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PATRIOTS, GENERAL  
DEC. 1944 - NOV. 1945

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# LIST OF PAPERS

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ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 3201 PATRIOTS - GENERAL

For pat pol problems after end of hostilities in Italy, 29 Apr, 225-7, relations CLNAI-IG.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
159	Ltr. R Prunas No. 71/1481/1169	12 Oct 45	Stone	Illegal activities carried on by Albanian partisans in Bari & S. Maria di Leuce. Request Allied Police help.
160	3631/66/EC Lush	5 Nov 45	Brit. Emb.	Report on Civilian attack on Forts.
161	Cbl LB/63 MC Bari	21 Nov 45	HQ AC	Text of Communist talks

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM -	DATE	TO -	SYNOPSIS
147a	Cbl AC Pat, 9441	9 Jun 45	Lomb, Piemonte	Milan Patz restless due non-pay bonus
148	Memo, Lush	10 Jun 45	CC	Disbandmt by enlisting in Army; Nino Nanetti Div.
148a	Cbl AFHQ, FX-95720	15 Jun 45	MMIA, AC	Disbandmt by enlisting in Army.
148b	Cbl MMIA, O.104	18 Jun 45	AFHQ, AC	Disbandmt by enlisting in Army.
148c	SAC (P) (45)15th Mtg	18 Jun 45		Financing the CLNAI.
149	13244/F, Grafftey-Smith	19 Jun 45	Dist	Financing the CLNAI - final payment.
150	Cbl MMIA, O.107	25 Jun 45	AFHQ, AC	Disbandmt by enlisting in Army.
151	Cbl AMG 8A, M-1133	28 Jun 45	AC, 8A GSI	Ex-Partisans in Udine volunteering for Far-East duty.
152	Cbl AC Pat, 883	29 Jun 45	8A	Ex-Partisans in Udine volunteering for Far East duty.
153	13244/F, Grafftey-Smith	1 Jul 45	CC	Financing the CLNAI.
154	SAC (P) (45) 16th Mtg	20 Jul 45	(Mtn. 3)	Financing the CLNAI.
154a	RXII/025.16, Dunlop	23 Jul 45	AC Ex C	Difficulties posed by CLNs.
155	9006/EC, Lush	9 Aug 45	RC Venezia	Ammo dumps in Belluno area.
156	AC/47/LG, Carr	6 Sep 45	RC Venezia	Difficulties posed by CLNs.
157	36/PAT Stone	19 Oct 45	Parri	Appreciation of work done by It Milit. Patriot Repres at HQ and in the Field.
158	308/83/EC Stone	27 Oct 45	RC Lomb Regn.	CLN Lombardia.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
138	SAC (P) (45) 12th Mtg	24 May 45		Financing the CLNAI.
139	Cbl IV Corps, 1478	25 May 45	5, AC, 15	Disbandmt by enlisted in I. Army, PS.
140	Memo, Stearns	26 May 45	Exc	Disbandmt by enlisting in Army, PS.
140a	Cbl AC Pat, 8546	26 May 45	5, 15, IV	Enplmt of pats in reconstr scheme.
141	542/109/EC, Talbot	27 May 45	5, IV, SCAOs	Activities of Royal Partisans, NW It.
141a	Cbl AC Pat 8638	28 May 45	5, 15, IV	Voluntary enlistment of Ps in Army.
141b	Cbl AC Pat Br 8764	30 May 45	AFHQ	Disbandmt by enlisting in Army.
141c	Cbl AC Pat 8784	30 May 45	5, 15, 8, IV etc	Payments on demobilisation.
141d	Cbl IV Corps 1622	31 May 45	5, AC Pat Br	Payments on demobilisation.
141dd	SAC (P) (45) 13th Mtg	31 May 45		Financing the CLNAI.
141e	Cbl Ven Reg RXII 034.11	1 Jun 45	AC CC	Incorporation of P Div NINNO NANETTI in It Army.
141f	Cbl Piedmont FR/FL/040	1 Jun 45	AC	Payments on demobilisation.
141g	Cbl IV Corps 1636	1 Jun 45	AC, 5, 15	Msg fr Cadorna's Hq: payments on demobilization.
142	Ltr Grafftey-Smith	3 Jun 45	CC	Financing the CLNAI.
143	Cbl AFHQ FX-87882	5 Jun 45	AC, 15	Financing the CLNAI.
143a	Cbl AC Fin 9150	5 Jun 45	Milan-Longhi	Financing the CLNAI.
143b	Cbl AC Pat 9153	5 Jun 45	5, 15, 8, IV etc	Payments on demobilization.
144	IIS 315/Fin, Reede	6 Jun 45	Fin S/C	Financing the CLNAI.
145	Cbl AC CC 9229	6 Jun 45	AFHQ, 15	Financing the CLNAI.
146	Cbl AFHQ F-88666	6 Jun 45	AC	Disbandmt by enlisting in It. Army.
147	SAC (P) (45) 14th Mtg	7 Jun 45		Financing the CLNAI.

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after end of fighting in Italy,  
29 April 45, see CC file 225-7:  
with relations CLNAI - Ital Govt.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM--	DATE	TO--	SYNOPSIS
125	Cbl 15 AC, AG-51	2 May 45	5-8/A, AC	Policy on visits to South by Northern CLNs - please comply with Alcom cable.
125a	Cbl 15 AG, CAS/1781(?)	2 May 45	AC	Policy on visits So. by N. CLNs.
125b	Cbl 15 AG, AG-54	3 May 45	5/A Rear, AC	Policy on visits So. by N. CLNs; AC request reports by pol advs Genoa, Milan.
126	DO Ltr Spofford	2 May 45	Stone	Reimbursement by IG of funds advanced to CLNAI by SOM and OSS. INCL: Ltr G-5/100-1, 27 Apr 45 to AC.
127	Cbl AFHQ, FX-70207	3 May 45	15 AG, AC, SOM	Message from SACMED to Head CLNAI.
128	SAC (P) (45) 9th Mtg	3 May 45		Financing the CLNAI.
129	13244/F, Grafftey-Smith	7 May 45	AFHQ G-5	Reimbursement by IG of funds advanced to CLNAI by SOM and OSS.
130	Cbl AFHQ FX-72848	9 May 45	AC, 15 AG	Financing the CLNAI.
131	SAC (P) (45) 10th Mtg	10 May 45		Financing the CLNAI.
132	Cbl AFHQ F-73364	10 May 45	AC	Financing the CLNAI.
132a	Cbl AC Fin, 7411	12 May 45	AFHQ, DPIC	Financing the CLNAI.
133	Cbl AFHQ, FX-74780	13 May 45	AC, 15 AG	Financing the CLNAI.
134	Cbl AC Fin, 7566	14 May 45	AFHQ, DPIC, 15	Financing the CLNAI.
135	Cbl AC Fin, 7565	14 May 45	Lombardy RFO	Financing the CLNAI.
136	Cbl AC Pat, 7582	14 May 45	15, 8 Venezie	Payments to Patriots - methods.
137	SAC (P) (45) 11th Mtg	18 May 45		Financing the CLNAI.
137a	SAC Econ Subcom 7th Mtg	22 May 45		Estab by CLNAI of "Retribution Bonus".

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111	56/PRB, Fiske	10 Apr 45	FWB, Greenless	FWB release on patriots harmful to AC interests.
111a	102/3/PAT, Upjohn	17 Apr 45	CC	It Mil Patriot Representatives. (IMPR)
112	Booklet, Ministry of Occupied Italy			Publication "I C.L.N. Nell'Alta Italia - formazione e funzionamento".
113	CC 3201, Stone	18 Apr 45	Bonomi	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia" shd not be distributed further; pls clarify IG's position on matter.
114	AFHQ AG 370.64/021 GCT-O	19 Apr 45	Pres, AC	Increase in funds for CLNAI (w/drawn)
115	Ltr, Bonomi	20 Apr 45	Stone	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia" - IG's position in regard thereto.
116	Cbl 15 A/G, CAS 435	21 Apr 45	8/A Macmillan	Increase in finance to CLNAI.
117	Cbl AFHQ, F-64613	23 Apr 45	AC	Medici Tornaquinci's mission to No., report on requested.
118	3208/63/EC, Stone	23 Apr 45	Bonomi	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia".
119	Memo, Quayle	25 Apr 45	PA to Pres.	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia".
119a	SAC (P) (45) 8th Metg.	26 Apr 45		Financing the CLNAI.
120	9/20.1/CA, Stone	27 Apr 45	Offrs, Regions SCAOS, etc.	CCAO's directive on Policy to govern relations of AMG with CLNs, in N.It.
121	573/39/EC, Lush	29 Apr 45	CA Sec	Civil employment of Patriots.
121a	Cbl AC 6570 L G SO(CC)	30 Apr 45	15AG etc	Policy re visits South by CLNs in North
122	Memo, Stone	30 Apr 45	Ex C	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia".
122a	Cbl 15 A/G, CAS-458	30 Apr 45	AMG Armies, AC	New Patriot Certificates being printed
123	Memo, Quayle	1 May 45	SO(M)LO, Rome	Bonomi invites Pres. of CLNAI to Rome. INCL: Bonomi's message to Longhi.
124	AFHQ AG-370.64/021 GCT-O	1 May 45	Pres, AC	Financing the CLNAI.

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114	AFHQ AG 370.64/021 GCT-C	19 Apr 45	Pres, AC	Increase in funds for CLNAI( w/drawn)
115	Ltr, Bonomi	20 Apr 45	Stone	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia"- IG's position in regard thereto.
116	Cbl 15 A/G, CAS 435	21 Apr 45	8/A Macmillan	Increase in finance to CLNAI.
117	Cbl AFHQ, F-64613	23 Apr 45	AC	Medici Tornaquinci's mission to No., report on requested.
118	3208/63/EC, Stone	23 Apr 45	Bonomi	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia".
119	Memo, Quayle	25 Apr 45	PA to Pres.	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia".
119a	SAC (P) (45) 8th Metg.	26 Apr 45		Financing the CLNAI.
120	9/20.1/CA, Stone	27 Apr 45	Offrs, Regions SCACS, etc.	CCAO's directive on Policy to govern relations of AMG with CLNs, in N.It.
121	573/39/EC, Lush	29 Apr 45	CA Sec	Civil employment of Patriots.
121a	Cbl AC 6570 L G SC(CC)	30 Apr 45	15AG etc	Policy re visits South by CLNs in North
122	Memo, Stone	30 Apr 45	Ex C	Publication "I CLN Nell'Alta Italia".
122a	Cbl 15 A/G, CAS-458	30 Apr 45	AMG Armies, AC	New Patriot Certificates being printed
123	Memo, Quayle	1 May 45	SO(M)LO, Rome	Bonomi invites Pres. of CLNAI to Rome. INCL: Bonomi's message to Longhi.
124	AFHQ AG-370.64/021 GCT-C	1 May 45	Pres, AC	Financing the CLNAI.

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
96	Cbl AFHQ, F-39896	8 Mar 45	Alcom	Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North.
97	Ltr, Admiral Stone	9 Mar 45	Bonomi	Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North.
98	Cbl AFHQ FX-41006	10 Mar 45	15 A/G, AC	Payments to Patriots in North, policy.
99	3201/207/EC, Lush	11 Mar 45	Rayner, PWB	Cavronsky's status on trips to NW It.
100	Cbl 15 A/G, 0272B	13 Mar 45	AFHQ, AC	Payments to Patriots in North.
101	3207/68/EC, Lush	15 Mar 45	de Sevin	Enrolment of FFI into French Army.
102	3207/69/EC, Norden	15 Mar 45	CA, Land For	Enrolment of FFI into French Army.
103	Cbl AFHQ, FX-44500	16 Mar 45	AC	Triparea rpt currency despatched AC; for CNIAI purposes.
104	LSC/116, Lush	20 Mar 45	RC Lomb, Lig, Pied, Ven, Em.	Civil employment of Patriots following liberation of Northern territory.
105	3207/74/EC, Stone	21 Mar 45	AFHQ	Induction of It Patriots into It Army INCL: Land Forces Ltr on MAFIA'S views.
106	Ltr, Commercial Bank of Italy	31 Mar 45	Lawler	Report on payments to Patriots in N., and CLNAI report on financial/economic conditions in Northern Italy. APPENDICES
107	Bonomi, 31875/25741/9.13	5 Apr 45	Stone	Remuneration to Patriots' next-of-kin.
108	Cbl EC, LGS, 4905	6 Apr 45	AMG 5/A	Scoccimarro's proposed visit Florence, Pistoia, on adm/pay of Partisans.
109	Cbl 5 Army, 5341	8 Apr 45	AC	Scoccimarro's proposed visit Florence, Pistoia, on adm/pay of Partisans.
110	Cbl 15 A/G, 0316B	10 Apr 45	AFHQ, AC	Policy in dealing w Partisans in NW It must be communicated to Armies; request AFHQ give final approval to plans.

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80	Memo, Political Sec	19 Feb 45	- -	Conversation Messrs Halford & Schott & Maj Whitty: Financing system not working satisfactorily.
80a	AFHQ MJPS, P/265	18 Feb 45		Int Rept on Measures deal w Patriots SAC approves Study P/265 of Joint Planning Study; discussion on possibility of sending sen. LO to N. Italy.
81	SAC (P) (45) 1st Mtg	20 Feb 45		
82	Ltr COS, AFHQ	20 Feb 45	CC AC	Enrolment of Patriots in It Army; new policy established.
82a	Ltr French Rep on AC	24 Feb 45	Ex Com	Enrolment of Patriots (FFI) in France. Gawronski's status in trips to NW It.
82b	3210/188/EC, Lush	23 Feb 45	Rayner, FWB	
83	3207/48/EC, Stearns	1 Mar 45	Land Forces & CA Sec	Enrolment of Patriots in It Army; new policy; COS AFHQ Ltr for comments.
83a	Memo, Actg President	1 Mar 45	CC	Patriots induction & processing. Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North
84	Memo, Grotanelli	1 Mar 45	Stone	
85	+Memo, Quayle	2 Mar 45	Ex Com	Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North
86	Memo, Quayle	2 Mar 45	Ex Com	Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North
87	Memo, Asst POLAD, AC	2 Mar 45	Ex Com	Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North
88	Cbl CCS, FAN 497 (Paraphrase)		AFHQ	Close watch on CLN attempt set up in opposition IG in Rome; SO fr SAC to CLN..
89	3207/52/EC, Stearns	2 Mar 45	Land Forces & CA Sec	Patriots' induction & processing; Mac- millan requests info for FO London. Gavronsky's status on trips to NW It.
89a	Ltr John Rayner, FWB	2 Mar 45	Lush	
90	3207/56/EC, Talbot	3 Mar 45	French Rep AC	Enrolment of Patriots (FFI) In Fr Army.
91	3207/55/EC, Norden	3 Mar 45	CA Sec, Land Forces SC	Enrolment of Patriots (FFI) in French Army.
92	Cbl AC 2972, Lush	6 Mar 45	AFHQ	Medici Tornaquinci's Mission to North.
93	121/6/PAT, Stone	7 Mar 45	Bonami	Remuneration to Patriots.
94	Cbl AFHQ, FX-39303	7 Mar 45	15 A/G, AC	Payments to Patriots in North.
95	Cbl AFHQ, NAF-875 FX-39851.	8 Mar 45	CCS	Propose await Tornaquinci's ret before replying FAN 497.

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65	P/541.13, Lush	12 Jan 45	RCs, SGAOs, DCCAO	Relations between Allies, Ital Govt & CLNAI explained in detail.
66	3207/13/COS, Stone	16 Jan 45	SACMED	Enrolment of Patriots in Ital Army.
67	121/6/PAT, Stone	23 Jan 45	Bonomi	Remuneration to Patriots.
68	Memo, Actg President	23 Jan 45	CC	Proposal to SAC to appoint Committee
69	Memo, COS	24 Jan 45	CC	Suggest CC(or rep) & Gen Browning attend Committee (AFHQ) on Patriots.
x-ref 70	Ltr G-3 AFHQ Plans/134	30 Jan 45		Mtg held 29 Jan re Occupation of No. Italy; Provision for & orders to CLNAI
71	6519/14/CCS	31 Jan 45	Dist AC	Patriot Situation in No. Italy: result of study by Pol Sec AC of report by HQ #1 Spec Force. Difficulties.
72	Ltr 6519 COS Stone	2 Feb 45	Kirk, Charles	Herewith report based on #1 Spec Force info. Propose to rec change to SACMED.
73	Cbl SOMTO, AG/6	2 Feb 45	G-3 AFHQ, AC	London directs No. 1 Sp Force funds not be used finance patriots; funds to come fr ROME Govt (or Army AFA funds)
74	Cbl AFHQ 047	5 Feb 45	SOMTO	CLNAI Finance, between Berne & Rome
75	Cbl AFHQ FX 22555 MAG 524	7 Feb 45	AGWAR for CCS	Circulation of currency by Partisans in enemy-occupied Italy
76	Ltr 3207/COS	8 Feb 45	French Rep AC	Enrolment of Patriots - questionnaire to be filled out by G-5 men in France
77	Ltr P/520.13 Stone	9 Feb 45	Bonomi	Instruction of Patriots by parts of new Ministry for Occupied Italy must cease, as SACMED is authority.
78	121/6/PAT, Stone	12 Feb 45	Bonomi	Remuneration to Patriots coming thru the lines or met in lib territory.
79	Cbl AFHQ F-27859 (F-26918)	16 Feb 45	AC (15 A/G)	Policy in dealing with partisans in NW Italy, subject approval by CCS.
79a	13196/F, Finance SC	17 Feb 45	CC	Expenditures for It Patriots.

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ALCOM LO Bari

HQ ALCOM for Executive Commissioner rptd Civil Affairs Section  
Public Safety Sub Commissioner

IMMEDIATE. Continuing our message reference LB/62 dated 20th November. Communist speakers La Torre - Renzuli called for the arrest of the Carabinieri NCO i/c Massafra and of Chief of Civil Police Massafra. The speakers also demanded the immediate resignation of the Prefect of Taranto. This probably a reprisal against the Prefect who bluntly ordered La Torre out of the Prefects office a few days ago. A so called order of the day was given to the Prefect ordering him to resign. The Prefect agreed to resign provided the Central Government gave order. The speakers standing on a vehicle told the people that the Prefect had agreed to resign. The so called Order of the Day also demanded the banning of the Uomo Qualunque and Corriere Meridionale but the Prefect said that he was no authority to do this as permission for publishing had been given by Central Government. After the demonstration Comitato di Liberazione met to discuss the events of the morning. C.D.N. meeting ended evening of 19th November. Three parties voted for Prefect and three against. Message ends.

A.C. Distribution.

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5. November 1945.

Ref: 3631/66/BB.

During one of your recent meetings with the Chief Commissioner you raised the matter of the attacks which are alleged to have taken place on several forts in the vicinity of GENOA early last month.

I regret that there has been delay in informing the Embassy on this subject but it has been difficult to find out what actually took place from the conflicting reports received.

It seems quite clear that the press reports concerning these attacks were greatly exaggerated. Reports received by this Commission show that there was never any serious attack on any of the forts and none in strength of either numbers or weapons. It appears that the residents in the vicinity of the forts were responsible for such firing as was done as a protest against the storage of ammunition and explosives in these forts. These protests were connected with explosions of ammunition dumps which had already occurred in GENOA or its vicinity.

There is no indication whatever that the attacks had any political significance.

M S LUSH

*M*

E. E. Sir Noel Charles, Bt, K.C.M.G.,  
High Commissioner,  
British Embassy,  
ROME.

3601/ce

It seems quite clear that the press reports concerning these attacks were greatly exaggerated. Reports received by this Commission show that there was never any serious attack on any of the forts and none in strength of either numbers or weapons. It appears that the residents in the vicinity of the forts were responsible for such firing as was done as a protest against the storage of ammunition and explosives in these forts. These protests were connected with explosions of ammunition dumps which had already occurred in QENKA or its vicinity.

There is no indication whatever that the attacks had any political significance.

M S. LUSH

✓

H.E. Sir Noel Charles, Bt, M.C.M.G.,  
High Commissioner,  
British Embassy,  
ROME.

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MSL/JG.

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OCT 20 RECD  
CC 037Rough TranslationCopy

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

No. 71/1481/1169

Rome, October 12th, 1945

Dear Admiral Stone,

I beg to call your attention to a letter (no. 443/33837 of September 21st, 1945) that the Public Safety Division, Ministry of the Interior, has addressed to the Allied Commission in order to inform them of illegal activities carried on by Albanian partisan elements in Bari and at S. Maria di Leuce.

On the grounds of said report and other information which has reached us, it cannot be excluded that such illegal activities are supported by the Albanian military Mission in Bari. Furthermore the Mission facilitates the clandestine movement of persons and merchandise to and from Albania.

Of course I keep in mind what the Allied Commission has already pointed out on the subject (see note no. 3/7.I.C.A. dated 7th August 1945) namely that it is a question in which it seems that the Italian Government has full authority.

However, in consideration of the serious nature of the above occurrences and owing to the fact that they are repeatedly taking place, I shall appreciate it greatly if you will consider the possibility of having the Allied Police Authorities instructed to cooperate with the Italian Police in watching over and controlling the above mentioned activities of the Albanian partisan elements.

We should also appreciate it if the Allied Authorities would examine the position of the Albanian Military Mission, whose action oversteps its normal scope and whose presence in Italy does not seem to be justified any longer. All the more so in view of the fact that, following the sending to Tirana of a semi-official Italian Mission, a semi-official civil Albanian Mission is expected in Rome, pursuant to the provisions of the Hoxha-Palermo agreement of March 14th, 1945.

Believe me, dear Admiral Stone,

Very Sincerely yours,

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EC DIST - 18 October 45Action: C.A. Section (2); Info: Chief Commr /s/ R. FRUNAS  
Executive CommrAdmiral Elery W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner  
Allied Commission  
ROME

CA Section:

Please forward on your file comments and draft  
reply indicating action taken

Capt. Off Ex Commr.

(159)

noted by [signature]

[handwritten initials]

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
AFO 394  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref : 3/7.1/CA

7 Aug 45

TO : The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Italian Government

(Through Liaison Officer to the  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission)

I refer to your Memorandum of 27 Jul 45 regarding the entry  
of Albanians into Italy.

It would appear that this matter is one in which the Italian  
Government has full competence and there are no grounds on which the  
Allied Commission can usefully interfere.

G.R. UPJOHN Brig,  
VP CA Section

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159

Ref: 308/83/INC.

27 October 1945.

SUBJECT: CLN Lombardia.

TO : Regional Commissioner,  
LOMBARDIA Region.

I refer to your letter R/0520 of 13 October 1945.

1. I am sure that the P.C., CREMONA was activated by the best motives to ensure the subordination of the activities and authority of the CLN to good and just administration. I am equally sure that the procedure he adopted defeated his ends and laid himself, ANG and Allied policy open to just criticism to the effect that ANG was about as dictatorial regime as can be imagined.

2. The CLN's sprang from the people, or a section of the people, who were prepared to fight the Germans and fascists. Whatever their subsequent defects - including usurpation of powers of government - they cannot and should not be put in their place by orders, issued in the form of an open letter, carrying such dictatorial instructions as are those contained in paras 5 - 8 of the letter. | Paras 1 - 4 are sufficient in themselves. The remaining paragraphs ruin the announcement and make the Provincial Commissioner's position extremely difficult to say nothing of that of the Regional Commissioner.

3. Moreover, the Provincial Commissioner must be very parochial in his outlook to imagine that such a public announcement could have been made without effect on other provinces. It should, of course, have been referred to you.

4. As regards your own action, you could have very well supported paras 1 - 4: there was little reason to support 5 - 8. It would not have been difficult to modify these paras, at any rate in verbal communication.

5. I am fully appreciative of the difficulties caused by the CLN and have every sympathy with the Provincial Commissioner and yourself. I am sure the Provincial Commissioner appreciates that his action was open to criticism. We will leave it at that.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

36/PAT

17 October 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

In view of the imminent closing down of Patriots Branch at this Headquarters I take the opportunity of expressing my appreciation for the work done by the Italian Military Patriot Representatives at this HQ and in the Field.

The work of the Italian Military Patriot Representatives has necessitated much research and detailed work. This work has been well done as is shown in the Registers compiled and completed in the Regions.

In addition to the normal routine work Italian Military Patriot Representatives have prepared elaborate records of the activities of partisans, rolls of honour etc. which will be of great value when the history of the partisan movement in Italy comes to be written.

In conclusion it affords me great pleasure in forwarding to you (a) History of the activities of the Patriot Office of Lombardia (b) Records in graph and map form showing inter alia the places where the various engagements took place, field operations of various units etc and (c) Album of photographs which includes that of yourself. You will be greatly interested in these as it was with the movement in Lombardia that you were closely associated and took part.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELDERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR,  
Chief Commissioner.

674

Professor Ferruccio PARRI  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
ROME.

157

SEP 7 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
AFO 394  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

NO/47/45

6 Sep 45

SUBJECT : Committees of National Liberation.

TO : EC Venezia Region

1546

- 1 The points raised by your letter NAL/025.16 of 23 Jul have been very fully discussed. It is thought that the Italian Government is fully aware of the position, you may have noticed that very recently in Milan the Prime Minister warned SIMs not to interfere in matters of "government". Their status is quite clear; they are political bodies having no legal status and no legal powers.
- 2 Under the circumstances, though the receipt of your letter is appreciated, it is considered that no useful purpose would be served by making representations to the Italian Government at the present time.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

*M. Carr*

M. CARR, Brig,  
VP CA Section

673

Copy to : Chief Comm  
Exec. Comm

*[Handwritten mark]*

3201/4

156

5009

CC AUG 10 1945

Ref: 9006/EC

9 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Reports of Ammunition Dumps  
in BELLUNO area.

TO : Regional Commissioner,  
VENEZIA REGION.

I am rather concerned at the reports which have reached me of ammunition dumps presumably formed by the partisans in the BELLUNO area. I understand these have been reported to your Provincial Officers from time to time, but no action has been taken. I would be glad to hear from you on this subject.

For the Chief Commissioner.

M S. LUSH

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

672

155

Handwritten scribble

32011

HEADQUARTERS  
VENEZIE REGION

Allied Military Government  
APO 394

23 July, 1945

TO : HQ. ALLIED COMMISSION  
(Att'n. : Executive Commissioner)

SUBJECT : National Committees of Liberation

File No. : RXII/c25.16

1. I wish to submit for your consideration the desirability and possibility of obtaining from the Italian Government a declaration on the position and responsibilities of Cs.L.N. after the 1st of September.
2. At present the various Cs.L.N. in the Region are reasonably cooperative and certainly in most directions their activities can be kept under control by Provincial Commissioners. I do, however, wish to emphasize that the position of Cs.L.N. in Venetie Region, and possibly in the whole of North Italy, differs entirely from the state of affairs known in South and Central Italy. There, the Cs.L.N. had not achieved any real power before the arrival of Prefects in the area and the development of the normal Italian system of local government. In the North, however, the Cs.L.N. had obtained considerable power among the population during the period of the resistance movement and, in some cases, had exercised executive authority for some days before the arrival of Allied troops and A.M.G. Experience at the time of our entry into the area showed that it would have been quite impossible to bring in career Prefects from the South. Instead local men, recommended by the Provincial C.L.N., were appointed by A.M.G. Many of these men had themselves been Presidents or leading members of the Cs. L.N. They have therefore felt themselves bound to pay considerable attention to the viewpoints of their former colleagues. Some are strong enough to take independent action, some not so strong. In any case, the pressure exists.
3. I do not expect any difficult developments so long as A.M.G. remains in existence. Our close link throughout the Region and the independent position of Provincial Commissioners give, I think, sufficient guarantee. I do, however, anticipate that when A.M.G. ceases one of two things will happen. Either the Prefects will become the mere tools of the Provincial Cs.L.N., or else there will be considerable friction between them. This, as I see it, can only be avoided by some definite decision now on the part of the Italian Government as to the policy they propose to adopt with regard to the Cs.L.N.

4. It may well be for the future good of Italy that local government

under control by Provincial Commissioners. I do, however, wish to emphasize that the position of Cs.L.N. in Venezia Region, and possibly in the whole of North Italy, differs entirely from the state of affairs known in South and Central Italy. There, the Cs.L.N. had not achieved any real power before the arrival of Prefects in the area and the development of the normal Italian system of local government. In the North, however, the Cs.L.N. had obtained considerable power among the population during the period of the resistance movement and, in some cases, had exercised executive authority for some days before the arrival of Allied troops and A.M.G. Experience at the time of our entry into the area showed that it would have been quite impossible to bring in career Prefects from the South. Instead local men, recommended by the Provincial C.L.N., were appointed by A.M.G. Many of these men had themselves been Presidents or leading members of the Cs. L.N. They have therefore felt themselves bound to pay considerable attention to the viewpoints of their former colleagues. Some are strong enough to take independent action, some not so strong. In any case, the pressure exists.

3. I do not expect any difficult developments so long as A.M.G. remains in existence. Our close link throughout the Region and the independent position of Provincial Commissioners give, I think, sufficient guarantee. I do, however, anticipate that when A.M.G. ceases one of two things will happen. Either the Prefects will become the mere tools of the Provincial Cs.L.N., or else there will be considerable friction between them. This, as I see it, can only be avoided by some definite decision now on the part of the Italian Government as to the policy they propose to adopt with regard to the Cs.L.N.

4. It may well be for the future good of Italy that local government should depend upon the existence of locally elected Provincial or Regional bodies. If, however, such is to be the case, then it is desirable that a pronouncement to that effect be made for the composition of such bodies and for their due election.

5. If, on the other hand, the Prefectural system is to continue unchanged then the Government should take the responsibility of saying so. To assume that it is a satisfactory solution to say that the members of the Cs.L.N. can become members of the Giunta Provinciale is, in fact, no practical answer; for the Cs.L.N. as they exist today, feel themselves considerably more important and more powerful than was the case of the old Giunta.

6. A very important question centers round the provision of finance. In the resistance days the various Cs.L.N. received financial grants from the C.N.L.A.I. With these grants they paid their staff and probably paid the members of the C.L.N. Now that the grants have ceased, the Cs.L.N. are beginning to find themselves in financial difficulties and the only way in which they can continue an administrative existence is by raising contributions from the

3201/c

1546  
See 136 ./.  
/.



- 2 -

public. In far too many cases these contributions resemble all too closely forced subscriptions. If it is the intention that Cs.L.N. exist in future in Italy then their composition and organization must be laid down and government funds be made available for their proper maintenance.

7. Otherwise I believe that there is real danger that they will degenerate into party bodies maintained by graft and they will lose a great measure of public sympathy and support. You have no doubt already heard the cynical public exposition of the meaning of their initials, "COME LORO NOI",

JKD/lgc. / cg.

s/ Regional Commissioner

0294

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

1546

**S E C R E T**

K 211

**ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat**

SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting  
20th July 1945

**SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE**  
**(POLITICAL)**

**EXTRACT**

- 3. **PAYMENTS TO CINAI**  
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 3)

1480

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the final payment of 160 million lire to the CINAI to discharge existing obligations had been made and the matter was therefore closed.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

0 2 9 8

785015

32016

3. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 3)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the final payment of 160 million lire to the CLNAI to discharge existing obligations had been made and the matter was therefore closed.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

670

151

Confidential

EXTRACT

cc 0925

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION.

13244/F.

1 July 1945.

SUBJECT : CLNAI Funds.

TO : The Chief Commissioner.

1. You may like to have the following information in preparation for the forthcoming political meeting of SACMED.
2. On 30th June, 1945, a letter was sent by Finance Sub-Commission to the DPIC, AFHQ, enclosing the original of the receipt signed by Longhi in the amount of 160 million lire, stating the acceptance of the payment as a full and final discharge of all obligations under the agreement of 7 December, 1944, between SACMED and the CLNAI.
3. In the same letter, DPIC was requested, in accordance with your instructions, to pass this information to the Secretariat of SACMED's political meeting. Finance Sub-Commission are already in possession of a statement, in some detail, covering the sums disbursed by Longhi from December 1944 to May 1945. A full statement will be sent to AFHQ when further details are received covering (a) the disbursement of 160 million lire relative to the final payment (b) the drawings and expenditure of the Piemonte CLN.
4. All funds advanced under the SACMED agreement have been recovered from the Italian Government.
5. At the request of AFHQ, it has been arranged for a small mission representing Special Forces to see the Prime Minister on 5 July with a view to requesting the repayment by Italian Government to OSS/SOE of 225 million lire being funds advanced by the Special Forces to the CLN prior to the signing of the SACMED agreement. You will recall that Minister Soleri requested further information before he would consider such a payment. The Special Forces Mission expects to achieve success as Signor Parri was the principal recipient of the funds under discussion.

6. Attached please find copies of two letters from Longhi.

*A.P. Grassby*

Brigadier  
Joint Director  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION.

669

153

3201/100

COPY

SECRET

To A.G. TUBB  
Lieut-Colonel  
Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region, Milan.

Your Ref. Fin/3.16/HQ.

SUBJECT: Agreement of 7th December 1944 between the Supreme Allied Commander  
and the Comitato di Liberazione/Alta Italia.  
Nazionale

1. I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 22 with enclosed a copy of letter No. 13244/F of 19 June 1945, received from the Finance Sub-Commission.
2. I take note that one letter of credito for 80 million lire has been forwarded to the Credito Italiano and another for a similar amount has been forwarded to the Banca Commerciale Italiana.
3. As required, I have signed a receipt in original and one copy.
4. I beg to confirm that this amount of 160 million will be subject to regional distribution.
5. I take note that you are forwarding to the Finance Sub-Commission a statement of expenditure, which I had previously submitted to you.
6. I beg to enclose a letter addressed to the Finance Sub-Commission, and I kindly ask you to forward it to Rome.

Please accept my thanks, and believe me, Sir,  
your obedient servant

(sgd) Alfredo Pizzoni  
Pietro Longhi

668 -

153

0 2 9 9

785015

COPY

SECRET

Your Ref. 13244/F

Milan, June 27th, 1945

Tò Brigadier A.P. GRAFFTEY-SMITH  
Joint Director, Finance Sub-Commission  
Headquarters Allied Commission, Rome.

SUBJECT: Agreement of 7 December, 1944, between the Supreme Allied  
Commander and Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italian.

1. I am in receipt of your letter of June 19, by which you inform me that (a) under the agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Forces, hereafter known as SACMED, and representatives and Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia, hereafter known as CLNAI, and (b) following a conversation held on 2 June 1945 in Milan between Brigadier A.P. Grafftey-Smith Finance Sub-Commission, Allied Commission and Signor Alfredo Pizzoni (alias Pietro Longhi), it has now been agreed by SACMED that a payment of 160 million lire should be effected through normal channels representing a full and final payment in discharge of all obligations under the agreement of 7 December, 1944, between SACMED and the CLNAI.

I beg to tender, on behalf of CLNAI, and personally, the most sincere thanks for your interpretation of the spirit of the above mentioned agreement, and for your consequent action.

2. I have handed to the Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region a receipt, in original and one copy, signed by me, on behalf of CLNAI, acknowledging the sum of 160 million lire (say one hundred and sixty million lire) as complete fulfilment of the undertaking of SACMED.

3. Furthermore, I acknowledge that this final payment is, in accordance with the spirit of the agreement, to receive regional distribution.

4. I have already handed over to the Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region, for submission to you, a statement covering all sums paid to my name from December 1944 to May 1945 included. In due course I will submit a statement for the 160 million lire relative to November 1944.

5. I feel bound to express here, once more, on behalf of CLNAI, our deep appreciation and gratitude for the confidence which SACMED has placed in the movement led by CLNAI, when he decided to support and finance it.

Personally, Pietro Longhi finds it difficult to find words adequate to express his profound and heartfelt thanks for the trust which has been placed on his person. These thanks are extended to all Officers, both in Caserta and Rome, and attached to Number I Special Force an OSS, who believed in him, and sponsored the decision to put so great a responsibility on his shoulders. It is Pietro Longhi's pride to have fulfilled his duty, with the help and assistance of a number of Directors of Credito Italiano and Banca Commerciale Italiana, and with the marvellous collaboration of Dr. Vittorio Vannucci, who came voluntarily from Rome to the North to assist in this dangerous undertaking, so that all sums paid to his name have been distributed in the various zones, without the loss of one lira, and amongst very great difficulties.

6

to be so kind to forward to

2. I have handed to the Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region a receipt, in original and one copy, signed by me, on behalf of CLNAI, acknowledging the sum of 160 million lire (say one hundred and sixty million lire) as complete fulfillment of the undertaking of SACMED.
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Pietro Longhi takes the liberty to ask you to be so kind to forward to all Officers concerned these personal expressions of gratitude.
6. I cannot but add, for you, Sir, and for Brig. Brickman and Col. King, at Caserta, who all have always been so comprehensive and trustful, a particular word of thanks.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant

(sgd) Alfredo Pizzoni  
Pietro Longhi

153



FOR ACTION AMG HIGHWAY

883

29 June 1945

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

151

PARA ONE PD REF YOUR MICE ONE THREE THREE PD NO INTENTION OF SENDING ITALIAN FORCES TO FAR EAST PD SCHEME BEING NEGOTIATED TO ENGAGE FIFTEEN THOUSAND ITALIAN CIVILIANS ON THREE YEAR CONTRACT FOR BUILDING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING WORK IN CEYLON PD PARA TWO FOR ACTION AMG HIGHWAY FROM HQ ALCOM CITE AGPAT PAREN

PARA TWO PD AGREEMENT EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BY MID HYPERN JULY AND FULL DETAILS WILL THEN BE ISSUED TO PROVINCIAL LABOUR OFFICES WHO WILL RECRUIT LABOUR PD WILL FORWARD YOU FURTHER DETAILS WHEN AVAILABLE

3201/CC

666

Patriots Branch

321

152

5

J/Comd,  
for R.R. CRIPPS, Col, Director, Local Govt S/O

Nicholas Fomhino  
CWO- U.S.A.  
Sgt. Admitt

CONFIDENTIAL

M1133  
JUNE 281430B

E/7189  
JUNE 281840B  
PRIORITY

MAIN ANG 8 ARMY

HQ ALCOM FOR ACPAT INFO COPY TO MAIN 8 ARMY FOR OSI(C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Considerable numbers of ex Partisans in UDINE are volunteering for service in the far east in Italian forces. Formation of which has been announced in the process. No official details are available here. Please send full details of why such scheme in existence as soon as possible.

Dist

- Action - Patriots Br
- Info - Chief Commissioner
- CA Sec
- I Forces SC
- Eloat
- File 2

See 152

685

3201/cu

151

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

O.107  
JUNE 251230B

E/6697  
JUNE 251520B  
IMPORTANT

MMIA

APHQ INFO/ ALCOM FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER AND PATRIOTS BRANCH.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Our O.104 of 18 due to cipher error. Your FX 93720 cite FHGCT of 15. Recruitment of Patriots since last July is as follows:

1. War Ministry under MMIA instruction has been recruiting volunteers, patriot or otherwise, from all over ITALY as and when required to bring formations and units up to strength.

2. General CADORNA'S proposal to enlist 10,000 patriots from NW ITALY would partially be met by MMIA agreement to accept 4,000 for month of June and more if War Establishment of combat groups and Administrative Divisions permitted. Numbers of patriot volunteers, however, have in past fallen short of vacancies available and considered unlikely 4,000 suitable patriot volunteers will be found from NW ITALY for month of June.

DIST

- INFO-ACTION - PATRIOTS BR
- INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER
- EX COMMISSIONER
- CA SEC
- FILE

664

150

3201/4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SECRET**

1610  
CORR 61 1100  
20

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

13244/F

19 June 1945

**SUBJECT:** Agreement of 7 December, 1944, between the Supreme Allied Commander and Comitato Nazionale Liberazione Alta Italia.

**TO :** As per distribution list.

1. I write with reference to (a) the agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Forces, hereafter known as SACMED, and representatives of the Comitato Nazionale Liberazione Alta Italia, hereafter known as CLNAI, and (b) a conversation held on 2 June 1945 in Milan between Signor Alfredo Pizzoni (alias Pietro Longhi) and Brigadier A. P. Graftley-Smith, Finance Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
2. It has now been agreed by SACMED that a payment of 160 million lire should be effected through normal channels representing a full and final payment in discharge of all obligations under the agreement of 7 December, 1944, between SACMED and the CLNAI.
3. The Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region, is hereby instructed to obtain from Signor Pizzoni, on behalf of the CLNAI, a receipt acknowledging the sum of 160 million lire (say one hundred and sixty million lire) as complete fulfillment of the undertaking of SACMED.
4. He should also indicate to Signor Pizzoni that the terms of the agreement prescribed the apportionment of the amount of 160 million lire per month between various zones. This final payment is, therefore, in accordance with the spirit of this agreement, to receive regional distribution.
5. While the difficulties inherent in securing an accurate accounting for all past disbursements are appreciated, the Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region, is instructed to request Signor Pizzoni to submit a statement to the undersigned as soon as possible.

663

*A.P. Graftley-Smith*

Brigadier,  
Joint Director

3

and final payment in discharge of all obligations under the agreement of 7 December, 1944, between SACMED And the CIMAI.

3. The Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region, is hereby instructed to obtain from Signor Pizzoni, on behalf of the CIMAI, a receipt acknowledging the sum of 160 million lire (say one hundred and sixty million lire) as complete fulfillment of the undertaking of SACMED.

4. He should also indicate to Signor Pizzoni that the terms of the agreement prescribed the apportionment of the amount of 160 million lire per month between various zones. This final payment is, therefore, in accordance with the spirit of this agreement, to receive regional distribution.

5. While the difficulties inherent in securing an accurate accounting for all past disbursements are appreciated, the Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region, is instructed to request Signor Pizzoni to submit a statement to the undersigned as soon as possible.

663

*A.S. Grassiey*

Brisadier,  
Joint Director,  
Finance Sub-Commission.

3201/c

Distribution: H.E. The Minister of Treasury  
Banca Commerciale Italiana, Rome  
Credito Italiano, Rome  
Signor Alfredo Pizzoni  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission ✓  
D.P.I.C., A.F.H.C.  
G-3, A.F.H.C.  
Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group  
Regional Finance Officer, Lombardia Region  
File

149

Confidential

SECRET

K-200

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting  
18th June 1945

SECRET

CONF NO 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

3. PAYMENTS TO CANAL

147

(Previous reference SAC(P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 3)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander stated that all arrangements for final payment of 160,000,000 lire to the CANAL to discharge existing obligations had been completed. It was expected that this sum would be turned over shortly.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

662

Sec 149

3201/CC

148c

SECRET

5-

Note

I informed EC Chief  
Clerk that CC wants  
to see reply to FX 93720  
661 before it is dispatched.  
See Maj. Mordis's note below.  
1/3 Garrison  
22 June

# SECRET

0.304  
JUNE 18/1935B

R/5693  
JUNE 19/1010B  
IMPORTANT

MMIA  
AFHQ INFO: ALOCM

~~SECRET.~~

148 a

Reference your EX 93720 of 15. Presume by militia army you mean Italian Army.  
Please confirm

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION : CA SEC (2)  
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
EX COMMISSIONER  
PATRIOTES BR  
FILE (2)  
FLCAT

32011/c

650

See 150

Note by Major Morden:

Spoke Lt. Col. Howard  
of st. Refused him to  
AFHQ signal EX 93720  
of 15 June. He is sub-  
mitting to us draft  
reply. 20 June 45

# CONFIDENTIAL

148 b



**TOP SECRET**

*Commissioner*  
*CC 1446*

*Copy no 2*

EX 93720  
JUN 151909B

E/5267  
JUN 161130B  
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGOT  
ACTION MMIA INFO ALCOM

TOP SECRET.

Italian Government have requested total of 10000 patriots be enlisted into Italian Army. Request you report earliest on implications of such step with recommendations.

DIST

- Copy No 1 ACTION: Land Forces S/C
- " " 2 INFO: Chief Commissioner
- " " 3 Ex Commissioner
- " " 4 CA Sec
- " " 5 Patriots Br
- " " 6 File

*See 148 b*

*See 150*



659

*148 a*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*32011*

10 June 1945

EXTRACT

Chief Commissioner:

The following matters appear to me ripe for early discussion:

\* \* \*

139

- 3. Recruitment of Partisans into the Italian Army. Cadorne in the North West has asked for the recruitment of up to 10,000. Brigadier Dunlop telegraphed to you on 1st June on the question of the recruitment of the "Nino Netti" Division.

\* \* \*

142

\*This is to be taken up by you with Gen. Browning.

