

ACC

10000/136/341

10000/136/341

MATERIAL HELP FOR PATRIOTS
DEC. 1944 - JUNE 1945

3206/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 3206 MATERIAL HELP FOR PATRIOTS

Page 2

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
14	Cbl AFHQ FX-60555	15 Apr 45	15A/G, Armies, Dists, AC, MIA	Feeding and clothing of partisans, rations authorized.
15	Cbl AMG 8 Army, M-851	18 Apr 45	AC	IMPRs shd be equipped Rome.
16	Cbl AFHQ, FX-70793	5 May 45	Armies, 15 AG, PBS, etc	CCS disapprove feeding, clothing part- isans from military stocks.
17	Cbl AC PAT, 7187	8 May 45	Toscana Reg	CCS disapprove feeding, clothing part- isans fr mil stocks - info needed.
18	94/6/PAT, LG (Pat) S/C	11 May 45	Various	AFHQ advise mistake in transmission cable FX-70793 (16).
19	Cbl AC Pat, 7584	14 May 45	AFHQ 15, 8, 5, 1, 2 Districts	Feeding partisans fr military stocks.
20	Cbl 15 AG, CAS-528	16 May 45	AFHQ, 5, 8, AC	Feeding partisans fr military stocks.
21	Cbl AFHQ, FX-76738	16 May 45	5, 8, 15, AC, PBS MIA, APC, 1, 2.	Feeding partisans fr It mil rations; to continue to 10 June, etc.
22	Cbl AFHQ FX-94030	16 Jun 45	8, AC, 15, 5	Feeding partisans fr It mil rations.
23	Cbl 8A, Q-5988	21 Jun 45	AFHQ, 8, 15, AC	Feeding partisans fr It mil rations.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

J.C.S. Jan 4 1974
J Miller Date 8/22/77
A G

3206/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 3206 MATERIAL HELP FOR PATRIOTS

Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Cbl AC L/G SG 8591	21 Dec 44	AFHQ	Aspects of patriots problem; rations, clothing, hospitalization, transport.
2	Ltr 121/PAT, Lush	26 Dec 44	AFHQ	Rationing, clothing, hospitalization & transport of patriots.
2a	Cbl AFHQ FX 75600	28 Dec 44	AC 5&8/A, etc	Patriots coming thru lines afforded treatment similar to Ital Army w/respect rations and clothing thru MMIA.
2b	Ltr AFHQ COS	6 Jan 45	CC, AC	Lumby's Times article that 'AFHQ will treat Patriots as soldiers of Ital Army
3	Cbl MMIA, 0670	8 Jan 45	AFHQ & AC	Evacuation of patriots to Ital Army hospitals - not possible.
4	Cbl AC Stone- 9757	12 Jan 45	AFHQ	Evacuation of patriots to Ital Army hospitals urged.
4a	Ltr AFHQ AG 400/033	13 Jan 45	5 & 8 Armies	Rations, clothing, etc for Patriots
5	Ltr Stone 3202/-/COS	17 Jan 45	AFHQ COS	Lumby's Times article that 'AFHQ will treat Patriots as soldiers of Ital Army'
6	Ltr G-5: 370.64-3	25 Jan 45	CC, AC	Vittel Conference, 6th Army Gp, on supplies for Partisans in NW Italy.
7	Cbl AC (PAT) 1387	9 Feb 45	AFHQ for Col Craig	Draft signal on Provision of clothing & food for patriots being discussed
8	95/1/PAT, Fiske	2 Apr 45	G-5 AFHQ	Hospitalization of Patriots; request decision as to responsibility therefor.
9	Cbl AFHQ, NAF-912 F-56424	7 Apr 45	CCS, AC	Contribution to It partisans rations fr Allied military stocks.
10	Cbl AFHQ, F-57980	10 Apr 45	AC	Contribution to It partisans rations fr Allied military stocks.
11	Cbl AFHQ, FX-58661	11 Apr 45	5 A/G, AC	Contribution to It partisans rations fr Allied military stocks.
12	Cbl 15 A/G, 0320B	12 Apr 45	AFHQ, AC	Contribution to It partisans rations fr Allied military stocks.
13	Cbl CG MTOUSA, FX-69235	15 Apr 45	5/A, PBS, AC, 15 A/G, MMIA	Interim emergency policy on issue of clothing to partisans.

Q 5988

JUNE 211210B

7/5126

JUNE 212130B

PRIORITY

REAR 8 ARMY

AFHQ CITE PHGDS INFO MAIN ARMY, 15 ARMY GP, ALCON, 5 ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

Your FI 94030 of 16 subject feeding Partisans.

- A. Rations issued ref your para A total 66481.
- B. Anticipate feeding 4,000 Partisans daily up to incl 15 July approx thereafter 1,000 daily.
- C. Partisans disposed UDINE Area and VENEZIA OTTOLIA.

Dist

Info-Action - Patriots Br
L. Forces SC 2

Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Commr
CA Sec
Econ Sec
Food SC 2
File

757

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) (1)
T.C.S. Trans. 4.12.7
By P.S. NARS, LNH 8/26/77

SECRET

06076
JUNE 16/91

05311
JUNE 16/91
ERIC IVY

ARE, STATED SACRED O THE FINE

ACTON : MAIN EARTH AREA

INFO: REAR AREA, ALCOA, 15 AREA GROUP, FIFTH ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

your 1212 of 13 June. require following further details before approving
extension

- (A) How many of one million visitors referred to in para 2 of EX 76793 of 16 May had been issued up to 14 June?
- (B) How many visitors do you anticipate feeding from 11 June until 10 July?
- (C) How many there in (B) above are located in VERMILION CANYON

952

SECRET

INFO-ACTION : LAME FORCES (2)
PATTONS IN
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
IN CHARGE

3200

CONFIDENTIAL

your visit of 13 June. Require following further details before approving

extension

(1) How many of one million rations referred to in para 2 of 76730 of

16 May had been issued up to 10 June?

(2) How many partitions do you anticipate feeding from 11 June until 10 July?

(3) How many these in (2) above are located in VERMILION CRUISE

DEPT

INFORMATION : LAM, PAGES (2)

PATIENTS IN

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

IN COMMISSIONER

CAS

HON. SEC

FOUR MC (2)

FILE (2)

FOOT

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 2.10

JCS

A-1

J. Miller

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

1/27

CONFIDENTIAL

EX 76738
MAY 161948BE/1119
MAY 171905B
IMPORTANT

AFIN.

CG 5 ARMY, CG 8 ARMY, INFO CG 15 ARMY GROUP, ALCON, EMMA ROME, IES, ABC,
DISTONE, DISTWO

CONFIDENTIAL.

Italian military ration for Partisans is approved for continuation with the following provisions.

- a. Feeding commitment to cease 10th June 1945.
- b. U.S. and British military responsibility limited each to 1,000,000 rations of dry vegetable coffee and catsup.
- c. ALCON to furnish in addition to the civilian ration compound sufficient flour to make up the full flour component and 4 ounces meat products supplementary to U.S./British military commitment for meat fish and cheese.
- d. Sugar to be deleted from the ration.
- e. EMMA to continue to supply Italian Government component. To ALCON only this to your 7584 of 14th May replies.

DIST

ACTION: Land Forces S/C 2
Patriots Br
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
CA Sec
ECOM Sec
Food S/C 2
File

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Dec. 23, 1974
By JCS
Date 8/22/77
A Miller

3206/er

SECRET

CAS 528
MAY 161730B

E/1856
MAY 170830B
ROUTINE

15 ARMY GROUP

ACTION AFHQ INFO 5 ARMY, 8 ARMY, ALCOM

SECRET.

Reference your FX 70793.

Based on reports received from both Armies this Headquarters recommends that time limit for feeding partisans on scale your FX 60055 be extended until political situation on both fronts clarified. Each Army is presently feeding about 1000 and each Army estimates that there are approximately 20,000 whom they have not yet contacted. These will be to be processed and fed when contact made which depends entirely on solution political problem. Entire partisan program which has been working extremely well to date is based on privilege, largely extra rations, and it is strongly recommended that present policy be continued. Civilian food problem in NORTH ITALY is not acute and if military rations for partisans not available

75 suggest ALCOM institute satisfactory system of feeding from civilian supplies. Present policy to be continued until new arrangements made.

DIST

INFO-ACTION: CA Sec
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Econ Sec
Land Forces S/C 2
File

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F) of (E)
By JCS JMS 1974
Date 8/22/77
J. Miller

FOR ACTION AFHQ GEORGE FIVE SECTION RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP GEORGE FIVE SECTION
EIGHTH ARMY REAR FOR AMG FIVE ARMY GEORGE FIVE CG DISTONE CG DISTWO

7584

14 May 1945

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

7 0 7 9 16
PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FOX KRAY SEVEN ZERO SEVEN NINE THREE CITE HAN ABLE
GEORGE DOG KUGAR PD OWING TO DIFFICULT COMMUNICATIONS NO ANSWER YET RECEIVED FROM
FIVE OR EIGHTH ARMY IN REPLY TO PARAGRAPHS ABLE AND BAKER OF YOUR SIGNAL PD

PARA TWO FOR ACTION AFHQ GEORGE FIVE SECTION RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP GEORGE FIVE SECTION
EIGHTH ARMY REAR FOR AMG FIVE ARMY GEORGE FIVE CG DISTONE CG DISTWO FROM HQ ALCOM
CITE ACPAT PAKEM

PARA TWO PD IN ANSWER TO PARAGRAPH CHARLIE WE ARE ALREADY COMMITTED TO ³FEEDING
PATRIOTS ON THE MILITARY SCALE AND IT IS NOW IMPOSSIBLE TO CHANGE OVER TO ANY OTHER
SCALE WITHOUT GRAVELY PREJUDICING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF PATRIOT PROBLEMS PD
DIFFICULTY IN DISARMING PATRIOTS HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPERIENCED IN MILAN AND IF THE
RATION IS REDUCED THE RESULTING DISCONTENT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO BREACHES
OF LAW AND ORDER PD

PARA THREE PD EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO REDUCE THE RATION COMMITMENT BY EARLY
DISARMAMENT AND DISPERSION AND IT IS THROUGH THAT THE COMMITMENT WILL NOT IN THE

759 AGREEMENT BE VERY LARGE PD

PARA FOUR PD TRUST I MAY HAVE PERMISSION TO CONTINUE ON YOUR FOX KRAY SIX ZERO
ZERO FIVE FIVE UNTIL FURTHER DETAILS AND INSTRUCTIONS CAN BE GIVEN

Patriots Branch

321

Lt. Col. F. CRAIG.

5
21
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12812, Sec. 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9
By JCS for 4/19/77
By JCS Date 8/22/77
J. Miller

3206/cc

MAY 12 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

Tel. Ext. 321

11 May 1945

Ref : 94/6/PAT

Subject : Rations for Partisans.

To : A/President
: Chief Commissioner
: Ex. Commissioner
: Economic Section
: Food Sub Com. (Attn. Lt.Col Imrie)
: Land Forces Sub Com. (2)
File (2)

16
3206/cc

The text of Signal FX 70793 of 5 May has been checked with AFHQ, who state that para C should read as follows.

" 0 What success can be expected if rations are furnished without the portion now being received from US/British Military Sources. Upon receipt of this information the matter will be further examined ".

732

3206/cc

sent 19

M. Pishy
F. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Local Govt. Sub Com.

18

/nlo.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
JCS
By A.B. J. Miller
1/22/77

456

FOR ACTION AMG TOSCANA REGION

7187

8 May 45

PRIORITY

~~PD~~ PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS FEEDING OF PATRIOTS PD AFHQ ADVISE
HAVING RECEIVED DISAPPROVAL FROM CHARLIE CHARLIE SLANT SUGAR
ON REPLACING MILITARY STOCKS USED FOR FEEDING OF PATRIOTS
OWING TO WORLD SHORTAGE OF FOOD AND PLANNED ALLOCATIONS PD
PAREN TO FOR ACTION AMG TOSCANA REGION FROM HQ ALCON CITE
ACPAT PAREN

PARA TWO PD PRESENT AUTHORITY TO FEED PART OF PATRIOT RATION
FROM UNCLE SUGAR SLANT BRITISH MILITARY SOURCES EXCEPT ON
REPAYMENT FROM ALLIED COMMISSION STOCKS WILL BE CONTINUED
IN EFFECT UNTIL ONE EIGHT MAY PD IN VIEW OF THIS YOU ARE
REQUIRED TO REPORT ON THE FOLLOWING PD ABLE POSSIBILITIES
OF DRAWING RATIONS FROM LOCAL CIVILIAN SOURCES PD BAKER
751 NUMBER OF PATRIOTS BEING RATIONED PD CHARLIE TOTAL
NUMBER ANTICIPATED TO BE PROCESSED AND RATE OF INFLUX
AND DISCHARGE FROM PATRIOT CENTRES AND HOSPITALS

Patriots Branch

321

Lt Col F. CRAIG

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(U) of (E)

JCS 474

By: A.G. Date: 8/22/77

J Miller

W 200/200

SECRETFX 70793
MAY 050914BD/9743
MAY 051850B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE HAGDS

ACTION CG 5 ARMY CG 8 ARMY ALCOM INFO CG 15 ARMY GROUP CG PBS

CG DISTONE CG DISTWO CO ABC MEDIA

Disapproval received from CG/S on replacing military stocks used for the feeding of Partisans. FX 60055 refers. Disapproval based on world shortage of food and planned allocations. Present authority to feed part of Partisans ration from US/British military sources except on repayment from Allied Commission stocks will be continued in effect until 18 May. Report is desired by 13 May on the following.

