Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/136/466

ITALIAN NAVY & MER
FEB. 1944 - APR. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/136/466

ITALIAN NAVY & MERCHANT MARINE, GENERAL
FEB. 1944 - APR. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8003/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner AC

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 8003 ITALIAN NAVY & MERCHANT MARINE, GENERAL

This file downgraded to Confidential

From: 01 Feb 44
To : 17 Apr 45

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
44	Ltr 19881/1/2.2 Bonomi	10 Jan 45	Stone	Accounting procedure for genral Navy services: pls re-examine
45	Ltr NSC/1534 Stone	19 Jan 45	Bonomi	Regret Allies cannot participate in Ital Navy accounting
46	Aide Memoire(Lush)	27 Jan 45	Bonomi	Attacks in It Press on serving officers of It Navy & Air Force (spec. 7 Adms and Min of Marine)
47	Ltr IS & PS,AFHQ	31 Jan 45	Actg Pres, AC	CinC-Med wishes retain right of passing on appts in It Navy.
48	Pres/45208/SI, Wyndham	3 Feb 45	IS & PS, AFHQ	CinC-Med wishes retain right of passing on appts in It Navy.
49	Memo, Stone	8 Feb 45	Col Valenzano	Polcevero sunk in 180 fathoms; salvage considered impossible.
50	P/350/385,Quayle	2 Mar 45	Myron Taylor	Ital shipping in Argentine waters
51	Memo, Quayle	2 Mar 45	Pol Sec(Stewart)	Italshipping in Argentine waters
52	P/350/385,Stewart	5 Mar 45	AFHQ	It shipping in Argentine waters.
53	AFHQ AG-334/121 IS&PS-O	7 Mar 45	Admiral Warren via CC	New Directive to Head of Naval Subcommission, AC
54	de Gasperi, 21/03137/9	12 Mar 45	Stone	Recovery of Italian ships (8) handed to Argentina in Aug 41.
55	350/385/EC(L)Stone	16 Mar 45	de Gasperi	Recovery of It ships handed to Argentine in August 1941.
56	350/385/EC(L)Stone	1 Apr 45	de Gasperi	Recovery of It ships fr Argentina
56a	NSC/2152, Warren	16 Apr 45	CinC- Med	Navy Call-up 1923-24 Classes.
57	350/385/EC(L)Stone	17 Apr 45	AFHQ, G-5	Recovery of It ships fr Argentine

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 091.711-2

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.711-2 ITALIAN NAVY, & MERCHANT MARINE

SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
32	Ltr Stone 091.711	25 Aug 44	Adm Morgan	Comando Supremo - Connection with IN App A - Ltr Morgan 1140/30, 1 Aug
33	Ltr Stone 091.711	31 Aug 44	AFHQ G-5	Post Hostilities Planning; plans for restricting construction of It Navy & merchant marine.
34	Ltr Stone 091.711-2	16 Sep 44	Bonomi	Operational salvage thru Ital Navy turn over to Ital Govt - ACC
35	Ltr Ziroli	22 Sep 44	Hq AAI & Secy Gen	Tires & tubes for Ital Navy transport
36	Ltr ACC/5566/IND Ind SC	22 Sep 44	A/CC	Italian ship-building. INCL: Notes of AFHQ Mtg on 19 Sep
37	Ltr Comdr Haines	23 Sep 44	Stone	Italian ship-building industry INCL: Report of Mtg 19 Sep AFHQ
38	Ltr Ziroli NSC/896	26 Sep 44	A/CC	Italian ship-building industry INCL: Report of Mtg 19 Sep 44 AFHQ
39	Ltr Ministry of Navy	? Nov 44	Adm Morgan	Conditions in general prevailing and undermining the Royal Italian Navy.
40	Ltr NSC/1202 Stone	3 Dec 44	CinC Med	Provision of tpt for Ital-controlled ports:Civitavecchia,Piombino,Stefano.
41	Ltr Bonomi 2121813/ 14625-13-5	16 Dec 44	Stone	Operational salvage thru Ital Navy turn over to Ital Govt - ACC
42	Ltr Stone	5 Jan 45	Frank Reiser	Info on post-war status of Ital Merchant Marine.
43	Ltr Stone	5 Jan 45	Naval S/C	Info on sinking of Ital Steamer POLCEVERO requested.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DSG ACC

C. M. C. Form 358 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.711 - ITALIAN NAVY

SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
17	Cbl ACC Main M187	6 May 44	Tarento	Case of Admiral Barone & his replacement by Admiral Matteini
18	Ltr Capt Stone DCC 091.711	13 May 44	Adm De Courten	Request by Navy Sub-Com to Ind & Com Sub-Com release 10 Quintali leather for shoes Ital Navy
18a	Minutes of Mtg	18 May 44	Decourten-Cunningham	Italian Salvage Organization
19	Ltr MacFarlane ES/15	19 May 44	Flag Off West Italy	clearing of Italian harbors
20	Ltr De Courten	19 May 44	Capt Stone	Thanks interest question footwear Italian Navy
21	Ltr MacFarlane	23 May 44	Adm Morgan	Mid-shift meal for Ital civiliens performing labor benefit Allied Forces
21a	Ltr Morgan Adm Food for Taranto	16 Jun 44	MacFarlane Dockyard Workers	Report of Naval Activities in Rome
22	Ltr Palmer	18 Jun 44	Chief Comm	Suggested clothing scale Ital Navy & requested source supply
23	Cbl CINC MED	23 Jun 44	Fotali Fowit & ACC	Lais Alberto Amm. Div. Irn. as Liaison officer between British & American navies in Rome Area
24	Ltr Navy Sub-Com	25 Jun 44	Pol Sect ACC	Duties of Palmer in Rome
25	Cbl ACC ADV 332	8 Jul 44	ACC Main	Duties Palmer to all concerned
26	Cbl ACC Main S280	10 Jul 44	ACC ADV	Difficulties Ital Navy face in
27	Ltr ACC ADV Navy NSC/529	12 Jul 44	Chief Comm	Rome re forming Port Parties
28	Ltr Palmer NSC/539	14 Jul 44	A/CC	Status of Italian Admirals in Rome
29	Ltr AAI 2086/1/Q2	17 Jul 44	See Dist	Release Ital Naval Personnel
30	Ltr Capt Stone	12 Aug 44	Navy Sub-Com	Ships Apollo, Hermada, Turiddu Incl 1- Ltr Min For Aff 10 Aug 6/220/108
31	Ltr Capt Stone A/CC 091.711	24 Aug 44	Bonomi	Ships for special service by order CINC CMF App a - Palmer L/316/1 20 Aug

558

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 20, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.711 ITALIAN NAVY

SECRET

S—6789

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
7	Memo Slaughter	8 Mar 44	Captain Stone	Accountant officer arriving. Personnel return & payroll for Ital fleet all taken care of.
8	Ltr Palmer	8 Mar 44	CC	Dispostion of Ital warshipsfor week ending 18 Mar 44.
9	Ltr TA 1043 FOLI	20 Mar 44	Minister Navy	Case of Admiral Barone and recommendation for release direct with Min. of Navy.
10	Cbl M129 MacFarlane	1 Apr 44	Taranto	Ref Ltr No. T.A. 488 7 Apr no objection of CC to removal Mooring Buoy for Iskenderon
11	Ltr Maj Doe SG (Misc)	17 Apr 44	Flag Off Taranto & Adriatic	Request fr Distwo for military rations Naval dock workers Taranto to Brindisi & Naples
12	Cbl AAI Adm Ech 0430362	17 Apr 44	MMIA & ACC Rear	Ref DCC 091.711 21 Apr Additional rations for militarised civilian personnel of Naval dockyards 13 App a - Ltr referred to above fr Stone to MacFar on same subject 13 App a Incl - Ltr fr Min of Navy 250-ADJ-19 Apr 19 Aide Memoire on this subject & File No. 212 Food rations for militarized workers to FOLI Taranto 250A-ADJ-19 30 Mar
13	Lt Col Quinsmith CS 294	22 Apr 44	Navy Sub-Com	
13a	Cbl Freedom F 35788	22 Apr 44	AAI & ACC Rations ref No 13 AAI G 4193 Cbl MMIA 0353 Cbl	
5585				
14	Cbl Fatima 3695	23 Apr 44	Fatima Rear	Ensuing paraphrase F-36237 23 Apr fr AFHQ cite FIEMGS --- Hold action on F-35285 21 Apr Ref F-35285 21 Apr & reply fr Fatima Rear 2657 23 Apr attached re repatriation naval cobelligerents held by Mideast request agreement
15	Ltr Gen MacFarlane CC/P/206	18 Apr 44	Adm Morgan FOTALI Taranto	Transmittal of messages fr AFHQ ref AG091.711-4(Ital)D/COS-0 15 Apr to Ital Govt & Min Marine Incl I - Ltr referred to above with messages attached re Policies re Ital Naval Vessels Incl Ia - COS 515/1 19 Mar on same subject as above Incl Ib - Same subject as above
15a	HQ AAI CMF 2096/1/Q2	3 May 44	See Dist Release of Ital Naval Personnel	
16	Cbl ACC MAIN 4384	6 May 44	Distwo Fotali Fatima Rear	Scale authorised substitution exieting supplementary ration scale heavy workers

SECRET

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.711 ITALIAN NAVY

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1	Ltr 1775	1 Feb 44	Badoglio	Questions of Ital battleships was referred to CIC Med, decision holds.
2	Ltr MS 370.01 Captain Stone	6 Feb 44	FOTALI	Please inform on projected demobilization of Italian Navy.
3	Ltr TA 290/16 Adm. McGrigor	21 Feb 44	CINC MED	Ref attached correspondence on discovery of acoustic MINE UNITS. ENCLOSURES: A) Ltr TA 290/16 21 Feb fr Adm. MacGrigor to Minister of Marine. Reason stated for omission of mines on inventory does not hold water. B) Ltr Min. of Marine 132/fs 16 Feb 44, giving excuse for not including mines on inventory. C) Ltr TA 290/16 11 Feb from Adm. McGrigor to Min. of Marine, asking why mines just found had never been listed. Breach of armistice terms.
5583				
4	Appendix A to MMIA ltr on Ital Army dated 24 Feb	22 Feb 44	FOTALI	Use of Italian Navy on Shore. Ltr G/1/59 from MMIA sgd Duchesne.
5	Memo fr Palmer	27 Feb 44	CC	Final decision re transfer of Ital sailors to Heel Ports.
6	Memo fr Palmer	8 Mar 44	DCC	Was complaint of Ital Govt on shore leave for Ital sailors ever deelt with? Bucked to Captain Stone & to Palmer: no record of action. APPENDICES: A) Ltr 091.711 Gen Taylor to Valenzano, 5 Jan 44, your complain has been forwarded to CINC MED. B) Ltr FOTA Adm McGrigor, 27 Dec, #TA 1044/7, Minister's ltr has been passed to CINC MED. C) Ltr 1369 Prot Valenzano of 16 Dec 43 to Joyce, enclosing Min. of Navy's complaint re shore leaves for Italian sailors in Allied ports.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref: 350/385/BC(I)

17 April 1945

SUBJECT: Redemption of Italian Merchant Vessels sold to Argentina

TO : AFHQ, G-5

(54)

1. By letter dated the 16th January 1945 and forwarded to you under cover of this Commission's letter P/350/385 of 26 January 1945, the Prime Minister expressed the desire of the Italian Government to secure the return from Argentina of eight Italian merchant vessels purchased by [illegible] in 1941. The Prime Minister requested that the vessels, if returned, should be placed at the disposal of Italy and exempted from the Armistice obligation of being included in the shipping pool.

2. The letter of the 16th January points out that the return of these vessels would to some extent be based on an option contained in the original contract of sale: that strictly such option does not become operative until after the war: and that therefore the Italian Government has no claim in law to the vessels. The Prime Minister feels, however, that on the grounds of humanity there is some prospect of success.

3. The actual contract of sale has not been produced to this Commission, but upon the basis of the Prime Minister's letter, the United Nations are not in a position under the Armistice terms to require the Italian Government to exercise the option in order to obtain the vessels for the shipping pool.

4. On the other hand, the proposal of the Italian Government does involve a waiver, in respect of these vessels, of one of the clauses of the Armistice terms. Of this, the Prime Minister is fully aware. It is to be observed, however, that unless such waiver is made, the Italian Government will not attempt to obtain the return of the vessels, which will not, therefore, be included in the shipping pool in any event.

558

5. This Commission strongly recommends that the request of the Italian Government be granted and that no corresponding reduction be made in the tonnage now allocated for shipment to Italy. Such a course will afford some measure of relief to the difficult economic condition of this country and will provide additional transportation which is so urgently required.

6. During the last two months this problem has been referred to G-4 (Mov & Tn) Section, and by that Section to the Chairman Mediterranean Shipping Board. It would appear, however, that no decision has been

(51)

[illegible] Office

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

reached, beyond the suggestion, which in the circumstances is not helpful, that the attention of the Italian Government should be drawn, as convenient, to the terms of the Armistice. Copies of the relevant correspondence are attached. (+ Encs 54)

7. This is a matter of urgency which involves a requested waiver of the rights of the United Nations under the Armistice terms and a consideration of the general allocation of shipping to this country. If required to be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I recommend that this be done at as early a date as possible, together with the recommendations of this Commission, for an early decision.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: Exec. Comm't.
Naval S/c
Legal S/c
CC files

5583

51

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

Subject: Desire of Italian Government to Retrieve Italian Merchant Vessels Sold to the Government of Argentina

Allied Force Headquarters
G-4 (MOV SEC) 5/9/GRK
20 Mar 45

To : Liaison Division
Headquarters Allied Commission.

Tel: Number 302

Ref your 350/335/SC(L) dated 16 Mar 45.

1. The position still remains as stated in my G-4 (Mov & Tn) 5/9/GRK of 15 Mar 45.

2. In considering the request contained in paras 2 & 3 of your above quoted letter the attention of the Italian Government should be drawn, as convenient, to the Terms of the Armistice conditions relative to the employment of the Italian Mercantile Marine.

3. Further correspondence should be addressed through the Navy Sub-Commission to Chairman Mediterranean Shipping Board.

C.F. RIDDELL, Lt.Col.
for Brigadier,
D.Q.M.G. (Mov & Tn)

5583

57 AAA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Liaison Division

Ref : 350/385/EC/(L) 16 March 1945

SUBJECT : Desire of Italian Government to Retrieve Italian Merchant Vessels Sold to the Government of Argentina.

TO : G-4 (Mov & Tn), Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Further to our F/350/385 of 12 March 1945.

2. A translation of a further letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs is forwarded herewith for your consideration.

3. It will be noted that the Italian Government ask for the explicit assurance that the ships, when recovered, shall be left at the exclusive disposal of Italy.

4. This matter has been outstanding since 26 January 1945, and it is requested that everything be done to obtain an early decision.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Officer-in-Charge
Liaison Division.

558 Encl: Ltr No. 21/03137/9 of 12 March 1945.

(57) Ang

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject: Desire of Italian Government to retrieve Italian Merchant Vessels sold to the Government of ARGENTINA.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-4 (MOV & TW) 5/9

15 Mar 45

To : H.Q. Allied Commission.

Tel : FREEDOM 302

1. Your P/350/385 of 12 Mar refers.

2. This matter was submitted to the Ministry of War Transport, LONDON for opinion or submission to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

3. As soon as a reply is received, H.Q. A.C. will be notified.

V. KIRK, Major,
for Brigadier,
D.Q.M.G. (Mov. & Tn).

(380) Copy to : G-5
M.W.T.R.

(37) AFP

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/0192
16 April 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Subject: Italian Navy Call-up of 1923 and 1924 Class Recruits.

Enclosures: (A) Copy Translation Ministry of Marine ltr 6196/2 of 24 March 1945.
(B) Copy Translation Ministry of Marine ltr 7490/2 of 10 April 1945.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), with reference to the call-up by the Italian Navy of the subject classes, are forwarded herewith for information.

R.D. Swann

REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.
for CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Copy to:
FCAIR
FCNAM
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AC.
EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, AC.
LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

5579

77/308

Eba

Q

From: MINISTRY OF MARINE (Cabinet)
To : F.O.L.I. - Rome
Date: 10 April 1945
Ref : 7490/2

Subject: Calling-up of 1925 and previous Class Recruits and 1924 Class

Further to letter N°6403/2 of 24th ulto., I give you the following additional information in regard to calling-up men for L.R.N.

1. Number of Lieut. of the Realm's Corresponding Decree.

Royal Decree N°1365 of 28th July 1932. Art.15 of same empowers Ministry of Marine to take care of all matters concerning recruits for the Navy.

2. Contingents Concerned.

Remnants of 1923-24 Class youths are concerned, who were sent on indefinite leave to await calling-up. A total of 20217 individuals is involved belonging to the following Captaincies of the port in liberated territory: Bari, Brindisi, Taranto, Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Salerno, Castellammare di Stabia, Torre del Greco, Naples and to the Captaincies in Sicily and Sardinia.

The contingent for the time being numbers 4650 bodies as this is the number of Service kits available.

5573

We are not aware of the numbers to be called by the Army and the Air Force as they call-up recruits independently and as required.

3. When Recruits are to be Called-up.

1923 (and previous) Classes as from 10th May; 1924 Class from 15th June, in accordance existing transport and communications.

4. How they are Called-up.

The Classes are called-up in the year when youths reach their 20th year; but preparation of lists, medical exams and selection can be carried out in advance, so that men reaching twenty in a given year may be called-up in the first month or two of same. (Art.6 of Decree).

Therefore Recruits can be called-up in mass once a year or in batches as desired.

6. If Calling-up covers the whole of Italy including Sicily

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

...yes the following additional information in regard to calling-up men for I.R.N.

1. Number of Lieut. of the Realm's Corresponding Decree.

Royal Decree N°1565 of 28th July 1932. Art.15 of same empowers Ministry of Marine to take care of all matters concerning recruits for the Navy.

2. Contingents Concerned.

Remnants of 1923-24 Class youths are concerned, who were sent on indefinite leave to await calling-up. A total of 20817 individuals is involved belonging to the following Captaincies of the port in liberated territory: Bari, Brindisi, Taranto, Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Salerno, Castellammare di Stabia, Torre del Greco, Naples and to the Captaincies in Sicily and Sardinia.

The contingent for the time being numbers 4550 bodies as this is the number of Service kits available.

5578

We are not aware of the numbers to be called by the Army and the Air Force as they call-up recruits independently and as required.

3. When Recruits are to be Called-up.

1923 (and previous) Classes as from 10th May; 1924 Class from 15th June, in accordance existing transport and communications.

4. How they are Called-up.

The Classes are called-up in the year when youths reach their 20th year; but preparation of lists, medical exams and selection can be carried out in advance, so that men reaching twenty in a given year may be called-up in the first month or two of same. (Art.5 of Decree).

Therefore Recruits can be called-up in mass once a year or in batches as desired.

5. If Calling-up covers the whole of Italy including Sicily and Sardinia.

The call-up does not cover all regions in liberated Italy, but only Puglia, Calabria, Campania, Sicily and Sardinia, excluding, therefore:- Marche, Lazio, Tuscany and Romagna. As a result, practically all territory South of maritime Departments of Bari and Naples (inclusive) and the two larger Islands are covered.

56a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. If any special criterion governs subdivision of personnel between the different Bases.

This is governed by R.Decree 243 of 3rd March, 1938 concerning territorial jurisdiction of the Captaincies of the Port in regard to I.R.N. Recruits, and distribution is effected with due regard to place of origin and traditional characteristics.

- Messina covers personnel attached to Sicilian Captaincies of the Port.
- La Maddalena; the same as above for Sardinia.
- Taranto; includes personnel attached to Captaincies of Port At Naples, Castellammare di Stabia, Torre del Greco, Salerno, Taranto.
- Brindisi; covers Bari, Brindisi, Vibo Valentia, Reggio Calabria.

6. If this is the first Call-up since the Armistice.

It is confirmed that no other Call-up or Recall to arms has been made since the Armistice.

8. If any difficulties are foreseen in regard to this Call-up, as occurred in Sicily with the Army.

Difficulties mainly exist in connection with communications and transport. For this reason instructions have been issued sufficiently in advance and there will be a bi-monthly mustering of Recruits.

As to cases of non-fulfilment, there are reasons to believe that such only would be sporadic in nature.

5577 It is not considered that disturbances will occur as this is not a mass recall of men who have served in peace or wartime, but Recruits who still have to carry out their Service Obligations and who should have been called-up some time ago. The delay has been caused only by conditions in being since the Armistice.

9. Information in regard to I.R.N. plans and directives re. use of personnel.

The following principles are involved;-

a) Regularize the service position of Recruits, taking into account the calling-up of 1925 Class which is overdue.

b) To allow the demobilization of older time-expired classes (especially 1919 Class which is the oldest at present serving).

c) To allow changes in personnel afloat in favour of those who have done considerable sea-time.

Chief of Cabinet

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Salerno, Taranto.
- Trinacri: covers Bari, Brindisi, Vibo Valentia, Reggio Calabria.

6. If this is the first Call-up since the Armistice.

It is confirmed that no other Call-up or Recall to arms has been made since the Armistice.

8. If any difficulties are foreseen in regard to this Call-up, as occurred in Sicily with the Army.

Difficulties mainly exist in connection with communications and transport. For this reason instructions have been issued sufficiently in advance and there will be a bi-monthly mustering of Recruits.

As to cases of non-fulfilment, there are reasons to believe that such only would be sporadic in nature.

5571 It is not considered that disturbances will occur as this is not a mass recall of men who have served in peace or wartime, but Recruits who still have to carry out their Service Obligations and who should have been called-up some time ago. The delay has been caused only by conditions in being since the Armistice.

9. Information in regard to I.T.N. plans and directives re. use of personnel.

The following principles are involved:-

a) Regularize the service position of Recruits, taking into account the calling-up of 1925 Class which is overdue.

b) To allow the demobilization of older time-expired Classes (especially 1919 Class which is the oldest at present serving).

c) To allow changes in personnel afloat in favour of those who have done considerable sea-time.

Chief of Cabinet

DATE: 13 April 1945.
FROM: FORELI ROMA.
TO : NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, NC, AC.

FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

REAR ADMIRAL

560

COPY

COPY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

From: MINISTRY OF MARINE (Cabinet)
To : P.O.L.I. - ROME
Date: 24.3.45
Ref.: 6406/E

Subject: Calling-up of 1923 and 1924 Cl. Recruits.

1. On 10th May and 15th June next two drafts of 1923 and 1924 Class recruits will be called up. They will be drafted as follows :-

a) 10th May 1945 : Recruits of 1923 Cl. (and previous Classes), about 1550 in N°, will be distributed amongst the Recruiting Centres at :-

- La Maddalena . . . . . 150)
- Taranto and Brindisi (
  (distributed evenly) . . . . 500) Total :- 1550
- Messina-Augusta. . . . . 900(

These numbers are subject to slight variations.

b) 15th June 1945 : First draft of 3000 recruits of 1924 Cl., as follows :-

- La Maddalena . . . . . 300)
- Taranto. . . . . .1200(
- Brindisi . . . . . 800) Total :- 3000
- Messina - Augusta. . . . . 700(

5576

2. Transfer will be effected in accordance with transport available, in drafts of 150 in N° on alternate days, as from 10th May and 15th June, respectively.

3. Total personnel strength will not vary as, simultaneously, time-expired men will be released.

(Sgd) THE MINISTER

DATE: 26 March 1945
FROM: FOTALI, ROME.
TO : NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, HQ, AC.

FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. On 10th May and 15th June next two drafts of 1923 and 1924 Class recruits will be called up. They will be drafted as follows :-

a) 10th May 1945 : Recruits of 1923 Cl. (and previous Classes), about 1550 in N°, will be distributed amongst the Recruiting Centres at :-

- La Maddalena . . . . . 150)
- Taranto and Brindisi (
  (distributed evenly) . . . . 500) Total :- 1550
- Messina-Augusta. . . . . 900(

These numbers are subject to slight variations.

b) 15th June 1945 : First draft of 3000 recruits of 1924 Cl., as follows :-

- La Maddalena . . . . . 300)
- Taranto. . . . . .1200(
- Brindisi . . . . . 300) Total :- 3000
- Messina - Augusta. . . . . 700(

5576

3. Transfer will be effected in accordance with transport available, in drafts of 150 in N° on alternate days, as from 10th May and 15th June, respectively.

4. Total personnel strength will not vary as, simultaneously, time-expired men will be released.

(Sgd) THE MINISTER

DATE: 23 March 1945
FROM: FOTALI, ROME.
TO : NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, HQ, AC.

FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

REAR ADMIRAL.

562

COPY

COPY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref: 350/385/ZC(L)

1 April 1945

(54)

My dear Minister de Gasperi:

In reply to your 21/03157 of 12 March 1945, the matter is still under consideration, and I will inform you as soon as a decision is reached.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

5575

H.E.Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Palazzo Ghigi
Rome

See 27/1

(56)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref: 550/385/00/(L)

16 March 1945

54

My dear Minister Di Gasperi:

In reply to your letter No. 21/05157/9 of 12 March 1945, I would like to assure you that everything possible is being done to expedite a decision in this matter.

A copy of your letter has been forwarded to the appropriate authorities, together with a further request for an early reply.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

557

H. E. Alcide Di Gasperi
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Italian Government
Rome, Italy

cc: Liaison Div.
CC files

55

56

800.03/12-2

CC MAR 14 RECD
cc-695.

Translation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
21/03137/9

Rome, 12 March 1945

Dear Admiral,

in his letter (21/00504/38) of January 16th, His Excellency Bonomi drew your kind attention on a question of great and urgent interest for us, that of the recovering of the eight Italian ships handed overto the Argentine Republic in August 1941.

With the same letter, His Excellency Bonomi prospected to you all the various aspects of the question and asked you to submit it to the competent Allied Governments to obtain the explicit assurance that the steamers, when recuperated, would be left at the exclusive disposal of Italy, - and therefore, not included in the pool -, to be able to take immediate action with the Argentine Government to recover the said ships. This would be in fact the only basis for a justified request on our part to the Argentine Government for the anticipated recovering of the said ships.

I have been informed that lately, numerous initiatives among the Italian groups of Latin America wanted to send relief and foodstuffs to the poorest populations of liberated Italy; as for what concerns the resumption of normal relations with American countries, there seem to be great possibilities for the shipping to Italy of essential goods, of which the country is at present so much in need. As usual, the greatest obstacle is the problem of transports, problem which would be partly solved if we could dispose of the eightships we have just mentioned.

557

I feel certain that you have already taken action with the Washington and London Government. I shall be most grateful if you will kindly ask the said Governments for a favourable decision about this question which is of great and urgent interest for us.

Thanking you for whatever information you will be able to give me, I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

Sec 55

A. De Gasperi

840.3/12

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

In his letter (21/00504/38) of January 16th, His Excellency Bonomi drew your kind attention on a question of great and urgent interest for us, that of the recovering of the eight Italian ships handed over to the Argentine Republic in August 1941.

With the same letter, His Excellency Bonomi prospected to you all the various aspects of the question and asked you to submit it to the competent Allied Governments to obtain the explicit assurance that the steamers, when recuperated, would be left at the exclusive disposal of Italy, - and therefore, not included in the pool -, to be able to take immediate action with the Argentine Government to recover the said ships. This would be in fact the only basis for a justified request on our part to the Argentine Government for the anticipated recovering of the said ships.

I have been informed that lately, numerous initiatives among the Italian groups of Latin America wanted to send relief and foodstuffs to the poorest populations of liberated Italy; as for what concerns the resumption of normal relations with American countries, there seem to be great possibilities for the shipping to Italy of essential goods, of which the country is at present so much in need. As usual, the greatest obstacle is the problem of transports, problem which would be partly solved if we could dispose of the eightships we have just mentioned.

557

I feel certain that you have already taken action with the Washington and London Government. I shall be most grateful if you will kindly ask the said Governments for a favourable decision about this question which is of great and urgent interest for us.

Thanking you for whatever information you will be able to give me, I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

A. De Gasperi

Admiral Ellery Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

E.C DISTRIBUTION.
14 Mar 45.
ACTION: Liaison Div (ref P350/385 of 26 Jan)
INFO: Chief Comm
: Ec Comm.

c.c.

54

A/Q

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

e c/s

S E C R E T

C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 334/121 IS & PS - O 7 March 1945

SUBJECT: Directive to Head of Naval Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission

TO: Rear Admiral Guy Langton Warren
Naval Sub Commission, Allied Commission

1. You have been appointed head of the Naval Sub Commission of the Allied Commission and as such you will report direct to the Chief Commissioner.

