

ACC

10000/136/351

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DEC.

10000/136/351

CARABINIERI, ITALIAN (C.C. R.R.)
DEC. 1943 - MAR. 1946

1951

785015

28 March 1946

SUBJECT: Reorganization of CC.RR.

TO : G-5, AFHQ

Forwarded herewith for information are five
copies of the Land Forces Subcommittee, AC, paper
subject "Reorganization of CC.RR."

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ L.W. STEARNS

L. W. STEARNS
Lt Col, AGD
Staff Officer to CC

13

Smith
3615/46

CONFIDENTIAL

BLD.
 XXXXXX
 R-91-45

DEC 11 1945

021540

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY ATTACHE

ROME, ITALY

Personal Observation & Evidence from Reliable Sources
 NORTHERN ITALY

7 December 1945

B-2

Police System (Non-Secret)

Report No. R-6-45, 13 September 1945. subject "Police System"

The Italian police system, primarily the Carabinieri, as presently organized and equipped, cannot maintain law and order in a suitable manner in the northern provinces now under Italian control, particularly Emilia. There are indications that a critical situation will develop upon return of Piedmont and Lombardi Provinces to Italian control by the AMG. If regularly authorized police forces are not strengthened and properly equipped, and Partigiani and other semi-official or self-constituted police forces are not disarmed.

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3615/ce

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1953



JOINT INTELLIGENCE LIBRARY, CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AC, AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR, MTOUSA

Surplus

3615/ce

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During visits made by the undersigned between the period November 10-13 and 17-20, to the Province of Emilia, including Bologna, Florence and Livorno, personal observation was made or reliable evidence given to the undersigned that pillage, extortion, highway robbery and housebreaking were prevalent in the areas visited, particularly in the Province of Emilia. Civilians in the cities, especially in Bologna, are fearful of going about after dark. People living in the country - especially those with means - bar their houses and remain indoors during the hours of darkness. The undersigned is unable to make an estimate at this time as to whether conditions are improving or becoming worse. It can be stated, however, that so far as law and order are concerned, the general situation in the areas visited is quite unsatisfactory.

Observations made by the undersigned indicated that:

a. Regular authorized police units, such as the Carabinieri, were undermanned, inadequately equipped and lacked adequate and proper transport, i.e., armored cars, motor vehicles, etc. Partigiani Auxiliary Police, originally authorized by Army Commanders, then by AMG authorities and later by Italian officials in the Province of Emilia to ferret out German soldiers and expose and take into custody prominent Fascist authorities, or, groups of hoodlums posing as Partigiani Auxiliary Police and bearing automatic arms and other weapons dropped into northern Italy by the Allies during the period of German occupation, were taking the law into their own hands and were using their semi-official status for intimidation of the Carabinieri, extortion of many business people and farmers upon threats of exposure as fascists, and committing highway robbery and housebreaking.

b. Efforts of the regularly constituted police, primarily the Carabinieri, were handicapped by the support given to the Partigiani police units by Partigiani Communist Prefects and Magistrates. The situation in this respect seemed to be particularly aggravated in the Bologna-Emilia area.

In conversations with the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, General Brunetto Brunetti, and with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, Gen. Raffaele Cadorna, the following points were brought out: Police work in Italy and the restoration of law and order are handicapped by:

a. Inadequate numbers and poor equipment of the Carabinieri, together with low rate of pay which seriously affects morale.

b. Carabinieri, lacking automatic arms and being inferior in numbers to the Partigiani or other semi-officially constituted police forces, especially in the Province of Emilia, and lacking practically all means of transportation, such as automobiles, armored cars or trucks, cannot successfully combat the law-breaking elements.

In enforcement efforts of the Carabinieri, especially in the

upon threats of exposure as Fascists, and committing highway robbery and house-breaking.

- b. Efforts of the regularly constituted police, primarily the Carabinieri, were handicapped by the support given to the Partigiani police units by Partigiani Communist Prefects and Magistrates. The situation in this respect seemed to be particularly aggravated in the Bologna-Emilia area.

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- a. Inadequate numbers and poor equipment of the Carabinieri, together with low rate of pay which seriously affects morale.

- b. Carabinieri, lacking automatic arms and being inferior in numbers to the Partigiani or other semi-officially constituted police forces, especially in the Province of Emilia, and lacking practically all means of transportation, such as automobiles, armored cars or trucks, cannot successfully combat the law-breaking elements.

- c. Law enforcement efforts of the Carabinieri, especially in the Province of Emilia, and particularly at Bologna, are seriously handicapped by the political status of the prefects who are Communists or Partigiani and who are protecting the semi-official Partigiani or Communist police in their extortion or pillaging activities.

The above Italian officials, General Cadorna and Gen. Brunetti, stated that a great improvement could be made in the enforcement of law and order in Italy (disregarding needed changes in the general government administration and political set-up) by the following:

- a. Increase in the strength of the Carabinieri and other regularly authorized and organized police forces, together with the provision of proper equipment for these police forces, especially of mobile Carabinieri battalions with armored cars and adequate military equipment to meet the organized bands of lawbreakers who are armed with automatic weapons and have motor vehicles.

- b. An effective program by Italian and Allied forces to collect the military weapons now in the hands of all unauthorized organizations and individuals in the northern provinces particularly.

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c. Dissolution of the previously semi-authorized Partigiani police units and their replacement by regularly authorized and organized police without political affiliations.

General Cadorna, in further conversation relating to law and order in Italy, stated that "were a condition now to develop where it would be necessary to call upon Italian army units for police duties a very bad situation would develop". He stated that the "army was under paid, inadequately armed, clothed and equipped, and probably a good percentage, even as much as 50%, might be expected to desert or refuse to carry out law enforcement duties".

Both General Cadorna and General Brunetti felt that the Allied authorities had shown lack of interest in development of an adequate police force and were handicapping the organization and development of proper police forces, particularly the Carabinieri, by administrative delay in making available Italian or Allied arms, clothing and equipment. (However, it is known by the undersigned that in certain respects the above statements are contrary to fact. The Parri government has consistently opposed the efforts of Allied authorities to establish "an Allied Police Mission for the organization and training of the Italian police".)

Further visits and investigation into the police situation in Italy are being made by the undersigned. A further report, containing information from the Allied Commission and other Allied and Italian sources, will be submitted at an early date.

From information received from reliable and well-informed sources it is believed that there will be widespread disorder verging on anarchy in the Lombardi and Piedmont areas if the AMG government and Allied troops are withdrawn prior to:

- a. Disarmament of Partigiani and/or bandit groups operating under the guise of patriotic organizations.
- b. Increase in the strength of the Carabinieri and their proper armament equipment and development of local police forces without Partigiani or Communist affiliations.

1062 FRANCIS M. BRADY
Brig. General USA
Military Attache

19.

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1061 FRANCIS M. BRADY
Brig. General USA
Military Attache

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CONFIDENTIAL

1192

JUN 15 1945

FIVE SEVEN AREA FOR LIGURIA REGION ALCOM ATTENTION RPBO

9740

14 JUNE 1945

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

SUBJECT IS CARABINIERI PD

PAREN TO FIVE SEVEN AREA FOR LIGURIA REGION ALCOM ATTENTION RPBO
FROM ALCOM CITE ACPSE PAREN

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR LIG SLANT SAF SLANT FIVE FIVE FIVE
DATED TEN JUNE FOUR FIVE PD

PARA TWO PD PLEASE SEE OUR AC SLANT ONE FOUR SIX ZERO ONE SLANT
TWO ONE SLANT PS DATED TEN JUNE FOUR FIVE PD NO FURTHER INCREASE
OF RATION STRENGTH HAS YET BEEN APPROVED BY AFHQ PD ACCORDINGLY
ALL RECOVERED CARABINIERI IN YOUR AREA MUST BE DEALT WITH IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARA FIVE OF DIRECTIVE AC SLANT ONE FOUR SIX ZERO
ONE SLANT THREE SLANT PS DATED ONE MAY PD

10

Public Safety 3/0

365

P.J. WILSON, Lt. Col.

NICHOLAS PICCIBINO
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

3615/CC

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

10th June, 1945.

[Signature]
Chief Commissioner.

The following matters appear to me ripe for early discussion:

See:
 1008/cc

- (1) The situation in VENEZIA GIULIA. The Italian press has published full details of the Belgrade agreement. I have no knowledge of the area to be administered by Allied Military Government or whether AMG is to depend from the Allied Commission or from AFHQ.

See attached
 + Hennis
 letter
 2 copies
 to flush

copy in
 204/cc

- (2) Preparation for a National Election in ITALY. I understand the present situation is that the existing Italian machinery is so cumbrous that we have indicated to the Italian Government that we do not propose to ask Regional Commissioners in AMG territory to prepare electoral lists. It is most important, in my opinion, that we do everything possible to prepare for an early election.

Who
 authorized
 this? his
 should be
 prepared

See:
 3201/cc
 prep

- (3) Recruitment of Partisans into the Italian Army. CADORNA in the North West has asked for the recruitment of up to 10,000. Brigadier Dunlop telegraphed to you on 1st June on the question of the recruitment of the "Pino Hanetti" Division.

This is to
 be taken up
 by you with
 Gen. Browning

195

- (4) The Police Forces of ITALY. Should the recommendations of the Poletti Committee be followed up? Should we make recommendations for a special Allied Police Mission as recommended in my memorandum of May 31st? In my opinion the present police situation is serious and action is essential.

yes to
 AFHQ.
 To be in-
 dicated in
 draft paper
 a subject of
 Commission

(9)

M.S.L.

(89)

Copy returned to EL
 with comments TMS cc

3615/cc

AG/14601/21/PS

30 May, 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

The War Ministry has represented the need to demobilize and send to their homes in the North the personnel of the Montegrano Battalion, Italian Army. These men are entitled to be demobilized on account of their age.

You will remember that the Montegrano Battalion was sent to Sicily and temporarily attached to the Carabinieri in December 1944, on the occasion of unrest in Catania.

The number of men concerned in this demobilization is 560 and no objection is raised by this Commission. However, it is realized that this will mean a further depletion in the policing strength in Sicily, which you will no doubt represent to your Minister of War should you consider it desirable.

These facts are brought to your notice in view of our recent correspondence on the subject of Carabinieri Strength in the South.

Yours very truly,

[s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

(88)

MAY 24 RECD

FIVEARMY FOR AMG

INFO COL HARRIS 15 ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS

57 AREA FOR LIGURIA REGION AICOM

8301

23 May 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

SUBJECT IS MOVE OF CARABINIERI TO GENOA

PAREN TO FIVEARMY FOR AMG INFO COL HARRIS 15 ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS 57 AREA FOR
LIGURIA REGION AICOM FROM AICOM CITE MCPST PAREN

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR CITE TWO FOUR FIVE DATED TWO TWO MAY NOT TO ALL

PARA TWO PD ONE ZERO OFFICERS ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO CARABINIERI FOUR ZERO TONS

STORES WILL ARRIVE LEGHORN SAN MARCO STATION ZERO SIX ZERO ZERO HOURS TWO FOUR

MAY PD THEY WILL REPORT TO US RTO CONVOY COMMANDER WHO WILL ARRANGE TRUCK

TRANSPORT TO GENOA UNDER P B S ARRANGEMENTS PD

Int. Dis. 13
 A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 CA-Sec.
 Transport S/C
 (Att: Maj. Worthington)

365 Public Safety S/C

F.J. WILSON Lt. Col.


 NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
 CWO USA
 Asst. Adjutant.

(87)

36155/100

Chief Commission

57 AREA FOR LIGURIA REGION ALCOM - FIVEARMY FOR AMI Attention : C.F.S.

Information : SCAD IV CORPS

8083

21 May . 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT IS CARABINIERI FOR LIGURIA

PAREN TO 57 AREA FOR LIGURIA REGION ALCOM CMA FIVEARMY FOR AMI FROM ALCOM CITE

ACRSE PAREN PD

PARA ONE PD FOR AMI LIGURIA REFERENCE YOUR EIGHT SIX DATED TWO ZERO MAY
FOUR FIVE PD

PARA TWO PD REPLY TO YOUR NUMBER ONE ZERO DATED FIVE MAY WAS OUR SEVEN ONE
FOUR SIX DATED SEVEN MAY ADDRESSED TO YOU AND AMI FIVEARMY PD

PARA THREE PD THIS CABLE IS REPEATED HEREWITH FOR YOUR INFORMATION REFERENCE
ONE ZERO DATED FIVE MAY PD FIVE OFFICERS FIVE ZERO ZERO CARABINIERI TWO ZERO
TONE STORES ARRIVE FLORENCE FOUR ZERO ZERO HOURS SEVEN MAY FROM ROME PD
THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THESE MEN BEING ASSIGNED TO YOU IF AMI FIVE ARMY AGREES PD
PLEASE REPLY RESULT QUOTE PD

PARA FOUR PD AMI FIVE ARMY BY THEIR CITE ONE NINE SIX DATE ONE FIVE MAY NO COPY
TO YOU REQUESTED THAT ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO CARABINIERI BE SENT TO GENOA FOR LIGURIA PD
TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR THE MOVE OF ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO MEN FROM THE
SOUTH ON OUR LETTER AG SLANT ONE FOUR SIX ZERO ONE SLANT FIVE THREE PUBLIC SAFETY
DATED ONE SIX MAY COPY TO YOU AND AMI FIVEARMY PF THESE MEN ARE EXPECTED TO
MOVE FORWARD FROM ROME DURING THIS WEEK ENDING TWO SEVEN MAY PD
PARA FIVE PD ACTION FIVE ARMY PD THE ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO CARABINIERI WILL BE STAGED
TO LEGHORN BY TRANSPORTATION SUB COMMISSION PD PLEASE REPLY URGENT METHOD OF
TRANSPORT TO GENOA PD

Int. Dist : A/President, Chief Commis.
CA Sec., Transport S/C
(Maj. Worthington)

Public Safety S/C
489001 - 264
F.J. WILSON Lt. Col.

NICHOLAS POMBINO
CWO USA
Asst. Adjutant

Ref: 3626/EC

19 May 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the CC.RR and other Police Forces of Italy

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
(Attention: G-5 Section)

1. Reference is made to your G-5 GL4.12 of 11 May 1945.

2. The point which you raise in your para 2 is noted--namely that MMIA responsibility for the administration of the CC.RR is specifically limited to the supply of rations.

It is essential, however, to bear in mind that the CC.RR are Italian Army personnel more than historically; they are actually an integral part of the Italian Army, depending from the Ministry of War for their organization, supply, training, and discipline.

It was with the knowledge of this fact and with understanding of the Italian organization that the Committee which sat to consider the reorganization of the CC.RR made their report.

3. This Headquarters' letter 3626/EC of 14 April sought assurance that "placing corresponding responsibilities (i.e., corresponding to those of the Italian Ministry of War whose counterpart in this Commission MMIA is) on the Public Safety Sub-Commission and Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) would not be inconsistent with any directives that have been issued to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) and, in particular, AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 OCT-0 of 16 November 1944."

4. It is now my recommendation, should these proposed new responsibilities not be covered by existing directives to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) or be in conflict with them, that it be considered whether these directives should not be changed.

cc: Exec Comm'r, AC
Land Forces S/C (MMIA), AC
Civil Affairs Sec, AC

ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

85

See 92

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
AFO 512

TBJ/irf

G-5: 014.12

11 May 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Carabinieri and other Police Forces
of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
AFO 394

1. Reference is made to your 3626/EC of 14 April.

2. While historically the CCRR are Army personnel, they are used as Civil Police and MMIA responsibility for their administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army. MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their organization, supervision or use and no extension of MMIA responsibility in this connection is contemplated.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

/s/ T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel

13

COPY

AG/14601/21/PS

11 May 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 29 April 1945 on the subject of the movement North of detachments of Carabinieri. A total of 7,674 was required to complete the total decided upon for the North, but I can inform you that it is not our intention to call forward this force at the present time.

I am glad to inform you that AFHQ has agreed to the publication of a decree by you increasing the strength of the Carabinieri from 55,000 to 65,000, although for the moment we cannot assume any commitment for the rations and clothing of this additional 10,000. The possibility of arranging for the transfer of rations from existing units to Carabinieri is being explored. In the interval it has been arranged that Carabinieri recovered in the North will be enrolled as special police and will be rationed and paid by the Allied Military Government.

Yours very truly,

s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

19

83

3615/ce

AO/14634/PS

9 May, 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter dated 23 April 1945 in which you enclose copy of a letter from your Minister of War to Land Forces Sub-Commission (ISMA) requesting that an additional 10,000 Carabinieri be authorized, and asking approval for a decree to accommodate this increase. I am happy to inform you that instructions have now been received from AFHQ that there is no objection to your Government adopting a decree to increase the strength of Carabinieri to 65,000.

This letter should be read in conjunction with my reply of this date in answer to your letter of 29 April 1945.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

13

3615/CC

82

1967

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

MAY 4 1945
cc 1045

SO To CC

Originator's Reference: FX 69806
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 031355B

Message Centre No: D/9541
Date Time Rec'd: MAY 031945B
Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG
TO: ALCOM ROME

~~SECRET~~

ACTION


SECRET.

Reur 6404 cite ACSCC.

1. We are as yet without reply from Combined Chiefs of Staff on our urgent request for authorization increase Carabinieri ceiling.
2. However, pending reply and action this Headquarters referred to in para 3 below, you may inform President of Council that there is no objection to Government adopting decree increase strength of Carabinieri to 65,000. It must be made clear that no commitment can now be made for the rations or clothing of this additional 10,000.
3. Without regard to final action by CCS, there is being urgently explored here the possibility of transferring ration basis from existing Italian units to Carabinieri. Final action on this must necessarily take some days.

DIST

ACTION: SO To Chief Commissioner
INFO: A/President
Executive Commissioner 2
CA Sec
Land Forces S/C
P.Safety S/C
File

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRIORITY

ALLIED COMMISSION ROME INFO 15 ARMY GROUP 8 ARMY, 5 ARMY

Carabinieri may be employed VENEZIA GIULIA only in cases where an Italian ministration is operating. In other instances Allied military personnel will be employed for duties as circumstances demand supervising local police where they are found functioning satisfactory.

Copy No 1 Action - Exec Comm
2 Info - A/Pres
3 Chief Comm
4 Pub Safety SC
5 CA Section
6 File

194

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

2nd May 1945.AIDE MEMOIR FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

1. In order to maintain law and order in Northern ITALY it is essential that an adequate police (CC.RR) force be made available. This can either be done by enlisting such CC.RR as can be found in the North or introducing an adequate force from Central and Southern ITALY into the North, or by a combination of these two methods. Initial reports indicate that few CC.RR can be found in the North and it will therefore probably be necessary to introduce a large force from Central and Southern ITALY.
2. We have planned to introduce 19,000 to be drawn from Central and Southern ITALY. We have asked for many months for permission to raise the CC.RR ceiling from 55,000 to 65,000. The Italian Government:
 - (a) wish to publish a decree raising the strength of the CC.RR;
 - (b) have represented that the withdrawal of 19,000 CC.RR from Central and Southern ITALY will jeopardise the maintenance of law and order in their territory.
3. It is essential, if Allied Military Government and the Italian Government are to maintain law and order, that vacancies for 10,000 CC.RR

1970

therefore probably be necessary to introduce a large force from Central and Southern ITALY.

2. We have planned to introduce 19,000 to be drawn from Central and Southern ITALY. We have asked for many months for permission to raise the CC.RR ceiling from 55,000 to 65,000. The Italian Government:

(a) wish to publish a decree raising the strength of the CC.RR;

(b) have represented that the withdrawal of 19,000

CC.RR from Central and Southern ITALY will jeopardise the maintenance of law and order in their territory.

3. It is essential, if Allied Military Government and the Italian Government are to maintain law and order, that vacancies for 10,000 CC.RR be made available at once in order that:

(a) such CC.RR as can be found in the North can be enrolled, fed and equipped;

(b) replacements can be made in the South.

4. As a result of the CCS ruling this can only be done by reducing the ceiling of the Italian Army proper. It is suggested that this be done forthwith, either by reducing the replacement percentage for the Gruppe Combatente, or reducing the numbers employed by Allied military services. It is submitted that in view of the present state of operations, either alternative is reasonable.

5. A most immediate decision is requested.

-2-

6. Cognate with the above it is requested that immediate attention be paid to the regrouping of the Italian Gruppe Combatente ^{to be} and Security Divisions in accordance with the recommendations made by the Italian Government and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission (in his role as Chief Civil Affairs Officer). These recommendations will depend largely on the decision made above and the resultant distribution of the CC.RR. It should be clearly understood that neither the Gruppe nor the Security Divisions can be used as policemen, which is the role of the CC.RR, but in the event of a shortage of CC.RR they would be required in certain areas to put down the disorder which would undoubtedly arise if the proper number of CC.RR are not made available. It is submitted that in the present state of operations the use of these Italian troops for the preservation of law and order may have to take precedence over their use as operational troops.

state of operations the use of these Italian troops for the preservation of law and order may have to take precedence over their use as operational troops.

(74)

AC/14601/17/3/PS

2 May. 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 23 April, 1945, and approve the temporary appointment of Colonel POLANI Ezio as Chief of Staff of the General Command of the Carabinieri.

I note that this appointment is in substitution for Col. DELLA CHIESA.

Yours very sincerely,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

10

(78)

2 May

3615/cc

Be assured, my dear Admiral, that my proposals are based on the characteristics of the present situation; not to take them in consideration might have serious consequences.

I feel sure that you will kindly examine them.

Yours very truly,

S. Ivanoe Bonomi

1317

(77)

Translation

C O P Y.

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 15014

Rome, 29 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

The request made by the Allied Commission to have other numerous contingents of Royal Carabinieri immediately destined to the provinces of North Italy places the Italian Government before insuperable difficulties.

As a matter of fact, contingents of Carabinieri amounting to 9650 men have already been withdrawn from the provinces of liberated Italy to be destined to the North.

The situation created in the P.S. Services by the withdrawal of these police troops is most difficult as I have already told you; for the lack of army units to destine to services of public order, and the special political conditions, as well as the presence of numerous armed groups in many provinces, and rural delinquency burden heavily the services of the public safety.

However, these 9650 men were given in the hope that the zeal of the contingents which remained at the disposal of the Italian Government would make up for their numeric deficiency, and that the Allied Commission wouldn't make any other request.

On the contrary, I have just been told that the Allied Commission has now asked for two more groups of Carabinieri, the first one of 3500 men and the second one of 5000 men to be ready to leave for the North.

Considering the situation which would be created by such a diminution of the forces at the disposal of the Italian Government, I have to point out that, should these detachments leave, the P.S. Authorities would no longer have the possibility of guaranteeing public order in the provinces and in the Capital itself.

I therefore consider that it is my duty to suggest that the Allied Commission should limit its present requests to 3500 men who, nevertheless would have to be left at the disposal of the Italian Government till May the 2nd, and that it shouldn't ask for the second contingent of 5000 Carabinieri.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e.

See 83

Q

36187/c

Ref/3606/33.

28 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 347 dated 25 April 1945 on the subject of the strength of the Carabinieri and kindred matters.

The points raised in the War Minister's letter which you enclosed call for examination by more than one Sub-Commission. Consideration is now being given to these matters and I will write to you again as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,

[s/ Henry W. Stone]

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Comm. (MILA)
Civil Affairs Section.

3615-1cc

76

A.F.H.Q. C-5

6404

28 April 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

72

PARA ONE PD URGENT REQUEST RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO PASS A
 DECREE INCREASING STRENGTH OF CARABINIERE TO FORMER CEILING OF SIX FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO PD
PAREN TO AFHQ C-5 FROM ALDOM GITE AC900 PAREN PD

PARA TWO PD IN HIS VIEW WITHDRAWAL NOW IN PROGRESS OF TWO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO FROM
 PRESENTLY LIBERATED ITALY TO NEW BATTLE ZONE MAKES FORCE REMAINING IN SOUTH WHOLLY IN-
 ADEQUATE TO COPE WITH LAW AND ORDER PD THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED IN HIS LETTER TO THE
 DANGER OF A RECURRENCE OF RECENT INCIDENT IN ROME AT TIME OF ESCAPE OF ROATTA WHEN
 POULAGE INVADED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND TO OTHER INCIDENTS IN PROVINCES AND STATED IT
 WAS ESSENTIAL TO INCREASE POLICE FORCES TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER AND FOR THE APPRE-
 HENSION OF OFFENDERS PD

PARA THREE PD ADDITIONAL NUMBERS REQUIRED WILL FORM TWELVE MOBILE BATTALIONS AND FOUR
 GROUP HEADQUARTERS PD

PARA FOUR PD THIS COMMISSION VERY STRONGLY SUPPORTS REQUEST AND CONSIDERS IT MOST
 UNWISE TO DENY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT RIGHT TO INCREASE THIS FORCE SO ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVA-
 TION OF LAW AND ORDER WHICH IS VITAL AT THIS PERIOD PD

Chief Commissioners

ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE, Rear Admiral

See 81

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
 CWO USA
 Asst Adjutant

75

3615/100

PAGE 2
Cable No. 6404

PARA FIVE PD UNDER PAR FOUR EIGHT SEVEN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER IN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY AND THEY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DISCHARGE THIS LIABILITY IF THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCES FOR THIS PURPOSE PD

PARA SIX PD MOREOVER UNDER TERMS OF PARAGRAPH TWO CHARLIE OF PAR FOUR EIGHT SEVEN ALLIED COMMISSION HAS ABANDONED THE PRACTICE OF APPROVING DECREES ENACTED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD

DISTRIBUTION

Public Safety
NMIA
Executive Commissioner
C A Section

13

75

AC/14601/53/PS

27 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of 20 April 1945, regarding the withdrawal of Carabinieri from the South of Italy to police the territory to be occupied in the North.

I attach hereto, as an Appendix, a list of the Carabinieri to be withdrawn from the Regions in occupied Italy. The number involved is approximately 20,000 Carabinieri, 4,000 of which are being moved North at the present time.

Your Excellency's assumption that 4,000 were being taken from Sicily is incorrect. 1,655 are scheduled to be withdrawn from Sicily, representing the figure in excess of the normal Sicilian strength. It is being arranged, moreover, that the Carabinieri from Sicily will be the last to be withdrawn.

I appreciate Your Excellency's remarks in regard to the preservation of law and order, but would point out that the ceiling of Carabinieri is at present fixed at 55,000 and the Force must be equally distributed over the whole of Italy. In this connection, very strong representations have been made to higher authority to have the ceiling increased to 65,000, which would, I hope, have the effect of giving a greater degree of security to the country.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Elmer W. Stone

MILROY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

REGIONAL COMMISSIONER VENEZIA REGION ADVANCED THROUGH EIGHTH ARMY
MAIN

6242

27 April 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

SUBJECT IS SHOULDER FLASH FOR CARABINIERI PD

PAREN TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER VENEZIA REGION ADVANCED THROUGH EIGHTH
ARMY MAIN FROM ALCON CITE ACPEF PAREN PD

PARA ONE PD AFHQ HAS DIRECTED THAT ALL CARABINIERI TAKEN IN TO
NEWLY LIBERATED TERRITORY MUST WEAR A SHOULDER FLASH TO DISTINGUISH
THEM FROM CARABINIERI FOUND ON THE GROUND PD

PARA TWO PD FLASH SHOULD BE OF RED CLOTH TWO INCHES BY ONE INCH
WITH THE LETTERS ABLE MIKE GEORGE IN BLACK THEREON PD

PARA THREE PD PLEASE ARRANGE URGENT FOR MANUFACTURE AND ISSUE
TO YOUR CARABINIERI PD

13

Public Safety S/C

365

F.J. Wilson Lt Col

NICHOLAS POMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst, Adjutant

73a

36157/CC

AG/14601/53/PS

27 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am in receipt of your letter of 19 April 1945 regarding the policing of territory in Northern Italy. Your Excellency's assumption that partisans would be employed as Agents of Public Security is erroneous.

The method of policing will be that the Carabinieri will be the first force to operate and that Public Security Agents, where found, will be employed on their normal duties thereafter. There is no restriction on the employment of Public Security Agents as their numbers are not limited as is the case with the Carabinieri. If, however, any of them are found to be unsuitable, due to political or other reasons, replacements will be called on from Rome to assume their duties in newly occupied territory.