- A. Number now being fed and the success being met under present method.
- B. Total number anticipated to be processed and rate of influx and discharge.
- C. What success can be expected if rations are furnished from AFHQ. The portion now being moved from US/British military sources. Upon receipt of this information the matter will be further examined.

Dist

Action - CA Sec
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm
Econ Sec
Land Forces 2
File

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(a) and 3(D) or (E)
By JCS Jan 4 24
By JCS MAR 4 24
J. Miller

RESTRICTED

M851

AFR 181600B

D/6017

AFR 181930B

PRIORITY

AMG MAIN 8TH ARMY

HQ ALCOM FOR PATRIOTS BRANCH

RESTRICTED.

Italian military patriot representatives are reporting for duty without uniforms and camp kit. Not possible to issue uniforms and camp ^{kit} from Army sources. Please equip these officers in HOME before sending to Army area.

DIST

ACTION: Patriots Br
 INFO: A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 CA Sec
 File 2
 Float

749

(15)

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 JLS Jan 4 1974
 by A6 Date 8/22/77

J. Matlin

SECRET

PA 60555
 APR 151831B

D/7974
 APR 181100B
 IMPORTANT

FREEDOM SIGNED BACMED CITE HQAE

15 ARMY GROUP INFO 5 ARMY, 8 ARMY, DISTONE, DISTWO, AC, MMIA

Subject is feeding and clothing partisans.

CLOTHING. Scale will not exceed

Battle Dress Suit	1
Shirts	2
Boots with laces	1 pr
Socks	2 pr
Drawers	2 pr
Vests or Undershirts	2
Jersey pullover or undershirt woolen	1
Blanket	1

All items will be reconditioned. Battle Dress will be dyed chocolate under arrangements to be made by AFM. Battle Dress will be marked with yellow letter V over left pocket. Letter V will be 2½ inches high 2½ inches wide at top 3/8 inches thick and will be stencilled on prior to issue under arrangements to be made by armies. As an interim measure and pending receipt of chocolate battle dress and reconditioned clothing as above you are authorized to issue 5th Army 500 items and 8th Army 500 items from above scale as you consider essential to clothe partisans. It is emphasized that this issue from Army stocks is an emergency measure only. If further quantities in excess of 500 items each 5th and 8th Armies are required you will

3206/ce

14

- 2 -

(FX 60555 cont'd)

SECRET

signal this HQ for authority for further release. You will be notified immediately chocolate bottle dress and reconditioned clothing is available when issue from army stocks will cease. If available in Army area reconditioned clothing should be used.

FOOD. ITI armed forces scale will be issued from Army and MMIA stocks. Cigarettes will be issued only if available from MMIA stocks. British cigarettes will not be issued. Records of ration issues to partisans will be kept and reported monthly to S.T. AFHQ. Detailed departmental instructions will be issued.

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Patriots Br
 INFO: A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 Executive Commissioner
 CA Sec
 Land Forces S/C
 Econ Sec
 Food S/C 2
 File

747

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)
 BY JWS Jan 4 1974
 J. Miller
 HARR, Date 8/28/72

SECRET

FX 60235

APR 150852A

D/7743

AIR 151948B

ROUTINE

MFOUSA SIGNED CG MFOUSA

CG 5 ARMY INFO CG 15 ARMY GROUP, MMIA, ALCON CG PBS

SECRET.

As interim emergency policy you authorized issue to partisans who came through your lines minimum essential clothing class X as follows:- jackets field (old style) each one trousers of any kind each one shirts cotton or woollen each 2 shoes with laces or improvised laces pairs 1 socks cotton or woollen pairs 2 drawers cotton or woollen pairs 2 undershirts cotton or woollen each 2 blankets each 1.

This is NOT Complete initial issue authorization but an allowance authorized replacement of similar items that are NOT in possession of the individual or if in possession is NOT wearable. Scrap items of shoe and cloth turned in will be evacuated to ALLIED COMMISSION. Each individual issuing cloth will be given written authorization upon which his name appears. In addition there will be stencilled on left breast of field jacket and in centre of blanket the letter V (for Victory) preferably in yellow dimensions 2½ inches by 2½ inches with 3/8 inch stripes. Stocks for US ITI now in hand 5th Army may be utilised preferably of undyed clothing. Replacement to extent required will be requisitioned on PBS. 5th Army to report issues monthly to this HQ for charge against Italian Government. Full Italian armed forces ration scale will be issued and will be shown separately in daily telegram to PBS. Italian portion of the ration will be furnished by MMIA

746

3206/02

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 301 AND 505 OF US
JCS Jan. 4, 78
By PLS DATE 8/22/77
J. Miller

SECRET

- 2 -

(FX60295 cont'd)

as demanded by PBS. PBS to demand on AC for items of civilian ration scale details of which will be furnished by this HQ. PBS to make monthly report to this HQ of total rations issued in order charge may be made Italian Government.

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Land Forces S/C

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

Executive Commissioner

Econ Sec 2

Food S/C 2

File 2

Float

745 -

(13)

TOP SECRET

Commissioner
CC 1517
APR 13 RECD
Copy No 4O-320B
APR 121530BD/7560
APR 131420B
ROUTINE15 ARMY GROUP
AFHQ INFO ALCOM 5 ARMY 8 ARMY

TOP SECRET

This answers your TX 58661 CITE FHGDQ of 11 April.

Our plan for future treatment of patriots brings on establishment of patriot centres for their care and maintenance prior disarmament. Establishment of centres completely conditional on adequate supply of food and clothing. Anticipate need for some of these centres will occur in near future as our Armies advance. Initial increment of Partisans already overrun by 5th Army and need care. Accordingly request very urgently authorization to proceed under provision para 3 of your FHGCT F26918 of 14 February.

3206/ce

Dist

Copy No 1 & 2 Info-Action - CA Section (2)
3 Info - A/President
4 Chief Commissioner
5 Exec Commissioner
6 Econ Sec
7 Land Forces
8 File

744

3206/ce

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(d) and 5(d) or (f)

JCS Jan 4 74
By A.C. RAB, DOW 822177

A Miller

12

TOP SECRET

CC 1225
APR 12 1966

Copy # 3

CHIEF Comm.

D/7457

APR 121025B

ROUTINE

FA 58661

APR 111950B

FREEDOM SIGNED SACRED CITE FROM

15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALLIED COMMISSION, 5th ARMY, 8th ARMY

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

TOP SECRET.

Ref 15 A Group's 0316h dated 10 April.

See our F 57979 of 10 April to 15 A.G. only and our F 57980 of 10 April to Allied commission only. Awaiting CCS approval before ordering implementation. If this is preventing you from taking any action which you consider should be taken now, you should report separately those matters requiring immediate action

DIBT

COPY NO 1
" " 2
" " 3
" " 4
" " 5
" " 6
" " 7

INFO-ACTION
INFO

C A SEC
A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMM ✓
EX COMM
ECON SEC
LAND FORCES SC
FILE

743

See (17)

3206/cc

DECLASSIFIED
By D. Bell... 8/22/77
A.6.

TOP SECRET

(11)

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 3

Chief Commissioner

F 57980
AFH 101659BCC 0945
APR 11 1945D/7337
AFH 110840B
ROUTINEAFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FOODS
ALCOMREF 30
3209/EC
FOR INFORMATION ONLY

TOP SECRET.

Your 4769 of 4 April 45.

1. Food and clothing scales for Italian partisans in N ITALY is subject.
2. Proposed food and clothing scales for partisans in northern ITALY submitted to CCS in NAF 912 which was paraphrased to you in our F 56424 of 7 April.
3. Our intention is to issue full Italian armed forces ration scale from Army and NMIA stocks, repayment of civil element of ration scale being made in bulk to the Army by AC.
4. Instructions will be issued regarding policy for handling of Italian partisans as soon as CCS approval has been received. In the meantime NAF 864 and NAF 912 should form the basis for your planning and preparation. No issues however will be made to partisans pending further instructions.

New subject.

5. Cigarettes for patriots is subject.
6. Reuret cannot authorize issue of Allied cigarettes to patriots. If Italian Government will make available supplies of Italian cigarettes for issue by Allied forces to patriots we will arrange for issued proposed by you to be made. Suggest cigarettes be furnished through NMIA channels.

DIST

Copy No 1 - ACTION: CA Section
 " 2 - INFO: A/President
 " 3 - Chief Commissioner
 " 4 - Executive Commissioner
 " 5 - Econ Sec
 " 6 - Land Forces S/C
 " 7 - File

10

See 11

3209/EC

APR 8 RECD

1131

Copy #3

Chief Commr.

TOP SECRET

F 56424
AFR 071514BD/7080
AFR 080900B
ROUTINEAFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FIGEG
ACTION ALCOM ROME

TOP SECRET.

There follows a paraphrase of MAF 912.

1. From Allied military stocks will be provided following contribution to Italian partisans rations.

Flour 7 oxs, canned meat or preserved fish or suitable substitutes 3 oxs, cheese 1 ox, macaroni 3 oxs, dried vegetables 2 oxs, tomato catsup 1/2 ox, coffee 1/2 ox, sugar 3/4 ox. This is balance towards full Italian armed forces scale after deducting Italian Government and AC contributions as indicated MAF 864 paras 5(a) and (b).

2. Scale of clothing para 6 MAF 864 stands.

3. Urgent approval requested of above and of MAF 864 proposals.

DIST

Copy No 1 - ACTION: Food S/C
" 2 - INFO: A/President
" 3 - Chief Commissioner
" 4 - Executive Commissioner
" 5 - CA Sec
" 6 - Econ Sec
" 7 - File

DECLASSIFIED

JCS Jan 4 '74
A-6 JCS 8/22/77
J. Miller

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

3206/CC

741

(9)

[REDACTED]

APR 5 1945

CC FILES

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AEC 354
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

95/1/PAT

2 April 1945

SUBJECT : Hospitalisation of Patriots.

TO : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters.

1. A conference was held on 28 March 1945 at this Headquarters to consider responsibility for the hospitalisation of Patriots. Those present were DDCS, No. 2 District and representatives of Civil Affairs Section and Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA).

2. During the course of the conference it became apparent that there was a difference of opinion as to the precise responsibility of No. 2 District, MIA and the Allied Commission.

3. While everyone agreed that emergency treatment would be given in whatever hospital was available, whether Allied or Italian, civil or military, it was not clear as to who was responsible for post-emergency treatment. It was the view of the Allied Commission that, having regard to AFHQ signal F.27859 dated 16 February 1945 paragraph 5, the Italian Army, and therefore MIA, would be responsible for the hospitalisation of Patriots and that this would include hospitalization with Army rations until a care was effected.

4. MIA, however, expressed the following views:

- a) that the Italian Army was responsible only for emergency hospitalization and that wounded Patriots should be removed to civilian hospitals by the Allied Commission (not MIA) as soon as possible, and reference was made to AFHQ letter AG 400/033 GEC-9 dated 13 January 1945.
- b) That no Italian Army hospitals could be established for the primary purpose of handling Patriots for the simple reason that neither personnel nor equipment was available above that which was required for Italian Army Hospitals necessary for the Italian Army;
- c) That the Italian Army Hospitals would be available for Patriots only to the extent that the accommodation available was surplus to the requirement for any personnel; and,
- d) that it was not practicable to issue either medical supplies or army rations to civilian hospitals for Patriots.

4. This Commission requests that the position may be clarified urgently as it is impossible to proceed with the necessary planning until responsibility has been determined.

5/.....

- 2 -

5. This Commission is strongly of opinion that the governing document is the signal above referred to of 16 February 1945 superseding the letter of 13 January which dealt only with a particular operation concerning the reception of 2000 Patriots then shortly expected to arrive through the lines.

6. A further point arose and was discussed, namely, assuming the responsibility of the Italian Army to provide hospitalization, it was recognized nevertheless that there would be substantial areas in which Italian combat forces would not be present and where therefore Italian Military hospitals would not be set up.

In these circumstances it is recommended that, within their existing resources, the Italian Army be instructed to provide hospitals for Patriots in areas where Patriots may be expected and, to the extent to which this is not possible, that civilian hospitals be authorized to draw military medical supplies and military scale of rations for Patriots in their hospitals.

/s/ NORMAN E. FISKE

NORMAN E. FISKE, Col.
Acting Executive Commissioner.

Copy to : LMS, No. 2 District
Land Forces Sub-Commission
Executive Commissioner's Office.

739 -

⑧

FOR ACTION AFHQ G-5.

PERSONAL FOR LT. COL. F. CRAIG.

1387.

