHO ARE AT PRESENT SERVING IN THE ITALIAN ARMY IN ORDER THAT THEY MIGHT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE PARTISAN FORCES PD BADOLIO SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD PRESENT EXTREME DIFFICULTIES INASMUCH AS IT WOULD INVOLVE THE RELEASE TO A FOREIGN ARMY OF PERSONS OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY PD BADOLIO SAID HE MADE NO COMMITMENTS ON THE SUBJECT. PART TWO MACCHIARANI SAW BOGOMOLOV THIS MORNING WHO GAVE A SIMILAR ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION EXCEPT THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD HAVE THE RANK OF COUNSELOR PD BOGOMOLOV AGAIN SAID SOVIET ACTION DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS PD HE ADDED THAT A MEMORANDUM SETTING FORTH THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW ON THIS AND OTHER ITALIAN QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS.

17

2/29

NOEL MARION BACCHETTI
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

ST WVB 1944

RECEIVED

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M124

SF

FATIMA (OEM MACFARLANE C COME)

26th. March, 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

2 2 6 6 0
 YOUR NUMBER F TWO TWO SIX SIX ZERO FNCIC PD PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON'S
EYES ONLY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I SAW BADOGLIO YESTERDAY MORNING
 ALONE HALF AN HOUR BEFORE HE WAS DUE TO SEE BOGOMOLOV PD HE PROMISED ME THAT HE WOULD MAKE
 NO FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING ME PD
PART TWO PD SINCE MR MACMILLAN'S ARRIVAL I HAVE SENT BADOGLIO A MEMORANDUM INFORMING
 BADOGLIO THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT REPEAT NOT ENTITLED TO ENTER INTO ANY
 ARRANGEMENT WITH ANY FOREIGN POWER WHETHER ALLIED OR NEUTRAL WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
 SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER WHICH SHOULD BE SOUGHT THROUGH ME PD
PART THREE PD YESTERDAY EVENING BADOGLIO SENT ME A MESSAGE STATING THAT HE WISHED TO SEE
 ME OR ONE OF MY POLITICAL VICE-PRESIDENTS THIS MORNING PD CACCIA AND I HAVE TO VISIT
 EIGHTH ARMY TODAY AND REBER WILL SEE BADOGLIO THIS MORNING PD MACMILLAN IS SEEING
 BOGOMOLOV AT ONE ONE ZERO ZERO THIS MORNING PD WILL TELEGRAPH AGAIN TONIGHT PD
PART FOUR PD DISCUSSIONS WITH ITALIANS OVER REVISED POW AGREEMENT ARE GOING EXTREMELY
 SLOWLY AND STICKILY PD NEXT MEETING IS ON AFTERNOON OF TWENTY EIGHTH AFTER WHICH I HOPE
 TO SEND YOU A REPORT

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
 Lieutenant-General
 Chief Commissioner. 228

TOP SECRET

M124

26 March

14

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M122

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

22nd. March, 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

REFERENCE MY FATIMA M ONE TWO ONE OF TWENTYTHIRD MARCH PD PAREN TO ALMA FOR GENERAL
WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINSTATE FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN I HAVE
 NOW OBTAINED CONFIRMATION OF THE FACT THAT THE KING RECENTLY SUMMONED THE CABINET TO
 BAVELLO AND INFORMED THEM OF HIS PLAN PD IT IS NOW ALSO KNOWN TO THE JUNEA

NORL MASON MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General
 Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

FATIMA M121

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C CORR)