Some confusion of ideas may have been caused by the suggestion made at Public Safety Conferences with your Commanding General of Carabinieri. It might be possible, for a temporary period, to treat Carabinieri found in Northern areas, and in excess of the present ceiling of 55,000, as partisans so that they could be fed and paid. If the ceiling is increased to 65,000 then these recovered Carabinieri could be taken on to the new strength.

Yours very truly,

[s] Ellery W. Stone

MILERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME.

ment should
be funded
G-5 without
delay, before
waiting for
LF S/L OCA
Sec to prepare
The replies to
questions by your
office — JMS

Exec. Committee
I think that
in addition to
the follow-up
will be to
an ArabIsraeli
strength, a
copy of PRC's
letter to attach -

THIS IS CC COPY.

CC

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/77/EC.

27 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army and Carabinieri.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCA).

1. Attached hereto is translation of letter from Prime Minister No. 347 dated 25 April 1945, together with its enclosure from the Minister of War, and copy of the acknowledgement.
2. Will you please prepare a reply to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 for signature by the Chief Commissioner.

sgt ES Morden
for Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

THIS IS CC COPY

APR 28 RECD

CC 1117

cc

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/78/EG.

27 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army and Carabinieri.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

- (72) a
1. Attached hereto is translation of letter from Prime Minister No. 347 dated 25 April 1945, together with its enclosure from the Minister of War, and copy of the acknowledgement.
 2. Will you please prepare a reply to paragraphs 1 and 2 for signature by the Chief Commissioner.
 3. It is suggested that with this reply should be combined also the reply to the Prime Minister's letter dated 23 April on the same subject.
- (72)

sgt ES Morden May
for Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

171

(72) c

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

347

CC 1117

APR 28 1945

Rome, 29 April 1945

My dear Admiral,

the maintenance of public order represents one of the most important problems for the interior safety of the State.

I therefore take the liberty of drawing your attention on the enclosed memorandum of the Minister of War and especially on paras 1 and 2 of the said memorandum.

The urgency to increase the numeric number of the Carabinieri is quite obvious. North Italy having to be garrisoned with about 10 thousand carabinieri, it is natural that the C Corps should have to be increased of identical forces.

Thus, request n. 2 is particularly important. We haven't enough safety troops, in Rome especially. Here, there is one battalion only, which, employed in guard service, can dispose of a few score of men only.

I trust that you, an old and trusted friend of Italy, will speak in favour of our request to the Allied Commission in which you have such an important situation.

Yours very truly,

S. I. Ronconi

Admiral Ellery A. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EC DISTRIBUTION - 27 Apr 45

Action : C A Section

Info : Chief Commr

Exec Commr

Land Forces S/C

e.o.

(72) a

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

Liaison Office

Rome, 23 April 1945

TO : His Ex. the President of the Council of Ministers

R O M E

SUBJECT : Military questions requiring urgent solution.

I expound to your Excellency, to have them forwarded to the allies, some of the main questions of a military character which require an urgent solution:

1) - INCREASE OF 10,000 CARABINIERE.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.F.H.-I. is of 25,000 men (of whom 1,800 are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the Kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 groupments) it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 65 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the interregional mobile ones.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, no army troops

to expand to your Excellency, to have them returned to the allies, some of the main questions of a military character which require an urgent solution:

1) - INCREASE OF 10,000 CARABINIERES.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.F.H.G. is of 25,000 men (of whom 1,800 are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the Kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 groupments) it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 60 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the interregional mobile ones.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, no army troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions for interior safety ('Calabria', 'Aosta', 'Sabaude' Divisions - 15 thousand men) are stationed in Sicily and Sardinia (only 600 men in Calabria to watch the plants).

It would be necessary to dispose of safety troops on the continent also, and particularly in the capital. To obtain this, the contingent which, for this category, is at present fixed to 15 thousand men, would have to be adequately increased by A.F.H.G., and above all, the formation of a safety division in ^{LAZIO} ~~Latium~~ would have to be authorized.

3) - GREATER CONSISTENCE OF THE TERRITORIAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The organs of the territorial, district and depot military commands fixed by A.F.H.G. are inadequate for the numerous, delicate and urgent functions which the said organs have to fulfil.

For instance, the districts can have an average of five men, only; the organization is completed with civilian personnel exclusively; in such conditions, all these organs cannot function well.

It must be remembered that many districts are also centres of mobilization for the units and are therefore burdened with the work which

72

INCL

- 2 -

such a function implies.

A.F.H.Q. would have to increase adequately the number of the personnel of the central and periphery administration which is at present fixed to 27 thousand men (1st category).

4) - MILITARY RATIONS

The allied control organs allot foodstuff rations according to the authorized forces and won't admit derogations for any motive whatever.

There are however, special situations which would require derogations, for instance:

- in favour of repatriated prisoners or interned soldiers, or soldiers who come back from other States, as long as they haven't been discharged;
 - in favour of sick or wounded soldiers who stay over 60 days in hospital (from the 1st day on, they get civilian rations);
 - in favour of travelling soldiers (those who start on a journey according to allied orders are only allowed to take two days rations, while the journey - because of the means of communications - often lasts several days);
and soldiers called under arms
 - in favour of draftees, ~~but they on which they present themselves to the districts (army rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);~~
- etc.
- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the allies and treated as such. The system must be revised: the motives are obvious and come from humanitarian considerations and from an understanding of reality; they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE BILLETAGE

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftees adequately would have a good moral effect on the country and for the Government.

It would also make it possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary - the draftees from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called under arms during the first period of their training.

allied orders are only allowed to be given by the means of communications - often lasts several days); because of the means of communications - often lasts several days); and soldiers called under arms in favour of draftees, sent them on which they present themselves to the draftees (army rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);

- etc.

- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the allies and treated as such. The system must be revised: the motives are obvious and come from humanitarian considerations and from an understanding of reality; they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE BUILDINGS.

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftees adequately would have a good moral effect on the Country and for the Government.

It would also make it possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary - the draftees from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called under arms during the first period of their training.

Only the allied side can solve this problem and leave at our disposal the necessary minimum of military buildings.

6) - REPARATION BUILDINGS 'CUNEO' & 'REGINA' ELEMENTS EMPLOYED IN EGYPT AS AUXILIARIES.

The troops of these two divisions, stationed in the Egean islands at the time of the armistice, did hard fighting against the Germans ever since September 9th, 1943, at the side of the Allies for the defence of these islands (the 'Cuneo' alone had about 400 dead and wounded in these actions. Overnumbered by the enemy, instead of surrendering, in agreement with the allied authorities, they reached Egypt through Turkey and Palestine; they were not allowed to carry on their fight against the Germans in other sectors and are being employed as auxiliary units in the dependence of the local English commands.

But, after having been at first considered as 'cobelligerents', the soldiers of the 'Cuneo' and of the 'Regina' (about 6500) were then to all effects placed by the British commands in the category of 'co-operating prisoners', though there had been nothing to cause such action to be taken.

(72) WCC
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- 3 -

It is necessary to :

- revoke this regulation, placing again these troops in the 'cobelligerent' category.
- repatriate them without delay.

I have expounded all these facts, for I know of your Excellency's wish to reconstruct the army, and I am sure you will intervene in favour of the solution of the above mentioned questions which are all of a fundamental and moral interest.

THE MINISTER

S. Casati

100

1992

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

File

(72)^a
1, 2, 3

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
336

CHIEF COMMR
CC 1000

APR 25 1945

Rome, 23 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

I send you a copy of the letter addressed by Minister Casati to C.F.S.C. - A.C. (M.M.I.A.) to obtain the Carabinieri Corps to be increased of ten thousand units.

From this letter you will learn the reasons which make it advisable to increase our police forces. With the occupation of the North, 9 thousand Carabinieri at least will have to be taken away from liberated Italy, while the conditions of Sicily prevent to diminish the forces which are scattered there.

I have already pointed out to you after the invasion of the Viminale - the very great need to increase the armed forces in the Capital. The Government cannot run the risk of being its offices invaded again, nor can it remain inactive any longer in front of the incidents which take place in the provinces and which have to remain unpunished because of the lack of police forces.

Will you kindly see that the request of my Minister of War is granted so that the decree may soon be issued.

I hope your answer will be favourable and I remain,

Yours sincerely,

S. I. Bonomi

E. C. DIST - 24 APR 45

ACTION: C.A. SECT (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMR

EX COMMR

LAND FORCES S/C

(WITHOUT ENCLOSURES)

Admiral tone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

72

3615/CC

Translation

War Department
Ufficio coordinamento

n. 102677/coord

Rome,

SUBJECT : Interior safety forces

TO : L.F.B.C. - A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

R O M E

As it is well known, the Italian military forces for interior safety are composed of the divisions of Interior Safety and the R.I.C.C. Corps.

The Interior Safety divisions are located in Sicily and Sardinia, where they are mostly used for guard duties; there are no safety units on the mainland (only 800 men in Calabria).

Up to now, the R.I.C.C. Corps was rather numerous, in liberated Italy, but is getting greatly reduced because of the numerous groups which are being organized for the requirements of the part of Italy which is being liberated (9,000 carabinieri at least are ready; another 10,000 are getting prepared).

When Italy will be entirely liberated, and especially during the critical period of the liberation and immediately afterwards, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will prove to be very scarce for the requirements of local safety (units for territorial service) and will prove insufficient for the requirements of interregional safety (mobile units).

Foreseeing these requirements, the general command of the R.I.C.C. has been pointing out to the competent organs of A.C. the necessity of raising the force of the corps from 55,000 to 65,000 men; in this way, 12 battalions (4 groupments) would be constituted; they would be mobile and might be transported from one region to another according to particular safety requirements.

I think this increase of force, and the ensuing constitution of mobile battalions are essential elements for the interior safety of the country, at the side of the Allied operating units.

As this is no longer a matter of plain military police, I forward a copy of the draft of the decree for the re-organization of the Corps, which, after obtaining the consent of the Allies, I mean to propose to the Council of Ministers, and I ask for the kind interest of the Mission, which always deal promptly with all fundamental problems.

THE MINISTER

M. A. Casati

1302

(72) e.c.

Translation

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

SUBJECT: Draft of a Regency Decree relative to the organic force and regulations of the Royal Carabineers.

The present regulations, sanctioned by laws issued on this subject and still officially in force, though they have in fact been modified for essential requirements, foresee that the RR.CC.Corps must face the various requirements with a force of 22,000 men (excluding the officers and the soldiers doing service in the colonies, or at the various Ministries and dependent organizations) at its disposal.

This force, according to the above mentioned regulations, should be divided between :

- a) - A General Command
- b) - Three Division Commands
- c) - Six Brigade Commands
- d) - A Central School
- e) - Twenty Territorial Legions
- f) - A Legion of Cadets
- g) - A Band of the Corps
- h) - Four Battalions
- i) - A Cavalry Group
- l) - A Squadron of Carabineers Guards of the King.

Experience has proved that to face the requirements, which are sometimes urgent, imposed by reasons of public order, the various commands, through lack of manpower, had to get the required personnel from the stations, not excluding the rural ones.

As the stations themselves, especially those of the periphery, have a personnel strictly limited to the requirements, the result was that they were sometimes reduced to the state of sheer reference points, which could, what is more, easily be submerged in case of trouble on a large scale, or in case of trouble brewing up simultaneously in various parts of the Kingdom.

Before fascism, the Corps could rely on eight mobile battalions, thanks to which - if only in part - it was able to face the various requirements without troubling the normal functioning of the rural stations, but the past regime thought among other things, that it could also reduce this Corps, so that, in fact, in determined periods, the said stations lived an ephemeral life, among difficulties of all sorts, caused by the lack of personnel, and by the requirements of the

- c) - Six Brigade Commands
- d) - A Central School
- e) - Twenty Territorial Legions
- f) - A Legion of Cadets
- g) - A Band of the Corps
- h) - Four Battalions
- i) - A Cavalry Group
- j) - A Squadron of Carabineers Guards of the King.

Experience has proved that to face the requirements, which are sometimes urgent, imposed by reasons of public order, the various commands, through lack of manpower, had to get the required personnel from the stations, not excluding the rural ones.

As the stations themselves, especially those of the periphery, have a personnel strictly limited to the requirements, the result was that they were sometimes reduced to the state of sheer reference points, which could, what is more, easily be submerged in case of trouble on a large scale, or in case of trouble brewing up simultaneously in various parts of the kingdom.

Before fascism, the Corps could rely on eight mobile battalions, thanks to which - if only in part - it was able to face the various requirements without troubling the normal functioning of the rural stations, but the past regime thought among other things, that it could also reduce this Corps, so that, in fact, in determined periods, the said stations lived an ephemeral life, among difficulties of all sorts, caused by the lack of personnel, and by the requirements of the service which had to be met in the interest of the population.

To solve the problem in a satisfactory, practical and definitive way, and in the belief that the organization of the territorial Corps - which is, as we have already said, strictly proportioned to the requirements - ought to remain practically unchanged, I emphasize the need:

- a) of increasing the organic force of the Royal Carabineers Corps, bringing it to 65,000 men (officers included);
- b) of making use of the men who will not be needed for strictly territorial requirements to form 12 mobile battalions and 4 Battalions Groupements Commands, the latter entirely autonomous and quite independent from the legions.

I therefore prepared the enclosed draft to a Regency Decree which shows the particulars of the above mentioned modifications, and the new organic characteristic which would in this case be assumed by the Carabineers Corps, and I submit it to your approval.

THE MINISTER

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UMBERTO DI SAVOIA
PRINCE OF PIEMONTE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF I.T.
KINGDOM

By the Authority invested in us,

Considered the R.D.L. 1 February 1920, n. 128 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D. 30 December 1923, n. 2986 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D. 2 April 1925, n. 381 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D.L. 16 May 1925, n. 895 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D. 26 July 1929, n. 1430 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D.L. 26 October 1939, n. 2002 and successive modifications;
Considered Law 9 May 1940, n. 368 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.L.D. 30 October 1943, n. 2/B;
Considered the Regency Decree 29 June 1944, n. 191;
On the proposal of the Minister of War in agreement with the Ministers of
the Interior and of Treasury,

We have sanctioned and promulgated what follows:

Art. 1

The organic force of the Carabinieri Corps will be of 65,000 men, including
the officers.

Art. 2

In this force are not to be included the soldiers who might have to do
service in the colonies or at the various Ministries and dependent organs.

Art. 3

The Royal Carabinieri Corps includes:

- 1 General Command
- Three Division Commands;
- Six Brigade Commands;
- 21 Territorial Legion Commands;
- 1 Central School;
- 1 Carabinieri Pupils Legion
- 4 Groups of Commands of Mobile Battalions;
- 12 mobile Battalions

Depending from the R.R.C.C. Legion of Rome Territorial, it also includes

Art. 1

The organic force of the Carabinieri Corps will be of 69,000 men, including the officers.

Art. 2

In this force are not to be included the soldiers who might have to do service in the colonies or at the various Ministries and dependent organs.

Art. 3

The Royal Carabinieri Corps includes:

- 1 General Command
- Three Division Commands;
- Six Brigade Commands;
- 21 Territorial Legion Commands;
- 1 Central School;
- 1 Carabinieri Pupils Legion
- 4 Groupment Commands of Mobile Battalions;
- 12 Mobile Battalions

Depending from the R.R.C.C. Legion of Rome Territorial, it also includes

- 1 R.R.C.C. Squadron;
- 1 Squadron of King's Guards
- 1 Band of the R.R.C.C. Corps.

Art. 4

The groupment commands of mobile battalions mentioned in the former article will have their seat in the towns of: Milan, Florence, Rome, Naples, and will have in their dependence the mobile battalions of:

MILAN: Milan - Turin - Genoa - Trieste;

FLORENCE: Florence, - Bologna - Ancona;

ROME: Rome - Cagliari;

NAPLES: Naples - Bari - Palermo.

Art. 5

The organic formation of the units mentioned in art. 3 are fixed by the enclosed gradual and numerical tables.

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- 2 -

Art. 6

The groupment commands of mobile battalions will depend on the Brigade commands in which seat they will happen to find themselves.

Art. 7

The stations are commanded by non-commissioned officers of various ranks and by first class privates empowered to do so.

Art. 8

The present Decree will be in force on the day of its publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of the Kingdom.

We order those it may concern to respect the present Decree and see that it is respected as State law.

Rome,1945

2000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Rome,1945

1800

E.O.

AL

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
n. 338

CHIEF COMMR

CC 1105
APR 25 1945

Rome, 25 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

In substitution of Col. Dalla Chiesa, we mean
to appoint temporarily Col. Poiani Ezio as Chief of staff
of the General Command of the RR. CC.

Will you kindly let me know whether there is any ob-
jection to this appointment on the part of the Allied Com-
mission.

Yours very truly,

a. l. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
r o m e

E.C. DIST-25 APR 45

ACTION : C. A. SECT

INFO : CHIEF COMMR

EXEC COMMR

LAND FORCES S/C

e.c.

1358

(71)

7

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

Chief Comm
CC 1730
APR 20 1945

Rome, 20 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

I have been told that 1,000 carabinieri are soon to be taken away from Sicily for the formation of contingents for the provinces of North Italy.

All the M.R.C.C. legions in liberated Italy are contributing to the formation of these contingents, and their organs will therefore be considerably diminished.

Now, generally speaking, ^{if} this is a cause of great preoccupation to all the authorities which have to maintain public order, the reduction of M.R.C.C. forces in Sicily, as you can easily understand, is a motive of special preoccupation.

Last January already, the police forces proved quite inadequate to cope with the numerous and simultaneous centres of rebellion; should new forces be now removed, nobody could guarantee the maintenance of public order in case of more trouble.

Considering this, I think it necessary for the police forces located in Sicily not to be diminished of a single man, and I want to draw your personal attention on this point, for I feel certain that because of your deep knowledge of our problems, you will certainly take it in due consideration.

Sec 74
Sincerely yours,

S. I. Bonomi

3615/11C
(X 3601/11C)
OK

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Admiral Ellery W. Spore
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission
R o m e

70a
e.o.

E C DIST - 20 APR 45

ACTION: E A Section
INFO: Chief Comm
EX COMM

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel : 473201

Ref/3626/78/EC.

3 May 1945

SUBJECT : Reorganization of CC.RR and other
police forces in Italy.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ.

With reference to our letter 3626/EC dated 14 April
45, a reply to para 2 would be appreciated.

For the Chief Commissioner :

[Signature]
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

3615/CC

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

CC 1500
APR 16 RECD

3626/KC

NEP/mrd
14 April 1945

Subject: Reorganization of the Carabinieri and other
Police Forces of Italy

To : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

1. The matter of the reorganization of the Italian Carabinieri is before the Commission. I enclose a report on this subject matter by a committee consisting of Colonel Poletti, Colonel Pidsley and Colonel Chapman, together with a letter of comment by General Browning.

2. The position of the Carabinieri in the Italian Governmental structure has been that its organization, supply, training and discipline have been a responsibility of the Ministry of War, whereas operationally they have been placed under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. Before proceeding to the discussion of this matter with the Prime Minister, I should welcome your assurance that placing corresponding responsibilities on the Public Safety Subcommittee and Land Forces Subcommittee (PMIA) would not be inconsistent with any directives that have been issued to Land Forces Subcommittee (PMIA) and in particular, AFHQ letter AG 891711/169 GCT-0 of 16 Nov 44.

For the Chief Commissioner:

183

sgt N.E. Fiske

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel

Acting Executive Commissioner

Encl.- R/0010, 7 April 45.
A.018, 11 April 45.

SECRET

C O P Y
 HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION S E C R E T
 APO 394
 Office of the Executive Commissioner

SUBJECT: Report on Reorganization of the Carabinieri
and other Police Forces of ITALY.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
 (M.M.I.A.)

A.018

11 April 45

TO : Executive Commissioner, A.C.

1. I have now had more time to "digest" the above report, which I had only time to read through quickly when the draft was shown to me.
2. Though undoubtedly some kind of reorganization of the Police Forces of ITALY is indicated and there is much in the report that I agree with, I would like to make the following observations, which I feel I must make before this matter goes further:-

(a) The remarks on "Specific Recommendation (c)" are liable to be misunderstood. MMIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.RR. This is specifically provided for in para 24 of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 Nov 44, which states, "The Carabinieri, except those units within Army Formations in role of Military Police, are a civil police organization under the Command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C." The onus of responsibility is thus laid distinctly on the Public Safety Sub-Commission, with MMIA as the supply agent. Any alteration in this subdivision of duties would have to be effected by AFHQ altering the above paragraph of its directive.

(b) Though having certain advantages, the committee's proposals would in fact merely transfer some of the existing responsibilities from Public Safety to Land Forces Sub Commission with further divided control.

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(b) Though having certain advantages, the committee's proposals would in fact merely transfer some of the existing responsibilities from Public Safety to Land Forces Sub Commission with further divided control.

(c) The real answer would seem to be to have the whole command, training and administration of both the State (CC.RR.) and local police forces under one head. Otherwise the two police forces cannot be fully integrated. As in ENGLAND, I think the Police Forces should be separate from the Army and under the Minister of the Interior. This of course would mean a radical break with Italian tradition, though that is not necessarily a point against it. It however would correspond with the existing set-up, where Public Safety Sub-Commission (the counterpart of the Minister of the Interior) should do the job, MMIA merely being the supply agent owing to the special supply conditions obtaining in this theatre in this time of war.

(d) My representative on the Committee stated before it that MMIA had neither the time or the staff at present to take on any large extra commitment, particularly with the uncharted problems of NORTH ITALY before us. Nor do I think would AFHQ agree of a similar situation "vis a vis" Prisoners of War.

s/ L. Browning

Major General
M.M.I.A.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 21
9th April 1945

K 140

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION
OF VENEZIA GIULIA

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.
2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.
3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC(P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

- (a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.
- (b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited.
(Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).
- (b) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These personnel would be Officer-in-

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- (b) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port.)

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

- (a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (b) Authorise, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paragraphs 4 (a), (b) and (c) above.

/s/ J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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AFHQ GEORGE FIVE

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11 Apr

O/S PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD UNDERSTAND SIGNAL FROM CHARLIE CHARLIE SUGAR REFUSES INCREASE OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER CEILING AND RECOMMENDS THAT NUMBERS FOR NORTHERN ITALY BE INCREASED BY TRANSFER OF FURTHER CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER FROM THE SOUTH TO BE REPLACED BY RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL CIVIL POLICE PD

PAREN TO AFHQ GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ, ALCOM SITE ACFCC PAREN

PARA TWO PD SITUATION NOW IS THAT NINE SIX ZERO ZERO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER ARE ALREADY BEING WITHDRAWN FROM LIBERATED ITALY FOR THE NORTH PD THIS LEAVES THE BARREST MINIMUM OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER IN THE SOUTH AND IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO WITHDRAW MORE WITHOUT GRAVEST RISK OF OUTBREAK OF FURTHER CIVIL DISORDER WHICH MAY AFFECT ALLIED WAR EFFORT PD INDEED CMA IN VIEW OF RECENT DISORDERS CMA MANY INFORMED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT LIMIT HAS BEEN PASSED PD

PARA THREE PD RECRUITMENT OF CIVIL POLICE TO REPLACE ANY FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER IMPOSSIBLE AND IMPRACTICABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS COLON ABLE PD THE PERIOD REQUIRED FOR SELECTION CMA TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF SUCH A FORCE WOULD RENDER IT INEFFECTIVE DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD PD BAKTER PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NO MEANS OF SUPPLYING UNIFORMS CMA ARMS OR EQUIPMENT PD CHARLIE PD SUCH A FORCE AT THIS BIRTH WOULD LACK MORALE GATHERED FROM EXPERIENCE AND ALSO RESPECT OF TRUCULENT SECTION OF POPULATION PD

PARA FOUR PD REQUEST URGENT RECONSIDERATION OF POSITION

INT DISTRIBUTION :-
Exec Comm
Pub Safety S/C
Land Forces S/C

(67) Civil Affairs Section

525

G.R. UPJOHN Brig

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

947.

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P
YSECRETREPORT ON REORGANIZATION OF THE CARABINIERI
AND OTHER POLICE FORCES OF ITALY

R/0010

7 April 1945

INTRODUCTION

The Committee is sensitive to the realization that the most basic need for the achievement and maintenance of a sound democracy in Italy is law and order. During these months, even with the presence of thousands of Allied military personnel, law and order has been weak. Progress has been made in the moral and physical rehabilitation of the police forces, but the progress has been slow. Certainly, the progress has not kept pace with the economic and social forces which foment crimes of violence and political disorders.

The Committee believes that the United States and Great Britain are genuinely interested in helping Italy to establish itself as a sound democracy. Hence, our two nations must be vitally concerned with the improvement of the Carabinieri and other police forces in Italy. Only if our two nations are not interested in the internal peace of Italy at the cessation of military operations can the following recommendations be ignored.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. "Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?"

The Committee answers that it is desirable and feasible. There is no explicit inhibition in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN 487). There is ample latitude in the directive to permit the Allied Commission to assume a live interest and to undertake concrete steps to assist in the reorganization of the Carabinieri and the other police forces. In paragraph one of the directive, a specific reservation of the powers contained in the Armistice and surrender instrument is made for any case in which military needs are involved. Inasmuch as the Carabinieri are inextricably linked with the Italian War Ministry, sound basis can be found for any action on the part of the Allied Commission. Paragraph 3(b) of the directive does not prevent the effectuation of any of the recommendations made by the Committee. The directive contemplates that law and order is fundamental that the police forces of Italy, both in Italian Government territory and AMG territory, are entwined and that accordingly the Public Safety Sub-Commission has a wide scope of authority and responsibility. There is nothing in the directive which pares the authority and responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

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The Committee realizes that a heavy strain will be placed on all police forces as soon as Northern Italy is liberated. However, it is the judgment of the Committee that a substantial program of reorganization can be instituted and carried out even in the face of the situation that will develop in the North. The Committee feels that it is not too late for the Allied Commission to undertake the steps proposed in this report.

- b. "If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about."

The Committee recommends that the Chief Commissioner confer with the Prime Minister with the purpose of presenting to the Prime Minister the Allied Commission's appraisal of the weakness of the Carabinieri and of the other police forces and the great need of their revitalization. The Chief Commissioner should ask the Prime Minister to have the Italian Government, and not merely the Minister of War or the Minister of the Interior or the Head of the Carabinieri, prepare and submit to the Allied Commission a concrete plan for the reorganization of the Italian police forces. The concrete plan should be discussed, formulated, and approved by the entire cabinet, and be submitted to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper. One reason for this is to obtain in advance the agreement of the various ministers representing different political attitudes. Once the cabinet plan is submitted, the Allied Commission can take appropriate action.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission has, of course, been having conferences with General Brunetti, the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and he is at the moment engaged in the preparation of a plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri. The General intends to submit his plan to the Public Safety Subcommission. The Committee feels that, as indicated above, any plan submitted should come to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper.

The Chief Commissioner should also point out to the Prime Minister that the cabinet paper ought to set forth not merely proposals of structural changes of the police forces, which may well be the temptation since it is the simplest task, but the paper should contain definite recommendations for the recruiting of new personnel, replacement of ineffective personnel, training, administration and discipline, and also moral strengthening of the police. The cabinet paper should likewise contain definite recommendations on the demarcation of responsibility between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Interior with respect to training, administration and discipline, and particularly operational direction of the police forces. The Committee believes that the basic weakness of practical police operation in Italy is the divided responsibility. Technically, the Questura has authority operationally over the Carabinieri, but

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practically it is most difficult to achieve. The Italian Cabinet ought to focus its attention on this basic weakness of Italian law enforcement.

The cabinet paper should also set forth specifically to what extent the Italian Government desires the assistance, both as regards personnel and equipment, of the Allied Commission and, also, whether it believes that a special commission of Allied experts - Allied Police Mission - would be desired by the Italian Government.

- c. "If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission or the Public Safety Sub-Commission?"

The Committee believes that the respective responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission should correspond exactly with those of the War Ministry and Ministry of the Interior of the Italian Government. In the performance of the functions of these two Commissions, this line has not been followed in the past. As a result, many tasks which should have been performed have been totally ignored through no fault of either sub-commission.