9 Feb

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

PARA ONE

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT SIGNAL BEING DISCUSSED BY CHIEF OF STAFF AG WITH GENERAL ROBERTSON CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AFHQ TODAY PD CHIEF OF STAFF WISHES YOU TO KNOW AND DISCUSS ON SAME LINES PD BEGINS

PAREN FOR ACTION AFHQ G-5 PERSONAL FOR LT. COL. F. CRAIG FROM ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD SUBJECT IS PROVISION OF CLOTHING AND FOOD FOR PATRIOTS PD PA PARTHREE PD IN YOUR NOTE CHARLES SUGAR SIGHT SIX EIGHT DATED TWO SIX JANUARY FOUR FIVE TO ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GEORGE THREE YOU STATED THAT PLANS MUST INCLUDE THE ISSUE OF ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTISANS TO REPORT TO CERTAIN CENTRES WHERE THEY WOULD BE PROPERLY CARED FOR AND PROVIDED WITH FOOD CLOTHING AND MONEY PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN

738

FOUR

PARA FIVE PD AT MEETING CONVENED BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GEORGE THREE ON MONDAY TWENTY NINE JANUARY IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT PROVISION OF FOOD AND CLOTHING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS A MILITARY COMMITMENT BUT I AM NOW INFORMED BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GEORGE FIVE PAREN REFERENCE TO LETTER DOG SUGAR JIG SIGHT ABLS SUGAR FIVE FEBRUARY PAREN YOU NOW ONLY HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND CLOTHING TO A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF PATRIOTS FOR AN AGREED PERIOD PD

3206/cc

⑦

2

PARAFIVE PD THIS NOW QUEN STRONGLY RECOMMENDING THAT THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND CLOTHING TO PATRIOTS BE REGARDED AS A MILITARY COMMITMENT AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE DETAILED PLANS FOR THE HANDLING OF PATRIOTS UNTIL I AM INFORMED EXACTLY WHAT PROVISION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY YOU PD

PARASIX PD REQUEST YOU URGENTLY TO GIVE ME AUTHORITY PAREN ABLE PAREN TO DRAW ON ITALIAN MILITARY RATIONS SCALE FOR PATRIOTS UP TO NINE ZERO DAYS IF NECESSARY FOR EACH PATRIOT UP TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO PAREN BAKER PAREN TO DRAW FROM ALLIED SOURCES CLOTHING UP TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO PATRIOTS ON THE SCALE LAID DOWN IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF FOUR ABLE GEORGE FOUR ZERO ZERO SLANT THREE THREE GEORGE EASY GEORGE DASH OHOE DATED ONE THREE JANUARY PD

PARASIX PD FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
SEVEN

ENDS

Major V.P.J.C. SKEE
Executive Officer
Patriots Branch

737 Exh 374.

①

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

KPM/mls

Cc 233
JAN 25 1945

G-5: 370.64-3

25 January 1945

SUBJECT: Report on VITTEL Conference.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Chief Commissioner).Attached hereto is a copy of Report on Conference held
at VITTEL on 17 January 1945 for your information.

For the Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

K. P. MANNOCK,
Jr. Comdr.Incl:
as above.~~Confidential~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11852, Sec. 3(a) and 5(D) of (E)
By: [Signature]

3206/CC

SECRET

NOTES ON DECISIONS TAKEN AT MEETING ON SUPPLIES TO
PARTISANS IN NORTH ITALY HELD AT HEADQUARTERS 6TH
ARMY GROUP, 1400 HOURS 17 JANUARY 1945.

Note: The decisions stated below are subject to review
by higher authorities at the various headquarters
represented at the meeting.

Action by

1. GENERAL

A meeting was held at VITTEL on 17 January at which the question
of the supply of Partisans in NW ITALY from OSS and SOE bases in SE
FRANCE was discussed by all interested parties, including the French
authorities. Security precautions satisfactory to the French Author-
ities and 6th Army Group were agreed. Arrangements for the supply of
these bases were also agreed by all concerned. The SOE and OSS bases
are cooperating satisfactorily.

2. FRONTIER CONTROL

SHAFF
G-3

SHAFF will direct the SHAFF Mission (FRANCE) to request the
Defense Nationale to agree to an extension of General Molle's auth-
ority to include control of the movement of agents and Partisans
across the entire FRANCO-ITALIAN border, including the area from
ST. ETIENNE to the sea. This will not affect General Tobin's op-
erational control of his area. G-3, 6th Army Group will request
General Devers' concurrence to this suggestion. Should the French
accept this proposal General Molle should have a liaison officer
at General Tobin's headquarters.

3. SUPPLY SITUATION

- a. All supplies for Partisans will be furnished from stores
under AFHQ control.
- b. SOLOC will transport from MARSEILLE to the OSS and SOE
bases in NICE, GRENoble, or ANNECY any supplies phys-
ically shipped to MARSEILLE from AFHQ sources. SOLOC are
not able to provide guards away from the main L of C.

Action by

4. SECURITY

6th Army Group Requirements

- a. The OSS and SOE bases will submit to 6th Army Group a copy
of all intelligence, operational, and administrative reports

SHAFF will direct the SHAFF Mission (readers) to request the Defense Nationale to agree to an extension of General Molle's authority to include control of the movement of agents and Partisans across the entire FRANCO-ITALIAN border, including the area from ST. ETIENNE to the sea. This will not affect General Tobin's operational control of his area. G-3, 6th Army Group will request General Devers' concurrence to this suggestion. Should the French accept this proposal General Molle should have a liaison officer at General Tobin's headquarters.

3. SUPPLY SITUATION

- a. All supplies for Partisans will be furnished from stores under AFHQ control.
- b. SOLOC will transport from MARSEILLE to the OSS and SOE bases in NICE, GRENOBLE, or ANNECY any supplies physically shipped to MARSEILLE from AFHQ sources. SOLOC are not able to provide guards away from the main L of C.

Action by

4. SECURITY

6th Army Group Requirements

- a. The OSS and SOE bases will submit to 6th Army Group a copy of all intelligence, operational, and administrative reports sent to OSS and SOE SHAFF and AFHQ. They will also submit a roster of all operating personnel, temporary or permanent, on duty with the OSS and SOE bases; and they will notify of any subsequent changes.
- b. Should any breach of security occur involving 6th Army Group in which personnel, either agent or operating, of the OSS or SOE bases are concerned, 6th Army Group reserves the right to take such action as it deems expedient.

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 3(D) of (E)

JCS Jan 4 77

By AGC [signature] 8/23/77

J. Miller

785015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

OSS
and
SOE
Bases

5. a. 6th Army Group OSS and SOE bases and the French Securitie Militaire agreed on a practical system of security checks. (See Annex).
- b. The security arrangements made with local French authorities by the OSS and SOE bases were stated by the DGER representatives to be satisfactory to General Molle.
- c. The OSS and SOE bases will keep General Molle fully informed of their activities. The OSS and the SOE GRENOBLE base should send their representatives to General Molle's Headquarters; the SOE NICE base should report through General Tobin's Headquarters until the agreement mentioned in paragraph 2 above has been reached.

6. COORDINATION OF SOE AND OSS BASES

SOE and AFHQ confirmed the OSS and SOE bases should keep each other fully informed as to recipients of supply and base of issue. The OSS and SOE bases will arrange mutual exchange and subsequent replacement of supplies as necessary.

7. AIR CRAFT FOR NICE

SOE NICE Base will follow out, through official channels, their request for an aircraft base on NICE.

Action by C. TRAVEL OF OSS and SOE PERSONNEL FROM FRANCE TO ITALY

AFHQ up travel permits for OSS and SOE base personnel wishing to move from FRANCE to ITALY.

SOE
NICE
Base

SOE NICE base will follow out, through official channels, their request for an aircraft base on NICE.

Action by C. TRAVEL OF OSS and SOE PERSONNEL FROM FRANCE TO ITALY

AFHQ
AFHQ agreed to take up with STAFF the question of speeding up travel permits for OSS and SOE base personnel wishing to move from FRANCE to ITALY.

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U. S. Army

16 January 1945

AGENDA OF MEETING
ON SUPPLIES TO PARTISANS IN NORTH ITALY

1. A meeting is to be held for the purpose of discussing matters concerning the infiltration of supplies from FRANCE to ITALIAN partisans operating in Northern ITALY.

Place of meeting - VITTEL PALACE
Date - 17 January 1945
Time - 1400 hours.

2. SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED:

- a. Statement of 6th Army Group position.
- b. Present state of Italian Partisans in northwest ITALY
Operational value (Presented by AFHQ).
- c. Brief review of project for supplying these partisans from bases in FRANCE (Presented by SHAEF).
- d. Present status of Office of Strategic Services base
(Presented by OSS).
- e. Present status of Special Operations Executive base
(Presented by SOE).
- f. Delivery of supplies to bases. What supplies will AFHQ furnish; where and when? What transportation arrangements, if any, are required from SOLOC? Can these arrangements be made? (Presented by AFHQ and SOLOC).
- g. Collection of these supplies by Italians. What arrangements have been or are to be made regarding collection of these supplies? What security agreements should be made with French General commanding the ALPS sector? Nature and extent of supervision of operations and border crossing to be exercised by General MOLLE and who would be responsible for negotiating with this French General? (General discussion).
- h. Present status of Partisan bands along FRANCO-ITALIAN border.

734

0 6 5 2

- 734
- c. Brief review of project for supplying these partisans from bases in FRANCE (Presented by SHAEP).
- d. Present status of Office of Strategic Services base (Presented by OSS).
- e. Present status of Special Operations Executive base (Presented by SOE).
- f. Delivery of supplies to bases. What supplies will AFHQ furnish; where and when? What transportation arrangements, if any, are required from SOLOC? Can these arrangements be made? (Presented by AFHQ and SOLOC).
- g. Collection of these supplies by Italians. What arrangements have been or are to be made regarding collection of these supplies? What security agreements should be made with French General commanding the ALPS sector? Nature and extent of supervision of operations and border crossing to be exercised by General MOLLE and who would be responsible for negotiating with this French General? (General discussion).
- h. Present status of Partisan bands along FRANCO-ITALIAN border.
- i. Location of Allied missions and DZ in Italy.
- j. Difficulty of supply by air and need for supplemental means.
- k. Coordination of OSS and SOE operations in this area. (General discussion).
- l. Organization of Permit System for operations moving from FRANCE to ITALY. (Presented by G-2, 6th Army Group).
- m. Question of supplying 6th Army Group CI passes to ITALIAN Personnel of OSS Annemasse. (Presented by G-2, 6th Army Group).
- n. Is present attachment of O.S.S. Annemasse to SOLOC satisfactory to both SOLOC and O.S.S.? (Presented by OSS and SOLOC).
- o. Is cooperation between OSS and SOE satisfactory? (General discussion).
- p. Portion of supplies available from Italian Government sources. (OSS ETGUSA).
- q. Further assistance required from OSS ETGUSA for transportation and rations in particular. (OSS ETGUSA).
- 6

0 6 5 4

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6th ARMY GROUP

APO 23, U.S. Army

16 January 1945

The following personnel will attend the meeting to be held at 1400, 17 January 1945 at the VITTEL Palace to discuss matters concerning the infiltration of supplies from FRANCE to Italian partisans operating in Northern ITALY:

From 6th Army Group

Brig. Gen. R. E. Jenkins,	AC of S, G-3
Lt. Col. W. E. Little	G-4
Lt. Col. J. W. Huffer	G-3
Major H. Alet	G-2)
Major Tupinier	G-2) - French
Major Simonneau	G-2)

From SHAEF

Colonel Durbin	G-4 (Lia O with 6AG)
Colonel Brook	Sp Ops Ex Lia O.
Lt. Col. Baumer	G-3
Lt. Col. O'Hanlon	SHAEF Mission (France)
Lt. Col. Canfield	OSS, Lia O.
Major Wintour	G-3

From AFHQ

Colonel G. King	15th Army Group
Colonel J. Riopo	
Lt. Col. I. Allen	
Lt. Col. J. Smith	

From OSS

Lt. Col. C. M. Wood	
Lt. Col. K. Baker	
Major T. F. McCoy	
Captain Alphino	
Mr. Stonborough	
Mr. A. Dulles	

From SOE

Major J. Hamilton	
Sqd/Ldr R. Botts	

From SOLOC

Captain E. M. Graham	G-4
----------------------	-----

From AFHQ

Major Wintour

G-3

Colonel G. King
Colonel J. Riepe
Lt. Col. I. Allen
Lt. Col. J. Smith

15th Army Group

From OSSLt. Col. C. M. Wood
Lt. Col. K. Baker
Major T. F. McCoy
Captain Alphino
Mr. Stonborough
Mr. A. DullesFrom SOEMajor J. Hamilton
Sqd/Ldr R. BettsFrom SOLOC

Captain E. M. Graham

G-4

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
G-3 Section

17 January 1945

Minutes of Meeting held in Vittel Palace Hotel
at 1400 hours, 17 January 1945, to discuss the
question of supplies to partisans in North ITALY.

PRESENT

6th Army Group

Brig. Gen. R. E. Jenkins, AC of S, G-3
Major Fenner G-4
Lt. Col. J. W. Huffer G-3
Major H. Alet G-2) French
Major Tupinier G-2)
Col. Culleton G-3
Col. Randolph G-2
Capt. Bertrand MS

SHAEF

Lt. Col. Baumer G-3
Lt. Col. O'Hanlon SHAEF Mission (FRANCE)
Major Wintour
Capt. Gaunt

AFHQ

Colonel G. King
Colonel J. Riopo
Lt. Col. J. Allen
15th Army Group

OSS

Lt. Col. C. M. Wood
Lt. Col. K. Baker
Capt. Griffith
Capt. Alphino
Mr. Stonborough
Mr. Gady

SOE

Major J. Hamilton
Sqd/Ldr R. Betts
Sqd/Ldr Brock

SOLOC

Capt. E. M. Graham G-4

SI

Capt. Guircho

ALPS SECTOR

Capt. Sallet
Lt. Maureir.

1. General Jenkins opened the meeting and welcomed the participants to the 6th Army Group. He explained that the meeting had fallen at an un-

AFHQ

Colonel C. King
Colonel J. Riopo
Lt. Col. J. Allen

15th Army Group

OSS

Lt. Col. C. M. Wood
Lt. Col. K. Baker
Capt. Griffith
Capt. Alphino
Mr. Stonborough
Mr. Cady

SOE

Major J. Hamilton
Sqd/Ldr R. Betts
Sqd/Ldr Brock

SOLOC

Capt. E. M. Graham G-4

SI

Capt. Guircho

ALPS SECTOR

Capt. Saillet
Lt. Maureir.

