

ACC

10000/136/344

36/344

CIVIL DISTURBANCES, GENERAL
JAN. 1944 - APR. 1945

3601/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 3601 CIVIL DISTURBANCES, GENERAL

From: 03 Jan 44
To : 07 Apr 45**Confidential**

VOL I

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
61b	Cbl AC COS 8386	18 Dec 44	AFHQ	Int Security Sicily weak.
61a	Catanians (Sicily)	16 Dec 44	Bonomi, Stone, etc.	Riots against mil call-up, Sicily.
62	Ltr RC Sicilia	20 Dec 44	Hq AC	Demonstrations against military call-up in Sicily.
62a	RC/000.5 Memo	24 Dec 44		Military strength in Sicily (Ital)
63	Ltr Upjohn - COS AC/14602/6/PS	28 Dec 44	COS - G-5	Demonstrations against military call-up in Sicily.
64	Ltr AC/4177/L, Lush	7 Jan 45	Director, MRS	Legal prosecution of strikes/absence fr duty - military railways workers.
65	Memo, Apostolo	8 Jan 45	CC	Seditious uprising in Ragusa, Sicily; apparent reason: call-up.
66	Ltr Lush 3618/COS	8 Jan 45	DCOS CA Sec	Seditious uprising in Ragusa, Sicily; apparent reason: call-up.
66a	Cbl AC, CA 9484	8 Jan 45	3Dist, AFHQ, etc.	
67	Cbl AC COS 9503	8 Jan 45	AFHQ CINOMED etc	Request move remainder Aosta Div fr Mainland to Sicily.
68	Cbl AC CA, 9504	8 Jan 45	Sicily Reg RSO	Reinforcements being sent Sicily
68a	Cbl AC CA 9557	9 Jan 45	3Dist, AFHQ, etc	Uprising in Sicily; call-up.
69	Cbls(2) PWB Sicily	9 Jan 45	PWB Italy (Rome)	Rebel action in Sicily (Ragusa)
69a	Cbl MAAF JCS/176	9 Jan 45	Air Forces S/C	Use of It a/craft in Sicily.
70	3618/COS, Lush	10 Jan 45	DCOS CA Sec	Rebel action in Sicily (Ragusa)
70a	Cbl Air S/C RA13	10 Jan 45	HQ MAAF SSO	Use of It a/craft in Sicily.
71	Cbl AC 9780	13 Jan 45	Sicilia Region	Ital Govt sends 2 cruisers-Sicily
71a	Cbl AC 9898	15 Jan 45	Sardinia	Mobile Ital ^{bn} ex-Sardinia to Sicily
72	Ltr Stone NSC/1516	17 Jan 45	Bonomi	Two cruisers sent to Sicily.
73	Ltr Bonomi 1223	16 Jan 45	Stone	Prefect & Questore in Catania removed and severe orders given.
74	Cbl PWB Sicily	5 Feb 45	PWB Rome	Sitrip on Sicily; calm now.
113? 75	CC 5203, Stone	3 Apr 45	Ex C	Request facts on Rome press stories of disorders in CAULONIA.
76	3631/EC, Fiske	7 Apr 45	CC	Recent disturbances at Caulonia, (Calabria,) and Regina Coeli.

Confidential

250.1 "A" Files

DSG ACC

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 250.1 CIVIL DISTURBANCES

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TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
47	Cbl S-335 Stone	18 Sep 44	AFHQ	Rpt on lynching of Carretta at Caruso trial, & reasons. APPENDICES: Ltr Pollock 18 Sept B) Pollock 18 Sept dispositions C) Pollock 18 July case of Caru D) Trans art by Nenni in Avanti E) Emergency dispositions F) 19 Sept Caccia's comments
48	Memo Caccia	19 Sep 44	A/CC	Necessity of more material support for the CC.RR. EWS says aprch AFHQ. Upjohn thinks no.
49	Cbl AFHQ F 27379	19 Sep 44	ACC for Stone	Conduct reported in S-335 is approved. Keep us informed.
50	Ltr A/CC 250-2 Stone	20 Sep 44	Bonomi	Enclosing photos of Caruso trial to help you apprehend offenders.
51	Cbl S-338 Stone	21 Sep 44	AFHQ	Caruso trial resumed. No trouble APP A) Ltr Pollock 19 Sept
52	Ltr A/CC 250.1 Quayle	22 Sep 44	VP Admin Sec	Public order in Rome. Pls put up reply. INCL: Ltr 5379 19 Sep Bonomi to Stone asking more CC.RR for Rome.
53	Cbl S-340 Stone	22 Sept 44	AFHQ	Caruso trial concluded. Death.
54	Ltr Brig Upjohn		A/CC	Public Safety in Sicily
55	Ltr Capt Stone ACC/14613/PS	24 Sep 44	Bonomi	Provision troops for Rome preserve law & order
1154	Ltr Col Pollock	24 Sep 44	See Dist	Disorder at Regina Coeli Prison
57	Ltr Bonomi 5972/142	25 Sep 44	Capt Stone	Public order Island Sicily growing worse
57a	Ltr Pres Inq 1004	25 Sep 44	Capt Stone - Pollock	Pollock's account happenings 19th events
58	Memo Quayle A/CC 250	26 Sep 44	Admin Sect	Col Pollock's evidence before Court of Enquiry
58a	News, Gen Rea	29 Oct 44	'Am. Mercury Mag'	"The Mafia Rides Again".
59	Ltr Bonomi/13151Cap	15 Nov 44	Stone	Disturbance at MACERATA.
60	Ltr CA/15/5/LG Brig Lush	20 Nov 44	Bonomi	Disturbance at Macerata - Gen Zanetti replaces Ponte as Prefect.
61	Memo Lush 3615/17	21 Nov 44	CC	Trouble breaks out again in Regina Coeli Prison.

Confidential

Q. M. C. Form 363 (Old No. 499)
Revised July 20, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 250.1 CIVIL DISTURBANCES

page 3

SECRET

8-0788

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
37	Stone	26 Jul 44	Brig. Dunlop	Ltr of intro. of Gen Infante,
37a	IS Stone A/CC 321	28 Jul 44	AFHQ G-5	who has reports of lawlessness in
	(ACC/AMG administration boundaries Italy)			commune of Marino.
38	Ltr 104521/AV	5 Aug 44	Stone	Minister of Interior has sent me
	Messe			enclosed copies of letters re inci
				dents near Taranto between French
				Carabinieri & civilian population
				3/INCLOSURES: as above.
39	Cbl ACC Reg 6 215	5 Aug 44	ACC Main	Sitrep no. 28. Strikes among
				dockyard workers causing new food
				ration delay.
40	Ltr Stone	9 Aug 44	Brig Lush	Behavior of French Troops in
				Taranto re action taken
41	Ltr Capt Stone	12 Aug 44	Chief It Gen Staff	Behavior of French Troops -
	395/CA			Taranto - disturbances
41a	IS AAI 16/1/G	16 Aug 44	MMIA (See Dist)	Disturbances Italians & French
				Brindisi & Taranto areas
42	Memo Stone	18 Aug 44	Pol & RC MG Sect	Possibility conflicts when
	A/CC 250.1			Venezia Giulia liberated - Pub Ord
42a	IS Col Pollock	18 Aug 44	Col Poletti	Incl 1 - Ltr Venosta 1/236 15 Aug
43	IS Stone A/CC 321	19 Aug 44	Venosta	Hinted trouble 15th Aug but none
				Possibility unfortunate inci-
				dents liberation Venezia Giulia
44	IS Stone A/CC 321	19 Aug 44	AFHQ G-5	Policy re administration pro-
				vinces boundaries Italy
45	IS Ltr Bonomi	28 Aug 44	Capt Stone	Happenings Piazza Farnese & at
				'fosse Ardeatine'
46	Ltr A/CC 250.1	6 Sep 44	VP Admin Section	AMG 5 Army conference with Publ
	Densmore		Pls rpt action	safety sub-comm: Cbl 8470 of 3 Sep

Confidential

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 250.1 CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
19	Ltr Stone	7 Feb 44	Badoglio	MacFarlane pleased with your note of 6 Feb.
20	Ltr Col. Mayne	7 Feb 44	Stone	Memo on Taranto situation.
21	Ltr T/ACC/29 Capt Hawkins	7 Feb 44	ACC	Enclosed are proposed proclamations for Taranto.
22	Cbl Fargo 786 MacFarlane	7 Feb 44	Freedom	ENCLOSURES: as above. Possible sit-down strike in Taranto dock-yards; have prepared to take strong measures but every thing appears quiet for now.
23	Memo Stone	7 Feb 44	MacFarlane	Suggestion of board and better transportation and distribution to deal with future troubles.
24	Cbl Fargo 788 MacFarlane	7 Feb 44	Freedom	Suggest local arbitration boards in future to deal with such disturbances.
25	Ltr Stone	7 Feb 44	Badoglio	Ref yr ltr 3 Feb re arrest of Questor of Taranto, matter being vigorously pressed.
26	Memo MacFarlane	17 Feb 44	Lush	Badoglio complaining no info yet on questor of Taranto. Please make inquiries.
27	Ltr 359/ /CA MacFarlane	20 Feb 44	Badoglio	Questor of Taranto will be released on promise he will not get another govt post. Assure pls.
28	Ltr Doe	20 Feb 44	Stansgate	Any comments on atchd ltr?
29	Ltr Lush	10 Mar 44	Chief Comm	ENCLOSURE: Ltr 2022/6 G 17 Feb Gen Nares Hq No 2 dist.
1120	Cbl ACC Reg 2	16 Mar 44	Fatima for Legg	Atchd are reports on civil disturbances in Caltanissetta.
31	Cbl Fatima 2225	17 Mar 44	Distwo	ENCLOSURES: as above. Dock-yard workers at Taranto threaten strike if families not given extra ration. Do not rec.
32	Cbl IBS Hancock	30 May 44	ACC Rear	From Lush: families of workers will not receive extra rations.
33	Cbl FOTALI	20 Jun 44	CINC Med	Disturbance at Regalbutto. Official strike at Taranto dock yard for more wages; ministry has promised increase.
34	Cbl ACC CA Br	25 Jun 44	Lush	Paraphrase of cbl No. 33 above.
35	Cbl ACC Reg 6	25 Jun 44	ACC Main	Disturbance at Villanova.
36	Ltr 359/4/CA Lush	28 Jun 44	A/CC	Clarification of what happened to cable Fotali of 20 Jun(a/m 33) Re strike at Taranto.

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G. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Aliberti	3 Jan 44	ACC Brindisi	Public order in Campania
2	C91.1 Taylor	4 Jan 44	Spofford ICCO	Conditions in Campania, doc fwd'd
3	Ltr Fiske	18 Jan 44	Badoglio	Disturbances in San Pancrazio
4	Ltr AG 311.2	25 Jan 44	Undersec Interior	Radio service for 28 Jan to safe-guard public order.
5	TS/2/1/61 Stone Ltr A.36 52 Area	2 Feb 44	Hq #2 District	Delays in punishment by Italian authorities; list of unpunishments.
6	Cbl Fargo 696 MacFarlane	3 Feb 44	AFHQ AGS	Food riot reported at Taranto this morning. Prefect removed.
7	Ltr 2022/10 G Hq #2 Dist	3 Feb 44	ACC	Arrest of Questore of Taranto; bad rpts recevd, orders by Towler.
8	Ltr Stone A/C cfs	3 Feb 44	MacFarlane	Fwd ltr from Badoglio complain-ing of arrest of Prefect of Taran-to, & request for release. INCLOSURE: Ltr 3 Feb Badoglio to MacFarlane.
9	Memo Stone	3 Feb 44	MacFarlane	Food ration dist poor hence diff to control strike. INCLOSURE: Report on Civil Dis-turbance of 2 Feb by Capt Hawkins.
10	Memo Stone	3 Feb 44	MacFarlane	Notes forwarded on demonstrat'n INCLOSURE: Memo 3 Feb, "Notes on Taranto Demonstration 2 Feb"
11	Ltr Stone	4 Feb 44	MacFarlane	Further to memo of 3 Feb on ar-rest of Questor of Taranto. Seems not warrant arrest; release recmd.
12	Cbl Fargo 688	4 Feb 44	2 Dist for Fatima	Trouble in Taranto may warrant Mil Govt. Prepare & acknowledge.
13	Cbl AMG Reg 2	5 Feb 44	Fargo	Situation Taranto normal, no need emergency measures.
14	Ltr Stone	5 Feb 44	MacFarlane	Recommendations for action re Ital Govt after 4 Feb disturbances INCLOSURE: Ltr Capt Hawkins No. T/ACC/13 of 5 Feb, report.
15	Cbl Fat 2273 Stone	5 Feb 44	Fargo for FNMM	Funeral parade Taranto went off without incident. Rpt forwarded.
16	Cbl Fat Rear 2277 Stone	5 Feb 44	Fargo	20 trucks urgently required at Taranto. Lack of transport one of causes of recent disturbances.
17	Cbl 071837 Fotali	7 Feb 44	CINC Med & ACC	Fears for sit-down strike at Taranto have not materialised.
18	Ltr Badoglio	7 Feb 44	Stone	Order has been restored in Ta-ranto this morning.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

CC 1156
APR 7 RECD

3631/EC

NEF/mrd
7 April 1945

Memo:

Subject: Civil Disturbances

To : Chief Commissioner

1. There recently has been several civilian disturbances in Italian Government Territory, the most important of which has been a prison break at the Regina Coeli, which was well organized from outside and which resulted in the escape of some thirty prisoners, four of whom were wounded, one seriously. The carabinieri seemed to have reacted well and the situation is now quiet.

2. Another was at the town of Caulonia in Calabria where a prisoner, arrested for robbery, was freed by a band of communists who in effect took over the town by force of arms, seized hostages, intimidated the local officials, the carabinieri gave way completely and the prisoner was liberated.

3. These incidents are to be expected, following the withdrawal of all Allied authority and will most probably reoccur. There appears to be no action indicated on our part, other than to keep ourselves informed.

1127

7

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel

Acting Executive Commissioner

76

3601/EC

CC 5203 *trans filed*

3 April 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

Recent Rome newspapers have referred to disorders in CAULONIA in Calabria. I have received no report of them. Can you advise me of the facts.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

1125

(75)

3601/c

Rede - Admiral Stone. For info on Stan

7605 To see → 11/12/2

P.V.B. HOME

P.V.B. AFHQ

051000

SECRET

FOLLOWING FOR BASHES FROM TITCHENER.

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF MALLEY'S CARDS NUMBER NINETEEN OF JANUARY THIRTYFIRST.

OUTRAGEDLY SITUATION CALM. BRIGADES CONTINUE. ENOUGH GRAIN NOW IMPORTED TO ENSURE TWO HUNDRED GMS BREAD RATION FILL AND FREQUENT. IN MY VIEW, NOAH DISTURBANCES PROBABLY FROM FOLLOWING: ONE. PROPOSED HOLDING OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. ELECTIONS BEING HELD ON MAINLAND WHILE HERE THEY ARE WITHHELD. WHEN ELECTIONS HELD HERE, SEPARATISTS THEN CONTESTERS WILL PROBABLY SUGGEST UNLESS A COMMITTEE IS SET UP INSTEAD OF PARTY CANDIDATES. TWO. ECONOMIC DISTRESS. THREE. STRIKE FOR WAGE INCREASES OR DECREASED COST OF LIVING. FOUR. BECAUSE OF LACK OF FUNDS, SALARIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS OFFER OVERDUE. FIVE. COST OF GRAIN IN FUTURE NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO PAY FOR COST OF PRODUCTION AND GIVE REASONABLY PROFIT. SIX. ALLIES GO FROM HERE AND SEPARATISTS FORCE THREATENED GROUP. SEVEN. SOME POLITICAL DOGMA WITH WHICH SICILIANS THINK THEY WILL BE ABLE TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS. EIGHT. POSSIBLE SUBVERSION OR INTERVENTION BY ENEMY. POSSIBLE GENERAL STRIKE BEGINNING FREQUENTLY AGAINST LOW WAGES AND HIGH COST OF LIVING BY CIVIL SERVANTS. PROPOSED CALLUP NINETEEN NINETEEN TO NINETEEN NINETEEN CLASSES ON OR ABOUT FIRST FEBRUARY.

REFERENCE MY NUMBER SEVENTEEN OF TWENTYFIFTH READ GUN CASTELLANO FOR CAVALLERO.

3601

3601/CC

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF MURLEY'S CABLE NUMBER EIGHTEEN OF JANUARY THIRTYFIRST.

OUTWARDLY SITUATION CALM. BRIGADES CONTINUE. ENOUGH GRAIN NOW IMPORTED TO SURE TWO HUNDRED GNS BREAD EATION TILL END FEBRUARY. IN MY VIEW, MORE DISTURBANCES PROBABLE FROM FOLLOWING: ONE. PROPOSED BUILDING OF MUNICIPAL PLANTIONS. ELECTIONS BEING HELD ON MAINLAND WHILE HERE THEY ARE WITHHELD. WHEN ELECTIONS HELD HERE, SEPARATISTS THEN CONTESTANTS WILL PROBABLY SUCCEED UNLESS A COMMITTEE IS SET UP INSTEAD OF PARTY CANDIDATES. TWO. ECONOMIC DISTRESS. THREE. STRIKE FOR WAGE INCREASE OR INCREASED COST OF LIVING. FOUR. BECAUSE OF LACK OF FUEL, SALARIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS OFTEN OVERDUE. FIVE. COST OF GRAIN IN FUTURE NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO PAY FOR COST OF PRODUCTION AND GIVE REASONABLE PROFIT. SIX. ALLIES GO FROM HERE AND SEPARATISTS FORCE THREATENED OUP. SEVEN. SOME POLITICAL DOGMA WITH WHICH SICILIANSTHINK THEY WILL BE ABLE TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS. EIGHT. POSSIBLY SUBVERSION OR INTERVENTION BY ENEMY. POSSIBLE GENERAL STRIKE BEGINNING FEBRUARY AGAINST LOS WAGES AND HIGH COST OF LIVING BY CIVIL SERVANTS. PROPOSED CALLUP NINETEEN MONTHS TO NINETEEN EIGHTEEN CLASSES ON OR ABOUT FIRST FEBRUARY.

REFERENCE MY NUMBER SEVENTEEN OF TWENTYFIFTH HEAD ON CASTELLANO FOR CAVALLERO.

IMPORTANT

DEPUTY HEAD

Sir,

Ref: your
message below,

It is not considered
needful to make
any reply to this letter.

Q.

OK.

File

Q.

Translation

The President of the Council of
Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 1223

Rome, 16 January 1945

Dear Admiral,

I received your letter 15607/2/PS in reference
with the incidents which took place in Catania.

As I have already informed the P.S. Subcommission, having felt
that the intervention of the armed force had been neither efficacious,
nor timely to repress the trouble in Catania, I gave orders for the
immediate substitution of the Prefect and of the Questore.

Later on, a P.S. General Inspector was sent there to find out
about the technical responsibility of the various persons who were
to maintain order.

A propos of a definite use of the public force in case of new
trouble in Sicily, orders have been given, through the High Commission-
er for Sicily, to all competent organs; these regulations have already
been enforced with good results in Ragusa and in Naro.

Sincerely yours,

B. L. Bonomi

1121

Rear-Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission
R o m e

(13)

u.c.

~~I want to see
any reply~~

C.S. List - 17 JAN 45

Action - C A SEC

INFO - CHIEF COMAR

C.S.

Have so informed office of C.O.S. 19.1.45.

J.A.Q.

3601/cc

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APC 394

NSC/1516

17 January 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Referring to your letter No. 509 of 11 January, the necessary arrangements have been made to implement the proposal to send 2 Italian cruisers to Palermo and Catania as a precautionary measure. The Minister of Marine is in possession of all details of the arrangements made.

Yours very truly,

[s] Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

112³

Prepared by:

M. V. Harvey
M. V. Harvey
Lt (S) R. N.
Navy Sub-Commission.

72

REGIONAL COMMISSIONER SARDINIA ATTENTION RPSO

9898

15 January, 1945

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE OUR CABLE NINE FIVE ZERO FOUR DATED EIGHT JANUARY FOUR

FIVE SUBJECT MOBILE BATTALION PD

PARIS TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER SARDINIA ATTENTION RPSO FROM HQ AICOM PAREN PD

PARA TWO PD ONE TWO ITALIAN LIGHT TANKS FROM SARDINIA WILL ARRIVE PALERMO TWO ONE
JANUARY FOUR FIVE PD

1123

Public Safety Sub-Commission

Ext. 365

F.J. WILSON Major.

71a

3601/cc

'A'

ALCOM SICILIA REGION

9780

13 January 45

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS SICILIAN DISTURBANCES PD

71 AAF

PAREN TO ALCOM SICILIA REGION FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONER FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ARE SENDING TWO CRUISERS TO SICILIAN WATERS ONE TO
PALERMO AND ONE TO CATANZA PD THEIR ROLE IS TO PROTECT HARBOUR
INSTALLATIONS PD APART FROM THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS IN THE NATURE OF A
DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE AND THEIR ROLE NOT REPEAT NOT AN ACTIVE ONE EXCEPT
IN EXTREME NEED

Ind. Dist.

Navy S/C
Land Forces S/C (MIA)
Air Forces S/C
C.A. Sec.
Pol. Sec.
Public Safety S/C
P.R.O.

Office of the Chief of Staff

300

1121

/s/ G.W.I. SHIPP, Lt. Col.

3001/c

71

Translation

The President of the Council of
Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 809

Rome, 11 January 1945

Dear Admiral,

In agreement with the Ministers of War and Navy, I think it advisable to send two cruisers in the waters of Sicily; this action would have a prudential and precautional character because of the situation of the island.

The two cruisers that might be the 'Duca d'Aosta' and the 'Montecitorio', should cruise in the waters of the harbours of Palermo and Catania; their presence should be mostly a demonstration, to give the impression that the Italian Government will not stand public order being troubled; it would therefore warn the agitators that they had better not make trouble.

In cases of extreme need, they might be used in co-operation with the Army Force to maintain order.

S. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

See 72

3601/CC

1100

S.O.

COS DISTRIBUTION 12 Jan 45

ACTION: NAVY SC.

INFO: CHIEF COMMRE

COS.

71 APP 1

SECRET

BA 13

JAN 101645A

C/7455

JAN 111645A

IMPORTANT

AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION HOME

HQ. NA/AF SCG. HQ. ALLIED COMMISSION (BY HAND), AFHQ. HQ. 3 DISTRICT, ALLIED
COMMISSION SICILY REGION, HQ. BALKAN AIR FORCE

SECRET.

Your immediate signal JSC/176 of January 9th no time of origin delivered this

Subcommission 1625 hours January 10th.

Presume it was written prior to discussion with Deputy A.O.C.-in-C. by
telephone but not certain of this as no time of origin.

Agree channels proposed by you are essential to avoid untoward incidents and
misuse of aircraft.

1 S.79 transport aircraft moved to CATANIA under orders of Chief of Staff Air
Ministry without reference to Allies 1 other S.79 has returned HOME and a further one
has proceeded CATANIA but only as transport for government officials.

These aircraft now under orders of Italian Air Force commander SICILY Colonel

SPEDIMI.

Orders were issued 1630 hours 9th January to Italian Air Ministry that no fighter

11 aircraft were to be used in SICILY but that SM.79 aircraft could be used for the
purpose of gaining information or supply dropping if required. Would point out A.O.C.

3601/c

Your immediate signal JSC/176 of January 9th re time of origin delivered this SubCommission 1625 hours January 10th.

Presume it was written prior to discussion with Deputy A.O.C.-in-C. by telephone but not certain of this as no time of origin.

agree channels proposed by you are essential to avoid untoward incidents and misuse of aircraft.

1 S.79 transport aircraft moved to CATANIA under orders of Chief of Staff Air Ministry without reference to Allies 1 other S.79 has returned HOME and a further one has proceeded CATANIA but only as transport for government officials.

These aircraft now under orders of Italian Air Force commander SICILY Colonel SPEDINI.

111 (1)
Orders were issued 1630 hours 9th January to Italian Air Ministry that no fighter aircraft were to be used in SICILY but that SM.79 aircraft could be used for the purpose of gaining information or supply dropping if required. Would point out A.O.C. BALKAN Air Force has not operational control of SM.79 squadron which comes under Italian Air Ministry through this SubCommission.

PICT
INFORMATION: P. Safety S/O
INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner
C.O.S.
C.A. Sec
Navy
Land Forces,
IR Ex, Wile

COFFEE

SECRET.

A

Ref: 3618/ /OCB.10 Jan 1945.

SUBJECT: Sicily Disturbances.

TO : DOWS, CA Section.

69

1. Enclosed are two reports from PAF on the situation in SICILY. They come from an officer in whom I have confidence and, I think, can be treated as accurate.

2. If the PAF representative can send through an excellent report such as this, I cannot see why the Public Safety Officer or the Regional Commissioner or his representative, cannot do the same. The obvious thing seems to me is for the Regional Commissioner to instruct his representative at Area HQ to send objective reports direct to this Commission with copies to him. But it is essential that we should get early information.

M S. LUSH

ESL/JO.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

1112

70

3601/CC

SECRET

JCS/176

JAN 09NFT

017291

JAN 101520A
IMMEDIATE

HQ MAJF SSO

AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION REPEATED HQ ALLIED COMMISSION, AFHQ, 3 DISTRICT

F.C. SICILY REGION, HQ BALKAN AIR FORCE

(666)

SECRET.

Last sentence of second addressees signal 9484 January 8th is not repeat not understood. This HQ has not been consulted or given approval for the employment of any repeat any Italian aircraft in connection with Sicilian disturbances. If the Italian authorities wish to make a case for the use of Italian aircraft for such purposes as reconnaissance or supply dropping that case should be put up by Air Ministry through AVM BUSCARLET. It will be considered here and, if approved in consultation with AFHQ, AOC BALKAN Air Force, under whose operational control the IAF squadrons are, will be authorised to make appropriate arrangements through you to release the aircraft required, for employment under Italian Command and on Italian responsibility in SICILY. In no circumstances are any orders or requests to be accepted except through this channel and no repeat no aircraft are to move without approval as above. It is most unlikely that the use of fighter aircraft will be authorised in connection with present disturbances for which on present information they appear to be entirely unsuited.