The Chief Commissioner should issue a directive defining the responsibilities of the two sub-commissions in accordance with the recommendations made above. In other words, this directive would make the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri a responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. The Public Safety Sub-Commission would be concerned only with the operational performance of the Carabinieri as a law enforcement agency. For instance, up to the present time there has not really been an effective job done by either sub-commission in following through and inspecting what occurs in the clothing, equipping, arming, and feeding of the Carabinieri. The Land Forces Sub-Commission has not undertaken the task as it does with regular units of the Army. On the other hand, the Public Safety Sub-Commission has not assumed the task because it lacks the authority inasmuch as those matters come under the authority of the Italian Ministry of War. And with this Ministry, the Public Safety Sub-Commission does not deal.

Once the Italian Government submits its concrete plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces, and a new line of demarcation is proposed by the Italian Government between its Ministry of War and its Ministry of the Interior, the Allied Commission in its work can make corresponding changes with respect to the duties of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission.

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- d. "What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri."

The Committee is of the opinion that the reorganization of the members of the Guardia Nazionale, formerly the Agents of Public Security, is more urgent and vital even than that of the Carabinieri. The Guardia Nazionale has proven in practical operation to be a weak and ineffective force. The Committee recommends that the Chief Commissioner ask the Italian Government to include in a cabinet paper a plan for the reorganization of the Guardia Nazionale. The Committee sees no reason why a reorganization of both the Carabinieri and Guardia Nazionale cannot proceed simultaneously. The Committee makes no recommendation in respect to the Royal Guardia di Finanza or the Guardia Forestale.

s/ Charles Poletti, Col.
s/ W. Pidsley, Col.
s/ John W. Chapman, Col.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3626/52/EG.

NEF/mrd
3 April 1945

Subject: Appointment of Heads of Carabinieri in the North

To : Vice President, Civil Affairs Section

At a recent meeting of the Prime Minister with the Regional Commissioners of Northern Regions, the question was raised as to the appointment of Heads of the Carabinieri in the North. It is presumed that the organization of the Carabinieri in the North will follow the former Italian pattern of territorial legions. Will you let me know what this territorial organization is and how it is proposed that the leaders be selected and appointed. Also, to what extent individuals have already been designated.

NORMAN E. FISKE

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel

Acting Executive Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

b.b.

Ref: 3626/48/AC

30 March 1945

Memorandum:

1. A committee is appointed consisting of the following officers, to meet at the call of the Chairman thereof, for the purpose of examining the question of reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces.

Colonel Charles Poletti - Chairman
Colonel John W. Chapman
Colonel W. G. Pidsley

2. The committee, in reporting its recommendations, will consider the following:

a. Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?

b. If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about.

c. If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Subcommittee or the Public Safety Subcommittee.

d. What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri.

3. The committee will consider this matter as highly confidential and urgent. A report by 5 April is desired.

By command of Rear Admiral STONE:

Morgan E. Fiske
MORGAN E. FISKE

Colonel
Acting Executive Commissioner

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HEADQUARTERS ARMED COMMISSION

AFD 294

Office of the Executive Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

Colonel Charles Colotti, LAMC-SEKLA Region.
 " John W. Chapman, Public Safety Sub-Commission.
 " W.G. Pridley, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA)
 Civil Affairs Section.
 Public Safety Sub-Commission.

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JAQ/hjp

CC 3615

29 March 1945

MEMO TO: Civil Affairs Section, Hq A.C.
(Attention: Col. Cripps)

1. A letter from Sig. Bonomi to the Chief Commissioner, No. 258 (Presidency of the Council of Ministers) of 26 March 1945, on the subject of improvements in the Police Force, was passed for action to Civil Affairs Section on the 27th of March.

2. This letter begins "In accordance with your kind request," and it should be explained that these words refer to a personal conversation between the Prime Minister and Admiral Stone.

3. The Chief Commissioner suggests that if the Poletti Committee on CC.RR. has been appointed then Bonomi's letter and its attachment might be included for consideration by the Committee under its terms of reference.

J. A. Quayle
J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

cc: EXEC. COMMR
CC FILES

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1. Major Q -
1. Yes.
 2. Has EC apptd the Politi Committee on CIPR?
 3. The attached might be included for consideration under its terms of referral 29/3 9/45
-

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Admiral

Could you tell me if
this is some matter which
you discussed with
Barani when he came to
visit you?

Q
28.3.45

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
2,8

Rome, 20 March 1945

Dear Admiral,

In accordance with your kind request, I enclose a note showing the action and means required to reinforce without delay the Police Forces; this is more than ever urgent nowadays, since the Allied Force left the greater part of the administration of the liberated provinces to the responsibility of the Italian Government, and also because public order will be faced with difficult times when North Italy will be liberated..

Trusting in the kind interest of the Allied Commission, I thank you and remain,

Yours truly,

G. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery A. Stone
Chief of the Allied Commission
R o m e

G.C.

EC DIST - 27 MAR.

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ACTION: CA SEC

INFO: CHIEF COMINT

: LEE COMINT

CHIEF COMINT
MAR 22 1945
CC.804

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Translation

SANITARY SUPPLIES AND RELIEF

The fact of treating differently the RR. CC. Corps and the P.S. Guardia Corps (and the Royal Guardia di Finanza) is a cause of trouble and dissatisfaction which is prejudicial to the collaboration between the Police Forces.

In fact, because of the regulation putting these last Forces on civilian rations, P.S. Guards (and the Guardia di Finanza) get a food ration which is considerably inferior in quantity as well as in quality to that which is allotted to the RR. CC.

The same rule established that the P.S. Guardia are not admitted (in opposition to what was formerly done) in military nursing homes nor are they entitled to the medicines supplied by the military authorities, which means that they have got to go to civilian hospitals which do not always have free beds, and which, as it is well known, dispose of very few means; civilian patients can make up for these deficiencies with what they get from their families, but the Guardia, especially the unmarried ones, find themselves in a state of inferiority. As for the medicines, they have to buy them on the market, where they are expensive.

It is clear that all that this difference of treatment has an influence on the moral of the Guardia, and hurts their pride for they know they are exposed to the same dangers and to the same responsibilities.

It must also be noted that the oats and fodder rations of the horses of the horse guards have been greatly reduced and are now quite insufficient, so that it was necessary to take special action to prevent their loss.

BARRACKS

It is indispensable that the P.S. units should get barracks, this for discipline as well as for their employment. Not only in Rome, but everywhere else, the Guards live isolatedly outside the barracks, without the necessary surveillance and military discipline, and in an emergency, it is difficult to collect the forces which are to be employed. These inconveniences are greater in Rome. It is therefore most important that in Rome, large barracks should be put at the disposal of the P.S. Guardia; these barracks ought to have at least two thousand beds, and constitute the nucleus of the police forces and the Guardia ought to be able to get trained and militarized there.

It is also necessary that one at least of the Viminale buildings, which are at present occupied by the Allies, should be given back, to be turned into barracks again for the unit which is on duty in the Interior Department. It is also ne-

the moral of the Guardia, and hurts their pride for they know they are exposed to the same dangers and to the same responsibilities.

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It is also necessary that one at least of the Viminale buildings, which are at present occupied by the Allies, should be given back, to be turned into barracks again for the unit which is on duty in the Interior Department. It is also necessary that the Caserta Police School premises, (at present occupied by the British Navy), should be given back; they are indispensable for the re-aperture of the School for non commissioned officers for which we have no premises.

BARRACKS EQUIPMENT

The construction of camp beds presents great difficulties; we require at least two thousand of them for Rome only.

WEAPONS

At present, the P.S. Guardia's armament is not complete. For a force of about 24,000 men between the present effective and those who will be enrolled in the railroad police which is being formed, to obtain an equipment which will enable to employ all the units, in such a way that they would all be armed at the same time, the following items are required:

Guns, mod. 91, with bayonet, cal. 6,5	n.	11.000 -
Automatic Beretta guns cal. 9		9.000 -
Automatic Beretta pistols, cal. 9		11.000 -
Hand grenade		5.000 -
Cartridges for mod. 91 guns, cal 6,5		100.000 -

Cartridges for Beretta pistol cal. 9	n.	250.000 -
Cartridges for Breda automatic gun n. 37, cal. 8		100.000 -
C " " " n. 30, cal. 6,50		200.000 -

Also indispensable:

Lacrymators	10.000 -
'Sfollagenti'	15.000 -

The equipment problem is urgent for nothing is more demoralizing for Police agents than knowing that the citizens are better armed than they are.

CLOTHING

To dress in uniform ten thousand Guardis only, the clothing requirement would be the following:

Cloth uniforms (material, lining, sewing material, buttons)	n.	12.000 -
Coats (with material, etc)		6.000 -
Waterproofs		10.000 -
Short waterproof coats (material, etc) for cyclists		700 -
Waterproof uniforms for motorcycle drivers		600 -
Leather jackets for drivers and motorcycle drivers		8.000 -
Spolverini (material)		600 -
Coats for riding agents (material, etc.)		300 -
Cloth caps		8.000 -
Cloth hats		8.000 -
Linen hats		10.000 -
Pairs of shoes (plus top boots and leggings in the proportion of 1/3)		15.000 -
Leggings (bands)		8.000 -
Grey-green shirts		25.000 -
Linen shorts		25.000 -
Woollen sweaters		25.000 -
Sweaters and shorts for gym.		25.000 -
Belts		25.000 -
Stockings		50.000 -
Handkerchiefs		50.000 -
Thick sweaters for cyclists and motorcycle drivers		700 -
Black leather belts		10.000 -
Trousers belts		10.000 -
Sheets (pairs)		20.000 -

The material, lining, buttons, sewing material, leather, etc. required to make the above mentioned pieces of clothing should therefore be supplied.

Waterproof uniforms for drivers	600 -
Leather jackets for drivers and motorbicycle drivers	300 -
Spolverini (material)	8.000 -
Coats for riding agents (material, etc.)	8.000 -
Cloth caps	10.000 -
Cloth hats	
Linen hats	
Pairs of shoes (plus top boots and leggings in the proportion of 1/2)	15.000 -
Leggings (bands)	8.000 -
Grey-green shirts	25.000 -
Linen shorts	25.000 -
Woolen sweaters	25.000 -
Sweaters and shorts for gym.	25.000 -
Bolts	50.000 -
Stockings	50.000 -
Handkerchiefs	700 -
Thick sweaters for cyclists and motorbicycle drivers	10.000 -
Black leather belts	10.000 -
Trousers belts	
Sheets (pairs)	20.000 -

The material, lining, buttons, sewing material, leather, etc. required to make the above mentioned pieces of clothing should therefore be supplied.

BICYCLES AND MOTORBICYCLES

As the bicycles and motorbicycles were damaged or requisitioned by the nazi-fascists, and as the manufactures which made them are closed, the P.S. Guardia Corps hasn't got these vehicles which are indispensable for police operations. A hundred motorbicycles and a thousand bicycles are therefore required as well as an adequate number of tyres.

VEHICLES

The problem of vehicles is most serious and urgent, the more so as the Allies go on requisitioning. From all the queature, especially from those of Sicily and Sardinia, we hear that the necessary vehicles are almost entirely lacking for police operations, as well as for the requirements of the various units.

To supply vehicles and accessories, tyres especially, is now impossible for they cannot be bought on the market. The police units cannot therefore perform the necessary operations, especially in Sicily, Sardinia, and Calabria, where it is obviously necessary to curb dangerous manifestations of banditism which require rapid movements of forces.

before long To avoid all police activity coming to an end/outside small inhabited centres and even inside large inhabited centres, it is therefore necessary for three trucks for troop transport, and a car for functionaries to be allotted to every questura of small importance. As for the more important questure, like those of Catania, Palermo, Messina, Reggio Calabria, Naples, Bari, Rome, Cagliari, Ancona, Florence, the allotment should be much greater, in accordance with the relative populations.

In Rome, it is also necessary that the Allied Authorities should hand over the Via Tommaso Campanella Pool, which is the only organization for the custody, maintenance and repairing of vehicles.

This is all the more necessary because of the fact that numerous armed cars are being repaired and put at the disposal of the police; these cars require a special maintenance.

An adequate allotment of tyres, which are now impossible to find on the market, is required for the functioning of the numerous vehicles in the provinces as well as in the Capital.

We point out that the immediate requirements would be covered, should the Allies derequisition the vehicles requisitioned from the Italian Government, as long as these vehicles are in good conditions.

FUEL AND LUBRICATOR

At present, the Rome police gets a monthly allotment of a hundred liters oil for each of its vehicles; this is quite inadequate for the requirements of the units and offices. A stock of oil and lubricators ought to be constituted to enable to face the unforeseen requirements of police operations. -

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(63)

SECRET.Ref: 3626/42/EC.19th March 1945.Chief Commissioner.

1. Some weeks ago I addressed you on the subject of the inefficiency of the CC.RR and gave as my opinion that we, the Allies, might perhaps have helped more in the past and might yet do so in the future in the way of training the CC.RR and other police agencies in their duties. Discussions with VP, CA Section and the Director of the Public Safety Sub-Commission led us nowhere and the matter dropped. (The paragraphs below are not intended to level criticism at the Public Safety Sub-Commission).

2. The contents of the whole of this file (ROAFTA case) compel me to bring the matter to your notice again. As the VP, CA Section comments on the report on the Viminale incident "the inefficiency is appalling". This has been proved repeatedly and in my opinion the time has come when, at the expense of going outside the terms of the directive, we must take action.

3. In the first place the CC.RR need much improvement (it is true they were not concerned in the Viminale case). The Italian Army has resuscitated itself, and to a certain extent redeemed itself by efficient work in the rear areas and adequate conduct in battle. There are many weaknesses but the force is a going concern.

4. The CC.RR, part of the Army, have not achieved the same success. True their task has been more difficult: their priority in receiving equipment, etc., lower: their training more complex. But we should, I think, ask ourselves whether our treatment of the Force has been successful: whether we have infused it with the degree of efficiency and enthusiasm which is apparent in the Italian Army. If we find that our treatment has been at fault we should find a new method.

5. I believe we have been at fault: that we have fallen between two stools: that we have not handled the CC.RR vigorously enough in AMG and have dropped the reins too hastily. Some of these omissions may be laid at the door of Allied policy. But the result is what we read in such files as the ROAFTA case.

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6. I submit two alternative remedies:

(a) We could hand over the training, equipping and general resuscitation of the CC.RR to the Ministry of War and Land Forces Sub-Commission (to whom one or two officers of the Public Safety Sub-Commission might be attached). In this way they would be assured equal treatment with the rest of the Italian Army: would enjoy the same regard from the Land Forces Sub-Commission and would greatly benefit therefrom. Moreover, the Land Forces Sub-Commission in its capacity as MILIA transmits SACRED's ORDERS to the Italian Army, in no uncertain terms, and sees that they are carried out. They are in fact (in this sense) a Military Mission.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission would then concern itself with (i) the other police agencies; (ii) the location of the CC.RR in accordance with general public safety requirements.

(b) We could persuade the Italian Government to accept and set up an Allied Police Mission for the immediate reorganisation of the Police Forces of the country including the CC.RR. This Mission would have the authority to operate in an executive manner in Italian

-2-

Government as well as AMG territory, insofar as the organisation and functions of the Police Forces were concerned. (A Police Mission has recently been set up in GREECE, we might well follow the same lines).

7. Without complacency I am satisfied with much of our work in AC but I feel that we must share with the Italian Government the onus of the existing inefficiency of the Police Forces and it is our duty to remedy the situation without fail.

8. I suggest a sub-committee under the chairmanship of Brigadier CARR with members from Public Safety and Land Forces Sub-Commissions should be set up to review the matter and make recommendations.

M. S. LUSH

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

A/Exec Comm

Para 8 is approved but Col. Poletti should be made chairman. Exec. Comm. has concurred with this change.

(Lrd) E.W.S.
cc.

182
3

(62)

Ref: 2810/20/EC

8th March 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

On 6th March I received a communication from you asking whether the appointment of General Sogno as General Commanding the CC.RR in succession to General Orlando would be acceptable to the Supreme Allied Commander. I obtained the Supreme Allied Commander's approval and communicated it to you.

I learned from the radio last evening and read in this morning's newspaper that the Italian Government has approved the appointment of General Brunetti as the General Commanding the CC.RR. I presume that this is a mis-statement.

If the report is true and the Italian Government has, in violation of the terms of the Armistice as modified by the communication recently made to you by the Acting President and myself, made an appointment of military importance without seeking the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, then I must request that the reason for such an appointment should be communicated to me and that the officer in question shall not take up his appointment until the approval of Field Marshal Alexander has been obtained.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
 ELLERY W. STONE
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief Commissioner

3015/EC
 (copy - 225-6)
 X-552/11

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
 President of the Council of Ministers,
 Italian Government,
 ROME.

See file 225-6

C O P Y

cc: U.S. Ambassador
 British Ambassador
 Land Forces Sub-Commission
 Civil Affairs Section
 Political Advisors
 CC Files

Ex C

61

Copy

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APC 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

AC/14153/PS.

28 February 1945

SUBJECT: Transport for CC.RR in Northern Italy.

TO : Executive Commissioner.

1. The peacetime war establishment for CC.RR trucks in the four northern regions is 527 (see Appendix "A" to 36a). This is obviously much more than can be allotted from the 1700 vehicles. It is felt by Public Safety and myself that a minimum of 100 vehicles should be allotted to the CC.RR for these regions, starting with a provisional allocation of 25 per region. Experience may necessitate readjustment of the allocation between regions.

These trucks are used for normal police duties, e.g. small mobile patrols in outlying districts; collection of CC.RR from outlying districts to bring them in to deal with situations in towns and so forth. It is not possible to rely on any pool that may be formed by Transportation Sub Commission for these duties which are constant and wholetime.

2. In addition, verbal arrangements have been made with the Transportation Sub Commission to bid on them for such matters as carriage of CC.RR or clothing over long distances, e.g. from Rome or Naples to the North, and for the provision of trucks to distribute rations, and for other administrative purposes which can be conveniently handled by a local pool.

3. The above does not include the provision of any transport for mobile CC.RR units. It is considered that at least 4 battalions, one for each region, should be made available for the North. Each battalion consists of 500 men; 300 carried in 12 3-ton trucks and 12 armoured vehicles; the balance of 200 men being used as a reserve.

2 District have already indented on AMR for three mobile battalions for the three compartimenti within their area (see Folio 32a).

4. There is no difficulty in forming very quickly mobile battalions provided transport is available. The formation of the two mobile battalions in Sicily has broken down because M.E.I.A. are insisting on the return of their trucks by 15 March 1945 and it has not been possible to requisition suitable vehicles in their place.

5. To sum up, it is recommended:

Page 2.

- a) that 100 of the 1700 vehicles be allotted to the CC, BR for normal police duties.
- b) that this Commission follow up the application by 2 District for three mobile battalions, asking for the transport for four mobile battalions in all.

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Section.

GRI/FR

(60)

cc

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 5823/13/EC

2 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Transport for CC.RR in Northern ITALY.

TO : VP, Economic Section.

1. The letter from VP, Civil Affairs Section, to the Executive Commissioner of 28 February 1945 is attached hereto, for study by your Transportation Sub-Commission.
2. Requirements laid down in this letter are to be discussed at the North West planning meeting tomorrow, Saturday, 3 March.

[Signature]
Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: File 503/EC.

3615-1cc

187

(60)

[Large handwritten flourish]

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

537

COPY NO. FEB 22 1945

TOP SECRET

FX 31016

FEB 211500A

D/2813

FEB 220900A

PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHGCT

AGWAR FOR COMBINED C.O.S. AND AMSSO FOR BRITISH C.O.S. RPTD SHALF
ALCOM MIA 15 ARMY GROUP

TOP-SECRET

This is NAF 868. Para 4 NAF 773 and para 3 PAN 448 are references.

1. Breakdown of international commitment of 124000 provides for ceiling of 55000 in respect of Carabinieri. This ceiling now full and strength fully engaged policing liberated ITALY.

2. Considered problem maintaining public order in thickly populated industrial areas of north when liberated will necessitate (a) redistribution of present Carabinieri strength throughout ITALY involving withdrawal OCRR personnel from base areas for duty in the north.

(b) Increase of 10000 in OCRR ceiling to facilitate this redistribution over the extended area in which police duties will become necessary when northern provinces are occupied.

3. To cover the suggested OCRR increase, approval is sought to an increase in the over-all ceiling of the Italian military forces by raising the international commitment from 124000 to 134000.

N.B.) This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Govt departments or Hq or re transmitted even in cipher without being heavily paraphrased.

Dist

over

TOP SECRET

A

3615-1cc

59

2007 10

Dist

Info-Action - P Safety SC
" L Forces SC
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Ex Com
CA Sec
File

Copy No.

1999

C O P YS E C R E TC O P Y

20 February, 1945.

SUBJECT : Italian Patriots and Carabinieri

MEMO TO : Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.

Reference is made to your 2207/12/COS dated 16 January, 1945.

1. The question of the disposal of the increasing numbers of Italian Patriots now being encountered in the Army area having been reviewed, a general policy is hereby established for the induction of Italian Patriots into the Italian Army as individuals to fill the current deficiency of approximately 48,000 under the present ceiling.

2. With the object, however, of making the most advantageous use of the fighting capabilities of the Patriots, the Land Forces Sub-Commission have been requested to submit recommendations to this Headquarters on a proposed organisation for the formation of Reconnaissance Companies (comprising Patriots in their own bands), to operate with the existing five Italian Gruppi. The present patriot bands fighting with the Armies will continue to operate with their present formations.

3. Your request to raise the ceiling of the Italian Army by an addition of up to 100,000 cannot at this stage be entertained. If, however, after operational experience of the Reconnaissance Companies has been obtained, it is considered desirable to form further units of a similar nature to operate with other Allied formations, the necessity for an increase in ceiling to cover the estimated future intake of Patriots will be reviewed.

4. The present Carabinieri ceiling of 55,000 being now full, approval is being sought from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a further increase to 65,000. Pending receipt of this approval, recruitment beyond the present figure of 55,000 cannot be authorised.

187

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER

JOHN L. HARLING,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

DMR/mmc

~~SECRET~~

(Action Copy - LK CammR)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

17 February 1945

10/14601/21/FS

53/PS 427/4.

SUBJECT : Carabinieri for Northern Legions.

TO : Regional Commissioners, Sicilia, Sardegna, Southern,
Lazio, Abruzzi-Marche, Toscana,
Emilia, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia and Venezia Regions
(Attention R.F.S.C.)

AMG 5th Army AMG 8th Army
Attn: C.F.S. Attn: S.C.A.F.O.

1. The present ceiling of Carabinieri for the whole of Italy is 55,000. Representations have, however, been made to increase this ceiling to 65,000, and the matter is now under discussion by AFHQ, from whom, it is learned, a favourable decision can be expected shortly. But, the recruiting of the extra 10,000 involved may take considerable time.

2. Meanwhile planning for the mobilization of the Northern Legions is taking place, and appendix "A" is circulated to inform all Regions of the Carabinieri required for this purpose and from where they will eventually be taken.

3. (A) Columns 1 and 2 of the appendix show the established strength of Legions at both ceilings.

127 (B) Column 3 shows the present strength of Legions as on the 9th January 1945, and any subsequent fluctuations will necessitate proportionate adjustments in columns 4 and 5.

3615/10

USG 5th Army USG 8th Army
Attn: C.P.S. Attn: S.C.A.P.O.

2038

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

3615/cc

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187 (B) Column 3 shows the present strength of Legions as on the 5th January 1945, and any subsequent fluctuations will necessitate proportionate adjustments in columns 4 and 5.

(C) Columns 4 and 5 show the numbers Legions will be required to release at both ceilings in order to mobilize the Northern Legion at full strength.

4. In view of this pending reduction of Carabinieri in the South, every effort should be made to return to normal police duties personnel extraneously employed.

By Command of Rear Admiral STONE,

[Signature]
C.R. UFFORD, BRIS.
VP, CA Sec.
DCOS, AC.

CONFIDENTIAL

57a

APPENDIX "A"

1 2 3 4 5

U N I T S	ESTABLISHED STRENGTH		Present Strength		TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM REGIONS	
	AT	AT	AT	AT	AT	AT
	55000	65000			55000	65000
ALESSANDRIA REGION	1720)	2043)				
BOLOGNA	3071)	3643)				
BOLZANO	1887)	2243)				
GENOVA	2521)	3003)				
MILAN	3078)	3647)	23753			
PADOVA	1886)	2245)				
TORINO	1906)	2263)				
TRIESTE	2461)	2993)				
VERONA	1397)	1673)				
VERUZZI	1655)	1974)	2622		967	648
ANCONA	1638)	1957)	2884		1216	927
BARI	2433)	2938)	4369		1936	1381
CAGLIARI	2337)	2785)	3673		1336	883
CATANZARO	2290)	2737)	2717		427	20*
FIRENZE	1794)	2143)	3688		1894	1545
LAZIO	2874)	3430)	4792		1918	1362
LIVORNO	1733)	2085)	2194		461	109
MESSINA	2335)	2783)	3125		790	342
NAPOLI	3588)	4385)	5967		2379	1582
PALERMO	3735)	4460)	4600		865	140
ROME TERR	4321)	5146)	4631		310	515*
SCHOOLS	4938)	4974)	3002		69	33
HOLDING CENTRES			5230		5230	5230
ATTACHED TO SEA, AIR						
ETC, - HEADQUARTERS			1405			
TO BE RECRUITED					101	10101
	55000	65000	54899	19929		23753

Total Required for Northern Regions at 55000

PARI	4432	2785	3473	1336	20*
CAGLIARI	2337	2727	2717	427	1545
CATANZARO	2250	2143	3488	1894	1362
FIRENZE	1734	3130	1792	1918	109
LAZIO	2874	2085	2194	441	342
LIVORNO	1793	2783	3125	790	1582
MESSINA	2235	4295	5967	2379	140
NAPOLI	3588	4160	1600	865	515*
PALERMO	3735	5146	4631	310	33
ROME TERR	4321	1374	3002	69	5230
SCHOOLS	1338		5230		
HOIDING CENTRES					
ATTACHED TO SIDA, AIR					
ETC., - HEADQUARTERS			1405		
				101	10101

TO BE RECRUITED

1850

55000	65000	54599	19929	23753
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

Total Required for Northern Legions at 55000

Total Required for Northern Legions at 65000

* * No to be returned to Legions.

GRD/G.

670

G 5 AFHQ

756

29 JANUARY, 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

SUBJECT IS REQUISITION OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER BARRACKS PD

PAREN TO G 5 AFHQ FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE TO ABLE GEORGE SIX TWO ZERO SLANT ONE FOUR EIGHT DOG CBCE
CMA MTOUSA TWO THREE JANUARY FOUR FIVE SUBJECT REQUISITION OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER
ROGER BARRACKS AND TO ABLE CHARLIE SLANT ONE FOUR SIX ZERO ONE SLANT ONE FIVE SLANT
PETER SUGAR CMA HQ ALCOM TWO ONE JANUARY FOUR FIVE SUBJECT CARABINIERI ACCOMMODATION
PD

PARA TWO PD REQUEST THAT STRONGEST REPRESENTATIONS BE MADE TO PREVENT REQUISITIONING
OF CARABINIERI ACCOMMODATIONS AT LIVORNO PD

PARA THREE PD WITH TROOPS ALREADY OCCUPYING CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER CASERMA
THE REQUISITIONING OF THE ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION NOW OCCUPIED BY CHARLIE CHARLIE
ROGER ROGER WILL COMPEL WITHDRAWAL OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER FROM LIVORNO TO
ANOTHER LOCATION WHERE ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION IS AVAILABLE PD THIS HEADQUARTERS
WILL THEN DECLINE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC SAFETY IN LIVORNO PD

PARA FOUR PD THE CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER IS AN AGENCY WORKING FOR THE ARMED
FORCES AND IS ITSELF WITHIN THE TERMS OF AFHQ ADMIN MEMO TWO NINE OF EIGHT JULY
AND UNDER PARA THREE PAREN C PAREN THEREOF THIS HQ IS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT
ANYTHING LESS THAN NECESSARY TO FULFILL THEIR REPEAT THEIR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS PD

Copy to : PBS
R.C. Toscana Region.

