

ACC

10000/136/352

2203

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

36/352

CARABINIERI, ITALIAN
JUNE 1945 - OCT. 1946

Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised May 25, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

3615/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

File under No. 3615 CARABINIERI - ITALIAN

ALLIED COMMISSION

From: 26 Jun 45

To :

~~TOP SECRET~~Vol. II Page 5
9-4782

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
136	Cbl ACBO/38	14 May 46	P. Safety	Automatic weapons ammo held by CC RR Bologna legion
137	Ltr 6/14.1/CA CC	19 Jun 46	AFHQ G-3	Police Agencies - Arms
138	Ltr 9/29/CA CC	25 Jun 46	De Gasperi	Request fr info re arms supply etc fr police agencies other than CC.RR
139	Memo Stone	29 Jun 46	EC	US UK Brit policy re reorgan of Carabinieri (Army) and Police
140	Cbl FX 68613 SACM	2 Jul 46	Troopers	Ceiling of Carabinieri
140a	Ltr 77121/35784/ 1.6.4 De Gasperi	28 Aug 46	CC	Info re arms supply etc fr Police Forces other than CC.RR
140b	Ltr 3627/144/C	3 Sep 46	Prov Comm	CC.RR - Clothing & Equipment; Encl
141	Ltr 184/EC	4 Sep 46	Bright	Ceiling of CC.RR. in Udine Prov.
142	AIDE MEMOIRE	30 Sep 46		Reorganization - It Police Forces
142a	Memo	30 Sept 46		Info on Italian police
143	Memo	17 Oct 46	CC	Incident at Viminal, ousting of Questor Verdiani
144	Memo	18 Oct 46	CC	Info on Polito, Questore of Rome

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3615/CC

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

File under No. 3615 CARABINIERI, ITALIAN (CC.RR)

=ALLIED COMMISSION=

From: 26 Jun 45

To:

TOP SECRET

Vol. II Page 9

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
102a	Ltr Lush	23 Aug 45	CC	Ceiling on Carabinieri <i>See 3616/CC</i>
~~103~~	~~3626/133/EC, Lush~~	~~31 Aug 45~~	~~AFHQ G-5~~	~~Allied Police Mission to Italy.~~
104	3627/EC, Lush	31 Aug 45	Browning	Br Battledress for Florence CC.RR.
~~405~~	~~AFHQ G-5: 014.12~~	~~5 Sep 45~~	~~AC~~	~~Allied Police Mission to Italy.~~ <i>See 3616/CC</i>
106	Parri, 34203	7 Sep 45	Stone	Request for increase of CC.RR auth str to 75,000, issue new arms, equipmt.
107	AC/14601/1/PS, Lush	15 Sep 45	LFSC	Clothing and equipment for CC.RR.
~~408~~	~~3626/149/EC, Lush~~	~~19 Sep 45~~	~~AFHQ~~	~~Allied Police Mission.~~ <i>See 3616/CC</i>
109	Parri, 37445	24 Sep 45	Stone	Arms for CC.RR & Police Forces.
110	AC/14601/21/PS, Carr	25 Sep 45	Secy of Pres.	Increase to 75000, issue arms, equipmt
~~111~~	~~EX 47521 (NAF 1077) AFHQ~~	~~6 Oct 45~~	~~AGWAR, CC~~	~~It Govt Re Allied Police Mission & Reorg & Retraining of Carabinieri~~
		<i>See file 3616</i>		
112	Ac/14601/11/PS Stone	8 Oct 45	Parri	Beretta arms for carabinieri.
~~113~~	~~Cbl 6884 Lush~~	~~10 Oct 45~~	~~AFHQ~~	~~Purpose of Allied Police Mission~~
~~114~~	~~Cbl 6906 Stone~~	~~12 Oct 45~~	~~AFHQ~~	~~Correction to Cbl 6884 10 Oct 45.~~
~~115~~	~~Cbl 48648 AFHQ~~	~~13 Oct 45~~	~~AC, CC~~	~~Reorg & Retraining of It Police~~
~~115a~~	~~Ltr Stone~~	~~22 Oct 45~~	~~Kirk~~	~~Ackn't State-Dept view of It Pol. Mis~~
~~116~~	~~Cbl 7546 Lush~~	~~23 Oct 45~~	~~AFHQ~~	~~Setting up of It Police Mission.~~
113	Memo, Montant	9 Oct 45	Col. Fiske	Clothing for Public Safty Organ Of N.
114	Ltr 014.12 Christenberry	14 Oct 45	CC	Transfer Carabinieri to MMIA
114a	Ltr 8255/EC Lush	27 Oct 45	COC Land F.S/C	Re-equipping of CC.RR
115	Ltr AC/14634/PS Carr	29 Oct 45	AFHQ G-5	Reformation of police forces
116	Ltr 3636/191/EC Stone	31 Oct 45	AFHQ G-5	Transfer of CC.RR to MMIA
117	Ltr 3627/71/EC SO/CC	31 Oct 45	Civil Affairs	Re-quipping of CC.RR
117a	Ltr 8020 EX Com	3 Nov 45	AFHQ	Arms for Carabinieri

TOP SECRET

LIST OF PAPERS

3615/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 3615 CARABINIERI, ITALIAN (CC.RR)

From: 26 Jun 45

~~TOP SECRET~~

Vol. II Page 10

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
117b	Cbl EX 51855 CINC MED	5 Nov 45	AGWAR	MMIA Policy for Carabinieri.
117c	Cbl G 52353 AFHQ	6 Nov 45	Stone	Release of Pistols & Carbines to CC.RR
117d	Aide Memoire, Carr	6 Nov 45	Stone	Clothing & equipment Police Forces.
117e	Ltr AC/14601/21/PS, CC	7 Nov 45	AFHQ	Stfth of Carabinieri Encloltr De Parri
118	Cbl 8250 Hq Alcom, CC	9 Nov 45	AFHQ	Release of Arms for Carabinieri request
119	Cbl (Ref M.S.L./1/) LUSH	13 Nov 45	AC Stone	Desperate conditions of Police Agencies in respect to clothing. Request cloth in North be manufactured into uniforms
119a	Cbl EX 53377 AFHQ	16 Nov 45	MMIA	Equipment of Italian police & Army
119b	Memo Col. Chapman	24 Nov 45	Stone	Representatives sent to Milan to work with NI Ind. Council re clothing CCRR
119c	Report R-6-45	7 Dec 45	CC	Police System
120	Cbl F 54194 AFHQ	23 Nov 45	AC	No increase in Carabinieri ceiling
121	Cbl Q.692 MMIA PS S/C	23 Nov 45	AFHQ	MMIA has taken over CCRR
122	Ltr AC/14601/21/PS Stone	12 Dec 45	De Gasperi	Increase strength of Carabinieri
123	Cbl AMG Liguria Reg	17 Dec 45	CC	Request for 200 Reinforcements
2071				
124	Ltr Comm. of pittorano	31 Dec 45	CC	Remov. and Trans. of Amodio, Paolo
125	Ltr AC/14601/21/PS	18 Jan 46	CC	Increase of Strength of Carabinieri
126	Ltr 588557/34023.1/1.2.1. 26 Jun 46 Admiral Stone		De Gasperi	Improv and increase of Carabinieri
126a	Ltr Stone	9 Feb 46	AFHQ G-5	Increase in Strength of CC.RR

~~TOP SECRET~~

3615/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 3615 CARABINIERI, ITALIAN (CC.RR.)

From: 26 Jun 45
To:

TOP SECRET

Vol. II
Page 8

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
92	AC/14631/PS, Stone	30 Jun 45	AFHQ G-5	Reorganization of CC.RR and other po- lice forces of Italy.
92a	Parri, 23057	6 Jul 45	Stone	Proposal to use It combat gas for IS.
93	Cbl AFHQ, FX-18722	7 Jul 45	AC, 8, XIII	Equipment for police force for VG.
94	14601/21/PS, Stone	12 Jul 45	Parri	Use of It Combat Gas for IS.
95	14601/21/PS, Stone	24 Jul 45	Parri	Uniforms to be supplied 10,000 CC.RR.
96	Cbl AFHQ, FX-32491	5 Aug 45	Troopers, AC	Ital police experts unable attend po- lice school in London.
~~97~~	~~Cbl AFHQ, FX-34913~~	~~12 Aug 45~~	~~Grookmil, AC~~	~~Allied Police Mission for Italy.~~ <i>See 3616</i>
98 2069	3627/33/EC, Lush	14 Aug 45	VP CAS	Clothing & Equipment for CC.RR.
99	Cbl Piemonte, P-127	16 Jul 45	CC AC	Parri-Morandi-Marshall parley on po- lice matters in North.
~~100~~	~~AFHQ G-5: 014.12~~	~~11 Aug 45~~	~~CC AC~~	~~Allied Police Mission for Italy.~~
101	Memo, CC	22 Aug 45	Ex C	Allied Police Mission; Parri's views.
102	3626/EC, Carr	25 Aug 45	AFHQ	Allied Police Mission; Parri's views.

TOP SECRET

3615/CC

GPO Form 353 (Old No. 400)
26, 1945

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

File under No. 3615 CARABINIERI, ITALIAN (CC.RR)

ALLIED COMMISSION

From: 26 Jun 45

~~TOP SECRET~~

Vol. II Page 4

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
126b	Ltr Lusa	16 Feb 46	De Gasperi	Increase Strength of CC.RR.
126c	Ltr Lusa	22 Feb 46	Charles	Report on Carabinieri
1.6d	Cbl SACMED IAF1117	22 Feb 46	INTO ALCON	Ceiling of Carabinieri
127	Ltr 700/32/EC Hind-Smith	25 Feb 46	Amer Emb	Ex Marshal Rodolfo Graziani
128	Ltr Kirk	25 Feb 46	Amer Emb London	Strength of Carabinieri
129	Ltr Browning	19 Mar 46	Stone	Reorganization of CC.RR
129a	Cbl F63137 SACMED	20 Mar 46	Alcom	Increase in strength of CC RR
130	Ltr Stone	22 Mar 46	Browning	Reorganization of CC,RR
131	Ltr Stone	22 Mar 46	De Gasperi	Increase Strength of Carabinieri
132	Ltr CC.RR/G/12	23 Mar 46	Stone	Reorganization of CC.RR
132a	Cbl SD 3166 ExCom	26 Mar 46	Ex Comm	Ceiling of Carabinieri
133	Ltr Stearns	28 Mar 46	G-5 AFHQ	Reorganization of CC.RR
2063a	Ltr 65205 De Gasp	29 Mar 46	CC	Increase Strength of Carabinieri
134	Ltr 3606/146/EC	2 Apr 46	Land Forces S/C	Frwd of ltr AC/14601/21/PS of 22 Mar CC-IPM
135	Ltr 3606/148/EC	23 Apr 46	Civ Affs Sec Land Forces S/C	Ceiling of CC.RR. in Interim Italian Armed Forces

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

18 00546

SUBJECT: POLITO, Saverio - New Questore of Rome

1. Saverio POLITO was born in Calabria on 8 February 1879, and has lived in Naples since his youth. He considers himself a Neapolitan by adoption.
2. In Naples he was a member of the city police. Later he became a noncom in this corps.
3. Having received a law degree, he soon became a Publica Sicurezza official. For many years he performed duty with the Questura of Naples. He became very widely known in that city for his operations in the criminal field.
4. His exceptional intelligence and shrewdness were soon noted, but he also became well known as an unscrupulous person who was easily corruptible.
5. BOCCHINI who maintained that he preferred crooked officials to stupid ones, assigned him in 1930 to special duties with the General Directory of Sicurezza Publica. The most famous case was the arrest of Cesarino ROSSI (on an anti-Fascist charge), whom POLITO caught by using disreputable police trick and who was sentenced to 30 years by the Special Tribunal and still is in jail.
6. POLITO climbed quickly to the highest grades of the P.S. career, continuing to perform confidential work for BOCCHINI.
7. He was sent to Sardinia as Chief of the Special Inspectorate for the repression of delinquency and banditry. The Special Inspectorate was actually an OVRA sub-section for Sardinia to which the Chief Commissario MORAZZINI had been appointed. MORAZZINI did not wish to accept the position and therefore it was given to POLITO. As the latter was of the Questore grade, he declined to head a mere sub-section which had been intended for a Chief Commissario. For this reason the so-called Inspectorate was created especially for him.
8. A few years later he went as Questore to Bologna and gained an unfavorable reputation for having openly used his position for personal advantages.
9. At the outbreak of the war he succeeded in being appointed to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces with the assignment of Inspector General of the Police Forces. From

2007

144 Copy held
to PPL-224

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

that time he wore the uniform of an Army General and opened an office on Viale Parioli. He selected as his collaborators some Army officers among whom figured CAMPINELLI and LA RUSSA. Both men were of ill repute. LA RUSSA was known for his vicious actions as a Fascist and for procuring business for Prefect LE PERA assigned to the Ministry of Interior in the discrimination against Jews. There were several noteworthy cases of corruption in this office.

10. On 25 July, POLITO placed himself at BADOGLIO's service; he was assigned to watch over MUSSOLINI whom he escorted to Ponza and to the Maddalena. He selected personally the Gran Sasso refuge. His incapacity is generally held to blame for the fact that KAPPLER was always informed on MUSSOLINI's movements.

11. POLITO was injured in an automobile accident coming back from the Gran Sasso during the early part of September. On 8 September he was still convalescing at his home. On MUSSOLINI's orders he was arrested by ROSELLI, who was then Questore of Rome, and taken to North Italy.

12. He was tried and sentenced to 20 years. There is an incredible charge which nevertheless seems to be true that after MUSSOLINI was arrested he tried to violate Rachele MUSSOLINI.

13. After the liberation of the North, he returned to the service. He received several special assignments among which that of investigating the Milan Questura in the Spring of 1945.

14. The Chief of the Police considers him as a highly trusted man and he is the only one, besides DOSI, who may enter his office without being announced.

15. Alberto GIANNINI of Becco Giallo will undoubtedly begin a press campaign against the Police, since he knows Subject from the Naples days and is fully aware of his criminal record.

2066

~~2~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

17. Oct. 46

SUBJECT: Incident at the Viminal Palace, Custing of
Questor Ciro VERDIANI

1. The Viminal Palace has been the natural target of public demonstrations since it is the seat of the Ministry of the Interior, of the Council of Ministers, of the Presidency of the Council, and of various inter-ministerial committees. For this reason Questor VERDIANI prepared a detailed plan for the defense of the building. This plan, (copy attached), was carefully engineered and studied, and illustrates great skill in the technique of preserving public order. By means of a telephonic order, the whole plan or a variation of it could be put into immediate effect.

2. The plan was used several times during the pre-electoral period and continually during the two-week period of the elections. Since then it has been used frequently, either in part or in its entirety, in some cases unnecessarily.

3. It was not the Questor alone, but the Central Police Headquarters and the Government itself which adjudged the necessity of applying the plan and gave the order for its application. Naturally the Government is at all times better informed than the Questura concerning the general situation and the danger of any disruption of public order for political or financial reasons.

+ 3615/cc
+ 3616/cc

4. On the morning of 9 October, the plan was not put into effect. It is noteworthy that the Government has always been opposed to police measures aimed at maintaining public order on the grounds that a show of police force makes the government unpopular. Misinterpreting the spirit of democracy, the Government has always prevailed upon the police to intervene hardly at all in public demonstrations. The Questor had received frequent instructions to this effect.

5. In the case of the 9 October incident, the Ministry of Public Works and all the Government offices were better informed regarding recent developments than the Questura, since the matter concerned the fate of tens of thousands of workers employed in tasks involving billions of lire.

2065

6. The governmental machine has given evidence of serious shortcomings in its functioning, since either it is true that the Ministers had decided to fire the workers (and it is therefore strange that no one thought of the possible consequences of such a decision), or else everything that happened was the result of a misunderstanding (in which case a governmental administration which functions in such a slipshod manner as to create this sort of situation by mistake is to blame for subsequent disorders).

File: The Police

SECRETcc: Questura
cc: Ministry of Public Works
cc: Ministry of the Interior

SECRET

7. On the other hand, either the governmental authorities were in possession of information enabling them to foresee the outbreak of serious incidents (in which case we must wonder why the Ministry did not warn the Questura to be on guard and to put into effect the Viminal defense plan), or else the Government did not know anything and could not foresee anything (in which case how could the Questor be expected to be better informed and more far-sighted than the Ministers themselves?)

8. The incidents of the morning of 9 October were unforeseeable, both in their incipience and in their development. The mass of workers had been observed early in the morning, and police patrols were following their movements. It was logical to presume an eventual demonstration at the Ministry of Public Works, on the Piazza di Porta Pia, or at Civil Engineering on Via Monzambano, since there had been small demonstrations there some days before. Policemen and carabinieri on foot and on horses were prepared to defend these places. Moreover, defense troops were stationed at the Ministry of the Interior and all the thirty-two Commissariats were advised to be on the alert.

9. It is a well-known fact that the Police serve in both preventive and repressive capacities. From the point of view of prevention, the measures taken were reasonable and in proportion to the situation, since no instructions had been received from the government that more elaborate measures were required.

10. From the point of view of "repression", the details of the incident are now generally known, but were completely unforeseeable before their occurrence.

11. No investigation will ever satisfactorily determine to what degree the incidents were planned and organized, by whom and to what end, because, in all mob action involving a large and excited crowd, phenomena of collective psychology crop up unexpectedly and without any specific cause.

12. It is noteworthy that the police force is not well equipped to maintain public order, since the sub-machineguns with which the reparti celeri are equipped cannot be used against a crowd, and horses (still used by the police) have long since been proved unsuited for armed action against demonstrators; moreover, the Italian police do not have the effective methods used by all other police forces in controlling crowds - hydrants for throwing water, or tear gas bombs. For these and other shortcomings, the responsibility must fall on the Government, the Ministry of the Interior, the Chief of Police, the Central Direction of Public Security - that is, on anyone other than the provincial questors who are compelled to make the best use possible of the equipment given them and who have long pointed out these defects and inconveniences to the Ministry.

SECRET

13. The Chief of Police, FERRARI, told journalists that the use of tear gas had been forbidden by the Allies. The Allied Commission denied this, but in the meantime the Italian press had had time to make the usual unpleasant remarks about the Allies. Excluding the possibility that FERRARI made this statement with malice aforethought, it would appear that he is rather ill informed about fundamental questions concerning the department of which he is the head.

14. In a difficult and unforeseen situation like that of 9 October and with unsuitable and inadequate equipment, the Police conducted themselves in a manner which must be adjudged satisfactory.

15. After the moment of initial surprise, the Questura quickly sent the necessary reinforcements, and the police force succeeded in saving the objective from the fury of the crowd and in protecting the offices and the members of the Government - with as little bloodshed as possible.

16. The police force was neither weak nor irresolute, for it opposed itself with courage and energy throughout the assault; nor was it over-zealous, for it made only a moderate use of arms. If the police agents had fired their sub-machineguns into the crowd, a massacre would have been the result; the small number of wounded among both people and police attests to the level-headedness of the police force.

17. VERDIANI's arrival on the scene also served to give a spirit of organization to the various police units. He was not obliged to put in an appearance, and it must be pointed out that he has taken similar risks on other occasions, and was even wounded during a monarchic demonstration late in May. His arrival gave courage to his men and served to calm various leaders of the Central Direction of the Police who, together with the Chief of Police, were at their wits' end - some of them literally terrorized. VERDIANI's calm and precise orders contributed much to save the situation.

18. After the incident, it was clear that a severe investigation would be required by the Government, to clarify and justify in the eyes of the public the explanation for and the manner in which such a situation came about. This naturally would entail a statement concerning responsibility.

19. No investigation of the Police was made, because that organization could not have been expected to function better. As for VERDIANI, he had again proved himself to be a real leader.

20. In the difficult pre-electoral period, VERDIANI did a masterful job of keeping the equilibrium in a situation which might have proved permanently dangerous to public order; during

2063

3
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the elections the Rome Police maintained perfect control of the city. Under VERDIANI, the Rome Questura enjoyed a period of effective recovery, with every branch and service being noticeably improved, the output considerably increased, discipline perfected, and a courageous elimination of negative elements from the police force effected, with a subsequent re-establishment of the prestige and the respect which in 1944 and 1945 seemed to have been irretrievably lost.

21. There is no justification for the decision to remove VERDIANI from his post. The practice of firing the Questor whenever public disorders occur in which, for the most part, the Questor has no responsibility, has resulted in the fact that Rome has had five Questors in five years. At the time that ROATTA's flight was receiving so much publicity, SESSA, who was an excellent Questor, was replaced, (after only fifteen days, although he did not have any responsibility), by the insignificant and inactive SOLIMANDO, who is now a candidate for the administrative elections in Rome on the Uomo Qualunque ballot, in spite of his rank of inspector general of Public Security.