23rd. March. 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS HAVING A DIRECT EFFECT UPON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH ITALY PD PAREN TO ASK FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN PARA TWO PD PRIOR TO THE SIXTEENTH MARCH THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD NOT ONLY PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE RUSSIAN DECISION HAD MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO THEIR POLICY BUT HAD CONTINUED TO BE THE PRIME MOVERS IN DEMANDING THAT THE THREE PARTY PETITION SHOULD GO FORWARD ON A JUNTA BASIS PD THEY HAD EVEN OFFERED PRIVATELY TO PAY A THIRD OF THE EXPENSES CMA OR CMA IF NECESSARY CMA THE ENTIRE AMOUNT PD AT THE MEETING OF THE JUNTA ON THE SIXTEENTH MARCH CMA HOWEVER CMA THEY COMPLETELY CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE AND THE SECRETARY NOW TELLS US THAT IN HIS OPINION THE PROPOSAL FOR A PETITION IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING SHELVED PD MOREOVER CMA IN A SPEECH AT BARI ON THE NINETEENTH MARCH PIEROSCHI COMPLETELY ALTERED THE LINE OF ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN HIS PREVIOUS SPEECHES CMA PARTICULARLY AT THE NAPLES MEETING PD AT BARI HE REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING THE KING AND BALBOLO AND ARGUED THAT THE ONLY NECESSITY WAS THAT ITALY SHOULD HAVE A STRONG GOVERNMENT PD FURTHER A MEMBER OF THE JUNTA CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH PIEROSCHI HAS STATED THAT CMA WHILE THE COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD JOIN ANY GOVERNMENT ON THE ABOLITION OF THE

2435

M121

23 March

- - 2 - -

KING CMA THEY NO LONGER INSISTED ON THIS AS A CONDITION PD THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE KING'S PLAN OR EVEN IF THE KING MADE NO CONCESSION THEY MIGHT NOW EVEN BE WILLING TO SERVE UNDER BATOGLIO PD PARA THREE PD IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT NO FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE YET BEGUN PD BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AS WELL AS THE COMMUNIST PARTY MAY NOW BE DISPOSED TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT PD IF BOTH THESE PARTIES TAKE SUCH A DECISION ONLY THE PARTY OF ACTION IS LIKELY TO HOLD OUT AND EVEN THEY MAY WITHDRAW THEIR OBJECTIONS IF THE KING MAKES SOME GESTURE PD PARA FOUR PD ALTHOUGH THE JUNTA IS STILL ENDEAVOURING TO MAINTAIN SOME FORM OF UNITY CMA THE CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND PRESUMABLY UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW WOULD APPEAR DEFINITELY TO HAVE LOOSENED THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUNTA PD THE FACT THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE NO REPLY TO THE JUNTA MEMORANDUM HAS CLEARLY AFFECTED THEIR ABILITY TO WITHSTAND ANY SUCH RUSSIAN ACTIVITY PD THE OTHER PARTIES AND MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGEROUS POTENTIALITIES OF SUCH A COMMUNIST GAMBUT BUT FEEL THAT THEY ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO STAND OUT IF ANY SUCH MOVE IS MADE PD PARA FIVE PD WE ARE INFORMED THAT ERGOL CMA TITULAR HEAD OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY CMA HAS ALREADY REACHED

2434

- - 3 - -

ALONE AND IS EXPECTED SHORTLY IN NAPLES PD AS HE COMES DIRECT FROM RUSSIA CMA WE SHOULD
SOON KNOW WHETHER THESE INDICATIONS OF A CHANGE OF POLICY IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY ARE
CONFIRMED

NOEL MARSH MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner 2/26

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

INCOMING

/ad

HQ ACC 400 300

30/23

Rec. 23 Mar 1415

12612

By 70

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MAR 221847A

SIGNED WILSON CITE MECOS. THIS IS NAF 653.
REF NAF 652.

MAR 231328A

AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF
STAFF RPTD UNITY LONDON FOR INFO AND TO FATIMA FOR MACFARLANE AND TO
MIDEAST FOR GENERAL WILSON CAIRO PLEASE PASS AND TO HQ MAAF.

Following received from MacFarlane. "We do NOT understand in what clause of
the Armistice we should base the representations to Italian Government proposed
in your 67463 March 21. (1) A

"In any event would NOT such representations at this stage indicate a lack
of unity between three principal United Nations? In our opinion to reveal this
to the Italian Government would NOT be to our advantage pending further consider-
ation of this point by Washington and London."