Public Safety Sub-Commission
686

JOHN W. CHAPMAN, Colonel.

Nicholas PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst. Adjutant.

FX 89856
JAN 23NFT

C.C.
C/9111
JAN 291045A
ROUTINE

CG MTOUSA CITE NAQMC
ALCOM ACTION, MMIA FOR INFO

IN CLEAR.

Reference MMIA letter SD/28 date 28 December 1944 and SD/28 of 15 January, 1945; Subject: Strength of CC.RR. MMIA is held responsible for the issue of rations to all categories of the Italian Army. Therefore MMIA will take such steps they deem necessary to control the rations issued to the CC.RR. to be assured that the ceiling strength of 55,000 is not exceeded. Your fullest cooperation with MMIA essential.

DIST

ACTION: Public Safety SC
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
C.O.S.
C.A. Sec
Econ Sec
Land Forces SC
File 2
Float

3615/CC

18

56

ee

AFHQ

225

20 January 1945

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS RETURN OF PICERNO GROUP TO ITALIAN ARMY PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FROM HQ ALCON PAREN PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FOX TRAY EIGHT SIX SIX SEVEN NINE DATED ONE SEVEN JAN PD

PARA TWO PD ALL TROOPS TRANSFERRED TO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER ARE AVAILABLE FOR RETURN WITH EXCEPTION OF MONTECORVINO BATTALION NOW IN SICILY AND ASSIGNED IN GRADE FIVE TO REMAIN WITH CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER PD

PARA THREE PD TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT FOLLOWING POINTS AS FROM MIDNIGHT TWO EIGHT JAN FOUR FIVE CMA AND WILL BE WARNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DETAILED MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS WHEN RECEIVED FROM YOU PD

PARA FOUR PD NAPLES TWO ZERO OFFICERS FOUR SIX SIX ONE TWO FOUR TONS STORES CMA

CHIEFTI FOR ORTOMA ONE EIGHT OFFICERS FOUR THREE NINE ONE TWO FOUR TONS STORES CMA

18 19 AGRI FOUR ZERO OFFICERS NINE THREE NINE ONE FOUR EIGHT TONS STORES CMA BARI NINE OFFICERS

FOUR ONE ONE ONE TWO FOUR TONS STORES PD

PARA FIVE PD THE TWO ZERO OFFICERS FOUR EIGHT ZERO AND TWO FOUR TONS STORES AT MARTINA

FRANCA WERE NOT MOVED TO CATANZARO AND HAVE NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO CHARLIE CHARLIE

ROGER ROGER PD

PUBLIC SAFETY E/C

Ext 365

P.J. SINQUE, Lt Col.

NICHOLAS PIONBING
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant.

55

3615/100

PARA SIX PD THE TWO FIVE OFFICERS FOUR SEVEN FIVE CRS OF COMEDANTI OF CAGLIARI ARE
STILL IN SARDINIA PD

DISTRIBUTION

CC
COS
CAS
MIA

18 PAGE TWO CABLE NUMBER 225 TO AFHQ.

55

SECRET

FX86679
JAN 17/1932

0/8343
JAN 18/0830
OP-PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED CITE: PHGOT.
ALCOM, INFO: MMIA

SECRET.

Reference your 3606/COS of 31 December last.

1. Urgent operational requirements of ITALIAN ARMY for reinforcements necessitate immediate return of 3000 troops PICHNO combat group at present on loan to you for SCRR duties.
2. To facilitate move you will forward earliest this Headquarters statement of entraining points, together with numbers of personnel and dates of readiness.

DIST

Action: C A Sec (2)
Info: A/President
Chief Commissioner
L Forces
COS Sec
P Safety
File

See (55)

SECRET

3615/CC

(54)

✓3

SUBJECT : Increase of authorized establishment of C.C.R.

A' FILES

Lord Poyser Sub Com, A.C.

10/23

16 Jan 19

Chief of Staff,
A.C.

Ref your 10/14504/21/23 of 11 Jan :-

1. I feel I must remark on the sentence in para 2 which says that : " 15% of the total strength in para 2 which says because your letter may effect the Army ceiling with which I as C.C.R. am vitally concerned and partly because this may be the subject of query by A.P.A. .

2. The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the "posted strength" and the "fighting strength" i.e. bodies actually doing duty.

3. On inquiry from Public Safety Sub Commission, I am informed that the 16% included :-

(a) Sick	 1200 equals	 2% of 55,000
(b) Leave	 5000 "	 9% of "
(c) A.P.O.L.	(Only 5% is authorized by A.P.O.)	
(d) Attached to Army Units	 100	
(e) Detached on special duty	1365 equals	 3%
	2000 "	 4%
	TOTAL	40165 " ... 13 %

- of these : -

(d) and (e) do not come within the term "ineffective" as they are actually doing duty.

(b) can only be 5%

(a) and (c) are correctly "ineffective" which means that the "ineffectives" really are :-

the difference between the "posted strength" and the "fighting strength" i.e. bodies actually doing duty.

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(a) Sick	 1200 equals	 2% of 55,000
(b) Leave	 5000 "	 9% of "
(Only 5% is authorized by ARH)		
(c) A.W.C.L.	 100	
(d) Attached to Army Units..	1865 equals	 3%
(e) Detached on special duty	2000 "	 4%
TOTAL	10165 "	... 18%

- of these :-

(a) and (e) do not come within the term "ineffective" as they are actually doing duty.

(b) can only be 5%

(a) and (e) are correctly "ineffective" which means that the "ineffectives" really are :-

Sick	1200	equals	2% of 55,000
Leave	2750	equals	5% "
AWOL	400	"	"
TOTAL	4050	equals	7% "

5. (a) Army units never count them "ineffectives" on the above basis and have, for obvious reasons, a greater difference than CC.RR. between "posted strength" and "fighting strength" i.e. a greater % of real "ineffectives".

(b) As a basis of comparison therefore (in connection with high for ceiling authorisation) the fair and proper figure of "ineffectives" in CC.RR. is 7%.

tvS.LB.

Major General,
M.A.I.A.

(ORIGINAL PASSED TO C.A. SEC - 17 JAN 45)

3615/CC

53

SECRET

A

①

Ref: 3526/26/DCM.

19th January 1945.

You will have received my memorandum on the necessity of coordination between Sub-Commissions on various subjects which are cognate with two or more Sub-Commissions.

My attention has been drawn to your letter SD/28 of 11th January regarding Mobile Carabinieri.

In this case it would, I think, have helped AFM if the letter had gone from the Chief Commissioner on the lines that:

- (a) It had been decided to form a Mobile Carabinieri battalion (para 1);
- (b) the total commitments would be as stated;
- (c) if agreement was given to the proposal, Land Forces Sub-Commission could make the necessary arrangements (para 3);
- (d) asking for approval.

I think we are in danger of giving AFM the impression that coordination here is lacking and thereby giving them the responsibility of deciding priorities which should be done here in the Commission.

Do you agree

13

M. S. LUSH

3615/CC

Major General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MP,
General Officer Commanding,
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFA).

52

ESL/CG.

3. We must look forward in the future to supplying the food and fuel up in that territory many thousands of CC.RR. Hitherto those CC.RR found on liberation have been invaluable. Under present regulations we cannot employ them and must immediately disband them unless we have discharged a similar number in Central and Southern ITALY. To reduce this number would be folly.

4. Security in Europe, even in the liberated territories, has deteriorated greatly in the last two months, will become worse until Allied reverses in FRANCE and embarrasments in GERMANY are forgotten, and may be almost non-existent in the North after a hard winter, much Allied bombing, and with devastation and unemployment the only hope in the spring. All our experiences prove that the strength of those whose object is to destroy constitutional government in this and any country is gathering: that there organization is extensive and well paid. We know that there is dynamite in the North. I cannot ask all officers to enter the territory and undertake the responsibility of maintaining order without an adequate, and a more than adequate, police force. I cannot tell you that law and order will be maintained unless I have that force.

5. It is imperative in my mind that we should continue recruitment of CC.RR over and above the ceiling of 55,000 authorized and even now slightly exceeded and I propose to continue to do so up to a ceiling of 65,000 unless I receive contrary orders after you have considered what has been written above and reconsidered my letter of 25th November.

S/ Evelyn W. Stone.

MAJOR W. STONES
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief of Staff
Land Forces Sub-Com

3615/CC

1331

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref/3624/53/008.

9 Jan 1945

My Dear Murray:

With reference to Guy Shipp's talk to you on 6 Jan 45 about your letter of 19 December 44, I have had a full investigation made into the memorandum you enclosed on the move of the Montegranero Battalion.

I enclose for your information report from the Director of the Public Safety Sub-Commission on the subject, together with a copy of my minute in reply.

Thank you for bringing the matter to my attention. I have taken action which I hope will avoid a repetition of indifferent staff work of this kind.

*Yours sincerely***M. S. LUSH**

13 Colonel J. Murray Mitchell, G.S.C.,
G-5 Section,
Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.

50

A/Q

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 39A

AC/44622/1/PS.

Tel. 439031 - 365

SUBJECT : A.F.H.Q. Memorandum concerning the Montegrano
Battalion.

TO : Chief of Staff, Allied Commission.

1. As instructed in your Memorandum, dated 21st December, 1944, the following report is submitted regarding the move of the Montegrano Battalion, Italian Army.
2. Public Safety Sub-Commission accepts full responsibility for the arrangements, the closest co-operation having been received from Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).
3. The Memorandum from G-3, A.F.H.Q. is substantially correct, apart from the specific points explained below:
 - i) A.F.H.Q. letter, dated 9th November, 1944, offering the Montegrano Battalion to the CC.RR., was received by Public Safety Sub-Commission on the 11th November, 1944. Since this Battalion had already been included in the Italian troops to be attached to the CC.RR. and had been notified to A.F.H.Q. in MMIA letter 80/28 of 28th October, 1944, (Serial No. 9 of Appendix A), the letter did not appear to call for an answer. Certain amendments were made to Appendix A and on the 27th November, 1944, A.F.H.Q. were again notified by Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) that arrangements had been made for the Battalion to be attached to the Ancona CC.RR. Legion.
 - ii) When A.F.H.Q. letter dated 2nd December, 1944, was received at this Headquarters on the 5th December, 1944, a reply (AC/44622/PS, dated 7th Dec 1944) was sent referring to Appendix A of MMIA letter 80/28 sent to A.F.H.Q. on the 27th November, 1944, and pointing out that the Montegrano Battalion was part of the Piceno Group scheduled to be transferred to CC.RR.
 - iii) Arrangements for accommodating the Montegrano Battalion at Ancona had been made by the General Commanding CC.RR. prior to 23rd October 1944. On the basis of Appendix A, which had been prepared by MMIA in co-operation with Public Safety Sub-Commission, transport arrangements were ordered by A.F.H.Q.
 - iv) On the 7th December, 1944, A.F.H.Q. telephoned that it was believed that no accommodation was available in Ancona. It was agreed that if that were so efforts would be made to find accommodation in Rome.

v) The letter dated 11th December from A.F.H.Q. confirming the move to Rome did not reach this Headquarters until the 16th December, 1944, that is, the same day as our cable cancelling the move owing to lack of accommodation.

vi) Since confirmation of the statement that no accommodation existed in Ancona had not been received on the 11th December, 1944, the original move proceeded as planned.

vii) On the 12th December, 1944, A.F.H.Q. again telephoned to the effect that they understood that no accommodation was available in Ancona. It was agreed that if that were true, rather than lose the services of the Montegrano Battalion, endeavours would be made to find room for them in Rome.

viii) On the 14th December, 1944, a copy of A.F.H.Q. signal ordering the Battalion to Rome was received by Public Safety Sub-Commission. At this point the Commanding General of the CC.RR. was still confident that the Battalion could be accommodated in Ancona.

ix) In the meantime it had been ascertained that owing to the arrival of 40 officers and 960 troops of the Piceno group in Rome, insufficient accommodation could be found for the Montegrano Battalion. A.F.H.Q. were immediately requested to suspend the move to Rome pending confirmation of the situation in Ancona.

x) On the 16th December, 1944, it was finally confirmed that owing to unexpected and secret operational concentrations in that area, the original arrangements made by the CC.RR. in Ancona had to be abandoned. Accordingly the Ancona move was cancelled. As reinforcements of Police were urgently needed in Sicily, owing to the call-up riots in Catania and elsewhere, the Montegrano Battalion was diverted to Palermo. This was finally settled by AG signal dated 17th December, 1944.

4. To sum up, the arrangements made to accommodate and use the Montegrano Battalion at Ancona were properly coordinated with all concerned from the 23th October 1944, but were upset between the 7th and 14th December 1944, by unexpected operational moves of which this Headquarters was unaware.

5. It is pointed out that the move of the Piceno Group involved eight moves of Italian troops arranged by IMIA and Public Safety Sub-Commission. The move of the Montegrano Battalion was the only one in which difficulty was experienced.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel, J.A.C.D.
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

Copy: Land Forces Sub-Commission (IMIA)

50

COPY

SUBJECT: Move of Montegrano Battalion.

TO: DCOB, Civil Affairs Section.

27 December 1944.

1. I have the following comments to make:
 - (a) The AFHQ letter of 9th Nov asked a specific question and clearly should have received an answer.
 - (b) There is obviously divergence between what was understood to be said on the telephone on 7th December, 12th December and 14th December.
 - (c) I cannot understand why, if the Director of the Sub-Commission desired the battalion to move to Rome on 12th December, the request should have been cancelled two days later because of accommodation. The information contained in the signal sent on 16th December cancelling the move owing to lack of accommodation in ANCONA and ROME should have been obtained before any commitments were made to receive the battalion.
 - (d) It is an unhappy story of lack of co-ordination and shows the danger of unrecorded telephone conversations which are not confirmed by telegram.
2. The attention of the Director of the Public Safety Sub-Commission should be drawn to these comments.

(Signed) M.S.LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

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Ref. AC/14601/0/1/PS.

9 January 1945

Dear Mr Broad

The Chief Commissioner has asked me to acknowledge your letter of 14 Dec 44 and to thank you for the memorandum from Gen Orlando which you enclosed.

Clothing for the Carabinieri is a serious question which is constantly before us and I am glad to tell you that we have been successful in effecting a considerable improvement.

In regard to the four items listed in Gen Orlando's memorandum, the first two are for ceremonial uniform, which it is not proposed to issue at present, whilst sheeting, the fourth item, is not on the scale of issue to the Italian Army. Everything possible is being done to increase the allotment of boots, the remaining item.

You need not take any further action in this matter.

The trouble you have taken is much appreciated.

Yours sincerely

JACQUAYLE MASOR

So to cc.

18

Philip Broad Esq.
Office of the Resident Minister
Central Mediterranean
A.P.H.S.

FILES A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

ATO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref. AG/14601/21/78

Tel: 4/8134.

SUBJECT: Piaceno Group - Strength of Carabinieri.

7th January, 1945.

TO : AMEN, G-5 Section.

(17)

1. With reference to my letter 3606/508 of the 31st December, 1944, and my subsequent letter of the 1st January, 1945, and also to the visit of Colonel Murray Mitchell to this office, I feel that some further explanation is necessary for you to arrive at a proper conclusion in your consideration of the return of the 3,000 troops comprising the Piaceno Group from their present duties with the Carabinieri.

2. So far as the strength of the Carabinieri is concerned the latest official figures as of 31st December last show an over-all strength of 54,836. Although no later figures are available there is no doubt that at the present time the strength, which has been increasing rapidly over the past two months, has now exceeded the authorised establishment of 55,000. This figure does, of course, show a considerable increase over the last official return sent to you from this Commission, but the reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the Public Safety Sub-Commission have always followed the Carabinieri practice showing only the effective strength when supplying you with over-all figures. In future a more realistic return will be forwarded.

3. The position at the present time is that of a strength of 55,000, 5,949 are ineffective (i.e. either sick or on leave), in addition to which there are 1,865 being employed on military police duties and 594 employed by Stato Maggiore, none of these are therefore available for civil police work. In short, it will be seen that out of an authorised establishment of 55,000 no less than 8,409 have to be discounted for the reasons mentioned above.

4. At the present time the whole question of Carabinieri strength and its disposition is being examined by the Land Forces and Public Safety Sub-Commissions in conjunction with the Carabinieri, and I hope by the middle of next week to be able to forward you figures which will be accepted by all.

3615/CC

return of the 3,000 troops comprising the Pistoia Group, even when returning to their duties with the Carabinieri.

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4. At the present time the whole question of Carabinieri strength and its disposition is being examined by the Land Forces and Public Safety Sub-Commissions in conjunction with the Carabinieri, and I hope by the middle of next week to be able to forward you figures which will be accepted by all concerned.

5. So far as paragraphs 2(a) and 3(c) of my letter of the 31st December are concerned, it has now been established that, in fact, no Army Guard Etna. will be available for public security duties in northern Italy, and that the AFM letter referred to allocates the Italian Etna. in question for normal garrison and guard duties only. The assumption, therefore, that one of the reasons for returning the Pistoia Group to their military duties was the fact that 2,500 additional Italian troops would be available for public safety purposes is now found to be incorrect.

6. With reference to my letter of the 1st January, it has now been ascertained that an authorized establishment of 1,865 Carabinieri for provost duties with the Italian Army had in fact only been assumed and not specified. As a result of discussions between Public Safety Sub-Commission and MIIA the Minister of War is being informed that his establishment for this purpose will be fixed at 1,865 and in consequence steps will be taken to ensure that the remainder will be returned to civil police duties.

- 2 -

7. As a matter of interest, you may like to know that the figure of 55,000 Carabinieri, as quoted in my letter of the 31st December, was arrived at by adding to the official Carabinieri figure of 1st December, 1944, i.e. 54,131, firstly 700 recruits who joined the service between the 1st and 9th December, secondly 400 Carabinieri who have arrived in Taranto, having been returned from the Balkans, and thirdly 500 Italian troops who are being seconded to the Carabinieri in Gardone.

8. To summarize, therefore, there is no doubt that in fact the Carabinieri have already exceeded their authorized establishment of 55,000, although 8,408 of this total are ineffective for employment on civil police duties, but nevertheless have to be carried on its official strength.

9. Since recruiting for the Carabinieri is continuing not only by recruit intake, but also by the return of personnel from the north of Italy and from prisoner of war camps, the authorized establishment of 55,000 is being steadily exceeded day by day. The matter which is of paramount importance therefore is the decision of your Headquarters in response to our long standing request for an increase in the Carabinieri establishment, see my HQ/14522/RS dated 26th November.

For the Chief Commissioner

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

long standing request for an increase in the Carabinieri establishment, per
by AC/14622/18 dated 28th November.

For the Chief Commissioner

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

A file

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel: 478733

Ref. 3606/008

1st January, 1945.

SUBJECT: 3000 Troops Piceno Group.

TO : AFHQ, G-3 Org.
AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. Reference this Commission's letter 3606/008, dated 31st December, 1944, and in confirmation of telephone conversation 1st January (Brig. Upjohn Capt. Woodward, G-5) it is pointed out that further investigation of the figures show that some 3,500 CC.RR are carrying out provost duties with the Italian army although only 1,000 are authorised for this purpose.

2. It follows that some 1,700 CC.RR are at present carried in the Carabinieri establishment of 55,000 though in fact not engaged in the maintenance of civilian law and order.

For the Chief Commissioner:

See (418)
Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

13.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Civil Affairs Section.

(47)

3615/008
FILES A

AG/14607/2/PS

31 Dec 44

My dear Mr Prime Minister,

I am writing to you in your capacity of Minister of the Interior to bring to your notice complaints which have been made about the inefficiency of the Italian police during recent disturbances which have taken place in Italy, and in particular in regard to those at Catania.

So far as these last disorders are concerned, it has been alleged, inter alia, that the police allowed the situation to get completely out of hand and took no measures whatever to deal with the comparatively small number of persons who were causing the trouble. For example, it is said that, during the disturbances, no policemen were to be seen in the streets; indeed, in at least one barracks, the Carabinieri had locked themselves in; the Lieutenant in charge explaining to an Allied Officer that because he had been ordered not to fire on the crowd he was unable to take any action. The Municipio was fired by not more than six persons, and the resulting conflagrations were not attended by the Fire Services, who were apparently afraid to venture from their Stations.

These complaints, serious in themselves, are also indicative of the general criticisms which have been levelled against the police in recent months. They have been brought to the attention of your Ministry and of the General Commanding Carabinieri, by my Public Safety Sub-Commission, who have asked for a full investigation to be made and for measures to be taken to prevent such complaints in future.

I am of opinion, however, that your various police commands are in need of the support of your Government in dealing with this problem, and I would suggest that consideration is given to the publication of an official announcement, made by you, on behalf of the Italian Government, as to the need for the preservation of law and order and of your Government's firm intention to insist on this being enforced by every means in your power and by force if necessary.

May I take this opportunity to remind you that I have not yet had a

reply to my letter to you on the subject of the possible reorganization of the Italian police, dated 26th November, 1944, since I believe that any measures contemplated to deal with the present difficulty ought to be regarded as part of a larger plan to effect an improvement in Italian Public Security Services as a whole.

40
Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe BONOMI
The Minister for the Interior,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government
R O M E

1857

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Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

CHIEF COMM

Rome, December 28th 1944.

Dear Admiral,

Thank you for the interest you so kindly take in the activity and functioning of the Italian police, to the reorganization of which I had been thinking for a long time.

It is natural that the police too should have felt the moral and material effects of the deep changes that the nation has lately been submitted to, and which have disorganized it and diminished its prestige, and above all attacked its material and disciplinary frame; it has notably reduced the means that it disposed of, with rapid repercussions on its activity. On the other hand, it must be observed that though the police is less efficient, the need for it has greatly increased, this because of the state of war and because of the economic crisis that the nation has to cope with, so that its activity is more diminished in the absolute sense of the word than relatively to its monetary power or its means, therefore, more outwardly than actually.

To obtain that, in the changed political situation, the police should get a maximum of power and adequately fulfill all the requirements of its various services, a complete reform is necessary. This reform would reorganize the police according to new criterions adapted to the present time; as you acknowledged, such a reorganization would require a long and careful study, for it would have to deal not only with the chief traits of its functioning, but also with the smallest particulars. Meanwhile, it is necessary that the police should be put in a position which will enable it to cope with the present difficult situation of public safety, which is getting worse instead of better.

As you are well aware, there are several police corps, but it is quite untrue that there are prejudicial interferences and superposition of power among them, for every one of them, according to its constitutive law and the relative regulations, has specific and well defined duties. If there are some deficiencies in their relations, and therefore, in the activity of the police at large, this is to be ascribed, as I have already said, principally to the present situation which have had repercussions on the functioning of this delicate organ.

Among these corps, the P.S. Agents Corps, with its P.S. functionaries,

tion has to cope with, so that its activity is more diminished in the absolute sense of the word than relatively to its necessary power or its means, therefore, more outwardly than actually.

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Among these corps, the P.S. Agents Corps, with its P.S. functionaries, depends directly from the Interior Department, for all services of public order, judiciary police, and administrative police; the CC.R. also depends also of the same Ministry, for the same services, except for those of administrative police which require a special bureaucratic organization. The Government has jurisdiction over the CC.R. and only for services of a military character and for discipline, for the corps is part of the Army. These two corps constitute the police in all its various aspects, and their parallel existence has been consecrated by a long tradition. The P.S. Agents Corps, directed by P.S. functionaries, functions mostly in the big towns, by means of the questura and of the section P.S. offices, detached in minor centres of some importance; on the contrary, the CC.R. also functions mostly in rural centres, where numerous small garrisons are scattered; these are grouped under hierarchic commands under a Comando Generale. Their singularity of action is regulated by the Chief of the Police, who has the general direction of all public safety services. As for the R. Guardia di Finanza, it depends from the Ministry of Finance, is in charge of customs practices and sees that that the various tributary laws, which are of the specific competence of this Ministry, are observed; under the competent military authorities, it contributes together with the other Army forces, to the military service of the frontiers.

45a

The Guardia Forestale depends from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests; its chief function is to see that the laws relative to the preservation of the forests which are a national patrimony should be observed; naturally it is only sent in forest zones. Nevertheless, in case of need, these two corps can also be employed in the services depending from the Ministry of the Interior, on its request, under orders and responsibility of their own I.O. functionaries. Besides, the various corps do not exclude one another, for they all have to see that the laws are respected, whatever they are, and they simply divide their task, specializing in determined categories, with better results for the services. In an emergency, they help one another, also by initiative of the minor commands. The result is that they fulfill their tasks separately in normal cases, and act under one direction only when special circumstances make it necessary.

I haven't considered here the military police and other minor polices, for they are inexistent at present, and, anyway, if reestablished, they would exercise their activity in a well determined field of action and under the direction of the P.S. offices which depend from the Interior Department.

In spite of all it has come through, the trend of the police taken as a whole is still sound, and doesn't lack very good elements among the agents and their respective commands, and mostly among the functionaries, many of whom can nevertheless not be used either because they have been transferred north, or because they are still submitted to a judgment of operation. If there are faults, they must be ascribed to the general state of disorder in which the whole country finds itself; these faults come therefore from the difficulty the country has to get settled, and will therefore disappear, in great part, at the end of this crisis.

As I have already said this doesn't exclude the need of a reform of the police on a large basis; the competent offices are making the necessary studies for its realization, while we have tried, meanwhile, to make all the possible modifications which could eliminate the more serious inconveniences and better the services, with compatibility with the lack of men and deficient means.

As soon as the first studies will have reached a concrete phase, - which will take a certain time - I will gladly follow your suggestion and entrust a commission with the task of examining them thoroughly and in detail; I shall be most glad if technical members of the Allied Commission will participate in it.

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As soon as the first studies will have reached a concrete phase, which will take a certain time - I will gladly follow your suggestion and entrust a commission with the task of examining them thoroughly and in detail; I shall be most glad if technical members of the Allied Commission will participate in it.

I remain,

Truly yours,

S. J. DONOMI

S.O.

Cors Ist

Action: C.A.S.E.C

INFO: CHIEF COMM

Cors

456

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

18th December 1944.

SUBJECT: Reinforcements for SICILY.

TO : Chief Commissioner.

1. It has been decided by Public Safety Sub-Commission that Carabinieri are not now to be sent to SICILY. They will be substituted by a battalion of Alpini (Montegrano Bn) who will be attached to the Carabinieri. They are part of the men whom the Italian Army are releasing for service with the Carabinieri. (approx 700)
2. A signal has been sent to AFHQ asking that shipping be made available at the earliest moment. ✓
3. Land Forces Sub-Commission have taken up again with AFHQ the question of the two Internal Security Battalions which we asked to be sent to SICILY as far back as last September. No authority has yet been granted for this move, although reminders had been sent. A final signal was sent to-day from the Chief of Staff Office again requesting the move of these two battalions to SICILY. ✓

*W. J. Trapp*Lt. Col.
Chief Staff Officer
To the Chief of Staff.

3615/CC

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(45)

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Q

CC. 1174
17/12/44.OFFICE OF THE RESIDENT MINISTER
CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN,

A.P.H.Q.

14th December, 1944.

My dear Commodore,

Some time ago Mr. Macmillan, when he was in Rome, asked Count Caradini to obtain for him some information regarding the needs of the carabinieri. As a result, a memorandum on this subject by General Orlando was received by this Office the other day. I attach a copy of this memorandum, which, as you will see, is an appeal for material for uniforms and sheets for 30,000 men.

I telegraphed to Mr. Macmillan to ask him whether there was any action which he wished me to take in this matter in his absence. In reply, I have received a signal from him instructing me to discuss the question with you and, if you wish it, with Allied Force Headquarters. I have not had an opportunity of talking to you personally about this, and I am therefore sending you this letter. I should be very grateful for advice as to what you would like me to do.

*Yours very sincerely,**Philip Dwyer.*

Commodore Stone, U.S.N.
Allied Commission,
ROME.

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See

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3615/CC

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COPYMEMORANDUM

In order to overcome the serious crisis in the equipment of the carabinieri and to provide in particular for those who are stationed in Sardinia and Sicily and have a greater need to replenish their stocks of clothing, it is essential to make provision urgently for enough material to make uniforms for 30,000 men and for lengths of stuff necessary for the making of sheets for the same number of troops.