2. The duty of the Naval Sub Commission is to represent the Allied Navies on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner on such matters affecting the Italian Navy as are dealt with by the Commission. The function is a professional one and not a political one.

3. The Naval Sub Commission is responsible for all administrative and material questions affecting the Italian Navy. These include:

5572

a. Employment of Personnel

b. Supplies of food, clothing, transport and naval stores

c. Disposal of war material

d. Requisitioning of Italian Naval property.

4. Effective this date all communications relating to matters of policy in connection with the Italian Navy under the Armistice Terms and the general administration of the Italian Navy, not directly affecting the operation of the Italian Fleet under the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, will be referred directly to the Sub Commission.

5. You are authorized to deal direct with the Ministry of Marine, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Headquarters 15th Army Group and the various sub commissions of the Allied Commission regarding all such administrative questions. Matters of policy or any question requiring decision by higher authority should be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander through the Chief Commissioner.

6. For Naval Sub Commission business, the channels of communication with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should also be through the Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission

TO: Rear Admiral Guy Langton Warren
Naval Sub Commission, Allied Commission

1. You have been appointed head of the Naval Sub Commission of the Allied Commission and as such you will report direct to the Chief Commissioner.

2. The duty of the Naval Sub Commission is to represent the Allied Navies on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner on such matters affecting the Italian Navy as are dealt with by the Commission. The function is a professional one and not a political one.

3. The Naval Sub Commission is responsible for all administrative and material questions affecting the Italian Navy. These include:

5572

a. Employment of Personnel

b. Supplies of food, clothing, transport and naval stores

c. Disposal of war material

d. Requisitioning of Italian Naval property.

4. Effedtive this date all communications relating to matters of policy in connection with the Italian Navy under the Armistice Terms and the general administration of the Italian Navy, not directly affecting the operation of the Italian Fleet under the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, will be referred directly to the Sub Commission.

5. You are authorized to deal direct with the Ministry of Marine, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Headquarters 15th Army Group and the various sub commissions of the Allied Commission regarding all such administrative questions. Matters of policy or any question requiring decision by higher authority should be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander through the Chief Commissioner.

6. For Naval Sub Commission business, the channels of communication with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should also be through the Chief Commissioner.

7. Commodore H. W. Ziroli, United States Navy, will be your Deputy and will act on your behalf in your absence. Subject to the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner the remainder of your staff is to be organized as you think best for the efficient performance of the above duties.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

/s/ G. W. Christenberry
G. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

(53)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER

Ref: E/350/385 5 March 1945

SUBJECT: Desire of Italian Government to Retrieve Italian Merchant Vessels Sold to the Government of Argentina

TO : G-5, AFHQ

1. Reference is made to our letters no. E/350/385 dtd 26 January and 17 February 1945.

2. It would be appreciated if some reply could be given at an early date.

For the Chief Commissioner:

(51) Ref

5571

Major A. J. STEWART
Major,
for Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Staff Officer of the Chief Commissioner, A.C.

(52)

FILE A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JAQ/hjp

2 March 1945

TO: Political Section, Hq A.C.
(Attention: Major Stewart)

1. Please note attached exchange of correspondence between Mr. Myron Taylor and the Chief Commissioner.

2. Will you please try to get a reply from AFHQ in answer to our letter P/350/385 of 26 January.

3. Also please note that Mr. Myron Taylor has an interest in this matter and should be posted of any progress.

/s/ J. A. Quayle
J. A. QUAYLE
Major, F. A.
Staff Officer to CC

2 Incls:
Incl 1 - Ltr fr Mr. M. Taylor dtd 16 Feb 45
Incl 2 - Ltr, Office of the CC P/350/385, 2 Mar 45

Pol. Sec. recd orig. No copy retained.

cc: Ex. Comm'r
CC FILES

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JAQ/hjp

Ref: F/350/385

2 March 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you know, Admiral Stone is laid up in bed and he therefore wishes me to apologize for the delay in answering your letter of February 16th.

The question of the Italian shipping in Argentine waters is one on which we had been pressing ARMG for some time but we will now again endeavor to obtain a decision from them, and will keep you informed of any progress that is made.

Sincerely,

5501

/s/ J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

Hon. Myron C. Taylor
The Personal Representative of the
President of the United States of America
To His Holiness The Pope
2, Via Bonconpagni
Rome

cc: pal Sec
~~Embassador~~
CC files
Ex, Comm'r

50

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

8 February 1945.

13

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL NINO VALENZANO

Subject: Italian S.S. "POLCEVERO".

1. The above named vessel was sunk in the Aegean in 180 fathoms and salvage is considered impossible.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

5568

cc: COS
CC files

49

3/cc

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FEB 7 REC'D CC. 337.

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

USC/1628
6 February 1945

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION

Subject: Italian S.S. "POLCEVERA". (43)

1. With reference to your enquiry EWS/dfe dated 5 January 1945, information has now been received that the above named vessel was sunk in the Aegean in 180 fathoms and salvage is considered impossible.

H. W. ZINCKE,
Commodore, U. S. Navy,
for Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, AG.

5561

22/3/cc8

49

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Chi ° Commissioner. cc 308

COPY.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the President

APO 394

PRES/45208/SI. 3rd February 1945.

SECRET.

TO: Colonel J.H.Lascelles,
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat,
A.F.H.Q.,

SUBJECT: Allied Policy towards ITALY.

Thank you for your minute of 31st January addressed to Mr Macmillan, which I shall lay before the Acting President on his return to Rome.

In the meantime you will, no doubt, have read paragraph 2(D) of FAN 487:-

" The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine."

5566

(SIGNED) JOHN WYNDHAM
Personal Assistant.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ministero delle Corporazioni

DIREZIONE GENERALE DEL SEGRETARIATO
DEL CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELLE CORPORAZIONI
DEGLI AFFARI GENERALI E DEL PERSONALE

(4798)

C.C.

With reference to the correspondence between Colonel LASCELLES and Mr WYNDHAM (herewith attached) I believe it possible that you have never seen the minutes of the meeting between C-in-C Med & the Italian Ministers of Marine on 12 May, '44.

They are submitted for your information, with particular reference to Item 9. Page 5.

Q. (180)

5563

b/2

Noted. I foresee no difficulty.

(48) APP

Yrs
CL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY. SECRET.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat

31st January 1945.

TO: H.Macmillan, Esq.,
Acting President, Allied Commission for Italy

1001-A/c

SUBJECT: Allied Policy towards ITALY.

With reference to Part II, Section III, of your paper on Allied policy towards ITALY, circulated as paper No.SAC(P)(45)2.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, desires to retain the present arrangement whereby he is informed of certain Italian appointments. He observes that relevant documents in this connection are:-

(1) The Cunningham-De Courten Agreement (paragraphs (D), 2 and 4)

(2) The minutes of a meeting between Admirals Cunningham and De Courten on 18th May, 1944, item 9 of which reads as follows:- (18a)

"With regard to paragraph 1(a), the Commander-in-Chief stated that he regarded the entire Mediterranean as being under Allied Military Control. It is, therefore, essential for all changes in appointment of Italian officers in command to be referred to him, through the Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy, for approval. It was agreed that the Minister of Marine should refer all changes in appointment of officers of the rank of Captain and above to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy."

556

(SIGNED) J.H.LASCELLES,
COLONEL.

COPY TO: Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

See (48)

(47)

C/3/cc

0138

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FILE UNDER N 8003/CC

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

27 Jan 45

Aide-Memoire for communication to the President of the Council of Ministers. (Prepared by Brigadier Lush)

"Attacks in the Italian Press on serving officers in the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force."

EXTRACT

+ + + + + + +

2. The Italian newspaper "Avanti" in its issue of 24 January, published an article entitled "The Navy and Naval Men". This article contained an attack on seven Admirals or Rear Admirals of the Italian Fleet and also on the Minister of Marine. It also contained a paragraph which impugned the integrity and good faith of the Allied authorities."

+ + + + +

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 9251/CC (X-8503)

5563

9251/CC

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on te consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

(46)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

NSC/1534

19 January 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The establishment of an accounting procedure for general services rendered by the Italian Navy to the Anglo-American Armed Forces referred to in your letter 19381/1.2.2 of 10 January 1945, has been carefully re-examined. As the Italian Ministry of Marine was previously informed on 15 June 1944 by the Flag Officer Liaison, Italy, the accounting of such services is a matter of internal administration and responsibility of the Italian Navy. While there is no objection to the maintenance of complete records of such services furnished by the Italian Navy, it is regretted that the Anglo-American Armed Forces cannot participate in the accounting.

(44)

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

5562

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

FILES A
COS

Prepared by: H. St. John Butler

H.ST.JOHN BUTLER,
Captain, U.S.Navy
Navy Sub-Commission.

Approved By: Finance Sub-Commission
(Sgd) A.P. Graffley-Smith, Col.
Director.

(45)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Commodore Zingli - What is this about. pls? Chief Comm

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

Rome, 10 January 1945

19881/1.2.2.

Dear Admiral,

Last April, the Navy Department sent the Flag Officer L. I., for examination, a series of regulations prepared to regulate organically the cessations of material, the works etc. done by the Navy in favour of the Allied Army forces.

By means of said organic regulations, it was hoped to organize a system which would enable the Italian authority to be exactly informed about the services which were being done by its various organs.

This initiative met an obvious and considerable practical need. And, besides this aspect, it also seemed to find a basis in the terms of the armistice, in reference to the said works and help (arts. 19 & 21).

The Flag Officer didn't deem it possible to agree to the proposal. After a first negative answer, which was followed by an explicatory answer from the Navy Department, he confirmed on October 23rd that 'to bring radical changes to the current practices isn't desired'.

I therefore want to ask you, my dear Admiral, after examining this question, to request the said officer to re-consider it. I think that through the work of a commission of representatives of both parts, it should be easy to make regulations which would give complete satisfaction to both sides.

Thank you for all you will be able to do.

I remain,

5561

Truly yours.

A. I. Bonomi

Dec (45)

Admiral Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

(44)

C.S. DIST 12 JAN 45

ACTION: NAVY SC
INFO: CHIEF COMM
C of S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

KWS/dfe

5 January 1945

Naval Subcommission:

Can you give me any information as to the location of the sinking of the Italian Steamer POLCEVERA, 4000 tons, on the 27th of December, 1943. The owners would like to undertake salvage operations if at all practicable.

KENNY W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

(49)

re: C of S
CC Files

5553

(13)

CCS 383/CC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/dfe

5 January 1945

Major Frank J. Reiser, T.C.
4th Port of Embarkation
APO 562, U.S. Army

Dear Major Reiser:

Replying to your letter of the 17th, I am afraid that I cannot give you any specific information as to post-war status of the Italian Merchant Marine. Presumably, of course, they will have one, but all such matters will have to be dealt with at the final peace table.

I am sorry that I cannot give you more specific information at this time.

Very truly yours,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

55
5559 Dispatched 5/5/45 PM

42

CC/ECS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4th Port of Embarkation
A.P.O. 562 -
U.S.Army-

17 December 1944

Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
Italy.

Dear Admiral Stone:

As far as may be possible, consistent with present conditions, I should like to know the future of an Italian Merchant Marine - whether or not it is expected that there may be another Italian Line operated upon cessation of hostilities.

Prior to the war I worked for the former Italian Line for some 14 years, both in New York and Philadelphia - as a matter of fact my entire business life has been in the steamship business, freight, operations, personnel. At present I am performing similar duties for the U.S. Army, having been with a Port Organization since 1942, in various port of the United Kingdom and here in France. (Superintendent of Water Division).

Any information that you may give that will assist me in knowing the future channels to obtain information as to openings will be deeply appreciated.

555

Respectfully,

Frank J. Reiser
Major, T.C.

(42)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Tel: 451

Ref: 5604/3/COS

19 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Salvage Operations.

TO : DCOS Economic Section.
Director, Navy Sub-Commission.

1. Attention is directed to Prime Minister's letter No.21283/14625-13-5 of 16 Dec 44, copy attached.

2. You are directed to submit your comments re: Interministerial Committee in the Italian Navy Dept and its general plan and basis of operation.

5551

4 Chief Staff Officer.
To the Chief of Staff.

Encl:
as above

(41)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers.

n. 212883/14625-13-5

Rome, 16 December 1944.

Dear Admiral Stone,

(34)

I received your letter of September 16th A/CC 091.711-2 communicating me informations about the control of the Allied Authorities over the salvage operations for the ships which have been sunk or damaged.

Considering that direct control would be maintained only for operative salvages, including the clearing of the harbours required by the Allied Forces, and the salvage of ships which, though they are not in operative areas, are deemed to be useful for the Allied Forces, I communicate to you that we have organized an Interministerial Committee to take care of the work which has been left to the competence of the Italian Government. In this Committee, all the Ministries concerned are represented, particularly the Navy and Public Works Departments, the shipowners, the navy yards, (for repairs), the insurance companies, and the Salvage Firms.

The Committee whose seat is in the Navy Department, is preparing a general plan on the following basis:

1) requisitioned ships - in charge of the R. Navy;
2) non requisitioned ships - their owners would take care of them with means of their own; should these means be lacking, the R. Navy or other Ministries would be put in charge.
3) crafts belonging to the Ministry of Public Works or other civilian Administrations of the State - the Public Works Department would take care of these, and if necessary, ask for the help of the Navy.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

5556

a/ I. Bonomi.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission
R O M E

(1)

Trans. e.c.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

101

SECRET

File No:
MEC/1202

S-E-C-R-E-T

3 December 1944.

From: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Subject: Italian Controlled Ports - Provision of Transport for.

Enclosure: (A) Copy FOWT letter No. 955-2-F of 20 October 1944.

1. In accordance with directives issued by the Flag Officer Western Italy, the ports of CIVITAVECCHIA, PIOMBINO and SAN STEFANO are now the operational and administrative responsibility of the Royal Italian Navy.

2. In each of these ports motor transport was allocated to the Italian Naval authorities prior to the turn-over. The Flag Officer Western Italy in enclosure (A), requests that transport for the ports of CIVITAVECCHIA and PIOMBINO now be provided by the Allied Commission for the stated reason that these ports are now working for the Commission.

3. It appears that the transport required will ultimately be used for the supply and maintenance of Italian Naval vessels and facilities in the ports concerned. Under this condition the necessary facilities should be provided by the Royal Navy inasmuch as under paragraph 9 of Combined Chiefs' of Staff Secret letter CCS. 515/1 of 19 March 1944, the repair, maintenance and supply of the Italian Navy is a United Kingdom responsibility. The necessary transport required for other purposes will presumably be supplied by the user of the facilities in question.

5553

4. In any event, the Allied Commission is not in a position to supply the over-all transport requirements which will be necessary for the complete rehabilitation of Italy, including all port operations. If these views are not concurred in, it is recommended that the matter be referred to Allied Force Headquarters, in order that plans may be made to furnish adequate transport to the Allied Commission for purposes which are determined to be the responsibility of the Commission.

/s/ Ellery W Stone

ELLERY W. STONE.
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:
FOTALI (Taranto)
FONAM

(40)

Prepared by: H. St. J. Butler
H. St. J. BUTLER
Captain, U.S.Navy,
Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.

Annex 2 - 117

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Office of Flag Officer,
Western Italy,
NAPLES.

20th October, 1944.

No. FOWIT 955-2-F.
HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
(Copies to:-
The Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
The Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison Italy, Base
Comando in Capo, Basso Tirreno)

PROVISION OF MOTOR TRANSPORT IN PORTS WORKING FOR ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

At present 1 3-ton truck, 1 15-cwt truck and 1 P.U. are allocated out of Naval stocks to each of the ports of Piombino and Civita Vecchia, for the use of the Italian Port Parties. 1 15-cwt truck, 1 P.U. and 1 motor cycle are also allocated for the use of the British Naval Liaison Officer, Civita Vecchia and his staff.

2. As these ports are working for the Allied Control Commission it is considered that motor transport for the Italian Naval Authorities in each port should be provided by the Allied Control Commission, and I would appreciated your early assistance in making the necessary arrangements to effect this.

5552

(SGD) J.A.V. MORSE

REAR ADMIRAL.

(ENCLOSURE (A)).

40

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Top Secret

THE MINISTER OF THE NAVY

Rome,

Dear Admiral,
Last July, when some actions of indiscipline occurred on a few Italian torpedo-boats, even though ~~yew~~ due to a noble feeling of concern for the future of the Country and of its institutions, you let me know your opinion on the matter and I did not fail to reassure you on the real meaning of these events.

Lately (at the end of October) some demonstrations have taken place, always on the torpedo-boats, and limited to sufficiently correct forms, among the draftees. The motive was the fact that although the draftees had received a few months ago considerable economic improvements, they had not been included, nor could they have been, within the frame of the recent economic measures in favour of the State employees.

It has not yet been possible for me to have a talk with you on this matter. However, some officers depending from me have reported on certain inquiries that appear to have been made by Allied officers among them in order to ascertain the importance of these demonstrations and to collect some data on the causes of a possible athmosphere of dissatisfaction among the personnel of the Royal Navy; which would rouse the Allies' concern as to the future tendencies of the Navy and a certain disappointment as to the solidity of its organization. Some hints to eventual faults of those who preside over the activity of the Royal Navy. appear to have been made.

5553 I have not the slightest doubt that, if really the responsible Allied Authorities had had any concern or impression of this sort, they would have informed me through you, or you would have brought up the matter yourself with the usual frankness that has always been at the basis of our mutual relations.

Anyhow, considering that the question has arisen, I profit by the occasion to express to you my views on the moral situation of the Royal Navy.

As I already mentioned to you in the past, I am busy and worried with the problem of epuration. I have the impression that there is a tendency to take advantage of the epuration to reach aims other than those of the law of sanctions against Fascism. Strictly speaking, this law would only affect very slightly the Royal Navy, which is traditionally and substancially uninfluenced by political tendencies of any kind (its behaviour at the moment of the armistice is the best evidence thereof). I am struggling against that tendency, without any intentions of giving way, and I am ready to ~~leave~~ relinquish my post if my views should not be accepted.

(39) File "Mar. Navy"

FILES A

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

But obviously all this leads to attacks by the free press against myself and the Navy; undoubtly your representatives here will have informed you of this. The widespread unrest of the Italian people extends its influence even to the morale of the Navy, favouring the growth of latent but already existing germs of dissention which are being spread by those who are interested to do so, chiefly among characters of feebler morality or previous ly weakened by personal or familiar troubles. I will not disgress any longer on this subject, as it really concerns the relations between myself and the Government of which I am a member.

But there is another main reason of depression, and I wish to call your attention to it, for it is connected with your field of action.

Last November, one year ago, the activity of the Royal Navy showed favourable aspects. A cruiser Division was due to leave for the Atlantic on war operations; our destroyers were expected to have war missions assigned to them in the Aegean and in the Adriatic; the convoy escort missions had the character of real war actions. The Navy felt it was already representing and active element to the purposes of cobelligerancy; and there were fair outlooks that this contribution could be gradually increased in course of time. As compared to the other Italian armed forces, the Navy clearly had the lead; this strengthened her pride and helped to consolidate her organization.

What has happened in these twelve months? Our Army, helped by the allotments of Allied material is constituing military units that soon will go and fight along with Gen. Alexander's Armies; the Royal ~~Airforce~~ Italian Air Force has received a large contri bution of machines and equipment from the Allied air forces and is alrea dy taking part to the war operations. Our Navy's activities, on the other hand, have been progressively reduced and its tasks have been limited to complementary duties that are certainly very important within the frame of the general conduct of the war but that all the same cannot be considered satisfactory and that anyhow give the officers and crews the sensation of having passed from the vanguard to the rearguard in comparison to the other armed forces. Perhaps you will answer me that the naval war is practically over in the Mediterranean and that the important is to contribute, no matter how, to the common effort, without minding too much the character of such a contribution. As far as the first point goes, I could answer that there still are some sectors, of the greatest national and moral importance for us in which the war is on and which are practically cut off from any action on our part: officers and crews cannot understand the reasons for which, if Italian air-men can bomb and strafe enemy targets in the Balkans, our naval unitax are not allowed to take a direct part to operations in this sector. Lack of team-work effaiciency with the Allied naval forces

5553

(34)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

cannot be given as an explanation because this team work can easily be obtained with some previous training in common. As to the second point I wish to remind you of what I have already told you on several instances, is of the moral situation of italians who know they are fighting for the future of their own country and trying to cancel the memory of an unfortunate policy that has opposed them temporarily to their allies of the last world war. Also because they are not being morally supported by an atmosphere of victory they need a special understanding: one cannot ignore our anxiety of proving with facts that we lack neither the will nor the ability to give an active contribution of sacrifices and blood for the re-birth of our country. In my opinion, these psychological factors that I am carefully surveying must also be kept in mind by the Allies when they chose the theme to be assigned to our ships now and in the future.

Anyhow, the truth is this: the personnel is little by little losing its fighting spirit; it is beginning to relax in the feeling that it hasn't got much of importance to do. And this makes them all the more vulnerable to the virus that is bound to attack the spirit of the people which has suffered a defeat.

As usual, I want to be sincere and I must tell you that my efforts to raise the spirit of the personnel by granting them some of their most elementary and material needs have failed, and this because they could only be realized with the comprehensive collaboration of the Allies, and my requests were either not granted or granted too late.

Knowing that the purchase of indispensable commodities such as soap, tooth paste, cloth brushes, cigarettes etc. are a very heavy strain on the limited economic resources of our personnel, especially enlisted, for months I have been asking for the authorization to buy from the A.A.F.I. a limited quantity of these commodities that I could undersell to my personnel: but to this day, in spite of your efforts, I haven't obtained anything.

For months I have been asking from all sides, but in vain for a small number of lorries and cars in order to facilitate the movements of the personnel and the transportation of materials. I hardly need to remind you, my dear Admiral, that in the present state of the communications in Italy, transfers of personnel, leave journeys, regathering of personnel made available in the provinces liberated by your armies can only be effected by motor. And it isn't a question of leaves and re-grouping being granted for idle purposes. In the case of sailors who for over 4 year have had no news of their families knowing they have been exposed to the cruel anti-fascist reprisals because of their own faithfulness to duty, the anxiety to get in touch with them is fully justified, and the sailors we are regrouping have been fighting for months on the mountains or have been in hiding short of food and clothing, threatened by unceasing dangers. When they are being regrouped, they need moral help and material comfort, or otherwise, they might become elements of danger for the social order. I am well aware that the Allied forces are away from their homes without any right to leaves for periods of three or four years but they do have the moral help that moral correspondence can give and I am sure that you will realize how much family feeling matter to the Italian people in particular, and what encouragements they are in their very military life.

Now, the Italian Army has received a contribution of motor vehicles and also the air force has been helped in this regard. On the other hand, the Navy that already was suffering from shortage of transport has so far been enabled to get anything and will soon have her last resources exhausted.

TOP SECRET

(39)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

I don't need to tell you all I did to obtain clothing, shoes, and materials to fill the empty depots of the dock-yards which are nevertheless working with the greatest zeal to comply to all your requests; to better the food conditions of the personnel on board; in a word, to help our war effort. Something has been granted, but I often have the unpleasant feeling that my requests are not taken for what they are, ie. an honest and sincere effort to give the organization (material and personnel) the degree of efficiency which can be useful to the common cause, and this without ever asking more than that which is strictly indispensable.

All this ends by disheartening the personnel. This personnel is not only without the commodities which the British and American sailors, and even the sailors of the less important navies enjoy, but also without the things which are indispensable for everyday life. It is difficult for these sailors to contact their families, and they often have to wait for weeks and weeks in the depots before being able to move.

I should also like to say a few words about the repatriation of our capital ships: three of them came back from Malta, but the two most modern ones are still being detained at Lagni Amari, without any possibility of contacts with the mainland; this situation has been lasting for 15 months. When I lately asked for the temporary transfer of the 'Doria' to Taranto, I was answered that it wasn't possible to allow three capital ships to concentrate at Taranto. You know the situation of the crew and of the armament of these three capital ships. What can the officers and the crew think of this unjustified manifestation of mistrust?

I think that many of these inconveniences could be avoided if it was possible for me to have more frequent contacts with you: but there also I must point out that, while the Heads of the Allied representations of the Army and Air Force are in Rome, where the Government and the Allied Commission have their seats, your being in Taranto because of the two posts you have to fulfil and which have nothing to do with each other, causes delay and trouble; and these cannot be entirely avoided by the goodwill of your representatives who haven't the support of your authority.

I conclude:

55(1)

I cannot ignore the fact that all the reasons which I have summed up greatly contribute gradually to depress the morale of the R. Navy; nevertheless there are as yet no symptoms which can make us doubt of the soundness of this organ. I am carefully observing the situation, also from the point of view of the diffusion of possible germs of corruption. I shall be most grateful if you will go on giving me your help in this difficult task. Yet I think that the Allies can efficaciously help the Navy to keep up the standard of its traditions, by granting, if only in part, our wish to take a greater share in the war, and by gratifying a few limited material needs.

31

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HQ ACC, APO 394
398 Sec. Y Gen.
Rec'd 27/9-1440
By DFE

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission
APO 394

NSC/896

26 September 1944

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. ACC.
To : Acting Chief Commissioner, ACC.

Subject: Italian Shipbuilding - Conference on.

Enclosure: (A) Report of conference, Italian shipbuilding held on 22 September 1944.

1. A copy of the subject report is forwarded herewith for information.

H. W. ZIRCLI,
Commodore, U.S. Navy,
for Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, ACC.

Copy to:
W.S. VAUGHAN
(Industry SC,ACC)

55/41

(38)
26 hyf

F 14 Q 8

SECRET

HQ ACC, APO 394
398 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 27/9-1440
By DEE

SECRET

22 September 1944.

SUBJECT: ITALIAN SHIPBUILDING - CONFERENCE ON.

1. A conference was held at Caserta at 1500 on 19 September 1944 to discuss the future policy for the rehabilitation of the shipbuilding industry in Italy. The following officers were present at the conference:

Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean -

Commodore Haines
Mr. Gibson Graham
Captain King
Captain Taylor
Commander Bonney

Representing Allied Control Commission -

Commander Butler
Mr. Vaughn

2. The representatives of the Allied Control Commission stated that programs were being developed to rehabilitate the Italian steel industry. In this connection it is necessary to determine what types of steel plates, etc., should be fabricated. If the Italian shipbuilding industry is to be rehabilitated, plans must be made at an early date to supply the necessary steel. For this reason a conference was requested with representatives of the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to determine the future policy for the shipbuilding industry in Italy.

5548

3. The conference first discussed the broad policy to be adopted. It was decided that pending the termination of the war and the final peace settlement that no firm policy could be established, but that during the interim, the Italian Government should not be permitted to embark on any shipbuilding program involving world trade. The capabilities of Italy for shipbuilding were discussed. Prior to the war, approximately 50% of the industry was devoted to the building of Naval vessels. The industry was not self sustaining, in that large subsidies were necessary to off-set the excessive costs, which are in many cases 100% over the cost in other countries. Even at the present time ship repair costs in Italy are excessive. Furthermore, even during peacetime, it was necessary to import a considerable amount of material and machinery from other countries. Under these conditions it is highly improbable that Italian shipbuilding facilities will be capable of constructing vessels of any size for a long time even if permitted to do so.

4. In view of the facts stated above, the conference was unanimously of the opinion that the efforts of the Italian shipbuilding industry should be restricted to the rehabilitating of the shipbuilding

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

building industry in Italy. [illegible] conference:

Representing Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean -

Commodore Haines
Mr. Gibson Graham
Captain King
Captain Taylor
Commander Bonney

Representing Allied Control Commission -

Commander Butler
Mr. Vaughn

2. The representatives of the Allied Control Commission stated that programs were being developed to rehabilitate the Italian steel industry. In this connection it is necessary to determine what types of steel plates, etc., should be fabricated. If the Italian shipbuilding industry is to be rehabilitated, plans must be made at an early date to supply the necessary steel. For this reason a conference was requested with representatives of the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to determine the future policy for the shipbuilding industry in Italy.

5548

3. The conference first discussed the broad policy to be adopted. It was decided that pending the termination of the war and the final peace settlement that no firm policy could be established, but that during the interim, the Italian Government should not be permitted to embark on any shipbuilding program involving world trade. The capabilities of Italy for shipbuilding were discussed. Prior to the war, approximately 50% of the industry was devoted to the building of Naval vessels. The industry was not self sustaining, in that large subsidies were necessary to off-set the excessive costs, which are in many cases 100% over the cost in other countries. Even at the present time ship repair costs in Italy are excessive. Furthermore, even during peacetime, it was necessary to import a considerable amount of material and machinery from other countries. Under these conditions it is highly improbable that Italian shipbuilding facilities will be capable of constructing vessels of any size for a long time even if permitted to do so.

