

ACC

10000/136/331

10000/136/331

CASE OF COL. REMONDINO  
JAN., FEB. 1945

The way in which operation is proceeding

A letter from Pietro Nenni

Dear Pacciardi,

as you published the resignation of A. v. Alberto Guidi from the Commission for the operation of the Air-Force, adding your comment on the case of Colonel Remondino, kindly acknowledge that by the intervention of the Allied Commission, on the first days of February of this year, the man who was then Chief of the Government asked for separating proceedings against Remondino to be stopped.

This was done in consideration of the numerous services rendered by Col. Remondino during the war against the Nazi-fascists, in which he was given a Distinguished Service Medal.

Colonel Remondino was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for the Air Force by the former Government.

For what refers to your question 'And Nenni?', you know me well enough to realize that, tenaciously, I am doing what I can, and the best I can, regretting that I must spend a 100 per cent energy for a 10 per cent result, but convinced that a 10 per cent result is better than no result at all.

Yours,

Nenni

to publish Nenni's letter which shows that:

- 1) the Allied Commission dictatorially intervenes thanks to the armistice clauses, in our operation proceedings.
- 2) the goodwill of the ministers taken individually is shattered by internal resistance.
- 3) the results that can be obtained by a policy of compromise are almost nonexistent (Nenni figure them out as amounting to 10 per cent) better 10 per cent than nothing, says Nenni.

It remains to be seen whether a 100 per cent energy wouldn't be better employed in a fight from the outside, without compromise.

Voce Repubblicana, Oct. 4th

trans. e/c

26/10/47

Ref: DF/4/13.1/CA.

21 February 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

109a

I acknowledge with thanks the information contained in your letter 2/117. 10124.62/1.7 of 16 February that proceedings against Colonel Remondino have been stopped.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

20

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
R O M E.

2610/cc

cc: Air Forces S/c  
Ex. Com.  
CC files  
CA Sec.

112

00

SECRET

h.b.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner  
+++++

Ref: 502/3B/00S.

16 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Press Attacks on Italian Serving Officers.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.  
Attn: I.H.C.

1. We discussed this morning the necessity of applying censorship to attacks in the Italian Press on serving officers of the Italian armed forces.
2. I enclose relevant correspondence.
3. I confirm my request that the press censors be instructed to prevent the publication of such articles as being contrary to the interests of military security.

M S. LUGH

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner,  
for the Chief Commissioner.

MSL/JG.

27

Copy to: GOC, Land Forces SubCom (MMA).  
Director, Air Forces Sub-Com.  
Director, Navy Sub-Com.  
Public Relations Branch.

9251/CC

A

177

Translation

FEB 17 1945  
CC 480

The President of the Council of Ministers  
27117 10121.62/1.7

Rome, 16 February 1945

Dear Admiral,

104

2610/cc

reference to the assurance I gave you in my note  
n. 26341/10121-62, of February 2nd, I communicate to you that the cessa-  
tion of the penal proceedings and of the epuration proceedings against  
Col. Aldo Remondino, Deputy Chief of staff of the Air Force, has already  
been ordered.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Truly yours,

S. I. BONVALI

To Admiral Henry W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission  
R O M E

SA (112)

2610/cc

e. 2610/cc  
e.c.

E. C. Dist - 17 FEB 45

ACTION: CA SEC

INFO: CHIEF COMMR  
Ex. Comm  
AIR FORCE'S SC

109a



CC 9251

6 February 1945.

Dear Mr. Macmillan:

171

173

In my letter CC/9251 of 1 February 1945 I told you that I had delivered to the Prime Minister an aide-memoire on the general subject of attacks on Italian military officers and sent to him a letter relating specifically to the proceedings which were being taken against Colonel Rosondino, and I sent you copies of both these documents.

File 2610/ce

174

I am now forwarding to you copies of the replies which I have received from Sig. Bonomi. I am taking steps to tighten the censorship so as to exclude from the press these attacks on serving officers.

Sincerely,

ELERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Mr. Harold Macmillan,  
Acting President of the Allied Commission.

Copy on 2610/ce  
9251/ce

175

CHIEF COMMR

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers  
n. 26342/10124.63

Rome, 2 February 1945

My Dear Admiral,

(111)

I have thoroughly examined the memorandum sent to me by the Allied Commission, about the frequent attacks made by the Italian press against the officers in service in the Navy and in the Air Force.

I fully agree with the Allied Military Commander about the obvious necessity to cut short these attacks by the newspapers, which depress the morale of the officers who are attacked, and therefore indirectly hamper the war effort against the common enemy.

On the other hand, I must point out that the preventive military censorship on periodical press, though being entrusted to a special Italian military office, whose seat is with P.W.B., is made in close liaison with Allied Head Quarters, and on the basis of the precise orders given by the Allied Authorities. In the provinces, censorship is entrusted to the organs of the Prefettura which have to follow the instructions of the said central office, as well as those of the Allied officers, acting as Regional Censorship Inspectors.

Considering this, I suggest it would be advisable for the Allied Authorities to issue the necessary regulations, so that the inconveniences which were so justly pointed out, shouldn't occur again in future.

As for what concerns the possible indiscretions through which the papers obtained their information, I can only express my regret for the hypothesis that the fact should have taken place. As such events cannot be allowed to occur again, I have drawn the particular attention of the Military Ministers and of the High Commissariat for sanctions against fascism on this delicate question, for the necessary action to be taken without delay.

26  
27

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

s. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner  
R o m e

See (175)

ACTION - COS

INFO - CHIEF COMMR  
AIR FORCE  
NAVY STAFF

(174)

s.o.



