Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/136/479

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/136/479

ITALIAN ARMY, GENERAL
MAR. - AUG. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8253/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

=ALLIED COMMISSION=

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 8253 ITALIAN ARMY - GENERAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: 28 Mar 45
To: 22 Aug 45

Vol. V

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
275	8251/217/EC, Lush	30 Jul 45	CAS, Econ	Plan for admin of Italian Army.
276	Memo, Stone	31 Jul 45	Ex C	Plan for admin of Italian Army.
277	8251/220/EC, Kemsley	31 Jul 45	Navy, Air	Plan for admin of Italian Navy.
278	Q/14/3, Browning	31 Jul 45	M of War	Mil personnel proceeding to Sardinia.
279	AFHQ MJPS P/306 Final	31 Jul 45		Interim policy for future of Italian Armed Forces.
279a	Parri, 567	1 Aug 45	Stone	Increase in Army effectives requested
280	Cbl AFHQ, NAF-1051	3 Aug 45	CCS, AC, MMIA	Interim policy for future of Italian Armed Forces.
280a	SAC (45) 2nd Meeting	4 Aug 45	(Min. 8)	Interim policy for future armed force
281	Cbl AFHQ, FX-32355	5 Aug 45	MMIA, AC	Reorganization of It Army approved, ir accordance w interim policy proposed.
282	Cbl AFHQ, FX-32362	5 Aug 45	5,1,2,3,13,AC MMIA PW Comd	Reorganization of It Army approved, ir accordance w interim policy proposed.
283	8276/6/EC, Stone	5 Aug 45	Parri	Demobilization of Italian Army.
284	SAC (45) 3rd Meeting	9 Aug 45	(Min. 4)	Interim policy for future armed force
285	8251/273/EC, Stone	16 Aug 45	AFHQ, MMIA	Increase in Army effectives requested
286	8251/280/EC, Stone	20 Aug 45	Parri	Increase in Army effective strength.
287	SD/73/LFSC, Stone	20 Aug 45	Parri	Demobilization of Army - also call-up in Foggia Province.
288	Cbl AFHQ, NAF-1059	22 Aug 45	CCS, BCS, AC	Interim policy for future, armed forces

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8253/CC

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 8253 ITALIAN ARMY, GENERAL

PART V

From: 28 Mar 45

TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
262	Memo, G/3, Land Forces	30 May 45		Proposed turn-over of control of It Army to Italian authorities.
262a	Prunas, 19/08720/24	1 Jun 45	Stone	Repat It soldiers from Jugoslavia.
263	Ltr, 8251/180/EC, Stone	7 Jun 45	COS AFHQ	Proposed turn-over of control of It Army to Italian authorities.
264	IPW/22/166, Campbell	8 Jun 45	AFHQ G-5	Repat of It soldiers from Jugoslavia.
265	IPW/22/167, Stone	11 Jun 45	Prunas	Repat of It soldiers from Jugoslavia.
266	6/1717/779, Prunas	14 Jun 45	Stone	Repat of It soldiers from Jugoslavia.
266a	Ltr CC 101B Stone	15 Jun 45	SACMED	AC's stand on use of Italian Army in Redeployment of Allied troops
267	CC 1001, Stone	23 Jun 45	SACMED	Future Policy Toward Italy - recommend It Army be maintained reasonable str.
268	SD/34, MMIA	29 Jun 45	Dist	Functions/responsibilities of It Territorial HQ and It Adm Div HQ
269	Cbl SD 5811, MMIA	1 Jul 45	Dist	Functions/responsibilities of It Territorial HQ and It Adm Div HQ.
270	AG 091.711/119 SAC-O	10 Jul 45	CC AC	Use of Italian Army
271	8251/197/EC, Stone	20 Jul 45	COS AFHQ	Use of It Army & its effect on redeployment of Allied Tps from Italy.
272	Parri, 41304/25372.22/1.2.2	27 Jul 45	CC	Demobilization of Italian Army.
272a	AFHQ Log.P. 120/6	29 Jul 45	D/CAO AFHQ	Plan for admin of Italian Army.
273	Cbl AFHQ, FX-29587	29 Jul 45	CC, MMIA	Plan for Admin of Italian Army.
273a	Log.P.120/CC,D/CAO AFHQ	29 Jul 45	CC,MMIA	Plan for admin of Italian Army.
274	Cbl AC CC, 2751	30 Jul 45	AFHQ D/CAO	Plan for admin of Italian Army.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8253/CC

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 8253 ITALIAN ARMY, GENERAL

PART V

From: 28 Mar 45
To:

~~TOP SECRET~~

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
249	DO Ltr, Stone	18 Apr 45	Spofford	Proposed turn-over of control of It Army to Italian Government.
250	8269/59/EC, Stearns	19 Apr 45	RCs N.Regs.	List of proposed commanders for Territorial HQ in North Italy.
251	Ltr, Bonomi	2 May 45	Stone	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS.
252	Cbl AC, CC, 6756	2 May 45	AFHQ COS	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS.
252a	AFHQ 091.711/173 GCT-O	2 May 45	AC, MMLA, etc	Emplmt of It tps outside Italy.
253	Cbl AFHQ, F-69530	2 May 45	AC	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS.
254	CC 8253 Stone (Q)	3 May 45	Bonomi	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS.
255	CC 8253, Quayle	3 May 45	Talbot	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS.
256	Cbl ACEXC, 6819	3 May 45	15 AG & IV Corps	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS. To complete duties in North.
257	Cbl, 2804/EC	3 May 45	Hopkinson, Maclean & Poletti	Appt of Cadorna as Army CGS. To remain in North to complete duties.
258	Cbl Robertson, CAO, 91	9 May 45	AFHQ & AC	It svc tps deserting to ret home inN.
258a	A/019, Land Forces SC	17 May 45	Ex C	Use of Ital Army for civil purposes.
258b	8251/158/EC, Lush	18 May 45	Land Forces	Use of Ital Army for civil purposes.
259	8251/EC, Stone	20 May 45	Land Forces	Proposed turn-over of control of It Army to Italian authorities.
260	8251/170/EC, Stone	24 May 45	COS AFHQ	Use of Ital Army for civil purposes.
261	A-020, MMLA	29 May 45	M of War	It Army - Control of Movmt for duty, leave, and demobilisation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Unclassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8253/CC

LIST OF PAPERS

Office of the Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 8253 ITALIAN ARMY, GENERAL

SECRET

From: 28 Mar 45
To :

Part V

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
236	8251/EC, Stone	28 Mar 45	COS AFHQ	Proposed turn-over control of It Army to Italian authorities.
237	8251/EC, Stone	28 Mar 45	Browning	Proposed turn-over some control of It Army to Italian authorities.
238	G/6, Land Forces, Browning	2 Apr 45	- -(Memo)	Proposed turn-over some control of It Army to Italian authorities.
239	G/6, Browning	2 Apr 45	CC	Proposed turn-over some control of It Army to Italian authorities.
239a	Ltr 274, Bonomi	2 Apr 45	CC	Proposed transfer of 210,228,231 Divisions fr Category 3 to Category 2.
240	Draft Decree			Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff (nee Comando Supremo). 1st Draft
241	Draft Decree			Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff (nee Comando Supremo) 2nd Draft.
242	AFSC/23/AIR, Buscarlet	7 Apr 45	CC	Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff (nee Comando Supremo).
242a	Biographical Sketch	7 Apr 45		Biographical sketch on Gen Trezzani.
243	Cbl AC, Stone, 5000	7 Apr 45	AFHQ COS	Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff; Trezzani to succeed Messe.
243a	SAC (P) (45) 21	9 Apr 45		Use of It forces in Occ. Ven. Giulia.
244	Cbl AC, Quayle, 5125	10 Apr 45	AFHQ COS	Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff - Please reply to Cable 5000, 7 Apr.
245	DO/2, Browning	10 Apr 45	Stone	List of proposed commanders for Territorial HQ in North Italy, It Army.
245a	G/6, MAIA, Borwning	10 Apr 45	AFHQ via AC	Empl of It tps outside Italy.
246	DO Ltr, Stone	10 Apr 45	Browning	List of proposed commanders for Territorial HQ in North Italy (It Army) OK.
246a	Cbl AFHQ, F-58754	11 Apr 45	AC	Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff, appt of Trezzani vice Messe OK'd.
247	CC 8253, Stone	11 Apr 45	Bonomi	Decree restricting duties of It Gen Staff, appt Trezzani vice Messe, approved.
248	SD/94/3, Stone	13 Apr 45	Bonomi	Proposed transfer of 210, 228 & 231 Divs fr Category 3 to Category 2.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Ex. Comm
CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Copy No 3

FX 37481
AUG 22 1830B

F/4976
AUGUST 23/1530B
PRIORITY

FM SC 1205
23 AUG

SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHCAO

ACTION: AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF. AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.
INFO AICOM. MMIA

TOP SECRET.

This is NAF 1059 and is further to NAF 1051

1. At the present time supplies and equipment for the Italian Army are provided largely from US and british military sources. Also the Italian Army is dependent partly on Allied administrative and supply services in ITALY for its administration though under current policy this dependence is progressively decreasing.

2. Italian Army of 140000. If operational control of the Italian Army of 140000 is vested in the Italian Government it is desirable that the maximum degreee of administration control should be assumed by them at the same time. In any event the Italian Government should assume full administrative and supply responsibility as early as practicable in order to relieve Allied military resources of the commitment. Also if the Italian Government undertakes this responsibility while Allied resources still remain in the theatre the means will be available to remedy any serious difficulty which may arise during the early stages of the Italian Government's responsibility.

3. The proposed Army of 140000 includes a due proportion of administrative troops. Allowing for the use by the Italian Army of civilian operated facilities such as railways, workshops, etc, this Army can be made self supporting in respect of administrative services and from the end of September need not be dependent on administrative assistance from Allied units for its logistical support.

4. Carabinieri of 65000. The administration and supply of the 65000 Carabinieri

1780

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(FX 37481 cont'd)

is already largely the responsibility of the Italian Government which the exercise through the ITI ITI administrative organisation of the Italian Army. The basic elements of the Carabinieri ration are however a US and British military provision and some small assistance is provided by the US and British in respect of clothing. It is at present proposed subject to such alteration as may be approved as a result of the investigation of the Allied Police Mission referred to in para 7 of NAF 1051 that the Carabinieri should continue to be administered by the Italian Army.

5. Provision of maintenance and equipment for Army and Carabinieri of total strength 205000. Food, clothing, warlike and non warlike equipment should be furnished as follows:

A. From indigenous Italian resources including captured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be procured in the Italian Government import programme.

B. By purchase from military stocks in ITALY which have been declared surplus by the US or British disposals organisations. It is considered that the Italian Government, in respect of items required for the Italian Army, should be accorded an equal priority with UNRRA in the procurement of these supplies.

C. Items not obtainable as in A and B above should be procured as finished products in the Italian Government import programme.

D. As the prevention of disorders in ITALY will largely depend on the efficient functioning of the Italian Army and Carabinieri it is essential that there should be no breakdowns in their administration caused by shortages or uncertainties in the arrival of their maintenance requirements. These requirements should, therefore, be accorded the necessary degree of priority by the furnishing agencies.

388

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

(FX 37481 cont'd)

To distinguish those requirements from those destined for the civil population they should be procured by separate indent in the Italian Government import programme.

6. Recommendations regarding the main items of supply for the Army and Carabinieri are as follows:

A. Rations. Allowing for the full use of indigenous supplies the following annual tonnages will have to be imported in addition to the import requirements for the civil population: Flour 35070 dried vegetables 4680 sugar 2340 pepper 12 coffee 1170.

B. Petrol. Petrol requirements will be included in the Italian national programme with effect from October programming for January requirements.

C. Clothing. Requirements of raw materials to enable an initial issue and 1 years maintenance to be provided for the Army of 140000 and the Carabinieri of 65000 are as follows: Shoddy 2100 metric tons cotton 320 metric tons virgin wool 3080 metric tons leather finished 750 metric tons. It is considered that the above quantities can be allocated from the present planned import programme provided this programme is met.

D. Equipment. Following general policy is proposed:

(1) All vehicles and equipment of British and US origin (including Lend Lease) now in possession of the Italian combat forces (GRUPPI and certain other units) should be retained with these forces and handed over to the Italian Government in accordance with procedure to be established. In respect of US equipment in possession of British ITI combat units this has already been recommended in MEDUSA signal to Joint Chiefs of Staff F 92580 dated 13 June 45. It is proposed to hand over at the same time 6 months maintenance parts for vehicles and equipments

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(FX 37481 cont'd)

supplied from Allied military sources.

(2) Requirements for non warlike equipments should be provided in accordance with para 5 above. It is proposed to place all non warlike stores including such items as are at present an Allied military supply responsibility, in this category as soon as is practicable.

(3) Owing to the present inability of the Italian Government to manufacture warlike items, requirements should continue for some time to be provided from Allied sources.

(4) Maintenance requirements for tyres and tubes for all vehicles, or raw materials for their manufacture, should be included on the Italian Government import programme. The situation regarding tyres and tubes is critical and supply on these items, or the necessary raw materials, must be forthcoming if the Italian Army is to function without Allied assistance.

7. The above proposals place the provisioning and maintenance and equipment for the Italian Army of 140000 and the Carabinieri of 65000 in channels similar to those used in respect of the provisioning for the Italian civil economy. They are only feasible if the latter provision is functioning efficiently and an adequate and steady flow of supplies to ITALY can be assured. Concern has ben expressed on this matter in para 2 of NAF 1051 and in NAF 1054.

8. When the transfer of operational and administrative control takes place the administrative functions of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army in respect of the Italian Army of 140000 will be largely of an advisory and liaison nature. They will however continue to screen those demands which continue to be met from Allied military stocks and exercise supervisory control of the use of such materials.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(FX 37481 cont'd)

9. Summary of recommendations is as follows:

A. It is proposed, subject to the proviso in sub para C below, to transfer administrative control of the Italian Army of 140000 and of the 65000 Carabinieri to the Italian Government at the same time as the transfer of operational control takes place.

B. If the supply policy outlined in paras 5 and 6 of this cable is approved it is proposed that the Italian Government should provision on their own account, commencing with their programme to be submitted in October, for all supplies, POL, clothing and equipment (including raw materials for the local production of same) which cannot be procured locally. Furnishing agencies should take into account declared surpluses of British and US military stocks in the theatre and include them in the allocation of sources from which the Italian Government programme is to be met.

C. Until requirements submitted in the Italian Government import programme can be made available to the Italian Government and a steady flow of these requirements has been established the US and British must continue to meet from US and British military stocks such requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri as cannot be provided from Italian Government sources. The transfer of present Allied military responsibility for providing maintenance and equipment items will be of necessity be gradual and will take place by items of supply depending on the time required to establish a pipeline of supply in respect of the various items. In the case of warlike equipment it is appreciated that responsibility for its provision may have to remain a military commitment for a considerable time. Requirements

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

(EX 37481 cont'd)

of items which continue to be provided from military stocks will be screened, as at present, by the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army which will exercise such supervision as is necessary to ensure that they are economically used.

10. In the case of those diminishing Italian forces who continue to be employed in relief of US and British manpower (para 5 of NAF 1051 refers) it is proposed to make no change in existing provisioning arrangements.

11. It is requested that the policy outlined above be approved. In the meantime necessary preparations are being made here to facilitate the handover of administrative control of the Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

DIST

Copy Nos. 2 INFO-ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
" " 3 INFO: Chief Commissioner
" " 4 CA Sec
" " 5 Econ Sec
" " 6 L.Forces
" " 7 File

CPS

Col Dunsmore
Pres Sec

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

22 August 1945.

Ref: SD/73/LF30

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to draw your attention to a matter which has bearing on the points raised in your letter 41304/25372/1.22 dated 27 July 1945.

