

0540

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

ACC

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36/379

FOOD PROGRAM, SICILY
SEPT. 1944 - JULY 1945

4021/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 4021 FOOD PROGRAM, SICILY
(Including Food Imports, Sicily)~~Confidential~~

Page 2

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
14	Cbl REO 354 Sicily Reg	8 Dec 44	AC for Lush	Many large cities will be without bread by 15 Dec. Trouble may ensue. Wheat imports - decrease of bread ration to 200 gr in Sicily. Bread will last only till 15th. Dec.
14a	PC(44) 35th Mtg	10 Dec 44		
15	Cbl Bonomi 16135/473	12 Dec 44	Stone	
16	Ltr, Stone	13 Dec 44	Bonomi	Shipment diverted from Mainland to Sicily to arrive 14th; another 20th.
17	Ltr Bonomi 21993/11247	31 Dec 44	Stone	Tnx ltr of 13 Dec and assurances.
18	94-1/ /Food, Telbot	26 Jul 45	IO	Food for & from Sicily.

3676

~~Confidential~~

4021/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 4021 - FOOD PROGRAM, SICILY.
(Including Food Imports, Sicily)

SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Memo Stone	13 Sep 44	Econ Sec	Phosphate rock for fertilizer
2	Ltr 4206/20/COS Stone	19 Oct 44	Bonomi	Makes it clear to everyone that no more wheat will be imported into Sicily. Harvest must do.
3	Memo Caccia	21 Oct 44	Econ Sec	Should Aldisio have stated that Sicily never has fed herself
4	Ltr A/CC 400-2 Stone	23 Oct 44	C of S	Wheat imports for Sicily. Aldisi- o says Sicily was never self-suppor- ting. Pls have survey made.
5	Memo 4805/COS Econ	26 Oct 44	Econ Sec	Make survey on Sic self suffice;
6	Memo Econ Sec	26 Oct 44	Pol Section	Sicily has never amassed enough wheat to cover needs. Always impor-
7	Memo Pol Shipp COS	1 Nov 44	C of S	Food - Sicily. Review of situatn
8	Memo Econ Sec	2 Nov 44	A/CC	Sicily - wheat & olive oil. Prob- lem of Sicily feeding herself
9	Ltr, Bonomi 12819	7 Nov 44	Stone	Sicily wheat supply will be ex- hausted mid-December.
9a	Ltr Econ Sec 21-2/18/FOOD	11 Nov 44	AFHQ C-5Sec	AC proposed import shipload wheat into Sicily.
10	Memo, Bonamere	12 Nov 44	Quayle	Propose tell Bonomi AC has recon- sidered and <u>will</u> import wheat.
11	Ltr Stone	16 Nov 44	Bonomi	AC will import shipload wheat.
12	Ltr Stone 4206/62/COS	27 Nov 44	CAO AFHQ	Col Goodwin's alarm at food situ- in Sicily.
12a	PC(44) 142	29 Nov 44		To request CCS policy-guidance.
12b	PC(44) 34th Mtg	30 Nov 44		Dep SAC decides no more imports, etc
13	DO, Lush 171/4/COS	2 Dec 44	Brig Carr	Dep SAC ruled no more food be im- ported; loop-hole: soup kitchens may be set up; you shd start on this.

Confidential

CHIEF COMMISSIONER
~~C. A. Sullivan~~

JUL 26 1945

Tel. 478204

26 July 1945

Ref. 91-1/ /FOOD

SUBJECT: Food for Sicily

TO : Lt. Col. Edward MORTON, Liaison Officer
Office of A. C. Liaison Officer

1. Reference is made to memorandum from the A. C. Liaison Officer NOB Navy 157, reference FD/5 dated 12 July 1945.
2. The substance of the letter from the High Commissioner for Sicily is noted and appreciated. Opportunities should be taken to indicate to the High Commissioner for Sicily the reasons for the very favorable stock situation is due to the arrival of a backlog of grain ships in a comparatively short period of time and that the tempo of imports will decrease considerably from August onward.
3. The effects of the dry weather on cereal production in Sicily is fully appreciated, but further imports of grain will be based on present stocks and an assessment of the present harvest yield. The Island will be expected to deliver to the Anagni a minimum of 92,000 tons of wheat and 22,000 tons of barley from the current harvest.

3874

BY COMMAND OF REAR ADMIRAL STONE:

E. Talbot

✓ Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

4021/c-

(14)

M

Translation

The President of the Council of
Ministers

n. 21995/11247.8.2

Rome, 31 December 1944

Dear Admiral,

I have received your letter R.E.S./d/e
of December 13th about the wheat situation of Sicily,
and I want to thank you for the interest you took in
the matter and for the gratifying assurances you gave
me.

I remain,

Yours truly,

B. I. Bonomi

3873


Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief of the Allied Commission
R o m e

S.C.

A.C. Distribution
Chief Commissioner
Food. S.C.
Economic Sec.
C.O.S.

4021/cc

(17)



m. 21/903
11847.8.2

*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

8
I RECD

Roma, 31 dicembre 1944

Caro Ammiraglio,

ho ricevuto la Sua lettera N E.W.S./d/e del 13 dicembre scorso relativa alla situazione granaria della Sicilia e desidero esprimerLe i sensi del mio vivo ringraziamento per il premuroso interessamento e per le soddisfacenti assicurazioni.

Con i migliori saluti, mi creda, caro Ammiraglio,


Sturani

3972

All' Ammiraglio
ELLERY W. STONE

dicembre scorso relativa alla situazione granaria della Sicilia e desidero esprimerle i sensi del mio vivo ringraziamento per il premuroso interessamento e per le soddisfacenti assicurazioni.

Con i migliori saluti, mi creda, caro Ammiraglio,



All' Ammiraglio
ELLERY W. STONE
Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

3972

(11)

0547

EWS/dfe

13 December 1944

(15)

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In reply to your urgent message of December 12th, I am able to alleviate your anxiety about the wheat situation in Sicily to the extent that a shipment of wheat amounting to approximately five thousand tons has been diverted from the Mainland and will arrive in Palermo tomorrow morning, the 14th. A further eight thousand tons is scheduled to arrive in Sicily on December 20th.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

3371

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: Food Sub-Commission
Chief of Staff
Economic Section
A Files

(16)

See (17)

41021/ce

Translat

Interior Department

Urgent

Rome, 12 December 1944

Admiral Ellery Stone
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
R o m e

n. 16135/473 Reference former message 9 December I inform Your Excellency about the very serious situation in Sicily because wheat supply will last only till the 15th. I beg your Excellency to intervene by this Commission so that it should kindly examine the proposal of the High Commissariat for Sicily to make agreement with local Commissariat General Alimentation, keeping in mind that failure to solve this grave problem would prevent regular explanation activity Government. I remain.