EWS  
CC"

"File.  
Copy returned to Ex Comm with comments

EWS/CC"

658 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT FILED IN 3615/CC, with further extracts in 204/CC

148

3201/CC

FOR ACTION LOMBARDIA REGION FOR COLONEL CRIPPS PIEMONTE REGION FOR COLONEL  
CRIPPS RPTD AMG LOMBARDIA REGION AMG PIEMONTE REGION AMG VENEZIE REGION

9441

9 June 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY REPORTS RECEIPT INFORMATION MILAN PATRIOTS  
RESTLESS AND MAY DEMONSTRATE CMA GROUNDS NON PAYMENT BONUS PD MINISTRY PROPOSES  
SEND FUNDS VIA PARRI TO MILAN BY DRAFTS PD MINISTRY INFORMED UNNECESSARY AS AMPLE  
FUNDS AVAILABLE AND PAYMENTS BEING MADE PD PARRI INSTRUCTED CONTACT REGIONAL  
COMMISSIONER AND EXPLAIN ALLEGED TROUBLE PD MAY BE DESIRABLE ARRANGE DRAFTS SHALL NOT  
BE CASHED WITHOUT CONSENT REGIONAL COMMISSIONER PD

PAREN TO FOR ACTION LOMBARDIA REGION FOR COLONEL CRIPPS PIEMONTE REGION FOR COLONEL  
CRIPPS RPTD AMG LOMBARDIA REGION AMG PIEMONTE REGION AMG VENEZIE REGION FROM  
HQ ALCOM CITE ACPAT PAREN

PARA TWO PD UNDERSTAND PARRI PROPOSES VISIT TURIN AND VENEZIA PD WILL YOU SEE HIM  
AND TAKE NECESSARY ACTION REGARDING THESE REGIONS

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

C.A. Section  
Finance Sub Commission

637

Patriots Branch

321

J/Comd

for Lt Col SH WHITE

147a

3201/cc

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

AFHQ Supreme Allied Commander's Political Conference

SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting

7 June 1945

\* \* \*

3. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI

141 ad

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 13th Meeting, Minute 2)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that an examination of the statement submitted by Signor Longhi, revealed that one further payment of 160,000,000 lire should be made to the CLNAI. Signor Longhi accepted that this payment would cover all outstanding obligations. Rear Admiral Stone had accordingly approached the Italian Prime Minister to request that these funds be made available and the latter had agreed.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- a. Directed that one final payment of 160,000,000 lire should be made from Allied funds to the CLNAI to discharge existing obligations.
- b. Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to ensure the reimbursement of the Allies, to this amount, by the Italian Government.

\* \* \*

148c

See 149

3201/cv

656

Confidential

147

**SECRET**

cc

F-88656  
JUNE 061624

E/3901  
JUNE 062100  
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG  
ALCOM ROME

SECRET.

Figure of 4000 in 2nd paragraph your signal not understood as MMIA authorization for feeding carabinieri at present limited to 3000 extra. Reur 8764 cite ACPAT. Hoped to increase this shortly as soon as final decisions made on Italian *ARMY* reinforcement holding.

1416

DIST

- ACTION - PATRIOTS BR
- INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER
- CA SEC
- LAND FORCES S/C 2
- FILE

3 20/1/50

655

146

**Confidential**

*[Handwritten signature]*

FOR ACTION AFHQ, FOR CHIEF OF STAFF: INFO 15 ARMY GROUP FOR  
GENERAL GRUENTHER

9229

6 June 1945

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

143

YOUR FOX XRAY EIGHT SEVEN EIGHT EIGHT TWO OF JUNE FIFTH PD

PAREN TO FOR ACTION AFHQ CITE EIGHT FOR CHIEF OF STAFF RPTD FOR INFO TO

FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP FOR GENERAL GRUENTHER FROM HQ, ACOM FROM ADMIRAL STONE

CITE ACSCC PAREN

142

REPORT RECEIVED FROM MILAN YESTERDAY INDICATES ONE ADDITIONAL PAYMENT OF ONE  
HUNDRED SIXTY MILLION LIRE SHOULD BE MADE PD LONGHI AGREES THAT THIS IS  
FINAL PAYMENT IN DISCHARGE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER SACMEDS AGREEMENT WITH  
CLNAI PD I SECURED AGREEMENT OF BONOME YESTERDAY MORNING TO REIMBURSE  
SACMED FOR SUCH PAYMENT AS IN THE PAST AND WILL SO RECOMMEND AT SACMEDS  
POLITICAL CONFERENCE TOMORROW CMA SEVEN JUNE

DISTRIBUTION:

- Finance SC
- Econ Sec
- Exec Comm
- CC Files

654

147

See

3201/ce

145

Chief Commissioner

222

EMERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

To Admiral Stone  
For your information  
[Signature]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

INS 315/F

6 June 1945

SUBJECT: Longhi's Contentions re CINAI Financing.

TO : Joint Directors,  
Finance Sub-Commission  
(Attn. Colonel R. B. Menapace).

142

1. Reference is made to the main arguments of Longhi in his interview with Brigadier Grafftey-Smith and Lieutenant-Colonel Tubb, as these were reported to me in Milan on 4 June 1945. They are presented herewith separately for the possible additional light they may shed on the Brigadier's letter of 3 June, but will be incorporated in a detailed report of the mission later.

2. Longhi stated that there was no question of duplication as regards the November financing. The expenditures concerned had actually been incurred and they have not hitherto been reimbursed by any means or from any source, including Special Force Accounts. This contention could be supported by other interested organizations, including O.S.S. and while it was undoubtedly impossible to set up the Credito Italiano account earlier than December, present acceptance of the responsibility for November financing could be regarded as in the spirit of the SACMED undertaking.

3. Longhi admitted that this undertaking was limited to the period of hostilities, and accordingly expired in a technical sense when the Armistice was signed. From a practical point of view he doubted the possibility of dealing with the problem of employing partisan operatives on the basis of any such given date hitherto unannounced. He was inclined to regard the May credit, not as an overpayment, but as a logical final payment providing proper notice to the operatives that their mission was completed and further activities were not needed. He pointed out that many partisans were still operating and still armed, and that some spokesmen would undoubtedly contend that a token payment for June should be made. Closing the books with a final full May payment seemed to him a logical compromise which he would loyally accept as complete fulfillment of SACMED's undertaking.

3201/c

653

/2.....

144

4. Longhi agreed that an accounting of Partisan expenditures, and of the use of the Credito Italiano balances for defraying a large part of them, should certainly be made. He contended that this was a task that would require much time, and pointed to the difficulty that an Allied Commander would have if asked to submit a detailed statement of his finances. The difficulty is much greater, he added, when one is dealing with an underground movement where every effort has been made to operate with maximum secrecy. He would not be able to supply even an approximate distribution in under a month or six weeks, and it would have a bad effect on the morale of the operatives if reimbursement of these payments was deferred until SACMED could receive such evidence. Meanwhile, on the basis of rough data which he submitted, he was prepared to guarantee that actual payments had exceeded the requested amount.

*A. H. Reece*

A. H. REEDE,  
Major, A.U.S.,  
Insurance Sub-Section,  
Finance Sub-Commission.

652 -

144



FOR ACTION FIVE ARMY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION HIGH ARMY FOR AMG IV CORPS  
 AMG TOSCANA REGION AMG EMILIA REGION 57 AREA REAR FOR AMG LIGURIA REGION AMG PIEMONTE  
 REGION AMG LOMBARDIA REGION AMG VENEZIA REGION RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE FIVE  
 SECTION

FOR GEORGE FIVE

9153

5 June 45

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD REF OUR EIGHT SEVEN EIGHT FOUR PD

PARA TWO PD PAYMENT TO PATRIOTS ON DEBILITATION IS AMOUNTED TO FOLLOWING SCALE WHICH  
 WILL COME INTO FORCE IMMEDIATELY ~~AND BE PAID TO ALL PATRIOTS PD~~ <sup>PP</sup> PAREN ABLE PAREN TO

RECOGNISED PATRIOTS OF LESS THAN THREE MONTHS SERVICE ONE THOUSAND LIRE PAREN BAKER

PAREN TO RECOGNISED PATRIOTS OF THREE MONTHS SERVICE OR OVER PAREN IN PLACE OF ABLE PAREN

FIVE THOUSAND LIRE PAREN CHARLES PAREN TO RECOGNISED PATRIOTS SERIOUSLY INJURED

IRRESPECTIVE OF SERVICE PAREN IN PLACE OF ABLE OR BAKER PAREN TEN THOUSAND LIRE PAREN

DOG PAREN TO FAMILIES OF THOSE MISSING OR KILLED IN ACTION OR WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF

REPRISALS OR OF WOUNDS OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED ON SERVICE TWENTY THOUSAND LIRE

651 PAREN TO FOR ACTION FIVE ARMY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION HIGH ARMY FOR AMG IV CORPS, AMG  
 FOR GEORGE FIVE

TOSCANA REGION AMG EMILIA REGION 57 AREA REAR FOR AMG LIGURIA REGION AMG PIEMONTE

REGION AMG LOMBARDIA REGION AMG VENEZIA REGION RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE FIVE

SECTION FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACPAT PAREN

3 201/c

PARA THREE PD YOU WILL BE ADVISE IN DUE COURSE OF ANY RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF THIS AMENDMENT

Internal Distribution.

Executive Commissioner.  
Civil Affairs Section,  
Finance Sub Commission,  
Col. Cripps.  
Liaison Officer - Patriots Branch.

670

Patriots Branch

143b 321

R.R. CRIPPS. Colonel, Director, Local Govt.S/C.

AMG LOMBARDIA REGION

9150

5 June 1945

OF PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD PLEASE ADVISE LONGHI PD

FAREW TO AMG LOMBARDIA REGION FOR RFO FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACPIN FAREM

PARA TWO PD ADMIRAL STONE PERSONALLY IS IN FAVOUR OF GRANTING ONE SIX ZERO MILLION PAYMENT FOR NOVEMBER ONE NINE FOUR FOUR AND WILL RECOMMEND THIS TO SACMED

*3/20/45*

649

Finance Sub-Commission

478604

143a

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO,  
CWO, USA,  
Asst Adjutant

**SECRET**

JUN 5 1951  
CC 1151

FX 87882  
JUNE 051655B

E/3742  
JUNE 051950B  
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT  
ACTION ALCOM INFO 15 ARMY GP

SECRET

130 132 133 132a 134

Re our FX 72848, F 73364, FX 74780, and ALCOM 7411 and 7566.

1. It is desired that report called for in our F 73364 be expedited. To ALCOM for Admiral STONE. Info 15 Army Gp for General GRUENTHER from Chief of Staff.

2. Further information received at this Hq strongly indicates debt of honor in respect of November payment exists. Unless your investigations have produced definite evidence to contrary, it is proposed to give final approval at Supreme Allied Commanders political conference Thursday, 7 June for action by you to insure payment is made.

W  
221  
/

See 145

Dist

- Action - Finance SO
- Info - Chief Commissioner
- Econ Sec
- Exec Comm
- File

648

143

**Confidential**

Map 5 -  
FOR CASERTA

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS, JUN 5 1945  
CC 0915  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT,  
LOMBARDIA REGION.

3rd June, 1945.

TO: The Chief Commissioner.

SUBJECT: Funds to C.L.N.A.I.  
-----

135

My original signal asking Lt.-Colonel Tubb to ask Longhi for a statement showing his estimate of the Allies' unfulfilled obligations to C.L.N.A.I., arrived in Milan late and badly mutilated. The R.F.O., did not see the comprehensive text until some days later when S.F.O., 5th Army, showed him an un mutilated copy. Longhi was then approached and promised to obtain from the leaders of the various bands the amounts still owed by their members to those who had advanced them money.

I saw Longhi yesterday who agreed that the collation of accurate statistics would take many weeks. In these circumstances I promised that I would forward to you for onward transmission to A.F.H.Q., his views on the unfulfilled obligations and a suggested modus operandi.

Longhi admitted that within the strict terms of the agreement the amount credited in Rome for the month of May should not have been necessary. In fact, however, the Partisans have not handed in their arms and are still being maintained out of these funds. Some Brigades are being retained with the objective of being eventually transferred to the armed forces or the Carabinieri. Their continued maintenance is, therefore, essential. In retrospect he stated that the figure of 90,000 Partisans was a considerable under estimate, but even on this basis at a L.100 per day per head, the amount required had been in the neighbourhood of 270 million lire a month. His claim that funds for the month of November had not been made available either from Special Force funds or under Sacmed's agreement is, I think, entirely true, and is substantiated by S.O.E., and O.S.S. He therefore asks for the amount of 160 million lire for the month of November to be authorised by A.F.H.Q., through the normal channels. This will be regarded as a full and final settlement of the obligation incurred by Sacmed towards the C.L.N.A.I. It does not include, of course, amounts due by the Special Force to their agents, which is a matter of separate negotiations between Finance Sub-Commission and the Minister of Treasury. Any further financing will be a matter to be arranged between C.L.N.A.I. through Longhi, and the Italian Government.

3201/cc

647

It is my opinion that the suggested proposal should be accepted, unless it be considered that it will result in the continued existence of armed bands. Longhi's record, however, of transferring

147

Sac 144

funds to authorised branches of the C.L.N.A.I. is good and it should not be thought, therefore, that this further grant-in-aid will result in an increase of hooliganism. There is no doubt that Longhi, compared with many high officials of the C.L.N.A.I., is a strong moderating influence; and the fact that he is non-party which resulted in his leaving the C.L.N.A.I., supports this statement.

✓ I therefore recommend that Sacmed should instruct Finance Sub-Commission to make a final payment of L.160 million; and that it should be made clear in all correspondence both to the banks and to the C.L.N.A.I. that no further finance will be made available at the instigation of Sacmed.

*A.P. Grasseby Mill*

Brigadier.  
Joint Director.

646

142

1636  
JUN 5 011245B

E/3227  
JUNE 011650  
ROUTINE

G-5 IV CORPS - WALKER  
G-5 5TH ARMY SUTHERLAND PLEASE PASS TO INC 3627 15TH ARMY GROUP  
AND ALCOM.

IN CLEAR.

General CADORNA now in ROME on Italian Army business his headquarters request that the following message having to do with patriot payments be given to him. "Beg you to intervene urgently to obtain authority from the Italian Government to pay the award of 5000 lire to the Partisans". Signed Lieutenant Colonel BEOLOCHINI.

DIST  
ACTION - PATRIOTS BR 2  
INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
CA SEC  
FILE 2  
FLCAT

3206/w

645

141g

RESTRICTED

PR/PI/040  
JUN 01NFT

E/3340  
JUN 021445B  
IMMEDIATE

RFO MEMONTE REGION  
HQ ALCOM ACPAT

RESTRICTED.

141c

- 1. Subject is patriots payment your 8784.
- 2. Payments have been made in excess of authorised scale and including gifts of clothing. These payments made by partisans out of their existing funds, and not from funds authorised under Italian Government scheme. Endeavours being made to gain control over these existing funds and regularise payments under the control of AMG Patriots Division.

DIST

ACTION: Patriots Br  
INFO: Chief Commissioner  
CA Sec  
File 2  
Float

3201/ce

644

RESTRICTED  
Confidential

141 f



# INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

JUN 2 RECD  
CC 1011

S.O. To C.C.

Originator's Reference: REIT/C3A.11  
Date/Time of Origin: JUNE 1945 *1st*

Message Centre No: B/3253  
Date Time Rec'd: JUNE 012150Z  
Precedence: IMMEDIATE

FROM: HQ VENETIA REGION  
TO: HQ AEGON FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER

## RESTRICTED Confidential

RESTRICTED

This is urgent. To STONE from DUNLOP on advice LUSH.

It is reported famous leader named MILC from VITTORIO VENETO has gone to ROME to try and arrange incorporation Patriot Division NINCO NARETTI in Italian Army. Number of famous involved probably about 3,000. From point of view Regional political situation would be most desirable event. Request your personal interest.

Dist

Action - S. O. to Chief Comm  
Info - Chief Commissioner  
Exec Comm  
Patriots  
Jama *CAS*  
File *LAND FORCES (2)*

*3201/ce*

HEADQUARTERS  
2 - JUN 1945  
*AG*

643

# ACTION

## RESTRICTED Confidential

*141e*

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

K 187

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 13th Meeting  
31st May 1945

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S  
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030  
HOURS ON THURSDAY 31ST MAY 1945

\* \* \* \* \*

2. PAYMENTS TO CENAI

138

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 2)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that though he understood that Signor  
Longhi had submitted a statement to the representative of the Allied  
Commission in MILAN listing all payments purported to have been made  
by the CENAI, this statement had not yet been received in ROME for  
investigation, although it was reported to have been dispatched from  
MILAN.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief Commissioner, ALLIED Commission, to take  
steps to expedite his investigations and to submit a report of his  
findings.

Longhi  
3201/2

See 142

See 147

642

141 dd

TOP SECRET  
Confidential

**SECRET**

1622  
MAY 311517B

E/3115  
MAY 311845B  
OP PRIORITY

SCAO AMG IV CORPS  
G 5 5TH ARMY FOR ACTION. INFO: ALCOM (PATRIOT BR)

1412

SECRET

Reference is made to message 8784 no authority granted by AMG in IV CORPS AREA for payment of 5,000 lire to Patriots. It is reported that payments of this amount have been made throughout LIGURIA and PIEDMONTE by CVL and CINAI but not through AMG.

It is claimed by General CADORNA Hq that General CADORNA received authority while in ROME to increase payment to 5,000 lire but no documentary proof offered except copy of minutes of conference held between CADORNA and Govt which would seem to indicate that payment in this amount was contemplated.

Apparently the CVL/CINAI have borrowed the sums paid out from private sources on the promise it would be made good by the Italian Govt.

641 First knowledge this Hq of such payment, 30 May 1945 when LONGHI and representative of CADORNA came to HQ IV CORPS requesting that some 500 million lire be secured from a Colonel KING AFHQ to pay off Patriots. Knowing that funds had been advanced by AFHQ in past to LONGHI questioned to determine basis of this request which developed that it has to pay the estimated 100,000 Patriots in NORTH ITALY at the rate of 5,000 lire each. Further investigation before receipt of signal on 31 May developed information regarding LIGURIA and PIEDMONTE.

3 201/4

1412

**Confidential**

Dist

Info-Action - Patriot Br  
Info - Chief Commissioner  
CA Sec File & Post 3

FOR ACTION REVENUE FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION REGIMENT FOR ANG IV CORPS FOR  
GEORGE FIVE SECTION REPTD 15 AREA REAR FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION ANG ILLIA  
REGION ANG ILLIA REGION ANG PISAPIA REGION 57 AREA REAR FOR ANG ILLIA  
REGION 210 SUB AREA FOR VENETIA REGION

8762

30 May 45

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD IT IS REPORTED THAT AUTHORITY HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR THE PAYMENT TO PATRIOTS  
OF INCREASED ALLOWANCES BASED ON A SCALE OF FIVE THOUSAND LIRE PD IF THIS IS SO WILL  
YOU PLEASE CHECK WHETHER THE PATRIOTS HAVE BEEN PAID ON THIS SCALE AND IF SO ON WHAT  
AUTHORITY PD

141b

141c

PARA TWO FOR ACTION REVENUE FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION REGIMENT FOR ANG IV CORPS FOR  
GEORGE FIVE SECTION REPTD 15 AREA REAR FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION ANG ILLIA REGION ANG  
ILLIA REGION ANG PISAPIA REGION 57 AREA REAR FOR ANG ILLIA REGION 210 SUB  
AREA FOR VENETIA REGION FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACPAT PAREN

PARA TWO PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS THIS MATTER AT PRESENT STILL UNDER DISCUSSION AND  
NO AUTHORITY YET FOR PAYMENT OF MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND LIRE FOR PATRIOTS, FIVE THOUSAND  
LIRE FOR DISABLED PATRIOTS AND TEN THOUSAND LIRE TO FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED OR DIED ON  
SERVICE AS SET OUT IN PATRIOT DIRECTIVE 9/PAT DATED 7 APRIL PD PAYMENT WILL PROCEED  
ON THIS SCALE WHICH WILL BE ADVISED TO

2201/100

640

NR

See 143b

141c

Patriots Branch  
321

J/Genl G. PUGH for  
R.M. CRISP, Col. Director,  
Local Govt. S/O

NICHOLA PIOMBINO  
CWO USA Asst Adjutant

FOR ACTION AFHQ CITE FHGEG

8764

30 May 45

PRIORITY

*attached*

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FOX EIGHT THREE THREE FIVE ZERO PD RECRUITMENT OF PATRIOTS IN ANY LARGE NUMBER IS DEPENDENT UPON THE FUTURE POLICY REGARDING ITALIAN ARMY AND ITS GRILING PD

PARA TWO PD MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MIKE MIKE ITEM ABLE WHO CMA WITHIN THEIR RESOURCES CMA HAVE AUTHORISED THE IMMEDIATE RECRUITMENT OF UP TO FOUR THOUSAND PATRIOTS PD

PAREN TO FOR ACTION AFHQ CITE FHGEG FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACPAT PAREN

PARA THREE PD WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN GIVE TO ALLOW OF FURTHER RECRUITMENT OF UP TO TEN THOUSAND PATRIOTS CMA WHICH IS THE MINIMUM NUMBER REQUESTED BY GENERAL CADORNA

139

See 146

3201/c

639

1416

Internal Distribution

Executive Commissioner  
Land Forces Sub Commission (MMA)  
Civil Affairs  
Public Safety

Patriots Branch  
321

*M. Proby*

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO  
CWO USA ASST Ajutant

J/Comd M. PROBY for  
R.R. CRIPPS, Col., Director, Local Govt. S/O

0330

785015

F 83350  
MAY 28 12 06 PM

E/2657  
MAY 28 1968  
PRIORITY

APPROX. SIGNED S. CHAND CITE THREE

ALCON. ROME

RESTRICTED

5 ARMY 9304 citing F-197 repeated to you. What action if any do you desire be taken here.

Dist

- Action: - Patriots Br.
- Info - Chief Commissioner
- Exec Commissioner
- C.A. Section
- Land Forces 2
- F Safety
- File 2
- Float

3 28/1/68

637 -

(144) APP

FOR ACTION FIVEARMY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION RIFED FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP FOR  
GEORGE FIVE SECTION FOUR CORPS FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION

3639

28 May 45

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS VOLUNTEER ENLISTMENT OF PATRIOTS INTO ITALIAN ARMY PD  
REF PARA TWO OF OUR NIGHT FOUR FIVE SIX OF TWO SIX MAY PD MIKE MIKE ITEM ABLE  
STATE THAT NUMBER OF VACANCIES IN THE ITALIAN ARMY DEPENDS ON FUTURE POLICY  
AND STRENGTH ALLOWED CMA BUT THAT IMMEDIATE INTAKE OF FOUR THOUSAND VOLUNTEERS  
ONLY APPEARS POSSIBLE PD

PARA TO FOR ACTION FIVEARMY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION RIFED FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP  
FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION FOUR CORPS FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALCON  
CITE ACBAT PAREN

PARA TWO PD MINISTRY OF WAR IS TELLING TERRITORIAL HEADQUARTERS AT MILAN TORIN  
AND GENOA HOW THEY SHOULD EFFECT ENLISTMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF UP TO THIS /  
FOUR THOUSAND IMMEDIATELY

Internal Distribution

Ex. Com.

Land Forces Sub Com(HECIA)

637 -

Patriots Branch

321

RR CRIPPS Col  
Director Local Govt. Sub Com.

141a

32011a

cc 1155

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ref: 542/109/EG.

27 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Report.

TO : S.C.A.O., Fifth Army.  
S.C.A.O., IV Corps.

DECLASSIFIED  
405 4/4/74  
2/11/74

The following extract from a report received from a reliable Secret source is passed to you for information.

"An Allied officer who was recently in the North was introduced by CAMERANA, Vice-President of FIAT, to Marquis Maurizio FRACASSI, the leader of a group of Royalist partisans. FRACASSI claims to have a following of about nine thousand fully armed partisans, all Royalists, who would be willing and are in fact eager to fight the Communists immediately. FRACASSI states that his band is recruited from ex-army officers, peasants, and from the sons of the old Piedmontese families.

According to VALLETTA, President of FIAT and CAMERANA, FRACASSI's band have already received ten million lire through the FIAT Company. CAMERANA states that all this money has been provided by the AGNELLI family, which owns the majority of FIAT shares, in order to keep the band together and to penetrate the Communists."

For the Chief Commissioner:

E TARDAT

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

636

Copy to: RO, PIEDMONT Region.

141

3201/10



FOR ACTION FIVEARMY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION RP'D FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP  
F R GEORGE FIVE SECTION FOUR CORPS FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION

8546

26 May 1945

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD REF YOUR NINE TWO FIVE FIVE OF TWO THREE MAY CITE FOX ONE EIGHT TWO PD  
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PLANNING EXTENSIVE RECONSTRUCTING SCHEMES WHICH WILL PROVIDE  
EMPLOYMENT FOR PATRIOTS AND EX MILITARY PERSONNEL PD MORE DETAILED INFORMATION  
NOT YET AVAILABLE PD

PARA TWO FOR ACTION FIVEARMY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION RP'D FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP  
FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION FOUR CORPS FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALCOM CITE  
A G P A T PARA

PARA TWO PD PARA AIMS PARA ITALIAN ARMY PREPARING FOR IMMEDIATE DEMOBILIZATION OF  
FIFTY THOUSAND MEN AND PROPOSE OBTAINING TWO THIRDS OF NECESSARY REPLACEMENTS BY  
CALLED UP CLASSES AND ONE THIRD BY VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENTS PD ISSUE BY MINISTRY OF  
WAR OF TERMS OF SERVICE FOR VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL AWAITED PD PARA BAKER PARA NAVY  
ACCEPTING NO VOLUNTEERS AT PRESENT PD NAVAL AUTHORITIES ENDEAVOURING TO ABSORB  
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PATRIOTS AS CIVILIAN LABOUR AT LA SPEZIA PD PARA CHARLIE PARA  
69 FORCE ACCEPTING NO VOLUNTEERS AT PRESENT BUT ENDEAVOURING TO REABSORB EX REGULAR  
AIR FORCE PERSONNEL PD

Internal Distribution  
Navy Sub Commission  
Land Forces Sub Commission (ASIA)  
Air Force Sub Commission

✓ Patriots Branch

321

J/Comd M. PROBY

140a For Col. R. R. CRIMPS, Director, Local Govt. Sub Com.

3201/c

LWS/hjp

26 May 1945

TO: Executive Commissioner, Hq A.G.

The Chief Commissioner directs that you immediately follow up and report what action and progress, if any, has been made in the following cables:

Incoming E/2405, dated 26 May, from IV Corps, on subject of implementation of G.O. #41

Incoming E/2307, dated 25 May, from LOCC, on disbandment of Partisan formations in N.W. Italy (VERY IMPORTANT)

Outgoing cable #8393, to 15th Army Group, from AC Transportation, concerning shortage of food stuffs in Bologna

*LWS*  
L. W. STEARNS  
Major, A.G.D.  
A/Staff Officer to CC

(13A)

*4019/ce*

*5201/ce*

634

(140)

Exec Comm  
Most important  
to follow up  
1178  
MAY 25 11 25

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1/2507  
MAY 25 15 10  
OF PRIORITY

1000

35 5 ARMY POLICE BARS TO AICOM AND 15 ARMY GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL.

Cite ref No 88

subject is disarmament of partisan bands in Northwest ITALY.

CASCOM request that enlistment of volunteers into Italian Army and Police be implemented soonest. CASCOM recommends that token ceiling of 10000 be fixed and that he be authorized to organize enlistment based on Territorial HQ and Departments with clothing, accumulated stores, rations and cadre from local Patriot and former Italian Army resources. Volunteer would be accepted as individuals and drafted as reinforcements to US-IFI and BR-IFI Units as required. Doubtful how many would respond but above action would ease disarmament and disarmament. SCAG AND IV CORPS

633

See (140) See (141a)

5200/1/10

DIST

- INFO ACTION
- INFO
- SAFETY
- CHIEF COMMISSIONER
- DEPT COMMISSIONER
- C & DEB
- LAND FORCE (2)
- FOR SAFETY SC
- FILE (2)
- WOMAN

(139)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

9304  
MAY 261832

1/2564  
MAY 2711730  
PRIORITY

3 ARMY G-5 FOR HUSB CITE F 197  
APHA INFO HQ ALCON

CONFIDENTIAL.

Reference your PA 82242 dated 26 May.

4 COMUS cable number 1474 reads as follows "Subject is disbandment of Partisan bands in Northwest ITALY. CADORNA requests that enlistment of volunteers into Italian Army and Police be implemented soonest. CADORNA recommends that ceiling of 10000 be fixed and that we be authorized to organize enlistment based on territorial RA and Departments, with clothing, accumulated stores, rations and cadres from local Patriot and former Italian Army resources. Volunteers would be accepted as individuals and drafted as reinforcements to US-ITI and AN-ITI Units as required etico commence on joining units. Doubtful how May would respond but above action would ease disbandment and disament."

S/C note;

See cable 632 -  
M/2432  
M/2307  
M/2414  
M/2415

LIST

INFO-ACTION PATRIOTS HQ  
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
EXEC COMMISSIONER  
C A SEC  
LAND FORCES HQ (2)  
PUB SAFETY SC  
FILE (2)  
FIGHT

3201/cc

CONFIDENTIAL

139

APP

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 182

SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting  
24 May 1945

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

\* \* \*

2. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI

137

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting - Minute 2)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the investigation being conducted by the Allied Commission to obtain proof whether a debt to the CLNAI existed in respect of the month of November, said that he understood that Signor Longhi was submitting to the representative of the Allied Commission in MILAN a statement of all payments purporting to have been made by the CLNAI. This statement would be forwarded to RCME for investigation and a full report would be forthcoming at a later date.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

\* \* \*

See 142

see 141 dd

3201/22

631

138

Confidential

RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

7th Meeting

25 May 1945

EXTRACT

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S  
ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE ECONOMIC SUB-COMMITTEE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 22 MAY 1945

\* \* \* \* \*

4. ESTABLISHMENT BY CINAI OF RETRIBUTION BONUS.

MR. ANTOLLINI reported that the CINAI had established in Northern Italy a retribution bonus system to be supported by all industrial workers. Collections are being enforced by industrial unions and similar organizations. He recommended that further collections be prohibited until approved by the Italian Government when this territory ceases to be a responsibility of AMG. GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that CINAI decrees in AMG territory are not legal or enforceable, and as a consequence this is a matter to be dealt with by AMG. GENERAL ROBERTSON stated that he would await further advice on this matter from the Chief Commissioner, A.C.

63V

3201/c  
Copies in 520  
4004

0 3 3 9

785015

3201/c  
(origin in 3202/c  
4004/c)

Italy a retribution bonus system to be supported by all industrial workers. Collections are being enforced by industrial unions and similar organizations. He recommended that further collections be prohibited until approved by the Italian Government when this territory ceases to be a responsibility of AMG. GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that CLMAI decrees in AMG territory are not legal or enforceable, and as a consequence this is a matter to be dealt with by AMG. GENERAL ROBERTSON stated that he would await further advice on this matter from the Chief Commissioner, A.C.

630

137a

~~Confidential~~

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 173

SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting  
18 May 1945

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

\* \* \*

2. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI

131

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - Minute 2)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to an investigation being conducted by Allied Commission in an effort to obtain proof whether a genuine debt of 160 million lire existed in respect of the month of November to the CLNAI and whether the payment on 2 May could be considered to cover such a debt, reported that a finance officer of the Allied Commission was now in Milan where he was holding conferences with Signor Longhi but no definite results could be yet reported. He stated that a full report would be forthcoming at a later date.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

\* \* \*

629

See 138

3201/12

137

~~Confidential~~



FOR ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP GEORGE FIVE SECTION REPT SIGNATURE REAR FOR AND  
HIGH ARMY REAR FOR AND VIRGILIA REGION MAIN

XXXX 7582

14 APRIL May 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS FINANCING PATRIOTS YOUR REFERENCE CHARLIE ABLE SEPAR FIVE  
ONE SEVEN OF ONE THREE MAY PD

PARA TWO FOR ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP GEORGE FIVE SECTION REPT SIGNATURE REAR FOR AND  
SIGNATURE REAR FOR AND VIRGILIA REGION MAIN FROM IN ALONG CITY ACPT PARIA

PARA TWO PD REFERENCE YOU HAVE NOW RECEIVED BY SEVEN FIVE ZERO ONE OF ONE THREE  
MAY EXPLAINING PROCEDURES WHICH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED PD VIEWS SHOULD BE OBTAINED AS IN  
NINE FOUR SEANT PEAR ABLE EARL OF SEVEN APRIL APPENDIX ABLE PARA TEN AND APPENDIX  
EASY AND ONE TWO ONE SEANT ONE FIVE SEANT PEAR ABLE TANK OF ONE EIGHT APRIL  
ADDRESS TO ADDRESS AND REFERENCE PD ARE MATTER ARISING OUT OF FINANCING OF PATRIOT  
CENTERS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO SENIOR FINANCE OFFICER AND ADDRESS PD COPY OF  
628 ONE TWO ONE SEANT ONE FIVE SEANT PEAR ABLE TANK OF ONE EIGHT APRIL IS BEING  
FORWARDED TO YOU

3201/cc

136

Patriots Branch

321

Lt Col F. CRAIG

AME LOMBARDIA REGION

7565

14 May 45

OF PRIORITY

131

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS SUGAR ABLE CHARLES OBTAIN FROM PAXXKI  
FULL SUBSTANTIATED STATEMENT OF AMOUNT CONSIDERED TO BE REQUIRED SUCCEED  
OBLIGATIONS TO CHARLES LOVE MAN ABLE ITEM PD STATEMENT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED  
BY DATA SHOWING EXPENSES DISTRIBUTION PD

REGION  
PAPER TO AME LOMBARDIA/PER REGIONAL FINANCE OFFICER FROM HQ ALGEM CIVIL AFFAIR BAHEN

PARA TWO PD YOU MAY INDICATE THAT MAY PAYMENT MADE IN EXCESS OF SECRET 1945 UNDER  
AGREEMENT IN VIEW OF LIBERATION AREAS PD ANY CLAIM FOR NOVEMBER ONE NINE FOUR FOUR  
THEREFORE LARGELY DISCHARGED BY OVERPAYMENT IN MAY PD REPORT CHARLES LOVE MAN ABLE  
ITEM CLAIMS EARLIEST PD

PARA THREE PD ITEM BEING TO REPORT DENIAL

627

3201/CC

FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

553

NICHOLAS PICHINO,  
CWO USA, Asst Adjutant.

135

0 3 4 3

FOR ACTION AFHQ CITE RHGCT RPTD DPIC RPTD FOR INFO ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS

7566

14 May 1965

OP PRIORITY

SECRET PD

133

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FOX ARMY SEVEN FOUR SEVEN EIGHT ZERO OF ONE THREE MAY PAREN TO FOR ACTION AFHQ CITE RHGCT RPTD DPIC RPTD FOR INFO ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACFIN PAREN

PARA TWO PD REGRET THAT SUGAR ABLE CHARLIE DIRECTION AT TEN MAY CONFERENCE NOT REPEAT NOT KNOWN TO WRITER OF ALCOM SEVEN FOUR ONE ONE OF TWELVE MAY PD ALCOM MILAN NOW INVESTIGATING

135

137a

626

FINANCE SUBCOMMISSION

555

NICHOLAS PRICIBINO,  
CWO, USA, Asst Adjutant.

134

1133

SECRET

EX 74780  
MAY 131541B

E/613  
MAY 131838B  
OF PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT  
ACTION ALCOM INFO 15 ARMY GROUP

1379

SECRET.

1. Reference ALCOM 7411 dated 12 May subject funds CLNAI for November 44 para 3.
2. Special forces referred to have already recommended provision of this contribution, and are not suitably positioned to carry out such investigation.
3. No information here of irresponsible elements likely to receive such sums. We have every confidence in past handling this matter by CLNAI.
4. Military Government officials now in close touch with CLNAI and should be able to investigate position.
5. In view of above unable to concur your para 4. Action in accordance with this HQ EX 73364 dated 10 May and SAC direction at conference on 10 May should be taken forthwith. This Headquarters will assist you to carry out this task.

625  
132

131

See 134

DIST

ACTION: Finance  
INFO: A/President  
Chief Commissioner  
Econ Sec  
Executive Commissioner  
File

3201/CC

133

Confidential

AFHQ RPTD DPIC .

7411

12 May 1945

OF PRIORITY

SECRET PD

132

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE FOX SEVEN THREE THREE SIX FOUR OF TEN MAY PD  
PAREN TO AFHQ CITE FHGCT RPTED DPIC FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACFIN PAREN

PARA TWO PD ACTION SUSPENDED AS DIRECTED IN FOX XRAY SEVEN TWO EIGHT  
FOUR EIGHT PD

PARA THREE PD MOST UNDESIRABLE ALCOM INVESTIGATE FINANCIAL POSITION  
CHARLIE LOVE MAN ABLE ITEM PD ANY OBLIGATIONS TO CHARLIE LOVE MAN ABLE ITEM  
PRESUMABLY GIVEN BY AND KNOWN ONLY TO SPECIAL FORCES PD UNDERSTAND LONGHI  
BEING ASKED TO PRESENT BEST POSSIBLE CLAIM WHICH WILL BE EXAMINED BY SPECIAL  
FORCES REPRESENTATIVES AND REFERRED YOUR HEADQUARTERS PD EMPHASIZE DANGER  
LARGE SUMS LIRE BEING MADE AVAILABLE IRRESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS PD  
PARA FOUR PD GRATEFUL RECEIVE YOUR CONCURRENCE THAT INVESTIGATION  
CHARLIE LOVE MAN ABLE ITEM FINANCIAL DEMANDS IS NOT REPEAT NOT ALCOM  
RESPONSIBILITY

See 133

624

Finance Sub-Commission

478604

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO,  
CWO, USA,  
Asst Adjutant.

1320

**SECRET**

F 73364  
MAY 10 1942B

E/266  
MAY 10 2150B  
OP PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT  
ALCOM

SECRET

(131) (131)

Further to FX 72848 and ALCOM proposal at SAC conference 10 May that one sixty million lire paid CINAI in MAB discharges claim for November 1944 PG. Suspend action directed in cited signal. Investigate fully and report earliest what additional amount if any is required to satisfy obligations to CINAI.

Dist

- Action - Finance SC
- Info - A/President
- Chief Commissioner
- Exec Comm
- Econ Sec
- File

623

(132) ~~131~~

3201/100

(137)

**SECRET**

SECRET.

SECRET.

Extract from Minutes of SACMED's Conference  
(Political) 10th Meeting held on 10th May 1945.

MINUTE No. 2.

2. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI.

128

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting, Minute 6).

MAJOR GENERAL LEMBITZER, in reply to a question by the British Resident Minister, said that instructions had been given to the Allied Commission to approach the Italian government to obtain payment of 185,160,000,000 lire to the CLNAI for the purpose of recovering expenditures in the month of November last. Before these instructions were given, the matter had been investigated and he understood that this amount had been raised by supporters of the CLNAI and the latter should therefore, as a matter of honour, be reimbursed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that if a genuine debt existed, it must be paid. Otherwise, no fresh reimbursements should be made to the CLNAI.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that he had not yet received the further direction referred to by the Deputy Chief of Staff, and consequently thought that he was not to approach the Italian government in regard to providing further funds to CLNAI unless the Italian government themselves desired to open the question. 160,000,000 lire had, in fact, been paid to the CLNAI on 2nd May, for disbursements planned during the current month. Since the German surrender in Northern ITALY had taken place on that date, he considered that this payment should cover the necessary reimbursement to CLNAI for the month of November last.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with Allied Commission, investigate the matter so as to obtain proof whether a genuine debt to the CLNAI in respect of the month of November existed, and if so, whether the payment made on 2 May could be considered to cover such a debt, and report to him accordingly.

622

131

see 132

see 137

3201/cc

TOP SECRET

Commissioner

Copy No 3

MAY 1 1945  
CC 1121

FX 72648  
MAY 091349B

E/186  
MAY 100930B  
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FIGOT  
ACTION ALCOM INFO 15 ARMY GROUP

TOP SECRET.

124

128

Subject is funds CLNAI. This HQ letter AG 370.64/021 GCT-0, 1 May 45, and statement by Chief Commissioner at SACMED Conference, 3 May, refers.

1. Liberation of ITALY being now substantially complete no further contribution under para 5 of SACMED-CLNAI agreement will be made. Inform CLNAI accordingly.
2. Retrospective payment of 160 million Lire for month November, however, is required to be made in order to refund supporters of CLNAI for money raised by LONGHI from them against expectation of Allied payment for this month. Consider Allies are in honor bound to ensure reimbursement to CLNAI of this amount. Consequently you should press ROME Government to refund November contribution soonest as directed in para 3 this HQ letter under reference.

132

See

DIST

- |           |         |                        |
|-----------|---------|------------------------|
| Copy No 1 | ACTION: | Finance S/C            |
| " " 2     | INFO:   | A/President            |
| " " 3     |         | Chief Commissioner     |
| " " 4     |         | Executive Commissioner |
| " " 5     |         | Econ Sec               |
| " " 6     |         | File                   |

3201/2

621

130

Seen by D.

TOP SECRET



*Copies to:*

*Major Quayle  
Office of Chief Commissioner*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

SECRET

*CC 1546*  
MAY 7 RECD

1324/F.

7 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Reimbursement by Italian Government of funds advanced to CINAI.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff,  
G-5, AFHQ.

*(M) INCL*

1. I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of and to thank you for your letter G5/100-1 of 27 April 1945 relating to the request by SOM and OSS for reimbursement by the Italian Government of sums advanced to CINAI.

2. It is considered by the Chief Commissioner that an approach to the Italian Government on the lines suggested will need to be substantiated with more detailed information. The sum of Lire 225 million is considerable; and it is expected that the Italian Government would claim that:-

- (a) They have no knowledge of the payments made,
- (b) No receipts are furnished to prove that such payments were in fact made,
- (c) It appears possible that further claims may be forthcoming, and
- (d) As the supplier of the required currency and in view of the total liberation of Italy, they have every right to be informed why lire funds are needed urgently at this time.

3. In the light of the foregoing, I am directed to suggest that SOM and OSS be requested to furnish more detailed information in anticipation of such questions being raised.

For the Chief Commissioner.

(Signed) A.P. GRAFFTEY-SMITH  
Brigadier

Joint Director,  
Finance Sub-Commission.

620

*[Handwritten signature]*

*(129)*

SECRET

*3201/CC*

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K-159

SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting

3rd May 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

+ + + +

114  
119a  
124

6. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI  
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting, Minute 11)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that his revised instructions on the subject of payments to the CLNAI required him to approach the Italian Government in regard to a payment for November last. As Signor Longhi was no longer head of the CLNAI and the Italian Government had not raised the matter, he doubted if it was desirable, under present circumstances, to hand over 160,000,000 lire to the new organisation.

BRIGADIER GENERAL EBBERLE said that this was a claim which had been made by Signor Longhi for a back payment to him by the Italian Government in respect of the month of November. It was considered that an undertaking had been given to him that the money for this month would be paid, though, owing to a misunderstanding, this had not yet taken place. We therefore had a responsibility to approach the Italian Government to ensure that his claim was met. This was quite a separate matter from payment for current or future services. Arrangements for the drastic reduction of such payments had been made separately.

2201/cc

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to re-examine the question of payments to the CLNAI and take action accordingly.

619

(sgd) J. G. SWEETMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

+ + + +

See 130

128

Confidential

RESTRICTED

FX 70207  
MAY 032125B

D/9575  
MAY 040830B  
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHCCT  
CG 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCOM, SORTO

RESTRICTED

Request you pass following message personal from Field Marshal ALEXANDER to Chairman CINAI.

"Now that the campaign in Northern ITALY has ended victoriously, I would be pleased if you would convey to General CADORWA and all subordinate Patriot commanders and units my admiration and gratitude for the successful part which they have played both in the destruction of the enemy and the preservation of installations and plants vital to the future life of ITALY.

I have noted also with particular pleasure the efficiency and speed with which the CINAI has been able to turn from these military achievements to the equally important task of restoring, in conjunction with my AMG officers, civil administration in Liberated ITALY."

618

Dist

- Info-Action - Patriots Div
- Info - A/President
- Chief Commissioner
- CA Sec
- File 2
- Float

3201/c

127

Confidential

PERSONAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

2 May 1945

Dear Ellery:

I inclose copy of a letter which will presumably go to the Finance Sub-commission. I think it is self-explanatory.