Apart from items of accessory material which can be dealt with at a later time, there is need for:

- (1) Blue material, width 1.40 - 295,000 metres.
- (2) Special black felt for hats, width .70 - 21,000 metres.
- (3) Pairs of shoes - 60,000
- (4) Material for sheets - 300,000 metres.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/62/003

11 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri PW in North Africa.

TO : Chief Commissioner.

42

1. Further to your memorandum of 1 Dec on the subject of 6,000 Carabinieri in N. AFRICA, more information which I now have casts doubt on this figure; in fact, G-1 AFHQ considers that the correct figures are as follow :

350 attached to the British Forces -
573 attached to the American Forces.

43

2. As I informed you previously negotiations are in hand for their repatriation and I will keep you advised of developments.

18

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

3615/cc

✓5

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

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1846

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

3615/CC

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel: 735

8 December 1944.

Ref: 3606/55/COS

SUBJECT: Carabinieri PW in N. AFRICA.

TO : Chief Commissioner.

In reply to your memorandum dated 1 Dec 44 the present situation is that we are actively pursuing the matter with AFHQ. Both discussions and correspondence are taking place and I will keep you informed of developments.

See

MSL.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

3615/CC

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(4)3

FILES

SECRETSc to Chief
Commissioner3722
59
cc 1102
9/2/44ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat

7 December 1944

Subject: Security Situation in ROME.

To : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

(39)

Your attention is drawn to Conclusion 4(b) of PC(44) 33rd Meeting, in which you are directed to examine and report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the carabinieri. It is requested that a report may be furnished on the present status of this matter.

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

See attached

3615/CC

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~~SECRET~~

Ext: 300.

2 December 1964

Ref: 3606/003

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. I attach copy of a letter to the Chief Commissioner from AMHQ. The relevant extract of the Political Meeting which is referred to reads as follows:-

"The Supreme Allied Commander directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, will report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Carabinieri."

2. Will you please furnish the report asked for, or if this is not yet ready, supply information to enable the Chief Commissioner to reply to AMHQ.

L. H.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: SO to O3.

3615/CC

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2. Will you please furnish the report asked for, or if this is not yet ready, supply information to enable the Chief Commissioner to reply to AFHQ.

EL

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: SO to CS.

3615/CC

29/12 - completed for

FILES A

FILES A

1843

12/20

Chief Commissioner

Carabinieri POW in North Africa

1 December

4

Chief of Staff

On more than one occasion the Italian officials have spoken of the presence of some 6,000 Carabinieri POW in North Africa whom they feel it would be of great advantage to return to lift the Carabinieri strength. Can you advise me what steps have been taken to secure their return? If we have been unsuccessful in the past, perhaps AFHQ is in a more receptive mood to arrange for their repatriation and employment.

E. W. S.

cc: DCOS, Civil Affairs Section
A File

30157/CC

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394.

AC/14622/PS.

28th November, 1944.

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri.

TO : G-5, AFHQ, APO 512.

1. Reference your G-5, 014.12 of the 4th November, 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, AFHQ HSD/424, dated 2nd November, 1944, and our reply of even number, dated 9th November, 1944.

2. The reply mentioned in para. 1, dealt with the provision of 5,000 soldiers to the Carabinieri. This letter deals with the ceiling of Carabinieri establishment.

3. The ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate. 55,000 was the normal peacetime strength of Carabinieri, but by Decree of Marshal Badoglio dated 25th July, 1943, the strength was fixed at 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

4. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri. The strength of these special Police Agencies totalled 16,300.

5. The uncertain state of public order following in the wake of war, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrant a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions. Many additional duties have been placed upon the Carabinieri as a result of the Allied occupation and liberation of Italy. Some of these duties are as follows:

- a. Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control lines and at other critical points.
- b. Dealing with refugees.
- c. Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided

by the Allied Nations.

- d. Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of possible affraye between civilians and troops.
 - e. Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
 - f. Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
 - g. Assisting in enforcing harvest regulations, and olive oil control.
6. Beyond the Pisa Rimini line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reale were approximately 23,000. This area is largely industrial, thickly populated, and has been long under German domination. 44,000 Carabinieri are already in service south of the Pisa Rimini line. It is essential therefore that the ceiling of Carabinieri be increased to 65,000 in order to make available for the north a strength comparable to that provided in peace time. This would be the minimum strength necessary to maintain public order.
7. It must be appreciated that if the strength of Carabinieri is below that considered essential, then any failure by the police services to deal with Public Safety conditions, will necessitate troops being diverted from combat duties to restore the situation.
8. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for the whole of Italy be fixed at 65,000.

/s/ ELLERY W. STONE.

ELLERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR.
Chief Commissioner.

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AO/14607/2/PS

26 Nov 44

My dear Prime Minister,

I know that in recent months your Government has given some attention to the question of the desirability for some reorganisation of the Italian Police. In my view the time has now arrived when this matter ought to be most carefully considered on the basis of both a long and short term policy.

Any constitutional change, which should be the subject of long term reform, will of course, be for you to consider, but nevertheless, even on a short term basis, which would more directly concern this Commission, I feel that there is a great deal which could be accomplished.

For your present consideration let me bring to your attention two points affecting the Italian Police Services, which I suggest should be the subject of careful review.

Firstly, the existing ambiguity of police command and responsibility, both on the administrative and executive levels. In the first instance, not only the Ministry of the Interior, but also the Ministries of War, Finance, Justice, Agriculture and Communications are all concerned with public safety matters; and in the second, the Royal Carabinieri, the National Police Guard, the Finance Guards, the Forest Guards and the Railway Police have by no means clearly defined spheres of responsibility, which are, in addition, superimposed one upon another.

Secondly, I believe there is much opportunity for the display of greater leadership by the officers of the various police services. I feel that this could be much improved by training the right type of officer in a much fuller and more comprehensive technical sense than has hitherto been the practice.

I am sure you will agree with me that any constitutional change of the Italian Police system will be a complicated matter, requiring a great deal of thought and attention from all the authorities who would be concerned, thus it is by no means easy, or indeed proper, to suggest in advance exactly what ought to be done. I would like to make the

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3615/cc Continuum

FILES

- 2 -

suggestion therefore, that an Advisory Committee of administrative and executive Police officials be constituted to give this matter full consideration and report to you their conclusions and recommendations.

I have in mind that your Government might wish to set up a full Committee, representative of the Ministries concerned and presided over by a Minister without portfolio, and that they would examine this subject by means of sub-committees upon which your technical experts could serve.

As I think you will agree the matter is urgent and the setting up of some such Committee as I have suggested is not only an expeditious and efficient way of handling the problems I have outlined above but will go far to restore much needed public confidence in the Police Forces of the country.

If you decide to initiate such a step, I would, of course, be very happy to provide one or more technical advisers from this Commission to assist your Committee in its work.

Yours very truly,

ELERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivano BONOMI
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government
R O M E

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(40)

S E C R E T

AFHQ Political Committee

33rd Meeting

22 November 1944

EXTRACT

4. SECURITY SITUATION IN ROME

(Paper No. PC(44) 136)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the security situation in ROME was serious enough to warrant consideration of precautionary measures and recommending:

- (a) That the Chief Administrative Officer investigate the underlying causes for this situation.
- (b) That G-3 examine the present internal security scheme for the area and recommend any additional measures necessary.

* * *

COMMODORE STONE, replying to a question by Mr. Kirk, stated that the Italian Government had not asked for an increase in the number of Italian troops in the ROME area or anywhere else on the mainland. While he believed that increased numbers of Carabinieri could most usefully be employed and he agreed with Lieutenant General Gammell's suggestion that it might therefore be desirable to increase their pay and rations, this would give them better treatment than the Italian Army, including those units fighting with AAI. This policy was therefore questionable. He considered that press attacks on the Italian forces, which were increasing, could be dealt with by censorship since it could be argued that they were military rather than political in character.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Directed that G-3 instruct Commander, Rome Allied Area Command, to report on the internal security situation in the ROME area and to recommend any additional precautionary measures considered necessary.
- (b) Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, examine and report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Carabinieri.

3615/CC

(b) That G-3 examine the situation and recommend any additional measures necessary.

* * *

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- (b) Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, examine and report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Carabinieri.
- (c) Directed that G-2 report to him periodically on the internal security situation in the ROME area.

* * *

FOR ENTIRE TEXT: See 1002-1/CC "A" Files

FOR SUPPORTING PAPER: See 1002-2/CC "A" Files

See (420)

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22 Nov.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Reference No. AGC/11622/PS

9 November, 1944.

SUBJECT : Italian soldiers to reinforce Carabinieri.

TO : G-5, A.F.H.Q., APO 512.

1. Reference your G-5, 614.12 of the 4th November, 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, A.F.H.Q., WSD/424. The letter from G-3 referred to deals with two matters, firstly the ceiling of the Carabinieri establishment and secondly the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to reinforce them. In this present letter I will refer only to the provision of the 5,000 Italian soldiers: the matter of the ceiling for the Carabinieri strength will be dealt with in a later communication.

2. The suggestion made by Brigadier Napier in his paragraph 4, to recruit additional Carabinieri and to consider what economies could be effected by way of reorganisation have not only already been examined but are also constantly under review.

3. It is hoped that the present intake, by means of recruiting, of 500 per month will be exceeded in the future, but it should be realised that this matter is by no means so simple as it would appear; particularly in view of the fact that for service with the Carabinieri it is worse than useless to employ men who do not possess the necessary qualifications for this work. So far as the general reorganisation of this service is concerned, this is a subject which is receiving special attention but which also is one which cannot be lightly disposed of or from which any real benefit can be obtained except over a long period.

4. The suggestion that 10,000 Carabinieri should be recruited forthwith is not realistic when one realises that recruitment for this service is voluntary and that it is essential that the type of man accepted is one who will be capable of efficiently performing police duty in the future. Facilities do not exist either to select or to train such an enormous figure. Another point which must be considered when contemplating the recruitment of such large numbers is that of the possibility of finding 12,000 disbanded Carabinieri north of the Pisa-Livorno line, the addition of which to a force already approaching its authorised establishment would raise it far beyond its proper figure. This is another reason in support of the policy to employ soldiers on a temporary basis since they can be returned to their units as the Carabinieri approach their normal strength.

- 2 -

5. I am afraid that paragraph 5 of the letter referred to is not of much help to us. The Brigadier should be informed that many very senior Police Officers are already employed in the Public Safety work of this Commission, both at R.C. and in the Regions.

6. I would remind you that the purpose of requesting the 5,000 Italian soldiers was solely to provide a similar number of trained Carabinieri who would be available for police duty when the north of Italy is in our hands. I have already explained to you the scheme by which these 5,000 soldiers would be used so that they could release an equivalent number of Carabinieri who would be taken from the centre and south of Italy for duty north of the Pisa-Rimini line.

7. Since it has been decided that these soldiers cannot be retained after the 31st December, 1944, they will not serve any useful purpose whatever, since they were required only as an expedient to reinforce police personnel in the north of Italy and for no other purpose.

8. I therefore must ask in the strongest terms for the matter to be reconsidered, since unless the Carabinieri are to have this reinforcement from the Italian Army, I shall have to make it clear to SACMAD that I cannot be responsible for Public Safety in the north of Italy with the meagre Police establishment that will be available to me.

9. You will, of course, appreciate that such inability on the part of the Italian Public Safety Services to deal with the situation must inevitably mean that troops will have to be diverted from their combat duties in an attempt to restore the situation.

10. I request therefore, that this matter be reconsidered and that the provision of these 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri be approved for an indefinite period.

WILLY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

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WY/G.

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COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 014.12

4 November 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

6
1. Reference telephone conversation Col Chapman -
Lt Col. Jackman, herewith as promised is copy of G-3 Memo
HSD/424 of 2 Nov.

2. It is requested that a progress report on the matter
be submitted to reach this HQ without fail by 15 Nov. 44.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

/s/ T.B. Jackman
Lt Colonel

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Incl: as above

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

2 Nov 44

FILE NO : HSD/424

SUBJECT : The Increase of Carabinieri

TO : G-5

1. Reference AG 014.12/137 GCT-0 of 27 Oct 44, copy to you.

2. As you are aware, the Carabinieri are at present some 10,000 in number beneath the ceiling figure, and we have recently had to provide 5,000 Army personnel to assist. These Army personnel must be returned without fail by 31 Dec 44.

3. You have requested an increase of 10,000 in the Carabinieri ceiling. Operations will require the use of all Army personnel within the Army ceiling, and it is regretted that it is quite impossible to transfer Army ceiling to Carabinieri.

4. I would like to suggest therefore, that you should inform the Public Safety Sub Commission that they should take immediate steps to carry out the following :-

- (a) To recruit 10,000 Carabinieri forthwith, in order that the soldiers can be returned to the Army, and
- (b) To carry out an examination of the present Carabinieri organisation to determine whether the numbers allotted cannot be made to go further.

5. If I might suggest it I should recommend that an experienced police officer from ENGLAND, INDIA or PALESTINE might be brought for a period of a few months to see if he

10,000 in number beneath the ceiling figure, and we have recently had to provide 5,000 Army personnel to assist. These Army personnel must be returned without fail by 31 Dec 44.

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- (a) To recruit 10,000 Carabinieri forthwith, in order that the soldiers can be returned to the Army, and
- (b) To carry out an examination of the present Carabinieri organisation to determine whether the numbers allotted cannot be made to go further.

5. If I might suggest it I should recommend that an experienced police officer from ENGLAND, INDIA or PALESTINE might be brought for a period of a few months, to see if he could not make some helpful suggestions.

6. I must add that with present operational needs, it is quite impossible to allow recruiting for the Carabinieri within the Army, as this would entail the removal of the better type of man of which there is already a great shortage.

7. As this is a matter directly affecting the efficiency of the Italian Army I would be grateful if you would inform me by 15 Nov as to the steps that will be taken by the Public Safety Sub Commission to increase the numbers of Carabinieri.

/s/ J L G NAPIER
/t/ J L G NAPIER

Brigadier GS.,
G-3 Org Sub Sec.

JLCN/JFN

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 394.

Ref. ACC/14622/PS.

28th October, 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri

TO : G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. Following your cable FX43589, dated 25th October, 1944, addressed to A.A.I., for action and Army Sub-Commission for information, arrangements are now being made for the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri. This matter was the subject of discussion between the Army Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission of this Headquarters on the 27th October, 1944. However, the Army Sub-Commission have emphatically declared that these soldiers must be returned to the Italian Army for combat duties by the 31st December, 1944, and that there is no prospect whatever of retaining their services beyond this date.

2. When, during the preliminary stages, this matter was being discussed between representatives of your Headquarters and Public Safety Sub-Commission, it was appreciated that the secondment of Italian Military personnel for auxiliary police purposes was an arrangement intended only to augment the Carabinieri until their numbers had grown sufficiently to enable them to deal with their police responsibilities following the liberation of the north of Italy. Therefore, in this sense, the provision was of a temporary character only. On the other hand however, it was never envisaged that the signifi-
fiance of the 31st December, 1944 (first indicated by your Headquarters in a cable addressed to A.A.I. No. FX38608, dated 14th October, 1944) was to be anything more than a date beyond which new approval would be required of these men. This view was, I understand, confirmed by Lt. Col. Murray Mitchell in

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3. You will appreciate that if the assertion of the Army Sub-Commission had been correct no useful purpose would have been served in expending so much time and trouble to incorporate these men into the ranks of the Carabinieri for so short a time. I would be glad, therefore, to have your assurance that my interpretation is the correct one and that the date on which these 5,000 Italian soldiers are to return to their normal military duties is one subject to your decision following representations from this Commission.

4. I quite understand that you will require to have some

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indication of the time which these men will be required and I can assure you that my own desire is to give you some definite appreciation of future public safety requirements. However, these matter presents some difficulty since the facts which will influence this need are subject very considerably to military operations and to future developments which at the present time can only be estimated. I therefore give you a recapitulation of the circumstances affecting these arrangements.

5. At present, having regard to the position of the Army line and the amount of Italian territory liberated, the numbers of Carabinieri available are no more than sufficient to discharge their existing police responsibilities. Beyond any questions, as the Military advance progresses and particularly having regard to the industrial and economic situation which are bound to influence the condition of Public Safety in the north of Italy, the present numbers will be entirely inadequate, to the extent that one should seriously doubt the effectiveness of the Carabinieri to deal with such situations as can be logically anticipated. There are, however, two main sources of augmentation of the Carabinieri strength, one which is being vigorously exploited at the present time and the other which will be just as zealously pursued when the opportunity arises. I refer firstly to the recruiting intake into the Carabinieri and secondly to the re-enlistment of men who have been disbanded or temporarily out of the Police service by living have been under enemy control. Figures now available indicate that by means of recruiting the Carabinieri strength is being increased at the rate of approximately 500 per month, and there is every reason to suppose that this figure will be more than in the present circumstances a substantial increase of this figure should be anticipated.

6. As regards the second factor, it is, of course, quite impossible to say how many Carabinieri are likely to be re-enlisted into the service by means of the "replacement Centres which have been set up to deal with this procedure,

cularly having regard to the industrial and economic situation which are bound to influence the condition of Public Safety in the north of Italy, the present numbers will be entirely inadequate, to the extent that one should seriously doubt the effectiveness of the Carabinieri to deal with such situations as can be logically anticipated. There are, however, two main sources of augmentation of the Carabinieri strength, one which is being vigorously exploited at the present time and the other which will be just as zealously pursued when the opportunity arises. I refer firstly to the recruiting intake into the Carabinieri and secondly to the re-enlistment of men who have been disbanded or temporarily out of the Police service by living have been under enemy control. Figures now available indicate that by means of recruiting the Carabinieri strength is being increased at the rate of approximately 500 per month, and there is every reason to suppose that this figure will be more than in the present circumstances a substantial increase of this figure should be anticipated.

6. As regards the second factor, it is, of course, quite impossible to say how many Carabinieri are likely to be re-enlisted into the service by means of the replacement Centres which have been set up to deal with this procedure, but a fairly accurate estimate can be given a comparatively short time after any substantial Military advance has been made.

7. From the aspect of Public Safety, I have no doubt that the most serious of our problems are to be encountered in the north, and accordingly, as you know, the 5,000 soldiers will be utilized to replace an equivalent number of trained Carabinieri from central and southern Italy, including Sicily, so that this dilution of police strength in these areas will enable an equivalent concentration to be made available in the north. If I may refer to figures I would remind you that the present authorised establishment of the Carabinieri is 55,000 men. This Commission is strongly of the opinion that this figure is inadequate and indeed, your Headquarters is

- 3 -

already considering an application for the increase of this establishment by an addition of ten to fifteen thousand men. At the present time, however, the strength of available Carabinieri is only 43,000, which is little more than two-thirds of the minimum strength this Commission recommends for the maintenance of law and order in Italy.

8. Having regard to these facts I ask for your authority firstly, that, in principle, the 5,000 Italian soldiers may be retained for police purposes until the strength of the Carabinieri reaches 55,000, after which they be progressively released as the Carabinieri establishment exceeds this figure. Secondly that specific agreement be given for the retention of these men until the 31st March, 1945, by which time the future conditions affecting this matter will have been much more clearly defined.

9. I regret that I am not able to place before you a more specific plan for the eventual release of these men, but under the circumstances I do not feel that it is possible for me to give you a more definite appreciation than I have done in this letter. I take the opportunity to emphasize that the maintenance of law and order in the north of Italy is a matter which is receiving very serious consideration and that the Chief Commissioner feels that unless these 5,000 men will be available for the period which I have in mind, he will not be able to accept, with any proper confidence, the responsibility for the preservation of law and order with a strength of Carabinieri so inadequate to meet their onerous duties in the north.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

Brigadier,
V.P. C.A. Section,
Dep. G.O.S.

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FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

Brigadier,
V.P. C.A. Section,
Dep. C.O.S.

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S E C R E TCOPYALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 014.12/137 GCT-O

27 October 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, APO 390

1. The authorized strength of the Italian Carabinieri has been established at 55,000. Latest report indicate that the strength of the Carabinieri is approximately 45,000.

2. Representations have been made to this headquarters that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri, as the total strength of all Italy, is inadequate and that an increase of 10,000 be made to the ceiling.

3. In view of the fact that the Carabinieri are at present understrength to the same amount as the suggested increase, it is requested that before further consideration is given to increasing the overall ceiling of the Carabinieri, steps be taken to make up the deficiency by recruitment and such other means as may be available.

4. It is desired that the deficiency be made up by 31 December 1944.

By command of General WILSON:

/s/ R.H. Frese

/t/ R.H. FRESE,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

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27 Oct

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JMM/mit

G-5 : 014.12

30 September 1944

Captain Ellery Stone.
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

Dear Captain Stone :

Confirming conversation on the telephone and in reference to your letter Ref. 9/12.B/A.S. of 23 September, subject "Carabinieri", it is hoped we will be able to make arrangements to provide you for a temporary period of 3 or 4 months 5,000 bodies of a type useful to your problem. It will need two or three more days to get a decision on this.

In the meantime we are not pressing the matter of the ceiling, desiring not to muddy the water pending decision on this point. As soon as a decision is received, we will then proceed on the ceiling. As the troops, if and when available, will most likely be at your disposal only for a matter of months, we are presume that you will continue aggressively to pursue your long term policy for obtaining suitable volunteers from civil life.

Very truly yours,

J. MURRAY MITCHELL
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

cc: Afiles ✓

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30 Sept

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

ERS/dfo

A/CC 014.13

30 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner
Brigadier Upjohn, Admin. Section
Colonel Chapman

I had a telephone call this morning from Lt. Col. Mitchell of G-5 AFHQ with reference to my recent letter on Carabinieri. He stated that AFHQ had decided to press to secure us additional bodies on a temporary basis for the next three or four months--leaving to be handled as a separate issue the question of permanent increase in the Carabinieri strength or ceiling.

He further stated that G-5 felt that notwithstanding the possibility of our securing additional temporary personnel, ACC should put into effect urgently such recommendations made by General Browning on a long term basis for reorganizing and improving the efficiency of the CC.HR. as we approve.

56 423
Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
1 OCT 1944
Via M. sy. 1140
Initials CA

ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

FILES (A)-B

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SECRET

ITALIAN CAPTAINS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
AWC 794

Date: 9/12.B/A.S.

23d September, 1944.

SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL

AWC 6-5 Section, A.I.C.S.

1. The primary duty of this Commission is to maintain, or to ensure that the Italian Government maintains, law and order throughout the territory. The Carabinieri (CC. It.) form the principal force for the maintenance of law and order. Micheli, with one notable exception in Rome, they have been moderately successful in achieving this object. The future, however, has filled me with great anxiety for some months. There are not sufficient Carabinieri in the country to ensure the maintenance of law and order in Italy after the occupation of the Northern regions. In these regions particularly we shall be faced with a situation in which security problems will be more difficult than any we have hitherto met.

2. Forseeing this, I have for some time been in communication with AAI in an attempt to secure sufficient men for the Carabinieri in order that I may fulfil the responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order which are properly mine.

3. I enclose copies of correspondence which has passed between my HQ and HQ AAI. I would summarise the position as follows:-

- a) In my opinion 65,000 is the absolute minimum strength of Carabinieri necessary for the maintenance of law and order for the whole of Italy. My reasons are set forth in my letter of 24/8/44 (14.15 of L. Aug (marked "A")), addressed to HQ AAI.
- b) HQ AAI has so far refused permission for this ceiling which accordingly remains at 55,000. This is insufficient. Of these 55,000 it has been found possible to recruit only 43,000. It seems unlikely that I shall be able to reach the ceiling of 55,000 by the end of the year. The Carabinieri in the normal way, i.e. by finding

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exception in Rome, they have been moderately successful in achieving this object. The future, however, has filled me with great anxiety for some months. There are not sufficient Carabinieri in the country to ensure the maintenance of law and order in Italy after the occupation of the Northern regions. In these regions particularly we shall be faced with a situation in which security problems will be more difficult than any we have hitherto met.

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- a) In my opinion 65,000 is the absolute minimum strength of Carabinieri necessary for the maintenance of law and order for the whole of Italy. My reasons are set forth in my letter 14/03 CLM.13 of 2. Aug (marked "a"), addressed to the AAI.
- b) The AAI has so far refused permission for this ceiling which accordingly remains at 35,000. This is insufficient. Of these 35,000 it has been found possible to recruit only 13,000. It seems unlikely that I shall be able to reach the ceiling of 35,000 by drawing upon the Carabinieri in the neutral zone, i.e. by sending them in liberated areas as the Allies propose northwards. The reasons (or this are set out in my 1/01 CLM.13 AAI/11522/38 of 6 September addressed to the AAI, para 5 (marked "b"). It is hoped that the reports of scarcity of Carabinieri in the Northern regions may be exaggerated: it is possible that we may be able to find as many as 10,000 - 15,000 but although I cannot possibly count on finding a single man north of the Rimini-Pisa line, I am prepared to run a certain risk by anticipating finding of between 10,000 - 15,000.

c) This still leaves me with the necessity of finding at once 5,000 - 13,000 carabinieri to police the area north of the Rimini-Pisa line. This is an absolute minimum. I am prepared to plan on a basis of 11,000.

d) In the letter of 6th Sept referred to above (marked "d"), I accordingly suggested that 11,000 soldiers should be attached from the Regular Army by the AAI to the Carabinieri as a temporary measure. The Army Sub-Commission has told my Public Safety Sub-Commission that clothed and equipped soldiers are not available but no reply has been received from AAI.

4. In view of this refusal I have had to strip the rest of

014.13 Rm & Am Rm

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23 Sept

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- 2 -

Italy, particularly Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy to a dangerously low level. I have already sent 4,000 Carabinieri to Florence where a holding station for the North will be formed and am planning to send a further 2,000 making a total of 6,000 Carabinieri against 12,000 needed.

5. I must therefore repeat my request for an allocation of troops from Regular Army by MFA and I now formally ask that 5,000 soldiers should be released immediately for duty with the Carabinieri in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy (4,000 regular soldiers and 1,000 Carabinieri). In order that I can ensure in connection with grain collection in Sicily (in order that I can release a further 5,000 highly trained Carabinieri from these areas for duty in the North). Such an arrangement would give me the minimum of 12,000 required as an initial nucleus to go forward to the Northern areas.

6. I would add that it is essential that such soldiers should be fully equipped and clothed.

7. I attach comments of the GSO, Army Sub-Commission on this request and I would ask that an immediate decision be made in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the urgency necessary for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the claimed organization of the MFA now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the continuance of grave disorder in the North without the necessary force to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganization of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Southern Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in these areas.

8. Without the Carabinieri I shall be compelled to ask for more Allied troops in newly liberated areas.

9. With a view to saving time I have shown a draft of the above letter to G.O.C., MFA and his comments are attached (marked "C"). I do not want to commit in detail on his letter but would point out

a) valuable though the suggestions are for a reorganization of the G.O.C., they will take time. It takes far longer to train a good policeman than a good soldier.

b) we are already proposing to send a further 2,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy (see para 4 above).

c) it is the view of this HQ that the use of patriots who are completely untrained in police work would be extremely hazardous.

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formulation at once. I need not say that the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organization of the MIA men proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North Atlantic the necessary force to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganization of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in these areas.

8. Without the Carabinieri I shall be compelled to ask for more Allied troops in newly liberated areas.

9. With a view to saving time I have drawn a draft of the above letter to G.O.C., MIA and his comments are attached (marked "a"). I do not want to comment in detail on his letter but would point out

a) valuable though his suggestions are for a reorganization of the O.C.M. they will take time. It takes far longer to train a good policeman than a good soldier.

b) we are already intending to obtain a further 4,500 Carabinieri from the South of Italy (see para 4 above).

c) it is the view of this HQ that the use of patriots who are completely untrained in police work would be extremely hazardous.

d) we must accept the fact that the Carabinieri must be taken for the Carabinieri. This has been the custom in the past, with good reason. Having in view the future of the Italian Army consequent on the familiarization of Italy which presumably must take place when hostilities have ceased it is now even more necessary that the Carabinieri should take the course.

It is precisely because of the above difficulties and because my proposal is immediate (especially in view of the reported fall of Rimini) that I have asked for the allocation as a temporary measure of 5,000 soldiers so as to enable me to send 3,000 fully trained Carabinieri for duty in the North. I need hardly say that the suggestions made by G.O.C. MIA are being examined immediately in detail with a view to reorganization of the Carabinieri.