PRESIDENT COUNCIL MINISTER INTERIOR
BONOMI

See (16)

3870

Trans. E.C.

(15)

4021/cc

SECRET
 35th Meeting
 10th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 521

SECRET

COPY NO 47

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
 HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
 ROOM AT 1130 HOURS ON SATURDAY 9 DECEMBER, 1944.

3. WHEAT FOR SICILY.

(Previous reference - PC (44) 34th Meeting - Minute 7.)

BRIGADIER LUSH stated that the position regarding the amassment of Sicilian grain had further deteriorated and present supplies would run out in the major towns on 15 December. A shipment of 9,000 tons was due to arrive on 20 December and it was proposed to cover the intervening period by moving 5,000 tons of grain to SICILY by rail. The shipment of 9,000 tons would then suffice until 10 January. Thereafter imports would be required until the next harvest in July. The present shortage was due to the failure of the Italian Administration to secure delivery from the local farmers of an adequate supply of grain, amassment of which had failed by some 70,000 tons to meet even the reduced estimate. However, it had always been realized that local supplies would not suffice for the needs of the Island until the next harvest and the import of some 121,000 tons, in March and subsequent months, had been envisaged in order to support the 300 gramme ration. He suggested that these shipments might now be spread over the months January - June, either the amount of the ration or the number of ration holders being proportionately reduced. The reduction of the ration to 200 grammes would allow a reduction to some 70/80,000 tons in imports. In reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that the Italian Administration had, in certain cases, used both troops and carabinieri to seize hoarded grain from the farmers, but this action had not in the main been directed against the larger land-owners, who were considered to be the principal offenders. The High Commissioner in SICILY had now ordered farmers to produce 25 kg. each of wheat immediately. The local administration were taking steps to enforce the collection of this amount.

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4021/CL

Sicilian grain had further deteriorated and present supplies would run out in the major towns on 15 December. A shipment of 9,000 tons was due to arrive on 20 December and it was proposed to cover the intervening period by moving 5,000 tons of grain to SICILY by rail. The shipment of 9,000 tons would then suffice until 10 January. Thereafter imports would be required until the next harvest in July. The present shortage was due to the failure of the Italian Administration to secure delivery from the local farmers of an adequate supply of grain, an assessment of which had failed by some 70,000 tons to meet even the reduced estimate. However, it had always been realized that local supplies would not suffice for the needs of the island until the next harvest and the import of some 121,000 tons, in March and subsequent months, had been envisaged in order to support the 300 gramme ration. He suggested that these shipments might now be spread over the months January - June, either the amount of the ration or the number of ration holders being proportionately reduced. The reduction of the ration to 200 grammes would allow a reduction to some 70/80,000 tons in imports. In reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that the Italian Administration had, in certain cases, used both troops and carabinieri to seize hoarded grain from the farmers, but this action had not in the main been directed against the larger land-owners, who were considered to be the principal offenders. The High Commissioner in SICILY had now ordered farmers to produce 25 kg. each of wheat immediately. The local administration were taking steps to enforce the collection of this amount.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCMAHON believed that there were considerable supplies of local wheat hoarded in SICILY. The Allies should not employ operational shipping to import grain into areas in which local supplies existed. It should be made plain to the Italian Government that by 10 January 1945 they must have made adequate arrangements to provide grain for the Sicilian towns from local resources, if necessary by forceful requisition. In his opinion, the only way to force the Administration to requisition local wheat was to suspend shipments, as in present circumstances these only served to feed the black-market. Suspension of shipments might be coupled with Government-controlled relief.

BRIGADIER LUSH in reply pointed out that, as the shortage was confined to the towns, withholding of shipments might cause riots in PALERMO and CATANIA. He did not consider that the provision of relief, by means of emergency soup kitchens or such like arrangements, under Italian Government control was practicable in view of the weakness of the administration.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM observed that the Sicilian ports were of considerable Naval importance and riots in these towns would have an adverse effect on Naval operations in the Theater.

SECRET

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SECRET

K 521

MR. BARNES agreed with Lieutenant General McFarney that the farmers were withholding their wheat in the hope of obtaining higher prices on the black-market. He considered, however, that no manipulation of prices paid by the Government would induce the farmers to bring forward more grain. If riots occurred, he thought that they would be directed against the larger land-owners and would not initially be anti-Allied in nature.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that the maintenance of the 300 gramme ration in SICILY would involve a commitment for 4½ Liberty ships per month, which could only be met at the expense of operational requirements. He thought, and Lieutenant General Gammell agreed, that the two Italian Divisions in SICILY should be used to extract the hoarded grain by force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER was not prepared to accept the diversion of shipping from operational requirements. He considered that the Sicilian ration should be reduced to 200 grammes at once.

MR. KIRK felt that it was necessary to galvanize the Italian Government into action to force the local farmers to hand over their wheat. He thought that the best means of doing this was to withhold further shipments and enforce the immediate reduction of the ration.

MR. BROAD, while agreeing with Mr. Kirk, commented that this action would need to be taken in conjunction with a carefully planned propaganda campaign.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

(a) That the Allied Commission take action to move 5,000 tons of wheat to SICILY by rail, in order, in conjunction with the shipment of 9,000 tons due on 20 December, to provide adequate grain for the Sicilian towns until 10 January.

(b) That the Allied Commission instruct the Italian Government:

(i) That in view of the failure to secure adequate amassment of local wheat in SICILY, the ration in that Island should be cut to 200 grammes per head per day forthwith.

(ii) That forcible measures to requisition adequate local supplies to meet the requirements of the Sicilian towns from 10 January 1945 until the next harvest must be taken at once.

(iii) That further shipments would not be forthcoming.