The CAO would be glad to have any comment you may wish to make before presenting this matter to the Italian Government, in view of the present relationships between the Government and CLNAI. We can see no objection to presenting the matter but I wanted to bring the question to your attention personally so that this item would not in any way complicate the present situation in Rome.

Both OSS and SOM are anxious to get the funds in lire for immediate use.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. SPOFFORD  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1 Incl:  
Copy G-5/100-1  
ltr dtd 27 Apr 45

3201/cc

617

Answer by G.S. (124)

TO: Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, USNR  
Chief Commissioner,  
Headquarters, Allied Commission  
APO 394.

(126)

**SECRET**

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

27 April 1945

SECRET

FILE : G-5/100-1

SUBJECT: Reimbursement by Italian Government of Funds Advanced to CINAI.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. From time to time during the year 1944, up to approximately the end of October, various amounts of lire were advanced by S.O.M. and O.S.S. to the CINAI in North Italy. These organizations have now requested this Section to raise with you the possibility of obtaining reimbursement from the Italian Government.

2. In the instance of S.O.M. the facts are as follows:

a. Amounts made available to CINAI:

Cash in Lire, Lit. 12,000,000  
Cash in Swiss Francs, 5,000  
Lire provided under guarantee scheme through Lloyds Bank, Geneva, Lit. 100,000,000.

b. Reimbursement of the entire amount, including the 5,000 Swiss Francs, will be accepted in Italian lire. The Swiss Francs should be converted into lire at the rate of 1 pound sterling equals 17.30 Swiss Francs equals Lit. 400.

c. S.O.M. will receive the entire amount, and is under instructions to hold 100,000,000 lire in safe custody as a fund available for repayment in Milan after its liberation in redemption of the guarantee given by Lloyds Bank who were in turn guaranteed by H.M. Treasury.

3. In the instance of O.S.S. the facts are as follows:

a. Total amount, Lit. 112,600,000.

b. These lire were obtained via Swiss Francs, but reimbursement will be accepted in lire.

4. Both S.O.M. and O.S.S. have rather urgent need of these funds. It will be appreciated if you will discuss the matter with the Italian Government at the earliest opportunity and advise us of the results of your conversations.

616  
616  
126

Sw (129)  
Confidential

SECRET

- 2 -

5. While the above sums are believed to be definitive, it is possible that S.O.M. and O.S.S. may later be informed of other advances made to the CINAI, reports of which have not yet reached this Headquarters.

6. It is realized that there has been no explicit discussion with or undertaking by the Italian Government relating to reimbursement of advances to the CINAI during the period prior to the Agreement between S.A.C. and CINAI. However, it is thought that the Italian Government may be receptive to a request for reimbursement as long as it will be accepted in lire.

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

cc S.O.M.  
O.S.S.

615

(176) INCL

SECRET

**SECRET**

AG 54  
MAY 031567B

D/9571  
MAY 040845B  
ROUTINE

15 ARMY GROUP  
5 ARMY REAR INFO ALCOM

175

121a

SECRET

AG 51 of 2 May refers.

Ref para 4 ALCOM Cite AGSCG 6570. ALCOM request until further notice report shall be submitted by political representatives at GENOA and MILAN.

Please convey this message to them.

Dist

- Information - I. Govt.
- Info - A/President
- Chief Commissioner
- Exec Comm
- CA Section
- Patriots BR
- File

32/1/57

614

125b

**Confidential**

**SECRET**

CAS/1781  
MAY 2/1927

D/9461  
MAY 3/0830B  
PRIORITY

15 ARMY GROUP  
AICOM

121a

SECRET.

Your Cite ACSEC 6570 of 30 April paragraph four. Entirely agree your view. If you approve please signal reply requesting political representatives at GENOA and MILAN to submit reports

DIST

- ACTION : LOCAL GOVT SC
- INFO : A/PRESIDENT  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
EX COMMISSIONER  
CA SEC  
PATRIOTS BR  
FILE

See 125a

32/11/52

613

125a

**Confidential**



**SECRET**

*SO to C/C*  
*CC 1631*  
*MAY 3 1945*

AG 51  
MAY 022015B

D/9505  
MAY 031530B  
ROUTINE

15 ARMY GROUP  
8TH ARMY 5TH ARMY INFO ALCOM

*121 a*  
*1320/CC*

**SECRET.**

Reference ALCOM signal cite ACSOC 6570 of 30th April para 3A.  
Please comply with request contained therein.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DIST

- INFO-ACTION: L. Govt S/C
- INFO: A/President
- Chief Commissioner
- SO to Chief Commissioner
- Executive Commissioner
- Ca Sec
- Patriots Ex
- File 2
- Float

*See 175a*

*3200/CC*

612

**Confidential**

*175*

*File*

~~TOP SECRET~~

ABK/jwp

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

.....  
: T O P S E C R E T :  
: Auth: SACMT :  
: Initials HL/ZA :  
: Date: 1 May 1945 :  
:.....

2

AG 370.64/021 GCT-0

1 May 1945

CC 1130

MAY 2 RECD

SUBJECT: Finance, CLNAI

TO: President  
Allied Commission  
APO 394

114

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, subject as above, dated 19 April 1945.

2. In view of recent developments it has now been decided that the proposed increase of the monthly CLNAI allocation to 300 million lire is unnecessary; no representations to the ITALIAN government for their agreement to this increase need therefore now be pursued. The whole 160 million lire has been authorized for the month of MAY; amounts for subsequent months, if applicable, will be reduced in respect of liberated compartments.

3. You still are requested, however, to obtain the support of the ITALIAN government for the retrospective payment of 160 million lire for the month of NOVEMBER as indicated in paragraph 2 of this headquarters letter under reference.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

*C. W. Christenberry*  
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

See 128

32011

611 DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Addressee
- 1 - 15th Army Group
- 1 - SACS
- 1 - Br Resident Minister
- 1 - US POLAD
- 1 - 2677th Regt, OSS
- 3 - G-3
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - DFIC
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M & D

EC Dist - 2 MAY 45

copy

APRESIDENT	1
CHIEF COMMR	2
EXEC COMMR	3

124

~~Confidential~~

## CROSS INDEX SHEET

Ltr AC Quayle to SOMLO Rome

1 May 1945

Please transmit enclosed message from Prime Minister to CLNAI, asking Gronchi to come to Rome for discussions.

Document filed in 225-1/CC

610

123

**SECRET**

CAS 458  
AFR 301030B

D/9188  
AFR 301515B  
OP PRIORITY

15 ARMY GROUP  
AMG 5 ARMY AMG 8 ARMY ALCON

SECRET.

New patriot certificates being printed. It is expected they will be ready latest 2 May. Instruct all concerned they will not issue any partisan certificates until new ones received. If it is necessary issue some document prior to receipt new certificates and interim certificate will be issued to be returned when new definitive certificate received.

DIST

ACTION: CA Sec  
INFO: A/President  
Chief Commissioner  
Executive Commissioner  
Patriot Mr  
File 2  
Float

609

122a

3201/ce

**Confidential**

30 April 1945

MEMORANDUM TO EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER:

I think we should advise Regional Commissioners that the Scoccimaro booklet on CLN's has been disavowed by the Prime Minister as a governmental publication. He has undertaken to suppress its further distribution, but of course he cannot stop its being reprinted and distributed in AMG territory. I think we should send a copy of his letter of disavowal to all A.C.'s, and without provoking an open fight, we should do everything possible to minimize its effect in the North.

E.W.S.

115

119

608

3201/CC

172

AMG

15 ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS (FOR ACTION) FIVEARMY FOR AMG CMA HIGHWAY REAR FOR AMG CMA SOAO FOUR CORPS CMA NINETY SECOND DIVISION CMA TWO DISTRICT CMA AND LIGURIA REGION CMA AND LOMBARDIA REGION CMA AND PIEMONTE REGION CMA AND VENEZIA REGION (FOR INFORMATION)

6570

30 April 1945

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD CIMS IN NORTHERN ITALY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK COMMANDERS AND AMG OFFICERS PERMISSION TO SEND DELEGATES TO ROME FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS PD PARA TWO FOR ACTION FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS RE TO FIVEARMY FOR AMG CMA HIGHWAY REAR FOR AMG CMA SOAO FOUR CORPS CMA NINETY SECOND DIVISION CMA TWO DISTRICT CMA AND LIGURIA REGION CMA AND LOMBARDIA REGION CMA AND PIEMONTE REGION CMA AND VENEZIA REGION FROM HQ ALONE CITE AC/OC PARA

PARA TWO PD THE POLICY CMA AGREED BY US AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS CMA IS TO LEAVE THE UNWINDING OF THE POLITICAL TANGLE WHICH IS BOUND TO FOLLOW LIBERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE HANDS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SINCE THIS WILL MAKE THEM FACE AND SHOULDER THE RESPONSIBILITY AND WILL IMPRESS ON CIMS THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES ARE CONDUCTING POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF ITALY WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ONLY PD

PARA THREE PD GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF COMMANDERS AND AMG OFFICERS IN FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP COULD BE INSTRICTED NOT REPEAT NOT TO GRANT PERMISSION TO ANY MEMBER OF CIMS OR POLITICAL LEADERS TO VISIT ROME UNLESS CALLED FORWARD BY THIS HQ WHICH WILL DO SO ONLY ON REQUEST OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD LOCAL APPLICANTS SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT THEIR REQUESTS WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH YOU TO THIS HQ FOR DISCUSSION WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD

(125)

607

32011

LOCAL GOVERNMENT S/O

620

(121) a

↙

- 2 -

PARA FOUR PD GRATEFUL ALSO FOR EARLY AND DAILY REPORTS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ATTITUDE OF CIVS ESPECIALLY IN THE MAIN TOWNS PD THE CIVS IN ROME ARE ALREADY ASKING FOR PERMISSION TO GO TO MILAN WHICH WILL BE REFUSED PD

Internal Distribution:

Chief Commissioner  
Executive Commissioner  
Civil Affairs Section  
Patriots Branch

See 1250 + b

5

606

611

LOCAL GOVERNMENT S/C

620

NICHOLAS POMBINO

CWO USA  
Asst. Adjutant

121 a

APR 30 1945

cc

Ref: 573/49/EC.

29 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Employment of Patriots.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

(NO)

1. I refer to your letter 4/8.B/CA dated 25 April 1945, subject 'Future Policy in N. Italy'.

2. The point has been raised as to the arrangements for absorbing Patriots into civil employment. I understand that among the details which are recorded when a Patriot enters a Centre is his occupation and it is important that this information is not wasted. The officer in charge of each Centre must establish contact with local labour offices or large employers so that no opportunity of placing unemployed patriots is lost.

3. If this point is not already covered in your directives I should be glad if you would give it emphasis.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

32201/CC

605

Q

(121)



*Chief Commission*

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief Commissioner

APR 28 1945

9/20.1/CA

27 April 45

SUBJECT : Committees of National Liberation.

TO : All Officers, Emilia, Liguria, Lombardy,  
Friuli and Venetia Regions,  
SCAO's 5 and 8 Army,  
HQ IV Corps

1 This directive lays down the policy which will govern the actions of all Officers of Allied Military Government in their relations with the Committees of National Liberation (CLN - "Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale") in Northern Italy.

2 CLN's have been organized on a communal, provincial and regional basis throughout German Occupied Territory. Their activities are co-ordinated by an over-all CLN for the whole of the area, known as the CINAJ - ("Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale dell'Alta Italia").

Intelligence reports from the North show that the various Committees of National Liberation have learned a good deal about the attitude of government in the year-long struggle against the Fascist, and the Germans. In many districts, "shadow" governments have been set up, and the various portfolios have been distributed amongst the leaders of the different parties. On the whole it seems that for the time being there is a remarkable degree of unity of purpose in the Committees, and party differences have been sunk in the common desire to chase the Germans from Italy and to punish their Fascist collaborators. These Committees have been assisted in their military operations by the Allied authorities and the giving of such assistance necessarily implies a degree of recognition of their position.

3 Relations with AMG. - The Supreme Allied Commander has made his own military arrangements with the CINAJ. He has not given political recognition to the CLN's, but under these military arrangements, the CLN's will endeavor to maintain law and order and continue to safeguard economic resources until they are established. Thereupon CINAJ has agreed that the CLN's will recognize AMG and hand over to it all authority previously assumed.

**604** - Likewise all components of the General Command of the Voluntary (CVL) will come under the direct command of the C-in-C, 15th Army Group, and will obey any order issued by him (or by AMG on his behalf) including orders to disband and surrender their arms when required to do so. Upon the establishment of AMG, the SCAC first, and later the RG, is supreme and possesses all powers of government, and the CLN has no official standing in the conduct of affairs.

320

But if you are other considerations which should be borne in mind.

3201/C

throughout German Occupied Territory. Their activities are co-ordinated by an over-all CLM for the whole of the area, known as the CLMAI - ("Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale dell'Alta Italia").

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4 But there are other considerations which should be borne in mind in implementing the policy indicated in the above arrangements. It is in the interest of the Allies that there should be a stable Government in Italy and the Allied policy is to strengthen the legitimate Italian Government in every way possible. The Italian Government in Rome may not have the entire confidence of the CLM's in the North and, at best, their influence there may be subject to fluctuation. This may be based on several factors. There is the feeling that the North has contributed more generously to the defeat of the Germans than the South, and has suffered far more heavily for Italy. There is criticism of the slow progress made by the Roman Government in the reconstruction of the country, in the solution of the pressing economic problems of food supply and fuel, and above all in the punishment of former fascists. The Italian Government will be aware of this antipathy and has an agreement which goes further than that of the Supreme Allied Commander in recognising the CLMAI as its representative in the struggle in the North. The Government has succeeded in exacting a certain measure of recognition from the CLM's in the North, but the possibility cannot be overlooked that they, or their component political parties, may not abide by this agreement if circumstances seem favourable for a political upheaval. It is hoped that after liberation the Rome Government will be able to absorb additional members from the North and thereby become more representative.

A.

120

5 Relations with the Italian Government. The recognition of the CLMs as the representatives of the Government in the struggle against the enemy does not affect the Allies, who are not parties to the arrangement. Moreover, the Italian Government has no authority of any kind in Military Government Territory. Its arrangements with the CLM are not operative in Military Government Territory and do not affect the relations between AMG and the CLM.

6 The problem facing AMG, therefore, is to reconcile the military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the aspirations of the political leaders of the CLMs to self-government, at the same time supporting the authority of the Italian Government in Rome in order that it may be able to administer the Northern Territories once AMG is withdrawn. The solution of this problem may well be found to lie in the absorption at a very early date of CLM nominees into the civil administration. If Allied officers arrive in the North and bluntly inform the CLM's that their task is accomplished and that they may now disperse and if, after that, Sindaco and other administrative officers are appointed without the views of CLM's being considered, the antagonism will be great and may well be disastrous. The danger of setting up local administrations composed of Italians who are not acceptable to the Patriot organizations cannot be over emphasized. AMG officers are not bound to accept the first suggestions of the CLM, who can always be instructed to submit alternative names. If, however, this principle is followed out, many of the problems of maintaining law and order will never arise. It will be easier to exploit the local resources of the country in the work of reconstruction and in the work of feeding the population. It will be easier to bring together the former Patriot organizations and the Italian Government, and it will be easier to prepare the ground against the time when the Government in Rome can take over the administration.

7 While the foregoing paragraph lays down a principle which is calculated to reconcile the Military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the aspirations of the CLMs, there are special considerations in regard to the office of Prefect and Questore. Prefects, as the official representatives of the Government, are normally appointed by the Government from career officials. Even in the present situation this practice has generally been followed. Similarly the Questore have normally been appointed from Public Safety personnel by the Central Government. Other appointments, such as the Sindaco, etc., are normally local choice. For obvious reasons the Italian Government wishes to continue the customary practice in regard to Prefects and Questore, and have raised it again very recently. It is the policy of the Allied Commission to support the Government and it would be unwise to depart, entirely, from the normal practice. The Italian Government has, therefore, been advised that any specific nominees whom they put forward for appointment to the post of Prefect or Questore by AMG will receive consideration. At the same time it has been pointed out that it would be quite useless to appoint any nominee who is not acceptable in the locality. Sindaco and MGs will not, by this arrangement, lose any of the powers delegated to them. It is their duty, however, in implementing the policy of this Commission, to use their best efforts to obtain local consent.

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AMG and IGOs will act, by this arrangement, lose any of the powers delegated to them. It is their duty, however, in implementing the policy of this Commission, to use their best efforts to obtain local acceptance for the Government nominee, endeavouring to reconcile the views of the CLN with those of the Italian Government. This must be the principle although the practice will always depend finally on the judgement of the SCAC or HC.

8

The action is, therefore, as follows: On arrival in a Province it seems almost certain that a Prefect and Questore appointed by CLN will be found in office. This will be fully in accord with the agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and CLNAI. These appointments should not be confirmed forthwith but the individuals should be normally allowed to remain in office as acting Prefect and acting Questore respectively solely for the purpose of carrying on routine business pending the final appointment by AMG. Nominations should then be invited from the CLN, to whom it will be explained that AMG alone have the right to make the appointment from names approved by the Italian Government, CLN and other sources. Nominations may also be sought from other sources, e.g. the local Archbishop. The names of Government candidates for these two posts will be furnished by this Headquarters as soon as they are available, and local opinion should then be sought as to the possible acceptance of the Government's nominees. The appointment should not be hurried and it is much better to allow a reasonable period, say 10-14 days, to elapse so that full consideration can be given to the matter before final decision is made. In appointing a Questore great importance is to be attached to the professional qualifications of the

so. Since purely political appointments to this important office should be avoided. The responsible SCAC or RC will inform this HQ of the following details directly they are available

- a) Name of Prefect and Quastore found in office
  - b) Name of Prefect and Quastore finally appointed.
- Case work is stressed that these special circumstances apply only to the two offices of Prefect and Quastore. The Italian Government fully appreciates that other officials are normally local choices and AMG officers will appoint them with due regard to CIM advice.

9 The CIMs must be treated with the courtesy due to their political position and their past labours. They should be received regularly by the RC and given the opportunity of expressing their views. They are at liberty to make representations to the RC or the Prefect, both of whom should seek the advice and views of the CIM whenever they think it opportune. It is however entirely a matter for the RC to consider whether, in any particular case, the advice of the CIM is to be followed or rejected. It would of course be in keeping with this directive to accept such advice except where it is in conflict with the Policy of AMG.

10 It should be added that, when a member of a CIM is appointed to an administrative position, it is better that he should resign from the CIM. There may be objections to this in individual cases and it is left to the discretion of the RC concerned. It is most desirable, however, that holders of administrative positions should be entirely divorced from the politics of the CIM.

11 It must be made plain to the Prefect and to other officials that they are the servants of AMG and can take no orders from the CIM. On the other hand, the RC must give his full support to the Prefect and the official administrators. If he no longer has confidence in his officials, the RC should take steps to remove them. The CIM must not exercise executive functions or usurp the authority of the Prefect, e.g. by making official appointments or setting up commissions of enquiry. If, after they have been duly warned and ordered to desist, the CIMs persist in attempting to be executive or otherwise violate the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander as Military Governor, then, as a last resort, the RC may ignore them completely. Such an attitude is to be adopted only in case of absolute necessity, when all other parts of consultation have failed and administration is at a deadlock.

12 There is some evidence that in parts of German Occupied Territory, where the enemy's control is slight, the CIMs have set up governing bodies in each commune, elected on an informal system of universal suffrage. Such popularly elected bodies may also be set up at other levels. These bodies will not be given official recognition and the official local authorities prescribed by former directives will be established as soon as possible. But every effort will be made to absorb into membership of the official authorities the nominees of such an elected body at the same level. If in very special circumstances in forward areas, the unofficial body is allowed to continue for a short time, it must be understood that it derives its authority from AMG and not from any popular mandate.

objections to this in individual cases and it is left to the discretion of the PC concerned. It is most desirable, however, that holders of administrative positions should be entirely divorced from the politics of the CIM.

11

It must be made plain to the Prefect and to other officials that they are the servants of AMF and can take no orders from the CIM. On the other hand, the PC must give his full support to the Prefect and the official administrators. If he no longer has confidence in his officials, the PC should take steps to remove them. The CIM must not exercise executive functions or usurp the authority of the Prefect, e.g. by making official appointments or setting up commissions of inquiry. If, after they have been duly warned and ordered to assist, the CIMs persist in attempting to be executive or otherwise violate the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander as Military Governor, then, as a last resort, the PC may ignore them completely. Such an attitude is to be adopted only in case of absolute necessity, when all efforts at conciliation have failed and administration is at a deadlock.

12

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603

*Robert W. Stone*

ROBERT W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Civil Affairs Officer

Copies for info to:

- Liberia-Merethe Region (12)
- Poseano Region (12)
- G-5 15 Army Group

120

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K-154

SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting  
26th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

\* \* \*

11. FINANCES FOR THE CLNAI

MR. MACMILLAN said that until recently the CLNAI had, under agreement, been provided with 160,000,000 lira monthly. Signor Longhi had recently, for various reasons, asked for this amount to be increased to 300,000,000. This had been agreed and the Allied Commission had been instructed to approach the Italian government accordingly. Meanwhile, however, the rapid advance of the armies had already involved the liberation of substantial areas of the north of ITALY and it therefore appeared inappropriate to increase the sums paid to the the CLNAI at this time. It appeared more proper to consider whether the amounts paid could not now be reduced. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had therefore refrained from requesting the Italian government to increase the payments, pending further direction from the Supreme Allied Commander.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to examine the matter of CLNAI finances, so as to determine whether, in view of the liberation of substantial areas of northern ITALY, the amounts paid should not be substantially reduced instead of increased, as had been previously proposed.

\* \* \*

See (128)

602

119a

TOP SECRET

320/100

25 April 1945

Captain Cecil:

118

With reference to our phone call, this is the latest letter in the "booklet" series.

Although, as you see, Bonomi's attention is drawn to the need to prevent further distribution of the document, it is not thought that he will be able to do much about it. The letter, therefore, is by way of completing the record.

J. A. Q.

See 118

3201/100

601

119



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner  
APO 394

Ref: 3208/63/EC.

23 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister;

113

I much appreciate your prompt reply of 20 April to my letter of 18 April on the subject of the publication "I.C.L.N. Neil 'Alta Italia - Formazione e Funzionamento."

Your re-statement of the relationship between the Italian Government and the CINAI makes the position abundantly clear but I am still somewhat concerned lest the issue of this booklet should do harm. I therefore draw your attention to the observation in my letter of 18 April that I considered it would be a serious mistake to permit a further distribution of this document and my enquiry as to the steps you intend to take regarding it.

113

I would like to have your reply on this point as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,

*Is/ Ellery W. Stone*

ELLEERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

3201/EC

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome.

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cc: U.S. Ambassador )  
British Ambassador ) --- With a copy of  
G-5, AFHQ ) Prime Minister Bonomi's  
A/President ) letter of 20 Apr 45.  
Chief Commissioner  
VP, CA Section  
Political Adviser (A)  
Political Adviser (B)

118

**TOP SECRET**

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

COPY No 4

APR 24 RECE  
CC 0937

F 64619  
APRIL 23/1948B

D/8485  
APRIL 24/0845  
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FRODOG

ACTION: ALCOM ROBE

TOP SECRET.

(95)

(96)

3201/cc

Reference our FX 39851 and F 39896 both of 8 March.

Understood TORNAQUINCI now returned HOME. Request you obtain report from him and submit here soonest in order decision may be taken as to attachment military officer.

DIST

Copy number 1 & 2 ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER

- " " 3 INFO : A/PRESIDENT
- " " 4 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
- " " 5 USAMB
- " " 6 BRAMB
- " " 7 CA SEC
- " " 8 FILE

3201/cc

59 8

(117)

**TOP SECRET**

*Chief Comm.*

# INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: CAS 485  
Date/Time of Origin: APR 21 1030E

Message Centre No: D/8287  
Date Time Rec'd: APR 21 1655B  
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP FRG1 MONTFORD  
TO: 8TH ARMY MAIN FOR MCKREERY FOR MACHITLAN INFO ALCOM FOR STONE

**SECRET**

114

SECRET.

STONE has received letter from AFHQ approving substantial increase CINAF financial arrangements and asking him to obtain BONAMI's concurrence. STONE advises this contrary to his understanding. Please telephone him today or advise him through me (a) do you want STONE to go to BONAMI or (b) shall he await your return.

# ACTION

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Chief Commissioner 2  
INFO: A/President  
Chief Commissioner  
Finance S/C  
File

HEADQUARTERS  
21 APR 1945  
A. C.

598

# Confidential

116

3201/CC

Q

MEMO FOR FILES:

Reference CC's minute attached, have passed on suggestion to Major Worden and also to Col. <sup>Burhan</sup> Bowen-Carter. C.A. Section will take action.

J.A.Q.

Admiral

I don't know what action you wish to take on this.

594

Think should be sent to all RC's of No. 1st Air Force and new letter about subjects

115

3201/CC

Translation

CHIEF COMMR

The President of the Council of Ministers

Rome, 20 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

113

after receiving your letter of the day before yesterday, I drew the attention of Minister Scopinardo on the booklet published by the Ministry for Occupied Italy, under the denomination of Documents, describes the formation and functioning of the Liberation Committee for North Italy.

Considering the importance of the arguments, I made this observation in the presence of the two vice presidents of the Council, of the ministers who represent the parties in the Government, and of the military ministers. We agreed that even if what is said in the booklet expresses the thought of all or part of the Committee for liberation of North Italy, this thought cannot be mistaken for that of the Government. Therefore, if this booklet which bore the inscription 'Ministry for Occupied Italy' could be misunderstood by the reader, it mustn't be believed that the powers, tasks and aims, which, from this reading, seem to be among the purposes of the Committee for Liberation of North Italy, have been decided in agreement with or in any way authorized by the Italian Government, nor that they are the development of the delegation of powers, which formerly took place between the Government and the Committee for Liberation which resides in Milan.

On this point which is of vital importance with the U.S.A. of North Italy and with the Allied Command, I want to make it clear that on the 26th of December 1944, the Government made these two statements only:

1. - The Italian Government acknowledges the National Committee for Liberation in North Italy as organ of the anti-fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy;
2. - The Italian Government delegates the U.S.A.A.I. to represent it in the fight which the patriots against the fascists and German in non-liberated Italy.

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It is therefore established that as long as the Italian territory will not be liberated, the committee for North Italy can act as delegate of the Government in the fight against fascism and against the German invader, and will naturally be able to take whatever action circumstances

Admiral Henry W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Rome

See 118

see by CC

115

5201/ce

require. As soon as the national territory will be liberated, and while waiting for the allied troops to enter the said territory, as delegate of the home Government, the committee for liberation will be able to take the necessary action for the maintenance of public order and for the requirements of local life. Of course, when the Allied Military Command will have assumed the administration of the Italian territory, the powers of the Committee for liberation of North Italy will be reduced to what the Command will deem fit to leave it, and the committee will not be able to claim others.

This has been fixed by the agreement of December 7th, between the Committee for North Italy and the Supreme Allied Command for the Mediterranean. In fact, in art. 4 we read: 'When the enemy will retire from the territory it is occupying, the C.L.N.A.I. will do everything to maintain public order and to go on saving the economic resources of the country, till the Allied Military Government be established. Immediately after the institution of the Allied Military Government, the C.L.N.A.I. will acknowledge the Allied Military Government and transmit it all the authority and powers of government and local administration it had formerly assumed.'

Such being the precise agreements which took place, the Government considers all that is written in the booklet published by the Ministry for Occupied Italy as not included in the said agreements, and therefore extraneous to the obligation to the C.L.N.A.I. for well determined aims and for a well determined length of time.

In making this statement, I wanted to say that in the communication made on March 29th by the C.L.N.A.I. to the Undersecretary of State Madici, during his recent visit to Occupied Italy, it clearly appears that the C.L.N.A.I. means to follow the spirit of the agreement n. 4, mentioned above, so that we may hope that the relations between the C.L.N.A.I., the Allied Command and the Italian Government (whatever the thought and aspirations of those who wrote the booklet which is the subject of this note) will remain within the forms and limits of the agreements which took place.

Sincerely yours,

S. EVANOE BONOMI

EX COMM. DIST

ACTION : CHIEF COMM.

INFO : A/PRESIDENT

EX COMM.

C A Section

POL ADV (A)

POL ADV (B)

596

s.c.

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APR 21 RECD

Roma, lì 20 aprile 1945

*Al Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Caro Ammiraglio,

In seguito alla sua lettera di ieri l'altro ho richiamato l'attenzione del ministro Scocimarro, sull'opuscolo edito dal Ministero dell'Italia Occupata e che, sotto la denominazione di Documenti, descrive la formazione e il funzionamento del Comitato di Liberazione dell'Alta Italia.

Tale richiamo - data l'importanza dell'argomento - ho fatto in presenza dei due vice presidenti del Consiglio, dei ministri che rappresentano i partiti al Governo e dei ministri militari. Si è concordemente constatato che, se anche ciò che è detto nell'opuscolo riproduce il pensiero di tutto o di parte del Comitato di Liberazione Alta Italia, tale pensiero non può essere confuso con quello del Governo. Se dunque la pubblicazione, comparsa con la scritta "Ministero dell'Italia Occupata", può trarre in equivoco il lettore è da escludere che i poteri, i compiti, i fini che sembra da quella lettura essere fra i propositi del Comitato di Liberazione Alta Italia siano stati con-

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Al Sig. Ammiraglio  
Ellery W. Stone  
Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

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- 2 -

*Al Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

cordati o comunque autorizzati dal Governo italiano e siano lo sviluppo di quella delega di poteri che, a suo tempo, il Governo ha fatto al Comitato di Liberazione sedente a Milano.

Su questo punto, che è di vitale importanza per i rapporti nostri con il C.L.N. Alta Italia e con il Comando Alleato, tengo a precisare che il Governo ha, il 26 dicembre 1944, fatte soltanto queste due dichiarazioni:

- 1° - il Governo italiano riconosce il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia quale organo dei partiti antifascisti nel territorio occupato dal nemico;
- 2° - il Governo italiano delega il C.L.N.A.I. a rappresentarlo nella lotta che i patrioti hanno impegnata contro i fascisti e i tedeschi nell'Italia non ancora liberata.

Resta pertanto stabilito che finchè il territorio italiano non sia liberato, il Comitato Alta Italia potrà agire come delegato del Governo per la lotta contro il fascismo e il tedesco invasore e naturalmente potrà prendere tutte quelle disposizioni che saranno suggerite dalle circostanze. Appena liberato il territorio nazionale e nell'attesa dell'ingresso nel territorio stesso delle truppe alleate, il Comitato di Liberazione potrà prendere, come delegato del Governo di Roma, le disposizioni necessarie per la tutela dell'ordine pubblico e per i bisogni della vita locale. Naturalmente quando il Comando Militare Alleato

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*Al Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

avrà assunto l'amministrazione del territorio italiano, i poteri del Comitato di Liberazione dell'Alta Italia si ridurranno a quei soli che il Comando stesso vorrà lasciargli senza che il Comitato possa pretenderne altri.

Ciò, del resto, è stabilito dall'accordo 7 dicembre scorso fra il Comitato Alta Italia e il Comandante Supremo Alleato per il Mediterraneo. Infatti nell'art. 4 si legge:

""Quando il nemico si ritira dal territorio da esso occupato il C.L.N.A.I. farà ogni sforzo per mantenere l'ordine pubblico e per continuare a salvaguardare le risorse economiche del paese finchè non venga istituito il Governo militare alleato. Subito dopo l'istituzione del Governo militare alleato, il C.L.N.A.I. riconoscerà il Governo militare alleato e gli trasmetterà tutta l'autorità ed i poteri di governo e di amministrazione locale assunti in precedenza."" x

Tali essendo i precisi accordi intervenuti, il Governo considera tutto ciò che è scritto nell'opuscolo edito dal Ministero dell'Italia Occupata come esorbitante dagli accordi stessi, e quindi come estraneo alla delega fatta al C.L.N.A.I. per un fine e per un tempo ben determinati.

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- 4 -

*Il Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Nel fare questa dichiarazione io sono lieto di constatare che nella comunicazione fatta il 29 marzo scorso dal C.L.N.A.I. al Sottosegretario di Stato Medici, nella sua recente visita nell'Italia occupata, appare chiaro che il C.L.N.A.I. intende mantenersi nello spirito del patto N° 4 superiormente trascritto, talchè è lecito credere che i rapporti fra il C.L.N.A.I., il Comando Alleato e il Governo italiano (qualunque siano per essere il pensiero e le aspirazioni di coloro che hanno scritto l'opuscolo oggetto di questa nota) si manterranno entro le forme e i limiti degli accordi intervenuti.

Con cordiali saluti.

*Luigi Einaudi*

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CC 3201

18 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

112

My attention has been drawn to a publication entitled "I.C.I.H. Nelli 'Alta Italia - Formazione e Funzionamento'" and headed "Documenti N.1" issued by the Ministry of Occupied Italy.

From a cursory reading of this document it would appear that there are a number of mis-statements, misconceptions, and serious omissions in it. At a time like this I think it would be a serious mistake to permit a further distribution of this document.

I shall be grateful if you will inform me if this document has the approval of your Government and what steps you intend to take in regard to it. I must request an immediate reply in order that I may inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the position of the Italian Government in this matter.

Yours very truly,

ELBERT W. STONE

ELBERT W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
Rome.

See 115

3201/cv

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AT 24 NOV ABK/jcm  
CO 1745

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

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Auth: SAC MT  
Initials: RNF  
Date: 19 April 1945

AG 370.61/021 OCT-O

19 April 1945

SUBJECT: Finance CLNAI

TO: President  
Allied Commission  
APO 394

482

1. Under the terms of the agreement signed in December 1944, between the SAC and representatives of the CLNAI visiting AFHQ, it was agreed to contribute a monthly sum of 160,000,000 lire to the CLNAI. Signor LONGHI, President of the CLNAI, has recently returned from North ITALY and has reported that he has been able to distribute these funds throughout the enemy-occupied territory. He asked, however, that consideration be given to increase this monthly contribution to 300,000,000 lire. His reasons are numerous, such as the increased cost of living, the enemy forcing inflation, and the increase in numbers of the partisan force, which since the agreement was signed has grown from 65,000 to 90,000.

2. He also pointed out that as the agreement was signed in December, in his detailed arrangement with the DFC the first installment was to be paid on 1 December, no thought being given to any contribution for the month of November. His previous source of supply ceased at the end of September. He therefore urged that the agreement should be made retrospective to 1 November.

3. This headquarters views both the above proposals made by Signor LONGHI with approval, but as the Italian Government has agreed to reimburse the contributions of 160,000,000 lire monthly, it is felt that they should be asked to concur in these new proposals and to accept the added financial responsibility. It is and always has been the wish of the CLNAI that the Italian Government should bear the responsibility for their (CLNAI) financial support.

4. You are therefore requested to approach the Italian Government with a view to obtaining their support to these new proposals put forward by the CLNAI. Further the Italian Government should be requested to repay this additional contribution monthly as is their present arrangement, and to pass immediately a credit of 160,000,000 lire for the month of November 1944.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

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See 116  
See 124 FILE  
C. W. CHRISTENSEN  
Colonel, AG  
Adjutant General  
Confidential

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 370.64/021 GCT-O,  
dtd 19 April 1945 (cont'd)

Br-618

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1. The Italian Government undertakes, on demand, to make available to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (hereafter referred to as SACMED) through the Allied Financial Agency, lire to the amount already paid or to be paid on the authority of SACMED to the accredited representatives of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia (hereafter referred to as CLNAI).
2. The amount of Lit. 210 millions (two hundred and ten million lire) was made available by SACMED during the month of December 1944 to the accredited representatives of the CLNAI. The Italian Government undertakes to reimburse this amount to SACMED through the Allied Financial Agency on or before 30 December 1944.
3. As regards subsequent payments the Italian Government undertakes to furnish, on demand, to SACMED, through the Allied Financial Agency, such amounts as may be requested by SACMED not to exceed Lit. 160 millions (one hundred and sixty million lire) per month.

ROME, 28 December 1944.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

/s/ Ivanoe Bonomi  
 PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN  
 THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

ACCEPTED:

/s/ H. R. Alexander  
 Field Marshal

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**Confidential**

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3201/100

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DOCUMENTI  
N. 1

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**I C.L.N. NELL'ALTA ITALIA**  
**FORMAZIONE E FUNZIONAMENTO**

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(BIRD IN)

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MINISTERO DELL'ITALIA OCCUPATA

FILE

## SOMMARIO

PREMESSA

CHE COS'È IL C. L. N. A. I.

COMPOSIZIONE, COMPITI, ORGANIZZAZIONE: SUA OPERA DI DIREZIONE POLITICA UNITARIA

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I C. L. N. DI RIONE E DI VILLAGGIO

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I COMITATI DI AGITAZIONE

FUNZIONE DI GOVERNO DEL C. L. N. A. I.

LE GIUNTE PROVINCIALI, LE GIUNTE POPOLARI DI AMMINISTRAZIONE

*Nella collana « Documenti » il Ministero dell'Italia Occupata intende pubblicare testimonianze, documenti e informazioni riguardanti il movimento di liberazione dell'Alta Italia. Scopo della « Collana » è di far conoscere agli italiani delle regioni liberate gli avvenimenti, i problemi, i dibattiti, gli eroismi di quanti ancora lottano contro i tedeschi e fascisti perchè sia chiaro ad ognuno come, malgrado e contro l'oppressione, serba intensa la vita della resistenza patriottica e si pongano già le basi della riorganizzazione democratica di quelle regioni.*



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*I C. L. N. NELL'ALTA ITALIA  
FORMAZIONE E FUNZIONAMENTO*

*MINISTERO DELL'ITALIA OCCUPATA*

*Questo opuscolo, largamente diffuso nel Nord per illustrare i compiti e le funzioni del C. L. N., viene presentato come testimonianza del nuovo orientamento del movimento e del modo con cui sono posti i problemi dell'organizzazione politica e amministrativa nel momento dell'insurrezione nazionale contro i tedeschi ed i fascisti.*

*La battaglia decisiva, che deve liberare definitivamente le nostre terre dall'incubo tedesco e dai suoi agguerriti fascisti, è già in pieno sviluppo. Per ogni militante del movimento di liberazione, per ogni patriota, i problemi dell'organizzazione e della guida unitaria dell'insurrezione nazionale, i problemi dell'organizzazione e delle forme del nuovo potere democratico, che sorge per volontà e per azione di popolo, acquistano un'attualità concreta ed immediata.*

*La battaglia insurrezionale, che — con l'aiuto possente dei vittoriosi Eserciti Alleati — ha da liberare e già sta liberando le nostre terre dalla peste nazifascista, non è il fatto di una classe o di un Partito: è l'insurrezione nazionale di tutto un popolo, in lotta per la sua indipendenza e per la sua libertà. E' tutto il popolo, ogni Italiano, che alla battaglia insurrezionale liberatrice dà l'apporto della sua opera e del suo sangue, può e deve dare il suo concreto contributo alla nascita della nuova Italia democratica e progressiva; perchè l'Italia del popolo non può essere un dono, è una conquista, che può essere realizzata solo per volontà e per azione di popolo.*

*Durante vent'anni, le cricche plutocratiche, reazionarie ed antinazionali, di cui il fascismo era ed è l'espressione e lo strumento, hanno imposto al nostro popolo un disastroso regime di oppressione. Per vent'anni, con tutti i mezzi, il fascismo ha cercato di imporre agli Italiani l'idea che ogni potere deve discendere dall'alto, se non si vuol cadere nel disordine e nell'anarchia. Ministri e consiglieri nazionali, podestà o funzionari delle pubbliche am-*

ministrazioni, fino i dirigenti dei sindacati e delle associazioni professionali, dovevano essere nominati dall'alto; non dal popolo e per il popolo, ma contro il popolo, che era escluso da ogni partecipazione alla soluzione dei suoi problemi vitali.

Ognuno di noi può oggi constatare come la teoria e la pratica fascista del « potere che scende dall'alto » abbiano tutelato l'ordine; per non parlare della libertà e della sicurezza dei cittadini, dell'indipendenza e della prosperità del Paese. Ognuno di noi può oggi constatare dove ci abbiamo condotti — precipitati, piuttosto — un regime di oppressione in cui « Mussolini aveva sempre ragione »; in cui aveva sempre ragione — contro il popolo — la cricca dei profittatori, dei magnati della finanza e dei mercanti di cannoni. Attraverso la tragica esperienza della guerra fascista e della disfatta, tutti gli Italiani, han potuto riconoscere cosa fosse quella unanimità nazionale, che il fascismo vantava di aver imposto con la cappa di piombo della sua dittatura. 25 luglio, 8 settembre: a quella concordia falsa e mentita, perchè non era concordia di popolo, il popolo, la Nazione ha dovuto, per salvare il Paese dall'ultima catastrofe, sostituire e contrapporre la sua concordia, la sua volontà e la sua lotta democratica.

Di questa concordia, nelle nostre terre ancora calcate dal tallone nazifascista, il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia è la più alta ed efficace espressione politica. Espressione di una concordia nazionale che non è, certo, quella morta e fittizia con cui il fascismo credeva di velare — come di un lenzuolo funebre — i profondi contrasti che dividevano il Paese; concordia che non esclude e non nasconde la varietà degli interessi di classe e delle impostazioni politiche, nè pretende conciliarla in un fittizio, immobile equilibrio; ma concordia che nasce, appunto, dalla comune esigenza e dalla lotta comune per l'indipendenza nazionale, di cui una tragica esperienza ha confermato l'indissolubile legame con la lotta democratica e popolare.

L'autorità, il potere del Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia (C.L.N.A.I.) — organo politico supremo dell'insurrezione nazionale nelle nostre terre — non sono, e non potrebbero essere, un'autorità, un potere che « scende dall'alto ». Son nati e nascono da una lotta di popolo, e solo per cosciente volontà e disciplina di popolo possono offer

arsi. La delega di poteri, che il Governo democratico italiano da Roma ha conferito al C.L.N.A.I. per l'Italia occupata, sarebbe sminuita nel suo alto valore se fosse interpretata in un senso puramente rappresentativo e burocratico: non è una investitura, è il riconoscimento e la conferma del significato democratico e rinnovatore della lotta di liberazione nazionale in cui tutto il popolo è oggi impegnato.

L'autorità, il potere del C.L.N.A.I., la sua efficacia come guida unitaria dell'insurrezione nazionale, sono, così, condizionate dalla sua sostanza democratica: sono l'autorità, il potere, l'efficacia che gli dà una cosciente partecipazione e disciplina di popolo. E democrazia significa appunto forza, azione, potere di popolo. Significa una forma di governo o di potere che non scende dall'alto sul popolo e contro il popolo, ma che nasce dal popolo, si afferma e si consolida per volontà, per diretta azione, per cosciente disciplina di popolo.

Stechè di fronte ai compiti essenziali dell'insurrezione nazionale, come di fronte a quelli non meno complessi della ricostruzione e del rinnovamento democratico, il C.L.N.A.I., lungi dagli atteggiamenti di un paternalismo autoritario e accentratore, fa appello all'iniziativa e all'attività democratica e popolare, che è la condizione di una cosciente disciplina di tutti gli Italiani. Comitati di Liberazione di fabbrica e aziendali, C.L.N. di villaggio e di rione, comunali, provinciali, regionali, sono gli organi di direzione politica unitaria in cui, a tutti i gradi, si esprime e si articola questa partecipazione diretta ed attiva del popolo alla lotta di liberazione nazionale ed all'opera del rinnovamento democratico; Giunte popolari comunali, Giunte di Governo di Provincia o di Zona liberata, sono gli organi politici ed amministrativi in cui questa partecipazione diretta ed attiva del popolo alla soluzione dei suoi problemi vitali si afferma nelle forme nuove del potere democratico.

Già, per tutta l'Italia occupata e nelle zone liberate dai gloriosi Volontari della Libertà, questi organi di lotta unitaria e queste nuove forme del potere popolare hanno affermato la loro vitalità. Una larga esperienza, positiva e negativa, è ricca in proposito di insegnamenti per ogni patriota, per ogni militante del movimento di liberazione nazionale. Occorre popolarizzare questa esperienza, chiarire a tutti i cittadini i compiti e la funzione

*dei nuovi organi di lotta e di potere democratico, per suscitare e moltiplicare le iniziative. Occorre che ogni villaggio, ogni fabbrica, ogni azienda, ogni rione abbia il suo Comitato di Liberazione, che ogni villaggio liberato abbia la sua Giunta Popolare. Occorre che ogni Comitato di Liberazione, ogni Giunta Popolare, abbia chiara l'idea dei suoi compiti e della sua funzione democratica, nel quadro della lotta comune che il C.L.N.A.I. promuove, coordina, disciplina.*



### *Cosa è il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia?*

Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia (C.L.N.A.I.) è l'organo di direzione politica unitaria del movimento di liberazione nazionale nell'Italia occupata. Questa direzione politica unitaria si esplica, sul terreno militare, a mezzo del Comando Generale del Corpo dei Volontari della Libertà, e dei suoi Comandi unificati regionali e di zona; nel campo più specificamente politico, attraverso i C.L.N. (Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale) regionali, provinciali, comunali, di villaggio e di rione, di fabbrica e di azienda.