1. General Jenkins opened the meeting and welcomed the participants to 6th Army Group. He explained that the meeting had fallen at an unfortunate time inasmuch as the current battle in the north was absorbing all the attention of 6th Army Group. Due to this fact he might not find it possible to be present at all the meetings but, in his absence, 6th Army Group would be represented by Col. Culleton and Lt. Col. Huffer.

He explained that the meeting had been called at the suggestion of SHAEF and with the concurrence of AFHQ. It was manifest that the problem was not one to be settled at Army Group level but rather at theater level between SHAEF and AFHQ. He proposed to state the 6th Army Group position in the matter and then turn the meeting over to the joint chairmanship of the senior representative from SHAEF and the senior representative from AFHQ.

General Jenkins felt that there must be at least one and possibly two more meetings inasmuch as the agreements reached would have far reaching effect and there can be no mistake as to their accuracy at

SECRET

the termination of the conference. He suggested that there be an open discussion of the problem and that agreements be reached insofar as possible. Minutes were being taken and a transcription would be furnished each member. Each should make such necessary corrections as he understands should be made in the original draft and then have another meeting tomorrow to edit and correct the minutes as the members agree following which they will be reproduced with such additions as are included and the final agreements sent to the represented headquarters for further study.

Lt. Col. Baumer agreed but stated that there were certain decisions which could not be made. General Jenkins agreed but felt that the question should be "buttoned up" as much as was possible at the Army Group level.

2.

General Jenkins then reviewed the origin of the problem. He stated that last fall 6th Army Group had received from AAI through AFHQ a cable in which they wished to establish an OSS detachment of not to exceed 10 officers and 15 EM in ANNEMASSE in FRANCE. The detachment would also have operational and intelligence functions in NW ITALY. They requested 6th Army Group approval and comments. Since 6th Army Group had at that time passed to operational control of ETOUSA cabled concurrence was sent to SHAEF who repeated it to AFHQ stating that we would approve the establishment of this detachment, provided that the party was under the control of AFHQ and that they definitely establish liaison and coordination between this detachment and the SOE detachment that had already been approved for operation in the same area. Since that time the problem has been boiling until it has now reached the point where it has become a problem for SHAEF and AFHQ because of political as well as military implications, which is culminated in an agreement with the French Government for the conduct of certain operations through this area and we and SOLOC agreed to place this OSS detachment under SOLOC for supply and administration. Summed up, the 6th Army Group position in the matter is very brief and is as follows:

a. See (*) below.

b. Detachment F will submit to 6th Army Group a copy of all intelligence, operational and administrative reports sent to OSS, SHAEF and AFHQ. We must know what is going on in our own combat zone.

c. A roster of all operating personnel, temporary or permanent, on duty with Detachment F will be furnished 6th Army Group. Any changes subsequently made will be promptly reported.

d. Should any breach of security occur involving 6th Army Group in which

would approve the establishment of AFHQ and that they definitely establish party was under the control of AFHQ and that they definitely establish liaison and coordination between this detachment and the SOE detachment that had already been approved for operation in the same area. Since that time the problem has been boiling until it has now reached the point where it has become a problem for SHAEF and AFHQ because of political as well as military implications, which is culminated in an agreement with the French Government for the conduct of certain operations through this area and we and SOLOC agreed to place this OSS detachment under SOLOC for supply and administration. Summed up, the 6th Army Group position in the matter is very brief and is as follows:

- a. See (*) below.
- b. Detachment F will submit to 6th Army Group a copy of all intelligence, operational and administrative reports sent to OSS, SHAEF and AFHQ. We must know what is going on in our own combat zone.
- c. A roster of all operating personnel, temporary or permanent, on duty with Detachment F will be furnished 6th Army Group. Any changes subsequently made will be promptly reported.
- d. Should any breach of security occur involving 6th Army Group in which personnel, both agent and operating, of this Detachment are concerned 6th Army Group reserves the right to take such action as it deems expedient.
- e. Because of having reached but a small proportion of the authorized War Department level of supplies 6th Army Group cannot concur in the diversion of any supplies shipped to SOLOC for the supply and maintenance of the Group nor can it concur in the diversion of any supplies destined for Civil Affairs in 6th Army Group area.

Those are the bases on which 6th Army Group stands, subject of course, to be over-ruled by SHAEF. He asked if there were any questions as to reasons behind these bases.

Sqd Ldr Betts asked if these regulations apply equally to SOE and OSS, to which Gen. Jenkins replied that the question of SOE was not up at this meeting but should it be raised the same rulings would apply. (Applicable to SOLOC - reference minutes below.)

- *. 6th Army Group will exercise no operational or administrative control over Detachment F, OSS.

SECRET

0660

SECRET

AFHQ asked if they understood correctly that 6th Army Group would not allow diversion of supplies for base personnel or for subsequent infiltration into ITALY to which Gen. Jenkins replied that supplies for the partisans would not be allowed. AFHQ then asked if when SOLOC accepts responsibility only for supply of Detachment F, they accepted responsibility only for supply of base detachment, to which Gen. Jenkins agreed.

Gen. Jenkins explained that 6th Army Group would be in a most awkward position if they were forced to tell Gen. de Lattre that they could not make up an extra FFI battalion in the south of France and then tell OSS they could supply 30,000 Partisans. He stated that 6th Army Group supply situation in the south of France was not at all healthy. Upon movement of combat troops from the north of France it is necessary to divert supplies to this area to support them because supplies are not available in the south of France. (See subparagraph 7, paragraph 7.)

AFHQ asked if 6th Army Group proposed to maintain the same attitude after this supply situation eases. Gen. Jenkins then replied that this would be for decision at the time and that 6th Army Group was now below proper level.

AFHQ then asked if this situation applied only to clothing and rations or if it extended to warlike stores to which Gen. Jenkins replied that 6th Army Group will not release small arms ammunition. He explained that the supply situation was the bad feature of the whole question. 6th Army Group will not accept or concur in any program which involves diversion of supplies destined for 6th Army Group or Civil Affairs to Partisans in NW ITALY.

AFHQ asked if supplies were landed in the ports of Southern France specifically for OSS detachment, would transportation be on hand to move them forward to bases. Gen. Jenkins replied that this was a question for SOLOC to decide but that it should be able to be worked out. He explained that 6th Army Group were quite interested in the program inasmuch as they had a program in the Alps ever since the initial landings and had not yet gained anything from it.

Lt. Col. Baumer felt that from the SHAEF standpoint it seems necessary to discuss both OSS and SOE as the two are not easily separated; problems which affect one will affect the other. Gen. Jenkins agreed to this if AFHQ felt the same way. 6th Army Group position is the same in either case. The five points mentioned above apply in either case. He then turned the chair over to Col. King of AFHQ and Lt. Col. Baumer of SHAEF.

Lt. Col. Baumer asked 6th Army Group's policy as to frontier control. At the present time it is a forward zone. He understood that First French Army controls part of the frontier and an AA Brigade the other portion. Gen. Jenkins replied that 6th Army Group controls the entire

which involves diversion of supplies destined for 6th Army Group or Civil Affairs to Partisans in NW ITALY.

AFHQ asked if supplies were landed in the ports of Southern France specifically for OSS detachment, would transportation be on hand to move them forward to bases. Gen. Jenkins replied that this was a question for SOLOC to decide but that it should be able to be worked out. He explained that 6th Army Group were quite interested in the program inasmuch as they had a program in the Alps ever since the initial landings and had not yet gained anything from it.

Lt. Col. Baumer felt that from the SHAEF standpoint it seems necessary to discuss both OSS and SOE as the two are not easily separated; problems which affect one will affect the other. Gen. Jenkins agreed to this; if AFHQ felt the same way. 6th Army Group position is the same in either case. The five points mentioned above apply in either case. He then turned the chair over to Col. King of AFHQ and Lt. Col. Baumer of SHAEF.

Lt. Col. Baumer asked 6th Army Group's policy as to frontier control. At the present time it is a forward zone. He understood that First French Army controls part of the frontier and an AA Brigade the other portion. Gen. Jenkins explained that 6th Army Group controls the SWISS frontier and the FRANCO-ITALIAN border through the First French Army as far south as ST. ETIENNE. General de Lattre is Army Commander commanding that area. General Molle is in command of the Alps front from the SWISS frontier to ST. ETIENNE. Troops are under 6th Army Group through First French Army. It is a combat zone and not communications zone nor zone of the interior. Only General Devers is responsible for everything in the area. South of ST. ETIENNE the border is controlled by a task force set up under the headquarters of 44 AAA Brigade under General Tobin who is responsible directly to Gen. Devers. This is also a combat zone and not CZ nor ZI.

Lt. Col. O'Hanlon of SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) stated that some time ago they had taken up with the French, at the request of 6th Army Group, the advisability of the French assuming responsibility for control of that frontier and a French general in charge responsible directly to 6th Army Group. He asked if this would still hold. Gen. Jenkins

Confidential

replied that the condition which existed at the time this request went to SILEX no longer exists. 6th Army Group proposed as soon as other operations are completed to pass back to the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier an additional division; the frontier to be controlled by 6th Army Group. That division will be, it is hoped, a Rearmament Program French Division.

4. AFHQ asked if it was to 6th Army Group's interest to keep a quiet frontier on FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier to which Gen. Jenkins replied that it was very definitely so. AFHQ then asked if it would be to 6th Army Group's interest to have a strong Partisan movement on the other side of the border. Gen. Jenkins stated that he felt it would be dependant on the ability of the Partisans to accomplish any mission, which he felt was doubtful.

5. Col. King of AFHQ then discussed the present state of Italian Partisans in NW ITALY. He stated there were 53,000 potential Partisans in NW ITALY. There are 25,000 active Partisans in NW ITALY and 5,000 effective Partisans close to the border. He stated that AFHQ plans an offensive some time in the future. AFHQ desires to hold all possible enemy hostiles in the NW, up in PIEMONTE. There are now held there by Partisan effort the 5th Mountain and 34th Inf. German divisions, sizable elements of Italian regulars and some irregular Italian outfits. We feel then that it is necessary to keep the 5,000 effectives close to the border still engaging the enemy and to prepare them by propaganda, training and some supplies to strike even a heavier blow when we start our offensive. To do this we will have to build up a little stock pile. Bearing in mind that Gen. Jenkins has said we do not want to be mixed up with any new activities on the border now but we do want to keep what is going there going. As to the operational value of the partisans, AFHQ feels that the value of these effectives and these active, now passive, Partisans is equal to the number of divisions and irregulars that they now hold there and may attract in the future. In other words we feel that the Partisan activity in NW ITALY is the equivalent of at least 3 1/2 hostile, perhaps not first class, enemy divisions. He then asked Col. Riepe with 15th Army Group to continue with more detailed information.

Col. Riepe felt that in addition to material considerations 15th Army Group had a certain moral responsibility to these people. In the beginning the Partisan movement in ITALY was spontaneous but since that time 15th Army Group has supplied them, furnished some 14 missions in NW ITALY, exhorted them to do this and to do that and he felt that a clear cut moral responsibility to do what they could to maintain them lay with 15th Army Group. Until they were satisfied that everything possible had been done for the Partisans, the responsibility will still remain.

even to build up a little stock pile. Bearing in mind that Jenkins has said we do not want to be mixed up with any new activities on the border now but we do want to keep what is going there going. As to the operational value of the partisans, AFHQ feels that the value of these effectives and these active, now passive, Partisans is equal to the number of divisions and irregulars that they now hold there and may attract in the future. In other words we feel that the Partisan activity in NW ITALY is the equivalent of at least $3\frac{1}{2}$ hostile, perhaps not first class, enemy divisions. He then asked Col. Riepe with 15th Army Group to continue with more detailed information.

Col. Riepe felt that in addition to material considerations 15th Army Group had a certain moral responsibility to these people. In the beginning the Partisan movement in ITALY was spontaneous but since that time 15th Army Group has supplied them, furnished some 14 missions in NW ITALY, exhorted them to do this and to do that and he felt that a clear cut moral responsibility to do what they could to maintain them lay with 15th Army Group. Until they were satisfied that everything possible had been done for the Partisans, the responsibility will still remain.

In regard to Para. 2c, G-4 AFHQ stated that he was not qualified to speak for the British side (SOE) but that OSS was supplied on the same basis as other American units from a catalogue prepared by OSS in WASHINGTON, supplies being shipped on order both to AFHQ and ETTOUS. There is actually no difference in supplies brought forward from AFHQ to SOLOCC from those shipped directly from the States. He stated that AFHQ would meet the requirements of this project to the extent possible or their proportionate share, which he believed to be about 50%. There is no difference in supplies shipped to OSS than in those shipped to SOLOCC for American Troops here.

SOLCC stated that all their needs had been predicated upon the requirements of 6th Army Group and not the addition of OSS. Gen. Jenkins brought out that a solution to the OSS supply problem appeared to be for AFHQ to place an emergency requisition on PEMARK for Partisan supplies and that these supplies be shipped directly to MARSEILLES for the purpose. AFHQ stated that shipping was not the big problem in supplies but felt that question could be worked out

SECRET

0 6 6 4

SECRET

with SOLOC. Col. King asked Lt. Col. Wood if he had anything to add to the question. Col. Wood stated that it seemed rather uneconomic to ship from ITALY to MARSEILLE and then across country to ANNEMASSE base if they could draw supplies from, say LYON. If emergency issue can be brought to France the problem would, however, be solved as far as OSS is concerned. The only alternative is to fly certain small quantities from ITALY. Economics or logistics of this project seem rather appalling; to fly from south of ITALY up to FRANCE. Any other means rather than aircraft would seem to be preferable. SOLOC stated they could ship supplies to ANNECY by rail but beyond 4 IX LA BAINS they would not be able to provide military protection. At this point supplies would be transferred to French railways and it would be up to OSS to protect them.