(c) That G-5 prepare for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken, and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local amassment.

date -
Cancelled
per
32.
36th Mtg
JL
file 4010-cc

3008

1/16

0553

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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SECRET

CITE: REG 354

DEC 080800

0/3236

DEC 081630
PRIORITY

AICOM SICILY REGION (CARR)

HQ AICOM FOR LUSH RPT FOR INFO TO ECONOMIC SECTION, FOOD FOR LEGG

SECRET.

Para 1. Subject is food.

Para 2. Having been constantly assured by local authorities and by statistics that grain reserves were sufficient to feed population till end of year these authorities now state grain will last only to 25 December.

Para 3. Owing to difficulties in and resistance to movement of grain from districts in possession to big towns authorities report that dated many cities will be without bread approximately 15 December and that trouble is feared.

Para 4. Have informed authorities that no immediate AGO is available.

Para 5. Situation critical PA:ENZO CATANIA MESSINA

DIST

ACTION FOOD SC (2)
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
COS
ECON SEC
C A SEC
TN SC
FILE

Confidential

14

INFORMATION

Subject: WHEAT FOR SICILY A FILE

Ref: 171/4/COS.

3 December 1944

N/R

Thank you for your letter 101/201 of 27 November.

The present situation with regard to imports of food into Sicily is as follows. One food ship of 7000 tons is now being routed for Sicily. This, we understand, should get you through up to 15 January. A very strong case was made at SACRED's political meeting on 30 November for further imports as included in our total requisition for Italy amounting to 25,000 tons per month. The matter was fully discussed and I regret to say that the Deputy SACRED ruled that no further food should be imported into the island and that the Italian Government should be informed of this.

The Chief Commissioner is awaiting receipt of the minutes and instructions before taking action with the Italian Government.

The Deputy SACRED did leave a loophole. He directed that in order to avoid starvation in the cities and towns the Italian authorities should set up soup-kitchens throughout the island and that application for food to supply these soup-kitchens could be considered. This subject is now being examined by the Economic Section who, I understand, will probably send a representative to Sicily to discuss this matter so you with you.

The Chief Commissioner and all of us realize the gravity of the situation and you may be quite certain that we shall do our utmost to help you and to seek some alternative to the very flat directions which we have at the moment. I do want you, however, to turn your mind at once to the organization of the soup-kitchens, communal restaurants, and the like, in order that a proper alternative may be examined in order to meet the directions. I know at the same time you will impress on the High Commissioner or his representative the absolute necessity of saving in every single grain of wheat possible.

30663

Brigadier M. Carr, CBE, MC,
Regional Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
SICILIA REGION.

M. B. LUSH

FILES A

Copy to: File 4206/COS.

13

S E C R E T

AFHQ Political Committee

34th Meeting

30 November 1944

EXTRACT

7. WHEAT FOR SICILY

(Previous Reference PC (44) 142)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper:-

- (a) Revealing that the assessment of Sicilian grain had fallen short of previous estimates, and that it would be necessary to import 160,000 tons of wheat between January and June 1945 if the bread ration of 300 grammes were to be maintained.
- (b) Outlining five courses open to the Supreme Allied Commander, and requesting direction as to which of them should be adopted.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that, in addition to the five courses suggested, it might be possible to institute emergency soup kitchens or such-like arrangements.

BRIGADIER LUSH stated that:-

- (i) Even if assessment had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grammes.
- (ii) The local administration though it had improved on last year's record had clearly failed to organize effective assessment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.
- (iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grammes per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.
- (iv) Signor BONCATI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if amassing measures were tightened up. He

0 5 5 7

Grammes were to be maintained.

- (b) Outlining five courses open to the Supreme Allied Commander, and requesting direction as to which of them should be adopted.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD pointed out that, in addition to the five courses suggested, it might be possible to institute emergency soup kitchens or such-like arrangements.

BRIGADIER LUSH stated that:-

- (1) Even if emassment had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grammes.
- (ii) The local administration though it had improved on last year's record had clearly failed to organize effective emassment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.
- (iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grammes per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.
- (iv) Signor BONOMI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if amassing measures were tightened up. He pressed most strongly for imports in order to permit the maintenance of the 300 gramme ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to send a shipload of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January 1945.
- (v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 gramme ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political repercussions.

MR. BARNES thought that this problem, if not resolved, would give the Sicilians a stick with which to beat the ROME government. He also reported that small farmers were unwilling to surrender their grain, arguing that the large holders were retaining theirs for sale on the black market.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK agreed that much grain was being held by the farmers. He felt that the Sicilians would always ask for more, and he urged that the Italian Government be told that they must find a solution for this problem themselves.

- 2 -

MR. BROAD observed that the situation of any new Italian Government which might be formed was likely to be difficult for some time. He felt that if nothing were done to help it over this problem its instability would be increased. He suggested that a compromise should be adopted. Imported supplies should continue to be provided, but on an "ad hoc" basis, depending on the situation from month to month. At the same time the Italian Government should not be informed of this policy, but pressure on them to extract further grain in SICILY should be increased.

MR. REINHARDT doubted whether indirect pressure on the Italian Government was likely to produce the desired results.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD AND BRIGADIER LUSH, replying to a question by the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreed that raising the price paid to farmers would not bring about an improvement in the situation. Contrary to the allegations of certain farmers, it was considered that the price of 1,000 lire per quintal was a fair one and covered costs of production.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR pointed out that the Sicilian separatist movement was strong, and that it was believed in certain quarters to have the support of the Allied Governments. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER did not believe that this was a suitable case for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would accept neither the diversion of shipping from operational commitments in order to bring in imports, nor the use of force to increase assessment. He felt, therefore, that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S ruling of 24 September should be maintained, namely "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available". He was of the opinion that no indication should be given to the Italians that they might receive supplies after the December ship-load. He agreed that the Sicilian population should not be allowed to die of starvation, but felt that if the Italian administration were incapable of feeding it adequately, soup kitchens or similar measures under Allied control should be instituted.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944 (see x above) be maintained without modification.

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farmers would not bring about an improvement in the situation. Contrary to the allegations of certain farmers, it was considered that the price of 1,000 lire per quintal was a fair one and covered costs of production.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944 (see x above) be maintained without modification.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to Sicily could be expected by them after the December ship-load already promised.
- (c) Directed that G-5 study and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of organizing emergency distribution of food in SICILY under Allied control.
- (d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer examine and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee as to the repercussions on operational shipping commitments if the imports required to maintain the bread ration in SICILY at 300 grammes were sanctioned.