22. Again in this instance, the Government has followed the practice of making the Questor pay for incidents provoked by a generally bad situation, as occurs in many cities, and as recently happened in Palermo, both the Prefect and the Questor were removed because DE NICOLA was hissed in that city.

23. By this means good officials are lost, and the country is deprived of the valuable work and activity of worthy men, who are sacrificed in order to save face for politicians of dubious value.

24. VERDIANI's removal caused general satisfaction among the many varieties of individual who had found themselves hindered by his honest and energetic action; officials and agents who had been reprimanded for unsuitable behavior, lack of discipline, and small output express their rejoicing openly; equivocal types, professional intriguers and traffickers repeatedly reprimanded by VERDIANI in spite of their traditional protection by persons in high places; proprietors of expensive restaurants and nocturnal locales, rigidly checked by the Questura under VERDIANI; and the Fascists and neo-Fascists who had found him to be an active adversary - all these rejoice in VERDIANI's downfall.

25. This unpleasant episode again poses the problem of the Italian Police.

26. The vast organism of Public Security must depend from the central political authority; but this criterion, however just, is carried to illogical extremes. The Police Force is sufficiently controlled by political authorities by the mere fact that it depends from the Ministry of the Interior and corresponding under-secretary. On the other hand, the organization depends from and is controlled by officials belonging to the administration of the Prefecture.

14
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

27. The question is an old one, and has been discussed for years without hitting upon the real issue, which is that of giving the police a central direction entrusted to career officials of public security.

28. The Chief of Police has always been a Prefect, but unfortunately, today he is a Magistrate. The same may be said for the Deputy-Chief, for the Chief of Personnel, as well as for the heads of the various general directions, almost all of whom are on the staff of the Prefecture. The result is that the behavior, the needs, the conveniences, the expedient motives, and everything regarding the working of the Police and its officials is subject to the will and the decisions of the officials of another administration, who are of necessity lacking in the experience and the understanding required for such a task.

29. This system gives the political authorities not only general control over the Police, but also the possibility of intervening and making decisions at any time and regarding the smallest details, in such a manner that even the highest and most skilled police officials must constantly yield to the politicians. When incidents such as the recent one occur, the position and the personal responsibility of these police officials are never defended by the elements of that very administration which is in a position to give its backing; instead they are abandoned into the hands of a central direction considered by tradition to represent arbitrary authorities, private interests, and petty ward politicians.

30. Until the police force is restored into the hands of apolitical chiefs and directors, it is useless to talk of police reform.

2061

5 -
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 794

30 SEP 1946

AIDE MEMOIREREORGANIZATION - ITALIAN POLICE FORCES.

1. Officers of the Allied Commission have for the past three years worked in very close touch with the Italian Police Agencies, and it has been very evident to them that allowing for disorganization as the result of the war, the state of efficiency of the Italian Police Forces leaves much to be desired.
2. It is generally agreed that for a Police Force to be effective and efficient certain basic principles are necessary.
For example:
 - (a) All Police Forces in a country should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.
 - (b) They must be adequately clothed, equipped and housed; efficient schools of instruction with a standard code of training should exist.
 - (c) There should be reasonable pay and conditions of service.
 - (d) The arming of Police should be kept at a minimum compatible with security.
 - (e) Police forces should be divorced from the Armed (Defence) Forces of the country and they should, as far as possible be without any political bias.
3. At the present time there are in Italy three major Police Forces i.e. Carabinieri, Corps of Public Safety Agents and Finance Guards, together with other smaller forces, all of which work more or less independently of each other.

It is obvious that this must lead to overlapping, inefficiency and a waste of man power, furthermore the above mentioned basic principles are in general not applied.

Even allowing for the consequences of the war, housing and office conditions are to large degree inadequate.

Conditions of clothing and equipment, although improving are very poor.

2069

File
142 Del 56 to PM 1745 - 30/IX JWC

- 2 -

Classes of instructions are in operation but there is little co-ordination between the Forces.

The pay and conditions of service are unsatisfactory.

Although it is appreciated that conditions at present are abnormal, the Police Forces are undoubtedly being overruled and a wrong mentality is thereby being fostered amongst both the Police and the Public.

Beyond doubt large sections of certain police bodies identify themselves with certain Political Parties.

4. The Allied Commission will be closing down in the near future, but before it does so, I propose that my Public Safety Officers submit a comprehensive report on the general efficiency of the Police Forces of Italy, together with their recommendations for improvement. To enable them to compile a detailed report, it will be necessary for them to seek information from Italian Police Officials and records. I am sure, that you will be only too pleased to give instructions for such information to be made available.

On completion I shall submit the report to you. If you are in general agreement with the recommendations contained therein, you may then care to consider:

- (a) whether the Italian Police Forces are able to implement the recommendations unaided or,
- (b) whether you would wish to ask the services of an Anglo-American Police Mission to assist in their implementation.

2059

Polad A
Polad B
Ex Con
CC ✓
Public Safety - C.A. Sec

142

SECRET AND PERSONAL

THE ITALIAN POLICE

1. At a future date, if it is of particular interest to you, we are prepared to submit a report on a latent crisis within the Italian Police, which is presently impeding any truly effective rehabilitation of this organization in Italy. Briefly, it entails a major dispute between the Chief of Police, FERRARI, and his group against the professional career men of the Italian Police. On the one hand, FERRARI and his immediate subordinates are non-professional police officials; on the other, VERDIANI and his "professional followers" (present Questura of Rome) are neutralizing the former group for eventual dominance.

2. It is submitted that special attention should be paid to this situation and, if possible, steps should be taken to correct this situation by unofficial direction, if possible with the sending of an Allied police commission to Italy to rehabilitate the Italian Police.

2058

File
(1421) km

~~SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

SEP 4 1946
CC

Ref. : 184/EC

4 September 1946.

Many thanks for your D/O letter No. P.C./103 dated 22nd Aug 46.

On the subject of CC.RR. in your province, I have again looked into the matter and report that there is nothing that I can add to my letter No. 14011/24/PS dated 14 Aug on this subject.

Until such time as recruits become available in numbers large enough to cover normal wastage and to build up the Force to their new ceiling I am afraid that you will have to make do with those that you have.

The Chief Commissioner has taken up with the Prime Minister the matter of Scocinarro's report published as a result of his trip to Udine and a full investigation has been ordered within 5 Territorial Command.

(Sgd) W. S. LUSH
Brigadier.

2057

Lt. Col. J. Bright, MBE,
Provincial Commissioner,
Allied Military Government,
UDINE PROVINCE

Copy to: file 3624.

141

SEP 4 1946

CC

Ref. : 184/EC

4 September 1946.

Many thanks for your D/O letter No. P.C./103 dated 22nd Aug 46.

On the subject of O.C.R.R. in your province, I have again looked into the matter and report that there is nothing that I can add to my letter No. 14011/24/PS dated 14 Aug on this subject.

Until such time as recruits become available in numbers large enough to cover normal wastage and to build up the Force to their new ceiling I am afraid that you will have to make do with those that you have.

The Chief Commissioner has taken up with the Prime Minister the matter of Soccimarro's report published as a result of his trip to Udine and a full investigation has been ordered within 5 Territorial Command.

(Sgd) W. S. LUSH
Brigadier.

2057

Lt. Col. J. Bright, MBE,
Provincial Commissioner,
Allied Military Government,
UDINE PROVINCE

Copy to: file 3624.

141

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A P O 794
Office of the Executive Commissioner

SEP 5 1946

CC

Ref. : 3627/1446/C

3 September 1946

SUBJECT: GO. RR. - Clothing and Equipment.

TO : Provincial Commissioner
SNG
U3ine

I have now fully investigated your complaints regarding the deficiencies of clothing, arms and equipment for the Carabinieri in your province and I enclose a copy of the report by the Land Forces Sub-Commission. Considering this report I do not feel justified in pressing the Italian Government on this point at present.

BY COMMAND OF REAR ADMIRAL SEYMOUR:

W. TURNER-COLLES
for Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encls. as above.

2056

Copy to: Land Forces S/C
P.S. S/C

1406

3615/11

COPY:SUBJECT: Clothing & Equipment (Udine)

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AD.
 M.M.I.A. ROSE.
 2/4/1/96/CC.RP

29 August 1946

TO : Executive Commissioner
 HQ, AD.

1. Reference your 3627/21 of 6 Aug 46.
2. Enquiry has been made by CC.RR.LO 1st. Division, with the following results:-

Deficiencies of Clothing.

Underpants (cotton).....273
 Pullovers (woollen).....616
 Towels.....616+
 Jackets: Khaki.....181
 Trousers, ".....616
 Shirts, ".....616
 Caps, ".....616+
 Ties, ".....616+
 Ties, Black.....1,000+
 + Supplies are arriving.

Deficiencies of Arms.

Pistols.....313
 Pistols, ammunition for.....14,140 rds.

Deficiencies of Equipment.

Rit Bags.....400
 Bandoliers.....400

Deficiencies of Transport.

There is a small deficiency of L/Cs and
 M/Cs, but this is largely counterbalanced by the loan from
 XIII Corps of 24 L/Cs and 16 M/Cs.

2055

3. Of the deficiencies, all legions are in the same position, except those legions south of Rome, which are in a worse condition.
4. Transport has been, and is being, supplied to all Legions, especially those in the South who have been very much neglected.
5. Udine Group has its full complement of boots, which is an extremely rare occurrence.
6. Pistols Mod. 34 are not available.
7. Comparatively speaking, Udine Group is in a good position, and unless the complaint of deficiencies can be clarified, the Group will

p.t.o.

(1406)

-2-

continue to receive its normal allowances of equipment.

C. HAYES, Major
for Major General
CC.PH. Section,
H. M. I. A.

CH/cas.

Certified true copy:

2054

2054

1406

SEP 5 1946

CC

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 28 August 1946.

77127/35784/1.6.4.

138

Dear Admiral,

In reply to the requests formulated in your letter No. 9/28/OA of 25 June 1946, I transmit to you the following data supplied to me by the competent offices with regard to the type and calibre of the arms assigned to the "Carabinieri" and to other police forces as well as with regard to the system of governmental control over the production, repair and transit of war material.

The Ministry of War provides for the armament of the carabinieri, of the finance guards, of the P.S. guards, of the corps of custody agents of penitentiaries and of the local police agents (communal guards, sworn guards etc.) according to the specialties as indicated in the enclosed lists.

As to the Public Safety corps in particular, the relative rule establishes as individual armament the sabre and the pistol for the warrant officers, the pistol and the musket for the "brigadiere", "vicebrigadiere", chosen guards and guards.

The detachment armament is not definitely set in the ruling. Practically it is composed of armored cars for 20 mm guns, heavy machine-guns for 8 mm, of 6,5 mm machine-guns and of hand grenades and tear bombs.

Such arms are however not sufficient for the total need of the corps, regardless of the fact that the General Direction of P.S. of the Ministry of the Interior provides to integrate the supplies furnished by the Ministry of War (see enclosure) with the distribution to the detachments of automatic muskets, machine-guns and heavy machine-guns which have been obtained second hand and then opportunely revised and repaired.

2053

The control over the production and repair of arms in military establishments and in the armament factory "Beretta" of Cardone Val Trompia is being exercised by the Ministry of War, while for the remaining civilian factories of arms and ammunition is competent the Ministry of the Interior. The latter provides also - according to art. 28 and the following of the P.S. laws approved by Royal Decree 19 June 1931 No 773 and of paragraph 7 of title 1 of the rules for the carrying out the P.S. law, approved by R.D. 21 January 1929 No. 62 - for the vigilance of the transit of war material across the borders and the various regions of the national territory.

Sincerely yours

/s/ De Gasperi

M

2053 2/9/46

G. A. L.

C. C.

E. C.

Hand to you S/C

Hand to you S/C

Hand to you S/C

Hand to you S/C

140a

6-10-53
Cipher Lab transfered
to CC 3753

2052

140

00 SECRET

29 June 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

The attached will need considerable study. With reference to the covering letter CORR/G/12 of 17 June, I cannot accept the conclusions in paras 4(a) and 4(d) that the Police Mission must be necessarily British.

Folder
3615-1

Moreover, it should be realized that under the armistice we have a right to take a much stronger line with regard to the Carabinieri (as a corps of the Army) than we do with the Police. Thus, even if a Police Mission is not acceptable to the Italian Government, the Land Forces Sub-Commission (Sub-Section) can still exercise considerable influence, as it has already, with the Carabinieri.

I think the foregoing should be borne in mind in your study of the attached.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

3615/2

2051

139

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

A P O 3-9794

Ref: 9/28/CA.

25 June 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am somewhat disturbed by information which reaches me from time to time regarding the manufacture and transit of arms and munitions in Italy. (137)

Under Article 13 of the Armistice Terms, the manufacture of war material and its transit is prohibited except as directed by the United Nations. Further, as you will be aware, under Article 3(a) of the Revised Armistice which is now being considered by your Government, the responsibility for the control of production of armaments will be vested in the Allied organization to be set up to supervise the Armed Forces in Italy.

My attention has been particularly drawn to the extent to which the Civil Police Forces (other than CC.RR) are being armed for the maintenance of law and order. 3615/ce

In connection with this matter I would much appreciate, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, information from you on the following matters:

- (a) The type and scale of weapons authorized for each of these Police Forces (other than CC.RR) under Italian law;
- (b) The system of control by your Government of the manufacture, repair and transit of war material, and the Ministry by which this control is exercised.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

See 140 a

ELLEERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

2050

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

Copy for: Chief Commissioner
Exec. Commissioner
Land Forces 3/6
Navy 3/6
Air Forces 3/6
Econ. Sec.

138

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref: 6/14.1/DA.

19 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Police Agencies - Arms.

TO: ALLIED POLICE HEADQUARTERS.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. I wish to draw your attention to the present situation as regards the strength and armament of the Police Forces and Agencies in Italy.

2. Interim strengths and types of armament have been laid down by the AGS for the Italian Navy, Air Force and Army (including CC.RR) which are controlled by their respective Service Sub-Commissions.

The CC.RR numbering 75,000, although a Corps of the Italian Army, form a large part of the existing police forces in Italy. Considered as a police force they are very heavily armed.

3. As regards other Police Forces and Agencies no limit has been placed on their strength and armament which matters have been left in the hands of the Italian Government.

Their present approximate strengths are as follows:

Public Safety Agents	...	45,000
Railway Police	...	6,000
Finance Guards	...	31,000
Forest Guards	...	6,000
Local Police	...	7,000
Total	...	95,000

The above strength is not considered in any way excessive especially having regard to the fact that their duties now include those previously carried out by the disbanded Fascist Militia which numbered about 170,000.

2049. It is, however, the armament of these Police Forces (which do include CC.RR) which calls for comment.

It is estimated that these Police Forces and Agencies are now armed with:

Tanks	...	5
Armoured Cars	...	30
Heavy Machine Guns	...	1000
Light Automatics	...	10000
Muskets	...	70000
Pistols	...	60000

See also

-2-

The armament of these Police Forces normally consists of the last two items, that is submachine guns and pistols for defensive purposes.

As far as is known the tanks and armoured cars are vehicles which were taken over by the Public Safety Agents from the disbanded Colonial African Police Force. Unconfirmed information is that manufacture of further armoured cars may be in hand.

As regards automatic weapons, this is also acknowledged in the past in the policy of some automatic weapons being held by the Public Safety Agents and Flammae Guards. But such weapons were to be controlled and to be in the nature of authorized releases in conjunction with Land Forces Sub-Commission from stocks from factories or from captured enemy material.

Moreover, the Public Safety Officers in the North when dealing with disorganized and inadequate Police forces in the early days of liberation arranged the issue of automatic weapons to these Police agencies from local captured enemy material. Further, in agreement with the policy laid down and with the military authorities, large numbers of partisans were grafted on to the Police agencies. These partisans brought with them the modern weapons in their possession.

There is evidence, however, that the Italian Government have been adopting such means as purchase of arms on what can be termed a black market through which the number of automatic weapons held has been considerably increased recently.

4. As regards control of production and of transit of arms and munitions, some control was exercised over factories in the North by the Allied military authorities in the early days of liberation. Such control as existed, however, was never handed on and with the departure of military staffs has ceased. The Commission, as has been reported, never possessed the numerical or technical staff necessary to exercise adequate control and the situation in this respect deteriorated, as the British was withdrawn from the North and continuous redeployment and release of personnel took place.

5. One cause put forward by the Italian authorities for the heavy arming of the Police forces is that it is necessitated by the large quantity of modern weapons in the hands of the civilian population. While the state of law and order may have called for the maintenance of heavily armed police reserves in certain districts there would appear to be some question as to justification for such scale of armaments on these grounds alone as has recently taken place.

2048 The disadvantages of divided control and of having a large proportion of the police provided by the Army have undoubtedly been important factors in this matter. It seems clear that the heavy arming of the Public Safety Agents has also a political basis and has been engendered by the feeling that they should be as well armed as the G.C.R.

-2-

137

-3-

7. As regards any provision in the existing or any revised Armistice Terms or in any Peace Treaty it is not known whether such a formidably armed police force in addition to the recognised armed military forces was or is contemplated. It is pointed out, however, that depending upon the political situation such armed police forces are potentially either a valuable addition or a serious menace to the recognised armed forces.

8. Instructions are requested as to whether:

(a) We should request or advise the Italian Government to reduce the armament of police agencies to a more reasonable scale.

(b) We should adopt attitude that this is purely an Italian internal matter, particularly in view of the forthcoming revision in the Armistice regime?

/s/ Henry V. Stone

HENRY V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

2047

137

ACBO/38
MAY.141437B

H/2943
MAY.150900B

IMPORTANT

ALCOM LO BOLOGNA
HQ ALCOM FOR PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

Automatic weapons ammunition held by CC RR Bologna legion
inclusive mobile battallion (-A-) 37 heavy MGS with 11,100
RDS (B) light MGS 319 Breda with 175,450 RDS, 361 Bren with
65,180 RDS. (C) Automatic Rifles:pistols 1,099 Beretta
with 210,710 RDS, 504 Sten with 30,880 RDS. Further 37,200
RDS for (C) Beretta being distributed.

AC DIST

ACTION P.SAFETY
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE
FLOAT 2

2046

CONFIDENTIAL

136

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

SECRET

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

APR 25 1946

Ref: 3606/148/EC.

23 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Ceiling of CCAR. in Interim
Italian Armed Forces.TO : Civil Affairs Section.
Land Forces G/C (MIA)

By authority of their letter AC 091.711 COT-0 dated
16 April 46, AFHQ signal number FX 61311 dated 22 February 46 is
downgraded to SECRET.

A. W. Knisely.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to : Chief Commissioner.

2045

135

3615/EC

QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

CC

Ref: 3606/146/EC.

2 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission. (LFI)

The attached letter AO/14601/21/EC dated 22 March 46, from the Chief Commissioner to the Italian Prime Minister, is passed to you for information.

A. W. Knisely.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Incl.

1 2044

APR 2 RECD

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
No. 65205/34082/1/1.2.1

Rome, 29 March, 1946.

Dear Admiral,

Will you please express to the Allied Supreme Commander the gratitude of the Italian Government and mine for allowing the Carabinieri to be increased from 65,000 to 75,000 units. This gives us a new evidence of the friendship and understanding for our needs in the work of moral rehabilitation and material reconstruction of our Country; this work could not be carried out in any satisfactory manner if the law and public order were not secured and enforced, with traditional zeal, by the Carabinieri.

I also want to express to you, dear Admiral, my deep gratitude for transmitting to the Supreme Allied Commander, and supporting our request.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

(s) Benito Mussolini.

Admiral Milroy W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

(GR)

EC. DWH

APR 1 1946

ACTION. LAND FORCES S/C
INFO. CASEC.

EC
CL.

204

133a

CC

28 March 1946

SUBJECT: Reorganization of CC.RR.

TO : G-5, AFHQ

Forwarded herewith for information are five
copies of the Land Forces Subcommittee, AC, paper
subject "Reorganization of CC.RR."

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ L. W. STEARNS

L. W. STEARNS
Lt Col, AGD
Staff Officer to CC

26/5/46

2042

133

2236

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SD 3166

MAR 26 RECD

0755

H/1220

MAR 261645B

IMPORTANT

MMIA

AFHQ

INFO: AC

SECRET~~SECRET.~~

(126d)

REFERENCE FX 61311 DATED 22 FEBRUARY AND GHQ F 63137 DATED 21 MARCH ADDRESSED ALCOM.

REQUEST QUOTATION REFERENCE AND DATE CHIEFS OF STAFF SIGNAL AUTHORIZING INCREASE IN CEILING ITALIAN ARMY FROM 205,000 TO 215,000 TO INCLUDE 75,000 CC RR INSTEAD OF 65,000 CC RR AS AT PRESENT.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION: EXEC COMMISSIONER 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

CAS

FILE

SKELETON

26 MAR 1940

2041

~~SECRET~~

(132a)

3615/20

SECRET

MAR 25 RECD

Subject:- Reorganization of CC.RRLand Forces Sub-Commission, AC
(M.M.I.A.)CC.RR/G/12
23 March 1946My Dear *Admiral*Very many thanks for your nice letter CC 3615 of 22 March
re above.We are very gratified with your commendation and I will pass
your remarks on to my staff.