Hq A C C Secy Gen.

DISP 24 SEP 1944

Date Time

Via Mx. 1130

Initials

WALTER M. STONE

Captain, MIA

Acting Chief Commissioner.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

9/12. B/A.S.

Tel: 525

23rd Sept., '44.

MEMO TO ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

1. Herewith letter for signature by the Acting Chief Commissioner. Down to Para 8 inclusive you have already approved the draft.
2. You will note that in Para 9 we have annexed General Browning's comments on the draft, and made our own comments in reply thereto. These comments have been discussed with Brigadier Lush.
3. As this letter is so long I propose leaving the question of Army personnel for Rome for another letter.

G. R. Upjohn
G. R. UPJOHN. Brigadier.
V.P. Admin. Section.

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YMB.

COPY.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali (CC.RR)

RESTRICTED

Appendix "C"

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

SD/28

22 Sept 44.

H.Q. ACC (2)

Ref your proposals re CC.RR, I have the following comments to offer:

1. QUALIFICATION FOR CC.RR.

- (a) Applications are voluntary. CC.RR. are not conscripted.
- (b) Men must have completed their voluntary school studies.
- (c) They must have passed all medical requirements.
- (d) They must be 1.65 metres in height for foot CC.RR and 1.70 metres for mounted CC.RR.
- (e) If already in the Army, they must have C.Cs recommendation.
- (f) They must pass tests for CC.RR training.

Obviously a high class type of man is necessary.

2. TRANSFER OF SOLDIERS TO CC.RR

(a) If this is permanent, it involves a vast selection project covering the whole Army, which would take weeks if not months. It would produce transport difficulties in getting the soldiers to some central depots or depots from all over ITALY. It would skim the cream off an already indifferent Army, whose efficiency would in consequence suffer deplorably by the removal of 5000 of its superior personnel.

(b) If this is temporary I cannot see where it is to come from, except at the expense of some vital Army requirement. Vide Appx 'A' (latest ceiling proposals), there is no category or combination of categories which can transfer any soldiers, let alone 5000. Also, a transfer en bloc as formed units is useless, as CC.RR work is individual and a large proportion of the personnel of such units would be quite unsuitable, if not a positive menace.

I would mention that the Allied Garrison in CORSICA is composed

- (c) They must have passed all medical requirements.
 - (d) They must be 1.65 metres in height for foot CC.RR and 1.70 metres for mounted CC.RR.
 - (e) If already in the Army, they must have C.Os recommendation.
 - (f) They must pass tests for CC.RR training.
- Obviously a high class type of man is necessary.

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(b) If this is temporary I cannot see where it is to come from, except at the expense of some vital Army requirement. Vide Appx 'A' (latest ceiling proposals), there is no category or combination of categories which can transfer any soldiers, let alone 5000. Also, a transfer en bloc as formed units is useless, as CC.RR work is individual and a large proportion of the personnel of such units would be quite unsuitable, if not a positive menace.

I would mention that the Allied Garrison in CORSIKA is composed of men of Yugo-Slav origin; that ACC and M. of W. are pressing for the retention of both 2 Divs in SICILY owing to unrest; that Internal Security troops 4100' is already earmarked by AAI to be organised into essential guard battalions.

The figure of 18400 for reinforcements etc is illusory. A large proportion are not available, as this covers sick in hospital, men in transit men being called up etc. It is the only 'cushion' (and in my opinion too small a one) for the operation of the personnel side of the always changing Italian Army.

(c) From the above, it is obvious that NO transfers of soldiers from the Army proper to CC.RR is possible. Some other solution must be sought.

#3 HOW TO INCREASE STRENGTH OF CC.RR

(a) From para 2 it can be seen that the strength of CC.RR can

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22 Sept

Sheet 2.

3. HOW TO INCREASE STRENGTH OF CC.PP. (Contd)

a) contd. be increased ONLY by some new kind of organisation, special call-up or tapping of some other (than the Army) existing organisation.

(b) It would be possible to reinforce the Army conscription law and call back men from the older age groups. BUT -

(i) many would not answer the call. We are having great difficulty, as it is, in calling up men for the Army. Only a small proportion present themselves and if comprehensive action is taken to apprehend and punish delinquents, the trial and jail problem for this large number would produce another problem impossible of solution

(ii) those that did present themselves would for the most part come unwillingly (a wrong basis on which to coopt guardians of law and order) or be unsuitable.

(c) It would be possible to extend the existing Army conscription law all over liberated ITALY and to 'screen' the resultant call-up for men suitable for CC.PP. BUT this would mean that -

(i) the cream would be skimmed to go to CC.PP and the Army would get the 'leavings'. This would have serious repercussions in the Army, particularly as regards the 57,000 Combat Force. The great problems for the latter is the getting of specialists without which the Combat Groups cannot be effective. If CC.PP had first pick, these specialists would not be forthcoming.

(ii) the whole process, to get 5000 suitable men, would take a considerable time.

(d) There are in Rome the 'Metropolitani' i.e. the local auxiliary police. They exist, I understand, under other names, in all big towns. Here is one solution. Auxiliary police could be enlisted locally on a volunteer basis in all big towns, under a national charter for (say) one year only, with attractive terms of service and pay, to ensure the necessary number of applicants. The CC.PP nucleus in any town would control this auxiliary police.

(e) Another solution is to use the ready-made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 3 (d). This would have the great advantage of:

(i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.

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(c) It would be possible to 'screen' the resultant callings all over liberated ITALY and to 'screen' the resultant callings for CC.PP. BUT this would mean that -

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(e) Another solution is to use the ready-made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 3 (d). This would have the great advantage of :

- (i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.
- (ii) affording an outlet and recompense for patriot enthusiasms and good work.

Any political difference in the bands could be forbidden and negatived by the terms of the national charter and a form of oath.

(f) I do not know if any attempt has been made to recruit new CC.PP from the population as a whole. I think not. This is the obvious solution and should have been carried out by the CC.PP themselves long ago. A proclamation and appeals in the press, radio etc should even now bring forth applicants.

(g) Finally, it can be noted that any of the combat groups may be made available for I.S. control where necessary.

4. REORGANISATION OF CC.PP. ITSELF.

(a) I am not in a position to say whether a figure of 55,000 to ~~say~~ whether a figure of 55,000 (or 65,000) is really necessary. If the figure is put forward on the basis of pre-war it does NOT by any means follow that the figure need be so large. The Italians have always been extravagant in ~~power~~ power, which

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Sheet 3.

4. REORGANISATION OF CC.FR. ITSELF. (Contd)

(a) (Contd) which was always in plentiful supply.

(b) I suggest that there should be such scope for reorganisation within CC.FR., so as to do the job with less men. This would involve an examination into :-

(i) the degree of danger of trouble in the various areas and allotment of priorities, "risking" quiet areas such as APULIA etc.

(ii) The subdivision of allotment in all areas to reduce the wide distribution of CC.FR and achieve greater concentration of forces with the necessary reserves.

(iii) the actual duties required under present circumstances including the hours of work, number of reliefs provided per man per job etc.

(c) This in effect means that the CC.FR would be "cutting their coat according to their cloth", as the Army proper are doing. The whole 5000 required might be saved thereby.

5. TO SUM UP.

(a) The Army can NOT be tapped by either the temporary or permanent transfer of either personnel or units, without serious harm to the vital military effort.

Another solution must be found.

(b) The most likely solutions for exploration are:-

(i) for CC.FR to recruit fresh personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.

(ii) to extend the local "Metropolitani" or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC.FR retaining control.

(iii) to use the existing patriot organization as auxiliary police, with national charter and attractive terms of service on a volunteer basis.

(iv) to reorganise the CC.FR itself, to enable fewer men to do the same job.

(v) to use Combat Groups as and where necessary. Should the war end within the next few months, these would certainly

be available.

according to their clowns, as the Army proper are doing. The whole 5000 required might be saved thereby.

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- (ii) to extend the local "Metropolitani" or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC.FR retaining control.
- (iii) to use the existing patriot organization as auxiliary police, with national charter and attractive terms of service on a volunteer basis.
- (iv) to reorganise the CC.FR itself, to enable fewer men to do the same job.
- (v) to use Combat Groups as and where necessary. Should the war end within the next few months, these would certainly be available.

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L. BROWNING.

Major General.
Military Mission Italian Army.

tps. LB.
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encls.1.

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Appendix "A" to SD/28
dated 22 Sept 44.
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ITALIAN ARMY

1.	Administrative Installations	27,000
2.	Combat formations, including C.I.L.	57,000
3.	Service Units under Allied Command	
	(a) P.B.S.	53,000
	(b) FIFTH Army	12,000
	(c) Allied Garrison Sardinia	9,000
	(d) Allied Garrison CORSICA	5,000
	(e) British Command	93,000
4.	A.A. & C.D.	600
5.	Internal Security troops, including	
	(a) A.C.C.	3,000
	(b) 18 Guard Battalion (800)	14,000
	(c) S.I.M.	1,500
	(d) 2 Divs SICILY	10,000
	(e) 1 Div SARDINIA	5,000
	(f) Internal Security troops	4,100
6.	Reinforcements, sick in hospital not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel including Liaison Officers, Interpreters, etc.	18,400
7.	CC.P.R., including CC.P.R. assigned to Military formations	55,000
		368,000

4. A.A. & C.D. 600
5. Internal Security troops, including
- | | |
|------------------------------|--------|
| (a) A.C.C. | 3.000 |
| (b) 18 Guard Battalion (800) | 14.000 |
| (c) S.I.M. | 1.500 |
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| (e) 1 Div SARDINIA | 5.000 |
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7. CC.PP., including CC.PP assigned to Military formations 55.000
-
- 368.000
-
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A/CU 014.13

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference your 1605/50/44/G (SDI) dated 13 Aug 44.
2. In compliance with para 4 of the above letter, I submit as Appendix "A" hereto a brief outline showing the organization, strength and location of the Carabinieri.
3. With respect to the suggestions made in para 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". With respect there cannot be two such classes anymore than you could have part of the Italian Army maintained by the Allies and part by the Italian Government.

The reason briefly is that the Carabinieri are an integral part of the Italian Army and the senior corps in the Army; this fact coupled with the importance of their duties (especially in connection with the black market) make it essential for them to continue to receive Army rations, Army petrol and Army clothing as at present; there is no other source from which these essential supplies can come.

4. As already pointed out in para 2 above, for all administrative purposes the Carabinieri are under the control of the Italian Government. It is true that in Military Government Territory, ACC Public Safety Officers supervise the duties of the Carabinieri, but the functions and organization remains unchanged. In fact, territory can be handed over to the Italian Government without the necessity of making any changes whatever in Carabinieri organization and administration. Rations, petrol, clothing and supplies are unaffected by the assumption of control by the Italian Government.

Again this proposal will not have the effect of reducing the Carabinieri strength.

5. It appears that the purpose of the proposed changes is to limit the amount of food and equipment to be supplied from Allied sources. In this connection it is our view that fundamental changes in the organization of the Italian police ought not to be made merely

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because of a temporary shortage of supplies. The organization of the Italian Police Forces is complex, affecting numerous Government Departments and civilian agencies. This Commission is not charged with the task of making constitutional changes in Italian national institutions, which is a matter for the Italian Government.

6. The following observations are offered regarding the specific suggestions made in para 3 of your letter:

a. Formation of separate corps of Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia.

Separate Carabinieri Brigades exist in Sicily and Sardinia. If it is proposed that these Brigades should be treated differently from other Brigades in the matter of rations and supplies this Commission advises most strongly against any such discrimination, which would be fatal to the "esprit de corps" of the Carabinieri.

From the political standpoint any proposal to divorce Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia from Carabinieri on the mainland would almost certainly be taken as a sign of encouragement by the "Separatist" parties.

It is pointed out that this proposal will do nothing to reduce the Carabinieri ceiling.

b. Transfer of Carabinieri to Finance Guards.

It will be appreciated that the functions of the Carabinieri are entirely different from those of the Finance Guards, who, under the control of the Ministry of Finance, are mainly engaged in enforcing revenue laws.

This is specialized work for which the Carabinieri are not trained. Carabinieri duties, on the other hand, are quite outside the experience of the Finance Guards. Further, the method and standards of selection and recruitment are different; lastly, such a transfer would be fatal to the esprit de corps of the CCRA.

7. In general it must be emphasized that the Carabinieri is part of the Italian Army with proud traditions and high morale. Any attempt to break up the Carabinieri at this stage would be disastrous to a body which has already done much to aid the Allied cause and whose services are still essential to the war effort in Italy.

1 Incl:
Appendix "A"

Draft submitted by:
Brig. Upjohn, Admin Sec

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED

Date: 6 Sept 1943

VIA

Encls

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ELDERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

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APPENDIX "A"

6 September 1944

CARABINIERI REGALI

1. Present Organization

a. The present organization of the Carabinieri consists of a General Headquarters at Rome; two divisions (2nd and 3rd) with Hqs at Rome and Naples, respectively. Each division normally consists of two brigades. Thus far three brigades have been activated: Rome, Naples and Palermo. A fourth brigade will soon be activated at Florence. Eventually the first Division will be reactivated with Hqs at Milan.

b. The brigades are sub-divided into Legions, the strength of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the moment, there are nine Legions namely: Abruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the Legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organized.

c. Each Legion is sub-divided into progressively small units: Groups, Companies, Lieutenancies, Sections and Stations. The jurisdiction of Group corresponds to that of Province.

2. The present strength is indicated as follows as of 1 August:

General HQ	129	Replacement Centre, Bari	381
Abruzzi Legion	2502	Replacement Centre, Rome	3013
Bari Legion	4564	Nucleus for the Activation	
Cagliari Legion	4053	of Florence Legion	300
Catanzaro Legion	2797	Nucleus for the Activation	
Lazio Legion	4446	of Leghorn Legion	100
Messina Legion	3546	RCO's Bn Bari	231
Napoli Legion	5726	Cadet Bn Andria	728
Rome Legion	4602	Cadet Bn Barletta	514
Palermo Legion	4764	Cadet Bn Gallipoli	409
Replacement Centre, Naples	255	Cadet Bn Cagliari	515
		Cadet Bn Palermo	379
			<u>43954</u>

Strength of the Leghorn nucleus is not available at this time. The total strength shown of 41,892 includes all Carabinieri serving with troops.

Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 3,011.

3. Future Organization.

It is planned that the future organization on the basis of an authorized strength of 85,000 will be approximately as indicated below. Allowance of course must be made for developments which might warrant

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an increase in strength in a particular area.

Strength of G.C.M. for all of Italy
based on a ceiling of 65,000

Torino	4211	Napoli	3220
Alessandria	2544	Bari	2640
Genova	4793	Catanzaro	2037
Livorno	2543	Palermo	2870
Milano	5289	Messina	2105
Verona	2244	Commando Generale	84
Bolzano	2715	Inspectorates of Brigades	30
Padova	2698	Central School	158
Trieste	3256	Cadet Legion	3960
Bologna	3285	Rome Battalion	1200
Firenze	3001	Palermo Bn	500
Abruzzi	2094	Squadron Groups	300
Cagliari	2134	Band	80
Roma	2487	King's Guards	90
Lazio	2432		
			<u>65000</u>

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EWS/hjp

A/CC 014.13
ACC/14,622/PS

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference 1605/50/44/G (SDI), dated 13 Aug 44.
2. A communication, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under separate cover.
3. However, since my letter to you of 1 August, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the PISA - RIMINI line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this Commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.
4. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43,954 men. A ceiling of 55,000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian Army is short at least 11,000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the DMIA be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11,000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Reali. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the CCAR to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.
5. Furthermore if no CCAR are found in the North it may be necessary to go further and ask that in order to make up the balance of 23,000, which in my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the North (see my A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug paras 5 and 6), part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCAR to work with them on police duties. Such an attachment has been arranged in Sicily in connection with the grain system and is working well.

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6. This Commission is still of the view that a Carabinieri strength of 65,000 is necessary. The need therefore was set forth in my letter of 1 August. But since the prospect of reaching the present authorized ceiling is made virtually impossible by the action of the Germans, it is urgently requested that favorable consideration be given to the proposal made above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered.

ELBERT W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Army Sub-Commission

Draft submitted by:
Brig. Upjohn, Admin Section

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Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date - Time 6 Sept 1916
Via Hq.
Initials DFR

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Acting Chief Commissioner.HQ APO 394
44 Sec y Gen.
45 5 Sept 11/60
By PER

4 September 41.

I submit drafts of two letters to AAI for approval.

The first (and longer) is a reply to AAI's letter; it deals only with points raised by that letter and encloses the information asked for. The second introduces an entirely new point namely the reported deportation from E. Italy to Germany of 14,000 CC.RR.

If the drafts are approved may one copy of each be returned noted to that effect, the originals are for use of the Sec Gen in preparing the letter for your signature.

Ext: 525
SHW/wb

G. R. Upjohn

G.R. UPJOHN, Brigadier,
Vice President, Admin Section.

OTR

hm

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(13) DRAFT

EWS/dfc

Acting Chief Commissioner

Strength of Carabinieri

Acting Head, Administrative Section

26 August

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I think it is of the greatest importance, both in the administration of Italy and as tactics to secure upward revision of the authorized strength of the Carabinieri to 65,000 as the Public Safety Sub-Commission recommends, to recruit to fill immediately the vacancies between the present actual strength of 42,000 and the present authorized strength of 55,000.

Kindly let me have your report on this at the Vice Presidents' Meeting on August 28th.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

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Ho ACC - Secy Gen.
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26 Aug.

EWS/dfa

Acting Chief Commissioner

Italian Carabinieri

A/CC 014.13

Acting Head, Administrative Section

15 August 4

1. Reference is AAI's letter 1605/50/44/G(SD1) of 13 August attached hereto.

2. Forwarded for action.

(24)

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl.
AAI ltr (see para 1
above)

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Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
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Date - Time 15 Aug 1950
Via Mags.
Initials PPK.

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15 Aug.

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A/CC 000.1

14 August 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of 18 July, 1944/10447/19.11, informing the Allied Control Commission of the appointment of General Taddeo Orlando as Commander of the Carabinieri Reali. This appointment meets with the full approval of the Allied Control Commission.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USRA
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government

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Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
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Date-Time 14 Aug 1944
Via HA
Initials UPR

14 Aug -

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DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

EWS/hd

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

A/CC 000.1

~~26 July 1944~~

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter^{10448/} of 18 July, 10447/19.11, ~~10449 and~~
~~10448~~, informing the Allied Control Commission of the appointment
 of General Taddeo Orlando as Commander of the Carabinieri Reali, and
~~Professor Gustavo Ingrassia as President of the Court of Accounts.~~
^{This}
~~These~~ appointments meet, with the full approval of the Allied Control
 Commission.

Yours very truly,

DRAFT

ELLERY W. STONE
 Captain, USNR
 Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
 The President of Council of Ministers
 Italian Government

18

21 July

Col. Bradley-Smith says Ingrassia's
 appointment is not to be confirmed, pending
 a talk with Segesser. (P)

Re - Orlando -
 Army S/C
 no objection

25

3 Aug.
 with Fin. S/C - not ready
 Aug. - ditto

SUBJECT:- Italian Carabinieri

Acc

Secy General
SECRET
1862

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.
1605/50/44/G(SDI)

13 Aug 44

HEADQUARTERS

14 AUG 1944

A. C. C.

Ref your A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug 44.

ACC

1. It will be appreciated that the manpower ceiling for the Italian Army, of which the Carabinieri form part, has been reduced and that it is essential, therefore, that the reduced number pay the best dividend in the interest of the war effort as a whole.

2. It is regretted that approval to hold personnel in excess of 55,000 and to pay such personnel a ration allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, petrol etc all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of :-

- (a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.
- (b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

184.2 While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing :-

- (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri
- (b) present strengths and location of all units and detachments

(a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.

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184. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing :-

- (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri
- (b) present strengths and location of all units and detachments
- (c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of ITALY.

This information will serve as a basis for further examination of the problem.

Copy to:-
 MEMA
 MA to CGS
 MA to CAO
 DCAO
 G(Ops)
 A Q

for Lieutenant-General,
 Chief of General Staff.

13 Aug.

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

No. 11524/10447.1.19

Rome, 3 August 1944

Dear Admiral,

I received your letter A/CC 01413 dated 23 inst.

I wish to assure you that I have myself shown it to
General Orlando.

Please accept, dear Admiral, my most cordial greetings

/s/ I. Bonomi

→ Admiral Ellery W. Stone USA
A/President
Allied Control Commission

→ c/c sent to Pub Safety - 6 Aug - 100

18.7

Trans - EL/lws

Files A+B/
700

(23)

11524/10447.1.19
3 Aug 44

HO ACC. APO 394
422 Sec Y Gen.
Rec'd 11/15/44
7/11/44

A 2030
- 7 AUG 1944

014,13

R. 11524/10447.1. 19



IL PRESIDENTE
DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

Roma, 3 agosto 1944.-

Caro Ammiraglio,

HQ A.C.C. APQ 394
422 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 6 Aug 11 46
By PRC.

ho ricevuto la Sua lettera A.C.C. 01413 del 23 corrente.- Desidero assicurarLa che del contenuto di essa io stesso ho dato conoscenza al Generale ORLANDO.-

Gradisca, caro Ammiraglio, i miei migliori saluti

Scorini

Ammiraglio ELLERY W. STONE U.S.A.
ff. Presidente della Commissione
Alleata di Controllo

= R O M A =

SECRET

File (A) B

EWS/dfe

A/CC 014.13

1 August 1944

Subject: Strength of Carabinieri Reali

To: Hq, AAI

1. By signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July, the following information was received:

"RESTRICTED (.) spoke HAMPTON McQUEEN (.) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 Jun and recommended subsequently to AFHQ total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed fifty-five thousand (.) 1605/50/3/G (SDI) of 19 Jun refers."

The office of origin was Main AAI: the addressee was MMIA.

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CGRA nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of ACC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ACC organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

a. The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.

b. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 65,000, exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

c. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,300.

d. In addition to the foregoing, the following duties, coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the

- 1 -

SECRET

files (H) 12/4/44

SECRET

occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali:

- (1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.
- (2) Dealing with refugees.
- (3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.
- (4) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilians and troops.
- (5) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
- (6) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
- (7) Enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

e. The uncertain state of public discipline, following in the wake of war and the overthrow of the Fascist government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrants a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions.

f. Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

4. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jun is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is submitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

18. =
- a. that the ration ceiling be lifted, or if that is impossible,
 - b. that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5. In the opinion of the Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situation as it exists, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 41,892, making maximum use of

2 -
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA-RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6. If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA-RIMINI line, i.e., the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 3 of this letter, this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

7. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5, AFHQ

1802

Hq ACC - Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 3 Aug 1020
Via AG m/c
Initials J.F.B.

cc: Admin. Section
Files (A) B

(22)

- 3 -
~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

HQ ACC APO 394
331
Rec'd 1 Aug 1944
By *SR*

ACC/14622/PS.

1 Aug 44.
huc

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

Attached for your consideration is a revised draft of a proposed letter to HQ AAI, on the above mentioned subject.

18.

OK to write
sm

G. R. Upjohn
G. R. UPJOHN Col.,
A/Hd Admin Sec.

A/366

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: ACC MAIN

7 AUG 1944

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 41/01

FROM: ACC REGION 6

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REFERENCE No:

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: AUG 011641B

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE ACC 035

REFERENCE YOUR CABLE 1129 DATED 29 JULY. YOUR 749 OF 20 JULY CANNOT BE TRACED. DUE TO PREVALENCE CRIMES OF VIOLENCE IN RURAL DISTRICTS DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY FURTHER REDUCTION CC RR STRENGTH HERE. 1220 CC RR HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED.

DIST

ACTION - P Safety	2
INFO - A/CC	2
FILE	
WICAT	

13-091.711

014.13

1103

DIST
ACTION - P Safety 2
INFO - A/CC 2
FILE
FLOAT

014.13

13-091.711

h ✓

file
Drs/1000

AUG 012136E

DATE and Time of RECEIPT

~~SECRET~~

Distribution:

see 2501
1000000

18-11

4

R.O. Region VI for R.P.S.O.

A 2034
7 AUG 1944

HQ AGC Public Safety S/C
1129

SECRET
PRIORITY

P.S. Sub-Commission.

16a

PLEASE EXPEDITE REPLY TO THIS HQ SIGNAL NUMBER ² ~~SEVEN~~
⁴ ⁹ ² ⁰ YOUR FIVE DATED TWO ZERO JULY PD PAREN TO HQ REGION
SIX FOR RPSO FROM HQ AGC PAREN PD WHICH READS DITTO
STRENGTH CORR IS SUBJECT PD PRESENT ORILING INTENDED
TO OFFICE WHOLE ITALY PD WHOLE COLON IT WILL BE NECESSARY
TO REDUCE STRENGTH OF CORR IN ALL REGION IN ORDER TO MEET
NEEDS IN REPLY CAPTURED TERRITORY PD WHOLE MATTER NOW
UNDER CONSIDERATION PLEASE STATE BY CABLE, YOUR VIEWS
ON REDUCTION IN YOUR REGION AND CONFIRM IN MORE DETAIL
BY LETTER DITTO

014-13

11-041,211

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✓
file @ HB/290

SWS/hjp

A/CC 014.13

23 July 1944

Subject: Command of Carabinieri Reali

23 JUL 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In my letter to you of 16 July, file A/CC 014.13, subject as above, I indicated to you the concern which the Allied Control Commission has in the Command and organization of the Carabinieri Reali. Since then, following consultation with me, General Taddeo Orlando has been designated Commanding General.

It is quite probable that General Orlando with the approval of the Minister of War has under consideration plans for the re-organization of the CCRR. As this Commission is so vitally interested in the maintenance of law and order behind the fighting line, I am sure you will agree that such plans should be discussed fully with the Allied Control Commission before they become operative.

Furthermore, under our agreement regarding the appointment of higher officials, the names of any proposed changes (appointments, dismissals, transfers, etc.) in the officer personnel of CCRR in the rank of Colonel and above will of course be communicated to the Commission.

I suggest that initially, these matters be communicated to the Public Safety Sub-Commission of which Colonel Paul G. Kirk is the Director.

Yours very truly,

ELERY W. STONE
Captain, USMR
Acting Chief Commissioner

19 His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of Council of Ministers
Italian Government

cc: Army Sub-Com.
Public Safety S/C

A/CC 014.13 FILES (A) B
23 Jul 44

014.13

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
AFC 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

AS3/14601/17/3/PS.

21 Jul 44.

SUBJECT : GCR.

TO : Secretary General. (19)

1 The attached letter addressed to the Acting Chief Commissioner is forwarded for submission to him.

(17) 2 With regard to the draft letter, addressed to the Prime Minister it will be noticed that this is not entirely in accord with para 6 of Col Kirk's ^{letter}. The letter has been re-drafted in this Section and agreed by Col Kirk in its present form and substance.

HBC/gal
Ext 608

2. July

G. R. Upjohn

G. R. UPJOHN Col,
As Head Admin Sec.

Col Upjohn thought
that Capt. Stone
would like to
see this
before he
sees Orlando
tomorrow.

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(PEU)

18

21 Jul 44

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

20th July, 1944

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner (thru' V.A.Admin.Sec.)

1. The designation of Gen. Taddeo Orlando, former Minister of War, as Commanding General of the Carabinieri Reali, has been announced by the Council of Ministers. As I stated to you when we discussed the matter, the appointment, in and of itself, would seem to be unobjectionable. Gen. Orlando is an officer of high rank and considerable military experience. It is no violation of precedent for an officer of the Italian General Staff to be placed in command of the Arma. The major misgiving which I had (and still have) on the subject was the apparently complete indifference of the Council of Ministers to the conspicuous service rendered by Gen. Picche to the Allies as the Commanding General of the CC.RR. during the last nine months when the Italian General Staff showed practically no interest in the CC.RR.

17. 2. The purpose of this letter is not to express dissent in any form to the appointment, which is an accomplished fact. My purpose is to point out what I believe to be the important implications in the appointment of Gen. Orlando and to suggest precautionary measures which may be adopted. The appointment cannot be viewed as an isolated fact. It must be viewed in the light of all the facts and circumstances which attend it. One of the circumstances which surround it is the prospective reduction in the size of the Italian Army, and the consequent drastic reduction of the number of generals and other high ranking officers in that Army. Another attending circumstance is the relative certainty that, of all the elements of the Army,

20 Jul 44

there would be a guaranteed substantial minimum strength, including general officers and colonels, for the Carabinieri Reali.