SECRET

COPY

K 478

SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERSPC (44) 142

29th November 1944

COPY NO 40POLITICAL COMMITTEEWHEAT FOR SICILYNote by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5BACKGROUND

1. In a letter dated 24 September 1944, The Supreme Allied Commander conveyed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff his views on the bread ration for ITALY as a whole. He stated that, in the case of SICILY,

- a. the current crop was sufficient to feed the island
 - b. the amassment was not going well
2. He proposed in consequence "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available".

CONSIDERATIONS.

3. The original amassing estimate was 297,000 tons to JUNE 30, 1945, a figure well within the amassing totals of the years 1937-40. Subsequently, this estimate was reduced to 221,000, and then to 200,000 tons; but present information shows that not more than 150,000 tons is likely to be obtained without

3562

BACKGROUND

1. In a letter dated 24 September 1944, The Supreme Allied Commander conveyed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff his views on the bread ration for ITALY as a whole. He stated that, in the case of SICILY,
 - a. the current crop was sufficient to feed the island
 - b. the amassment was not going well
2. He proposed in consequence "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available".

CONSIDERATIONS.

3. The original amassing estimate was 297,000 tons to JUNE 30, 1945, a figure well within the amassing totals of the years 1937-40. Subsequently, this estimate was reduced to 221,000, and then to 200,000 tons; but present information shows that not more than 150,000 tons is likely to be obtained without repressive measures. 4021/c
4. It is estimated that, if the bread ration for SICILY is to be maintained at 300 grammes, it will be necessary to import 160,000 tons between January and June 1945. Pending a decision on the matter, the Allied Commission proposes to bring into SICILY one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the Island must support itself until 15 January.
5. The reasons for the failure of the amassment are in the main as follows:
 - a. political activities, and in the particular the failure of a weak administration to control strong agrarian interests.
 - b. resentment of the farmers at receiving only 1000 lire per quintal against an alleged cost of production of 1400 lire

See 12-a

- 2 -

SECRET

per quintal.

c. the natural resistance of the peasant to amassment.

COURSES OPEN

6. The following courses appear to be open to the Supreme Commander:

a. to reduce the bread ration to 200 grammes; which appears to be unacceptable politically.

b. to resort to force in an attempt to increase the amassment; which would be unacceptable militarily and politically, as well as of doubtful effectiveness.

c. to increase the price offered for wheat; a course whose success could not be guaranteed, and which might set an undesirable precedent for other parts of ITALY.

d. to adhere to the action which is proposed (Para 2 above) and to place the onus of collection of resources on the local administration; thereby to accept the political and economic consequences which might arise from their failure to carry out their responsibilities.

e. to provide the estimated quantities of wheat to make up the deficiency, and to accept the conflict of the consequent shipping demands with other urgent operational commitment.

RECOMMENDATION.

7. No recommendation is made. It is considered, however, that this opportunity should be taken of preventing SICILY

b. to resort to force in an attempt to increase the amassment; which would be unacceptable militarily and politically, as well as of doubtful effectiveness.

c. to increase the price offered for wheat; a course whose success could not be guaranteed, and which might set an undesirable precedent for other parts of ITALY.

d. to adhere to the action which is proposed (Para 2 above) and to place the onus of collection of resources on the local administration; thereby to accept the political and economic consequences which might arise from their failure to carry out their responsibilities.

e. to provide the estimated quantities of wheat to make up the deficiency, and to accept the conflict of the consequent shipping demands with other urgent operational commitment.

RECOMMENDATION.

7. No recommendation is made. It is considered, however, that this opportunity should be taken of presenting SICILY to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a test case. SICILY is not only a complete economic unit but policy towards it will constitute an important precedent in the rest of ITALY, and possibly in other territory as well. It is therefore desired to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Commander regarding the policy to be followed.

(init) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

DISTRIBUTION

- 2 -

SECRET

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- 3 -

SECRET

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NO.</u>
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
Commander, Eight Fleet, USN	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
US. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Director, PWB	23
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3601

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3801

17a

A File

4206/62/603.27 November 1944.

Dear General:

Thank you for your letter of 20 November in which you referred to the talk you had with Colonel Goodwin on the food situation in Sicily.

I share his concern about this question and you will remember that representations have been made by this Commission to SACRED and by the letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Very truly yours,

W. H. Stone

ELDER W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Lieut. General J. W. C. Clark, CB, MC,
Chief Administrative Officer,
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

3600

4021/CC

(12)

16 November 1944

My Dear Prime Minister:

9

Your letter N. 11819 of 7 November 1944 has received careful consideration.

My advisers still are convinced that there is a large amount of wheat hidden in Sicily, but, in order that the just may not be punished with the unjust, it has been decided in view of your request to reconsider our position. It is now planned that one shipload of wheat will be brought into Sicily in December and that, with this help, the Island must feed itself until the middle of January. Shipments will be arranged for subsequent months, but their amount must of course depend on the general food situation in Italy, and on the availability of shipping for imported supplies.

9

I am as anxious as you are that the question of the general ration of bread and pasta for liberated Italy as a whole should be resolved as early as possible. The estimate in your letter of 7 November of the amount of grain needed by Italy has been noted, and is being studied by us. Meanwhile, the figures of actual wheat-flour imports to date, and details of our present knowledge of expected tonnages until next harvest, are attached for your information as an appendix to this letter.

355

Members of my staff have already gone over with H. E. Bergami, Under Secretary of Food, the problems involved in transferring the responsibility for food to your Government. While the wheat problem is by no means completely solved, it is hoped that current consultations between the Italian Government and the Allied Commission may lead to a solution as satisfactory as possible to all concerned, in view of the supply and shipping limitations under which we are all working.