### *Come è sorto il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia?*

Il C.L.N.A.I. è sorto come organo di direzione politica unitaria del movimento di liberazione nazionale nell'Italia occupata per iniziativa dei Partiti antifascisti, che non hanno mai cessato di esprimere, contro il fascismo antipopolare ed antinazionale, la volontà di indipendenza e di libertà del popolo italiano. È sorto dalla esigenza e dalla volontà comune di assicurare al movimento di liberazione ed all'insurrezione nazionale una guida politica unitaria; giacché l'insurrezione nazionale non è e non può essere il fatto di un Partito o di una classe, è il compito di tutto il popolo in lotta per la sua indipendenza e la sua libertà, contro il tedesco e contro i suoi sgherri fascisti.

### *Da chi è costituito il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia?*

Il C.L.N.A.I. è sorto come un organismo collegiale, costituito dai delegati dei cinque maggiori Partiti che nell'Italia occupata han promosso e organizzato la lotta antifascista delle masse per l'abbattimento del regime di Mussolini, e il movimento di liberazione nazionale: il Partito Comunista, il Partito Socialista, il Partito d'Azione, il Partito della Democrazia Cri-

siana, il Partito Liberale. Un organo essenziale del C.L.N.A.I. — il Comando Generale del Corpo dei Volontari della Libertà — assicura, più ancora che il contatto, la sua intima compenetrazione con le necessità, con le aspirazioni, con la volontà di lotta dei nostri eroici e gloriosi combattenti. Nel corso ed ai fini della lotta stessa, d'altronde — per assicurare una più efficace e democratica direzione del movimento di liberazione nazionale — il C.L.N.A.I. ha sentito il bisogno di allargarsi col riconoscimento della rappresentanza di quelle organizzazioni unitarie di massa che han preso parte e dato il loro contributo alla lotta di liberazione: sicchè oggi i rappresentanti del *Fronte della Gioventù per l'Indipendenza Nazionale e la Libertà* e dei *Gruppi di Difesa della Donna*, organizzazioni di massa aderenti al C.L.N.A.I., e da esso riconosciute, che inquadrano e guidano alla lotta decine di migliaia di giovani e di donne, al di sopra di ogni distinzione di fede o di Partito, partecipano di diritto ai lavori del C.L.N.A.I., a cui portano la voce delle masse giovanili e femminili.

Così pure il C.L.N.A.I. ha riconosciuto la funzione nazionale dei *Comitati di agitazione* che promuovono e dirigono la lotta della classe operaia contro l'occupante, contro i padroni collaboratori, contro le deportazioni, per lo sciopero generale insurrezionale; e con questi Comitati, come con gli analoghi *Comitati di Difesa dei Contadini*, esso ha assicurato, attraverso i suoi organi centrali e periferici, uno stretto contatto.

Altri Partiti e Movimenti, d'altronde — oltre a quelli che del C.L.N.A.I. son stati iniziatori o che partecipano ad esso in virtù del loro stesso carattere nazionale e unitario — han proclamato la loro adesione ai principi e alla disciplina del Comitato di Liberazione: così il Partito della Democrazia del Lavoro, il Partito Repubblicano, il Movimento dei Cattolici Comunisti, che son rappresentati negli organi regionali, provinciali o locali del C.L.N.A.I. là dove questi Partiti o Movimenti hanno forze organizzate.

Del C.L.N.A.I. sono infine parte integrante i suoi organi periferici, C.L.N. regionali, provinciali, comunali, di rione e di villaggio, di fabbrica e di azienda, di cui più avanti illustreremo l'essenziale funzione democratica; e al C.L.N.A.I. aderiscono numerose Associazioni, professionali, culturali, assistenziali, che ne accettano i principi e la disciplina: come quelle degli Insegnanti, dei Medici, degli Avvocati, dei Magistrati, ecc. Sicchè si può ben dire che tutte le forze nazionali dell'Italia occupata, tutte le forze che danno il loro contributo alla lotta di liberazione, trovano nel C.L.N.A.I. la loro espressione e riconoscono in esso la loro guida unitaria.

### *Quali sono i compiti e le funzioni del C. L. N. A. I.?*

Il compito essenziale del C.L.N.A.I. è quello di promuovere, di organizzare, di coordinare il movimento di liberazione e l'insurrezione nazionale nell'Italia occupata, di assicurarne la direzione politica unitaria e democratica. Sul terreno militare, il C.L.N.A.I. assicura, a mezzo del Comando Generale del Corpo dei Volontari della libertà, l'inquadramento di tutte le formazioni combattenti dei patrioti, il coordinamento delle loro operazioni con quelle dell'Esercito Italiano e degli Eserciti Alleati, ai fini della vittoria nella guerra di liberazione.

Ma i compiti del C.L.N.A.I. non si limitano alla direzione unitaria del movimento di liberazione e dell'insurrezione nazionale. Il C.L.N.A.I. ha una funzione non meno essenziale nell'opera di rinnovamento democratico delle nostre terre. E' suo compito organizzare, coordinare tutte quelle iniziative democratiche e popolari che, mentre impegnano oggi le più larghe masse del nostro popolo nella lotta di liberazione e nell'insurrezione nazionale, le preparano a partecipare domani, con non minore slancio, all'opera immane della ricostruzione democratica, economica, politica, sociale, culturale del nostro Paese. Sicchè la funzione del C.L.N.A.I. non cessa con la vittoria dell'insurrezione nazionale e con la liberazione delle nostre terre, ma si allarga a tutte le iniziative da prendersi, all'atto della liberazione, per la costituzione degli organi del nuovo potere democratico, per l'epurazione immediata dei residui del regime del tradimento fascista, per la soluzione dei compiti economici, politici, sociali, militari che si pongono di fronte alle nostre popolazioni in una crisi così decisiva della vita nazionale. E' all'iniziativa e all'attività democratica delle grandi masse del nostro popolo che il C.L.N.A.I. fa affidamento, per la soluzione di questi problemi angosciosi; è questa iniziativa e questa attività che esso vuol promuovere, organizzare, coordinare, ai fini della salvezza del Paese.

### *Qual'è l'autorità e quali sono i poteri del C. L. N. A. I.?*

L'autorità necessaria all'assolvimento di questi compiti deriva al C.L.N.A.I. dalla volontà popolare, dall'unanime riconoscimento e dalla cosciente disciplina di tutte le forze nazionali che, nell'Italia occupata, danno il loro contributo alla lotta di liberazione. Questa autorità trova d'altronde la sua

conferma nell'espressa delega di poteri che il Governo democratico italiano da Roma ha conferito al C.L.N.A.I. per l'Italia occupata, che i Governi e le Autorità Alleate hanno riconosciuto.

Tale delega di poteri non si riferisce solo alla direzione politica generale del movimento di liberazione, ma si estende alla promulgazione di disposizioni e di decreti aventi forza di legge, per tutto quanto riguarda la condotta della guerra e il rinnovamento democratico nell'Italia occupata. Sicchè il C.L.N.A.I. è, a tutti gli effetti, come rappresentante del Governo democratico italiano, l'unico potere legale in questa parte d'Italia ancora occupata dal nemico.

### *Come si esercita l'opera di direzione politica unitaria del C. L. N. A. I.?*

L'opera e la funzione di direzione politica unitaria del C.L.N.A.I. si esercita a mezzo di documenti, manifesti, ordini del giorno che, attraverso la stampa o la radio, esso indirizza a tutta la popolazione dell'Italia occupata, nei momenti cruciali della lotta; a mezzo delle direttive e delle istruzioni politiche generali che esso indirizza ai suoi organi periferici (C.L.N. regionali, provinciali, ecc.) e alle organizzazioni di massa aderenti, per promuoverne, coordinarne, indirizzarne l'attività; a mezzo degli interventi che di volta in volta possono apparire necessari a risolvere determinate situazioni politiche od organizzative del movimento di liberazione.

Ma la funzione di direzione politica unitaria del C.L.N.A.I. — funzione squisitamente democratica — si esercita essenzialmente, pur nello spirito e nel quadro delle sue direttive politiche generali, attraverso l'iniziativa e l'attività dei suoi organi periferici, che ne ripetono la composizione e la funzione politica unitaria in più immediata aderenza alle situazioni e alle necessità locali. Nella vivacità e nella crescente attività democratica di questi organi periferici del C.L.N.A.I. è la speranza, la certezza del rinnovamento democratico della vita italiana.

### *Quali sono gli organi periferici del C. L. N. A. I.?*

L'iniziativa del C.L.N.A.I., che si identifica, coordinandola, con l'iniziativa democratica delle masse, è venuta articolando tutte le forze del movimento di liberazione nazionale in organismi periferici, che al C.L.N.A.I. danno tutto l'apporto della loro più stretta aderenza alle necessità particolari

e locali, della loro attività e della loro cosciente e volontaria disciplina. Sono migliaia di Comitati di Liberazione di fabbrica e aziendali, C.L.N. di categoria, di villaggio, di rione, di comune, espressione immediata e guida politica unitaria delle masse nella loro lotta di liberazione; sono C.L.N. provinciali e regionali, che di questi organi locali promuovono la costituzione, delle loro iniziative e delle loro attività assicurano il coordinamento su scala provinciale o regionale, assolvendo importanti funzioni direttive. Organizzazioni unitarie di massa, come quelle del *Fronte della Gioventù* e dei *Gruppi di difesa della donna*, Comitati di Agitazione e Comitati di Difesa dei Contadini, si articolano d'altronde anch'esse nel sistema delle organizzazioni periferiche del C.L.N.A.I., dandogli l'apporto della loro iniziativa, della loro attività e della loro disciplina.

### *Quali sono le funzioni dei C. L. N. regionali e provinciali?*

I C.L.N. regionali e provinciali sono rispettivamente, nell'ambito della regione e della provincia, gli organi di direzione politica unitaria del movimento di liberazione nazionale. In questo quadro regionale o provinciale e coordinando tutte le iniziative particolari e locali, essi sono i realizzatori delle direttive e delle istruzioni generali del C.L.N.A.I. Loro funzione precipua è l'organizzazione concreta dell'insurrezione nazionale, in stretta collaborazione coi Comandi regionali e di zona dei Volontari della Libertà.

Dell'insurrezione nazionale, i C.L.N. regionali e provinciali assicurano la direzione politica unitaria: ai Volontari della Libertà, che da oltre un anno già combattono per la liberazione delle nostre terre, essi hanno il compito di assicurare tutto l'appoggio materiale e morale; attorno ad essi hanno il compito di mobilitare nella lotta insurrezionale decisiva, che ogni giorno si sviluppa, le masse di tutto il popolo, sventando le manovre dei frenatori, dei predicatori e mezzani di « tregue » e di patti col nemico.

Accanto a questi compiti essenziali ed urgenti, altre funzioni di alta importanza politica spettano ai C.L.N. regionali e provinciali per tutto quanto riguarda il riassetto materiale e il rinnovamento democratico delle nostre regioni. I C.L.N. regionali e provinciali, direttamente o a mezzo di Commissioni di epurazione e di giustizia da essi fin d'ora costituite, hanno il compito di raccogliere i dati e di predisporre le misure necessarie affinché, all'atto della liberazione, sia resa possibile la più rapida epurazione della vita delle nostre regioni dai residui del tradimento, della corruzione,

dell'oppressione fascista. Così pure, a mezzo di apposite Commissioni economiche, questi C.L.N. fin d'ora hanno il compito di predisporre le misure necessarie ad assicurare, all'atto della liberazione e nel periodo immediatamente successivo, l'approvvigionamento della popolazione, la continuità dell'attività produttiva, il riassetto della vita economica.

Ai C.L.N. provinciali, infine, in quanto organi di direzione politica unitaria della lotta di liberazione nazionale più aderenti alle situazioni locali, il C.L.N.A.I. ha demandato la designazione delle persone che, all'atto della liberazione, dovranno essere chiamate a coprire le principali funzioni politiche e amministrative (Commissario alla Provincia, Sindaco del Capoluogo, Capo della Polizia, Presidente della Deputazione provinciale, ecc.); questo, s'intende, in attesa della possibilità di una libera consultazione popolare e delle ulteriori disposizioni di legge.

Queste designazioni possono venir sottoposte d'altronde, in alcuni casi particolari, all'esame dei C.L.N. regionali o del C.L.N.A.I.

Sulle funzioni, che i C.L.N. provinciali vengono ad assumere all'atto della liberazione, avremo occasione di parlare più avanti.

### *Quali sono le funzioni dei C. L. N. comunali?*

I C.L.N. comunali sono, nell'ambito del comune, gli organi di direzione politica unitaria del movimento di liberazione e dell'insurrezione nazionale; e in questo quadro, promuovendo e coordinando tutte le iniziative particolari, sono i realizzatori delle direttive e delle istruzioni generali del C.L.N.A.I.

La loro immediata aderenza alle situazioni e alle necessità locali fa dei C.L.N. comunali l'ingranaggio essenziale della direzione democratica unitaria del movimento di liberazione nazionale. Sarebbe vano pensare ad un'efficacia di tale direzione senza una rete densa ed efficiente di C.L.N. comunali, capaci di promuovere e coordinare in ogni città, in ogni villaggio l'iniziativa delle masse nella lotta e per la lotta di liberazione, capaci di mobilitare in questa lotta *tutti gli Italiani*. E' un'opera, questa che il C.L.N.A.I., i C.L.N. regionali e provinciali possono promuovere ed indirizzare nei suoi aspetti più generali, ma di cui solo i C.L.N. comunali possono assicurare la realizzazione. Certe debolezze, certe insufficienze del movimento di liberazione dipendono proprio da una attenzione ancor troppo scarsa e saltuaria rivolta a questi essenziali organi locali del C.L.N.A.I.

Ovunque, i militanti del movimento di liberazione nazionale si sono

preoccupati dapprima di costituire i C.L.N. regionali e provinciali: la rete di questi organismi copre tutto il territorio dell'Italia occupata. Non vogliamo certo negare l'importanza e l'urgenza dei compiti, alla cui soluzione immediata questi organismi hanno dato e danno il loro contributo; nè può meravigliare, date le condizioni particolari in cui il movimento di liberazione si è sviluppato, che alla costituzione di tali organismi si sia talora data la precedenza su quella degli organismi locali. Ma nella fase attuale di sviluppo della lotta, che richiede la mobilitazione e la tensione di tutte le energie, i C.L.N. regionali e provinciali stessi non potrebbero assolvere ai loro compiti sempre più vasti e complessi se non fondassero la loro opera di direzione unitaria sulla più minuta rete dei C.L.N. comunali, che in ogni città, in ogni villaggio, assicurino la rappresentanza e la mobilitazione delle forze nazionali.

Senza C.L.N. comunali, un C.L.N. provinciale resta una testa senza corpo: solo fondandosi sulla più larga base dei C.L.N. comunali, un C.L.N. provinciale può disporre di tutta l'autorità, di tutti i trami e i mezzi necessari allo sviluppo della sua azione. *Promuovere e suscitare la creazione dei C.L.N. comunali là dove essi ancora non sono costituiti, indirizzarne e coordinarne l'attività, è oggi uno dei compiti essenziali di ogni C.L.N. provinciale: un compito sul quale ogni C.L.N. deve essere sostenuto dall'iniziativa di tutti i militanti del movimento di liberazione di tutti i patrioti.*

Quel che talora ha ritardato, specie nei comuni minori, la costituzione dei C.L.N. comunali, è stata un'errata concezione della loro composizione e dei loro compiti. Se nel C.L.N.A.I., nei C.L.N. regionali e provinciali, nei maggiori C.L.N. cittadini, la rappresentanza dei Partiti e delle organizzazioni di massa che partecipano alla lotta di liberazione assicura la più efficace direzione democratica unitaria al movimento di liberazione stesso, ciò non è sempre e necessariamente vero per i C.L.N. dei Comuni minori. Avviene spesso, nei Comuni minori, che non esistano sul luogo rappresentanti qualificati di questo o di quel Partito del C.L.N.A.I.: o anche, sovente, accade che esponenti dei Partiti non ne esistano affatto. Questo non può e non deve essere, evidentemente, una ragione che impedisca la costituzione di un C.L.N. comunale, capace di assicurare la direzione politica unitaria della lotta di liberazione. Là dove mancano le rappresentanze dei Partiti, non mancano sovente quelle delle organizzazioni di massa; vi sono decine di migliaia di Volontari della Libertà, vi sono centinaia di migliaia di patrioti, che non sono iscritti ad alcun Partito, e che

pur partecipano attivamente alla lotta di liberazione. Quel che importa, perchè un C.L.N. comunale possa costituirsi ed assolvere efficacemente la sua funzione, non è il fatto che esso comprenda la rappresentanza di tutti i Partiti del C.L.N.A.I.: nei comuni minori, con una vita politica ancora indifferenziata, una tale pretesa sarebbe anzi spesso del tutto artificiale, e porterebbe solo questo o quell'esponente di interessi locali ad inalberare etichette politiche assolutamente estranee all'ambiente. Quel che invece importa, è che il C.L.N. comunale assicuri l'effettiva rappresentanza e direzione degli interessi e delle forze locali che effettivamente partecipano o sono suscettibili di essere attratte alla lotta di liberazione: e questo potrà perfettamente avvenire, anche all'infuori di ogni etichetta di Partito, attraverso la rappresentanza di organizzazioni di massa o di categoria, nella persona di patrioti ai quali la partecipazione nelle prime file della lotta dia l'autorità necessaria o promuoverla, a dirigerla, a esprimere i compiti.

La funzione dei C.L.N. comunali deve sempre concretarsi in un'azione precisa di iniziativa, di organizzazione, di coordinazione di tutte le forze locali ai fini della lotta di liberazione; e a questi fini i C.L.N. comunali non han bisogno di astratte discussioni di « alta politica » o di politica di Partito, che non nascano e non rispondano a situazioni ed esigenze locali. Ogni C.L.N. comunale deve avere una composizione e una struttura tale, da assicurargli l'effettiva possibilità di promuovere e di coordinare tutte le iniziative e tutte le energie locali: e queste molto spesso, nei Comuni minori, non sono iniziative o energie di Partito, ma iniziative o forze politicamente indifferenziate, o piuttosto differenziate per categorie professionali e sociali. In molti Comuni montani, ad esempio, un C.L.N. che raggruppi i rappresentanti dei valligiani e dei pastori, dei Volontari della Libertà e degli sfollati, dei professionisti e degli operai della centrale elettrica, sarà certo più « rappresentativo », più capace di promuovere e di dirigere la lotta concreta della popolazione, che non un Comitato costituito sulla base di rappresentanze di Partito, che non troverebbe nella valle una rispondenza nella situazione effettiva.

Con quanto diciamo, non vogliamo certo negare o sminuire l'importantissima funzione dei Partiti e dei loro militanti nella lotta di liberazione: è una funzione di iniziativa e di direzione, che anzi qui vogliamo ancora precisare e sottolineare. Ma una visione schematica e astratta di questa funzione non deve venir a costituire un ostacolo all'effettivo sviluppo del movimento di liberazione e dei suoi organismi, la cui efficienza è condi-



zionata dall'aderenza alle situazioni locali, tali quali esse si presentano dopo vent'anni di repressione fascista, e in un periodo in cui ancora la vita politica è costretta nei sotterranei dell'illegalità.

### *Quali sono i compiti dei C. L. N. comunali?*

La funzione di direzione politica unitaria dei C.L.N. comunali deve oggi più che mai esercitarsi nella soluzione dei compiti concreti del movimento di liberazione e dell'insurrezione nazionale. L'insurrezione nazionale, l'abbiam detto, è un compito di domani, non è un compito dell'«ora X»: l'insurrezione nazionale deve allargarsi e svilupparsi oggi, tutti i giorni, fino alla liberazione definitiva delle nostre terre dal tedesco e dai suoi sgherri fascisti. E' compito concreto e preciso dei C.L.N. comunali quello della mobilitazione di tutte le energie locali per l'insurrezione e per la guerra di liberazione. Dal reclutamento di nuove forze nelle formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà, e in particolare nelle S.A.P. (Squadre d'Azione Patriottica), all'armamento e al vettovagliamento di queste formazioni, dall'organizzazione di servizi di informazione a quella di servizi sanitari e d'assistenza, in cento forme diverse i C.L.N. comunali possono e debbono assicurare la mobilitazione di tutte le risorse locali per la guerra di liberazione e per la vittoria. Ad opera dei C.L.N. comunali, attorno alle avanguardie dei combattenti deve stringersi per la battaglia decisiva, la massa di tutto il popolo.

A questo compito fondamentale, i C.L.N. comunali sapranno far fronte tanto più efficacemente, quanto più sapranno effettivamente assumere la direzione di tutta la vita locale. In molti Comuni, e non solo in quelli già liberati dall'azione dei Volontari della Libertà, le « autorità » fasciste sono praticamente assenti, o presenti solo di nome e saltuariamente. Anche in Comuni di una certa importanza, specie se situati in zone dell'azione partigiana, la disgregazione del potere fascista è assai avanzata: le « autorità » fasciste non sono più in grado di comandare e di controllare, e di fatto debbono rinunziarvi. In tali casi i C.L.N. comunali, pur dove non sia ancora possibile un'assunzione di poteri diretta e formale, possono e debbono assumere di fatto la direzione dell'amministrazione, risolvendo secondo criteri democratici i problemi più urgenti che interessano la condotta della guerra di liberazione e la vita della popolazione locale (vettovagliamento, riscossione delle imposte, prezzi, trasporti, ecc.). Ovunque ciò sia possibile,

e nella misura del possibile, i C.L.N. comunali debbono divenire di fatto, da organi di direzione politica, organi del potere democratico; capaci di risolvere i problemi più urgenti delle popolazioni e di indirizzarne gli sforzi ai fini della guerra di liberazione.

Una larga esperienza dimostra che, con gli sviluppi della situazione, le possibilità in questo senso divengono sempre più urgenti e frequenti. In molti luoghi già avviene che i funzionari stessi del comune si rivolgono al C.L.N. per prenderne le istruzioni. Non bisogna attendere che ciò avvenga: con le sue iniziative e con la sua attività, il C.L.N. deve presentarsi ed apparire con sempre maggior evidenza, agli occhi di tutti, come l'unico potere reale, come l'unico capace di risolvere i problemi concreti ed urgenti della popolazione. Se si tratta di fissare il prezzo del grano, non si debbono lasciare gli organismi fascisti padroni di stabilire quantitativi e prezzi: deve essere il C.L.N. a fissarli, nell'interesse dei produttori e dei consumatori, e tenuto conto delle necessità dei combattenti della libertà: deve essere il C.L.N. ad assicurare la salvaguardia contro le requisizioni fasciste e tedesche.

Lo stesso si dica per tutti gli altri aspetti della direzione della vita locale: ovunque sia possibile, il C.L.N. deve sostituirsi di fatto al potere fascista, indirizzando ogni attività locale nel senso degli interessi delle popolazioni o della guerra di liberazione.

Vogliamo citare in proposito, fra molti altri — per portare un esempio concreto — quello del C.L.N. di un Comune della Valle di Lanzo. In questa zona alpina del Piemonte operano, come è noto, importanti formazioni garibaldine, che ne hanno liberato e ne presidiano vari Comuni. Il Comune in questione, tuttavia, non rientra nella zona liberata, ma è ad essa adiacente. La presenza delle « autorità » fasciste non ha potuto impedire al C.L.N. comunale di prendere effettivamente nelle sue mani la direzione della vita locale. A proposito dell'ammasso del latte, ad esempio, il C.L.N. del detto Comune ha pubblicato e ha fatto applicare le disposizioni di cui qui appresso riproduciamo il testo:

#### COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE DI X.

Si è dovuto purtroppo constatare che in questo Comune da diversi mesi manca assolutamente il latte e il burro. Non potendo durare questo stato di cose, il locale Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale ha stabilito quanto segue:

1) Tutti i proprietari di bestiame bovino sono tenuti a portare giornalmente all'ammasso un litro di latte per capo di bestiame. (Sono esclusi quelli che detengono solo un capo).

2) Tenuto conto delle condizioni locali, il prezzo del latte è stato fissato a L. 4 al litro all'ingrosso e a L. 5 al minuto.

3) A quelli che cercheranno di evadere la presente ordinanza sarà sequestrato il bestiame. I proprietari inadempienti saranno denunciati al Comando delle formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà operanti nella zona.

Siamo sicuri che tutti gli allevatori con spirito di comprensione si atterrano scrupolosamente alle norme nell'interesse della popolazione e della lotta di liberazione.

Il C. L. N. di X.

Lo stesso C.L.N. comunale ha emanato e fatto applicare, nell'interesse delle popolazioni e dell'aiuto alle formazioni dei Volontari, numerose altre disposizioni, che vanno da quelle relative all'ammasso delle patate a quelle che si riferiscono al commercio del bestiame, ecc. ecc. Per la realizzazione delle numerose disposizioni da esso emanate, il C.L.N. del Comune di X si basa sulla effettiva rappresentanza degli interessi delle forze locali, che gli assicura l'autorità e i mezzi d'azione a ciò necessari; il suo legame con le forze armate dei Volontari della Libertà operanti nella zona, gli assicura una forza supplementare, alla quale del resto esso ha dovuto solo di rado far ricorso.

Si contano a migliaia oggi, i Comuni ove le condizioni obiettive sono analoghe a quelle del Comune di X: quasi ovunque, nelle campagne, formazioni o di partigiani o di S.A.P. (Squadre d'Azione Patriottica) assicurano o possono assicurare ai C.L.N. comunali l'appoggio di una forza armata capace di controbilanciare le residue resistenze delle « autorità » fasciste. Le possibilità in questo senso sono oggi, lo ripetiamo, grandissime, e non solo nei Comuni minori: quel che occorre, è più slancio e maggiore ardimento, più iniziativa e organizzazione nei C.L.N. comunali, che debbono moltiplicarsi in tutti i Comuni, grandi e piccoli.

Il contributo di questi organismi alla lotta di liberazione nazionale, alla mobilitazione delle riserve e delle masse, sarà tanto maggiore, quanto meglio essi sapranno assicurarsi questa effettiva direzione della vita locale, contribuendo al tempo stesso alla disgregazione delle forze e del potere fascista.

In tutta questa loro azione, s'intende, i C.L.N. comunali dovranno evitare con la massima cura anche la sola possibile apparenza di una qualche « collaborazione » con le autorità e col potere fascista. In nessun caso essi possono accettare di avallarne le misure o la attività; di fronte a tutto il popolo essi si presenteranno sempre come un altro potere, il potere del popolo, che si contrappone a quello fascista, che con esso non ha nulla in comune, che contro di esso conduce una lotta a morte.

Questa direzione sempre più effettiva della vita locale da parte dei C.L.N. comunali sarà assicurata tanto meglio, quanto più la loro rappresentanza sarà aderente alla situazione e alle necessità locali. Un C.L.N. comunale non potrà fissare un prezzo equo per il grano o per l'uva, se in esso non saranno rappresentati consumatori e produttori; non potrà tener viva e presente la preoccupazione delle esigenze della guerra di liberazione, se in esso non saranno rappresentati i Volontari della Libertà; non potrà assicurare l'effettiva difesa contro le requisizioni, se non sarà organicamente legato con le Squadre d'Azione Patriottica, con i Comitati di difesa dei contadini; e così via. Un C.L.N. comunale, insomma, non avrà bisogno di essere composto di « grossi calibri » della politica, ma ha bisogno di essere formato da patrioti pratici ed arditi, legati alle masse, capaci di interpretarne le necessità, capaci di mobilitare e di organizzare tutte le forze popolari.

### *Come si costituisce un C. L. N. comunale?*

Da quanto abbiamo detto risulta la funzione, risultano i compiti essenziali dei C.L.N. comunali nella lotta di liberazione e nello sviluppo dell'insurrezione nazionale, nella creazione di nuovi organi del potere democratico. Ma abbiamo anche rilevato le deficienze che ancora si riscontrano nel numero e nell'attività di questi organismi.

Chi deve costituire, come si deve costituire un C.L.N. comunale, là dove esso ancora non esiste?

E' da evitare in proposito, l'abbiamo già detto, ogni preconcetto schematico. Ogni C.L.N. provinciale, certo, ha il dovere di preoccuparsi a che in ogni Comune della sua giurisdizione si costituisca e funzioni un C.L.N. comunale; ma ciò non significa che i C.L.N. comunali possano o debbano essere « nominati » dall'alto. Nei Comuni, ove esistono organizzazioni o militanti di uno o più Partiti o di organizzazioni di massa del C.L.N., questi

hanno, s'intende, nella costituzione di un C.L.N. comunale, una funzione d'iniziativa, che il C.L.N. provinciale dovrà opportunamente stimolare e coordinare. In ogni caso, al C.L.N. provinciale, la costituzione del C.L.N. comunale dovrà essere notificata, e con esso dovranno essere stabiliti i necessari rapporti in forma organica e permanente. Ma tutto ciò non significa che la costituzione di un C.L.N. comunale debba sempre e necessariamente dipendere da una diretta iniziativa del C.L.N. provinciale. Avverrà spesso, e sempre più spesso deve avvenire, che esso sorga per iniziative locali: *là dove un C.L.N. comunale ancora non esiste, ogni patriota, ogni attivista del movimento di liberazione nazionale può e deve prendere l'iniziativa per la sua costituzione, preoccupandosi di raggruppare e di collegare gli elementi più rappresentativi delle forze che partecipano effettivamente alla lotta, e di notificare al C.L.N. provinciale l'avvenuta costituzione, stabilendo con esso i necessari collegamenti.*

Un caso particolare, ma assai importante, è quello di Comuni situati in zone ove operano formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà, o da esse liberate. In tali zone, evidentemente, la necessità di una mobilitazione di tutte le forze popolari si fa sentire con urgenza particolare, e la presenza stessa dei nostri valorosi Volontari promuove e facilita la costituzione dei C.L.N. comunali. E' assolutamente da escludere tuttavia la « nomina » dei C.L.N. comunali da parte dei Comandanti o dei Commissari politici delle Formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà operanti nella zona. Un tale metodo, avrebbe, non foss'altro che per la forma, un carattere antidemocratico, incompatibile coi principi e con le direttive del C.L.N.A.I.; può portare talora, di fatto, alla costituzione di C.L.N. a composizione artificiale, non rispondente alle situazioni locali, e perciò privi della necessaria autorità.

Questo non significa, s'intende, che le formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà, i loro Comandanti e Commissari politici, non possano e non debbano avere un'importantissima funzione nella costituzione dei C.L.N. comunali, là dove essi ancora non esistono. Ma deve essere una funzione di organizzazione e di stimolo, che susciti dal basso l'iniziativa democratica delle masse stesse; non potrebbe essere, da parte di combattenti democratici, un'azione autoritaria di « nomina » dall'alto.

Le formazioni Garibaldine operanti nella zona delle Langhe hanno preso in proposito, un'iniziativa particolarmente opportuna, che merita di essere segnalata ed imitata. Ad assicurare la mobilitazione morale e materiale delle popolazioni locali nella lotta di liberazione, le formazioni hanno

costituito un organo speciale, una *Delegazione Civile*. Quest'organo, se pur strettamente legato con i Comandi e con i Commissariati politici delle formazioni, è da essi indipendente: in stretto contatto con le popolazioni locali, è esso che ha promosso la costituzione dei C.L.N. comunali della zona, suscitando l'attività e l'entusiasmo democratico delle masse. L'iniziativa delle formazioni Garibaldine ha saputo così evitare, nella sostanza e nella forma stessa, ogni intervento autoritario nella costituzione dei nuovi organi di direzione politica unitaria, come in quella degli organi del nuovo potere democratico.

Quel che importa, insomma, è questo: Che C.L.N. provinciali, Comandanti e Commissari politici delle formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà, organizzazioni di Partito, organizzazioni di massa e singoli militanti del movimento di liberazione, moltiplichino e coordinino i loro sforzi perché in ogni Comune sorga e funzioni effettivamente un C.L.N., rappresentativo delle forze e degli interessi locali, capace di mobilitare e di unire le masse nella lotta. Le iniziative locali vanno suscitate e coordinate, e coi C.L.N. provinciali ogni C.L.N. comunale deve stabilire, lo ripetiamo, rapporti regolari e continuati; ma deve essere cura particolare degli organismi promotori di evitare ogni forma di intervento che venga a comprimere o a falsare le iniziative locali stesse; e tanto meno a sostituirsi ad esse, con « nomine » dall'alto di C.L.N. comunali, che non troverebbero alcuna rispondenza nella situazione reale, e resterebbero necessariamente privi di ogni autorità e di ogni funzione democratica.

#### *Quali sono le funzioni dei C. L. N. di rione e di villaggio?*

Nei maggiori Comuni cittadini, e in quei Comuni rurali che comprendono vari centri, spesso distanti gli uni dagli altri, il C.L.N. comunale non può sovente bastare ad assicurare direttamente la coordinazione unitaria di tutte le energie e di tutte le iniziative locali. È apparsa necessaria, in tali casi, la costituzione di C.L.N. di rione o di villaggio, che sotto la direzione e in stretto legame con il C.L.N. comunale promuovano e coordinino le attività delle forze della liberazione nel quartiere o nel villaggio. Per la costituzione e per i compiti di questi C.L.N., vale quanto abbiamo già detto per i C.L.N. comunali. Un'attenzione ancor più vigile deve essere qui portata alla effettiva rispondenza di questi organismi alle esigenze delle situazioni ambientali. Né si dovrà temere di suscitare un'esuberanza di iniziative locali: l'esperienza dimostra che tali iniziative non tardano a tro-

vare il loro coordinamento e la loro disciplina nel quadro generale della lotta. Nulla sarebbe invece più pericoloso dell'indebolire lo slancio ed il fervore delle masse nei centri minori, al solo scopo di mantenere nell'apparenza una subordinazione ed una disciplina dall'alto, puramente formali ed illusorie. Perché alla parola d'ordine dell'insurrezione nazionale si possa rispondere ovunque con l'entusiasmo e con lo slancio necessario, occorre non scoraggiare, ma anzi stimolare in ogni regione, in ogni villaggio, la potenza irresistibile dell'iniziativa popolare. Una « settimana del Partigiano » o una manifestazione di strada, ogni azione concreta di sviluppo dell'insurrezione nazionale fino alla sua fase decisiva, non potrà, in un rione cittadino o in un villaggio, raggiungere il suo pieno successo se, sul posto medesimo, non esiste un organo unitario capace di suscitare e di coordinare gli sforzi comuni. A questa esigenza hanno dimostrato di rispondere efficacemente, là dove son già stati costituiti, i C.L.N. di rione e di villaggio; e anche qui le iniziative dei singoli militanti, delle singole organizzazioni di Partito e di massa, si devono coordinare con quelle dei C.L.N. comunali, per assicurare l'estensione della rete di questi organismi periferici.

La funzione ed i compiti dei C.L.N. di rione e di villaggio, sono particolarmente importanti per tutto quanto riguarda la mobilitazione delle masse nella lotta di liberazione nazionale sulla base dei loro interessi locali.

La soppressione di una linea tranviaria (perché i tedeschi portan via le motrici...) deve essere l'occasione di una presa di posizione del C.L.N. rionale; la chiusura di un mercato o delle panetterie di un quartiere (perché i tedeschi portan via i prodotti o deportano gli esercenti...) non deve essere lasciata « passar liscia ». I problemi dei trasporti e dell'annona, quelli dei mercati e dell'assistenza, quelli dei prezzi e degli ammassi, possono e debbono essere affrontati dai C.L.N. rionali o di villaggio con la mobilitazione delle masse; possono e debbono essere oggi risolti, in molti casi, al di sopra e contro le disposizioni delle « autorità fasciste », nell'interesse della popolazione e della lotta di liberazione. Vi è qui un larghissimo campo di attività, nel quale questi organismi possono dare un efficacissimo contributo alla disgregazione del « potere » fascista.

#### *Quali sono i compiti dei C. L. N. di fabbrica e aziendali?*

La mobilitazione unitaria delle masse per l'insurrezione e per la guerra di liberazione nazionale, per la grande opera della ricostruzione e del rinnovamento democratico del Paese, non potrebbe evidentemente esaurirsi nel-

l'azione di organismi centrali e periferici costituiti su di una base semplicemente territoriale. I problemi e i compiti della lotta di liberazione sono troppo indissolubilmente legati con quelli della vita produttiva del Paese perchè essi possano essere risolti senza la collaborazione attiva di organismi unitari che, nei centri nevralgici stessi della vita e dell'attività produttiva, assicurino la mobilitazione delle masse e promuovano la loro iniziativa democratica sotto la bandiera del C.L.N.

A questi compiti assolvono i C.L.N. di fabbrica e aziendali, che sul luogo del lavoro e della produzione stessa debbono assicurare la mobilitazione delle masse e delle risorse materiali del Paese per l'insurrezione nazionale e per la guerra di liberazione. Ovunque, già, nelle maggiori fabbriche ed aziende private, nei servizi pubblici, i C.L.N. aziendali si sono costituiti numerosi, hanno svolto un'opera importante per il successo delle azioni popolari nella lotta di liberazione. Non mancano tuttavia ancora, anche in questo campo, le deficienze e le incertezze. In non pochi centri, e specie per quanto riguarda le aziende minori, i C.L.N. aziendali non sono ancora costituiti o efficienti; anche là dove esistono, non sempre hanno chiara la nozione dei loro compiti.

I C.L.N. aziendali o di fabbrica sono organismi di direzione unitaria, che sorgono sul luogo di lavoro e debbono essere costituiti dai rappresentanti di tutti i Partiti e tendenze politiche nazionali attive nell'azienda o nella fabbrica stessa, dai rappresentanti di tutte le categorie partecipi alla produzione, ivi compreso il personale dirigente, e dai rappresentanti delle organizzazioni di massa. La proporzione delle varie rappresentanze dovrà essere concordata dai promotori stessi del C.L.N., tenendo conto di una effettiva rispondenza alla composizione sociale e politica del personale. E' necessario comunque che ogni categoria sociale ed ogni tendenza politica esistente sul luogo di lavoro sia rappresentata da almeno un membro del C.L.N.; ma questo principio non va interpretato nel senso di una rappresentanza paritetica di tutti i Partiti nel C.L.N. aziendale. Se in una data fabbrica o azienda una data corrente politica è assente, ciò non può e non deve costituire un ostacolo alla creazione di un C.L.N. aziendale; mentre avverrà spesso che questa o quella corrente politica sia rappresentata da più di un membro del C.L.N., se ciò risponde alle effettive necessità di direzione della lotta.

L'esperienza dimostra che, sul luogo di lavoro stesso, senza interventi estranei e dall'alto, questo problema della rappresentanza può essere facil-



mente risolto: nessuno meglio di chi è sul posto può riconoscere qual è la composizione che assicura al C.L.N. aziendale e alla sua azione il massimo di autorità e di efficacia.

I C.L.N. aziendali di fabbrica hanno la funzione essenziale, l'abbiamo detto, di mobilitare, sul luogo stesso di lavoro, le masse e le risorse nella lotta di liberazione. Questa funzione si concreta in compiti specifici, molteplici e vari secondo le situazioni. Nella lotta contro le deportazioni, in particolare, questi organismi debbono assicurare la collaborazione di tutti gli esponenti dell'attività produttiva, dirigenti e maestranze, alla difesa del patrimonio umano della Nazione.

Il C.L.N. aziendale interverrà, ad esempio, con la forza della sua autorità, a predisporre in tempo la concessione alle maestranze di anticipi, che permettano loro di abbandonare il lavoro; a impedire che liste di lavoratori siano consegnate alle autorità fasciste e tedesche, ecc. ecc. Sono ormai numerosi gli esempi di un buon lavoro svolto dai C.L.N. aziendali in questo campo. Lo stesso si dica per quanto riguarda la lotta contro la rapina del patrimonio industriale (macchine, materie prime, ecc.) da parte dei tedeschi: l'energico intervento del C.L.N. di fabbrica è già valso sovente a salvare, con l'occultamento, con azioni di sabotaggio amministrativo, ecc., una parte importante di questo patrimonio prezioso. Più deficiente è in generale, ancora, l'azione dei C.L.N. aziendali volta ad assicurare al movimento di liberazione un più diretto apporto di mezzi materiali e finanziari: un C.L.N. aziendale di una fabbrica di armi, di tessuti o di calzature deve non solo preoccuparsi che non si lavori per i tedeschi; deve assicurarsi che una parte della produzione sia devoluta al rifornimento delle formazioni dei Volontari della Libertà. E lo stesso si dica dei mezzi finanziari, necessari allo sviluppo della lotta.

Per la soluzione di questi compiti, il C.L.N. aziendale, e solo il C.L.N. aziendale, sotto il controllo e nel quadro delle direttive degli organi superiori del movimento di liberazione, può assicurare la collaborazione di tutte le forze della produzione. Questa stessa collaborazione esso deve esigere — contro ogni eventuale resistenza — per quanto riguarda le azioni di massa volte allo sviluppo della resistenza e dell'insurrezione nazionale. Il sabotaggio di massa della produzione nemica, uno sciopero di maestranze che chiedono gli anticipi per sfuggire alla minaccia di deportazione, uno sciopero di protesta contro il massacro degli ostaggi, lo sciopero generale

insurrezionale, non son oggi semplici manifestazioni e azioni di classe, sono atti concreti della lotta di Liberazione nazionale, ai quali un C.L.N. aziendale deve assicurare l'appoggio concreto di tutte le forze della produzione, ivi comprese quelle dirigenti.

Il C.L.N. aziendale, e proprio il C.L.N. aziendale, in quanto organo unitario del movimento di liberazione nazionale sul luogo di lavoro, ha il dovere di denunciare a quanti mancano oggi, nella fabbrica e nelle aziende, al dovere della solidarietà nazionale, di predisporre e di applicare in proposito le opportune misure.

I C.L.N. aziendali hanno così, come si vede, una funzione essenziale nella preparazione e nello sviluppo dell'insurrezione nazionale. In rapporto anche col compito di predisporre — nel quadro generale delle esigenze della lotta armata — la difesa degli stabilimenti industriali e dei servizi pubblici contro le distruzioni del nemico, essi possono e debbono assicurare un importante contributo all'armamento delle masse.

Fin d'ora, così, i C.L.N. aziendali hanno il compito di predisporre tutte le misure necessarie a mantenere l'apparato produttivo in condizione di continuare a funzionare, a liberazione avvenuta, nell'interesse della lotta antinazista e delle possibilità di lavoro e di approvvigionamento della popolazione. E' compito di questi organismi, infine, a liberazione avvenuta, curare l'epurazione dell'apparato produttivo dagli elementi fascisti e collaborazionisti, che debbono essere sin d'ora segnalati agli organi competenti. Là dove il C.L.N. provinciale, anche su proposta del C.L.N. aziendale, assumerà, a liberazione avvenuta, il controllo di aziende i cui dirigenti si sian resi colpevoli di collaborazione col nemico, spetterà al C.L.N. di azienda di proporre i nomi dei dirigenti provvisori e dei sequestratari, di esplicitare un'opera di controllo sulla loro attività e di curare che la particolare situazione non ostacoli l'efficienza della produzione. Così pure i C.L.N. di fabbrica e aziendali saranno consultati e chiamati a collaborare con gli organi economici provinciali e regionali incaricati di coordinare l'attività economica e produttiva.

Nel quadro insomma delle direttive generali del C.L.N.A.I., l'iniziativa e l'azione dei C.L.N. aziendali si allarga, sul luogo di lavoro, a tutti i compiti della lotta di liberazione e della ricostruzione, nello spirito di una necessaria e severa solidarietà nazionale.

### *Quali sono le funzioni dei C. L. N. di categoria?*

Funzioni analoghe a quelle dei C.L.N. aziendali hanno, sotto certi aspetti, i C.L.N. di categoria che sono già sorti numerosi per iniziativa di professionisti, artisti, insegnanti, ecc. Anche qui, il compito è quello di una mobilitazione unitaria di questi importanti ceti sociali nella lotta di liberazione e nell'opera di ricostruzione democratica del Paese.