CHIEF COMMR

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers  
n. 26511/10124.62

Rome, 2 February 1945

Dear Admiral,

106

Reference to your letter of January 27th  
(DE/4/13.I/CA), about Colonel Aldo REMONDINO, Deputy  
Chief of Staff of the R. Airforce.

I am glad to be able to tell you that I have already  
imparted the necessary instructions to the competent ju-  
diciary and administrative authorities, immediately to  
suspend the proceedings against the said officer, and to  
see that the most complete silence is kept about such  
elements as already came to light on this subject.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Truly yours,

B. I. BONOMI

Admiral Elery W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner  
Allied Commission  
R o m e

See 109  
See 109a

2610/cv

COS DIST

ACTION: CA Section  
INFO: CHIEF COMMR  
COS  
Air S/C (6/2/45)

o.o.

104

EMS, ed

CC 9251

1 February 1945.

Dear Mr. Macmillan:

170a

Replying to your message through the British Embassy with respect to the attack in "Voce Republican" on Colonel Remondino, I delivered both an Aide Memoire on the general subject of attacks on Italian military officers and a letter specifically relating to the proceedings against Colonel Remondino, copies of which I am attaching.

see file 2610/cc

I have asked the Prime Minister to advise me this week what steps he has taken to implement the position taken by us in both documents. So far, I have not received a reply but I shall be pressing him in a day or two.

Very truly yours,

ELERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

22 Mr. Harold Macmillan,  
British Embassy,  
Athens.

cc: COS  
A File

(copy with 2610/cc)

9251/1/cc

173

ENG/ud

CC 9251

1 February 1945.

Dear Mr. Macmillan:

*file 9251/cc*

*file 9251/cc*

Replying to your message through the British Embassy with respect to the attack in "Voce Republican" on Colonel Amendino, I delivered both an Aide Memoire on the general subject of attacks on Italian military officers and a letter specifically relating to the proceedings against Colonel Amendino, copies of which I am attaching.

101

I have asked the Prime Minister to advise me this week what steps he has taken to implement the position taken by us in both documents. So far, I have not received a reply but I shall be pressing him in a day or two.

104

Very truly yours,

HARRY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Mr. Harold Macmillan,  
British Embassy,  
Athens.

21

See 104

*2610/1000  
(copy in 9251/cc 101)*

cc: COS  
A File

A  
/

103

*sample*

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,  
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION  
ROME

DATE: JANUARY 30th. 1945

REF: AF SC/R/21/SPEC.INT.

171

With reference to your letter to me 502/29/COS. of 28th. January 1945. forwarding a copy of an aide memoire handed by the Chief Commissioner to H.E. Bonomi on the subject of Press attacks on serving officers of the Italian Navy and Air Force.

Below is a translation of a letter I have just received from the Air Minister for any action you may think fit.

/s/ W.A. Bowen-Buscarlet  
W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL.

TRANSLATION

REF. 2601. 30th. January 1945.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

With reference to the publication in the Press of information concerning facts and persons which are of interest to the military element.

I have specially consulted H.E. Bonomi on this subject and he has promised that he will make the necessary representations and issue warnings to members of the Press.

With regard to the censorship of facts and news of a military nature. This censorship is already in existence and is exercised by the Allied Commission through trustworthy Italian officers. It would, perhaps, be advisable if the Allied Commission were to renew their instructions to these officers so that they do not allow similar articles to appear in 'La Voce Repubblicana' in the future.

44 20

925116

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF  
 FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,  
 AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION  
 ROME

DATE: JANUARY 30th. 1945

REF: AF SC/R/21/SPEC.INT.

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19 20

925116

As far as I am concerned, I have advised the director of the



W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARIET,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL.

TRANSLATION

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As far as I am concerned, I have advised the director of the Press Bureau at the Presidency to communicate with the officers of the Censorship Bureau in order to render more efficacious any action which may be taken against further indiscretions and imprudences.

I shall always be glad to meet your wishes as far as I am able.

Yours Sincerely,

L. GASPAROTTO.

cc: COS (file 502/cos)  
A file

177.0

925/100



27th January 1945.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

ATTACKS IN THE ITALIAN PRESS ON SERVING OFFICERS IN THE ITALIAN NAVY AND THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Deputy Air Officer Commander-in-Chief at Allied Force Headquarters have had brought to their notice attacks made in the Italian press on serving officers in the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

2003/CC

2. The Italian newspaper "Avanti" in its issue of 24 January, published an article entitled "The Navy and Naval Men". This article contained an attack on seven Admirals or Rear Admirals of the Italian Fleet and also on the Minister for Marines. It also contained a paragraph which impugned the integrity and good faith of the Allied authorities.

X  
2003/CC

3. In "Voce Repubblicana" of 14 January there appeared an article entitled "The Favourites of the Monarchy. Col. Remondino, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force". This was followed by a similar attack on Colonel Remondino in the same paper on 21 January. Not only do these articles contain attacks on serving officers of the Italian Air Force but it seems clear beyond all doubt and has, I understand, been established by an official investigator appointed by the Italian Government, that material for these articles must have been supplied to the newspaper by an official of the High Commission for Repatriation or of the Repatriation or Military Tribunal having access to official documents of a confidential nature.

see also 2010/CC 27 Jan

19

4. I understand that the Air Minister has very properly taken the greatest exception to the publication of these articles and has brought them to your notice.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander has directed me to represent to you in the strongest manner the necessity for ensuring that such newspaper attacks on Italian serving personnel now fighting with the Allied forces should stop. Such attacks in what should be a responsible newspaper cannot fail to have an adverse effect on the morale of such personnel and thus upon our joint war effort against the common enemy. Being serving officers neither the Admirals nor Colonel Remondino can themselves reply publicly to the allegations against them but they should be able to rely for protection upon the Italian Government. It will become quite impossible

171

See 174

-2-

to conduct affairs of the fighting services in the war if their senior officers are to be exposed to newspaper attacks of a scurrilous nature based upon information itself misleading which, certainly in the case of Colonel Remondino, can only have been supplied by officers in official positions having access to papers which should be treated as strictly confidential.