2). It is understood that some 579 may already have moved to CATANIA. If

3601/CC

1117

understood. This HQ has not been consulted or given approval for the employment of any repeat any Italian aircraft in connection with Sicilian disturbances. If the Italian authorities wish to make a case for the use of Italian aircraft for such purposes as reconnaissance or supply dropping that case should be put up by Air Ministry through AVM BUSCARLET. It will be considered here and, if approved in consultation with AFHQ, AOC BALKAN Air Force, under whose operational control the IAF squadrons are, will be authorized to make appropriate arrangements through you to release the aircraft required, for employment under Italian Command and on Italian responsibility in SICILY. In no circumstances are any orders or requests to be accepted except through this channel and no repeat no aircraft are to move without approval as above. It is most unlikely that the use of fighter aircraft will be authorized in connection with present disturbances for which on present information they appear to be entirely unsuited.

2). It is understood that some 579 may already have moved to CATANIA. If this is so

(a) You are to report by whom and to whom was this order issued, and

69a

See 70a

Confidential

3601/cc

- 2 -

(JCS/176 - 9 Jan continued)

SECRET

under whose orders they are now, and

(b) Immediate instructions should be issued that they are in no repeat no circumstances to be employed on anything but reconnaissance, supply dropping or transportation.

(Note: This message received from RAAC decyphering.)

DIST

ACTION: Air Forces S/C
 INFO: A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 C.O.S.
 C.A. Sec
 Land Forces
 IR Br
 P.Safety
 Political Sec
 Local Govt
 File

0 9 9 9

785015

(Note: This message received from RAAC decyphering.)

DIST

ACTION: Air Forces S/C
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner ✓
C.O.S.
C.A. Sec
Land Forces
MR Mr
P. Safety
Political Sec
Local Govt
File

1115

(Signature)

CONFIDENTIAL

cc 68

Classification: SECRET

Time received: 9th Jan. 1945.

Precedence: IMMEDIATE.

No. 5

For information only. Situation tense province Ragusa and part province Siracuse. Have visited Solarino Palazzolo Giarratana Ragusa Modici Noto Avola today. Road clear but unfriendly groups in towns who might have taken hostile action had we been Italian troops. General Ronco has restored order Ragusa. Streets deserted everything closed and spasmodic firing while there. Rebels well armed with sufficient automatic weapons. Rebels reported to have several intellectuals and probably Italian army officers leading them. Comiso and Vittoria in hands of rebels. No action being taken against them by General Ronco as he has not sufficient troops to send there though column of 300 troops with 4 field guns left Agrigento for Vittoria today. Prefect and Questore Ragusa claim that trouble agitated principally by Fascists aided by separatists. Today 6 hand grenades thrown against train at Avola. No casualties or damage. Rioters with MGs stopped train from proceeding Siracuse. Italian troops from Noto later dispersed rioters. Ref signal number 4 only (doors?) of depot at Solarino destroyed by hand grenades. Explosives not used. Try to visit Vittoria and Comiso tomorrow if can get through.

The above cable received from the PWB observer in Sicily is forwarded by Mr. Titchener, elaborating telephone message given verbally this morning.

1115

Rear Admiral Stone (1)
Major Fielden (2) for Public Security Sub-Commission.

cc: Hon. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles
CofS
cc Files

(69)

3601/cc

Classification: SECRET

Time received: 9th Jan. 1945.

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

No. 6

cc 68

Frantz and Garbutt told me last night situation quiet their areas. The call up in Ragusa has been postponed until order is restored. Prefect of Ragusa stated yesterday that town had appearance of being quiet but that trouble could break out from one moment to another as large number of rebels were still hiding in town. General Ronco has 500 troops and 200 CORR at his disposal in prov. Ragusa. Reinforcements ammo and supplies have been asked for. Woman wearing nurses uniform arrested at Ragusa for shooting at Italian troops. Rebels taking their prisoners to Comiso. In Ispica saw Viva Il Duce freshly written on walls together with anti-call up slogans. Telephone to Ragusa interrupted this morning.

Above telegram just received 16.30 hrs. Frantz is PWB representative in Palermo and Garbutt is stationed in Catania.

117

cc: Hon. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles
Cof S
cc files

(61)

DISTRESS FOR ACTION RPTD AFHQ PC SICILY REGION

9557

9 Jan

075 PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PAPA ONE PD CANCEL LAST SENTENCE THIS HQ SIGNAL NINE FOUR EIGHT FOUR EIGHT
JANUARY PD

PAPER TO DISTRESS FOR ACTION RPTD AFHQ PC SICILY REGION FROM HQ ALCON FROM
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION FAIRN

PAPA TWO PD AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ITALIAN RECCE
AIRCRAFT ARE NOW TO OPERATE IN AFFECTED AREA

AC DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff
Political Sec.
Pub Safety s/o
Loc Govt s/o
Hon Alexander Kirk.
Sir Noel Charles.

111?

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

437

NICHOLAS POMBINO,
CWO, USA.
Asst Adjutant.

3601/cc

CHIEF Commissioner

ALCOM SICILY REGION ATTENTION RPSO

9504

8/1/45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD TWO FOUR TRUCKS FOR MOBILE BATTALIONS CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER
HAVE BEEN SENT FROM NAPLES TO SICILY PD

PARA TWO ALCOM SICILY REGION ATTENTION RPSO FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN PD

PARA TWO PD SIX TRUCKS LEFT ON SIX JANUARY FORTY FIVE CM SIX ON SEVEN
JANUARY FORTY FIVE FOR PALERMO PD

PARA THREE PD ONE TWO TRUCKS LEFT ON EIGHT JANUARY FORTY FIVE FOR CATANIA PD

PARA FOUR PD ONE TWO ARMORED VEHICLES WILL BE SENT FROM SARDINIA AND
ONE TWO FROM LECCE PD DATE NOT YET FIXED PD

PARA FIVE PD SIX ARMORED VEHICLES LEFT ROME ON FIVE JANUARY FORTY FIVE
BY RAIL FOR PALERMO PD THESE WILL BE RETURNED WHEN OTHER VEHICLES ARRIVE
FROM SARDINIA AND LECCE. PD

1112

Internal C.C. ✓
C.C.S.
C.L.

Public Safety Sub-Commission

Ext 502

F.J. WILSON Maj.

FILES A

-A-
R

AFHQ Rptd CINCOMED DISTRESS ALCOM SICILIA REGION

9503

8 Jan 45

OF PRIORITY

SECRET PD

SICILIAN DISTURBANCES ARE SUBJECT PD

PAREN TO AMEL REPEATED CINCOMED CMA DISTRESS CMA ALCOM SICILIA REGION FOR
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN

RESULT CONFERENCE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THIS COMMISSION DECIDED THAT ALL
 POSSIBLE STEPS MUST BE TAKEN PREVENT SPREAD OF DISORDER PD REQUEST IMMEDIATE
 STEPS BE TAKEN EXPEDITE MOVE REMAINDER BATTALION AOSTA DIVISION TO SICILY AND OF
 TWELVE LIGHT TANKS FROM CAGLIARI SARDINIA TO PALERMO

14th Dist.

Land Forces S/C (MFA)

Navy S/C

C.A.Sec.

Public Safety S/C.

O. W. I. SHIPP

Office of the Chief of Staff

XOO

N. W. GRADNIEFF
 Major, AGD
 ADJUTANT

3601/cc

DISTTHREE ACTION RPTD AFHQ INFO RC SICILY REGION INFO

9484

8 Jan

OPS PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ ID

PARA ONE ID SERIOUS DISTURBANCE REPORTED RAGUSA PROVINCE OCCASIONED BY ENFORCEMENT OF CALL UP ID COMMUNICATIONS ARE DIFFICULT BUT THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REPORTED ID PAREN TO DISTTHREE ACTION RPTD AFHQ INFO RC SICILY REGION INFO FROM HQ ALCOM FROM CIVIL AFFAIRS PAREN

PARA TWO ID TOWN COMISO SEIZED BY RIOTERS CMA TELEPHONE LINE RAGUSA TO COMISO CUT CMA ARTILLERY UNIT SENT TO SCENE FEARED DISARMED CMA TWO HUNDRED INFANTRY LEFT SYRACUSE SIX JANUARY MET OPPOSITION GIARRATANO AND FAILED TO REACH COMISO CMA SIX CCHR AND FOUR SOLDIERS KILLED THIS PROBABLY EXAGGERATED ID

PARA THREE ID GENERAL RONCA LEFT CATANIA FOR RAGUSA WITH FORTY CARABINIERI TO TAKE COMMAND ID

PARA FOUR ID COLONEL LEONARDA PROCEEDING WITH ONLY AVAILABLE TANK TO TRACE ARTILLERY UNIT ID SIX FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PLACED DISPOSAL GENERAL RONCA

AC DISTRIBUTION :

Chief of Staff
Political Sec.
Pub Saf S/C
Loc Govt S/C

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

437

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Ass Adjutant.

See 68a - 69a

3601/CC

66a

A' File

Ref: 3618/GOS.

8th January 1945.

SUBJECT: Disturbances - SICILY.

TO : GOS, CA Sec

1. Reference attached memorandum from the Italian Government, please take the following action:

- (a) Inform Regional Commissioner, Sicily, by telephone that ^{Six} fighter airplanes are being despatched to report to ~~Chief Commissioner, Catania~~ *General* ~~Commissioner, Catania~~. ~~If they should land at Catania it would be preferable that they should go there and report to General Ronce. Please clear with the Chief Commissioner.~~
- Ronce*
- (b) Send summary by telegram of this memorandum to No. 3 District, rptd ASHQ and RC, SICILY.
- Link*
- (c) Instruct Public Safety Sub-Commission to keep in close telephonic touch with No. 3 District who are in turn in touch with General Ronce.

2. The telegram should go on the highest priority.

3. On the instructions of the Chief Commissioner I am asking No. 3 District that if Allied intervention is contemplated, the Chief Commissioner should be consulted before action is taken.

M S LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

1100

ML/JC.

Copy to: Public Safety B/O

66

3601/cc

Rome, January, 8th, 1945

N. 0453/LP

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER

H.E. Berruti, Chief of Cabinet Interior, telephones to inform Admiral Stone of the following:

Since two days a seditious uprising is taking place in the Province of Ragusa, Sicily.

Apparent reason: call to arms.

Rebel Armed action was taken against the town of Comiso, which is believed to be held by the rebels.

The telephone line between Ragusa and Comiso has been cut and the railroad damaged.

It appears that an artillery unit has been overwhelmed in the same zone.

Uprising appears limited within the Province of Ragusa.

The High Commissioner for Sicily has sent reinforcements of troops and Carabinieri, which are en route.

Also General Ronca has been sent from Catania to take command of the zone.

As direct information are lacking and the situation is uncertain, the High Commissioner has requested two fighting planes to support the troops.

The Air Ministry is willing to send two of the fighters stationed at Lecce Airport. The needed authorization from Air Force Sub-Commission is being requested. Will you please support the request?

P. Apostolo
P. APOSTOLO
Lt. Comdr, ENR
Liaison Officer

FILE

SICILY
DISTURBANCES

This has been done

See 66

65

EW

3601/CC

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Roma, 8 January 1944
N. 0454/LP

Additional information received by Ministry of Interior
from Sicily.

Infantry units 200 strong which left Siracusa on the evening of the 6th for Ragusa have clashed near Giarratano with the rebels. It appears that 6 Carabinieri were killed, and so were 4 soldiers ; many wounded. Rebel casualties are not known. The troops did not reach Ragusa.

Gen. Ronca has left Catania for Ragusa with 40 Carabinieri.

Col. Leonardo left Caltanissetta with the only available tank in order to retrace men of his battery which started for Ragusa yesterday and that is supposed to have been disarmed near Comiso.

Brig Carr has visited Sig. Aldisio & suggested to send some fighter planes to Ragusa in support of the troops. He believes that this action should prove very useful.

11.45 hrs

Photolo L.O.

1107

65

SECRET

A

Ref. AC/4177/L.

7th January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Civil Disturbances.

TO : The Director,
Military Railway Services. Italy.

1. In reply to your MS.1/43 of 12th December, 1944, railway personnel in Italian Government territory are divided into two categories. On the mainland they are "mobilitati civili": in Sicily and Sardinia they are "militarizzati".
2. For personnel of either category it is, under the existing law and without further legislation, an offence to strike or to be absent from their posts for more than five days. For "mobilitati civili" the punishments range from six months to ten years; for "militarizzati" the punishments are heavier, and sentence of death can be awarded under Art. 14, of CPMG if the offence amounted to desertion in the face of the enemy.
3. Italian military courts have jurisdiction over personnel of both categories for the trial of such offences.
4. In military government territory railway personnel are equally "mobilitati civili" and subject to the above provisions of Italian law. They could, if it was considered necessary or desirable, be tried in AM Courts for the appropriate offences under Italian law.
5. It would, however, probably be simpler in AM territory for the cases to be dealt with as violations of the AM proclamations. Suitable charges could be laid under Proc.1 Art. IV.13, or Proc.1 Art. V Secs. 42 and 45. Maximum punishments prescribed by the Proclamation are death (under Art. IV) and imprisonment for life (under Art. V). If, however, it is considered desirable to bring the penalties into conformity with those in Italian Government territory, a directive could be issued for this purpose.
6. The above deals with the judicial remedy for dealing with individual or collective strikes. There is, of course, a further important sanction: if Railway workers struck they would automatically lose the Armed Forces A ration scale to which they alone among Government workers are entitled.
7. I hope the above to some extent resolves your anxieties. If, however, you have in mind extra-judicial action needed to break a sudden strike then I suggest a conference between yourself and members of this Commission.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

(64)

A file

SECRET

Ref : 3648/93/COS.

3 January 1945

SUBJECT : Disturbances in SICILY.

TO : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters.

I enclose for your information a report on the recent disturbances in SICILY, prepared by Vice-President, Civil Affairs Section.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Major E. T. Tamm
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to : Civil Affairs Section.

A.
O

3601/cc

1105

63

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: AC/11602/6/18

28 Dec 44.

SUBJECT: Demonstrations against Military Call-up in SICILY.

TO : COS.

The following notes have been prepared regarding the recent demonstrations in Sicily against the call-up for the Italian Army:-

1. Italian Army Call-up.

The call-up for the Italian Army affected the 1914-1924 age groups, who were to be called up in three batches; the 1922/23/24 classes to present themselves during the period 12 - 19 Dec 44, while the remaining classes to be called up during the periods 3-10 Jan 45 and 15-22 Jan 45.

2. Summary of Demonstrations.

The demonstrations began on the 10 of December and continued for about 10 days.

No incident has been reported since the 20 of December.

In all, 75 demonstrations are known to have occurred, the majority dispersing without causing injury or damage. The incidents may be summarised as follows:-

Demonstrations causing conflict and damage	9
" " "	1
" " damage	3
" without conflict or damage	<u>55</u>
	73

3. Casualties.

Dead	4 civilians
Injured	25 "
	6 police

4. Catania Incident.

The most serious disorder and damage occurred in the city of Catania on the 14th of December 44.

(a) In the morning about 500 demonstrators, led by students, gathered in front of the Italian Military District Headquarters to protest against the call-up. A hand-grenade was thrown by an unknown person killing one civilian and injuring another.

The Italian Army officers were attacked by the crowd and stripped of their uniforms.

There was also some dismantling of the Carabinieri.

(b) In the afternoon some Carabinieri trucks which had brought Carabinieri into the City were set alight by the mob. Several Carabinieri were disarmed by the crowd. The Town Hall was set on fire after the door had been forced by a beam used as a battering ram. No attempt was made to extinguish the fire, the Fire Brigade, although called, failing to appear on the scene. The Law courts and

without causing injury or damage. The incidents may be summarized as follows:-

Demonstrations causing conflict and damage	9
" " "	1
" " damage	8
" without conflict or damage	55
	73

3. Casualties

Dead	4 civilians
Injured	25 "
	6 police

4. Catania Incident.

The most serious disorder and damage occurred in the city of Catania on the 14th of December 1944.

(a) In the morning about 500 demonstrators, led by students, gathered in front of the Italian Military District Headquarters to protest against the call-up. A hand-grenade was thrown by an unknown person killing one civilian and injuring another. Two Italian Army Officers were attacked by the crowd and stripped of their uniforms. There was also some dismantling of the Carabinieri.

(b) In the afternoon some Carabinieri trucks which had brought Carabinieri into the City were set alight by the mob. Several Carabinieri were disarmed by the crowd. The Town Hall was set on fire after the door had been forced by a beam used as a battering ram. No attempt was made to extinguish the fire, the Fire Brigade, although called, failing to appear on the scene. The Law Courts and the Tax Office were also gutted, while other buildings including the military District Headquarters were damaged by fire. The damage was largely caused by a comparatively small number of youths of the hooligan type.

(c) Further demonstrations were attempted on 15 Dec but were repressed by the police. The total casualties in Catania on the 14 and 15 Dec were: 4 Civilian killed and 18 injured. 3 Carabinieri were injured. 27 arrests were effected.

(d) On 17 Dec demonstrators again attacked the Town Hall in Catania. Carabinieri opened fire killing two civilians. 100 Italian troops were placed at the disposal of the Civil Authorities in case reprisals were attempted but the situation remained quiet.

5. Causes of the Disturbances.

While the disturbances originated as a protest against the military call-up, economic and political dissatisfaction was also ventilated. Unfortunately the military call-up coincided with an order from the High Commissioner to agricultural producers to consign 25 kilos of grain per person to ease the food shortage. There is no evidence to connect the separatists with the outbreak but there can be little doubt that their past propaganda exerted an influence on the minds of the population. It is said that the call-up came as a surprise to the Sicilians who had not been prepared by suitable publicity.

The grounds of protest may be summarised as follows:-

13

- 2 -

- (a) The Sicilians have no wish to participate in the war (such slogans as "We will not serve as gun-fodder" were carried by students).
- (b) They do not wish to fight for the Italian Government.
- (c) They are unwilling to bear arms against Italians in the North.
- (d) The Italians are still treated as enemies by the Allies.
- (e) The Aristocracy have not been made public.
- (f) The young men called up refused to abandon their families to starvation.
- (g) Those called up were invited to bring with them blankets, spoon and mess tin which they would have to buy.
- (h) The call-up should not have coincided with the Xmas festivities.

6. Result of Call-up.
Of the 6000 men who should have answered the call-up in Sicily between the 12 and 19 Dec. only 1600 presented themselves. The Ministry of War has stated that the military call-up both in Sicily and elsewhere will prove and that men who failed to enlist will be arrested.

7. Control of the Disturbances.
In general it can be said that the police failed to take energetic action to disperse demonstrators before disorders occurred. In Catania especially, it is alleged that no policeman were seen in the streets while crowds of excited people were gathering. Although Italian troops have been called on to stand by as a reserve no instances have been reported of troops having been used against the civil population.

8. Strength of Police, etc.
The strength of the Police Agencies in Sicily is as follows:-

Carabinieri	6273
Agents of Public Security	2782
Finance Guards	2216

Internal Garrison troops of the Italian Army (chiefly Sabaudia Division) stationed in Sicily number:
633 Officers and 10372 men.

9. Reinforcements.

- (a) Arrangements were at once made to reinforce the Carabinieri in Sicily by sending 786 troops of the Montegrano Battalion to Palermo. The majority of these have already arrived, while the others are in course of transit. The Commanding General of the Carabinieri, at the request of the Ministry of the Interior, is sending to Sicily 306 Carabinieri from the mainland (Rome, Naples and Bari).
- (b) It has also been agreed to expedite the transfer of two battalions (800 men) of Italian troops to reinforce the Italian garrison troops in Sicily.
- (c) A mobile unit of 1000 Carabinieri is being equipped with 24 three ton trucks and 24 armoured vehicles supplied by the Ministry of War. These Carabinieri are drawn from those already serving on the island. They will be

1103

were gathering. Although no instances have been reported of troops having been used against the civil population.

8. Strength of Police, etc.
 The strength of the Police Agencies in Sicily is as follows:-
- | | |
|---------------------------|------|
| Carabinieri | 6273 |
| Agents of Public Security | 2702 |
| Finance Guards | 248 |
- Internal Garrison troops of the Italian Army (chiefly Sabaudia Division) stationed in Sicily number:
 635 Officers and 10572 men.

9. Reinforcements.

- (a) Arrangements were at once made to reinforce the Carabinieri in Sicily by sending 736 troops of the Montegrano Battalion to Palermo. The majority of these have already arrived, while the others are in course of transit. The Commanding General of the Carabinieri, at the request of the Ministry of the Interior, is sending to Sicily 300 Carabinieri from the mainland (Rome, Naples and Bari).
- (b) It has also been agreed to expedite the transfer of two battalions (800 men) of Italian troops to reinforce the Italian garrison troops in Sicily.
- (c) A mobile unit of 1000 Carabinieri is being equipped with 24 three ton trucks and 24 armoured vehicles supplied by the Ministry of War. These Carabinieri are drawn from those already serving on the island. They will be distributed throughout Sicily with Headquarters at Palermo and Messina.

1102

10. Other Measures.

- (a) A new Prefect of Catania left Rome by plane on 17 Dec. 44.
- (b) The High Commissioner for Sicily has ordered an investigation on the conduct of the Carabinieri during the Catania riots.
- (c) The Director of the Public Security, Ministry of the Interior and the Commanding General of the Carabinieri have been requested to conduct a thorough investigation of Police action in Sicily. It has also been suggested to them that a statement originating from the Prime Minister might be issued announcing to the Italian people that it is the intention of the Government to preserve Law and Order by any means in its power and by force if necessary.
- (d) There is before you for submission to the CC a draft letter to the Italian Prime Minister expressing concern at the inability of the Italian Police to control the disturbances in Sicily and asking what measures will be taken to prevent a recurrence.

(signed) G. R. URJOHN, Brig.
 (typed) G. R. URJOHN, Brig.
 VP CA Section,
 DGGS AG.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission.

SICILY AS AT 24 DEC 1944

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O. R. 's</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sabauda Division	222	4816	5038
Aosta Division	271	5208	5479
CC.RR	128	8087	8215
Montegranero Battalion	—	—	799
			<u>19,531</u>

1102

626

PRES A

ANNEXURE A

GIOVANI SICILIANI.

Ancora una volta dopo lunghi anni di guerra, di sciagure e di miseria, ci si chiede contro la volonta' di un popolo; di spargere il nostro sangue.

Come ieri il vile monarca ci impose di morir per la conquista di altri imperi, oggi con la stessa viltà, ci impone di conservargli col nostro sacrificio quella corona che non ha il diritto di tenere, per il suo alto tradimento al popolo tutto.

A noi giovani si uniscano le nostre madri ed i nostri padri. Il popolo tutto formi un blocco compatto per difendere questa gioventu vanamente destinata al macello.

Noi non impugneremo le armi.

GIOVANI DI SICILIA,
siate tutti solidali nell'esprimere la vostra volonta' non presentandovi. Pace Pane e Lavoro: Ecco quello vogliamo!

ANNEXURE B

MOVIMENTO PER L'INDIPENDENZA DELLA SICILIA

COMITATO NAZIONALE

Palermo 13 Dicembre 1944

A S.E. L'ALTO COMMISSARIO PER LA SICILIA

- PALESTRA -

e per conoscenza:

AL GENERALE M. CARR Capo della Commissione Alleata

- PALESTRA -

A.S.E. IL PREFETTO DI

- PALESTRA -

"More solito" Gli avversari di questo Movimento diffondono in mala fede, la voce che i movimenti giovanili contro il richiamo alle armi verificatisi in questi giorni siano da attribuire, in tutto o in parte, al Movimento per l'Indipendenza della Sicilia.

A scanso dei soliti equivoci, dichiaro nella forma piu' esplicita ed ufficiale che questo Movimento e' perfettamente estraneo alle dimostrazioni di questi giorni, non avendo alcun interesse che il richiamo alle armi sia coronato da successo o da insuccesso.

Questo Movimento per l'Indipendenza della Sicilia prosegue nella sua propaganda legalitaria con la osservanza delle leggi e la protezione della liberta'; ma non intende subire deviazioni dell'opinione pubblica inteso a metterlo in cattiva luce o a farlo oggetto di persecuzione.

Occorrendo chiedo che l'Ecc. V. indaghi con scrupolo e severita'.

Con ossequi.

1049

IL SEGRETARIO GENERALE
/t/ (Antonino Varvaro)

/s/ A. Varvaro

(62)

SECRET

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APC 394

FILE: MC/000.5

20 Dec 1944

SUBJECT: Unrest in SICILY

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission
ROME

1. I am sending herewith a general report on the present unrest in SICILY and on its causes and effects.

I would point out that this region has (except for AMG Islands) Provincial Officers only in CATANIA Province and that therefore in general has no sources of information of its own. Moreover, with the existing small staff it is not possible adequately to sift and collate all the information including voluminous P.W.B. reports which are transmitted to this Office.

At this stage, therefore, the following views must be taken more as personal opinions rather than those based on weighed evidence.

2. Widespread demonstrations and disturbances have occurred throughout the Island during the period from approximately 10 DEC to date. So far demonstrations with or without damage and conflict have been reported at approximately 55 places. Damage to public buildings at CATANIA was serious. There have been various other reports about damage to property but, although this may be comparatively considerable, approximate details are not available. Casualties so far have not been serious and to date might be estimated as 4 dead and 31 injured, mainly civilians.

At CATANIA Police action was completely ineffective. In RAGUSA Province it is reported to have been good. I have not sufficient information to express an opinion on Police conduct generally.

Italian troops have been moved to various centres of disturbance but I have not had any reports of their being actively engaged in quelling disorders. There has been a tendency on the part of the local administration to apply to an Allied Headquarters, if one is nearby, for intervention or assistance e.g. with transport. By far the greater part of the demonstrations have taken place in the Eastern part of the Island.

110!

3601/c

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Italian troops have been moved to various centres of disturbance but I have not had any reports of their being actively engaged in quelling disorders. There has been a tendency on the part of the local administration to apply to an Allied Headquarters, if one is nearby, for intervention or assistance e.g. with transport. By far the greater part of the demonstrations have taken place in the Eastern part of the Island.

3. The demonstrations have been directed mainly against the present call-up of military classes. In a few cases the question of grain and bread may have been the sole or a partial cause, and I feel that the difficult economic conditions are an underlying contributory cause to all these disorders.

In my opinion the primary reason for the resistance to the call-up is that the Sicilian does not want to fight. Secondary reasons are that the terms of the Armistice have not been made known, that the Sicilian does not want to fight to free the Mainland of the Germans, he does not relish leaving his family on a small allowance when food is scarce and prices prohibitive, he does not wish to fight for the existing Italian Government and so forth. Some of the slogans and manifestoes which have appeared are:-

"Why should we fight in Italy while our families are left to starve?"

"We will not fight against our brothers in Italy."