Herewith the 5 extra copies you desire.

Yours *Very sincerely**Langley Browning*

LB/c

Major General.

Rear Admiral ELDERT W. STONE, USNR.
Chief Commissioner,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION.
R O M E

2040

132

2238

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

AC/1072/1/1/13

11 March 1946

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I refer to your letter dated 26th January 1946 on the subject of the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000. 126

This matter was referred to Allied Force Headquarters, and I am very glad to be able to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander has approved the increase in strength from 65,000 to 75,000.

I have also been asked to inform you that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which may subsequently be taken in the Peace Treaty.

Yours Very Truly

Ernest W. Stone,

Major General, USAF,
Chief of Staff,
Allied Commission.

Mr. Indro Montanelli
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

2039

131

13615/12

11 March 1946

AC/14601/21/73

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I refer to your letter dated 26th January 1946 on the subject of the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

This matter was referred to Allied Forces Headquarters, and I am very glad to be able to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander has approved the increase in strength from 65,000 to 75,000.

I have since been asked to inform you that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which may subsequently be taken in the Peace Treaty.

Yours Very Truly

Is/ Every M. Stone,

ELDERY M. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN,
Chief Commissioner.

DR. ADOLFO DE GASPERI
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.

3615/cc

CC

1946

3615/c

increase is without prejudice to any decision which may subsequently be taken in the Peace Treaty.

Yours Very Truly

/s/ Emory W. Stone,

EMORY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

DR. ALDO DE GASPERI
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

2039

2039

131

AC/14501/11/73

11 March 1946

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I refer to your letter dated 25th January 1946 on the subject of the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

This matter was referred to Allied Force Headquarters, and I am very glad to be able to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander has approved the increase in strength from 60,000 to 75,000.

I have also been asked to inform you that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which may subsequently be taken in the Peace Treaty.

Yours Very Truly

Is/ Henry M. Stone,

Major General, USARH,
Chief of the American
Military Government

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers,

3615/ce

126

3615/cc

Yours Very Truly

Es/ Emory W. Stone,

EMORY W. STONE

Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.Dr. A. C. L. GASPARI
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

2039

2039

131

CC 3615

22 March 1946.

My dear

129 I read with much interest your report on the reorganization of the CC.RR dated 19 March and want to commend you and your staff for both the report and the excellent job you are doing.

Please forward me five additional copies for transmittal to AFHQ.

Yours

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Major General Langley Browning, CB, OBE, MC,
COC, Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.

2038

130

4615/CC

CC
SECRET.

MAR 19 REC'D

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

CC.RR/C/12

19 March 1946

My Dear *Admiral*

You will be interested to have the attached.

Presumably you will pass the information on to A.F.H.Q., if
you think this necessary.

Yours

Very Sincerely
Langley Browning

LE/c

Major General.

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, USNR.
Chief Commissioner,
ARMED COMMISSION.

↗

2613/12

see

(172)

2037

(129)

Subject:- Reorganization of CC.RR

SECRET.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

CC.RR/G/12
13 March 1946

Chief Commissioner, A.C. (2)

1. In October 1945 the responsibility for reorganization of the CC.RR was transferred to my Sub-Commission, but no extra staff was provided till 11. Jan 1946.

2. I decided to tackle the problem as follows:-

(a) Organization and initiation of a special staff.

10 experienced British Police Officers were transferred to me from Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the Field in ITALY. A two-day "course" was held by H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) to explain to these officers the general M.M.I.A. set-up and procedure and the task before us. An H.Q. Section in ROME under Lt. Col. MICHAEL was organized as a "Carabinieri Section" of H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as L.O's to the CC.RR Divisional and Brigade H.Q's.

(b) Collection of information.

The H.Q. Section applied itself to gaining information on all CC.RR matters from G.H.Q., CC.RR, while the L.O's did the same in outstations all over ITALY. Simultaneously the H.Q. Section and the L.O's assisted the CC.RR in day-to-day procedure and applied ginger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the CC.RR.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) ROME on 13 and 14 March 1946, at which all L.O's attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

(d) Planning for the future

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) to explain to these officers the general M.M.I.A. set-up and procedure and the task before us. An H.Q. Section in R.O.E. under Lt. Col. WIGGALL was organized as a "Carabinieri Section" of H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as L.O's to the CC.RR Divisional and Brigade H.Q's.

(b) Collection of information.

The H.Q. Section applied itself to gaining information on all CC.RR matters from G.H.Q., CC.RR, while the L.O's did the same in outstations all over ITALY. Simultaneously the H.Q. Section and the L.O's assisted the CC.RR in day-to-day procedure and applied ginger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the CC.RR.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) ROME on 13 and 14 March 1946, at which all L.O's attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "tidying-up" which has been done since Jan 1946, it is now possible to plan more accurately for the future. I directed that this planning should take two forms:-

(i) the immediate objective - I have laid down that our immediate object is to transform the CC.RR into a properly armed and equipped force capable of doing its job, before the elections take place next June. Such limited reorganization as is possible will also take place, without any major change which might upset the equilibrium and functioning of the CC.RR. With proper arms and equipment, however, the morale and prestige of the CC.RR should be considerably enhanced. In fact, from all reports this enhancement is already considerable.

(ii) the ultimate objective - to put the CC.RR completely on modern feet. This will be a development out of 2(d)(i). It will involve many major matters as longer term policy, such as:- reorganization and change of staffs and superior personnel; standardization of organization; review of terms and condition of service; accommodation generally; reorganization of the complete training scheme; organization ab initio of criminal records and scientific aids to crime detection on modern lines; etc.- this inevitably will take time.

2036

129

- 2 -

(a) The stage we have reached now is set out in the attached interim report to me by Lt Col. MICHAEL.

(b) The report shews:-

(i) that we have made considerable progress towards our immediate objective, despite the chaos and inertia that existed in the CC.RR hitherto.

(ii) the task before us in achieving our ultimate objective and the lines on which we are thinking and acting.

4. The advantages of CONTINUITY as regards retention of personnel connected with the CC.RR business are obvious. I would urge that at this critical stage no major removals of officers should take place. The value of the work done by these few officers is out of all proportion to their numbers. Moreover, their ability, enthusiasm and energy has been beyond praise. I think that we can achieve success if, and only if, continuity is maintained.

5. Finally, I would mention that I have placed the CC.RR as "first priority," agreeing with what I know is your view in the matter viz. that the first line of defence for law and order is the CC.RR, the Army proper being merely secondary and in reserve for this purpose.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and the interim report to the British and American Embassies, as they have taken and are taking a considerable interest in this vital matter.

LB/c

Copy to:- British Embassy.
American Embassy.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.H.I.A.

agreeing with what I know is your view in the matter viz. that the first line of defence for law and order is the CC.RR, the Army proper being merely secondary and in reserve for this purpose.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and the interim report to the British and American Embassies, as they have taken and are taking a considerable interest in this vital matter.

LB/c

Copy to:- British Embassy.
American Embassy.

2035

L. Branning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

109

SECRETSUBJECT : Reorganization of GCRR - Interim ReportLAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, AC,
(M. G. I. A.)
ROME

GCRR/G/12

12 March 19461. POLICE OFFICER STAFF OF GCRR SECTION

GSO I	Lt Col H. HIGHAIL	B
GSO II (ADMIN)	Major B. POWELL	B
GSO II (Ops)	" R. F. FIELDERS	B
Schools and Trg	Capt T. MARSH	B
Liaison Officers		
TURIN	Major A. G. HILLS	
MILAN	" P. COXHEAD	
FLORENCE	" W. CHURCHHOUGH	
ROME	" W. LACEY	
NAPLES	" C. HAYES	
PALERMO	" T. GODDARD	

Commenced duty on 14 Jan 1946.

2. POLICY

- (a) (i) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the GCRR may be rapidly improved having regard to the responsibilities they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious crime wave.
- (ii) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and
- (iii) To submit recommendations regarding organisation, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a

GSO I	Lt Col H. HIGHAIL	B
GSO II (ADMIN)	Major R. POWELL	B
GSO II (Ops)	" R. F. FIDERS	B
Schools and Trg	Capt T. KERSH	B
Liaison Officers		
TURIN	Major A. C. HILLS	
MILAN	" P. COXHEAD	
FLORENCE	" W. GREENHOUGH	
ROME	" W. LACEY	
NAPLES	" C. HAYES	
PALERMO	" T. GOODRAGE	

Commenced duty on 14 Jan 1946.

2. POLICY

(a) (i) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the CCRR may be rapidly improved having regard to the responsibilities they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious crime wave.

(ii) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and

(iii) To submit recommendations regarding organisation, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a longer term policy.

(b) To deal with 2(a) CCRR LCs were required to make a comprehensive preliminary survey of existing conditions in Division, Brigade and lower formations. This HQ Section simultaneously commenced a survey at CCRR, GHQ, ROME. This preliminary survey has been made and it is now possible to assess the information obtained in a condensed form, state what has been done already, and what will be done in the immediate future to complete 2(a) (ii) above.

(c) A conference of CCRR Officers was held at these HQs on 13th and 14th March 46 to discuss fully and amplify the facts now known, to ensure that the programme under 2(a) (i) and (ii) above is carried out to the best advantage and to gain further information upon which to base final recommendations for permanent improvement in CCRR organisation as in 2 (a) (iii) above.

.....2/

- 2 -

(d) The immediate objective at this stage is to provide the OCRR with the necessary facilities to perform efficiently the duties required of them. Convenience and personal comfort though necessary and important for keeping up morale, are secondary considerations.

(e) Drastic changes in the nature of the OCRR as a police agency are not envisaged, as it is unlikely they would be acceptable to the ITALIANS. The peculiar position occupied by the OCRR in relation to other Police Agencies, chiefly the Questura, also prevents some possible though desirable changes.

(f) As this Section is limited in its activities to the OCRR, it is intended without major alteration in the character of the OCRR to make that force more of itself. Nevertheless, the closest touch is being kept with Public Safety Sub-commission AG in respect of the police angle.

3. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The OCRR is organized into:

(a) Comando Generale - the GHQ in ROME (see Appx 'A')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and efficient, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally, the 13 "uffici" being too top-heavy to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inadvisable to alter this understood organization and procedure. That can come later when the formations and units are more on their feet

(b) Divisions and Brigades (See Appx 'B')

These commanders pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staffs concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have decentralized to them a much greater responsibility and power of supervision and control. The most that can be said of them is that they do very little harm. Under existing regulations, for instance, Divisional Commanders are expressly forbidden from visiting OCRR Stations of their lower formations!

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities

The OCRR is organised into:

(a) Comando Generale - the GHQ in Rome (see Appx 'A')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and efficient, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally, the 13 "ufficio" being too top-heavy to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inadvisable to alter this understood organization and procedure. That can come later when the formations and units are more on their feet

(b) Divisions and Brigades (See Appx 'B')

These commanders pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staffs concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have decentralized to them a much greater responsibility and power of supervision and control. The most that can be said of them is that they do very little harm. Under existing regulations, for instance, Divisional Commanders are expressly forbidden from visiting OCRR Stations of their lower formations!

2033

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities will be made.

(c) Legions (See Appx 'B')

Reports from LOs show that more energy and determination is shown by Legion Commanders.

Apart from NAPLES Region, which has been the subject of separate reports, no immediate changes are necessary.

(d) Groups and Companies (See Appx 'B')

On the whole, as satisfactory as can be expected under the circumstances. The personnel are good but require equipment and leadership.

.....3/

109

- 3 -

(c) Mobile Battalions (See Annex 'B')

A comparatively recent innovation. This powerful, hard hitting, mobile reserve should help both directly and indirectly in the maintenance of law and order. See also page 14.

4. PERSONALITIES

Confidential reports will be submitted on the important commanders and staff officers. In general, while many of these are good (and would be better, given proper powers and support), there are some whose capabilities and energy leave much to be desired. The matter of changes will have to be approached delicately in view of the political implications involved, particularly at this time. This however will have to be faced sooner or later, ruthlessly. Without proper direction, no force can become efficient.

5. CHANNELS OF SUPPLY

(a) There is no doubt that lack of clothing and boots for the GCR has largely been due to faulty distribution procedure within the GCR; the present system is for Legion Commanders to indent direct to GHQ GCR which is done by way of a monthly report showing requirements and stocks held. There is no method at GHQ for checking these returns and stocks are permitted to issue items at their own discretion.

(b) Each Legion has a store of clothing, equipment, arms and ammunition which is supervised by a subaltern with NOCs and men under his command. To maintain reserve stocks, and in an effort to ensure easy distribution (which has not been accomplished), certain supplies are held in main depots, e.g. MILAN, ROME, BARI, NAPLES, entirely under the control of GHQ. Legion Staffs maintain these main depots but releases therefrom are authorised by GHQ only. GHQ either supply from existing stocks or send consolidated Legion demands to the War Ministry, who release availabilities to GHQ. The latter alerts the supplies to Legions in need and notifies the Legion concerned.

Up to that point the supplies still lie in Army or GCR main depots wherever they may be and the Legions have to collect them from the depot.

(c) Little, if anything, is ever done by the War Ministry or GCR GHQ to ensure the physical delivery of the supplies to the Legions who are often not in a position to collect, having insufficient or unreliable transport at their disposal.

5. CHANNELS OF SUPPLY

(a) There is no doubt that lack of clothing and boots for the CCRR has largely been due to faulty distribution procedure within the CCRR; the present system is for Legion Commanders to indent direct to GHQ CCRR which is done by way of a monthly report showing requirements and stocks held. There is no method at GHQ for checking these returns and Legions are permitted to issue items at their own discretion.

(b) Each Legion has a store of clothing, equipment, arms and ammunition which is supervised by a subaltern with NCOs and men under his command. To maintain reserve stocks, and in an effort to ensure easy distribution (which has not been accomplished), certain supplies are held in main depots, e.g. WILM, HOME, BARI, NAPLES, entirely under the control of GHQ. Legion Staffs maintain these main depots but releases therefrom are authorised by GHQ only. GHQ either supply from existing stocks or send consolidated Legion demands to the War Ministry, who release availabilities to GHQ. The latter allots the supplies to Legions in need and notifies the Legion concerned.

Up to that point the supplies still lie in Army or CCRR main depots wherever they may be and the Legions have to collect them from the depot.

(c) Little, if anything, is ever done by the War Ministry or CCRR GHQ to ensure the physical delivery of the supplies to the Legions who are often not in a position to collect, having insufficient or unreliable transport at their disposal. Thus the Legions are left to their own devices and the complacency shown by the War Ministry and GHQ regarding this is largely responsible for the frequent delays in getting supplies out to men on the ground. One LO reported his opinion that it was "A matter of luck how much equipment Carabinieri had and when he got it". This HQ concurs.

(d) The complacency referred to above is largely due to the curia's dual control of the CCRR which is reflected in the mentality of HQ's, War Ministry and CCRR. The CCRR down to Legion level is the child of the War Ministry. Then it is adopted by the Ministry of Interior, who is by no means a satisfactory foster parent. Thus at War Ministry and GHQ there exists a lack of drive to see that the CCRR are equipped in a fit condition to carry out their duties.

.....44/

2032

129

2253

785015

- 4 -

(c) In an effort to effect an immediate remedy a recommendation has been made by this Section (and concurred with by GHQ, OCRR) for Army channels of supply to be used at once for all OCRR supplies (excepting accommodation stores). This would ensure the physical delivery of supplies to all Legions through the Army Territorial Commands, and would fix the responsibility of maintaining the OCRR upon the War Ministry. It would also ensure simplification of procedure and Economy and prevent serious delay in distribution.

A scheme has been drawn up, which, it is confidently anticipated, will have the desired effect. For details see Appendix 'C'.

Releases for the period October 1945 to 25 February 1946 as Appendix 'D'.

6. STRENGTH

(a) Extraneous duties performed by the OCRR have, according to GHQ, become necessary owing to the absence and unreliability of other police agencies.

Economies have been effected and more than 500 personnel have been returned to normal duties. Allied Military demands for the Service of OCRR have been exacting and this is being dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission, AC.

(b) Dissipation of strengths are being closely observed by IOs and representations made to Brigade Commanders, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available

<u>Establishment Authorised</u>	<u>Present with units</u>
65,000	58,322

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick, men on leave etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, OCRR being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve as special Companies for eventual guard duties. Steps have been taken to remedy this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representations have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) GHQ OCRR, IOs and Public Safety Sub-Commission AC are strongly opposed to the closing of any permanently manned OCRR Station. We concur. There are 4106 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or under. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying between 3 and 21) of communes throughout ITALY. The withdrawal of

(b) Dissipation of strengths are being closely observed by IOs and representations made to Brigade Commanders, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available

Establishment Authorized	Present with units
-----------------------------	-----------------------

65,000

58,322

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick, men on leave etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, CCRR being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve as special Companies for eventual guard duties. Steps have been taken to remedy this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representations have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) CHQ CCRR, IOs and Public Safety Sub-Commission AC are strongly opposed to the closing of any permanently manned CCRR Station. We canour. There are 4106 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or under. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying between 3 and 21) of communes throughout ITALY. The withdrawal of the CCRR from any of these stations would deprive the population of any police protection whatever and of any visible sign of the power of the law. Therefore the closing of such stations will not be recommended, but an improved standard of efficiency demanded.

7. ACCOMMODATION

(a) The unsatisfactory "Casermaggio" system, whereby CCRR barracks stores are provided by civilian contractors, has completely broken down and the condition of most of the 5,000 Caserma's concerned is bad. The contractors are obliged to maintain the buildings, provide furniture and bedding and kitchen equipment. They are at present quite unable to do this.

.....5/

129

2031

- 5 -

- (b) It would be difficult to overcome the many legal and other difficulties in order to change the present accommodation situation, and, short of compulsory acquisition of all caserma's occupied by CCRR which would mean lengthy legislation, no immediate remedy can be suggested. CCRR GHQ do not favour state ownership of the buildings concerned, as local interest (which CCRR value) in the housing of the CCRR would no longer be taken.
- (c) The provision of accommodation stores is another matter. Here again the War Ministry should step into the breach. CCRR GHQ have applied to War Ministry, on our recommendation, for the loan of accommodation stores to improve existing conditions. The question of accounting is one for the Ministries and contractors concerned.
- (d) Similarly regarding repairs to caserma's, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War should co-operate in this vital matter. Genio Civile and Genio Military must provide the necessary material, and there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labour.
- (e) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for CCRR will be submitted.

8. UNIFORM AND CLOTHING

- (a) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions very greatly in different Legions. Since October 1945 the War Ministry have released to CCRR among other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 32,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 pullovers, 70,000 blankets, 71,000 shirts, etc.
- (b) The normal scale of clothing for CCRR is generous (too generous for immediate fulfilment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now allotting more to CCRR and the general situation is improving.
- (c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated indent made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if the supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered at once.
- (d) CCRR uniforms etc requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1946 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

2030

there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labour.

(e) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for CCR are will be submitted.

8. UNIFORM AND CLOTHING

(c) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions very greatly in different Legions. Since October 1945 the War Ministry have released to CCR other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 32,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 pullovers, 70,000 blankets, 71,000 shirts, etc.

(b) The normal scale of clothing for CCR is generous (too generous for immediate fulfilment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now allotting more to CCR and the general situation is improving.

(c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated indent made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if the supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered at once.

(d) CCR uniforms etc requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1946 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

2030

9. ARMS AND AMMUNITION

(a) GIC suggested a scale for arming CCR (less Mobile Battalions). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate adoption of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.

(b) 16,110 Beretta automatic rifles with abundant supply of ammunition, are already on their way to Legions.

A further 34,000 Beretta automatic rifles are being assembled, 8,000,000 rounds of ammunition is available, and will be supplied to the CCR exclusively.

In addition, each CCR Station is now receiving a Breda machine-gun and a minimum of 20 handgrenades for station defence. Many have already been delivered.

.....6/

129

- 6 -

(c) The carrying of automatic rifles by CCRR on normal day-patrols in cities should be discouraged for obvious reasons. However, the CCRR must have available at all times weapons equal to those in possession of the "enemy", who have acquired considerable numbers of powerful weapons illegally as a result of the war. Therefore, present and future distribution will ensure 50,110 automatic rifles for CCRR use on dangerous duties, or when strong opposition may be met.

(d) Authority has been given for the manufacture of sufficient 9 mm pistols (mod 34) to arm the CCRR on the scale of 1 per man.

(e) On provision of the above CCRR armament will be standardised, sufficient, and no further recommendations regarding arms will be necessary.

(f) CCRR have expressed great satisfaction and morale and prestige has been raised as a result.

(g) For scale of arms: see appendix 'M'.