4. In view of the facts stated above, the conference was unanimously of the opinion that the efforts of the Italian shipbuilding industry should be restricted to the rehabilitating of the shipbuilding plants and repairs to damaged ship or ships requiring overhaul. The policy established by CinC. MED. Secret ltr. MED. 829/4/18 of 24 March 1944 was reviewed, and re-affirmed as follows;

"(a) Assist and encourage the Italians to restore facilities which are required for the immediate war effort.

(b) First priority is accorded to all ship repairs. Yards which were formerly engaged only on ship construction are taking an increasing share in this work. This policy to be extended as quickly as possible.

(38) INCL

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(c) New construction orders already placed have generally been confined to barges, floating docks, and other craft of simple construction which are urgently needed, and which can be produced with the minimum of equipment".

5. The question of whether Italian shipbuilding facilities should be utilized to build ships for Allied Nations was discussed. It was decided that this procedure was not desirable on account of the high cost of shipbuilding in Italy and the fact that it would be necessary to manufacture a large proportion of the machinery in other countries. It was then pointed out that requests will undoubtedly be received from many private Italian shipbuilding firms for authority to undertake new construction. These requests cannot be denied without sound reasons, especially in view of the present shortage of shipping to meet the economic needs of Italy. A situation has already arisen in the Naples area whereby the facilities available are in excess of the demands for ship repairs. Under such conditions reasonable requests to build ships cannot be denied. The conference therefore agreed that each request would be decided upon the merits of the case and that as a matter of policy there would be no objection to the building of small coastal vessels of approximately 1500 tons, including schooners, tugs and barges, provided definite plans were produced indicating that the work could be accomplished without interference to the immediate war effort.

H. St.J. BUTLER,
Commander, U.S.Navy.

55/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

facture a large proportion of the machinery in other countries. It was then pointed out that requests will undoubtedly be received from many private Italian shipbuilding firms for authority to undertake new construction. These requests cannot be denied without sound reasons, especially in view of the present shortage of shipping to meet the economic needs of Italy. A situation has already arisen in the Naples area whereby the facilities available are in excess of the demands for ship repairs. Under such conditions reasonable requests to build ships cannot be denied. The conference therefore agreed that each request would be decided upon the merits of the case and that as a matter of policy there would be no objection to the building of small coastal vessels of approximately 1500 tons, including schooners, tugs and barges, provided definite plans were produced indicating that the work could be accomplished without interference to the immediate war effort.

H. St.J. BUTLER,
Commander, U.S.Navy.

55/1

(38) INCL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station,
Allied Force Headquarters.

23rd September, 1944.

Dear Captain Stone

Attached is a precis of our discussion on 19th September concerning the Italian Shipbuilding Industry.

It does not by any means cover all the points brought up but I hope it will give you something to work on.

We would be very glad to be associated with any further proposals by the Allied Control Commission as I think you will agree that the Royal Navy is closely concerned in order to make full use of certain facilities particularly in the South.

55/6

H.D. Hamer

COMMODORE ADMINISTRATION

(37)

Captain Stone, U.S.N.R.
Industry Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission,
ROME.

23 Sep

2-11-45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

5543

ITALIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY.

Report of a meeting held on 19th September, 1944 in accordance with a request from the Industry Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission. (Appendix I).

Present.

Commodore J.R.S. Haines.	Industry Sub-Commission.
Commander Butler U.S.N.	Industry Sub-Commission.
Mr. Vaughan.	Industry Sub-Commission.
Mr. Gibson Graham.	Ministry of War Transport Representative, Mediterranean.
Captain (E) L.A. Taylor, R.N.	Fleet Engineer Officer.
Commander (E) A.D. Benny, R.N.	Outside Production Engineering Manager.
Constructor Captain I.E. King, R.C.N.C.	Fleet Constructor Officer.
Captain P.R. Robinson, R.N.V.R.	Fleet Civil Engineer.

Commander Butler stated that as the Industry Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission were engaged in formulating a policy for Italian industry, they would be assisted in this by a knowledge of present and prospective naval requirements of the shipbuilding industry.

2. Commodore Haines referred to a recent message (FX 24540 dated 13th September, 1944) from the Supreme Allied Commander as President of the Allied Control Commission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting guidance on future economic policy in Italy generally. He stated that the policy regarding naval requirements of the Italian shipbuilding yards remained as stated in the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's letter Med.829/4/18 dated 24th March, 1944 (Appendix II). Constructor Captain King added that the labour position was easier now than when paragraph 2(d) was drafted, partly owing to the reduced volume of damage and other repairs, and partly owing to readjustment of labour itself.

3. Mr. Vaughan reported that the Terni steel plant was now in operation and enquired what demands naval requirements were likely to make on its output of steel plate. Captain King stated that a bid had already been made for :-

(a) 500 tons of plate found on the works.
(b) A regular supply from future output, sufficient supply to cover prospective needs.

He added that the usefulness of the Italian steel plate output was to some extent limited by metallurgical considerations.

Commodore J.R.S. Haines.	
Commander Butler U.S.N.	Industry Sub-Commission.
Mr. Vaughan.	Industry Sub-Commission.
Mr. Gibson Graham.	Ministry of War Transport representative, Mediterranean.
Captain (E) L.A. Taylor, R.N.	Fleet Engineer Officer.
Commander (E) A.D. Bonny, R.N.	Outside Production Engineering Manager.
Constructor Captain T.B. King, R.C.N.C.	Fleet Constructor Officer.
Captain P.R. Robinson, R.N.V.R.	Fleet Civil Engineer.

Commander Butler stated that as the Industry Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission were engaged in formulating a policy for Italian industry, they would be assisted in this by a knowledge of present and prospective naval requirements of the shipbuilding industry.

5545

2. Commodore Haines referred to a recent message (FX 24590 dated 13th September, 1944) from the Supreme Allied Commander as President of the Allied Control Commission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting guidance on future economic policy in Italy generally. He stated that the policy regarding naval requirements of the Italian shipbuilding yards remained as stated in the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's letter Med.829/4/18 dated 24th March, 1944 (Appendix II). Constructor Captain King added that the labour position was easier now than when paragraph 2(d) was drafted, partly owing to the reduced volume of damage and other repairs, and partly owing to readjustment of labour itself.

3. Mr. Vaughan reported that the Terni steel plant was now in operation and enquired what demands naval requirements were likely to make on its output of steel plate. Captain King stated that a bid had already been made for :-

(a) 500 tons of plate found on the works.
(b) A regular supply from future output, sufficient ampl' to cover prospective needs.

He added that the usefulness of the Italian steel plate output was to some extent limited by metallurgical considerations.

4. Mr. Gibson Graham said that subject to the satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief's requirements (Appendix II) he considered that the Allied Control Commission should seek a directive as to the use to which the Allies were prepared to allow Italian Shipbuilding Industry to be put. In any event provision of machinery for the ships would unquestionably be a limiting factor but the extent of this limitation could not be estimated at present as almost all the machinery and boiler manufacturing plant was in territory yet to be captured. Any directive to be issued should take into account the following factors:-

(a) Was there an Allied requirement for more shipping.

(b) Could production in Italy be justified on economic grounds, having....

(31) WL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

having regard to the present state of developement of Allied organisation and resources and the fact that Italian Shipbuilding industry had only survived in the past because of heavy state subsidies and imports of raw materials.

(c) Assuming there were no Allied shipbuilding requirements, would the Allies be prepared to allow the Italians to commence to restore their Merchant Marine with an eye to peacetime commercial requirements observing that they would thereby enjoy an advantage over the Allies whose effort is still fully devoted to the production of ships essentially designed to meet wartime requirements.

(d) The considerations in paragraph (c) did not apply to small ships and the Italians could present a very reasonable case for the construction of coasters for the distribution of food supplies etc. around their own coasts.

Captain (E) Taylor pointed out that a considerable part of the Italian shipbuilding industry had specialised in warship production and he hoped this would not be permitted to revive. Absorption by merchant ship production or repair organisations could not easily be achieved.

In reply to Captain King, Mr. Gibson Graham said that he considered that the difficulty of importing raw materials could be surmounted provided there was an Allied need for ships.

Commander (E) Bonny said that assuming that Allied requirements and permitted Italian activities would not completely absorb materials and labour available, it should be possible to divert any surplus to the production of engineering materials for making good war damage, e.g. bridging.

554.

5. Commodore Raines said that post European war naval repair requirements in the Mediterranean were at present under consideration and the final decisions on this subject would have considerable bearing upon the future of Italian shipbuilding / ship repairing resources. Captain King said that undoubtedly we should require full use of the resources in Southern Italy and Taranto in particular. He considered that it would be sound policy to allow the Italians to use their facilities in the North for their own repair requirements which would put us in a strong position to refuse any bids they might make to use Taranto resources, and to counter any attempts to withdraw labour. He stressed that the Northern Ports should give priority to restoration and manning of ship repairing facilities, and resources and personnel of shipbuilding yards should be diverted as necessary to this end.

6. It was agreed that general proposals for the partial restoration of the Italian Shipbuilding Industry would have to be deferred until a survey of the facilities had been made.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

requirements observing that they would thereby enjoy an advantage over the Allies whose effort is still fully devoted to the production of ships essentially designed to meet wartime requirements.

(d) The considerations in paragraph (c) did not apply to small ships and the Italians could present a very reasonable case for the construction of coasters for the distribution of food supplies etc. around their own coasts.

Captain (E) Taylor pointed out that a considerable part of the Italian shipbuilding industry had specialised in warship production and he hoped this would not be permitted to revive. Absorption by merchant ship production or repair organisations could not easily be achieved.

In reply to Captain King, Mr. Gibson Graham said that he considered that the difficulty of importing raw materials could be surmounted provided there was an Allied need for ships.

Commander (E) Bonny said that assuming that Allied requirements and permitted Italian activities would not completely absorb materials and labour available, it should be possible to divert any surplus to the production of engineering materials for making good war damage, e.g. bridging.

554

5. Commodore Haines said that post European war naval repair requirements in the Mediterranean were at present under consideration and the final decisions on this subject would have considerable bearing upon the future of Italian shipbuilding / ship repairing resources. Captain King said that undoubtedly we should require full use of the resources in Southern Italy and Taranto in particular. He considered that it would be sound policy to allow the Italians to use their facilities in the North for their own repair requirements which would put us in a strong position to refuse any bids they might make to use Taranto resources, and to counter any attempts to withdraw labour. He stressed that the Northern Ports should give priority to restoration and manning of ship repairing facilities, and resources and personnel of shipbuilding yards should be diverted as necessary to this end.

6. It was agreed that general proposals for the partial restoration of the Italian Shipbuilding Industry would have to be deferred until a survey of the facilities had been made.

7. It was recommended that machine tools and other equipment specially installed for production of war weapons, if not required as indemnity, should be scrapped.

[signature]

SECRETARY TO
COMMODORE ADMINISTRATION.

(57)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX I.

Extract of Industry Sub-Commission's letter Ref.ACC/5566/IND of 2nd September, 1944.

In order to form a policy for the reactivation of the shipbuilding industry, it would be appreciated if an appointment could be made for a member of this sub-commission to visit the S.B.E.O. in Naples.

5543

ANNEX II

Allied Force Headquarters,
ALGIERS.

24th March, 1944.

Med.329/4/18.

THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, ITALY

(Copies to:- The Flag Officer, Taranto and Adriatic.
(Ref.1018/3 of 8th March, 1944).
The Flag Officer, Western Italy.
(Ref.437 dated 17th February, 1944).
The Commodore Superintendent, Taranto.
The Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters.
The Ministry of War Transport Representative, Mediterranean.
The Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force Headquarters.
M.S.A.)

REPORT ON SHIP BUILDING YARDS IN ITALY.

The reports of the sub-commission of Italian experts on the ship building and repairing facilities in occupied and unoccupied Italy (excluding Sicily) deal primarily with the private shipyards. With the exception of Franco Tosi Yard at Taranto, and Ansaldo Yard at Castellammare, all the large ship building yards are situated in Northern Italy. There are no facilities for the manufacture of main machinery installations, large forgings and castings in Southern Italy.

5542

2. The following is the general policy worked to in the Naval and private shipyards already under Allied control:-

(a) Assist and encourage the Italians to restore facilities which are required for the immediate war effort.

(b) First priority is accorded to all ship repairs. Yards which were formerly engaged only in ship construction are taking an increasing share in this work. This policy to be extended as quickly as possible.

(c) New construction orders already placed have generally been confined to barges, floating docks, and other craft of simple construction which are urgently needed and which can be produced with the minimum of equipment.

(d) It is considered that surplus skilled labour in ship building yards should be transferred to large ship repairing centres, e.g. Naples

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Copies to:- The Flag Officer, Taranto and Adriatic.
(Ref. 1048/3 of 8th March, 1944).
The Flag Officer, Western Italy.
(Ref.437 dated 17th February, 1944).
The Commodore Superintendent, Taranto.
The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters.
The Ministry of War Transport Representative, Mediterranean.
The Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force Headquarters.
E.N.A.)

REPORT ON SHIP-BUILDING YARDS IN ITALY.

The reports of the sub-commissions of Italian experts on the ship building and repairing facilities in occupied and unoccupied Italy (excluding Sicily) deal primarily with the private shipyards. With the exception of Franco Tosi Yard at Taranto, and Ansaldo Yard at Castellamare, all the large ship building yards are situated in Northern Italy. There are no facilities for the manufacture of main machinery installations, large forgings and castings in Southern Italy.

5542

2. The following is the general policy worked to in the Naval and private shipyards already under Allied control:-

(a) Assist and encourage the Italians to restore facilities which are required for the immediate war effort.

(b) First priority is accorded to all ship repairs. Yards which were formerly engaged only on ship construction are taking an increasing share in this work. This policy to be extended as quickly as possible.

(c) New construction orders already placed have generally been confined to barges, floating docks and other craft of simple construction which are urgently needed, and which can be produced with the minimum of equipment.

(d) It is considered that surplus skilled labour in ship building yards should be transferred to large ship repairing centres, e.g. Naples, Taranto and Brindisi. This additional labour would assist in the introduction of regular day and night shifts, which is necessary to speed repairs, and get the maximum value out of the available docks.

NOTE:- Towards the end of March all the dry docks at Naples will probably be in operation. A new caisson for No.5 dock has been expeditiously constructed at Castellamare.

3. It will be seen that the above stated policy is chiefly concerned with the immediate war effort, and not the general rehabilitation of the Italian ship-building industry.

(37)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4. Arrangements are made with the British Admiralty for the supply of repair materials to meet this programme. Italian stocks of ship repair materials should continue to be reserved for this work.

5. It is requested that any orders which the Allied Control Commission propose to place with Italian Shipyards should be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean for consideration. Copies of such proposals to be sent to the Flag Officer, Taranto and Adriatic and the Flag Officer, Western Italy. Any proposals for construction or repair of shipbuilding facilities such as shipyards, docks, slips etc. should be treated similarly.

6. The following technical officers on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean have an office in Naples addressed c/o The Flag Officer, Western Italy, Navy House, Naples :-

Principal Base Engineer Officer:- Captain (E) C.M. Morrell O.B.E., (P.B.E.O.) Royal Navy.

Principal Base Constructor Officer:- Constructor Commander J.A. Mavor, (P.B.C.O.) (Italy). Royal Navy.

Officer in Charge of Works (West Italy):- Commander (Sp), D.L. Bell, (O.C.W.) R.N.V.R.

7. The Commodore Superintendent, Taranto (Commodore F. Powell, D.S.O., Royal Navy) is responsible for all ship repair and shipbuilding activities in the "Heel" ports viz. Taranto, Brindisi, and Bari.

8. British Admiralty technical officers are stationed in all ports where there are ship repair or building facilities.

9. It is considered that the above policy should continue in operation until the termination of European hostilities.

5541

10. In view of the considerable work outstanding in the construction of the new Graving docks at Taranto, Naples and Brindisi, labour should not be employed on completing these projects.

ADMIRAL.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

or repair of shipbuilding facilities such as shipyards, docks, slips etc. should be treated similarly.

6. The following technical officers on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean have an office in Naples addressed c/o The Flag Officer, Western Italy, Navy House, Naples :-

Principal Base Engineer Officer:- Captain (E) C.M. Morrell O.B.E., Royal Navy. (P.B.E.O.)

Principal Base Constructor Officer:- Constructor Commander J.A. Mavor, Royal Navy. (P.B.C.O.) (Italy).

Officer in Charge of Works (West Italy):- Commander (Sp), D.L. Bell, R.N.V.R. (O.C.W.)

7. The Commodore Superintendent, Taranto (Commodore J. Powell, D.S.O., Royal Navy) is responsible for all ship repair and shipbuilding activities in the "Heel" ports viz. Taranto, Brindisi, and Bari.

8. British Admiralty technical officers are stationed in all ports where there are ship repair or building facilities.

9. It is considered that the above policy should continue in operation until the termination of European hostilities.

5541

10. In view of the considerable work outstanding in the construction of the new Graving docks at Taranto, Naples and Brindisi, labour should not be employed on completing these projects.

ADMIRAL.

(31)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INDUSTRY SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

WV/VB

Tel. 489081 Ex. 348

22nd September, 1944.

Ref. ACC/5566/IND

HQ ACC, APO 394
339 Soc'y Gen.
Rec'd 24 Sep 1945
By DFE

SUBJECT: Italian Ship Building.

TO : The Acting Chief Commissioner
(Through Economic Section)

1. Mr. W.S. Vaughan of this Sub-Commission, together with Commander Butler, attended the A.F.H.Q. meeting at Caserta on the above subject on Tuesday last, the 19th September.

2. Attached is a copy of his notes covering that meeting. He would be glad to discuss the matter further with you should you so desire.

J.S.E. TODD,
Colonel,
Acting Director,
Industry Sub-Commission.

Enc.

5540 Copy to:
File 5521.

2-IHC-150

(30)

22 Sep

File.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INDUSTRY SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

WV/VB.

Ref. ACC/5566/IND

22nd September, 1944.

M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: Shipbuilding - Rehabilitation of in Italy.

1. A meeting on the above subject was held at A.F.H.Q., Caserta, on Tuesday, 19th September, 1944, at 3 p.m. Those present were:-

Commodore Haines,
Administrative Officer of C.-in-C. Med. Station.
Mr. Gibson Graham,
Minister of War Transport.
Capt. King,
Construction Superintendent - Ships of C.-in-C.
Capt. Taylor,
Construction Engineer to C.-in-C. Med. Station.
Commander Barnes,
Assistant Constructional Engineer.
Commander Butler,
A.C.C., Navy.
Mr. W.S. Vaughan,
A.C.C., Industry.

2. Commodore Haines, after hearing from Mr. Vaughan that A.C.C. was interested in the Italian ship building industry from a materials requirement point of view, i.e. tons of steel needed, cement, and so forth, advised the meeting that the Navy's view had not changed and that their policy remained as set forth in their letter dated March 24th, 1944. He stated, however, that this might be an opportune time to reopen the matter and this he would do.

5539

3. Mr. Gibson Graham's remarks throughout the meeting can be summarised as follows:-

(a) The present was not an opportune time to embark on a programme of ship-building in Italy when the main ship yards in the north are not as yet liberated.

(b) First priority on Italian ship yards will be given to the repair of ships for the Japanese push.

(c) Italy at no time in the past has been able to build complete ships - engines, steel forgings, non ferrous castings, propellors, drive shafts, ventilating systems, and other ships' accessories were always purchased

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SUBJECT: Shipbuilding - Rehabilitation of in Italy.

1. A meeting on the above subject was held at A.F.H.Q., Caserta, on Tuesday, 19th September, 1944, at 3 p.m. Those present were:-

Commodore Haines,
Administrative Officer of C.-in-C. Med. Station.
Mr. Gibson Graham,
Minister of War Transport.
Capt. King,
Construction Superintendent - Ships of C.-in-C.
Capt. Taylor,
Construction Engineer to C.-in-C. Med. Station.
Commander Barnes,
Assistant Constructional Engineer.
Commander Butler,
A.C.C., Navy.
Mr. W.S. Vaughan,
A.C.C., Industry.

2. Commodore Haines, after hearing from Mr. Vaughan that A.C.C. was interested in the Italian ship building industry from a materials requirement point of view, i.e. tons of steel needed, cement, and so forth, advised the meeting that the Navy's view had not changed and that their policy remained as set forth in their letter dated March 24th, 1944. He stated, however, that this might be an opportune time to reopen the matter and this he would do.

5539

3. Mr. Gibson Graham's remarks throughout the meeting can be summarised as follows:-

(a) The present was not an opportune time to embark on a programme of ship-building in Italy when the main ship yards in the north are not as yet liberated.

(b) First priority on Italian ship yards will be given to the repair of ships for the Japanese push.

(c) Italy at no time in the past has been able to build complete ships - engines, steel forgings, non ferrous castings, propellors, drive shafts, ventilating systems, and other ships' accessories were always purchased from foreign countries. None of these items are now available.

(d) Italian ship building has always been an uneconomic business, heavily subsidised, and the few ships built for other nations were on a barter basis and not built in competition with bids from other powers.

(e) Fifty per cent of the ship building yards in Italy were working on war machines and should not be allowed to resume their ship building activities.

(f) There would be no objection on the part of the Admiralty to Italy building small vessels for inter coastal trade to assist in bringing back her economic structure. Such small vessels would include either wooden or cement barges and small coast-wise going ships. It must be understood, however, that any construction of this nature is not to interfere

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

in any way with the Navy's ship repair programme.

(g) There is another thought, that of transferring ship building facilities from Italy to such United Nations as have suffered heavy damage in this direction.

3. Captain King stated that southern Italian yards are now being reconditioned for repair purposes and that this work would come before any actual ship building programme was resorted to.

Northern Italian yards, in his opinion, could be used by the Italians for repair work only, that is for such vessels as are necessary for the continuance of their economic life.

Since no docking facilities are available in the Indian Ocean the use of southern Italian yards will save the long journey back to England or the United States for ship repairs. Two floating docks have been built in these yards and it is proposed to construct at least four additional ones.

4. Mr. Vaughan brought out the following point. In 1938 the Italian steel industry had a capacity of 4.5 million tons per year, yet in the same year only 2.3 million tons were produced. Of this amount 120,000 tons of steel went into their ship building programme, or approximately 5 per cent. In addition 60,000 tons of steel products were imported during the same year.

5. A summary of the high lights of the meeting can be stated as follows:-

(a) There is no change in the Navy's policy regarding Italian ship building yards.

(b) Southern yards will be used for repairs by the Navy.

(c) Northern yards may be used for repairs by the Italian Government.

(d) There is no objection to the Italians building small coastal craft whether of cement or wood.

5538

(e) No large ships may be built at the present time.

6. The foregoing are preliminary notes only. The usual minutes of the meeting will be circulated later from A.F.H.Q., Caserta.

W.S. VAUGHAN
Industry Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Italians for repair work only, that is for such vessels as are necessary for the continuance of their economic life.

Since no docking facilities are available in the Indian Ocean the use of southern Italian yards will save the long journey back to England or the United States for ship repairs. Two floating docks have been built in these yards and it is proposed to construct at least four additional ones.

4. Mr. Vaughan brought out the following point. In 1938 the Italian steel industry had a capacity of 4.5 million tons per year, yet in the same year only 2.3 million tons were produced. Of this amount 120,000 tons of steel went into their ship building programme, or approximately 5 per cent. In addition 60,000 tons of steel products were imported during the same year.

5. A summary of the high lights of the meeting can be stated as follows:-

(a) There is no change in the Navy's policy regarding Italian ship building yards.

(b) Southern yards will be used for repairs by the Navy.

(c) Northern yards may be used for repairs by the Italian Government.

(d) There is no objection to the Italians building small coastal craft whether of cement or wood.

5538

(e) No large ships may be built at the present time.

6. The foregoing are preliminary notes only. The usual minutes of the meeting will be circulated later from A.F.H.Q., Caserta.

W.S. VAUGHAN
Industry Sub-Commission.

(34) IWSC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

0 1 7 21

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FILE UNDER NO. 091.711-2 ITALIAN NAVY

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

Ltr Ziroli Navy Sub-Com of 22 Sep 44 to HQ AAI & copy to Secretary General ACC.

Tires & Tubes for Italian Naval Transport.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 500 - TRANSPORTATION

5537

091.711-2

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on te consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

(35)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TWS/wfs

A/ CC 091.711-2

16 September 1944.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Up to the present time the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has exercised complete control over all salvage operations in Italian waters, including Sicily and Sardinia. It is now planned to retain direct control only over operational salvage, including port clearance necessary in all harbors required for the use of Allied Forces and the salvage of such ships and crafts in non-operational areas as may be required for use by the Allied Forces. All other non-operational salvage will be gradually turned over to the Italian Government under the Allied Control Commission.

Salvage facilities of the Italian Navy and commercial salvage firms have been utilised through the Italian Ministry of Marine to excellent advantage for salvage work. The Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will continue to employ a proportion of these facilities, the remainder will be available for non-operational salvage. In order that appropriate instructions may be issued, information is requested as to whether the Italian Ministry of Marine or the Italian Ministry of Public Works is responsible for the broad planning and co-ordination of harbor clearance and re-construction work and the actual salvage operations.

5536

Yours very truly,

See (41)

KILSEY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

SM 247
Sig. A.C.C. Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 18 Sept 0910
Hd
Dft R

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

34

Copy to:
Naval CinC-Med.
PW & C SC ACC.
Navy Sub-Com.

FILED SEP 1944

Prepared By: H.St.J. Butler
H.St.John Butler,
Commander, U.S.Navy
Navy Sub-Commission.

0174

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FILE UNDER N 091.711-2 Ital Navy
000.1-2 Ital Pol
014.13 (Carabinieri)

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

Ltr A/CC 091.711 31 Aug 44 from Stone to AFHQ G-5

POST HOSTILITIES PLANNING

Atchd questionnaire, with partial answers by us, given to Exec Comm by Lt Col Geddes. Matters of principle are hard for us to answer.

Questions covered:

1. Future plans for demobilizing etc of Ital Army etc

x-091.711-2 2. Plans for restricting construction of Ital ships & warships

3. Restrictions to be imposed on Ital frontier & coastal defences. Destruction & removal of guns, etc

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO. 091.711-1 Ital Army General

4. Difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of them.

x-014.13 5535 5. Italy will later take over her own frontiers. Will skeleton army have to be left in addition to Carabinieri? What about strength of CC.RR etc?

(33)

INSTRUCTIONS - Under «Synopsis» make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on te consolidated index sheets and then destroyed.

31 Aug

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EHB/ajp

A/ CC 091.711

25 August 1944

SUBJECT: Comando Supremo - Connection with Italian Navy

TO : Rear Admiral C. R. Morgan, FOTALI

32 ATP A

1. Your letter of August 1st was not received until August 19th and I discussed its contents with you on August 21st. This will confirm, however, my statement that the name of the Comando Supremo has been changed to Stato Maggiore Generale, that it has been instructed that it is to exercise no command or operational functions of either the Italian Navy, Army, or Air Force, and that its former duties of operation of Navy, Army and Air Force officers would be turned over to the Ministries of Marine, War and Aeronautics, respectively.

2. These changes were made subsequent to your letter of August 1st.

3. I shall therefore be grateful if you would advise me if the instances referred to in the first paragraph of your letter still continue. If so, I shall be glad to make suitable representations to Marshal Messe.

553

HENRY W. STORK
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

c.c. Navy Sub-Commission

32

Hq ACC Sec'y
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 25 Aug 1944
Via
Initials

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DRAFT

OF 1.211

SUBJECT: Comando Supremo - Connection with Italian Navy

TO : Rear Admiral C. E. Morgan, FOTALI

1. Your letter of August 1st was not received until August 18th and I discussed its contents with you on August 21st. This will confirm, however, my statement that the name of the Comando Supremo has been changed to Stato Maggiore Generale, that it has been instructed that it is to exercise no command or operational functions of either the Italian Navy, Army, ~~and~~ or Air Forces, and that its former duties of epuration of Navy, Army and Air Force officers would be turned over to the Ministry of Marine, ~~Ministry of~~ War, and ~~Ministry of~~ Aeronautics, respectively.

2. These changes were made subsequent to your letter of August 1st.

3. I shall therefore be grateful if you would advise me if the instances referred to in the first paragraph of your letter still continue. If so, I shall be glad to make suitable representations to Marshal Messe.

553

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

A 34
27 AUG 1944

COMANDO SUPREMO - CONNECTION WITH ITALIAN NAVY.