6. I am to bring to your notice the possibility of dealing with the matter of publication under present Italian military censorship and to request that you should consider taking all necessary powers if your Ministries do not now possess them.

7. I am also to request that you should take the proper measures to deal with officers in responsible positions who betray their trust by making improper use of confidential and official information.

8. Both the appearance of these articles in responsible Italian newspapers and the leakage of confidential information, in the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander, reflects most unfavourably on the Italian administration and must be stopped.

*Note:*

*Copy of minute to COS from Major Quayle:  
Aide memoire will be delivered by C.C.  
to Sig. Bonomi at 1730 hrs. this evening,  
January 27th.*

*cc: Air Force Stc } per 502/29/COS.  
• Naval Stc }  
Mr Macmillan - per folio 173.*

(171)

8

DE/H/13.1/CA

27 January 1945

FOR PRESS ATTACKS ON  
REMONDINO, See File 9251/CC

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have been informed that judicial and separation proceedings have been initiated against Colonel Aldo REMONDINO of the Royal Italian Air Force and that the investigation of the charges made against this officer has already been started.

The Air Vice Marshal commanding the Air Force Sub-Commission advises me that the retention of Colonel REMONDINO as Vice Chief of the Air Staff is essential to the Allied war effort.

Further I am informed that the facts which will be brought to light upon investigation of these charges or in the hearing of the separation proceedings are of such a nature that their publication would be contrary to the Allied interests in the prosecution of the war.

The Procuratore Generale Militare has been interviewed and has been informed that, from the evidence in possession of this Commission, Colonel REMONDINO appears to be entirely innocent of the charges made against him. Nevertheless, he has stated that he has no power to intervene in the case unless this evidence is brought to the notice of the court.

You are, of course, aware that under the Armistice Terms you are required to abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and to carry out promptly and efficiently all orders in relation thereto given by the United Nations.

For the reasons above given, I must require the immediate discontinuance of all proceedings both judicial and under Decree 159 against Colonel REMONDINO.

I shall be glad to hear from you as soon as possible that the necessary action has been taken.

Yours very truly,

See (104)

ELERY W. STONE

ELERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Office of CC  
DISPATCHED  
Date 27 Jan 1945  
Via Hand of Admiral STONE  
Initials D.H.

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government, ROME.

cc: CA Section (originator) - See (103)  
dis S/C  
Naval S/C  
COS

26/10/45  
A-1-2503-20-7m

(104)

JAN/30

CC 9251

27 January 1945.

170a

Dear Mr. Malcolm:

I am directed to acknowledge and thank you for the message from Mr. Macmillan transmitted by you on January 26th.

Yours sincerely,

*J. A. Quayle*

J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R. A.  
Staff Officer to CC

See 173

15

• Mr. A. C. E. Malcolm,  
First Secretary,  
British Embassy,  
Rome.

FILED A only

16

16

9251/CC

172

Message for Chief Commissioner of Allied Commission from  
the Acting President of the Allied Commission.

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Mediterranean Allied Air Force authorities  
are much concerned by a repetition of previous attack  
in "Voce Repubblicana" on Colonel Remondino, Vice  
Chief of Italian Air Staff.

2. There are two features of this case which are  
particularly disturbing and reflect most unfavourably  
upon the Italian administration:-

(a) Colonel Remondino is an officer who has the  
confidence of Italian Air Force personnel now fighting  
with the Allied Air Forces and attacks of this sort in  
what would be a responsible newspaper cannot fail to have  
an adverse effect on morale of these personnel and thus  
upon our joint war effort against the common enemy. Being  
a serving officer, Colonel Remondino cannot himself reply  
publicly to allegations against him but should be able to  
rely for protection upon the Italian Government.

(b) It seems clear beyond all doubt that material for  
these articles must have been supplied by an official in  
the Italian Air Ministry or High Commission for operation,  
having access to official documents of a confidential nature.

3. Deputy A.C.C. in Chief on January 17th discussed  
previous article which appeared on January 14th with the Air  
Minister, Signor Casparotto who expressed his indignation and  
promised to take up the matter strongly in the Council of  
Ministers on the following day. And it will become quite impossible  
to conduct affairs of a fighting service in the war if its  
senior officers are to be exposed to newspaper attacks of a  
scurrilous nature based on information itself misleading, which  
they must be well aware can only have been supplied by officers  
in official positions, having access to papers which should be  
treated as strictly confidential.

14 -  
1706

/A

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4. I would be grateful if you would speak to Prime Minister Bonomi on this matter in suitable terms and discuss with him possible remedies to prevent a repetition. The two points that arise are -

(a) Possibility of dealing with these under present Italian military censorship, and

(b) taking of appropriate measures to deal with officers in responsible positions who betray their trust by making improper use of confidential and official information.