10. TRANSPORT

(a) An establishment for CCRR Transport (less Mob Bns) has been agreed and it is attached hereto as appendix 'P'.

(b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each CCRR Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - one vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. Thus all supplies will be distributed by CCRR themselves from Legions to the smallest unit, and present method of distribution by locally hired transport (in many cases by bullock cart) will be abolished.

(c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient state is the most vital need of the CCRR. The general situation regarding lack of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.

(d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by

- (i) Re-allocation of Army transport,
- (ii) Release to CCRR of the next 500 vehicles from ITALIAN Army workshops.

by War Ministry, out of those

has been raised as a result.

(g) For scale of arms: see appendix 'F'.

10. TRANSPORT

(a) An establishment for CCRP transport (less Mob Bns) has been agreed and it is attached hereto as appendix 'F'.

(b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each CCRP Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - one vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. Thus all supplies will be distributed by CCRP themselves from Legions to the smallest unit, and present method of distribution by locally hired transport (in many cases by bullock cart) will be abolished.

(c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient state is the most vital need of the CCRP. The general situation regarding lack of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.

(d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by

- (i) Re-allocation of Army transport,
- (ii) Release to CCRP of the next 500 vehicles from ITALIAN Army workshops.
- (iii) Release to CCRP of new vehicles by War Ministry, out of those becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with ARAR and the Treasury.

(e) As it is inadvisable to deplete Army transport which is still very short, the solution (d) (iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which confirmation in writing is being requested) to provide CCRP with:

- (i) 250 Jeeps - "delivery to commence in about 3 weeks".
- (ii) 910 heavy and medium lorries - new, from ITALIAN motor industry - 500 to be delivered by the end of June 46.
- (iii) 24 light lorries - new, from ITALIAN factories - delivery soon.
- (iv) 500 motor cycles - new, from GUZZI factory - delivery soon.
- (v) 2000 bicycles - new, from BELLUCHI factory - delivery soon.

.....7/

2029

109

- 7 -

CORR have made arrangements for collection of the above, as they become available.

(f) The establishment of CORR transport (less Mobile Battalions) compared with present holdings is

	Passenger vehicles	Medium Load		Heavy Load		Light lorries and Jeeps	Motor Cycles	Total
		Carriers	Carriers	Carriers	Carriers			
Establishment:	982	945	67	897	1951	3712		
Held	:	714	-----341-----	1434	2489			

Recent census shows over 50% of holdings are inefficient. Most passenger vehicles are requisitioned and no facilities exist for their repair, it being the intention of CORR to de-requisition as a matter of policy.

(g) The establishment is thus extremely modest and possible quickly to implement, but it will provide all immediate CORR transport requirements for maintenance and high operational efficiency.

11. POL

(a) POL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a provincial basis through Prefects. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the mercy in some cases of a biased political person.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through Army channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by UNRRA as part of civilian needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the Army to supply POL to legions will mean the Army having to increase its purchase or reduce consumption in units to supply CORR. Therefore it is recommended that the petrol now supplied through UNRRA should be allotted by Ministry of Industry and Commerce to GRC CORR who would then allot to Legions, the channels of supply being through Army Territorial Commands.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by CORR at "Comitato Italiano Petrole" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.P. reserves in

2028

(a) POL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a provincial basis through Prefects. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the mercy in some cases of a biased political person.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through Army channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by UNRRA as part of civilian needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the Army to supply POL to legions will mean the Army having to increase its purchase or reduce consumption in units to supply CCRR. Therefore it is recommended that the petrol now supplied through UNRRA should be allotted by Ministry of Industry and Commerce to GHQ CCRR who would then allot to Legions, the channels of supply being through Army Territorial Commands.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by CCRR at "Comitato Italiano Petroli" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.P. points may not function, but this could be overcome by reserves in sufficient quantities to be available at Army Territorial Commands for use in emergency.

(d) Full recommendations will be made regarding POL supplies and distributions.

12. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) More than 2,000 stations are without telephones. It is not yet known how many of these stations formerly had telephone communications. Where telephones are installed, the majority are available for part time service only. (Civilian exchange system).

(b) It is recommended that private lines be installed throughout. Much detailed information is being collected, but it is apparent that no appreciable improvement can be expected in telephone communications in the immediate future.

.....8/

129

- 8 -

15. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

- (a) A scheme for wireless communications down to group level has been recommended and the sets will, it is hoped, be provided immediately by AFHQ. Spare sets (3) will be kept at Legion HQ, available for temporary use at any station - ie below Group level - in emergency.

Copy of wireless scheme recommended is attached as appendix 'G'. This is essential in view of the lack of telephone communications.

- (b) The provision of motor-cycles according to scale is the best pro-tem remedy for the poor state of CCR communications.

14. MOBILE BATTALIONS

- (a) Agreement on minor points has not yet been reached between CCR and War Ministry as to the establishment of these Battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the Battalions will be up to establishment by the end of May 1946.

- (b) We have obtained from AFHQ the release of 125 "Staghounds" Armoured Cars and their issue is expected in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, CESINO. A further 45 "Staghounds" will later be provided to replace the 45 Humbers at present held in the North of ITALY, i.e. PADUA, MILAN, TURIN and GENOA. Efforts are being made to obtain spares for both Humbers and "Staghounds" and request has been made to AFHQ for supplies of ammunition for cannon.

- (c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at CESINO. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crews in the Battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.

- (d) It is considered that the Battalions should be formed of 3 composite companies, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by GHQ CCR accordingly, and isolated detachments will be recalled to Bn HQs.

LOs have been asked to see that the instruction of GHQ is

(b) We have obtained from AFHQ the release of 123 "Staghounds" Armoured Cars and their issue is expected in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, CESSANO. A further 45 "Staghounds" will later be provided to replace the 45 Humbers at present held in the North of ITALY, i.e. PADUA, MILAN, TURIN and GENOA. Efforts are being made to obtain spares for both Humbers and "Staghounds" and request has been made to AFHQ for supplies of ammunition for cannon.

(c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at CESSANO. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crews in the Battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.

(d) It is considered that the Battalions should be formed of 3 composite companies, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by GHQ CERR accordingly, and isolated detachments will be recalled to BN HQs.

IGs have been asked to see that the instruction of GHQ is fully complied with and report.

(e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, defeat the purposes for which the Mobile Battalions were formed and the above is being pressed, so that the Battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming elections. See also para 3 (e).

15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

(a) Apart from specialist training at Army Schools at CESSANO, elementary training is being given as in (b).

Pre-war, all elementary training was given at ROME and TURIN.

Owing to the lack of equipment and accommodation, schools are not working to the maximum capacity.

.....9/

2027

109

- 9 -

(b)

Location	Actually Under training	Max Capacity per annum
(i) Legione Allievi OCRR Caserma Vittoria Emanuele, Via Legnano 3, <u>ROME</u>	1250	3000
(ii) Battaglione Allievi OCRR <u>Torino</u> , Castello Reale, <u>TORINO</u>	300	800
(iii) Battaglione Allievi OCRR di <u>Bari</u> , Caserma Arco- nautica, <u>BARI</u>	300	500
(iv) Battaglione Allievi OCRR di <u>Cagliari</u> , <u>CAGLIARI</u> (Sardinia)	100	500
(v) Scuola Centrale OCRR di Firenze, Via della Scala 20, <u>FLORENCE</u> (NCOs)	700	700

CHQ OCRR occupies 1/3rd of accommodation at the Central School in ROME for its offices.

(c) The present method of instruction is farcical and accommodation and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of selection for NCOs courses leaves much to be desired, and no Officers' training course is taking place at the moment. The matters of recruiting, training, terms and conditions of service are all under review and a final report will be made shortly.

16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF OCRR

(a) Any success achieved by the OCRR in maintaining law and order in existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of affairs in OCRR.

OCRR have no system of criminal records, or the recording of crime.

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them. This important section of police work has always been regarded as the

2028

(v) Scuola Centrale CCRR
di Firenze, Via della Scuola 20,
FLORENCE (NCOs)

700

700

GHQ CCRR occupies 1/3rd of accommodation at the Central School
in Rome for its offices.

(c) The present method of instruction is farcical and accommodation
and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of selection for
NCOs courses leaves much to be desired, and no Officers' training
course is taking place at the moment. The matters of recruiting,
training, terms and conditions of service are all under review and
a final report will be made shortly.

16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF CCRR

(a) Any success achieved by the CCRR in maintaining law and order in
existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of
affairs in CCRR.

CCRR have no system of criminal records, or the recording of crime.

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them.
This important section of police work has always been regarded as the
responsibility of the Questura.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these
defects and full recommendations will later be made.

(b) With the immediate application of the remedies suggested regard-
ing transport, arms and ammunition, Mobile Battalions, accommodation
stores, and, in particular, channels of supply through Territorial
Commands and the adoption of the plan for detailed improvement through-
out the CCRR organisation, this HQ is satisfied that the following
results will be achieved:-

- (i) The CCRR will progressively be more and more successful in
maintaining law and order in the immediate future, and
- (ii) CCRR will improve in its functioning as an efficient,
independent Police Force, without altering the special
character and tradition of this Branch of the Italian Army,
particularly as and when the reorganization gathers force.

H. M. I. A.

H. MICHALL, Lt Col CSO 1
CCRR Section, H.M.I.A.

2 2 6 7

2028

129

SECRET

Appendix 'A' to CORR/C/12
 Dated 19 March 1946

COMANDO GENERALE

The GHQ CORR comprises the undermentioned staff:

BRUNETTI Brunetto, Generale, Comandante.

Chief of Staff : Col SAGGI Mario;

Vice-Chief of Staff : Lt Col BIANCO Marco.

Ufficio Segreteria e Riservato (Secretary's Office - Confidential matters)

CC : Lt Col BIANCO Marco - matters regarding personnel (Officers; recruiting of Officers, and rewards to Officers and NCOs.

Ufficio Situazione ("Situation" Office)

CC : Major PURGERT Ruggiero - Reports on crimes, arrests, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major FIERONI Guido - Duty matters, rewards for ordinary work, reinforcement.

Ufficio Ordinamento (Organisation office)

CC : Major GACCIO Cesare - Division into smaller Commands, strength, lists of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the strength and the regulations of CORR.

Ufficio Personale Sottufficiali e Truppa (Personnel Office & ORG)

CC : Major SIMONCINI Emilio - Movement, marriages, discipline, instruction and training of NCOs and soldiers of CORR.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilisation office)

CC : Capt CAJANO Mario - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, demobilisation of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC : Major RUGGERI Ruggiero - Reports on crimes, arrests, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major PIERONI Guido - Duty matters, rewards for ordinary work, reinforcement.

Ufficio Ordinamento (Organisation office)

CC : Major GACCIO Cesare - Division into smaller Commands, strength, lists of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the strength and the regulations of OCRR.

Ufficio Personale Sottufficiali e Truppa (Personnel Office & ORs)

CC : Major SIMONCINI Emilio - Movement, marriages, discipline, instruction and training of NCOs and soldiers of OCRR.

Ufficio Mobilitazioni (Mobilisation office)

CC : Capt CAJANO Mario - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, demobilisation of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

2025: Major MILETO Domenico - Publication of the "Foglio d'Ordini", of the official bulletin of OCRR, and the paper "CARABINIERE DELLA NUOVA ITALIA" - printing of OCRR regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione del Carabiniere in Congo" (Organisation for ex-Carabinieri).

Ufficio Assistenza (Welfare)

CC : Major MILETO Domenico - Welfare of personnel.

Ufficio Amministrazione (Administrative Office)

CC : Col. MOSPOLA Giovanni - Administration.

Ufficio di Commissariato (Supplies)

CC : Col LA ZARA Angelo - Rationing and eqpt of the OCRR personnel.

.....2/

129

- 2 -

Appendix 'A' to CORR/C/12
dated 19 March 1946

Ufficio Collegamento e Motorizzazione (Communications and Motorisation)

OC : Col CEMILI Rodolfo - Arms, motorisation and communications of CORR.

Direzione Ippica e Veterinaria (Riding Establishment and Mounted Section)

OC : Col MAREMONTI Francescantonio - Horses, mules, etc, of CORR.

Ufficio Inchieste (Inquiries and Screening)

OC : General FERRARI Alfredo (Generale di Divisione) - Screening of Officers and NCOs, in connection with their political background, and with what they did after the armistice.

2271

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.


785015

2022

bc1

SECRET


- 1 -

GENERAL LAYOUT - CARABINIERI

NOTE: In addition, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to cer


2022

- 1 -

Appendix 'B' to CCR 12
dated 19 March 1946GENERAL LAYOUT - CARABINIERI

m, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to certain legions.


- 2 -

SECRETDETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

SUMMARY:-

3 Divs	21 Legions
6 Bdes	111 Groups
4 HQ Mob Bn Gps	12 Mob Bns

- 2 -

Appendix 'B' to CORR/G/12
dated 19 March 1946DETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

SECRET.

Appendix "C" to MIA Letter
CC.RR/G/12 dated 12 March 1946

1. Attached is a diagrammatic key to proposed channel of supply to CC.RR Legions.
2. The system intended to be implemented, is briefly as follows:-
 - (a) Legions submit demands to Army Territorial Command.
 - (b) War Ministry release items available and notify the appropriate Territorial Commander, who is responsible for collection from Army Depots unless delivery to Territorial Command has been arranged by Ministry of War.
 - (c) Legions will collect from Territorial Command and be responsible for "break-down" and delivery to sub-units.
3. The following supplies and equipment are involved:-
 - Clothing and Equipment
 - Arms and Ammunition
 - Rations
 - Petrol
 - Vehicles

c/

2277

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015


Rations
Petrol
Vehicles

c/

2020

129

- 2 -

SECRETPROPOSED CHAIN OF SUPPLY TO LEGIONS OF CORPS


Note 1: GHQ, Div and Bde HQs are to be maintained by the nearest Legion

Note 2: Legions will be responsible for collecting from Army Territorial Commands, and distribution to own Sub-Units.

2018

- 2 -

CLOSED CHANNEL OF SUPPLY TO REGIONS OF CCR

Appendix 'C' to CCR/G/12
of 14 March 1946MINISTRY OF WAR
ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

to be maintained by the nearest Legion

e for collecting from Army Territorial Commands,
Sub-Units.

SECRET.

Appendix "D" to MIA letter
CC.RR/G/12 dated 17 March 1946.

RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE CC.RR

From October 1945 to 25 February 1946.

I T E M S	Released by W. M.	Received by CC. RR	R E C E I V E D	
			Excess (a)	Short
Caps	30,000	24,650	-	5,350
Jackets	28,037	38,187	10,150	-
Cloth for Jackets	34,050	-	-	34,050 In course of manufacture
Blouses	10,000	-	-	10,000 - do -
Trousers	32,401	39,450	7,049	-
Cloth for Trousers	37,600	-	-	37,600 - do -
Greatcoats	29,600	30,950	1,350	-
Cloth for Greatcoats	3,000	-	-	3,000 - do -
Hackinaws	2,116	1,716	-	400
Putties	25,300	45,780	20,480	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443
Boots	66,600	90,500	23,900	-
Shirts	99,252	71,200	-	28,052 - do -
2017	82,000	71,310	-	10,690

Jackets of manufacture

Blouses	10,000	-	-	10,000	- do -
Trousers	32,401	39,450	7,049	-	-
Cloth for Trousers	37,600	-	-	37,600	- do -
Greatcoats	29,600	30,950	1,350	-	-
Cloth for Greatcoats	3,000	-	-	3,000	- do, -
Mackinaws	2,116	1,716	-	400	-
Putties	25,300	45,730	20,430	-	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500	-
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443	-
Boots	66,600	30,500	23,900	-	-
Shirts	99,252	71,200	-	28,052	- do -
2017	82,000	71,310	-	10,690	-
Socks	64,632	73,843	2,211	-	-
Undershirts	1,674	1,674	-	-	-
Pullovers	40,000	40,000	-	-	-
Totals	21,200	20,000	-	1,200	-
Blankets	66,000)	70,800	-	17,200	-
Comforters	22,000)	-	-	-	-
Overalls	3,212	2,192	-	1,020	-
Gloves	3,064	1,954	-	1,110	-
Hoods	2,554	1,954	-	600	-
Overcoats with fur	600	-	-	600	-
Crash Helmets	898	238	-	660	-

SECRET.Sheet No. 2.

Appendix "D" to MTA letter
CC.RR/G/12 dated 8 March 1946.

I T E M S	Released by W. A.	Received by CC. RR	R E C E I V E D	
			Excess	Short
Capes Waterproof	510	-	-	510
Canteens (Flasks)	10,000	10,000	-	-
Cym Short Trousers	1,674	1,674	-	-
Handkerchiefs	130,000	130,000	-	-
Shirts	-	15,300	15,300	-
Spectacles for drivers	-	1,954	1,954	-
Complete Allied Uniforms with Shirts dyed green	-	10,000	10,000	-
Complete Grey-Green Uniforms (Jackets and Trousers)	-	10,650	10,650	-
The following materials released to CC.RR on 20 February 1946 are still to be withdrawn by them:-				
Overalls	6,000	-	-	-
Spectacles for drivers	12,456	-	-	-
Hoods (woollen)	3,000	-	-	-
201b Gloves	6,200	-	-	-
Socks (Cotton)	24,972	-	-	-

The following materials will be released shortly:-

Complete Uniforms with shirts dyed green	-	10,000	10,000
Complete Grey-Green Uniforms(Jackets and Trousers)	-	10,650	10,650

The following materials released to CC.RR on 20 February 1946 are still to be withdrawn by them:-

Overalls	6,000	-
Spectacles for drivers	12,486	-
Hoods(woollen)	3,000	-
Gloves	6,200	-
Socks(Cotton)	24,972	)

2015

The following materials will be released shortly:-

Caps	10,000
Uniforms	10,000
Boots	10,000

(a) Excess is due to special releases from other sources such as HQ 2 District direct.

129

SECRETCCRRTABLE OF EQUIPMENT - ARMS AND AMMUNITIONA. AUTOMATIC PISTOLS BERETTA MOD. 34

One for each man (officers excluded, as they provide their own). The revolvers mod. 89 which are now held will be substituted by automatic pistols mod. 34.

B. RIFLES MOD 91.

One for each man who is not in possession of a Beretta automatic rifle.

C. AUTOMATIC RIFLES BERETTA MOD. 38 Cal. 9

One for each man in Mobile Battalion (12 Battalions);
4 for each 5 men of the total strength of NCOs and men excluded men of Mobile battalions (56,929 men)
Four for the 4 Comando Raggruppamento Mobile Bns -
Total 16.

D. LIGHT MACHINE GUNS BREDA MOD. 30 Cal 6.5.

- 5 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 2 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 2 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 4 for each "Comando Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili" (4 for four Raggruppamenti)
- 21 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 72 for CCRR School "Legione Allievi"
- 16 for the Central School
- 5 for the Squadron Group, Legion of Rome
- One for stations with less than 10 men; total 4,106
- 2 for stations with not more than 25 men
- 3 for stations with not more than 50 men
- 4 for stations with more than 50 men

E. HAND GRENADES

- 50 for each Comando Ge
- 10 for each Division H
- 10 for each Brigade H
- 100 for each Raggruppam
- (4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn
- 100 for Cadets Region
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group
- 100 for each Company L
- 20 for each station w
- 20 for each station w
- 30 for each station w
- 50 for each station w

F. AMMUNITION

As follows for each w

- automatic pistol Beret
- Rifle mod. 1891
- Automatic rifle Beret
- Light Machine guns B

2015

C C R RAppendix 'E' to CCRR/G/12
of 17 March 1946.ARMY - ARMS AND AMMUNITIONE. HAND GRENADES

- 50 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili (4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Region (Regione Allevi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (21)
- 20 for each station with less than 10 men
- 20 for each station with not more than 25 men
- 30 for each station with not more than 50 men
- 50 for each station with more than 50 men

F. AMMUNITION

As follows for each weapon:

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal.9	21 rds handed to each man
	7 " reserve
Total	28
- Rifle mod.1891	72 rds handed to each man
	28 " reserve
Total	100
- Automatic rifle Beretta	80 rds handed to each man
	170 " reserve
Total	250
- Light Machine guns Breda	500 rds handed to men
	422 " reserve
Total	922

hey provide
re now held
mod.34.

of a

Battalions);
of NCOs
(56,929 men)
bile Bns -

glioni

total 4,106

an

an

SECRET

ESTABLISHMENT FOR CARABINIERI TRANSPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, ETC.