"We want nothing to do with the Italian Government."

"Why should we be cannon fodder?"

"Why should we fight when we do not know what we are fighting for?"

- 1 -

SECRET

FILE 3 A

SECRET

A copy of a printed manifesto which was distributed at CATANIA is attached as Annexure A. In addition there were manifestoes crying down the call-up and enjoining all affected not to present themselves.

4. No evidence has been produced to me that the Separatist leaders are directly responsible for organising the disturbances. It will be quite obvious, however, that the object of the Separatist Movement must have a very considerable bearing on the situation not to mention in particular their normal virulent propaganda against the Italian Government and the local administration and their continual misrepresentations. One of the lines of Separatist propaganda has been that in the event of an Independent Sicily there would be no conscript service in the Italian Army or that in any case Sicilians ought to fight under their own flag or banner. The Separatists weighed in early with a letter to the High Commissioner copy of which was sent to me. A copy is enclosed as Annexure B.

5. Demonstrations have not always been confined to those directly affected by the call-up nor have these individuals always been the perpetrators of the damage. This was most evident at CATANIA where criminal and disruptive elements, many of them were boys who having been delighted spectators during the morning, when the students and others affected were demonstrating against the call-up, decided to take a hand in the proceedings in the afternoon when lamentable consequences as regards damage to public buildings resulted. The lack of effective action on the part of the Police Forces at CATANIA leads one to feel that they may have some sympathy with the demonstrators. It is reported, but it is not known whether any reliance can be placed on the report, that at CATANIA the head officials at the Questura had given instructions not to interfere.

I have not heard any reports as to the Army sympathising in any way with the demonstrators. Although there have been the usual unconfirmed reports, I have no concrete evidence of any anti-allied feeling.

6. As regards future developments this seems to depend on two factors, the extent to which the call-up is going to be enforced, and the bread situation. It is reported that the response to the call-up has been very meagre. It is said that some of those affected may have retreated into the country and that they have arms. If following on this present unrest, no grain was imported into the Island with the result that bread and pasta would comparatively soon only be available in the towns to those who could afford to buy them in the Black Market where

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As regards the forces of law and order, I feel that those at present on the Island, if properly employed, might be sufficient to maintain order if there is no deterioration in the situation as it stands at the moment. But this depends very much on the methods, if any, to be employed in the arrest of those who fail to present themselves and on whether or not grain is to be imported to maintain the present ration. I have, however, always been of the opinion that the forces of law and order here have been reduced to a dangerous level and I am therefore supporting the High Commissioner in his request for some reinforcement. Moreover my present instructions from your headquarters are that force is to be used to collect grain which policy in existing circumstances is quite impossible. The High Commissioner considers it imperative that reinforcements should be sent at an early date.

/s/ M. Carr, Brigadier
M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Encls-

Copies To: Vice President Civil Affairs Section
Public Safety Sub-Commission

- 2 -

SECRET

*Copies sent to -
Mr. Kirk 28/12/57
Mr. Charles 19/1*

AFHQ

3386

18 Dec 44

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

ONE PD INTERNAL SECURITY POSITION IN SICILY IS WEAKENED BY TWO BATTALIONS OF THE TWO ITEM SUGAR DIVISIONS IN SICILY BEING EMPLOYED ON THE MAINLAND PAREN CALABRIA PAREN FOR GUARD DUTIES PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM FROM LUSH PAREN

TWO PD THE PROBLEM OF ITEM SUGAR TROOPS FOR THE MAINLAND CMA SARDINIA AND SICILY WAS PASSED TO YOU FOR A DECISION BY HEADQUARTERS ABLE ABLE ITEM IN THEIR LETTER ONE SIX ZERO FIVE SLANT THREE ZERO SLANT ONE SLANT GEORGE PAREN SUGAR DOG ONE PAREN OF TWO FOUR SEPTEMBER ONE NINE FOUR FOUR PD

THREE PD IN YOUR SIGNAL FOX XRAY FOUR THREE SEVEN ONE THREE OF TWO FIVE OCTOBER YOU ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION OF TROOPS CONSIDERED NECESSARY IN SARDINIA WHICH WAS ANSWERED BY OUR FIVE EIGHT TWO TWO OF TWO NOVEMBER PD

FOUR PD IN VIEW OF RECENT DISTURBANCES IN CATANIA I AGAIN RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT TWO ~~MILKIE~~ FULL ITEM SUGAR DIVISIONS ARE MINIMUM PRESENT GARRISON REQUIRED FOR SICILY AND ~~THE~~ MOVE OF TROOPS TO ACHIEVE THIS BE UNDERTAKEN EARLIEST

Distribution:

Land Forces Sub-Comm (MELA)

Civil Affairs Sec for Public Health Sub-Comm

Office of Chief of Staff

300

H.W. DRAGNETT
Major, AGO
ADJUTANT

FILES A

To H.E. Bonomi
 To the Minister of War
 To 'Italia Nuova'
 To the High Commissioner

and

to be seen by Admiral Stone - Chief of the Allied Commission
R o m e

A group of inhabitants of Catania want to give some information about the riots; the demonstration had no international character; the young people called under arms only wanted to know what advantage Italy would get from their fighting, for Italy is still being treated as a defeated country.

The authorities are entirely responsible for what happened; they fired at the demonstrators who were disciplined and organized but did nothing against the mob which looted and destroyed the Municipio etc...

S. A group of inhabitants of Catania

Catania, 16 December 1944

1098

S.O.

61a

A.C. Distr

INFO-ACTION: GA. Sec

Info: 506 cc

c of S

3601/cc

cc 954
21/11/64.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 3515/17/COS.21st November, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief Commissioner.

1. Regional Commissioner, LAZIO-UMBRIA rang up at 15.15 hours to say that trouble had again broken out in the Regina Coeli Prison: that there were disturbances in three wings and that the prisoners were already on the roof.
2. Regional Commissioner said that beyond sending an observer to watch the performance of the Italian authorities he proposed to take no intervening action but to make it quite clear to the Italian authorities that this was their affair and must be resolved by them. He told me he had warned Rome Area Command of the circumstances.
3. I approved the Regional Commissioner's line of action and asked him to keep this HQ in touch with the situation.

BSL/JG.

1095

Copy to: DCOS CA Sec.

→ M.S.L.
Pls c me
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.
J—

250.1

(61)

'A'

CA/15/5/LG

20 Nov 44

SUBJECT : Prefect - Macerata.

TO : The President of the Council Minister of Interior.

(59)

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter, reference No 13151 Cab. dated 15 November 44, and note its contents.

This Commission was advised by telegram of the demonstration that took place on the 14 November and Dr. Aurelio Ponte also reported to the Local Government Sub-Commission on the matter on the 15 November. I have called for a full report by the Provincial Commissioner, and when this is received I will communicate with you further. In the meanwhile I do not propose to send Dr. Ponte back to Macerata and General Disma ZANETTI is to be appointed and proceed to-day. The appointment has been agreed with your chief of cabinet at the Ministry of Interior.

For The Chief Commissioner:

(sgd) M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

250-1

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(60)

A/X

Office of the Chief of Staff.

Disturbance at MACKRATA.

3618/29/003.

DCOS CA Sec.

16 November, 1944.

The enclosed translation and original of letter No. 13151 Gab. dated 15 Nov 44 from Prime Minister Bonomi to the Chief Commissioner is forwarded. I saw a report on this matter this morning which stated that the situation was under control. Will you please draft a reply for the Chief Commissioner's signature.

EE/AG.

[Signature]
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

Copy to: 30 to CC.

1026

See (60)

FILES A

Translation

Department of the Interior

Rome, 15 November 1944

ADMIRAL ELMERY STONE

Chief Commissioner Allied Commission

R O M E

n. 15151 Cab.

Prefect of Macerata Dr. Aurelio Ponte, came this morning to this Ministry and communicated that yesterday morning Nov. 14th at eleven o'clock a large crowd of people entered the palace of the Prefecture and penetrated into his office, attacked him, struck him and threatened to kill him. Others penetrated into his apartment, looting it and beating the family. Dr. Ponte who bears the marks of the blows he got, says that the food difficulties which served as a pretext for the demonstration were but a pretence for - to his opinion - the demonstration has a political motive; hostility against the representative of the Governmental Authority. Dr. Ponte says that during this very violent demonstration which lasted over an hour, there was no efficacious intervention of the public force to protect him. Dr. Ponte ended his declaration by saying that immediately after the aggression, he left Macerata with his family, in agreement with the Allied Provincial Commissioner, on a car provided by the same. Though I have no means for ascertaining what happened, I drew your attention on the gravity of these facts. It seems obvious that Prefect Ponte cannot go back to Macerata. I shall be grateful if you will let me know what you think about this incident

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL MINISTER OF INTERIOR

BONCHI

/s/ Bonchi

1099

trans. E.C.

250.1

FILES A

THE MAFIA RIDES AGAIN
by
Gino Rea.

TO:
Charles Angoff
Managing Editor
American Mercury
570 Lexington Avenue
New York 22, New York.

[Sicily's notorious Black Hand - the Mafia - rides again, more powerful than it ever was. From the chaos of war it has surged to play its sinister part in the life of a people that are demanding a Napoleonic form of government to give them bread and "peace". Its mysterious leaders are outwardly self-respecting citizens, big-shot in the game of politics that has brought Sicily on the verge of actual anarchy. For today the Flimzy pretence of a governing body is nothing more than a false veneer because there is no law and order in this turbulent island. The Italian officials are nothing more than puppets whose strings are being pulled by the masked hands of the Mafia.]

[There is no single Mafia organization. Throughout Sicily today there are probably six hundred Mafia bands, each having its own sphere of influence. These bands range in groups of two to a dozen. Some of them are outright brigands. Most of them pay tribute to the Chiefs in the provinces. They have earned the respect and the fear of the Sicilian population. The daily murders that are committed are practically all

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(MORE)

FILES A

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益母草

past be forgotten, and thus have their activities during 22 years of Fascism obliterated. The Separatists are using the Mafia to oppress all those who are against them. The Communists, always working underground, want to see the chaotic conditions grow to the point where revolution becomes inevitable. It is their plan, then, to step in with their steadily growing organization and seize power.

The rich Barons have no reason to see their estates broken up. Many of the present Barons earned their vast estates and wealth from their past activities as members of the Mafia. These virtual feudal lords intend to use the Mafia as a personal police force to guard themselves, and, at the same time, to terrorize the "contadini" into submission. The "gablotto" is seeking to protect his job. He favors the Mafia because it affords him a chance to do business. A strong central Italian government would wipe out his entire class.

The Mafia started operating almost immediately after the German retreat in Sicily. Scores of Fascists deserted from the Italian army fled into the "macchia" fields and hills - carrying with them as much abandoned arms as possible. The Germans, before leaving the island, opened all the jails and released thousands of criminals, many of whom had been arrested by the Fascist regime because of their Mafia activities. These criminals joined in the general loot of the arms and munition that was being left behind.

(MORE)

Some of them even went into Allied camps and stole rifles and bullets. Tens of thousands of pieces of arms and an unlimited amount of ammunition was thus robbed and hidden away in the "macchia". Little groups of brigands then began robbing and killing, strictly on an independent basis.

It was later, when the political factions, the former Fascists, and the Barons realized that law and order could not be enforced by the standing Sicilian Government that the Mafia was patronized by the big-shots and organized on an island wide basis.

When Allied Military Government took over, all Fascists laws were revoked. This meant that the criminals who had escaped could not be arrested for their past crimes. Allied military police had been able to maintain public order only while it remained in Sicily. When these police forces were shifted to the mainland, the Sicilian government had to depend on its own law enforcing agencies. Inasmuch as all Fascist organizations were wiped out, the Italian police did not in fact exist. It was, therefore, necessary to organize an entirely new system. The men that were selected were low in spirits, their morale was broken. When the Allied armies left Sicily they took all their supplies with them. Thus the Italian police found itself without enough arms to go around to all its members. Many of the police could not cover their "beat" because they had no shoes to wear, or clothing to wear, or clothing to protect them from the winter cold. In a country where transportation is of vital importance for the maintenance of law and order, the police found themselves with a handful of old broken down cars. The police, too started to receive a ridiculously low salary - about six dollars a week. This cer-

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With such a weak police force, the men responsible for organizing the mafia into a political instrument started to work in earnest.

(MORE)

58a

Charles Angoff; page 4

They called together men who had been notorious in the old days of the Black-Hand. They promised them protection from the police and the Allied authorities. They provided those that had no arms with guns and munition. They gave them horses to ride and hiding places to escape. And now the dye was cast - the big game of gaining power in political circles began.

Allied Military Government looked around for "responsible" people to place in official position. They could not expect to find experienced leaders among the illiterate masses, so they turned to a class of people that had enjoyed the blessings of Fascism. And from these people they selected the mayors and the commissioners.

Foremost target of all anti-Fascists is Lucio Tasca, who, together with two other brothers, is the richest landowner of Palermo and possibly of all Sicily. A man who had wine and dined Fascist officials, had benefited from their laws, and had been untouched by war, Lucio Tasca is a replica of New York's Tammany bosses. Yet it was Lucio Tasca who was selected by AMG to be Mayor of Palermo! It was at his home that high British and American officials spent many a gay evening being lavishly entertained.

Lucio Tasca as a mayor of Palermo did not make a hit. The Communists and Socialists knew his record too well. The Democratic-Christian Party, presumably the strongest organ in Sicily, protested. The six-party government of Rome protested. One night at the Tasca Villa in Mondello, Allied Commission officials paid Lucio a visit. They could not buck the tide, they said. Lucio would have to ask for his resignation. Everything was done in a very friendly way. Lucio agreed. The Allied

1030
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But Lucio Tasca was not eliminated from the game of politics.

The Tasca clan, although not members of the Mafia, pulled many Mafia strings. The work of the Mafia is too dirty for them. But the Mafia serves their purpose.

(MORE)

There is Alessandro Tasca, the eldest of the three brothers. He is President of the Concilio Agrario - the agrarian cooperative.

Through his position he holds the power or grain over. Giuseppe Tasca is the administrator of the family estates. It is through him that the actual contact with the Mafia is maintained. Lucio is the politician. He seeks to keep his hands clean, to conduct his business as a gentleman Baron.

The Tasca clan is the real power behind the throne of the Sicilian Independence Movement, of which Andrea Pinocchiaro Aprile is the nominal president. Aprile, a lawyer who practiced in Rome, has been connected on various occasions with the Mafia. So has the Secretary General of the Movement, another lawyer by the name of Antonio Varvaro.

Aprile is being used by the Tasca brothers as their front. If anything goes wrong it is Aprile that gets the blame and not the Tascas. The three brothers are well protected. They have "influential friends" in important positions with the Allied Commission. Lucio is a frequent visitor at the offices of A.C. The Italian government at Rome would like to arrest Lucio and shoot him. But Tasca enjoys complete liberty of action. He can't be touched.

One of the most colorful bands of brigands to terrorize the country-side, the Russo Band, has been linked with the Mafia with connections leading to the Aprile group. But the nature of the Sicilians not to talk or "squeal" has made it impossible for the police or the Rome authorities to get the final documentation that could prosecute the big shots.

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Giuseppe D'Antonino Russo is a young man of 23. He was a "contadino" before he took up the practice of brigandage. His first attempts were petty robbery, together with a companion that was caught. Russo heard through underground channels that his companion had implicated him in various crimes. Whereupon Russo set out and killed the entire family of his former companion. He turned to the hills. Here he met 60 year old Augustino Ciaramodaro, an old hand Mafia member, whose connections with the Aprile group were well established. Now Russo really became "big-time".

58a

(MORE)

Charles Angoff: page 6

Russo had taken as mistress 22 year old Teresa Messina, the wife of his brother, who is a Prisoner of War. They learned the tricks of the Mafia through Ciarasciaro and proved to be very apt pupils. The old man was left in the background and Russo with his mistress who dressed herself as a man, roided the countryside. They went in mostly for robbery, but they also indulged in extortations. The police estimate that Russo received as much as 50 million lire from extortations, and that his total booty amounts to 400 million lire!

The Russo Band helped the Separatists cause by threatening the "contadino" with death if he planted more than a certain amount of grain, or if he turned in more than a minimum amount of his crop to the "People's Granaries". Death did come violently to those who infringed the order. The purpose of planting less grain and turning in a minimum amount to the Granaries is to incite the common people against the house government by proving to them that Rome only exploits them and to time of need doesn't offer any help.

In Villalba the Allies selected another man who is directly connected with the Mafia. He is a young lawyer by the name of Beniamini Farina. Farina is the nephew of a Mafia Chieftan, Don Calogero Vizzini, a rich Baron with vast acres of land.

Don Calogero Vizzini is the head of another group of Separatists with the sober name of Fronte Democratico Antine Siciliano. The emblem of this group is an American flag with the island of Sicily as its base. Because of this emblem Vizzini's Separatist Group is labeled "pro-American", and the Fasci, or Aprile Group, "pro-British".

036 The latter is due to the fact that

amounts to 450 million.

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029

The reason that the Sicilians have so labeled the latter is due to the fact that

today most of the officials of the Allied Commission are British and inasmuch as Lucio is very frequently seen in their company it has led to the assumption that the British are supporting the Tessa-Aprile group.

Vizzini's Separatists are much better organized than the Aprile group, even though the latter count a much larger membership. There are today throughout Sicily 4000,000 combatant Separatists. The members are largely centered in the big cities, with the provinces of Catania and Palermo enrolling the majority of members.

(cont.)

Charles Angoff: page 7

The Separatists want to set up an autonomous Republic, divorced from Italy. Their main grievance is that Sicily has been always exploited by the Rome government.

Actually the Separatists want to seize power for themselves and don't care what kind of government is set up as long as they are in power.

Vizzini, who frankly admits that he is a Mafia Chieftan, is not much interested in "numbers" of men following him. He has seen what a well organized Fascist, Nazi, and Communist group can do to gain control of a nation. He, therefore, is following their plan. His members are all tough, the "ready-to-die" type. The opposition fears Vizzini and has endeavored to liquidate him in many ways. They have so far failed. They thought that they could jail him when they had circumstantial evidence that it was he who threw a bomb at Dr. Girolamo Licausi, Chief Communist Inspector of Italy who had come to Sicily to address a party meeting. The bomb exploded and sent Dr. Licausi to the hospital for a month and gravely wounded 17 others. But circumstantial evidence means nothing in Sicily today, and the bent that the combined opposition could do was to arrest Farina on a flimsy charge. Vizzini has raised heaven and earth to free his nephew without success. But, he has not remained idle. His Mafia has ridden well at nights and territory belonging to the sphere of influence of the opposition has been raised frequently.

In the scholarly offices of the University of Palermo sits studious Professor Giuseppe Montalbano, vice director of the University and titular head of the Communist organ in Sicily. The only reason that can be advanced for him holding such a high position is that he suffered under Fascism and therefore should be rewarded! Far more active in Communist activities is Cesare Sessa, a man well known for making trouble.

1041

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The communists found themselves at a disadvantage in Sicily, for the Sicilians are highly individualistic and not vulnerable to the "workers of the world unite" slogan. The Mafia was an enemy of the Communists, and, it was, therefore necessary to cultivate its friendship as soon as the party members saw its growing importance in the field of power politics. Accordingly the Communists began working underground for

(MORE)

Charles Angoff: page 8

they had to put up the front created by Foglietti, Minister-without-Portfolio of the Communists in the six party government in Rome, that they were working with the central Italian forces. They contacted members of the Mafia who were still independent and offered them better rewards than the Aprile and Vizzini groups.

Like most of the combatant political elements who are waiting for "the day", the Communists had looted their share of arms and a munition, from the retreating Nazis and also from Allied stores. They marked all their weapons with the Communist insignia of the hammer and sickle and with the slogans, "Vive Stalin" and "Vive il Comunismo". These arms are among the most modern to be used in the present war, and the Communists guarded them jealously. When they knew that they could trust the Mafia and that it would work for them, the Communists armed them from their warehouses.

In the village of San Buca, in the province of Agrigento, the first of these Communist Mafia bands started operating. Well armed and provisioned, riding some of the best Sicilian horses, they functioned smoothly and with great success. The band then came to the attention of the Aprile and Tasso groups, who probably knew that this band did not work for them. When the police had failed to catch any of the members of "La Banda San Buca", sudden strength came to their aid and a trap was set for this particular Mafia group. The ambush did not succeed completely, but several members of the band were caught and their arms confiscated. There, buried in the wood of the rifles was the hammer and sickle and the Communist slogan. The insignias were not forged, because they matched with those found on active Communists in the cities.

Prominent former Fascist like Dr. ...

also from Allied troops. The hammer and sickle and with the slogans, "Vive Stalin" and "Vive il Comunismo" are used in the present war, and the Communists guarded them jealously. When they knew that they could trust the Mafia and that it would work for them, the communists armed them from their warehouses.

In the village of San Buca, in the province of Agrigento, the first of these Communist Mafia bands started operating. Well armed and provisioned, riding some of the best Sicilian horses, they functioned smoothly and with great success. The band then came to the attention of the Aprile and Tascia groups, who probably knew that their band did not work for them. Where the police had failed to catch any of their members of "La Banda San Buca", sudden strength came to their aid and a trap was set for this particular Mafia group. The ambush did not succeed completely, but several members of the band were caught and their arms confiscated. There, burned in the wood of the rifles was the hammer and sickle and the Communist slogan. The insignias were not forged, because they matched with those found on active Communists in the cities.

Prominent former Fascists like Dr. Nicola Leotta, professor of surgery at Palermo University, and former Consul-General of the Fascist Militia, and Engineer Teuto Montasento, a former Socialist who left that party in 1925 to praise Mussolini's cause, are now espousing the separatist cause openly and aiding the Mafia behind the scenes. The chaos there is, the greater the anarchy, the less chances will there be for men like the above two to pay for the crime of fascism.

(MORE)

580

Charles Angoff: page 9

Today the Mafia has been raised to a level that it had never attained before - it is the main force that is used to gain political power and a threat to any one that dares oppose it. The Mafia has become the master of the tragic situation existing in Sicily today. It is the Frankenstein by selfish, greedy elements who hope to keep their ill gotten gains and those political forces that using it for the day of revolution.

The Mafia is largely responsible for the lack of sufficient grain to feed the people of Sicily. In the island of some 4 million inhabitants an absolute minimum of 3,500,00 quintals of grain had to be amassed from the farms. By extortion, threats, and murder, the Mafia has succeeded in keeping the production of grain down to a minimum, and by successfully forcing the contadino to hide as much grain as possible the Sicilian government was able to amass only 1,300,000 quintals of grain. This means that the Sicilian government cannot meet its basic ration quota of 200 grams a day for the people. It means that today in Sicily there isn't a single gram of Sicilian wheat to give to the people!

By moving out and forcing the allies isolated Sicily completely. The island depended for a great part of its livelihood upon its vast export trade. Sicily is rich in sulphur, in oranges, lemons, olive oil, and fish. This export trade is practically choked off. Because of military requirements, enough transport ships cannot be allowed to ply between Sicily and the mainland or other parts of the world. A country whose inhabitants eat bread and "pasta" as their main food practically seven days a week, this isolation means that the entire economic life of the island is constrained to live off its own products. Contrary to general beliefs that Sicily was self-sufficient in grain, the

source of bread and pasta.

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(MORE)

58a

Charles Angelo: page 10

The cities which contributed manpower for the export trade now find themselves with hundreds of thousands of unemployed who have no prospect of work anywhere. It is the cities, also, that has given proof of the terrific storm that is brewing, for here much blood has been shed in strikes and riots. The so-called "white-collar" class is clamoring for a strong one man government to put an end to politics. Most of the buildings are marked with the Communist insignia and slogans and the Separatist motto: "Sicily for the Sicilians". Everywhere among the common people, in the shops, on the street corners, in family reunions, you hear outbursts against democracy. "We need a Napoleoni to feed us!" they cry.

And with this bitter feeling against the Allies rising, the Sicilians do not look too harshly at the rising tide of the Mafia. Many of them have colored the lives of these bandits with a romantic glow. Some talk of men like Busso as Robin Hoods, for now and then the brigands throw a "bone" to some starving family. The word spreads and soon the countryside knows that this or that band is feeding hundreds of starving families. The raids of the brigands are glamorized. The men ride at night on swift horses. They wear masks and they sing. They are unafraid and the police and soldiers run upon hearing their voices! They rob the rich to feed the poor. They go right into the heart of the cities with heroic daring and they plunder the warehouses of the Barons! Such is the talk that has spread among the common people of Sicily, who hope that perhaps out of the six hundred bands of Mafia a single strong man will emerge and take control of all the bands. Then, they say, this man will put the island back on its feet.

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It is exactly this kind of thinking that the creators of the new Mafia are fostering. The former Fascists, the Separatists, the Barons, the Communists and the "goblotto", all hope that "their side" will possess that strong man. And they are preparing for the showdown by piling up stores of arms and munition.

Hidden in the "macchie" of Sicily today are enough guns, artillery, and munition to supply an army of 100,000 men! Fantastico? Well, the guns are there all right, and the forces that are waiting for the day when the fight will start know it. The police and soldiers are powerless to prevent this growing strength of the Mafia.

(MORE)

032

38a

Charles Angelo: page 11

The Sicilian government can do nothing about it. For the people do not believe in the "Horse" clique. Furthermore there are hundreds of towns and villages and cities that are today governed by members of the Mafia themselves, or front-men who are ruled by the Mafia.

The day of battle is coming. Perhaps by the time this article goes to press that day will already have come. No one denies the gravity of the situation, least of all the authorities, who frankly state that they don't see any way of averting disaster under the present conditions. Once the grain ends, the trouble will start. A whole army of occupation will then be necessary to quell the riots. Thousands upon thousands of tons of wheat will have to be imported. Much blood will have to be shed to wipe out entrenched positions of the Mafia. The whole rotten feudal system will have to be wiped out. Men of political honesty and high ideals will have to found, to govern.

Until this is done, the Mafia will continue to ride, continue to kill, continue to rule.

Gene Bea
October 29th, 1944

1049

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Gene Rea

October 29th, 1944

1031

58a

Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

Colonel Pollock's Evidence Before
Court of Enquiry
Administrative Section

A/CC 250

26 September 4

The attached letter is passed to you for action.

10 1 Incl: Ltr fr President of the
Court of Inquiry, ref: N. 1004

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R.A.
Chief Staff Officer

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 26 SEP 1944
Via Hqgr 1512
Initials CM

250.1

TRANSLATION

378

26/9-1030
270

COURT OF INQUIRY

(about the facts which happened in the Palazzo di Giustizia on 18/8/1944)

N. 1004

Palazzo di Giustizia, 25/9/1944

TO: Captain Stone
U.F.N.
Acting Chief Commissioner A.C.C.