Sincerely yours,

See 10

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

11

H. E. Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc. Section
100 S/C

FILES A

APPENDIX

ACTUAL CEREAL IMPORTS INTO ITALY FROM ALLIED SOURCES
July 1, 1944 - October 31, 1944
 (all figures in tons)

	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Barley</u>	<u>Total</u>
1944				
July	36,009	-	-	36,009
August	52,721	-	-	52,721
September	18,086	-	-	18,086
October	34,310	11,528	15,161	<u>60,999</u>
			TOTAL	167,815 Tons

EXPECTED IMPORTS, NOVEMBER 1, 1944 - JUNE 30, 1945
 (all figures in tons)

	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Barley</u>	<u>Total</u>
1944				
November	49,853	17,162	22,485	89,500
December	-	-	-	93,000
1945				
January	-	-	-	93,000
February through June	107,000 monthly			535,000
			TOTAL	<u>810,500</u> Tons

NOTES:

- 358 Total for year July 1st 1944 to June 30th 1945 - 978,315 tons.
2. Figure quoted for February 1945 to June 1945 is not fixed firm. Increase or decrease will depend upon shipping available.
3. Of the imports from November 1944 to June 1945 a considerable quantity must be earmarked for the estimated needs of North Italy, to be utilized there after its liberation.

(11)

LDD/cs

12 November 1944

TO: MAJOR QUAYLE:

TONY -

Re attached memo 10 November 1944, "Request for Sicily," Ref 4206/43/COS:

(1) On November 11 we told AFHQ G-5 that we would import wheat to Sicily and that we would tell the Italian Government of our decision.

(2) The Italian Government has not as yet been told.

(3) Unfortunately on October 19, Ref 4206/20/COS, we let the Chief Commissioner tell H. E. Bonomi "no more imports of wheat for Sicily."

(4) I now propose to use H. E. Bonomi's letter (N 11619) as a means whereby we will in view of his request, etc. agree to reconsider our position and import wheat into Sicily.

(5) I also propose to include a full statement in the letter to the Italian Government setting forth the import wheat position in Italy, as we see it, based on assumed imports. For some reason, which I do not understand, the Italian Government has never been told how much we import or how much we plan to import. I think they should know all.

(6) I will keep the boys on this and will submit draft of reply to N 11619 along the lines indicated above.

11

Renamor
L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, FA, CGO
Economic Section

OK
hms

u
A

4021/cc

3557

10

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.F.O. 394

Economic Section

11/51

A

Tel: 478907

11 November 1944

Ref: 21-2/18/FWD

SUBJECT: Wheat Situation Sicily

TO : 1 APRG, G-5 SECTION

1. It is desired to clarify the past and present situation with regard to Sicilian wheat.

2. The statement was originally made that Sicily would be self-sufficient in wheat production on a 200 gram ration basis, which was the ration prevailing when estimates for wheat requirements were first made.

3. When the question of the 300 gram ration first arose, the estimated assessing figure for Sicily was given by Agriculture Sub-Commission as 297,000 tons. This was not considered unreasonable, an assessing total for year 1937--1940 had been well above that figure. In addition, it was then considered a possibility that numbers of ration card holders might be reduced to 2,900,000, which was the average number from October 1941 to March 1942. The 300 gram ration based upon that number of Ration Card Holders could just have been supplied from the 297,000 tons assessing estimate. Self-sufficiency for Sicily was therefore still a possibility and the goal at which we aimed.

4. In early August two new factors arose. First. The number of Ration Card Holders could not be reduced below 3,200,000. Second. A revised estimate of assessing brought the total down to 221,000 tons.

As a result of this, it was then recognized that imports would be required over the year if the 300 gram ration were to be retained. In our memorandum to you of 7 August 1944 it was stated that Sicily would require wheat imports of 130,000 metric tons during the year beginning 1 July 1944.

5. This view was not publicized beyond our memorandum to you, as it was considered essential psychologically to keep the pressure upon the Sicilians to assess the greatest possible extent. It was, however, included in the estimates prepared by Food Sub-Commission in mid-September and shown to you before being taken to Washington by Colonel L. B. That program called for a resumption of wheat imports in February 1945, with a total of 121,000 metric tons to June 30, 1945. Assessing estimates was still retained at 221,000 tons.

2. The statement was originally made that Sicily would be self-sufficient in wheat production on a 200 gram ration basis, which was the ration prevailing when estimates for wheat requirements were first made.

3. When the question of the 300 gram ration first arose, the estimated assessing figure for Sicily was given by Agriculture Sub-Commission as 297,000 tons. This was not considered unreasonable, an assessing totals for year 1937-1940 had been well above that figure. In addition, it was then considered a possibility that numbers of ration card holders might be reduced to 2,900,000, which was the average number from October 1941 to March 1942. The 300 gram ration based upon that number of Ration Card Holders could just have been supplied from the 297,000 tons assessing estimate. Self-sufficiency for Sicily was therefore still a possibility and the goal at which we aimed.

4. In early August two new factors arose. First. The number of Ration Card Holders could not be reduced below 3,200,000. Second. A revised estimate of assessing brought the total down to 221,000 tons.

As a result of this, it was then recognized that imports would be required over the year if the 300 gram ration were to be retained. In our memorandum to you of 7 August 1944 it was stated that Sicily would require wheat imports of 150,000 metric tons during the year beginning 1 July 1944.

5. This view was not publicized beyond our memorandum to you, as it was considered essential psychologically to keep the pressure upon the Sicilians to assess to the greatest possible extent. It was, however, included in the estimates prepared by Food Sub-Commission in mid-September and shown to you before being taken to Washington by Colonel J. G. That program called for a resumption of wheat imports in February 1945, with a total of 121,000 metric tons to June 30, 1945. Assessing estimate was still retained at 221,000 tons.

6. Later, revised assessing estimate was fixed at 200,000 tons, but the Regional Commissioner does not think that we shall get more than 150,000 tons without representative measures, which are not considered advisable at the moment. If this view is accepted, then Sicily cannot feed itself after the end of December. It is therefore proposed to bring into Sicily one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the Island must support itself until January 15. Shipments in January and subsequently must depend upon the general food situation in Italy.

Wheat Situation, Cont'd.

7. Recent estimates submitted of wheat imports required to maintain bread ration of 300 grams, i.e., 165,000 tons monthly from November 1944 onwards, are in line with the situation expressed in Para 6.

For the Chief Commissioner:

AGL
A. G. LARSEN
Acting Deputy
Chief of Staff
Economic Section

Copies to:

Chief Commissioner
Food Sub-Commission
Additional Section
File

Copies to:

Chief Commissioner
Food Sub-Commission
Political Section
File

3655

SECRET

-2-



Col. Densmore

Sub-6 D COS Econ Sec
 has been further
 called Col. D's
 attention to it. Q.

Office of Chief of Staff.

Wheat for Sicily.

4206/43/COS.