COMMANDS	Motor Cars	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	Arm'd Cars
		30 cwt - 3 ton	Over 5 ton			
General Command	14	1	1	2	8	-
Division Command	2	-	-	-	2	-
Brigade Command	2	-	-	-	1	-
Legion Command	3	2	3	1	6	-
Group Command	1	1	-	1	2	-
Company Command	1	1	-	1	2	-
Sec Command and stations Commanded by Lts	1	1	-	1	2	-
Stations with personnel up to 10 men	-	-	-	-	-	-
" " " " " 25 "	-	-	-	-	-	-
" " " " " 50 "	-	-	-	-	-	-
" " " " over 50 "	-	-	-	-	-	-
Squadrons' Group	-	-	-	-	-	-
Royal Guards - CCRS Squadron	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cadets Legion	2	2	2	2	60	6
Central School	2	1	1	1	20	2
"Raggruppamento" Command (each "Raggruppamento" includes 4 Mob Bns)	2	-	-	1	2	-
Total vehicles required for all Carabinieri units, except the 12 Mobile Battalions	982	915	67	897	1951	8

Appendix "A" to OCMR/G/12
of 14 March 1946

FOR CARABINIERI TRANSPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, REGIONS AND LOWER UNITS

	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	Arm'd Cars	Workshops	Bicycles	Petrol Carriers
	30 cwt - 3 ton	Over 5 ton						
	1 - - 2 1 1 1 - - - - 2 1 -	1 - - 3 - - - - - - - 2 1 -	2 - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - 2 1 1	8 2 1 6 2 2 2 - - - - 60 20 2	- - - - - - - - - - - 6 2 -	1 - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - -	6 2 2 6 2 2 2 4 6 2 2 100 30 2	- - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 1 -
	915	67	897	1951	8	23	12474	22

SECRET

Appendix "C" to MIA Letter
CC.RR/6/12 dated 17 March 1946.

Carabinieri Wireless Communications.

The following are the proposed Carabinieri requirements for wireless communications:-

1. MOBILE BATTALIONS

	<u>For each Battalion</u>	<u>Total for 12 Bns.</u>
No. 12 Sets	2	108
No. 9 Sets	2	24
No. 35 Sets	12	144

2. Carabinieri HQ's in ROME and 18 Legions outside ROME.

Nineteen powerful sets are required to enable communication to be set up between ROME and Legions in the following cities:-

TURIN, ALESSANDRIA, GENOA, MILAN, PADUA, BOLZANO, VERONA, BOLOGNA, FLORENCE, ANCONA, LEGHORN, CHIETI, NAPLES, BARI, CATANZARO, MASSIMA, PALERMO, CAGLIARI.

3. Two Legion HQ's in ROME.

Three No 9 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri GHQ in ROME and the two Legions in ROME. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri GHQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 111 Gruppi. 131 No 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Gruppi.

5. Station HQ's.

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless, but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble and disorder, it is proposed that three No 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required sixty No 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

2013 If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No 9 Set should be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there whilst trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set

Three No 9 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri GHQ in ROME and the two Legions in ROME. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri GHQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 111 Gruppi. 131 No 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Gruppi.

5. Station HQ's.

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless, but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble and disorder, it is proposed that three No 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required sixty No 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

2013 If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No 9 Set can be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there whilst trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set would return to Legion HQ when the situation became normal.

7. Mobile Battalions.

No. 9.	Radio Sets		No. 36.
	No. 19.	No. 19.	
1	1		-
1	1		-
-	4		-
-	3		-
-	-		12
2	0		12
24	108		144

Legion HQ's
Mobile Battalion HQ's in field
Mobile Battalion HQ's to 3 Coy HQ's
3 Coy HQ's to Armoured Cars
3 Coy HQ's to 3 Platoons

Total for 12 Mobile Battalions

8. SUMMARY OF SETS REQUIRED.

POWERFUL SETS.

Carabinieri GHQ, ROME 1
18 Legions Outside ROME 18
19

199

SECRET.Appendix "G" to LRIA Letter
CC.RV/c/12 dated 1/4 March 1946Sheet No. 2.B. SUMMARY OF SETS REQUIRED. (Cont'd)No. 9 SETS.

GHQ, Rome	1
2 Rome Legions	2
Legions	20
Group	111
Spare Sets at Legions	60
Mobile Battalions	24
	<u>218</u>

No 19 SETS.

Mobile Battalions	<u>108</u>
-------------------	------------

No 38 SETS.

Mobile Battalions	<u>144</u>
-------------------	------------

c/

2012

2291

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

No 36 SETS.

Mobile Battalions 144

c/

2012

129

~~TOP SECRET~~DRAFT~~TOP SECRET~~

25 February 1946.

From: KIRK

To : AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON FOR DUHM

Admiral Stone has asked me to inform you that with reference to authorized strength of Italian Carabinieri which he discussed with you and Cannon in London, SACMED has now concurred with the Admiral's recommendation that the Carabinieri strength be increased from 65,000 to 75,000 and so recommended to Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 February with copy to British Chiefs of Staff. British Embassy is also passing same information to Foreign Office.

3615/100

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 8.1(a) and 8.1(b) or (E)
STATE DEPT LTR 8/22
BY [Signature] DATE 8/28/24

2011

~~TOP SECRET~~

(128)

FEB 26 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 700/32/HC.

25 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Ex Marshal Rodolfo Graziani.

TO : The American Embassy.
The British Embassy.
C-5 Section, A.P.H.Q.

W/R L. Chief File Clerk 5/7/46

The attached copy of translation of C.C.R General Command letter No. 183/7/R.P. addressed to Allied Commission, Public Safety sub-Commission, dated 17 February 1946, is forwarded to you for information.

2010/10

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ N. W. HIND. SMITH
MAJ
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

2010

Incl.

127

W/R

126L.

Cipher Cables transferred
to Cl. ~~33753~~ 3753

2009

FEB 23 RECD

Ref: AE/14601/72/PS.22. February 1946.

A few days ago General Browning spoke to you from an Aide Memoire on the Carabinieri. He subsequently showed me his notes. I felt that he had, naturally, spoken only from the military aspect of their functions and organisation. I therefore instructed the Public Safety Sub-Commission to prepare some notes for you on the civil side of their work which is, of course, controlled, by the Ministry for Interior, and I am sending them herewith. I hope that they may be of value to you.

M. S. LUSH

H.E. Sir Noel Charles, K.C.M.G.,
British Ambassador,
British Embassy,
ROME.

2008

MSL/JG.

Copy to: *to Commissioner*
Land Forces S/C.
Executive Commissioner.

(126) a

✓ 4

3615/CC

22nd February 1946.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR H.E. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

ORGANISATION - CARABINIERI.

1. Although the CC.RR is a unit of the Italian Army and organised as such, it is primarily a Police Force and its members are policemen charged with the duty of preserving the peace. It is for this reason that the CC.RR. is under the control of two Ministries, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior. The functions are as follows:

(a) Ministry of War. Administration, organisation military training, discipline, recruiting, arms and equipment, transport (including horses). Military Police, action under mobilisation orders, supervision of soldiers on leave and release, searched for deserters and those escaping from military prisons. The Ministry of War always works in agreement with the Ministry of Interior regarding the distribution and assignment of officers.

(b) Ministry of Interior. Maintenance of public order and security, billeting and barrack equipment. The Ministry can order concentration of forces whenever necessary. In matters concerning the strength of the CC.RR., or its disposition, the Commanding General, CC.RR. must obtain the previous authorisation of the Ministry of Interior before interesting the Ministry of War in the matter.

2. The number of police in Italy today is less than the number employed before Italy's entry into the war, before its industrial, commercial and economic resources had been destroyed, and before its population was confronted with hunger, homelessness, unemployment and inflation. Before the war, the aggregate number of police engaged in maintaining law and order (excluding Royal Finance Guards) was approximately 207,000 officers and men. Of this number 130,000

training, discipline, recruiting, arms and equipment, transport (including horses). Military Police, action under mobilization orders, supervision of soldiers on leave and release, searched for deserters and those escaping from military prisons. The Ministry of War always works in agreement with the Ministry of Interior regarding the distribution and assignment of officers.

(b) Ministry of Interior. Maintenance of public order and security, billeting and barracks equipment. The Ministry can order concentration of forces whenever necessary. In matters concerning the strength of the CC.RR., or its disposition, the Commanding General, CC.RR. must obtain the previous authorization of the Ministry of Interior before interesting the Ministry of War in the matter.

2. The number of police in Italy today is less than the number employed before Italy's entry into the war, before its industrial, commercial and economic resources had been destroyed, and before its population was confronted with hunger, homelessness, unemployment and inflation. Before the war, the aggregate number of police engaged in maintaining law and order (excluding Royal Finance Guards) was approximately 207,000 officers and men. Of this number 130,000 were organized into specialized police agencies including:

- (a) Railway Police.
- (b) Port Police.
- (c) Highway or Road Police.
- (d) Post and Telegraph Police.
- (e) Frontier Police.
- (f) Coastal Police.
- (g) Forest Guards.
- (h) Anti-Aircraft Guards.

These agencies were named from M.V.S.M. (Black-Shirt Militia), they were fascist organizations, and were all abolished when the Allies occupied Italy. No replacement was made, and as a result, Carabinieri are being used for duty on railways, ports, roads, frontiers, etc., to the detriment of their primary function, the duty of preserving the peace. (The Italian Government has appreciated this situation and has issued Decrees creating Railway Police. Men are being enrolled as agents of Public Security under Questore and will be trained as Port and Road Police).

3. The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime. Next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. These functions cannot be performed by police on static guard duty, nor by

-2-

those held in reserve bodies in readiness to put down riots or other disturbances beyond the capacity of the CC.RR. on patrol. The close contact with the public so necessary to the proper performance of police duty is secured by the naming of 4,800 stations throughout the country. The location and importance of the station determines the number of police to be assigned. The extraneous duties which must at present be performed by the CC.RR. militates against the effectiveness of their strength, with the result that the stations throughout the country are not manned to their proper strength. The minimum station allotment is usually 5 but this number has had to be reduced. The increase in mobility of a force increases efficiency. However, a reduction in strength in communes, to be replaced by visiting CC.RR. in motor cars or trucks, will inevitably lead to a worsening of public safety conditions. The presence of the CC.RR. resident on the scene frequently prevents crime being committed. Flying squads can only deal with the trouble after it has occurred. Experience at home has shown that with all the many modern aids so valuable and necessary in police work today, the basis of the whole system is the "man on the beat". He cannot be replaced.

4. It is not generally appreciated that the CC.RR. is the only representative of law and order in the towns and communes below provincial level. He is not a village policeman. He is a member of a national police force and is transferred from a city or small town to a commune in the mountains in accordance with the exigencies of his service. The CC.RR. in Rome is of the same type as the CC.RR. in a Sicilian village.
5. Agents of Public Security are concentrated in cities and provincial seats and are not distributed into communes to assist in the duty of preserving order. Guardia Finanza are revenue agents, not police in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is anticipated that an additional 6,000 agents will be trained by April and a further 6,000 by June. This increase in strength should enable a large number of CC.RR. to return to proper police duty. When this occurs, every effort should be made to build up the strength of the force at the station level.

2008

2008

5. Agents of Public Security are concentrated in cities and provincial seats and are not distributed into communes to assist in the duty of preserving order. Guardia Pinarua are revenue agents, not police in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is anticipated that an additional 6,000 agents will be trained by April and a further 6,000 by June. This increase in strength should enable a large number of CC, RR, to return to proper police duty. When this occurs, every effort should be made to build up the strength of the force at the station level.

2005

2005

126 c

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

FILE 18.000

Ref: 3606/132/BO

16. February 1946

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I acknowledge your letter 58557/34033.1/1.2.1 dated 26
January 1946 regarding the increase in strength of the CC.RR.

I have strongly recommended your request to higher author-
ity and hope to be able to let you know further news at the earli-
est opportunity.

Very truly yours,

M. S. Luth
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Dott. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

2005

copy to: Chief Commissioner ✓
Land Area &c.

176

FEB 18 1946

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.P.O. 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3606/132/23

16 February 1946

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I acknowledge your letter 58557/34033.1/1.2.1 dated 26 January 1946 regarding the increase in strength of the CC.RR.

I have strongly recommended your request to higher authority and hope to be able to let you know further news at the earliest opportunity.

Very truly yours,

M. S. Luth
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Dott. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

2005

copy to: Chief Commissioner ✓
Land Area Co.

176

Ref: AC/14601/21/PS.

9 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Increase in Strength of CC.RR.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. The Italian Prime Minister has now raised with me officially the question brought up by his predecessor of an increase of 10,000 in the strength of the CC.RR, thus raising the ceiling of the corps from 65,000 to 75,000. I attach his letter which represents the views of the Italian Government as a whole and, in my opinion, of the local government authorities and, one might even say, the Italian public generally.

2. The Prime Minister bases his case mainly on the comparatively weak strength of the forces of law and order and on the present unsatisfactory state of public order.

3. As regards the strength of the police forces, Dr. de Gasperi points out that before the war, with efficient communications and means of transport and with normal conditions prevailing, the forces in charge of the various services of public order amounted to 207,000 men, without counting the CC.FF.

Of these forces, 130,000 belonged to Fascist specialist militia such as railroad, harbour, frontier, custom, forest militia. Generally speaking these specialist militia have been suppressed and though some of them are being reactivated on democratic lines, it is a fact that the CC.RR are now carrying out tasks extraneous to their normal duties and will be compelled to do so for some time to come.

2004 4. The extent to which the CC.RR strength is affected by employment on such tasks was fully set out in my letter AC/14601/21/PS of 7 Nov 1945 when this matter was last under consideration. It was then decided by your HQ that an increase was not to be recommended at that time.

5. You will be fully aware of the existing unsatisfactory state of public order in certain parts of Italy. There do not seem to be grounds for expecting any improvement in existing conditions, especially having regard to the present shortage of basic foods and the prevalence of arms illegally held.

6. The first Italian elections since the downfall of Fascism are due to commence on 10 March. At first these local elections will cover only a small part of the country. It is however anticipated that local elections will be followed by national elections in April or May, and even after this further and possibly the majority of local elections will follow. The country is

-1-

COPY TO: CH. COM.
EX. COM.
LAND FORCES G.
US & BC REPRESENTS.

[Handwritten signature]

-2-

therefore faced with a considerable period during which security and public order will be of paramount importance to the Government and to the country as a whole, at a time when their efforts to implement the policy of democratic government will be on trial before the world, and at a time when the Allied troops in Italy may be considerably reduced.

7. I submit, however, that there is an even more cogent reason for acceding to the request of the Prime Minister than those given above. The whole of Italy has now been liberated in accordance with the policy of the Allied Governments that the Italian Government should assume the full responsibility for the administration and control of their country. Italy has thereby become virtually a sovereign state entitled to determine the strength of the forces of law and order necessary to enable its citizens to live under peaceful and stable conditions. The Italian Government might justifiably plead that to give them the task of governing their country and at the same time to refuse them the means with which to do so would be to place them in a position which no Government could accept.

8. The last request for an increase in the manpower ceiling of the CC.RR was not recommended by your HQ on the grounds that the needs of the Italian Government could be best met by improvement in the quality, organisation and distribution of the existing forces of 65,000. Every effort is being made to this end, and definite improvement has resulted, though the full reorganisation must inevitably take time and the immediate future is all important. Moreover, the Prime Minister points out that the extraneous duties which must be performed by the existing forces militate against the effectiveness of their strength and the steps now being taken by the Italian Government with the assistance of the Land Forces and Public Safety Sub-Commissions cannot make up entirely for shortage of men.

9. In this connection I must point out that the CC.RR are the "first line" of the police forces in this country and the counterpart of the city and village police in the US and Great Britain. If a satisfactory state of public order is to be attained within a reasonable time it is essential that the CC.RR should regain confidence in themselves and thereby the confidence of the public. In this respect and because the CC.RR must be scattered in the many communes of the provinces, numbers play an important part. I understand that a project is now being discussed by the head of the CC.RR and the Minister of War whereby some three quarters of the increase asked for would be devoted to reinforcing the detachments of village and city police which have fallen in many cases to very small figures; and to form the remaining 2,500 into five reserve battalions for use as necessary.

10. I also understand that the Italian Government would find no great difficulty in recruiting the additional numbers and that they could in fact obtain about 5,000 men at once out of ex-CC.RR, many of whom have already applied for re-employment.

11. COC Land Forces Sub-Commission, whom I have naturally consulted with regard to this proposal, is in agreement with me that the increase should now be permitted and I therefore strongly recommend that the request of the Prime Minister who has a very heavy responsibility in this matter, and whom, I submit, we must support to the fullest extent in the exercise of his responsibilities, should be granted.

126 a

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

58957/ 34083.1/1.2.1

Rome, 20 January 1946

Dear Admiral,

Some time ago, the Italian Government asked the Allied Commission to be allowed to raise the number of the Carabinieri from 65 to 70 thousand units. Regarding this proposition, A.M.I.A. considered that the service of the Carabinieri would in fact be improved by bettering their equipment and armament and giving them better means of transport, instead of increasing their number.

The steps suggested by A.M.I.A. would doubtless be most useful; however they cannot make up for the scarcity of the men.

Before the war, with efficient communications and transport means, active industries, a general state of well-being, in short, in normal living conditions, the forces in charge of the various services of public order amounted to 207 thousand men, without counting the Guardia di Finanza.

Of such men, 130 thousand belonged to the militia specialized in the various services (railroad, harbors, road, post and telegraph, frontier, coast and forest militia). Such specialized Corps were suppressed, and the Carabinieri were entrusted with tasks which, in normal times, were carried out by thousands of agents, who, among other things had special competence and outfits.

However, the Carabinieri Corps must now supply not only soldiers for the above mentioned services which are not included among the special duties of the Corps, but also the men that are continually requested by the Allied Army Forces, by various other allied organizations and by numerous organisms of the Italian Government. Thus about 17,000 men are withheld from the service, and to this figure, we must add another 6 thousand carabinieri forming 12 battalions that must be kept as movable reserve.

The remaining force is quite inadequate to carry out the service of local detached commands where where the prevention and repression work of the Carabinieri takes place in very difficult conditions. In the provinces and in isolated places where incidents and riots trouble public order more frequently, police duties are entrusted to the Carabinieri Corps only, for the activity and service of the Public Safety Corps are limited to the towns.

To the problems of a general character regarding the safeguard of public order, and are of vital importance, we must add, in a near future, those which are relative to the organization of the elections. The Italian

Admiral Ellery M. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EC DIST - 29 Jan
ACTION - Send Foreign Sec
INFO - CC
- EC
CA Sec

126

131

- 2 -

Government is aware that voting must take place in a regime of utmost freedom and order if the elections are to be the first step towards the concrete reestablishment of a democratic administration procedure.

This is why I wanted to bring once more to your attention the problem regarding the increasing of the number of the Carabinieri, so that you may efficaciously support the request of the Italian Government with A.F.H. I., hoping that approval may be granted in time for the new contingent to take up its duties before the beginning of the electoral period.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours,

S. De Gasperi

e/c

2001

126

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub Commission
APO 394

AIDE MEMOIRE

AG/14601/21/PS

18 January 1946

SUBJECT : Increase of Strength of Carabinieri
TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. Should the Italian Government make another request for authority to increase the strength of the CC.RR., the Allied Commission should support it and press for the granting of such authority.

2. Under date of 7 September, 1945, Parri, as Prime Minister, and on behalf of the Italian Government, made a request that the CC.RR. strength be increased by 10,000 bringing it up to 75,000 officers and men. This request was put forward to G-5, AFHQ, with a recommendation for its approval. However, WMA expressed an opinion to try and meet the commitments by increasing mobility, armament and communications rather than manpower. Under date of 15 November, 1945, G-5 advised this Headquarters that the SAC did not propose at that time to recommend an increase in the manpower ceiling of the Carabinieri and that he reaffirmed his previous view "that the needs of the Italian Government can best be met by means of vigorous measures to improve the quality, organization and distribution of the 65,000 Carabinieri at present authorized".

3. So long as the present attitude toward the use of Carabinieri continues no amount of improvement of quality, organization and distribution can obviate the necessity for actual manpower in place. Under existing conditions there is a deficiency in strength which is not fully appreciated due to several factors which are mentioned herein after.

2000

106

3615/ce

125

4. The first factor is the failure to recognize that the aggregate number of police in Italy to day is less than the number employed before Italy's entry into the war, before its industrial, commercial and economic resources had been destroyed, and before its population was confronted with hunger, homelessness, unemployment and inflation. Before Italy's entry into the war the aggregate number of police engaged in maintaining law and order (excluding the Royal Finance Guard) was approximately 207,000 officers and men. Of this number 130,000 were organized into specialized police agencies as follows:

- a. Railway Police, 29,500
- b. Port Police, 1,000
- c. Highway or Road Police, 1,250
- d. Post and Telegraph Police, 1,500
- e. Frontier Police 2,400
- f. Coastal Police 33,750
- g. Forest Guards 5,000
- h. Anti-Aircraft Guards 56,250.