In view of these representations request early instructions as to policy to
be followed and what instructions should be issued to MacFarlane.

NO DISTRIBUTION MADE.

SECRET

(10) A

2433

22 Pym

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M19

SF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

22nd. March. 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM REPEATED H.Q. M.A.A.F (INFO)

(9A)

WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND ON WHAT CLAUSE OF THE ARMISTICE WE SHOULD BASE THE REPRESENTATIONS TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PROPOSED IN YOUR SIX SEVEN FOUR SIX THREE MARCH TWO ONE PT PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT REPEATED HQ MAAF FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN IN ANY EVENT WOULD NOT SUCH REPRESENTATIONS AT THIS STAGE INDICATE A LACK OF UNITY BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL UNITED NATIONS QUERY PD IN OUR OPINION TO REVEAL THIS TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE PENDING FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS POINT BY WASHINGTON AND LONDON

DECLASSIFIED
 FR 11652, Sec. 310 and 510 of 103
 By [signature]
 DATE 4/1/74

ROBERT E. DOE,
 Major, AGP,
 Secretary-General.

2432

TOP SECRET

1343

TOP SECRET

CSF
[Signature]

TOP SECRET

URGENT

36/21

67463

URGENT

MAR 211115A

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE PHSGS

MAR 211216A

SATDA FOR MACERPLANE RPTD TO H. MAF FOR INFORMATION

You should point out to Prunas that the Italian Government is not in a position to enter into any engagement with any country without the consent of Supreme Allied Commander which must be sought through the Control Commission.
(Reurad K 118 of 20 March). You will be kept informed of British and United States Governments reaction to Prunas' statements.

9

HD ACC, ARD 324
Sec 1 Gen
Rcd 21 Mar 1947
By *[Signature]*

NO DISTRIBUTION MADE

9 A

67463
21 Mar

RECEIVED
MAR 21 1947

~~TOP SECRET~~

2431

TOP SECRET

K118

Capt. Stone

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

20th. MARCH 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 - MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

(H)

FREEDOM

PARA ONE PD PRIMEA YESTERDAY ARMED THE POLITICAL SECTION THAT BOGOMOLOV HAD TOLD HIM IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET DECISION TO EXCHANGE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES WAS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS AN ISOLATED ACT BUT WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS BASED ON A POLICY OF CLOSER RELATIONS WITH ITALY. ACCORDING TO PRIMEA GEN BOGOMOLOV FRANKLY ADMITTED THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO EXPLOIT THEIR PRIVILEGED POSITION IN ITALY WHERE THERE WAS NO SOVIET ARMY OF OCCUPATION AND WHERE IN THE MINDS OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THEY WERE NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY MILITARY GOVERNMENT PARA TO FREEDOM FOR GENERAL WILSON GEN MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA PERSONAL FROM MACFARLANE PARA PARA TWO PD BOGOMOLOV DID NOT INDICATE THE NATURE OF ANY NEW PROPOSALS BUT PRIMEA SURMISED THAT THEY MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF AGREEMENT ON THE LINES OF THE SOVIET BASH CATCH ACCORD PD PRIMEA ALSO FELT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT PUT FORWARD SOME GUARANTEE OF ITALY'S EASTERN FRONTIER SINCE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH VITO THEIR INFLUENCE WAS BECOMING PREDOMINANT & IT MIGHT EVEN BE THAT SOVIET RUSSIA WAS CONSIDERING A CHANGE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD

(9)

M118
20/3/44~~TOP SECRET~~

2430

TOP SECRET

outgoing message no. 1118, 23 Mar 44, to Moscow, (cont'd):