Col. Riepe again raised the point that the only other alternative appears to be to fly supplies in from BRINDISI and drop by parachute to the FRANCO-ITALIAN border; the whole question had been brought up, however, by the inability of AFHQ to fly in supplies due to poor weather conditions at the present time. Col. Wood stated that time was the essence of the entire proposition; project had been started over two months and had been revised due to inability of AFHQ to obtain supplies. It was much quicker to draw supplies in France than to attempt to ship them from ITALY. Col. King stated that AFHQ G-4 would discuss the problem further with SOLOC.

7. Col. Baumer stated that the supply problem jumping off point was that CZ EFOUSA will supply nothing. There were three additional points mentioned. He asked AFHQ to confirm that there would be no further commitment involved in supplying SOE base at NICE. Representative of SOE ITALY stated that they do expect to have a continuous demand for stores based on NICE and GRENOBLE. They have so far sent a certain amount of stores by air; in addition they have succeeded in sending a very small quantity by shipping. SOM stores in the BRINDISI area is the supply base. It had been suggested that certain small YUGO-SLAVIAN ships might be used to ship the supplies to France in small quantities very rapidly.

In discussion it appeared that a cable had been sent to SHAEF requesting supplies for OSS and that no further supplies would be demanded for SOE. This was predicated upon the fact that a common supply system was to be adopted whereby SOE and OSS would draw from the same dump. However, SOE representative stated that SOE supplies had not been included in the original cable. Col. Wood stated, however, that they had been included in a subsequent cable. The proposition had, however, been refused and it was now necessary that both SOE and OSS have additional supplies.

The point was raised that the French DGES had received a request

731

would discuss the problem further with SOLOC.

7. Col. Baumer stated that the supply problem jumping off point was that C2 ETOUSA will supply nothing. There were three additional points mentioned. He asked AFHQ to confirm that there would be no further commitment involved in supplying SOE base at NICE. Representative of SOE ITALY stated that they do expect to have a continuous demand for stores based on NICE and CREMOLE. They have so far sent a certain amount of stores by air; in addition they have succeeded in sending a very small quantity by shipping. SOM stores in the HRINDISI area is the supply base. It had been suggested that certain small YUGO-SLAVIAN ships might be used to ship the supplies to France in small quantities very rapidly.

In discussion it appeared that a cable had been sent to SHAEF requesting supplies for OSS and that no further supplies would be demanded for SOE. This was predicated upon the fact that a common supply system was to be adopted whereby SOE and OSS would draw from the same dump. However, SOE representative stated that SOE supplies had not been included in the original cable. Col. Wood stated, however, that they had been included in a subsequent cable. The proposition had, however, been refused and it was now necessary that both SOE and OSS have additional supplies.

The point was raised that the French DGERS had received a request from the Italian Under Secretary of War to provide air transport for shipping supplies from FRANCE to Italian Partisans in NW ITALY; supplies to be furnished by ITALY. SOE representative at NICE stated that the idea was good but where would the Italians get the supplies; in all probability they would approach SOE representatives, obtain the weapons, ship them to FRANCE and turn them over to the French who could probably find a place to infiltrate them into NW ITALY.

Lt. Col. Baumer then brought out the following points: first, anything that comes from ITALY we will accept when it arrives and use it accordingly; second, OSS WASHINGTON and any replacement for supplies used does not enter into this problem; third, supplies will have to come from AFHQ.

Col. King asked if it would be possible to have supplies from AFHQ earmarked for OSS in Southern France and items in bases in France issued to OSS before the actual physical arrival of supplies from AFHQ.

SECRET

Gen. Jenkins replied that as the 6th Army Group supply situation stands today SOLOC can furnish nothing, not even supplies that are replaced by a due bill from AFHQ. The supplies must be physically in SOLOC from AFHQ before 6th Army Group can handle it. He stated that 6th Army Group could not undertake the supply and maintenance of 30,000 bodies at its present level of supply. Col. Wood said they were only asking for 4,000 but Gen. Jenkins stated that the rule still held. SOLOC confirmed the 6th Army Group position.

Gen. Jenkins then presented a little more background on the supply situation. He stated that operations are dependent on supplies which G-4 and SOLOC can deliver. 6th Army Group is now back-logged in PEMBERK with supplies that should be in the theater. Ships from ITALY to MARSEILLE run quite frequently and necessary supplies for 4,000 Partisans can be shipped, deck loaded if necessary, and brought in France. SOLOC will then deliver them but 6th Army Group will never agree to any diversion of 6th Army Group stores. Major Fennor raised the point that certainly OSS must have ordered supplies for these operations in advance and that the question should be only that of moving supplies from ITALY to FRANCE. Col. Wood stated, however, that in informal discussions they had been led to believe that the question of 10 or even 20 tons of supplies per day for Partisan activity was not worth worrying about, that it was only a question of AFHQ requesting them; hence supplies were not in hand in ITALY for this purpose.

SOE asked if it could be assumed that SOLOC would transport any supplies brought into ports of Southern FRANCE to SOE/OSS bases in NICE, GRENOBLE, and ANNECY, to which SOLOC agreed.

8. Col. King stated that it was apparent that AFHQ will get no supplies from SOLOC sources for Partisans. Gen. Jenkins asked SHAEF's views on the matter. Col. Baumer replied that it was a very difficult answer to give. He stated that any project of this kind, whether in NORMANDY, HOLLAND or ITALY or wherever resistance may be useful, becomes a matter as to whether it is worthwhile giving supplies in proportion to what you expect to get from the resistance. At the moment we have no decision from high level to state whether or not this would be top priority. Much would depend on the intelligence as to how much good in value of operational help the Partisans can give us. Then there should be no question about giving priority to this sort of project. But at the moment there can be no decision. Col. King asked if it would be given consideration. Col. Baumer said, of course, that was one reason SHAEF wanted to find out as much as possible about the whole situation.

9. In regard to 2g, Col. O'Hanlon was asked to give the political side of the question as seen from SHAEF Mission. He stated that they had been asked to take up with the French Government the question of allowing Italian Partisans to enter French territory for the purpose

this purpose.

SOE asked if it could be assumed that SOLOCC would transport any supplies brought into ports of Southern FRANCE to SOE/OSS bases in NICE, GRENOBLE, and ANNECY, to which SOLOCC agreed.

8.

Col. King stated that it was apparent that AFHQ will get no supplies from SOLOCC sources for Partisans. Gen. Jenkins asked SHAEF's views on the matter. Col. Baumer replied that it was a very difficult answer to give. He stated that any project of this kind, whether in NORMANDY, HOLLAND or ITALY or wherever resistance may be useful, becomes a matter as to whether it is worthwhile giving supplies in proportion to what you expect to get from the resistance. At the moment we have no decision from high level to state whether or not this would be top priority. Much would depend on the intelligence as to how much good in value of operational help the Partisans can give us. Then there should be no question about giving priority to this sort of project. But at the moment there can be no decision. Col. King asked if it would be given consideration. Col. Baumer said, of course, that that was one reason SHAEF wanted to find out as much as possible about the whole situation.

9.

In regard to 2g, Col. O'Hanlon was asked to give the political side of the question as seen from SHAEF Mission. He stated that they had been asked to take up with the French Government the question of allowing Italian Partisans to enter French territory for the purpose of picking up supplies. French were at first against it but SHAEF Mission put forth the argument that Partisans were keeping a number of enemy divisions dispersed in Italy after which they agreed to allow this project to go on, that they would allow the Partisans to come into French territory subject to following conditions: a French general in Alps sector be placed in a position so that he could supervise operation and protect French interests; they will have opportunity of knowing what goes on and insure that any Italians entering should leave country; operations carried out in such a way that there is contact only between Italian Partisans and British or American personnel - they do not want FFI to assist in these operations due to fear of clashes.

10.

Col. Baumer raised the question of security agreements. Mr. Stoneborough thought this question would better be answered by Col. Baker.

SECRET

0 8 6 8

SECRET

Col. Baker stated that some such difficulty had been sensed when first OSS arrived in November. Every member of the detachment was instructed, especially officers in charge of operations, to inform both French and Italians that the only persons we were interested in were men who would work and fight in ITALY. We wanted in no way to encourage the idea that Americans or British had supplies on this side of the border and that Italians could come over here and live off them. All Italians were informed that they could have supplies if and only they returned to ITALY. Arrangements with frontier personnel have been informal but agreeable. The Deuxieme Bureau of General Mollo's Headquarters in GRENOBLE and his assistant have taken our word for individuals as to whether or not they were working for us and were prepared to go back on the return trip and have allowed those individuals to come through their patrols and in return he has received benefit of interrogation of personnel who have just come through enemy positions. Location of emplacements and strength and manning of emplacements. Agreements have been reached so that if they object to any particular personnel they will be kept here rather than returned. Arrangements have been very satisfactory.

Major Hamilton confirmed Col. Baker's statements. He stated that his connections with French divisional authorities had always been quite pleasant and even with Italians who had been long in this country French were prepared to accept SOE guarantee for them. The French are quite agreeable to let them go back if we certify they are the right people; we go to the Military Security people who issue passes to these personnel.

Col. Baumer asked if it were correct to conclude that front line conditions are very agreeable. Is there any necessity for further political meetings over the rear area or the French general in command? Major Hamilton stated that any difficulties experienced had been at a low level; at high levels there is no question. Col. Baker stated that French Mission had been established to place French officers of the DGER with each mission - at NICE, GRENOBLE and ANNEMASSE - for the purpose of insuring that French regulations were carried out and to act as representatives to the French authorities in case any difficulties should arise.

Col. Baumer then asked if the French had anything further to say in the matter. SOE NICE brought out the point that he had had considerable difficulty in his area. However, since the appointment of General Mollo it was possible that conditions might improve and he thought it might be wise to let things ride for the present and see how they turned out. This was agreed.

Col. Baumer cautioned that Gen. Mollo should be in sufficient contact with the French authorities.

0 6 6 9

his connections with French divisional authorities had always been quite pleasant and even with Italians who had been long in this country French were prepared to accept SOE guarantee for them. The French are quite agreeable to let them go back if we certify they are the right people; we go to the Military Security people who issue passes to these personnel.

Col. Baumer asked if it were correct to conclude that front line conditions are very agreeable. Is there any necessity for further political meetings over the rear area or the French general in command? Major Hamilton stated that any difficulties experienced had been at a low level; at high levels there is no question. Col. Baker stated that French Mission had been established to place French officers of the DGER with each mission - at NICE, GRENOBLE and ANNEMASSE - for the purpose of insuring that French regulations were carried out and to act as representatives to the French authorities in case any difficulties should arise.

720

Col. Baumer then asked if the French had anything further to say in the matter. SOE NICE brought out the point that he had had considerable difficulty in his area. However, since the appointment of General Molle it was possible that conditions might improve and he thought it might be wise to let things ride for the present and see how they turned out. This was agreed.

Col. Baumer cautioned that Gen. Molle should be kept informed in sufficient time to allow him to ask for any detailed modifications. It was agreed that both SOE and OSS would keep General Molle informed of all plans. Col. Baker stated that G-2 at forward base knows all personnel at the base but no report is made by OSS. Col. O'Hanlon said that the French Government had agreed subject to Gen. Molle's supervision. Capt Guircha and Capt. Sailer both said that no further agreement is necessary with General Molle and if any difficulty should arise in the future, Capt. Guircha's mission is made for solving those difficulties.

Gen. Jenkins came back to the point of the difficulty at NICE. One point remained to be cleared up; Gen. Molle's authority and responsibility ends at ST. ETIENNE. SOE NICE thought General Molle's activity extended to the NICE Sector. Gen. Jenkins said that it did not; that Col. Lanusse and his command were under Gen. Tobin. Gen. Jenkins felt that the question was one which should be handled by the SHAEF Mission. It is unquestionably the French Government's wish that Gen. Molle have authority over all this activity throughout the length of the frontier but for the moment it extends only to

SECRET

ST. ETIENNE. Col. O'Hanlon explained that the French had agreed to the Partisan activity at a time when they thought the entire frontier would be under a French general. It will now be necessary to go back to them and ask if they will consent to such operations with CG 44th AAA Brigade responsible for southern half of sector. Col. Baumer asked if we could get a definition of Gen. Molle's responsibility from those members of French mission present. Col O'Hanlon stated that according to the French interpretation General Molle controls the whole of the sector administratively and only the northern half operationally. Gen. Jenkins raised the point that rear boundary of 44th AAA Brigade excludes NICE which is in SOLOC and is under command of Gen. Larkin. North of that area rear boundary of combat zone extends around from the provinces which Gen. Molle commands but Gen Molle certainly does not command the NICE area. To which the SOE NICE representative replied that although Col. Lanusse's headquarters were in NICE it was of the area around NICE that they were interested in. Gen Jenkins stated that movement of supplies through sector of 44th AAA Brigade is a responsibility of Gen. Tobin only. If we can bring about agreement that Gen. Molle controls entire boundary for that purpose then Gen. Molle should bring down there his personal representative alongside Gen. Tobin. Tactical command set up should remain as is but for these purposes and to control flow of Italians or French across the frontier, a scheme can be worked out by SHAFF Mission with French Government permitting Gen. Molle to extend his authority to the MEDITERRANEAN Coast putting a personal representative with Gen. Tobin.