As is known to you, men of the 1914 - 1924 classes have been called up for military service throughout Southern Italy, up to and including the Regions of the Abruzzi and Lazio, with the single exception of the Province of Foggia.

In this Province, the call up was postponed in the first place because of the absence of Italian Administration in the Airforce enclave. Nevertheless, an attempt was made in October 1944 to recall to the colours the estimated 5,000 men in this Province liable for Military Service. The complete failure of this attempt was ascribed by the War Ministry to the local population taking advantage of the presence of the Allies and more partibularly:-

(a) Large numbers of men employed by MAAF and encouraged by the latter not to present themselves;

(b) the inability of the Italian authorities to enforce the law owing to restrictions imposed by the Allies in the enclave.

On 30th June Allied Force Headquarters instructed all A.A.F. units in that area to give every possible assistance to the Government Authorities to effect the call up. The Italian General Staff had recommended that firm action should be taken, but the Ministry of the Interior having been consulted (in view of the recent disturbances in Apulia), stated that in their opinion it was undesirable to upset the population of the Province by enforcing the call up at this moment.

The fact that the matter has been allowed to lapse is common knowledge; you will appreciate, I know, Mr. Prime Minister, that as well as causing discontent and lowering the discipline among men from the

/adjacent ....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

adjecent provinces, this is likely to have serious ropercussions throughout the country. The fact that the future of the Italian Army is being considered at the highest level and that the possibility of a call up in the Northern Regions is under examination, makes it particularly important that the authority of the Army should be maintained at this stage. Moreover, the matter has direct bearing on the question of equality of military service and the demobilization of older classes, mentioned in your letter referred to above.

I should be grateful, Mr. Prime Minister, if this subject could be given serious consideration, and I would urge that your Government should take firm action in the matter. I understand that the Garibaldi Regiment is stationed in the Foggia area and would therefore be in a position to assist in enforcing the call up of at least the 1920 - 1924 classes. The entire 1914 - 1919 classes will in any case be demobilized before long, and their call up is not therefore a matter of such moment.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

cc: Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)

287

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref: 2851/280/50.

20 August 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of 1 August 1945, number 967, regarding the increase in strength of the Italian Army, and I have submitted the letter to the appropriate authority with my recommendation that it be given sympathetic consideration.

I hope to be able to advise you soon of the action taken.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CRET.

Ref: 8251/273/80.

16 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

280a

1. At SACMED's Conference of 2nd August I gave notice that the Italian Prime Minister had declared his intention to request an increase of 20,000 in the size of the interim Italian Army, bringing the total to 160,000.

279a

2. I have now received his official request which I attach.

3. Although there appears to be some difference in the minds of the Prime Minister and his Minister of War as to the disposal and functions of these extra troops, I recommend that the proposal be given sympathetic consideration particularly as the total number is still considerably less than the strength of the Italian Army as proposed in the British draft treaty proposals.

4. As in any case imports of food, etc., into Italy will have to be increased to meet the needs of the interim army of 140,000, the additional strength will make no appreciable difference in this respect.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

See 280a

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

285

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

SAC (45) 3rd Meeting
9 August 1945

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Para 4: INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

Reorganization to proceed.

DOCUMENT FILED IN 1002-1/CC

284

AG 1/3-2 8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref:8276/6/20.

6 August, 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The point which you raise in your letter 41304/25372.22/1.2.2 dated 27 July 1945 is under consideration at AFHQ. I will communicate immediately to you any decisions that may be reached on the subject.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government
Rome.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

T/2795
AUG 0608453
IMMEDIATE

FX 32362
AUG 0514043

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FIGOT
5 ARMY, DISTONE, DISTWO, DISTHREE, 13 CORPS. INFO: AICOM, MMIA,
MTOUSA PW COMMAND

SECRET

1. It has been decided that when Italian Govt assumes responsibility for civil administration of ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA and other special areas certain forces will have to be handed over to them at same time to enable them to maintain law and order in areas for which they will be responsible. This handover will take place by 30 September. At present authority of Italian Govt rests on presence of Allied troops. It is obviously in Allied interests that Italian armed forces handed back to control of Italian Govt should be as efficient as possible so that Allied intervention is no longer needed.

2. Part of proposed force of 140,000 to be handed back consists of ten internal security brigades (one for each region of mainland). Owing to impracticability of forming new Italian units and desirability for maintaining such Esprit de Corps as exists the bulk of these brigades must be provided by the 27 Italian Guard Battalions now employed by the Allies.

3. It is proposed therefore to release initially Italian Guard Battalions as under by 15 August. In view of their future role the best available must be selected/ 5 ARMY ONE DISTONE TWO DISTWO ONE DISTHREE 1 13 CORPS 2.

282

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

4. It is also proposed to release the remaining Guard Bns as soon as possible thereafter and at latest by 30 September. Plans for progressive release must therefore be prepared now.

5. A representative from this Hq will visit addressees not before 7 August to discuss the effect of the above proposals and in particular (A) the present employment of Guard Battalions (B) how commitments can be cut down (C) the suggested program for progressive release, (D) what troops if any will be required to replace Italian Guard Battalions when released.

Dist

Info-Action - C.A. Section
Land Forces
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm 2
P Safety
File 2
Float

SECRET

282

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FX 32355
AUG 051359B

F/2769
AUG 052100B
IMMEDIATE

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT
MMIA INFO ALCOM

280

382

SECRET

Ref this Hq signal NAF1051 of 3rd August 45.

1. You will proceed as a matter of urgency with the reorganisation of the Italian Army on the lines of para 8 of the above signal. In particular this will include the formation of 10 internal security brigades. To assist in this an immediate investigation is being made by this Hq as to availability and date of release of Italian guard battalions now employed by Allied Forces.

2. Existing arrangements regarding the maintenance of the Italian Army will at present remain unchanged.

Dist

Action - Land Forces SC 2
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Commr 2
CA Sec
Econ Sec
Air SC
Navy SC
File

1357/m

SECRET

281

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat B-1025

TOP SECRET

SAC (45) 2nd Meeting
4th August 1945

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

E X T R A C T

* 279 * *

8. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
(JPS Study No. P/306 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examning the requirements for Italian armed forces in the interim period until the peace conference, and recommending that the Italian Army should be organized as a force of 140,000 men plus 65,000 Carabinieri, that the present arrangements in respect of the Italian Navy should not be changed and that a separate investigation should be carried out in regard to the Italian Air Foce. The paper further attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting approval of this policy.

MR. KIRK expressed the view that everything possible should be done to develop the Italian Army, as the future preservation of law and order would depend largely on the development of that force. In relation to this, the development of the Carabinieri was less important, as the Italian people had greater respect for the Army than the Carabinieri.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the current policy that the province of Bolzano should remain under Allied Military Government indefinitely, stated that after careful consideration, he had now recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the return of this province to the Italian Government on September 30th. He requested therefore that the draft signal now under discussion should be worded so as to avoid prejudicing this decision. He also thought that the statement in the draft signal, to the effect that the Carabinieri were corrupt and inefficient, was too strong. With regard to the size of the interim Italian Army, Signor PARRI had informed him that it was the intention of the Italian Government to request an increase of 20,000, making a total of 160,000. He had suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that he discuss this matter with the Ministry of War, after which, if it were still believed desirable the Government could make a definite recommendation to the Allied authorities.

See 284

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should include a recommendation regarding the need for a strong Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed concern regarding the maintenance of supply for the civil population of ITALY. The future arrangements for the provision of such supplies had not yet been agreed and any cessation would add most gravely to the difficulty of maintaining law and order. He agreed with Admiral STONE's remark concerning the Carabinieri. He also agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in regard to the importance of the task of MMIA. The main difficulty with the Italian Army was not its rank and file, but the quality of its officers. This could only be improved by the organization of good officer schools, efficient training, and the elimination of unsatisfactory officers. He considered that the JPS proposals for the size and organization of the Italian army were sound. It was important to restrict the force to a size which could be made efficient. Any suggestion by the Italian Government for an increase in the size of the Army was therefore unlikely to meet with his approval.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD considered that the paragraphs of the signal pertaining to the size and composition of the Italian Air Force should be revised to state that the existing ceiling of 34,000 should be retained. In reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander he stated that the Italian Air Force was at present providing useful internal air communications and also providing manpower for service duties.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported that a separate meeting was being held that afternoon to determine administrative responsibilities in regard to the Italian Army and that separate recommendations would be submitted on this matter.

617

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated under JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) in accordance with the above discussion, and to submit the revised draft to him for his approval.

7806

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) Directed that Commanding General, AAF/MTO and AOC-in-C RAF MedMe should :

(1) Cause a further investigation to be made regarding the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to retain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty

(2) In conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, examine what responsibilities in regard to the administration of the Italian Air Force can legitimately be transferred to the Italian Government

and report accordingly.

See 284

816

380a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Copy No 3 AUG 3 DECD

Commissioner

cc 1421

FX 31519

AUG 030001

F/2438

AUG 031130

PRIORITY

SIGNED ALEXANDER CTTE FHDSC

ACWAR FOR CCS AND AMMSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO AICOM AND MMIA

TOP SECRET.

(This is MAY 1051)

1. I have had under consideration the interim policy which, pending final settlement by the peace treaty, should be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces in the light of our intention to hand over to the Italian Government by 30 September responsibility for Civil Administration of all ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA and any other special areas which may be retained under AMG.

2. Internal situation in ITALY.

a. With a poor harvest and a general shortage of raw materials, especially coal, the economic situation in ITALY is deteriorating and the position is not likely to improve. This will cause labour disturbance and internal unrest which is already beginning. Such unrest would be aggrivated by failure to introduce adequate civil supplies into ITALY, and in this connection the existing uncertainty regarding future procurement of such supplies is causing me grave concern.

b. The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied troops which are being steadily reduced. If we are to avoid having to interfere in order to maintain law and order in ITALY the Italian Government must be given adequate forces whose efficiency must be increased as much as possible.

3. Italian Navy.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

The proposal to turn over further responsibility for Civil Administration to the Italian Government does not have any bearing on the size and employment of the Italian Navy. Further, the Italian Navy is employed in accordance with CCS paper 515/1 of 19 March 1944. This arrangement should continue. Measures are already in force whereby the Italian Ministry of Marine has a large say in the employment of small Italian warships after obtaining the approval of the appropriate Allied Naval authorities.

4. Italian Air Force.

There will for some time be a need for the Italian Air Force to assist the Allied forces. It is at present providing useful internal air communications and it also provides manpower for service duties. The turn over of further territory to the Italian Government is not a major consideration in regard to the size and employment of the Italian Air Force and it is therefore proposed that the present agreed ceiling of 34000 be retained. The strength within this ceiling is, however, being kept under constant review.

5. Allied requirements for Italian Army Units.

In order to save Allied manpower there will for some time continue tobe an Allied requirement for the employment in ITALY of certain Italian Army Units. These requirements amount to:

A. 106000 Britis in service units in direct support of British Army. This will be reduced to 59000 by end of September with further reduction thereafter.

B. 83000 Usitis in service units in direct support of UNITED STATES Army. This will be reduced to 30000 by end of August with further reduction thereafter.

C. 18000 Iti-Itis in guard units on Allied installations and in other miscellaneous units. These will gradually be reduced as dumps and

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

installations are eaten up or closed down.

6. Requirements of Italian Government for land forces.

The Armed Forces which it is considered willbe required by the Italian Government in order to assume responsibility for Civil Administration of metropolitian ITALY, less the special areas remaining under AMG, are stated at paragraps 7 and 8 below. These requirements for the maintenance of law and order can be summarised as:

a. An efficient and adequate police force deployed over the whole country

b. Local army reserves in each territorial region in order to back up the police force in quelling local disturbances.

c. A general army reserve strategically located in order to underteke suppression of major uprisings.

d. Command and administrative machinery.

7. The present establishment of the Carabinieri is 65000. This force is inefficient b y Allied standards. It is not however considered that any overall alteration to its establishment is necessary. The remedy lies in increasing its efficiency rather than its numbers. For the purpose al Allied Police Commission should be provided urgently to reorganize and train the Carabinieri.

8. It is considered that the Italian Goverment should be allowed an army of 140000 made up as follows:

Type of troops	Strength	Remarks
Local reserves	40000	Organized into 10 internal security brigades each of 2500 men for 10 territorial regions on mainland and 2 Is Divs in SICILY and 1 in SARDINIA each of 5000 men
Mobile reserves	50000	5 combat grps and Garibaldi Regt
Command	9000	Min of War and territorial region HQS
Administration	31000	None
Training and reinforcements	10000	None
Total	140000	

FOR SECRETARIAT

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

9. The Italian Army has never been an effective force but as in the case of the Carabinieri we should rely on increasing the efficiency of a small force which can be maintained by the Italians themselves rather than allow them a larger interim army. The existing ALLIED MILITARY MISSION to the Italian Army must therefore be strengthened in quality and charged with supervising the reorganization of the Italian Army and assisting in its operational and administrative training.

10. Operational and administrative control of the force in para 8 should be assumed by the Italian Government at the time the remaining northern provinces less special areas are handed over, I.E. by 30 September.

11. Administration.

Recommendations regarding administrative arrangements for the forces to be handed over to the Italian Government will be the subject of a separate communication.

12. I urgently request that you approve:

a. The policy in para 2 B

b. My proposals regarding the Italian Navy and Air Force in paras 3 and 4.

c. My proposal to hand over control of an army of 140000 men organized as in para 8 to the Italian Govt about 30 September.

d. The provision of an Allied Police Mission as indicated in para 7 and details in regard to which will be the subject of separate signal.

13. In view of the urgency of the matter and of the fact that my proposals regarding the interim Italian Army are well within the ceiling at present authorized, I am proceeding to reorganize this army forthwith on the lines of para 8. The handover of this force to the Italian Government will of course await your approval.

A/C note:
I FORCES S/C received a copy direct.

NOTE: DIGT on back of this page.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(COPY)

Translation.

The President of the Council of Ministers.

Rome, 1-8-1945

567

To confirm the verbal request already made to you, I express the opinion that the effectives of the transition army granted to Italy by the Allies ought to be increased of two large units.

As I have already told you verbally, this request is chiefly made because of the requirements of public order especially during the next elections and the electoral campaign which will take place before them.

The units which are at present available do not appear to be sufficient to have them scattered as they should in all the provinces of the Peninsula.

I beg you, my dear Admiral, to support this request; thanking you in advance, I remain,

Yours very truly,

s. Ferruccio Parri.

Admiral Hilery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

P.S. The Minister of War agrees and thinks that an increase of the regular effectives is still to be wished for; he does not consider it advisable to employ the army for the maintenance of public order. I agree with him, but I think that in our conditions, an increase of the available military forces is an important and supplementary element of security, especially if it is possible to free the army from the ancient classes and make it homogeneous.

Of course, instead of two large supplementary units, it would be better to dispose of a number of carabineers if not equivalent, at least important.

s. Ferruccio Parri.

2 Fig

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

AFHQ Med Joint Planning Staff 31 July 1945

P/306 (Final)

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

1002-2/CC

DOCUMENT FILED IN 8253/CC

279

Chief Comm Floor

Subject: Military Personnel Proceeding to Sardinia

AUG 2 RECD

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
Q/14/3

31 July 1945

To : Minister for War

Reference your 2161:5/11 / 223.4.1 of 23 July, above subject.

1. a. In connection with the transportation to and from Sardinia, MMIA is concerned with only the following classes of personnel of the present Armed Forces:

(i) Personnel traveling on duty.