ELIMINATE THE PRESENT PARADOX OF COMBELLIGENCE AND EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES ON ONE SIDE AND AN ARMISTICE ON THE OTHER PD PARA THREE PD FRANKS SAID THAT THE SOVIET MOVE HAD BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED BY THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND PARTICULARLY IN THE NORTH INsofar as THE LIMITED INFORMATION FROM THAT AREA COULD DETERMINE PD FOR THIS REASON HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ANY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO INCLINE ANY FURTHER OFFER OF SOVIET FRIENDSHIP ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH FOR SUCH A ONE-SIDED DEVELOPMENT OF ITALY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION PD ON THE CONTRARY ONE THEY WISHED TO BASE THE REHABILITATION OF THE COUNTRY UPON A CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN PD THEY FELT COMMA HOWEVER ONE THAT THEY WERE BEING FORCED IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION PD PARA FOUR PD IT WAS THE EARNEST DESIRE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO NEUTRALIZE THE PRESENT TENSION PD FRANKS HIMSELF REALIZED THAT THE MOMENT HAD NOT YET COME FOR ITALY TO BE ACCEPTABLE AS AN ALLY PD HE BELIEVED ONE HOWEVER ONE THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE DONE TO REGULARIZE THE PRESENT POSITION WHEREBY ITALY WAS BOTH A COMBELLIGENT AND A QUOTE DEFEATED ENEMY PD THE QUOTE MANY OF THE ARMISTICE CLAUSES IN HIS OPINION HAD ALREADY BEEN CARRIED OUT AND ARE SO FAR APPLICABLE PD HE ASKED WHETHER THE TIME HAD NOT NOW COME WHEN THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS COULD CONSIDER A SUBSTITUTE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD OBTAIN ALL THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AND LEAVE OVER QUOTE WHICH WOULD NOT BE INCURRED NOW BUT WHICH WOULD GIVE ITALY SOME OF THE LEGAL AND FOREIGN BENEFITS THAT IT RIGHT NEXT TO DERIVE FROM THE FACT OF COMBELLIGENCE

Distribution:

- 1 - Political Section
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AUTHENTICATED:

COL. MARION MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PATIMA #115

Solomon

PATIMA (GEM MACFARLANE C COM)

19th. March. 1944.

TOP SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

(H)

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.A.I.

I SAW BAROGGIO ALONE LAST NIGHT PD PARH TO FREEDOM FOR GENERAL WILSON REPEATED HEADQUARTERS
AAL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM PATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARH PART ONE PD I ASKED
 HIM HOW IT WAS THAT IN VIEW OF OUR HITHERTO CLOSE AND CORDIAL COLLABORATION HE HAD ISSUED
 HIS ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES WITH RUSSIA WITHOUT
 FIRST CONSULTING ME PD HE TOLD ME THAT THE RUSSIAN APPROACH HAD COME TO HIM AS A COMPLETE
 SURPRISE PD BOGOMOLOV HAD COME TO SEE HIM AND HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
 HAD ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL MADE BY PRUMAS TO VISHINSKY AT THE TIME OF A MEETING OF THE
 ADVISORY COUNCIL IN ITALY PD BAROGGIO SAID THAT PRUMAS HAD IN FACT INFORMED VISHINSKY
 THAT BAROGGIO HAD ONCE SUGGESTED TO GENERAL JOYCE THAT AN EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC
 REPRESENTATIVES BETWEEN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST
 WELCOME TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD AFTER BOGOMOLOV'S VISIT BAROGGIO HAD AT ONCE TOLD
 PRUMAS TO INFORM MY POLITICAL SECTION OF WHAT HAD OCCURRED PD AGAIN WHEN BOGOMOLOV
 REVISITED BAROGGIO WITH THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT PRUMAS HAD IMMEDIATELY
 NOTIFIED MY POLITICAL SECTION PD IN BOTH CASES AS YOU KNOW I IMMEDIATELY TELEGRAPHED THE
 INFORMATION TO YOU PD BAROGGIO STATED THAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD ACTED PERFECTLY OPENLY WITH