693 Rec'd 18 Aug 1944
No.T.A.1140/30.

FROM .... FLAG OFFICER, TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE .... 1st August, 1944.

TO .... CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
(Copy to: Naval Sub-Commission Representative, ACC, H.Q., Rome.)

It has been brought to my notice that the Marshal Supremo, Marshal Messe, has been interesting himself in certain matters connected with the Italian Navy. The particular instances quoted were a) that he had been making enquiries about the screening of Italian naval personnel and b) that he was connected with the appointment of Italian Flag Officers.

2. It is pointed out that in accordance with both the Cunningham - De Courten agreement and the Combined Chiefs of Staff memorandum on the Italian Navy, the Italian Navy is controlled by the Minister of Marine acting under orders from Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean transmitted through Flag Officer Liaison Italy. The Marshal Supremo does not, therefore, play any part in the control of the Italian Navy, either operationally or administratively. Appointments of all Flag and Senior Officers, for instance, are proposed by the Minister of Marine and submitted to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean for approval.

553?

3. It would be appreciated if the Marshal Supremo could be informed that the Minister of Marine is under the orders of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and that the Marshal's interference in Italian naval matters is superfluous and undesirable.

C. S. Morgan.

REAR-ADMIRAL.

(32) XDP A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/ajp

A/CC 091.711

24 August 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The ships mentioned in memorandum No. 220/108 of 10 August are being prepared for special service by order of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

After being surveyed, they were selected for this service because they were found to be too seriously damaged to justify repairing them in the present circumstances.

There could be no question of bringing these ships into use for the Italian Government only. If fit for normal service, they would pass into the Mediterranean Shipping Board pool for the general use of all the Allied war efforts.

Yours very truly,

EMERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date filed 24 AUG 1944
Via
Officials

c.c. Navy Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

EWS/ajp

A/CC 091.711

23 August 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The ships mentioned in memorandum No. 220/108 of 10 August are being prepared for special service by order of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

After being surveyed, they were selected for this service because they were found to be too seriously damaged to justify repairing them in the present circumstances.

There could be no question of bringing these ships into use for the Italian only. If fit for normal service they would pass into the ~~Allied~~ pool for the general use of all the Allied war effort.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

5530

Government

Mediterranean Shipping Board

(31) 2ND DRAFT

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HQ ... Records Sec. 776 5 Aug 0920 By ... DNR.

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
HEADQUARTERS,
ROME.

20th August, 1944.

No. L.316/1.

ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ROME.

DAMAGED ITALIAN MERCHANT SHIPS.

With reference to your memorandum No. A/C.C.091.171 of 12th August, a draft reply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is attached.

COMMODORE.

5529

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DRAFT.

The ships mentioned in your memorandum No. 220/108 of 10th August, are being prepared for special service by orders of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean,

2. After being surveyed, they were selected for this service because they were found to be too seriously damaged to justify repairing them in the present circumstances.

3. There could be no question of bringing these ships into use for the Italians only. If fit for normal service they would pass into the MEDEO pool.

5528

(31) FIRST DRAFT

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Acting Chief Commissioner

A/CC 091.711

Naval Sub-Commission, Hq ACC

12 August 4

(30) Incl 1

1. Reference is made to attached copy of memorandum Nr. 6/220/108 dated 10 Aug 44 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relative to the ships "Apollo", "Hermuda", "Turiddu", and the tanker "Cesco".

2. It will be appreciated if appropriate reply be drafted for my signature.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
as stated above

5527

(30)

SA 795

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date - Time 12 Aug 1515
Via Msgr.
Init 19mm

File A11270

Comm 795

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

Nr. 6/220/108

A 2129
13 AUG 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STONE

H.E. the President of the Council of Ministers wishes to call Admiral Stone's personal attention on the following matter:

The Italian Navy has recently been able to refloat the ships "Apollo", "Hermada", "Turiddu" and the tanker "Cesco", which were scuttled at the time of the armistice. These units can be repaired and put into commission within a brief space of time.

The Allied Naval Authorities, however, have informed the Italian Ministry for the Navy that, in case of need, they intend making use of these ships, scuttling them, to substitute partly destroyed moles or wharves in the ports recently liberated.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize how important for the Country's supplies would be the use of the not inconsiderable tonnage represented by the four ships in question.

However, all dealings on the matter between our Ministry for the Navy and the Allied Authorities have remained without effect.

Bearing in mind that not one single merchant ship has been left to Italian economy; that our major islands

./.

5525

(30)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

(Sicily and Sardinia) are completely isolated; that Italy is not allowed one single tonn of autonomous foreign trade, it would be much appreciated if the foregoing ships were placed at the disposal of the Italian Merchant Marine Ecdg_

Rome, 10th August 1944.

5525

30 Encl 1

Subject:- Release Italian Naval Personnel.

615

Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS
21 AUG 1944
HQ A.F.H.Q. C. C.
C.M.F.

HQ [illegible] APO 394
141 21 July 160° DRR. 2086/1/Q2.
BY [illegible]
A 1631
25 JUL 1945

17 July 44.

15a

1. This HQ 2086/1/Q2 dated 3 May, 44, is cancelled.

2. "A" Branch this HQ are issuing shortly a comprehensive instruction covering the procedure for demobilisation of all Italian personnel employed by Allied Armed Forces.

for Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:-

CG, Fifth Army
Rear Eighth Army
Rear 5 Corps
1 District
2 District
3 District
CG, PBS
55 FBWIT
FCTALI
MAAF
AAFSC/MTO (3)
TAF (4)
21A Gp RAF (2)
HQ, ACC.
Naval Sub Commission, ACC.
N.L.O.

A
AG(US)
G.4
Q1
Q2
Q(AE)
RA
RE(2)
Works
X
CSC L of C.
Svy
Mov
Tn Br
Tn US
ST

Ord
REME
Lab
AFA

29

20

file A+B
100

Lmmy Aug 11, 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. This HQ 2056/1/Q2 dated 5 July.

2. "A" Branch this HQ are issuing shortly a comprehensive instruction covering the procedure for demobilisation of all Italian personnel employed by Allied Armed Forces.

for Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:-

CG, Fifth Army
Rear Eighth Army
Rear 5 Corps
1 District
2 District
3 District
CG, PBS
FSWIT
FOTALI
MAAF
AAFSC/MTO (3)
TAF (4)
21A Gp RAF (2)
HQ, ACC.
Naval Sub Commission, ACC.
N.L.O.

A
AG(US)
G.4
Q1
Q2
Q(AE)
RA
RE(2)
Works
X
CSO L of C.
Svy
Mov
Tn Br
Tn US
ST

Ord
REME
Lab
AFA

55

(29)

2056/1/Q2
17 Jul 44

(D)
file (A+B)
100

17.7.44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ ACC, APO 394
Secy's Gen
Rec'd 15 Jul 1945
By

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission
APO 394

NSC/539

17 JUL 1944 14 July 1944.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner, ACC.

SUBJECT : Italian Admirals in Rome, Status of.

1. For your information the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has agreed to recognize officially the following named Italian admirals who were in Rome prior to Allied occupation :

Senior Rear Admiral	Angelo PARONA
Senior Rear Admiral	Emilio FERRERI
Senior Rear Admiral	Carlo GIARTOSIO
Rear Admiral	Francesco MAUGERI

2. In addition Admiral FERRERI has been authorized to act for the Italian Minister until he arrives in Rome. Admirals PARONA, GIARTOSIO and MAUGERI are acting as Capo dell'Ufficio Stralcio di Maripers; Capo dell'Ufficio Stralcio di Maristat and Capo dell'Ufficio Stralcio del Reparto Informazioni respectively. The appointments of the latter three admirals have not yet been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Commodore,
S.B.N.O., ROME.

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NND by [illegible] date 2 Aug 66

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HQ ACC, APO 394
995 Sec'y Gen
Rec'd 14 Jul 1005
By

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission
APO 394

NSC/529

12 July 1944.

Commanding General,
Rome Area Command.

A 1681
15 JUL 1944

Copies to: Chief Commissioner
F.O.T.A.L.I.
F.O.W.I.T.
HQ. A.A.I.
Army Sub-Commission
Air Sub-Commission

It is wished to draw attention to the difficulties the Italian Navy is faced with in Rome and all addressees are much concerned in addition to the Naval Sub-Commission as the Italian Navy is the only balanced Force and will play a most important part in the future of this country, disciplinary, politically and morally. The object aimed at is to form Port Parties to maintain and man northern ports which are assembled here to take the place of British personnel no longer available to man these ports, which are essential to the 5th and 8th Armies. These men are therefore operationally on the same level as all fighting personnel of the Allies.

5522

Also, the Ministry of Marine moves to Rome next week entailing some 200 officers and 900 men. At present the only accommodation is the E. PISTELLI School which only holds 400 men. Accommodation is required therefore for a further 200 officers and 900 men. Also the school has to be evacuated in September. Application is being made to Administrative Branch, A.C.C. to retain it. Here again we are up against the Educational Authorities.

The Italian Navy were ordered to evacuate their own Naval Barracks last month for use as an American hospital. These barracks would have answered all personnel requirements.

F.O.T.A.L.I. has again represented the application to have it retained but it is understood as there are now some 300 wounded in it, it is fully appreciated they cannot be moved. Therefore, it is essential that the Italian Naval authorities should be given authority to requisition a suitable school, hotel or building to answer this operational requirement.

(Over)

NSC/529
12 Jul 44

mAtB

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RESTRICTED

10 JUL 1944

ACC ADV

ACC MAIN

S-280

10 JUL

RESTRICTED
ROUTINE
ACTING CHIEF COMM.

REFERENCE ADVANCE THREE THREE TWO JULY EIGHT RELATIVE TO DUTIES COMMODORE PALMER PAREN TO ACC ADVANCE FOR SECRETARY GENERAL FOR ACTION FROM ACC MAIN SIGNED STONE PAREN DIRECT THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE PROMULGATED TO ALL CONCERNED

AUTHENTICATED:

L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, Sig C
Chief Staff Officer

5521

RESTRICTED

5-280
10 Dec 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3204

DSM 1420
10 JUL 1944

ADV MAIN

ADV ADV

ADV 332

NAVY

IMPORTANT

356/8

[illegible]

UNO MED HAS ADVISED THAT IN ADDITION TO HIS DUTIES AS HE REPRESENTATIVE IN ROME ON THE NAVAL SUB COMMISSION O[illegible] THE ACC DOMINIONS IN PALERMO DO STILL REPRESENT HIS OP ALL QUESTIONS OF LIAISON WITH THE ITALIAN NAVY IN ROME. ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THE ITALY NAVY AT ROME SHOULD THEREFORE BE REFERRED TO DOMINIONS /////// PALERMO. REQUEST YOU SEE INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED UNDER WHICH ADV ATV HQ ROME FACE TO DOMINIONS PALERMO

55[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS
9 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

ACTION - C-S-O (2)
INFO - DEPCC
- CABN
- FILE
- FLOAT 2

Send Ahead

RS

Adv 332
8 Jul 44

File Grp
+ SG file

JUL 081223B

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AREA COMBINED HEADQUARTERS.
TARANTO.

16th June, 1944.

DSD 1500
3 JUL 1944

My dear General.

(21)

With reference to your letter of 23rd May, 1944, concerning food for Taranto Dockyard Workers, I am glad to report that the position is now entirely satisfactory.

The midshift meal now consists of:-

(a) Soup.
(b) Vegetables dried (possibly fresh when available)
(c) Bread.

(a) and (b) are paid for by the Ministry of Marine, (c) is bought at the man's own baker with a special permit card showing his qualification.

2. With reference to paragraph four of your letter, bread and vegetables were turned down because the workmen could not afford the 7 lire for these items.

5519

3. Thank you very much indeed for all your help in this matter.

ACTION TAKEN: 3 Jul 44

2 copies of this and 2 copies of ref ltr given Economic Sec for their info.

LAA.
L.D.D.

Yours sincerely,

E. C. Morgan.

Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission.

(21)a

16 Jun 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Sec. Gen 54796

HQ ACC, APO 394
Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 27 June 1700
By

a/cc

SECRET

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

P/B/tum

25 June 1944.

SUBJECT: LAIS Alberto, Amm. Div. IRN.

TO : Political Section, A.C.C.

DSH 1163
30 JUN 1944

Amm. Div. Alberto LAIS IRN is acting as a liaison officer between British and United States naval authorities in Rome Area and the Italian Navy Commissioner for the city of Rome, Amm. Div. Emilio FERRERI IRN.

Admiral LAIS was on duty in the United States early in 1941 prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Italy in December. He is eminently qualified for liaison duty and is apparently cooperating to the fullest extent. This matter is brought to your attention so that you may be cognizant of the situation.

COMMODORE

Copy to:
55[illegible] C in C MED
COMNAVNAW
FOTALI
FOWIT
Acting Chief Commissioner.

2 Encls. 2 ltrs. dtd 24 Jan 44

25 Jan 44

File 408

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U. S. SECT
Allied British

7540

RECEIVED FBI SEC
27 JUN 1944
ALLIED HQ A.C.C.

SECRET
Precedence

ROUTINE

CINC MED

GENERALLY H FOTALI TO IT VAM ACC (NAVY) SALERNO

JUNE 231638

JUNE 270910B

DSM 1434
29 JUN 1944

1. NAF 687 suggested clothing scale for Italian Navy and requested source of supply be indicated.

2. Combined Chiefs of Staff state in FAM 365 that in the first instance it is the responsibility of the Royal Navy to obtain all supplies.

3. Request Admiralty arrange supply of clothing for 75,000 men for delivery direct to Italian Navy in Italy who will be required to warehouse and issue under control of Military Mission to Italian Army.

4. No supply action by Admiralty required for provisions and medical stores.

5. FAM (365)

6. Passed by letter to FOTALI FORCE VAM and ACC (1 group)

5517

DISTRIBUTION:

1 File
1 Float
1 DSO Info
1 Army "
1 Navy (Adv) Info
1 Navy (Taranto) Info
1 Adj Main

INFO

U. S. SECT
Allied British

23 Jun 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVY SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

IMP/tum

18 June 1944.

OSS 1346
23 JUN 1944

SUBJECT: Naval Activities in Rome Area, Report of.

To : Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

1. I am at present Flag Officer Liaison with Italian Ministry representing C.inC. and F.O.W.I.T.

2. First objective is to raise necessary officers and men for northern ports and allocate as desired by F.O.W.I.T.

3. Commander Butler is with me representing Commodore Ziroli. General Johnson, Area Commander has informed me that the Caserma Regia Marina-Italian Naval Barracks is required as an American hospital. At a meeting yesterday I pointed out it was our Drafting Centre and if taken would completely disorganise our present plans for the early manning of the ports now urgently required for meeting Army Transport supplies.

4. Owing to the urgency of the needs of the wounded, I agreed that I required therefore alternative accommodation for at least 600 officers and men. This has not yet been found.

5. To ensure that in the future no dislocation should occur and to encourage the Italian personnel, a ruling re: paras. 19-20 of Hq. AAI for SECRET letter 66/G(ops) of 3 June 1944, as it appears to me that no planning can be arranged for future administration if operational requirements still override and it is pointed out that manning of the ports is very much an operational requirement.

6. In order to guard against the many authorities that visit the Italian Naval Authorities in the Ministry, I have set up an office there to insure close contact.

7. I have called on General Johnson and Brigadier Sub-Area.

/s/ I. M. PALMER
C O M M O D O R E

No Action. NAI 19/6.

22

18 Jun 44

5516

fol/2006

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

GMS/eom

25 May 44

DSH 955
27 MAR 1944

On the basis of AFHQ authority 30 Jan 44, AFHQ Adv Adm Echelon 47/44, 6 Feb 44 authorized the issue of a mid-shift meal for Italian civilians performing manual labour for the benefit of the Allied Forces. The shift was to be of 8 hours or more duration and base Section, District or Area Commanders were made responsible for the provision of facilities necessary to prepare and serve such meals.

The meal consisted of 1/3 lb bread, 6 oz fresh vegetables (or equivalent scale of dried vegetables), and 1/2 oz dehydrated soup. For this meal the worker was charged 7 lire which was deducted from his daily wage.

2nd Area 4 Adm, 11 Feb 44 advised the Capt. Superintendant of the Taranto Dockyard that this issue would be available from 15 Feb 44.

When investigating the causes of the discontent of the Taranto Dockyard workers my Labour officers discovered that only dehydrated soup had been issued and that the authority to draw bread and vegetables had not been exercised.

I hope that the authority to draw the full mid-shift meal is now being used and that the dockyard workers are satisfied that they are receiving the maximum amount of food permitted by the existing supply situation.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner .

Rear Admiral C. E. Morgan, D.S.O., R.N.
F.O.T.A.L.I.

COPY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The Minister of N[illegible]

D5d 922
25 MAG 1944

19 May 1944

Dear Commander Stone:

I wish to send you my sincerest thanks for your interest in the question of footwear for the Italian Navy.

Cordially yours,

De Courten

Ellery W. Stone,
Captain, USNR,
Deputy Chief Commissioner.

551

Italy

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IL MINISTRO DELLA MARINA

19 Maggio 1944

D3 13 92
25 MAG 1944

Caro Comandante Stone,

Le invio le mie più sincere espressioni di gratitudine per il suo interessamento nei riguardi del problema delle calzature per la Marina Italiana .=

Cordiali saluti.

Ellery W. Stone
Captain, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

5513

20

0198

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DSA/lab

ES/15

19 May 1944

Subject: Italian Salvage Organization.

To: Flag Officer, Western Italy.

DSM 877
21 MAG. 1944

1. Reference your FOWIT 223 of 3 May 44, calling attention to a cutting from the Union Jack involving the appropriation of 5,000,000 Lire for raising sunken vessels in Italian harbours. I have made an investigation and find that the basis of this article rises from the activities of the Italian Ministry of Public Works.

2. I have been advised that this Ministry was expecting to engage in certain harbour clearance of secondary ports.

3. In order there may be no confusion I have ordered that the Italian Ministry be notified of the information contained in your letter as to the proper organization to deal with such matters.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

5512

RECEIVED
20 MAY 1944
OOS DSC

19

ES/15-
19 May 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

S.3813

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT.

MEETING BETWEEN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MEDITERRANEAN STATION AND ITALIAN MINISTER OF MARINE.

FROM THE FLAG OFFICER, TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE 30th May, 1944. No. T.A. 25.

TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
(Copy to: Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station)

HQ ACC, APO 394
Secret Gen
Rec'd 1 June 1944
By

The attached minutes of a meeting held at Taranto on 18th May, 1944, between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station and the Minister of Marine are forwarded for information.

HEADQUARTERS
7 JUN 1944
A. C. C.

H. J. Morgan.

REAR-ADMIRAL.

Seen by Admiral Stone. See folio 4 & 5 ante. H.S. 6 Feb. 45.

Enclosure:-
Minutes of Meeting.

1511

18a

Commodore Palmer
Please speak. Where is
the communist
with him
OK

TOP SECRET.

MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN STATION, AND THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF MARINE, AT 1500 ON THURSDAY, 18TH MAY, 1944.

Present:-

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham, K.C.B., M.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station.

Admiral R. de Courten, Minister of Marine of the Royal Italian Navy.

Rear-Admiral C. E. Morgan, D.S.C., Flag Officer Taranto and Adriatic and for Liaison with Italians.

Captain M. B. Laing, O.B.E., Royal Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Captain S. N. Blackburn, D.S.C., Royal Navy, Chief Staff Officer (Liaison, Italy) to F.O.T.A.L.I.

Captain Pecori, Italian Royal Navy.

Captain Giuriati, Italian Royal Navy.

Paymaster Lieutenant Commander G. H. L. Kitson, Royal Navy, Secretary to F.O.T.A.L.I.

5510

The Commander-in-Chief opened the meeting by saying that he had given deep consideration to the points which the Minister of Marine had communicated to him through Admiral Morgan. He proposed to deal with them one by one and said he would be glad to consider anything which the Minister might wish to add to his previous proposals.

Captain Pecori read out the following three points on behalf of the Minister :-

(i) Italy has been at War with Germany for seven months, and no-one is more anxious to fight the Germans and to see that the Italian effort is the maximum possible.

(ii) With the above in view it is pointed out that considerations which are suggested by the Minister as a result of his knowledge and experience of the Italian Navy and of its material and personnel could in no way be meant as objections or difficulties.

[illegible] have families in German occupied

3/321-3 8003 CP

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Present:-

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham, K.C.B., M.V.O.,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station.
Admiral R. de Courten, Minister of Marine of the
Royal Italian Navy.
Rear-Admiral C. E. Morgan, D.S.C., Flag Officer Taranto and
Adriatic and for Liaison with Italians.

Captain M. B. Laing, O.B.E., Royal Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff
to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Captain S. N. Blackburn, D.S.C., Royal Navy, Chief Staff
Officer (Liaison, Italy) to F.O.T.A.L.I.

Captain Pecori, Italian Royal Navy.

Captain Giuriati, Italian Royal Navy.

Paymaster Lieutenant Commander G. H. L. Kitson, Royal Navy,
Secretary to F.O.T.A.L.I.

5510

The Commander-in-Chief opened the meeting by saying that he had given deep consideration to the points which the Minister of Marine had communicated to him through Admiral Morgan. He proposed to deal with them one by one and said he would be glad to consider anything which the Minister might wish to add to his previous proposals.

Captain Pecori read out the following three points on behalf of the Minister :-

(i) Italy has been at War with Germany for seven months, and no-one is more anxious to fight the Germans and to see that the Italian effort is the maximum possible.

(ii) With the above in view it is pointed out that considerations which are suggested by the Minister as a result of his knowledge and experience of the Italian Navy and of its material and personnel could in no way be meant as objections or difficulties.

(iii) Almost 80% of the Italian Navy have families in German occupied territory, in very difficult financial situations and subject to heavy reprisals. It is this difficult situation which I look after with every possible care, and I cannot ignore that, although it does not worry me too much, it does cause difficult situations in both the higher and lower ranks of the Italian Navy.

The Commander-in-Chief replied that he fully appreciated that the Italian Navy had done all that lies in its power in a co-belligerent sense during the last few months. He further stated that he would always be glad to receive advice from the Minister in the light of his knowledge of the Italian Navy and the Italian mentality, but that it was his duty to co-ordinate the effort of the Allies and Co-belligerents into one most.....

18a

18 May 44

W/321-5 & 323/22

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Minutes of a Meeting Between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, and the Italian Minister of Marine, at 1700 on Thursday, 18th May, 1944.

---

one most effective whole against the common enemy, and on that basis he had read the points made by the Minister with interest and, in many respects, with sympathy.

(Note:- The item numbers and paragraph references which follow correspond to those of the points raised by the Minister.)

ITEM 1. - RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALIAN NAVY AND ALLIED AUTHORITIES.

Paragraph 3 :- (a) The Commander-in-Chief stated that he was not at present prepared to separate Flag Officer Taranto Area and Flag Officer Liaison, Italy. The merging of these two appointments has proved of definite benefit to the Allied war effort since it places one Flag Officer in touch with both the Italian and the operational problem, who is therefore in a position to co-ordinate administration and operations.

The Minister stated that so far as Taranto Area was concerned all was running smoothly, but he was concerned regarding the liaison in other areas such as Sardinia and Naples. The Commander-in-Chief said that the Senior Officers in these areas were acting directly under his orders and would normally act in liaison with their Italian opposite numbers on unimportant and routine matters. On important questions and matters of general interest they would write to F.O.T.A.L.I., asking him to take them up with the Minister of Marine.

5509

The question of what was to happen if the Minister found it essential to move to Rome when it is captured and the Italian Government has been established there, was discussed. The Commander-in-Chief stated that if and when this occurred, he would reconsider the question of separating F.O.T.A. and F.O.L.I., and added that, wherever the Minister might move, there would always be an officer of the rank of Commodore or above to represent the Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission and F.O.T.A.L.I.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief considered it essential to decentralise as much as possible and said that questions of routine or of local importance only should be dealt with direct between the local Allied and Italian Authorities. He agreed that all important questions and those of general interest should be referred to F.O.T.A.L.I., to be taken up with the Minister.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

and, in many respects, with sympathy.

(Note:- The item numbers and paragraph references which follow correspond to those of the points raised by the Minister.

ITEM 1. - RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALIAN NAVY AND ALLIED AUTHORITIES.

Paragraph 3 :- (a) The Commander-in-Chief stated that he was not at present prepared to separate Flag Officer Taranto Area and Flag Officer Liaison, Italy. The merging of these two appointments has proved of definite benefit to the Allied war effort since it places one Flag Officer in touch with both the Italian and the operational problem, who is therefore in a position to co-ordinate administration and operations.

The Minister stated that so far as Taranto Area was concerned all was running smoothly, but he was concerned regarding the liaison in other areas such as Sardinia and Naples. The Commander-in-Chief said that the Senior Officers in these areas were acting directly under his orders and would normally act in liaison with their Italian opposite numbers on unimportant and routine matters. On important questions and matters of general interest they would write to F.O.T.A.L.I., asking him to take them up with the Minister of Marine.

5509

The question of what was to happen if the Minister found it essential to move to Rome when it is captured and the Italian Government has been established there, was discussed. The Commander-in-Chief stated that if and when this occurred, he would reconsider the question of separating F.O.T.A. and F.O.L.I., and added that, wherever the Minister might move, there would always be an officer of the rank of Commodore or above to represent the Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission and F.O.T.A.L.I.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief considered it essential to decentralise as much as possible and said that questions of routine or of local importance only should be dealt with direct between the local Allied and Italian Authorities. He agreed that all important questions and those of general interest should be referred to F.O.T.A.L.I., to be taken up with the Minister.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief agreed with the Minister on this point and asked Admiral Morgan to prepare a paper setting out the differentiation between F.O.T.A.L.I., and the Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission.

(d) The Commander-in-Chief agreed that the Italian Mini of Marine should control the internal administration of the Italian Navy on its own authority, but pointed out that for operational reasons and in the interests of the Allied war effort, it was essential for him to give instructions regarding certain matters of an internal administrative nature.

(18a)

The Minister.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Minutes of a Meeting between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station and the Italian Minister of Marine, at 1500 on [illegible], 18th May, 1944.

The Minister cited the case of the reduction of the "Eugenio di Savoia" and "Caderna" to care and maintenance and said that he would have preferred F.O.T.A.L.I., not to have made a specific statement regarding the numbers of officers and men who should remain in the ships. It was pointed out that Admiral Morgan had merely suggested these numbers, which are based on the standard British care and maintenance party of one fifth of the ship's complement;. and had asked for the Minister's early proposals.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that he would have no objection to the Minister making some small increases in these figures, but asked that early action should be taken observing that 18 days have now elapsed since F.O.T A.L.I's letter was written.

ITEM 2. - EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLESHIPS AT MALTA.

The Commander-in-Chief agreed that one "Duilio" class battleship, and "Cesare" should be sent to Taranto and the other "Duilio" class battleship to Syracuse. He will communicate this officially to the Minister in the near future, stating which of the "Duilio" class is to go to Taranto and which to Syracuse.

The Commander-in-Chief further stated that he had been influenced in making this decision by the hardship which the crews of the battleships were at present undergoing at Malta. He laid down the following conditions for the return of these battleships:-

(i) To land all except anti-aircraft ammunition at Augusta.

55UK (ii) Only repairs essential to keep the ships afloat to be carried out.

(iii) All three ships to be reduced to reserve complement.

The Minister agreed to all the Commander-in-Chief's conditions but asked that the ships should be allowed to embark practice ammunition if required to go to sea for target practice. The Commander-in-Chief gave tentative approval to this request but pointed out that it would not be possible to allow any increase over and above the reserve complements to enable the ships to proceed to sea for this purpose. The Minister said that this would not be necessary.

The Minister of Marine expressed his gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief for his favourable decision.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

that he would have preferred F.O.T.A.L.I., not to have made a specific statement regarding the numbers of officers and men who should remain in the ships. It was pointed out that Admiral Morgan had merely suggested these numbers, which are based on the standard British care and maintenance party of one fifth of the ship's complement;. and had asked for the Minister's early proposals.

The Commander-in-Chief stated that he would have no objection to the Minister making some small increases in these figures, but asked that early action should be taken observing that 18 days have now elapsed since F.O.T A.L.I's letter was written.

ITEM 2. - EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLESHIPS AT MALTA.

The Commander-in-Chief agreed that one "Duilio" class battleship, and "Cesare" should be sent to Taranto and the other "Duilio" class battleship to Syracuse. He will communicate this officially to the Minister in the near future, stating which of the "Duilio" class is to go to Taranto and which to Syracuse.