Col. O'Hanlon stated that he would like to have a recommendation from SHAFF that this proposal be put into effect after which they would in turn present it to the Defense Nationale. Col. Baumer stated that since there is some lack of agreement as to Gen. Molle's control from ST. ETIENNE to the Coast SHAFF will now instruct SHAFF Mission to ask Defense Nationale for a definition of Gen. Molle's duties particularly in regard to Italian Partisans in the southern sector while tactical command is still exercised by 6th Army Group. Gen. Jenkins stated that he understood that there was a French G-2 representative at NICE, GRENOBLE and at ANNECY. Why could not these officers perform the same function. SOE NICE replied that would be part of their functions and that was why he had asked if it would be necessary to refer the matter to SHAFF or await results of Gen. Molle's decision. Gen. Tobin said he would like it settled.

11. Col. Baumer stated that two weighty questions had been discussed; the political situation on the frontier and the fact that supplies would have to be made available by AFHQ and brought forward physically over supply route from MARSEILLE and thence to SOE and OSS bases.

but for these purposes and to control flow of supplies across the frontier, a scheme can be worked out by SHAEF Mission with French Government permitting Gen. Molle to extend his authority to the MEDITERRANEAN Coast putting a personal representative with Gen. Tobin.

Col. O'Hanlon stated that he would like to have a recommendation from SHAEF that this proposal be put into effect after which they would in turn present it to the Defense Nationale. Col. Baumer stated that since there is some lack of agreement as to Gen. Molle's control from ST. ETIENNE to the Coast SHAEF will now instruct SHAEF Mission to ask Defense Nationale for a definition of Gen. Molle's duties particularly in regard to Italian Partisans in the southern sector while tactical command is still exercised by 6th Army Group. Gen. Jenkins stated that he understood that there was a French G-2 representative at NICE, GRENOBLE and at ANNECY. Why could not these officers perform the same function. SOE NICE replied that would be part of their functions and that was why he had asked if it would be necessary to refer the matter to SHAEF or await results of Gen. Molle's decision. Gen. Tobin said he would like it settled.

11. Col. Baumer stated that two weighty questions had been discussed; the political situation on the frontier and the fact that supplies would have to be made available by AFHQ and brought forward physically over supply route from MARSEILLE and thence to SOE and CSS bases. He then asked CSS and SOE to review their work for the past few months.

Col. Riepe said that he would like statements from Sqd Ldr Betts and Col. Baker in this regard.

Sqd Ldr Betts said they had made very few patrols. They were hoping that the sea route would be their main line of communication but have experienced great difficulty in getting naval support and have only just started on sea side. As for patrols we have done about 10-12 successful patrols carrying 30-35 pounds of food and clothing per man.

SECRET

0 6 7 2

SECRET

Maj. Hamilton stated that their station had started earlier and had taken between 30-35 tons over the border. Things have, however, slowed down tremendously lately due to tactical difficulties and snow bound roads. Everything now has to be carried by humans which makes it very difficult. During the early months (back to September) it was practically all ammunition, arms and explosives.

Col. Baker stated that his detachment came in latter part of November and started from scratch. They have delivered to date about 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ - 5 tons which is all by human portage. Supplies have consisted of food and clothing and small light arms mostly for security purposes. We are not eager to give Italians enough to make them a lucrative target for the Germans since once they gather too many arms Germans begin to take counter measures against Partisans.

12. Col. King then brought up Para. 2b of the Agenda. Col. Riepe stated that it had been pretty well covered as regards numerical strength. It was estimated at 15th Army Group that at heads of valleys touching on FRANCO-ITALIAN border there are somewhere between 5 and 10,000 semi-active Partisans remaining. As to physical condition it would be best to contact the missions who are in a better position to give correct answers.

Sqd Ldr Betts stated that question of nutrition was not so acute as in other areas - question of clothing is rather more pressing - first priority is ammunition, second clothing, third arms, fourth food, fifth explosives.

Major Hamilton stated that clothing at this time of the year is one of the main difficulties, especially boots. Average Partisan is more or less in rags. Very few have boots which will enable them to cross the mountains. I think clothing is one of the first problems. In some of the valleys food position is rather difficult but somehow they seem to manage it but they can go on for a little while. If we want to maintain their actual numbers we have to assist them as far as food is concerned. Arms are not so pressing because they can't afford now to make attacks against overwhelming German forces and only can lie low.

Col. Riepe then pointed out that on 12 November General Alexander issued instructions to the Partisans all of which led up to a slow down program, cease any ambitious projects, attempt conservation of stores in their possession and build for the future, - in other words a Partisan effort to parallel military effort. Lt. General Clark later reiterated these instructions.

G-4 AFHQ asked if clothing sent across border were issued in original state if any attempt were made to disguise it. The answer was that it was issued as received, in its original state.

724

Equid. But before stated that question of nutrition was not so acute as in other areas - question of clothing is rather more pressing - first priority is ammunition, second clothing, third arms, fourth food, fifth explosives.

Major Hamilton stated that clothing at this time of the year is one of the main difficulties, especially boots. Average Partisan is more or less in rags. Very few have boots which will enable them to cross the mountains. I think clothing is one of the first problems. In some of the valleys food position is rather difficult but somehow they seem to manage it but they can go on for a little while. If we want to maintain their actual numbers we have to assist them as far as food is concerned. Arms are not so pressing because they can't afford now to make attacks against overwhelming German forces and only can lie low.

Col. Riepe then pointed out that on 12 November General Alexander issued instructions to the Partisans all of which led up to a slow down program, cease any ambitious projects, attempt conservation of stores in their possession and build for the future, - in other words a Partisan effort to parallel military effort. Lt. General Clark later reiterated these instructions.

G-4 AFHQ asked if clothing sent across border were issued in original state if any attempt were made to disguise it. The answer was that it was issued as received, in its original state.

Col. Baker confirmed Major Hamilton's statements. People who come over the border in his sector are in pretty bad shape, it is surprising that they survive the trip. Clothing and food are a high priority. The arms they desire are different from those they receive. Partisans still think in terms of arms for attacking whereas what they need to follow Gen. Alexander's directive are arms for security and so they get such items as 9 mm M-3s that will use enemy ammunition. They also get some explosives for road blocks and any sabotage they can do. Food situation is not as acute as it was but any we can give them is readily accepted.

G-4, 6th Army Group asked if the same people returned to the missions repeatedly. Col. Baker replied that most of the work was handled by the same people who acted as porters between the missions and the Partisans band leaders. We have an officer north of TURIN at the present organizing these parties. This

6

SECRET

SECRET

may become a bottle neck due to our inability to pass supplies through the mountains, especially in winter, by any other means.

Col. Riepe raised the question as to the need for supplies to the Partisans. In connection with Para 2i, 15th Army Group had thought enough of NW ITALY to put in 14 missions in the area west of a line GENOA-MILAN - LAKE MAGGIORE, of which only 7 are within actual reach of the border. These 14 missions have in their control 22 DZs which in good flying weather would be quite satisfactory for supplying area. Experience, however, shows 2 out of 3 flying missions fail. Only answer then is need for overland missions. Col. Baker pointed out that though it was physically harder to handle supplies overland the Partisans prefer overland deliveries to air deliveries. Time and again they have seen Germans locate DZs and take material and clean outvalley when they do it. Report came in that Germans had picked up 23 tons which were dropped in December. Major Wintour asked if the overland route would be a permanent method of supply to which Col. Riepe replied that it should exist only for two or three months until flying conditions improve. He stated that upwards of 600 tons had been delivered by air in all of ITALY during December but only 83 tons went into the area west of GENOA - MILAN line. Sqd Ldr Betts stated that last winter it was found that air forces based on Southern ITALY could not fly consistently in the high Alps. He thought, therefore, that there might still be a need in certain Partisan valleys for overland deliveries after spring. Col. Riepe agreed to this but stated the big effort (overland supply across border) would be finished.

13. SOE NICE asked what were the possibilities of getting an aircraft to operate out of NICE. Col. Riepe asked 6th Army Group views on supply base by air. Sqd Ldr Betts stated that a letter had been sent through Gen. Tobin to 6th Army Group requesting this aircraft. Gen. Jenkins said this letter should have gone to 1st TACAF. Gen. Jenkins said 6th Army Group had no objection to their using the airfield at NICE, however, NICE was in the SOLOC area and they would have to be consulted.

14. In regard to Para 2k, Col. King felt that SOE/OSS relations were such that no further coordination was necessary. Col. Baker said that coordination was quite close between the units but as yet supplies had not been pooled. If SHAEF supply had gone through we would have had a joint dump but we still have separate supply dumps, requesting separately to OSS and SOE. We know what each has in store and occasionally borrow from each other. Col. Riepe did not think a definite boundary between the two was required. Col. Baker said the two worked together to avoid duplication of effort and in order to prevent supplying one Partisan band twice while missing some other. Major Hamilton said that in order to prevent Partisans from getting supplies from both teams it might be a good idea for each to notify the other where and to whom supplies were delivered. Col. Baker agreed to this if orders were issued from higher headquarters. Stated that when shortages develop in either branch, each is authorized to borrow and make arrangements. It encouraged a common supply dump but leaves control in the

13. SOE NICE asked what were the possibilities of getting an aircraft to operate out of NICE. Col. Riepe asked 6th Army Group views on supply base by air. Sqd Ldr Betts stated that a letter had been sent through Gen. Tobin to 6th Army Group requesting this aircraft. Gen. Jenkins said this letter should have gone to 1st TACAF. Gen. Jenkins said 6th Army Group had no objection to their using the airfield at NICE, however, NICE was in the SOLOC area and they would have to be consulted.

14. In regard to Para 2k, Col. King felt that SOE/OSS relations were such that no further coordination was necessary. Col. Baker said that coordination was quite close between the units but as yet supplies had not been pooled. If SHAEF supply had gone through we would have had a joint dump but we still have separate supply dumps, requesting separately to OSS and SOE. We know what each has in store and occasionally borrow from each other. Col. Riepe did not think a definite boundary between the two was required. Col. Baker said the two worked together to avoid duplication of effort and in order to prevent supplying one Partisan band twice while missing some other. Major Hamilton said that in order to prevent Partisans from getting supplies from both teams it might be a good idea for each to notify the other where and to whom supplies were delivered. Col. Baker agreed to this if orders were issued from higher headquarters. Stated that when shortages develop in either branch, each is authorized to borrow and make replacements. It approaches a common supply dump but leaves control in the hands of men to whom originally issued. Col. King confirmed that these orders exist.

15. General Jenkins stated that items 2l and m were quite important and that 6th Army Group must ask that their views be respected since this is 6th Army Group combat zone and 6th Army Group must know who is in it and be responsible for securing its own combat zone. Col. Randolph agreed with the Security Sub-committee to produce a statement which will be distributed as an annex to the present minutes.

16. SOLOC agreed that conditions of 2n were satisfactory. Col. Baker did not know OSS had been attached to SOLOC. Col. King said that FX 80986 had advised the attachment of Detachment F to SOLOC; Col. Baker agreed to work it out with SOLOC.

SECRET

SECRET

17. Col. Baumer felt that a fairly definite decision had been arrived at as regards the political question, secondly supply and transportation - AFHQ, SOLOC, OSS and SOE are vitally concerned, and it appears SOE and OSS are cooperating. He felt that rather than have any further full meetings, other than for concurrence of the minutes, the members should be broken into small groups to thresh out problems among themselves. A committee composed of AFHQ, 6th Army Group, SOE, OSS and SOLOC was formed to discuss supply considerations. Full meeting was scheduled for 0930, 18 January to approve the minutes with sub-committees meeting later. Col. Randolph felt that committee meetings should be held earlier to give them a chance to prepare their data and the full meeting held later. Col. King stated that in the matter of passes it was not a question which involved other theaters and could be worked out between SOE, OSS and 6th Army Group.

Sqd Ldr Brock brought up the difficulty of personnel of the detachment getting permission for inter-theater travel from FRANCE to ITALY. He stated that going through present channels sometimes meant a delay of 10 - 14 days. Col. King agreed to straighten this matter out upon his return to AFHQ.

Col. Baumer stated that supply committee would have a preliminary meeting immediately after adjournment of main conference.

Col. King then adjourned the meeting until 0930, 18 January.

0 6 7 7

Col. Baumer stated that supply committee would have a preliminary meeting immediately after adjournment of main conference.

Col. King then adjourned the meeting until 0930, 18 January.

Confidential

0 6 7 8

SECRET

ADDENDUM

A meeting was held at 0930, 18 January, in which the minutes were reviewed and amended and concurred in by all parties with the addition of annexes on Supply and Security and a statement by DGER.

Annex I - Supply
Annex II - Security Subcommittee report.
Annex III - Captain Guirche's statement on behalf of DGER, 6th Army Group will retain the original and add it to the minutes as Annex III.

Colonel Randolph moved that the original copies of the minutes be upgraded to "Top Secret". This was agreed.

After the statement of Captain Guirche was read, Major Hamilton expressed the desire of SHAEF to cooperate with the French Mission.

Colonel Baumer stated that a one page brief of the conference was being prepared. He suggested that the brief be given to Colonel Culleton for addition to the minutes. This was agreed.

Distribution of copies of the minutes:

AFHQ	10 copies
OSS	5 copies
SOE	8 copies
DGER	5 copies
SHAEF	10 copies
SOLOC	5 copies
6th Army Group	10 copies
15th Army Group	10 copies
Headquarters, Gen. Molle	2 copies

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned.

dition to the minutes. This was agreed.