(ii) Personnel traveling on authorized leave, i.e., within the allotment of transport authorized.

(iii) Personnel of the present Army who have been demobilized in accordance with present orders and who are returning to their homes in Sardinia, such personnel being in possession of proper demobilization papers.

b. All other people, including ex-POW who have not been enrolled in the present Army and repatriates, are handled by the civil government and transport for them is not a concern of the War Ministry and MMIA.

2. The present arrangements provide for 400 places each month on the "Abbazia" and "Campidoglio". It is fully realized that this allotment will not satisfy the normal leave demands.

3. The following courses are open:

a. Retention of the allotment of 400 places each month on the ships as in Para 2 above.

b. Assignment of a ship of the Italian Navy to supplement the lift in Sub-para a above.

c. Charter or requisition, by War Ministry, of a schooner or schooners now in the hands of their civilian owners to supplement a and b above (as has already been done by the Naples Territorial Command).

4. With reference to Para 3b above, the Navy Sub Commission ALCOM advises that it will be possible to [illegible] less permanent base

609

2 2 5 3 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Reference your 216145/11 of 28 July, above subject,
223.4.1

1. a. In connection with the transportation to and from Sardinia, MMIA is concerned with only the following classes of personnel of the present Armed Forces:

(i) Personnel traveling on duty.

(ii) Personnel traveling on authorized leave, i.e., within the allotment of transport authorized.

(iii) Personnel of the present Army who have been demobilized in accordance with present orders and who are returning to their homes in Sardinia, such personnel being in possession of proper demobilization papers.

b. All other people, including ex-POW who have not been enrolled in the present Army and repatriates, are handled by the civil government and transport for them is not a concern of the War Ministry and MMIA.

2. The present arrangements provide for 400 places each month on the "Abbazia" and "Campidoglio". It is fully realized that this allotment will not satisfy the normal leave demands.

3. The following courses are open:

a. Retention of the allotment of 400 places each month on the ships as in Para 2 above.

b. Assignment of a ship of the Italian Navy to supplement the lift in Sub-para a above.

c. Charter or requisition, by War Ministry, of a schooner or schooners now in the hands of their civilian owners to supplement a and b above (as has already been done by the Naples Territorial Command).

4. With reference to Para 3b above, the Navy Sub Commission, ALCOM advises that it will be possible to assign on a more or less permanent basis one destroyer, which can ferry 600 per month. Add this number to the 400 (Para 2) and a lift of 1,000 per month is permitted.

5. With reference to Para 3c above, it is known that a number of schooners are now in the hands of civilian owners. These schooners are not controlled by the Allies and the War Ministry can arrange with the owners for the hire of these schooners on a charter basis, or in case the owners refuse to so employ the schooners, it appears that the schooners could be requisitioned and operated by Naval crews furnished by the Italian Navy. (Schooners must be provided for transport from Palermo to Sardinia, as no other transport is available between Sicily and Sardinia.)

609

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. It is not considered that the problem will be solved by the assignment of the destroyer (600 places per month), but for the time being all three courses enumerated in Para 3 above must be employed. At the same time it is necessary that only the classes of personnel shown in Para 1a above be considered by you.

7. a. MMIA will proceed with securing the assignment of the destroyer from the Naval Sub Commission, and you will be advised of the final arrangements which must be handled by MMIA with the Flag Officer, Italy, who will deal with the Ministry of Marine.

b. You should proceed to charter or requisition schooners, as necessary, as outlined in Para 5 above..

c. The allotment of spaces on the two civilian ships will continue as heretofore

8. I am directed to inform you that firm orders must be issued by you, and fully enforced, so that large numbers of men will not congregate at Naples awaiting transport to Sardinia. Only men in the classes outlined in Para 1a will be authorized to proceed to Naples and then only after proper arrangements for transport have been assured in advance. This will require a definite allotment of available space and an enforced order that men for whom transport is not available are not allowed in Naples, otherwise the use of the Naples Port may be prejudiced as large congregations of men waiting around Naples interferes with the Allied war effort.

9. It is desired that I be fully informed of the action taken by you, especially in regard to Para 7b and 8 above.

L. Browning

Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

608

cc: Chief Commissioner, ALCOM
Executive Commissioner, ALCOM
COS, F.O.I.L. - Capt Blackburn
Naval Sub Commission, ALCOM
Regional Commissioner, ALCOM - Naples
All MMIA LO's

INTERNAL

G
A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

the destroyer from the Naval Sub Commission, and you will be advised of the final arrangements which must be handled by MMIA with the Flag Officer, Italy, who will deal with the Ministry of Marine.

b. You should proceed to charter or requisition schooners, as necessary, as outlined in Para 5 above..

c. The allotment of spaces on the two civilian ships will continue as heretofore

8. I am directed to inform you that firm orders must be issued by you, and fully enforced, so that large numbers of men will not congregate at Naples awaiting transport to Sardinia. Only men in the classes outlined in Para 1a will be authorized to proceed to Naples and then only after proper arrangements for transport have been assured in advance. This will require a definite allotment of available space and an enforced order that men for whom transport is not available are not allowed in Naples, otherwise the use of the Naples Port may be prejudiced as large congregations of men waiting around Naples interferes with the Allied war effort.

9. It is desired that I be fully informed of the action taken by you, especially in regard to Para 7b and 8 above.

L. Brownjohn

Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

cc: Chief Commissioner, ALCOM
Executive Commissioner, ALCOM
COS, F.O.I.L. - Capt Blackburn
Naval Sub Commission, ALCOM
Regional Commissioner, ALCOM - Naples
All MMIA LO's

INTERNAL

G
A
Q(Mov)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1807

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

CC FILES

Ref: 8351/220/HC.

31 July 45.

SUBJECT: Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army.

TO : 1. Director, Navy Sub-Commission.
2. Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission.

2726

1. Attached is copy No. 26 of AFHQ paper "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army."

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that it is a planning paper only and has not received the approval of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer. It does not, therefore, contain approved policy or provide the basis for executive action.

3. A meeting will be held on Thursday, 2 August 45, at AFHQ to discuss this paper. The Chief Commissioner will attend this meeting.

4. Will you please give the paper your immediate consideration and report with comments by Wednesday, 1 August 45, 1200 hrs.

5. Director, Navy Sub-Commission, is requested to pass to the Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, as early as possible in order to permit the latter's comments to reach this office in accord with preceding paragraph.

6. Will the Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, please return the enclosed plan to this office with his comments.

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ K.W. KENSLEY

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl: As stated in Para. 1 above.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

31 July 1945.

* * * U R G E N T * * *

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

It is extremely important that Log.P.120/6 of 29 July, "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army", be reviewed with Admiral Warren and AVM Brodie in view of the references made in connection with administration of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC FILES

TOP SECRET

JUL 30 REC'D

Ref: 8851/217/EC.

30 July 45.

Subject: Plan for Administration of the Italian Army.

To: VP, Civil Affairs Section.
VP, Economic Section.

1. Attached are copies of "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army (Copies 26 and 27 for Economic Section, 28 for Civil Affairs Section.)

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that it is a planning paper only and has not received the approval of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer. It does not, therefore, contain approved policy or provide the basis for executive action.

3. A meeting will be held on Thursday, 2nd August, 45, at AFHQ to discuss this paper. The Chief Commissioner will attend this meeting.

4. Will you please give the paper your immediate consideration and report with comments by Wednesday, 1st August, 1200 hours.

5. For VP, Economic Section.

Your attention is drawn particularly to Appendix "D", reverse of the final sheet of the documents enclosed.

For Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encls.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

( ) ( ) Copy No. 3

TOP SECRET

AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACRUDER

2751 30 JULY 1945 PRIORITY

TOPSEC PD

YOUR FOX XRAY TWO NINE FIVE EIGHT SEVEN PD

PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACRUDER FROM ADMIRAL STONE FROM HQ

ALCOM CITE ACSCC PAREN

I WILL ATTEND

Distr. Copy No.

Signed M/C 1
Exec. Commr. 2
Chief Commissioner 3
Chief Commissioner 4

TOP SECRET

Chief Commissioner

222

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

FC FILES

TOP SECRET
AUTH: SAC
29 Jul 45

JUL 30 RECD
CC 1455

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log.P.120/6/C

To : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Copies No.24 - 28)
Director MMIA (" " 29 - 31)

SUBJECT: Plan for the Admin stration of the Italian Army

1. Attached paper, copy numbers as above, on "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army" is forwarded.

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that it is a planning paper only and has not received the approval of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer. It does not, therefore, contain approved policy or provide for executive action.

3. A meeting convened by the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, will be held on Thursday, 2 August, in the G - 1(B) Conference Room, AFHQ at which this paper will be discussed and at which you are requested to be represented.

(Signed) x x x

C.B. MAGRUDER,
Major General,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer.

5013

3730

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Clement 273

Entitlement with Erie Ch.

C.C. 3753

Ltr. 30/745 —

602

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

JUL 30 RECD
CC 1455

:::::::::::::::::::::
:TOP SECRET :
:Auth: SAC :
:Initials :
:29 Jul 45 :
:Copy No 24 :
:::::::::::::::::::::

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. Plans Section

Log. P. 120/6

29 Jul 45

To: D/CAO (Copy No. 1)

Attached paper on "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army" is submitted for approval.

A.M. MILNE,
Colonel,
Log. Plans.

Distribution:

G-1(A)	Copy No 2
G-1(B)	" 3
G-3	" 4 - 7
G-4(A)	" 8 - 12
G-4(B)	" 13 - 15
G-4(Mov & Tn)	" 16
G-5	" 17 - 18

2734

601 3/1 57

TOP SECRET
DRAFT

JUL 8 0 RECD
CC 1453

TOP SECRET

Log. P. 120/6

PLAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

GENERAL

1. The Italian Army is largely under Allied operational control and is dependent to a major degree on Allied administrative assistance to perform its operational role. It is desired to pass as much responsibility as possible for the Italian Army to the Italian Government;

   a. To accord with the CCS policy of relaxing Allied control over the Italian Government (FAN 487).

   b. To give them the resources necessary, when the remainder of ITALY now under Allied Military Government (excluding VENEZIA GIULIA and other small areas) is passed to their direct control, with which to maintain internal security and to control such parts of the Italian frontier which will then be their responsibility to guard.

   c. To relieve Allied resources from a heavy administrative commitment.

PRESENT POSITION

2. Composition of the Italian Army

600

   a. These various categories which together form the Italian Army have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which it is maintained are now matters of considerable complexity.

   b. Details of the composition of the Italian Army are given at Appendix 'A'. (The serials quoted in the following paragraphs refer to the categories given in this Appendix).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

dependent to a major degree on Allied administrative assistance to perform its operational role. It is desired to pass as much responsibility as possible for the Italian Army to the Italian Government;

a. To accord with the CCS policy of relaxing Allied control over the Italian Government (FAN 487).

b. To give them the resources necessary, when the remainder of ITALY now under Allied Military Government (excluding VENEZIA GIULIA and other small areas) is passed to their direct control, with which to maintain internal security and to control such parts of the Italian frontier which will then be their responsibility to guard.

c. To relieve Allied resources from a heavy administrative commitment.

PRESENT POSITION

600

2. Composition of the Italian Army

a. These various categories which together form the Italian Army have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which it is maintained are now matters of considerable complexity.

b. Details of the composition of the Italian Army are given at Appendix 'A'. (The serials quoted in the following paragraphs refer to the categories given in this Appendix).

3. Present Administrative Responsibilities

The present responsibilities of the British and US Army and of the Italian Government are given at Appendix 'B' in which it is shown that the Allies exercise considerable administrative responsibilities for supplies, equipment and administrative services for the Italian Army.

4. Italian Administrative Organisation

a. The Italian administrative organisation consists of eleven territorial HQs covering all of ITALY and SICILY with under

272

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. Composition of the Italian Army

The Italian Army should be established as a self sufficient force, complete of its own administrative services and be capable of fulfilling its operational role without assistance from Allied administrative units. On the basis that the Army :

a. will be used to prevent the violation of the Italian frontiers and in an "internal security" role

b. will be composed partly of internal security troops which need only be semi-mobile and partly of a mobile combat force.

c. will be able to make use of civilian operated facilities such as railways, ports, communications and workshops,

it is considered that an overall force 140,000 (excluding Carabinieri) will be required. Proposed detailed composition is given at Appendix 'C'.

7. Provision of units to form the Italian Army

The following are available to form the nucleus of the 140,000

Serial		Theoretical strength
1	Combat force (Br/Iti)	64,000
3	Internal security divisions (Iti/Iti)	15,000
5	Italian command and administrative organisation (Iti/Iti)	3,000
6	Italian administrative services (Iti/Iti)	24,000
	TOTAL	106,000

Balance of the force would have to be formed by making the best use of personnel released from the Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops (Serial 2), Iti/Iti guard units (Serial 4), and by recruitment. Allowing for reduction in Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops and Iti/Iti guard units, this force can be formed within the overall Iti ceiling of 333,000.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a. will be used to prevent the violation of the Italian frontiers and in an "internal security" role

b. will be composed partly of internal security troops which need only be semi-mobile and partly of a mobile combat force.

c. will be able to make use of civilian operated facilities such as railways, ports, communications and workshops,

it is considered that an overall force 140,000 (excluding Carabinieri) will be required. Proposed detailed composition is given at Appendix 'C'.

7. Provision of units to form the Italian Army

The following are available to form the nucleus of the 140,000

Serial		Theoretical strength
1	Combat force (Br/Iti)	64,000
3	Internal security divisions (Iti/Iti)	15,000
5	Italian command and administrative organisation (Iti/Iti)	3,000
6	Italian administrative services (Iti/Iti)	24,000
	TOTAL	106,000

509

Balance of the force would have to be formed by making the best use of personnel released from the Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops (Serial 2), Iti/Iti guard units (Serial 4), and by recruitment. Allowing for reduction in Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops and Iti/Iti guard units, this force can be formed within the overall Iti ceiling of 333,000.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES FOR THE 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

8. Availability of service units

The following will be the situation at the end of September :-

a. ST Transport

Assuming the retention of British vehicles at present in possession of the combat forces and allowing for recaptured Italian vehicles, the Italian Army initially should have

272a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

TOP SECRET

adequate administrative transport.

b. ST Depots

Iti/Iti personnel are now available for depot units. These units are taking over where Italian troops have been dependent on Allied units.

c. Ordnance

Ordnance dumps already exist and the Italian equivalent of a BOD is being formed.

d. REME

Italian workshops are now being formed and there will shortly be civil facilities available to which major repairs can be let out by the Italian Government.

e. Petrol

By the end of September all petrol for the Italian Army can be drawn through the CIP organisation.

f. Medical

This is already the responsibility of the Italian Government using Italian hospitals.

By the end of September the Italian Army of 140,000 should not therefore be dependent on Allied administrative services.

PROVISION OF MAINTENANCE, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOR 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

9. Method by which Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment should be provided.

a. Italian Unit Transport, Clothing and Equipment

Transport, clothing and equipment of British and US origin at present held by Italian units from which the 'interim' Italian Army is to be formed should be retained by these units.

b. Rations

for the Italian Army to be provided

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

c. Ordnance

Ordnance dumps already exist and the Italian equivalent of a BOD is being formed.

d. REME

Italian workshops are now being formed and there will shortly be civil facilities available to which major repairs can be let out by the Italian Government.

e. Petrol

By the end of September all petrol for the Italian Army can be drawn through the CIP organisation.

f. Medical

This is already the responsibility of the Italian Government using Italian hospitals.

By the end of September the Italian Army of 140,000 should not therefore be dependent on Allied administrative services.