In varie provincie, il C.L.N. dei medici ha già assicurato un apporto effettivo e concreto di capacità professionali e di mezzi sanitari alle forze armate del movimento di liberazione nazionale; il C.L.N. degli insegnanti ha assicurato la sua efficace collaborazione alla lotta per la chiusura delle scuole fasciste, iniziata dal Fronte della Gioventù. Ovunque questi organismi di direzione unitaria hanno promosso ed organizzato la resistenza all'imposizione del giuramento, hanno curato l'elaborazione dei principi e delle liste per l'epurazione della categoria, per la riorganizzazione degli istituti e delle istituzioni culturali, per il rinnovamento dei testi scolastici, ecc.

La moltiplicazione delle iniziative di questi C.L.N. di categoria, specie per quanto riguarda le manifestazioni ed i compiti *attuali* della lotta di liberazione, può e deve divenire un elemento sempre più importante della mobilitazione di tutti gli Italiani per la battaglia decisiva.

### *Qual'è la funzione nazionale dei Comitati di Agitazione?*

Il Comitato d'Agitazione è l'organo unitario di classe che dirige, oggi, sul luogo di lavoro, la lotta delle maestranze per la difesa delle loro condizioni di lavoro e di vita. E' un organo unitario dal punto di vista politico, in quanto esso comprende una rappresentanza di tutte le correnti politiche nazionali esistenti nella maestranza; si differenzia tuttavia dal C.L.N. aziendale in quanto è un organismo di classe, che come tale rappresenta sul luogo di produzione, solo le categorie lavoratrici (operai, e impiegati, non il personale dirigente).

Non è questo il luogo di trattare degli importantissimi compiti sindacali che oggi i Comitati d'Agitazione assolvono. Ma importa precisare in che senso i Comitati d'Agitazione si articolano nel sistema degli organi direttivi unitari della lotta di liberazione.

Riconoscendo l'autorità e la missione dei Comitati di Agitazione, il C.L.N.A.I. ha dato un efficace riconoscimento della *funzione razionale* che la classe operaia ha dimostrato di assolvere con la sua lotta nel quadro della guerra di liberazione. Ha voluto riconoscere che con la sua lotta rivendicativa in difesa delle condizioni di lavoro e di vita delle masse, con la sua partecipazione nelle prime file della lotta armata, con il suo spirito di sacrificio e con il suo slancio, con i suoi grandi scioperi politici e con le sue manifestazioni di massa, la classe operaia assolve ad una funzione di avanguardia, che non si esplica nella rivendicazione di gretti interessi corporativi, ma si identifica con gli interessi generali della lotta di liberazione nazionale.

I Comitati d'Agitazione sono stati e sono i promotori e gli organizzatori di questa lotta della classe operaia. Mobilitando le classi lavoratrici sul terreno della difesa delle loro condizioni di lavoro e di vita, essi le hanno mobilitate e le mobilitano, appunto, su di un terreno che si identifica con quello degli interessi generali del movimento di liberazione: e ciò nella forma più larga ed efficace, in quanto parte dalle esigenze vitali stesse delle masse.

La funzione nazionale dei Comitati di Agitazione, pertanto, nasce dalla loro stessa funzione di direzione della lotta della classe operaia, classe d'avanguardia nella lotta di liberazione nazionale e democratica; e per assolvere efficacemente questa loro funzione nazionale, è necessario che i Comitati d'Agitazione mantengano nella più completa indipendenza la loro funzione di classe. Questo non significa, beninteso, che la loro azione non debba essere coordinata a quella di tutti gli organi del movimento di liberazione, e in particolare a quella dei C.L.N. aziendali, coi quali i Comitati d'Agitazione debbono mantenere un contatto permanente. Ma la loro iniziativa deve rimanere autonoma e indipendente, senza di che essi non potrebbero assolvere alla loro specifica funzione di mobilitazione della classe operaia, verrebbero meno alla loro efficacia democratica, che è quella, appunto, dell'intervento diretto e autonomo delle masse lavoratrici nella lotta e nella soluzione dei problemi della liberazione.

### *Come si esercitano i poteri del C. L. N. A. I.?*

Abbiamo già detto che le funzioni del C.L.N.A.I. non si esauriscono in un compito di direzione politica unitaria della lotta di liberazione, ma si allargano — per volontà di popolo, sancita da una delega del Governo

democratico italiano — all'esercizio di un potere, che è oggi nelle nostre terre il solo potere legale.

Fin d'ora questo potere del C.L.N.A.I. si esplica nella promulgazione di decreti, che hanno a tutti gli effetti forza di legge nei territori occupati dal nemico. Il C.L.N.A.I. ha così promulgato decreti per quanto riguarda le misure economiche, politiche, finanziarie; ha il potere, in particolare, di imporre tributi e contributi straordinari. Dell'esecuzione di questi decreti sono incaricati gli organi centrali e periferici del C.L.N.A.I., facendo ricorso, se d'uopo, alle forze armate dei Volontari della Libertà. Per quanto riguarda altri decreti — come quelli relativi allo stato giuridico dei militari e funzionari statali, restati al servizio del cosiddetto governo fascista repubblicano — anche se questi non possono, evidentemente, trovar la loro esecuzione oggi, l'esecuzione stessa è garantita, o liberazione avvenuta, dall'esplicita delega di poteri che il Governo di Roma ha conferito in proposito al C.L.N.A.I.

I poteri di governo e di amministrazione del C.L.N.A.I. si esercitano, d'altra parte, in forma ancor più diretta e completa, in tutti quei territori che l'azione eroica dei Volontari della Libertà o l'avanzata vittoriosa degli Eserciti delle Nazioni Unite viene man mano liberando. Tali poteri vengono qui esercitati dal C.L.N.A.I. a mezzo dei suoi diretti interventi e a mezzo dei suoi organi regionali, provinciali, comunali.

Abbiamo già detto come, sin d'ora, questi organismi debbano porsi come compito quello di contrapporsi e di sostituirsi al potere fascista, contribuendo alla sua disgregazione e prendendo nelle proprie mani la direzione di tutta la vita locale. Con questa azione e con l'esercizio di un sempre più largo potere *di fatto*, questi organismi si prepareranno nella maniera più efficace all'esplicazione dei gravi compiti che li attendono all'atto della liberazione.

Ai C.L.N. spetta, infatti, il compito di assumere la responsabilità dei poteri di amministrazione e di governo nei territori liberati, sotto l'autorità del C.L.N.A.I., delegato del Governo democratico di Roma. Ai C.L.N. spetta il compito di costituire — in attesa della possibilità di una libera consultazione popolare — gli organi provvisori del nuovo potere democratico, di designare le persone chiamate a coprire, nell'ambito della loro giurisdizione, le principali cariche di governo e amministrative.

### *Quali sono gli organi del nuovo potere democratico?*

In ogni comune, zona o provincia liberata, i locali C.L.N. assumono di diritto i poteri provvisori di amministrazione e di governo. Questi poteri vengono esercitati a mezzo di appositi organismi (Giunte provvisorie di governo provinciali o di zona, Giunte popolari di amministrazione) e dalle persone, sin d'ora designate dai C.L.N. provinciali a coprire determinate cariche pubbliche (Commissario alla provincia, sindaco, capo della polizia, ecc.). Nell'esercizio delle loro funzioni, tali persone sono responsabili di fronte all'organismo che le ha loro conferite.

### *Quali sono le funzioni delle Giunte provinciali di governo?*

Nelle provincie in tutto o in parte liberate dall'azione dei Volontari della Libertà o dall'avanzata degli Eserciti Alleati, il C.L.N. provinciale — mentre conserva le funzioni originarie di organo di direzione politica unitaria della lotta di liberazione — assume direttamente, inoltre, sotto l'autorità del C.L.N.A.I., i poteri di governo nell'ambito della provincia, prendendo funzione di *Giunta provvisoria di Governo*. Là dove, per ragioni cospirative, i rappresentanti dei Volontari della Libertà e delle organizzazioni di massa non avessero ancora partecipato regolarmente, come di diritto, ai lavori del C.L.N. provinciale, questo dovrà allargarsi, all'atto della liberazione, con l'immissione effettiva di questi rappresentanti; nella sua funzione di Giunta di governo, esso si allargherà inoltre con la rappresentanza delle principali categorie economiche della provincia. I rappresentanti delle organizzazioni di masse e delle categorie economiche dovranno esser designati o convalidati al più presto, beninteso, da elezioni delle categorie interessate.

Nel quadro della disciplina e delle direttive del C.L.N.A.I., la Giunta provinciale di Governo esercita tutti i poteri di governo nell'ambito della provincia. Il Commissario alla provincia, previamente designato dal C.L.N. provinciale, è responsabile di fronte alla Giunta medesima.

A mezzo di sue apposite Commissioni, la Giunta ha il compito di affrontare i compiti che si pongono all'atto della liberazione nel campo della economia, degli approvvigionamenti, della finanza, delle comunicazioni, dell'epurazione e dell'ordine pubblico, nell'interesse della popolazione e ai fini della continuazione della guerra di liberazione.

*Quali sono le funzioni delle Giunte popolari di amministrazione?*

La Giunta popolare di amministrazione è l'organo provvisorio di amministrazione nei Comuni liberati dall'azione dei Volontari della Libertà o dall'avanzata degli Eserciti Alleati. Essa è presieduta dal Sindaco, che è dinanzi ad essa responsabile nell'esercizio delle sue funzioni.

Là dove esista e funzioni già sul luogo un C.L.N. comunale — che ha e continua ad avere in ogni caso il compito della direzione politica unitaria della lotta di liberazione — questo potrà assumere direttamente, all'atto della liberazione, la funzione di Giunta popolare di amministrazione. Qualora, per ragioni cospirative, le rappresentanze dei Volontari della Libertà e delle organizzazioni di massa non avessero ancora partecipato regolarmente ai lavori del C.L.N., come di diritto, questo dovrà allargarsi in ogni caso, all'atto della liberazione, con l'immissione effettiva di questi rappresentanti. In questa composizione e allargandosi ulteriormente con la rappresentanza delle principali categorie economiche del Comune, il C.L.N. potrà assumere le funzioni di Giunta popolare di amministrazione. I rappresentanti delle organizzazioni di massa e delle categorie economiche dovranno essere designati o convalidati al più presto, beninteso, da elementi delle categorie interessate.

Qualora ciò appaia necessario e opportuno (ad esempio nei Comuni maggiori), il C.L.N., pur allargato con la effettiva e permanente partecipazione di rappresentanti dei Volontari della Libertà e delle organizzazioni di massa, potrà conservare la sua sola primitiva funzione di organo di direzione politica unitaria, che già assorbirà tutta l'attività dei suoi componenti. In tal caso, persone diverse da quelle componenti il C.L.N. potranno essere chiamate a comporre la Giunta che dovrà essere sempre costituita secondo i criteri di rappresentanza democratica sopra indicati, in corrispondenza alla effettiva composizione sociale e politica della popolazione del Comune. Ovunque ciò sia possibile, d'altronde, per la costituzione della Giunta popolare di amministrazione si procederà per via di una diretta consultazione ed elezione popolare, esista o non esista sul luogo un C.L.N. Ciò è spesso e immediatamente possibile — una esperienza ormai larga lo prova — specie nei Comuni minori. In tal caso il C.L.N., quando esista, avrà il compito di

promuovere, di dirigere, di controllare nei suoi risultati la consultazione popolare.

In ogni caso sono da escludere, come antidemocratiche, per la costituzione delle Giunte popolari, le nomine « dall'alto », sia che queste provengano dai C.L.N. provinciali, sia che avvengano da parte dei Comandi delle formazioni combattenti che hanno partecipato alla liberazione. Solo per i Comuni capoluogo di provincia il C.L.N. provinciale — che ha anche funzione di C.L.N. del Capoluogo — procederà alla designazione della Giunta di amministrazione, assumendo esso stesso funzione di Giunta provinciale di governo.

Questo non significa, beninteso, che C.L.N. provinciale o Comandi e Commissariati delle formazioni debbano disinteressarsi della costituzione degli organi del nuovo potere democratico. Al contrario: come abbiamo già detto per i C.L.N., anche per la costituzione delle Giunte di amministrazione, essi devono suscitare, organizzare, coordinare l'attività democratica delle masse. Speciali organi — come le *Delegazioni civili* delle formazioni liberatrici, di cui abbiamo già citato il buon lavoro nella zona delle Langhe — possono opportunamente servire a questo scopo, senza per altro mai imporsi o sostituirsi alla volontà popolare liberamente espressa. Una esperienza positiva e negativa ormai larga nelle zone liberate dimostra che solo un potere sorto dal popolo, retto dalla collaborazione e dal controllo delle organizzazioni popolari, può aver l'autorità e la forza necessaria a risolvere i problemi di un periodo di crisi così decisiva della vita nazionale e locale.


E' in piena coscienza di questa realtà, di questa forza dell'iniziativa e del potere del popolo, che il C.L.N.A.I., i suoi organi centrali e periferici affrontano i compiti della lotta di liberazione e della ricostruzione democratica.



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PREZZO L. 15

ISTITUTO POLIGRAFICO DELLO  
STATO - G. C. - ROMA, 1945

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

APR 17 1945  
CC 1116

Ref: 102/3/Pat-

17 April, 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Military Patriot Representatives.

TO: Chief Commissioner

1. The names which appear on the attached list (Appx "A") have been selected by Scoccimarro and were submitted by him on 5 April 1945.  
  
These officers who are now recommended have not been independently screened, but appear to have been considered by the Euration Committee. In view of your direction they will now be screened by S. I. M.
2. Appendix "B" shows changes that have been made and indicates the reason for such changes so far as is known to this Section.
3. There has been no legislation abolishing the original Patriot Committee set up by DLL.319. However, on 8 Feb 45, it was stated by the Prime Minister to me that the Committee had been abolished. Furthermore, Article 4 of DLL.73 of 28 Feb 45 gives to the Ministry of Occupied Italy (Welfare Office) the functions formerly carried on by the Committee.
4. Attached is a report from Avv. FORTI who was also present at Scoccimarro's meeting on 14 April 45. He, like a number of others, is a reserve officer and if selected will go forward as an officer. This report gives further indication of Scoccimarro's ideas.
5. IMPR are intended solely to assist Allied Patriot officers and perform a useful service in running camps, making payments, etc. This is their sole function and the Minister should only give instructions on such technical matters as running camps. The officers are on the staff of the Regional Commissioner and take their policy from him only.
6. It is recommended that the Chief Commissioner see the Prime Minister and request him to instruct Scoccimarro that he is to give no policy instructions to his Patriot Officers.

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G. R. UPJOHN, Brig.  
VP/CA SECTION.

Encl: Appx. "A"  
Appx. "B"  
Report by Avv. FORTI  
Plan : Patriots NW Italy

Copies to: Acting Executive Commissioner  
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

3201/c

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## APPENDIX "A"

LIST OF PATRIOT REPRESENTATIVES  
 APPOINTED BY MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY ON 5 APR 45.  
 (including subsequent amendments by the Ministry)

- + have already moved forward  
 ⊗ under orders to move forward

LIGURIA REGION.

⊗ HQ Liguria	Ten. S.M.	BALBI Giovanni
CP GENOVA	Ten.Col.Art.	LESCAI Luigi
⊗ CP LA SPEZIA	Cap. Ftr.	SANTINI Gino
CP SAVONA	Cap. Ftr.	MILLESIMI Luigi
CP IMPERIA	Cap. Ftr.	SALVI PIO

PIEMONTE REGION.

HQ Piemonte	Ten.Col.Ftr.	FEDELI Vincenzo
CP TORINO	Cap. Genio	BANDINELLI Remo
CP TORINO City	Ten.Col.Ftr.	NATA Camillo
CP ALESSANDRIA	Cap.Aer.	CIMICCHI Giuseppe
CP AOSTA	S.Ten.Aer.	TORRETTA Alfredo
CP CUNEO	S.Ten.Ftr.	TOCI Amedeo
CP ASTI	Capt.Ftr.	FABBRI Mario
CP NOVARA	Ten.Cav.	CAMPERIO Manfredo
CP VERCELLI	Cap.Ftr.	BENUCCI Bruno

LOMBARDIA REGION.

+ HQ Lombardia	Col.Ftr.	QUARONI Giuseppe
+ HQ Lombardia	Magg. Genio	BERSELLINI Mario
CP MILANO	Col.Aer.	BACCARI Spartaco
583 CP MILANO City	Magg.Art.	DAIMAZZO Luigi
CP VARESE	Ten.Col.Aer.	BOSCHI Marco
CP PAVIA	Magg.Ftr.	VIVANTI Augusto
CP MANTOVA	S.Ten.Ftr.	RICCI Aldo
CP BRESCIA	Cap.Ftr.	COMPAGNUCCI COMPAGNONI Eros
CP CREMONA	Cap.Cav.	LENTINI Rocco
CP Como	Magg.G.Aer.	ORLANDO Giovanni
CP SONDRIO	Magg.Ftr.	D'ANGELO Giulio
CP BERGAMO	Ten.Col.	ROBIGLIO Pasquale

/TOSCANA REGION.

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2.

TOSCANA REGION.

+ HQ Toscana	Magg.Cav.	TERROSI Giulio	
+ CP FIRENZE	Ten.G.Fin.	GRACI Amirigo (?)	
⊗ CR "	Cap.Cav.	CARRARA Francesco	
+ CP LUCCA	Magg.Art.	GRAZZINI Alberto	
+ CP SIENA	Cap.Ftr.	BARBI Dante	
⊗ CR PESCIA	Cap. Ftr.	PLANEGLIANI Raffaele	} Moving with IV CORPS.
⊗ CR "	S.Ten.Ftr.	PIROTTI Agostino	
CP GROSSETO	Cap.Ftr.	DI COCCO Antonio	Returning - work finished.
+ CP PISA	Ten.Art.	GORI Renato	
CP AREZZO	S.Ten.Ftr.	CECCHINI Giorgio	Returning - work finished
+ CP APUANIA	Ten.Art.	MELOSI Gualtiero	

EMILIA REGION.

HQ Emilia	Capt.Ftr.	BORSARI Franco	
+ CP FORLI	Magg.Ftr.	BIANCONI Giovanni	Now Toscana Region
+ CP BOLOGNA	Magg.Comm.	TESTA Antonio	
CP REGGIO EMILIA	S.Ten.Ftr.	POPPI Osvaldo	
CP PARMA	Magg.Comm.Aer.	BARBIERI Gino	
CP PIACENZA	Cap.Art.	CASA' Gerolamo	
+ CP FERRARA	Ten.Ftr.	BARILLI Cecrope	
CP RAVENNA	Cap.Art.	SCOTO Corrado	Now Toscana Region
CP MODENA	Ten.Ftr.	SALVADORI Adriano	Att. Mine School
Scuola Bon.Campi Minati	Magg.Cav.	NOMIS DI COSSILIA Gianluigi	

3 VENEZIE REGION.

+ HQ Tre Venezie	Magg.AARN	QUADRELLI Carlo
Sub HQ Veneto	1 Cap.Ftr.	FORTI Bruno
+ CP PADOVA	Col.Ftr.	CALZAVARA Giuseppe
+ CP VENEZIE	T.Col.AARN	GALLINA Vitale
CP TREVISO	Ten.R.A.	PAUTRIER Felice
CP VICENZA	Cap. AARN	CIPRIAN Rino
CP BELLUNO	Magg.Art.	DE MAS Cellio
+ CP ROVIGO	Col.Ftr.	GERVASONI Giorgio
CP UDINE	T.Col.Ftr.	DEL DIN Prospero
5 CP VERONA	Ten.Art.	CLAUDI Antonio
CP TRENTO	Magg.Ftr.	CERRUTTI Arduino
CP BOLZANO	Ten.Ftr.	CARTA Mario
CP GORIZIA	Cap.Art.	GIANNOTTI Guglielmo
CP TRIESTE	Magg.RMGN	DE CASTRO Diego
CP POLA	Cap.Freg.SM	LESIO Mario
CP FIUME	Ten.Ftr.	MUSCHIETTI

/ VIII ARMY ....

111a

VIII ARMT.

⊗ Ten.	SANTORI Italo	} MOOI desire to change these men.
+ Maj.	MAGRI Aldo	
+ Capt.	DE LUCA	
+ Maj.	CASILLI D'ARAGONA Massimo	
+ S.Ten.	REBECCHI Enrico	
+ Ten.	MONTANSONI	
+ Ten.	BRUSCHINI	

V ARMY.

Ten.	DE ROSA
Col.	CAMBOSU Sebastiano
Capt.	JANNARONE Filippo (IV Corps)

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## APPENDIX "B"

APPOINTMENTS OF ITALIAN MILITARY PATRIOT REPRESENTATIVES  
CHANGED BY MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY.

(Note: These officers have not yet been employed in forward areas.)

A PLACE	B ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT	C M. O. O. I. APPOINTMENT	D REASON FOR CHANGE
<u>LIGURIA</u>			
Regional HQ Genova	Col. LESCAI Cap. GERINO Silvio	Ten BALBI Giovanni Col. LESCIA	GERINO not released by NAVY.
La Spezia Savona Imperia	Cap. CERASUOLI Cap. LAZZERI Cap. POGGIO	Cap. SANTI Gino Cap. MILLESIMI Cap. SALVI	Disoiplinary Disciplinary
<u>PIEMONTE</u>			
Aosta Asti Vercelli	Cap. BELLAGAMBA Cap. D'ANGELIS Col. LAMIA	S. Ten. TORRETTA Cap. PABBRI Cap. BENUCCI	
<u>LOMBARDIA</u>			
Regional HQ Milano Varese Mantova	Col. SILVESTRI Magg. STURCHIO T.Col. VEZZOLI Cap. GUARDABASSO	Col. QUARONI Col. BACCARI T.Col. BUSCHI S. Ten. RICCI	
<u>EMILIA</u>			
Ravenna	Ten. COLLURA	Cap. SCOTO (Previously Reggio Emilia)	
Modena	Ten. ZANETTI	Ten. SALVADORI (Previously Bologna)	
Parma Piacenza	Capt. SPERMAZONI Capt. ALQUATI	Magg. BARBIERI Gino Cap. CASA	
<u>VENEZIE</u>			
Venezia Verona Trento Padova Rovigo Giume	Cap. Vasc. FRANCHI S. Ten. RUFFINI Magg. LOMBARDI Cap. VEZZIL Cap. LANZA Ten. Vasc. FABIANI	T. Col. GALLINA Ten. CLAUDI Magg. CERRUTI Col. CALZAVARA Col. GERVASONI Ten. MUSCHIETTI	

note; The delay in confirming appointments as explained by S. E. Soocimarro has been caused by the fact that the Commissariat for Eputation warned him that some of the names selected by the Presidency of the Council were being investigated. Appointments eventually confirmed on 5 April 1945.

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22 24 470

SECRET

REPORT OF AVV. FORTI ON A MEETING HELD AT THE  
MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY ON 14 APR 45 AT  
1000 HOURS.

Avv. FORTI, who is one of the Legal Advisers on Italian law attached to this Sub-Commission is also a member of the Committee of the Liberal Party. He is a TRIESTE lawyer who has lost all his worldly belongings and his son in the War. He has been appointed by the Ministry of Occupied Italy as a Liaison Officer between AMG and the Ministry in the Sub-Region of VENETO (TRIESTE Town).

He was officially requested to attend a meeting of LOs for Northern Italy by Scoccimarro. The Meeting took place at the Ministry at 100 hrs on 14 April.

LOs had a short talk before the meeting with an Italian Colonel who is in charge of the Military Department of the Ministry and who discussed the general situation with them.

Scoccimarro then spoke. He said that LOs would have to deal with the problem of the Partisans and to this effect ensure liaison between Regional, Sub-Regional and Provincial Commissioners of AMG, the Ministry and especially contact the Partisans. He outlined their responsibilities and explained how best they could fulfil their Mission.

An LO from VENEZIA GIULIA asked Scoccimarro whether there were special instructions for LOs in his own province.

Scoccimarro replied: "You have time enough to consider your duties. In all probability VENEZIA GIULIA will be occupied by a mixed formation of Italians and Yugoslavs under TITO. Consequently there will be no reason for your intervention as no Partisan camps will be organized as in other parts of Northern Italy. Your appointment was made in case you would be required some time or other and it became necessary to send you there. There is plenty of time in any case."

From conversation with other LOs, FORTI gathered that TITO's Partisans in VENEZIA GIULIA are composed of CROATS, SLOVENES and separatist Italians, all communists. A non-communist Partisan formation recruited in VENEZIA GIULIA is operating in UDINE province.

The LOs feel that the PIC has agreed with TITO the surrender of VENEZIA GIULIA to Yugoslavia either on order from MOSCOW or for some eventual help from TITO in N. Italy.

Corsati, Brosiv, etc., with whom FORTI spoke often (at) the meeting state that they know nothing about Scoccimarro's statements or his sources of information - as far as they are concerned they will follow instructions which the Allies will no doubt give in due course.

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LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION  
HQ. ALLIED COMMISSION



**TOP SECRET**14th April, 1945

1. The principle of selection, by the C.L.N.A.I., of nominees for civic appointments in N. ITALY after liberation is as follows:
  - (a) C.L.N.A.I. allots the posts to the various parties.
  - (b) Regional C.L.N.s allot the posts to individual members of the parties designated by C.L.N.A.I.
2. So far nothing has come to light which would indicate that the individuals selected would not act in the interests of law and order and the Allies, with the possible exception of one man ROVEDA whose identity is still in doubt. Enquiries concerning him are still being made.
3. It appears that the reason why these names are coming through so slowly is because the C.L.N.A.I. is apprehensive of giving the names of their nominees due to security objections.
4. Attached are the names so far submitted for appointments and also the names of members of the C.L.N.A.I. and the COMANDO GENERALE.

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LIST OF PERSONS NOMINATED BY CLNAI TO ASSUME TEMPORARY POSTS PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

**TOP SECRET**

Name, Profession, Age, Politics

TURIN

Questor AGOSTI - Judge 35 Partito d' Azione.

Prefect

PASSONI - Accountant 45 Socialist

Mayor

ROVEDO - Civil Servant of BADOGLIO Government Communist (JUL 45) ?

GENOA

Questor

(Name?) - Lawyer 40 Non-Party

Prefect

DE MARTINO - Lawyer 40 Liberal

Mayor

RICCI - ex Mayor - 65 Liberal

VENICE

Questor

(Name?) Liberal Nominee

Prefect

MATTER - Industrialist 45 Partito Azione

Mayor

PONTI - Engineer 45 Christian Democrat

MILAN

Questor

(Name?) Liberal nominee

Prefect

LOMBARDI (GILBERTI) - Engineer 45 Partito d'Azione

Mayor

GREPPI - Lawyer 55 Socialist

Deputazione Provinciale

FOSSATI - Christian Democrat

Economic Commission

MERZAGORA - Liberal - General Manager of Pirelli

GENOA

Questor (Name?) - Lawyer 40 Non-Party  
 Prefect DE MARTINO - Lawyer 40 Liberal  
 Mayor RICCI - ex Mayor - 65 Liberal

VENICE

Questor (Name?) Liberal Nominee  
 Prefect MATTER - Industrialist 45 Partito Azione  
 Mayor PONTI - Engineer 45 Christian Democrat

MILAN

Questor (Name?) Liberal nominee  
 Prefect LOMBARDI (GILBERTI) - Engineer 45 Partito d'Azione  
 Mayor GREPPI - Lawyer 55 Socialist  
 Deputazione Provinciale FOSSATI - Christian Democrat  
 Economic Commission MERZAGORA - Liberal - General Manager of Pirelli

BOLOGNA

Mayor DOZZA alias DUCATI - Communist.  
 Known personally to Mr. LONGHI and supported by his personal recommendation.

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A. CLINAI - MARCH 1945

Chairman (Non-voting) LONGHI

Partito d'Azione LEC  
 LOMBARDI (GILBERTI)  
 SOLARI (SONDA)

Communist ITALO  
 LONGO  
 SERENI (BERNARDI)

Socialist PERTINI (SANDRI)  
 MORANDI (MATILDA)  
 MARZOLA (OLIVIERI)

Liberal ARPESANI (GIUSTINO)  
 CODA (NONA)  
 MEZAGHERA (CESARE)

Catholic MARAZZA (FABIO)

Secretary (non-party) CECCHONI

B. COMANDO GENERALE

VALENTI  
 GALLO  
 SOLARI

Chief of Staff FARINA (Socialist)

Adjutants ARGENTI (Liberal)  
 MARCONA (Catholic)

B. COMANDO GENERALE

VAIENNI	
GALLO	
SOLARI	
FARINA	(Socialist)
ARGENTI	(Liberal)
MARCONA	(Catholic)

Chief of Staff

Adjutants

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111a

CC FILES

56/PRB

10 April 1945

SUBJECT: P.W.B. "D" Section Weekly Reports

TO : P.W.B. (Attention of Major Greenless)

1. This is in further reference to 6518/23/EC of 27 March.
2. Our attention has been called to #10 Intelligence Report for Liberated Italy North of the Army Control Line, dated 16 March, which came to us after sending the above mentioned memorandum to you.
3. On page 15 of the above mentioned report there is a section dealing with partisans. It is stated as a positive fact that Provincial Commissions for partisans have been created. This information is completely inaccurate.
4. Because such inaccurate information is harmful to the Allied efforts we reiterate our request that any statements having direct or indirect reference to the work of the Allied Commission or Allied Military Government be cleared with the AC prior to publication.

NORMAN E. FIDKE  
Colonel,  
Acting Executive Commissioner

575

Copy to: EC Files (2)  
PRB Files (2)

(11)

(11)

3201/EC

**TOP SECRET**

Copy No. 3

0316B  
APR 101800B

CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
D/7354  
APR 111015B  
ROUTINE

15 ARMY GROUP

ACTION AFHQ INFO 5 ARMY 8 ARMY ALCON Q ALCON

APR 11 1950  
CC-111

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

TOP SECRET

Firm plans for issuance to Armies dealing with Patriot problems in North ITALY which require immediate action being delayed by lack of final authority to proceed under provisions of FX 26918 of 14 February. Request final authority soonest.

Dist

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - CA Section
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 Exce Comm
- 5 File

79

(M/C Note. No record of FX 26918)

574 -

110

Ref?

15

3201/ce

**Confidential**

**SECRET**

5341  
APRIL 8/1400B

D/7165  
APRIL 8/1718  
PRIORITY

5 ARMY SIGNED TRUSCOTT  
AICOM

106

SECRET.

Reference your 4905 for operational reasons visit of SOCCIMARO and  
TROMBACORE not approved at this time

DIST

- ACTION : LOCAL GOVT SEC
- INFO : A/PRESIDENT  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
CA SEC  
FILE (2)  
PLCAT

3271/2

573

**Confidential**

109

100

5



APR 6 RECD

FIVE ARMY FOR AMG FOR ACTION RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP GEORGE FIVE SECTION FOR INFO

4905

*April*  
6 March

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD PERMISSION IS REQUESTED FOR HOW EASY SCOCIMARO CMA MINISTER FOR OCCUPIED ITALY CMA ACCOMPANIED BY HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY PAREN DOTT ANTONELLO THOMBARDORE PAREN TO PROCEED TO FLORENCE CMA PISTOLA AND PESCIA ON ELEVEN APRIL PD DURATION OF VISIT SEVEN LAYS PD

PAREN TO FIVE ARMY FOR AMG FOR ACTION RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP GEORGE FIVE SECTION FOR INFO FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACLGT PAREN

PARA TWO PD PURPOSE OF VISIT MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF PARTISAN GROUPS AND PAYMENT OF PARTISANS USED OPERATIONALLY PD CHIEF COMMISSIONER APPROVES OF THE VISIT BUT LEAVES THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THIS OFFICIAL AT THE PRESENT TIME IN YOUR HANDS

*See 109*

*5201/00*

572

*108*

LOCAL GOVERNMENT S/C

478107

R.R. CRAPPS Col.

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO

CWO USA

Ass Adjutant

CC 1738  
APR 6 RECD

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers  
51875/25744/9.15

Rome, 5 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

(67)

the Ministry of Occupied Italy, to which I had sent your letter of January 25th, n. 121/6/3AT, has now assured me that it will follow the modalities which were indicated in this letter, for what concerns the sending of their representatives in the territory of the Allied Military Government.

On this occasion, it has been ascertained that the responsibility for the irregular system, according to which the distribution of subsidies to the families of the Florentine patriots who have been killed, <sup>made</sup> is entirely of a representative of the Patriots Office, who acted on his own initiative.

The subsidies to be given to the patriots and their survivors has been fixed by a general and uniform criterion as follows:

- L. 10.000 to the family in case of death of the patriot;
- " 5.000 to the patriot in case of disability or of serious wound;
- " 1.000 to all the patriots, when being demobilized, as a contribution for their immediate requirements.

To this end, a sum of 150.000.000 Lire has been foreseen in the budget of the Ministry for Occupied Italy.

The officials sent for this purpose in the various provinces will be responsible for the distribution of the compensations, and they will be strictly controlled by the Ministry.

I remain,

Yours very truly,

S. I. Bonomi

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Admiral Hilary W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner  
Allied Commission  
R o m e

E.C. DIST - 6 APR 45.

ACTION: C.A. SEC (2)  
INFO : CHIEF COMMR  
: EXEC COMMR.

(107)

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1

TRANSLATION

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET  
BY AUTHORITY OF CHIEF  
COMMISSIONER, AC: j1

COMMERCIAL BANK OF ITALY  
Main Office

Rome, 31 March 1945

Dear Lawler,

I do not know to which person I should address this letter,  
which deals with a "top secret" matter.

I beg of you to be kind enough to transmit it to the office  
for which it is destined.

With most cordial greetings, and with renewed good wishes  
for a Happy Easter, please believe me

Yours truly,

/s/

1 Incl.

Commander John Lawler, USCGR  
Finance Sub-Commission  
Allied Commission

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*Handwritten scribbles*

**Confidential**

5201/cc

*Handwritten initials*

T O P   S E C R E T

TRANSLATION

COMMERCIAL BANK OF ITALY  
Main Office

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET  
BY AUTHORITY OF CHIEF  
COMMISSIONER, AC: jl

TO: H.E. Count Alessandro Casati  
Minister of War

Rome, 31 March 1945.

FOR INFORMATION TO:

H.E. Prof. Avv. Ivano Bonomi  
President of the Council of Ministers

H.E. Avv. Marcello Soleri  
Minister of the Treasury

H.E. Dr. Mauro Scoccimarro  
Minister for Occupied Italy

The Supreme Allied Commander, CMF, Rome

We have received the memorandum from the Ministry of War,  
Central Clerical Office No. 341/R, dated 27 March 1945, which reads as  
follows:

"By order of H.E. the President of the Council of Ministers,  
you are requested to transfer the 30 million lire which your  
Bank will receive on 1 April of this year for the financing in  
question to an account opened with the Bank of Rome in Rome in the  
name of Avv. ZAMERUNO, Vice Commissioner of the Bank itself.

"We shall appreciate being informed of the completion of this  
transaction."

In connection with this matter we wish to make known the  
following:

(1) As is known to your Ministry, the aforementioned transfer of  
30 million lire represents part of the last installment of 80 million lire  
of a complete transaction of 400 million (in five equal installments) de-  
posited with us by Allied Force Headquarters, CMF, to the account of Sig.  
Pietro LONGHI acting on behalf of the National Committee of Liberation for  
Northern Italy. It is furthermore known to you that Sig. Pietro LONGHI

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T O P   S E C R E T  
**Confidential**

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APP A

T O P   S E C R E T

gave us instructions at a later date that of the total of the aforesaid 400 million lire 150 million, in five installments of 30 millions each, should be accredited by us to the Personal Estate Bank of Piedmont. It is lastly known that the Personal Estate Bank of Piedmont has rejected the accrediting of the sum in question, because of which, following instructions given us by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, agreed to by the Allied Command and concurred in by the Ministers of War, Treasury, and of Occupied Italy, we have arranged to turn over 120 million lire, against the said 150 millions, to Sig. Sandro FIORIO. The 30 million lire referred to in the above memorandum from the Ministry of War represent the difference between the 150 millions whose accrediting to the Personal Estate Bank of Piedmont Sig. LONGHI instructed, and the 120 millions paid to Sig. Sandro FIORIO.

(2) Nevertheless this sum of 30 million lire, if and insofar as it has been turned over to us by the Supreme Allied Command, CMF, cannot be disposed of by us according to the instructions originally given us by Sig. LONGHI, since we know that the Personal Estate Bank of Piedmont will reject any accounts in his favor, and this sum should therefore be accredited to the said Sig. LONGHI, subject to his further instructions.

(3) On the other hand this Bank, which has knowledge of the purposes to which the said sums should be put, is perfectly well aware of the necessity of furthering in every way the accomplishment of these purposes. To this end, as already proposed on the occasion of the rejection of credit of the first four installments of 30 millions by the Personal Estate Bank of Piedmont, our Institution is prepared, upon instructions by the Presidency of the Council, given us with the concurrence of the three interested Ministries -- Ministries of War, Treasury, and Occupied Italy -- and with the agreement of the Supreme Allied Command, CMF, to limit the deposit of the last installment of the transaction to 50,000,000 lire, (we) being entirely relieved of any responsibility whatever in the matter of the final disposal of the remaining 30 millions.

(4) Whereas for reasons unknown to us this solution must be discarded, it is evident that instructions different from those given us originally by Sig. LONGHI must therefore be communicated to us in a Ministerial letter by the Presidency of the Council and the three interested Ministries - Ministries of War, Treasury, and Occupied Italy -- with the agreement of the Supreme Allied Command, CMF, in accordance with what has occurred in the matter of the preceding four installments of 120 millions in all.

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Respectfully yours,

COMMERCIAL BANK OF ITALY  
Main Office

Trans - Sgt Shenfield/lws

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APR '41

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TRANSLATION

5 February 1945

TO: The Governor of the Bank of Italy

With reference to the questionnaire sent to us through our Delegation during the trip of last week to the South, we enclose a copy of the answers covering almost all of the points requested. Naturally, since the situation is fluid, these data are subject to subsequent modifications and worsenings. We shall take care of keeping them up-to-date month by month and reserve it to ourselves to come back to the various subjects where necessary.

We would be grateful to you if for our orientation you would furnish us with similar data on affairs in the South, so that here as well we may have the situation kept up-to-date and possibly complete.

Cordially,

THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION  
Of the C.L.N.A.I.

/s/

1 Incl.

567

Trans - Sgt Shenfield/lws

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APP

TRANSLATION

## QUESTIONNAIRE "GOV"

N.B. All data refer to the administration of the North only, reflecting results up until the date indicated by bringing forward the data for the entire nation for the period prior to 8 September 1943.

I - Circulation of currency up to the most recent date:

Until 31 December 1944 the circulation of Bank of Italy notes, according to information received, amounted to approximately 240 billions. Another source, referring to the Soleri statement, tells us that from 1 August until last month (31 January) 39 billion notes (6½ billion per month) were probably issued.

II - Amount of notes printed daily: 270 million.III - Has it been determined that some are being printed outside of Italy and where?

Not determined.

IV - Decree of 1 August 1944 authorizing the issue of currency:

The issue of 16.8 millions has been authorized.

V - Commissioner appointed to the Bank of Italy:

Avv. Giovanni Orgera (Decree of 28 June 1944).

VI - Commissioners appointed to the principal banks:

Bank of Naples: Dr. Francesco Lo Jucco (D. 25/9)

Bank of Sicily: Avv. Bruno Salerno (D. 11/11)

National Labor Bank: Dr. Vincenzo Lai (D. 30/10/44)

Savings Bank of Turin: Prof. Agostino Cerutti (Gazzetta Ufficiale 20/12/44)

Institute for Industrial Reconstruction: Avv. Vincenzo

Tecchio (D. 11/5/44)

Government Credit House for Public Works: Dr. Giuseppe

Ferrario (D. 28/9/44)

Italian Real Estate Institute: Rag. Ferdinando Tesi

III - Has it been determined that some are being printed outside of Italy and where?

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Tecchio (D. 11/5/44)

Government Credit House for Public Works: Dr. Giuseppe

Ferrario (D. 28/9/44)

Italian Real Estate Institute: Rag. Ferdinando Tesi

(D. 11/5/44)

Institute of Credit for Public Utilities Works: Dr. Angelo

Tarchi (D. 11/11/44)

We will inform you later of other appointments.

VII - Commissioners appointed to large industries:

Dalmine: Appointed President: Ing. Massimino Rosari

(February, 1944)

FIAR : Commissioner: Gray Avv. Ezio Maria (From December

1942)

ACIP : Commissioner: Ing. Zammatti.

We will inform you later of other appointments.

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APP

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VIII - Measures taken by the Council of Ministers for the protection of the Lira;

The Council of Ministers, at its meeting of 15 November 1944, addressed the following appeal to the people;

"The Council of Ministers, recognizing that it is becoming more and more necessary, even among the serious difficulties and exceptional exigencies of the present time, to carry out with resolute firmness a policy aimed at the strengthening of the public finances and especially at the defense of the real value of the lira, protection and guarantee of depositors of savings and of the classes with fixed incomes, addresses to our Italian people, in this decisive hour for the fortunes of our Nation, an appeal and a plea that they give their help, with all the means at their disposal and above all with their faith and will to fight all speculation, to the defense of the national currency, symbol and basic instrument of the economic capacity and the political power of the country; and reaffirms as in 1927, on the basis of the policy declarations contained in the speech at Pesaro in 1926, while actually in a different situation and emergency, the Government's intention to hold firm to its obligation to workers of every class, directed toward protecting the fruit of their labors and of their savings, avoiding at the same time the danger of inflation which, utterly destroying all savings and all buying power, might, as has recently occurred in other countries, completely ruin the economic life of the Nation."

Following these declarations several provisions were made directed above all against the black market. They may be summarized as follows:

- The setting up in every comune of consumers' cooperatives entrusted to the direct management of the workers. For this purpose the Government has granted a contribution of 100 millions, declaring that it is desired to hasten the setting up of the cooperatives in all the comunes that were deprived of them and to strengthen the cooperatives already functioning in such a way that the mass of the consumers could find food supplies at listed prices.
- The transformation of eating places and restaurants into collective messes with fixed prices. All restaurants and eating

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- The transformation of eating places and restaurants into collective messes with fixed prices. All restaurants and eating places of all kinds and types have been closed and at the same time special "war messes" were opened with fixed prices, organized on a unified basis by the comunes themselves to provide for furnishing the necessary supplies and for providing a control over the management.
- The requisition of foodstuffs businesses. A decree published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of 8 January 1944 has provided for the requisition, until six months after the conclusion of hostilities, of all industrial firms engaged in the production, preparation and conversion of foodstuffs, as well as wholesale firms dealing in harvested foodstuffs and in goods that may generally concern the feeding of the people. The appointment of Commissioners chosen from the heads of the respective Provinces provides for the management of the firms. By and large the previous

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directors have been retained at their posts.

- Strengthening of surveillance against clandestine commerce in agricultural foodstuffs, which have had a wide distribution, as well as the requisition of auto transport and the requirement of all owners of automobiles to carry out four trips a month on behalf of the Provincial Section for provisioning.

Subsequently, in the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 19 January 1945, the following measures were taken:

- 1) The taking in of savings by means of capitalization receipts with premium to be issued by the National Institute of Insurance. The issue of said receipts should begin in the first ten days of March. Their issue is meeting practical difficulties of various kinds.
- 2) Obligatory restitution of the extraordinary real estate tax instituted with Royal Decree of 6 October 1926. The restitution of said tax, which was previously voluntary and could be obtained through the restitution of the bonds of the Obligatory Loan redeemable at 5%, has been made obligatory for the possessors of land and buildings which have not yet been provided for, through the turning over in cash rather than the restitution of the bonds, deducting the annuities still due under the tax of 4%. The measure should produce about 2 billion lire.
- 3) Bringing up to date of the registry appraisalment of lands, which it is declared desirable to make equal to the actual present incomes concerned, through the application of a coefficient of increase not yet determined. At the same time it has been decided to reduce the rate of tax from 10% to 6% as well as, in the same way, the provincial and comunale supplements.
- 4) Extension of the extraordinary tax on exceptional incomes resulting from the state of war, to incomes derived from agrarian rents, whatever may be the manner of rate payment, as well as to agrarian incomes obtained by owners directly cultivating their lands or managing them on a fixed-price basis following the system of manual laborers or that of collective farming. For the said incomes, however, the tax rates are reduced by half.
- 5) Modification of the set-up of inheritance and trading taxes. For inheritances new rates on inherited goods acquired during the war period have been introduced. Insofar as the trading tax, for commercial shares and obligations quoted on the stock exchange, is

redeemable at 5%, has been made obligatory for the land and buildings which have not yet been provided for, through the turning over in cash rather than the restitution of the bonds, deducting the annuities still due under the tax of 4%. The measure should produce about 2 billion lire.