RECEIVED
 25 MAR 1944
 1944

✓

2428

M115
 19 Apr

- - 2 - -

ME AND THAT AS I HAD TAKEN NO ACTION IN THE MATTER HE HAD NATURALLY CARRIED THROUGH THE DESIRE OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT PD THIS EQUALLY NATURALLY HAD RESULTED IN GREAT ADVANTAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT AS IT HAD HAD A GREAT EFFECT ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN ITALY AND THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT PD FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS I CLEARLY COULD NOT INTERFERE ON MY OWN INITIATIVE AS I HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER THE RUSSIAN ACTION WAS UNILATERAL OR NOT PD PART TWO PD BAUCOLIO ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE HIS MEMORANDUM TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS REQUESTING THEM TO ACCORD ALLIED STATUS TO ITALY READY FOR TRANSMISSION BY ME IN A DAY OR TWO PD AT THE END OF OUR TALK HE SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED NOW TO UNDERTAKE CATEGORICALLY THAT ITALY WOULD CONTINUE THE WAR AGAINST THE AXIS AFTER THE GERMANS HAD BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF ITALY AND THAT HE WISHED THE ITALIAN FORCES AND ESPECIALLY THE ITALIAN FLEET TO TAKE PART IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN PD HE STRESSED THE FACT THAT THE SUPPORT WHICH HE COULD EXPECT FROM HIS COUNTRY TO SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD DEPEND VERY LARGELY ON THE TREATMENT ACCORDED TO ITALY IN THE MEANTIME BY THE ALLIES

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

FATIMA M113

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

16th. March, 1944.

SECRET

16 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

6 5 0 4 6

REFERENCE NO SIX FIVE ZERO FOUR SIX PD PAID TO AHEAD FOR MES FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE
PERSONAL FARM MY TELEGRAMS OF MARCH EIGHTH TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH SHOULD HAVE MADE IT
 CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE IMPLIES THE INITIATIVE CAME FROM THE ITALIAN
 GOVERNMENT THE DECISION WAS THAT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING A GENERAL REQUEST
 FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WHICH WAS MADE TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL IN DECEMBER PD
 THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSEQUENTLY THEN TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO EXCHANGE REPRESENTATIVES PD
 FURTHERMORE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT NOTIFIED THE ACC OF BOGDANOV'S PROPOSAL IMMEDIATELY
 AFTER IT WAS MADE PD SHOULD ANY PROTEST BE MADE TO BADOLIO AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD IN
 FACT CONSTITUTE A PROTEST AGAINST THE ACTION OF THE RUSSIANS RATHER THAN OF THE ITALIAN
 GOVERNMENT

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General
 Chief Commissioner.

SECRET

C

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6

2495

SECRET

FATIMA M108

DSN 352
15 MAR 1944

SF

DCC

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

12th. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER FATIMA ONE EIGHT TWO ZERO

FD PAREN TO AFHQ EYES ONLY GENERAL

WILSON CMA MACMILLAN AND REINHARDT REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACIF EYES ONLY GENERAL.
 ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN BOGOMOLOV RETURNED UNEXPECTEDLY
 FROM ALGIERS YESTERDAY AND SAW THE MARSHAL LAST EVENING TO INFORM HIM THAT MOSCOW HAD
 REPLIED FAVOURABLY WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES PD
 FOREIGN OFFICE STATES THAT COMMUNIQUE ON THE SUBJECT WILL BE ISSUED PROMPTLY BY BOTH
 GOVERNMENTS CMA POSSIBLY TOMORROW PD BOGOMOLOV WILL ACT TEMPORARILY AS THE FIRST SOVIET
 REPRESENTATIVE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General,
 Chief Commissioner

SECRET

14 MAR 1944

COPY

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE /afe

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO : 9/10

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 62458

PREC : URGENT

FILED : MAR 09 1941

FROM : FREEDOM SIGNED WILSON CITE FBOOS

REC'D : MAR 10 0611

TO : AIR MINISTRY FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF RPTD BRITMAN WASHINGTON FOR
U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO HQ MAAF AND TO FATIMA

1. Following is paraphrase of message number 1820 of March 8th received this morning from MacFarlane. This is MEDCOS 65. Begins . . .