PROVISION OF MAINTENANCE, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOR 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

9. Method by which Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment should be provided.

a. Italian Unit Transport, Clothing and Equipment

Transport, clothing and equipment of British and US origin at present held by Italian units from which the 'interim' Italian Army is to be formed should be retained by these units.

b. Rations

It is feasible for rations for the Italian Army to be provided through Italian Government channels and to be included with the normal civil supply requirements for the civilian population. This will involve a small increase in the import programme if the Italian civil ration is not to be impaired. Details of this increase are given at Appendix 'D'. Provision of rations need not, therefore, be a British and US military responsibility.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

c. Clothing

Industrial capacity and skilled labour exists in ITALY, but the Italian Government is dependent on the import of raw materials and coal for the manufacture of items of clothing. Estimated requirements of raw materials are given at Appendix 'D'. Until this manufacture is possible, clothing will be provided in accordance with para 10 below.

d. Petrol

This can be imported with civil requirements.

e. Non-warlike Equipment and Accommodation Stores

These can partly be provided from recaptured material and local manufacture. Deficiencies should be procured in accordance with the principles given in para 10 below.

f. Warlike Equipment

It is the interpretation of TAM 638 that the Italian Government can be directed by this HQ to resume production of warlike stores required for the equipment and maintenance of the 'interim' Italian Army. For some time, however, warlike stores will have to be provided in accordance with para 10 below until production in ITALY is possible.

10. Supply of Clothing, Equipment and Accommodation Stores

Clothing, warlike, non-warlike equipment and accommodation stores should be found from the following sources :-

598

a. Indigenous Italian resources including recaptured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be demanded by the Italian Government on the appropiate civil agencies in US and UK for import with that part of the Italian Government programme termed category 'B' items.

b. Purchase of items from military stocks in ITALY which have been

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

accordance with para 10 below.

d. Petrol

This can be imported with civil requirements.

e. Non-warlike Equipment and Accommodation Stores

These can partly be provided from recaptured material and local manufacture. Deficiencies should be procured in accordance with the principles given in para 10 below.

f. Warlike Equipment

It is the interpretation of TAM 638 that the Italian Government can be directed by this HQ to resume production of warlike stores required for the equipment and maintenance of the 'interim' Italian Army. For some time, however, warlike stores will have to be provided in accordance with para 10 below until production in ITALY is possible.

10. Supply of Clothing, Equipment and Accommodation Stores

Clothing, warlike, non-warlike equipment and accommodation stores should be found from the following sources :-

598

a. Indigenous Italian resources including recaptured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be demanded by the Italian Government on the appropiate civil agencies in US and UK for import with that part of the Italian Government programme termed category 'B' items.

b. Purchase of items from military stocks in ITALY which have been declared surplus by the British and US Disposals organisations.

c. Should there be items which cannot be obtained locally in accordance with sub paras a. and b. these items should be demanded as finished products in the category 'B' import programme.

272a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

11. Handling of Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment obtained through Italian Government channels.

All items for the Italian Army provided from sources outside ITALY will be imported on Italian Government account to be received and handled by the Italian Government through their own organisation and as their own responsibility. Items made available from surplus stocks in this theatre through the US and British organisations should be handed over by the US and British Army to the appropriate Italian Army base depot.

12. Date by which the Italian Government should assume full responsibility for the provision of Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment for the 'Interim' Italian Army.

This date cannot be determined until examination has been made of current import programmes and of the time required to procure such items as have not been previously requisitioned or cannot be procured locally. Responsibility of AFHQ in this respect should, however, cease by the end of September or as soon after as is practicable and, in any event, not later than 31 December 1945. It may be necessary for the Italian Government to assume provisioning responsibility in stages in respect of the different items of provisioning.

DEGREE OF ALLIED CONTROL OVER 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

13. Administrative Control

a. It is to be doubted whether the Italian Army will ever be efficiently administered as compared with British and US standards. The Italian Government must, however, at some time assume full administrative responsibility and there is every advantage in making them responsible as early as possible while Allied troops and resources are available to remedy any immediate crisis that may arise after they have assumed control. Any transfer of control

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

responsibility. Items made available from surplus stocks in this theatre through the US and British organisations should be handed over by the US and British Army to the appropriate Italian Army base depot.

12. Date by which the Italian Government should assume full responsibility for the provision of Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment for the 'Interim' Italian Army.

This date cannot be determined until examination has been made of current import programmes and of the time required to procure such items as have not been previously requisitioned or cannot be procured locally. Responsibility of AFHQ in this respect should, however, cease by the end of September or as soon after as is practicable and, in any event, not later than 31 December 1945. It may be necessary for the Italian Government to assume provisioning responsibility in stages in respect of the different items of provisioning.

DEGREE OF ALLIED CONTROL OVER 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

13. Administrative Control

a. It is to be doubted whether the Italian Army will ever be efficiently administered as compared with British and US standards. The Italian Government must, however, at some time assume full administrative responsibility and there is every advantage in making them responsible as early as possible while Allied troops and resources are available to remedy any immediate crisis that may arise after they have assumed control. Any transfer of control to the Italian Government should, however, be subject to :-

i. The Allied right to re-assume control in the event of the Italian Government being incapable of performing their operational role.

ii. The submission by the Italian Government to the Allied authorities of all information regarding the administration of their army.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

iii. The retention by the Allies of the right to control the use of accommodation, railways, ports, communications and facilities generally in ITALY as required for US and British purposes.

b. About end September it is proposed to transfer operational control of the 'interim' Italian Army to the Italian Government. By this date this army should, on present plans, be administratively self supporting in respect of service units. While it may not be possible for the Italian Government to assume full provisioning responsibility by this date it is considered that administrative control should be transferred at the same time as operational control. The direct control functions of AFHQ and MMLA over this army will therefore cease by end September except in respect of the screening of such items of provisioning which cannot be transferred by this date - see para 12.

14. Administrative Functions of MMLA

After end September the functions of MMLA in respect of the 'Interim' Italian Army, should be largely advisory and of a liaison nature. They should, however, retain the right of inspecting the Italian Army and its administrative organisation to enable them to report to this HQ on matters which are prejudicial to Allied interests or are contrary to the provisions of any peace treaty which may be signed. MMLA should, in fact, merge into such inspectorate organisation as may be established by the peace treaty.

REMAINDER OF 'PRESENT' ITALIAN FORCES

15. In addition to 'Interim' Italian Army there remain :-

Carabinieri (Serial 7)
British and US Italian Service Troops (Serial 2)
Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

By this date this army should, on present plans, be administratively self supporting in respect of service units. While it may not be possible for the Italian Government to assume full provisioning responsibility by this date it is considered that administrative control should be transferred at the same time as operational control. The direct control functions of AFHQ and MMIA over this army will therefore cease by end September except in respect of the screening of such items of provisioning which cannot be transferred by this date - see para 12.

14. Administrative Functions of MMIA

After end September the functions of MMIA in respect of the 'Interim' Italian Army, should be largely advisory and of a liaison nature. They should, however, retain the right of inspecting the Italian Army and its administrative organisation to enable them to report to this HQ on matters which are prejudicial to Allied interests or are contrary to the provisions of any peace treaty which may be signed. MMIA should, in fact, merge into such inspectorate organisation as may be established by the peace treaty.

REMAINDER OF 'PRESENT' ITALIAN FORCES

15. In addition to 'Interim' Italian Army there remain :-

Carabinieri (Serial 7)
British and US Italian Service Troops (Serial 2)
Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)
Italian Navy (Serial 8)
Italian Air Force (Serial 9)

16. Carabinieri (Serial 7)

The Carabinieri are already largely the administrative responsibility of the Italian Army, but the US are responsible for providing rations for the Carabinieri held in the Iti/Iti category and the British are responsible for providing rations for the Carabinieri held in the Br/Iti category. Future administration should be as follows :-

277a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a. Administrative Services

The Carabinieri should continue to be maintained through the territorial organisation and the Italian administrative services which are included as part of the 'interim' Italian Army at Appendix 'C'.

b. Provision of Maintenance Supplies and Clothing

When the responsibility for the provision of rations for the 'interim' Italian Army is made the responsibility of the Italian Government the responsibility for feeding the Carabinieri should, at the same time, also be assumed by the Italian Government. Requirements for this purpose should, as necessary, then be included with the supply requirements of the Italian Government. Additional imports required are included in the figures at Appendix 'D'. Clothing is, in practice, provided now from Italian Government resources and this should formally be made their responsibility.

c. Administrative Control

This will continue to be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to such responsibilities as it may be decided to give to an Allied Police mission should such a mission be established.

17. Br/Iti and Us/Iti Service units (Serial 2) and Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)

a. These units are employed to meet Allied requirements to economise in manpower. There will be a diminishing requirement for these units as redeployment proceeds and the number of personnel employed will be reduced accordingly. Estimated rate of reduction is as follows :-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

When the responsibility for the provision of rations for the 'interim' Italian Army is made the responsibility of the Italian Government the responsibility for feeding the Carabinieri should, at the same time, also be assumed by the Italian Government. Requirements for this purpose should, as necessary, then be included with the supply requirements of the Italian Government. Additional imports required are included in the figures at Appendix 'D'. Clothing is, in practice, provided now from Italian Government resources and this should formally be made their responsibility.

c. Administrative Control

This will continue to be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to such responsibilities as it may be decided to give to an Allied Police mission should such a mission be established.

17. Br/Iti and US/Iti Service units (Serial 2) and Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)

a. These units are employed to meet Allied requirements to economise in manpower. There will be a diminishing requirement for these units as redeployment proceeds and the number of personnel employed will be reduced accordingly. Estimated rate of reduction is as follows :-

US/Iti Service Units - reduced to 30,000 by end of August, thereafter a gradual reduction will be made until end of December when there will be no requirement for their employment.

Br/Iti Service Units - reduced to 96,000 by September and thereafter further reduced at a rate of 6,000 a month to the end of the year.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Iti/Iti units under Allied control - no reduction envisaged for some time.

b. Present responsibilities of the Italian Government, British Army and US Army regarding provision of maintenance, clothing and personal equipment should continue. Administrative services should be provided to an increasing degree by the territorial organisation and administrative services which will have been incorporated into the 'interim' Italian Army. It will be necessary for MMLA to exercise their present responsibilities over the Italian administrative organisation to ensure that these service and guard units are adequately administered and are able to carry out their operational role. While inconvenient, MMLA consider it possible for this control to be exercised in respect of service and guard units while giving the Italian Government full control over their administrative organisation in respect of its administratice functions performed for the 'interim' army of 140,000.

18. Italian Navy (Serial 8)

a. The British Army is responsible for such provision of rations and clothing to personnel of the Italian Navy as is normally supplied to all Br/Iti personnel. In practice the greater part of the clothing for the Italian Navy is provided from Royal Navy sources.

b. As it is likely that the Italian Navy will continue to exist at some strength not yet decided, it should be made administratively self-supporting. Responsibility for the provision of rations should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for provision of rations to the Italian Army is transferred. The provision of clothing should

596

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

necessary for MMLA to exercise their present responsibilities over the Italian administrative organisation to ensure that these service and guard units are adequately administered and are able to carry out their operational role. While inconvenient, MMLA consider it possible for this control to be exercised in respect of service and guard units while giving the Italian Government full control over their administrative organisation in respect of its administratice functions performed for the 'interim' army of 140,000.

18. Italian Navy (Serial 8)

a. The British Army is responsible for such provision of rations and clothing to personnel of the Italian Navy as is normally supplied to all Br/Iti personnel. In practice the greater part of the clothing for the Italian Navy is provided from Royal Navy sources.

b. As it is likely that the Italian Navy will continue to exist at some strength not yet decided, it should be made administratively self-supporting. Responsibility for the provision of rations should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for provision of rations to the Italian Army is transferred. The provision of clothing should likewise be made an Italian Government responsibility to be obtained from Italian Government sources, including imports made on Italian Government account.

19. Italian Air Force (Serial 9)

(This is still under discussion with RAF MedME and AAF/MTO).

598

372a

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONCLUSIONS

20. Future of Italian Army

The present Italian Army should be divided into two parts :-

a. that which is required to control the frontiers of ITALY and to maintain internal security in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA. The control of this part - the 'interim' Italian Army - is a legitimate responsibility to give to the Italian Government.

b. that which is employed as a British and US requirement in relief of British and US manpower. The control of this part should remain the responsibility of the British and US.

21. Composition of 'Interim' Italian Army

This army should be established as a self sufficient force in no way dependent on Allied administrative units for its support. The proposed army of 140,000 includes the necessary complement of administrative troops which, by using present Iti/Iti administrative troops, can be organised as a self sufficient army by the end of September.

22. Time when administrative control of 'Interim' Italian Army should be given to the Italian Government

Administrative control over the 'interim' Italian Army should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government when operational control of its army is transferred. This is likely to take place about the end of September.

23. Provision of Maintenance for 'Interim' Italian Army

a. Clothing, transport, warlike and non-warlike equipment, including items of lease lend origin, at present in possession of units from which the 'interim' Italian Army will be formed, should be retained.

b. Supply of all items of maintenance, clothing, warlike and non-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

legitimate responsibility to give to the Italian Government.

b. that which is employed as a British and US requirement in relief of British and US manpower. The control of this part should remain the responsibility of the British and US.

21. Composition of 'Interim' Italian Army

This army should be established as a self sufficient force in no way dependent on Allied administrative units for its support. The proposed army of 140,000 includes the necessary complement of administrative troops which, by using present Iti/Iti administrative troops, can be organised as a self sufficient army by the end of September.

22. Time when administrative control of 'Interim' Italian Army should be given to the Italian Government

Administrative control over the 'interim' Italian Army should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government when operational control of its army is transferred. This is likely to take place about the end of September.

23. Provision of Maintenance for 'Interim' Italian Army

a. Clothing, transport, warlike and non-warlike equipment, including items of lease lend origin, at present in possession of units from which the 'interim' Italian Army will be formed, should be retained.

b. Supply of all items of maintenance, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment, should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government. Such items which cannot be provided from indigenous Italian resources should be purchased through Italian Government channels from civil disposal agencies in this theatre or civil procurement agencies in US and UK.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

24. Carabinieri

Maintenance for the Carabinieri should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government on the same basis as the 'interim' Italian Army and should be assumed at the same time as they assume administrative control of the army.

25. Italian Service and Guard Troops employed to meet Allied requirements

Present Italian Government, US Army and British Army responsibilities for these units should continue both as regards provision of maintenance, clothing and personal equipment and as regards administrative services. Control should continue to be exercised by MMIA.

26. Italian Navy

Rations and clothing for the Italian Navy should be provided by the Italian Government and this responsibility should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for those items for the 'interim' Italian Army is transferred.

27. Italian Air Force

(This is still under discussion with RAF MedME and AAF/MTO).

595

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

to meet Allied requirements.

Present Italian Government, US Army and British Army responsibilities for these units should continue both as regards provision of maintenance, clothing and personal equipment and as regards administrative services. Control should continue to be exercised by MMIA.

26. Italian Navy

Rations and clothing for the Italian Navy should be provided by the Italian Government and this responsibility should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for these items for the 'interim' Italian Army is transferred.

27. Italian Air Force

(This is still under discussion with RAF MedME and AAF/MTO).