? 3. The inference which can be reasonably drawn from the foregoing is that the Italian General Staff will seek to save itself at the expense of the Arma. This, I submit most earnestly, should give us pause.

4. The Carabinieri is of the Army but it is not always with it. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognized that fact when on the one hand they planned the fight against the Italian Army and simultaneously, on the other hand, designated the CC.RR. as the agency upon which we should mainly rely for the maintenance of public order. The officer corps of the Carabinieri except the Commanding General are not only specialist career men who as subalterns entered the Arma, but share a tradition of which they are, and have a right to be, very proud namely; that they are non-political and seek only to protect lives and property, and to enforce the law equally as to all. The fact that they, in common with the officers of the Army as a whole, come under the jurisdiction of the Minister of War, should not blind us to the essential difference in character, purpose and tradition.

? 5. If it is the purpose of the Minister of War and the General Staff with the acquiescence of Gen. Orlando to unload senior officers of the Army on the CC.RR., we should resist it, and for the following reasons:-

a) The scheme would defeat the spirit of the proposed reduction in army strength on the grounds stated in paragraph 4 above.

b) It would be condoning a stratagem which closely parallels that resorted to by the Germans to perpetuate their general staff after the last war.

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(17)

✓
c) It would be a decided disservice to the Carabinieri Reali as an institution, and ultimately to the people of Italy. The Carabinieri fared ill during the Fascist regime. It has since felt the harsh impact of clashing armies as it sought to serve the people. Of all the agencies of the Italian State, I submit that it deserves well at the hands of the Allies. None has merited more their complete and sympathetic interest with a view to restoring the primacy of prestige and efficiency and "esprit de corps" which it enjoyed at one time and upon which we capitalized. (Reference Appendix to Public Safety monthly report dated 7 April 1944). That we at this stage should tacitly consent to the administration of a "coup de grace" in order to save the unpopular military clique, is unthinkable.

6. It is fully realized by me that there is as yet no direct evidence tending to show that the situation portrayed above will come to pass. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to meet it before it does. I had originally considered the advisability of preparing a letter requesting that Gen. Orlando submit to me the names and records of officers of the rank of Lt.Col. and above whom he proposed to transfer to the Carabinieri Reali in addition to, or in substitution for, the officers of such grade now serving. Upon reconsideration, I doubt if this would be efficacious. Presumably Gen. Orlando, in consultation with the Minister of War, will devise an over-all plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri. Before that plan, in any phase, is undertaken, we should know of it. I have therefore drafted the appended letter which I submit for your consideration for forwarding to the President of the Council of Ministers.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

PGK/ngd

(17)

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

749

DISTRO PERBASS CAMPORASSO PARLE FIVE ARMY EIGHT ARMY

ACC IE

A 1866
28 JUL 1944SECRET
PRIORITY

20 July 1944

Civil Affairs Branch

STRAIGHT CORRE IS SUBJECT TO PARISH TO DISTRO FOR ACC REGION TWO CMA TO PERBASS FOR ACC
REGION THREE CMA TO CAMPORASSO FOR ACC REGION FIVE CMA PARLE FOR ACC REGION SIX CMA
FIVE ARMY FOR ACC CMA EIGHT ARMY FOR ACC FROM ACC IE PARISH TO PRESENT CHILIN IMPROVED
 TO SUPPLY WIKIA ITALY TO RESULT COLON IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REDUCE SURVEILLANCE OF
 CORRE IN ALL REGIONS IN ORDER TO MEET NEEDS IN NEWLY CAPTURED TERRITORY TO WHILE
 MATTER NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION PLEASE STATE BY CABLE YOUR VIEWS ON REDUCTION IN YOUR
 REGION AND COMMENT IN MORE DETAIL BY LETTER

178

014.13

DISTRIBUTION:

Region I	Rome Region
Region IV	Executive Commissioner
Region VII	Public Safety Sub-Comm.
Region VIII	Admin. Section
Region IX	Italian Refugees Branch (for Comment also)

(A)

L.T. MONTANT JR
1st Lt. AGO
Adjutant

(16) a

Foley 100

20 Jul 44

TRANSLATION

No - 10448-10447/19.11

HQ ACC, APO 394
 207 Sec'y Gen.
 Rec'd 24 Jul 1944
 By RTB

A 1833

25 JUL 1944

THE PRESIDENT

OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, July 18th 1944

Dear Admiral Stone,

In application of the accords referred to by the letter of March 10, 1944, CC/P I 34/000.1 of the Allied Control Commission, I communicate to you that the Council of Ministers, in the meeting of to-day, has nominated Lieutenant General Taddeo Orlando Chief Commander of the Royal Carabinieri Corps.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ivanoe Bonomi

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 R 760 000.1

Admiral Ellery W. STONE

Chief Commissioner of the A. C. C.

R O M E

16

10448-10447

18 July

Files 7413
 401

N-10448-10447/19.11



IL PRESIDENTE

DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

Roma, 18 luglio 1944

HQ ACC. APO. 1944

207

Rec.

By

24 July 1944

Caro Ammiraglio Stone,

in applicazione degli accordi cui si riferisce la lettera 10 marzo 1944, CC/P I 34/000.1 della Commissione Alleata di Controllo, Le comunico che il Consiglio dei Ministri, nella riunione odierna, ha deliberato la nomina del Generale di Corpo d'armata Taddeo Orlando a Comandante Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali.

Saluti cordiali

014.13

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014.13

James S. ...

rato la nomina del Generale di Corpo d'Armata Radde-
Orlando a Comandante Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri-
ri Reali.

Saluti cordiali

AMIRAGLIO ELLERY W. STONE
Commissario Capo A.C.C.

R O M A

11/11

Files (A) B

SG-516

17 JUL 1944

EWS/hjp

A/CC 014.13

16 July 1944

Subject: Command of Carabinieri Reali

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It is to be expected that the Council of Ministers will shortly give consideration to the designation of a Commanding General for the Carabinieri Reali.

In view of the many important technical and personnel problems involved, and the intimate connection between the work of the CC.RR. and the military operations of the Allied Armies, I have no doubt that you will wish to confer with the Allied Control Commission before any decision is made.

Yours very truly,

MILLY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1789
His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of Council of Ministers
Italian Government

cc: Col. Zupjohr

(15)e

A/CC 014.13
16 Jul 44

File 148

014.13

DRAFT

O/H. B. File (A)

SUBJECT : Command of Carabinieri Reali.

TO : His Excellency, Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers.

1. It is to be expected that the Council of Ministers will shortly give consideration to the designation of a Commanding General for the Carabinieri Reali.
2. In view of the many important technical and personnel problems involved, and the intimate connection between the work of the CC.RR and the military operations of the Allied Armies, I have no doubt that you will wish to confer with the Allied Control Commission before any decision is made.

ELLERY W. STONE,
Captain U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner

To A/Chief Commissioner.

1788

Col Kirk reports that the Cabinet yesterday considered putting some of their high ranking staff officers into the CCRR "to save them". I think we should be in on this & the above mentioned draft for your consideration is intended to preclude the Cabinet from taking a quick step behind our backs.

16 July. G. R. W.
C.A.

2143

785015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

2990

DSN 1571
- 8 JUL 1944

TO: ACC MAIN FOR ARMY SUBCOMMISSION L O FOR BROWNING

FROM: ACC REAR FROM KIRK SIGNED STONE SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N 96/5

REFERENCE No: NR 3045 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: JULY 5/1700 OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

REFERENCE MESSAGE HAMBLEN TO BROWNING STRENGTH CC RR NOT OUT OF PROPORTION. REDUCTION
CANNOT BE MADE. LETTER FOLLOWS WITH PROPOSAL. CONFERENCE WITH YOU DESIRED

MAJECCE DIST

Action - Army 10(2)

Info - JEPCC -

FILE

FLONT (2)

014-13

1787

REFERENCE MESSAGE HAMLEN TO BROWNING STRENGTH CC RR NOT OUT OF PROPORTION. REDUCTION
CANNOT BE MADE. LETTER FOLLOWS WITH PROPOSAL. CONFERENCE WITH YOU DESIRED

MAJCC DIST

Action - Army 10(2)
Info - JEPCC -
File
FOAT (2)

014-13

1787

(15)

File/and

DATE and Time of RECEIPT JULY 5/1745

3045

Distribution:

5 Jul 44

CONFIDENTIAL

REAR HEADQUARTERS
 ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
 Public Safety Sub-Commission
 APO 394

Asst. Chief Commissioner

44370

ACC/14522/PS

5th July, 1944

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.RR and GG.FF.

DSO 1590
 10 JUL 1944

TO : Army Sub-Commission ACC. (Major General Browning)

Reference your G/6/1 of 27 June, 1944

1. In connection with the letter above referred to, wherein it was recommended that the total strength of the Carabinieri Reali and Guardia di Finanza should not, in the aggregate, exceed 55,000, it is requested that I be invited to confer with you in order that the relationship of the two bodies to one another and to the Italian Army may be clarified before any final decision is reached.

2. Pending such a conference, I wish to invite your attention to the following observations:

- a) The Carabinieri Reali is an integral component of the Italian Army and is the senior element thereof. Its primary mission is the maintenance of public order. Its normal peace-time strength is 55,000 officers and men. By decree of July 25, 1943 Marshal Badoglio authorized the strength of the CC.RR to be increased to 65,000. The Combined Chiefs of Staff designated the Carabinieri Reali as the police agency upon which reliance would primarily be placed to preserve public order, it having been specifically determined that military police battalions would not be available for this purpose. With the disbandment or dissolution of numerous other special police bodies, the duties hitherto performed by them have devolved upon the CC.RR. This, together with the general state of unrest following in the wake of war and the lack of or defective means of communication, has taxed the strength of the CC.RR to the utmost. There is every reason to believe that the conditions which have hitherto pertained will not only continue, but will be considerably aggravated as

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ACC/14622/PS
 5 Jul 44

File/you
12 Jul 44

the advance to the north, with its numerous industrial centres, continues. That in the face of such conditions the strength of the CC.RR should be reduced below its peace time level is a decision which is fraught with peril and to which this sub-commission registers most emphatic dissent. Rather it is the view of this sub-commission that the strength of the CC.RR because of its manifold increased duties and because of the uncertain state of public discipline, should be augmented above, rather than cut below, its normal peace-time level. The present strength of the CC.RR is 33,909. Of this number 30,836 are engaged in public order duties; the remainder work under the direction of the Italian General Staff with the Italian Army. It is likewise believed that, save for the units of the Italian Army actually committed to combat, first priority as to armament uniforms, and equipment especially motor transport should be accorded to the Carabinieri Reali. Whatever factors may enter into revision of the effective strength of the Italian Army as a whole, the incontrovertible fact is that the Carabinieri has a continuing and growing responsibility.

- 171
- b) The Guardia di Finanza is not an integral part of the Italian Army. It depends as you are aware, from the Minister of Finance. It is construed however, to be one of the armed forces of the Crown and for disciplinary purposes is under the command of a general officer detailed by the Italian General Staff. Because of its quasi-military character, it was, upon the invasion of Italy by the Allied Armies, diverted from its normal duties of enforcing revenue laws etc., and required to assist in the maintenance of public order. It was for this reason that it was included with the assent of AAI amongst the elements which were entitled to draw rations from Army sources. The CC.FF continue in many cases, especially in the forward areas, to be used for general law enforcement purposes, although as soon as possible they are permitted to revert to their normal duties.

The present strength of the CG. 37 is, as reported to us, 3,171. The normal peace-time establishment is 3,148.

- c) If the underlying reason for the proposed reduction in strength of both the CG. 37 and CG. 38 is to keep the Italian army within a predetermined ration ceiling, then it is most respectfully submitted that a different approach be used to solve the problem. Under no circumstances, in our view, should the strength of the CG. 37 be reduced. Rather, an increase should be expected and provided for. Similarly, the strength of the CG. 38 should not be reduced. The solution which is now offered, if the decision reached as to ceiling is inflexible, is that the CG. 37 be dropped from the army ration and be authorized to draw the special ration for public safety personnel from civilian sources (schedule C special ration scale); and that the CG. 38 continue to draw ration from army sources up to at least its normal peace time strength. Before this suggestion, if acceptable, is adopted and made effective an opportunity should be afforded this sub-commission to make the requisite arrangements with the Food Sub-Commission to implement it as to the CG. 37. If, pending this adjustment, an overdraft of ration is made, it will later be compensated for because the CG. 38 will not have reached its authorized strength even according to your figures.

3. Finally, it is urged upon you most strongly that a reduction in the strength of the CG. 37 could invite consequences which are not at all pleasant to contemplate and for which this sub-commission cannot share responsibility.

178

Copies to:

Acting Chief Commissioner
Adm. Vice-President
Food Sub-Commission

PAUL S. WIRE,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

SUBJECT: Strength of CC.RR and GG.FF.

Army Sub Commission, A.G.C.
Main HQ (MIA)
LEQUILL (IECCE)
G/6/1
27 June 44.

To: Public Safety Sub Commission, ACC

copy to: HQ ACC ✓
HQ AAI (2)
Minister for War
Chief of Staff, SURE.

DSV 1973
3 JUL 1944

Reference: - your ACC/14622/PS of 20 June 1944.

1. Attention is invited to letter 1605/50/3 (SDI) HQ AAI dated 19 June 1944, addressed to AFHQ. This letter recommends that the ceiling of the CC.RR and the GG.FF shall be 55,000 in case the total ceiling for the Italian Armed Forces is maintained at 444,300.

2. Paragraph 5 of above letter is quoted for your information:

"Personnel in excess of ceiling. 5. The question as to whether part of the administrative establishments, sick, reinforcements and personnel in transit could be carried in excess of the ceiling was considered. In view of the difficulties of implementation and the lack of clothing and other stores it was not found practicable for such personnel to exist on the strength of the Italian Army and be a charge against the Italian Government Administration."

3. The CC.RR and GG.FF are a part of the Italian Armed Forces, and the total strength of these units cannot, in accordance with this letter, exceed 55,000.

4. The strength return submitted by you indicates that as of 1 May the total strength of the CC.RR and GG.FF, including the personnel assigned to military formations was 47,282. It is understood that another seven or eight thousand will be picked up in Rome. The ration strength is, of course, somewhat under this figure inasmuch as some men are given an allowance of money in lieu of rations. However, it is believed that the total figure should be held within 55,000, regardless of the ration strength, for the following reasons:

(a) The Italian Government cannot be allowed to maintain a private Army of any size which is not carried on the strength returns submitted to the Allies.

(b) The maintenance of a private Army would further drain Italian resources

014.13

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(a) The Italian Government cannot be allowed to maintain a private Army of any size which is not carried on the strength returns submitted to the Allies.

(b) The maintenance of a private Army would further drain Italian resources which should be used to assist in maintaining the authorized army and decrease the amount of food imported by the Allies. This applies whether or not the personnel is issued army rations or civilian rations.

5. Instructions are in the course of preparation covering the reports to be submitted by the Minister for War on the strength of the Italian Armed Forces. These instructions will provide that all members of the Italian Armed Forces be reported on the strength returns, and that proper deduction be made on the ration demands for personnel not issued rations for any reason.

6. In order to stabilize the strength of the Italian Armed Forces as quickly as possible, it is requested that you issue necessary instructions to the CC.RR and GG.FF that the total combined strength of the two units does not exceed 55,000 and that hereafter the returns submitted to the Minister for War will show:

(a) Total strength of the Forces, regardless of how rationed, in two parts as follows:

(i) Assigned to and operating under command of Army formations, and Headquarters.

(ii) Operating under command of CC.RR and GG.FF.

Number of personnel of (ii) above to be issued Army rations.

A. Brown
Major General,
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

9/6/11
29 Jan 44
tva.

RESTRICTED

1087

DCC

ACTION ACC MAIN

10 JUN 1944

S/08

FREEDOM

RESTRICTED

F56333

NONE

JUN071936

CITE/FHCAB

(8)

LOOK AT AFHQ MESSAGE F53671 SUBJECT RELEASE OF CORR FOR USE IN ITALY.
 EXPLAIN HOW NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS NATURE WERE CONDUCTED BY YOU WITH
 A COMMAND OUTSIDE MEDITERRANEAN AND NOT THROUGH AFHQ.

ACC DIST

Action - Army Rear
 Info - DCC

Adm Sec
 Pub Safety
 CTR

Army Sec
 File
 Float

014.13

178

JUN080445

(12)

F 56333
 7 June 44

RESTRICTED

KMO/rj

Ref. CC/F/365.

5th. June. 1944.

7 JUN 1944

Dear General,

I am extremely sorry but I am unable to get away to attend your Anniversary ceremony this morning. As you will readily understand, I am terribly busy now that we are on the threshold of Rome.

2. On this 130th. Anniversary of the Royal Carabinieri I send to you and to them my best wishes. I send also my great appreciation of the loyal cooperation which I have always been given by the Royal Carabinieri since first I arrived in Italy. I am glad to know that a detachment of the Corps is even now preparing to enter Rome and I know that I can count on the Corps' performing its duty in Rome as elsewhere in accordance with its old and fine traditions.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General
Chief Commissioner.

General Picche,
Commanding the Royal Carabinieri.

11
cc/p/345
5 Jan 44

file 7008

014.13 Civil & Army Relations

TOP SECRET
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: ACTION TROOPERS INFO ACC MAIN MIDEAST HQ EAST AFRICA COMMAND
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N 8/07
FROM: AFHQ SIGNED WILSON CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET
REFERENCE No: F 55709 PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: JUNE 4/1500 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE EHCH

DSH 1175
16 JUN 1944

EAST AFRICA COMMAND MESSAGE 07270 PW OF 31ST MAY IS SUBJECT. CARABINIERI (CCRR) AND FINANC GUARDS (CCFF) URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR USE ITALY WHERE SHORTAGE VERY ACUTE. NUMBERS AND TYPES SET OUT IN MESSAGE COULD BE MOST USEFULLY EMPLOYED THERE. NOT POSSIBLE SUPPLY SUCH MEN FROM NORTH AFRICA. REQUEST AUTHORITY BE GIVEN AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO DIVERT TO ITALY AND DISEMBARK DIRECT THERE. IMPOSSIBLE TO DISEMBARK ALGIERS AND HOLD PENDING(?) SHIPMENT

ACC DIST

Info - ACC
Army Rear
Army XO
Admiral
Pub Safety
CAB
File
Float

DATE and Time of RECEIPT JUNE 7

Distribution:

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Deputy Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

DCC 014.33

3 June 1944

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Carabinieri Personnel

DSB 322
4 JUN 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

1. This is in reference to your memorandum (ref. CC/G/27) to AFHQ, Attention G-5, dated 23 May, above subject, copy attached as Incl #1.
2. The Public Safety Sub-Commission has, in conjunction with the Italian authorities, prepared lists of CC.RR. & GG.PP. officers who are believed to be Prisoners of War in India and Africa, and for whom application is made for release, in order of priority as shown on attached lists (Inclosures #2 and #3).
3. With respect to the name of General Taddei Leonetto, Incl #2, CC.RR. list; on 14 April 1944 you made a special representation by letter (ref. 302/101/CA) to Hq AAI relative to the release of General Taddei.
4. Note that the name of Capt. CASANO Onofrio, shown on Incl #2, CC.RR. list, 1st priority, was previously included on second Comando Supremo priority list of 25 names sent to AFHQ by you on 22 April 1944 (ref. CC/G/222).
5. In view of AFHQ letter (MGS 014.12) dated 11 May 1944 (copy attached as Incl #4) and your memorandum referred to in para 1 above, it is suggested that you might want to send the enclosed lists to AFHQ for information of G-5 and for such use as G-5 can make of them.

ELLERY W. STONE

Captain, USIA

Deputy Chief Commissioner

4 Incls:

- Incl 1 - Copy memo referred to in para 1 above.
- Incl 2 - Priority release list of CC.RR. officers who are POW's (In dupl)
- Incl 3 - Priority release list of GG.PP. officers who are POW's (In dupl)
- Incl 4 - Copy MGS letter 014.12 referred to in para 5 above.

cc: Public Safety Sub-Commission
Army Sub-Commission (Rear Hq)

DCC 014.33

CONFIDENTIAL

014.13 Conf & mem

File

(5)

List of CC.RR officers who are Prisoners of War, and for whom application is made for release, in order of priority as shown.

1ST PRIORITY

In India

General TAVIERI Leonetto.

In Africa.

Major ROMERIO Luigi

Major SCODAROLI Emilio

Capt. MARCHELLI Alessandro

Capt. FOLLINO G; Battista

Capt. DE GIACOMO Paride

Capt. GELI Giovanni

1778

Capt. BORGHI Pietro

Came from the Alps, excellent skier. Versus, active, very willing.

Outstanding officer. Intelligent, cultured, goodhearted and generous, fine character, reserved, fine taste and chivalrous manners.

Excellent officer, with college degree. Has commanded several companies outstandingly.

Excellent officer in every respect. Maintains warm relations with all. Positive performance.

Excellent assistant Adjutant.

Excellent technical qualifications. Excellent performance.

Son of Gen. Angelo GELI of CCRR. Energetic officer, capable, competent, outstanding. Excellent territorial commander and assistant Adjutant. Ideal in any field, even of special trust.

Outstanding in every respect. Highly esteemed by his superiors.

Capt. FRATELLI Alessandro

Capt. POLLANO G; Battista

Capt. DE GIACOMO Paride

Capt. CALI Giovanni

1778

Capt. BORGATA Pietro

Capt. CARTA Gaspare

✓ Capt. CASANO Onofrio

Lt. FRATELLI Ugo.

Capt. IERRE Felice

29

Encl # 2

-1-

line character, superior, and cavalrous mannerisms.

Excellent officer, with college degree. Has commanded several companies outstandingly.

Excellent officer in every respect. Maintains warm relations with all. Positive performance.

Excellent assistant Adjutant. Excellent technical qualifications. Excellent performance.

Son of Gen. Angelo CALI of CAPR energetic officer, capable, competent, outstanding. Excellent territorial commander and assistant Adjutant. Ideal in any field, even of special trust.

Outstanding in every respect. Highly esteemed by his superiors who held him in very high regard.

Excellent officer, very serious, great performance.

Was instructor of the Academy of Modena. Cavalry instructor. Very good for Cavalry Sections. Good all around officer. Fine type.

Excellent officer. Good professional qualities. Good initiative, likes action, full of enthusiasm at any moment and under any circumstances.

Outstanding Officer. Willing. Very dependable as to ability and performance.

2ND PRIORITYIn Africa

Major PORTA Giuseppe

Serious, level-headed, composed,
good sentiments.

Capt. MANNATRIZIO Segrino

Veteran colonial ^{Officer}/outstanding, very
capable. Very energetic manner of
exercising his command.

Capt. TALUGI Antonio

Expert colonial officer, with good
requisites. Noble bearing, serious,
well balanced.

Capt. ANRICO Aloce

Good officer. Good performance.

Capt. SONGINI Francesco

Fine officer, co-operative. Excellent
Performance Ideal for sections of
instruction.

Capt. STRINGONE Giovanni

Rose from Non-Com in arma. Good
capacity. Excellent performance.

Capt. RUSSO Genaro

Rose from Non-Com in arma. Good capacity
Excellent performance.

Capt. RIPA DI MEANA Umberto

Very young captain, fast, intelligent,
active. Very outstanding and obliging.
Bold and elegant horseman. Specially
adaptable for instruction.

Capt. BONZANO Carlo

Very serious, intelligent. Fine
technical qualifications. Ideal for
instruction.

Capt. BJONO Michele

Serious, outstanding, capable. Sure
performance.

Capt. GIULIO USAI Antonio

Captain in effective service. Excellent
horseman. Good for instruction purposes.

Capt. FERRI Alfonso

Advanced age, serious, cautious and
well balanced. Scrupulous and diligent
worker. Knows his business and is very
capable.

Capt. LUIGI Patricio

Capt. RUSSO Gennaro

capacity. Excellent performance.
Rose from Non-Com in Arms Good capacity
Excellent performance.

Capt. RIPA DI MEANA Umberto

Very young captain, fast, intelligent,
active. Very outstanding and obliging.
Bold and elegant horseman. Specially
adaptable for instruction.

Capt. BONZANO Carlo

Very serious, intelligent. Fine
technical qualifications. Ideal for
instruction.

Capt. RUONO Michele

Serious, outstanding, capable. Sure
performance.

Capt. GIULIO USAI Antonio

Captain in effective service. Excellent
horseman. Good for instruction purposes.

Capt. FERRI Alfonso

Advanced age, serious, cautious and
well balanced. Scrupulous and diligent
worker. Knows his business and is very
capable.

Capt. LUCIDI Patrizio

Fine officer, cultured, capable, willing.

Capt. CAPARELLI Dante

Comes from the Arms. Was at Kassaua for
many years as commander of the Lieutenant's
Good man.

Lt. MONTINARO Antonio

Good officer, serious, good worker. Left
an excellent record.

Lt. MAZZARELLA Guglielmo

Comes from the Arms but has frequented the
Academy of Modena. Serious and capa-
ble. Excellent performance.

Lt. RAVERA Perruccio

Excellent officer, good worker.

(continued)

2ND BRIGADE

In Africa

Capt. MODENA Giovanni

Officer of mediocre qualities.
Deficient in technical knowledge.
Not outstanding. Drinks. Third
rate type.