The Commander-in-Chief further stated that he had been influenced in making this decision by the hardship which the crews of the battleships were at present undergoing at Malta. He laid down the following conditions for the return of these battleships:-

(i) To land all except anti-aircraft ammunition at Augusta.

55UK (ii) Only repairs essential to keep the ships afloat to be carried out.

(iii) All three ships to be reduced to reserve complement.

The Minister agreed to all the Commander-in-Chief's conditions but asked that the ships should be allowed to embark practice ammunition if required to go to sea for target practice. The Commander-in-Chief gave tentative approval to this request but pointed out that it would not be possible to allow any increase over and above the reserve complements to enable the ships to proceed to sea for this purpose. The Minister said that this would not be necessary.

The Minister of Marine expressed his gratitude to the Commander-in-Chief for his favourable decision.

ITEM 3. - POSITION OF BATTLESHIPS "VITTORIO VENETO" AND "ITALIA".

Paragraph 4. :- (a) The Commander-in-Chief stated that he had this question continually under review and that if and when the battleship "Italia" was required she would be repaired.

(b).....

(18a)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Minutes of a Meeting Between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, and the Italian Minister of Marine, at 1500 on Thursday, 18th May, 1944.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that the reduction in the ships' companies had been agreed between the local British and Italian Authorities. He is prepared to investigate the present numbers which, however, he feels to be excessive.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree to these battleships being transferred from Ismailia.

With regard to (b) and (c) above, the Commander-in-Chief said that he could foresee no occasion for the use of these battleships in the future, since the Allies already have sufficient battleships to meet their requirements. The maintenance of their material and exercising of the ships is not, therefore, important in the interests of the Allied war effort.

The Commander-in-Chief considered that to avoid discomfort, the number of personnel on board should be reduced to the irreducible minimum.

ITEM 4. - SHORE LEAVE.

The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree with the Minister's proposals. He pointed out the incidents that had already occurred in various places in the Mediterranean between Italian maritime personnel and that of the United Nations. He considered the removal of the battleships from Malta should be of assistance in this connection.

550 ITEM 5. - INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION.

The Commander-in-Chief thanked the Minister for bringing this question to his notice and assured the Minister that he had the question of the state of repair of Italian and French Naval units in German hands continually in mind. The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree that there should be a greater exchange of information between the British and Italian intelligence services than at present.

ITEM 6. - NAVAL COMMAND IN SICILY.

The Commander-in-Chief said that his decision regarding Naval Command in Sicily has been communicated to the Minister in F.O.T.A.I.'s letter No.T.A.1140/10 of 12th May, 1944. The Commander-in-Chief

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

the present numbers which, however, he feels to be excessive.

(c) The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree to these battleships being transferred from Ismailia.

With regard to (b) and (c) above, the Commander-in-Chief said that he could foresee no occasion for the use of these battleships in the future, since the Allies already have sufficient battleships to meet their requirements. The maintenance of their material and exercising of the ships is not, therefore, important in the interests of the Allied war effort.

The Commander-in-Chief considered that to avoid discomfort, the number of personnel on board should be reduced to the irreducible minimum.

ITEM 4. - SHORE LEAVE.

The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree with the Minister's proposals. He pointed out the incidents that had already occurred in various places in the Mediterranean between Italian maritime personnel and that of the United Nations. He considered the removal of the battleships from Malta should be of assistance in this connection.

5501 ITEM 5. - INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION.

The Commander-in-Chief thanked the Minister for bringing this question to his notice and assured the Minister that he had the question of the state of repair of Italian and French Naval units in German hands continually in mind. The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree that there should be a greater exchange of information between the British and Italian intelligence services than at present.

ITEM 6. - NAVAL COMMAND IN SICILY.

The Commander-in-Chief said that his decision regarding Naval Command in Sicily has been communicated to the Minister in F.O.T.A.M.E.'s letter No.T.A.1140/10 of 12th May, 1944. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that he had not made these decisions without careful consideration and they were essential for the retention of operational control.

The Minister was concerned regarding the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the Commander-in-Chief's decision, which reads as follows:- "It is to be clearly understood, however, that the Italian senior officer of each of these establishments is to be subordinate to the British or United States senior officer, whatever his rank."

(18a)

It was.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Minutes of Meeting between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, and the Italian Minister of Marine, at 1500 on Thursday, 18th May, 1944.

It was tentatively agreed that the following words should be inserted after the words, "United States senior officer" :- "acting under the delegated authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station."

ITEM 7. - COMMUNICATIONS.

The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree that any change should be made as regards (a) and (b) of the Minister's proposals. With regard to (c), the Minister was asked to take this question up direct with F.O.T.A.L.I.

ITEM 8. - LABOUR AND MATERIAL FOR ITALIAN AND ALLIED NAVIES.

The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that all the material in use in Italy is now being produced by the Allies for use in the Allied war effort. The Allied Control Commission, acting on behalf of the Allied Governments, must therefore be responsible for deciding where, when and how this material is to be employed and for allocating priorities between British and Italian ships. He did not, therefore, agree that a joint commission such as that suggested by the Minister was necessary at present.

ITEM 9. - APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICERS IN COMMAND.

With regard to paragraph 1.(a), the Commander-in-Chief stated that he regarded the entire Mediterranean as being under Allied Military Control. It is, therefore, essential for all changes in appointment of Italian officers in command to be referred to him, through F.O.T.A.L.I., for approval. It was agreed that the Minister of Marine should refer all changes in appointment of officers of the rank of Captain and above to the Commander-in-Chief, through F.O.T.A.L.I.

5505

"EUGENIO DI SAVOIA".

The Minister raised the question of repairs to the "Eugenio di Savoia". The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that all docks in Taranto and elsewhere are in full use for high priority repairs. However, he asked Admiral Morgan to bear the question in mind in case a dock should become available for the length of time required for the docking of this ship.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Mediterranean Station."

ITEM 7. - COMMUNICATIONS.

The Commander-in-Chief was unable to agree that any change should be made as regards (a) and (b) of the Minister's proposals. With regard to (c), the Minister was asked to take this question up direct with F.O.T.A.L.I.

ITEM 8. - LABOUR AND MATERIAL FOR ITALIAN AND ALLIED NAVIES.

The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that all the material in use in Italy is now being produced by the Allies for use in the Allied war effort. The Allied Control Commission, acting on behalf of the Allied Governments, must therefore be responsible for deciding where, when and how this material is to be employed and for allocating priorities between British and Italian ships. He did not, therefore, agree that a joint commission such as that suggested by the Minister was necessary at present.

ITEM 9. - APPOINTMENTS OF OFFICERS IN COMMAND.

With regard to paragraph 1.(a), the Commander-in-Chief stated that he regarded the entire Mediterranean as being under Allied Military Control. It is, therefore, essential for all changes in appointment of Italian officers in command to be referred to him, through F.O.T.A.L.I., for approval. It was agreed that the Minister of Marine should refer all changes in appointment of officers of the rank of Captain and above to the Commander-in-Chief, through F.O.T.A.L.I.

5506

"EUGENIO DI SAVOIA".

The Minister raised the question of repairs to the "Eugenio di Savoia". The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that all docks in Taranto and elsewhere are in full use for high priority repairs. However, he asked Admiral Morgan to bear the question in mind in case a dock should became available for the length of time required for the docking of this ship.

A.F. Kitson

PAYMASTER LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, ROYAL NAVY.

Distribution:-

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station (3 copies)
Minister of Marine (3 copies)
Deputy Chief of Staff to
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station. (3 copies).

(18a)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM Nº 1.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ITALIAN NAVY & ALLIED AUTHORITIES.

1) In the agreement reached on 23rd September 1943 (that is to say before the declaration of war against Germany by Italy) with Admiral Sir Andrew CUNNINGHAM regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet to assist the Allied effort in the continuation of the war, it was established that:

a) - the units of the Italian Fleet, utilized for war operations, would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, in accordance with agreements to be reached between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government. (Para 1, sub para a).

b) - the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief would act as representative of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Fleet, the stationing and the armament of the ships. (Para 1, sub para d).

c) - the Commander-in-Chief would place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine a Naval Officer of high rank, who would answer to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for all matters relative to the employment of the Italian Fleet and who would advance the requests of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Ministry of Marine, acting in close collaboration with the latter for the issueing of all orders to the Italian Fleet. (Para 2).

From the above summary it is seen that the agreement was inspired by the following principles:

a) The Italian Ministry of Marine retains on principle complete authority over the entire organization which is subordinate to it, of which (organization) the Fleet is the operating part.

5503

b) The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as representative of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, having the power to direct Naval operations in the Mediterranean, informs the Italian Ministry of Marine of his requirements relative to the employment of the Fleet.

c) The forwarding of such requests, and the issueing of the orders relative to the Italian Fleet by the Ministry of Marine, to be effected through and with the collaboration of a British Naval Officer of high rank, placed at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine.

2) In the course of the practical application of the above-stated principles, which now covers a period of approximately seven months, I have encountered the following disadvantages:

a) The Naval Officer placed at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine (F.O.I.M.) having been unified with

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, in accordance with agreements to be reached between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government. (Para 1, sub para a).

b) - the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief would act as representative of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Fleet, the stationing and the armament of the ships. (Para 1, sub para d).

c) - the Commander-in-Chief would place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine a Naval Officer of high rank, who would answer to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for all matters relative to the employment of the Italian Fleet and who would advance the requests of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Ministry of Marine, acting in close collaboration with the latter for the issueing of all orders to the Italian Fleet. (Para 2).

From the above summary it is seen that the agreement was inspired by the following principles:

a) The Italian Ministry of Marine retains on principle complete authority over the entire organization which is subordinate to it, of which (organization) the Fleet is the operating part.

5503

b) The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as representative of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, having the power to direct Naval operations in the Mediterranean, informs the Italian Ministry of Marine of his requirements relative to the employment of the Fleet.

c) The forwarding of such requests, and the issueing of the orders relative to the Italian Fleet by the Ministry of Marine, to be effected through and with the collaboration of a British Naval Officer of high rank, placed at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine.

2) In the course of the practical application of the above-stated principles, which now covers a period of approximately seven months, I have encountered the following disadvantages:

a) The Naval Officer placed at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine (F.O.L.I.), having been unified with the Officer of Admiral's rank appointed to the Taranto area (F.O.T.A.), has gradually assumed an ever more local character and has lost the position of superiority which should have derived by virtue of his being the high liaison organ between the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Ministry of Marine for matters appertaining to the employment of the Fleet; I must draw your attention, in this respect, that the residence at Taranto of the central organ of the Royal (Italian) Navy is only of a temporary nature and is liable to cease in a short while.

(182)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

b) In consequence of that stated above, the tendency has been increased gradually for other organs of the British Naval Command to deal directly with local Italian Maritime Commands on matters which, because of their general character, can be examined and decided upon only by the Italian Ministry of Marine; on this subject I must bring to notice that, for obvious reasons inherent to the present situation of the Italian Navy in this delicate phase of co-belligerency, the obligation of maintaining a direct and strict centralised control upon the activities of the Navy and its personnel is encumbent upon me, in contrast perhaps to the British Navy, whose position and whose employment in a sphere of world action contribute to counsel its functioning in a largely decentralised manner.

c) In a few cases the intervention of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has been requested by F.C.L.I. or has come about in a direct manner, in matters which exceed the sphere of the employment of the Fleet or in matters connected with it; in consequence doubtshhave arisen relative to the rights and duties of office of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and those of the Allied Control Commission, as well as the degree of autonomy which the Ministry of Marine cannot be without in matters of discipline, organization, technique etc.

d) In a few cases problems of secondary importance, discussed with F.C.L.I. have had very slow development because of the necessity for F.C.L.I. to refer them to and be given orders by the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

3) In regard to that which is stated above, I suggest the necessity that the following measures be taken:

a) That F.C.L.I. be detached from F.C.T.A., so that the Officer of high rank placed at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine has a definite appointment and one in keeping with the importance of his duties.

b) That it be established that all requests of a general nature, emanating from the Allied Naval Authorities, be forwarded to the Italian Ministry of Marine always through F.C.L.I.

5503

c) That the field of jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and that of the Allied Control Commission in matters relative to the Italian Fleet, be defined.

d) That all interference be obviated in actions which the Italian Ministry of Marine has to perform with its own necessary authority, in all matters which come within its field or jurisdiction, bearing in mind that the active and loyal co-belligerence over a period of six months gives the most ample assurance as regards the course and the aims of that Ministry.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

manner.

c) In a few cases the intervention of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has been requested by F.O.L.I. or has come about in a direct manner, in matters which exceed the sphere of the employment of the Fleet or in matters connected with it; in consequence doubtshhave arisen relative to the rights and duties of office of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and those of the Allied Control Commission, as well as the degree of autonomy which the Ministry of Marine cannot be without in matters of discipline, organization, technique etc.

d) In a few cases problems of secondary importance, discussed with F.O.L.I. have had very slow development because of the necessity for F.O.L.I. to refer them to and be given orders by the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

3) In regard to that which is stated above, I suggest the necessity that the following measures be taken:

a) That F.O.L.I. be detached from F.O.T.A., so that the Officer of high rank placed at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine has a definite appointment and one in keeping with the importance of his duties.

b) That it be established that all requests of a general nature, emanating from the Allied Naval Authorities, be forwarded to the Italian Ministry of Marine always through F.O.L.I.

550

c) That the field of jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and that of the Allied Control Commission in matters relative to the Italian Fleet, be defined.

d) That all interference be obviated in actions which the Italian Ministry of Marine has to perform with its own necessary authority, in all matters which come within its field or jurisdiction, bearing in mind that the active and loyal co-belligerence over a period of six months gives the most ample assurance as regards the course and the aims of that Ministry.

Everything must come to Fotl
Based on British C+M of 1/5

18a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N° 2.

EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLESHIPS OF THE "DUILIO" CLASS.

1) On 7th November 1943 I handed to Admiral POWER, on the occasion of his departure from Taranto, an Aide-Memoire for Admirals Sir Andrew CUNNINGHAM, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir John CUNNINGHAM, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, this Aide-Memoire being the direct result of an agreement of outlooks with Admiral POWER himself in regard to the present and future requirements of the Royal Italian Navy.

In the Aide-Memoire, I made evident the Italian Navy's need to have available at Taranto and Augusta a Battleship of the DUILIO Class in each Base, with the object of being able to complete the professional training of Cadets who would shortly pass out of the Royal Naval Academy, and to renew the formation of specialized lower-deck personnel (Seamen and Gunnery trainees).

2) On 16th December 1943, Admiral Mc GRIGOR, back from Algiers where he had conferred with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, communicated to me that the problem of the return to Taranto of one of the DUILIO Class Battleships was in course of examination, stressing that the solution would be subordinated to the maintenance of the ship's armament in its present condition (heavy calibre guns immobilised by removal of the breech-blocks) so as to avoid difficulties of principle in regard to the policy of the Allies concerning the Italian warships.

I adhered to the British request so as to have available, within a short space of time, a battleship for training purposes.

3) On 19th January 1944, to provide for this need which had become ever more pressing, especially for the Royal Naval Academy Cadets, I wrote a personal letter to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, renewing the request for an early favourable decision.

5503

4) On 23rd March 1944, not having received any reply up till then, I addressed a letter to F.O.L.I., recapitulating the matters in question, making further proposals thereto and requesting an early decision from Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. But this request also has had no reply to-date.

5) In the meantime, the organic needs of the Royal Italian Navy have been progressively increasing: If, as I have reason to believe, also in consequence of the British Prime Minister's public declarations, the contribution made by the Royal Italian Navy to co-belligerency should eventually become stronger, in harmony with the principle of making every effort to bring nearer a victorious conclusion to the conflict, it is absolutely indispensable that provision be made for the training and formation of technical specialized personnel. It would be very difficult for me to maintain units of the Italian Fleet in activity, pro-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

In the Aide-Memoire, I made evident the Italian Navy's need to have available at Taranto and Augusta a Battleship of the DUILIO Class in each Base, with the object of being able to complete the professional training of Cadets who would shortly pass out of the Royal Naval Academy, and to renew the formation of specialized lower-deck personnel (Seamen and Gunnery trainees).

2) On 16th December 1943, Admiral Mc GRIGOR, back from Algiers where he had conferred with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, communicated to me that the problem of the return to Taranto of one of the DUILIO Class Battleships was in course of examination, stressing that the solution would be subordinated to the maintenance of the ship's armament in its present condition (heavy calibre guns immobilised by removal of the breech-blocks) so as to avoid difficulties of principle in regard to the policy of the Allies concerning the Italian warships.

I adhered to the British request so as to have available, within a short space of time, a battleship for training purposes.

3) On 19th January 1944, to provide for this need which had become ever more pressing, especially for the Royal Naval Academy Cadets, I wrote a personal letter to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, renewing the request for an early favourable decision.

5503 4) On 23rd March 1944, not having received any reply up till then, I addressed a letter to F.O.L.I., recapitulating the matters in question, making further proposals thereto and requesting an early decision from Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. But this request also has had no reply to-date.

5) In the meantime, the organic needs of the Royal Italian Navy have been progressively increasing: If, as I have reason to believe, also in consequence of the British Prime Minister's public declarations, the contribution made by the Royal Italian Navy to co-belligerency should eventually become stronger, in harmony with the principle of making every effort to bring nearer a victorious conclusion to the conflict, it is absolutely indispensable that provision be made for the training and formation of technical specialized personnel. It would be very difficult for me to maintain units of the Italian Fleet in activity, providing for the necessary replacements and integrations of personnel, if it were not possible to renew the functioning of training classes. All Royal Italian Naval schools (training establishments) were situated in the part of Italy at present controlled by the Germans: and the rapid succession of events, connected with the conclusion of the Armistice and with its consequences, have not allowed me to set up in Free Italy other than the Royal Naval Academy.

(182)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The situation ruling in liberated Italy, above all regarding the availability of buildings and shore equipment, does now allow me to organize such schools on shore.

I do not see any other solution to the problem other than taking recourse to the old-class battleships for accomodation and professional instruction, providing above all that they are not to be assigned war duties.

And, so as to satisfy the organic requirements of the Royal Italian Navy, I have no objection that (or place no difficulty in the way of), if it is still considered indispensable, the conditions of armament established for these ships be such as to afford the Allies the desired guarantee of security.

6) In connection with the above, I ask that the following requests be agreed to, even if gradually, in a short space of time:-

a) The transfer to Taranto of one of the DUILIO Class battleships for the training of personnel for the Seamen, Signals, Electrician, Wireless, Motor Mechanic and Engine Room Branches and for the instruction of Cadets for the Executive &Communications service) and Naval Engineering and Naval Armament Branches.

b) The transfer to Augusta of one of the DUILIO Class battleships for the formation of Gunnery and Armourers and Fire-Control personnel, for the instruction of Executive Branch Cadets (Gunnery service) and for the following of courses for Director-Firing.

c) Transfer to Taranto of the Battleship CESARE (the condition of her A/A armament and the state of the hull exclude her at present from being used for war purposes) which would be totally disarmed and employed as an Accomodation-Ship for Royal Italian Naval personnel, also probably as Headquarters for the Royal Italian Navy.

5502

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

difficulty in the way of), if it is still considered indispensable, the conditions of armament established for these ships be such as to afford the Allies the desired guarantee of security.

6) In connection with the above, I ask that the following requests be agreed to, even if gradually, in a short space of time:-

a) The transfer to Taranto of one of the DUILIO Class battleships for the training of personnel for the Seamen, Signals, Electrician, Wireless, Motor Mechanic and Engine Room Branches and for the instruction of Cadets for the Executive (Communications service) and Naval Engineering and Naval Armament Branches.

b) The transfer to Augusta of one of the DUILIO Class battleships for the formation of Gunnery and Armourers and Fire-Control personnel, for the instruction of Executive Branch Cadets (Gunnery service) and for the following of courses for Director-Firing.

c) Transfer to Taranto of the Battleship CESARE (the condition of her A/A armament and the state of the hull exclude her at present from being used for war purposes) which would be totally disarmed and employed as an Accomodation-Ship for Royal Italian Naval personnel, also probably as Headquarters for the Royal Italian Navy.

5502

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N°.3.

SITUATION OF THE BATTLESHIPS "VITTORIO VENETO" AND "ITALIA".

1). According to the orders contained in paragraph 3, sub-paragraph a) of the agreement concluded on the 23rd September, 1943 with Admiral Sir Andrew CUNNINGHAM, measures of disarmament would have had to be applied to the Battleships of the Italian Royal Navy, these to be arranged in such a way that the Units could be put back into service if that should appear advisable. Every ship would have had to maintain on board the quota of Italian personnel deemed sufficient to keep the Unit in good condition.

2). There is no doubt that the recent measures agreed upon to maintain the material in a state of efficiency and to reduce the personnel to that strictly indispensible for the security and maintenance of "VITTORIO VENETO" and "ITALIA" conformed to the letter with the orders summed-up above. And I have appreciated at their just value the considerations which have induced the Commander in Chief Mediterranean to demand a reduction in the Ships' Companies, thereby reducing to a minimum the repercussions of the difficult conditions of material life, imposed by the present transfer of the ships to the Bitter Lakes.

3). When, however, one considers the spirit of the provisions of the agreement concluded with Admiral CUNNINGHAM which are inspired by the criterion of the subsequent re-arming of the Units themselves for employment in War Operations, it appears evident that the progressive passing of time (almost 7 months have elapsed since the time of the agreement with Admiral CUNNINGHAM), and the further reductions of personnel are creating a situation ever more serious in regard to both the efficiency of the material of the two Battleships, and, above all; to their training.

5563

And indeed:-

a). - The particular situation of the Battleship "ITALIA", which is in need of repairs to eliminate the consequences of the German bomb which struck her on the 9th of September 1943, is known: however much the technicians may have affirmed that no serious damage can come to the ship by delaying the work of repair, which would have to be postponed until the end of the war against Germany, it is evident that an excessive prolongation of the present conditions cannot but have repercussions upon the complexity and length of it.

b). - However accurate and scrupulous the execution of the measures

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Royal Navy, these to be arranged in such a way that the Units could be put back into service if that should appear advisable. Every ship would have had to maintain on board the quota of Italian personnel deemed sufficient to keep the Unit in good condition.

2). There is no doubt that the recent measures agreed upon to maintain the material in a state of efficiency and to reduce the personnel to that strictly indispensible for the security and maintenance of "VITTORIO VENETO" and "ITALIA" conformed to the letter with the orders summed-up above. And I have appreciated at their just value the considerations which have induced the Commander in Chief Mediterranean to demand a reduction in the Ships' Companies, thereby reducing to a minimum the repercussions of the difficult conditions of material life, imposed by the present transfer of the ships to the Bitter Lakes.

3). When, however, one considers the spirit of the provisions of the agreement concluded with Admiral CUNNINGHAM which are inspired by the criterion of the subsequent re-arming of the Units themselves for employment in War Operations, it appears evident that the progressive passing of time (almost 7 months have elapsed since the time of the agreement with Admiral CUNNINGHAM), and the further reductions of personnel are creating a situation ever more serious in regard to both the efficiency of the material of the two Battleships, and, above all; to their training.

55

And indeed:-

a). - The particular situation of the Battleship "ITALIA", which is in need of repairs to eliminate the consequences of the German bomb which struck her on the 9th of September 1943, is known: however much the technicians may have affirmed that no serious damage can come to the ship by delaying the work of repair, which would have to be postponed until the end of the war against Germany, it is evident that an excessive prolongation of the present conditions cannot but have repercussions upon the complexity and length of it.

b). - However accurate and scrupulous the execution of the measures for the conservation of material, decided upon in agreement with British technicians, I deem it beyond doubt that, especially in consideration of the great quantity of systems employing electricity in our Battleships, the material will suffer from a long period of inactivity, consequently the time necessary for a subsequent re-arming of the units will become ever greater and will require a greater total amount of work and replacement of material.

c). - The training for war of the two Battleships is so reduced that it is justifiable to presume that in a short time it may reach

18a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

such a low level as to require a considerable time (estimated as at least 6 months for the training of the personnel alone, exclusive of the reconditioning of material) to make the two ships into efficient instruments of war.

4). It is my conviction that, in the subsequent evolution of the present war, these two Battleships, of the most modern type, well armed and well tried out, can constitute a considerable contribution which it would not be advisable to renounce at first evaluation, nor, above all, does it appear logical, should one be of the opinion to be able to use them again, to let the material and fighting efficiency deteriorate, and then have to accomplish at a later date, the long and arduous work of restoration to efficiency.

In consequence I request that :-

a). - The question of the repairs to the Battleship "ITALIA" be always borne in mind so that, as soon as the opportunity occurs, it may be acted upon, in Italy or in Allied Countries.

b). - The decision to reduce the Ships' Companies be reviewed as early as possible, so as to renew, in the necessary manner, the maintenance of the material and the training of the personnel.

c). - The two Battleships may be transferred to a Home Base where the standard of living due to co-belligerents may be permitted to the crews, and the execution of the necessary exercises to the ships.

5500

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

evaluation, nor, above all, does it appear logical, should one be of the opinion to be able to use them again, to let the material and fighting efficiency deteriorate, and then have to accomplish at a later date, the long and arduous work of restoration to efficiency.

In consequence I request that :-

a). - The question of the repairs to the Battleship "ITALIA" be always borne in mind so that, as soon as the opportunity occurs, it may be acted upon, in Italy or in Allied Countries.

b). - The decision to reduce the Ships' Companies be reviewed as early as possible, so as to renew, in the necessary manner, the maintenance of the material and the training of the personnel.

c). - The two Battleships may be transferred to a Home Base where the standard of living due to co-belligerents may be permitted to the crews, and the execution of the necessary exercises to the ships.

5500

B.A.H./-.

18a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N° 4

SHORE LEAVE FOR SHIP's COMPANIES.

1. The problem of shore leave for personnel, during the past seven months, has been the subject of frequent exchanges of views between the Italian and Allied Authorities.

I have particularly appreciated the favourable attitude of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and his efficacious intervention which has permitted the question to be solved favourably in French North Africa.

2. The problem however, still remains in certain territories under the direct or indirect control of the Anglo-Americans, where Italian Naval and Mercantile Units are stationed, or pass in transit.

At GIBRALTAR, FREETOWN (after a period of forty days quarantine), at BERMUDA, I believe also in COLOMBO (but I am not certain), at HAIFA, our crews can enjoy shore leave: it is not the same at MALTA and in EGYPT.

3. It seems to me that six months of co-belligerency, during which Italian Naval and Mercantile Units have made faithful and efficient contribution to the conduct of the war against the common enemy, can and must give to our crews the right of complete equality in shore leave, which is, as all sailors know, the only compensation for the hard life on board ship.

I do not consider that possible inconveniences ashore, if they were to occur, would assume a great importance. Experience up to now, shows even that, after the first contacts, no more incidents occur : and in any case, given the fact that the equality requested will have to be applied, every delay increases, and not lightens, the possibility and gravity of such occurrences.

4. Consequently, I request that :

5499

- a) The complete equality of Italian Maritime Personnel with that of the United Nations, be explicitly affirmed in regard to shore leave.

- b) Whenever exceptions of a local character are considered absolutely necessary, Italian Naval and Mercantile Units, although operating in such localities, must not be based there.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and his efficacious intervention which has permitted the question to be solved favourably in French North Africa.

2. The problem however, still remains in certain territories under the direct or indirect control of the Anglo-Americans, where Italian Naval and Mercantile Units are stationed, or pass in transit.

At GIBRALTAR, FREETOWN (after a period of forty days quarantine), at BERMUDA, I believe also in COLOMBO (but I am not certain), at HAIFA, our crews can enjoy shore leave: it is not the same at MALTA and in EGYPT.

3. It seems to me that six months of co-belligerency, during which Italian Naval and Mercantile Units have made faithful and efficient contribution to the conduct of the war against the common enemy, can and must give to our crews the right of complete equality in shore leave, which is, as all sailors know, the only compensation for the hard life on board ship.

I do not consider that possible inconveniences ashore, if they were to occur, would assume a great importance. Experience up to now, shows even that, after the first contacts, no more incidents occur : and in any case, given the fact that the equality requested will have to be applied, every delay increases, and not lightens, the possibility and gravity of such occurrences.

4. Consequently, I request that :

5499

- a) The complete equality of Italian Maritime Personnel with that of the United Nations, be explicitly affirmed in regard to shore leave.

- b) Whenever exceptions of a local character are considered absolutely necessary, Italian Naval and Mercantile Units, although operating in such localities, must not be based there.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

(18)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N° 5

SITUATION OF ITALIAN AND FRENCH SHIPS WHICH REMAINED IN THE GERMAN CONTROLLED AREA.