595

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(272a)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'A'

PRESENT COMPOSITION OF ITALIAN ARMY

1. The Italian Army can be divided into the following general categories:-

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Theoretical strengths (round figures)	Remarks
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garabaldi Regt, certain auxiliary combat units and administrative ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance.
2	Service units	Br/Iti	106,000 +	Consisting of administrative units on Allied ME/TO employed in direct support of British and US forces in the theatre. They are under complete Allied control though their administration is largely effected through the Italian administrative organisation (Serials 5 and 6). In this category are included the Italian Administrative Division Headquarters which are in some degree responsible for
		US/Iti	83,000 +	

504

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785215

Serial	Nature	US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Strengths (round figures)	
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garabaldi Regt, certain auxiliary combat units and administrative ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance.
2	Service units	Br/Iti	106,000 +	Consisting of administrative
		US/Iti	83,000 +	units on Allied WE/TO employed in direct support of British and US forces in the theatre. They are under complete Allied control though their administration is largely effected through the Italian administrative organisation (Serials 5 and 6). In this category are included the Italian Administrative Division Headquarters which are in some degree responsible for the administration of Combat and Service units.
3	Italian Security Divisions	Iti/Iti	15,000	Comprising two divisions in SICILY and one division in SARDINIA. These are under the control of the Italian Government.

504

372

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'A' (Contd)

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Theoretical strengths (round figures)	Remarks
4.	Italian units under Allied operational cond	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising guard units on Allied installations, intelligence units, certain AC transport units, mine clearance and "refugee" units. These units, while Iti/Iti are in effect borrowed from the Italian Government and are under Allied operational control.
5	Italian Command and adm control organisation	Iti/Iti	3,000	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
6	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army units and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	These are under the control of the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

	operational cond			installations, ancillary units, certain AC transport units, mine clearance and "refugee" units. ∅ These units, while Iti/Iti are in effect borrowed from the Italian Government and are under Allied operational control.
5	Italian Command and adm control organisation	Iti/Iti	3,000	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
6	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army units and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	These are under the control of the Italian Government where territory has been handed back to the Government, and under Allied Military Government control where the territory is still administered by Allied Military Government.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX 'A' (Contd)

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Theoretical strengths (round figures)	Remarks
8	Italian Navy	Br/Iti	75,000	These are under the control of C-in-C Med but are partly administered by the Italian Army administrative organisation.
9	Italian Air Force	Br/Iti	24,500 +	These comprise 2,500 service troops supporting the RAF and 6,500 service troops supporting AAF/MTO. Balance 22,500 Br/Iti are operational air force personnel part of whom are employed to assist in meeting RAF operational requirements (e.g. Air Sea Rescue). The Italian Air Force are partly administered by the Italian Army administration.
		US/Iti	6,500 +	

+ These are diminishing commitments (see paras 17 & 19)

ϕ "Refugee" units are Collecting Posts, Transit Camps etc. employed on the administrative services for displaced persons.

593

2. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Army

Responsibilities of the US Army, British Army and the Italian Government for the provision of maintenance, clothing and equipment are given at Appendix 'B'.

3. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Navy

These responsibilities are the same as for Army Br/Iti personnel, namely:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8	Italian Navy	Br/Iti	75,000	These are under the control of C-in-C Med but are partly administered by the Italian Army administrative organisation.
9	Italian Air Force	Br/Iti	24,500 +	These comprise 2,500 service troops supporting the RAF and 6,500 service troops supporting AAF/MTO. Balance 22,500 Br/Iti are operational air force personnel part of whom are employed to assist in meeting RAF operational requirements (e.g. Air Sea Rescue). The Italian Air Force are partly administered by the Italian Army administration.
		US/Iti	6,500 +	

+ These are diminishing commitments (see paras 17 & 19)

ϕ "Refugee" units are Collecting Posts, Transit Camps etc. employed on the administrative services for displaced persons.

593

2. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Army

Responsibilities of the US Army, British Army and the Italian Government for the provision of maintenance, clothing and equipment are given at Appendix 'B'.

3. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Navy

These responsibilities are the same as for Army Br/Iti personnel, namely:

Rations — British, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.

Clothing — British, with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.

Equipment — Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.

The provision of rations is a British Army commitment. The provision of clothing is a British Army commitment in theory but in practice the greater

5722

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

part is provided from Royal Navy sources.

4. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Air Force

These responsibilities are the same as for Army Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel, namely:-

a. Br/Iti

Rations — British, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.

Clothing — British, with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.

Equipment — Personal equipment largely from Italian sources. Technical equipment for aircraft supplied from British sources from RAF.

b. US/Iti

Rations — US, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.

Clothing — US, with assistance from the Italian Government.

Equipment — Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.

The provision of rations and clothing is a British Army responsibility for Br/Iti Air Force personnel and a US Army responsibility for US/Iti personnel. In practice certain clothing is made available from RAF and AAF/ATO sources.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIES AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY

Serial	Nature of Unit	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for	Provision of adminis
1.	Combat forces	Rations	British less Italian element provided by Italian Government.	ST Tpt	Combat forces have o 2nd line.
		Clothing	British	ST Depots	Maintenance from Br future to be maintai
		Equipment	British	Ord	Combat forces have o dump standard others for those forces are
				REME	Except for first lin LADs which are part equipment and vehicl in British workshops
				Petrol	Maintained from Alli
2.	Br/Iti Service Tps	Rations	British less Italian element provided by Italian Government	ST Tpt	Units possess small this usually has to Br units.

D72a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET
APPENDIX 'B'

PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIES AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY

Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for Provision of administrative services	
Rations	British less Italian element provided by Italian Government.	ST Tpt	Combat forces have own tpt up to and including 2nd line.
Clothing	British	ST Depots	Maintenance from British depots and planned in future to be maintained from Italian Depots. (Serial 6)
Equipment	British	Ord	Combat forces have ord facilities up to "ADOS" dump standard otherwise stocks of ord stores for these forces are held in British depots.
		REME	Except for first line repairs performed in LADs which are part of the Combat forces, equipment and vehicles are, in the main, repaired in British workshops.
		Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots
e Tps Rations	British less Italian element provided by Italian Government	ST Tpt	Units possess small quantity of own tpt but this usually has to be supplemented by tpt of Br units.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

Serial	Nature of Unit	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for Provision of administrative ser
2.	Br/Iti Service Tps (Contd)	Clothing	British with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.	ST Depots	In 3 District units are general through Italian territorial org Italian depots. In 1 and 2 Dis generally maintained from Britis units with whom they are workin Italian administrative division being taken to hand over the ma supply distribution responsibil troops by 1 Aug 45.
		Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.	Ord	This is largely clothing and he controlled by the administrative
				Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots.
2.	US/Iti Service Tps	Rations	US less Italian element provided by Italian Government.	QM Tpt	Units possess small quantity of usually has to be supplemented b
		Clothing	US with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.	QM Depots	Maintained almost entirely by US services.
		Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.	Ord	This is largely clothing and is from US Depots.
				Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for Provision of administrative services
ning British with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.	ST Depots	In 3 District units are generally maintained through Italian territorial organisation from Italian depots. In 1 and 2 Districts units are generally maintained from British DIDs by British units with whom they are working, assisted by the Italian administrative divisions. Steps are, however, being taken to hand over the majority of the British supply distribution responsibilities for Italian troops by 1 Aug 45.
ment Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.	Ord	This is largely clothing and held in Ord dumps controlled by the administrative divisions.
	Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots.
ts US less Italian element provided by Italian Government.	QM Tpt	Units possess small quantity of own tpt but this usually has to be supplemented by tpt of US units.
ng US with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.	QM Depots	Maintained almost entirely by US administrative services.
ent Personnl equipment largely from Italian sources.	Ord	This is largely clothing and is issued largely from US Depots.
	Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Serial	Nature of Unit	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for Provision of admin
3.	Italian Security Divs	Rations	US less Italian element provided by Italian Government	ST & QM Tot. Units largely tpt but some assist
4.	Italian units under Allied operational command	Clothing	Italian Government assisted by the US and British on 50/50 basis	ST & QM Depots. In 3 Dist a maintained through I
5.	Italian command and administrative control organisation	Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources	ation from Italian d and Fifth Army areas British depots or th trative divisions fr
6.	Italian administrative services			Ord Depots. This is largel PBS area clothing is orial organisation.
7.	Carabinieri (of which 10,000 at present count against Br/Iti ceiling and are provisioned in same manner as Br/Itis).			Fifth Army areas clo through the territor Ord dumps controlled
				Petrol Maintained from Allie

Medical: For all serials medical facilities are provided by the Italian Government and medical stores

TOP SECRET

3724

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

t	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment	Responsibility for Provision of administrative services
ty Divs)	Rations US less Italian element provided by Italian Government	ST & QM Tpt. Units largely possess small quantity of tpt but some assistance given by US and British.
nder)	Clothing Italian Government assisted by the US and British on 50/50 basis	ST & QM Depots In 3 Dist and PBS area generally maintained through Italian territorial organisation from Italian depots. In 1 and 2 Districts and Fifth Army areas maintained from US or British depots or through the Italian administrative divisions from dumps under their control.
l and) control)	Equipment Personal equipment largely from Italian sources	Ord Depots. This is largely clothing. In 3 Dist and PBS area clothing is issued through the territorial organisation. In 1 and 2 Districts and Fifth Army areas clothing is either supplied through the territorial organisation or through Ord dumps controlled by the adm divisions.
trative)		Petrol Maintained from Allied depots
) at) gainst) and are) same) tis).)		

ll serials medical facilities are provided by the Italian Government and medical stores by the British.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'C'

PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

1. A suitable composition is considered to be as follows :-

a. CONTROL

S.M.G. and M of W.	2,000
Territorial Regional HQs, Districts and Regimental Depots	7,000

b. ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING

Services	31,000
Training and reinforcements	10,000

c. TROOPS

Five Combat Gps and Garibaldi Regt.	50,000
SICILY (as now) two I.S. Divs	10,000
SARDINIA (as now) one I.S. Div	5,000
Ten I.S. Bdes (one per Terr Region excl SICILY)	25,000
	140,000

2. Above does not include Carabinieri or Italian units employed to meet Allied administration or guard requirements.

591

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

S.M.G. and M of W.	2,000
Territorial Regional HQs, Districts and Regimental Depots	7,000

b. ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING

Services	31,000
Training and reinforcements	10,000

c. TROOPS

Five Combat Gps and Garibaldi Regt.	50,000
SICILY (as now) two I.S. Divs	10,000
SARDINIA (as now) one I.S. Div	5,000
Ten I.S. Tdes (one per Terr Region excl SICILY)	25,000
	140,000

2. Above does not include Carabinieri or Italian units employed to meet Allied administration or guard requirements.

591

(272)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'D'

ADDITIONAL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS
FOR
MAINTENANCE OF ITALIAN ARMY AND CARABINIERI.

1. RATIONS

If following items of food are imported, the Italian Army, of strength 140,000, and Carabinieri, of strength 65,000, can be fed from Italian Government sources without impairment of the civil ration.

	Tons per annum				
Item	Flour	Dried veg	Sugar	Pepper	Coffee
Army of 140,000	25,000	2,800	1,600	8	800
Carabinieri of 65,000	11,600	1,300	720	4	400

Above figures do not include items or tonnages provided from indigenous resources.

2. CLOTHING

Following is estimated tonnage of raw material requirements to enable an initial issue and one year's maintenance to be provided to the Italian Army of 140,000.

Shoddy	1,472	tons
Cotton	396	"
Virgin wool	2,046	"
Leather	1,000	"

3. POL

Requirement for Italian Army of 140,000 estimated at 6,000 tons a month.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

140,000, and Carabinieri, of strength 65,000, can be fed from Italian Government sources without impairment of the civil ration.

Item	Tons per annum				
	Flour	Dried veg	Sugar	Pepper	Coffee
Army of 140,000	25,000	2,800	1,600	8	800
Carabinieri of 65,000	11,600	1,300	720	4	400

Above figures do not include items or tonnages provided from indigenous resources.

2. CLOTHING

Following is estimated tonnage of raw material requirements to enable an initial issue and one year's maintenance to be provided to the Italian Army of 140,000.

Shoddy	1,472	tons
Cotton	396	"
Virgin wool	2,046	"
Leather	1,000	"

3. POL

Requirement for Italian Army of 140,000 estimated at 6,000 tons a month.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

rep. u 19
JUL 30 RECD
CC 1017

Translation

The president of t. Council of Ministers
n. 41304/25372.22/1.2.2.

Rome, 27 July 1945

Dear Admiral,

the Minister of War particularly drew my attention on the ever increasing dissatisfaction of the soldiers under arms, mainly caused by the excessive duration of the service done by the ancient classes, and by the great difference in the military duties which exists between the various regions. As a matter of fact, in Latium, Abruzzi, Puglia, Campania, Lucania, and Calabria, the classes from 1914 to 1924 (last four months) were called under arms; the classes from 1918 to 1924 in Sicily; from 1916 to 1924 in Sardinia. In Puglia, Lucania, Molise and Sardinia, the 1924 classes (2nd and 3rdperiods of four months) and the 1925 class have also been called under arms. On the contrary, no call or draft was made in other regions.

The spreading dissatisfaction greatly compromises the morals of the units, and encourages desertion.

Gradual demobilization is urgently expected by the soldiers and the country, and all unit Commanders consider it is impossible to postpone it any longer.

I therefore think it is necessary to examine without delay whether it is possible to bring about without delay the gradual reduction of the contingent which is at present in service, according to the discharge program which is to be carried out during August and September and which M.M.I.A. has, it seems, already studied.

If the Allied Military Authorities agree about this matter, I shall be most grateful, my dear Admiral, if you kindly exercise your influence to have this immediately announced, to calm impatience and give confidence in the Superior Commands.

I remain,

Truly yours,

s. Ferruccio Parri

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

trmas s/c
cc.

272

See 283
287

5/3/5
590

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC/1017 CC
JUL 30 RECD

Tel: 735

28 July 1945.

Ref: 8276/3/30.

SUBJECT: Service with Thailand Army.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (SEATIC).

A letter from the Prime Minister to the Chief Commissioner, reference 41304/25372.22/1.2.2 dated 27 July 1945, is passed to you herewith and your comments are requested on the points raised therein.

M. PROBY
for
Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Encl:
as above

Sg.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Ltr Stone 8251/197/EC 20 July 1945

to AFHQ CCS

Use of Italian Army and its effect on redeployment of Allied Troops from ITALY

DOCUMENT FILED IN CC 1018

271

CCS 453

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RHF/mlm
AP 438
CHIEF COMM R

AG 091.711/115 SAC-O

10 July 1945 5279

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army

JUL 12 1945
JUL 13 RECD
CC 1500

TO: Chief Commissioner (15 JUL 45)
Allied Commission
APO 394

260 Action copy on file 8251/EC

1. Reference is made to letter, Allied Commission, file 8251/170/EC, dated 24 May 1945.

2. While it is agreed that the future of the Italian Army must be actively considered, the Allies presently maintain Italian troops on a special ration scale and largely with Allied clothing and equipment, in order that they may perform purely military duties as guards, service and Internal Security units. For this reason it has always been considered that wherever tasks could be performed by civilians, the Italian Army should not be used. This ruling is even more important now that the question of unemployment and unrest in Italy is causing concern.

3. The final decision of the Allied Governments as to the future size of the Italian Army has not yet been received, but it is known that the Italian Government is at present of the opinion that the country would be unable to support more than 140,000 troops for the next few years. Such an army may eventually become the only means by which the Italian Government can defend its frontiers against possible aggression.

4. It is known that the Allied Governments are anxious to reduce the ceiling of the Italian Army as soon as military requirements allow. Any troops used in the ways suggested by your letter under reference, would have to be fed and maintained by the United States or United Kingdom on the full Italian Army scale. Such a course would be uneconomical, where this work could be done by civilians.

5. As the training and organization of the future Italian Army will be a considerable task, it is difficult to foresee a time when either MMIA or the Italian Army would be free to take on any extensive commitments which could be handled by civilians.