These agencies were manned from the M.V.S.N. (Blackshirt Militia), and were considered as Fascist organizations. So when Mussolini was overthrown and Badoglio was given control, he ordered the disbanding of the Volunteer Militia and the transferring of all its personnel to the Italian Army. At the time of Allied occupation orders were issued abolishing all fascist institutions. Thus the specialized police agencies disappeared, and no replacement has been made. Carabinieri are being used for railway, port, road and frontier police - a few hundred withdrawn from their regular duty attempting to perform the duties of several thousand. The Italian Government appreciates this situation and has issued decrees creating railway police and within the body of Questura Agents are being trained port police and road police. Until sufficient men are recruited and trained, the country's general police force is depleted in order to do specialized guard duty.

5. The second factor is the use of Carabinieri by Allied Forces and agencies and by the Italian Government

1999

125

again on forms of specialized guard duties this preventing their employment on regular and normal police duty. In this category are carabinieri assigned as guards for airfield, to UNRRA, to ENDSI, to PSS, SIC, CID, SIB, and MP detachments, to MAC, to Epuration Committees, to various Ministries and offices, and others. A recent inspection of the Naples Legion disclosed that from that Legion alone 1,056 are so employed and in addition 182 on port duty and 209 as railway guards. Continually requests are made by Allied officers and others for Carabinieri to be used on guard duties. If the strength cannot be increased then all Carabinieri now engaged on guard, escort and like duties should be released for police duty.

6. This brings up the third factor which is the misconception of the status and functions of Carabinieri. Regardless of the fact that the CC.RR. is a unit of the Italian Army and organized as such, it is primarily a police force and its members are policemen, peace officers if you please, to the same extent that the Metropolitan of London and the Metropolitan of New York are police forces. The principal difference is that the CC.RR. is a national police force whereas the others are city or metropolitan police forces. So, as in London and New York, there are police stations at which a certain number of policemen are assigned whose function is to preserve the peace, also in Italy there are police stations, 4,809 to be exact, to which policemen (carabinieri) must be assigned for the purpose of keeping the peace and of performing the many other functions which policemen are called upon to perform. The location and importance of the station determines the number of policemen who must be assigned. The first function of a policeman is to preserve the peace and prevent the commission of crime. The second function is, in the event of a crime having been committed, to apprehend, if possible, the criminal. This is elementary. These functions cannot be performed by policemen on static guard duty, nor by policemen who are held in reserve bodies who may be held in readiness to put down riots or other disturbances beyond the capacity of the patrolman or constable. And so today in Italy must be withdrawn from

199x

69

consideration as policemen, the 6,000 carabinieri who constitute the 12 mobile battalions.

7. Finally it should be understood that the agents of public security, the questura agents, are concentrated in cities and provincial seats and are not distributed into communes as conservators of the peace and that Finance Guards are revenue agents not police. The Carabinieri are the police of Italy. They are the conservators of the peace, the policemen in the communes who have the respect of the general public. If their strength is to be dissipated in assignments of guard duty and by concentration in mobile battalion formations then the strength must be augmented for normal police functions and no amount of improvement in quality, armament and distribution can be a substitute.

JWC/ae

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

1997

125

475

Translation

COMUNE di Pistorino sul Gizio

Subject: Removal and transfer of AMADIO Paolo, Brigadier of the CC.RR.

To : The Command of the CC.RR. Legion Chieti
 The Command of the CC.RR. Corps Rome
 H. L. De Gasperi, President of the Council Rome
 Admiral Stone, Chief Commissioner Rome.

The leaders of the political parties that have been formed in Pistorino heard about the undeserved and unfair transfer of Brigadier Amadio Paolo, who managed to reestablish order in civilian life, with special tact and ability, in a period of unrest. He gave to his corps an authority and seriousness worthy of its past and to the population the feeling that the Carabinieri in command should safeguard public safety and enable the citizens to carry out their activities in peace. In fact after Brigadier Amadio had been in Pistorino for a few months, public order was no longer perturbed by all kind of manifestations, this for the benefit of the whole population. As soon as it was heard that the Brigadier was to leave Pistorino, discontent spread among the citizens who publicly and privately expressed their displeasure for the way in which this active non commissioned officer had been treated; his only purpose was to fulfil his duty.

He therefore deems it advisable to ask the Authorities to revoke the transfer.

The Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party ... De Ruffinis Pasquale

The Secretary of the Action Party Serafini Pasquale

The Secretary of the Socialist Party Buccianelli Enrico

The Secretary of the Communist Party

The Secretary of the Liberal Party

The Secretary of the Labour Democrat Party Mario Croce

1996

156

e/o

EC 8/10/52

Action - C. 1/2

CC

CC

Handwritten: 1/2/52

13

124

171540A

G/5814

DEC 181545

IMPORTANT

AMG LIGURIA REGION

ALCOM CITE ACPGF

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

1. Urgently request immediate reinforcement of 200 armed and equipped Carabinieri.
2. Force is below strength due to demobilizations and sickness.
3. Letter follows.

AC DIST

ACTION: PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

LAND FORCES S/C (MMIA)

FILE 2

FLOAT

1995

RESTRICTED

(125)

Ref: AC/11601/21/PS

12 December 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I refer to Professor Ferruccio Parri's letter dated 7th September 1945 on the subject of the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

This matter has been referred to Allied Force Headquarters, but it is regretted that the Supreme Allied Commander is not prepared at this time to consider an increase in the manpower ceiling of the Carabinieri.

Yours very truly,

[s] Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

1994

1953

122

3616/lec

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: Q.692
 Date/Time of Origin: 23NOV0800A

Message Centre No: G/4192
 Date Time Rec'd: 24NOV0940A
 Precedence: ~~ROUTINE~~
 IMPORTANT

FROM: MMIA PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
 TO: AFHQ INFO ALCOM

RESTRICTED.

REFERENCE YOUR FM 533772Z 16 NOVEMBER.

MMIA HAS TAKEN OVER. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CORR AS ORDERED IN YOUR AG 014.12
 GEG-O 14 OCTOBER. WHILE ^{able} TO ASSIST AND ADVISE IN DAY TO DAY ADMINISTRATION
 AND MAINTENANCE OF CORR PENDING ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL STAFF OFFICERS NEEDED
 FOR THIS DUTY IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO UNDER TAKE SUCCESSFULLY THE COMPLETE
 REORGANISATION, PREPARATION OF DETAILED ORDER OF BATTLE, W ES. AND EQUIPMENT
 TABLES REQUIRED.

PROPOSE THEREFORE TO GIVE YOU BY 3 DECEMBER INTERIM REPLY TO PARA 3 WHICH
 WOULD BE ESTIMATE ON SAFE SIDE AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO AMENDMENTS NEEDED
 AS RESULT OF LATER DETAILED EXPERT STUDY.

WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY POSTING 3 POLICE OFFICERS, 2 SECOND GRADE STAFF
 OFFICERS, VIDE YOUR FX 51855 5 NOVEMBER (NAF 1086) AND LATER 7 LIAISON OFFICERS
 FOR CCRR.

1993

AC DIST

ANFO - ACT - EX COM 2
 INFO -C. COMM.
 POLAD A
 POLAD B
 C.A. SEC
 ECON SEC
 NAVY S/C
 FILE

F54194
23NOV1533

G/4203
24NOV 1000
ROUTINE

AFHQ C (SD) CMB.

ALCOM

RESTRICTED.

REFERENCE YOUR WAD/3B/175 DATED 29 OCT 45.

REGRET CANNOT AUTHORISE TEMPORARY INCREASE OF 4000 IN CEILING OF
CARABINIERI. REQUEST YOU EXAMINE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN
GUARDS. THESE COULD POSSIBLY BE RECRUITED FROM TIME EXPIRED CARABINIERI
REFERRED TO PARA 3 YOUR ABOVE QUOTED LETTER.

AC DIST X

ACT - WAR M. DISPOSAL
INFO - C. COMM.
PUBLIC SAFETY S/C (2)
FILE 2
FLOAT

5615/cc

1992

129

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY ATTACHE
ROME, ITALY
7 December 1945
Personel Observation & Evidence from Reliable Sources
2-2
ITALI WREATHRON
Police System (Non-Secret)

Report No. A-6-45, 13 September 1945, subject "Police System")

The Italian police systems, primarily the Carabinieri, are presently organized and equipped, cannot maintain law and order in a suitable manner in the northern provinces nor under Italian control, particularly in Milan. There are indications that a critical situation will develop upon return of Piedmont and Lombardy Provinces to Italian control by the AHD. If regularly authorized police forces are not strengthened and properly equipped, and Partigiani and other semi-official or self-constituted police forces are not disbanded.

3615/CC

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(a)
 and 5(a)(2)
 (E) (3)

1691

3615/CC

BY [Signature]
S. 1103, Sec. 3 (a) (3) of (b)
DECLASSIFIED

JOINT INTELLIGENCE LIBRARY, CHIEF COMMISSIONER, A.S. AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR, WZOUA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

119c

1991

CONFIDENTIAL

During visits made by the undersigned between the period November 10 - 13 and 17 - 20, to the Province of Emilia, including Bologna, Florence and Livorno, personal observation was made of reliable evidence given to the undersigned that pillage, extortion, highway robbery and housebreaking were prevalent in the areas visited, particularly in the Province of Emilia. Civilians in the cities, especially in Bologna, are fearful of going about after dark. People living in the country - especially those with means - bar their houses and remain indoors during the hours of darkness. The undersigned is unable to make an estimate at this time as to whether conditions are improving or becoming worse. It can be stated, however, that so far as law and order are concerned, the general situation in the areas visited is quite unsatisfactory.

Observations made by the undersigned indicated that:

a. Regular authorized police units, such as the Carabinieri, were undermanned, inadequately equipped and lacked adequate and proper transport, i.e., armored cars, motor vehicles, etc. Partigiani Auxiliary Police, originally authorized by Army Commanders, then by AMI authorities and later by Italian officials in the Province of Emilia to ferret out German soldiers and expose and take into custody prominent Fascist authorities, or, groups of hoodlums posing as Partigiani Auxiliary Police and bearing automatic arms and other weapons dropped into northern Italy by the Allies during the period of German occupation, were taking the law into their own hands and were using their semi-official status for intimidation of the Carabinieri, extortion of many business people and farmers upon threats of exposure as Fascists, and committing highway robbery and housebreaking.

b. Efforts of the regularly constituted police, primarily the Carabinieri, were handicapped by the support given to the Partigiani police units by Partigiani Communist Prefects and Magistrates. The situation in this respect seemed to be particularly aggravated in the Bologna-Emilia area.

In conversations with the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, General Brunetto Brunetti, and with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, Gen. Raffaele Cadorna, the following points were brought out: Police work in Italy and the restoration of law and order are handicapped by:

a. Inadequate numbers and poor equipment of the Carabinieri, together with low rate of pay which seriously affects morale.

b. Carabinieri, lacking automatic arms and being inferior in numbers to the Partigiani or other semi-officially constituted police forces, especially in the Province of Emilia, and lacking practically all means of transportation, such as automobiles, armored cars or trucks, cannot successfully combat the law-breaking elements.

c. Low equipment of the Carabinieri, especially in the

1990

being the law into their own hands and were using their semi-official status for intimidation of the Carabinieri, extortion of many business people and farmers upon threats of exposure as Fascists, and committing highway robbery and house-breaking.

b. Efforts of the regularly constituted police, primarily the Carabinieri, were handicapped by the support given to the Partigiani police units by Partigiani Communist Prefects and Magistrates. The situation in this respect seemed to be particularly aggravated in the Bologna-Emilia area.

In conversations with the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, General Brunetto Brunetti, and with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, Gen. Raffaele Cadorna, the following points were brought out: Police work in Italy and the restoration of law and order are handicapped by:

a. Inadequate numbers and poor equipment of the Carabinieri, together with low rate of pay which seriously affects morale.

b. Carabinieri, lacking automatic arms and being inferior in numbers to the Partigiani or other semi-officially constituted police forces, especially in the Province of Emilia, and lacking practically all means of transportation, such as automobiles, armored cars or trucks, cannot successfully combat the law-breaking elements.

c. Law enforcement efforts of the Carabinieri, especially in the Province of Emilia, and particularly at Bologna, are seriously handicapped by the political status of the prefects who are Communists or Partigiani and who are protecting the semi-official Partigiani or Communist police in their extortion or pillaging activities.

The above Italian officials, General Cadorna and Gen. Brunetti, stated that a great improvement could be made in the enforcement of law and order in Italy (disregarding needed changes in the general government administration and political set-up) by the following:

a. Increase in the strength of the Carabinieri and other regularly authorized and organized police forces, together with the provision of proper equipment for these police forces, especially of mobile Carabinieri battalions with armored cars and adequate military equipment to meet the organized bands of lawbreakers who are armed with automatic weapons and have motor vehicles.

b. An effective program by Italian and Allied forces to collect the military weapons now in the hands of all unauthorized organizations and individuals in the northern provinces particularly.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Dissolution of the previously semi-authorized Partigiani police units and their replacement by regularly authorized and organized police without political affiliations.

General Cederna, in further conversation relating to law and order in Italy, stated that "were a condition now to develop where it would be necessary to call upon Italian army units for police duties a very bad situation would develop". He stated that the "army was under paid, inadequately armed, clothed and equipped, and probably a good percentage, even as much as 50%, might be expected to desert or refuse to carry out law enforcement duties".

Both General Cederna and General Brunetti felt that the Allied authorities had shown lack of interest in development of an adequate police force and were handicapping the organization and development of proper police forces, particularly the Carabinieri, by administrative delay in making available Italian or Allied arms, clothing and equipment. (However, it is known by the undersigned that in certain respects the above statements are contrary to fact. The Parri government has consistently opposed the efforts of Allied authorities to establish "an Allied Police Mission for the organization and training of the Italian police".)

Further visits and investigation into the police situation in Italy are being made by the undersigned. A further report, containing information from the Allied Commission and other Allied and Italian sources, will be submitted at an early date.

From information received from reliable and well-informed sources it is believed that there will be widespread disorder verging on anarchy in the Lombardi and Piedmont areas if the AMG government and Allied troops are withdrawn prior to:

a. Disarmament of Partigiani and/or bandit groups operating under the guise of patriotic organizations.

b. Increase in the strength of the Carabinieri and their proper armament equipment and development of local police forces without Partigiani or Communist affiliations.

1989

J R R

1061 FRANCIS M. BRADY
Brig. General USA
Military Attache

2 3 2 0

being made by the undersigned. A further report, containing information from the Allied Commission and other Allied and Italian sources, will be submitted at an early date.

From information received from reliable and well-informed sources it is believed that there will be widespread disorder verging on anarchy in the Lombardi and Piedmont areas if the AMI government and Allied troops are withdrawn prior to:

a. Disarmament of Partigiani and/or bandit groups operating under the guise of patriotic organizations.

b. Increase in the strength of the Carabinieri and their proper armament equipment and development of local police forces without Partigiani or Communist affiliations.

1989

1989

1989

1061 FRANCIS M. BRADY
Brig. General USA
Military Attache

CONFIDENTIAL

119c

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 24 1944

Chief Commissioner:

Prior to seeing the signal from E.C. I had already arranged with Ferrari and Gen. Oxilia to send special representatives to Milan to work directly with the State of North Italy Industrial Council. The representatives are there and are obtaining material. The material is being processed into clothing as rapidly as the Italian authorities can arrange.

I also directed Ferrari to confer with Prime Minister and Minister of War on further releases of material stocks under Italian control. The result of any difficulty it was to be notified. I have heard nothing.

R.P.O. Milan was notified to cooperate with representatives of P.S. and G.I.F.F. and to report any difficulties. I have heard nothing from him.

1988

Shapeman
Capt. R.P.O.

1196

EX 53377
161608A

G 3800
171115A

Routine

AFHQ G(SD) COMF

MMIA Info ALCOM

Confidential.

Subject is equipment of Italian Police Forces and Interim Army.

Para 1. In response to Alcom request for Qty 3000 pistols and 44000 automatic pistols have recently released to you 3000 pistols and 10000 pistols for Carabinieri and have requested Alcom to justify further release of pistols and to coordinate their reply with you.

Para 2. Previously transport including arms cars has been demanded for Carabinieri.

Para 3. In order to assess fairly these demands and to be able to estimate our possible commitments request you forward soonest proposed order of battle of units by types and quantities for Carabinieri and any other police forces for which weapons E T C are required together with complete weapon and vehicle staff tables and approximate bulk quantities of other major items of equipment and stores required. Also show existing holdings of all items demanded and items which can be made available from Italian Army resources.

Para 4. Complete order of battle of Units by types and quantities (including 1 of 6 Units) together with weapon and vehicle staff tables and existing holdings and availabilities is also required for Interim Army.

1987 Appreciate information required above may not be immediately available but must emphasize importance of information to this Headquarters at present time as plan for equipment including captured enemy weapons and ammunition can not be formulated until staff tables required by paras 3 and 4 above are available here.

Para 6. Grateful if preparation of reply to para 3 above be given high priority and information forwarded as soon as available and not held pending availability of reply to para 4.

Para 7. For Alcom. Your signals 4958 of 02 Sep 8020 of 03 Nov and AFHQ letter G-5:000.5 of

0 3800 (Page 2)

07 Nov also refer.

AC DIST

Act - MIA

Info - C.Comm

P.Safety S/C (2)

File (2)

Float

1988

(119) a

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

NOV 15 1945

Originator's Reference: M.S.L./1/

Message Centre No: G/3569

Date/Time of Origin: NOV 12/1900 A

Date Time Rec'd: NOV 14/1545

FROM: BRIGADIER LUSH

Precedence: IMPORTANT

TO : ALCOM FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER

CONFIDENTIAL

1. You are aware of the desperate condition of the police agencies in respect of clothing. There is in LOMBARDIA Region and other Regions in the North, a large quantity of uniform material and shoes sufficient for a large part of the CARABINIERI and other police agencies. Whilst realizing the necessity of clothing the Italian Army, it is most urgently recommended that a decision at the highest level be taken to unfreeze these stocks which have been blocked for 5 months, and issue them to those members of the forces of law and order many of whom are already on duty above the snow line and who therefore should in my opinion have priority over the troops of the Italian Army.

2. Every Regional Commissioner has stressed this point to me with great emphasis and it is patently absurd that men should be required to attempt to preserve law and order without clothes while stocks of clothing lie idle in factories and warehouses. GOC DIST 2 has expressed himself strongly in the matter.

3. As stocks are now controlled by the Italian Government, would it not be possible to get the PRIME MINISTER to give an order unfreezing these stocks and giving priority to CCRR and police agencies.

3615/100

119

HEADQUARTERS

11 NOV 45

ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
"A" Files

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G/3569

Continuation page 2.

AS I AM.

4. The drill/advised here would be for MINISTRY of WAR to release necessary material for conversion into uniforms. The North Italy Industrial Council would then distribute material to the textile and clothing committee with the order to convert into uniforms. This can then be done with supervision from AMG so long as it exists.

DIST

ACTION CHIEF COMMISSIONER *
INFO EX COMMISSIONER
P SAFETY S/C (2)
ECON SEC (2)
MMIA
FILE (2)
FLOAT

1984 - In accordance with Chief Commissioner's order
Col Chapman (PS S/c) was instructed to immediately
investigate the problem and take appropriate action
in cooperation with Col Kerr (Land Forces S/c).

0910 hrs 15/11

Pro
So to CC~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(119)

NO. 5 RECD

CC

AFED

DEER 8250

9 Nov 45

OF PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

REFERENCE YOUR GEORGE FIVE TWO THREE FIVE THREE OF SIX NOVEMBER RECEIVED
TODAY PD

PARIS TO AFED FOR GENERAL MORGAN FROM HQ ALCON FROM AIRMAIL STONE CITY
ACSCC PAPER

GRATEFUL YOUR PROMPT ACTION IN APPROVING RELEASE THREE ZERO ZERO ZERO
PISTOLS ONE ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO CARBINES WHICH IS WELCOME STORCAP PD
ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR FOUR FOUR ZERO ZERO ZERO CARBINES NOW BEING EXAMINED
IN DETAIL IN LIGHT OF YOUR GEORGE FIVE PD ZERO ZERO ZERO PD FIVE OF SEVEN
NOVEMBER TO WHICH REPLY WILL BE MADE SOONEST

Copy to: Land Forces S/C
CA Section

1983

XOO.

RECEIVED

Chief Commissioner

300.

(Sgd) F. H. Moleary.

Lt Col.

CSO to Exec Comr.

B

118

97^A

AC/14601/21/PS

7 November 1945

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri

TO : ANHQ G-5 Section.

1. I am forwarding copy of a letter dated 7 September 45 received from the President of the Council of Ministers, in which he requests an increase in the strength of the Carabinieri from 55,000 to 75,000. The delay in dealing with this matter has been due to the necessity of checking the figures quoted by the President and also of obtaining a breakdown of the number of men listed as not available for normal Carabinieri police duties. You will recall that at the SACMED Political meeting on August 2, 1945, it was ruled that the strength of the Italian Army cannot be altered in existing circumstances. On this premise, any increase in the strength of the Carabinieri would have to be included in the composition of the Italian Army as laid down in the peace treaty or any prior document which preceded it.