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6) Reduction of 20% in the economic treatment of personnel transferred to the North with the Government, the job indemnities payable to presidents and commissioners of Government bodies, in the allowances of members of administrative councils and syndical colleges, in retributions and attendance checks on the attendance of commissions and committees as well as in the indemnities in

concerned,

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case of emergency.

In addition to the aforesaid measures aimed to increasing incomes, the Council of Ministers has made an appeal to the "necessity of drastic measures being adopted throughout all of the national life, not only to eliminate all superfluous expenditures but, by means of understanding, sacrifice, and contribution on the part of all citizens, to reduce all expenses, keeping them within the closest economy for the sake of the war and for the safeguarding of the national patrimony" and taking upon itself the first step towards a more severe reduction of expenses". The Council has deliberated:

- Prohibition against proposing increases in the budget not directly resulting from expenses in connection with the war or which have no reference to income.
- Prohibition against engaging new personnel even if previously authorized.
- Utilization, by means of an intensification of work, of enrolled and non-enrolled personnel now in service, also providing for, in those administrations which because of current contingencies have reduced their activities, the transfer of enrolled personnel under their jurisdiction to other administrations which find themselves in need of them.

IX - Ordinary Treasury Bonds:

According to information received, circulation up to 31 December 1944 probably amounted to approximately 85 billion lire (until 30 June 1943, 53.2 billion).

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TRANSLATION

5 February 1945

TO: The Minister of Finance

With reference to the questionnaire sent to us through our Delegation during the trip of last week to the South, we enclose a copy of the answers covering almost all of the points requested. Naturally, since the situation is fluid, these data are subject to subsequent modifications and worsenings. We shall take care of keeping them up-to-date month by month and reserve it to ourselves to come back to the various subjects where necessary.

We would be grateful to you if for our orientation you would furnish us with similar data on affairs in the South, so that here as well we may have the situation kept up-to-date and possibly complete.

Cordially,

THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION  
Of the C.L.N.A.I.

/s/

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Questionnaire "PES"

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Trans - Sgt Shenfield/lws

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"PES" QUESTIONNAIRE

All figures are referred to the northern administration only. They show results at the indicated date by comparing figures for the whole State in the period prior to Sept 8th, 1943.

CURRENCY.

I - Quantity in circulation : Up to 31 Dec 1944 circulation of Bank of Italy notes appears to amount - according to information obtained - to 240 billions (rough figure). According to another source, which refers to the Soleri Statements, bank notes for an amount of 39 billion lire appear to have been issued in the period between 1st Aug 1944 to 31 Jan 1945 (6.5 billions a month).

II - Monthly issues :

a), b) - total amount at present, 8 billions, one fourth of which delivered to the German Command.

c) whether other means of payment are in circulation & if so in what quantity : circulation of circular cheques of fixed amount is estimated to about 20 billions (another source indicates 15 - 20 billions).

III - Budget income figures : incomes of the 1943-44 financial year are shown to be the following (according to ascertainment made in the various areas up to the moment of liberation, and ~~xxxxxx~~ June 1944 forecasts):

- main incomes (direct taxes, business taxes, customs & monopolies)	29	
- minor incomes	4.9	
		Total
		<u>33.9</u>

According to the estimate published in Gazzetta Ufficiale No 151 of 30 June 1944, ordinary incomes for 1944-45 financial year, including territories of Tuscany, Marche & Umbria, were estimated at 31,4 billions.

It appears that in the course of 1944 direct taxes were collected, as an average, in proportion not exceeding



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It appears that in the course of 1944 direct taxes were collected, as an average, in proportion not exceeding 50 % of due fees. In many cities of northern Italy (e.g. Genova) Prefects have dispensed tax-collector's offices from the obligation "non riscosso per riscosso" ((System according to which those offices were held responsible also for what had not actually been collected - Translator's Note)).

IV - Expenditure figures : in the financial year 1943-44 expenditures have been :

	BILLIONS
- Ordinary expenditures	38.3
- Extraordinary expenditures	90.3
- Indemnity to Germany	80.0
	208.6
Total	

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- Extraordinary expenditures	90.3
- Indemnity to Germany	80.0
	208.6
Total	

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For the financial year 1944-45 expenditures are fore-  
seen as follows :

- ordinary expenditures	BILLIONS	
- extraordinary expenditures		34.7
- indemnity to Germany		80.0
		120.0
	Total	<u>234.7</u>

The deficit would be, according to the above quoted figures, 175 billions for 1943-44 and 203.3 billions for 1944-45. According to another source, which considers recent variations in expenditures, deficit for 1944-45 is estimated 220 billions.

V. - Situation of the Treasury, including "floating" debt:

- deficit up to 31 June 1943	165	BILLIONS
- deficit of 1943-44, including cost of occupation	175	
- deficit of the first 6 months, financ. year 1944-45	100	
- Total deficit on 31st December 1944	<u>440</u>	BILLIONS

VI - Whether there have been issues of Treasury bonds, and of what type: there has been no issue of Treasury bonds except of ordinary ones, the release of which is permanently open. Circulation of the latter on the whole is indicated in 85 billions on 31 December 1944.

VII - In what other ways the Treasury has faced the deficit: with advances of the Bank of Italy and deposits of Banks with the Treasury, as well as with state notes. Circulation of the Bank of Italy has been contained mainly thanks to the flowing back of money, with an increase in current account deposits at the ordinary banks.

PRICES

VIII - Level of prices. Whether there is one single market, or whether there are considerable differences between the various areas: we enclose results of various ascertainment made on the Milan & Turin markets. We lack figures from the production centres, in which considerable variations are

- deficit of the first 6 months, financ. year 1944-45

100

440 BILLIONS

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PRICES

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IX - Price of gold & of foreign currencies: in Milan gold is quoted 1200 lire a gramme. On other markets however lower prices are reported, with differences that reach 200-300 lire below that price. Gold sterling is being sold at 11-12,000 lire, the "marengo" at 9,500 lire.

TRANSPORTATION

X - Situation of railways: immediately behind the front lines are in a similar condition to the one you have noticed in the areas of Central Italy abandoned by the Germans. Further north, on many lines one track has been removed, on others there are bridge destructions & various interruptions that the Germans repair only as far as military traffic is concerned. Long stretches of the main lines, & entire secondary lines are completely abandoned.

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XI - Quantity of locomotives & of surviving rolling stock:  
in the regions of Northern Italy (not including Emilia)  
towards the end of January, figures were the following:

	NUMBERS	% ON PRE-WAR
- Steam locomotors	500- 600	} . . . . . 40 %
- Electric locomotors	350	
- Passenger wagons	800	} . . . . . 20 %
- Open freight wagons	7000	
- Closed freight wagons	3000	15 %
- Luggage vans	400	40 %

Of the surviving stock about one half can be considered efficient, the remaining half is in need of repairs.

XII - Available motor transports

XIII - Situation of river navigation

} we shall give  
} detailed information  
} later on.

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BLACK MARKET PRICES IN TURIN  
(September-December 1944)

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(September-December 1944)

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BLACK MARKET PRICES IN TURIN  
(September-December 1944)

We relate some data, collected by the "Municipio" of Turin from September to December last year in seven different shops, concerning the state of 21 prices of 15 different food items sold on the blackmarket.

For each item, three prices are quoted; minimum, maximum and medium (monthly); although the extremely strong jolts between minimum and maximum prices make medium prices *via* irrelevant.

Two facts must be pointed out, as signs of a serious situation:

1. - The above mentioned difference between minimum and maximum prices, which means a strong dispersion of the prices around the average value, a consequence of markets' disorganization. These are some instances of the differences between maximum and minimum prices (it must be kept in mind that such differences have been observed in the same city and in the same days):

- White flour bread	_____	difference 6 lire per Kg.	- 20% of minimum
- Bread, ration-card type	_____	" "	" - 56% "
- Corn flour	_____	" "	" - 33% "
- Dry beans	_____	" "	" - 90% "
- Milk	_____	" liter-100%	" "
- Sugar	_____	" Kg.	" - 60% "
- "Nazionali" cigarettes	_____	" pack.	" - 43% "

2. - The second fact is the remarkable mobility of prices in the period September-December. The strongest increases have been those of jam and sugar prices, with percentages of 135 and 304% respectively.

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	difference	6 lire per Kg.	- 20% of minimum
- White flour bread	"	"	"
- Bread, ration-card type	9	"	56%
- Corn flour	5	"	33%
- Dry beans	18	"	90%
- Milk	10	" liter-100%	"
- Sugar	300	" Kg.	60%
- "Nazionali" cigarettes	15	" pakk.	43%

2. - The second fact is the remarkable mobility of prices in the period September-December. The strongest increases have been those of jam and sugar prices, with percentages of 135 and 304% respectively.

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PRICES ON THE BLACK MARKET - SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1944

	September	October	November	December
White flour bread	Min. 20,-- Max. 35,-- Av. 28,66	25,-- 35,-- 30,31	25,-- 35,-- 31,17	30,-- 36,-- 33,57
Bread, mixed flour	Min. 18,-- Max. 25,-- Av. 23,02	20,-- 25,-- 22,33	22,-- 30,-- 26,25	22,-- 35,-- 26,92
Bread, ration-card type	Min. 10,-- Max. 16,-- Av. 13,92	10,-- 15,-- 14,57	10,-- 20,-- 16,50	16,-- 25,-- 17,93
White, dry soap paste	Min. 25,-- Max. 40,-- Av. 30,84	25,-- 30,-- 31,82	30,-- 35,-- 31,99	32,-- 40,-- 36,93
Soup paste, ration type	Min. 10,-- Max. 20,-- Av. 14,54	10,-- 25,-- 16,32	15,-- 25,-- 18,27	16,-- 25,-- 20,68
Rice	Min. 15,-- Max. 20,-- Av. 17,70	18,-- 29,++ 18,60	20,-- 25,-- 22,60	20,-- 35,-- 23,93
White flour, wheat	Min. 20,-- Max. 35,-- Av. 25,79	25,-- 30,-- 27,70	25,-- 35,-- 28,42	28,-- 38,-- 32,15
Wheat mixed flour	Min. 15,-- Max. 25,-- Av. 19,69	15,-- 25,-- 19,75	16,-- 25,-- 20,80	18,-- 30,-- 24,12
Corn flour	Min. 10,-- Max. 18,-- Av. 13,41	10,-- 18,-- 14,04	12,-- 18,-- 15,33	15,-- 20,-- 17,71
Common dry beans	Min. 12,-- Max. 30,-- Av. 20,10	18,-- 25,-- 20,40	20,-- 30,-- 26,--	20,-- 38,-- 29,86
High choice dry beans	Min. 15,-- Max. 50,--	24,-- 50,--	25,-- 56,--	25,-- 65,--

Rice	Av.	14,54	16,32	20,--	20,--
	Min.	15,--	18,--	20,--	20,--
	Max.	20,--	29,++	25,--	35,--
	Av.	17,70	18,60	22,60	23,93
White flour, wheat	Min.	20,--	25,--	25,--	28,--
	Max.	35,--	30,--	35,--	38,--
	Av.	26,79	27,70	28,42	32,15
Wheat mixed flour	Min.	15,--	15,--	16,--	18,--
	Max.	25,--	25,--	25,--	30,--
	Av.	19,69	19,75	20,80	24,12
Corn flour	Min.	10,--	10,--	12,--	15,--
	Max.	18,--	18,--	18,--	20,--
	Av.	13,41	14,04	15,33	17,71
Common dry beans	Min./	12,--	18,--	20,--	20,--
	Max.	30,--	25,--	30,--	38,--
	Av.	20,10	20,40	26,--	29,86
Top choice dry beans	Min.	15,--	24,--	25,--	25,--
	Max.	50,--	50,--	56,--	65,--
	Av.	33,75	30,71	42,--	44,65
Beef meat (tight), no bones	Min.	150,--	170,--	220,--	220,--
	Max.	250,--	250,--	250,--	250,--
	Av.	204,41	210,60	229,33	234,29
Beef meat (tight), with b.	Min.	120,+-	140,--	180,--	180,--
	Max.	180,--	200,--	200,--	220,--
	Av.	156,25	167,50	190,+-	192,--
Sheep meat	Min.	140,--	140,--	150,--	160,--
	Max.	140,--	140,--	150,--	200,--
	Av.	140,--	140,--	150,--	177,50
Raw salame	Min.	280,--	350,--	350,--	400,--
	Max.	400,--	450,--	450,--	500,--
	Av.	367,86	390,--	421,67	447,15
Raw ham	Min.	400,--	450,--	450,--	450,--
	Max.	450,--	450,--	510,--	550,--
	Av.	433,34	450,--	485,--	505,--

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	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	
Parmesan cheese	Min.	300,--	320,--	350,--	380,--
	Max.	400,--	400,--	450,--	500,--
	Av.	351,67	364,17	391,67	431,43
Table cheese	Min.	120,--	130,--	140,--	150,--
	Max.	300,--	300,--	330,--	380,--
	Av.	207,50	218,10	239,17	273,22
Milk (per liter)	Min.	7,--	10,--	10,--	10,--
	Max.	10,--	15,--	15,--	20,--
	Av.	9,75	10,75	11,75	13,15
Butter	Min.	380,--	400,--	450,--	450,--
	Max.	500,--	500,--	520,--	580,--
	Av.	427,50	459,65	489,17	537,86
Olive oil	Min.	900,--	950,--	950,--	1000,--
	Max.	1200,--	1400,--	1400,--	1400,--
	Av.	1038,75	1120,--	1204,17	1250,--
Eard.	Min.	360,--	350,--	440,--	440,--
	Max.	450,--	450,--	500,--	500,--
	Av.	408,22	418,22	470,84	472,86
Sugar	Min.	100,--	160,--	250,--	500,--
	Max.	200,--	300,--	500,--	800,--
	Av.	164,41	210,48	381,67	665,--
Washing soap	Min.	60,--	65,--	90,--	90,--
	Max.	150,--	150,--	140,--	200,--
	Av.	95,75	100,75	119,--	144,29
Jam	Min.	40,--	70,--	100,--	130,--
	Max.	100,--	100,--	150,--	200,--
	Av.	66,--	92,50,--	114,50	155,--
"Nazionali" cigarettes, per package (10)	Min.	25,--	30,--	30,--	35,--
	Max.	35,--	35,--	37,--	50,--
	Av.	31,23	33,04	33,64	42,36
"Macedonia" cigarettes per package	Min.	35,--	40,--	40,--	====
	Max.	50,--	50,--	50,--	====
	Av.	43,34	42,--	42,71	====
Cigars, "Toscani" and "Neapolitani" types, apiece	Min.	7,--	8,--	10,--	12,--
	Max.	12,--	13,--	16,--	18,--
	Av.	9,34	10,14	12,--	14,65

Sugar	Min.	100,--	160,--	230,--	200,--
	Max.	200,--	300,--	500,--	800,--
	Av.	164,41	210,48	381,67	665,--
Washing soap	Min.	60,--	65,--	90,--	50,--
	Max.	150,--	150,--	140,--	200,--
	Av.	95,75	100,75	119,--	144,29
Jam	Min.	40,--	70,--	100,--	130,--
	Max.	100,--	100,--	150,--	200,--
	Av.	66,--	92,50,--	114,50	155,--
"Nazionali" cigarettes, per package(10)	Min.	25,--	30,--	30,--	35,--
	Max.	35,--	35,--	37,--	50,--
	Av.	31,23	33,04	33,64	42,36
"Macedonia" cigarettes per package	Min.	35,--	40,--	40,--	==
	Max.	50,--	50,--	50,--	==
	Av.	43,34	42,--	42,71	==
Cigars, "Toscani" and "Napoletani" types, apiece	Min.	7,--	8,--	10,--	12,--
	Max.	12,--	13,--	16,--	18,--
	Av.	9,34	10,14	12,--	14,65

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PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF AVERAGE PRICES FROM SEPT. TO DEC. 1944

<u>Items</u>	<u>% increase</u>
White flour bread ; ; ; .....	17, 77
Mixed flour bread .....	16, 94
Ration-card type bread .....	28, 80
Soup paste, white, dry .....	19, 74
Soup paste, ration card type .....	97, 24
Rice .....	35, 19
Wheat white flour .....	20, --
Wheat mixed flour .....	22, 49
Corn flour .....	32, 06
Dry beans, common type .....	48, 55
Dry beans, choice .....	32, 29 <sup>n</sup>
Beef meat (tigh), without bones .....	14, 61
" " " with bones; .....	22, 88
Sheep " .....	26, 78
Raw salame .....	21, 55
Raw ham .....	16, 53
Parmisan cheese .....	22, 68
Table cheese .....	31, 67
Milk .....	34, 87
Butter .....	25, 81
Olive oil .....	20, 33
Lard .....	15, 83
Sugar .....	304, 47
Washing soap .....	50, 69
Jam .....	134, 84
Tobaccoes: "Nazionali" cigarettes .....	35, 63
"Toscani" cigars .....	56, 65

"	"	with bones;	22,60
Sheep "			26,78
Raw salame			21,55
Raw ham			16,53
Parmesan cheese			22,58
Table cheese			34,67
Milk			34,87
Butter			25,81
Olive oil			20,33
Lard			15,83
Sugar			304,47
Washing soap			50,69
Jam			134,84
Tobaccoes: "Nazionali" cigarettes			35,63
"Tobscani" cigars			56,85

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BLACK MARKET PRICES IN MILAN

(September-December 1944)

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BLACK MARKET PRICES IN MIAMI  
(September-December 1944)

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APP

FOOD ITEMS

Bread, common kind.....	25/40 per Kg.	Carrots.....	20/25 per Kg
White bread.....	50/70 "	Beet-roots.....	20/25 "
Wheat flour.....	25/40 "	Onions.....	30/25 "
Corn flour.....	20/25 "	Alcohol.....	500/600 "
Potatoes.....	20/25 "	Coffee.....	1600/2000 "
Rice.....	20/40 "	Pepper.....	3000 "
Sugar.....	700/1000 "	Cinnamon.....	3000 "
Salt.....	500/700 "	Tea.....	2000 "
Meat.....	350/400 "	Wine.....	60/80 "
Poultry.....	300/350 "	Wine in bottles.....	150/250 " bott
Saltmeat.....	450/500 "	Italian liquors.....	450/1000 "
Fresh cheese.....	100/120 "	Butter.....	650/700 " Kg.
Hard cheese.....	500 "	Lard.....	650/700 "
Canned meat (cans of 250 gr.)	50/60 each	Seeds oil.....	500/550 "
Honey.....	350/400 per Kg.	Catsup.....	150 "
Powdered milk (250-gr.cans)	80/90 each	Jam.....	200/300 "
Broth dice (vegetable).....	1.50/2 each	Cured fish.....	300/400 "
Broth dice (meat).....	3/3.50 "	Eggs.....	20 each
Soup paste.....	35/50 per Kg.	Sardines in oil (250-gr.can)	250 per can
Beans.....	40/50 "	Laundry soap.....	250/300 per Kg
Apples, pears.....	60/70 "	Face soap.....	30/15 spiece
Chestnuts.....	40 "	Candles.....	12/15 "
Citrus fruits.....	70/80 "	Tobacco.....	1000/2000 per K
Lemons.....	15/25 spiece	Cigarette paper (40 sheets)	15/20
Dry plums.....	170/200 per Kg.		

CHEMISTRY ITEMS

Paraffine.....	100 per Kg.	Copper sulphate.....	150/300 per Kg
Talc.....	10 "	Sulphur.....	100 "
Tar oil.....	100 "	Calcium carbide.....	70/100 "
RUBBER			
Motor-cyclers tires.....	7,000/8,000 "	Soccer balls tubes.....	200 "
Tubes cuttings.....	200/250 per Kg.	Bicycle tubes.....	250/300 spiece
Tires cuttings.....	150 "	Motor-car tubes.....	2500/3000 "
Motor-car tires (4.00-15).....	15,000 spiece	Rubber putty.....	2000 per Kg
" " (5.50-15).....	45,000 "	Rubber pipe (10X30).....	150 per met
" " (155x100).....	50,000 "	Soil sheets.....	140/150 " Kg.
" " (30x5).....	35,000 "	Soils (mountain type).....	250 per pair
" " (42x9).....	50,000 "	Belts (685 cm. long).....	100 spiece

Fresh dice (vegetable) ..... 1.50/2 each  
 Broth dice (meat) ..... 3/3.50  
 Soup paste ..... 25/50 per Kg.  
 Beans ..... 40/50 " "  
 Apples, pears ..... 60/70 " "  
 Chestnuts ..... 40 " "  
 Citrus fruits ..... 70/80 " "  
 Lemons ..... 15/25 apiece  
 Dry plums ..... 170/200 per Kg.

CHEMISTRY ITEMS

Paraffine ..... 100 per Kg.  
 Talc ..... 10 " "  
 Tar oil ..... 100 " "  
 Copper sulphate ..... 150/300 per Kg  
 Sulphur ..... 100 " "  
 Calcium carbide ..... 70/100 " "

RUBBER

Tubes cuttings ..... 200/250 per Kg.  
 Tires cuttings ..... 150 " "  
 Motor-car tires (4.00-15) .. 15,000 apiece  
 " " (5.50-15) .. 15,000 " "  
 " " (165x100) .. 50,000 " "  
 " " (30x5) .. 35,000 " "  
 " " (12x9) .. 50,000 " "  
 Motorcycles tires ..... 7,000/8,000 "  
 Bicycles tires ..... 1,400 apiece

FUELS

Gasoline ..... 250 per liter  
 Gas-oil ..... 180 " "  
 Kerosene ..... 100 " "  
 Naphta ..... 80/100 " "  
 Firewood ..... 600 per 100 Kg.  
 Soft coal ..... 1000/1500 " "  
 Pit-coal ..... 1400/1800 per 100 Kg  
 Compressed coal powder .. 1000/1200 " "  
 Coke coal ..... 450/600 " "  
 Lignite ..... 250/350 " "  
 Fuel casks (25c liters) .. 2000 apiece

MINERALS

Iron sheets ..... 60/65 per Kg.  
 Rolled iron items ..... 35/40 " "  
 Copper scraps ..... 20 " "  
 Zinc ..... 50 " "  
 Gold (15 K.) ..... 900 " gr.  
 Lead ..... 40 per Kg.  
 Tin ..... 350 " "  
 Brass losses ..... 70/80 " "  
 Aluminum ..... 100/110 " "  
 Silver (900/1000) ..... 30 " gr.

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ART

MECHANICAL ITEMS

Large trucks w. trailer (second hand)	.....	3,000,000	each
Light three-wheeled trucks	.....	300,000	"
Battery-operated trucks	.....	3/400,000	"
Motorcycles	.....	80,000	"
Motor-cars	.....from	100,000	on
Ammeters... (15/20 Amp.)	.....	2,000	each
Temperature gauges	.....	3,000	"
Helicoidal drilling points	7mm.	70	"
Three-corner files	.....	70	"
Winch taps	.....	90/100	"
Winch taps	.....	250/270	"
Bicycles	.....	8000/12,000	each
Typewriters (Olivetti M40)	.....	15,000	"
Balances (15 Kg.)	.....	900/1000	"
Ball-bearers (30x72x19)	.....	150/500	"
Battery for FIAT 500	.....	900	"
"	.....	1360	"
"	.....	4015	"
"	.....	5100	"
"	.....	1400	"
"	.....	700	"

BUILDING MATERIAL

Plain bricks	.....	2.50	apiece
Hollow bricks	.....	3.00	"
Flat tiles	.....	13/15	"
Cement	.....	600	per 100Kg. plywood.... (4 mm.)
Sand	.....	100/105	cu.m. Fir wood..... 6500/6700 " cu.
Gravel	.....	95	per cu. meter
Flat glasses	.....	150	" sq. "
"Masonite"	.....	150/180	" " " "
"	.....	150	" " " "

TRANSPORTS

Truck-&-trailer hire (fuel not included)	.....	100	per Km.
Three-wheeled truck hire (fuel not included)	.....	30	" "
Horse-drawn cart hire	.....	1200	per day

CLOTHING ITEMS

Wool cloth for man	.....	3000	per meter
"Combed" wool cloth for man	.....	5000	"
Cloth for man (ministerial type)	1000	"	"
Pure silk cloth	.....	100/500	"
Cotton cloth	.....	150/250	"
Flax cloth	.....	350/500	"
Hemp cloth	.....	150/180	"
Light rayon cloth	.....from	100	cm "
"popelin" cotton cloth	.....	250/350	"
Cotton handkerchiefs	.....	1000/1500	dozen
"	.....	600	"
"	.....	3500/5000	per Kg. Women shoes.....
"	.....	800/1000	apiece
Raw wool	.....	800/1000	per Kg.
Raw spinned wool	.....	1000/1500	" "
Cotton shirt (man)	.....	800/1000	apiece
Wool socks (man)	.....	250/300	pair
Cotton socks (man)	.....	150/200	"
Rayon socks (man)	.....	80/100	"
Silk stockings (woman)	.....	200/300	"
Rayon stockings (woman)	.....	30/120	"
Man hats	.....	600/800	apiece
Man gloves	.....	100/500	pair
Man shoes	.....	1500/3000	pair
Women shoes	.....	1500/3000	pair
Silk umbrellas	.....	800/1000	apiece

Cement..... 600 per 100kg. Plywood..... 6500/6700 " cu.  
 Sand..... 100/195 cu.m. Fir wood ..... 1200 per day

Track-&-trailer hire (fuel not included)..... 100 per Km.  
 Three-wheeled truck hire (fuel not included)..... 30 " "

TRANSPORTS

Horse-drawn cart hire

CLOTHING ITEMS

Wool cloth for man .....	3000 per meter	Raw wool .....	800/1000 per Kg.
"Combed" wool cloth for man..	5000 "	Raw spinned wool .....	1000/1500 " "
Cloth for man (ministerial type)	1000 "	Cotton shirt (man).....	800/1000 apiece
pure silk cloth .....	150/500 "	Wool socks (man).....	250/300 pair
Cotton cloth.....	150/250 "	Cotton socks (man).....	80/100 "
Flax cloth.....	250/500 "	Rayon socks (man).....	200/300 "
Hemp cloth.....	150/150 "	Silk stockings (woman)	80/120 "
Light rayon cloth .....	100 cm "	Rayon stockings (woman)	600/800 apiece
"Popelin" cotton cloth.....	250/350 "	Men hats.....	400/500 pair
Cotton handkerchiefs .....	1000/1500 dozen	Man gloves .....	1500/3000 pair
Rayon "	600 "	Man shoes .....	1500/3000 pair
pure wool yarn .....	2500/5000 per Kg.	Women shoes .....	800/1000 apiece
Cotton sewing yarn (100 meters)	120/180 each	Silk umbrellas .....	300/500 apiece
Rayon "	1200 apiece	Rayon "	2500/3000 apiece
Wool blankets .....	1000/5000 "	Raincoats.....	

ARTISANS' PRICES

Men suit manufacturing .....	1500/3000	Dyeing .....	300 per Kg.
Shoes manufacturing .....	200/1000	Suit cleaning.....	100/150 each
Men shirt manufacturing.....	150/300	Hat cleaning .....	10/50 "
Men suit turning inside out....	1000/1500	Men shoes resoling (leather)	300/350 "
Derinings .....	100 cm	Woman "	200/300

HOUSE ARRANGEMENTS

Kitchen-range (Standard type)...	30,000	Gas range.....	15,000
Gas-stove.....	1500	Kitchen-kit (aluminum)...	15000
Kitchen dishes set (ceramic)....	1200/1500	Dishes-set (china).....	13,000/15,000
Crystal set.....	30,000	Cover set.(stainless steel)	12000/15000
Broom-corn brooms.....	40 apiece	Kitchen-range (wood).....	12000/15000
Carbide lamps.....	450/350 "		

106 Part

HOUSE ELECTRIC ITEMS

Electric kitchen ranges .....	25000/30000	El. stoves (one place).....	500
Electric irons.....	250	" " (two places).....	3000
Fan.....	1500	3 tubes radio receivers....	6500/7000
Room-stoves.....	800/1200	Vacuum-cleaners.....	8000/8500
Domestic ovens.....	5000	Electric wire .....	11 per meter
Lead-covered cable (2x2.5).....	60/70 meter	Flashlight batteries.....	6/15 pieces
Portable batteries.....	120 piece	Bulbs.....	20/10 "
Switchers (6AMP.).....	15 "		

0478

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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app



Bollettino della Borsa di Milano dal 24 al 26 Gen

Main financial table with columns for various bond types (TITOLI A REDDITO FISSO), stock values (VALORI AZIONARI), and interest rates. Includes sub-sections like 'TITOLI DELLO STATO', 'Fondari ed equiparati', 'Provinciali e Comuni', 'Trasporti', 'Elettrico', 'Militare e Metallurgici', 'Meccanica ed Automobilistica', and 'Diversi'.

CALENDARIO DELLA BORSA DI FEBBRAIO 1935 - Lunedi 20 Borsa (ore 9.30) - Giovedi 22 Compensi (ore 9.00) - Martedi 24 Borsa (ore 8.10) - Lunedi 26 Correzioni errori (ore 8.10) - Martedi 28 Liquidazione - Giorni d'interesse: 28 - Borsa

(\*) Prezzi fatti (mentre i prezzi nominali non sono seguiti da asterisco). (\*\*) Sono soggette alla decurtazione del 10% (R. D. L. 7 settembre 1934). L. 2.62 (cedola esercizio 1-4-1932 a 31-3-1933 pagata, 1-7-1933). - (3) Il dividendo si riferisce alle azioni da nominali L. 350. - (4) Circolano altre cartelle... ACCONTI DIVIDENDI ESERCIZI IN CORSO (al netto): Nord Milano priv. L. 8 (1-2-1933); F.lli Compagnia L. 5.80 (15-4-1933); La Centrale L. 20-3-1934; Unione Manifatture L. 13.93 (22-4-1934); Vizzola L. 25.20 (22-2-1934); Franco Tosi L. 12.60 (19-2-1934); Rossari & Yenzi L. 18 (5-2-1934) più L. 8 (3-3-1934); Compagnia L. 1 per rimborso imposta cedolare



0479

106 APR

SECRET.

66

Ref: 3207/74/AC.

21 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Induction of Italian Patriots into the Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

*see Ext file*  
*see Ext file*

1. I forward herewith the reply of my Land Forces Sub-Commission to your AC/091.741/083 GGT-0 of 22nd February 1945 addressed to the President of the Commission. (I should be grateful if papers of this nature could be addressed to the Chief Commissioner).

2. I agree generally with General Browning's remarks.

HARRY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USMC  
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Com (MMLA).

*3207/74*

547

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MAR 20 1945

C.C.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel. 475904

20 March 1945

REF. : 150/116

SUBJECT : Northwest Italy Planning--  
Employment of Patriots.

TO : Regional Commissioners, Lombardia, Liguria,  
Piemonte, Venezia and Emilia.

1. This memorandum deals with the civil employment of Patriots, following liberation of Northern territory, in pursuance of the primary object of Patriot policy to return these men to normal civil life as early as possible.

2. Patriots should be placed in employment at the earliest possible moment. The employment should be of a long-term character and regard should be paid to the industrial background and skill of individual Patriots so that the employment should be suited to their qualifications. It will be recognized that if Patriots are placed in casual employment lasting a few days only, the problem of reestablishing them in civil employment will be continually recurrent. Equally, employing units should not discharge known partisans without sufficient reason and without informing at an early date, and if possible before discharge, a responsible representative of the Regional Commissioner, e.g., the Provincial Patriots Officer.

3. The following directions give effect to the policy and principles stated above:

(a) Registration of Partisans for Civilian Employment. Patriots will be registered at Patriot Centers or Camps where these have been established; or at AAG Labor Offices; or at offices opened by P.A.M. or military employing units for the engagement of Italian civilian personnel.

At each Patriot Center a Labor Officer should attend for the specific purpose of registering patriots for civil employment. At the other offices arrangements should be

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made for the separate registration of patriots. At the registration stage patriot leaders should identify the men as recognized patriots and the registration personnel should proceed to ascertain and record the qualifications and industrial background of individual patriots in order that they may be placed on the highest graded job for which they are qualified. Patriots whose services are terminated for good cause after employment will be entitled to re-register. The Patriots Register should be made available for the selection of men for employment by the Allied Armed Forces and also for employment in civilian industrial establishments from which demands for labor are received or are known to be developing. It will be realized that the closest cooperation between all interested parties will be essential to insure the effective operation of established policy in this connection.

(b) Immediate steps should be taken on receipt of these directions to ascertain the estimated requirements of the Armed Forces in various localities. Naval, Military, Air Force and Civil Affairs Officers who are able to estimate by localities and by trades their labor requirements should supply such estimates to Regional Commissioners so that, through the Regional and other labor Offices, and through the Provincial Patriot Offices, a number of posts may be reserved for patriots to the extent that suitable men can be made available from the registered patriots. As and when further possibilities of employment can be estimated or reported, similar steps should be taken through Regional Commissioners and the Offices indicated, to relate the labor requirements to the register of patriots. Prompt communications between offices involved will be essential, but employing units should be prepared to accept a slight delay in filling positions reserved for patriots, before filling them from other sources.

(c) Employing units should identify patriots employed by them with the object of insuring that when reductions of personnel, or discharges, take place, the patriots are the last to be discharged. Equally, if disciplinary or suitability issues arise which may lead to the discharge of patriots, special endeavor should be made to retain their services by rearrangement of work; failing which, early notification should be given to Patriot Offices and Labor Offices to which the discharged patriots should be instructed to report for the purpose of obtaining other employment.

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(d) Similar action should be urged by Labor Officers upon other employers, e.g., public utilities, relief schemes, and private employers.

(e) Although arrangements are being made for the accommodation, feeding and payment of patriots in the interim period while they are being considered for recruitment or for placing in civil employment, it should be understood that patriots who refuse suitable employment will forfeit their rights to benefits and preferential treatment. This principle should not however be harshly applied, and due regard should be paid to personal circumstances and industrial background when deciding whether a patriot has just cause for refusing offered employment.

4. From time to time reports will be required regarding the application and operation of this policy, and units should keep suitable records to be in a position to render necessary reports, the form of which will be indicated in separate instructions.

For the Chief Commissioner:



Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner

Chief Commissioner  
CC 7/3  
MAR 16 1946  
COPY NO 3.  
TOP SECRET

FX 44500  
MAR 16 1243A

D/5178  
MAR 16 1600A  
PRIORITY

AHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FRPAY  
ACTION ALCOM ROME

TOP SECRET.


1. TRIPAREA report currency totalling Met Lire 236,300,000 despatched you March 15. Signal confirmation receipt.
2. This currency to be reserved for CLNAI purposes VIDE our 1 HQ/PAY/309 February TWA (22 ?).

DIST

Copy No 1	ACTION: Finance S/C
" 2	INFO: A/President
" 3	Chief Commissioner
" 4	Executive Commissioner
" 5	Icon Sec
" 6	File

(L/C Note:  
No record in M/C of  
quoted reference)

3201/CC





TOP SECRET.

1. TRIPAREA report currency totalling Met Lire 236,300,000 despatched you March 15. Signal confirmation receipt.
2. This currency to be reserved for CINAI purposes VIDE our 1 HQ/FAY/303 February TRM TWA (22 ?).

DIST

Copy No	1	ACTION: Finance S/C
"	2	INFO: A/President
"	3	Chief Commissioner
"	4	Executive Commissioner
"	5	Exec Sec
"	6	File

(M/C Note:  
No record in M/C of  
quoted reference)

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**Confidential**

3201/CC

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0 4 8 5

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

MAR 16 1945  
cc 706

cc

Tel: 735

15 March 1945.

Ref: 3207/69/EC

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.  
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA)

91

With reference to the copy of questionnaire which was enclosed with my letter 3207/55/EC dated 3 Mar 45, I have now received a reply to this questionnaire and enclose a copy for your information.

*J.H.*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:  
as above

3201/EC

542

102

File

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE  
APO 394

MAD 16 111  
CC 706

The F.F.I. do not constitute, in themselves, a homogeneous group. They were formed from the parties of different "maquis" which remained voluntarily mobilized.

This party itself, although animated by an ardent desire to fight, was heterogeneous, taken from "maquis" who were not all animated by the same spirit.

Some, grouped under the command of active or reserve Officers, had done it out of pure patriotic ideal; others animated by an equal patriotic spirit, were grouped according to political affinities.

Among them, undesirable elements, in fact not very numerous, had inevitably infiltrated themselves but were gradually eliminated. These F.F.I. who did not join the Army, have been sent back home. It is not certain that they have surrendered all their arms.

1.- The F.F.I. units have been assigned, in regular formations, to the Atlantic front, as well as to the Army of General De Lattre de Tassigny, or the Division of General Billotte. They remained under command of their F.F.I. Chiefs whenever those were confirmed in their ranks; nevertheless the Minister remains responsible for any transfer.

2.- An F.F.I. unit may be at the command of Army Officers whenever the transfere within the officers personnel leads an Officer of the Regular Army to assume its command, or when elementary units are included within tactical groupments under command of active service officers.

3.- Yes, in this way they have contracted an individual obligation. The State has not undertaken any commitment as to how their units would be made up, this can be regarded as under the common law.

4.- They follow the common law. The "cours" are sent to Officers Schools if necessary, or given courses.

5.- None

6.- Those who did not enlist for the duration of the war had to give in their arms.

7.- There have been in the F.F.I. undesirable elements either from the point of view of common law, or as regards their "patriotic attitude"; people who joined the F.F.I. to redeem their past; they were referred to Common Tribunals.

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INCL

/.....

2

8.- The Patriots have been dressed and fed by their proper means (purchases, spoils of war, compulsory confiscation of existing stocks, requisitions more or less summary) until the moment when the Military authorities attended to their needs.

9.- The Army has accepted all the applications which have been presented.

10.- They have an F.F.I. Identity Card which is replaced by the regular Army Identity Card after their enlistment.

11.- They have the benefit of Military pension laws and grants.

12. - They are looked after in military hospitals the same as members of the Regular Army.

13. - Yes, after confirmation of their ranks. They may be reduced a lower rank than they held in the insurrectional period.

14. - Yes.

15.- Those F.F.I. who have not joined the Army went back to their homes without any other advantage than a demobilization bonus.

16.- The C.L.L. under the provisions of the Ordinance of Algiers which dealt with them, had only the object of assuring municipal life between the liberation and the moment when the Municipal councils of pre-1939 would have been reconstituted.

As soon as the Municipal Councils started again, the C.L.L. were supposed to cease to function. This ordinance has not been fulfilled and the C.L.L. still continue to administrate the country.

17.- About 100,000./.

102 INC

cc

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel: 735

15 March 1945

Ref: 3207/68/EC

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots.

TO : Maj. General X. De Sevin,  
French Representative,  
Allied Commission.

137 *ndc*

I am much obliged to you for your letter of 14 March 1945 and for the trouble you have taken to obtain answers to our questionnaire, which are most useful.

M S H

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

3207/68

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*Q*

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

MAR 14 1954

Copy No 3

TOP SECRET

D/4954  
MAN 140700A  
ROUTINE

O 272 B  
MAR 13 1954

15 ARMY GROUP  
AFHQ HHTD ALCOM

98

TOP SECRET

This is in reply to your FHCT FX 41006.

No further effort will be made to infiltrate funds direct to Partisans direct during March. Prior to receipt of your signal 1500000 lire despatched by parachute courier to FERRARA MODENA area. Disagree your conclusion that need does not exist for using channels of infiltration other than CINAI. Accordingly will submit on 15 March details for proposed infiltration during April of 60 millions for PIEDMONT and 50 millions to other compartments. Meanwhile we consider that military value of resistance movement suffers because of delayed receipt of funds. Regret you saw fit not to follow our recommendation in this matter.

3201/c

DIST

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - Finance SC
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 Exec Comm
- 5 Econ Sec
- 6 CA Section
- 7 Patriots Br
- 8 File

This is in reply to your FHGCT FX 41006.

No further effort will be made to infiltrate funds direct to Partisans direct during March. Prior to receipt of your signal 1500000 lire despatched by parachute courier to FERRARA MODENA area. Disagree your conclusion that need does not exist for using channels of infiltration other than CLNAI. Accordingly will submit on 15 March details for proposed infiltration during April of 60 millions for FIEHMONT and 50 millions to other compartments. Meanwhile we consider that military value of resistance movement suffers because of delayed receipt of funds. Regret you saw fit not to follow our recommendation in this matter.

3201/c

Dist

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - Finance SC
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 Exec Comm
- 5 Econ Sec
- 6 CA Section
- 7 Patriots Br
- 8 File

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**Confidential**

SECRET

MAR 13 RECD

COPY.

COPY.

COPY.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 3201/207/EG.

11 March 1945.

My dear Rayner:

Thank you for your letter of 2nd March, which I only received on 9th March, with the news about Major Gavronsky.

The first thing that strikes me is that it is somewhat extraordinary that an officer should be sent to Switzerland to make a report on the political conditions in Northern Italy without consultation or the knowledge of the Chief Commissioner, and secondly, that he should produce a report on 11th February which is sent to the Allied Commission, not as a matter of course, but incidentally, attached to a DO letter from you.

As you know, it is vital that the Allied Commission should receive prompt information about all matters affecting the political situation in Northern Italy. If officers of FWB are being sent to that area or to neighbouring countries, I would ask that the Commission be consulted with regard to any special information which we may wish to acquire and be given information on general and particular subjects as soon as it is available to FWB.

I will comment on Major Gavronsky's report in due course.

I am sending a copy of this correspondence to AFHQ.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Maurice Lush.

Mr. John Rayner,  
Head, P.W.B.,  
15th Army Group,  
APO 512, US Army.

538

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ  
Pol Adv  
CA Sec  
PR Branch

} With copy of previous  
correspondence

99

3201/207

File



TOP SECRET

CHIEF MAR 10 1977  
COMMISSIONER CC 664

Copy No 3.

FX 41006  
MAR 101550A

D/4710  
MAR 101730A  
URGENT

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED GITE FRGCT  
ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCON

TOP SECRET.

(94)

Reference FX 39303 dated 7th.

Information received here from various agencies does not warrant any infiltration during March of funds to CLNAI in compartments other than PIEDMONT already arranged with FIORIO. In accordance with LONGHI wishes full credit of 100 million Lire will be made to BERNE for March and any subsequent proposals for infiltration in April will be submitted on 15th in accordance with this HQ AP 973 dated 15th February para 1 (b). It is our policy to limit unilateral action to minimum and only when there is absolute certainty as was case in PIEDMONT that money is not getting to the destinations as required by LONGHI will implementation of para 3 of AP 973 dated 15th February be permissible. Am confirming to LONGHI that full credit of 100 million Lire for March will be made.

3201/c

See (100)

DIST

- Copy No 1 INFO- ACTION: Finance S/C
- " " 2 INFO: A/President
- " " 3 Chief Commissioner
- " " 4 Executive Commissioner
- " " 5 Econ Sec
- " " 6 CA Sec
- " " 7 Patriots Br
- " " 8 File

537

(98)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 7

9 March 1945

96

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander for the visit of Marchese Medici Tornaquinci into enemy occupied territory has been obtained with the proviso that the visit is limited to a period of a fortnight.

Very truly yours,

ELLIOT W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi  
President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome

cc: Exec Comm

See 117

AC DISTRIBUTION:

- Copy No 1 - Addressee
- 2 - Exec Comm
- 3 - A/President
- 4 - US Ambassador
- 5 - British Ambassador
- 6 - CA Section
- 7 - CC Files

3201/CC

536

97

**TOP SECRET**

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

COPY No. 3

CC 647

D/4525

MAR 081900A

PRIORITY

F-39896  
MAR 081551A

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG  
ACTION: ALCOM

TOP SECRET

93

Reference ALCOM 2972.

1. Approved is the request of Italian Government to send TORNAQUINCI on mission as suggested. Agree that visit should be limited in period to fortnight.

2. See our reply to FAN 497 repeated to you as NAF 875.

88

AC Dist

- Copy No 1 Action - Exec Comm
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 US Ambassador
- 5 British Ambassador
- 6 CA Section
- 7 File

See 97 See 117

322/1000

535

96

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Chief Commissioner

Copy No 3

cc 646  
D 4526

MAR 082000A

ROUTINE

FY 39851  
MAR 081516A

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHGEG

AGWAR FOR CCS AND TO AMBSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF RPTD TO  
SHAEP AND TO ALCOM FOR INFO

TOP SECRET

This is NAF 875.