10 November, 1944.

DOS Economic Section.

I enclose a translation, with original, of a letter No. 11819 dated 7 Nov 44 from H. K. Bonard to the A/CC. You will no doubt wish to discuss this matter with A/CC and A/COS before drafting a reply for the former's signature.

Chief Staff Officer,
 To Chief of Staff

Copy to: SC to A/CC.

Sec 10

Bring up to A/CC

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 11819

Rome, 7 November 1944.

Dear Admiral,

It is my duty to request you to examine personally the situation of the wheat supply of this country.

The wheat supply of Sicily will soon be exhausted, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests has stated the matter several times (for the last time in letter n. 4/1/4398/11.17/C of October) to the Allied Agriculture Sub-Commission, specifying the needs of the island. If in Sicily the amount of wheat brought to the 'granai del popolo' hasn't reached the foreseen figure, it must be noted that the difference between the foreseen quantity and the quantity which was collected is greatly inferior to the amount of wheat required to feed the inhabitants of the island from the middle of December - when the supply will probably come to an end - till the next harvest. Therefore, the severe regulation, which has been discussed, and by which no wheat should be sent to Sicily, thus striking the mass of the population which kept nothing from the 'granai del popolo', does not seem just.

Nevertheless, the Sicilian question, essential not only in itself, but also because of the political repercussions it can have, is but the regional aspect of a problem by which the whole of liberated Italy is being faced. Calculating the daily distribution of 200 gr. of bread and 80 gr. of pasta to all those who have the food-rations cards, the amount of wheat required till the next harvest, would be roughly of seven million quintals, besides the existing supplies, and the amount which will probably be collected in future.

Italy needs seven million qts, and hopes in the kind comprehension of the Allied Governments; its trust is even greater now that President Roosevelt has publicly expressed his wish to see the bread ration to be raised to 500 grs daily in Italy.

For us Italians, this is a vital problem requiring swift action. The lack of transport, prevents wheat being brought from one province to another, yet this might keep a certain balance between the various provinces for a certain length of time at least. I rely on your help, dear Admiral, to eliminate the obstacles and help to come to some agreement. Meanwhile, I remain,

Truly yours,

/s/ I. Bonomi

See (10)

Admiral Billy R. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission

R O M E

trans. E.C.

4021/CV

3033

(9)

2 November 1944

SICILY: WHEAT AND OLIVE OIL

A. W H E A T

1. Sicily has fallen considerably short of amassing the wheat which all the figures showed was available for amassing. The original figures, many months ago, showed that Sicily was roughly self-sufficient at the 200-gram ration, if the target amassing figure was met. A later estimate showed Sicily feeding herself up to April 1945 at 300 grams, if the relatively conservative amassing figure of 2,000,000 quintals was met. At present, the picture is that only about 1,300,000 quintals have been amassed, the ration is still at 300 grams, and Sicily will barely get through the month of January on its own stocks.

2. The Acting Chief Commissioner has written to the Prime Minister stating that Sicily should feed herself and would get no imported wheat. From the economic standpoint, it is clear that this position is not tenable.

3. If we have to bail Sicily out anyway, the decision should be made early, and the first shipment of wheat should actually arrive in December. Reason: it would be inefficient, from the transport standpoint, to move local grain from interior centers to coastal cities until stocks in the interior ~~were exhausted~~, ~~and then a month or two later~~ to have to ~~move~~ imported grain back from the ports into the interior provinces.

36 to 2

At present, the picture is that only about 1,000,000 tons of wheat are amassed, the ration is still at 300 grams, and Sicily will barely get through the month of January on its own stocks.

2. The Acting Chief Commissioner has written to the Prime Minister stating that Sicily should feed herself and would get no imported wheat. From the economic standpoint, it is clear that this position is not tenable.

3. If we have to bail Sicily out anyway, the decision should be made early, and the first shipment of wheat should actually arrive in December. Reason: it would be inefficient, from the transport standpoint, to move local grain from interior centers to coastal cities until stocks in the interior ~~were exhausted, and then a month or two~~ later to have to ~~35 to 40~~ move imported grain back from the ports into the interior provinces.

4. On the other hand, our availability of imported wheat is low. Both our November and December shipments were cut down, -- an aggregate bite of some 40,000 tons out of the 200,000 tons that was supposed to come in during the ~~two~~ months. To put a shipload of wheat into Sicily during December (as will be necessary if the decision is made to bail Sicily out) would mean robbing the stockpile for the north of that much wheat -- when it has already been robbed of the cutback applied to the November and December arrivals. And of course we don't know whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff will give us what we requested (enough to maintain a 300-gram ration in the whole country) on the wheat to arrive from January on.

-2-

Cont'd: Sicily: Wheat and Olive Oil.

5. From a strictly economic point of view, without considering the political angles, we recommend that we tell the Italian Government (a) that we will give them one shipload (8-9,000 tons) of wheat in December, and on that basis the island must take care of itself on a 300-gram ration until the 15th of January; (b) that the situation after that, including consideration of a possible reduction in the ration, will have to depend on the availability of imported wheat; and (c) that the Government should redouble its efforts, by every means at its disposal, to increase the availability of wheat through an increased rate of amassing. (In connection with (c), the proposed system of bartering fertilizer for wheat may be of some help.)

3851

0 5 7 9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

3851



SUBJECT: Food - SICILY.

1st November, 1944.

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. At a meeting held in your office yesterday afternoon in your absence Mr. Antolini asked RC Sicily how much more grain over and above the 1,300,000 qtls already amassed he was likely to get this year. Brigadier Carr said he did not expect to get any appreciable extra quantities at all. He asked RC Sicily ^{up to} what date the island could feed itself. Brigadier Carr replied that it was estimated that the island could feed itself until the end of December.
2. RC Sicily drew attention to the phrase "to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which are known to be available", which occurs in the fifth paragraph of the A/CC's letter to the Prime Minister. This appears to be copied from the seventh paragraph of General Wilson's telegram of 24th September to the C.C.S. Brigadier Carr pointed out that no resources were known to be available in the sense of being obtainable. The High Commissioner for Sicily had been constantly urged to intensify grain collection but it was now so late in the season that it was anticipated that only small quantities would be forthcoming. Grain which had not been amassed had either been consumed, smuggled to the mainland, passed into the hands of speculators, or hidden. To bring the total assessment figure up to 1,500,000 would mean an additional 200,000 quintals which would entail grain collection at the rate of over 3000 quintals per day during the months of November and December. There appeared to be no prospect whatever of amassment being revived to this extent. Grain had been coming in recently at the rate of 600 to 1000 quintals per day and the average was falling rapidly.
3. After discussion, Economic Section (Mr. Antolini and Major Imrie), felt that a realistic attitude must be adopted but pointed out that only 9000 tons from reserves could be sent to the island in December. This was only sufficient for one third of a month but must suffice the island up to January 15th, after which date the full monthly requirements of 29,000 tons would be required. This would have to be cleared with the A/CC. Presumably the SAC's approval would be necessary and the policy letter sent to the Prime Minister and to Sicilia Region would require drastic modification.
4. Mr. Antolini was unable to see the A/CC last night but I understand that he was going to point out the necessity of baling out Sicily in January and to discuss with the A/CC how we should present to AFHQ our case in this matter.