Distribution of copies of the minutes:

AFHQ	10 copies
OSS	5 copies
SOE	8 copies
DGER	5 copies
SHAF	10 copies
SOLOC	5 copies
6th Army Group	10 copies
15th Army Group	10 copies
Headquarters, Gen. Molle	2 copies

727 - There being no further business, the meeting adjourned.

(6)

SECRET

ANNEX I

SUPPLY

The decision reached at the meeting of the supply sub-committee was:
"That if supplies in addition to those on hand or due in for support of 6th Army Group (including civil affairs) could physically be shipped to Southern France ports, that SOLOC will transport them to OSS/SOE bases in NICE, GREEN-OBLE or ANNECY."

/s/ Graham, SOLOC

Fenner, C-4, 6th AG

I. Allen

C.M. Wood

/s/ Graham, SOLOC

Fenner, G-4, 6th AG

I. Allen

C.M. Wood

724 -

6

~~Confidential~~

'SECRET'

ANNEX II

SECURITY

1. The matter of passes referred to in Items 2-L and 2-M for British and American personnel of SOE/OSS should follow the procedures as laid down by 6th Army Group and contained in Intelligence Memorandum #4 dated 6 December 1944 and A.G. Memorandum dated 15 January 1945, Subject: "Pass to Enter Zone 6th Army Group Where dual Language Difficulty is Experienced." The first of these is required by all personnel, other than members of this command, operating in the area of the 6th Army Group and is issued by the A.C. of S., G-2. The other requires that all American, British and French personnel of this command, or such personnel from other headquarters, shall carry passes known as "Laissez Passer Militaire" for their proper identification in areas where dual language difficulties are experienced by guards, patrols etc. This pass will be issued by the headquarters to which such personnel are assigned or attached.

2. With respect to Italian personnel utilized by SOE/OSS, neither of the above passes will be used. Existing procedures for securing passes from Sec-urite Militaire and headquarters of combat units concerned to effect the proper control and identification of such personnel have been in satisfactory operation for the past several months. These procedures are acceptable from a security point of view, if they are known and approved by the Commanding Generals of the combat forces involved. Care should be taken that such Italian personnel be re-lieved of all local passes that may have been issued to them before leaving the combat areas or when discharged from service of SOE/OSS.

0 6 8 2

0 6 8 3

785015

2. With respect to Italian personnel utilized by SOE/OSS, neither of the above passes will be used. Existing procedures for securing passes from Sec-urite Militaire and headquarters of combat units concerned to effect the proper control and identification of such personnel have been in satisfactory operation for the past several months. These procedures are acceptable from a security point of view, if they are known and approved by the Commanding Generals of the combat forces involved. Care should be taken that such Italian personnel be re-lieved of all local passes that may have been issued to them before leaving the combat areas or when discharged from service of SOE/OSS.

725

(6)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ANNEX III

Statement made by Captain Guirche in behalf of DCER

Reference Paragraph G (of the report) of the meeting on 17 January 1945 at VITTEL. The viewpoint of the French Liaison Mission of the DCER with OSS and Special Force is as follows:

1. Jurisdiction of General Molle's services:

a) Security for territory in the ALPS Sector is a purely military element, and it is the responsibility of the Securite Militaire in the sector commanded by General Molle to decide upon all measures to be taken for the most effective security. Of common interest to Allied troops, these measures should present no difficulties.

2. Jurisdiction of the Liaison Mission:

b) Even questions apparently of a purely military character concerning Italian Partisans in French territory -- by the simple fact that they are in French territory -- involve problems pertaining to the French Government's intended policy toward a country with a common frontier.

For this reason, the DCER Liaison Mission is empowered to deal with all questions, military or otherwise, which may result from the presence of Italian Partisans in French territory. If, as the result of difficulties, parleying should occur, involving contacts and conversations with General Molle's services, missions of the Allied OSS and Special Force in FRANCE should consult liaison officers whose duty it is to overcome such difficulties, if they fall within the scope of their jurisdiction, or to forward them to the echelon qualified to make a decision in the matter. These interests are the better defended for being common to English, Americans and French, to the degree that intimate and effective cooperation is observed between French and Allied missions in FRANCE.

This desire for close cooperation was outlined by Captain Guirche to Colonel Baker and Majors Hamilton and Betts of Special Force 1, who expressed their agreement.

6th Army Group
AG TRANSLATION
T-568 18 January 1945

For this reason, the DCAR Liaison Mission is empowered to deal with all questions, military or otherwise, which may result from the presence of Italian Partisans in French territory. If, as the result of difficulties, parleying should occur, involving contacts and conversations with General Molle's services, missions of the Allied OSS and Special Force in FRANCE should consult liaison officers whose duty it is to overcome such difficulties, if they fall within the scope of their jurisdiction, or to forward them to the echelon qualified to make a decision in the matter. These interests are the better defended for being common to English, Americans and French, to the degree that intimate and effective cooperation is observed between French and Allied missions in FRANCE.

This desire for close cooperation was outlined by Captain Guirche to Colonel Baker and Majors Hamilton and Betts of Special Force 1, who expressed their agreement.

6th Army Group
AG TRANSLATION
T-568 18 January 1945

724 -

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

A

Ref: 3202/-/QSS.

17 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Press release.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Army Chief of Staff.

26

I refer to your letter of 5th January.

1. No official release was in fact made. Mr. Luby, the special correspondent of the "Times" showed the Director of the Patriots Branch a document emanating from Italian sources criticizing the Allied treatment of the partisans. Colonel Spicer, the Director, told him that he could expect a change in this treatment and then proceeded to give him in round terms the gist of your telegram of 73500. He did not authorize the release but on the other hand did not tell Mr. Luby that the information was "off the record". He began to be a close personal friend of Mr. Luby.

2. Mr. Luby thereupon telegraphed the attached cable to the "Times" on 29th December. He did not refer this telegram to the Commission before despatch, nor was he under any obligation to do so. The censors did not stop it nor refer it to the Commission, holding that it was non-operational.

3. Colonel Spicer was undoubtedly at fault in releasing information of this nature to a press correspondent, however trustworthy, without insisting that it was "off the record" and not for publication. He has since been relieved of his duties as Director of the Patriots Branch and reprimanded for this action.

4. It is, however, fair to say that so much has been written about the partisans and their treatment after liberation by the Allies that it is difficult to distinguish, as indeed the "Times" correspondent has shown, what information concerning them is operational and what is political and administrative. In order to avoid embarrassment and breaches of security in the future the "Times" correspondent has been asked to submit articles concerning the partisans to this Commission before despatch.

723

5

RECEIVED

CLARENCE A. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief CommissionerCopy to ~~the~~ (NOT SENT)
to those
two.

3206/CC

Translation of Mr. Lanby's cable to the "Times" of 29 Dec 44.

Allied HQ Italy.

A welcome and opportune decision has been taken by Allied HQ that Italian partisans coming through the lines shall be treated henceforth as soldiers of the Italian Army and be issued with rations, uniform and equipment on Italian Army scale with the exception that the uniform instead of being green will be dyed black. There is no question that the Italian partisan bands contain some of the best human material of young Italy. They have been fighting for months past in enemy country at great risk under conditions of great hardship, engaging considerable forces of enemy troops and rendering similar services to the FFI in France. Now since the beginning of winter, weather has made existence in the open impossible they have been drifting through Allied lines in parties of 50 or so, hoping they would be maintained as units under their own commanders. This, according to the general decision at Allied HQ, is not allowed. Instead they are disarmed and told they may join the Italian Army as individuals. Few care to do this. Thus they are discharged with a small payment of money and remain nobody's child nourishing a big grievance in a state of material and moral dejection - good material wasted.

By degrees, in the last month or two, organizations have been built up by the Allied Commission to take charge of them. Reception camps have been established in forward areas where they are fed and clothed and then distributed among labour companies. So far this organization has been compelled to beg clot ing and equipment where it could from various Army sources, American Red Cross, etc., The new decision to treat the partisans as soldiers of the Italian Army represents a great step forward. It would be better still could they be maintained, where willing, as fighting units. In one single instance on the 8th Army front this has been done with great success. (Here Ravenna partisans who did admirable work in cooperation with the Canadian Corps during the recent advance are being employed by the Army staff as an operational unit with excellent results). They are keen as mustard, making themselves extremely useful. The example might be profitably copied elsewhere.

Passage in brackets was suppressed by censor.

717.

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 512.

CONFIDENTIAL

AG 400/033 GEG-O

13th Jan 45.

Subject: Rations, Clothing, Hospitalisation and
Transportation for Patriots.

To: Commanding General, Fifth Army APO 464
Commander, Eighth Army
President Allied Commission

For: Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMIA)

1. Patriots who come from enemy territory will be regarded as an Allied responsibility for the whole of the period during which it is necessary to hold them for screening, determination as to their future status or other purposes. This period will not exceed thirty (30) days.
2. The agency through which the above-mentioned Allied responsibility will be carried out is the LMIA, which will make available to the appropriate organisation of the Allied Commission the necessary clothing, supplies (paras. 3 and 4) and hospitalisation facilities (para. 7b). (This does not relieve AC/AMG of the normal responsibilities with regard to organisation, screening, etc., as outlined in para. 7b.)
3. Authority is granted for the issue by LMIA of up to two thousand (2,000) sets of reconditioned clothing on the following scale.)

1 pair boots	1 jersey, pullover or equivalent
2 pair socks	1 gas cape or raincoat or equivalent
1 pair trousers, wool	1 mess tin or equivalent.
1 shirt, wool.	

The addition of a blanket to this scale is authorised within the limits of availability. No issue in excess of this ceiling will be made without authority of this HQ. Wool outer garments will be dyed either black or rust brown prior to issue.

4. Up to one thousand (1,000) sets of British clothing and one thousand (1,000) sets of United States clothing will be made available in due course to replace the reconditioned Italian clothing issued in accordance with para. 3. above.

721 -

(4/2)

2.

5. The Allied Commission will take all possible steps to ensure that reconditioning of Italian Army and salvage clothing and boots is carried out with the greatest possible speed, in order that it may assume this commitment in full as soon as possible.

6. Authority is granted for issue of Italian military rations. These rations will be drawn through the agency of MMIA. They will count against the totals authorized for US-ITI and BR-ITI ceilings, and will be accounted for on an equal basis.

7. Responsibility.

(a) Armies will collect, disarm and transport Italian patriots to reception camps. They will issue Italian military rations, furnish emergency hospitalization during the period of army control and provide facilities for disinfection and sterilization out of normal resources as far as operational commitments allow.

(b) Allied Commission will maintain suitable reception camps, arrange for Italian Army Hospitalization of sick or wounded to the extent that operations permit, evacuate such casualties as soon as possible to Italian civilian hospitals, issued Italian military rations, provide clothing subject to availability (para.5.) disperse patriots as rapidly as possible and ensure that calls on military supplies are kept to the minimum.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER.

(Sgd.) C.W. CHRISTENBERRY

Colonel AGD.
Acting Adjutant General.

720

ACC DIST-
Patrol Branch
cc files
Exec Comm

(4) a

COPY - info
W. J. Lee
 0870
 JAN 08:500A

SECRET

0/7115
 JAN 09:1500A
 ROUTINE

MEMO

ACTION: AFHQ INFO: WTCUSA, 5 ARMY, COPY TO HQ ALCON, AG, ST.

Ref is para 15 of AMG 5 ARMY letter file 109/2 of 29 December subject handling of Partisans. This provides Partisans before being accepted in Italian Army will be evacuated to Italian Army Military Hospitals for treatment and is contrary to par 3b of AFHQ letter 22 September file 16-400/105 D-O. Italian Army hospital facilities limited in forward areas to bare essential accommodation for effective troops and any such commitment will necessitate increase of ITI-ITI personnel and facilities including allocation of accommodations in buildings which is now very limited on account of Allied requirements. Also rations for such patients would be on ITI-ITI account which cannot stand the strain under present ceilings. These people are civilians until absorbed in Italian Army and civilian hospitals should be made available for them as for normal refugees. This is not Italian Army responsibility. Request clarification of instructions.

Dist

Info-action - Patriots Br (2)

Info - A/President

Chief Commissioner

718

3206/00

Ref is para 15 of AM 5. This provides Partisans before being subject handling of Partisans. This provides to Italian Army military accepted in Italian Army will be evacuated to Italian letter 22 Hospitals for treatment and is contrary to para 30 of AMHQ letter 22 September file AC-400/105 D-0. Italian Army hospital facilities limited in forward areas to bare essential accommodations for effective troops and any such commitment will necessitate increase of ITI-ITI personnel and facilities including allocation of accommodations in buildings which is now very limited on account of Allied requirements. Also rations for such patients would be on ITI-ITI account which cannot stand the strain under present ceilings. These people are civilians until absorbed in Italian Army and civilian hospitals should be made available for them as for normal refugees. This is not Italian Army responsibility. Request clarification of instructions.

Dist

Info-Action - Patriots Br (2)
 Info - A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 C O S
 F Health
 CA Sec
 File (2)
 Float

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) (1) & (2)

Date 10/1/77

By [Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Signature]

PA/ B.L. with all the correspondence & references
 15/1

Original being dealt with by CJS

CONFIDENTIAL

It appears that Colonel Spicer gave this information to Lumbly.

6 January 1945

SUBJECT: Press Release.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
(attention: Chief Commissioner)
APO 394.

1. Your attention is drawn to PX 75600 of 28 December 1944.
2. On 30 December "The Times" is reported to have printed a message from its special correspondent "regarding a decision apparently taken recently by AFHQ to treat Italian Partisans coming through the lines as soldiers of Italian Army".
3. This is assumed to be a misquotation of the first sentence of the signal mentioned above, which reads:

"Patriots coming through our lines will be afforded treatment similar to that accorded to the Italian Army."