1. Ever since the meeting with ADMIRAL Sir Andrew CUNNINGHAM on 23rd September 1943, I insisted in making clear that in the area controlled by Germany, there were left :-

- a) Italian Naval Units under repair, the major part of which had been scuttled in the repair bases.
- b) Italian Naval Units under construction or being completed, considered probably scuttled or sabotaged.
- c) French Naval Units which, salvaged or being salvaged, were being re-fitted for re-commissioning.

In addition to this, I stressed the fact that, in view of the unforeseen rapidity with which those events, connected with the conclusion of the Armistice, developed, it was to be presumed that the acts of sabotage, or the scuttling, would cause only the temporary inactivity of the Units concerned, and that the probability of the major part of the Units being re-commissioned within the near or distant future, had to be taken into consideration.

I concluded affirming that it was possible that, within a length of time varying from six to twelve months from the Armistice, two Naval Forces, the strength of which could estimated with a fair degree of accuracy, might be constituted under German control, either in the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas. This strength, at first seemed to be such as to call for the necessity of concentrating fairly large Naval Forces (including heavy Units) in the Mediterranean, thereby partly annulling the advantages gained by the Allies from the Armistice concluded with Italy.

As time went by, and more or less reliable information was reaching me, regarding the re-fitting of the Italian or French Units which had remained in German-controlled Italy, I informed C.F.O.L.I, insisting upon the views I had already expressed to ADMIRAL Sir Andrew CUNNINGHAM.

549

I also requested that the photographs taken during Air Reconnaissance of the principal enemy bases in the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas by Allied Air Forces, be supplied to us, as I considered that interpretation of these by our experts, who are perfectly cognisant of the characteristics of the harbours and Naval Units, would have helped in the task of estimating the stage of advancement of the refit work undertaken by the Germans.

3. I am certain that this problem which can have serious repercussions in the conduct of the Naval War in the Mediterranean, is correctly apprised by the Commander in Chief Mediterranean.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

- b) Italian Naval Units under construction or being completed, considered probably scuttled or sabotaged.

- c) French Naval Units which, salvaged or being salvaged, were being re-fitted for re-commissioning.

In addition to this, I stressed the fact that, in view of the unforeseen rapidity with which those events, connected with the conclusion of the Armistice, developed, it was to be presumed that the acts of sabotage, or the scuttling, would cause only the temporary inactivity of the Units concerned, and that the probability of the major part of the Units being re-commissioned within the near or distant future, had to be taken into consideration.

I concluded affirming that it was possible that, within a length of time varying from six to twelve months from the Armistice, two Naval Forces, the strength of which could estimated with a fair degree of accuracy, might be constituted under German control, either in the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas. This strength, at first seemed to be such as to call for the necessity of concentrating fairly large Naval Forces (including heavy Units) in the Mediterranean, thereby partly annulling the advantages gained by the Allies from the Armistice concluded with Italy.

As time went by, and more or less reliable information was reaching me, regarding the re-fitting of the Italian or French Units which had remained in German-controlled Italy, I informed F.O.L.I, insisting upon the views I had already expressed to ADMIRAL Sir Andrew CUNNINGHAM.

549

I also requested that the photographs taken during Air Reconnaissance of the principal enemy bases in the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas by Allied Air Forces, be supplied to us, as I considered that interpretation of these by our experts, who are perfectly cognisant of the characteristics of the harbours and Naval Units, would have helped in the task of estimating the stage of advancement of the refit work undertaken by the Germans.

3. I am certain that this problem which can have serious repercussions in the conduct of the Naval War in the Mediterranean, is correctly apprised by the Commander in Chief Mediterranean. But, it is my duty to recall attention to it, and even I consider it necessary to insist upon a closer collaboration between the Allied and Italian Intelligence Services, in this particular field, in order to contribute with our knowledge and to avoid unpleasant surprises.

I attach a copy of the last "List of the Italian and French Units which, at the time of the Armistice remained in territories occupied by the Germans" (May 1944 Edition), compiled by the Intelligence Service of the Royal Italian Navy.

(18a)

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N° 6.

ORGANIZATION IN SICILY.

Now that Sicily has returned under the administration of the Royal Italian Government, it is necessary to define on what lines the organization of the Island may be developed from the Naval point of view.

(a) Long-term Programme.

Maintain only the organization at Augusta, as an administrative base, so as to make use of existing supplies and shore establishments.

(b) Immediate Programme.

To absorb the Naval organization in Sicily into that at present in being in the Taranto, Brindisi and Sardinian areas.

The relative outline is as follows:-

= To institute, in a locality to be decided upon, a High Sicilian Command, under an Admiral, with the task of co-ordinating the services of the Naval Commands, Harbourmasters, Lighthouses and Lights, and to proceed to the regrouping of Naval personnel and materials extant in Sicily for their useful employment in the war within the framework of collaboration.

= To institute a Naval Base Command at Augusta, under a Senior Officer, charged with the task of organizing Naval port services for the operational requirements of the Allies and of Italian ships engaged in escort duties, and to ensure mine-sweeping in the area under his charge.

= To institute a Naval Command at Messina, under a Senior Officer, with the task to proceed to the regrouping of material and personnel, and to ensure mine-sweeping in the Straits area. This Naval Command would absorb that already instituted at Reggio Calabria.

5497

= To institute a Naval Command at Trapani with similar duties to that at Messina. As is known, this Naval Command is in course of being instituted.

This outline has already been forwarded to F.O.L.I. in letter N° 10347/S. dated 22nd March last, with a request that it be submitted to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for his remarks. Meanwhile, in agreement with F.O.L.I., Senior Rear Admiral Antonio BOBBIESE, Senior Officer of the Italian Navy in Sicily designate, has been sent there to engage in the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Maintain only the organization at Augusta, as an administrative base, so as to make use of existing supplies and shore establishments.

(b) Immediate Programme.

To absorb the Naval organization in Sicily into that at present in being in the Taranto, Brindisi and Sardinian areas.

The relative outline is as follows:-

= To institute, in a locality to be decided upon, a High Sicilian Command, under an Admiral, with the task of co-ordinating the services of the Naval Commands, Harbourmasters, Lighthouses and Lights, and to proceed to the regrouping of Naval personnel and materials extant in Sicily for their useful employment in the war within the framework of collaboration.

= To institute a Naval Base Command at Augusta, under a Senior Officer, charged with the task of organizing Naval port services for the operational requirements of the Allies and of Italian ships engaged in escort duties, and to ensure mine-sweeping in the area under his charge.

= To institute a Naval Command at Messina, under a Senior Officer, with the task to proceed to the regrouping of material and personnel, and to ensure mine-sweeping in the Straits area. This Naval Command would absorb that already instituted at Reggio Calabria.

5497

= To institute a Naval Command at Trapani with similar duties to that at Messina. As is known, this Naval Command is in course of being instituted.

This outline has already been forwarded to F.O.L.I. in letter N° 10347/S. dated 22nd March last, with a request that it be submitted to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for his remarks. Meanwhile, in agreement with F.O.L.I., Senior Rear Admiral Antonio BOBBIESE, Senior Officer of the Italian Navy in Sicily designate, has been sent there to engage in the task of co-ordinating the services of the Harbourmasters and Lighthouses and Lights and to begin reorganization of Naval personnel who remained in Sicily.

I thought we gave the orders in Brindisi & Taranto!

(18a)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N° 7.

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Radio Communications.

To accelerate communications between our ships in operation and Allied ships, and between our ships and Allied shore Commands, and to eliminate the uncertainties which may occur with the present organization, it is held that an ANGLO=ITALIAN BILINGUAL CODE is necessary.

(b) Communications by Wire.

It is necessary to establish that line connections between Royal Italian Naval Commands are not subjected to interruptions and requisitioning on the part of local Allied Commands, unless agreed upon by the parties concerned.

(c) Semaphore Service.

It is deemed necessary to define the limits within which the semaphore network could be organized so as to avoid sudden and not pre-arranged taking over or interruptions to the service on the part of outlying Allied Commands. And this particularly in areas as they become liberated, for Sicily and the minor islands.

5493

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) Communications by Wire.

It is necessary to establish that line connections between Royal Italian Naval Commands are not subjected to interruptions and requisitioning on the part of local Allied Commands, unless agreed upon by the parties concerned.

(c) Semaphore Service.

It is deemed necessary to define the limits within which the semaphore network could be organized so as to avoid sudden and not pre-arranged taking over or interruptions to the service on the part of outlying Allied Commands. And this particularly in areas as they become liberated, for Sicily and the minor islands.

5495

(186)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM Nº.9.

LABOUR, APPLIANCES AND MATERIALS FOR THE ITALIAN AND ALLIED NAVIES.

I). I have already had occasion to draw the attention of the Allied Control Commission and of F.O.L.I. to the fundamental problem of labour and appliances required to maintain the Italian Navy and the portion of the Allied Navies operating in the Mediterranean, in a state of efficiency.

The question substantially interests the Allied Control Commission, as it bears on the capacity of production of the Works, but, since the Commander in Chief Mediterranean is directly interested in the efficiency of the Naval Forces, which operate under his direction, I deem it necessary to expound also to him, the actual situation and the possible solutions of the existing difficulties so that I may obtain his authoritative support in this field.

2). The problem, in regard to the Italian Navy, can be summarised from the following facts:-

a). - Before the Armistice, the Italian Royal Navy, to maintain in a state of efficiency and to recondition the fleet, availed itself:-

x). - of the machinery and the appliances of the whole Nation.

xx). - of the labour of about 23,000 Dockyard Workers, supported by about 52,000 workmen of private firms, whilst about 82,000 in other firms supplied subsidiary labour for the Italian Royal Navy.

Instead of which, today, are available:-

i). - other than the Dockyard of TARANTO (upon which in normal times only a portion of the Fleet depended), only the machinery and appliances existing in the Provinces of PUGLIA, which are of less than modest proportions, since as is known, almost the whole of Italian Industry was concentrated in the Northern part of the peninsula,

ii). - about 12,000 workmen, concentrated almost completely in the TARANTO Area.

5495

b). - In the past, the Italian Royal Navy and the Italian Merchant Navy were able to avail themselves in the whole of Italy of about 50 dry docks (24 floating and 26 graving). Today in controlled Italy, there are available 24 dry docks (17

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

terranean, in a state of efficiency.

The question substantially interests the Allied Control Commission, as it bears on the capacity of production of the Works, but, since the Commander in Chief Mediterranean is directly interested in the efficiency of the Naval Forces, which operate under his direction, I deem it necessary to expound also to him, the actual situation and the possible solutions of the existing difficulties so that I may obtain his authoritative support in this field.

2). The problem, in regard to the Italian Navy, can be summarised from the following facts:-

a). - Before the Armistice, the Italian Royal Navy, to maintain in a state of efficiency and to recondition the fleet, availed itself:-

x). - of the machinery and the appliances of the whole Nation.

xx). - of the labour of about 23,000 Dockyard Workers, supported by about 52,000 workmen of private firms, whilst about 82,000 in other firms supplied subsidiary labour for the Italian Royal Navy.

Instead of which, today, are available:-

i). - other than the Dockyard of TARANTO (upon which in normal times only a portion of the Fleet depended), only the machinery and appliances existing in the Provinces of PUGLIA, which are of less than modest proportions, since as is known, almost the whole of Italian Industry was concentrated in the Northern part of the peninsula,

ii). - about 12,000 workmen, concentrated almost completely in the TARANTO Area.

b). - In the past, the Italian Royal Navy and the Italian Merchant Navy were able to avail themselves in the whole of Italy of about 50 dry docks (24 floating and 26 graving). Today in controlled Italy, there are available 24 dry docks (17 floating and 7 graving), of which 19 are efficient (13 floating and 6 graving).

c). - The supplies of materials for construction and repairs are becoming practically exhausted (it should be borne in mind that during the first months of 1943 the greater part of the supplies was concentrated in the Northern part of Italy for war reasons, whilst the sources of such materials are almost exclusively in the Areas of Northern Italy.

549

18a

FORTAL will always represent MMS Points & ACC

Draft from - Subs batteries

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

d). - The active Italian co-belligerency has brought into action, by the directives of the Alliesabout 435 Italian Naval Units large and small, which, by the activity they have been called upon to perform and in consequence of the heavy wear and tear of more than three years of war, have frequent need of small repairs.

e). - One comes to the CONCLUSION that the availability of labour, of equipment and supplies of materials would not in themselves suffice to assure the maintenance of efficiency of even the Italian Royal Navy.

3). - But it must be borne in mind that a large part, assessed roughly at about 2/3rds, of the aforesaid available resources is absorbed by the requirements of the Allied Navies, a fact which occurs in ever wider measure to the resources of controlled Italy. This is right within the framework of the common war: but it is worth bringing into ever wider evidence the necessity to study and to actuate the remedies, essential to supplement the existing possibilities, not only in the Provinces of PUGLIA, but also in the Areas of NAPLES and SICILY. It would thus be possible not only to augment the possibility of output to the advantage of the Allied Navies, but also to eliminate the present lack of efficiency in the Italian Fleet, many Units of which cannot execute the repairs they need for lack, either of labour, of dry docks or of the necessary materials.

I ought to make known, on this subject, that it is my impression that, especially in the NAPLES Area, the Allied Armies and Air Forces, may it be even for justified Operational considerations, are employing the existing resources in a manner which perhaps does not appear to be the most profitable, or at least the most suitable to guarantee the Naval exigencies, which are thus suffering from this situation.

549

I wish also to express the opinion that the problem not only interests the present operational cycle in the Mediterranean, but may make its influence felt also in the future developments of the war in the Indian - Pacific sector: as, in that phase of the war, Italy with her resources and her facilities for repair will constitute a precious supply Area in the rear Area, nearer to the theatre of operations than Great Britain and perhaps nearer than the United States themselves.

And finally I wish to emphasise that, implementation of the possibilities for production in the Naval field, for the reasons already stated and for yet others, cannot be effected except with the support of the Allies and with the aid of their

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

bour, or equipment and supplies of materials would not in themselves suffice to assure the maintenance of efficiency of even the Italian Royal Navy.

3). - But it must be borne in mind that a large part, assessed roughly at about 2/3rds, of the aforesaid available resources is absorbed by the requirements of the Allied Navies, a fact which occurs in ever wider measure to the resources of controlled Italy. This is right within the framework of the common war: but it is worth bringing into ever wider evidence the necessity to study and to actuate the remedies, essential to supplement the existing possibilities, not only in the Provinces of PUGLIA, but also in the Areas of NAPLES and SICILY. It would thus be possible not only to augment the possibility of output to the advantage of the Allied Navies, but also to eliminate the present lack of efficiency in the Italian Fleet, many Units of which cannot execute the repairs they need for lack, either of labour, of dry docks or of the necessary materials.

I ought to make known, on this subject, that it is my impression that, especially in the NAPLES Area, the Allied Armies and Air Forces, may it be even for justified Operational considerations, are employing the existing resources in a manner which perhaps does not appear to be the most profitable, or at least the most suitable to guarantee the Naval exigencies, which are thus suffering from this situation.

549 I wish also to express the opinion that the problem not only interests the present operational cycle in the Mediterranean, but may make its influence felt also in the future developments of the war in the Indian - Pacific sector: as, in that phase of the war, Italy with her resources and her facilities for repair will constitute a precious supply Area in the rear Area, nearer to the theatre of operations than Great Britain and perhaps nearer than the United States themselves.

And finally I wish to emphasise that, implementation of the possibilities for production in the Naval field, for the reasons already stated and for yet others, cannot be effected except with the support of the Allies and with the aid of their organising capacity and of their resources.

4). With regard to what appears above I propose that a Commission be constituted, composed of representatives of the Allied and Italian Navies, assisted by technical experts, to study and effect the provisions to:-

a). - Strengthen the production centres of the Italian Royal Navy.

b). - Restore to a state of efficiency the private firms essential

(18a)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

to the needs of the Allied and Italian Navies at present in being in Liberated Italy, reducing to the minimum the effective requisitions.

c). - I wish finally to state briefly that, when "Materials" needful to the Navy are spoken of, it means not only those necessary for construction and repair, but also those indispensible to the life of the Navy, which for the known reasons of a general nature, cannot be supplied by their ordinary sources. I refer in this regard to two essential categories:

a). - Consumable materials, destined to assure the functioning of the Naval Units and the maintenance of their material.

b). - Clothing (including footwear) for which the help given up to date by the Allies, although much appreciated, can only in the smallest measure reduce the deficiency, due to the progressive consumption without possibility of replacement.

5493

B.A.M./-.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

reasons of a general nature, cannot be supplied by their ordinary sources. I refer in this regard to two essential categories:

a). - Consumable materials, destined to assure the functioning of the Naval Units and the maintenance of their material.

b). - Clothing (including footwear) for which the help given up to date by the Allies, although much appreciated, can only in the smallest measure reduce the deficiency, due to the progressive consumption without possibility of replacement.

5493

B.A.H./-.

(18a)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITEM N° 9

APPOINTMENTS AND MOVEMENTS OF OFFICERS HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMAND.

1. One of the questions, which is among the disadvantages referred to in paragraph 2, sub-paragraph c), of Item N°1 (Relations between the Italian Navy and Allied Authorities), is that of the appointments and movements of Officers with responsibilities of Command.

Whilst during the first months, there was no interference from the Allied Naval Authorities, except in those instances where there were complaints because of detected anomalies of a local character, later there became a tendency on the part of the Commander in Chief Mediterranean to ask for and to give his approval to such changes.

On February 25th, in the course of a conversation with ADMIRAL McGRIGOR, I considered it necessary to state that there must be a misunderstanding in this matter and I stressed the following points :

- a) According to the instructions of the Head of the Government, approval is to be requested only for the changes of appointment of the Commanding Officers, in those areas under Allied Military control, (for instance : NAPLES.).

- b) The Italian Ministry of Marine has considered it advisable to apply this ruling also to the Admirals in Command of Naval Detachments, as they operate under the general direction of the Commander in Chief Mediterranean.

- c) For all other appointments, the Ministry of Marine must and can act without asking for consent : on some occasions, I have considered it wise to ask, in a spirit of collaboration, whether there were any objections to certain appointments.

5492

2. F.O.L.I, in his letter N° 1025 of the 4th of April, informed me that : "The Commander in Chief Mediterranean considers "it of great importance, that all changes of Admirals ashore or afloat be referred to him for approval, especially in ports and areas where there are Allied interests. In this respect he is the representative of the Allied Supreme Commander for the application of Article 3 of the Protocol of Armistice."

3. It does not seem to me that Article 3 of the Protocol of Armistice can be interpreted upon examination as conveying an obligation that the movements of Admirals must be subject to the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

between the Italian Navy and Allied Authorities), is that of the appointments and movements of Officers with responsibilities of Command.

Whilst during the first months, there was no interference from the Allied Naval Authorities, except in those instances where there were complaints because of detected anomalies of a local character, later there became a tendency on the part of the Commander in Chief Mediterranean to ask for and to give his approval to such changes.

On February 25th, in the course of a conversation with ADMIRAL McGREGOR, I considered it necessary to state that there must be a misunderstanding in this matter and I stressed the following points :

- a) According to the instructions of the Head of the Government, approval is to be requested only for the changes of appointment of the Commanding Officers, in those areas under Allied Military control, (for instance : NAPLES.).

- b) The Italian Ministry of Marine has considered it advisable to apply this ruling also to the Admirals in Command of Naval Detachments, as they operate under the general direction of the Commander in Chief Mediterranean.

- c) For all other appointments, the Ministry of Marine must and can act without asking for consent : on some occasions, I have considered it wise to ask, in a spirit of collaboration, whether there were any objections to certain appointments.

5492

2. F.O.L.I, in his letter N° 1025 of the 4th of April, informed me that : "The Commander in Chief Mediterranean considers "it of great importance, that all changes of Admirals ashore or afloat be referred to him for approval, especially in ports and areas where there are Allied interests. In this respect he is the representative of the Allied Supreme Commander for the application of Article 3 of the Protocol of Armistice."

3. It does not seem to me that Article 3 of the Protocol of Armistice can be interpreted upon examination as conveying an obligation that the movements of Admirals must be subject to the approval of the Allied Supreme Commander and, in lieu of him, to that of the Commander in Chief Mediterranean.

In fact, the duty of adopting the measures considered necessary for the protection of all military organisations "against every Ally of Italy" to maintain law and order, to employ all the available Armed Forces for the guarantee of the execution of the various clauses of the Armistice, has been devolved upon the Italian High Command, and in this particular case, upon the Ministry of Marine.

18a

Except outside Mediterranean

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

The control on the application of the clauses of the Armistice obviously does not imply prior consent to all the provisions which come within the duties devolved upon the Italian Authorities.

4. But, apart from the litteral interpretation of article 3, that which counts is the spirit in which it is dictated. This article, which still speaks of Germany as an "Ally of Italy", refers evidently to the situation as it was at the time of the Armistice, and may have retained its full value in the period immediately following the Armistice itself. The events which have occurred in the meantime, events which have greatly modified the situation and brought our Naval Forces (and now even, contingents of the Royal Italian Navy in action on the land front) into active operation by the side of the Forces of the Allies, authorise a claim to a comprehensive rather than a restrictive interpretation, which should take into account the close uniformity of intention and action between the Italian and Allied Armed Forces, and should leave to the Italian Ministry of Marine that autonomy in matters of organisation which is closely linked to the direct understanding of the personnel and which is also a necessary condition to its prestige and authority.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

5491

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

following the Armistice itself. The events which have occurred in the meantime, events which have greatly modified the situation and brought our Naval Forces (and now even, contingents of the Royal Italian Navy in action on the land front) into active operation by the side of the Forces of the Allies, authorise a claim to a comprehensive rather than a restrictive interpretation, which should take into account the close uniformity of intention and action between the Italian and Allied Armed Forces, and should leave to the Italian Ministry of Marine that autonomy in matters of organisation which is closely linked to the direct understanding of the personnel and which is also a necessary condition to its prestige and authority.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

5491

18a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

14 MAG 1944

EWS/hjp

DCC 091.711

13 May 1944

My dear Admiral De Courten:

With reference to your memorandum of 10 May 1944, a formal request has been made by the Naval Sub Commission, ACC, to the Industry and Commerce Sub-Commission, ACC, for the release of 10 Quintali of leather for the manufacture of shoes for the Italian Navy. You will be kept advised as to the results obtained.

For your information, this procedure is in accordance with a recent directive dated 22 April 1944 governing the supply of controlled material, such as leather. Further requests for controlled material should therefore be forwarded to the Chief, Naval Sub-Commission, Taranto, to receive prompt attention.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

5490 His Excellency Admiral De Courten
Minister of Marine
Italian Government

cc: Navy Sub-Commission

DCC 091.711
13 May 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET M187

DSM 74,
8 MAG 1944

ACC MAIN (GEN MACFARLANE C COM) 6th. May, 1944.

SECRET V16

PRIORITY GEN MACFARLANE

TARANTO

I SAW BADOGLIO YESTERDAY ABOUT THE CASE OF ADMIRAL BARONE PD PAREN TO FOTALI PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL MORGAN FROM ACC MAIN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN HE HAS INFORMED DE COURTEN THAT BARONE MUST GO AND ADMIRAL MATTEINI WILL BE APPOINTED IN HIS PLACE PD BADOGLIO ASSURED ME THAT MATTEINI IS A BETTER MAN FOR THE JOB THAN CASARDI PD I DO NOT KNOW MATTEINI AND REFRAINED FROM COMMENT PD PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF THIS IS NOT IN ORDER PD PARA TWO PD ZIROLI WILL TELL YOU RESULTS OF MY EFFORTS TO DATE REGARDING FOOD FOR DOCKYARD WORKERS CMA TYRES AND MOTOR TRANSPORT 5489 AR FOR YOURSELF PD THINGS HERE MOVE B SLOWLY BUT I AM DOING MY BEST

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

17

M187
6 May 44

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U. S. RESTRICTED
INCOMING
Equals British RESTRICTED

/mcr 114p

USA 729
7 MAR 1944
4384
MAY NIL

6 MAR 1944
REAR HQ. A.C.S.

RESTRICTED

NOT GIVEN

ACC MAIN FOR ADMIN SGD MCFARLANE

MAY 061415B
Teletype

DEPT O FOR AMG REGION II FOR HELLANS FOR FRAZER
FOR SCICLIMA INFO TO FOTALI INFO TO DEPT O FOR AMG
REGION II FOR KNIGHT INFO TO FATIMA REAR

A scale authorised in substitution and not in addition to existing supplementary ration scale heavy workers. Ration cards and all instructions for issue scale A rations will be in possession supply officer Taranto within few days. Scale effective from 12 May.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - File
1 - USG Info
1 - FCC "
1 - Army "
1 - Navy "

5488

U. S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTED

16

4384
1 MAY 44

A.C.C. Rear HQ 4/306

DSH "G" 6565

8 MAG 1944

Subject:- Release of Italian Naval Personnel.

HQ AAI,
C.M.F.

2086/1/Q2.

3 May 44.

1. Requests for the demobilisation of Italian Naval personnel employed by the Allied Armed Forces are at present being forwarded direct to the Italian Minister of Marine.

2. All future applications for release of Italian Naval personnel from service with the Italian Armed Forces should be sent to Flag Officer, TARANTO and ADRIATIC, giving full particulars of the personnel concerned, and the grounds on which their release is desired. The necessary arrangements will then be made by him with the Italian Ministry of Marine.

for Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

C.G., Fifth Army
Fifth Army (Br. Increment)
Rear Eighth Army
Rear 5 Corps
1 District
2 District
3 District
C.G., P.B.S.
C.O., I.B.S.
FOWIT
FOTALI
MAAF
AAFSC/MTO (3)
TAF (4)
214 Gp. RAF (2)
HQ, ACC.
Naval Sub Commission ACC.
N.L.O.

A
AG(US) (2)
G.4
Q1
Q2
Q(AE)
RA
RE (2)
Works
X
CSO L. of C.
Svy
Mov
Tn. Br.
Tn. US.
ST
Med
Ord
REME
Lab
AFA

5481

15a

Twe 11.1.60

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. Requests for the demobilisation of Italian Naval personnel employed by the Allied Armed Forces are at present being forwarded direct to the Italian Minister of Marine.

2. All future applications for release of Italian Naval personnel from service with the Italian Armed Forces should be sent to Flag Officer, TARANTO and ADRIATIC, giving full particulars of the personnel concerned, and the grounds on which their release is desired. The necessary arrangements will then be made by him with the Italian Ministry of Marine.

W. D. Hamblen
Brig Head for

Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

548

C.G., Fifth Army
Fifth Army (Br. Increment)
Rear Eighth Army
Rear 5 Corps
1 District
2 District
7 District
C.G., P.B.S.
C.O., I.B.S.
FOWIT
FOTALI
MAAF
AAFSC/MTO (3)
TAF (4)
214 Gp. RAF (2)
HQ, ACC.
Naval Sub Commission ACC.
N.L.O.

A
AG(US) (2)
G.4
Q1
Q2
Q(AE)
HA
RE (2)
Works
X
CSO L. of C.
Svy
Mov
Tn. Br.
Tn. US.
ST
Med
Ord
REME
Lab
AFA

Turnhill 11/1/60

15a

fill/700

15a

2681/1/02
3 May 44

732

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/P/206

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET

Cyt. Stone

TOP SECRET

DSM 45-7
29 APR 1944

FMM/rj

18th. April, 1944.

I enclose herewith copy of AFHQ No. AG091.711-4(Italian) P/COS-0 of 15th. April 1944 together with two copies of the enclosures referred to.

2. As you will see, these are for distribution to the Italian Government and Ministry of Marine.

3. I herdly think that it can be the intention that the whole enclosure should be passed to the Italians and it seems to me that the Appendix, Italian Naval Vessels, is all that should be given to them.

4. I suggest that you give this or copies of it to Admiral De Courten for himself and for the Italian Government.

5485 5. I am still unlikely to get down to Taranto in the immediate future and hope you may be up this way yourself ere long.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner.

Rear Admiral C.E. Morgan, DSO,
F.C.T.A.L.I.,
TARANTO.

15

CC/P/206
18 Apr 44

TOP SECRET

0245

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

- COPY -

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A P O 512

PSM 656
29 APR 1944

TOP SECRET

AG 091.711-4 (Italian) D/COS-O

15 April 1944

SUBJECT: Policies Regarding Italian Naval Vessels.

TO : Deputy President, Allied Control Commission.