R o m e

This Court needs to hear Colonel Pollock's account of the events which took place on Sept. 19th in the Palazzo di Giustizia.

Will you kindly inform Colonel Pollock of the request of this Court, and let us know on what day and at what time the Colonel would like to give his evidence.

Yours very truly,

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY

/s/

2cc (47)

250.1

1070

Trans. E.C.

B7a

COMMISSIONE D'INCHIESTA

in merito ai fatti verificatisi nel Palazzo di Giustizia il 16/8/1944-

Prot. N° IOO4-

dal Palazzo di Giustizia il 25/9/1944-

Sig. Capitano Stone

U.F.N. Acting

Commissioner A.C.C.

R O M A

Questa Commissione ha necessità di ascoltare della viva voce del Signor Colonnello Pollock una relazione sugli avvenimenti verificatisi il 16 corrente nel Palazzo di Giustizia.-

Si prega pertanto voler comunicare il desiderio di questa Commissione al Signor Colonnello Pollock, e di voler far conoscere in qual giorno ed a quale ora il Colonnello gradirebbe rendere le sue dichiarazioni.-

Si resta in attesa di un cortese cenno di risposta.-

IL PRESIDENTE
DELLA COMMISSIONE D'INCHIESTA

Questa Commissione ha necessità di ascoltare dalla viva voce del Signor Colonnello Pollock una relazione sugli avvenimenti verificatisi il 18 corrente nel Palazzo di Giustizia.-

Si prega pertanto voler comunicare il desiderio di questa Commissione al Signor Colonnello Pollock, e di voler far conoscere in qual giorno ed a quale ora il Colonnello gradirebbe rendere le sue dichiarazioni.-

Si resta in attesa di un cortese cenno di risposta.-

1079

IL PRESIDENTE
DELLA COMMISSIONE D'INCHIESTA



TRANSLATION

5972/142

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

CABINET

Telegraph and cipher office

384

26/9-1510
DFE

Rome 25 September 1944

Admiral Ellery W. STONE
Chief Commissioner Allied Control CommissionR O M E

5972/142 period High Commissioner Sicily signals conditions public
order of the Island growing worse period Referring letter sent to you
16 present month, renew request for your kind intervention so that
units Italian military forces should not at the present moment be
withdrawn from Sicily period Thanks period

PRESIDENT COUNCIL MINISTRE INTERIOR

BONOMI

1077

250.1

FILED

Trans. E.C.

(57)

100 450 394

357
100 450 394
100 450 394

100 450 394

HEADQUARTERS

ARMED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SECTION 17

APO 394

24 September, 1944

Subject: Disorder at Regine Coal Prison-
1 prisoner killed; 6 wounded.

To : Col. FORTI, Regional Commissioner
Copies for: Capt. STONE, Acting Commissioner, A.C.C. ✓
General BROOK, Rome Area Commander
Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.C.

1. Late last night, 23rd, September, 1944, some Italian prisoners in the 7th Wing of Regine Coal Prison managed to break loose from the cells, assisted other prisoners to get from their cells, and there was some disorder. It is understood some of them attempted to force the bars of the windows looking to the courtyard below, and they were fired on by the Carabinieri. As a result, one prisoner was killed, and two (2) were wounded. Some semblance of order was eventually restored during the night.

2. At 7:30 a.m., 24th September, 1944, disorder again broke out when several hundreds of prisoners broke loose from the cells, but were confined to the corridors and inside the main prison gateway which was securely locked. Captain FORTI telephoned me at 8:15 a.m., 24th September, 1944, and I immediately went to the prison with Major GONNARD.

3. There were at least 500 prisoners out of the cells, yelling and shouting, creating a serious disturbance. There was a slight fire on the roof of the 7th wing, and I summoned the Colonel of the fire brigade with 40 men and appliances. As far as I can gather, 1 or 2 prisoners had escaped to the roof and it is alleged that they set fire to some rubbish and timber. Some attempts had been made to remove the rubbish, probably with intentions of increasing the conflagration, but the fire was quickly extinguished by the Fire Brigade. There were no prisoners on the roof.

4. There was very considerable antagonism against the Carabinieri present by the howling mob of prisoners, who were concerned about the four wounded men lying in the corridor.

5. Accompanied by a few fire brigade men, Major GONNARD and I went into the prison to see the four wounded prisoners, and quitted the mob who

1076

250.

General Sub-Commission, A.C.C.

1. Late last night, 23rd, September, 1944, some Italian prisoners in the 7th wing of Regio Coeli prison managed to break loose from the cells, assisted other prisoners to get from their cells, and there was some disorder. It is understood some of them attempted to force the bars of the windows looking to the courtyard below, and they were fired on by the Carabinieri. As a result, one prisoner was killed, and two (2) were wounded. Some semblance of order was eventually restored during the night.

2. At 7:30 a.m., 24th September, 1944, disorder again broke out when several hundreds of prisoners broke loose from the cells, but were confined to the corridors and inside the main prison gateway which was securely locked. Captain Farnham telephoned me at 8:15 a.m., 24th September, 1944, and I immediately went to the prison with Major CHURCH.

3. There were at least 1000 prisoners out of the cells, yelling and shouting, creating a serious disturbance. There was a slight fire on the roof of the 7th wing, and I summoned the Colonel of the fire brigade with 40 men and appliances. As far as I can gather, 1 or 2 prisoners had escaped to the roof and it is alleged that they set fire to some rubbish and timber. Some attempts had been made to remove mattresses, probably with intention of increasing the confusion, but the fire was quickly extinguished by the Fire Brigade. There were no prisoners on the roof.

4. There was very considerable antagonism against the Carabinieri present by the howling mob of prisoners, who were concerned about the four wounded men lying in the corridor.

5. Accompanied by a few fire brigade men, Major Coxhead and I went into the 7th wing and removed the four wounded prisoners, and quitted the mob who then returned quietly to their respective cells.

6. To pacify them I got them to select six prisoners to form a committee to air their grievances and complaints and I passed these six men over to the prison governor to investigate their complaints.

7. As this wing was somewhat overcrowded, I arranged for the removal of about 100 of them to other parts of the prison. Complete order was restored by 9:00 a.m.

8. As far as can be ascertained at present some 30 guards are missing and will be dealt with later by the prison authorities.

(46)

CHURCH (A)X

See by Capt. Farnham

250.1

- 2 -

9. Owing to the very strong feeling against the Carabinieri in prison, I advised that they confine themselves to outside of the prison for the time being. About 50 Metropolitan are standing by in reserve and by arrangement with Chief, Fire Brigade and Prison Governor, 40 selected firemen (unarmed) are acting as prison guards as a temporary measure.

10. Major Mulhoney of A.C.C. has kindly offered to come and assist and deal with the following matters:-

- a. Many of the locks on cell doors are broken or damaged and possibly some of the keys are missing. Immediate steps are being taken today to have these locks repaired and if necessary, replaced.
- b. A better segregation of the prisoners, especially in this 7th wing where there are a few dangerous criminals.
- c. Securing bars, windows, and other precautionary measures.
- d. In conjunction with prison governor, and Minister of Justice, a complete purge of the prison staff and recruitment of new guards.

11. Further report will be submitted in due course.

12. Allied Military not called out or required.

J.H. POLLOCK,
Lt. Colonel,
Chief, Public Safety
Region IV

See by Capt. [unclear]

File

Q

1075

ACG/14613/PS.

24th September, 1944.

My dear Prime Minister:

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter N.5379 dated 19th September.

The question of providing a regiment of Italian troops in Rome will be considered but in view of the limited ceiling laid down for the Italian Army and the necessity of organising combat units for operational purposes and internal security divisions in other parts of the country, I can assure you that the provision of troops for Rome will only be permitted if it is considered absolutely necessary to maintain law and order.

The preservation of law and order is the primary duty of the CC.RR, CC.FF and other police agencies. Only if they are likely to fail can the presence of troops be deemed necessary. While in the opinion of my advisers your request is not unreasonable, they consider that a great improvement is essential in the loyalty, initiative, energy and sense of public duty of the CC.RR, CC.FF and other police agencies, and that we must be assured of far greater effort to instil these qualities into the forces of law and order: this is an immediate and paramount necessity.

07! Eye witnesses have informed me that the unhappy incidents on Monday were due not to any lack of numbers of CC.RR but to extremely bad organisation connected with the arrangements for the trial itself, and to complete lack of organisation, initiative and fortitude displayed by the CC.RR, CC.FF and other police agencies themselves. In conference with General Orlando, General Ayomoni and H.E. Ferrari, Brigadier Upjohn urged upon them the necessity of instilling greater enthusiasm, energy and esprit de corps among the various forces. Much can and must be done by Commanding Officers to instil the qualities of leadership into their subordinates, to teach them to regain their pride and their authority. Epuration of the Fascist elements and of others whose conduct has been lacking, must be carried out more rapidly and with greater vigour. The confidence of the public in the various forces must be re-established by sympathetic investigation into complaints and immediate action to remove those complaints.

There should be no delay in taking steps to effect these remedies and I beg you in the interests of law and order in Italy to use your personal influence with General Orlando, General Ayomoni and H.E. Ferrari to see that this is done.

-2-

Moreover, I think that much could be done to increase the morale of your police forces if you yourself and your colleagues in the Government would influence the press in their present campaign against the police, persuading them to adopt a new note of encouragement by pointing out the very good work done by them rather than criticising and discouraging the forces.

I do not under estimate, my dear Prime Minister, the difficulties which face your Government and your police forces: I am fully aware of the distressing shortage of boots and clothing, and the difficulties under which the police forces are working, and I assure you that I am doing all that is possible to assist you. In particular I hope it may be possible to increase the ration of the CG.FE and the police agencies and to bring over from North Africa more CG.RR.

For operational reasons it has been necessary to remove one battalion of troops from Sicily but I hope that they will be replaced without delay by a battalion or battalions from Sardinia. I shall be in a position to give you more information on this subject in a few days.

MERRY W. STONE
Captain, USMR
Acting Chief Commissioner

11079

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

1947

Hq ACC	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Dep-time	26 SEP 1947
Via	AG. 09.45
Initials	EM

Drafted by Admin. Sec. (Pub. Safety S/c)
cc: Admin. Sec.

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Brig Upjohn to A/CC.

Public Safety in Sicily.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 091.711-1 - ITALIAN ARMY

1072

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheets and then destroyed.

54

SECRET

AFHQ

HQ ACC

S-340

22 SEPT

SECRET

PRIORITY

ACTING CHIEF COMM.

SECRET PD FURTHER MY SUGAR THREE THREE EIGHT PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACRED CMA UNITED
 STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM HQ ACC FROM STONE
 PERSONAL PAREN CARUSO TRIAL CONCLUDED TWENTY FIRST PD CONVICTED CMA SENTENCED
 TO DEATH CMA APPEAL DENIED CMA EXECUTED TODAY ONE FOUR ONE ZERO HOURS PD
 CCGHIETTO CMA HIS ASSISTANT CMA CONVICTED CMA SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS
 IMPRISONMENT PD NO OUTWARD INCIDENTS

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY W. STONE
 Captain, USNR
 Acting Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

Sir Noel Charles
 Hon. Alexander Kirk
 Political Section
 CA Branch
 Exec Commissioner
 Public Safety
 Security Branch

CG, RAAC

FILES (A-B)

510 310

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date - Time 22 Sept 1645
Via _____
Initials _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

JAQ/hd

A/CC 250.1

22 September 1944

Subject: Public Order in Rome

To: Vice President, Administrative Section

The Acting Chief Commissioner wishes me to call your attention to attached copy of a communication from the Prime Minister, requesting that you put up a suitable reply for his signature in the light of your recommendations.

(51) ETC

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Chief Staff Officer

X-014.13 - 250.1

- 1 Incl:
Ltr fr Bonomi, No. 5379
dated 19 Sept 1944, with
enclosure thereto.
- 1072
- (52)
- 22 Sept

53308

Hq A.C.C. Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date 22 Sept 1944
By Major
DVR

TRANSLATION

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Rome 19 September 1944

n. 9379

A395

HO AGC, APO 394
 283 Sec'y Gen.
 Rec'd 20 Sep 1945
 By PER.

Dear Captain,

Here is a copy of the letter which I sent to the Allied Control Commission, Public Safety Sub-Commission; will you kindly see that the competent Allied organs provide without delay adequate reinforcements to face the present urgent need of the public order in the capital.

I take the liberty of drawing your attention on this subject and of appealing to your kind comprehension.

Trusting in your help to solve in a satisfactory way a problem, the importance, the gravity and the urgency of which have been but too emphasized by the regrettable incident of yesterday, I thank you and remain,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Admiral ALLAN H. STONE

Chief Commissioner

Allied Control Commission

1063

1063

FILES (A) B

TRANS. E.C.

TRANSLATION

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Rome, 19 September 1944.

TO THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-CommissionR O M E

The painful events of yesterday morning have tragically proved the grave numerical deficiency of the forces for the public order services in the Capital, as well as the urgent necessity to appoint adequate reinforcements to face the needs of the services during the present moment.

If, because of the limited efficiency of the cadres of the P.S. Agenti' Corps, it should prove impossible to transfer more police contingents, to employ troops would be the only solution left.

Even this solution could not be put to immediate execution, for, from what the competent military organ say, no army unit can be disposed of in Rome.

If this was to be a lasting deficiency, other unpleasant repercussions might occur; it is therefore necessary that we should be able to dispose of the forces of one regiment at least, to fulfill the above mentioned duties.

This could be done by transferring temporarily from Calabria here two battalions of the Ignotova Division. An other infantry regiment could be formed with the elements which will come to Rome from the districts of the Lazio, to leaving the levy not taking place. As soon as this unit should be formed, the battalions of the Ignotova could be sent back.

As the chief difficulty seems to be the lack of foodstuffs, the competent Allied Authorities would have to grant a greater number of rations, corresponding to a regiment of about 1200 men.

If this should not prove possible, will you ask the above mentioned authorities to authorize that these rations should be taken from the contingent assigned to the carabinieri, which is not entirely drawn as the present force of the Corps does not reach the number of the fixed effectives.


1059

I hope that the Allied Control Commission will agree with these proposals, considering the special gravity of the problem and the necessity of finding a solution. These proposals have been made in agreement with the Minister of War.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

/s/ Bonomi



Il Ministro dell'Interno
Prot. N. 5323 Gab.

Roma, 18 settembre 1944

REG. C. APO 394
292 REG. Y. GEN.
REC. 20 Sept 1944
By *over*

Signor

AMIRAGLIO ELLERY W. STONE
Commissario Capo della Commissione Alleata
di Controllo -

R O M A

Desidero richiamare la Sua particolare attenzione sulla
unita lettera da me inviata alla Sottocommissione per la Pubblica
Sicurezza, e pregarla di volersi cortesemente interessare per la
soluzione della importante questione nel senso da me prospettato.

Ringraziandola sentitamente in anticipo per quanto vorrà fare
al riguardo, la prego di gradire, Signor Ammiraglio, i sensi della
mia particolare considerazione.

IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO
MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO

Handwritten signature

Desidero richiamare la Sua particolare attenzione sulla
unita lettera da me inviata alla Sottocommissione per la Pubblica
Sicurezza, e pregarla di volersi cortesemente interessare per la
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IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO
MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO


Ammiraglio

1057

ISTITUTO POLIGRAFICO DELLO STATO

COPIA

Roma, 18 settembre 1944-



Il Ministro dell'Interno

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO
Sottocommissione per la P.S.

ROMA

e, per conoscenza:

A S.E. IL MINISTRO DELLA GUERRA = ROMA
ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA P.S. = SEDE

Per le imprescindibili esigenze dei servizi di ordine pubblico della Sicilia avevo interessato il Ministro della Guerra perchè disponesse il trasferimento di due battaglioni del R^o Esercito dalla Sardegna in Sicilia, da effettuarsi il 1^o ottobre, quando cioè le truppe alleate lasceranno la Sicilia, ritenendo assolutamente necessario che il presidio di quell'isola venga rinforzato.

Nonchè vengo ora informato che il Comando Alleato ha disposto che due battaglioni attualmente in Sicilia vengano subito inviati in Calabria.

Se questa notizia è esatta io devo richiamare la particolare attenzione di codesta Commissione sulle gravi ripercussioni che l'esecuzione di tale disposizione determinerebbe sulle condizioni di pubblica sicurezza della Sicilia, dove la mancanza di

Per le imprescindibili esigenze dei servizi di ordine pubblico della Sicilia avevo interessato il Ministro della Guerra perchè disponesse il trasferimento di due battaglioni del Reiser- cito dalla Sardegna in Sicilia, da effettuarsi il 1° ottobre, quan- do cioè le truppe alleate lasceranno la Sicilia, ritenendo asso- lutamente necessario che il presidio di quell'isola venga rinfor- zato.

Senonchè vengo ora informato che il Comando Alleato ha disposto che due battaglioni attualmente in Sicilia vengano subito inviati in Calabria.

Se questa notizia è esatta io devo richiamare la parti- colare attenzione di codesta Commissione sulle gravi ripercussioni che l'esecuzione di tale disposizione determinerebbe sulle condi- zioni di pubblica sicurezza della Sicilia, dove la mancanza di due battaglioni - ed il 1° ottobre di quattro - aggraverebbe la situazione già di per se stessa poco rassicurante per la deficien- za di forze di polizia.

Rivolgo, pertanto, viva preghiera a codesta Commissione di voler esaminare con particolare considerazione l'opportunità che i due battaglioni attualmente in Sicilia non vengano spostati in Calabria e che altri due battaglioni siano trasferiti - come

./.

sopra accennato - dalla Sardegna in Sicilia, il 1° ottobre.

All'uopo si fa presente che i due battaglioni richiesti per la Calabria potrebbero essere immediatamente trasferiti in quella regione dalla Sardegna.

Si gradiranno cortesi comunicazioni in proposito.

IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO
MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO

1070

785015

SECRET

AFHQ

HQ ACC
S-338

21 SEPT

SECRET
PRIORITY
ACTING CHIEF COMM.

49
F 27379
S-335
YOUR FOX TWO SEVEN THREE SEVEN NINE FURTHER BY SUGAR THREE THREE FIVE PAREN TO
AFHQ FOR SACRED CIA UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER
FROM ACC FROM STONE PERSONAL PAREN CARUSO TRIAL ADJOURNED LATE YESTERDAY AND HAS
RESUMED THIS MORNING PD ALL WITNESSES HEARD PD ARGUMENTS OF PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE WILL BE MADE TODAY AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT TRIAL WILL BE CONCLUDED TODAY
PD THERE WERE NO UNTOWARD INCIDENTS YESTERDAY OF ANY KIND EITHER WITHIN OR OUTSIDE
THE COURT

AUTHENTICATED:

MILERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

- 106
Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk
Political Section
Exec Commissioner
CA Branch
Security Branch
Public Safety S/C
General Brown, RAAC

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 21 SEP 1944
Via *my* 1115
Initials *5*

FILES (A) B

SECRET

51
21 Sept

250-1
X-250-1
X-250-2
OK

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
BRIDGE IV
APO. 964

Regimental Public Safety HQ.

19th Sept. 1944.

TRIAL OF CANTHO - 20th Sept. 1944.

1) Place of trial : Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Via della Lungara No. 10.

2) Only one entrance : Lungotevere Farnesina gates, through Accademia d'Italia.

3) Portion of Via Lungara will be cordoned off and closed to traffic.

4) Case will commence promptly at 9 a.m. and hearing will continue throughout the day and evening. It is hoped to finish the hearing in one day, and the Court will sit 20 hours if necessary (Col. Pollock arranging about electric light and emergency lighting if necessary).

5) President of the Court : A.E. Marchi - 9 Judges will sit and 3 other reserve Judges to remain in attendance.

6) Separate room for witnesses available. 24 witnesses to be produced - they will be taken direct from their rooms with police passes in 5 cars to be found by 300 police (Col. Pollock has this in hand) *2 notes*

7) Separate room at opposite end of the courtroom for prisoner.

8) In event of any ugly situation he can be withdrawn immediately into separate ante room - door locked and barricaded and shut off entirely from the court.

9) All persons having business in the case will have special police card issued by Postore.

- 2) Only one entrance : *unpotevere* *Farnesina* gates, through *Accademia d'Italia*.
- 3) Portion of *Via Vungara* will be cordoned off and closed to traffic.
- 4) Case will commence promptly at 8 a.m. and hearing will continue throughout the day and evening. It is hoped to finish the hearing in one day, and the court will sit 20 hours if necessary (Col. Follock arranging about electric light and emergency lighting if necessary).
- 5) President of the Court : *A. E. Maroni* - 9 judges will sit and 3 other reserve judges to remain in attendance.
- 6) Separate room for witnesses available. 24 witnesses to be produced - they will be taken direct from their rooms with police passes in 5 cars to be found by *ANC* police (Col. Follock has this in hand) *2 notes*
- 7) Separate room at opposite end of the courtroom for prisoner.
- 8) In event of any ugly situation he can be withdrawn immediately into separate ante room - door locked and barricaded and shut off entirely from the court.
- 9) All persons having business in the case will have special police card issued by masters.
- 10) Only 20 members of the public will be admitted, who will be chosen through Italian Govt. by leaders of the parties. Members of the public subject to search on entry.
- 11) All unnecessary doors in the building closed and locked.
- 12) Italian Press limited and issued with special police pass by masters.
- 13) Allied Press - 20 reservations made by special tickets which will be handed to Col. Follock for distribution through P.M.O.
- 14) Three or four special reservations for senior allied officials if necessary.

1064

APPENDIX A

(1)

- 2 -

- 15) Italian Govt. have asked through President of the Court to refrain from filming the case unless the allies feel that this should be done, in which case they have no objection, but they prefer it not to be done.
- 16) The President suggests only 3 or not more than 5 cameramen to handle a few shots only. *how* *OK*
- 17) No radio.
- 18) No relatives of victims. Prisoner is not on trial for murder of victims but for high treason against the State.
- 19) Only a few allied officers will be present:
Maj. Coxhead on duty below, at foot of stairs.
It is recommended that only those allied officers with real business be admitted.
- 20) Chief of Public Safety will be with bookstore on duty in courtroom. There will be police control room outside: Tel. 55236. Dockstairs telephone in courtyard No. 51929.
- 21) AMO. Police: One officer in Court
" with Varuso
" at foot of stairs (Maj. Coxhead)
" patrolling outside
- 22) Regina Voell only 300 yds. away and prisoner will be brought from prison to place of trial early tomorrow morning - 20th Sept. before dawn.
- 23) Civil police arrangements:
Not yet completed but:
200 for cordons outside
100 patrolling back of building and grounds
50 in gardens opposite
100 mounted outside
50 in corridors
50 in vicinity of prisoner and his detention room
100 reserves.

- 19) Only a few allied officers will be present. Maj. Coxhead on duty below, at foot of stairs.
- It is recommended that only those allied officers with real business be admitted.
- 20) Chief of Public Safety will be with Quastore on duty in courtroom. There will be police control room outside. Tel. 55236. Downtown telephone in courtyard No. 51929.
- 21) AMG. Police: One officer in Court
" with Quastore
" at foot of stairs (Maj. Coxhead)
" patrolling outside
- 22) Regina Coeli only 300 yds. away and prisoner will be brought from prison to place of trial early tomorrow morning - 20th Sept. before dawn.
- 23) Civil police arrangements:
- Not yet completed but:
- 200 for cordons outside
 - 100 patrolling back of building and grounds
 - 50 in gardens opposite
 - 100 mounted outside
 - 50 in corridors
 - 50 in vicinity of prisoner and his detention room
 - 100 reserves.
- Reserves at Quastore. Tel. 481663.
- Pollock going over these arrangements with Quastore later tonight. They will all be in position by 7 a.m. 20th Sept. 1944.
- 24) Military:
- a) Col. Dodgeon G-3, A. G. Liaison officer for Home Command will be in close touch with Pollock throughout.
 - b) No military will be in evidence anywhere near the court unless grave emergency arises when matter will be reported to Col. Solstet R.C.

c) Col. Dodgeon is arranging for military police reserves at Regina Civil prison and others at 5th Canadian Hospital (parachute troop 100), plus some military police if necessary.

25/ All the above arrangements have the approval of the President of the Court of Appeal, Westmore and Officer in charge of CC.R.C.

J. H. Pollock

J. H. POLLOCK
Lt. Col.
Chief, Public Safety
REGINA IV.

EWS/ajp

A/CC 250-2

20 September 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Enclosed are some photographs which were taken at Pietro Caruso's trial on September 18th 1944 and may assist you in detecting and apprehending the principal offenders who took part in this distressing affair and assisted in the lynching of Caretta.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

7 Incls:
Photographs.

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

10.1

A 294

Hq ACC	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date - Time	21 1000
Via	1000
Incls	1

FILES (A) B

20.1

5674
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

A 350
22 SEP 1944

TO: ACC FOR STONE

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N68/19

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SCAMER CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REFERENCE No: F 27379 PRECEDENCE: URGENT

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: 191631 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE FHGEG

REPORT IN S - 335 RECEIVED PD YOUR CONDUCT APPROVED PD KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS CLOSELY INFORMED PD THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF INSTITUTING ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITHOUT REMITTANCE TO THIS HQ

47

ACC DIST

ACTION: C.S.O.
INFO: A/CC
FULE

250.1

FILES (A-B)

10:0

1078

REPORT IN S - 335 RECEIVED PD YOUR CONDUCT APPROVED PD KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS CLOSELY
INFORMED PD THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF INSTITUTING ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
WITHOUT REMITTANCE TO THIS HQ

47

ACC DIST

ACTION: C.S.O.
INFO: A/CC
FILE

250.1

FILES (A-B)

10:0

49

19 days

DATE and Time of RECEIPT 191820

Distribution:

(2)

Brig. Upjohn -
I think we must press again for increase in the ceiling
 19 September 1944
 20 SEP 1944
 5-

TO: Acting Chief Commissioner
 FROM: Political Section

One aspect of yesterday's incident over Caretta that seems to me particularly serious is the signal demonstration of the supineness of the Carabinieri and of their lack of authority with the Italian public. The explanation for this is of course not far to seek. It derives (1) from their use by the Fascist Regime, (2) from their poor standard of pay, equipment, feeding, etc., and (3) from the total disregard with which they are treated by Allied Forces. There is nothing much I think that we can do about (1) and (3). But is there not something that could be effected on (2) and might it not be as well to increase the ceiling at present allowed? We must look forward to the period when the whole of Italy is our responsibility, by which time the number of Allied troops in Italy may be greatly reduced by commitments in Austria and elsewhere. It is therefore a direct Allied interest that there should be some Italian forces capable of keeping order. The difficulties are obvious and the time may be short.