either been consumed, smuggled to the mainland, passed into the hands of speculators, or hidden. To bring the total amassment figure up to 1,500,000 would mean an additional 200,000 quintals which would entail grain collection at the rate of over 3000 quintals per day during the months of November and December. There appeared to be no prospect whatever of amassment being revived to this extent. Grain had been coming in recently at the rate of 600 to 1000 quintals per day and the average was falling rapidly.

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4. Mr. Antolini was unable to see the A/CC last night but I understand that he was going to point out the necessity of baling out Sicily in January and to discuss with the A/CC how we should present to AFHQ our case in this matter.

5. Mr. Antolini reported that the Italian Government had written to the Allied Commission saying that they proposed to increase the price of olive oil ^{in Sicily} from L.60 to L.75 per kilo. He pointed out that this appeared to be a decision on the part of the Italian Government and that they were not asking for our permission in the matter. However, he would like to have the RC's comments on this. Brigadier Carr stated that the High Commissioner had written to him suggesting a price of L.80. Brigadier Carr said that he was doubtful about a special price for olive oil in Sicily on the following grounds. It was questionable whether any reasonable price would lead to successful olive oil amassing in Sicily: the higher price in Sicily might lead to considerable quantities of olive oil moving across the Straits of Messina; moreover, a higher price in Sicily would mean an admission that costs of production were higher in Sicily than on the mainland, might have repercussions on future prices and might give encouragement to the separatist movement which was growing in strength.

Mr. Antolini suggested that the higher price ought to be operative only up to a fixed date or for a fixed quantity which ever was reached first and that after this point the price should revert to L.60. Unless it was decided to dispute the Italian Government's decision it was felt that their attention should be drawn to the necessity of imposing the time and quantity limits suggested above.

W. Supp

Lt. Col,
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

10/11/45/JG.

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
APO 394

JI/mi

Tel: 761

ACC/21-2/FOOD

26 October 1944

INTER OFFICE MEMO

SUBJECT: Investigation Report

TO : Political Section

(3)

1. Reference your memorandum of 21 October 1944 on the subject of imports of wheat into Sicily.
2. Sicily during the last four years has never amassed sufficient wheat to cover the needs of the population on a 300 gram bread ration basis. The quantities amassed, however, have always been low compared with the total harvest.
3. The estimate of selfsufficiency of grain in Sicily was made on a 200 gram bread ration basis. As a result of the increase of the ration to the equivalent of 300 gram, and a lowering of the estimated amass to 200,000 tons, it was realized that imports of grain into Sicily would be necessary by February 1945. These estimates which include a figure of 8,000 tons for February and 29,000 tons per month subsequently were included in the figures recently presented to Washington by Brig. Gen. O'Dwyer and Col. Legg.

3619

/s/ A.G.A.
/t/ A.G. ANTOLINI
Acting Head
Economic Section

Copy to: Acting Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff

(6)

26 CT

C O S

Ext. 300

Wheat Imports for Sicily.

4805/13/COS

Economic Section.

26 Oct

4

I refer to letter No. A/CC 400-2 ~~(211-11)~~ of the 23rd of October from Acting Chief Commissioner.

Would you please arrange for the survey mentioned in para 3 of this letter to be made as soon as possible and forward it to me?

h 86
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

400-2

16:8

(5)

26 Oct

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APC 394

EWS/hjp

A/CC 400-2

23 October 1944

SUBJECT: Wheat imports for Sicily

TO : Chief of Staff, Hq ACC

1. At my meeting with High Commissioner Aldisio on October 19th, I anticipated my letter to the Prime Minister by telling Aldisio that in the face of this year's harvest of between six and seven million quintals the Allies would not be justified in importing further wheat into Sicily and that it was up to the Government to ensure equitable distribution of the total wheat available on the island.

2. In the course of our discussion, Aldisio stated that contrary to Allied belief, Sicily is not self-supporting on wheat and was not in past years. I asked him if he could prove this statement statistically and he promised to forward such figures promptly, but to date they have not been received.

3. In the meantime I should like you to have a survey of this question made by the Economic Section (Food Sub-Commission) as to Sicily's past record on wheat imports, possibly thru the Italian Office of Statistics and Supply Information.

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Economic Section

1817

23 OCT

File
HJP

INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

21 October 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Economic Section.

You will see from the attached copy of the Roman newspaper "IL TEMPO" that the Italian High Commissioner for Sicily yesterday said:

"It will be recalled that the amount of wheat presently available for feeding Sicily is scarcely sufficient for two months and that a responsible authority in the ACC even yesterday stated that the Allies have decided not to send more wheat to Sicily, as they were certain that in this respect Sicily was self-sufficient.

That is the result of propaganda put out by the Separatists, which is based amongst other things on the self sufficiency of the island in foodstuffs.

The truth is that Sicily, especially in these last four war years, has always received wheat from continental Italy to cover six months need."

Should he have?

H. A. Caccia
Vice-President

30.6

Copies to:

Chief of Staff

Acting Chief Commissioner ✓

21 Oct

(3)

400-11

A FILE

Ref: 1506/20

11th October 1944

My dear Prime Minister

The collection of grain in Jolly has, as you and I well know, produced a serious problem, a problem which has been tackled with energy by the High Commissioner with the advice of the AG Regional Commissioner and his staff of AG officers in the Island. In this connection you will be aware that I have reinforced the staff of the Regional Commissioner with a number of officers in order to help the local provincial government in the collection of grain.