5. I would be grateful for a report as to present situation under 4 (a) and 4 (b) respectively. The Italian Government should be asked to consider taking any necessary powers if they do not possess them.

6. You will no doubt make clear to the Prime Minister that we are not concerned with actual merits of the case against Colonel Remandino but it should be pointed out that his selection was made by Italian Air Ministry and approved by Air Forces Sub-Commission with full authority of Air Marshal Slessor.

26th January, 1945.

31



JAN 24 RECD

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,  
 ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL ELLERY W. STONE,  
 CHIEF COMMISSIONER,  
 HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 24TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/20/SPEC INT.

Herewith the Italian version of the attack on REMONDINO in the  
 Voce Republicanana of January 21st.

for expiration of this man,  
 see file 2610/CC 270m.

*W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet*

See (171)  
 Para (3)

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET;  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
 AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

9251/CC

12 .

(170)

Hold file ←

Message for Chief Commissioner of Allied Commission from  
the Acting President of the Allied Commission.

-----

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1706

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26th January, 1945.

JAN 24 RECD

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,  
 ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL ELLERY W. STONE,  
 CHIEF COMMISSIONER,  
 HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 24TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/20/SPEC INT.

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*For expiration of this man,  
 see file 2610/CC 279m.*

*W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet.*

*See (171)  
 Para (3)*

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET;  
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
 AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

*92551/CC*

13 .

*(170)*

*Hold file* ←

TRANSLATION. P. 20h "La Voce Repubblicana". Jan 21st 45.

CABBAGES AND KINGS.

The analysis of the Remondino case has created a great buzzing in the military burocratic camp, rotating round the axis of epuration.

What alarms, mobilization of defense reserves, speculations and what not.

In the scramble to defend, by Italians and non Italians, there is an effort to repair the breach in the ranks of the Monarchists caused by a surprise action.

They didn't expect that one.

The zone of silence they thought to have created around the person of one of the prototypes of the double game was suddenly subjected to the light of day.

They counted profoundly on the subtle comprehension of the Military Tribunal, in which composed and austere isolation it would have been possible to have wangled a fait accompli, saving the face of (?the King) and in doing so saving the faces of the underlings automatically and with convenience.

It is incomprehensible however, that Remondino did not think that at least some of his associates would be sacrificed and muddled by the Lt. General's decree of July 14.

No. He wanted to play his cards for all they were worth, strong in the protection of the Monarchy and a small coterie of fortune's favourites and by the latitude of his place of residence.

His escort of parasites was numerous, and grew between Sept. 8th 43 and June 44. It cannot therefore be excluded that, exactly on the 4th of June, at eight in the morning, somebody bolted into a rabbit hole by way of Viale Castro Pretorio, under the noses of American tanks, to ask whether they really were Allies - whether they really intended to stay in Rome! One never knows does one? In October 45 the big shots and their underlings changed flags pronto in order to secure a bi-lingual certificate for their pockets, and in December they made ready to hop off. Somewhere about that time they swore to Remondino, who had been to Bassano and who had returned to create the set-up of a double game with the Musco-Santini radio station and make contact with General Cappa. General Cappa - only in December he it remembered

- took advantage of information from the open city, connected up the bands that had been operative since September and October inside and outside the Roman walls, placing them under the

provisions



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What was Remondino doing? He assisted those who had made over to the King's government in various ways, or who had cantered this way and that in search of employment with the republicans.

He attached no importance to the others, for he thought them too compromised and sought-after by the SS because they had remained indifferent and deaf to all appeals and threats and because they did not seek evasion in convalescent leave or clinics; because they faced things in the streets alongside the partisans of whatever political creed who risked their lives and did not do any acrobatics in the shape of double games.

But what was Remondino's game from December to December? He was close to Gen. Urbani in order to save himself in the first sad days and to justify his failure to leave Sardinia; he was the

170



JAN 24 1945

VOCE REPUBBLICANA 21 GENNAIO 1945

=====  
C A P R A E C A V O L I  
=====

L'analisi del caso Remondino, resa di pubblica ragione, ha messo in ebollizione tutta la struttura burocratica militare ruotante intorno all'asse dell'epurazione.

Allarme, mobilitazione delle forze di riserva, indagini, corsa ai ripari.

Ai lati del cuneo insinuatosi nelle difese, italiani e non italiani, cercano di riprendere contatto per arginare la falla aperta nel fronte monarchico dall'azione condotta di sorpresa.

Non se l'aspettavano.

La zona di silenzio che credevano aver posto all'intorno di uno dei prototipi del "doppio gioco", è stata improvvisamente attraversata dalla luce.

Fidavano molto sulla sottile comprensione del Tribunale Militare nel cui composto ed austero isolamento sarebbe stato possibile creare il fatto compiuto, salvando innanzi tutto la capra. I cavoli si sarebbero automaticamente salvati per conseguenza e per convenienza.

E' inconcepibile, però, il fatto che il Remondino, non abbia pensato che almeno una piccola parte dei suoi cavoli bisognava sacrificarla gettandola in pasto al decreto luogotenenziale 27 luglio 1944.

No. Ha voluto tentare il tutto per tutto, forte della protezione di due monarchie e di una piccola massa di favoriti dalla fortuna e dalla latitudine del luogo di residenza.

La scelta di cavoli era copiosa ed acquistata nel tempo trascorso dall'8 settembre 1944; non si può anzi escludere che qualcuno sia entrato nel canestro proprio il 4 giugno, alle otto del mattino, passando dal viale Castro Pretorio tra un singolo e l'altro dei carri armati americani, e dopo aver domandato se quelle truppe erano proprio ..... gli alleati e se avevano

te attraversata dalla luce.