HAC
 H. A. CACCIA

To: *Brigadier Upjohn.*
To AFCE

I think the point is a false one. The Army view will be that it is no use reducing the Army strength to increase an effete body of men.

On other grounds however the Space Com myself have been discussing a fresh letter to A.F. HQ.

which will be submitted to you in the near future.
gpm
✓

250-1

1440

1050

48

19 Sept

TOP SECRET

AFHQ

HQ ACC

S-335

18 SEPT

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

ACTING CHIEF COMM.

THIS MORNING AT TRIAL OF PIETRO CARUSO CMA FORMER FASCIST CHIEF OF POLICE OF
ROME CMA PUBLIC BROKE INTO COURTROOM CMA CLAMOURING FOR THE LYNCHING OF DEFENDANT
PD BECAUSE OF DISORDER JUDGES HAD NOT BEEN SEATED AND DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN
BROUGHT INTO COURT BUT CROWD ATTACKED DONATO GARRETTA CMA FORMER DIRECTOR OF
REGINA COELI PRISON CMA DRAGGED HIM FROM COURTROOM CMA BEAT HIM INTO INSENSIBILITY
AND THREW HIM INTO TIER PD DISCOVERING THAT HE WAS STILL ALIVE CMA MEMBERS OF
THE CROWD BEAT HIS BODY WITH OARS TILL HE WAS DEAD PD LATER HIS BODY WAS TAKEN
TO THE JAIL HE HAD FORMERLY DIRECTED UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION CMA WHERE IT WAS
TIED FOR A SHORT TIME TO A WINDOW GRATING PD PARA PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACRED CMA
UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM ACC FROM
STONE PERSONAL PAREN DISORDERS AROSE THROUGH LACK OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
TAKEN BY THE TRIAL COURT AND TO INEPTITUDE ^{OF} ~~BY~~ THE POLICE AND CARABINIERI PD
ENOUGH POLICE WERE ON HAND TO HAVE PROTECTED HIM BUT AS IN THE CASE OF PAST
DISTURBANCES AT TARANTO CMA THEY LACKED LEADERSHIP CMA ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUAL
CARABINIERI MADE EFFORTS TO DEFEND HIM PD PARA BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF ALLIED
PRISONERS IN REGINA COELI JAIL CMA ^{RAAC} ~~RAAC~~ MILITARY POLICE CUT DOWN GARRETTAS

10.5

Confidential FILES (A-B)

WITH 5 APPENDICES

(47)

18 Sept

250.1
X-250-1
X-250-1
250.1
250.1

TOP SECRET

CABLE TO AFHQ, NO. S-335, 18 SEPT 44, continued:

BODY AND DISPERSED CROWD WITHOUT DIFFICULTY PD PARA I CONFERRED WITH BONOMI AND SFORZA THIS AFTERNOON CMA ACCOMPANIED BY REGIONAL COMMISSIONER POLETTI PD SFORZA IS IN CHARGE OF TRIALS PD I WARNED THEM OF THE NECESSITY OF PREVENTING RECURRENCES ON RESUMPTION OF TRIAL WHICH CMA ON MY ADVICE CMA WILL BE POSTPONED TO WEDNESDAY CMA PERMITTING PREPARATIONS TO BE MADE TOMORROW FOR LIMITING ATTENDANCE IN COURTROOM AND ADEQUATE POLICE ~~MEASURES~~ PD THE GOVERNMENT WILL ISSUE STATEMENT DEPLORING SHAMEFUL INCIDENT AND STATING THAT POLICE AND CARABINIERI OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED PENDING INVESTIGATION PD I WARNED BONOMI THAT IF CIVIL DISORDERS BROKE OUT AGAIN IN ROME CMA IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO CALL OUT ALLIED TROOPS AND HE WOULD REALIZE THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD ENTAIL PD PARA WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SPECIFIC PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THEM WHICH WILL BE CHECKED BY REGION FOUR OFFICERS PD PARA IF GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY UNABLE TO PRESERVE ORDER AND I DEEM IT NECESSARY TO ASK RAAC TO CALL OUT ALLIED TROOPS TO DEAL WITH EXCESSES CMA I PROPOSE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS TO REESTABLISH COINCIDENT THEREWITH ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE ROME GOVERNATE PD PARA THE SERIOUSNESS OF TODAY'S OCCURRENCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS IS FULLY APPRECIATED BY BONOMI AND SFORZA AND I AM HOPEFUL THAT THEY WILL MEASURE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

1057

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

Sir Noel Charles : Security Branch
Hon. Alexander Kirk : Public Safety Sub-Comm.
Political Section, ACC : General Brown, RAAC
Ex. Commissioner :
CA Branch :

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
REGION IV
APO. 394



Regional Public Safety HQ.

18th Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Disorder at Palazzo di Giustizia - 18th Sept. 1944 -
Caruso Trial.

TO : Col. C. Poletti, Regional Commissioner.
copy to Capt. Stone, Acting Chief Commissioner
General Brown, Rome Commander.

FACTS BRIEFLY.

1. The trial of Pietro CARUSO (45) ex-Chief of Police, Rome, was due to commence at 8.30 a.m. 18th Sept. 1944, at the Palazzo di Giustizia.
2. Considerable publicity had been given to the case and special police arrangements had been made.
3. Considerable public disorder occurred inside the Court. At 9.30 a.m. I advised the President of the Court to adjourn the case in the interest of public order.
4. Whilst order was being restored inside the Court, and important witness of the case, Dr. Donato CARRETTA, ex Governor of Regina Coeli prison, who had been removed from office by AMG. police some weeks ago was seized by an infuriated mob outside the building. The mob inflicted severe violence on Dr. Carretta; he was thrown over the wall into the Tiber river, then retrieved from the river and taken by the crowd to Regina Coeli prison, where he was hung, strung up by the feet, until cut down, when he was certified dead from fractured skull and multiple injuries.

DETAILS AS FOLLOWS:

Brief history of Caruso:

5. Age 45, born at Naples, formerly a Consul of the Fascist Pontifical Militia at Trieste. Appointed Chief of Police

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DETAILS AS FOLLOWS:

- 10.4
- Brief history of Caruso:
5. Age 45, born at Naples, formerly a Consul of the Fascist Portuaria Militia at Trieste. Appointed Chief of Police for Rome on 1st Feb. 1944, being regarded as the best man "entirely faithful to the Fascist Republic".
 6. As soon as he took up office he became ruthless, gathered around him a number of close collaborators, most of whom

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(47) APPENDIX A
✓
FILES A-B

1083

- 2 -

fled before our arrival in Rome on 4th/5th June, 1944. Caruso's work found favour and praise from Fascist Government - he was personally congratulated by Mussolini who termed him "my faithful Questore".

7. On 24th Mch. 1944, Caruso submitted the names of 50 persons to the German Command. These persons were shot and only last week their bodies were recovered from the Ardeatine Caves.

8. Caruso fled north with retreating Germans on the eve of our entry into Rome, and took with him a large quantity of valuables, including questura property eg. gold bars (obviously jewellery melted down) rings, watches, gold and silver jewellery, pearl ear-rings, a large number of bonds and over half a million lire in notes - total value worth at least eight or nine million liras.

9. By a trick of fate his car was extensively damaged by mine or bombing and he sustained a fractured leg and was taken to a nearby hospital with his valuables under an assumed name.

10. On 14th June, 1944, I received information from the partisan group that he was lying at Bagno Regio, being guarded by patriots. I sent for him, he was brought back under police escort and for several weeks has been kept in Regina Coeli prison infirmary recovering from serious leg injuries. Practically the whole of the loot was recovered intact, and I passed this over with all papers in the case to the Questore. The official document signed by Caruso setting out the names of victims to be passed over to the Germans was also confiscated and handed over to the Italian authorities. In prison Caruso admitted to me that he signed that document.

BRIEF HISTORY OF CARRETTA; killed by the mob on 18th Sept. 1944.

11. About 43 years of age, with Fascist background. Was prison governor on our arrival in Rome. There were mixed opinions about him but Col. Roletti ordered me to remove him on 15th July, 1944 and this was done. He was not arrested but simply removed from his post. He had been called by the prosecution as a witness at the trial of Caruso.

POLICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIAL - 18th Sept. 1944.

10. 12. Owing to the strong public feeling against Caruso, the following police arrangements were made:

pearl ear-rings, a large number of pearls and
lire in notes - total value worth at least eight or nine million
lire.

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at the trial of Caruso.

POLICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIAL - 18th Sept. 1944.

10. 12. Owing to the strong public feeling against Caruso,
the following police arrangements were made:

Palazzo Giustizia: Interior - 105 P.S. officers and men 205
100 CC.RR.

Exterior - 103 P.S. officers and
men and CC.RR.
10 P.S. mounted 123
10 CC.RR. "

Regina Coeli
- 22 P.S. officers and men-
with machine guns &
hand grenades
4 motorcycles 22
2 lorries ./.

47

Police reserves ready for alarm
at other places

200

TOTAL 550

The Questore Motrazzini was in charge of the Police arrangements.

DISORDER INSIDE THE PALAZZO DI GIUSTIZIA

13. Unfortunately most of the entrances to the Palazzo di Giustizia were open to the public, and it is estimated that 5000 to 6000 at least streamed into the building between 8.30 and 9 a.m. - they were in the corridors, upstairs, downstairs - in fact all over the building.

14. At 9.5 a.m. I received a message from Rome Command about the disorder and I at once went to the Court where the trial was to take place. The place was in a complete uproar and it was packed with screaming and yelling civilians, witnesses, court officials, and relatives of Ardeatine Caves victims. The two balconies above were crowded, and I estimate there were 600 to 700 people at least cramping into this fairly small courtroom. Between 40 to 50 police were present but were completely powerless and had no control over the public.

15. I conferred with Col. Dodgeon and we agreed that to introduce military would only make matters worse.

16. I ensured that there was an adequate guard on the person of Caruso and he was kept safe in another part of the building under strong guard.

17. I advised the President of the Court that it would be unwise from a public order point of view to attempt to open the case, and he made an announcement to the public present that the case would be postponed. With considerable difficulty I established some sort of order in the court and removed all the public except essential witnesses. There were then several thousand civilians swarming the corridors outside and it took over an hour to clear them out of the building.

DISORDER OUTSIDE THE PALAZZO DI GIUSTIZIA

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DISORDER OUTSIDE THE PALAZZO DI GIUSTIZIA

18. Whilst I was handling the inside situation, and the preventing the mob from smashing down doors and getting at Caruso, there was trouble outside the building.

19. Carretta/as said above, was a witness, was seized by a mob of at least 100 strong, who used considerable violence on the unfortunate man. He was dragged and kicked unconscious, thrown down the stairs and placed in a taxi cab outside. The driver, however, refused to take him away.

(47)

-4-

20. Carretta was dragged from the cab, again subjected to violence, dragged across the road and thrown into the Tiber river. It is said that some person with an oar kept on striking the body in the water. Carretta was apparently dragged out of the river and taken by some means to Regina Coeli prison where he was hung up by the feet, tied with rope. He was quickly cut down however, and the body taken inside the prison entrance. I arrived at the prison at 12.50 p.m. and was present with the Procuratore when the body was examined by Doctor Alfredo Monaco, Prison surgeon, who pronounced life extinct; death being caused by fracture of skull and multiple head and body injuries. The body was removed later to the mortuary at Verano Cemetery, San Lorenzo, where I arranged an adequate CC.RR. guard.

21. Military police remained on reserve at the prison - were not called in but held in reserve to safeguard the security wing of the prison where over 200 security prisoners are held by G-2 of R.I.A.C.

SUGGESTIONS FOR NEXT HEARING

22. At 4 p.m. 18th Sept. 1944, I submitted a separate list containing suggestions for general arrangements at the resumed trial which should not take place tomorrow. In accordance with orders I will personally supervise the arrangement with Maj. Coxhead.

CONCLUSION

23. The whole trouble was not insufficient policing, but bad organisation. The courtroom was too large and the whole large building was thrown open to the public, which simply invited trouble. The police lacked leadership and instructions in their duties. These matters will be rectified at the next hearing.

J. R. Pollock

J. R. POLLOCK
Lt. Colonel
Chief, Public Safety
REGION IV.

1089

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J. R. Pollock
J. R. POLLOCK
Lt. Colonel
Chief, Public Safety
REGION IV.

1033

(47)

Major Grayle

Thank you

g/12/11

Clats:-

This Course
trial is likely to be
under constant reference
for a few days to
papers as it should be
over

held in a separate
folder until
done with.
J.A.Q.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
REGION IV
APO, 394

Regional Public Safety HQ.

18th Sept. 1944.

SUBJECT: Suggested arrangements for CARUSO trial,
Place of trial etc.

1. It was suggested to hold the trial outside Rome, but I recommend that the trial continue to be held within the Palazzo di Giustizia, Rome. *no*

2. There should be only one entrance and one exit open, all other gates and doors locked.

3. No other trials or courts to be held during Caruso's trial in any other part of the building

4. A smaller courtroom with no balcony.

5. One entrance at the back for judges and Council and one exit only.

6. Witnesses and relatives not to remain in court as today but in an adjacent waiting room.

7. Witnesses in the case to be issued with a simple witnesses' admission ticket signed by the Procuratore's Department.

8. Only witnesses for that day's hearing should be summoned.

9. Special admission tickets for counsel, press etc. *see*

10. No admission to the court without a ticket.

11. Admission to public: Only a few members of the public should be admitted. Today there were 5000 or 6000 people attempting to storm the building. 150 to 200 and no more should be allowed, even less. They should only be

2. There should be only one entrance and one exit open, all other gates and doors locked.
3. No other trials or courts to be held during Gervais's trial in any other part of the building.
4. A smaller courtroom with no balcony.
5. One entrance at the back for judges and Council and one exit only.
6. Witnesses and relatives not to remain in court as today but in an adjacent waiting room.
7. Witnesses in the case to be issued with a simple witnesses' admission ticket signed by the Procurator's Department.
8. Only witnesses for that day's hearing should be summoned.
9. Special admission tickets for ^{rel} counsel, press etc.
10. No admission to the court without a ticket.
11. Admission to public: Only a few members of the public should be admitted. Today there were 5000 or 6000 people attempting to storm the building. 150 to 200 and no more should be allowed, even less. They should only be allowed in by tickets which should be evenly distributed to the leaders of the political parties, and let them select their own public.
12. Public should be subject to search on entry into court, and public not allowed to enter until preliminaries are commenced in the court.
13. Court corridors to be kept clear, and barricades erected where necessary.

101039

APPENDIX B

Prisoner Caruso.

14. To be kept under separate guard in adjacent room - not to be brought into court until ready commence case. Before he is brought in the President should announce to the public present that if there is any hostile demonstration or disturbance proceedings will be adjourned forthwith.

15. Caruso should stand in a special dock near the exit door to his waiting room. The front should be boarded up at an angle in a corner as high as his shoulders with no access to his stand from the court itself.

Police arrangements:

16. AMG. Three officers in court. 2 AMG. officers outside the court and two police officers outside the building - 4 P/M at disposal public safety chief in court.

Civil police :
20 P.S. agents in plain clothes inside the courtroom
30 " " uniform " "
10 C.I.R.R.

in corridors leading to the court room :

50 C.I.R.R. in uniform
20 P.S. agents "

Near Caruso: 40 mixed police outside and inside his detention room - 2 C.I.R.R. and 2 P.S. agents on either side.

These men will be especially instructed in the event of the slightest sign of trouble to withdraw Caruso and place again into detention room.

Outside entrance: 40 P.S. agents and C.I.R.R. mixed patrolling exist.

40 C.I.R.R. on foot
100 mounted police

107! : patrolling outside.

Police arrangements:

16. AMK. Three officers in court, 2 MC. officers outside the court and two police officers outside the building - 4 P/M at disposal public safety chief in court.

Civil police :
20 P.S. agents in plain clothes inside the courtroom
30 " " uniform " "
10 CC.RR.

in corridors leading to the court room :

30 CC.RR. in uniform
20 P.S. agents "

Near Caruso: 40 mixed police outside and inside his detention room - 2 CC.RR. and 2 P.S. agents on either side.

These men will be especially instructed in the event of the slightest sign of trouble to withdraw Caruso and place again into detention room.

Outside entrance: 40 P.S. agents and CC.RR. mixed patrolling exist.

40 CC.RR. on foot
100 mounted police

1071 patrolling outside.

Court officials:

Per too many today. Every second individual in the mob claimed to be in some way connected with the case.

Prosecutors to limited essential counsel and court officials to minimum - not one unnecessary official to be in the place. This is highly important

(47)

- 3 -

Berina Coeli prison:

30 P.S. agents and CC.RR. on reserve inside entrance.

Reserve police:

Two separate police reserves and 100 men mixed CC.RR. and P.S. agents at two places in building (Palazzo Giustiniani) held in reserve in direct telephone communication with the Court.

Police officers in Charge: nestore of Rome, Chief of Public Safety and two Vice-questori in attendance.

I will personally see that all police receive adequate instructions from the Questore as to their individual post and individual duties.

W. J. Block
Chief, Public Safety
Region 4

instructions from the Bureau as to mail
post and individual duties.

W. J. Block
at
Chief, Public Safety
Region 4

10-9

15

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
ROME REGION
APO. 394

RC

JUL 19 1944

Public Safety Division

18th July, 1944.

CASE OF PIETRO CARUSO

Age 45 (born at Maddaloni, Naples
Nov. 10th, 1899)

Ex-Questore of the City of Rome

It is known that Caruso fled north with the retreating Germans on the eve of our entry into Rome i.e. night of 4th June, 1944, and it is also established that Caruso took away with him a considerable quantity of valuables, including Questura property.

On 14th June, 1944, Col. Pollock received information from a representative of the partisan group that Caruso, under assumed name, was lying wounded in a small hospital north of Viterbo, being guarded by patriots.

Enquiries were made and the hospital in question was found to be a military hospital at Bagno Regno, some 70 miles from Rome.

Col. Pollock sent an ambulance for Caruso on 16th June, 1944, but the journey was fruitless because the F.S.S. refused to release him. Anyhow after Col. Pollock consulted AMG. 8th Army, Caruso was sent back to Rome on 22nd June, 1944, and is now recovering from a leg wound in Regina Coeli prison infirmary.

The property found in Caruso's possession at the hospital (Caruso accepted a receipt for it all) is shown in the attached list. The gold bars alone are worth several million liras I am told. There is almost half a million lire in Italian cash money. In his possession was also found gold watches, golden sovereigns, emerald brooch, diamond and pearl ear-rings assorted etc.

Caruso's history briefly is as follows:

He is 45 years old, formerly a Consul of the Fascist Portuaria Militia, serving at Trieste.

(47) APPENDIX C

- 2 -

The Fascist Government appointed him Chief of the Rome City Police Forces (Questore) about 1st February, 1944, because he was regarded as a suitable man entirely faithful to the Fascist Republic.

As soon as he took up office, he warned all under him at the Questura that they had to crush all enemies of Fascism and Nazism. He gathered around him a number of men of ruthless character to act as his close collaborators. I think it is safe to say that all his ~~colleagues~~ *infidels* fled before our arrival.

Caruso's work found favour and praise from the Fascist Government and he was personally congratulated by Mussolini, who called him "my faithful Questore".

On March 23rd, Caruso was asked by the German Command to submit names of political prisoners who were to be shot as a reprisal for the killing of the German soldiers. It is alleged that Caruso gave a list of 50 names of persons in no way connected with the outrage, and it is also alleged that the list included the names of his political rivals.

It is clear from all accounts that Caruso collaborated hand in glove with the Germans and Fascists. It is also clear that Caruso was one of the prime movers in the Caves Massacre. Has admitted this in his cross-examination attached.

The case is very involved, and there are many other charges levelled against Caruso, all of which are being investigated.

Public feeling is very high against Caruso, and I have strengthened the guard on his cell.

J. M. Moch

1040

(17)

FROM ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICE TO A/CO

TRANSLATION
=====

After yesterday's lynching

AT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM - By Pietro Nenni, from the
"Avanti!" of 19 September
1944

The tragic episode of yesterday, at the opening of Caruso's trial, is the symptom of that exasperation on which for some time we have been calling the attention of public powers.

We deeply deplore the savage action which cost the ex-warden of Regina Coeli prison his life: he was an official who had given his support to resistance against the Nazi-Fascists, during the nine months of Rome's occupation.

He has not been lynched and thrown into the river because of his past faults or of his recent merits, but simply because he has been designated by fate to be the victim sacrificed to the bloodthirsty spite which is one of Fascism's and war's inheritances.

To deplore, to feel indignant and stirred is not enough. It is necessary to understand.

Last night, in official and popular circles one heard a lot of talk about "suborners"

There can be some truth in this.

But one has to admit that the most serious suborning fact lies in the state of minds and the state of things.

It lies in the fact that Caruso's trial is being made three months after Rome's liberation, whereas it should have been made three days later.

It lies in the people's irritation for the contradictions and the slownesses, among which justice is following - or rather not following - its course.

It lies in the impopularity of the police corps, which, with its present organization - that is still the Fascist one - does not have the moral authority to enforce, by its mere presence, the respect of law.

It lies also in the absolutely ridiculous way in which the Director of Public Safety, the Questore and the Carabinieri HQ had organized the trial, as if it had been a feast. It was instead the first tragic contact between the most exasperated part of the people - the one that is mourning for the crimes of Nazi-Fascism - and one of the executers of those crimes.

1047

APP D

\$00

But, considered beyond its causes and its immediate consequences, yesterday's episode does open once more the problem of the country's political direction. It seems to us that the problem points out to the need of an energetic concentration of powers in the hands of a committee of public emergency (Comitato di Salute Pubblica). A Committee of this sort should deal with the problems of sanctions, of epurations, of a rehabilitation of public morals and of a reform of the political and social structure of the State, not with the spirit of a weary and sluggish bureaucracy, but with the energy of an emergency committee, feeling itself supported by all the vital forces of the Nation, in an effort to save the country from its most dangerous enemy, the distrust in itself and in justice.

104

✓

(47)

18 September 1944

Captain Stone:

General Browning informs this office that there are two companies of Grenadiers (Italian Troops), approximate strength 90 each, under command of RAAC, now in Rome.

FJS
F. J. S.

file with Carmelo Call
FJS

1045

APP

E

C O P Y

19 September 1944

TO: Acting Chief Commissioner

FROM: Political Section

One aspect of yesterday's incident over Caretta that seems to me particularly serious is the signal demonstration of the supineness of the Carabinieri and of their lack of authority with the Italian public. The explanation for this is of course ~~not~~ far to seek. It derives (1) from their use by the Fascist Regime, (2) from their poor standard of pay, equipment, feeding, etc. and (3) from the total disregard with which they are treated by Allied Forces. There is nothing much I think that we can do about (1) and (3). But is there not something that could be effected on (2) and might it not be as well to increase the ceiling at present allowed? We must look forward to the period when the whole of Italy is our responsibility by which time the number of Allied troops in Italy may be greatly reduced by commitments in Austria and elsewhere. It is therefore a direct Allied interest that there should be some Italian forces capable of keeping order. The difficulties are obvious and the time may be short.

/s/ H.A. Caccia.

104'

To: - Brigadier Upjohn

I think we must pass again
for increase in the ceiling.

5-

FILES (A)

(47) APPENDIX F

CONFIDENTIAL**URGENT**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

LDI/ajp

A/CC 250.1

6 September 1944

Subject: AMG 5 Army Conference with Public Safety Sub-Commission
Representative.

To : Vice President, Administrative Section.

1. Reference is made to confidential message 8470 of 3 Sept 44
from AMG 5 Army, which follows:

"CONFIRMING PHONE CONVERSATION 1 SEPTEMBER CONSIDER VERY
DESIRABLE REPRESENTATIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION CONFER WITH THIS
HQ SOON AS POSSIBLE ON PLANS TO MEET EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR
FUTURE. CAN YOU ARRANGE REPRESENTATIVE VISIT THIS HQ. ACKNOWLEDGE."

2. The Acting Chief Commissioner desires to be informed promptly
as to what action has been taken on the above request for visit.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, Sig C
Chief Staff Officer

1049

(46)

6 Sept

CONFIDENTIAL

50101

Hq. A.C.C.	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date Time	6 Sept 1944
Via	msg.
Initials	DRR

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Bonomi 28 Aug 44 to Capt Stone.

Happening in front of 'fosse Ardeatine' some people tore part of Italian flag is lack discipline & dangerous seditiousness. Similar episode took place in Piazza Farnese. Sent to Head Public Safety & Comando Carabinieri Corps with instructions.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 000.1 - COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS
POLITICS

1042

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

45

250.1

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 → CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 321 of 19 Aug 44 to AFHQ G-5.

Policy re administration of provinces on boundaries of Italy.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 321 - REORGANIZATION ACC

321
X-000.1
X-250.1

1041

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

44

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Capt Stone A/CG 321 of 19 Aug 44 to Venosta.

Acknowledge ltr 1/236 of 15 Aug re possibility unfortunate incidents when Venezia Giulia is liberated.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 321 - REORGANIZATION AOC

321
X - 000.1
X - 250.1

100

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

43

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Col Pollock Pub Saf 18 Aug 44 to Col Poletti,
Brig Lush, Col Kirk & then to A/CC.

Hunted trouble on 15th Aug 44 on the taking over of
Rome by Italian Government but no reports have been made.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 000.1 - COMMUNISTS & SOCIALISTS
POLITICS

1030

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheets and then destroyed.

(42) a

250.1

FILE UNDER NO.

250.1 Civil Disturbances

~~321 Organization~~INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Letter Stone A/CC 250.1 18 August 44 to Political & RC & MG Sec

Requesting comments on letter 1/236 from Visconti Venosta that conflicts may break out in Venezia Giulia when it is liberated. Dated 15 August.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 321 Organization

10392.

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on te consolidated index sheets and then destroyed.

250.1
Original Document in 321
X-000.1

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

**INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS**

Ltr AAI 16 /1/G(Ops) of 16 Aug 44 to MMIA (See Dist).

Disturbances between Italians & French troops in Brindisi & Taranto areas.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 091.711 - ITALIAN ARMY

091.711
K. 250.1

1037

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

41a

A/

Ref: 395/CA.
A/CC 250.1

12th August 1944

SUBJECT: Behaviour of French Troops - TARANTO.