1. Concurrently with your FAN 497 Italian Govt has asked permission to send TORNAQUINCI, present Under Secretary of State for Ministry of Interior to contact CLMAI in occupied ITALY. Object of visit to prepare ground in north to avoid misunderstandings at moment of liberation.

2. TORNAQUINCI is reliable and it is felt no harm can be done by such mission which may bring back useful information.

3. Propose to await TORNAQUINCIS return which should be within 2 to 3 weeks before deciding whether to attach officer as suggested FAN 497 stipulated.

See (96)

320/100

Dlst

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - Exec Comm
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 US Ambassador
- 5 British Ambassador
- 6 CA Section
- 7 File

534

(95)

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
MAR 8 RECD  
CC 640 Copy No 3

PK 39303  
MAR 071734A

D/4423—  
MAR 080830A  
OP PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT  
ACTION: 15 ARMY GROUP INFO AC ROME

TOP SECRET

Ref OSS signal from FLORENCE.

"1. We have received the following message from BALDWIN  
"From CLNAI to Brigadier General BRICKMANN in CASERTA. Please pay  
in at once amount due February 1st for LOMBARDIA LIGURIA VENETO  
EMILIA totalling 100 million lire. Such amounts have already been  
cashed and distributed by me. Confirm by radio. On March 1st please  
pay in same amounts and confirm. Signed LONGHI."

2. This should be done according to AFHQ procedure which to  
us is unknown"

Assume you will take necessary action regarding confirmation  
asked for, giving LONGHI details of distribution of 15 million lire  
infiltrated last month from 100 million lire allotment for compartments  
in above quoted signal. Assume you will leave LONGHI with full 100  
million for March as he requests.

533

AC Dist

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - Finance SC
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 Exec Comm
- 5 Econ Sec
- 6 File

See 98

94

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
MAR 8 RECD  
CC 640 Copy No 3

FX 39303  
MAR 071734A

D/4423 -  
MAR 080830A  
OP PRIORITY

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ACTION: 15 ARMY GROUP INFO AC ROME

TOP SECRET

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million for March as he requests.

533

AC Dlst

- Copy No 1 Info-Action - Finance SC
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 Exec Comm
- 5 Econ Sec
- 6 File

See (98)

(94)

**TOP SECRET**

CC

Ref: 121/6/PAT.

7 March 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

(67)

I refer to my letter of 23 January, reference 121/6/PAT, on the question of payment of patriots who come through the lines or whose activities come to an end when the territory is newly liberated. My letter of 12 February reminds you of the urgency of this matter.

(78)

May I also have confirmation that the requests in the sixth paragraph of my letter of 23 January have been complied with?

I am certain that you and your ministers have been deliberating these points and I hope that you will soon be in a position to offer a programme which we can put into effect to our mutual advantage.

Yours very truly,

Sec (107)

ELLIOT W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

3201/45

532

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
ROME.

A

(93)

CC 627  
MAR 5 RECD

TO : AMHC  
FROM : HQ ALCOM

TOP SECRET

2972

6 March

PRIORITY.

84

TOP SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD SIGNORE BONOMI HAS ASKED WHETHER ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CAN SEND MEDICI TORNAQUINI LIBERAL UNDER SECRETARY FOR OCCUPIED ITALY TO VISIT CHARLIE LOVE NAN ABLE ITEM IN PRESENTLY GERMAN OCCUPIED ITALY IN ORDER TO QUOTE PREPARE GROUND IN NORTH AND AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND FRICTION BETWEEN CHARLIE LOVE NAN ABLE ITEM AND ALLIES ON LIBERATION UNQUOTE PD MISSION HAS APPROVAL OF LEADERS OF FOUR PARTIES ALTHOUGH FOR SECURITY PURPOSES PROJECT HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT FULL CABINET MEETING PD

PARA TO AMHC FOR SACMED (ACTION AND FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE (INFO) FROM HQ ALCOM PARAN PD

PARA TWO PD MEDICI WOULD BE INFILTRATED BY NUMBER ONE SPECIAL FORCE PD

PARA THREE PD I THINK THE MISSION MIGHT DO GOOD PD IT CAN CERTAINLY DO NO HARM AND I HAVE BONOMIS WORD THAT THIS WILL NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF NEW MINISTRY IN NORTHERN ITALY PD UNITED STATES AND BRITISH EMBASSIES AGREE PD IN VIEW <sup>can 4 9 7</sup> PAR FOUR NINE SEVEN I THEREFORE RECOMMEND YOUR EARLY CONCURRENCE

3201/cc

Copy to: US Ambassador  
British Ambassador  
A/President  
Chief Commissioner  
CA Section.

531

See 96

Office of the Executive Commissioner.  
343

(Sgt) M. S. LUSH  
Brig,  
Ex. Com.

92

Confidential



cc

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel: 735

3 March 1945

Ref: 3207/55/EG

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots.

TO : Civil Affairs Section  
Land Forces Sub-Commission (ISCA)

76

1. Attached hereto is copy of the questionnaire which was handed to a French Liaison Officer before his departure for France in order to obtain answers from the appropriate representative of the French Government.

2. The Liaison Officer has not yet returned with the answers, but from the French Representative to Allied Commission we have received the attached copy of letter dated 24 February 1945, with its enclosure, which whilst not constituting a direct answer to the questionnaire, does have some bearing upon it.

87

*[Signature]*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
To Executive Commissioner.

530

Incl:  
as above

91

unpublished

QUESTIONNAIRE ON PATRIOTS FOR THE FRENCH  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

1. Do the French enrol the Maquis in companies under Maquis officers ?
2. Do they enrol them in Maquis companies under regular army officers ?
3. Do they disregard Maquis companies and absorb them into the French Army recruiting them individually into the existing establishment ?
4. Do they recruit them into the existing establishment but earmark them as specially trained men ?
5. Do the Maquis have any special privileges ?
6. Are the Maquis disbanded when they arrive in liberated territory and if so how is this done ?
7. Are there Patriot Screening agencies to deal with volunteers and to differentiate between the real Patriot and those who have joined at the last moment to acquire preferential treatment ?
8. Is the clothing and feeding of Patriots a civilian or a military responsibility during the interim period before they are either recruited into the regular army or sent home as civilians ?
9. Does the French Army accept Patriot volunteers in large numbers or is there a fixed ceiling ?
10. Do Patriots carry any recognized Identity documents which distinguish them from other armed bodies ?
11. What do the French authorities do with regard to the families or fallen Patriots ?
12. How are wounded Patriots treated ?
13. Are Maquis officers granted immediate Commissions ?
14. Are members of the Maquis paid ?
15. If Maquis are not absorbed into the French Army are any arrangements made for giving them employment ? If not, how are they disposed of ?
16. Is recognition given to the equivalent of C.I.M. ?
17. How many Maquis have been enrolled in the French Army ?

- 3. Is the clothing and feeding of Patriots a civilian or a military responsibility during the interim period before they are either recruited into the regular army or sent home as civilians ?
- 9. Does the French Army accept Patriot volunteers in large numbers or is there a fixed ceiling ?
- 10. Do Patriots carry any recognized Identity documents which distinguish them from other armed bodies ?
- 11. What do the French authorities do with regard to the families of fallen Patriots ?
- 12. How are wounded Patriots treated ?
- 13. Are Maquis officers granted immediate Commissions ?
- 14. Are members of the Maquis paid ?
- 15. If Maquis are not absorbed into the French Army are any arrangements made for giving them employment ? If not, how are they disposed of ?
- 16. Is recognition given to the equivalent of U.I.M. ?
- 17. How many Maquis have been enrolled in the French Army ?

(11)

cc

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel: 735

3 March 1945

Ref: 3207/56/EC

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots.

TO : Brig.General K. De Sevin,  
French Representative,  
Allied Commission.

82a

I am greatly obliged to you for your letter of 24 February 1945, reference JN/SM, with its enclosure. This is most helpful and I now look forward to the answers to our questionnaire which I trust your representative will bring back with him from France.

See (91)

Major E. Talbot

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

10/2/45

528

A

(90)

COPY.

COPY.

COPY.

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH, 1st  
Unit No. 14 - APO 512.

2nd March, 1945.

77b

Dear Brigadier:

Your letter of the 23rd of February about Major Gavronsky:

The position is this. He is a member of the 1st Combat team which is headquartered at Nice with an outpost at Grenoble. This team is known as 1st "F" Force, the code name being FIDEL, and is under the command of Lt. Colonel MacFarlane who was our staff officer at AAI.

The "F" Force combat team is operating on the same principle as our combat teams with the 5th and 8th Armies with the difference that dissemination of leaflets by air and artillery is very much less, and the gathering of intelligence and the infiltration of material is very much more.

Gavronsky was sent on a mission for the purpose of gathering intelligence material and he returned with a report which I think it will interest you to read and of which I attach a copy. I would be glad to know if you have any comments to make on this report. The question of his going back again for the same purpose is under consideration, but no decision has been made, though I think you will agree from looking at the report that there are opportunities for useful work by an officer with a full knowledge of political background and directives.

Gavronsky is a newcomer to 1st AF and I do not suppose that he has seen the directive you refer to. I will see to it that he does. MacFarlane of course has it.

I can set your mind at rest that he will not go back to the Committee "and tell them things".

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) John Payne.

3207/CC

527

Brigadier Lush,  
Allied Commission,  
RMS.

See (99)

87a

Tel Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APC 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LWS/el

Ref. 3207/52/EC

2 March 45

SUBJECT: Patriots' Induction and Processing

TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommittee (AMIA)  
VP, Civil Affairs Section

83

1. Your attention is invited to the attached copy of a memorandum -- and in particular to the last sentence thereof -- from the Acting President, Mr. Harold Mcmillan, on the subject of Patriots.

2. Will you please prepare for this office a memorandum showing the following:

- a. The current average length of stay in Patriot camps; that is, the time that elapses between the Patriot's arrival at a camp and his formal induction into an official military or other recognized unit.
  - b. The status of action as outlined in your minutes of the meeting held at AMIA on 26 February and convened to discuss the proposed organization, etc., of Patriot RECON units.
  - c. Any other proposed or active measures that are being taken to officially absorb Patriots into controlled groups.
3. May this matter please be treated with the utmost urgency?

3201/10

3201/02

836

TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommission (AMIA)  
VP, Civil Affairs Section

1. Your attention is invited to the attached copy of a memorandum -- and in particular to the last sentence thereof -- from the Acting President, Mr. Harold Macmillan, on the subject of Patriots.

2. Will you please prepare for this office a memorandum showing the following:

- a. The current average length of stay in Patriot camps; that is, the time that elapses between the Patriot's arrival at a camp and his formal induction into an official military or other recognized unit.
  - b. The status of action as outlined in your minutes of the meeting held at AMIA on 26 February and convened to discuss the proposed organization, etc., of Patriot REGUS units.
  - c. Any other proposed or active measures that are being taken to officially absorb Patriots into controlled groups.
3. May this matter please be treated with the utmost urgency?

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Chief Staff Officer  
Executive Commissioner

~~AQ~~

525

89

TOP SECRET.

Paraphrase of FAN 497.

A close watch should be kept on developments regarding any attempt by Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy to set itself up in opposition to Italian Government in Rome on the strength of powers conferred on CLNAI by military agreement with SACMED and political agreement with Italian Government on 7th and 26th December 1944 respectively. Any indications of such a tendency on part of the Committee should be immediately communicated to CCS.

It is suggested that a Staff Officer from SACMED should be attached to the CLNAI as his representative for the purpose of reporting direct in a purely military capacity on the activities of the Committee.

It may become necessary for CCS to instruct SACMED, as a party to the military agreement with the Committee, to denounce this agreement, should it become apparent that the Committee is attempting to set itself up in opposition to the Italian Government in Rome.

Such a decision will be communicated to SACMED as and when it is considered the situation renders it necessary.

See (95)

3201/cc

525 -

(88)

FILE

**Confidential**



COPY

TOP SECRET

Executive Commissioner, AC

I have consulted both the United States and the British Embassies.

2. Both Embassies see no objection in principle to the proposed visit of Marchese Medici to the North.
3. It is not clear from Major Quayle's memorandum to what extent the Government as a whole have been consulted in this matter. Mr. Kirk feels very strongly that the project should have the full sanction of the whole Government and not only of the Presidency of the Council. I have no doubt that signor Bonomi will readily give his assurance but there have been cases in the past when members of the Government have given approval of certain measures in the name of the Government without in fact having consulted all the members of the Cabinet. In a delicate question of this sort it is most important that the project should not appear to be sponsored by any particular party whether it be to the right or to the left. *Not deliberate*
4. The Embassies both feel that not only should Allied Force Headquarters be informed of this proposal, but they should also be asked formally to give their permission for it to be carried out. If you telegraph to Allied Force Headquarters accordingly, Mr. Kirk would be glad to have the reference number of the cable in order that he can follow the matter up through his office in Caserta.
5. The two Embassies, while not insisting in the matter, feel that it would be interesting to learn in more detail the scope of Marchese Medici's mission and the terms of any messages which he may carry to the Committees of Liberation in the North.

524 -

2nd March 1945

(signed) A. S. HALFORD  
Asst. Political Adviser

87

Confidential

2 March 1945.

Executive Commissioner,  
Allied Commission.

Sir:

I have spoken on the phone to Major Gibson (in the absence of Commander Ellsworth). he says that the urgency only really concerns their own CLNAI man who is required to go North urgently with needed funds.

Marchese MEDICI merely wishes to go with his friend.

Major Gibson states that No. 1 Special Force have no interest in Medici's trip, but have merely agreed to act as transporters. I gathered from Major Gibson that he felt it would be desirable to clear the matter with Chief of Staff, AFHQ, and he himself saw no reason why the two could not go North separately.

*J. A. Quayle*

J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R. A.  
Staff Officer to CC

See (85)  
(87)

*5201/CC*

523 -

(86)

TOP SECRET

2 March 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner

1. Sig. Bonomi has given his approval to a proposed mission into occupied Italy to be undertaken by the Undersecretary of State for Occupied Italy, March. Medici, Tornaquinci, accompanied by Dr. Eng. Fiorio (Liberal, representative of the CLNAI, who has recently arrived from Turin).
2. The purpose of the mission is to prepare the ground in the North so as to avoid misunderstandings and friction with the Allies at the moment of liberation.
3. When this request was made, the Chief Commissioner raised two objections:
  - a. That the granting of authorization might create a precedent and so make it difficult to refuse Sig. Scoccimarro if he should present a similar request in a short time.
  - b. That such an enterprise was outside the scope of the Ministry for Occupied Italy.
4. This morning Admiral Stone has received an assurance that this is the only request which the Ministry for Occupied Italy will make and Sig. Bonomi has also assured him that the mission would represent the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as a whole rather than the Ministry for Occupied Italy alone, and that he definitely wishes March. Medici to go.
5. The carrying out of the mission would be entrusted to No. 1 Special Force and the two men urgently wish to make their start tomorrow March 3rd.
6. Admiral Stone now makes this point. If in the opinion of the Political Advisers and of the U.S. and British Embassies this may be considered a political mission as Sig. Bonomi assures him it is, then he feels that we can grant permission without any reference to AFHQ. If, on the other hand, it is felt (possibly owing to the agency of No. 1 Special Force) that there are operational implications, then permission would have to be sought at once from Chief of Staff AFHQ.
7. The Chief Commissioner requests that you obtain the opinion of the Political Advisers and the U.S. and British Embassies

522

- 1 -  
Confidential

See 876

File 2/10/45

**TOP SECRET**

on this point as quickly as possible. He wishes to give a firm decision one way or the other to Sig. Bonomi by this evening.

J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R. A.  
Staff Officer to CG

1. Am asking Embassies  
own opinion is that we  
must consult COS by word  
Am also contacting Holdsworth

(Sgt) M. S. LUSH 2/3

521 -

8.5

**Confidential**

TOP SECRET

Memo for Admiral Stone

March 1st, 1945

1. The Undersecretary of State for Occupied Italy, Medici Tornaquinci, has come this morning to enquire about the Mission to the North for which a request was submitted to you yesterday by Mr Bonomi through Dr Montanari (verbally).
2. The Undersecretary has been informed (through Mr Casati) of the two objections you had raised, i.e.
  - a) That granting authorization for this mission might create a precedent in case of a similar request being eventually advanced by Mr Scoccimarro in the future,
  - b) that such an enterprise was beyond the tasks of the Ministry of Occ. Italy.
3. His reaction to these objections is :
  - a) he had already approached Mr Scoccimarro on this question, and he can assure that should authorization for this mission be granted, no similar request would follow in the future ;
  - b) the Mission is not intended to be sent specifically from the Ministry of Occupied Italy, but rather from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
4. The Undersecretary was accompanied by Dr Eng Florio from Turin (a liberal), representative of the CLNAI, who has recently arrived from the North. He also insisted on the advisability of organizing this Mission both for internal policy reasons and with the aim of preparing the ground up there so as to avoid misunderstandings & friction with the Allied at the moment of liberation.
5. The carrying out of the mission would be entrusted to Special Force No 1.
6. Owing to the urgency of the case, Marchese Medici and Dr Florio would be ready to go to Caserta if you deemed it advisable.

520

*V.L. Grottanelli*  
V.L. Grottanelli, Lt.

P.S. I have informed Mr Bonomi, through Montanari, of the above. The President's viewpoint is that he would like to talk the whole thing over with you before anything was decided.

See (85)  
**Confidential** Montanari 6.30  
FILE.

(84)

3201/CC

CC 611  
MAR 2 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the President

APO 394

1st March, 1945.

Chief Commissioner.  
(Copy to Executive Commissioner).

I learn that last month Count Carandini, when calling at the British Foreign Office, declared that patriots were not absorbed into the Italian army, but put into concentration camps where they remained for a considerable time. Only a few had been taken out of the camps and put into the Army, and these men had been scattered over various units. These men constituted a valuable element and if they could be kept in their units, they would be a useful fighting force, whereas in concentration camps they lost their morale and might ultimately prove a source of difficulty.

Of course I know that this is out of date now and that it is to be the policy to introduce patriots into the Italian army to fill as far as possible the 48,000 existing vacancies under the present ceiling, and to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands, but Count Carandini hits the nail on the head in stressing the value of getting the patriots through the camps as quickly as possible. I should be glad to know what arrangements are now being made to this end, in order that I may report them to the Foreign Office.

3201/cc

519

83a

89

JEM

Spoke to C.S.O. to Ex: Co: 2/3/45  
who will direct C.A. Section to draft  
suitable reply. J.A.Q.

FILE.

# SECRET

Tel Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LWS/el

Ref. 3207/48/EG

1 March 45

SUBJECT: Italian Patriots and Carabinieri

TO : Land Forces Subcommittee (MMA) and  
Civil Affairs Section

87

1. Your attention is invited to attached copy of letter of Chief of Staff, AFHQ, on the subject of Italian Patriots and Carabinieri.

2. The Executive Commissioner requests that you submit your proposals in regard to paragraph 2 as soon as possible. Before these proposals are submitted it is presumed that the problem will be mutually discussed between Land Forces Subcommittee (MMA) and Civil Affairs Section.

Chief Staff Officer  
To Executive Commissioner

3207/48

518 -

A

83

**Confidential**

CONF.

CONF.

CONF.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 3210/108/32.

24 February 1945.

My dear Rayner:

Mr. Cavronski lunched with me today and told me that he had been travelling on the outskirts of Northern Italy making contact with CLM's, presumably from a distance, and that he was returning thither on the same mission, that is to say, putting across to the Italians in Northern Italy Allied policy and propaganda, etc.

He spoke as if he had not seen the directive which was issued for the use of PWE officers and EIC's working with the Northern groups and as if he did not know any of the policy with regard to our future treatment of partisans. He ~~ask~~ also asked me if he could "go back and tell the Committee of National Liberation that the Allies would make use of them, etc. etc."

What is his position and what direction has he been given, and does that direction tally with the policy of the Commission and AHC? It struck me that he was groping a little bit in the dark with regard to policy, although extremely earnest to find out what that policy was and to transmit it to the people in the North.

(Signed) Maurice Luch.

Mr. John Rayner,  
Head, P.W.B.,  
15th Army Group,  
APO 512, US Army.

517

See (89)

5201/ce

822



C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the French Representative  
APO 394

Rome, February 24th 1945  
JN/SM

TO : OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION  
SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots.

76

In reference to your letter February 8th No. 3207/COS this Office has requested the proper authorities in Paris to answer the questionnaire dealing with enrolment of Patriots known in France as F.P.I. (Forces Francaises de l'Interieur).

While no answer could yet be expected from France at this early time, this Office has endeavoured to make some researches in the official files of the French Embassy as well as questioning some Officers just recently back from France.

This result of this work is forwarded to you for your information pending the official answer from Paris.

P/I. Johan de Noux, Lt  
Assistant.

3201/CC

See (90)

516

82a

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the French Representatives  
APO 394

Rome, February 24, 1945

ENROLMENT OF FRENCH PATRIOTS  
=====

Forces Francaises de l'Interieur  
-----

French Government's Decrees.

I. - DECREE OF SEPTEMBER 19th, 1944.  
=====

- 1) The F.F.I. are considered as part of the French Army and, thus, submitted to the general rules of the military organization and discipline. They are under the Minister of War's sole authority. The F.F.I. units, when in operations, are made up in detachments which, during those operations, are under a command appointed by the President of the Government, Chief of the Army. The other units, which are not in operations, are, within each military district, under the orders of the military Commander of the District.
- 2) The present F.F.I. Units will be immediately regrouped either into Infantry march Battalions or, as far as possible, into equivalent units in the other services and arms. The present F.F.I. Officers will become the basic Officers of those Units.
- 3) As soon as they are trained and equiped, the Units thus constituted will be:
  - a) either assigned, in keeping their actual formation, to the existing large units;
  - b) or made up as new large units.

II. - DECREE OF SEPTEMBER 20th, 1944.  
=====

- 1) Any man who has been voluntarily fighting the enemy, and thus accomplished, during the fight for liberation, acts of war, either with fighting units or with special services, belongs to the F.F.I.

515

87a

- 2) The fact of belonging to the F.F.I. is checked by the military authority appointed by the Minister of War. Each man concerned will be given a certification mentioning the date at which he joined the F.F.I. as well as relating the actions in which he took part.
- 3) As soon as any part of the territory is liberated, no further recruiting for the F.F.I. can be made in that area.
- 4) Members of F.F.I. while in service can enlist voluntarily for the duration of the War. If not, they are sent back home on temporary leave up to the time when their class will be called up.
- 5) From the day when they join the Army, members of the F.F.I. are granted the benefit of all rights and advantages given to all members of the Army whether regular or reserve, as regards ranks, promotion, invalidity allowances, decorations and honors.

On a certain date, fixed by a Ministerial decision for each formation, the men's pay as F.F.I. will be replaced by the normal pay and this without any right to restoration or readjustment of pay. The so-called assimilated ranks give the right to an equivalent pay.

- 6) The assimilated ranks in the F.F.I. are registered by decision of the Minister of War who takes into consideration the commands actually assumed and the services given in the fight for liberation.
- 7) Further dispositions will deal with the admission within active service of those who got an F.F.I. assimilated rank as well as of their promotion in the reserve.

\*\*\*\*\*

The wounded F.F.I. are taken care of in military hospitals, ambulances and dispensaries in the same manner as regular army soldiers. It is difficult to find out how many F.F.I. have been absorbed by the Regular French Army:

- a) a certain number of Independent F.F.I. Battalions are still in the vicinity of the Atlantic ports, still occupied by the Germans, and are part of the French Forces of the West, under command of General de Laminat.
- b) some new large units (Infantry Divisions) have been made up mostly with F.F.I. taken either individually or in small groups formed on completion of their training.

The number of those Divisions was, in October 1944, of 4 and later on increased to 10. However, at the present time, with the call up of the classes in France, it is more and more difficult to discriminate them.

- c) General Delattre de Tassigny's Army has absorbed, from August to October 1944 approximately 40,000 F.F.I. men, keeping them in units (companies or battalions) which were associated with regular formations in each Division.

*(Signature)*  
In conclusion, it is possible to estimate the number of F.F.I. who were kept in service to 200,000 men. There is no ceiling and the number is only restricted by the amount of arms and equipments which can be furnished by the Allies.

/.....

The local Committees of Liberation are still functioning and retain their authority as long as elections have not taken place and municipal councils have not been elected.

82

FEB 23 RECD  
CC 524

C.C. FILES

SECRET

20 February, 1945.

SUBJECT : Italian Patriots and Carabinieri  
MEMO TO : Chief Commissioner,  
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.

Reference is made to your 3207/12/COB dated 16 January, 1945.

1. The question of the disposal of the increasing numbers of Italian Patriots now being encountered in the Army area having been reviewed, a general policy is hereby established for the induction of Italian Patriots into the Italian Army as individuals to fill the current deficiency of approximately 48,000 under the present ceiling.

2. With the object, however, of making the most advantageous use of the fighting capabilities of the Patriots, the Land Forces Sub-Commission have been requested to submit recommendations to this Headquarters on a proposed organisation for the formation of Reconnaissance Companies (comprising Patriots in their own bands), to operate with the existing five Italian Gruppi. The present patriot bands fighting with the Armies will continue to operate with their present formations.

3. Your request to raise the ceiling of the Italian Army by an addition of up to 100,000 cannot at this stage be entertained. If, however, after operational experience of the Reconnaissance Companies has been obtained, it is considered desirable to form further units of a similar nature to operate with other Allied formations, the necessity for an increase in ceiling to cover the estimated future intake of Patriots will be reviewed.

4. The present Carabinieri ceiling of 55,000 being now full, approval is being sought from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a further increase to 65,000. Pending receipt of this approval, recruitment beyond the present figure of 55,000 cannot be authorised.

51

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARCHAL ALEXANDER:

See (83)

JOHN L. HARDING,  
Lieutenant General,  
Chief of Staff.

DMR/uno

(82)

( Confidential ACTION COPY - Ex Comm )

3207/12/COB  
3207/12/COB

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EXTRACT

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting  
20th February, 1945

K 77

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

\* \* \* \* \*  
*80w*

7. PATRIOT PROBLEM IN NORTHERN ITALY  
(JPS Study No. P/265 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them an interim report, prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, on measures to deal with Patriot problems in Northern Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING enquired whether there was any political objection to the despatch to Northern ITALY of one or more senior liaison officers to improve the Partisan organization and to act as a steadying political influence. The despatch of one such officer to Northwest ITALY and one to Northeast ITALY was under consideration.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR strongly supported the suggestion to improve liaison with the Italian Partisans in the manner suggested by the Chief of Staff, adding that much effort had been wasted owing to poor organization of air supply reception arrangements.

MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that there could be no harm in the appointment of such officers if their sole purpose was to increase the efficiency of distribution of supplies. It was important, however, that they should not succumb to the inherent tendency to participate in politics. Officers who did this were on occasions a source of political danger, in that they tended to elevate and distort sectional political views. He felt that, if high grade officers were sent in as proposed, they should be drawn from the ranks of the United States and British Services.

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MR. KIRK supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasised the importance of confining the activities of such officers to operational functions.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the arrangement for providing the Italian

THE CONFERENCE had before them an interim report, prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, on measures to deal with Patriot problems in Northern Italy.

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MR. KIRK supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasised the importance of confining the activities of such officers to operational functions.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the arrangement for providing the Italian Partisans with funds required careful supervision to ensure that no war chest was built up for use against the Allies after liberation.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that this matter was under discussion by the authorities concerned, and the arrangements proposed were likely in his opinion to afford satisfactory safeguards.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Took note with satisfaction of the measures taken or contemplated to deal with Partisan problems in Northern ITALY, as described in JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).
- (b) Took note with satisfaction of Rear Admiral Stone's statement at 'X' above.
- (c) Directed that the Chief of Staff arrange for the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 6 in all copies of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) distributed outside AFHQ, in view of the discussion recorded under Minute 5 above.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3201/206/EC.

10 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problem in N. ITALY.

TO : VP, CA Section.

1. In reply to your letter TS/16/18/CA of 5 March 1945, herewith for your retention copy of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).

81

2. In accordance with Conclusion 7(c) of the Minutes of SACMED's Political Conference of 20 February 1945, (copy forwarded you under this office letter 3201/190/EC of 28 February) the last sentence has been deleted from para 6 of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).

See

*E. W. Murphy*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
to the Executive Commissioner.

/JC.

Copy to: SO to CC (with copy of JPS Study No. P/265  
Pol Adv (Final and to note para 2 above).

3201/EC  
(original/EC)

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COPYCOPYCOPYF/265 (Final)TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

18 February 1945

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH  
PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

Cover Note by MJPS.

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from Chief of Staff on 16 February 1945, we have prepared the attached interim report on measures to deal with patriot problems in Northern ITALY.
2. In the time available it has not been possible to consult 15 Army Group, Allied Commission, or MMIA.

(Sgd) G. L. EBELLE  
Brig. General, U.S.A.,  
G-3 Plans.

Representatives concurred in  
conference but the time  
factor has prevented signature  
being obtained

( L.T. FANGHURST,  
Air Commodore  
MAAF Plans  
W.A. ALAIR  
Commander,  
Staff Officer, Plans

51 DISTRIBUTION:

List "A" plus,  
CG, 15th Army Group  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Commander SOM  
British Resident Minister  
US Political Adviser  
A/C of S, G-5

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Lawmed

(~~AFH~~ ~~Measures~~ ~~Key~~ ~~Foot~~  
by Med. Joint  
King Staff. AFH W on  
Measures to Deal with  
Patent Problems  
in Study, 18 Feb 45)

Under 2:  
If instructions to c

1000/134/339



Justice to the CLNs  
 (2) from Adm Stone,  
 Ch. Comm. & CC to RC  
 Lombardy Region.  
 27 Oct 45

P 1/2  
 A O to "Paras 1-4"

15 Oct 1945/339

TOP SECRET.

P/265 (Final)

TOP SECRET.

18 February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PATRIOT PROBLEMS  
IN NORTHERN ITALY.

OBJECT.

1. To examine all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern ITALY and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:

- a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.
- b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
- c. The prevention of fighting between Slovenes and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern ITALY were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.

509 c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

- b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
- c. The prevention of fighting between Slovene and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

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- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

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3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. By AFHQ.

- (1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest ITALY" was issued on 21 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 26918 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.
- (2) The covering approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the scales of food and clothing, envisaged in the instructions given to 15th Army Group, has been asked for in MAP 364 dated 15 February.
- (3) A letter is being dispatched to MIA, copy to 15th Army Group, which lays down a general policy for the introduction of patriots into the Italian Army to fill, as far as possible, the 48,000 existing vacancies under the present ceiling, and instructs MIA to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands for employment with the five Italian combat groups. (Patriots are now filtering through the lines at a rate of about 500 per week

*(Handwritten initials)*

and it is anticipated that on the occupation of Northern ITALY it will be possible to absorb about 10,000 patriots in this manner into the Italian Army). Depending on the success with Italian combat groups, the use of Italian patriot reconnaissance companies with British and U.S. divisions is also envisaged.

b. By 15th Army Group in conjunction with Allied Commission.

It is understood that the following measures have been taken:

- (1) Messages giving detailed anti-scorch instructions have been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.
- (2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centres.
- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LOs with patriot bands.

c. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CLM representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots"

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- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

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3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northwestern ITALY are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern ITALY are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the Slovene difficulty.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

- 4. To meet the object stated at paragraph 1 a above, the following additional measures are recommended:

a. The Establishment of Closer Links between the CLNAI and the ROME Government.

There will be advantages in representatives being credited from each of these organisations to the other, though the nomination of suitable persons will represent a difficulty. On this connection an exchange of missions between SACRED and the CLNAI has also been considered, but as our object is now to play down the patriots, such a course does not appear desirable.

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-3-

b. Informal Agreement as to Suitable Italians for Military Government Positions.

There will be advantages if the ROME Government and the CLNAI can be induced to agree on lists of suitable candidates for employment as Prefects, etc., under AMG. SACMED could then undertake that, when instituting an Allied Military Government, agreed nominees would be considered for such appointments.

5. In regard to the object of paragraph 1 b, we have assumed that this refers to riots and not to normal operations of war against Fascist formations which may be <sup>or</sup> complying with German orders. In our opinion, the danger of armed disturbances developing between Fascists and patriots is small and the real danger is that of strife among patriots of diverse political opinions. The measures already taken, supplemented by those suggested at paragraph 4, should deal with this contingency.

6. In regard to the object given at paragraph 1 a, the best insurance will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions remain urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY. ~~Subject to any agreement that may have been made at the CHIMEA Conference, we remain of the opinion that tri-partite government for VENEZIA GIULIA up to the 1959 frontier will present the best solution.~~

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Political Section  
APO 394

19 February 1945

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MESSRS. HALFORD AND SCHOTT -  
MAJOR WHITTY (ASSISTANT TO COLONEL RIEPE).

1. The Major said that the system of financing the Patriots does not work and it has been suggested that in the future distribution of funds be made not through the CLNAI but through British and American Authorities working with the Patriots.
2. There has been no direct evidence of fraud in the distribution of these funds but there is little positive information, some negative information and a large lack of any information at all. It is known that since December 15, 1944, three and a half million lira were received by the 6th Zone Commander at Piacenza from the CLNAI (MILAN), and one million by the Comando Unico of Parma - a total of 4½ million lira.
3. Positive information of a non-receipt of funds has been obtained from Piedmont (which receives 40% of the total monthly allotment), Reggio-Emilia and Modena. The difficulty at these places seems to be a failure of the money market and drafts on Switzerland cannot be negotiated for lack of funds. In these instances, the CLNAI is held blameless.
4. There have been no reports regarding the receipt or non-receipt of funds from the Po Valley where cover has been very poor, and also no reports from North East Italy.
5. In addition to the sums mentioned above, it is known that the Italian Ministry of War, through OSS 5th Army, has supplied 13 million lira over the line to the Comando Unico of Parma. Similarly, 9 millions were supplied to the CLN and CU in Apuania and an additional two million to individual Patriot leaders in Apuania.

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*[Handwritten signature]*

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File  
Patriots ←

FEB 20 RECD  
CC 515

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED COMMISSION  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION  
A.P.O. 394.

13196/F.

17 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Expenditures for Italian Patriots.  
TO : Chief Commissioner. ✓

1. With the appropriation of ten million lire the Ragioneria Generale dello Stato authorised the institution of a new item entitled "Expenditures for the Office of Patriots of Liberated Italy" under capitolo 2,3bis (Expenditures for assisting patriots and their families) in the budget of the Minister of the Treasury.
2. This relevant decree (No 107892) was forwarded to us and returned marked "visto" on 22nd December 1944.
3. The Court of Accounts rejected the decree on the grounds that such expenditure should be carried by the budget of the newly constituted Ministry of Occupied Italy.
4. Consequently no payment has as yet been effected under this heading but payments have been made by the Ministry of War as "assistance to patriots" to the extent of fifteen million lire for the period January/March, 1945.
5. It is clear that any delay in authorising the expenditure for making the requisite payment is due to the Italian Administration and not to the Allied Commission.

*A.P. Graboyes Smith*

Brigadier,  
Joint Director,  
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION.

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Copy: Director Patriot Branch,  
Civil Affairs Section.

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FEB 17 RECD  
CC #63

TOP SECRET

ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME

N80/16

AFHQ SIGNED SACHED  
F-27859

TOP SECRET  
ROUTINE

CITE FMCT

FEB 16/1151

TOP SECRET.

The following is paraphrase of our F-26918 to 15 Army Group furthering our Operation Instruction dated 21 December 44 and Administrative Instruction dated 25 January 45 on occupation of Northwest Italy.

1. Occupation of Northwest Italy may take place earlier than thought due to Russian successes.
2. Subject to approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff the following policy in dealing with the Partisans is proposed by SACHED. Recognition of assistance to Allied cause will be basis of treatment together with necessity that they be disarmed, disbanded, placed in employment as quickly as possible. Unless and until they are taken into existing categories of Italians they will not not be treated as belonging to any existing category. Areas of assembly will be specified as soon as arrangements for reception can be made. These areas must be selected considering suitability from Partisan viewpoint as well as other factors. Disarmament of Partisans will take place on entering reception areas. Paragraphs three, four and five outline assistance, after disarmament, that will be rendered them until final disposition has been

320/1cc  
(copy in 1007/10) etc.

504

Occupation Instruction dated 21 December 44 and Administrative Instruction

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(copy in 1007/ce) et. 207

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Confidential / continued....  
FEB 16/1943

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TOP SECRET

AHQ CABLE P-27859 of 16 FEB 1945 (continued):

3. During phase 1 Army Headquarters (together with Allied Military Government of the Army Headquarters) will feed and clothe partisans in areas concerned; Armies will supply necessary food and clothing for this purpose as follows:
- a. Italian Military Forces ration scale as modified later in detail will apply.
  - b. Minimum essential scale of clothing will be issued from military sources.
4. Italian Government will be responsible for pay. Necessary arrangements with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.
5. United States and British will assist Italian Military who will be responsible for hospitalization.
6. Amplification of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be furnished later in a detailed Administrative Memorandum. Approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being requested for issue of rations and clothing outlined in paragraphs 3 a. and b.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: *Executive Commissioner*

INFO: *CA Section (2)*

*503 - Chief Commissioner*

*~~Political Sec.~~*

*Land Forces S/C*

*Political Sec.*

*A/President*

b. Minimum essential scale of clothing will be issued from military sources.

4. Italian Government will be responsible for pay. Necessary arrangements with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.

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3 a. and b.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: Executive Commissioner

INFO: CA Section (2)

503 - Chief Commissioner

~~Political Sec.~~

Land Forces S/C

Political Sec.

A/President

ECON. SEC. (2)

(79)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ref. 121/6/PAT

12 February 1945.

67

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

On 23 January I wrote you a letter Ref. 121/6/PAT about the question of payments being made to patriots who come through the lines or who are met with in newly liberated territory.

In my letter I pointed out that certain irregular payments were being made. I requested that immediate steps be taken to correct these conditions, and that instructions, as a temporary measure, be issued at once that no patriot representatives be sent into Military Government Territory without the written consent of Patriots Branch of the Allied Commission.

In addition I asked that the present haphazard method of remuneration of patriots be replaced by an approved governmental system.

May I remind you, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, that the situation is urgent and that an answer to my letter of 23 January will hasten a solution of this important problem.

Yours very truly,

Walter V. Stone

WALTER W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome

509

See

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See 107

3201/cc

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Ref: P/520.13

9 February 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It has been reported to me that the new Ministry for Occupied Italy already has been organized physically, at least in part, and that it has begun some activity. Included in this, it is said, there is the reception of Partisans arriving from the North who had been told to report to the Ministry upon their arrival in Rome where they are interviewed and given instructions before returning to the North. Should this be the case, I wish to state that it is an irregular procedure inasmuch as Partisans from German-occupied Italy are under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Field Marshal Alexander. They should therefore not be instructed by the Italian Government.

I am sure that you will understand my attitude in this matter and that, should the above-indicated practice actually exist, you will take measures to terminate it.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

*(copy in 221/ce)*  
3241/ce

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome, Italy

501

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9 Feb



ACC

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8 February 1945.

Ref/3207/COS.

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots.

TO : Capt. de Noue,  
Office of the French Representative to A.C.

I have been directed by the Chief of Staff to say that he would be most grateful if you would give the attached questionnaire to your liaison officer, who I understand is leaving for France today, and ask him to obtain the answers from the appropriate representative of the French Government.

*[Signature]*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
The Chief of Staff.

See (82a)

3201/CC

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S.F.

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QUESTIONNAIRE ON PATRIOTS FOR THE FRENCH  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

\*\*\*\*\*

1. Do the French enrol the Maquis in companies under Maquis officers ?
2. Do they enrol them in Maquis companies under regular army officers ?
3. Do they disregard Maquis companies and absorb them into the French Army recruiting them individually into the existing establishment ?
4. Do they recruit them into the existing establishment but earmark them as specially trained men ?
5. Do the Maquis have any special privileges ?
6. Are the Maquis disarmed when they arrive in liberated territory and if so how is this done ?
7. Are there Patriot Screening agencies to deal with volunteers and to differentiate between the real Patriot and those who have joined at the last moment to acquire preferential treatment ?
8. Is the clothing and feeding of Patriots a civilian or a military responsibility during the interim period before they are either recruited into the regular army or sent home as civilians ?
9. Does the French Army accept Patriot volunteers in large numbers or is there a fixed ceiling ?
10. Do Patriots carry any recognized identity documents which distinguish them from other armed bodies ?
11. What do the French authorities do with regard to the families of fallen Patriots ?
12. How are wounded Patriots treated ?
13. Are Maquis officers granted immediate Commissions ?
14. Are members of the Maquis paid ?
15. If Maquis are not absorbed into the French Army are any arrangements made for giving them employment ? If not, how are they disposed of ?
16. Is recognition given to the equivalent of C.L.N. ?

- 8. differentiate between the real Patriot and those who have joined at the last moment to acquire preferential treatment ?
- 9. Is the clothing and feeding of Patriots a civilian or a military responsibility during the interim period before they are either recruited into the regular army or sent home as civilians ?
- 9. Does the French Army accept Patriot volunteers in large numbers or is there a fixed ceiling ?
- 10. Do Patriots carry any recognized identity documents which distinguish them from other armed bodies ?
- 11. What do the French authorities do with regard to the families of fallen Patriots ?
- 12. How are wounded Patriots treated ?
- 13. Are Maquis officers granted immediate Commissions ?
- 14. Are members of the Maquis paid ?
- 15. If Maquis are not absorbed into the French Army are any arrangements made for giving them employment ? If not, how are they disposed of ?
- 16. Is recognition given to the equivalent of O.L.N. ?
- 17. How many Maquis have been enrolled in the French Army ?.

499

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**SECRET**

FX 22555  
FEB 07/1935

D/1054  
FEB 08/0915  
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FUGES  
AGWAR FOR CGS FOR CGAC RPTD FOR INFO: AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS  
OF STAFF AND HQ COMZONE MAIN ETUSA AND HQ ALCOM.

MAT 524

SECRET.

Reference TAM 436 of 23 January this is MAT 524.

Note circulation in enemy occupied ITALY is subject.

1. AC reports OMAA, according to Credito Italiano, ROME there were unconfirmed rumors in June and July 1944 that in LOMBARDY and TUSCANY "special bonds" or other "instruments" were circulated by Italian Partisans as part of a "loan of liberation".

2. In December 1944, also according to Credito Italiano, reliable sources reported that in LOMBARDY a number of five hundred and thousand lire notes were over stamped with a seal of C. L. N. raising them to 20 times their original face value. These over stamped notes were reportedly purchased for cash by wealthy people in TURIN and MILAN at their raised value, did not circulate, were closely held, and total amount issued has not been large.

3. Efforts being made to obtain sample note and additional information.

AC DIST

- Info Action
- Info
- Finance S/C
- A/President
- Chief Commissioner
- Econ Sec
- File (2)
- Float

498 k.

75

7 Feb

3201/CC

**Confidential**

SECRET

047  
FEB 5/2110

0/746  
FEB 6/0915  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ROME

FREEDOM FOR US AND DPIC INFO: ALCON 048, TROOPERS 049

SECRET.

Reference our 040 subject CLMAY Finance.

1. Following advice now received from BERNE.
  - A. LORCHI is free and can operate.
  - B. Courier communication now working between BERNE and LORCHI but slow.
  - C. MILAN banks require assurance that January payment has been made to ROSE banks stating amounts and will then pay out on receipt this assurance which can be given by BERNE through channels already arranged with MILAN.
  - D. IF for any month it is decided to send money direct by air sortie from SOUTH ITALY or by courier from BERNE to any area, LORCHI should be advised of amounts and area concerned and payments to ROSE banks should be reduced accordingly.
2. Doubtful whether BERNE held written message signed by LORCHI to above effect but authenticity of message may be safely assumed.
3. Trust this facilitate decision on our 040.
4. Meanwhile have signalled BERNE to try get from LORCHI written confirmation of ~~para 1B~~ above if not already received and have given BERNE assurance and details requested in para 1C.

3201/00

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5 Feb

Confidential

REF: ACTION : FRANKS SC  
 INFO : ✓ PRESIDENT  
 CHIEF COMMISSION  
 ROOM 206  
 FILE (2)  
 FLOAT

10  
**SECRET**

10/6

FEB 02069

1/320

FEB 021125  
SECURITY

SECRET

TRANSM FOR G 3 AND DPIC FOR INFO AICOM FOR GRAFFETY SMITH

SECRET.