Attached are copies of Policies Regarding Italian Naval Vessels, Combined Chiefs of Staff, for distribution to the Italian Government and Ministry of Marine.

By command of General WILSON:

A. B. KING,
Major, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Policies Regarding Italian
Naval Vessels (quadruplicate)

5485

Copy to:
Pol. Sec.
Capt. Stone

(15) ~~II~~ Encl I
15 Apr 44
AG001.711-4 (Ital) D/COS-O

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

COPY

TOPSECRET

COPY NO. 80.

C.C.S. 515/1

19 March 1944

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

POLICIES REGARDING ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS.

References: a. C.C.S. 448 series.
b. C.C.S. 378.
c. C.C.S. 150th Mtg., Item 7

Note by the Secretaries.

In their 150th Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the detailed recommendations of the Combined Staff Planners as contained in C.C.S. 515 subject to certain amendments agreed to during the discussion. The report of the Combined Staff Planners as so amended is enclosed for information.

H. REDMAN,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Combined Secretariat.

548

(15) Incl I A

C.C.S. 515/1

1973a #4

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

TOP SECRET

TOPSECRET

ENCLOSURE

POLICIES REGARDING ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS.

References: a. C.C.S. 448 series.
b. C.C.S. 378.

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a policy within the terms of the Cunningham de Courten Agreement for the employment, maintenance and repair of Italian naval units under Allied control in furtherance of the Allied war effort.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Following the Armistice with the Ialian (Badoglio) Government, a large number of Italian naval vessels surrendered and are now in Allied hands. The Italian (Badoglio) Government subsequently declared war on Germany.

3. The original agreement known as the Cunningham Agreement which dealt with the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine has been amended, vidi, C.C.S. Memorandum for Information No. 172 (Cunningham-de Courten Agreement).

5483

4. The overall picture of Allied resources and facilities for repair, overhaul and maintenance of combatant ships is such that none should be devoted to ships which will not contribute immediately and profitably to the war effort.

CONCLUSIONS

5. A statement of policy by the Combined Chiefs of Staff relative to Italian naval units is an urgent necessity.

(B) Encl I B

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

TOP SECRET

6. It is essential to safeguard the right of the United Nations to dispose freely and without restriction of all Italian naval vessels as the needs of the United Nations may ultimately direct.

7. The employment of Italian naval vessels manned with Italian crews must be considered on the merits of each case with particular regard to any improvement in Italian morale.

8 Recommendations in this paper can only cover those Italian naval vessels remaining under Combined Chiefs of Staff control.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

a. Italian naval vessels be primarily employed in the Mediterranean except on specific tasks approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Overalls and repair be conducted primarily in Italian yards or in Allied yards in the assigned theater of operations.

c. No rearmament or modernization of Italian naval units be undertaken at the expense of Allied ships.

5482

d. All Italian naval vessels for which no immediate employment has already been, or can be found, be laid up as arranged by the Allied Naval area commander.

e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposed detailed instructions attached as Appendix, Page 3, to implement the above broad recommendations.

f. The Combined Chiefs of Staff be requested to remove from their agenda C.C.S. 378.

(15) Incl I B

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX

ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS

GENERAL CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Future handling and control of changes in employment of Italian naval units while under the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, their overhaul and requests for material will be handled by the designated executive agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as outlined below.

EXECUTIVE AGENCY OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

2. The Admiralty, in collaboration with the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, through the head of the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D.C., will act as the executive agency to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Action by the executive agency will conform with the policies laid down in this paper or such specific instructions as may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

5481

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS

3. All Italian naval vessesl for which no immediate employment has already been, or can be, found will be laid up as arranged by the Allied Naval area commander.

4. Initially, the Italian naval vessels will be employed primarily in the Mediterranean except on specific tasks approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Future changes in employment of Italian ships will be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as required for the most effective prosecution of the war effort.

(15) Incl I B

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

COPY

OPERATIONAL COMMAND

5. Italian ships assigned to any duty or operation will operate under the operational command of the Allied Naval area commander. They will be manned by their own crews with such Allied Naval liaison personnel on board as required.

POLICY IN REGARD TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS

6. The policy in regard to the employment of specific classes of Italian naval vessels will be:

a. Battleships.

That as there appears to be no immediate employment for the battleships, they remain for the present laid up in such a state of care and maintenance as is decided by the Naval area commander.

b. Cruisers.

Employ primarily in the Mediterranean in support of local operations and in transport of troops and supplies. Two Italian cruisers are now in the Atlantic on blockade runner patrols from Free-town, such employment having been agreed upon by the Admiralty and the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

5483

c. Destroyers, Minesweepers and Other Small Craft Suitable for Anti-Submarine Work.

Employ in the Mediterranean on escort duty to the fullest extent of their capabilities.

d. Submarines.

(1) Employ primarily and to the maximum extent possible on anti-submarine training duties.

(2) Employ those submarines, whose characteristics are particularly suitable, as troops and cargo carriers and on other special missions.

Encl E B

TOP SECRET

0232

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

TOP SECRET

e. Aircraft Transport "MIRAGLIA".

Employ as a depot ship initially in the Mediterranean.

f. Auxiliaries.

Employ to give best contribution to Allied war effort.

ITALIAN NAVAL PERSONNEL

7. The employment of Italian naval personnel in positions of command and responsibility and in replacement of Allied naval personnel will be at the discretion of the Allied Naval area commander. Allied Naval units or personnel should not be placed under the command of Italian Naval authorities.

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION

8. The internal administration of naval vessesl operated by Italian personnel will remain with the Italian naval authorities whose actions will be subject to the approval of the Allied Naval area commander.

5473

REPAIR, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY

9. a. As the Mediterranean is an area of British operational responsibility, the United Kingdom will be primarily responsible on behalf of the United Nations for the necessary repair, maintenance and supply of Italian naval vessels in that area.

b. Issues of supplies from U.S. stocks direct to Italian naval vessels in the Mediterranean will be made only to meet minimum essential operational requirements of those Italian naval vessels operating from U.S. controlled ports.

c. Maintenance of Italian navel vessesl is in all cases subject to the provisos that:

(15) Incl B

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

COPY

(1) Italian resources and stores are used to the maximum extent of their availability.

(2) No facilities or stores are used which would prejudice U.S.-British operational requirements.

REQUEST FOR OVERHAUL AND REPAIR

10. All requests from the Italian Navy for overhaul or repair, or for new equipment to enable its ships to carry out their duties in areas where it is operationally desirable that they should be so fitted will be submitted to the Allied Naval area commander under whom the ship concerned is operating, who will carry out such needed items as he may approve within the capacity of the facilities he controls. Items beyond the capacity of the repair facilities under his control will be forwarded with his recommendation for further action to the executive agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff via the chain of command.

5478

VESSELS OPERATING OUTSIDE THE MEDITERRANEAN

11. Maintenance, overhaul, repair and supply of Italian naval vessels employed outside the Mediterranean will be the responsibility of the country having operational control of those particular vessels.

TOP SECRET

(S) Incl B

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U S RESTRICTED
Equal Brand RESTRICTED

DSM 613 3446

25 APR 1944

IMD CHRONO /mer

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

FATIMA

FATIMA REAR

RECEIVED 24 APR P.M.

3695

APR 231644B

APR 240845B

Teletype

Ensuing is paraphrase of F-36237 dated 23 April from AFHQ Cite FHMS

Hold action meantime on F-35285 dated 21 April this year.

Reference F-35285 dtd 21 April:

Cable received from MIDEAST rptd FOTALI states latter has requested repatriation of 1400 cooperative naval cobelligerents held by MIDEAST now. Cable request agreement to repatriation and information as to where the persons should be sent. Not known whether you have knowledge this proposal. Request your comment having regard number involved.

Cable in reply to F-35285. Fatima Rear 2657 of 23 April.

Reference signal Freedom F-35285 April 21 repeated to you. TO FOTALI RPTD FREEDOM FROM FATIMA REAR FROM NAVY SIGNED MACFARLANE. No knowledge proposal here presume you are replying.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AG File
1 - MEC Info
1 - DCC " /
1 - Navy ACTION

5471

U. S. RESTRICTED
(Equal Brand RESTRICTED)

19
OUT 3695
23 Apr

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

26/22

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM SGD CINC

APR 221440

APR 221201

F 35788

FHGCT

ADDSD AAI INFO ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

DATED 19 APRIL YOUR SD/322. IT IS DESIRED THAT NO COMMITMENT BE MADE AS TO THE SIZE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO BE SUPPLIED UNDER THE TERMS OF F338 OR AS TO DETAILS OF COMPONENT PARTS OF THE ARMY UNTIL APPROVED BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF. SUPPLY SHOULD CONTINUE ALONG THE LINES ON THE INTERIM PLAN UNDER WHICH YOU HAD BEEN WORKING PRIOR TO DUCHESNES LETTER. THEREFORE IT IS DESIRED THAT THE DUCHESNE LETTER BE WITHDRAWN.

ACC DIST

INFO: SEC GEN

5476

DCC

CA BR

ARMY (REAR)

MMIA LO

FILE

FLOAT

(13) a

22 Apr

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

INCOMING /msr

NOT GIVEN G4193

NOT GIVEN AFR 211530Z

EQ AA1 AFR 220815Z

EUCOM INFO FLASH Via Dr Sig

(13) a WPP B

Reference your 0353 dated 19 April. Our signal to Freedom substantially conforms with your views. Pending Freedom action continue to issue rations to Italian Armed Forces as at present. Security police forces, militarized civilians and fire brigade issues not approved.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - AC
1 - DSC Info
1 - DCC "
1 - Army "

5475

(13) a APPA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY
SECRET

N23/6/21

Rec'v'd APRIL 21

Filed: APRIL 19/1608

AG 993 (MMIA 0353)

NONE

SECRET
OP PRIORITY

MMIA SIGNED BROWNING COMD MMIA
AAI REPEATED FANIMA

SHPE WERE INFORMED PERSONAL BY DUCHESNE AND UNDERSTAND PENDING APPROVAL BY CCS OF EXACT FIGURES TO RATION STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN ARMY PURELY AS AN INTERIM BASIS TO WORK ON IS LIMITED TO 341170 UNDER CATEGORIES RECOMMENDED BY AAI TO AFHQ. THIS NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT REPEAT NOT TO EXCEED THE 500,000 RATIONS CEILING FOR ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AS NOW IN OPERATION AND BEING SHIPPED FOR THEIR USE. LIMITATION ON ISSUES TO ITALIANS AS PRESCRIBED BY DUCHESNE NECESSARY AS INTERIM BASIS TO WORK ON PENDING DECISION ON THE FIGURES BY CCS. CONSIDER ABOVE ACTION DOES NOT REPEAT DOE NOT COMMIT ALLIES TO FURNISH SUPPLIES FOR SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF ITALIANS ON A PERMANENT BASIS. EXPLAINING SITUATION AGAIN IN WRITING TODAY TO ALL RECIPIENTS DUCHESNE'S C/6/1/35 DATED 6 APRIL

WITH REFERENCE TO Q993 NOTE ORIGINATORS NUMBER NOW CHANGED TO 0353. PLEASE CORRECT.

547

IN VIEW OF ALL ABOVE SHALL I WITHDRAW DUCHESNE'S LETTER AS DESIGNED BY AFHQ. IF SO ON WHAT BASIS CAN RATIONS CONTINUE TO BE ISSUED TO ITALIANS ARMED FORCES. MY AQ LIEUT COL NOAKES ARRIVES CASERTA THURSDAY 20TH MORNING. SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS WITH HIM

ACC DIST

Info - Sec Gen
DCC
C A Br
Army Rear LO
File
Fleet

(13) APP B

SECRET
COPY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DSM 616

QS294 22 April 1944 25 APR 1944

SUBJECT: Additional rations for the militarised civilian personnel of the Naval dockyards.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.

Reference letter No. DCC 091.711 dated 21 April.

While very glad to assist in any coordination in regard to policy, it is pointed out that in my position as Liaison Officer on matters of policy, I am unable to deal authoritatively with the question of rations, the whole of which is dealt with by Q Branch at Army Sub-Commission, Main HQ.

As can be seen from the file I passed to you today, the decisions taken in regard to rations at the recent high level conference at A.A.I. Adm. Sch. of which the Chief Commissioner was present seem to have been partially negatived by the A.F.H.Q. letter

Col. NOAKES (AQ MG Army Sub-Comm., Main HQ.) was at CASERTA yesterday discussing this matter. I have been trying to get hold of him in NAPLES today, so far without success.

In my opinion before the matter is discussed with Food and Labour Sub-Commissions, the terms of reference should be fixed by direct liaison between Q Branch at LECCE and the Naval authorities at TARANTO who presumably are familiar with the conditions detailed by Admiral DE COURTEN.

F.H.S. Lt. Col.

Copy to:
5473 Deputy Chief Commissioner

(13) File

QS294
22 Apr

file/700

Lucas 700 11.5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HQ ACC [illegible] D54240
Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 22 Apr 1944 21/4
By DFE

DCC 091.711

21 April 1944

To: General MacFarlane

The attached letter was delivered to me by Admiral de Courten. The question of additional rations for the militarized civilian personnel of the naval dockyards has been the subject of communications between FLAMBO and MMIA, since the latter has handled the question of rations to the Italian military services.

I have suggested to Commodore Palmer that he have Col. Quin-Smith, for MMIA, discuss with Brigadier Lush to coordinate with Food and Labor Sub-Commissions. If they concur, then approval must be secured to increase ration strength of the Italian Navy by approximately 14,300.

L.W.F.

cc: Commodore Palmer
Col. Quin-Smith
Brigadier Lush

5472 file/400 → A. C.C.
I agree below
Lawrence

(13) ADGA
DCC 091.711 /

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION No. 250-AMJ-19 Apr 44-Lgt. Borisi/lws

MINISTER OF THE NAVY

Salerno, 19 April 1944

AIDE-MEMOIRE

I) At the end of March 1944 from various sources the Ministry of the Navy received information, confirmed by collective manifestations on the part of workers of the Ministry itself and of private firms doing work for the Italian and Allied navies, that the food problems facing the workers and their families were assuming such proportions as to seriously affect the efficiency of the workers due to their physical condition and their morale, which was lowered by the sad conditions of their families.

May I point out, on this subject, that the M. M. Arsenal of Taranto constitutes the largest and most efficient work center in liberated Italy, and that, aided by private firms which increase its output and integrated by smaller centers of the kind established in Brindisi, La Maddalena and Naples, it constitutes one of the most substantial contributions by Italians to the Allied war effort.

In reference to this situation, the Ministry of the Navy, with the purpose of meeting the needs of the mass of workers, took a series of steps which are gradually being materialized, and which can be summed up as follows:

a) Setting up of cooperatives for the sale of foodstuffs which can be bought at a free market, obviating costs for middlemen, etc.

b) Distribution of fish and vegetables forthcoming from war agencies.

c) Medical assistance through medical officers of the Royal Navy.

d) Other aid measures of minor importance.

II) - Since, in the meantime, civilian workers of the Army and Air Force establishments, and the naval workers of La Maddalena Naval Base, were receiving Food Rations Type "B" from the Allies, the Ministry of the Navy, not having included its militarized workers in the number of those who had the right to such rations (perhaps because of a too scrupulous interpretation of the concept of militarization), sent to the F.O.L.I. a letter, file no. 212, dated 30 March (copy of which is enclosed) requesting that all civilian militarized workers under the M. M. Administration should be accorded Ration "B" by the Allies.

On 14 April we asked F.O.L.I. for a prompt reply to our request, stressing the increasingly rapid deterioration of the situation.

5471

(13) APP A Incl

250
14 Apr

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

III) - On 15 April, a delegation representing the workers of the Royal Arsenal of Taranto requested to meet with the Minister of the Navy, to whom they unfolded a detailed account of the matter already well known to us, relative to the sad physical condition the workers were reduced to after many months of insufficient nutrition, which physical condition did not permit them at this point to engage successfully in their activities, and they begged:

a) The distribution of Ration "B" by the Allies.

b) The assignment of a daily indemnity of high cost of living of 60 lire for workers above the age of 18, and of 35 lire for those under 18.

These requests were renewed on the 17th inst. to the British Colonel, Chief of the Labor Office, who went to Taranto to personally examine the situation and study any solutions to the problem.

IV) - The Minister of the Navy feels it his duty to state that the attitude of the body of workers under jurisdiction of the M. M. Administration has up to now been exemplary, since, notwithstanding the grave food restrictions and the consequent organic debility, the workers have given all their energy to contribute to the national and Allied war effort, refusing to accept any suggestions of work stoppage put forth by other sources.

V) - H. E. the Chief of Government has already been approached on the matter of high-cost-of-living indemnities, which, however, as can be well understood, involve great problems of a financial and social nature which cannot be solved neither simply nor quickly.

5473 We now wish to bring to the attention of the Allied Control Commission the matter of conceding as soon as possible the distribution of "B" rations to the militarized employees of the Royal Navy, so that:

a) The maximum output of Arsenals and military plants may be assured, to the advantage of the conduct of the war against the common enemy.

b) The social stirrings (Translator's note: "work stoppages, strikes, etc.") which, in order to be justified by a reduction of physical efficiency deriving from a constant insufficiency of nutrition, could not certainly be kept down by recurrence to force, may be avoided.

(3) APP A Incl

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION No. 2904-ADJ-19 Apr 44-Sgt Sorisi/lws

C O P Y

MINISTRY OF THE NAVY
CABINET

File No. 212 30 March 1944

SUBJECT: Food rations for militarised workers.

TO: P.C.L.I., Toronto.

The workers who are employed at the factories and docks of the Royal Navy have been militarised since June 1940 in regard to punishment and discipline.

On 1 February all land-based military personnel, even if not members of a mess, and to militarised workers, there was distributed food rations type "B", furnished by the Allies.

In commuting the rations this Ministry did not include militarised workers, under the assumption that such rations covered only personnel under full military control.

Later it became known that:

5469

a) Civilian militarized personnel working in shops of the Army and Air Force were getting said rations.

b) The M. M. Command on Sardinia, in agreement with Allied Authorities, and in view of existing local food problems, from the 15th inst. has started the distribution of said food rations to the workers of La Maddalena Naval Base.

c) The workers of the Naples Navy Shops are in a high state of unrest, trying to obtain daily distribution of food rationsas is practised in that locality as regards the workers depending on the Army, on the basis of orders issued by the Armed Forces Hq. of Campania.

On the other hand cognizance must be taken of the fact that while up to the present time the workers of the M. M. Administration were furnished, at noon, with a plate of vegetable soup, the greater part of the

(13) App A Incl 1
2507
30 Mar

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

cost being borne by the Administration, right now this procedure presents difficulties because it is impossible to get the ingredients for such a dish.

Furthermore, the restricted amounts of foddstuffs on the civilian market creates grave difficulties for the workers who have families to feed, for which reason they are extremely anxious to get the daily food rations.

All this, in the final analysis, may be translated into a reduction of effort (which does damage to the Italian and Allied navies), and in a malcontent which becomes increasingly alive, and the consequences of which it is not easy to foresee.

For example, in Brindisi, the very serious conditions of the food market led to a strong demonstration by workers of the local Naval Shop of the Royal Navy, who threatened to stop working unless provisions be made quickly, which provisions the Political Authority is not in a position to materialise, in view of the scarcity of food and difficulty of transportation.

In order to avoid demonstrations and work stoppages, which would result in complete disadvantage of production in the shops of the Royal Navy, and in order to regularize the situation, we envision the absolute necessity of urgently distributing food rations Type "P" to all civilian militarized employees under the A. M. Administration.

I believe that such a step should not meet with great difficulty; on the other hand it would bring about a decrease in public consumption of the localities in question.

There would therefore be a daily need of the following number of rations:

Taranto	12,000
Naples (including Castellamare)	700
La Maddalena (including Cagliari; already on distribution list)	1,000
Brindisi	600
Total	14,300

I strongly beg of you to give this important problem all your careful consideration.

THE MINISTER

/s/ de Courten

5468

(13) APP A Encl 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Stone

1 [illegible] 1944

2302

1 February 1944

To His Excellency Marshal Badoglio -

Dear Marshal Badoglio:-

This is in reply to your letter of January 1st to General Joyce which forwarded a memorandum from the Ministry of Marine dealing with the battleships "Vittorio Veneto" and "Italia".

This question has been referred to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiral Cunningham, and I am obliged to inform you that as a matter of naval policy there is no question of the decisions already communicated to the Minister of Marine concerning the battleships being reversed.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

5467

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

(1)

1 Enc

0265

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IL MINISTRO DELLA MARINA

P R O - M E M O R I A

I°) - Alla fine del mese di Marzo u.s. è stato segnalato da varie fonti al Ministero della Marina, e confermato da manifestazioni collettive fra le maestranze dipendenti dal Ministero stesso e da Ditte private che lavorano per le Marine Italiane ed Alleato, che le difficoltà alimentari in cui versavano gli operai e le loro famiglie stavano assumendo caratteristiche tali da influire in maniera sensibile sul rendimento degli operai, minorati nella loro efficienza fisica e menomati moralmente dalle tristi condizioni delle loro famiglie.-

Si deve tener presente a questo proposito che l'Arsenale M.M. di Taranto costituisce il più grande ed efficiente stabilimento di lavoro in attività nell'Italia liberata, e che esso, fiancheggiato dalle Ditte private che ne aumentano la potenzialità ed integrato dai minori analoghi stabilimenti esistenti a Brindisi, La Maddalena e Napoli, costituisce uno dei più sostanziali apporti da parte italiana alla condotta di guerra degli Alleati.-

5465

In relazione a questa situazione, Il Ministero della Marina, allo scopo di venire incontro alle necessità delle masse operaie, ha preso una serie di provvedimenti, la cui attuazione sta gradatamente realizzandosi e che si possono così riassumere :

a) - costituzione di cooperative per le forniture dei gene-

(3 All A Incl

.../...

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IL MINISTRO DELLA MARINA

ri alimentari, acquistabili sul mercato libero, senza gli aumenti determinati dall'intervento di intermediari etc;

b) - distribuzione di pesce e di verdura, provenienti dalle aziende di guerra;

c) - assistenza sanitaria da parte di Ufficiali Medici della R. Marina;

d) - altre misure assistenziali di minore importanza.-

2°) - Essendo nel frattempo risultato che gli operai civili militarizzati degli stabilimenti del R.Esercito e della R. Aeronautica e gli operai della Base Navale di La Maddalena ricevevano dagli Alleati la razione viveri tipo B, il Ministero della Marina, che non aveva incluso gli operai militarizzati nel novero degli aventi diritto a detta razione forse per una troppo scrupolosa interpretazione del concetto della militarizzazione, diresse al F.C.L.I. la lettera 212 in data 30 Marzo, di cui si allega copia, chiedendo che a tutti gli operai civili militarizzati dipendenti dall'Amministrazione M.M. fosse estesa la concessione da parte degli Alleati della razione B.-

In data 14 Aprile venne sollecitata al F.C.L.I. una risposta favorevole alla richiesta, mettendo in evidenza il progressivo rapido aggravarsi della situazione.-

3°) - Il 15 Aprile, delegati della massa operaia del R. Arsenale di Taranto, chiesero di essere ricevuti in udienza dal Ministro della Marina, al quale esposero dettagliatamente le già note tristissime condizioni fisiche, nelle quali sono ridotti gli operai dopo molti mesi di insufficiente nutrizione, condizioni fisiche che non consentono ormai loro di svolgere la loro attività col dovuto rendimento ed invocarono :

.../...

5465

ALL A I N. 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IL MINISTRO DELLA MARINA

a) - la concessione della razione B da parte Alleata;

b) - la assegnazione di una indennità giornaliera di carovita familiare di lire 60 per operai di età superiore a 18 anni e di lire 35 per operai di età inferiore a 18 anni.-

Queste richieste furono rinnovate il 17 c.m. al Colonnello inglese, Capo Ufficio del Lavoro, recatosi a Taranto per rendersi personalmente conto della situazione e dei provvedimenti occorrenti per sanarla.-

4°) - Al Ministro della Marina corre l'obbligo di mettere in evidenza che l'atteggiamento della massa operaia, dipendente dall'Amministrazione M.M., è stato finora esemplare, giacchè, nonostante le gravissime restrizioni alimentari ed il conseguente depauperamento organico, gli operai hanno dato ogni loro energia per portare il loro contributo allo sforzo di guerra nazionale ed alleato, rifiutando di cedere agli inviti all'astensione dal lavoro avanzati da altre correnti.-

5°) - S.E. il Capo del Governo è già stato interessato alla questione della concessione di una indennità di carovita, la quale peraltro, come ben si comprende, involge grossi problemi finanziari e sociali che non possono essere risolti nè agevolmente nè rapidamente.-

Si richiama ora l'attenzione della Commissione Alleata di Controllo sulla pressante opportunità di concedere a brevissima scadenza di tempo la assegnazione della razione B alle maestranze militarizzate della R. Marina, in modo che :

a) - sia assicurato il massimo rendimento degli Arsenali e

.../...

(3) APP A Incl

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

IL MINISTRO DELLA MARINA

delle officine militari a vantaggio della condotta di guerra contro il comune nemico;

b) - siano evitate agitazioni sociali che, per essere giustificate da una riduzione di efficienza fisica derivante da constatata insufficienza di nutrimento, non potrebbero certamente essere contenute e superate col ricorso alla forza.=

Salerno, 19 Aprile 1944

(3 ALLA INCL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPIA

MINISTERO DELLA MARINA

GABINETTO

Indir. telegr.: MARINA

Prot. N. 212 Allegati

ARGOMENTO: Razione viveri per operai militarizzati.-

xxx, li 30 Marzo 1944

AL F.C.L.I.

T A R A N T O

Gli operai che lavorano presso gli stabilimenti e cantieri dipendenti dalla R.Marina furono militarizzati fino dal giugno 1940 agli effetti penali e disciplinari.-

Con la data del 1° Febbraio c.a. a tutto il personale militare destinato a terra, anche se non convivente a mense, ed a quello militarizzato è stata concessa la razione viveri in natura tipo B fornita dagli Alleati.-

Nel computo delle razioni questo Ministero non incluse gli operai militarizzati ritenendo che la concessione non potesse estendersi al personale non militarizzato a tutti gli effetti.-

Successivamente si è venuti a conoscenza che :

a) - gli operai civili militarizzati che prestano servizio negli stabilimenti del R.Esercito e della R.Aeronautica ricevono la predetta razione viveri in natura;

b) - il Comando M.M. della Sardegna, in accordo con le Autorità Alleate ed in vista delle locali difficoltà alimentari, dal 15 c.m. ha iniziato la distribuzione della predetta razione viveri agli operai della Base Navale di La Maddalena;

c) - gli operai dipendenti da Marina Napoli sono in vivissimo fermento allo scopo di ottenere la distribuzione giornaliera della razione viveri in natura in analogia di quanto viene già praticato in quella sede per quelli dipendenti dal R.Esercito in base ad ordini impartiti dal Comando FF.AA. della Campania.-

D'altra parte è da tener presente che mentre finora agli operai dipendenti dall'Amministrazione M.M. veniva fornito a mezzogiorno un piatto di minestra il cui costo era in massima parte sostenuto dall'Amministrazione, attualmente questo risulta assai difficile per l'impossibilità di procurarsi i generi per confezionare tale refezione

.../...

5462

(13) App A Inc 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Per di più la penuria di alimenti per la popolazione civile crea difficoltà gravissime agli operai per il sostentamento delle loro famiglie, per cui è in essi vivissimo il desiderio di poter ricevere la razione viveri giornaliera.-

Tutto questo si traduce in ultima analisi in una riduzione di rendimento (che va a danno della Marina Italiana e di quella Alleate) ed in un malcontento sempre più vivo del quale non è facile prevedere la conseguenze.-

Ad esempio a Brindisi le gravissime condizioni del mercato alimentare hanno prodotto una fortissima agitazione negli operai della locale Officina Mista della R.Marina i quali minacciano di astenersi dal lavoro qualora non vengano presi sollecitati provvedimenti che l'Autorità Politica non è in grado di concretare date le esigue scorte di viveri e le note difficoltà nei trasporti.-

Allo scopo di evitare agitazioni ed astensioni dal lavoro, che tornerebbero a tutto svantaggio della produzione degli stabilimenti della R. Marina, e per regolarizzare la situazione, si prospetta l'assoluta necessità di concedere con urgenza a tutti gli operai civili militarizzati dipendenti dall'Amministrazione M.M. la razione viveri tipo B.-

Ritengo che questo provvedimento non dovrebbe incontrare gravi difficoltà; d'altra parte porterebbe una riduzione nel consumo della popolazione civile nelle località interessate.-

Occorrerebbe pertanto giornalmente il seguente numero di razioni :

TARANTO	12.000
NAPOLI (compreso CASTELLAMARE)	700
LA MADDALENA (compreso CAGLIARI; già in corso la distribuzione)	1.000
BRINDISI	600
Totale	14.300

Prego vivamente prendere nella più attenta considerazione questo importante problema.=

IL MINISTRO

F.to de Courten

5461

(13) APP A INC 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL Equals Bulgarian CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED ADJ G-2
18 APR 1944
3123
REAR HQ. A.C.O.