2. The President of the Council bases his request in general on the fact that the present strength of the Carabinieri does not, after making allowances for ineffectives, permit of the 4,809 Carabinieri stations being manned. While the present Carabinieri strength is approximately that of pre-war this deficiency in personnel is brought about by two main factors :

Firstly, owing to the abolition of certain fascist militias, and owing to emergency conditions, Carabinieri are being employed on work outside their normal duties.

Secondly, there is the recent formation of 12 mobile battalions which at full strength should absorb 7,000 men.

11382

(117) 2

- 2 -

3. After consultation with the Commanding General CC.RR., some minor adjustments are necessary in the figures given in the letter of the President of the Council of Ministers but they are of such a minor nature that they do not affect the main question.

4. The reduction of the effective strength available for station duty from 55,000 to the 42,340 given in the President's letter is brought about as follows :

The PRIESTE Legion has not been activated, thus reducing the strength to 62,300. (Not 62,000 as quoted in the President's letter)

The Officer strength of the force is 1,760, causing a reduction to 60,540. (Not 61,450 as quoted in the President's letter)

17,600 (not 17,700 as quoted in the President's letter) are not available owing to detached duties, leaves, sickness, etc., as explained in Appendix A, thus reducing the strength to the figure of 42,940 given by the President of the Council.

As explained at items 10 and 11 of Appendix A, 2,600 of the total non-effectives are performing normal police duties and should, therefore, be added to the strength available for manning stations, thus bringing the figure to 45,540. But when the 7,000 for the 12 Mobile Battalions is deducted, the actual strength available for manning stations on the President's calculations becomes 38,540.

5. In the last part of his letter, the President makes a request for the issue to Carabinieri of the stock of automatic arms at the Berretta factory, Brescia. This matter is already under discussion with your Headquarters and an application for the release of 44,000 automatic rifles has already been made by our letter Ref.AC/14601/11/PS dated 14 September. In your reply Ref: G-5 : 000.5 dated

1984

117

- 3 -

15 October it is mentioned that the matter is still under discussion.

6. NMIA have raised the question as to the extent to which the present commitments of the Carabinieri might be covered by an increase in mobility, armament and communications rather than in manpower. The most important of these three factors is mobility and it seems doubtful whether, in existing conditions, sufficient POL will be available in this country to make the forces of law and order really mobile.

I recommend that the strength of the CC.RR be increased by 10,000.

ELLERY V. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Commission (NMIA)
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1000

1172

97^B

APPENDIX A

DETAILS OF THE 17,600 CC.RR SAID
NOT TO BE AVAILABLE ARE AS SHOWN BELOW :

1.	Mobilised with Italian Army ;;;.....	1.865
2.	With Air Ministry (Security of Airfields);;...	635
3.	With Railway and Dock Police	1.306
4.	With E.N.A.C. (National Transportation Goods) E.N.D.S.I. (National Distribution aid to Italy) Enforcement of Wheat Regulations	850
5.	For Prison Security	200
6.	For Special Services with Allies	550
7.	Various Duties with the Ministries (General Attorney and Military Tribunal General Attorney and Judicial Office - High Court of Justice - Inspectorate of Industry, Commerce & Labour - High Commissioners - Spuration Commissions etc).....	1.094
Total		6.500
8.	Absent on (Ordinary leave - Sick - Convalescence - Hospital - Matrimonial etc.) about 10% of the strength	6.000
9.	Under Training (Central School and Cadet Legion Rome)	2.500
10.	Over-strength in the Legions of Sicily by agreement Italian Government/AC	900
11.	Over-strength in the Legions of Venesia	1.700
Total		11.100
Complete Total...		17.600

Item 1 is the approved Mobilised strength with
the Italian Army and is in accordance with
the Order of Battle.

Item 3 represents the number of men who, in con-
junction with Agents of Public Security form
the Railway and Dock Police. Both these
services were performed by Fascist Militia

1979

(117) 2

- 2 -

A.

prior to our occupation. The Militia were disbanded and their duties taken over by existing Police agencies with no increase in strength.

Item 4 represents the men who have taken over the duties of the Fascist Traffic Police which was disbanded, and also those dealing specially with assassinating regulations.

Item 2, 3, 6, and 7 are proper and necessary duties.

Item 8 represents the usual loss due to the causes mentioned and is a proper percentage.

Item 9 represents the strength under training at the Central School, Florence, and the Cadet Legion Rome, and is in fact below the strength authorized by the Order of Battle.

Item 10 represents overstrength in Sicily. These extra 900 men have to be balanced by a similar reduction on the mainland, but this circumstance has been brought about by Public Safety conditions and the men concerned are in fact performing ordinary Police duty. Their retention in Sicily is by agreement between the Italian Government and this Commission.

Item 11 represents overstrength in Venezia where large numbers of carabinieri were recuperated.

At the moment this has been balanced by a similar reduction in the rest of Italy. However, steps are now being taken to reduce the Venezia strength to that authorized in the Order of Battle, and therefore the men concerned will become available for regular duty.

The strength mentioned in Items 10 and 11 totals 3,600. These men are performing normal police duty and should therefore be subtracted from the total of 17,600 stated not to be available for station duty. The total thus becomes 14,000.

1978

472

97^cTranslation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 34203

Rome, 7 September 45

Dear Admiral,

as you know, my Government wishes to handle with the necessary firmness the problem of public order in Italy, fully to reestablish respect for the law.

The CC.RR Corps, whose collaboration is able and trustworthy, is one of our best instruments to reach this aim.

However, considering the numerous duties entrusted to it, the organization of the Corps is still insufficient, so that I must draw your kind attention on the advisability of granting a further increase of the CC.RR corps, to reach 70 thousand units.

On this subject, I must inform you that from the present force of 62,000 units (besides the Trieste legion) 1750 officers included must be deducted.

Of the remaining 60,250 men, we must not consider 17,700 enlisted men who are not available and cannot be made available, for part of them is on leave, part is attached to special services, part is being detained with the legions of the Veneto by the express wish of the Allied Authorities.

1978
The result is that 42,540 men are available; this figure is inferior to the already insufficient number required for the 4800 CC.RR stations, which ought to amount to 44,670 units. It seems obvious that the number of men of the stations cannot be further reduced, for it is sometimes of two elements only, while on the other hand we must form 12 mobile battalions, amounting as a whole to 7 thousand units.

I trust that this short report will show how urgent it is to increase the Corps in number; during the last few days, the War Department sent an official request to the commission.

However, the wished-for reinforcement of the CC.RR Corps depends not only on the increase of the number of the Carabinieri, but also on the improvement of their armament.

You already know, my dear Admiral, the particular importance of this problem. Unfortunately, the present armament of the Carabinieri is entirely inadequate considering the situation and the requirements. It is enough to say that personal equipment has remained what it was half a century ago, i.e. a rifle, mod. 1891, and a pistol which some of the men don't even have. Such a situation cannot but have a fatal effect on the morale and spirit of the Carabinieri who are often obliged to face, in conditions of obvious inferiority, gangs of delinquents more numerous than themselves, and equipped with portable weapons and bombs.

I therefore trust in your kind interest about this matter. In particular, I beg you to intervene personally, so that kind consideration may be given to the proposal made by the Comando Generale of the Corps to obtain that the Carabinieri be allotted 44,000 automatic rifles 'Mitra' and 3000 pistols at present in the Beretta weapon factory, at Gardone Val di Trosia; up to now, the Land Forces Sub Commission hasn't granted this request for it stated that such arms must be considered as war booty.

I thank you, my dear Admiral, for taking this matter in consideration, considering its importance, it deserves to be dealt with without delay.

Yours sincerely,

S. Ferruccio Parri

Trans. c/c

1976

(17) 2

AIDE MEMOIRE - CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENTPOLICE FORCESA. CC.RR.

- 1 Clothing and Equipment. Now entirely in the hands of War Ministry. Sufficient stocks are available. 10,000 recent increase (now BR-ITI) will revert to War Ministry for administration on 15 Nov 45. Issues from BR-ITI stocks up to 100% will be made by that date.
- 2 Arms and Ammunition. Entirely in the hands of the War Ministry. Stocks except in automatic weapons, sufficient. Essential that output Beretta Factory be released for War Ministry. AFHQ decision awaited. Large quantities of automatic weapons were issued from Italian Army Depots for "Partisans". These should be returned to the Italian Army. This matter is under active consideration.
- 3 Transport. Load carriers are now being allotted. If the Ministry of Transport honour their agreement, a substantial improvement should soon be apparent. Allied vehicles are awaited from Ministry of Transport including proportion of jeeps and light cars badly needed. AFHQ are being approached to authorize
 - (a) retention of armoured cars borrowed for the four mobile regiments in the North.
 - (b) issue of additional 50 such AFV's.

B. POLICE FORCES OTHER THAN CC.RR.

- 1 **1945** Apart from the Carabinieri, the Police Agencies dealt with by the Red Commission (Public Safety Sub-Commission) are:-

Agents of Public Security
 Finance Guards
 Forest Guards
 Prison Guards
 Municipal Police.

With the exception of the Municipal Police, all the above forces are

3 Transport. Load carriers are now being allotted. In the Ministry of Transport honour their agreement, a substantial improvement should soon be apparent. Allied vehicles are awaited from Ministry of Transport including proportion of jeeps and light cars badly needed.

AFHQ are being approached to authorize

- (a) retention of armoured cars borrowed for the four mobile regiments in the North.
- (b) issue of additional 50 such AFV's.

B POLICE FORCES OTHER THAN CC.RR.

- 1 1945 Apart from the Carabinieri, the Police Agencies dealt with by the Red Commission (Public Safety Sub-Commission) are:-

Agents of Public Security
Finance Guards
Forest Guards
Prison Guards
Municipal Police.

With the exception of the Municipal Police, all the above forces are national in character. They are all urgently in need of clothing, arms and transport.

- 2 Clothing. During hostilities, very little clothing was made available to the Police forces owing to military priorities. On the cessation of hostilities stocks of clothing and manufacturing materials were all blocked pending decision as to military requirements. Certain limited supplies are now becoming available.

- 3 Arms and Ammunition. All Italian stocks of arms and ammunition are in the hands of the Ministry of War. These stocks are insufficient for the needs of all Police forces, and on 4 Sep 45, a bid was made to AFHQ for all arms included in lists of Captured Enemy Material of a type useful to Police forces. No reply has yet been received, and the allotment of these arms now becomes a matter of urgent necessity.

- 4 Transport. A number of Allied load carrying vehicles has been allotted to the Italian Ministry of Transport. Although the Police forces all require vehicles, no allocation has yet been made by the Italian Ministry. nor is there any guarantee that they will in fact be allotted. The responsibility for the sub-allocation of these vehicles rests with the Italian Government.

(117)

ML

3615/ce

RESTRICTED

G 52353
NOV 6/1855A

G 3158²⁰⁵⁵
NOV 9/2245A

OF PRIOR ITY

AMHQ SIGNED SACRED FROM GENERAL MORGAN
ALCOM FOR ADMIRAL STONE

RESTRICTED.

You spoke to me about armament of Carabinieri. Request was for 3,000 pistols and 44,000 carbines. There are now released to you. 3,000 pistols and 10,000 carbines. Does this meet immediate requirements. Issue now of balance of carbines demanded for carabinieri might prejudice rearmament of Italian Army later on

DIST

ACTION : SO TO CO (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EX COMMISSIONER (2)
CA SEC
F SAFETY
FILE (2)
FLOIT

1976

B

3

RESTRICTED

117

3615/ce

INCOMING MESSAGE

Originator's Reference : EX 51855
Date/Time of Origin : NOV 5/1311A

Message Control No: G 2964
Date Time Recd : NOV 6/1200A
Precedence : ROUTINE

FROM : CIRC MED

TO : ACTION: AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF CABINET OFFICES, LONDON
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: ALCOM MIA

SECRET.

This is NAF 1086 and is further to NAF 1071 para 7 and 12D and NAF

1077.

1. Since MIA will shortly become responsible for advice on and supervision of the carabinieri except for matters of operational control it is considered that police officers holding temporary military rank should be included in the MIA detachments to handle carabinieri affairs. In order to avoid any confusion owing to differing methods all these police officers should be either British or American not mixed and as the training and organisation aspect of MIA is mainly British it is recommended that they should be British. In order to avoid offending Italian susceptibilities it is essential that these officers hold temporary military rank and wear military uniform.

2. Police officers will be required. (A) at HQ MIA. One Lt Col (Staff officer first grade) police college trained and with wide experience of police duties and procedure (B) one Major (Staff officer second grade) with experience of police duties from the operational and detailed organization aspect. One Major (Staff officer second grade) with experience of police duties from the

1973

3615/CC

3615/ce

considered that police officers holding rank should be included in the MMA outposts to handle carabinieri affairs. In order to avoid any confusion arising to differing methods all these police officers should be either British or American not mixed and as the training and organization aspect of MMA is mainly British it is recommended that they should be British. In order to avoid offending Italian susceptibilities it is essential that these officers hold temporary military rank and wear military uniform.

2. Police officers will be required. (A) at HQ MMA. One Lt Col (Staff officer first grade) police college trained and with wide experience of police duties and procedure (B) one Major (Staff officer second grade) with experience of police duties from the operational and detailed organization aspect. One Major (Staff officer second grade) with experience of police duties from the administrative and legal aspect. These officers would act as technical advisers. (B) At Italian Army territorial Regional HQ. One with each of 11 territorial Regions. (C) At carabinieri schools. 1 with each of 3 schools. (D) total 17 police officers. In addition the necessary clerks batman and dr ptp will have to be provided.

3. If these proposals are approved it is recommended that the senior police officer should be selected early and sent to AMHQ for consultation before final decision as to police representation is made.

DIST
INFO-ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
CA SED

CON SEC (2)
LAND FORCES ST
NAVY SC - FILE

1111

ANTIC

NOV 5 RECD

8020

3 Nov 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER AND OTHER POLICE AGENCIES ARE INADEQUATELY ARMED PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND AMG OFFICERS TESTIFY THAT THEY CANNOT PROPERLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES BECAUSE OF THIS LACK OF ARMS PD

PAREN TO AZIM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM SIGNED STONE CITE ACEAC PAREN

PARA TWO PD ON ONE FOUR SEPTEMBER IN MY ABLE CHARLIE SLANT ONE FOUR SIX ZERO ONE SLANT ONE ONE SLANT PETER SUGAR TO GEORGE DASH FIVE SECTION I REQUESTED THAT FOUR FOUR ZERO ZERO ZERO AUTOMATIC MUSKETS AND THREE ZERO ZERO ZERO PISTOLS BE RELEASED FROM THE BERETTA ARMS FACTORY AT BRESCIA FOR THE CARABINIERI PD I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED PERMISSION PD I AM TOLD BY GEORGE DASH FIVE IN THEIR GEORGE FIVE CLN ZERO ZERO ZERO PD FIVE OF ONE THREE OCTOBER THAT THE ISSUE OF THESE WEAPONS IS UNDER DISCUSSION PD I SUBMIT THAT TO REFER OR POSTPONE FURTHER THE ISSUE OF THESE ARMS TO THE POLICE FORCES IN THIS COUNTRY IS TO IGNORE THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND ALLIED RESPONSIBILITY IN HELPING THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND ^{ORGE} ~~IT~~ WOULD ~~BE~~ THAT AN IMMEDIATE

1972 AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BE MADE

Copy to: C.Com
EX.Com

ONE SLANT ONE ONE ONE
 THAT FOUR FOUR ZERO ZERO AUTOMATIC MUSKETS AND THREE ZERO ZERO ZERO PISTOLS
 BE RELEASED FROM THE BERETTA ARMS FACTORY AT BRESCIA FOR THE CARABINIERI PD
 I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED PERMISSION PD I AM TOLD BY GEORGE DASH FIVE IN THEIR
 GEORGE FIVE CLN ZERO ZERO ZERO PD FIVE OF ONE THREE OCTOBER THAT THE ISSUE OF
 THESE WEAPONS IS UNDER DISCUSSION PD I SUBMIT THAT TO REFER OR POSTPONE FURTHER
 THE ISSUE OF THESE ARMS TO THE POLICE FORCES IN THIS COUNTRY IS TO IGNORE THE
 REALITY OF THE SITUATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND ALLIED RESPONSIBILITY IN HELPING
 THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND I WOULD ^{USE} ~~SEE~~ THAT AN IMMEDIATE

1972 AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BE MADE

Copy to: C.Com
 Ex.Com
 Land Forces S/C.

Ex.Com for CA SEC

343

Brig.
 Ex.Com

117

50-10 FEG

Ref: 3621/74/43

31 October 1945

SUBJECT: Re-equipping of CC.R.

TO : Civil Affairs Section

1. The Chief Commissioner desires that the request from Public Safety Submission to AFM (10/14/50/11/50) of 14 September 1945) with reference to the release of weapons from the Beretta Arms Factory at Brescia for the Italian Police Forces be followed up.

2. Please send this office a copy of your communication.

Chief Staff Officer
To the Executive Commissioner

Copy to: HOD A/C
HQA

10/20/50

1971

(117)

3621/74

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

CE

Ref: 3636/191/SC.

7 October 1945.

SUBJECT: Transfer of responsibility for GCHQ to MIA.

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. In your telegram 750563 of 25 Oct 45 you refer to your letter G-5, 104.12 of 7 Oct 45 to which I have not yet replied. I read your letter under reference in conjunction with your telegram 81 47521 of 6 Oct 45 on which I commented in my telegram 6834 of 10 Oct 45. I was studying the whole question of the transfer to MIA of the responsibility for the GCHQ in conjunction with your letter of 7 Oct 45 when your instructions of 14 Oct 45 arrived (your letter M5 014.12 GCHQ-0).
2. I have received a letter from GOC, Land Forces S/C (MIA) in which he states that he had previously informed you that in order to carry out his new duties he would require no less than 20 officers.
3. This matter is under discussion with GOC, Land Forces S/C (MIA) and you will appreciate that in view of the divergence between the number quoted in your letter of 7 Oct 45 and the demands of GOC Land Forces S/C (MIA) together with the grave shortage of personnel, a rapid decision is not possible.
4. My first impressions are that the numbers quoted in your letter and requested by GOC Land Forces S/C (MIA) are extravagant but until Land Forces S/C (MIA) and Public Safety S/C have worked out a modus operandi it would be premature of me to express a firm agreement. This will be forwarded in due course.
5. In this connection I forward you copy of a communication received from the US Ambassador in which you will note he has been instructed to communicate the State Department's instructions to the Prime Minister on the question of the despatch of an Allied Police Mission to this country.
6. I still hold that it would be better to prosecute the question of an Allied Police Mission as a whole rather than to adopt a plan which deals with only part of the question. I should therefore be glad if this point of view, together with a copy of the Ambassador's letter, could be submitted to SACMIA in support of my views which you note in para 3 of your telegram 750563 of 25 Oct.

WILSON K. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MIA)
CA Section.

116

RESTRICTED

F50363
OCT 251825A

G/2052
OCT 261000A
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG
ALCOM ROME

RESTRICTED

1. Para 5 of NAF1077 stated that no action was required by CCS on para 12(D) of NAF1051 for the time being. It is intended to finalise the examination of the proposal to attach a small increment of police officers to MMIA as indicated in para 4 of NAF1077. Your view on this proposal were requested by letter reference G-5. 014.12 of 7th October to which no reply has yet been received.

2. When your reply has been received and a decision made by AFHQ with regard to attachment of police officers to MMIA the whole question of the establishment of a separate police mission will again be reviewed.

3. Your views in the action of SACMED are noted.

Dist

Action - P Safety SC
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Commr 2
CA Sect
File 2 Float

1968
10 12

OCT 31 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: AG/2,634/IS

29 Oct 45.

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces.

TO: AFHQ, G-5 Section.

With reference to your AG: 014.12 GDC-0 of 14 Oct 45.

1. 1 Nov 45 has been agreed upon as the date of transfer of responsibilities, in matters connected with the Carabinieri, except their operational functions, from the Public Safety Sub-Commission to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMIA).

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

*M. Carr Brigadier*M. CARR, Brigadier,
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
AMIA,
Establishment Section.

1968

(115)

3615/oc

*I.C. & Trials
We should trace AFHQ
in the Binetta arms
request we made*

Ref: 815/2

3/10

WLL

OST 23 FELT

C.C.

27 October 1945.

SUBJECT: Re-equipping of CC.RR.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com.

1. The Chief Commissioner wishes to draw your attention to the requests made by the Italian Government and persistent references made by Ministers of the Government to the necessity of re-equipping the CC.RR with up to date weapons and vehicles. You will perhaps have noted that in his last press conference the Prime Minister stated that a further mitigation of the armistice terms would be made when Italy was allowed to carry out this very necessary reform which was most important for the purpose of maintaining public order.