1. Your signal F 16999 not to AICOM gave authority for No 1 Special Force to infiltrate up to 15000,000 lire urgently required by certain N Italian Resistance Groups who have not yet received funds through CIAI channels due to inevitable time lag before LONGHI'S credit arrangements can take effect.

2. You authorized this 15000,000 to be provided from special funds available to No 1 Special Force with proviso that they would be reimbursed through normal Army channels when LONGHI'S agreement to this procedure and to the consequential reduction of his credits had been obtained.

3. Financial Director GCE LONDON however does not agree use of special funds for this purpose stating that ROSE Government should advance funds and bear any risk of LONGHI'S consent not being obtained.

4. He adds that TROPPERS said that if it is impossible to obtain funds immediately from ROSE Government they should be produced by Army authorities or by AFA not chargeable against special funds but recoverable from ROSE Government.

5. No 1 Special Force are authorized to meet the requirements of their own field <sup>496</sup>missions out of special funds but not to finance local Partisans or Resistance Movements this being result of LONGHI'S credit agreement. Since urgent requirements by Partisans exist request ruling whether currency can be provided by Army authorities or by AFA (AFA).

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**Confidential**

LIST

INFO-ACTION FINANCE SC  
INFO A/PRESIDENT  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ECON SEC.  
FILE (3), FLBAT

TOP SECRET

6519 COS

2 February 1945.

W

There is forwarded herewith a summarization by the Political Section of a report from No. 1 Special Force on the political situation of the patriot bands in Northern Italy.

It is to be noted that No. 1 Special Force recommends the discontinuance of further "drops" of arms to patriot bands. I propose to advise SACMED that I concur with this recommendation.

Pursuant to the financial agreement between SACMED and CLNAI, there has been advanced to CLNAI the sum of 160,000,000 lire for December plus a special advance of 50,000,000 lire, 160,000,000 lire for January, and 160,000,000 lire for February. Of this amount, G-3 (Special Ops) 15th Army Group states that there is evidence that only 9,000,000 lire have been received by bands operating under its direction. Further reports have been called for and are expected to be received within a week.

If these reports do not indicate a more substantial employment of the funds advanced, and specifically for the purposes for which they were advanced, I propose also to recommend to SACMED that further advances be discontinued until such time as compliance with the contract by CLNAI can be demonstrated.

I should be grateful for your comments.

Es/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

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- 1 - The American Ambassador.
- 2 - Ambassador Sir Noel Charles.

cc: Pol. Sec.  
COS  
cc files

Confidential

3201/cc

FEB 1 1945  
CC 267

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
\*\*\*\*\*

Copy No.....

Ref: 6519/14/CCS.

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: Patriot Situation in N. ITALY.

TO : Distribution Below.

The following, sent to you for information, is the result of a study made by Political Section, HQ AC, of a document giving an appreciation of the patriot situation in N. ITALY:-

1. From the information contained in this report and that in many others received from British missions in Northern Italy during the last few months, Headquarters, No. 1 Special Force, C.M.F. felt impelled on January 15, 1945 to report to 15th Army Group that there is left to it "no doubt that those who control Communist bands are preparing to seize power by force when the Germans are expelled by the Allies." In particular, Communist-controlled bands in North East Italy were seen to pursue this course by:

- (a) denying their operational responsibility to SACMED and placing themselves under TITO's SLOVENE IX Corps;
  - (b) ignoring the orders of the CLMHI;
  - (c) disarming partisans who will not profess allegiance to TITO;
  - (d) threatening not to cooperate with AMG and not to surrender their arms when North Italy is liberated,
2. On military grounds it is recommended "that Marshal TITO be requested to prohibit SLOVENE attempts to interfere with the operational control of Italian partisan bands in 15th Army Group territory."

3. (In its initial report on planning for the occupation of North East Italy to AFHQ Allied Commission recommended that an Allied-TITO understanding regarding this region be reached at the earliest possible date, to avoid con-

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3. (In its initial report on planning for the occupation of North East Italy to AFHQ Allied Commission recommended that an Allied-TITO understanding regarding this region be reached at the earliest possible date, to avoid controversy and possible conflict when the region is liberated).

4. The Slovenes now have indicated a claim on all of North East Italy to the Partisans and they are attempting to attain realization of their aspirations by a show of popular support through propaganda, intimidation and forced mobilization.

5. The Italian Communist leaders in North East Italy, to further personal ambition and in the hope of witnessing an Italian Communist territorial link with the USSR through the Balkans, aid and abet the Slovenes in their activities. This reputedly is done with the agreement of the Slovene IX Army Corps and of the Russian mission attached to the Corps.

6. Similarly in North West Italy, Communist bands showed evidence of:

- "(a) taking, or likely to take, a similar line, hostile to Anglo-American operational control, and to the establishment of AMG when the North is liberated;
- (b) concealing and storing arms and funds for long term political purposes instead of using them against the enemy."

(11)

Confidential

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7. An estimate of the situation was afforded No. 1 Special Force by General CADORNI, a non-political Italian General who was infiltrated to the CLICCI on the instructions of SACCHEDI, and who established himself as head of the military command of the CLICCI. He wrote in mid-December, 1944, as follows:

"It appears that the Allies continue to consider the partisan war as a normal military campaign, refusing to recognize its predominant political character. It must be stated very clearly that the resistance movement could not have existed without the political organization and that in this partisan warfare the Communist Party is predominant. The encroachment of political factors do not disappear by ignoring them. It is better to give them due consideration.

The Communist Party, which gives the lead, does not try in the least to hide its intention of seizing the reins and setting up a regime similar to the Russian. Its leaders in Northern Italy (ITALO, MARE, MONTI, etc) have been trained in Russia and have seen service with the International Brigades in SPAIN and with Bolshevism in FRANCE. They declare openly that they wish to lean upon Russia and TITO and will rebel rather than submit to the orders of the Western Allies."

8. It is pointed out in the report that the partisan movement initially was regarded as being of purely military character and so was treated by Allies. The partisans have shown that they will fight well under favourable conditions and, if properly instructed and led, will not cease in carrying out acts of sabotage. The number of partisans grew rapidly after the winter of 1943/44 and with this growth there was a proportionate increase in Allied support. Enormous damage was inflicted on the German and Italian Republican forces, both in loss of life and through acts of sabotage. This led the enemy to make determined efforts early in the current winter, to force the partisans from the hills where, with Allied aid, they might have wintered. The efforts were successful and aided by the hard winter, the number of partisans operating in bands, engaged in sabotage, rather than as military formations ready to engage the enemy on a large scale, independently or in tactical support of the Allies. The last vestige of hope has been dissipated that the partisan movement might be built into a striking force resembling that the army (the partisans never have been able to hold territory against a secret determination to seize it). However, even in reduced numbers and in an organized state, the very presence of the

TOP SECRET

-2-

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9. In the 15 months existence of the partisan movement it has become apparent that politics plays in it a role equally important to that of the military. The partisan formations depend politically upon one or other of anti-Fascist Parties represented in the CLM.I. The latter, as a rallying point for anti-Fascist supporters, is a unifying body and a secret organisation for maintaining the partisans by financing and feeding the bands. As such, it enjoys a limited measure of authority but it has not been able to exercise operational control through its military command, and it has not been able to prevent the several political parties from retaining their identity and continuing their separate activities which include the conduct of party warfare. As a result, "the partisan movement can be considered to be no more or less in its structure than a series of armed political elements fighting for different aims". The aim of the Communists is considered to be not patriotic but for the eradication of all traces of Fascism and for the "elimination of all elements who actively oppose their intention towards a finally liberated Italy." Those not Communists are inspired by patriotic motives and also with the destruction of Fascism, but lately they have shown themselves to be opposed to the growing Communist power.

TOP SECRET

10. The Communists are numerically strong. They are well organized and have fought well under fanatical commanders and political commissars. They are a force to be reckoned by any foe, be he Fascist or Allied. Their Party is the closest active anti-Fascist organization. It pays lip service to the CLMFI because the latter is a source of finance and supply, because it thereby retains Allied sympathy, because it thereby is afforded a respectable facade behind which to pursue its activities within a strong programme-- while, at the same time, it disregards the general directives of the CLMFI and makes little effort to hide its aims and objectives. The report states that:

"Certain of their less discreet leaders have made damaging references to the Allies, whom they branded as enemies of a new socially reconstructed Italy. Against this, they pour praises on the Russians whom they recognize as the true friends of the future Italy. Manifestos issued by the Communist Party organization are becoming more and more violent in their approach to the people and throughout the text there can be seen a reflection of antipathy towards the efforts of the Allies in Italy."

11. In view of the above-described situation, No. 1 Special Force queries the desirability of reconsidering the future policy to be adopted towards the partisans as regards their military supply by the Allies to obtain for them the greatest measure of assistance during the course of military operations, with a minimum of disorder after the total liberation of the country. It is recommended that there be abandoned the hope of using guerrilla bands in tactical support of the Allied armies and that the partisans (including the Communists, since any attempt to discriminate against them would precipitate the hostile reactions already evidenced by them against the Allies) be instructed to limit their activities to sabotage and anti-aircraft. There would be ended the delivery of arms which eventually might be turned against the Allies and a concentration made on the provision of explosives, incendiaries, boots clothing and foodstuffs, and protective arms only."

*S. J. ...*

ESL/JC.

Colonel,  
Chief Staff Officer.

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*87-66114*  
Colonel,  
Chief Staff Officer.

ESM/JG.

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"	No. 9	PIEMONTE Region
"	No. 10	VENEZIA Region
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"	No. 12	NW ITALY Planning Committee
"	No. 13	(Lt. Col. Morley-Fletcher)
"	No. 14	"A" File
"	No. 15-18	File
		Spare

(11)

**Confidential**

FILE NOTE:

Attached is summary of No. 1 Special Force Top Secret report identified as follows:

Hq. No. 1 Special Force  
C M F  
Ref: MN/909  
15 January 1945.

TO : 15 Army Group  
G-3 Special Operations

Copy To: HQ SO (M)  
C M F

/S/ R. T. Hewitt,  
Lieutenant Colonel G.S.  
No. 1 Special Force  
C M F

RJH/JHC

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FILE UNDER NO. 3201/CC Patriots

**INDEX SHEET**  
**SYNOPSIS**

G-3 AFHQ Plans/134

30 Jan 45

Minutes of mtg held 29 Jan re OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

SEE: Paragraphs 16 to end: PROVISION FOR PATRIOTS

ORDERS TO PARTISANS

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 1014/CC Admin of Frontier Areas

3201/CC

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INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief of Staff

CC 206

JAN 24 RECD

24th January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

I suggest that you (or representative) and  
General Browning, should attend the small Committee.

(6) DINA

see memo 23 Jan  
A/Bros to CC

M.S.L.

32-011/CC

4949

3

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the President  
APO 394

To: The Chief Commissioner.  
From: Mr. Macmillan.

Our conversation this morning.

I shall be seeing the Field Marshal to-morrow on my way to Greece. I wonder whether you would like me to speak to him and leave with him a minute on the lines of the attached draft.

Is not the decree setting out the functions of the Italian Minister for Occupied Italy of some importance in considering the Patriots question, and should it not be studied by the same machinery? I should imagine that a good many of the questions arising from the functions of this Minister affect A.F.H.Q. just as much as us, if not more.

X-221/cc

JHM

3201/cc  
X-221/cc

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23rd January, 1945.

(68)

File  
"Patriots"  
"COLATI"

## DRAFT MINUTE

TO: SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER  
IN CHIEF.

FROM: MR. MACMILLAN.

I have discussed with the Chief Commissioner the Patriots problem. You may remember that he sent you a minute on one aspect of the enrolment of patriots in the Italian Army on the 16th January. There are also other aspects, for instance, the question of the financial support which is being given to the Committees of Liberation under the recent agreement. There is reason to believe, from some of the Liaison Officers' reports, that this is not actually reaching the individual partisans. This ought to be investigated. We do not want them to build up a central fund for post-liberation revolutionary purposes.

2. Rather than bring the matter up at the full meeting of your

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which is being given to the Committees of Liberation under the recent agreement. There is reason to believe, from some of the Liaison Officers' reports, that this is not actually reaching the individual partisans. This ought to be investigated. We do not want them to build up a central fund for post-liberation revolutionary purposes.

2. Rather than bring the matter up at the full meeting of your Conference, I wonder whether it would be a good thing to have a small Committee appointed under say the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff to thresh out the different points and produce either an agreed report or a clear statement of the various points of view. If so, I am sure that the Chief Commissioner will be glad to attend or to send a representative. In view of our recent

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recent experience in Greece, I think the proper handling of this question is of vital importance.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
AFO 394  
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref. 121/G/PAT.

23 January, 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

My attention has been drawn to the question of making payments to patriots who come through the lines or who are met with in newly liberated territory.

So far patriot representatives have been provided with funds by the I.N.P.C. and have been making payments of varied amounts to patriots. Sometimes much dissatisfaction has been caused because representatives have run out of cash and have not been able to make any further payments.

On the 12th January one of your patriot representatives inserted an advertisement in a newspaper in Florence stating that the families of patriots who had been killed fighting, if they belonged to the Communist, Social Democrat, or Liberal Party, would be paid 10,000 lire. I have, of course, issued instructions that this advertisement is to be cancelled and payments made to the families of deceased patriots without reference to their political party.

It has also been reported to me that a representative of the Ministry of Occupied Italy has been sent to the neighbourhood of Florence - without consulting the Patriots Branch here - with a large sum of money for distribution to patriots. I have ordered an immediate investigation and his recall.

These are two examples of the present haphazard and unsatisfactory system of remunerating patriots and it cannot be allowed to continue in Military Government Territory.

As a matter of urgency therefore, my dear Prime Minister, I must ask you to give immediate instructions, as a temporary measure, that no patriot representatives will be sent into Military Government Territory except with the consent, to be obtained in writing, of an officer of the Patriots Branch of the Allied Commission; and further that such representative be furnished with written instructions by the appropriate Ministry stating the amount of currency which he is carrying and the exact terms upon which he is to distribute such currency amongst patriots or their dependents.

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See 78

See 107

15201/CC

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With regard to the future I would ask you to consider putting the remuneration of patriots onto a proper governmental basis so that the present haphazard system may be terminated.

In particular I ask you to consider:-

- (a) The proper budgetary appropriation of a sufficient sum to remunerate patriots; it is of course impossible to say how many patriots will ultimately be met, but purely as a guide I doubt if the number is likely to exceed 10,000 in the next three months.
- (b) The basis on which the payment should be made. This has varied in the past and you will no doubt want to consider whether every patriot should be paid a flat rate or whether the sum should vary according to his financial means, injuries received, or some other basis. The latter method would give rise to some complications and it would be necessary to lay down with the utmost clarity the principles upon which a variation is to be made in each case. Certainly no discrimination should be made on the basis of political beliefs or party membership. The amount to be paid is entirely for you to determine.

I ask you, my dear Prime Minister, to give this matter your most urgent consideration, for much difficulty is being met with every day as patriots come through owing to the lack of a coordinated policy on the part of your patriot representatives.

Yours very truly,

[s] Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
Rome.

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SECRET and URGENT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief Commissioner

16 January 1945.

Ref: 3207/13/COS.

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots in the Italian Army.

To : Supreme Allied Commander,  
Allied Force Headquarters.

1. The disposal of patriots immediately on liberation has been a matter of constant consideration, and indeed anxiety, on the part of myself and my advisers for some months. Arrangements made to meet this extremely difficult problem, which were agreed upon last July by all parties concerned including members of Special Force and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful: a new approach must now be made.

2. Hitherto our aim has been to make of the patriots, after liberation, good civilians: to rehabilitate them in their normal vocations: to give them preferential treatment in the matter of employment: to clothe them and to feed them insofar as supplies make it possible: to recruit them as individuals into the Italian Army: and to repatriate them to their homes if they are not found to be locals. Finally, our policy has been to disarm them.

3. Our reports from Allied Military Government officers, however, have shown that patriots expect better and different treatment. They are disillusioned at their reception. Those that have really fought in bands and companies have expressed the desire to continue the fight in the same formations. The meagre supplies of food and clothing that we have been able to give do not, in their opinion, fulfill the promises made to them by the Allied missions with whom they have been operating. The order to disarm is the final straw: they resent it and the majority of them disobey it. True, we have had no serious trouble so far but, in my opinion, a fundamentally different situation will arise when we get to the north with its more virile population and (estimated) 100,000 patriots in well organized bands.

4. The experience of the Allied Nations in Belgium, France and Greece have exposed the vital danger which threatens any government, be it military or indigenous, which has to face, in the initial stages of liberation, the presence of armed bands of men accustomed to living by force of arms alone, who are readily affected and enrolled into political organisations the object of

3201/0



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3201/00

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5. We must, therefore, in this country endeavour to avoid the misuse of those bands of partisans who, armed with Allied rifles and equipment, provided with Allied food and money, encouraged by Allied officers, have aided the Allied war effort. Disrupted from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only virile members of a defeated population, they find it easier and more attractive to retain the role of fighters and thus become an easy prey to the forces of anarchy.

6. I believe that with patience and understanding we can overcome many of the material causes of disillusionment but attempts at wholesale disarmament will ever be a source of resentment and of resistance for a portion of these persons.

7. The offer to enlist individuals into the Italian Army under the normal conditions of recruitment for that Army, intended to meet the desires of those who wish to carry on the fight, have met with little success. From many Italian sources, from the patriots themselves and from members of the Italian Government, have come requests that they should be recruited into the fighting element of the

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-2-

Army in their patriot bands under their patriot officers so that the comradeship and loyalty displayed behind the lines may not be lost after liberation. I am now convinced that whether in fact they will join the Army in these circumstances or not, we must give them the opportunity to do so.

8. The technical objections to this course are well understood. In the very difficult task of reorganising the Italian Army the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission naturally dislikes the idea of forming special nuclei within that Army which might become political formations and which would be of doubtful value militarily. He must object to accepting men into the Italian Army on their own terms: he must resist the breaking up of existing Army units in order to fit in special bands. General Browning's objections are expressed in the enclosed proposed draft reply to the Italian Chief of Staff's letter attached.

9. I submit that we must consider accepting the principle of taking into the Italian Army patriot bands as units, in numbers not exceeding say that of a company, under their own existing officers. In my opinion the political, and indeed, administrative advantages, must outweigh the military objections, for by doing so we shall be going a long way to ensure the preservation of law and order in the North and the avoidance of political and civil strife. I would ask, therefore, for your earnest and urgent consideration that the principle be approved.

10. The numbers of the Italian Army within the present ceiling are fully committed to combat groups, security divisions and service units working for the Allies: the latter units comprise some 100,000 men. It is true that at present the Italian Army is 43,000 men short of establishment. On first impression, therefore, it would appear simple to absorb the patriots in bands into existing formations and so fill the establishment. In fact, however, there would be difficulties. The desire of the patriots to continue the fight would not be wholly met by absorption into internal security divisions or service units. They ask to join the combat groups. These groups are already organised and it would be difficult to absorb ready made patriot units into them. The formation of further combat groups is precluded at present by restrictions on ceiling and equipment. Nevertheless such are the advantages of wise employment of the patriots and such are the dangers of neglecting any opportunity that I would strongly recommend (a) immediate reconsideration of the ceiling of the Italian Army by an addition of up to 100,000 men, and immediate measures to form at least one and subsequently further combat groups; and (b) direction to the Italian War Ministry to recruit patriots in bands forthwith to fill the deficiency in establishment recorded above.

11. General Browning, with whom I have discussed the contents of this letter, regards the proposal as unwise from a purely military point of view. If, however, political considerations prevail over military considerations, he is prepared to overcome the practical difficulties in order to absorb patriot bands into composite units of the Italian Army provided that requisite equipment

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11. General Browning, with whom I have discussed the contents of this letter, regards the proposal as unwise from a purely military point of view. If, however, political considerations prevail over military considerations, he is prepared to overcome the practical difficulties in order to absorb patriot bands into composite units of the Italian Army provided that requisite equipment and clothing is forthcoming.

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12. Our present policy towards the patriots is being attacked both in this country and in the Allied countries, particularly in the United States. We should not reject any opportunity to create, particularly in Northern Italy, an atmosphere of content and cooperation as against resentment, even hostility, towards the Allies. We must support the legitimate Italian Government. We know that there are many forces willing and prepared to upset this Government. The concession outlined above would have a tremendous effect, in my opinion, on the patriots now in German occupied Italy. It would make them, after liberation, part of the armed forces of the country whose duty it would be to preserve rather than disrupt order. It would give them scope to use their loyalty and patriotism, it would direct their hatred of fascism into the right channels and it would draw the heat from this potential political bonfire. And even if our offer to accept units into the Regular Italian Army were not accepted by them we should have at least generally improved our position in the political sense.

13. Whatever, therefore, the technical difficulties of raising or adjusting the distribution of the ceiling may be: whatever the extra financial commitments (and we must remember that many millions of lira in many tons of supplies are

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-3-

already being poured into the patriot stores in the North), these should and must be overcome in order to give to the patriots what they think is their due reward and make them part of a responsible government rather than potential tools of disorder. This is a matter with an international, even a world-wide aspect and should not be judged, in my opinion, on the basis of local and parochial considerations of purely military exigencies in this theatre of operations.

/s/ ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Acting President, HQ AC  
Sir Noel Charles  
Mr. Alexander Kirk  
G-5 Section, AHFQ  
Land Forces Sub-Com  
Political Section  
CA Section  
"A" File. ✓

66

SECRET

SUBJECT: Patriots

ARMY HONORS SUB COMMISSION  
C. I. A. (A.C. E. O. I. B)

Jan 1945

TO : Mr. G. B. BERRY (through SAC, the Director for AF)

(Initial)

Your letter dated 11/19/44 (210302) has been passed to me. I realize that Col. FIDISIO, while advising us on whether that a change in policy was desirable, asked us to provide a memorandum from you on the subject, which you have raised on more than one occasion recently. As you have written frankly, so do I.

2. EXISTING POLICY

As you are well aware, the existing policy was adopted last Summer after considerable discussion of both the military and political aspects, both for now and post-war, by all authorities concerned including patriot leaders. After decision by high Allied authority this policy was stated in ALIA letters 1/19 of 23 Jul 44 with amendment IS/3/10 of 30 Nov 44. I need hardly say that the whole matter has been continuously watched ever since by all Allied authorities concerned - particularly in view of the tragic occurrences in GERMANY.

3. REASONS FOR POLICY

While a large number of factors affected the problem, among the main ones are the following:-

- (a) There can be only one official Italian army and its prestige and authority must be maintained and enhanced both for now and post-war.
- (b) Private armies of patriots or anyone else within liberated territory would not only undermine the authority of the official Italian army but would be the seeds of grave potential trouble in the future.
- (c) Marcellin patriots (who undoubtedly have widely different political views as complete bands would:-
  - (i) tend to create political "nuclei" within the army, to the detriment of the policy that the army is above politics and with possible serious post-war repercussions.
  - (ii) be of doubtful value militarily. The bands are not well equipped & trained soldiers. Though they may be useful guerrillas, they are not tactically sound.

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after considerable discussion of both the military and political aspects of the problem, among the main factors concerned including patriot both for now and post-war, by all authorities concerned this policy was stated in leaders. After decision by High Command authority this policy was stated in the letters of 19 of 25 July 44 with amendment S/G/LC of 30 July 44. I need hardly say that the whole matter has been continuously watched ever since by all Allied authorities concerned - particularly in view of the tragic occurrences in Italy.

(4)

3. RE-SOUNDING POLICY  
 While a large number of factors affected the problem, among the main ones are the following:-

- (a) There can be only one official Italian Army and its prestige and authority must be maintained and enhanced both for now and post-war.
- (b) 'Private armies' of patriots or anyone else within liberated territory would not only undermine the authority of the official Italian Army but would be the seeds of grave potential trouble in the future.
- (c) 'Mazzini patriots' (no undoubtedly have widely different political views and complete bands would:-

(i) tend to create political 'nuclei' within the army, to the detriment of the policy that the army is above politics and with possible serious post-war repercussions  
 (ii) be of doubtful value militarily. The bands are not all composed of trained soldiers. Some may be useful guerrillas, they would require training in British weapons, platoon and company tactics, etc. before being suitable for absorption into the (British armed) combat groups. The leaders of the bands would, in most cases, have to be replaced by regular officers which would cause resentment in the bands.

(iii) mean accepting the bands on their own terms instead of ours. Real 'patriot' should be patriotic enough to accept that the allies of Italy, without causing difficulty to the allies.  
 (iv) mean that existing official army units would have to be broken up in order that the bands may replace them. Apart from the military and psychological aspect of such a procedure on an army unit, widespread application could unhinge and destroy the basic homogeneity of the army.

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See para 8 of covering letter.

(6) mnd

The developments in U.S. of allied policy in Italy and no chance in that policy can be accounted which might bring Italy one step nearer the state of affairs in GERMANY.

COLLINS G. WOODS R. G. JR. / CP of 2 1943

4.

Your paragraph 1.

- (a) I do not accept your contention that there is a paradox.
- (b) You imply that men called to come into the army unwillingly.
- (c) While some bands may be willing to come into the army as bands on their own terms, my information from a variety of sources is that the reason why we have secured for the army only a few hundred patriots out of the thousands available in liberated territories is that:
- (i) patriots do not find it inclined to change their lives and easy life for the more circumscribed life of a soldier.
- (ii) as soon as their task or village is liberated they want to go home. They would be unable, at any rate, immediately, to do so if they enlist in the army.

(iii) enlistment is strongly discouraged by many of their leaders who realize that once their men are enlisted they (the leaders) become non-entities without power instead of reasonably important people.

(d) Your statement that "those who are anxious to fight encounter difficulties when attempting to join the army" is not a fact. Screening agencies have been set up and any patriot is at liberty to join the army if he wishes. These agencies have had little work, due entirely to the patriots own decision as to what they are prepared to do.

5.

Your paragraph 2.

- (a) The solution has already been decided by the Allies, taking into account all the factors involved.
- (b) The fact that only a few patriots have enlisted and many have evaded the call-up (which is the law of the land) does not invalidate the solution or prove it wrong.
- (c) The potentially large number of patriots in the North was a factor that was taken into account in framing the patriot policy. Failure to continue with that policy as soon as Italy is liberated will only accentuate the military and political difficulties and dangers mentioned above.

6.

Your paragraph 3.

- (a) The Italian military effort, there has been a tendency to give undue prominence to it, at the expense of the good work done by the official Italian army. It is largely for this reason that Italy considerably more participation has been given in the North and elsewhere to the forces of the army and its valuable aid to the Allied effort.
- (b) The matter of provision of food, clothing, etc. for patriots is, as you know, a complex problem, affected by a number of factors such as availability of supplies, shipping, etc. As you also know, supplies for the Italian army are very short. The Allies have no in-warehouse, reservoir which can be tapped to provide

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(c) The patriot can meet the Army provided he is suitable, not "only a small number" - see also my para. 4 (1) above.

(d) While appreciating the value of links of affection and comradeship, see my remarks in 3 (c) above. Presumably the patriot should put his country above all, no matter what his nationality.

(e) As regards your para. 3 (b) see my para. 4 (c) above. Judging by results of enlistments, the patriots will only come in on their own terms.



7. Your paragraph 4.

(a) I am in agreement with much of what you say. Undoubtedly, the patriots have a very valuable aid in the Allied cause and to Italy.  
 (b) I am doubtful of your assertion of the insincerity of Giuseppe or that he is as sincere as you state in my para. 3 (c) (i) above.  
 (c) The real point at issue is whether patriots shall be permitted to enter the army as bands or as individuals. In this connection see my para. 3 (c) above.

8. Your paragraph 5.

See also my para. 3 (b) above - you doubtless emphasize that:-  
 (a) Disarmament is part of the policy laid down by the Allied authority.  
 (b) In view of the unfortunate state of affairs between Italy and the Allies during recent years and the fact that fascism and anti-fascism feeling has not yet been completely eliminated, it is essential, on the grounds of security alone, if for no other reason, to make very sure that Italians crossing the line are what they say they are.  
 (c) With the best will in the world, issues of clothing, food, etc. can only be issued as authorized and not indiscriminately to all and sundry - see also my para. 6 (b) above.

9. Your summary

(a) I have commented already on most of this and would add only the following remarks:  
 (b) It is the Allied policy NOT to permit the existence of another armed force apart from the army (see my para. 3 (b) above). Hence the procedure laid down for patriots.  
 (c) Patriots must be considered as civilians till they are officially enrolled into the Italian army.  
 (d) The whole matter of formation of mountain units was fully considered recently by high Allied authority. In theory, there is something to be said for the idea - in practice the difficulties of producing and maintaining fully equipped mountain organizations on a different establishment to combat groups, combined with these of training even the combat groups to strength, have rendered the proposition impracticable. No useful purpose can be served by reopening the question, particularly at a time when the Italian Army is some 48,000 short of its authorized establishment and difficulties are being encountered to make up that shortage, which is mainly in essential service units.  
 (e) All contact with patriot forces in the north must be through the 15th Army Group and not direct.

10. CONCLUSION.

(a) You will have seen from above that I am in virtually complete disagreement with your memorandum.  
 (b) I am constrained to say that I think it is based on false promises

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- (e) All contact with patriot forces in the sort must be through the 15th army group and NOT direct.

10. CONCLUSIONS.

- (a) You will have seen from above that I am in virtually complete disagreement with your Memorandum.
- (b) I am constrained to say that I think it is based on false premises.
- (c) I find an incorrect view of the problem as a whole.
- (d) My departure from the patriot policy laid down by higher authority can be permitted.
- (e) In connection with all the above, the really important thing at the moment is that allied policy, the authority of the Italian Government and the law of the land, shall be upheld by:
  - (i) strict adherence to the patriot policy laid down.
  - (ii) obtaining the necessary soldiers for the Italian Army by ensuring effective call-ups and non-revision of their duty by all men of military age.

66 Diver

447024 GAMBACIA  
10. 11. 1. 4.

TRANSFORMATION

Ref: 84/08

Date: 2 Jan 45

FROM: WILLIAM P. BIRDSEY

TO : COL. P. BIRDSEY

SUBJECT: Patriots

1. Introduction

In Italy today, the following paradox exists:-  
Those who are forced to go into the army, are admitted.  
Those who are anxious to fight encounter difficulties when attempting to join the army.

The latter are the Patriots.

2. The problem of the Patriots has lately acquired extraordinary proportions and very shortly it will be imperative to find a solution.

In fact:-

Thousands of Patriots have for some time now lived in liberated Italy and over three thousand have recently crossed the line because they were attacked by whole German divisions.

Nearly 100,000 Patriots will become available when Northern Italy is liberated.

3. Policy of the Allied authorities and wishes of the Patriots.

(a) The Allied authorities have shown a tendency to:-

- disperse these formations giving the Patriots the impression that their support to the war of liberation is of little account,
- not provide adequately and immediately to the vital necessities (food, billets, clothing) of those who crossed the line.
- allow only a small number of Patriots - always isolated men - to enter the rear parts of the army.

Thus these links of affection and comradeship formed in partisan groups, in the midst of the struggle and continued risks, are broken, links which, to give a firm and clear character, are so very important in the performance of these tasks.

(b) On the other hand the Patriots most ardently desire to continue to fight the Germans, whenever possible, maintaining in its present formation.

4. Psychology of the Patriots.

- They have the profound conviction, which is even backed by Allied recognition, that they have given everything for the Allied and national causes and that they have given and material treatment corresponding to the risks

TRANSLATION

FROM: S.M.H.B.

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TO : COL. PISSELY MILA

Date: 2 Jan 45

SUBJECT: Patriots

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- allow only a small number of Patriots - always isolated men - to enter combat units of the army.

Thus these links of affection and comradeship formed in partisan groups, in the midst of the struggle and continued risks, are broken, links which are the basis of the Italian character, are so very important to the performance of these groups.

(b) On the other hand the Patriots most ardently desire to continue to fight the Germans, whenever possible, maintaining their present formation.

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(b) On the other hand the Patriots most ardently desire to continue to fight the Germans, whenever possible, maintaining their present formation.

4. Psychology of the Patriots.

- They have the profound conviction, which is even backed by Allied recognition, that they have given everything for the Allied and national causes and expect therefore a moral and material treatment corresponding to the risks they have taken so far.
- They are first class combatants chosen by hazards and privations of a difficult war.
- They represent all parties. During the partisan war politics had never been made, both chiefs and followers having only one thought, that of fighting for the common cause.
- Among the chiefs are numerous regular army and reserve officers as well as improvised commanders who, with their courage and organizing ability, have won the esteem and consideration of their followers.
- The mass of the followers is sound and their only desire is that of continuing to fight against the Germans. Once they are absorbed by the army they will become soldiers with all the qualities common to the Italian soldiers enhanced by an ideal.
- Every adventure is therefore to be gained by taking these men into the regular units of the army including, naturally, officers of proven capacity, tact and nerve. These Patriots would promptly rejoin order and discipline and

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World in Italian units, marked impulse in their fighting spirit.  
 - If, on the other hand, these youths were left to themselves and their immediate necessities (food, bedding and clothing) not provided for it is to be surmised that they would become easy prey of the more dangerous elements willing to hide their arms and later to employ force in order to increase their possessions.

5. Treatment given in many cases to patriots who have recently crossed the line.

- Immediate disarmament, incorporation into coloured units, long marches even under the rain, extended questioning (treatment almost equal to that given to P.O.s).
- no moral or medical assistance (patriots arrive from over the line with scabbies and other infective diseases),
- no issue of clothing to replace their rags or to protect them against the hardships of winter,
- inadequate feeding (patriots receive the same ration as civilian rations which is totally inadequate),
- Italian military authorities can do nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the patriots because, unfortunately, they have no availability of food, clothing or means of transport.

Summary

- bearing in mind that:-
- it is in the common interests that Italy should remain a peaceful country and that no alteration of the internal order should take place in the rear of the operative army,
- that the existence of another armed force apart from the army would create a dangerous competition between the said armed forces,
- it would be a real shame, from an operational point of view, to waste so much precious material particularly suitable for mount-in warfare. It is considered advisable that the following measures be taken:-
- that the patriots be treated, the moment they cross the line, as true and proper combatants for the allied cause and not as suspects;
- that suitable patriots reception camps be formed behind the line where the patriots may find a suitable and comfortable equipment (blankets, food, clothing, sick bay, baths, etc.) in order to give these men, who have suffered so much and who arrived starved and naked, a minimum of comfort;
- that the formation of these patriot groups into regular army units led by capable and staff officers, be allowed;
- that, according to the instructions, studies be started at once in order to organize the immediate enrollment and cadre of the northern Italy patriots when the armies advance.

... which is to be...  
- Italian military authorities can do nothing to alleviate these sufferings of the patriots because, unfortunately, they have no availability of food, clothing or means of transport.

Summary

Bearing in mind that:-

- it is in the common interests that Italy should remain a peaceful country and that no alteration of the internal order should take place in this part of the operating army,
  - that the existence of another armed force apart from the army would create a dangerous competition between the said armed forces,
  - it would be a real shame, from an operational point of view, to waste so much precious material particularly suitable for mountain warfare.
- It is considered advisable that the following measures be taken:-
- that the patriots be trusted, the moment they cross the line, as true and proper combatants for the Allied cause and not as suspects;
  - that suitable patriots' reception camps be formed behind the line where the patriots may find a suitable and comfortable equipment (blankets, food, clothing, sick bay, baths, etc.) in order to give them men, who have suffered so much and who arrived starved and naked, a minimum of comfort;
  - that the formation of these patriot groups into regular army units led by capable and self-officers, be allowed;
  - that, according to the instructions, studies be started at once in order to organize the immediate enrollment and cadre of the northern Italy patriots upon the armies advance.

Since most of the men or natives of the mountainous regions or men who have fought for a long time in the mountains these studies could be based, for example, on the policy of organizing Alpini regiments or at least troops equipped for mountain warfare. These units could be grouped in such a way as to constitute one or more main units to operate in the mountains or to be collected, for employment, to Allied Divisions for patrol or guide duties.

Once the enrollment plan has been established, it could contact the military staff of the partisan forces of the north in order to arrange the carrying out of the plan as and when the regions of northern Italy are liberated.

The Chief of Staff  
(Sgd) P. BARRACLOUGH





S-3-C-R-3-9

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AXIS, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE  
OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN NORTHERN ITALY

1. Shortly before the fall of the first Bonomi Government a group of emissaries from the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy arrived in Rome. Their object was to secure the recognition by the Allied military authorities and the Italian Government of the C.L.N.A.I. as the agent of the Italian Government in the north and a large measure of financial and material assistance. The C.L.N.A.I. had already in August last been accorded by the Italian Government a limited degree of recognition as the co-ordinating body for resistance activities in Northern Italy. The Allied military authorities, however, had previously refused to accord any form of recognition to the C.L.N.A.I. as it was generally held that to do so would tend to render more difficult the establishment of Allied military Government when one territories in due course came to be liberated.
2. Since that time the C.L.N.A.I. in the cities of the north had been playing an increasingly powerful role and through their access to funds and to support of the Allied officers serving in occupied territories they had succeeded in acquiring control of a large number of the bands of patriots engaged in fighting the enemy. There is a considerable body of evidence to show that their ambition has been to play an active role in the administration of Italian territory as and when it is freed from the enemy. It is known positively that in Turin for example the local Committee intended to assume legislative functions by means of issuing decrees and to exercise other attributes of Government such as the requisitioning of buildings and the arrest of Fascists.
3. When, therefore, the emissaries of the C.L.N.A.I. came forward with the request for formal recognition by the Allied military authorities and the Italian Government it was obviously necessary to proceed with great caution. Negotiations were initiated in the first instance on the basis of a tri-partite agreement, that is to say, between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Italian Government and the Representatives of the C.L.N.A.I. The fall of the Government and the interregnum of two weeks during the formation of the present Government caused these negotiations to be held up, and the Supreme Allied Commander decided to conclude a straight military bi-lateral agreement with the C.L.N.A.I. which purposely excluded any form of political recognition. A copy of this agreement is attached. (Annex A).
4. The difficulties in regard to the formation of a new Government turned largely on the attempt of the Central Committee of National Liberation in Rome to impose a nominee of the Committee on the Lieutenant-General, as Prime Minister, and, in general, to establish the Committee of National Liberation as the single dominant factor in Italian political life. With emissaries of the Committee of National Liberation in Rome at this period it was only natural that the latter's claims to recognition should figure in the demands put forward in the declaration and pronouncements of the political parties particularly those of the extreme left.

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3. When, therefore, the emissaries of the C.L.N.A.I. came forward with the request for formal recognition by the Allied military authorities and the Italian Government it was obviously necessary to proceed with great caution. Negotiations were initiated in the first instance on the basis of a tri-partite agreement, that is to say, between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Italian Government and the representatives of the C.L.N.A.I. The fall of the Government and the interregnum of two weeks during the formation of the present Government caused these negotiations to be held up, and the Supreme Allied Commander decided to conclude a straight military bi-lateral agreement with the C.L.N.A.I. which purposely excluded any form of political recognition. A copy of this agreement is attached. (Annexe A).

4. The difficulties in regard to the formation of a new government turned largely on the attempt of the Central Committee of National Liberation in Rome to impose a nominee of the Committee on the Lieutenant-General, as Prime Minister, and, in general, to establish the Committee of National Liberation as the single dominant factor in Italian political life. With emissaries of the Committee of National Liberation in Rome at this period it was only natural that the latter's claims to recognition should figure in the demands put forward in the declarations and pronouncements of the political parties particularly those of the extreme left.

5. When, therefore, the new Government was formed, one of their first aims was to issue a declaration in which, in welcoming the decision of the Central Committee of National Liberation to continue its collaboration in the war effort, the Government referred to the C.L.N.A.I. as its representative and stated that it had delegated to the C.L.N.A.I. the task of directing the action of the patriots in the battle against the enemy. The declaration also stated that the Government was pleased to note that the Allied Command had recognised the C.L.N.A.I. as the representative organism of all anti-fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy. This was of course a distortion of the terms of the military agreement.

6. Meanwhile, direct negotiations between the Italian Government and a representative of the C.L.N.A.I. continued and in due course an agreement was signed, a copy of which is attached (Annexe B). This document while conveying a further measure of recognition to the C.L.N.A.I. also, by implication, binds the latter to accept the authority of the Italian Government. In order to correct any misunderstandings due to the inaccurate reference to the political recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. by the Allied military authorities referred to above, the Italian Government were asked that, in the communique announcing their political recognition of the C.L.N.A.I., they should include a specific statement to the effect that no such recognition had been accorded by the Allies. A copy of the Italian Government's communique is annexed. (Annexe C).

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7. It will be noted that under para 4 of the military agreement the C.L.M.A.I. undertake to recognize Allied Military Government, when it is established and to hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government previously assumed. They also undertake that military formations dependent upon them should disband and surrender their arms when called upon to do so by the Supreme Allied Commander. In dealing, therefore, with any clubs which may be made in newly liberated territories by the local Committees of National Liberation to exercise powers of Government or to maintain any position of authority which their members may have assumed, or the refusal of patriot groups to disband or disarm, the above agreements may be made full use of by Allied Military Government authorities but should not be quoted in extenso. In particular no reference should be made whatever to the sums of money which are being placed at the disposal of the C.L.M.A.I. For the information of Regional Commissioners only, this money is being provided by SACMED with control of its use remaining in the hands of the Allied Military authorities, but SACMED will be reimbursed by the Italian Government.
8. Finally, Regional Commissioners should be aware of the implications of the establishment of a Ministry for Occupied Italy under Signor Scoccimarro. A draft decree establishing the functions of this Ministry in which far-reaching powers over the activities of the forces of resistance in the North are claimed has been submitted to the Allied Commission and is at present under examination. It will undoubtedly be modified substantially before approval can be given. A copy of the decree as finally approved will be sent to Regional Commissioners in due course.

to the Allied Commission and is at present under examination. It shall be modified substantially before approval can be given. A copy of the decree as finally approved will be sent to Regional Commissioners in due course.

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE  
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ALLIED MILITARY COMMANDS  
OF OPERATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL  
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

1. The Supreme Allied Commander wishes the utmost military co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The C.L.M.A.I. will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.L.M.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.
2. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.L.M.A.I.) will, on behalf of the C.L.M.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against搜掠, expropriations and like depredation by the enemy.
3. The Military head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the C.L.M.A.I.) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.
4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by the C.L.M.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied military Government, C.L.M.A.I. will recognize Allied military Government and will hand over to that Government all Authority and powers of local Government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the Supreme Allied OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disband and surrender their arms, when required to do so.
5. During the period of enemy occupation in Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the C.L.M.A.I. in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; a monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the C.L.M.A.I. anti-fascist organizations.

Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

military command of the C.I.M.A.I.) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by the C.I.M.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, C.I.M.A.I. will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all Authority and powers of local Government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disband and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation in Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the C.I.M.A.I. in common with all other anti-fascist organisations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; a monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the C.I.M.A.I. and all other anti-fascist organisations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

LIGURIA	20
PIEMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied Missions attached to the C.I.M.A.I. to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-aircraft and maintenance of order.

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Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by C.L.N.A.I., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER  
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

(Signed) R. Maitland Wilson,  
General.

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL  
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

(Signed) Pietro Longhi.

Maurizio

More

E. Sodio

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FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL  
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

(Signed) Pietro Longhi.  
Maurizio  
Mare  
E. Soppio

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(CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET  
(BY AUTHORITY OF CSIS)  
(S. 11(93/94), AC.)

DECLARATION

MINISTRY  
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, December 1944.

The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

The Italian Government designates the C.L.N.A.I. as its representative in the struggle that the patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and Germans in that part of Italy not yet liberated.

The C.L.N.A.I. agrees to act towards this end as the delegate of the Italian Government which is recognized by the Allied Governments as the successor of the government which signed the Armistice Terms and is the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has already been or will later on be restored to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

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THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT  
(signed) Ivanoe Bonomi

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY  
(signed) here

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## PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

Ufficio Stampa

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The President of the Council informs to have received the following message from the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy:

"The Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy, confronted with the urgent task that the anti-Nazi liberation war imposes on the new Italian democracy, conscious of the responsibilities of all people anxious for a free men's peace in this moment in which war is nearing its ultimate phase;

"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQ, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the acclamation dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties in enemy occupied territory, is inaccurate. The Allied military authorities have not accorded any form of political recognition of the aforesaid Committee of Northern Italy, but they have agreed with it on military means as aiding to the prosecution of the war behind the enemy lines. On the other hand our Italian Government, having a wider sphere of action, has recognized the C.L.N.A.I. as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the still occupied territories. As the consequence of this the Government have delegated the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy to represent them in the struggle that the patriots are waging against the Fascists and the Germans in the not yet liberated territories.

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Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

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PART IV

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