Capt. BASPARO Giuseppe


Not too desirable because of
deficient technical competence.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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In AfricaRED PRIORITY

Major	CASPIRO Aurelio
Capt	GALEOTTI Giovanni
"	RINZO Leopoldo
"	LOIACONO Domenico
"	SEVERINI Ambrogio
"	MARINA Arturo
"	BARBERI Luigi
"	CONZINI Giovanni
"	ACANTONE Francesco
"	VALLI Giletto
"	PICCOLI LEONARDO Silvio
Lieut.	FRACARDO Giuseppe
"	GIARELLA Pasquale
"	GUERINZI Corrado
"	ALIANI Degoberto
"	DELLA MARE
"	FAICELLA Rosario
"	PICCOLIOTTI Franco
"	TOMASINI Francesco
"	ETEROTTI Virgilio
"	CHONLE Antonio
"	MARELLA Santi
"	BIGNI Francesco
"	D'AMORE Luigi
"	FRANCESCO
2nd	CARBONE Antonio
"	ZIACARDI Ferdinando

" Della Mario
 " Picchiola Rosario
 " Picchiotti Franco
 " Tomassini Francesco
 " Picchiotti Virgilio
 " Cucchi Antonio
 " Martarò Santi
 " Biondi Francesco
 " D'Amore Luigi
 " ~~Carriera Domenico~~
 " Carbone Antonio
 " Ziccardi Ferdinando
 2nd "
 " "

1712

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

Lieut. CARLOTTA GIOVANNI
 Lieut. MARIA GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLOTTA GIOVANNI
 Lt./Col. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI

ITALY

Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lt./Col. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Major. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Major. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Capt. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI
 Lieut. CARLO GIOVANNI

9
 Incl #3

List of 60,000 officers who are prisoners of war, and for whom application is made for release, in order of priority as shown:

1st PRIORITY

Colonel	ELISABONDO Giuseppe	In E. Africa
Lt. Col.	SPINELLI Pasquale	" "
Capt.	TOMU Ernesto	In H. Africa
Captain	GRANVILLE Sornalzo	In E. Africa
Lieut.	DI CERCONE Antonio	In H. Africa
Lieut.	VITTA Felice	In H. Africa
Lieut.	RAVAGNI Augusto	In H. Africa
2/Lt.	CINQUE Gino	In H. Africa
Lt. Col.	VERANO Mario	In H. Africa
Capt.	ACQUINO Valentino	" "
Capt.	CARRARA Giuseppe	" "
Lieut.	CARABELLAMA Giuseppe	" "
Lieut.	MANCA Giovanni	" "
Lieut.	BADINO Paolo	" "
Lieut.	SCAVATRI Giuseppe	" "
Lt/Col.	AROSE Giovanni	" "
Capt.	MANCINI Umberto	" "
Capt.	FRANCESCO Salvatore	" "
Lieut.	RAVONE Bruno	" "
Lieut.	DAL VECCHIO Giuseppe	" "

2nd PRIORITY

Lieut.	DI MARTINO Nicola	In H. Africa
Lt/Col.	ZAGRA Angelo	" "
Capt.	KIMEL Alessandro	" "
Capt.	BAMANTI Francesco	" "
Lieut.	CALABRESE Pasquale	" "
Lieut.	CARRINO Lorenzo	" "
Lieut.	RODINO Alfredo	" "
Major.	DA JUDICONE Corrado	" "

ATTENTION

Lieut. DONAVANI Giuseppe
Lt/Col. ANTONI Giovanni
Capt. MANCINI Umberto
Capt. RABINOWICZ Salvatore
Lieut. RAVOTTO Bruno
Lieut. DEL VECCHIO Giuseppe

Lieut.	DI MARTINO Nicola
Lt/Col.	ZAPPAL Angelo
Capt.	KIMEL Alessandro
Capt.	DALANTI Francesco
Lieut.	CALABRELL Pasquale
Lieut.	GARRINO Lorenzo
Lieut.	RODINO Alfredo
Major.	DE JUDICIBUS Corrado
Lieut.	ZHAREVO Vincenzo
Lieut.	ZIGHEZZI Ettore
Lieut.	VESCHIO Francesco Antonio
Lieut.	STANO Ruggio
Major.	PUBITAL Michelangelo
Capt.	SABATINO Pasquale
Capt.	GIACCHERONE Giuseppe
Capt.	ONIGLI Vincenzo
Lieut.	PIONE Nicola
Lieut.	INTRABATTOLO Vittorio
Lieut.	D'AMORE Giorgio
Lieut.	BOVI Ferdinando

List of senior officers who are prisoners of war, and for whom application is made for release, in order of priority as shown:

1st PRIORITY

Colonel	ELISABETH Giuseppe	In E. Africa
Lt. Col.	ANTONIO Pasquale	" "
Capt.	TOLU Ernesto	In E. Africa
Captain	GIANNI Corrado	In E. Africa
Lieut.	DI CRISTOFORO Antonio	In E. Africa
Lieut.	VITA Felice	In E. Africa
Lieut.	BAVAGNI Augusto	In E. Africa
2/Lt.	CINQUE Gino	In E. Africa
Lt. Col.	UTRANO Mario	In E. Africa
Capt.	ADRIANO Valentino	" "
Capt.	CARLO Giuseppe	" "
Lieut.	CARLOTTA Giuseppe	" "
Lieut.	MARCA Giovanni	" "
Lieut.	PAOLO Paolo	" "
Lieut.	TOMMASO Giuseppe	" "
Lt/Col.	ANGELO Giovanni	" "
Capt.	MANFREDI Umberto	" "
Capt.	PACIFICCO Salvatore	" "
Lieut.	RAVOTTO Bruno	" "
Lieut.	DOL VECCHIO Giuseppe	" "

2nd PRIORITY

Lieut.	DI MARTINO Nicola	In E. Africa
Lt/Col.	ZAGRA Angelo	" "
Capt.	KIRBY Alessandro	" "
Capt.	DAMIANI Francesco	" "
Lieut.	CALABRO Pasquale	" "
Lieut.	CARRINO Lorenzo	" "
Lieut.	ROSSI Alfredo	" "
Major	DA JUDIZIO Corrado	" "
Lieut.	THOMAS Vincenzo	" "

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(Continued 33.77)

AND PRIORITARY

Capt. SEVERINO Fausto
 Capt. DONCO Genaro
 Capt. DELFINO Giovanni
 Lieut. ASCERIO Cesare
 Lieut. CIGOLILLA Mario
 Lieut. SCARFI Giovanni
 Capt. MARIOLLA Salvatore
 Capt. IOTTA Alberto
 Lieut. LONGO Letterio
 Lieut. MENTINA Riccardo
 Capt. VIGNOLI Mario
 2/Lt. MARANO Giovanni
 2/Lt. PUCCHI Ildebrando

In E. Africa
 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
 n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n

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(continued 03.47)

3RD PRIORITY

Capt. SEVERINO Fausto
 Capt. ENZO Colombo
 Capt. DALFINO Giovanni
 Lieut. ALBERTO Cesare
 Lieut. CICCOLINI Mario
 Lieut. BONATI Giovanni
 Capt. FANTUCCI Salvatore
 Capt. LORIA Alberto
 Lieut. LOCCO Vittorio
 Lieut. FERRARI Riccardo
 Capt. FIGNOLI Mario
 2/Lt. MARANO Giovanni
 2/Lt. PUGNI Riccardo

In E. Africa

n n n n n n n n n n
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TOP SECRET

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JCC

ACG MAIN SIGNED SIGNED

DSM 1042
6 JUN 1944

H 9/02

FREEDOM SIGNED SIGNED

TOP SECRET

F 53671

PRIORITY

JUNE 1/1907

CITE: FRIEDG

MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HQ EAST AFRICA COMMAND REFERS TO REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY COM TO EAST AFRICA CONCERNING RELEASE OF CORR FOR USE IN ITALY. SUBJECT TO WAR OFFICE AGREEMENT EAST AFRICA WILL INCLUDE TWENTY OFFICERS AND 700 O/R GUY IN SECOND FLIGHT OF PWS NOW BEING TRANSFERRED TO UK AND ABOUT 25 OFFICERS AND 1000 O/R CORR IN THIRD FLIGHT. TO ENABLE THIS TO BE DONE EAST AFRICA REQUEST US TO GET AUTHORITY FROM TROOPERS TO DIVERT ABOVE NUMBERS TO YOU. DO YOU WANT THE GUY AS WELL AS THE CORR AND WHERE MOST SUITABLE PLACE TO DISSEMBARK. ON RECEIVING YOUR REPLY WILL IMMEDIATELY REQUEST AUTHORITY FOR DIVERSION

1713

POW ✓

CCRR

JUNE 2/0215

ACG DIST
Action Admin Sec
Info - OCC
P.S. Rear
Army Sec
Army Rear
CA Br.
File
Float

014.13 (CCRR) (CinCPAC) (CinCPAC)

F53671
1 Jan 44

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

FME/rj

Ref. CC/G/327.SF
DSM 980
3 JUN 1944

23rd. May, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
(ATTENTION: G.5.)Carabinieri
POW

1. Your No. MGS 014.12 of 11th. May.
2. I am sorry that the response to my request for repatriation of Carabinieri P.W. looks like being so small.
3. I would again emphasise the fact that the value of these men in Italy is infinitely greater than it can be elsewhere. They are practically irreplaceable here whereas elsewhere their duties could probably be performed equally well by other personnel.
4. I am now endeavouring to arrange for the repatriation of Carabinieri P.W. from East Africa and will keep you informed of developments.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

7

CC/G/327
23 May 44

014.13 Civil & Milit Relations

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

ACC/14601/6/PS

18 May 1944

SUBJECT : Application for Release of POW - CCRR and CGFT

TO : Deputy Chief Commissioner, ACC ✓

2

1

1. Herewith are nominal rolls of officers of the CCRR and CGFT who are believed to be prisoners of war in India and Africa.

2. Their services are urgently required in Italy for the maintenance of public order, and particularly at the present time when it can be anticipated that new territory will be occupied and lack of officer personnel is making itself more evident.

3. With reference to General TADDEI, prisoner of war in India, special representations were made by this Sub-Commission to the Executive Commissioner on the 10 March 1944, reference ACC/14601/6/PS, and a letter, reference 302/101/CA dated 14 April 1944, on the subject was addressed by the Chief Commissioner to HQ, AAI.

4. The Chief Commissioner on 27 April 1944, reference CC/C/236, informed this Sub-Commission that another urgent request had been made to AFHQ for the return of all CCRR POW personnel. Also that the verbal support of Generals Wilson and Alexander had been obtained in the matter.

5. At time of writing, it is learnt that 50 CCRR POW personnel (not officers) have just arrived at Naples from Africa.

A. E. Young

A.E. YOUNG,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief Public Safety Sub-Commission.

BRT/Rm

177

6

18 May

21st May 1944

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Hq. COFF. LIBERATED ITALY.
Section 1.

No. 7198 di prot.

Salerno

TO: Colonel Paul KIRK
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Salerno.

SUBJECT: Officers, Non-Com., EM/OR's of COFF P.O.M.

The actual strength of the R. Guardia di Finanza is inadequate for the complex duties of the service. We have been compelled, in fact, to hold in the service officers, non-coms, and soldiers already advanced in age, recall men from retirement and request for an enrollment of 4000 Finanzieri and 300 non-coms. for which necessary measures are about to be approved.

But the situation cannot be examined even in relation to the proximate future because the personnel deficiency will assert itself when the Allied Troops have liberated Rome and the situation will become more critical if we have a sudden collapse of the Germans with the resultant necessity providing for the exigencies of the service entrusted to R. Guardia di Finanza, in all the territory of the nation.

This necessity makes itself felt if we consider that the assignment of personnel situated on the other side of Italy and Balkans, cannot be done immediately because as they gradually return, it will be necessary to examine each case individually in relation to their collaboration with the Germans.

Independently of other measures which must be undertaken to cope with the a/m exigency, I would like to put at the disposal of this Command all the personnel of the R. Guardia di Finanza (officers, non-coms, soldiers (militari di truppa) who are held as prisoners of war by the Anglo-Americans.

Personnel held as prisoners of war are as follows:

(See attached list)

I cannot supply a nominal list for the non-coms and ordinary soldiers because of lack of information.

I can only state that in Palestine, el Barrej Camp (South of el Gaza) there is a group of 50 men of the R. Guardia di Finanza.

COMMANDING GENERAL
- Crete Moricca -

APP A Incl 1

Captured in E. Africa

1. Colonel	SISIMANDO	Giuseppe	"
2. Lt/Col.	TUTOLI	Pasquale	"
3. "	URBANO	Mario	"
4. "	ADONE	Giovanni	"
5. "	ZARA	Angelo	"
6. Major	DE JULIENUS	Corrado	"
7. "	FUGLISI	Michelangelo	"
8. Captain	GRAVINA	Cerardo	"
9. "	ACHILLE	Valentino	"
10. "	CASANOVA	Giuseppe	"
11. "	LAUCHEI	Umberto	"
12. "	FACINIGO	Salvatore	"
13. "	KIRIEL	Alessandro-	"
14. "	DAMANTI	Francesco	"
15. "	SABATINO	Pasquale	"
16. "	GLANGRANIE	Giuseppe	"
17. "	ORCE	Vincenzo	"
18. "	STEVILINO	Pausto	"
19. "	BEGG	Gennaro	"
20. "	TRINING	Giovanni	"
21. "	PIRVICONE	Salvatore	"
22. "	NOTTA	Alberto	"
23. "	VIGNOLI	Mario	"
24. "	CASTELLANA	Giuseppe	"
25. "	MANCA	Giovanni	"
26. "	BAOINO	Paolo	"
27. "	PONAVZFI	Giuseppe	"
28. "	RAVOTTO	Bruno	"
29. "	DEL VECCHIO	Giuseppe	"
30. "	DI MARTINO	Nicola	"
31. "	GAIARRESE	Pasquale	"
32. "	CARRINO	Lorenzo	"
33. "	RODRIGO	Alfredo	"
34. "	TRACOTTO	Vincenzino	"
35. "	CIOSEFFI	Ettore	"
36. "	VECOHIO	Francesco Antonio	"
37. "	SEARO	Bigio	"
38. "	FIGHE	Nicola	"
39. "	INTRABARTOLO	Vittorio	"
40. "	D'AMARE	Giorgio	"
41. "	DOCI	Ferdinando	"
42. "	ASCHERIO	Cesare	"
43. "	CICCOLLELLA	Mario	"
44. "	SCARFI	Giovanni	"
45. "	LONGO	Letterio	"
46. "	MESSINA	Riccardo	"
		Giovanni	"

Lieut.

Col. Young (draft)
Does this look O.K?
make any changes
desert,

Desert

Col. D. Moore

Looks O.K.

Young.

1709

6

Colonel Young.

~~He~~

Captain Stone has directed that I

prepare a letter to the Chief Commissioner
on the matter.

Before doing so I should like to talk
to you about it.

Will you call me (#43) when you
can spare me a few minutes & I will
come up.

Densmore

26 May

Colonel Densmore

lists attached, giving
three categories of priority.

Bud Cox
Major

1705
6

Captain Stone

I think this is something that Col Young
talked to you about -

I had this list checked against
the (6 lists of 25) and find Capt Caruso
Page 2 is on list #2.

Deussen
20 May

1768

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

CICG/PIJ/cs

Military Government Section

MGS: CIL.12

11 May 1944

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Carabinieri Personnel SF

TO : H.Q., Allied Control Commission (3)

1. Reference is made to the Chief Commissioner's letter of 23 April enclosing copy of a memorandum from General Picche who commands the carabinieri.

2. The letter above referred to has been brought to the attention of the Chief Administrative Officer who caused investigation to be made with a view to seeing what officers and men of the Carabinieri held in North Africa could be made available for repatriation. The results of these investigations appear below in paragraphs 3 and 4.

3. So far as Carabinieri officers are concerned it is stated that 6 in all have been handed back by the British and that so far as is known there are no others in British custody. On the American side 10 were originally registered by them but except in the case of two whose repatriation is being arranged it is not possible to repatriate any more either because of the key positions they are holding or because of their pronounced racist views.

4. In the case of Carabinieri other ranks it is not possible to spare more than 50 for repatriation as the balance held are being used for essential duties here but the 50 have been assembled and are now awaiting orders to embark to Italy.

/s/ Charles M. Spofford
/t/ CHARLES M. SPOFFORD,
Colonel, U. S. A.
Chief of Section

1704

SECRET

MGS 1014.12
11 May 44

CONFIDENTIAL

FNMM/rj

Ref. CC/G/236

27th April, 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Vice-President,
Administrative Section.

Reference memorandum ACC/14601/8/PS of 18th. April from Colonel Kirk forwarded by you to me.

1. I have forwarded yet another urgent request to A.F.H.Q. for the return as soon as possible of all Carabinieri P.O.W. personnel. I have secured verbally the support of both General Alexander and General Wilson in this matter.

2. I have taken up with Badoglio the question of ensuring that the Italian War Ministry complies urgently with the Carabinieri's requirements in clothing, equipment, etc.. Badoglio has promised me that he will speak strongly to Messe and Orlando on this subject.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. CC/G/225.

CONFIDENTIALDSN 611
25 APR 1944

FNM/rj

23rd. April, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.

- (1)
1. I enclose a copy of a memorandum from General Fieche, Commanding the Carabinieri.
 2. I am in agreement with practically everything that he says.
 3. The Carabinieri have proved invaluable to us on the public safety side and it is in my opinion most necessary to do everything we can to ensure an adequate supply of Carabinieri to meet the situation as and when we advance further into Italy. It is impossible to increase the Carabinieri by untrained intakes as their value lies largely in their special training, esprit de corps, and good discipline.
 4. I have already taken up the question of clothing, equipment and arms locally, and am continuing to do so. If I require any more help in this direction I will let you know.
 1705. In the meantime I can only say that I would warmly welcome and strongly recommend the repatriation of as many Carabinieri personnel held by us as Prisoners of War at the earliest possible date.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

014.13 Encl and Return

(3)
CC/G/225
23 Apr

✓ 3

COPY

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

ACC/14601/8/PS

18 April 1944

SUBJECT: Additional Personnel and Equipment for CC.RR.

TO :Vice President ACC, Administrative Section.

(1) e
1. Herewith is a translation of a SECRET communication from General Pieche, Commanding General of the Carabinieri Reali to the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior.

2. It is submitted that Gen. Pieche properly states the problem, accurately portrays the exiting conditions, and pointedly indicates the feasible remedy.

3. The Chief Commissioner has from the beginning evinced his interest in the repatriation of Carabinieri who are prisoners of war. Pursuant to a request from the Executive Commissioner a list of fifty-six officers whose services were especially desired, was furnished, supplementing a shorter list submitted on Feb. 7. Included in the March list was Gen. Taddei, reported to be a prisoner of war in India, whose qualifications were set forth in particular. The bulk of the personnel, both commissioned and enlisted are said to be in East Africa. Thus far as of March 31, AFHQ have been able to assure us that two majors will be released.

1701
4. Insofar as uniform and equipment are concerned, all that this sub-commission can do has already been done. The Army Sub-Commission has been advised, since the source of supplies is Italian Military Stores. As of March 28, information was received that 3000 sets of re-dyed British type clothing had been allocated. This however, has not as yet been received, and when received will meet only part of ^{the} immediate urgent needs. This office is not aware of what plans there may be for the tactical employment have been determined by the War Ministry

(2)
18 Apr
for...

- 2 -

for the issuance of clothing and equipment. It does seem, however, that recognition must be given to the fact that the Carabinieri will have an important and continuing mission of operational significance to perform in any event, and recognition should be given to the fact that the Carabinieri are the first Arm of the Italian Army.

5. It is recommended that the Chief Commissioner be informed of the classified letter sent by Gen. Pieche and that the Italian War Ministry be again impressed with the urgent need for clothing and equipment, and renewed efforts be made to bring about the repatriation of CC.RR. who are prisoners of war as soon as possible.

/s/ Paul G. Kirk

/t/ PAUL G. KIRK
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

hgd

Pen note:

The Chief Commissioner: I can add nothing to this clear statement of the case.

18-4-44

/s/ Stansgate.

1760

(2)

TRANSLATION

SECRET

15 April 1944

HQ CCMR LIBERATED ITALY - Recruiting Office

No. 65/16-1943

SUBJECT: Provision for Employment by ARMA of Additional Personnel in Territory yet to be occupied - Personnel of ARMA Prisoners of War.

TO : Minister of War
Minister of Interior

COPY to Gen CAZZERA - High Commissioner for Prisoners of War.

Departing from the axiomatic principle that the war will be won by the Allied Nations, the moment will consequently arrive when Anglo-American troops will occupy all of Italy.

The populations under the Fascist regime will be at least tainted, if not permeated with fascism which must be erased as quickly as possible.

To re-establish order will require a strong police force.

Do the Allied Nations have such police forces available to be able by themselves to control and screen the rest of Italian territory? I do not believe so, judging from the numbers now available in the liberated territories and which appear to be few in comparison with the job at hand. Therefore, it will require the collaboration of the Italian police forces, which, with its better psychic insight of the Italian peoples, could render itself very useful.

Judging from the numerous testimonials of praise which I have received and am receiving from Allied officers of all ranks and branches, I believe that the collaboration of the ARMA is appreciated and esteemed.

Hence, it may be assumed that the ARMA will be entrusted with new territories in collaboration with Allied troops and police in the maintenance of public order.

But for this force to be able to handle the exigencies of the morrow, enlarging its sphere of action and diluting its forces, it will be necessary to start preparing now for conditions of perfect efficiency to be achieved.

It is foreseen that the occupation of the rest of Italy may be very rapid if, as we all hope, Germany suddenly collapses.

And if this should suddenly happen, how can we confront it? The ARMA itself has undertaken duties of war and of occupation, it is getting back, but good intentions alone are not enough to reacquire its old prestige and efficiency.

1763 Uniforms are still lacking although we have had promises for months; shoes

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And if this should suddenly happen, how can we confront it? The Arma itself has undertaken duties of war and of occupation, it is getting back, but good intentions alone are not enough to reacquire its old prestige and efficiency.

Uniforms are still lacking although we have had promises for months; shoes are lacking; weapons are defective; the number of officers and troops is lacking.

It is true that it may be presumed that many carabinieri who have disbanded so as not serve in the republican guard will return to the Arma; but under what conditions? In civilian clothes, without arms, emaciated from the long period under strain. And we must clothe them with uniforms which we do not have, arm them with defective weapons, feed them with a dwindling food supply, organize them under officers who are lacking or of dubious conduct which will have to do.

They are problems which must be considered seriously and with positive conclusions, otherwise we will be forced through sheer necessity at the earlier moments to use the Fascist Republican Guard, to be screened at a later moment.

I do not have sufficient officers even for the present needs, those borrowed from other branches of military service will be of help, but will hardly be sufficient to plug the more urgent leaks.

The enrollment of troops is progressing badly; the leftist parties are spreading contrary propaganda. In spite of high wages offered by the Allies to whomsoever works for them, low spirits and the major risks and doubts of an unclear future for the police, have resulted in that of eight thousand recruits requested, hardly 2,000 have been enrolled.

SECRET

TRANSLATION

Ltr from HQ CCRR LIBERATED ITALY (No 65/16-1943 of 15 Apr 44) cont'd:

With the present force, we can handle Rome inclusive, but beyond Rome, it will be necessary to remove numerous Carabinieri from Liberated Italy, and while it does not seem to me to be a wise move in view of the present confused conditions, (politics, food situation, etc.).

One prime and efficacious aid, the one immediate efficacious aid in solving the more urgent problems is the liberation of officers and troops of the Arma who are prisoners. There are amongst them the better elements, the younger, the more physically adept, almost all in the regular service.

To have them, clothe them, and give back to them a little something would be a question of but a month at the most and they would be ready for their new job with certain confidence in performing it well.

But all pleas, requests, promises, have to-date remained fruitless. Only one officer has been repatriated (except those of the S.I.M. who remained with it) and he, strange as it may seem, was a 'squadrista'.

I am permitting myself to insist because from now on we must look to the future and come to a decision that will be timely, definite, and practicable.

The police problem in the occupation of the rest of Italy is an important matter with us and for the Allied with whom the Arma would like to be in a position so that it may collaborate properly and honorably.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL

/s/ Giuseppe Pieche.

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I am permitting myself to insist because from now on we must look to the future and come to a decision that will be timely, definite, and practicable.

The police problem in the occupation of the rest of Italy is an important matter with us and for the Allied with whom the Armia would like to be in a position so that it may collaborate properly and honorably.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL

/s/ Giuseppe Picche.

1758

(1)

~~SECRET~~

U-400

U.S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTEDAG 383.6-1 GAP-AGM 1st Ind.
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, APO 512, 25 February 1944.

TJB/jew

TO: Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.

1. It is desired that your headquarters prepare and deliver a letter, substantially as follows, to "The Chief of General Staff, Comando Supremo," Italian Army.

"1. Due to the important nature of services performed by all Italian officers, including members of the Royal Carabinieri, now assigned to Italian Service Units in North Africa, it is not contemplated repatriating these officers.

2. It is agreeable that any officer not necessary to the efficient administration of these Italian Service units will be released for use by the Italian Comando Supremo.

3. Further, it is agreeable that the Comando Supremo send a representative to prisoner of war enclosures in North Africa to select officers desired from those not being used in Italian Service units."

By command of General WILSON:

T. J. BEE,
1st Lt, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

2 Incls.

- Incl 1 - Ltr fr Comando Supremo
dtd 21 January 1944
Incl 2 - List of names of officers
of the Royal Carabinieri
prisoners of war

1757



duplicate

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U.S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTED

25 Feb

24 JAN 1944

RBD/hjp

In reply refer to:
041.33

24 January 1944

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Italian Officer Prisoners of War

To : Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, AFU 512

SEE
REPATRIATION
LISTS

1. In reference to letter, this headquarters, dated 7 January, file and subject as above, inclosed is a translation of a letter from the Chief of the Supreme General Staff, Marshal Messe, which is self explanatory.

2. Their letter, reference No. 3962/OP of 22 December, was forwarded to you as an inclosure of our letter referred to above.

3. In this connection it is noted that from the first paragraph of our letter of 7 January was inadvertently omitted mention of 106 Naval officers, 9 aviation officers, 3 aviation non-commissioned officers, and 4 other officers especially requested. Request for all of these, however, was enclosed with the letter.

4. The Allied Control Commission considers that it is most desirable to meet this Italian request insofar as practicable.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

ELERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:
Transl of ltr fr Marshal Messe
No. 10526/OP, 21 Jan 1944

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see (1) d

(1) C

24 Jan

04.33-

22 JAN 1944

2508

FROM COMANDO SUPREMO

Operation Office

TO GENERAL CHIEF OF
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSIONNo. 10526/Op
21 January 1944SUBJECT: Repatriation of Royal Carabinieri personnel

As the liberation of national territory proceeds, public order requirements are bound to become greater, and they will entail the employment of numerous personnel of the Royal Carabinieri.

As it is known, the recruiting of Officers and ORs has already begun. But it is necessary to have more personnel in active service, already experienced in this Arm's particular duties.

With note No. 3962/Op of 22 December last, I asked for the repatriation of all Royal Carabinieri - Officers and ORs - who are at present still in North Africa.

The repatriation of at least a part of this personnel at the earliest possible date is a matter of necessity.

30 Officers, 200 NCOs and 500 Carabinieri would be required.

The enclosure gives the names of a few Carabinieri 17 Officers now in North Africa, who should be included in the

014.33

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The repatriation of at least a part of this personnel at the earliest possible date is a matter of necessity.

30 Officers, 200 NCOs and 500 Carabinieri would be required.

The enclosure gives the names of a few Carabinieri Officers now in North Africa, who should be included in the first lot to be repatriated. To these officers could be committed the choice of the remaining officers and of ORs.

THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF
(Marshal Messe)

FOR INCLs:

SEE "A" FILE
REPATRIATION LISTS

106
21 g-

duplicate

106

3962/OP -22 Dec.43

COMANDO SUPREMO

To A.C.C.

23 DEC 1943

545

Subject. - Italian W.F. repatriation.

For the needs of the organization of the Italian Armed Forces, the repatriation of the following personnel has been requested of the Allied H.Q.

R.ARMY: N. 25 Generals and N. 501 of different ranks and of different branches. Total N. 526. (See enclosure N.1).
N. 128 Officers are listed with their names and specifically asked for. (Enclosure N. 2).

In order to make an easier and surer choice, it is suggested that the same Officers (of a rank above Captain) individually asked for in enclosure N. 2, be appointed to select the remaining 398 Officers to be repatriated, amongst the Italian POW of North Africa. —

R.NAVY: 106 Officers - (Enclosure N. 3)- Officers belonging to the Staffs of specialx craft are listed separately.

R.AVIATION: 9 Officers and 3 N.C.O. (Enclosure N. 4)

The Officers already returned to Italy are not included in the above mentioned lists of the four inclosures. Enclosure N. 5 shows name and number.

Besides the given lists it would be very useful to obtain the repatriation of all Royal Carabinieri, Officers and ORs, still war prisoners in North Africa.

I should be very grateful, General, if you would be kind enough to point out the usefulness of a speedy repatriation.

Il Maresciallo d'Italia
Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale
signed Messe

OFFICIO COLLEGAMENTO
V.P. *[Signature]*

FOR INCLS

SEE "A" FILE
REPATRIATION LISTS

22 Dec

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF COMMISSIONER

APO 394

1753

4032/CC

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

File under No. 4032 AFIR(1)B LABOR & WAGES CONTROL COMMITTEE

ALLIED COMMISSION

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	LRS-206	29 Sep 44		Minutes of 22nd mtg of Committee held 29 Sep 44
2	LRS-217	30 Sep 44		Agenda for 23rd meeting
3	LRS-217	14 Oct 44		Additions to agenda for 23rd mtg
4	LRS/217	24 Oct 44		Minutes of 23rd meeting of Comm
5	- -	2 Nov 44		Excerpt special sub-comm mtg held at Naples 2 Nov 44.
6	Ltr, Col Smith	2 Nov 44	Members Special Sub-Comm.	New increases in AF Wage Scales w.e.f. 16 Nov.
7	Cbl, Smith, 5950	3 Nov 44	Various	Special Sub-Comm. approved AF wage scale increase w.e.f. 16 Nov.
8	Ltr, Stone	4 Nov 44	Gen Clark	I accept recommendations for AF wage scale increase w.e.f. 16 Nov.
5	LRS/217	8 Nov 44		Agenda for 24th Meeting
6	LRS/217	16 Nov 44		Minutes of 24th Meeting.
10	Cbl Smith, 6611	17 Nov 44	CAO AFHQ	Publicity of AF wage scale incr.
11-7	Cbl AFIRS, LRS/217	1 Dec 44		Special Mtg on 5 Dec - Agenda.

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