The remainder of the message dealt with the issue of clothes and rations to Patriots arriving in a destitute and exhausted condition through the lines.
4. It is alleged that this release to the press was made through Allied Commission channels. Please inform this Headquarters:
 - a. Whether a release was in fact made, and if so,
 - b. The correct text of such release,
 - c. The grounds for releasing information of an operational nature.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

JOHN HARDING,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 307
By JCS Jan. 4 1974
By AG NND, Date 8/22/77
J. Miller

3206/CC

717

See 5

2 b

CONFIDENTIAL

EX 75600
DEC 281852AC/5719
DEC 282130A
ROUTINEAFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FIGDS, FIGDS, FIGAE
ALCOM 5TH ARMY, 8TH ARMY, LAND FORCES SUBCOMMISSION (NMIA)

CO

Patriots coming thru our lines will be afforded treatment similar to that accorded the Italian Army. Pending receipt of detailed instructions you are authorized to issue rations on scale approved for Italian Army and clothing and equipment thru NMIA per individual where required on following scale:

1 pr boots, 2 pr socks, 1 pr trousers wool, 1 shirt wool, 1 jersey pullover or equivalent, 1 gas cape or raincoat or equivalent, 1 mess tin or equivalent.

In addition 1 blanket is authorized within limits of availability.

DIST

ACTION: Patriots Ex 2
Land Forces 2
INFO: Chief Commissioner
C.A. Sec
File 2
Float

716

See

3206/CC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)
JCS Jan. 4 1974
By: AG NARS, JMS 8/22/77
J. Miller

A. 16

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

Ref. 121/PAT.

20 December, 1944.

SUBJECT : Rationing, Clothing, Hospitalisation,
and Transport of Patriots.

TO : A.F. H.Q.

1. This Commission has had under consideration the question of treatment accorded to Italian patriots. Four aspects of this question are regarded as urgent. They are :

- a. Rations.
- b. Clothing
- c. Hospitalisation
- d. Transport.

2. On the basis of the best information available, and more particularly on the basis of information supplied by the Commander of No. 1 Special Force, it is estimated that up to 100,000 genuine fighting patriots will be encountered in the near future and will require to be handled. Patriots have already begun to cross the line in numbers so large that it is impossible for the A.M.G. Officers to handle them adequately under the arrangements which have hitherto been applied. Latest reports say that patriots on FIFTH Army front are at present crossing the lines at an average rate of more than 60 a night.

3. Patriot activities in enemy occupied territory are conducted under the orders of the Allied Commander in Chief. It is not therefore necessary to recapitulate in detail the value of the services rendered by the patriots to the Allied cause. On the other hand, it is very necessary to keep constantly in mind the political background against which patriot activities are conducted.

71 4. The patriots have been encouraged constantly by the Allied wireless, Allied leaflets, and Allied agents to wage war against the enemy. They have been armed and instructed by the Allies. They have learnt to rely not on the Government, for the Fascist Government betrayed them; not on law, for the law was perverted to serve Fascist ends, and they have no more respect for it, but on themselves and on their leaders. The task of disarming and dispersing the patriots, of inducing them to abandon the habits and mental attributes of the guerilla, and to settle down into the normal avocations of a civilian life is, at the best, one of extreme difficulty. The problem is rendered virtually insoluble unless the means

✓

FILES A

Ref. 121/PAT.

20 December, 1944.

are provided whereby the patriots can be assured of fair treatment whenever they are encountered by the Allied Armies of liberation. Unless such treatment can be assured to the patriots, great danger is to be apprehended. Their resentment will, it is to be feared, lead them to conceal their arms and secretly maintain their bands in readiness with a view, when the times are ripe, to seize by force the control of the organs of Italian political and economic life. The seeds of the same unfortunate conflict and misunderstanding which have burst into civil war in Greece are present to-day in the soil of Northern Italy.

5. Experience shows that patriots when they are first encountered are in practically every case in a destitute and exhausted condition. The first problem which has to be faced in connection with their rehabilitation is a problem of supply:

a. Rations.

No scale for the feeding of patriots has hitherto been laid down. It is submitted that, on political as well as military grounds, a case exists for treating the genuine fighting patriot, until such time as it has been possible to rehabilitate him into civilian life, as a soldier on a par with his comrades who are fighting in regular disciplined units.

During the period of transition which must elapse before large numbers of patriots can be dispersed to their homes and ordinary avocations, it is intended to place alternative offers of employment before them.

- i. Patriots will be offered the opportunity to accept service as individuals in regular units of the Italian Army.
- ii. Patriot bands will be offered employment en bloc on heavy essential labour in the Army areas.

Centres and points for the reception of patriots when they cross the line are in process of being established on FIFTH and EIGHTH Army Fronts in such numbers and in such locations as may prove to be necessary. It is anticipated that at any given time during the next four months seven such Centres or Points will be in operation, affording accommodation to some 300 patriots in each. It is submitted that on grounds of military necessity accommodation stores sufficient to provide for the needs of 2,100 patriots should forthwith be made available for use in these Reception Points and Centres. It is submitted further that authority should be given for rationing patriots during such time as they are accommodated in these Reception Centres and Points on the scale of rations laid down for the Italian Army. It would be very desirable that authority should be given further for such comforts as cigarettes, tobacco and sweets to be made available for issue in small quantities to the patriots while

Ref. 121/PAT

20 December, 1944.

they are accommodated in the Reception Points and Centres. This last concession, coming in most cases immediately after the patriots are first encountered would, it is considered, have an excellent effect upon morale.

It is submitted that, until patriots have been afforded an opportunity of enlisting as individuals in regular units of the Italian Army, authority should be given for them to be rationed on the Italian Army scale. Furthermore, experience has shown that patriots will not be willing to accept employment in gangs on essential heavy labour in the Army areas if any scale of rations lower than the Italian Army scale is offered to them. It is accordingly submitted that, at the discretion of FIFTH and EIGHTH Army Commanders, rations on the Italian scale may be made available from military sources forthwith for the use of patriots who do accept such employment. Many patriots, it is hoped, will be dispersed peaceably to their homes and normal agricultural pursuits. It is not anticipated that more than 50% of the overall total of 100,000 patriots who are likely to be encountered within the next four months will require to be rationed on the Italian Army scale. These patriots who do not accept employment in labour gangs or who do not volunteer for service in the regular units of the Italian Army will continue to be rationed as at present on the refugee scale.

b. Clothing.

Very small quantities of boots and clothing have from time to time been made available by this H.Q. for the use of patriots from salvage sources as and when they were needed. The quantities of material which it has been possible to obtain from such sources have been inconsiderable and haphazard. For handling numbers in the neighbourhood of 100,000 the methods hitherto followed would be unavailing. It is submitted for your consideration that on grounds of military necessity adequate supplies of:

- i. Boots.
- ii. Battledress.
- iii. Underwear, Greatcoats and Socks
- iv. Blankets

should forthwith be made available from military sources to meet the needs of an overall total up to 100,000 patriots.

This clothing need not necessarily be new. Reconditioned clothing will suffice. It is understood from MMIA that adequate supplies of partworn clothing would be available to meet this need and authority will be given for its release, provided dying and tailoring repair can be arranged.

c. Hospitalisation.

A letter on the subject of hospitalisation was despatched

Ref. 121/PAT.

20 December, 1944.

to H.Q. A.A.I dated 21 November, ref. 3152(PH).

In this letter it was submitted that authority be given for the treatment in Italian military hospitals, when available, of all patriots wounded in operations on the side of the Allies. It was further submitted that in cases where no Italian military hospitals were readily available authority be given for wounded Italian patriots to be received in Allied hospitals, as is the case at present when soldiers of other belligerent nations, e.g. Greeks, Poles, and Brazilians are wounded.

This request was based on grounds not only of justice and gratitude, but on the necessity for maintaining patriot morale.

712 The existing practice both in FIFTH and EIGHTH Army Areas is not uniform. In FIFTH Army area wounded patriots are sometimes passed through military channels to the Italian military hospital depot attached to FIFTH Army, and in other cases to civilian Hospitals. In EIGHTH Army area most wounded patriots are passed through military channels until they finally arrive in a civilian hospital.

- 4 -

This procedure, it is submitted, offers little encouragement to patriots for although the technical treatment to be found in Italian civilian hospitals, may be as good as in the military hospitals, there are three disadvantages:

- i. Immediately after an area is liberated the civilian hospital may be exceedingly short of essential supplies at the moment when they are most needed.
- ii. Civilian hospitals only receive civilian hospital rations, which are on a much lower scale than Italian Army rations.
- iii. Cigarettes and other small personal items which may be available in military hospitals are never available in civilian hospitals. Experience has shown that the issue of such small comforts had a morale effect upon patriots.

4. Transport

For operations at the Patriot Reception Points and Centres referred to in paragraph 5 transport is urgently required. These Reception Points and Centres, being established in Fifth and Eighth Army Area, are mobile and will shift as operations require. At these locations there will be Allied Patriot Officers for whose work the vehicles are necessary and for which they will be accountable.

This transport will be used for:

- a) Camp maintenance
- b) Moving of equipment and supplies
- c) Transfer of patriots from Reception Points to Reception Centres and from Reception Centres to Italian Army Volunteer Depots
- d) Supervision of patriot work in their areas by patriot officers.

Since the patriot problem is more pressing in Fifth than in Eighth Army Area, more transport should be allocated to Fifth Army.

Accordingly it is requested that 10 trucks and 5 Jeeps or 15 cars be provided and allocated as follows:

- a) Assigned and charged against ASG Fifth Army 7 trucks if possible American, and 3 Jeeps or 15 cars
- b) Assigned and charged against ASG Eighth Army 3 trucks, if possible British, and 1 Jeep or 15 cars.

It is proposed to find drivers for all this transport from the ranks of the patriots themselves.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

H. G. G. G.
Chief of Staff

211

(2)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS (G.5 FOR ACTION)

8591

21.835 Dec

ROUTINE

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD FOUR ASPECTS PATRIOTS PROBLEM ARE RATIOS CLOSING HOSPITALIZATION

TRANSPORT PD MY POLICY NO LETTER 121/PAT WILL REFER PD

PATRIOT TO AMIO G FIVE FOR ACTION FROM HEADQUARTERS ALCOH FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT

SIGN E D STONE PARA N

PARA TWO PD URGE AUTHORITY BE GIVEN SOME RATIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITALIAN ARMY FOR NUMBERS UP TO TWO THOUSAND PATRIOTS IN RECEPTION POINTS AND CENTRES FIFTH AND EIGHTH ARMIES A L SO CIGARETTES TOBACCO SWEETS DURING TIME HOUSED IN RECEPTION POINTS AND CENTRES POSSIBLE MAXIMUM TWENTY ONE DAYS PD

PARA THREE FURTHER URGE AUTHORITY ISSUE SIMILAR RATION TO PATRIOTS EMPLOYED HEAVY LABOUR ^{ARMY} ~~AS NOT AREA~~ WHEN HELD YND AS SELF CONTAINED UNITS IN PATRIOT GARRIS PD

PARA FOUR TOTAL FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR FIFTY THOUSAND PATRIOTS WITHIN NEXT FOUR MONTHS MUST RECEIVE EQUAL CONSIDERATION

719 PARA FIVE LOGGING PD BOXES BATTLE DRESSING UNDERWEAR CLOTHES SOCKS BLANKETS ARE NECESSARY AND IHC GRANT FOR TWO THOUSAND PATRIOTS MONTHLY AND LATER OVER ALL TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PD HOSPITALIZATION PD AUTHORITY REQUIRED TREAT WOUND PATRIOTS ITALIAN MILITARY HOSPITALS AND WHEN NO ITALIAN MILITARY HOSPITAL AVAILABLE SUCH WOUNDED PATRIOTS BE RECEIVED ALLIED HOSPITALS PD TRANSPORT PD EFFICIENT

3206/1cc

(1)

EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION REQUISITION POWERS AND SERVICES IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ADEQUATE TRANSPORT
TO TEN TRUCKS AND FIVE JEEPS OF FIFTEEN HUNDREDWEIGHTS THEIR ACTIVE TO SEVEN T RU CKS
FOR FIFTH ARMY THREE TRUCKS TO EIGHTH ARMY FOUR JEEPS TO FIFTH ARMY ONE JEEP TO EIGHTH
ARMY TO DRIVERS CAN BE FORCED FROM RANGES OF PATRIOTS BUT MAINTENANCE AND SUPERVISION
WILL BE UNDER ALLIED MILITARY OFFICERS TO SUGGEST TRUCKS FIFTH ARMY BE AMERICAN
AND TRUCKS EIGHTH ARMY BRITISH

3206/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 3206 MATERIAL HELP FOR PATRIOTS

~~SECRET~~

Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Cbl AC L/G SC 8591	21 Dec 44	AFHQ	Aspects of patriots problem: rations, clothing, hospitalization, transport
2	Ltr 121/PAT Lush	26 Dec 44	AFHQ	Rationin, Clothing, Hospitalization, & Transport of Patriots
3	Cbl MMIA 0670	8 Jan 45	AFHQ & AC	Evacuation of Patriots to Ital Army hospitals - not possible
4	Cbl AC Stone 9757	12 Jan 45	AFHQ	Hospitalization of Patriots: urge wounded Patriots be evacuated to Ital Army hospitals

DECLASSIFIED
 BY: JCS
 DATE: Jan. 4, 1974
 J. Miller 8/22/77

0 7 0 3