"Prunas today told Reber that yesterday morning, March 7, Bogomolov saw Badoglio. He told Badoglio that Soviet Government were willing to establish diplomatic arrangements with Italian Government and exchange representatives who would have all privileges and rights of ambassadors and would have equal status to Allied representatives with French Committee of National Liberation. Since this was an offer from one of the Allied Governments, Italian Government felt it must accept and so informed Bogomolov. He is telegraphing Moscow accordingly. Prunas understands Moscow will very shortly be making an announcement. Italian Government hopes that in meantime U.S. and British Governments will not reveal to Russians that they have been given this information.

"Also Bogomolov asked Badoglio for facilities in Southern Italy for Russian Air Force. Badoglio without committing himself asked whether the attitude of the other Allied Governments had been ascertained.

"I wish to bring to your attention fact that yesterday afternoon Bogomolov saw me. Not even in connection with his request to me for facilities for Russian Air Force did he mention fact that he had seen Badoglio in the morning.

2/23

62458

9 0mm

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

incoming message No. 62 9 Mar 44, fr Freedom (cont'd)

"request care be taken to avoid letting Bogomolov know you have been informed of his Badoglio meeting when he arrives Algiers March 9."

2. MacFarlane informed me yesterday that Bogomolov has asked whether Russians would be allowed to base a few aircraft with Russian crews and maintenance personnel at an airfield in South Italy to constitute an air link of their own with their Mission to Tito.

3. As this request raised questions of policy not confined to this theatre it was referred to London for guidance. I foresaw obvious difficulties and disadvantages but on balance felt that we should have to comply. Not only are there questions of reciprocity which might make it disadvantageous to us to refuse; but also a refusal would be likely to let us in for a commission to do for the Russians what we would not allow them to do for themselves; and that would be likely to absorb a quite unacceptable proportion of our special operations air sorties at the expense of our own contribution to Tito and other Balkan partisans. My recommendation therefore was that we accede to the Russians request on the understanding that they would agree to their Air Force Detachment operating under the operational control of 334 Wing, who are responsible for the execution of all air special operations in this theatre.

4. The fact which has since transpired that Bogomolov had already approached Badoglio direct on this matter to which he made no reference when he made the request to MacFarlane is disturbing, and shows that our misgivings about the possibility of misunderstandings and one sided dealings with the Italians if a Russian Air Force Detachment were stationed in Italy had some justification. This may merely be a question of Moscowite methods and may not be unconnected with recent statements about the Italian Fleet. But it confirms my expectation that we shall have a number of difficulties with any Russian Detachment that may be stationed in Italy.

~~SECRET~~

1388
Incoming message no. 6 (C) 9 Mar 44, fr Freedom (cont'g) (C)

5. At the same time there are two considerations which seem to us to weigh heavily in favour of our agreeing to the Russian proposal.

a. It seems quite certain that the large Russian Mission with Tito under a Lieutenant General will result in a state of demands for air communication and supply which we shall find it almost impossible to resist if we do not allow the Russians to do it themselves. Our resources in special operations aircraft are even now not sufficient to meet all our own requirements in decent weather conditions.

b. The American and British Air Forces may require from the Russians base facilities in other theatres of which the importance would far outweigh the inevitable disadvantages of having a Soviet Air Force unit in Italy.

6. I see therefore no reason to depart from my recommendation that the Russian request be agreed. I should be anxious to retain the condition that the Russian unit should act under our operational control. But recognize that this may conceivably raise questions of reciprocal treatment of Allied Air Forces operating from Russian soil. That may be considered so material a factor as to make it advisable for us to be prepared to agree under pressure to independent operation; provided adequate liaison arrangements are made to ensure the security against enemy action of all special operations aircraft including Russian and of missions to whom they will be operating.