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Nell'ottobre 1943, capra e cavoli, aderirono pro-forma, per avere il certificato bilingue in tasca, nel dicembre si impegnarono a partire, qualche giorno dopo giurarono nelle mani del Colonnello Remondino il quale era stato a Bassano, era ritornato e si era creato ormai il piedistallo del "doppio giuoco" con la stazione radio della città aperta (Musco-Santini) e con i contatti presi col generale Cappa che, soltanto nel dicembre - si noti - e vedendosi delle informazioni avute dalla radio città aperta, agganciò le bande che si erano costituite fin dal settembre e dall'ottobre, entro e fuori le mura romulee, e le pose al suo comando, inquadrandole con generali ed iniziando una provvidenziale opera di assistenza senza la quale una gran parte dei coraggiosi e fedeli aviatori sarebbe morta di fame, di stenti e di demoralizzazione.

Che fece il Remondino? Assistette quelli che avendo aderito in varia forma o che avevano fatto su e giù per l'Italia in cerca

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under secretary of Botto, to play a double game for both; he was with the Republican under secretary Tessari, the so called "Ferocious Saladin" for the spoliation of offices and stores; he was with Gen. Lombard in order to obey all the orders of Kesselring, and, finally, he was in contact with Gen. Kappa in order to put himself in the right for the future.

To us, enemies of the too-intelligent and the Machiavellian and friends of courageous decision in face of any risk, it would have been pleasant to have had a Remondino of sincerity who would have spoken to us thus -

" Dear friends - I am a good chap, just as you are. I have a family, and I want to stay with them. To do so I will abandon to their fate the units in Sardinia, who, after all are quite well off and can get along without me. But I am scared pink that I might lose everything, perhaps my life, and with it the rank of Colonel, which I have gained with such ease by means of my smooth tongue and one or two gambles of a fortunate nature along the way. Everything has gone jolly well for me and I don't want to bust things up by doing anything rash. So as to save myself I shall hang up my hat here, with a pretty comfortable income, plenty of good food, a car for running around, and a corps of yes-men admirers under my thumb which I can count upon after having paid them, fed them, protected them from every present and future inconvenience by means of my certificates in various languages - German, North Italian, South Italian and - well, why not say it? - English. If those of the North return again I shall be OK. If those of the South come North I shall be OK just the same.

But for you there is no salvation. Either you take a chance with the Republicans or you get out and fend for yourselves. But be careful of your step, of the guns of the PAI and the SS, the Fosse Ardeatine; and if you have not enough to eat, then resist, resist and resist - for the honour ~~of~~ of the IAF."

them!

Remondino did not speak those words, but he acted

C.C.A.

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But for you there is no salvation. Either you take a chance with the Republicans or you get out and fend for yourselves. But be careful of your step, of the guns of the PAI and the SS, the Fosse Ardeatine; and if you have not enough to eat, then resist, resist and resist - for the honour of the IAF."

Remondino did not speak those words, but he acted  
them!

C.C.A.

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di reddito impiego repubblicano.

Di quegli altri non se ne curò: li riteneva troppo com-  
promessi e ricercati dalle S.S. perchè rimasti sordi a tutti  
gli appelli ed a tutte le minacce perchè non avevano cercato  
licenze di convalescenza o ricovero in luoghi di cura, perchè  
si erano schierati nelle strade, a fianco di altri partigiani  
delle formazioni politiche di tutti i colori, rendendosi  
pericolosi e non avvicinabili dagli acrobati del "doppio giuoco".

Ma quale è stato il gioco del Remondino dal settembre  
al dicembre? Fu vicino al generale Urbani per mettersi al  
sicuro nei primi tristi giorni e per giustificare un pochino  
la mancata partenza per la Sardegna, fu col sottosegretario  
repubblicano Botto per il doppio giuoco di entrambi (sic), fu  
col sottosegretario repubblicano Tessari, detto il feroce  
Saladino, per la spoliazione degli uffici e dei magazzini,  
fu col generale Lombard per obbedire a tutti gli ordini del  
Kesselring, fu in fine a contatto col generale Cappa per met-  
tersi un buon puntello sotto il seggiolino dell'avvenire.

A noi, nemici della troppa intelligenza e del machia-  
vellismo, amici della coraggiosa decisione di fronte a qualsiasi  
rischio, sarebbe invece piaciuto un Remondino sincero e che ci  
avesse parlato così:

"Cari amici, io sono un bravo ragazzo come voi, ho una famiglia,  
vorrei rimanermene a Roma con i miei abbandonando al loro  
destino i reparti che stanno benissimo in Sardegna anche senza  
di me, ma ho una fifa santa di perdere tutto, forse la vita  
e con essa anche il grado di colonnello che ho raggiunto in  
un soffio, per merito della mia voce di primadonna e di due  
o tre fortunate circostanze incontrate per via, come si  
incontrano i numeri da giocare al lotto. M'è andata sempre  
bene e non vorrei arrischiare tutto della vostra stessa ed  
unica partita. Per salvarmi mi piazza qui, con uno stipendio  
vistoso, una buona razione viveri, la macchina per deambulare  
Ad un gruppetto di corifei ammiratori intorno che mi riservo  
manovrare all'ultimo momento, dopo averli pagati, nutriti,  
protetti da ogni inconveniente presente e futuro mediante il

fu col generale Lombard per obbedire a tutti gli ordini del Kesselring, fu in fine a contatto col generale Cappa per mettersi un buon puntello sotto il seggiolino dell'avvenire.