2. The Chief Commissioner trusts that this re-equipping will be put in hand as early as possible and would be grateful for a report thereon in due course.

Done, see cable to AFHQ, COS

8020 3 Nov 45

REI/JG.

RESL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1967
1006

Copy to: CI Section

Noted

(117) a

RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 014.12 GEG-0

14 October 1945

SUBJECT: Transfer of Responsibility for the Carabinieri to MMIA

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission,
FCR: MMIA

1. Reference is made to paragraph 24 of letter, this headquarters, AG 091.711/169 GGT-0, dated 16 November 1944, subject, "Command and Administration of Italian Army" and to letter, this headquarters, G-5 014.12, dated 20 July 1945, subject, "Reorganization of Carabinieri and Other Police Forces of Italy".

2. It is believed that the time has now come when the supervisory functions of MMIA should parallel the executive functions of the Italian Ministry of War. It is therefore desired that you cause all matters connected with the training and administration of the Carabinieri which have heretofore been handled by the Public Safety Sub-Commission to be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). This will result in all matters connected with the Carabinieri except their operational functions which should remain as at present, being placed under the supervision of MMIA.

3. The date of transfer of responsibilities will be mutually agreed between Public Safety Sub-Commission and MMIA and will be reported by you to this headquarters. In any event this date will not be later than 1 November 1945.

4. In matters affecting the instruction of the Carabinieri in purely civil police duties, as distinct from normal military training, MMIA will consult the Public Safety Sub-Commission which will afford such advice and assistance as may be required.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

1966

/s/ C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

114

RESTRICTED

9 October 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Colonel FISKE.

The following telephone message was received from Colonel FALCK, Deputy Regional Commissioner, Lombardia Region, 1530 hours: -

Col. FALCK is very much disturbed at the position with regard to winter clothing for the public safety agencies in the North. Repeated representations have been made to Hq. A.C. but with only limited results. In consequence, the Pubblica Sicurezza (Quartiere), Carabinieri, Finance Guards and Forest Guards are still in summer uniforms.

If it is necessary to submit requisitions, Public Safety Sub-Commission has all the facts and figures necessary and can submit them.

Col. FALCK further states that ample material (which he believes is blocked by MIA) is available in and around Milan. Can it be released without delay?

WFM/dr

WFM
L. T. MONTANI Jr.,
Captain, AGO.
Establishment Section.

SO to CC

79865

*3615/202**WFM*

AC/14601/11/PS

8 Oct. 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I refer to your letter of 24th September 1945 on the subject of automatic arms for carabinieri.

The need for these arms is well understood, and the matter is under discussion with Allied Force Headquarters with a view to the whole stock of arms at the Beretta Factory being made available for the Police forces. I will keep you advised of the progress made.

Yours very truly,

~~W. E. Stone~~ Ellery W. StoneELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

2083

1966

Professor Ferruccio PARI
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government,
ROME.

112

SEP 28 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

25th September 1945

AC/14601/21/PS

Dear Sir,

156

With reference to the Prime Minister's letter of 7th September 1945 addressed to Admiral Stone concerning the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

I am directed to say that this matter is receiving attention and you will be informed of the result.

Yours very truly,

M. Carr
M. CARR,
Brigadier,
VP CA Section.

1963

The Secretary of
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Rome

FJW/G

Copy to : Chief Commissioner ✓
Executive Commissioner
Land Forces S/C

110

9

3615/100

EC Personal

*This note put on
EC copies of
correspondence*

Will you get into this pls? If the arms desired are available, I feel we should help. A record is being built here that will not read well, if we don't meet his needs.

30/9/45

EWS
CC

1962

181

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 3745

Rome, 21 September 1945

Dear Admiral,

In my letter of the 7th, n. 34303, I drew your attention on the fact that it was necessary to give to the carabinieri an adequate personal armament, chiefly based on a modern automatic weapon.

I go on receiving informations proving how urgent it is to do so.

Unfortunately there are many cases of carabinieri killed while doing their duty, only because they have to face in conditions of inferiority offenders who have better and more modern weapons.

In spite of the well known spirit of sacrifice of the soldiers of this Corps, such a state of things cannot, in time, but affect their morale and fighting spirit of the men entrusted with the protection of the life of the citizens, for which they must risk their own.

The police forces are in the same position; for what concerns armament, they find themselves in worse conditions even than the carabinieri. To give them adequate technical efficiency is no less urgent and perhaps even more so.

I must therefore insist and ask for your personal intervention, for the Italian Government no longer to be denied the means to carry out the defence of lawfulness and safeguard of public order so justly demanded by the Allies. The problem, to my mind, would be quickly solved in the following way:

1. - by allowing not only the High Command of the Corps, but also the General Direction of P.S. to purchase a large part of the automatic rifles 'mitra' (5000) and pistols (5000) supposed to be stocked in the Beretta weapon manufacture at Gardone Val di Trompa;
2. - should it be impossible to grant this first solution, by allowing M.M.I.A. to put immediately an adequate amount of automatic weapons at the disposal of the above mentioned High Command and Direction General.

Thanking you for whatever action you will take, I remain, my
Dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

S. Ferruccio Parri

Admiral Stone
Chief Commissioner

EC DIST - 28 Sep 45

Action: C A Sec

Info: Chief Commr

Exec Commr

Land Forces S/C

trans. a/c

1961

36/15/100

189

AD/14601 /1/83

15 September 1945

SUBJECT: Clothing and Equipment for Carabinieri

TO : Land Forces Subcommittee (LFLA)
Attention: Major General Browning

1. During a conversation between Lieutenant General Morgan and myself on 7 September 1945 he agreed with me that Carabinieri must have top priority in the matter of clothing, arms and other equipment and that their requirements, when need is established, must be met on a higher scale than allowed to the other Italian Army units.

2. I am passing this information on to you knowing that you will give all assistance possible.

S. LUSH

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner1059
1950

107

3615/cu

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 34203

ROME, 7 September 1945

Dear Admiral,

as you know, my Government wishes to handle with the necessary firmness the problem of public order in Italy, fully to reestablish respect for the law.

The CC.RR. Corps, whose collaboration is able and trustworthy, is one of our best instruments to reach this aim.

However, considering the numerous duties entrusted to it, the organization of the Corps is still insufficient, so that I must draw your kind attention on the advisability of granting a further increase of the CC.RR. Corps, to reach 70 thousand units.

On this subject, I must inform you that from the present force of 62,000 units (besides the Trieste Legion) 1760 officers included must be deducted.

Of the remaining 60,240 men, we must not consider 17,700 enlisted men who are not available and cannot be made available, for part of them is on leave, part is attached to special services, part is being detained with the legions of the Veneto by the express wish of the Allied Authorities.

The result is that 42,540 men are available; this figure is inferior to the already insufficient number required for the 4800 CC.RR. stations, which ought to amount to 44,670 units. It seems obvious that the number of men of the stations cannot be further reduced, for it is sometimes of two elements only, while on the other hand we must form 12 mobile battalions, amounting as a whole to 7 thousand units.

I trust that this short report will show how urgent it is to increase the Corps in number; during the last few days, the War Department sent an official request to the Commission.

However, the wished-for reinforcement of the CC.RR. Corps depends not only on the increase of the number of the Carabinieri, but also on the improvement of their armament.

You already know, my dear Admiral, the particular importance of this problem. Unfortunately, the present armament of the Carabinieri is entirely inadequate considering the situation and the requirements. It is enough to say that personal equipment has remained what it was half a century ago, i.e. a rifle, mod. 1891, and a pistol which some of the men don't even have. Such a situation cannot but have a fatal effect on the morale and spirit of the Carabinieri who are often obliged to face, in conditions of obvious inferiority, gangs of delinquents more

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner

RETURN TO
Chief Commissioner

- 2 -

numerous than themselves, and equipped with portable weapons and bombs.

I therefore trust in your kind interest about this matter. In particular, I beg you to intervene personally, so that kind consideration may be given to the proposals made by the Comando Generale of the Corps, to obtain that the carabinieri be allotted 44,000 automatic rifles 'Mitra' and 3000 pistols at present in the Beretta weapon factory, at Gardone val di Trompia; up to now, the Land Forces Sub-commission hasn't granted this request for it stated that such arms must be considered as war booty.

I thank you, my dear Admiral, for taking this matter in consideration; considering its importance, it deserves to be dealt with without delay.

Yours sincerely,

S. Ferruccio Parri

trans. e/c

1953

EC DIST - 11 SEP 45

ACTION: C A SEC

INFO: CHIEF COMAR

EXEC COMAR

LAND FORCES SC

106

~~Delivered~~

AUG 31 1945

CJ

Ref: 3627/EC.

31 August 1945.

My dear General:

May I ask for your personal help in the matter of the supply of 10,000 British Battledress (to be dyed green) to the Florence Brigade of the C.S.M.

It is essential from the point of view of prestige and to avoid discrimination between members of the Brigade that these 10,000 suits be issued in a body so that the whole Brigade can change from their present uniform to the B.D. uniform at one time. The Public Safety Sub-Commission are proposing to your staff that the present uniforms should be classified good, repairable or unserviceable, and that the first two categories should be placed in store for re-issue and held on charge by the C.C.R., and that the 10,000 should be issued at one time.

I know that there may be technical difficulties over this but I hope that a word from you will iron them out.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Maurice Lush.

Major-General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC,
COC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MFA).

1957

Copy to: Public Safety Sub-Com.

ML/JC.

104

3645/5176

23rd August 1944.

↓
Acting Chief Commissioner.

NO. 400-400 355
785 23 Aug 1944
1944

1. Your Regional Commissioners heard this morning with great anxiety the report of the Director of the Public Safety Sub-Commission in which he stated that the ceiling fixed for the Carabinieri in the whole of Italy was insufficient, and that Carabinieri would have to be removed from the Regions already liberated in order to fulfil the numbers undoubtedly required for Regions X, XI and XII.
2. In his statement Colonel Kirk said that of the present ceiling of 55,000 only 42,000 had actually been enrolled. It seems that the Director hopes to obtain the remainder from the Carabinieri which may be found in Northern Italy.
3. The Regional Commissioners have asked me to represent to you in the strongest manner possible the dangerous situation which confronts the Commission with regard to the Carabinieri. I suggest that the present strength of 42,000 be immediately increased to 55,000 by enrolment of men in liberated Italy and that we do not rely on a hypothetical number of men who may be picked up in the Northern Regions and who may number from anything between 0 and 20,000.
4. It occurs to me that if we fill our ceiling at once we shall have a much better case to present to AAI regarding any Carabinieri who may be found in the Northern Regions as additional effectives. If we present the case that we have not yet filled up our ceiling, AAI are bound to assume that we are half satisfied with the present situation and are hoping to remedy it when we get North. So far as I can see it is extremely doubtful whether we shall find any effective number of Carabinieri in the North. I make this suggestion without prejudice to the strong recommendations that I know you are making to encrease the Carabinieri to a figure consonant with the serious commitments we have in the North.
5. I submit that this is a case which might well be placed before the Supreme Allied Commander himself.

1950:

Hold } Col. Upjohn to report
8 - on this, with draft letter to P.M.
25

MSL/JC.

MSL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

(102) a
X

Col Upjohn explains difficulty in the

3615/100

RESTRICTED

P 127

F/1330

JULY 26 0900B

JULY 26 1045

HQ PIEMONTE SIGNED MARSHALL

ROUTINE

ALCOM PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL STONE

RESTRICTED.

(33) FILE 225-8/c

1. Pursuant to your personal message advantage was taken of recent gathering in Torino. Conferred at length with Parri and Morendi and discussed particular points with others.

2. Complete accord and understanding in all matters of police with all questions satisfactorily resolved.

* * *

DIST

Action: Chief Comm 2
Info: Ex Comm
File

1955

3615/c
(X-225-8/c)

(99)

66

Ref: 3627/33/ED.

14 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Clothing and Equipment for CC.RR.

TO : VP, GA Section.

1. I have read MIA's letter 6/15/15 of 11 August (copy to you) the subject matter of which Colonel Kerr discussed with me at some length. He is perfectly ready to help but the impression in the Land Forces Sub-Com is that the Public Safety Sub-Com does not requisition for clothing, equipment, etc., of the CC.RR in the proper manner.

2. I think the reasons set out in Colonel Kerr's letters are fully justified and that to requisition a full scale equipment for a force which obviously must have stocks in hand and which the Land Forces Sub-Com suspects has large undeclared stocks in depots (as were found in Army depots), is unreasonable.

3. It occurs to me that we might do well to find an officer with good 'Q' experience who could tackle the whole of this 'Q' and 'S' & 'T' business for the CC.RR. Alternatively we should hand over the whole matter to the Land Forces Sub-Com and ask their 'Q' staff to deal direct with the CC.RR and so get the matter tackled in an adequate manner.

M S. LUSH

1945

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

98

36157/cu

FX 32491
AUG 051853B

F/2818
AUG 061200B
ROUTINE

RESTRICTED

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE PHGEG
ACTION TROOPERS INFO ALCOM ROME

RESTRICTED

Reur 60866 CA 2 (BO)

Regret owing to changed circumstances vacancies on next
fingerprint course not now required.

Much regret inability of police experts to attend July course.

Italian Govt very short of reliable police officers capable
of training recent large intake of recruits and of dealing with
civil disturbances which have lately increased in frequency. Con-
sider it inexpedient in circumstances to press them to send offi-
cers to ENGLAND when they say cannot be spared.

Fully appreciate inconvenience caused.

Dist

Info-Action - P Safety SC
Info - Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
File 2
Float

1953
1952

M/C Note. No trace of quoted ref.

RESTRICTED

96

36151/2

AG/11601/21/PS

24 July 45

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

94

I refer you to letter of the 12th July in which I notified you of the increase in the number of Carabinieri to 65,000.

The uniforms to be supplied to the extra 10,000 thus authorized will be British Battle Dress which has been dyed to a grey green colour. I have reason to believe that dyed British Battle Dress could also be supplied to replace worn garments in the possession of the other 55,000 Carabinieri.

Before I give orders for the Public Safety Sub-Commission to investigate this possibility further, I would be glad to know your feelings in this matter. As you know, there is a shortage of Italian Army uniform and it is unlikely that supplies will be available for some time. I suggest that the use of this British type uniform is a good solution even though it means a temporary departure from the traditional dress.

Yours very truly,

E. W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

3615/10

Professor Ferruccio PAVI
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

95

Ref: AG/14601/21/RS

12 July 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of the 6 July 45 and am glad to be able to tell you that authority was granted on 1 July 45 to raise the maximum number of Carabinieri to 65,000 and this has been duly communicated to the Minister of War.

With regard to the remainder of your letter I am reluctant to remove from the North any of the Combat Groups but part of the Garibaldi Regiment has already been moved to the Bari Area. I appreciate your desire that there should be additional battalions of troops in the South of Italy and I am able to inform you that the whole question of the numbers and distribution of Italian Internal Security Troops all over Italy is now under consideration at AFHQ. I hope to be able to give you the Field Marshal's decision shortly.

Very truly yours,

ELMER W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

9951

5.1.1

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

94

CONFIDENTIALFX 18722
JULY 071309BE/8553
JULY 071645
PRIORITYAFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHCAO
ALCOM MAIN 8TH ARMY INFO 13 CORPS

CONFIDENTIAL.

Equipment for the police force of 3500 men requested in your cable 1028 of 3 July will be provided from the sources and on the scales which will be furnished you in the next few days. This does not constitute an undertaking for the permanent maintenance of this force. Permanent maintenance of this force will be the responsibility of the Italian Government through ALLIED COMMISSION. Items for this maintenance provided by the Italian Government will be delivered to the military for issue to the force through military or AMG channels. Further requirements may be submitted but each will be considered on its merits as an independent case.

DISTACTION - CA SEC 2
INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE 2
FLOAT**CONFIDENTIAL**

93

3615/2

785015

Translation

CC 1503

The President of the Council of Ministers
 Minister of the Interior
 n. 23057
 To Admiral Stone
 Chief Commissioner - A.C.

Rome, 6 July 1945

Dear Admiral,

a proposal of the preoccupations caused by the weakening of the police forces because of the transfer of important contingents of carabinieri to North Italy, you pointed out in your letter of April 27th, n. 14601/55/P.S., that the maximum number of carabinieri fixed in Italy is of 55,000 units and that this force must be equally distributed all over Italy, adding that the superior authorities had been requested to raise this number to 65,000 units.

On this subject, it must nevertheless be remembered that in past times, in an emergency, public order was assured by using, exceptionally, the regular forces of the Army stationed all over Italy, and particularly in the main towns of the provinces, especially in the most important ones.

As it is well known the only units which are at present at the exclusive disposal of the Italian military Authorities are the 'Garda' and 'Aosta' divisions, stationed in Sicily, and the 'Calabria' Division stationed in Gardinia, with two battalions detached to Calabria. These units represent the indispensable minimum to maintain order in these regions, and cannot be weakened by sending men to other places.

As in the present state of things there is no possibility of using the Army forces, in the other regions, the advisability of arranging for the co-operation of the Italian troops depending from the Allied Commands for the maintenance of public order, ought to be taken in consideration, and consequently, their equal distribution in the various regions of the peninsula. In particular, I think it would be advisable to transfer South of the Apennines one of the combat teams, for instance the 'Cremona' group which is now stationed in Adria. The most efficient of the pioneers battalions and guards battalion might also do very well.

I shall later on indicate the most appropriate destinations.

I shall be most grateful if you will take this proposal in consideration and intervene with the competent Authorities.

Yours sincerely,

n. Ferruccio Parri

E.C. Italy - 9 July 45

ACTION: C.A. SEC

INFO: Chief Commr

E. H. H. Commr

LAND FORCES S.C.

9964

134494

See

CC 1503

cc

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/99/EG.

10 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Proposal to use Italian Combat Groups
for Internal Security.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Attached hereto is letter No. 23057 dated 6 July 1945 from the Prime Minister requesting that a Combat Group and other units should be transferred South of the Apennines to assist in maintaining public order in emergency.

2. This letter is sent to you for action as it concerns the overall situation of public safety, but you will, of course, discuss with Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMIA) before preparing a reply for signature by the Chief Commissioner.

[Signature]
Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (LMIA) - With copy of a/m letter.

1945
JUL 11

920

Tel: 478427

AC/14634/TS

30 June 1945

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the CC.RR. and other Police Forces.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters, APO 512,
(Attention : G-5 Section.)

1. Reference is made to your G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, and to my 3626/EC of 19 May, 1945.

2. Since writing my letter of 19 May, I have had occasion to make further study of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November 1944, and I am now firmly convinced that under the provisions of that letter the responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) in regard to the CC.RR do parallel the responsibilities of the Italian Ministry of War insofar as control, supervision, administration and supply are concerned. I, therefore, request that a critical study be made in order to clarify the situation which has developed over the past several months in regard to responsibility for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the CC.RR.

3. In your letter G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, it stated that "MMIA responsibility for their (the CC.RR.) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army." In this connection I invite your attention, first, to the fact that MMIA admit their responsibility for the feeding, clothing and equipping of the CC.RR., (letter A.018 of 1 April, 1945, copy sent to you as enclosure to our letter 3626/EC of 14 April, 1945), and, second, to para. 4b of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November, 1944, wherein it is stated that MMIA will be responsible for supervision of administration

and supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.RR. being Italian Army units, inasmuch as they were specifically included under the CCS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 11 May, 1945, it is stated that "MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.RR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ letter AG 021. 711/169 SCT-O of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on MMIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War. Para. 8a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MMIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 8b provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.RR.) are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri.". The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri are a civil police organization directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission.". Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing operational use of the Carabinieri as police.

The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of MMIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in an unsatisfactory

level of supply of all kinds of equipment as compared with line troops of the Italian Army. Also this has caused the development of a fallacious opinion that, because Carabinieri are used as police, Public Safety Sub-Commission, which controls nothing in the way of supplies and equipment, is responsible for everything relating to Carabinieri. This situation has contributed materially to the ineffectiveness of the Carabinieri and the reports I am now receiving from my Public Safety officers in the north all testify to the very poor impression created in the minds of the public in all parts of the territory recently liberated by reason of the poor turn out of the Carabinieri sent North.

6. The internal security situation in Italy is far from satisfactory and threatens to become worse due in part to taking Carabinieri from the south to assist in the policing of the north. Now that combat operations have ceased, I feel that every aid and assistance possible should be given to strengthen, not only the Carabinieri, but also other Italian Police agencies. I see no reasons why Land Forces Sub-Commission (LNFIA) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the AFHQ letter herein referred to.

7. For the reasons herein expressed and as a matter of urgency, I request that serious and prompt consideration be given to this matter.

/s/ Elery W. Stone

ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to : Chief Commissioner
Land Forces S/C (LNFIA).

72

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 1025 ADMISSION OF COMMERCIAL INTERESTS TO ITALY

SECRET

Page 2

[illegible]

SECRET

2369