TO : Chief of Italian General Staff.

1. On receipt of your letter P.M. 135,11 dated 5th August, I caused enquiries to be made regarding the disturbances in TARANTO and BRINDISI Provinces. Preliminary reports show that a number of serious disturbances involving French soldiers and sailors on one side and Italian soldiers, sailors and civilians on the other side, did take place and that casualties were inflicted on both sides.

2. It was also reported that the Area Commander, in order to avoid further casualties, gave orders that the CC.RR should perform their duties without arms. Although in principle I agree with you that the CC.RR should not be deprived of their arms, I think we must leave the decision in these cases to the Military Commander on the spot and I have no doubt that he consulted representatives of the Allied Control Commission before giving this order.

3. I expect shortly to have a full report from the Regional Commissioner of the area concerned and I have little doubt that by now the arms have been restored to the CC.RR.

4. I understand that BRINDISI has been placed out of bounds to French troops.

1036

Hq ACC Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 13 Aug
Via 144
Initials WRR

HELMY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: Adm Sec (Attn. Public Safety Sub-Com).

(41)

files H/17/22
1036

Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

A/CC 014.13

Behavior of French Troops-Taranto

Brigadier M. S. Lush

9 August

4

Attached is translation of letter N. 104521/AV of 5 August from Marshall Messe together with copies of Italian telegrams Nos. 10243, 10244, and 10245.

You will recall copies of these telegrams were handed to you in order that the matter be called to the attention of AAI, District and Sub-Area.

Will you please inform me what action was taken by the Commission in order that I can make reply to Marshal Messe.

S
Stone.

4 Incls-
as in para 1. above.

40
1035

Mo	A C C	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED		
Date-Time	9 Aug 1950	
Via	Msg.	
Initials	P.R.R.	

4 Aug 50

File 10/100 -
Inspected to 15 August 44

014413
250.1

FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Cbl ACC Reg 6 cite ACC 215 5 Aug to ACC Main.

Sitrep No. 28. Strikes among civil dockyard workers
causing new food ration delay.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 400 - AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

103!

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

Strong

X
400
215.1
Aug 5
1958

TRANSLATION

n. 104521/AV

P. M. 135, 11

August 5th 1944

COMANDO SUPREMO

Chief of Staff

HQ ACC, APO 394

440 Sec'y Gen.

Rec'd 7 Aug. 1944

By 1812

Dear Captain Stone,

The Minister of the Interior has delivered to me the enclosed copies of certain telegrams about incidents which took place recently in the province of Taranto between French troops, carabinieri, and the civilian population.

I take the liberty to draw your attention on the gravity of such facts and on the consequences which might follow, and especially on the order given by the Allied Authorities that our police troops should go unarmed even when on duty.

I will be most grateful to you, dear Captain, if you will kindly go into the matter and let me know the decisions taken by the Allied Authorities.

Thanking you, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ IL MARESCIALLO D'ITALIA
CAPO DI STATO MAROCCHINO DI LIAISON

(Giovanni Messe)

/s/ G. Messe

Captain Elmer W. Stone

1033

Acting Chief Commissioner of the

Allied Control Commission

APO 394

104521/AV

Trans. / S.C.

38

5 Aug

File ATRB/100

250.1

C O P Y

TRANSLATION

A 1186
 HQ ACC, APO 394
 382 Sec'y Gen.
 Rec'd 4 Aug 1944
 By *BPR*

TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR - WIRE NO. 10245

FROM MARTINA FRANCA, 2 AUGUST 1944, 1100 hrs, RECEIVED 3 AUG., 0400 hrs.

No. 402.

Today, August 1st, 1500 hrs, one platoon of about 50 French Degaulist sailors commanded by three officers and armed with sub-machine guns arrived on trucks in the square of Martina Franca. Platoon commander went home of chief of local communist party, Prof. Carucci, and obliged him to lead him to homes of seven main town Authorities, Sindaco (Mayor), public safety Commissar, Priest, Carabinieri Commander, etc., all of which should have been taken and shot down tomorrow as reprisal for killing of French sailor reported with note 74/183 of 29 July.

Prof. Carucci accompanied platoon to Carabinieri barracks which, in the meanwhile, had taken defence precautions. On request to open door of barracks and deliver the Section Commander for above said reprisal purposes, CWO Campolmi refused, inviting the French to keep quiet and to wait. Whereupon a French officer replied with several pistol shots, and immediately ordered to open fire against the barracks and to knock down the door. The Carabinieri reacted with hand grenades and succeeded in repulsing the attackers, who fled first to the public gardens, and then drove off on their trucks towards Taranto, taking with them three of their own men seriously wounded. On Italian side five casualties, of which only one seriously wounded among civilians who had helped in defending barracks. Military division directly informed took safety measures in order to meet possible return of Degaulist reinforcements, and detached patrols to defend Carabinieri barracks and military HQs.

It looks likely that incidents (accidents ?) should occur again. Allied Police, warned by telephone, has already arrived.

Sgd Raffaele CAMPOLMI, CWO,
 RE.CC. Section Commander

1032

File A B

Originals given to Brig. Lush
 by Lt. Benmore
 3 Aug 1944
 COPY

File A 1186

TRANSLATION

A 1986
181 300 y Gen.
Rec'd 4 Aug 093a
By DRR

WIRE NO. 10244 - COPY

FROM TARANTO, 2 AUGUST, 2130 HRS. ARRIVED 3 AUGUST, 0400 HRS.

TO: WAR MINISTRY - ROME
NAVY MINISTRY - ROME
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR - ROME

No. 90/22. Serious accidents which have taken place in the past days at Taranto and in Taranto province between French troops and Italian sailors and civilians have roused feelings which forecast more serious troubles.

In the afternoon of yesterday French armed troops unit under command of three officers went to Martina Franca (Taranto), aiming to take hostages, following killing of a French sailor; they assailed Royal Carabinieri barracks, and were thrown back by Carabinieri and civilians. Five Italians and three French were wounded.

Other facts of violence have taken place in the Commune of Crispiano (Taranto); Italian and Allied Authorities, upon warning, have taken safety measures in order to avoid that such aggressions should be repeated.

Carabinieri posts in Martina Franca and Crispiano have been reinforced.

Urgent measures are requested from responsible Authorities to prevent further troubles.

CARDACI, Maj., Royal Carabinieri

1031

C O P Y

(30) INCL 2

TRANSLATION

COPY OF WIRE NO. 10243

FROM TARANTO 2 AUG 1944, RECEIVED 3 AUG. 0300 HRS

TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR - PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT - ROME

No. 02220

Reference dispatch dated 21 July 1944, I inform you that on the 21, the 22 and 23 of last month also in Martina Franca several accidents have occurred, caused by French soldiers and ended with the killing of a French soldier by an unknown Italian marine. Last Sunday 30 July, more serious accidents between French and military have occurred in Taranto, along the crowded seavlk. Two civilians who were passing by or looking on were killed and four others seriously injured. Four Italian soldiers were wounded. French casualties are not known.

We have been informed that other troubles caused by French soldiers have also occurred in the surrounding country and in the village named Statte, where several people were stopped, searched, insulted, slapped and eventually robbed by the French.

On the 30th, some Carabinieri, who were passing in a lorry near the French camp at Martina Franca were insulted and slapped.

On the night of the 15th, several farmers were compelled to defend themselves from Moroccan troops, who wanted to force their way into a farm near Bellavista. Italian sailors intervened from a station nearby, and several shots were fired on both sides. Some people were injured. Yesterday afternoon 40 French soldiers led by 3 officers called at the Carabinieri barracks in Martina Franca, to carry out reprisals for the killing of French soldiers on 21 July. Shots were fired and hand grenades thrown. 5 French and Italians were wounded. After the intervention of the Allied Police, the French drove off, threatening to come back in greater strength.


In agreement with the Allies, necessary precautions have been taken. ON ALLIED REQUEST, ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE ORDERED OUR CARABINIERI AND POLICE-MEN PATROLS TO CIRCULATE UNARMED. Also civilians have been prohibited from carrying weapons of any kind in Taranto. I shall keep you informed.

1022

Sgd. PREFECT FESTA

(C O P Y)

n°104521/AV.



COMANDO SUPREMO

IL CAPO DI S. M. GENERALE

All. 3

P.M. 135, li 5 agosto 1944

HQ ACC. APO 394
446 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 7 Aug 0846
By 1944

Mio caro comandante Stone,

il Ministro degli Interni mi ha trasmesso le anne
se copie di telegrammi relativi ad incidenti verificatisi
recentemente nella provincia di Taranto fra truppe fran
cesi, carabinieri e popolazione civile.

Mi permetto di richiamare la Sua attenzione sulla gra
vità di tali fatti e sulle conseguenze che ne possono deri
vare, e in modo particolare sull'ordine dato da autorità
alleate che le nostre truppe di polizia circolino disarmate
anche quando sono in servizio.

Le sarò molto grato, caro comandante, se vorrà cortese
mente interessarsi della questione e comunicarmi le decisio
ni che saranno prese in merito dalle autorità alleate.

Nel ringraziarla vivamente Le invio il mio più cordia
le saluto.

il Ministro degli Interni mi ha trasmesso le anness₉ se copie di telegrammi relativi ad incidenti verificatisi recentemente nella provincia di Taranto fra truppe francesi, carabinieri e popolazione civile.

Mi permetto di richiamare la Sua attenzione sulla gravità di tali fatti e sulle conseguenze che ne possono derivare, e in modo particolare sull'ordine dato da autorità alleate che le nostre truppe di polizia circolino disarmate anche quando sono in servizio.

Le sarò molto grato, caro comandante, se vorrà cortesemente interessarsi della questione e comunicarmi le decisioni che saranno prese in merito dalle autorità alleate.

Nel ringraziarla vivamente Le invio il mio più cordiale saluto.

Sinceramente Suo

IL MARESCIALLO D'ITALIA
CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE
(Giovanni Messe)

Al capitano di vascello

ELLERY W. STONE

commissario capo ff. della commissione alleata di controllo

APC 394

COPIA TELEGRAMMA n° 10243

all. n° 1 all' al f

del

DA TARANTO 2.8.1944 ore 12,30 arrivo ore 4 dell'3 del Comando Supremo

MINISTERO INTERNO DIREZIONE GENERALE SICUREZZA - ROMA


n. 02220

Seguito mia segnalazione p.n. del 21 decorso comunicato che giorno 21, 22 e 23 anche Martina Franca avvennero vari incidenti provocati militari francesi che culminarono uccisione un militare francese da parte un marinaio italiano rimasto sconosciuto. Domenica scorsa 30 luglio in Taranto come segnalato con lettera 31 decorso al Lungomare gremito popolazione civile avvenivano altri gravi incidenti tra militari francesi e italiani a seguito dei quali deploransi due morti e 4 feriti gravi tra civili di passaggio o spettatori e quattro feriti fra militari italiani. Ignoransi perdite militari francesi. Pervengono anche segnalazioni incidenti provocati militari francesi campagne circostanti e borghata Statte ove varie persone sono state dai predetti fermate, perquisite, insultate, schiaffeggiate e talune anche rapinate. Giorno 30 carabinieri transitando autocarro prossimità accampamenti francesi via Martina Franca furono lanciati insulti e schiaffeggiati. Notte sul 15 corrente località Bellavista vari agricoltori hanno dovuto difendersi da militari marocchini che volevano penetrare masseria viva forza. Intervenuti marinai italiani vicina postazione venivano scambiati vari colpi arma da fuoco con qualche ferito. Pomeriggio ieri 40 militari francesi guidati da 3 ufficiali presentavansi caserma carabinieri Martina Franca attuando minaccia rappresaglia per uccisione militari francesi avvenuta 21 decorso. Avveniva scambio fucilate e bombe con 5 feriti italiani e francesi. Detti militari allontanavansi per intervento polizia alleata minacciando ritornare in maggiori forze. Accordo Alleati

10
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Riservoni ulteriori notizie.

PREMETTO FESTA



1. 2 del
del Comando Supremo

COPIA TELEGRAMMA N° 10244

DA TARANTO 2.8.1944 ore 21,30 arrivo ore 4 del 3

MINISTERO GUERRA	ROMA
MINISTERO MARINA	ROMA
MINISTERO INTERNO	ROMA

N° 90/22 = Gravi incidenti verificatisi giorni scorsi Taranto e provincia fra truppe francesi, marinai e civili italiani hanno creato stato animo che lascia prevedere più gravi disordini.

Pomeriggio ieri reparto truppe francesi armate al comando 3 ufficiali recatosi Martina Franca (Taranto) per prendere ostaggi a seguito avvenuta uccisione colà di un marinaio francese aggredivano quella caserma CC.PP. cui componenti e civili luogo reagivano allontanando aggressori. Cinque feriti italiani e 3 francesi.

Altri episodi violenza verificatisi comune Crispiano (Taranto) Autorità italiane e alleate tempestivamente interessate disposte misure sicurezza previsione ripetersi aggressioni.

Stazione Martina Franca e Crispiano rinforzate.

Urgono provvedimenti comandi competenti intesi evitare successive violenze.

MAGGIORE RR.CC. CARDACI



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Stazione Martina Franca e Crispiano rinforzate.

Urgono provvedimenti comandi competenti intesi evitare successive violenze.

MAGGIORE PR.CC. CARDACI



11027

MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO
Gabinetto

C O P I A

all. n. 3 al f. del
d. Comando Supremo

telegramma n. 10245

DA MARTINA FRANCA 2.8.1944 Ore 11 arrivo ore 4 del 3

MINISTERO INTERNO ROMA
(Gab. Pá.)


n. 402

Ore 15 oggi 1 agosto plotone di circa 50 marinai francesi degollisti inquadrate e armati moschetto mitragliatore al comando 3 ufficiali giungevano in autocarri sulla piazza Martina Franca. Loro comandante portavasi sulla piazza casa capo locale sezione comunisti prof. Carucci e lo obbligava a scendere ed a guidare a casa delle sette maggiori autorità del luogo sindaco, commissario p.s., parroco, comandante CC.RR. ecc. che avrebbero dovuto essere presi e fucilati alba domattina per rappresaglia uccisione marinaio francese cui tratta segnalazione 74/183 del 29/7 u.s. Prof. Carucci accompagnava il plotone alla caserma CC.RR. che nel frattempo erasi messa in posizione di difesa alla richiesta di aprire la porta e consegnare comandante sezione per rappresaglia il maresciallo maggiore Campolmi rispondeva con un diniego invitando alla calma ed attendere. Ufficiale francese gli indirizzava alcuni colpi di pistola e faceva immediatamente aprire fuoco contro caserma la cui porta si cercava di abbattere. Carabinieri reagivano risolutamente a colpi bombe a mano riuscendo disperdere gli aggressori che fuggivano prima nei giardini pubblici poi verso Taranto con i propri automezzi portando seco 3 feriti gravi; da parte italiana 5 feriti di cui uno solo grave tra civili intervenuti per difendere caserma. Divisione militare subito informa-

1 1 2 5

gevano in autocarri sulla piazza. Prof. Carucci e lo vasi sulla piazza casa capo locale sezione comunisti prof. Carucci e lo obbligava a scendere ed a guidare a casa delle sette maggiori autorità del luogo sindaco, commissario p.s., parroco, comandante CC.RR. ecc. che avrebbero dovuto essere presi e fucilati alba domattina per rappresaglia uccisione marinaio francese cui tratta segnalazione 74/183 del 29/7 u.s. Prof. Carucci accompagnava il plotone alla caserma CC.RR. che nel frattempo erasi messa in posizione di difesa alla richiesta di aprire la porta e consegnare comandante sezione per rappresaglia il maresciallo maggiore Campolmi rispondeva con un diniego invitando alla calma ed attendere. Ufficiale francese gli indirizzava alcuni colpi di pistola e faceva immediatamente aprire fuoco contro caserma la cui porta si cercava di abbattere. Carabinieri reagivano risolutamente a colpi bombe a mano riuscendo disperdere gli aggressori che fuggivano prima nei giardini pubblici poi verso Taranto con i propri automezzi portando seco 3 feriti gravi; da parte italiana 5 feriti di cui uno solo grave tra civili. 102 intervenuti per difendere caserma. Divisione militare subito informata provvedeva a misure sicurezza onde fronteggiare eventualmente ritorno in forza di degollisti e provvedeva distacco rinforzi a protezione Caserma CC.RR. e sedi militari e probabile il rinnovarsi di incidenti. Polizia Alleata tempestivamente telefonicamente informata è già giunta.

MARESCIALLO MAGGIORE COMANDANTE RAFFAELI CAMPOLMI



FILE UNDER NO. 250.1 - CIVIL DISTURBANCES

INDEX SHEET
SYNOPSIS

Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 321 of 28 Jul 44 to AFHQ G-5.

Guidance re provinces which should be included withing AOC/ANG
administration on boundaries of Italy.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 321 - REORGANIZATION AOC

103

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on te consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

(37a)

26 July 1944

27 JUL 1944

Dear Brigadier Dunlop:

This will introduce General Mario Infante, now retired but formerly of the Italian Air Force. He is an old personal friend of mine whom I have known for the past eleven years. He is completely reliable and trustworthy, and a gentleman of the highest integrity.

He has brought me some grave reports of lawlessness in the Commune of Marino in your Region. I should be grateful if you would hear his story and take the necessary action at once through your Public Safety officer and the appropriate Italian authorities.

WILLIAM W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Brigadier Dunlop
Region IV, AMG

104

37

26 July

filed A+B
for

B - 250

250.1

Mr. Cuddy

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

guy

Regional Control and Military Government Section.
+++++

Ref: 359/4/CA.

28. June. 1944.

SUBJECT: Disturbance at TARANTO.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

DSH 1419

28 JUN 1944

33

201831

1. I should like to clarify the position regarding the telegram received from FOTALLI, TARANTO, relating to the unofficial strike at TARANTO.

2. The telegram was received by this Section and Economic Section on 21st June. On the same day a copy was sent to the Labour Sub-Commission from the Economic Section and an officer of this Section discussed the matter with the Economic Section who stated that repercussions were not expected.

34

3. The telegram was repeated to me in ROME by my Section in order to keep me informed. The telegram terminated with the information that the Labour Sub-Commission were dealing with the matter in consultation with the Economic Section.

4. If you will read Pages 1 - 3 of this file, I think you will agree that everything possible has been done to keep the Economic Section and the Labour Sub-Commission fully informed and that no action has been taken by this Section except that my Staff Officer here thought it fit to inform me personally in Rome.

1022

MSA

250.1 Cui

2. The telegram was received by this Section and Economic Section on 21st June. On the same day a copy was sent to the Labour Sub-Commission from the Economic Section and an officer of this Section discussed the matter with the Economic Section who stated that repercussions were not expected.

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1022

MSL/JG.

Copy to: Vice President,
Economic Section.

MSL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

250.1 Civil Disturbances

(36)

28 June

Fla / 405.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADD MAIN

ADD REGION 6

WM 921

JUN261351

DSB 1457
30 JUN 1944

6-2/25
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY
CITY/186

SPECIAL SITREP. DISTURBANCE TOOK PLACE AT VILLANOVA MONTENAPOLI
PROVINCE OF CASERTA PERHAPS 24 JUNE. 500 PERSONS ATTEMPTED TO FORCE
LOCAL MILLS TO GRIND WITHOUT AUTHORITY. 1 CARABINIERI AND 3 FORESTRY
GUARD INTERVIEWED WHEN STONED AND ATTEMPTS MADE TO DISARM THEM. FIRE
WAS OPENED. 1 FARMER KILLED 8 CIVILIANS AND 2 OFFICIALS WOUNDED.
3 KING LEADERS ARRESTED. SITUATION NOW QUIET. INVESTIGATIONS
PROCEEDING AND DETAILED REPORT FOLLOWS.

ADD LIST

1-0-5-0

1023

35

WM 921

26 June

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN261421

File 1208

C O P Y

SECRET

6691

ACC MAIN (Civil Affairs Branch)

JUNE 25, 1944

SECRET

Vapor 165 - Shapp.

PRIORITY

ROME AREA COMMAND FOR ACC ROME

33

DSB 1404
28 JUN 1944

PERSONAL FOR INFO LUSH PD PAREN TO ROME AREA COMMAND FOR ACC ROME FROM ACC MAIN
 PAREN FOLLOWING FROM ROME PD QUOTE UNOFFICIAL STRIKE INVOLVING ONE THOUSAND MEN
 STARTED IN DOCTRARD TODAY FOR MORE FOOD OR WAGES PD PAREN TWO PAREN MINISTRY
 HAS PROMISED AN INCREASE IN WAGES OF ONE TWO TO ONE FIVE PER CENT ON ONE JULY PD
 PAREN THREE PAREN TOSIS YAGD ARE ON STRIKE FOR INCREASE OF THREE LIRE A DAY
 ALL BOUND PD PAREN FOUR PAREN RAMIREZ NEW UNDER SECRETARY VICE ADEGO IS COMING DOWN
 PD PAREN FIVE PAREN IT IS HOPE THAT WORK WILL BE RESUMED TOMORROW TWO ONE JUNE PD
 PAREN SIX PAREN MOST OF THESE MEN ARE EX-SERVICE CIVILIAN ABLE BATION FOR HEAVY
 WORKERS PD PAREN SEVEN PAREN CHARLIE IN CHARLIE LED NAPLES PASS TO ADMIRAL MORGAN
 PD INQUOTE PD LAHOR SUB COMMISSION ARE DEALING MERGENTICALLY IN CONSULTATION
 ECONOMIC SECTION AND INSISTING TO REPEAT NO INCREASE IN WAGES BE MADE

P

1031

34

25 June

File/229

ROGER B. DERRY
Capt, AGD
Deputy Adjutant

Confidential

250.1 Civil Administration

SECRET

1971

See you

HQ ACC, APO 334

21 June 1940

28 JUN 1944

CINC MED MPLES (R) ACC

SECRETS

IMPORTANT

TOTAL

NONE

JUNE 20/1831

154 4403

28 JUN 1944

OFFICIAL STRIKE INVOLVING ONE THOUSAND MEN STARTED IN DOCKYARD TODAY FOR MORE FOOD ON WAGES.

2. MINISTRY HAS PROMISED AN INCREASE IN WAGES OF TWELVE TO FIFTEEN PERCENT ON THE FIRST JULY. 3. TOLIS YARD ARE ON STRIKE FOR INCREASE OF THIRTY LIRE A DAY ALL ROUND. 4. RAMIREZ NEW UNDER SECRETARY VICE ALBAGO, IS COMING DOWN. 5. IT IS HOPE THAT ORK WILL BE RESUMED TOMORROW 21ST JUNE. 6. MOST OF THESE MEN ARE RECEIVING CIVILIAN A RATION FOR HEAVY WORKERS.
7. C IN C MED MPLES PASS TO ADMIRAL MORGAN

ACC DIST

NAVY SEC

SEE YOU

DEF. C. R.

C. A. B. R.

E. C. R.

Adm. Sec.

File

7/10/44

INFO

OFFICIAL STRIKE INVOLVING ONE THOUSAND MEN STARTED IN DOCKYARD TODAY FOR MORE FOOD OR WAGES.
 2. MINISTRY HAS PROMISED AN INCREASE IN WAGES OF TWELVE TO FIFTEEN PERCENT ON THE FIRST
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 TOMORROW 21ST JUNE. 6. MOST OF THESE MEN ARE RECEIVING CIVILIAN A RATION FOR HEAVY WORKERS.
 7. C IN C MED NAPLES PASS TO ADMIRAL MORGAN

ACC DIST

INFO

NAVY S e

SECY GEN

Dep Dir.

C A Br

E con Sec

Adm Sec

File

Float

JUNE 21/

Confid

1012

(33)

201831

20 June

U. S. SECRET
Equals British

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTINE

IDS STUBBLELINE FROM HANCOCK FROM SNOOK CITE RPS-43

ACC REAR FOR P SAFETY AND ACC RAIN FOR LUSH FOR HANCOCK

S-10984

MAY 30 11408

MAY 31 07008
Br SigDSJ 999
3 JUN 1944

There was a disturbance at Regalbuto Province of Enna on morning of 28 May. Chief of Separatist movement was speaking in Theatre when 100 Communists went to stop the speech. GCRH dispersed the mob but they returned and opened fire. GCRH returned the fire. Casualties were one civilian killed and two or three wounded. The head of Communist Party Ravanusa died heart failure. The head Separatist was Andres Pinochimro-Aprile.

New Subject. At about 1000 hours 28 May about 3,000 persons believed agricultural workers demonstrated outside the Municipio at Licata province of Agrigento. Reinforcements were sent from Agrigento but they were fired on by MGs placed in houses and old emplacements. One car got through but other could not and took up fire positions outside town. Firing continued till dark. At dawn an Armv car entered the town and firing had ceased. Italian military are patrolling the town. Suspected late temporary mayor (RE) probable leader of rioters. Documents burned in tax register and food offices. Casualties believed three killed 12 wounded. Further information not available at present.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 File
- 1 DGC Info
- 1 DGC
- 1 Political Sec Info
- 1 Admin Sec Info
- 1 P Safety ACTION

Confidential



250,1 Civil Disturbances

30 May

SECRET

D5 H 384
20 MAR 1944

PATMA 2225

PATMA (Executive Commission)

17 March 1944.

SECRET

Vapor 5-10050-1ash

PRIORITY

DISTWO

RT / 317
 YOUR ROGER TAKE SLANT THREE ONE SEVEN PD PATMA TO DISTWO FOR ACO REGION TWO PAGE
PATMA SIGNED MACFARLANE BARKER PD ON NO REPEAT NO ACCOUNT WILL FAMILIES OF DOCK
 WORKERS RECEIVE EXTRA RATION AND MIDDAY MEAL PD STRIKE MUST BE PREVENTED BY OTHER
 MEANS

25011

1010

31

2225

17 Mar

Confidential

L. T. MONTANT, Jr.
2/Lt. AGO.
ADJUTANT.

18 MAR 1944

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

18 March 1944
Date

To From

Chief Commissioner

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Deputy Chief Commissioner

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

A. D. C.

Secretary General

P. R. O.

Mil. Sec.

Comm. Sec.

Pol. Sec.

Econ. & Admin. Sec.

Fin. Sub-Sec.

Legal Sub-Sec.

G-2

Army

Navy

Air

P/W

War Material Disposal

Displaced Persons

Industry

To From

Labor

Education

Interior

Public Health

Public Safety

Public Utilities

Agriculture

AG

Hq. Comdt.

Transportation O.

Supply Officer

Billeting O.