6. Italian Prisoners of War. In reply to your specific suggestions:

a. If Italian Prisoners of War on repatriation were considered to be members of the Italian Army from the time of their arrival in Italy until the Italian Army had processed them and

270

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

arranged for their discharge, it would be necessary to obtain authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the importation and issue of additional Army rations. For this reason it would be preferable that all repatriates should be treated as civilians on arrival. Moreover, very few of the repatriates will be eligible for enlistment into the Italian Army, and the great problem will be in their absorption into civil life.

b. It is agreed that the Italian War Ministry should screen repatriates for suitable material for the Italian Army, and that it will be necessary for the Italian Army Territorial organization to deal with documentation dischargees. While the requirements of Internal Security permit, every endeavour will be made to leave the 6,000 Combat Group troops under your command as at present, to assist with repatriation, but as Allied troops are withdrawn you will appreciate that it may be necessary to return these troops to their primary task.

c. As the Territorial organization of the Italian Army is very largely civilianized, it is felt that the Italian staff built up to deal with repatriates can be equally civilian, employing only the minimum assistance from the Italian Army.

d. Transfer of control of the PW Sub-Commission to MMIA will be a matter of domestic arrangement within Headquarters Allied Commission should MMIA pass from under direct operational control of this headquarters. At present, such a transfer would imply direct control of Italian repatriation by this headquarters, whereas it is desired that the responsibility should lie as far as possible with the Italian Government. It is preferred that you make no change meantime.

7. Clearance of Land Mines. This subject is now under separate consideration with a view to the employment of German surrendered or prisoner of war personnel. The possiblity of releasing to the Italian Government some US-ITI or BR-ITI personnel to guard and to assist in training mine-clearance teams is also being examined.

8. Harvesting. It is understood that you are making alternative arrangements owing to the lack of Italian troops. Should German prisoners of war be employed, an effort will be made to find guards from Italian sources, but reliance should not be placed on this arrangement, as the ration difficulty remains to be solved.

9. In principle, the use of the Italian Army in the Rehabilitation of Italy is supported, but until the Italian Government is able to feed and clothe its own army, such employment would further

1856

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ltr AFHQ AG 091.711/15 SAC-O
10 July 1945 (Cont'd)

strain the already difficult Allied food situation. It is therefore requested that every possible use be made of civilian manpower, to enable the Italian Army to be reduced in size as quickly as possible, and trained for the defence of Italian soil.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - Addressee
1 - COC, Land Forces Sub Commission
1 - AC, MMIL
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-1 (B)
3 - G-3 AMO
1 - G-3 (Org-2)
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - G-5
1 - CAO
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M&D

Exc List - 12 July 45
(8251/Sec)

15 Chief Comm
16 Exec Comm
17 CA Sec
18 Econ Sec
19 WMD + IPOW Sec
24 Land Forces Sec. (Received Direct)

5

270

JUL 4 RECD
cc 0930

CUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : MMLA

DATE TIME OF ORIGIN
1 1510 B

TO : AFHQ
15 ARMY GRCUP
FIFTH ARMY
MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
REAR EIGHTH ARMY
CG IV(US)CORPS
1 DISTRICT
2 "
3 "
PBS
PENSOUTH
RAAC
WAR MINISTRY
MMLA LO SARDINIA
COMNOB PALERMO FOR MMLA LC
FIFTH ARMY FOR MMLA LC
EIGHTH ARMY FOR MMLA LO
DISTONE FOR MMLA LO
DISTWO FOR MMLA L6 NW ITALY
DISTHREE FOR MMLA LO
PENBASE C/o LIAISON SECTION FOR MMLA LO
PENSOUTH FOR MMLA LC
54 AREA FOR MMLA LO
FLORENCE CITY COMD FOR MMLA LO
56 BLU FOR MMLA LO
"F" BLTU FOR MMLA LO
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER PIEMONTE REGION
" " VENETO REGION
" " LOMBARDIA REGION
" " LIGURIA REGION
COMMISSIONER ANCONA
NAPLES
LIVORNO
PISTOIA

REF NO. SD 2811

SECRET

APPX A THIS HQ LETTER SD/34 OF 29 JUN SETS OUT FOR INFO PLANNED FINAL ITALIAN TERRITORIAL HQ LAYOUT AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT HQs AND UNITS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3 "
FBS
PENSOUTH
RAAC
WAR MINISTRY
MMLA LO SARDINIA
COMNOB PALERMO FOR MMLA LO
FIFTH ARMY FOR MMLA LO
EIGHTH ARMY FOR MMLA LO
DISTONE FOR MMLA LO
DISTWO FOR MMLA L6 NW ITALY
DISTHREE FOR MMLA LO
PENBASE C/o LIAISON SECTION FOR MMLA LO
PENSOUTH FOR MMLA LO
54 AREA FOR MMLA LO
FLORENCE CITY COMD FOR MMLA LO
56 BLU FOR MMLA LO
"F" BLTU FOR MMLA LO
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER PIEMONTE REGION
" " VENETO REGION
" " LOMBARDIA REGION
" " LIGURIA REGION
COMMISSIONER ANCONA
NAPLES
LIVORNO
PISTOIA

REF NO SD 2811

SECRET

APPX A THIS HQ LETTER SD/34 OF 29 JUN SETS OUT FOR INFO PLANNED FINAL ITALIAN TERRITORIAL HQ LAYOUT AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT HQs AND UNITS IN VENEZIA GIULIA

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED Lt Col Major

SD DISTRIBUTION:

ALLIED COMMISSION	INTERNAL
President AC	MA to GOC
Chief CommissionerAC	C of S
Exec Commissioner AC	A
G-1 (A) AC	Q
G-1 (B) AC	Mov
Naval Sub Comm AC	RE
Air Force Sub Com AC	X
Local Gov'tvSec AC	ST
Econ Sub Com AC	MED
Disper Sub Com AC	ORD
Pub Safety Sub Com AC	REME
Patriots Sub Com AC	
WMD & IDW Sub Co. C	L'B
TRANSPORT SUB COMM A/C	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

SUBJECT: Functions and Responsibilities of Italian Territorial HQs and Italian Adm Div HQs

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

SD/34

29 June 45

TO : (SEE DISTRIBUTION)

1. The object of this letter is to restate and clarify the functions and responsibilities of Italian Army Territorial HQs and Adm Division HQs with reference to MMIA letter TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44.

2. The layout of Territorial HQs is attached at Appx "A", Appx "B" shows the org and allotment of Adm Div HQs.

3. Adm Division HQs were formed in the first instance to maintain and administer on the Italian side, US-ITI, BR-ITI and ITI-ITI under command of British and American Armies, Base Sections and Districts to whom they were directly responsible and part of whose staff they may be said to be. When Combat Groups were formed and arrived in Army Areas Adm Div HQs allotted to Armies also administered them on the Italian side. The channel of command on the Italian side is normally - Unit - Adm Div HQ - Territorial HQ - War Ministry, ROME, but in actual fact since Territorial HQs did not function in Army Areas before the cessation of hostilities, Adm Div HQs with Armies often dealt direct with ROME. For the above reason also they maintained and administered ITI-ITI Units in forward areas.

4. Territorial HQs were formed with the object of:-

(a) Extending the authority of the Ministry of War over all Italy.

(b) Enabling control of Army personnel, real estate and military stores to be resumed as soon as possible.

(c) Implementing the call-up or demobilization of classes as required.

(d) Administering and maintaining ITI-ITI formations not under Allied Command in their area including all Districts and Depots.

Since the Commanding General of a Territorial HQ is the equivalent of a Corps Commander he is delegated certain powers (especially of disciplinary matters) that are not accorded to a Divisional Commander.

5. Whilst Appx "E" and "F" which are attached for ease of reference to MMIA letter TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 are in no way altered or affected by the cessation of operations it should be noted that Adm Div HQs with Armies are now for the first time located in Areas where Territorial Div HQs are [illegible] function. The channel of Command -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

and responsibilities of Italian Army [illegible]
with reference to MMLA letter TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44.

2. The layout of Territorial HQs is attached at Appx "A", Appx "B" shows the org and allotment of Adm Div HQs.

3. Adm Division HQs were formed in the first instance to maintain and administer on the Italian side, US-ITI, BR-ITI and ITI-ITI under command of British and American Armies, Base Sections and Districts to whom they were directly responsible and part of whose staff they may be said to be. When Combat Groups were formed and arrived in Army Areas Adm Div HQs allotted to Armies also administered them on the Italian side. The channel of command on the Italian side is normally - Unit - Adm Div HQ - Territorial HQ - War Ministry, ROME, but in actual fact since Territorial HQs did not function in Army Areas before the cessation of hostilities, Adm Div HQs with Armies often dealt direct with ROME. For the above reason also they maintained and administered ITI-ITI Units in forward areas.

4. Territorial HQs were formed with the object of:-

(a) Extending the authority of the Ministry of War over all Italy.

(b) Enabling control of Army personnel, real estate and military stores to be resumed as soon as possible.

595

(c) Implementing the call-up or demobilization of classes as required.

(d) Administering and maintaining ITI-ITI formations not under Allied Command in their area including all Districts and Depots.

Since the Commanding General of a Territorial HQ is the equivalent of a Corps Commander he is delegated certain powers (especially of disciplinary matters) that are not accorded to a Divisional Commander.

5. Whilst Appx "E" and "F" which are attached for ease of reference to MMLA letter TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 are in no way altered or affected by the cessation of operations it should be noted that Adm Div HQs with Armies are now for the first time located in Areas where Territorial Div HQs are installed and have started into full function. The channel of Command - Unit - Adm Div - Territorial HQ - War Ministry, ROME - is now the correct one for them on all purely Italian Adm matters and especially A/G1 matters.

See 269

268

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6. When the need for Adm Div HQ ceases owing to a considerable reduction or disbandment of service tps (US-ITI, BR-ITI categories) Adm Div HQs will most likely first become an incr to Terr. HQs and then in a later phase be dissolved and their functions for all matters will pass over to Italian Territorial HQs. Until such time Adm Div HQs must continue to administer Italian Service Tps under Comd US or Br Formations.

H A C Howard
Lt Col
for Major General
M M I A

ws

DISTRIBUTION:

AFHQ	(5)
15 ARMY GROUP	(5)
FIFTH ARMY	(5)
MAIN EIGHTH ARMY	(5)
REAR EIGHTH ARMY	(2)
C.G. IV(US)CORPS	(2)
1 DISTRICT	(2)
2 "	(2)
3 "	(2)
PBS	(2)
PENSOUTH	(2)
R.A.A.C.	(2)
WAR MINISTRY	(5)
MMIA LC SARDINIA	
" " SICILY	
" " FIFTH ARMY	(2)
" " EIGHTH ARMY	(2)(plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44)
" " 1 District	(2)
" " NW ITALY c/o 2 Dist	(4)(plus 2 copies TS/G/12 of 26 Dec & 1 copy SD/25 of 18 Mar 45)
" " 3 District	
" " PENBASE	(plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & copy SD/25 of 18 Mar 45)
" " PENSOUTH	
" " BARI c/o 54 AREA	
" " FLORENCE City Comd	(plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & SD/25 of 18 Mar 45)
" " 56 ELU	
" " "F" ELTU RTC ICF	

PRESIDENT A.C.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER A.C.
EXEC COMMISSIONER A.C.
G-1 (A) A.C.
G-1 (B) A.C. (plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & SD/94/1 of 3 Jun 45)
NAVAL SUB COMMISSION A.C.
AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION A.C.
LOCAL GOV'T SEC A.C. (plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & SD/94/1 of 3 Jun 45)
ECON SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
DISPER SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")

REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, LOMBARDIA REGION
" " , LIGURIA REGION
COMMISSIONER, ANCONA
" , NAPLES
" , LIVORNO
" , PISTOIA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

MA to GOC	
C of S	
A	(Two)
Q	(Four)
MOV	(Two)
RE	
X	
ST	(Three)
MED	
ORD	
REME	(Three)
LAB	
WAR DIARY	(Two)
FILE : SD/35	
SPARE	(Two)

504

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

AFHQ	(5)
15 ARMY GROUP	(5)
FIFTH ARMY	(5)
MAIN EIGHTH ARMY	(5)
REAR EIGHTH ARMY	(2)
C.G. IV(US)CORPS	(2)
1 DISTRICT	(2)
2 "	(2)
3 "	(2)
PBS	(2)
PENSOUTH	(2)
R.A.A.C.	(2)
WAR MINISTRY	(5)

MMIA LO SARDINIA
" " SICILY
" " FIFTH ARMY (3)
" " EIGHTH ARMY (2)(plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44)
" " 1 District (2)
" " NW ITALY c/o 2 Dist (4)(plus 2 copies TS/G/12 of 26 Dec & 1 copy SD/25 of 18 Mar 45)
" " 3 District
" " PENBASE (plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & copy SD/25 of 18 Mar 45)
" " PENSOUTH
" " BARI c/o 54 AREA
" " FLORENCE City Comd (plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & SD/25 of 18 Mar 45)
" " 56 BLU
" " "F" BLTU RTC ICF
PRESIDENT A.C.
HIEF COMMISSIONER A.C.
EXEC COMMISSIONER A.C.
G-1 (A) A.C.
G-1 (B) A.C. (plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & SD/94/1 of 3 Jun 45)
NAVAL SUB COMMISSION A.C.
AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION A.C.
LOCAL GOV'T SEC A.C. (plus copy TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 & SD/94/1 of 3 Jun 45)
ECON SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
DISPER SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
PATRIOTS SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
WMD & IPW SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
TRANSPORTATION SUB COM A.C. (" " " " " ")
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, PIEMONTE REGION
" " , VENETO REGION
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, LOMBARDIA REGION
" " , LIGURIA REGION
COMMISSIONER, ANCONA
" , NAPLES
" , LIVORNO
" , PISTOIA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

M. to GOC	
C of S	
A	(Two)
Q	(Four)
MOV	(Two)
RE	
X	
ST	(Three)
MED	
CMD	
REME	(Three)
LAB	
WAR DIARY	(Two)
FILE : SD/35	
SPARE	(Two)

504

768

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TERRITORIAL HQ LAYOUT

DESIGNATION	REGION	MILITARY DISTRICT HQ's	TOTAL (99)
Terr. HQ No. 1 TURIN	PIEDMONT less CUNEO and MONDOVI	TURIN, IVREA, NOVARA, VERCELLI, ... CHIVASSO, PINEROLO, CASALE, ALESSANDRIA, TORTONA	9
Terr. HQ No. 2 GENOA	LIGURIA plus CUNEO and MONDOVI	GENOA, CUNEO, MONDOVI, SAVON.	4
Terr. HQ No. 3 MILAN	LOMBARDY	MILAN, SONDRIO, COMO, VARESE, ... BERGAMO, MONZA, TREVIGLIO, BRESCIA, LODI, PAVIA, CREMONA, MANTOVA	12
Terr. HQ No. 4 BOLZANO	VENEZIA TRIDENTINA	BOLZANO, TRENTO, BELLUNO, VICENZA, ... VERONA	5
Terr. HQ No. 5 UDINE	VENEZIA	UDINE, SACILE, GORIZIA, TREVISO, PADOVA, TRIESTE, VENEZIA, ROVIGO, POLA, ...	9
Terr. HQ No. 6 BOLOGNA	EMILIA - MARCHE	BOLOGNA, PIACENZA, PARMA, REGGIO, EMILIA, FERRARA.. MODENA, RAVENNA, FORLI, PESARO, ANCONA	10
Terr. HQ No. 7 FLORENCE	TUSCANY	FLORENCE, APUANIA, LUCCA, PISTOIA, PISA, ... AREZZO, SIENA, GROSSETO	8
Terr. HQ No. 8 ROME	LAZIO - UMBRIA ABRUZZI - SARDINIA	ROME, PERUGIA, MACERATA, ORVIETO, SPOLETO, ASCOLI PICENO, TERAMO, VITERBO, AQUILA, CHIETI, SULMONA, FROSINONE, LITTORIA, CAGLIARI, ORISTANO, SASSARI, ...	16
Terr. HQ No. 9 BARI	APULIA - LUCANIA	BARI, CAMPOBASSO, FOGGIA, BARLETTA, POTENZA, TARANTO, LECCE, ...	7
Terr. HQ No. 10 NAPLES	CAMPANIA - CALABRIA	NAPLES, CASERTA, BENEVENTO, AVERSA, NOLA, AVELLINO, SALERNO, COSENZA, CATANZARO, REGGIO CALABRIA, ...	10
Terr. HQ No. 11 PALERMO	SICILY	PALERMO, TRAPANI, MESSINA, ENNA, CATANIA, CALTANISSETTA, AGRIGENTO, RAGUSA, SIRACUSA, ...	9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ANNEX "A" to MMIA letter SD/3 dated 29 Jun 45