A noi, nemici della troppa intelligenza e del machiavellismo, amici della coraggiosa decisione di fronte a qualsiasi rischio, sarebbe invece piaciuto un Remondino sincero e che ci avesse parlato così :

"Cari amici, io sono un bravo ragazzo come voi, ho una famiglia, vorrei rimanermene a Roma con i miei abbandonando al loro destino i reparti che stanno benissimo in Sardegna anche senza di me, ma ho una fifa santa di perdere tutto, forse la vita e con essa anche il grado di colonnello che ho raggiunto in un soffio, per merito della mia voce di primadonna e di due o tre fortunate circostanze incontrate per via, come si incontrano i numeri da giocare al lotto. M'è andata sempre bene e non vorrei arrischiare tutto della vostra stessa ed unica partita. Per salvarmi mi piazza qui, con uno stipendio vistoso, una buona razione viveri, la macchina per deambulare ed un gruppetto di corifei ammiratori intorno che mi riservo manovrare all'ultimo momento, dopo averli pagati, nutriti, protetti da ogni inconveniente presente e futuro mediante il mio stesso certificato in lingua tedesca, italiana del nord, italiana del sud e - perchè no - anche inglese? Se scendono quelli del nord, sono a posto, se salgono quelli del sud me la cavo brillantemente col doppio giuoco.

Per voi non c'è più posto e perciò, o partite per la repubblicchina o datevi alla macchia, state attenti alle voltate, ai mitra della P.A.I. e delle S.S., alle Fosse Ardeatine e, se non avete da mangiare, resistete, resistete per l'onore dell'aeronautica."

Remondino non ha parlato così, ma ha fatto così. E' tutto.

C.C.A.

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British Embassy,

Yone.

26th January, 1945

Secret.

Dear Admiral Stone,

We have just received by telegraph the enclosed message for you from the Acting President, Mr. Macmillan.

Yours sincerely,

*A.C.E. Malcolm*  
A.C.E. Malcolm.

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,  
USNR,  
Chief Commissioner,  
15. Chief Commission,  
etc.

170a

Sec 172  
173  
A

12.5.11/...

CC 149  
JAN 18  
FILED

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL ELLERY W. STONE,  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 16TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/20/SEC INT.

TOP SECRET.

167a

Attached is a copy of a paragraph from a letter which I received this morning from Sir John Slessor.

2. I have already notified you of the <sup>article</sup> ~~action~~ in the Voce Republican. The case now divides itself into two:

(a) To find who was responsible for the leakage of information disclosed by the article.

(b) To stop the attacks in the press, on serving Officers.

3. As regards 2(a) this is a very complicated and rather delicate matter, but I hope to let you have an interim report or reports very shortly.

4. As regards 2(b), Sir John told me, when he left Rome, to leave the matter to him to settle. From the attached you will see that the onus is now on us again. A translation of the article was sent to you with my original report.

5. I understand I am seeing you about this at 1800 hours this evening.

See 170

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

TOP SECRET

925-11cc

168

Disseminated with P17

17

FILE

As regards the newspaper article, Mr. Macmillan is inclined to think that we might get the Italian Government to take some action in this matter, because it is definitely one which affects the military efficiency and morale of the Italian Air Force which is fighting with us against the Germans. He wishes you to have the article translated and, again in the first instance, to consult the Chief Commissioner on the action taken. You mentioned the possibility of getting the Italians to establish their own censorship to deal with this sort of thing, though I am in some doubt as to whether that would be much good. But I think the line we should stand on is that the Italian Government should make it clear that they will not tolerate this sort of personal attack in the Press upon serving officers of the Italian Forces, because that is a military matter as affecting military efficiency.

I understand Mr. Macmillan will be back in Rome on Sunday and you will probably have had time to do some preliminary exploration of both these points in conjunction with the Chief Commissioner before he returns.

168

Mick Compton }  
Bononia

JAN 29 RECD  
CC 250

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,  
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: REAR ADMIRAL ELLEFY W. STONE, U.S.N.R.,  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 15TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/20/SPEC INT.

TOP SECRET.

See (168)

Attached herewith is a translation of an article which appeared in yesterday morning's issue of the Voce Republicanana.

2. By a stroke of fortune the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Slessor, was in Rome yesterday. He views this sort of thing with the very gravest concern, as it is obviously quite impossible to maintain order and discipline in an Armed Force when articles of this kind, directed against serving Officers in high positions, are allowed to appear in the Public Press. Sir John went back to Caserta yesterday afternoon and hoped to see Mr. Macmillan, but I have not yet heard that he has done so. His intention was to ask SACMED to issue an order prohibiting articles containing criticisms of serving Officers, on the grounds that these are prejudicial to the war effort.

3. The article really amounts to the brief for the Prosecution against Remondino, before the Commission for Sanctions against Fascism or the Military Tribunal. It is scandalous that an article of this sort, containing information which can only be obtainable within the Air Ministry, should reach the press. In fact it is quite obvious that it is "an inside job".

4. One of the more serious aspects of this is that it is a fact that Remondino was risking his life under the direct orders of the Allies, who had ordered him to join the Germans and create as much confusion as possible, while submitting information to us. At present this fact cannot be publicly disclosed, the more so as Remondino's relatives are in the North, and undoubtedly reprisals would be taken against them.