Stenographic Section

File Section

Deputy Secretary General

Approved

- ☒ For your information
☐ For comment
☐ Contents noted
☐ For necessary action
☒ For necessary action & return
☐ For compliance
☐ For file

(initials)

1137

785015

Naval Sub Com.
To note

Dep. CC
5385

FROM ACC REGION 2
TO FATIMA FOR LEGG
GR 48 BT
RE/317

DCC

HEADQUARTERS
17 MAR 1944
A. C. C.

DS 2 383
20 MAR 1944

DOCK AND ARSENAL WORKERS TARANTO WHO ALREADY RECEIVING EXTRA RATION AND MIDAY MEAL AT MEETING TODAY THREATENED STRIKE UNLESS THEIR WIVES AND FAMILIES ARE GIVEN EXTRA RATION. IN MY OPINION THIS GRANT WOULD BE MOST SERIOUS AND CAUSE IMMEDIATE REPRISALS THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN ITALY BUT NOIC SAYS WORK MUST CONTINUE. PLEASE INSTRUCT US AND ACFTER NOIC THRU FLAMEG

TIME SENT 16/1709A
RECB NR 4 16/1709

250.1

101^c

(30)

RE/317
16 MAR

✓
File/100

ACC DIST

ACTION ECON SEC (3)
INFO DEP CC
CA BR
FILE
FLOAT

18 MAR 1944

copy.

DSH 342
14 MAR 1944

10 March 1944

Chief Commissioner.

I attach report on the civil disturbances at Caltanissetta.
on 1st and 3rd March 1944. Caltanissetta is not far from Enna in
the centre of Sicily.

Recent telegrams show that the incident was unique and
that no further trouble has followed.

M.S.L. (Brig Lush)

copy to: V.P. Admin. Section.

SEEN: FNMM, 11/3

(29) 104

10 March

✓ 3

file/700

250.1

COPY

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394COPY
14 MAR 1944

4 March 1944

FILE: REO 000.5

SUBJECT: Report of Civilian Disturbance (SERRADIFALCO).

TO : Brig. M. LUSH, Executive Commissioner,
R.C. & M.G. Section, A.C.C.H.Q.

1. Particulars, concerning an incident which occurred at SERRADIFALCO, :
Province of Caltanissetta, at 0930 hours on 1 March 1944, are forwarded herewith:

On 1st March 1944 at 0930 hours, one thousand persons, majority of which were unemployed sulphur workers and women, assembled in front of the Municipio at Serradifalco demanding that the Sindaco Chiarella, Carmello be dismissed.

Both at the Municipio and the Mayor's home windows were broken by stones thrown by boy members of group. Participants in the disturbances complained that unemployment was very prevalent, that employment in the commune was impossible to obtain, that their bread ration was insufficient and that prices of essential food commodities were too high.

2. Competent authorities have obtained authorization to commence work which will alleviate the existing unemployment and work will consequently begin in the mines located here. The bread ration however could not be increased for general dispositions.

3. An appropriate commission has gone to the Provincial Capital and complained to the Prefect on behalf of the population.

4. Local Carabinieri members have arrested the main instigators of the demonstration and other violators of Public Order.

5. Public order has been restored.

6. This information is forwarded for your consideration and action, supplemental to radio, this date.

For the Regional Commissioner:

/s/ WILLIAM R. JORDAN
WILLIAM R. JORDAN
Lt. Col., CAC
Regional Executive Officer

COPY

104

(29) INCL

HQ ACC, APO
Sec'y Gen
Rec'd 11 Mar 0900
BY HD

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

FILE: REO 000.5

4 March 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Civil Disturbance in Caltanissetta.

TO : Brig. M. LUSH, Executive Commissioner,
THRU : R.C. & M.G. Section, A.C.C.H.Q.

1. Particulars concerning a serious riot in the city of Caltanissetta which occurred on 3 March 1944 and continued throughout the day, are forwarded herewith:

Beginning at 0730 hours on 3 March 1944 about 1500 people demonstrated in the main streets of Caltanissetta to complain against a decrease in food rations, high prices and Fascist tendencies of employers. A few shots were fired and windows were broken. Attempts were made to break into the food warehouses but members of the Carabinieri and ACC officers on duty prevented this from taking place. One boy age thirteen was shot trying to steal bread from a local bakery. The crowd was dispersed by Fire Brigade hoses around 0900 hours.

A crowd of about 2500 collected again around 1100 hours and proceeded to march to the Prefettura and stopped about 150 feet from the Prefettura when they were faced with Carabinieri and ACC officers with drawn weapons. A committee of rioters then called on the Prefect after which the Prefect and other officials addressed the mob. After the various speeches the crowd seemed to quiet down but shortly after they dispersed another crowd of about 300 marched to the Prefettura and attempted to break down the doors but CCRR managed to prevent it. Throughout the day mobs gathered but no further damage was done. At approximately 1830 hours a crowd of 5000 collected in the Piazza, flew a Red flag and sang a Communist song. It appeared that the entire day's activity was instigated by members of the Christian Democratic and Communist Parties. The agitation was believed to have been instigated by a number of agitators apparently sent into the city from communes in the Province. None of the leading agitators were found to be local citizens. It was reported that the Italian soldiers, called out by the Prefect to break up the mob, said to various rioters that they were in sympathy with

a decrease in food rations, high prices and Fascist tendencies of employers. A few shots were fired and windows were broken. Attempts were made to break into the food warehouses but members of the Carabinieri and ACC officers on duty prevented this from taking place. One boy age thirteen was shot trying to steal bread from a local bakery. The crowd was dispersed by fire brigade hoses around 0900 hours.

A crowd of about 2500 collected again around 1100 hours and proceeded to march to the Prefettura and stopped about 150 feet from the Prefettura when they were faced with Carabinieri and ACC officers with drawn weapons. A committee of rioters then called on the Prefect after which the Prefect and other officials addressed the mob. After the various speeches the crowd seemed to quiet down but shortly after they dispersed another crowd of about 500 marched to the Prefettura and attempted to break down the doors but CCRR managed to prevent it. Throughout the day mobs gathered but no further damage was done. At approximately 1850 hours a crowd of 5000 collected in the Piazza, flew a Red flag and sang a Communist song. It appeared that the entire day's activity was instigated by members of the Christian Democratic and Communist Parties. The agitation was believed to have been instigated by a number of agitators apparently sent into the city from communes in the Province. None of the leading agitators were found to be local citizens. It was reported that the Italian soldiers, called out by the Prefect to break up the mob, said to various rioters that they were in sympathy with them and would not shoot them as they were hungry themselves. A further demonstration was said to have been scheduled for the morning of 4 March 1944 but up to this writing normal public order has prevailed in the city today. During the activities on 3 March 1944 rocks were thrown at Capt. Smith, an ACC officer in Caltanissetta and threats reported to have been made on his life. During the day arrests were made but the persons were released.

2. This is all the information received to date and is forwarded for your consideration and action.

For the Regional Commissioner:

/s/ William R. Jordan
/t/ WILLIAM R. JORDAN
Lt. Col. CAC
Regional Executive Officer

C O P Y

C O P Y

5,841

104

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Secretary General
APO 394

RED/afe

20 February 1944

DS 21 140
22 FEB 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Lord Stansgate

Do you have any comments concerning the attached letter before it
is presented to the Chief Commissioner?

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

From: Maj Gen E.P. Nares, Hq 2 District, 2022/6 G, 17 Feb 44
To: Gen MacFarlane.

in No. 2 District

Re: Civil disturbances/ especially recent ones in Toronto.
Main cause attributed to shortage of food and ex-Fascists
officials and recommending the replacement of some of
these officials still in office.

1019

(28)

20 Feb

file

700

COPY

COPY

COPY

From: Maj. Gen. E. P. Nares, CBE, MC
HQ 2 District CME
2022/6 C

17 Feb 44

Dear General,

Civil disturbances are constantly being reported from widely scattered areas in No 2 District; these disturbances may well have an adverse effect on our war effort; indeed on a recent occasion in TARANTO they resulted in the loss of a considerable number of working hours in the docks and military establishments.

While the main cause is the shortage of food a contributory one is invariably found to be the retention in office of ex-Fascist officials who represent to the ordinary people the corrupt regime which landed Italy in her present plight.

In this I think that the Italians have a very real grievance and I feel that the replacement of some of these officials should go a long way towards calming unrest and consequently ensuring a more vigorous co-operation from Italians engaged on work for the Allied Military authorities.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ E. P. Nares

Lt. Gen. F. N. Mason Macfarlane, KCB, DSO, MC,
Deputy President Allied Control Commission
HQ Allied Control Commission

JHC

101! COPY

COPY

COPY

(28) INCC

17 Feb

COP.

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

DSH 173
25 FEB 1944Ref: 359/ /CA.20th February 1944.

Subject: Questore of Taranto.

To : His Excellency Marshal Badoglio.

My Dear Marshall,

(8) INCL

I have made enquiries into the matter of the arrest of the Questore of Taranto as requested in your letter of 3rd February 1944.

I am informed that the Questore was removed from his appointment and interned because he failed to co-operate with the Allied military authorities and because his attitude was such that he was deemed to be a potential danger to security. In spite of frequent requests he failed to effect the arrest and bring to trial a very considerable number of persons charged with serious security offences. In the opinion of the Allied military authorities his failures probably contributed to the unrest in Taranto.

The Commander-in-Chief is, however, prepared to release this official from internment on condition that he is given no official appointment in the Italian Government and that he does not return to the Province of Taranto.

If I can have your assurance that this condition will be carried out and if you will inform me where you intend to send him, I will arrange for his release to be carried out.

/S/ NOEL HASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General,
Chief Commissioner.

10:2

(27)

25 FEB 1944
XXII

Ref. CC/G/66.

CONFIDENTIAL

Capt. Loughlin

12574 1411
24 FEB 1944

FNM/rj

17th. February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Brigadier Lush,
Vice-President,
Regional Control & Military Government Section.

1. Badoglio last night complained that he had as yet received no information as to why the Questore at Taranto, and in another case Captain Russo and others at Bari, had been arrested.
2. I understand both arrests were made by the F.S.P..
3. I told Badoglio I would find out and let him know.
4. Would you please make the necessary enquiries.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

1000

26

17 Feb

file 492

7 February 1944

To His Excellency Marshal Badoglio -

Dear Marshal Badoglio:-

I have not acknowledged earlier your letter dated 3 February with regard to the arrest of the Questore of Taranto because I had hoped before this to be able to send you news of his release together with an explanation of this matter.

Unfortunately, the matter had to be referred to higher authority in Naples by a series of letters, and during the last few days we have had to resort to the usual courier service since the Commission's plane was not being dispatched with mail.

Confirming my statement to Dr. Montanari of this morning, please accept my assurance that the matter is being pressed vigorously.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

1039

25

7 Feb

SECRET

FARGO 788

FARGO

SECRET

PRIORITY

7 FEB 44

10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM (ACTION) HQ ACME (INFO)

IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT TROUBLE AND THREAT
 OF TROUBLE AT TARANTO AND POSSIBILITY OF SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES ELSE-
 WHERE I THINK THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF
 ESTABLISHMENT IF AND WHEN NECESSARY OF LOCAL ARBITRATION COMMITTEES
 TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS AFFECTING LABOUR CONDITIONS PD PLEASE PAREN
 FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ FOR REG FOR GENERAL
 GAMMEL FOR MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REFD HQ ACME ^{For Dure} PD CITE FARGO
 SEVEN EIGHT EIGHT PD PLEASE LET ME KNOW EARLIEST POSSIBLE IF YOU
 AGREE TO MY APPROACHING ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS QUESTION

1007

copy to:
 Gen. MacFarlane

Political Sec.
 Legal Sub Comm.
 Adm V.P.
 Econ V.P.

L.P. NICHOL
 Lt. Col. AGS
 Adjutant General

Confidential

7 Feb

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

DMS/hjp

7 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane

In the interest of preserving an orderly L of C; here is a suggestion for dealing with the Taranto labor situation, and others as they may arise.

In consideration of a no-strike (including sit-downs, slow-downs, mass absences, etc) pledge from labor unions and unorganized workers for the duration of the war, the Government could agree, in each case of a labor dispute, to establish an Arbitration Board composed as follows:

- 1 Representative from Government
- 1 Representative from Labor
- 1 Representative from Employers

(Or 3 each—to avoid a tie vote)

The subjects to be dealt with by the Board in the case of the Taranto workers would be:

- (a) Food ration
- (b) Wages
- (c) Elimination of Black Market

In the last analysis, topics (a) and (b) could only be finally determined by us—under our actual control of imports and our desire, at least, to control inflation, but that need not prevent the Board from making findings on these subjects.

As to topic (c), the Government could request labor's suggestions for, and cooperation in, the elimination of black markets. The Board could propose new legislation, if need be, and penalties to implement. The Government would pledge itself to remove any corrupt or incompetent officials whom labor could prove are supporting black market operations.

Because of our interest in points (a) and (b), we might consider having an observer on the Board, without vote. The advantage to us of this would be to discourage the Government making a settlement with the workers by acceding to wage and food ration demands which we might finally have to veto. In other words, we might want to sit in, without official voice or vote, just to keep from having the first two points dumped, in the last analysis, in our lap.

E.W.S.

SECRET

FARGO 786

46

FARGO

7 FEBRUARY 44

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM (ACTION) HQ ACMF (INFO)

I RECEIVED WARNING LAST NIGHT OF POSSIBILITY OF SIT DOWN STRIKE IN TARANTO DOCKYARD TODAY PD PENBASE PAREN FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ FOR MGS CMA GENERAL GAMBEL CMA MISTER MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR ACTION RPTD HQ ACMF FOR INFO PD CITE FARGO SEVEN EIGHT SIX PD I SENT MESSAGES TO BADOGLIO THROUGH BOTH JUNG AND STONE IMPRESSING ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR PREVENTION DISLOCATION WORK IN DOCKYARD PD ALTHOUGH WAGES AND BREAD RATION ARE THE OSTENSIBLE CAUSES OF DISAFFECTION THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT POLITICAL AGITATORS ARE STIRRING UP TROUBLE IN TARANTO TO EMBARRASS BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT AT THIS RATHER CRITICAL MOMENT PD I HAVE SENT MONFORT TO MAKE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION AND AM HOLDING AMG TEAM READY TO PUT INTO TARANTO IN CASE I HAVE TO IMPOSE MILITARY GOVERNMENT PD WHILE DICTATING ABOVE MESSAGE ARRIVED FROM STONE AT BRINDISI TO SAY THAT ALL WAS QUIET AT TARANTO PD THAT BADOGLIO HELD A SPECIAL MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH REALE CMA DE COURTEN CMA AGSTA AND OTHERS AND THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE WELL IN HAND PD THE MINISTER OF MARINE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE INTENDED

Admin V.P.
Neonale V.P.

(page 1)

L.F. NICKEL,
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General

22
7 EL
Confidential

SECRET

continued

FARGO 786

FARGO

7 FEBRUARY 44

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM (ACTION) HQ ACMT (INFO)

TO TAKE THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE LINE IN DEALING WITH ANY THREAT OF
DISLOCATION OF WORK

100'

Confidential

TRANSLATION

ROYAL PREFECTURE OF TARANTO

Having reestablished public order and feeling confident that no ill-intentioned person will render inevitable the adoption of rigorous, exceptional measures in order to repress disorders;

Convinced that the largest part of the population of the province long for the healing of the innumerable wounds which lacerate them, and that no one will allow or provoke new struggles and troubles;

I REVOKE

in my position as Military Naval Commandant, the ordinance issued February 2, 1944 and the extraordinary provisions therein to protect the public safety and to ensure, by authority of law, the ordained solution of most weighty and urgent problems.

In fact, all the matter treated in said ordinance is considered restored to the status existing up to 1 February.

I ORDER

1. The Armed Forces, the Police Forces and the Auxiliary Army Corps (Fire Guards, City Guards, Deputy Guards) under orders of the respective units and commands to remain directly dependent on me in my position as Military and Naval Commandant for the safeguarding of the law and the maintenance of public order.

2. All the arms and munitions legitimately owned by civilians and given in charge of the police, by virtue of the provisions of No. 5 of the aforementioned ordinance, shall be restored to the owners.

3. All citizens caught in flagrant acts of violence against the public safety and against all those who are obligated to safeguard it will be reported to the Military Tribunal.

I DECLARE

a. Let all citizens know that the Allied Authorities require (and wish that it be fully clear and understood) that no disorder harm the life of the country; they intend that there shall be no interference but instead that sincere contributions shall be made to the cause of liberty for which there is still much to fight and oppose on Italian soil.

b. My work will not halt in face of the manifold difficulties, in the task which I have assumed, either as Regent Prefect or as Military and Naval Commandant.

1037

21

File
7 Feb Taranto letter

SUBJECT:- Proclamations.

Regional Control Commissioner,
(Apulia),
(Lt. Col. E.B. Mayne),
Allied Control Commission.

Allied Control Commission,
Palazzo del Governo,
TARANTO.

T/ACC/29.

7 Feb. 44.

I attach herewith proposed proclamation to be displayed in
TARANTO.

May I have your comments please?

(21)
RMEH/AM.
10.7.44

R. P. Smith
Liaison Officer.

I HOPE

not to have to use force in defense of the peaceful evolution of the work of restoring order to public and private life which I have assumed;

to have the voluntary assistance of all conscientious and honest people in Provincia Jonica.

Taranto, 5 February 1944

IL REGGENTE LA PREFETTURA
Ammiraglio di Divisione

G. FIORAVANZO

Pfc H. F. Jaeckel - Transl.
/hjp

1001

R. PREFETTURA DI TARANTO

Ristabilito l'ordine pubblico e confidando che nessun malintenzionato vorrà più oltre rendere inevitabile l'edizione di misure di rigore eccezionali al fine di reprimere disordini;

Convinto che la massima parte della popolazione della Provincia amela al risanamento delle infinite piaghe che la lacerano, e che nessuno vorrà consentire o provocare nuovi lutti e disagi;

R E V O C O

nella mia qualità di Comandante Militare Marittimo, l'ordinanza emanata il 2 Febbraio 1944 e la disposizioni eccezionali in essa contenute per proteggere la pubblica incolumità e per assicurare, con l'autorità della legge, l'ordinata risoluzione di problemi gravissimi e urgenti.

Pertanto s'intende restituita alla normalità esistente a tutto il 1° Febbraio u.s. tutta la materia trattata in detta ordinanza.

O R D I N O

1°) Le Forze Armate, le Forze di Polizia e i Corpi Armati Ausiliari (Vigili del Fuoco, Vigili Urbani, Guardie Giurate), agli ordini dei rispettivi Enti e Comandi, rimangono alle mie dirette dipendenze nella mia qualità di Comandante Militare Marittimo, per la tutela della legge e il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico.

2°) Tutte le armi e munizioni legittimamente in possesso a civili e consegnate, in virtù della disposizione di cui al no. 5 della citata ordinanza, saranno restituite ai possessori.

3°) Saranno denunciati al Tribunale Militare i cittadini comunque colti in flagranza di atti di violenze contro la pubblica incolumità e contro tutti coloro che hanno l'obbligo di tutelarla.

D I C H I A R O

a) Tutti i cittadini sappiano che le Autorità Alleate esigono, e intendono che sia ben chiaro e noto, che nessun disordine porti nocimento alle vite del paese; intendono che non siano portati intralci, ma seri contributi alla causa della libertà per la

10) Le Forze Armate, le Forze di Polizia e i Corpi Ausiliari (Vigili del Fuoco, Vigili Urbani, Guardie Giurate), agli ordini dei rispettivi Enti e Comandi, rimangono alle mie dirette dipendenze nella mia qualità di Comandante Militare Marittimo, per la tutela della legge e il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico.

20) Tutte le armi e munizioni legittimamente in possesso a civili e consegnate, in virtù della disposizione di cui al no. 5 della citata ordinanza, saranno restituite ai possessori.

30) Saranno denunziati al Tribunale Militare i cittadini comunque colti in flagranza di atti di violenza contro la pubblica incolumità e contro tutti coloro che hanno l'obbligo di tutelarla.

D I C H I A R O

a) Tutti i cittadini sappiano che le Autorità Alleate esigono, e intendono che sia ben chiaro e noto, che nessun disordine porti nocumento alla vite del paese; intendono che non siano per tutti intralci, ma seri contributi alla causa della libertà per la quale sul suolo italiano è ancora molto da resistere e da combattere.

b) L'opera mia non si arresterà davanti alle molteplici difficoltà, nel compito in cui mi sono impegnato, sia come Reggente la Prefettura, sia come Comandante Militare Marittimo.

S P E R O

di non dovere usare la forza in difesa del pacifico procedere dell'opera di riordinamento e di risanamento della vita pubblica e privata che mi sono proposto;

di avere la volenterosa collaborazione di tutte le associazioni oneste della provincia Jonica.

Taranto, 5 Febbraio 1944.

IL REGGENTE LA PREMEPURA
Ammiraglio di Divisione

G. FIORAVANTO

208 12

13 FEB 1944

7 February 1944

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Taranto Situation.

TO : Capt Ellery W. Stone, Acting Chief of Staff, ACC.

FROM : Lt Col E. B. Mayne, Regional Liaison Officer, ACC (APGLIA)

1. Recent events in Taranto are, I consider, straws in the wind.
2. On the one hand, there is an important body of workers in the dockyards and associated plants. The workers are organized and there is every indication that political influences are active in their leadership.
3. On the other hand is the local Italian Naval Command, who have taken charge of the situation. Their intention, as far as we know it, is to handle matters with firmness, while attempting to remove abuses and improve local conditions. Admiral Fioravango however, by his handling of recent events, has not given grounds for confidence. Against this, I am informed that the Italian Ministry of Marine under S. E. de Courten is remaining at Taranto.
4. I consider that it is quite on the cards that the labor leaders will bring about a trial of strength. What occurs in Taranto will then be a kind of test case for similar developments elsewhere.
5. Questions of high policy are likely to arise without warning:
 - a) In the event of serious trouble, the Italian Naval Commander may seek the military assistance of the Area Commander. This, in effect, is what has already occurred twice.
 - b) Allied support, short of military intervention, may be sought, e.g. in a proclamation, in a public statement, or at a meeting.
 - c) Questions involving the alteration of wages or rations, which require coordination for all of liberated Italy, can be foreseen.
6. With reference to c), I recommend that a member of the Labor Sub-Commission should be sent to Taranto immediately, in order to make himself familiar with conditions of labor and the problems involved. This can be done without his appearing to interfere in the situation.
7. In view of the uncertain situation, I propose to post myself at Taranto from tomorrow. My office will be in the ACC Liaison Office, Prefettura, Taranto; Tel No Taranto 3455.

99"

E B Mayne
Lt. Col.

20
+ 20 Trucks for Taranto.

7 Feb

E.B.

F 7 FEB 1944 2453
7 February 1944

To His Excellency Marshal Badoglio - 18

My dear Marshal:-

Encl of 7 Feb
Thank you for your note of this morning which was delivered to me by Dr. Montanari.

Its contents have been communicated to General MacFarlane who received it with the greatest satisfaction and appreciation of your efforts.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR

940

19

7 Feb

O 2 FEB 1944 5549
2/7/44TRANSLATION

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

Dear Stone,

I beg you to inform General MacFarlane that order in Taranto has been restored and this morning the laborers resumed work.

The Government has taken all the measures necessary so as to prevent further incidents and so that work on the dock-yard may be permanently assured.

Cordially,

/s/ Badoglio

Pfc H. F. Jaeckel - Transl.
/hjp

997

18 Telephone to Genl MacFarlane
071130 A

7 Feb

(Std. 94/35)

(S. 854) Wt. 4498g D6358. 35,000M. J. M. B. & S. Ltd. 51-8876.

S. 1320h.
(Established—October, 1935)**SECRET CYPHER IMPORTANT
NAVAL MESSAGE.**

To: C IN C MED NAPLES (R) ACC

FROM: FOTALI

C IN C MED ALGIERS

Fill
FED

MY 061317. ALL FEAR BY ITALIAN LOCAL AUTHORITIES THE SIT DOWN
STRIKE FORECASTED FOR TODAY HAS NOT MATERIALISED

TOO 071837
TOR 071930

T/P A 42GR

ACCSEC SOC FILE

250-1

17996

7 Feb

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
 Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING

FEB/13/50

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FATIMA REAR

FARGO

8
2377

FEB 05/1545A

FOR DISTRIBUTION CIVILIAN FOODSTUFFS TWENTY TRUCKS ARE URGENTLY REQUESTED
 TARANTO PD PAREN TO FARGO FOR GRADY FROM FATIMA REAR FROM STONE SIGNED
MACFARLANE PAREN LACK OF CIVIL TRANSPORT IN THIS PROVINCE WAS ONE OF
 THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF RECENT DISTURBANCES PD APPRECIATE YOUR SEEING
 CAPTAIN IMRIE DUE NAPLES TOMORROW VIEW SEEING WHAT CAN BE ARRANGED

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY S. STONE
 Captain, USMR
 Acting Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG Files
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - Capt Stone
- 1 - Col Wayne

995

16

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
 Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

5 FL

EWIS/hjd

15

2223

051130A

FEB

94

22/3

5 Feb

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

SUBJECT: Taranto Disturbances

TO : General MacFarlane

5 February 1944

1. Attached is a copy of a report dated 5 February, by Captain Hawkins, ACC Liaison Officer, Taranto. The events described constitute the sequel, on 4 February, to the original disturbances of 2 February (reported in my Memorandum of 2 February and my note of 3 February).

2. The events of 4 February again showed up conspicuously the ineptitude of the local Italian authorities--of Admiral Fioravanzo in particular--when faced with having to handle a crowd. They reinforce recommendations 1), 2) and 3) made in my memorandum of 2 February.

3. There is particular significance also, it seems to me, in the readiness of the local workmen's "Committee" to fall in with the wishes of the Allied military authorities--once these wishes were clearly made known to them. The time of handing over other provinces to the Italian Government might be the moment to give publicity to Allied military requirements in the interests of the war effort. Possibly paras. 6 and 7 of the Badoglio Proclamation (Document C) could be strengthened in this respect.

4. To revert to the situation at Taranto, the first thing is for the Italian Government to put their house in order locally and to see that the new officials get down at once to tackling the problems which most affect the populace: that of food distribution. The Alimentazione, the Consorzio, the provisioning and control of shops and markets, all need attention; and the local ACC Supply Officers, supplemented if necessary by others, can be of great assistance.