7. Meanwhile Bogomolov, who is returning to Algiers, is being asked by British Resident Minister to resubmit his request to MacFarlane formally through the Russian Military Mission to Allied Force Headquarters, giving complete details of what is required. 5121

8. British Resident Minister is of course dealing with paragraph 1 of message number 1820 above.

(7)
DISTRIBUTION:
- 1 - CC

- 3 -
~~SECRET~~

1359

785015

SECRET

FATIMA 1301

DCS

DS 289

9 MAR 1944

8F

FATIMA (ONE HAFSARLINE C COMED)

7th. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 HAFSARLINE

PRIORITY

FRIDAY

DOUGLAS HAS ASKED ME IF THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE COULD BE PERMITTED TO BASE A
 FEW RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT WITH RUSSIAN CREWS AND GROUND STAFF AT AN AIRCRAFT IN
 SOUTHERN ITALY TO PROVIDE AN AIR LINE OF THEIR OWN WITH THE RUSSIAN MISSION
 WITH TITO IN ORDER TO AVOID FOR SHIP OF STAFF FROM FATIMA FROM HAFSARLINE.
INTERNAL MATTER I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD RAISE HIS REQUEST TO YOU AND FURNISH
 HIM AN ANSWER IN THE COURSE

500

1. T. HENRY JR.
 2. L. ACT
 ACTG. Adjutant.

2420

3

See also cable # 62458, 9 Mar. 1944
 on opposite side

M 101

7 Mar

SECRET

9 MAR 1944.

SECRET

COPY

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION OUTGOING

FATIMA 1820
MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO :

CLASS: FATIMA

8 MARCH 1944

REF NO:

PREC : SECRET

10050 MACFARIANE

FILED :

FROM : URGENT

REC'D :

TO :

EYES ONLY WILSON MAKING REINHARDT PD PAREN FROM MACFARLANE TO FREEDOM CITE FATIMA
ONE EIGHT TWO ZERO PAREN PD PRUNAS INFORMED REBER TODAY THAT BOGOMOLOV SAW BADOGLIO
 YESTERDAY MORNING PD BOGOMOLOV TOLD BADOGLIO THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE PRE-
 PARED TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO EXCHANGE
 REPRESENTATIVES PD THESE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD HAVE ALL THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
 OF AMBASSADORS AND WOULD HAVE THE SAME STATUS AS THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES WITH
 THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION PD AS THIS WAS AN OFFER FROM ONE OF THE
 ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FELT THAT IT MUST ACCEPT AND SO INFORMED
 BOGOMOLOV WHO IS TELEGRAPHING MOSCOW TO THIS EFFECT PD PRUNAS UNDERSTANDS THAT MOSCOW
 WILL BE MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT VERY SHORTLY BUT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT
 THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL NOT IN THE MEANTIME
 DISCLOSE TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION PD PART II PD
 BOGOMOLOV ALSO ASKED BADOGLIO FOR FACILITIES FOR THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE IN SOUTHERN
 ITALY PD WITHOUT COMMITTING HIMSELF BADOGLIO INQUIRED IF THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER
 ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN ASCERTAINED PD PART III PD I WISH TO CALL ATTENTION TO
 THE FACT THAT BOGOMOLOV SAW ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON PD HE DID NOT MENTION THE FACT
 THAT HE HAD SEEN BADOGLIO IN THE MORNING NOT EVEN IN CONNECTION WITH HIS REQUEST TO ME
 FOR FACILITIES FOR THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE PD PART IV PD BOGOMOLOV ARRIVES ALGIERS TOMOR-
 ROW NINE MARCH PD PLEASE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID LETTING HIM KNOW THAT YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD
 OF HIS MEETING WITH BADOGLIO PD

2

1820

8 March

SECRET

1384

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NHC No. 785015

8/18

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