5. My Intelligence Staff are convinced that they know who is responsible for this, and so far have produced a certain amount of circumstantial evidence; direct evidence would, of course, be almost impossible to get. The individuals we consider responsible are a certain Colonel CAPEZZONE, and a Civil Servant called BUCELLATO. Both are employed in the Air Ministry, and CAPEZZONE is Air Force Liaison Officer to the Epuration Commission. We

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925-1100

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5. My Intelligence Staff are convinced that they know who is responsible for this, and so far have produced a certain amount of circumstantial evidence; direct evidence would, of course, be almost impossible to get. The individuals we consider responsible are a certain Colonel CAPEZZONE, and a Civil Servant called BUCCELLATO. Both are employed in the Air Ministry, and CAPEZZONE is Air Force Liaison Officer to the Epuration Commission. We have known for some time that it has been the avowed intention of these two to disrupt the Italian Air Force. This article is the first of a series which the Voce Republican intends to publish, dealing with other Senior Officers of the Air Force.

6. I have not yet paid my official call on the new Air Minister, but through the Chief of Staff I have sent him a message asking him to investigate this matter at once, and if he is satisfied that these individuals are responsible, he is to dismiss them at once. If he will not do so, I intend to step in and order him to do so; this step has the full approval of Sir John Slessor.

7. I do not wish to be precipitate in this matter, but it is essential that action should be taken as soon as possible. The morale of the Operational crews is already badly shaken by the departure of General Piacentini, and we know that Remondino is held in the highest esteem by them, and that even this article may cause a collapse in morale in the Air Force.

167a ✓ W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet  
A

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,  
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,  
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.



JAN 29 1950  
CC 250

THE FAVOURITES OF THE MONARCHY

COL. REMONDINO DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
OF THE AIR FORCE

Remondino denounced to the High Commissioner.

On the basis of a number of unquestionable documents in November 1944 the High Commissariat for Sanctions against Fascism deferred Col. Aldo Remondino, who is at present Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, to the Military Tribunal of Rome for having committed the crimes contemplated in article 5 of the defascising laws.

The denunciation was drafted as follows :

"On September 6th 1943 Col. Pilot Aldo Remondino was Commanding Officer of the Fighter Wing of Sardinia which was acting in collaboration with squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group. At that time a group of aircraft of the above Wing, comprising a reduced number of personnel, was at Foligno for re-equipment.

On September 6th 1943 Col. Remondino left for Rome on official duty and landed at Ciampino Sud A/D where his plane was parked. On the evening of the 6th, having already carried out his mission, he heard of the Armistice.

It was his duty to return to his post immediately, and in consideration of the important task which he should have performed in that very critical and delicate crisis with his Fighter Wing, he should have used whatever means possible to reach his operational base.

It is known that Ciampino Sud A/D was occupied by the Germans on the evening of September 10th at 2300 hours, he therefore had two days' time to leave by the same means he had arrived by. Further, the other A/Ds in the vicinity only fell under the actual control of the Germans between the 16th and the 16th of September. This is proved by the fact that :

a) Major Koci left the Urbs A/D on September 14th;

On September 5th 1943 Col. Remondino left for Rome on official duty and landed at Ciampino Sud A/D where his plane was parked. On the evening of the 8th, having already carried out his mission, he heard of the Armistice.

It was his duty to return to his post immediately, and in consideration of the important task which he should have performed in that very critical and delicate crisis with his Fighter Wing, he should have used whatever means possible to reach his operational base.

It is known that Ciampino Sud A/D was occupied by the Germans on the evening of September 10th at 2300 hours, he had therefore had two days' time to leave by the same means he had arrived by. Further, the other A/Ds in the vicinity only fell under the actual control of the Germans between the 15th and the 16th of September. This is proved by the fact that :

- a) Major Moci left the Urbs A/D on September 14th;
- b) Major Casini left Littoria together with the whole garrison of that A/D on September 12th;
- c) Col. Cigerza left Perugia A/D with 56 aircraft on September 14th.

As it was not necessary for him to reach his post by means of his own plane, he could easily have used any aircraft parked on the above A/D which contained a considerable number. Col. Giuseppe Baudoin, Commanding Officer of the Corsica A/D, acted on these lines. He was also in Rome at the time, and on the morning of September 5th he went to Centocelle A/D, took the first plane he could get hold of and reached his post in Corsica.

In his memorandum, Col. Remondino himself states that immediately after the declaration of Armistice five planes of his Wing left for Sardinia under the orders of Captain Spagnolino. Why did he not feel that it was his duty to go too ?

167a

He made no effort to leave either by land or air. His honour as a soldier, Commanding Officer of a Group which was on the other side of the lines, required that he cross the lines, even if he had to do so by foot, as many others did.

It must therefore be assumed that Col. Remondino failed to leave because he had decided not to take up a position hostile to the Germans. Evidence of his mental outlook on this subject is given by :

- his having taken part as a volunteer in the Spanish war, where he fought two years for the defense "of the high ideals of fascism" as indicated in the motivation of a silver medal awarded to him on this occasion
- Gen Venceslao D'Aurelio - I.A.F. - Ministry Rome, who was his Commanding Officer for some time, can testify as to his Germanophile and fascist sentiments, which he often displayed in a sectarian manner

Remondino at the Orders of Fascism.

It is also known that a few days after armistice Remondino made contacts with the Fascist Air Force Authorities of Rome, and as soon as the organization of the Republican Air Force was initiated, he began to collaborate under the new minister Botto.

This activity is proved :

- a) by the above named Gen. D'Aurelio who, before crossing the lines to reach the Royal Government, was in Rome and by means of reliable sources was informed of everything that took place in the Roman Air Force circles
  - b) by a circulation permit issued to Remondino by the Nazi/Fascist authorities on October 18th 1943
  - c) by Remondino's own admissions in the above mentioned memorandum.
- Remondino served in the Republican Air Force up to the 5th of June 1944.