In spite of this the collection has fallen far short of the target, and my present advice is that it is doubtful even whether that target can be reached.

My Regional Commissioner informs me that an approximate estimate of the grain harvested in Jolly amounts to no less than 7 million quintals. The amount of grain to be issued monthly on the present ration basis of 500 grams per day totals 200,000 quintals monthly. You will realize that in order to feed the whole of the population, that is to say those entitled to grain, until the next harvest in 6 months time, will consume 1,750,000 quintals. You will appreciate that this is far less than the total amount of grain harvested in the Island and therefore in the hands of the people.

Although there is in the collection depot sufficient grain to feed those on ration cards until the end of this year, the Regional Commissioner sees little prospect of collecting more than an additional month's supply for these people.

I feel you should understand and should inform the High Commissioner for Jolly that it is the definite intention of the Supreme Allied Commander not to import additional grain for Jolly and to leave to the local administration the problem of finding an equitable distribution of the resources which are known to be available. No grain will therefore be imported to Jolly between this date and the coming harvest.

See (10)

(2)

14 Oct

-2-

The High Commissioner, therefore, on present figures is faced with the problem of feeding the ration population of Sicily from January until mid-July on the grain which exists in the Island and which, as I am advised at present, will not be raised.

I recommend that you take the earliest opportunity of making this clear, not only to the High Commissioner but to the people of Sicily, so that there can be no doubt in their minds, as in the minds of others, that the grain exists in the Island and that it is for the Island to show sufficient public spirit to provide sufficient grain, and it is only a small proportion of the harvest, to feed those in the urban areas who depend upon the producer for their daily bread.

I must repeat that no further grain can be imported into Sicily and I must ask you to make this perfectly clear to all concerned.

15/ E.W.S.

CLARE W. HUME
Governor, USA
Acting Chief Commissioner

Since writing the above I have discussed this matter with S.E. Aldis.

35

(2)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

13 September 1944

TO: Colonel Densmore, Economic Section

In the conference with Sig. Aldisio, High Commissioner of Sicily, he informed me that Sicily requires a 1,400,000 quintals of phospho-rate rock for making fertilizer in Sicily, that so far they have received only 50,000 quintals.

Please investigate with your section and get me the facts. This is certainly something that it would appear we should be bidding heavily for tonnage to bring in here.

E.W.S.

84203

Hq ACC - Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 14 SEP 1944
Via Mgr 1455
Initials mgr

4021-2
X-450-1

3543

13

13 Sept

FILES (A) B

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 20, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 383.6

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
1815	A.F.H.Q.	6 OCT 43	A.G.W.A.R.	Policy re P.O.W.
2111	A.F.H.Q.	9 OCT 43	A.G.W.A.R.	Policy re P.O.W.
2902	A.F.H.Q.	19 OCT 43	A.G.W.A.R.	Policy re P.O.W.
3775	A.F.H.Q.	30 OCT 43	A.G.W.A.R.	Policy re P.O.W.
No 42	BADOGGIO	5 JAN 44	GEN JOYCE	Policy re P.O.W.
383.6	GEN MAX TAYLOR	8 JAN 44	A.F.H.Q.	Herewith attached letter No 42
40/150/0	ADDIS	9 JAN 44	H.A.CACCIA Esq	re attached Agreement on Financial Treatment of P.O.W.
No Ref	Not shown	No Date	Not Shown	Special Agreement re Organisation & Employment of Italian P.O.W.
383.6-3	COL ROBERTS	11 JAN 44	A.C.C.	Signature of Badoglio required
29126	MAKIN SIGNED CC	16 JAN 44	CACCIA	Signature of Badoglio-Finance Agree
3004	FREEDOM	16 JAN 44	CACCIA	Alteration in letter ref 29126
2116	MACFARLANE	24 JAN 44	FREEDOM	Badoglio states that not prepared to sign until seen Prunas.
562 f	DEP PRES A.C.C.	28 JAN 44	FREEDOM	Badoglio refuses to sign
No REF	E. STONE	29 JAN 44	MACFARLANE	NOTE VERBALE and letter re convers between STONE & BADOGGIO
617	MACFARLANE	30 JAN 44	FREEDOM	No prospect of getting Badoglio to sign present agreement
DP/G/26	MACFARLANE	30 JAN 44	A.F.H.Q.	Comments on Agreement
785	MACFARLANE	7 FEB 44	FREEDOM	Gen Roberts to send P.W labour unit to Italy---Disadvantages.
50563	FREEDOM	13 FEB 44	MACFARLANE	Despatch to Italy of P.O.W. Units unavoidable
File 564	BADOGGIO	25 FEB 44	MACFARLANE	Gen Gazzera appointed for P.O.W. Agreement
1390	MACFARLANE	28 FEB 44	FREEDOM	For information of Freedom-564
58124	FREEDOM	29 FEB 44	MACFARLANE	Washington accepts alterations
59406	FREEDOM	3 MAR 44	MACFARLANE	Proposal Gen Gepp visit Italy
58752	FREEDOM	2 MAR 44	MACFARLANE	Gen Wilson thinks it not necessary
60911	FREEDOM	7 MAR 44	MACFARLANE	Gen Gepp left for Algiers 6 MARCH
40/150/0	MR MAKIN	7 MAR 44	Brig. ELLSWORTHY	Copy of revised draft text
62796	FREEDOM	10 MAR 44	FATIMA	Gen Gepp leaving for Naples 11 MAR
2030	FATIMA	13 MAR 44	MILSTAFF	When can AFHQ expect instructions from C.C.S.
112	MACFARLANE	13 MAR 44	FREEDOM	Gen Gepp arrived. Not in receipt of official Text
2096	AGWAR C.C.S	13 MAR 44	FREEDOM	C.C.S conclusions on proposed draft
2067	AGWAR	13 MAR 44	FREEDOM	Official Text of Agreement
2068	AGWAR	13 MAR 44	FREEDOM	Correction to Official Text
114	MACFARLANE	19 MAR 44	FREEDOM	Discussion between Macfarlane & Gazz
2311	MACFARLANE	20 MAR 44	TROOPERS	Text handed to Gazzera
No Ref	MACFARLANE	19 MAR 44	GAZZERA	MEMO from Macfarlane to Gazzera

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

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