TERRITORIAL HQ LAYOUT

REGION	MILITARY DISTRICT HQ's	TOTAL (99)	NUMBER OF REGIMENTAL DEPOTS (RECORD CENTRES)
PIEDMONT less CUNEO and MONDOVI	TURIN, IVREA, NOVARA, VERCELLI, ... CHIVASSO, PINEROLO, CASALE, ALESSANDRIA, TORTONA	9	10
LIGURIA plus CUNEO and MONDOVI	GENOA, CUNEO, MONDOVI, SAVON.	4	4
LOMBARDY	MILAN, SONDRIO, COMO, VARESE, ... BERGAMO, MONZA, TREVIGLIO, BRESCIA, LODI, PAVIA, CREMONA, MANTOVA	12	6
VENEZIA TRIDENTINA	BOLZANO, TRENTO, BELLUNO, VICENZA, ... VERONA	5	6
VENEZIA	UDINE, SACILE, GORIZIA, TREVISO, PADOVA, TRIESTE, VENEZIA, ROVIGO, POLA, ...	9	4
EMILIA - MARCHE	BOLOGNA, PIACENZA, PARMA, REGGIO, EMILIA, FERRARA.. MODENA, RAVENNA, FORLI, PESARO, ANCONA	10	9
TUSCANY	FLORENCE, APUANIA, LUCCA, PISTOIA, PISA, ... AREZZO, SIENA, GROSSETO	8	4
LAZIO - UMBRIA ABRUZZI - SARDINIA	ROME, PERUGIA, MACERATA, ORVIETO, SPOLETO, ASCOLI PICENO, TERAMO, VITERBO, AQUILA, CHIETI, SULMONA, FROSINONE, LITTORIA, CAGLIARI, ORISTANO, SASSARI, ...	16	20
APULIA - LUCANIA	BARI, CAMPOBASSO, FOGGIA, BARLETTA, POTENZA, TARANTO, LECCE, ...	7	10
CAMPANIA - CALABRIA	NAPLES, CASERTA, BENEVENTO, AVERSA, NOLA, AVELLINO, SALERNO, COSENZA, CATANZARO, REGGIO CALABRIA, ...	10	14
SICILY	PALERMO, TRAPANI, MESSINA, ENNA, CATANIA, CALTANISSETTA, AGRIGENTO, RAGUSA, SIRACUSA, ...	9	3

1643

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

DESIGNATION	LOCATION	FUNCTION	ALLIED HQ	ITALIAN HQ	MIL. LO	R
HQ 205 Adm Div	NAPLES	US-ITIS under Comd	USAAFSC/MTO	Terr HQ 10 NAPLES	Senior LO NAPLES (c/o PENSOUTH)	Deals w Air For USAAFSC
HQ 209 Adm Div	CESENA	BR-ITIS under Comd	DISTONE (A)	Terr HQ 6 BOLOGNA	LO DISTONE	This is comd DI
HQ 210 Adm Div		US-ITIS under comd	FIFTH ARMY	Terr HQ 4 BOLZANO	Senior LO FIFTH ARMY	All US- HQs 1, concern
HQ Italian Command 212	NAPLES	US-ITIS under Comd	P.B.S.	Terr HQ 10 NAPLES	Senior LO NAPLES	This HQ ten Gro at PINE and GEN
(HQ 227 Adm Div	NAPLES	BR-ITIS under Comd	DISTHREE (& RAAC)	Terr HQ 10 NAPLES	LO DISTHREE)	There a
(Eastern Det HQ 227 Div	BARI	" " "	DISTHREE (Eastern Territory)	Terr HQ 9 BARI	Senior LO BARI (c/o 54 Area)	or SICI
HQ 228 Adm Div	UDINE	" " "	EIGHTH ARMY	Terr HQ 5 UDINE	Senior LO EIGHTH ARMY	Terr. H concern
HQ 230 Adm Div	FLORENCE	" " "	DISTONE (B)	Terr HQ 7 FLORENCE	LO FLORENCE	See Not
HQ 231 Adm Div	LONATO (See Note C)	" " "	FIVE ARMY BR INCR (See Note D)	Terr HQ 4 BOLZANO	LO FIVE ARMY BR INCR	It has b this HQ gether the uni Senior at MILA TURIN a 2 DIST side an at TURI

(SEE NOTES ON NEXT PAGE)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX "B" TO MMLA LETTER
SD/34 DATED JUNE 1945

ORG AND ALLOTMENT - ADM DIV HQ'S

CATION	FUNCTION	ALLIED HQ	ITALIAN HQ	MMLA LO	REMARKS
PLES	US-ITIS under Comd USAAFSC/MTO		Terr HQ 10 NAPLES	Senior LO NAPLES (c/o PENSOUTH)	Deals with Adm of all Italian Air Force Personnel assigned to USAAFSC/MTO.
SENA	BR-ITIS under Comd DISTONE (A)		Terr HQ 6 BOLOGNA	LO DISTONE	This is one of two HQs under comd DISTONE. See note (A)
	US-ITIS under comd FIFTH ARMY		Terr HQ 4 BOLZANO	Senior LO FIFTH ARMY	All US-ITIS in FIVE ARMY. Terr HQs 1, 2, 3, and 6 may also be concerned.
PLES	US-ITIS under Comd P.B.S.		Terr HQ 10 NAPLES	Senior LO NAPLES	This HQ has three Zone HQs and ten Group HQs. MMLA has LO's at PENBASE (LEGHORN), FLORENCE and GENOA.
APLES	BR-ITIS under Comd DISTHREE (& RAAC)		Terr HQ 10 NAPLES	LO DISTHREE	There are no BR-ITIS in SARDINIA or SICILY.
ARI	" " " DISTHREE (Eastern Territory)		Terr HQ 9 BARI	Senior LO BARI (c/o 54 Area)	
DINE	" " " EIGHTH ARMY		Terr HQ 5 UDINE	Senior LO EIGHTH ARMY	Terr. HQs 4 and 6 would be concerned regarding this area.
FLORENCE	" " " DISTONE (B)		Terr HQ 7 FLORENCE	LO FLORENCE	See Note (B) at foot.
LONATO (See Note C)	" " " FIVE ARMY BR INCR (See Note D)		Terr HQ 4 BOLZANO	LO FIVE ARMY BR INCR	It has been agreed by AFHQ that this HQ pass to comd 2 DIST together with a proportion of the units it administers. The Senior MMLA LO N.W. ITALY is at MILAN and has officers at TURIN and GENOA. He works with 2 DIST and IV Corps on the Allied side and Terr. HQs 1, 2, and 3 at TURIN, GENOA and MILAN.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX "B" (CONT'D)

NOTES:

(A) 209 Adm Div HQ administers all BR-ITI Units in that part of DISTONE Area in the Regions o the Province of MANTOVA.

(B) 230 Adm Div HQ administers the remaining BR-ITI Units in DISTONE Area (i.e. TOSCANA - UM

(C) It has been recommended by MMLA that 231 Adm Div HQ moves to a location near HQ 2 DISTRIC

(D) Br Incr 5 Army ceased to exist w.e.f. 23 June 45. BR-ITI Units formerly under its comma by 231 Div (which passes to cond 2 DIST) if West of the Western bdy of the Provinces of B MANTOVA, REGGIO EMILIA, and North of the Northern bdy of TOSCANA; and by either 209 Div or cond 1 DIST) if East and South of that boundary.

WS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

" (CONT'D)

dm Div HQ administers all BR-ITI Units in that part of DISTONE Area in the Regions of EMILI - MARCHE and rovince of MANTOVA.

dm Div HQ administers the remaining BR-ITI Units in DISTONE Area (i.e. TOSCANA - UMBRIA and part LAZIO).

s been recommended by MMIA that 231 Adm Div HQ moves to a location near HQ 2 DISTRICT.

or 5 Army ceased to exist w.e.f. 23 June 45. BR-ITI Units formerly under its command will be administered 1 Div (which passes to cond 2 DIST) if West of the Western bdy of the Provinces of BOLZANO, TRENTO, VERONA, VA, REGGIO EMILIA, and North of the Northern bdy of TOSCANA; and by either 209 Div or 230 Div (both under 1 DIST) if East and South of that boundary.

APPENDIX "E" to MMIA
letter TS/G/12 of 26
Dec 44

FUNCTIONS OF TERRITORIAL HQ's, DISTRICTS AND DEPOTS

1. Territorial HQs

(a) represent authority of War Ministry and General Staff throughout area of responsibility.

(b) A Branch/G-1 matters and discipline behond the scope of lower fmn HQs (incl tps under Allied operational comd)

(c) responsibility for safe custody and accounting of all Italian mil stores.

(d) reps of services attached to the staff are responsible for org of services in the area.

(e) Org and op of Districts, Depots, hosps and other mil ests.

(f) Supervision and org of call-up and demobilization.

(g) Administration and discipline of Italian I.S.Tps.

2. Districts constitute the mil documentation and adm centres through which the citizen enters or leaves the Army. Essential functions are: -

(a) machinery of conscription on calling up of classes/

(b) demobilization and recall of reserves

(c) assistance to families of men killed, wounded or taken prisoner

(d) payments of allowances to dependents of offrs and Ors

(e) records of junior reserve offrs

(f) settlements of claims and complaints for NCOs and ORs.

3. Depots (Record Centers) are the homes and record centers of Italian regts. Their functions incl:-

(a) Soldier's record while he is with the Army

(b) Clothing and arming the soldier when he is first called up; vice versa on demobilization

(c) forming personnel into units when required, incl units for Allies

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(a) represent authority of War Ministry and General Staff throughout area of responsibility.

(b) A Branch/G-1 matters and discipline behond the scope of lower fmn HQs (incl tps under Allied operational comd)

(c) responsibility for safe custody and accounting of all Italian mil stores.

(d) reps of services attached to the staff are responsible for org of services in the area.

(e) Org and op of Districts,Depots,hosps and other mil ests.

(f) Supervision and org of call-up and demobilization.

(g) Administration and discipline of Italian I.S.Tps.

2. Districts constitute the mil documentation and adm centres through which the citizen enters or leaves the Army. Essential functions are: -

(a) machinery of conscription on calling up of classes/

(b) demobilization and recall of reserves

(c) assistance to families of men killed, wounded or taken prisoner

(d) payments of allowances to dependants of offrs and Ors

(e) records of junior reserve offrs

(f) settlements of claims and complaints for NCOs and ORs.

3. Depots (Record Centers) are the homes and record centers of Italian regts. Their functions incl:-

(a) Soldier's record while he is with the Army

(b) Clothing and arming the soldier when he is first called up; vice versa on demobilization

(c) forming personnel into units when required,incl units for Allies

(d) records of all arms and eqpt issued to units

(e) holding stocks of clothing, unit and personal eqpt etc

(f) regimental adm and records

NOTE functions at 3 (b) & (c) are being performed by the Allies under present circumstances. The clothing referred to in serial 3 (c) is known as ITI clothing.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FUNCTIONS OF ITALIAN ADM DIV HQ's

(a) Org of sups of all kinds (rations, clothing, POL, and sups, accn stores) for all Italian tps under command of the parent Allied fmn, with the assistance of MMIA LO and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA. In all such matters the Adm Div HQ will deal direct with the Italian War Ministry, keeping the MMIA LO informed, or direct with parent Allied fmn, through MMIA LO.

(b) Distributions of sups of all kinds to all Italian tps under command of the parent Allied fmn under the direction of MMIA LO, and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA.

(c) Dispipline and welfare and all purely Italian Army Adm matters for all tps placed under its command. On all such matters the Adm HQ will deal with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ and NOT direct with the War Ministry.

(d) Maintenance of all ITI-ITI tps under its command by arrangement with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ when directed by MMIA.

(e) Function as the recognised Italian Mil Authority with whom the parent Allied fmn will deal on all local matters concerning the Italian tps under its comd.

(f) GOC Italian Adm HQ is the rep of the War Ministry in the area under his command and is there to be consulted on and give every assistance in all matters of major issue.

NOTE:-For purely Italian Adm matters, the channel of comd is :

Unit - Adm Div HQ - Territorial HQ - War Ministry. The Territorial HQ is particularly concerned in this case with all A/G1 matters; Adm and discipline of personnel and control of funds and stores. It will NOT interfere with the org of sups to tps under Allied comd nor move or transfer such personnel without prior agreement of the parent Allied fmn and/or MMIA: Should tps of an Adm Div HQ be spread over more than one region, the channel of comd will be :

Adm Div HQ to Territorial HQ in which the HQ of the Adm Div is situated.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) Distributions of sups of all kinds to all Italian tps under command of the parent Allied fmn under the direction of MMIA LO, and in accordance with directives issued from time to time by MMIA.

(c) Dispipline and welfare and all purely Italian Army Adm matters for all tps placed under its command. On all such matters the Adm HQ will deal with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ and NOT direct with the War Ministry.

(d) Maintenance of all ITI-ITI tps under its command by arrangement with the appropriate Italian Territorial HQ when directed by MMIA.

(e) Function as the recognised Italian Mil Authority with whom the parent Allied fmn will deal on all local matters concerning the Italian tps under its comd.

(f) GOC Italian Adm HQ is the rep of the War Ministry in the area under his command and is there to be consulted on and give every assistance in all matters of major issue.

NOTE:-For purely Italian Adm matters, the channel of comd is :

Unit - Adm Div HQ - Territorial HQ - War Ministry. The Territorial HQ is particularly concerned in this case with all A/G1 matters; Adm and discipline of personnel and control of funds and stores. It will NOT interfere with the org of sups to tps under Allied comd nor move or transfer such personnel without prior agreement of the parent Allied fmn and/or MMIA: Should tps of an Adm Div HQ be spread over more than one region, the channel of comd will be :

Adm Div HQ to Territorial HQ in which the HQ of the Adm Div is situated.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

EXTRACT

29 June 1945

Hq AC Ltr CC 1001

To: EACTED

From: Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Future Policy toward Italy

* * *

(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength (say 200,000 or 250,000 men).

263

In my memorandum 8251/180/EC of 7 June 1945 I have suggested the maintenance of the Italian Army at an interim strength of 140,000 men consisting of five combat groups and one reserve regiment (50,000), three internal security divisions for Sicily and Sardinia, and one internal security brigade for each of ten military regions (40,000), with the remainder to be control and administrative units. In addition, the present strength of 65,000 men of the Royal Carabinieri should be maintained. Such a strength would suffice so long as Allied troops, mentioned in subpara (f) below, remained, but should be increased as these are withdrawn.