INCOMING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT GIVEN

AAI AMM ECH NAPLES CITE FLAM FOR 184

NAIA INFO DISTWO FLAG OFFICER TARANTO & ADRIATIC
FCWIT ACC REAR FOR NAVY

D56591
21 APR 1944

0430362
171730B APR
171830B APR
teletype

Request received from Distwo for providing basic military rations for Naval dock workers Taranto, Brindisi and Naples. Fatima Rear confirms these are naval personnel. Request information whether these included in strength Italian navy furnished AMG for CCS. Strength appears approximately 14300. If these in fact enlisted or commissioned portion of navy and raises ceiling as reported AFHQ immediate reports of facts desired. Issue food not authorized until your reply.

5459

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Adj File
1 - DSG - info
1 - DCC - info
1 - Army - info
1 - Navy - info

file/700

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

(12)
CM 0430362
17 Apr 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RED/dfe

17 April 1944

SG (Misc)

Subject: Mooring Buoy for Iskenderon.

To: Flag Officer Taranto and Adriatic.

Reference your letter number T.A. 488 of 7 April, the Chief Commissioner directs me to say that he has no objections to the removal of the buoy requested.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

SG (Misc)
17 Apr.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL FATIMA M129

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM) 1st. April. 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL FIORITY

TARANTO

REFERENCE CASE OF ADMIRAL BARONE REFERRED TO YOU BY COMMODORE PALMER FD PAREN TO TOTALI PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL MORGAN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN IT WOULD BE BEST CMA IF YOU AGREE CMA FOR YOU TO ARRANGE FOR BARONE TO BE RELIEVED DIRECT WITH THE MINISTER OF MARINE FD GLAD IF YOU WOULD LET ME KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY

5458

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET.

Flag Officer Liason Italy.
Area Combined Headquarters
TARANTO.

20th March 1944.

No F.A.1043.
Minister of Marine,
Maristat, Palazzo Resta.
TARANTO.
(Copies to C - in - C
IONIC and LOWER ADRIATIC.
Commodore Palmer)

DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN WARSHIPS FOR WEEK
ENDING 18th MARCH 1944.

AOSTA	In dock at Freetown.
ABRUSSI	To dock after Aosta to change propellors
Garabaldi	Left Gibraltar for Freetown March 14th. F.F.A.1200/18.
Montecuccoli	At Palermo for repairs. Due to complete 23rd March.
Pompo Magno	At Taranto " " " 28th March.
Scipione	" " " " " 10th April.
Sirio.	Left Taranto for Naples March 14th.
Ardimentoso	Special operations 15th - 18th March.
Ariente	Transferred to Agusta/Naples group March 18th.
~~S/M H.I~~	~~Left Naples for Agusta March 18th~~
Pisani	LeftNaples for Augusta March 18th.
S/M H.I	Left Malta for Agusta March 13th . To remain 10 days.

Otherwise no important change.

5457

Distribution:-
Chief Commissioner.
Deputy Commissioner
One copy circulated Vice Presidents.

Chief

(9)

S

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Copies to C - in - C
IONIC and LOWER ADRIATIC.
Commodore Palmer)

DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN WARSHIPS FOR WEEK
ENDING 18th MARCH 1944.

AOSTA	In dock at Freetown.
ABRUSSI	To dock after Aosta to charge propellors
Garabaldi	Left Gibraltar for Freetown March 14th. M.E.A.1200/18.
Montecuccoli	At Palermo for repairs. Due to complete 23rd March.
Pompe Magno	At Taranto " " " 28th March.
Scipione	" " " " " 10th April.
Sirio.	Left Taranto for Naples March 14th.
Ardimentoso	Special operations 15th - 18th March.
Ariente	Transferred to Agusta/Naples group March 18th.
~~S/M. H.I~~	~~Left Naples for Agusta March 13th.~~
Pisani	LeftNaples for Augusta March 18th.
S/M H.I	Left Malta for Agusta March 13th . To remain 10 days.

Otherwise no important change.

5457

Distribution:-
Chief Commissioner.
Deputy Commissioner
One copy circulated Vice Presidents.

Chief

9
20 Mar

9.

DST VCC
MAR 1944
CS
CE 1.5

20 Mar

S

Last

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1550 283
18 MAR 1944

From : Head of Naval Sub-Commission, A.C.C. SALERNO

To : Chief Commissioner, A.C.C.

Date : 8th March 1944

Personnel return of Italian Fleet has been sent to Brigadier, Lecce by F.O.T.A.L.I.

(II)Pay roll of Italian Fleet received from Financial Section has been sent to Military Section, Salerno for checking with Army ration roll.

/s/ I. M. Palmer

C O M M O D O R E

5456

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

D54 296
10 MAR 1944

8 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Captain Stone:

Commodore Palmer informs that an accountant officer will arrive here this evening to go into the matter of food for the Italian Army and Navy. He did not get the officer's name over the telephone, but will bring the officer to see you at 1030 hours tomorrow 9 February.

FJS.

5455

file 700

(7)

8 Mar

0278

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8 MAR 1944

Candie Palmer

~~Captain Stone.~~

The attached correspondence comprises all that is known of this matter at Rear Hq, ASC. Neither Navy or Army has any ~~[redacted]~~ record dated later than 5 January.

There must have been a letter from General Joyce forwarding the matter to Commodore Zirolli, on Admiral McGregor's letter indicates, but there is no copy available.

There is no record of any action by C-in-C, Mediterranean station.

5451

Forwarded, Pls return our files

(6) Stone

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

S. 132c

(GV211) Wt. 2313/D797. 120M Pd 10/42. E. & S. 45-228.

NAVAL MESSAGE.

For use in Signal Department only	DSNJ 83 14 13 MAR

Originators Instructions (Indication of Priority, Intercept Group, etc.)	Codress/Plaindress	No. of Groups

TO: Deputy President.

FROM: Colin Talmie

5452

Do	you	know	if	the	5
Gen	elect	with	the	Memorandum	10
Complaint	re	Store	leave	dated	15
5253/16	Dec.	Lie.	only	Just	20
received	it	and	would	like	25
by	know	the	answer.		30
	Bitter	Lakes	and	West	35
Africa	in	particular.	!!		40
			Sd.		45
					50

CROSS WHITE

(6)

System	P/L Code or Cypher	Time of Receipt	Time of Despatch	Operator	P.O.O.W.	Date

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MDT/hjp

5 January 1944

In reply refer to:
091.711

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Col. Valenzano, Special Secretary of the Chief of Government

On 16 December 1943 Your Excellency frowarded to General Joyce a memorandum from the Ministry of Navy regarding certain matters affecting the crews of the Navy and Merchant Marine. I have the honor to inform you that this document has been forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, where it is being considered.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

5451

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RSA 334
13 MAR 1944

CREWS OF ITALIAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE.

FROM.. FLAG OFFICER TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE.. 27th December, 1943. No.T.A. 1014/7

TO .. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION (for General Joyce).

- - - -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

12 DEC 1943 108

S 20
MAT DOE
1 COPY TO
CAPT ZEROLI
17 DEC

TRANSLATION

SPECIAL SECRETARIAT OF THE
CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT
No. 1369 of Prot.

16 December 1943

PSM 331
13 MAR 1944

General Joyce:

His Excellency Marshal Badoglio has asked me to forward the attached memorandum from the Ministry of the Navy, in hopes that you will examine the possibility of remedying the difficulties of which it speaks.

Cordially yours.

SPECIAL SECRETARY OF THE
CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT
(Lt. Col. G. Valenzano)

(Sgd) Valenzano

5449

To General Kenyon A. Joyce
Chief of the Allied Control Commission
Headquarters

092 20 - 11 760

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION

DSH 334
13 MAR 1944

MINISTRY OF THE NAVY
Chief of the Cabinet
No. 1370 of Prot.
Inclosure No. 1

15 December 1943

SUBJECT: Crews of the Navy and Merchant Marine

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, the Chief of Government

I consider it necessary to bring to the attention of your Excellency the situation that has developed relative to shore leave for the crews of Italian warships and merchant ships touching Allied ports.

1. Since the 13th of October the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine have lent their aid to the Allies in accordance with Italy's co-belligerency and even before this our units cooperated with the Allied Navies. It has therefore been more than two months since the Italian Navy first commenced to work wholeheartedly toward furthering the common cause. Until now however, none of our sailors, soldiers or merchant seamen have been able to obtain liberty ashore in Allied Mediterranean ports.

2. The various local Allied headquarters have so far denied them any special privileges, citing the following reasons:

(a) Warships in outside ports:
Location near prison and concentration camps, and an absence of sufficient quarters to house personnel during their off-time ashore.

(b) Warships at Malta:
Resentment of the population against Italy because of the great number of aerial attacks made against the island.

(c) Ports in Egypt:
Presence in these ports of Greek and Yugoslavian elements that might create disorders if Italian sailors were allowed to circulate freely.

5448

(d) Ports in Libya:
Presence of the Italian population.

(e) Ports in French North Africa:
Presence of the French population, difficult to control, and likely to rebel at the presence of our sailors.

3. Similar reasons have been given by the Commander in charge of the Mediterranean Fleet, the authority to whom we are responsible for naval matters. It is furthermore necessary to point out that all the areas mentioned are under the military control of the Allies, who should therefore be empowered to intervene effectively to prevent any manifestations of disorder or resentment and to repress them as soon as they are discovered.

4. The proposals made by the Commander in charge of the Mediterranean Fleet for bettering the conditions of our crews are reasonable enough, but are not conducive to a final solution of the problem.

14

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

In regard to warships, [illegible] possibility of drastically re[illegible]ing crews has been mentioned. But even a reduction of some hundred men would not alter the problem.

Concerning warships and merchant ships now working with the Allies, it has been proposed instead to attempt to persuade our crews, explaining to them the necessity demanding such action, and repeating that the situation is only temporary -- but for how long? While a program of persuasion could have some success with warship crews, the same cannot be said for the units of the Merchant Marine, for whom any limitation of personal liberty is considered contrary to the labor contracts and the democratic principles affirmed by the Allies.

5. Many revolts aboard merchant ships have demanded intervention. For example:

(a) On H. M. S. Penarica, Capt. Giuriati, of the Italian Military Mission to the AlliedGeneral Headquarters, found it necessary to intervene in order to calm the feelings of the sailors, who rebelled at their prolonged confinement and who pointed out that as co-nationals, enrolled as volunteers on Allied merchant ships, they should enjoy ever so much more personal liberty.

(b) On the hospital ship Toscana, which had carried wounded English and American soldiers, shore leave has been prohibited even in Sicilian ports, as well as in ports of French North Africa, with considerable discontent among the crew because of this incomprehensible restriction. (See inclosure.)

It must also be kept in mind that the sailors of our Merchant Marine wear civilian clothes and not a uniform which, being more easily discernable, might be the cause of revolt on the part of local inhabitants.

6. This Ministry earnestly requests the Anglo-American authorities to grant recognition of a privilege which seems directly and closely connected with the status of co-belligerency governing the activities of our navies. There are no end of incidents which emphasize increasing difficulties that will continue to prevent the effective employment of our navy's services if these unjustified restrictions on the freedom of personnel should be allowed to persist. I consider it necessary that the matter be carefully studied by the Allied Control Commission inasmuch as the problem is not only military but above all political.

THE MINISTER FOR NAVY

(Sgd) De Courten

5227

13

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PSN 331
13 MAR 1944

TRANSLATION

MEMORANDUM No. 3
No. 18 of Prot.

Algiers, 22 November 1943

TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Following a visit by me to the hospital ship Toscana, it is my duty to inform you of the requirements which must be met before the ship can in the future be employed by the Allied Nations. A most dissatisfied feeling has grown up among members of the crews as a result of orders given by the British authorities intended to prevent the crew from obtaining any liberty ashore.

Since the 8th of October, when the Toscana left Taranto, the ship has touched at the ports of Sicily and at Tripoli, Alexandria, Phillipville and Algiers. In none of these ports was the crew allowed to go ashore. The men know of no reason for these restrictions, seeing that, since the armistice, they have been loyally serving the Allied cause.

The same feeling is prevalent among the crews of all merchant ships that have been compelled to remain in port for long periods for repairs or other reasons.

I must inform you that if these measures are continued in force, extremely grave consequences will follow and commanders will find it more and more difficult to maintain discipline aboard and to keep their crews happy in the execution of their duties.

I hope a way may be found to permit the crews of all Italian ships to go ashore subject only to whatever reasonable restrictions may be necessary because of local situations.

5446 (The rest of the communication has been omitted.)

(Sgd) C. V. Ernesto Giuriati

(6 21)

12

PSM. 309
11 MAR 1944

From : Head of Naval Sub-Commission, Allied Commission of Control, SALERNO.

To : The Chief Commissioner.

Date : 27th February 1944. No.

Before final decision is reached re transfer of Italian R.N. Sailors to the Heel Ports it is considered essential that the complement return of all Italian Sailors employed by the Navy should be reviewed. This will show approximately;-

I. Shore Establishments: all ranks and ratings. This includes Barracks, Signal Stations, Coastal Defence, Boom Defence etc.

II. Dockyard Complement: Machine Shops etc., and all Shore Bases, Ammunition Depots, Administrative etc.

III. Training, Sick, Working Parties and Essential Services.

I understand that a return on above lines will be rendered this week.

Naples area has given their return, which shows approximately 1,800 employed by F.O.W.I.T. On receipt of F.O.T.A.L.I's it should be clear how many are not being used.

5445

Brigadier Duchesne has requested a telegraphed return of numbers rationed once a week. This has been arranged with F.O.W.I.T. and F.O.T.A.L.I. will also conform. I gather that PLAMBO get these returns at present.

On receipt of above returns I would request that the whole matter be then reviewed by Military Sub-commission and yourself and the Admirals concerned.

COMMODORE.

(5)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Before final decision is reached re transfer of Italian R.N. Sailors to the heel Ports it is considered essential that the complement return of all Italian Sailors employed by the Navy should be reviewed. This will show approximately;-

I. Shore Establishments: all ranks and ratings. This includes Barracks, Signal Stations, Coastal Defence, Boom Defence etc.

II. Dockyard Complement: Machine Shops etc.,and all Shore Bases, Ammunition Depots,Administrative etc.

III. Training, Sick, Working Parties and Essential Services.

I understand that a return on above lines will be rendered this week.

Naples area has given their return, which shows approximately 1,800 employed by F.O.W.I.T. On receipt of F.O.T.A.L.I's it should be clear how many are not being used.

5445

Brigadier Duchesne has requested a telegraphed return of numbers rationed once a week. This has been arranged with F.O.W.I.T. and F.O.T.A.L.I. will also conform. I gather that FLAMBO get these returns at present.

On receipt of above returns I would request that the whole matter be then reviewed by Military Sub-commission and yourself and the Admirals concerned.

(5)

COMMODORE.

17 Indefinite leave 2108 POs 10,700 men.

Future Commitments.
Spezia
Leghorn
Genoa
Trieste etc.

27 Feb

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY FOR COVERING LETTER of 91.711 ITAL ARMY
24 Feb

DS 2 216
27 FER

APPENDIX 'A'

SUBJECT:- USE OF ITALIAN NAVY ON SHORE

Army Sub Commission A.C.C.
Main H.Q. (MMIA)
LEQUILE (LECCE)
G/1/59
22 Feb 44

F O T A L I, NAVY HOUSE, TARANTO

1. In confirmation of conversation (Admiral MACGREGOR - Brig DUCHESNE) on 21 Feb. I should be glad if you would arrange for personnel of the Italian Navy on shore to take over port labour at TARANTO and BRINDISI to the greatest possible extent.

2. There are at present employed at TARANTO three thousand five hundred Italian Army personnel; and at BRINDISI five thousand Army plus one thousand Navy, making six thousand in all. The object of the operation would be to release an equivalent number of Army for the ACMF programme (for which we are short of men on the mainland), and the accommodation at present occupied by soldiers would be available on relief if desired. The idea was discussed early in Feb at TARANTO between my Lt Col MORIARTY and Commodore ZEROLI who may have already made preliminary investigations.

3. Control of military port labour is at present exercised by the Inspector of Labour, General MATTEOLI, who has a Colonel in charge of each port. The sailors at present working at BRINDISI come under him andit would be desirable to continue this system of top control which is working well. This we can discuss.

4. I should like also to enquire whether Italian Naval labour could be made available at NAPLES and SALERNO.

5445. There are two other current questions affecting naval personnel

(a) Two thousand port operating personnel for FLAMBO as outlined in their letter reproduced at Appendix 'A'. I am not now directly concerned, but am interested on an 'information only' basis.

(b) Truck drivers, for which I have been given a programme for raising eight thousand on a rather impossible time basis. You have already told me that the Italian Navy is unlikely to be a fruitful field, but I should like to pursue investigations with a view to training men ifnecessary and transferring them to the Army.

6. I shall be glad to have your views in due course and can send over an officer at any time when desirable.

signed C. C. DUCHESNE

Brigadier,
Army Sub Comm A.C.C.

ABC

(4)

91.711 Ital. Army

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. There are at present employed at TARANTO three thousand five hundred Italian Army personnel; and at BRINDISI five thousand Army plus one thousand Navy, making six thousand in all. The object of the operation would be to release an equivalent number of Army for the ACMF programme (for which we are short of men on the mainland), and the accommodation at present occupied by soldiers would be available on relief if desired. The idea was discussed early in Feb at TARANTO between my Lt Col MORIARTY and Commodore ZEROLI who may have already made preliminary investigations.

3. Control of military port labour is at present exercised by the Inspector of Labour, General MATTEOLI, who has a Colonel in charge of each port. The sailors at present working at BRINDISI come under him andit would be desirable to continue this system of top control which is working well. This we can discuss.

4. I should like also to enquire whether Italian Naval labour could be made available at NAPLES and SALERNO.

5. There are two other current questions affecting naval personnel

(a) Two thousand port operating personnel for FLAMBO as outlined in their letter reproduced at Appendix 'A'. I am not now directly concerned, but am interested on an 'information only' basis.

(b) Truck drivers, for which I have been given a programme for raising eight thousand on a rather impossible time basis. You have already told me that the Italian Navy is unlikely to be a fruitful field, but I should like to pursue investigations with a view to training men ifnecessary and transferring them to the Army.

6. I shall be glad to have your views in due course and can send over an officer at any time when desirable.

signed C. C. DUCHESNE

Brigadier,
Army Sub Comm A.C.C.

(4)

ABC

COPY

27 FEB 1944 XXII

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

DSM 245
6 MAR 1944
SECRET

DISCOBERY OF ACOUSTIC MINE UNITS

FROM ..... FIAG OFFICER TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE ..... 21st February, 1944. No. T.A. 290/16.

TO ..... COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN STATION
(Copy to: Allied Control Commission.)
Commodore Palmer

The attached correspondence regarding the discovery of Acoustic Mine Units at Taranto is forwarded for consideration in accordance with paragraph 5 of my letter No. T.A. 290/16 dated 21st February, to the Minister of Marine.

(Sgd) R. MCGRIGOR
REAR-ADMIRAL.

- -

Pencilled note:

No action in the meantime. Spoke CinC Med and Ziroli. CinC Med is considering reorganising the Naval Subcommission. FNMM. 2/3/44

5443

091.711 Med Navy 1

file/100

(3)
21 Feb

SECRET 15 MAR Rec'd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
AREA COMBINED HEADQUARTERS,
TARANTO.

21st February, 1944.

SECRET

No.T.A. 290/16.

MINISTER OF MARINE,
MARISTAT, PALAZZO RESTA,
TARANTO.

DISCOVERY OF ACOUSTIC MINE UNITS

I acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 132/F.S. of 16th February and note the reason stated for the omission of the Acoustic apparatus for Mines in the lists of available material previously furnished.

2. I find it impossible to agree that the alleged lack of efficiency of the apparatus justified its exclusion.

3. These units were manufactured in Northern Italy, and adequate stocks should be available to the Germans. With modifications, the inefficiency of the Italian design may well be overcome and the mine used with effect.

4. This Acoustic apparatus cannot be considered as anything other than a "naval device" and "war material" and the failure whether from negligence, indifference to its potentialities or any other cause to declare it constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and 11 of the Armistice Terms.

5. The circumstances of the case are therefore being forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and the Allied Control Commission for their consideration.

6. I must again ask you for your categorical assurance that no other information about naval devices has been withheld and that the lists forwarded in accordance with the Armistice Terms are complete in every particular.

5442

(Sgd) R. MCGRIGOR
REAR-ADMIRAL.

SECRET

(3) A

3 MAR Rcd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY OF TRANSLATION

From: Ministry of Marine (Cabinet)
To: F O L I
Date: 16 February 1944
Letter No: 132/FS

SECRET

Subject: ACOUSTIC APPARATUS FOR MINES.

I refer to your letter T.A. 290/16 of 11th Instant.

1) As you are aware, from the date of the Armistice, all Italian Naval Workshops and stores have always been at the disposal of Allied Officers and specialists, who have been at liberty to make all the visits and checks they wished. All requests for documents and information made on these occasions have always been replied to in the fullest manner, without any reserve, including information with regard to new material in course of introduction, in service or in the experiemental stage, thus complying with the letter and the spirit of the terms of the Armistice Agreement: Giving thereby a sincere collaboration, as called for by the subsequent condition of co-Belligerency.

2) In regard to the specific case of the DL Acoustic apparatus for mines, I must state that as notifiedto Lieut. Commander Rosevere by the Director General of Naval Armaments Lt. General Matteini, on 10th February, these apparati were abandoned because they proved inefficient when employed in actual practice.

As such they were not even included in the statement of available underwater weapons and apparatus forwarded to the Minister of Marine, a copy of which was handed to Sub.Lieut. Lloyd of the British Navy; nor were they indluded in the tabulated report of mines; which is the official list of such weapons, a copy of which has also been handedto the Allies.

The fact that the DL Apparatus did not figure in these official documents constitutes the most evident prof of their not being considered any longer as part of the weapons of the Italian Navy. Their omission which is now pointed out does not therefore constitute a violation of the Armistice Terms. Should the Italian Navy have wished to conceal the existence of such apparatus from the Allied Commission, it is evident that, in the five months that have elapsed they would have had plenty of time to destroy them or make them disappear.

- 4 -

As was pointed out the conversation between General Matteini and Lieut.Cdr. Rosevere, a limited number of these apparati was completed, which have not been practically employed in the war on account of their deficient characteristics.

The few examples made were sub-divided between the bases of Taranto, Augusta, and Trapani and abandoned there, awaiting a favourable moment in which their destruction could be undertaken.

Only summary information about these apparati was given in 1941 to the Germans, who were not interested in the question seeing that they already had better weapons in this field.

On their part, the Italian Navy were experiementing with other acousting apparatus and verbal information about these has been furnished by General Matteini to Lt. Cdr. Rosevere in the spirit of collaboration.

(3) B

SECRET
3 MAR Rec'd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Finally, I must recall that with regard to acoustic mines, information was immediately given to the Allies about the KKG tubes and the "Sonorous buoys", German apparati which represented the best antidote to this form of weapon.

3) From the above, the basis of which can be verified by your experts in underwater weapons, it appears clear that:-

(a) the apparati in question do not constitute in any way an efficient form of weapon against Germany, as otherwise the Italian Navy, in view of the state of war existing between Italy and Germany, would have proposed their immediate use;

(b) the possibility of the use of this type of weapon against us by the enemy may be excluded, as it has proved to be inefficient.

4) I must therefore reject in the most caterogical manner your assertion that a violation of the termsof the Armistice has been committed in any way.

R/DG.-)

(signed) THE MINISTER.

5440

(3)B

Declassified
E.O. 12356 Sec 3.3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

SECRET

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
AREA COMBINED HEADQUARTERS,
TARANTO.

11th February, 1944.

No. T.A. 290/16.

MINISTEROF MARINE,
MARISTAT, PALAZZO RESTA,
TARANTO.

DISCOVERY OF ACOUSTIC MINE UNITS

I have to bring to your notice the recent discovery of a very serious breach of the Armistice Terms, Articles 10 and 11. The circumstances are as follows: -

On January 27th., Engineer Lieutenant Commander Rosevere, Royal Navy, on my staff was visiting the Mining Store at Calza Rossa near Martina Franca. In the course of his inspection he found 130 sealed boxes, one of which was removed for examination. The box was found to contain a complete new type Italian acoustic unit with batteries, microphone and switch. This discovery is of paramount importance in the furtherance of the war against Germany, and unquestionably the existance of these units should have been declared under the terms of the Articles quoted above. The omission to make such a declaration istoo serious to be over-looked, particularly as it is probable the Germans have been using the hitherto unknown type of mine against us.

2. I request you will cause a full enquiry to be made into this flagrant breach of the Armistice Terms, and that meanwhile you will take immediate steps to ensure that no other information about naval devices (Article 10) has been withheld, and that the lists forwarded under Article 11 of the Armistice Terms are complete in every particular.

5439 3. In view of the vital importance of the omission which has now been revealed, I must request early and vigorous action in this matter.

(Sgd) R. MCGRIGOR
REAR-ADMIRAL.

(3) C

SECRET

3 MAR Recd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/hjp S

In reply refer to:
MS 370.01

6 February 1944

SUBJECT: Demobilization

TO : FOTALI, Taranto

see 091.711 DTO corresp AG 119 5 Feb from Alexandria

1. The Commission is advised that the Italian Army has ordered demobilization up to including the 1906 Class and has sent on indefinite leave up to including the 1912 Class.

2. It is unofficially understood that the Italian Air Force is demobilizing up to including the 1918 Class.

3. In order to consider the question of coordinating the demobilization policies of the respective services, will you kindly advise us the policy with regard to demobilization in the Italian Navy.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USMR
Acting Chief of Staff

cc: Brig Ducheone

5438

091.711 DTO corresp AG 119 5 Feb from Alexandria

File
Demobilization Italian Army

2
6 Feb

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 20, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.711

ITALIAN ARMY

8—6788

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
25) D208	MMIA	9 Feb	Brig Lush	1300 Carabinieri ready to sail at Cagliari
26) G/6/18	Brig. Duchesne	10 Feb	Messe	Request you recall trops to maintain It. Army level at 190,000.
27)	Gen Gammell	11 Feb	Gen MacF	Command of It. forces in Corsica
28) FREEDOM 50285	CINC	11 Feb	FARGO	Cuneo Div to stay in Palestine.
29) Ch of Govt # 449	Valenzano	13 Feb	ACC	Rations for It Army officials
30) COS/2/Pers	Gen Gammell	13 Feb	Gen Soldarelli	When you see your Div, give them pep-talk
31) COS/3/Pers	Gen Gammell	13 Feb	Gen MacF	Fwdg (30). If OK send it, if not, don't.
32)	Brig Duchesne	13 Feb	Gen MacF	Italian Army, Generally
33) FREEDOM 51283	CINC	14 Feb	FARGO	Decisions in our 50285 (13) must stand to avoid political repercussions.
34)	Brig Duchesne	15 Feb(?)		Report No. 2-Activities during month of Jan of MMIA
35) CC/P/56	Gen MacF	16 Feb	Gen Gammell	Not advisable to send (30).
36) CC/P/58	Gen MacF	16 Feb	Badoglio	Have fwdd (21) to my CINC for action.
37) CC/P/60	Gen MacF	16 Feb	Gen Gammell	Fwds (21) to Gammell
38) Q54	Capt Stone	16 Feb	Messe	1st It. Motorized Group
39) SD 246	MMIA	18 Feb	ACMF rptd FATIMA	Procedure to follow to obtain It. troops.
40) CC/G/76 5137	Gen MacF	19 Feb	Lord Stansgate	Have asked Badoglio to repeal decree of Dec 6 re enrolling road & port militia into Carabinieri
41) FATIMA 2355	QUINSMITH	23 Feb	FARGO	Army Subcom SITREP 14/20 Feb.
42) G/6/19	Brig Duchesne	17 Feb	Messe	To inform you of revised policy for Italian Army.
43) AQ/8	Noams for Duchesne	11 Feb	Gueterbock	Supply org for It. Military

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

02971