5. Closely bound up with this is the provision of trucks for the transportation of civilian supplies, not only from warehouses to centers of distribution, in the case of imports, but also of local produce from country districts to town. The immediate provision of 20 trucks to be employed solely on transporting civilian supplies would relieve the position. I have telegraphed Mr. Grady on this point today.

6. Summarizing, it seems to me that it would be helpful if these points could be stressed in a general way to Marshal Badoglio, and more specifically, by Brigadier Lush or myself, to Under-Secretary for Interior

Reale. I do not think this would constitute interference with Government, so much as its supervision and control in furtherance of our own military needs for an orderly L of C.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
Ltr fr Capt Hawkins
No. T/ACC/13, 5 Feb 44

992

(14)

SUBJECT:- Notes on Feb 44 at Taranto.

Allied Control Commission,
Palazzo del Governo,
TARANTO

Chief Liaison Officer,

Lt-Col E.B. Mayne,

HQ, Allied Control Commission.

1234 129
22 FEB 1944

1/ACC/13

5 Feb 44.

1. I was informed at approx. 1000 hrs that the funeral of one man killed by accident within the dockyard during the strike of 2 Feb 44, an accident referred to in my earlier report, would take place at 1500 hrs. I informed the Area Commander, Port Security Officer, and S.O(I) 2, Navy House.
2. I saw Admiral Riorovanza, who told me that a demonstration was possible at the funeral, and that all the workers in the arsenal and Franco Tosi shipyards would attend, a total of some 18,000 people.
3. Admiral Riorovanza then saw the Area Commander. I was not present.
4. A/C, 22 Area telephoned to me at approx. 1100 hrs, and asked me to come to see the Area Commander. On the way out, I met Admiral Riorovanza, who appeared very agitated. The admiral told me that the Area Commander would not provide Allied troops to keep order, and that he feared a serious riot. He explained how difficult it would be for him as an Italian to give the order to his troops to fire, which would be the inception of civil war. He told me that without using force he did not think he could keep order, yet he did not think he could give the order to fire. I do not know if he was uncertain of the troops under his command, or whether the political effect of such an order was in his mind. It added up to the fact that he could not give any guarantee of keeping order.
5. I saw Brig. Goodwin at approx 1115 hrs, and he pointed out that demonstrations of this nature were impeding the war effort - he did not wish to employ Allied troops to keep order. The Brigadier told me that policy could wait, the main thing was to avoid a serious dislocation of traffic in the town, and more important, bloodshed. I showed the Area Commander the route to be taken by the funeral and it was noted that it did not pass over the swing bridge. Brig. Goodwin asked me to find the workers leaders and to ask them for an assurance of good behaviour, and that only 400 persons would follow the coffin.
6. I travelled all over the town looking for the three leaders, whose names and addresses were given to me by the Questura, calling at their private houses and also the Communist party HQ in Taranto, but was

he feared a serious riot. He explained how difficult it would be for him as an Italian to give the order to his troops to fire, which would be the inception of civil war. He told me that without using force he did not think he could keep order, yet he did not think he could give the order to fire. I do not know if he was uncertain of the troops under his command, or whether the political effect of such an order was in his mind. It added up to the fact that he could not give any guarantee of keeping order.

5. I saw Brig. Goodwin at approx 11.15 hrs, and he pointed out that demonstrations of this nature were impeding the war effort - he did not wish to employ Allied troops to keep order. The Brigadier told me that policy could wait, the main thing was to avoid a serious dislocation of traffic in the town, and more important, bloodshed. I showed the Area Commander the route to be taken by the funeral and it was noted that it did not pass over the swing bridge. Brig. Goodwin asked me to find the workers leaders and to ask them for an assurance of good behaviour, and that only 400 persons would follow the coffin.

6. I travelled all over the town looking for the three leaders, whose names and addresses were given to me by the Questura, calling at their private houses and also the Communist party HQ in Varanto, but was unable to locate them. Meanwhile, in view of the situation, I had asked for Lt. Col. Wayne to be informed of the morning's events by telephone.

7. At approx. 12.15 hrs., I returned to report to the Area Commander that I could not contact the leaders of the workmen, and that I should find them in the dockyard. I then found that Admiral Riorovanza had asked them to call on him, and had taken them to the Area Commander. The workmen's representatives were as follows - Sig. VOCCOLI, Eduardo - who signed for the Communist party at the Bari Congress; Sig. RENZULLI, Amadeo, who usually speaks for the party in Varanto and Sig. LA TORRE, Guiseppe, who works in the Franco Rossi yard, and holds a minor post in the party at Varanto.

8. The Area Commander gave me a resumé of what he had said to the workmen's representatives, and told me that they had assured him that there would be no trouble.

9. At approx. 1.315 hrs. I again saw Admiral Riorovanza, and he told me of his preparations for the funeral. A motor hearse was provided, and the driver given instructions; troops and carabinieri to be in readiness but kept out of the way; all officers (Italian naval) of the dockyard to march with Admiral Riorovanza behind the coffin, and a large wreath to be given by the Italian navy. The Archbishop was requested to provide a large clerical escort for the hearse.

10. The funeral procession went off very quietly, and after passing the dock (main) Arsenal gate, the hearse proceeded at a normal rate to San Giorgio, where the man was buried quietly.

11. At ~~1515~~ 1515 hrs, Lt-Col Wayne arrived, and most of the points in this report were recapitulated for him with Admiral Fiorovanza, and later with the Area Commander.

R. W. H. C. W.

Liaison Officer.
TARANTO.

1167

V.P.

Wed 1100

(14) INCL

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/are

10/5

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5 Feb

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

INCOMING

1037

7/4

7/37

SECRET

PRIORITY

FARGO CITE FARGO 688

2 DISTRICT FATIMA FORWARD, INFO PBS

This message has been forwarded to 94 Sub Area for Fatima Forward.

Minister of Interior reports rioting in Taranto. Am sending officer investigate circumstances. If rioting continues may be necessary to place Taranto Province under Allied Military Government. You should make immediate plans to send necessary provincial staff there if so ordered by this Headquarters. Personnel to be found from Region 2. Acknowledge earliest.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG
1 - Diary

880
Confidential

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET

Cap Stone

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
 APO 394

EWS/afe

4 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane

7

Further to my memorandum of yesterday concerning the arrest of the Questore of Taranto.

I have received today the attached letter from District 2.

The "continuous bad reports", so far as I am able to make out, relate to the question of failing to secure convictions in the case of most of the police arrests, referred to in the third paragraph of my letter of yesterday.

The OC, 52 Area states that he did not ask for the arrest of the Questore and the attached letter from District 2 states only that his removal was requested.

It seems to me that the question is thus limited to the application of "the overriding power" as applied in the case of high officials.

Meanwhile the Government awaits our reply as to the reason for the Questore's arrest. If the attached letter is disclosed as representing the cause for his arrest, we may certainly expect the Government's demand for his release.

I recommend that District 2 be requested to release the Questore from arrest on the understanding that he will not be reinstated.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
 Captain, USNR
 Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
 Ltr, Hq 2 Distr
 2022/10 G, 3 Feb 44

file
Cap Stone
wrote & letter on this
then destroyed it
& matter closed
19 Feb 1944

Confidential

4 Feb

2 FEB 1944

3 February 1944

TO: General MacFarlane

The attached are the notes which
I telephoned to Naples this morning
for use at your meeting with Reale.

E.W.S.

1 Incl:
Memo, Notes on Taranto
Demonstration

(10)

92?
3 Feb

File

3 FEB 1944

EWS/hjp

3 February 1944

MEMORANDUM:NOTES ON TARANTO DEMONSTRATION
FEBRUARY 2, 1944General Causes

1. Low level of family rations--150 grams of bread per person per day.
2. General decline in governmental authority following collapse of Fascism and lack of strong local command--partly due to uncertainty as to how far Allies will support the putting down of political demonstrations.

Particular Causes

3. Large industrial population of Taranto due to dock yards, by nature unruly and susceptible to agitation.
4. Poor local administration, with particular reference to food distribution services. (Col. Monfort knows details of this.)

Events Shown

In spite of the generally peaceful nature of the crowds and the presence of numerous Carabinieri and Italian troops, no effective steps were taken to handle the crowds. Conspicuous lack of command.

RecommendationsBy Italians

1. Inquiry into the lack of command, and its immediate rectification.
2. Appointment of the best Questore available.
3. Appointment of the best Prefect available.
4. Effective reorganization of the food distribution services. ACC supply officers to assist.

By Allies

1. See whether rations can be improved. Notably, a regular, if

small, pasta ration.

2. The immediate supply of some transport for civilian supplies --say, 20 trucks. Taranto Province is particularly short of transport* for distributing supplies and bringing local supplies to the town.

Since dictating above, I have learned from Naples that an immediate increase in the bread ration to 200 grams is being considered. In my opinion, if this increase can be made, together with the establishment of a regular pasta ration, say, 40 or 50 grams per day (existing ration cards authorize 70 grams per day), it should be made effective before the transfer of Regions I and II to the Government. First, on humanitarian grounds, and second, if withheld until the Government takes over, the opposition is likely to charge that the Allies are "window dressing" the Government.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

* These could be loaned by Italian Army for the time being.

3 February 1944

To: General MacFarlane

The attached report was prepared by Captain Hawkins, the ACC Liaison Officer at Taranto. The penciled notation in the last paragraph clarifies his meaning.

In elaboration orally of par. 5, Capt Hawkins informs me that a number of the "workmen" admitted that they had received their pasta ration. In fact, very little headway was made at the meeting until their leader arrived who turned out to be the Secretary of the Communist Party. Capt Hawkins insists that the entire disturbance was engineered by political leaders to coincide with the strike of the Franco Bossi workers over the delay in receiving their pasta ration.

In any case, it would appear that so long as the food ration continues to be meager, it will not be difficult for agitators to stir up trouble, particularly amongst urban workers.

E.W.S.

1 Incl:
Report from Capt Hawkins

98

3 Feb

SUBJECT: Report on Disturbance -
Taranto

Allied Control Commission,
Palazzo del Governo,
TARANTO.

Chief Liaison Officer,
(Lt. Col. E.B. Mayne),
Allied Control Commission,
Advanced Command Post,
Brindisi.

T/ACC/13.

3 Feb. 44.

I attach two copies of a report on the Civil Disturbance
on the morning of 2 Feb. 44.

It is regretted that this has been written and typed
under great pressure of work.

RMPH/AM.

RMPH/AM

Liaison Officer.

(9) MRL

*File
Capt Stone
has no objection*

250,1

2 Feb. 44.

(Authorities - R. Questura report, eye-witness accounts from members of this office, personal observation and conversation with those concerned)

1. CAUSES. The workmen, and their families of the FRANCO TOSI works had not received their pasta ration of 300 grammes and decided to strike. They were later followed by the Naval Arsenal workers. Political unrest has resulted Bari Congress and a desire to see the "old gang" go. General anxiety at the cost of living increased prices hoarding and particularly the black market. It is considered that the chief cause was a political one, and not hunger & most of the inhabitants of Taranto received their 300 grammes of pasta on ~~one~~ 1 Feb. 44) - a feeling that after 4 months of Allied occupation political chicanery still continued, and no millennium had appeared.

2. EVENTS. Workers of FRANCO TOSI yard left work at 7.30, crossed the Mare Piccolo by the regular ferries, marched to the Prefecture and broke in there (many used the lifts in building). Crowd reached the Prefettura at 0810 hrs. The Prefect was attacked but known to escape. Major of Carabinieri who helped him was manhandled. From 0900 to 0910 hrs., the Prefect was effectively hidden. On losing the Prefect the workmen went to his kitchen (the Prefect lives in the Palazzo del Governo) and smashed it up. Wine was thrown out of the windows but no evidence of rationed goods in large quantities were found. Carabinieri and soldiers then cleared the buildings of the Prefecture of the crowd, but they remained in the two courtyards, hooting and demanding resignation of the Prefect as a Fascist. By 1000 hrs the crowd had grown considerably but large reinforcements of soldiers had arrived. We must now return to the Naval Arsenal. After coming to work, these workmen decided to strike in sympathy with the FRANCO TOSI workers. On orders from Admiral FICRAVANZO the Arsenal gates were shut. During this time some 20 workmen fell down a deep ditch when some railings broke, several were severely injured. The few Carabinieri inside were having a hard time, and the military guard, composed of Poles asked permission to open fire. This was refused, but in view of the ugly situation, the gates were opened at 0900 hrs. These workmen then marched to swell the crowd at the Prefecture. At 1030 hrs. someone raised the cry to march to the Amassi warehouses which are situated in old Taranto. The swing
the leaders of the crowd

3. ACTION TAKEN. Warned at 1830 hrs. of a possible strike in the dockyard Admiral FICRAVANZO was informed at 1900 hrs. The Prefect knew of this matter. *This took place on 1 Feb 44.*

Feb-

No serious attempt seems to have been made to prevent the entrance into the Prefecture of the FRANCO TOSI workers at 0810 hrs. There was at no time anyone controlling the police and military. Italian military officers, including a General stood and talked to the crowd. The soldiers were so heavily weighted down with blankets, mess kit and so on, that they could hardly stand up, let alone take any active part. Machine guns were placed in the courtyard of the Prefecture, all facing inwards, and towards each other. Soldiers and Carabinieri individually worked well, but there was no central control, and the crowd always had the situation well in hand. The whole business was mismanaged from beginning to end.

4. ALLIED ACTION. Area Commander and POTA were informed of the disturbance at 0825 hrs. Permission to sound the air raid alarm was wisely refused by the Area Commander, and after a company of British infantry had taken over the guard of the swing bridge, it was reopened to traffic. Admiral FIOROVANZO gave authority for the sounding of the air raid alarm and also shutting of the bridge, without consulting British authorities. Dock clearance was hindered for over two hours. Two Sherman tanks were driven about in the neighbourhood of the Prefecture. CIP's were stationed on the outskirts of the crowd to prevent Allied personnel becoming involved. At no time was there any feeling against Allied personnel, and I and my officers passed freely through the crowd. As an instance of the ease with which the whole disturbance might have been controlled - at one stage, some irresponsible characters, accompanied by a small crowd, and numbering some 30 people wished to overturn a tramcar. One Military Policeman, who speaks no Italian, dispersed this crowd in five minutes.

5. RESULTS. At approx. 1030 hrs. I was present in Admiral FIOROVANZO's office, when a deputation of the workmen arrived. Sig. INNOCENTI, Capo di Gabinetto to the Prime Minister was also there. It had obviously been previously arranged - some ten minutes before I entered the room, that Admiral FIOROVANZO should take over the Civil Administration of the Province, and he told the deputation of this decision. A long political speech was made by the Secretary of the Communist Party in this Province, again a well prepared speech. When a general discussion was started, purely on politics, I left the meeting. It was confirmed that the original casus belli, the pasta ration which had not been issued to the FRANCO TOSI workers, was due to inefficiency, not on the part of the local administration, who had made the issue to the FRANCO TOSI co-operative, but by the co-operative itself.

I am convinced that this disturbance was a

the outskirts of the crowd to prevent Allied personnel becoming involved. At no time was there any feeling against Allied personnel, and I and my officers passed freely through the crowd. As an instance of the ease with which the whole disturbance might have been controlled - at one stage, some irresponsible characters, accompanied by a small crowd, and numbering some 80 people wished to overturn a tramcar. One Military Policeman, who speaks no Italian, dispersed this crowd in five minutes.

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS. I am convinced that this disturbance was a political one rather than a hunger riot. The 300 grammes pasta ration had been made available to the public on 1 Feb. 44. The present arrangement of a naval prefect has satisfied all concerned, but it is obvious that it cannot be permanent. Administration cannot be divorced from politics, and the Prefect was merely a scapegoat. I consider he did his best with a bad job and I know he worked hard. Although I am only concerned with administration, there is no doubt of the different political lines in this province:-

- (a) The parties of the left are out to try and bring the present government into disfavour, and more particularly with the Allied authorities.
- (b) The parties of the right are at great pains to show that this disturbance was purely a hunger riot, and that the situation is in hand.

That a riot of this nature was able to take place in a traditionally naval and royalist province is a good indication of the feeling.

1180

It is evident that a much stricter control of Italian politics is needed, as otherwise they will, as evidenced in Taranto, stand in the way of the war effort.

The majority of the people here have no idea that a war is going on further north - and many do not understand that they have been defeated. Taranto has been spared most of the horrors of war, and the feeling of egotism - looking after one self - is too deeply ingrained to be lost in 4 months.

I recommend (a) that the civil administration in this province should be informed in no uncertain terms that the war effort must come first:- (b) that considerable publicity should be given to the fact that a war is going on:- (c) and that disturbances of this nature are hindering the war effort. (d) that immediate steps be taken, regionally, to control hoarding and the black market, which are the sounding boards for the parties of the left. (e) that definite instructions are given to all Italian officials that graft and speculation will be considered as very serious offences, and, if possible, sent to an Italian military court. (f) that as we have not come here either as missionaries or providential societies, it is up to the Italians to put their administration in order, and to find their own salvation.

Feb. 3.44.

By The Podoglio
Government
RW P. G.
Capt.
Liason Officer, Taranto.

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Feb. 3.44.

by The Padoglio
Government

Capt.

Liaison Officer, Taranto.

RWPG

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APC 394

ERS/hjp

3 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane

Re the attached concerning the arrest of the Questore of Taranto.

The Marshal made an error as to the date of the arrest which occurred on the 1st and not on the day of the disturbance.

Monfort is familiar with the case of the Questore. District II and the Area Commander have accused him of releasing prisoners with only light sentences, if any. The Questore is not responsible for convictions and sentences. The former Procurator was lax in this respect and was removed.

I have discussed this with both Brigadier Goodwin, the Area Commander, and Colonel Sisley of District II. Each claims that the other authority is responsible for the arrest. The report from District II as to the reasons for the arrest has not been received but from what I can learn from Colonel Wayne, the Questore should have been removed from office but not arrested.

The Security Police, as in the Donati case in Naples, claim that "obstructionism" is sufficient cause for arrest on the ground that security is endangered. Colonel Spofford is familiar with their practice in such cases.

My own opinion is that a directive should be issued by Hq ACMF distinguishing between those cases which, while obstructionists, do not actually endanger security.

I have not acknowledged the attached because of the policy involved. I will send you District II's report on MENDOLA as soon as it has been received.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
Ltr fr Marshal Badoglio
3 Feb 1944

3 Feb

I have since learned that he was removed, but under Secy for Justice was given to do so.

Sgt Sorisi
File copy
TRANSLATION

P.M. 151, 3 February 1944

THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

Dear General MacFarlane,

I have been informed that yesterday morning Comm. Dr. Alfredo MENDOLA, Questore of Taranto, was arrested by order of Allied Authorities, without any advance notice or other communication having been given to Italian Authorities.

I will not conceal, dear General, my surprise in regard to this matter, all the more because these unaccustomed procedures tend to become habitual. Only a few days ago, the arrest of an Italian General occurred under similar circumstances.

Such arrests, performed by the Allies in territory which has never been considered as one of occupation, and which is, on the contrary, directly administered by the Royal Government, could only find an explanation in the case of flagrant crimes: the case of Taranto is not of this character, since, up to the present moment, I have not even been told of what charges are being made against Dr. Mendola.

Whereas the prestige of the Royal Government thus becomes compromised beyond all hope, be it in relation to the population under its rule, as in regard to dependent officials, one can foresee that chaotic situations, not easily controllable, may be the result.

Neither can one but remark that those officials involved in measures of the kind, especially if—as in the case of Taranto—the person happens to be Chief of the Provincial Police, they lose irrevocably all authority and control over the population, even though they may later on be released of any charge because their innocence has been proven.

Therefore, I beg of you, dear General, to please make it possible for me to know the motives which impelled the Allied Authorities to arrest the Comm. Mendola, in addition to the charges made against him.

I also send you an earnest plea to arrange that, in the future and under similar circumstances, the Allied Authorities under your control may act together with Italian Authorities, which, as you know, are always ready to comply with the just demands of the Allies.

Please accept, dear General, the expression of my highest regard.

THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

/s/ Badoglio

970
8 INCL 1
To Lt. General Mason MacFarlane
Chief of Allied Control Commission
Brindisi

Sgt Sorisi - Transl.
/hjp

Vogel
SUBJECT: Arrest of Questore of TARANTO

3 FEB 1944 3436
SECRET

HQ 2 District CEF
2022/10 G

3 Feb 44

ACC ✓

Copy to 52 Area

1. Continuous bad reports have been received by this HQ concerning the Questore of TARANTO. General DOWLER gave instructions for his arrest and internment. The arrest was to be postponed pending the arrival of 410 FSS in the area.
 2. Normally civilian arrests are made in the co-operation with the BADOGLIO Government or its representatives but overriding powers remain in Allied hands if the military situation requires.
 3. A request was received on 31 Jan by this HQ from OC 52 Area for the immediate removal of the Questore. In consequence the overriding power was exercised and FSS instructed to proceed with a representative of OCRR to the immediate execution of the arrest as ordered by GOC No 2 District.
 4. This HQ had no information that it was proposed to supersede the Questore.
- 2501

(7) TOS 0830 A

JHC

93

2 H

E. M. Paul
Major-General
Commanding 2 District

Proper

SUBJECT: Arrest of Questore of TARANTO

3 FEB 1944 3436
SECRET

HQ 2 District CEF
2022/10 G

3 Feb 44

ACC ✓

Copy to 52 Area

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7 TOS 0830 A

JHC

97

3 Feb

E. Maud
Major-General
Commanding 2 District

250.1

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

FARGO

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FARGO - 696

3 FEBRUARY 64

10050 MACFARLANE

AFHQ FOR MCS

_____ It is reported from Turanto that a food riot took place this morning when a crowd numbers yet undetermined invaded the Prefettura and reportedly attacked the Prefect. No shots were fired and there were no casualties. The Prefect was immediately removed by the Italian Government and replaced by the local Italian Admiral. All quiet. Complete report will be forwarded.

9776

646 Farg

3 Feb

785015

8 FEB 1944

C-2374 FLOAI

UPDATE - by S.D.R.

SUBJECT: Delays in Punishment by Italian Authorities.TO: HQ No. 2 District.

4 see below

A-36.

1. For your info the unreported is a statement of the number of cases which have been lodged for the months of Nov, Dec 43 and Jan 44, and also shows the number of cases in which there has been no known punishment awarded.

2. This info is as accurate as possible but there may have been one or two cases in each month in which punishment has been awarded but which has not been reported to this HQ. The statement however is substantially correct and you will observe the large number of cases which have not yet been dealt with. Information on all the cases was given to the Questura.

November.Serious Charges.

1 Stabbing.

2 Murder.

1 serious injury.

2 Wounding.

Others.

44.

Known Punishments - 1.December.

1 Shooting.

1 large scale theft of goods to the value of £.350.

1 Murder.

41.

Known Punishments - 1.January.

1 Wounding.

1 Sabotage of Cars.

36.

Known Punishments - Nil.

7501-

7501-

- 1 serious injury.
- 2 wounding.

Known Punishments - L

December.

41.

- 1 shooting.
- 1 large scale theft of goods to the value of £.350.
- 1 murder.

Known Punishments - L

January.

36.

- 1 wounding.
- 1 Sabotage of Guns.

Known Punishments - MIL.

97

- 3. The charges shown in the "Others" coln are very largely for larceny and unlawful possession.
- 4. It is intended to send to you within a few days a complete and detailed statement of all the charges, meantime a copy of the January Statement is enclosed.

(5)

Field.
2 FEB 44.
TGR/ENG.

[Handwritten signature]

Brig.
Comd.
52 ARMA.



File Custodian - Toronto

A.36
2 Feb.

26 JAN 1944

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

HTM/hd

*HTM*In reply refer to:
AG 311.2
TS/2/1/61

25 January 1944

Subject: Radio service for 28 January to Safeguard Public Order.

To: Under-Secretary of State for the Interior

1. In reply to your telegram of 25 January on the above subject, it is regretted that it has not been found possible to provide a special wireless network for the occasion.

2. Arrangements have been made, however, by the Military Mission to the Italian Army, which will permit SMRE to send very urgent messages over British wireless circuits. By this method communication should be sufficiently rapid.

ELLERY F. STONE
Captain, USNR
Vice-President
Communications Section

cc: MMIA for Sigs S.O.

250.1 - Forwarded for Transmission

97

(1)

18 JAN 1944

HEF/hjp

File 0911

18 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency Marshal Badoglio
Chief of the Government

It has been reported to the Allied Control Commission that political disturbances in the city of San Pancrazio are presently interfering with the operation of the Allied Armed Forces in that locality. The Commission would appreciate it if Your Excellency would take necessary prompt measures to remedy the situation.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel, Cavalry

X

975

(3)

18 Jan

4 JAN 1944

MDT/hjp

In reply refer to:
091.1

4 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Spofford, Deputy Chief Civil Officer
Headquarters AMG, Naples

SUBJECT : Conditions in Campania

The attached document received from the Italian War Ministry is
transmitted for your information.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

1 Incl:
Ltr, War Ministry,
No. 12/c P.M. 107, 3 Jan 44

9th copy held

(1) ?

1-082

(2) 97

091.1

4 Jan

This appears
to be for information
only, inasmuch
as this territory
is out of our
bailiwick.

RED

972

ROYAL CROWN SEAL

WAR MINISTRY

TRANSLATION

CABINET

PM 107

3 January 1944

SUBJECT : Public Order in Campania

TO : Allied Control Commission,
Brindisi.

The headquarters of the Armed Forces in Campania has informed us that the situation of the public order in the communes of S. Bartolomeo in Galdo, Castelvetero, Valfortore, Colle Sannita, Circello, Reino, S. Marco dei Cavoti, Molinara, Fobiano Valfortore, Montefalcone, and Basalice (both in the province of Benevento), is becoming daily aggravated and that the population is threatening to adopt violent action against public offices and their directors for the following reasons:

1. Failure of payment for the relief of military day-laborers
2. Higher cost of living.
3. Lack of work due to winter
4. Deficiency in vital foods: oil, fats, dough, rice, etc.
5. Failure of the postal system to function.

The above is transmitted to you for your information.

s/s/s/

A. ALIBERTI
Brigadier General Italian Army

971

/msr

(1)

39

1194

785015

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 20, 1918**LIST OF PAPERS**File under No. 094 ROME

Page Three

B-0724

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
10		28 Feb 44		Mr. Churchill's speech, extrac Broadly based gov't to be formed at Rome.
11	Badoglio #856 Pres	27 Feb 44	Gen MacFarlane	Re 2500 Carabinieri held for occupation of Rome: might 200 be withdrawn to reinforce Sicily, as sitrep there is alarming. No other CC RR troops available.

970 -

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