An examination of the documents of the case proves that :

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Remondino served in the Republican Air Force up to the 5th of June 1944.

An examination of the documents of the case proves that : there is no evidence that Remondino, before joining the Republican Air Force, was authorized to do so by the Royal Government or by the Committee of National Liberation.

On the other hand there is evidence, by his own admissions, that his adhesion was spontaneous. He now justifies this adhesion by saying that he meant to serve the cause, but it is obvious to all that this is a childish excuse, for to serve the National cause he had out to do his duty by returning to his unit.

The contacts he had with Lt/Col. Musco and Major Santini, his informers, during the period in which he approached the new republican Air Minister, Botto, do not mean anything; these two officers had no contact at the time with the Royal Government and could not therefore but give egoistical and interested advice as they too had joined the Command of the Open City of Rome under the orders of the Nazis.

1676



The first evidence of an official request by Remondino to the Royal Government for authorisation to play a double game is a cable dated February 15th 1944, i.s. after the consolidation of the Allied bridgehead at Anzio, and that authorisation was issued on February 20th 1944.

In the above mentioned memorandum Remondino, in order to justify his attitude, mentions a programme that he intended to carry out in the interest of the National cause, but does not clearly specify the nature of same. Briefly, this programme can be summarized in the contents of page 4 on the following lines :

- a) the assistance due to families of fallen, missing and P.O.s. was to be continued and encouraged;
- b) all military personnel who actually or subsequently was in the territory depending from the Royal Government, was to be considered P.O.s. and assistance was to be afforded to their families;
- c) Military and Civilian personnel of the Air Ministry, either mutilated, wounded, invalidated or convalescent, following war or service causes, were to be amply assisted;
- d) a partial administrative liquidation of the supplies to the R.Aeronautica was to be effected (for this reason he was also provided with a Power of Attorney);
- e) he was to take charge of de-requisitioning and effect the administrative liquidations relating to same;
- f) a line of conduct with a view to safeguarding the estates and property of the R.Aeronautica actually in Rome
- g) a method of treatment was to be devised for the Personnel of the R.Aeronautica who would refuse to join the Republicans;
- h) the property and goods belonging to Firms and Institutes relating to or in touch with the Air Force were to be safeguarded
- i) the activities of the C.N.F.A. and the A.N.F.C.A.M.V. were to be continued and encouraged.

On this subject it is to be observed that



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3) With regard to par. a), b) and c), the Republican Ministry of National Defense made a number of decrees covering all forms of assistance for the families of absent military personnel, therefore Remondino's activity in this field was superfluous (see enclosure E Circular Ministry National Defense no. 910 of November 20th 1943)

2) With regard to par. d), it is not clear what connection there is between the National cause and the suppliers of the Regia Aeronautica, who had many other ways of getting their credits acknowledged.

3) The same be said with regard to de-requisitioning - par. e).

4) Par. f). It appears that nothing was done to safeguard the property of the Air Force, for it was possible (impossible?) to remove the estates, and the moveable property, as proved by enclosure F and G, were anything but safeguarded by Remondino.

1676

- 5) With regard to par. g) it is remarked that the goods and liquid funds of the various Institutes depending from the Air Force were not safeguarded at all, as everything possible was carried North;
- 6) The activities of the C.N.F.A. and the A.N.C.A.M.V. could not have been subject to changes.

Nothing in favour of the National Cause.-

From the above it is clear that Remondino's activity in favour of the National cause was nil, with the exception of some sporadic information of military character casually supplied to some patriot who managed to extort it from him. And even this information was only supplied in the later days when there was no longer any doubt on the adverse fate of the fascist arms.

On the other hand it is quite clear that

- in those Air Force circles which never would have anything to do with the authorities, Remondino was considered a hostile element, dangerous to non collaborationists
- he persuaded much personnel to go North
- he presided the ceremonies of taking the oath for the Republic which were performed in Rome, and took part in public manifestations representing the Republican Air Ministry (La Tribuna 11th December 1943)

Remondino never belonged to the Clandestine Front, those members of the Front who were in charge of its records testify in this sense, and it can be also gathered from a perusal of his memorandum, in which he never mentions this fact. He never boasted of having done so either, until November 1944, that is five months after the liberation of Rome, and during the latter period there was no reason to justify this reserve on his part.

At present, following the proceedings taken up against Remondino, a Committee of the Clandestine Front has made a statement declaring that Remondino was a member of the same from November 1st 1943 on, but in enclosure M, issued by an officer who was in charge of the records of the Clandestine



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From the above it can be understood that Remondino :

- failed in his loyalty to the State and in his military honour for not having reached or attempted to reach his unit in his Country's most critical period
- enlisted in the armed forces of the enemies of his Country collaborating actively in their field
- induced by persuasion and threats military personnel to take the oath of loyalty to the republic and go North
- by his activity facilitated the transfer North of a greater part of the moveable property.

Apart from the fact that he was a legionary in Spain and a convinced Germanophile, the following sentence uttered by Remondino in the presence of a senior Air Force officer, who had

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turned to him for advice, can give an idea of his moral character. He said: "They are both enemies, but at least with these we eat"

These are the results of the inquest. In spite of this Remondino is being saved. Instead of being arrested he is protected by all the military monarchist caste.

Translation from the "Voce Repubblicana"  
Sunday 14th January 1945

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