8251/180/EC

267

SEE CC File 1001 for complete document & further planning

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

CC 1018

15 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Allied troops in Italy.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterraneen Theater.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

Confirming the position taken by us at your operational conference yesterday on the subject of redeployment of Allied troops in Italy, I desire to place formally before you the following recommendations:

1. In examining the question of the redeployment and distribution of Allied troops in Italy, consideration must be given to external and internal security and the undoubted duty of the Allied Governments to ensure so far as possible that free elections are held so that the population may express its opinion on (a) the institutional question; and (b) the constitutional government of the country, without fear.

2. Consideration must also be given to the size and location of the Italian land forces.

3. If the proposals for the maintenance of an interim Italian Army of 140,000 submitted in MAAC memorandum 8251/180/MC of 7 June 1945 are approved, then the following distribution of the troops is recommended:

Combat Groups:	One each in TURIN, MILAN, BRESCIA, UDINE and BOLOGNA.
Internal Security Divisions (strength 2500 each):	2 Divisions in SICILY. 1 Division in SARDINIA. 1 Division in each of the Military Regions; viz, PALERMO, BARI, NAPLES, ROME, FLORENCE, BOLOGNA, GENOA, TURIN, MILAN, BOLZANO, UDINE.

4. The primary functions of the Combat Groups are for frontier defence and control. The Group at BOLOGNA could be used as a reserve.

5. If the above distribution of the Italian Army is approved, then the maintenance of five Allied Divisions is recommended in addition to the administrative and service units employed in redeployment of personnel and material and exclusive of any Allied forces in

266 a

Ap 263

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

CC 1018
Subject: Redeployment of Allied troops in Italy. 15 June 1945.

VENEZIA GIULIA. Consideration has been given to the fact that Italian troops will not be maintained within 15 miles of the French frontier.

6. It is recommended that one division be placed in each of the following areas: MILAN, PADUA, FLORENCE-BOLOGNA, ROME-NAPLES, BARI.

7. The distribution of troops within these areas is a matter for military consideration. It is obvious, however, that a small force will be needed on the Franco-Italian frontier and possibly in the Southern Tyrol and UDINE. Mobility would be a prerequisite and during the weeks preceding the elections it would be expedient to allow a very wide distribution of troops in order to cover the larger towns and some of the more important rural areas. This would naturally take the form of a special exercise or operation and need not be considered in detail in this memorandum.

8. It is considered that it would be retrogressive to station Allied troops in SARDINIA or SICILY even during the election period. SARDINIA can very well be left to Italian troops and in SICILY, particularly during election times, the employment of Allied troops would be unwise.

9. The role of the Allied troops at all times and especially during the election period would be as representatives of the democracies, and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs except in the gravest emergency would have to be avoided and the greatest care would have to be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation, requisitioning, etc. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government, to strengthen by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of radical methods by force.

10. The Allied troops should be maintained in this country until such time as the Italian Army and the forces of public security in Italy can play a competent role in the preservation of security. It is estimated that at the earliest this cannot take place before September 1st, 1946.

cc. U. S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
Exec Commissioner
CA SECTION
Col. FISKE (2)

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

(266)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

A.C. FILES
CC 1615
6/1717/779

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

Rome, 14 June 1945

265

Dear Admiral,

I have received your letter IPW/22/167 dated 11 June 1945 and I thank you sincerely for the kind steps you have taken in the matter of repatriation of all Italian soldiers and ex-soldiers now in Jugoslavia.

Yours very truly,

/S/ R. Prunas.

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
H.Q. Allied Commission, Rome.

EC DIST - 19 JUNE 45

ACTION: WND & IPW SCI

INFO: CHIEF COMM

EXEC COMM

760

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Prepared by _____ _____

WMD & IPOW S/C.

730/1mm

Ref: IPW/22/167 // June 1945

My dear Mr Frunes :

In reply to your letter 19/03726/24 dated 1 June 1945, I have referred the matter to higher authority with the request that everything possible be done to repatriate to Italy all Italian soldiers and ex-soldiers now in Yugoslavia.

As soon as a decision has been made you will, of course, be informed.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Don Renato Prunas
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Italian Government
Rome

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
WAR MATERIALS DISPOSAL AND
ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR SUB-COMMISSION

IPW/22/166

8 June 1945

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Italian Soldiers from Yugoslavia.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters, APO 512.
(Attn: G-5 Section.)

1. The attached copies of Memoranda from the Italian Government regarding Italian soldiers in Yugoslavia are forwarded.

2. I have been requested by the Italian Government to examine the position with a view to the early repatriation of all Italians from Yugoslavia. The fear that the political situation of the last few weeks may make the position worse for these Italian soldiers and ex-soldiers, is used as a strong reason for seeking Allied assistance in this matter.

3. Any steps which can be taken to return these Italians to Italy are strongly recommended, and I shall be pleased if you will inform me of any action taken.

For the Chief Commissioner :

J.A. [illegible]
Lieut.-Colonel,
Director,
WDS & IPW Sub-Com.

Encls:

Memorandum No. 6/1509/690 dtd 30 May 45.
Memorandum No. 6/1516/696 dtd 31 May 45.

cc

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner.

Ref: 8251/180/EC. 7. June 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

260

1. With reference to my letter of 24 May 1945, 8251/170/EC, I have now received a memorandum on this subject from GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMLA), a copy of which I enclose.

262

2. I am in general agreement with this memorandum and make the following recommendations:

(a) That the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding CC.RR, should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.

(b) That complete administrative control of the "interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:

(i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;

(ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and

(iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.

(c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.

(d) That AFHQ accept responsibility for supplying Italian troops working for them as in (c) above.

Your early consideration of the above recommendations is requested.

3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

8153

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to my letter of 24 May 1945, 8251/170/EC, I have now received a memorandum on this subject from GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), a copy of which I enclose.

(262)

2. I am in general agreement with this memorandum and make the following recommendations:

(a) That the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding CC.RR, should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.

(b) That complete administrative control of the "interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:

(i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;

(ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and

(iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.

(c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.

(d) That AFHQ accept responsibility for supplying Italian troops working for them as in (c) above.

Your early consideration of the above recommendations is requested.

3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2) (with copy of relevant correspondence).
Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA)
CA Sec
Econ Sec -do- (For action in accordance
WMD & IPW Sub-Com with para 3 above).
File
Float
Spare (3)

(263)

TOP SECRET

8153

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JUN 5 RECD
CC 0943

Translation

State Department

The Secretary General

19/08720/21 Rome, 1 June 1945

Not rec'd by C.C. or EC to with liaison office

Not rec'd by C.C. or EC to with liaison office

Dear Admiral,

I take the liberty of drawing your attention on two memorandums, n. 6/1509/690 and n. 6/1516/689 respectively of the 30th and 31st of May sent by the State Department to the Allied commission in relation with the question of the repatriation of the Italian soldiers and ex-soldiers who are in Yugoslavia. From the news which we constantly receive, the situation of these people is getting worse and worse because of the inhuman way in which they are treated, and which will probably get worse because of the political situation which arose in the last few weeks.

I shall therefore be most grateful, my dear Admiral, for anything you can do to hasten the return to Italy of the said soldiers.

Yours very truly,

s. R. Prunas

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Allied Commission
Rome

See 164

EC DIST - 4 June

ACTION:- HMD & IBOR SIG

INFO: CHIEF COMMR.

: EX COMMR.

3626

TOP SECRET

COPY

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Relaxation of Control of the Italian Army

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
G/3
30 May 45

PREAMBLE

1. Chief Commissioner, A.C. envisages the handing over of all ITALY to the Italian Government in due course, tentative date being 1 Sep 45. In order that the Italian Government may then be able to fulfil its functions, it is to be assumed that it must control its own Army.

OBJECT

2. The object of this Memorandum is to examine to what extent and how the control of the Italian Army maybe handed over, subject to the Allied interests involved.

FACTORS

3. Ceiling. The whole problem is conditioned by the ceiling of 313,000 (excl. CC.RR) authorized by the C.C.S. which in turn is dependent on world wide supply availability. Presumably this ceiling is not to be increased and may even be reduced in view of world wide shortage of supplies.

4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organization and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.

5. Interim Force. This falls into two broad subdivisions:-

(a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfil its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied man-power,

(b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a variable and constantly decreasing figure.

6. Capacity for self-support.

(a) The Italian Army is NOT at present capable of supporting itself. Basic rations are provided by the Allies. Clothing and boots are supplied largely by the Allies, either in the form of new articles or worn items which are renovated by the repair organization set-up. The Italians have relatively small stocks of arms and equipment; this is particularly evident in the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PREAMBLE

1. Chief Commissioner, A.C. envisages the handing over of all ITALY to the Italian Government in due course, tentative date being 1 Sep 45. In order that the Italian Government may then be able to fulfil its functions, it is to be assumed that it must control its own Army.

OBJECT

2. The object of this Memorandum is to examine to what extent and how the control of the Italian Army maybe handed over, subject to the Allied interests involved.

FACTORS

3. Ceiling. The whole problem is conditioned by the ceiling of 313,000 (excl. CC.RR) authorized by the C.C.S. which in turn is dependent on world wide supply availability. Presumably this ceiling is not to be increased and may even be reduced in view of world wide shortage of supplies.

4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organization and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.

5. Interim Force. This falls into two broad subdivisions:-

(a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfil its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied man-power,

(b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a variable and constantly decreasing figure.

6. Capacity for self-support.

(a) The Italian Army is NOT at present capable of supporting itself. Basic rations are provided by the Allies. Clothing and boots are supplied largely by the Allies, either in the form of new articles or worn items which are renovated by the repair organization set-up. The Italians have relatively small stocks of arms and equipment; this is particularly evident in the Combat Groups which are equipped throughout by the British.

(b) There are, therefore, two aspects of this:-

(i) what steps can the Italians take by 1 Sep (and there after to make their Army self-supporting ?

(ii) what will or can the Allies provide or leave with the Italians to make up the deficiency ?

On this will depend the size and composition of the Interim Force. It is also bound up with the Peace Treaty matter as to whether the Italians shall maintain any armament industry or whether they shall be dependent on the Allies for such armaments as are necessary.

/7.....

TOP SECRET

(262)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

7. Type of Control.

(a) The administration of the Italian Army is carried out by the central plan and procedure produced by the Ministry of War, under Allied direction (through M.M.I.A.) and depending (see para 6) on the supplies made available by the Allies. Administratively therefore it would be impracticable to hand over to the Italians complete Administrative Control or responsibility for their own supply or part of their Army, while the Allies retained such functions for the remainder. This would result in complications such as separate supply depots, a different ration scale for the two parts and difficulties in allotment of personnel; officers removed for delinquency or inefficiency from the Allied part could be transferred to the Italian part, comparison would be drawn by the troops between the two parts etc. etc. In fact the actual working of two parallel yet different systems within the same army is a possibility and a complication in an already difficult situation that we can NOT contemplate. Any relaxation of control therefore must be applied in respect of the Army as a whole and NOT of parts of that Army.

(b) (i) There are two types of general control as regards the Army as a whole viz. operational and administrative.

(ii) Operational control of their Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA is a function of the Italians, no Allied troops troops being present in these limited areas surrounded by water. The matter of operational control is more complex on the Mainland, where large numbers of Allied troops will remain for a long time to come and where Allied interests are more concerned and more affected in the event of disorder.

(iii) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Operational Control under these circumstances

secondly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain, if such Operational Control is handed over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strengths, the three ITI categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficients etc. (see AG.091.711/169 GCT-O dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary;-

firstly, as to whether the Allies (particularly in view of para 6 (a) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate examination of the point mentioned in 6 (b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control, or only the latter.

[illegible] as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

difficult situation that we can NOT contemplate. Any relaxation of control therefore must be applied in respect of the Army as a whole and NOT of parts of that Army.

(b) (i) There are two types of general control as regards the Army as a whole viz. operational and administrative.

(ii) Operational control of their Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA is a function of the Italians, no Allied troops troops being present in these limited areas surrounded by water. The matter of operational control is more complex on the Mainland, where large numbers of Allied troops will remain for a long time to come and where Allied interests are more concerned and more affected in the event of disorder.

(iii) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Operational Control under these circumstances

secondly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain, if such Operational Control is handed over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strengths, the three ITI categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficients etc. (see AG.091.711/169 GCT-O dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary;-

firstly, as to whether the Allies (particularly in view of para 6 (a) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate examination of the point mentioned in 6 (b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control, or only the latter.

thirdly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain if such Administrative Control is handed over.

7. (c) In any event, it seems clear that no matter what degree of relaxation of control is granted, the Allies must retain the power to ensure that ITALY carries out the terms of the Peace Treaty without evasion.

8. Phasing.

(a) If the reasoning outlined in para 7 is accepted and decisions are in the affirmative, it follows that either operational control or administrative control or both must be handed over complete on a given date. That is the only phasing possible.

(b).....

(262)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(b) The date or dates depend on:

(i) the speed with which the Peace Treaty is signed. If this is before 1 Sep., presumably the hand over takes place then, subject to safeguards such as continuing the existence of Italian service units so long as the Allies require the assistance of these.

(ii) the speed with which the necessary decisions can be given and the plan thus worked out, particularly as regards the supply aspect.

(iii) the internal conditions in ITALY and the general international situation on her frontiers, e.g., TRIESTE, BOLZANO and AOSTA.

(iv) the extent to which the hand over is kept simple and on broad lines.

(c) In general, I consider that the earlier the hand over takes place the better. It would give the Italians longer and more experience to set their military house in order while the Allies "hold the ring" in ITALY. Moreover it would be a gesture of trust and would conduce towards the atmosphere of a friendly Italy which is so desirable and which may not be easy if the Italians consider the terms of the Peace Treaty to be severe. Despite the fact that removal of Allied control will undoubtedly result in a loss of Italian military efficiency and of value for supplies rendered, we should accept this. ITALY has got to make a start on her own sometime and, within reason, the sooner the better.

For these reasons and also on the grounds of simplicity, the hand over of complete operational and administrative control (subject to safeguards) on a definite date seems the correct answer.

9. Position of Allied HQs and Troops.

(a) (i) Assuming hand over of complete operational and administrative control, Allied HQs and troops would become "free priority tenants" - a self-controlled organization superimposed on the self-controlled Italian State.

(ii) The Allied right of reassuming control in the event of disturbances to Allied interests; of priority use of accommodation, requisition and rail and port facilities; of receiving full and advance information and consultation on Italian projects; and finally of veto; would be safeguarded in the hand over.

(iii) The Ministry of War would work through its Territorial Regional HQs. Allied Armies, Districts and Base Sections would work in conjunction with these Regional HQs; Ministry of War with AFHQ, through MMLA.

(b) Assuming hand over of operational control only, the Italian forces authorized for this (Combat Groups, I.S. Divs, Guard Bns)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

the supply aspect.

(iii) the internal conditions in ITALY and the general international situation on her frontiers, e.g., TRIESTE, BOLZANO and AOSTA.

(iv) the extent to which the hand over is kept simple and on broad lines.

(c) In general, I consider that the earlier the hand over takes place the better. It would give the Italians longer and more experience to set their military house in order while the Allies "hold the ring" in ITALY. Moreover it would be a gesture of trust and would conduce towards the atmosphere of a friendly Italy which is so desirable and which may not be easy if the Italians consider the terms of the Peace Treaty to be severe. Despite the fact that removal of Allied control will undoubtedly result in a loss of Italian military efficiency and of value for supplies rendered, we should accept this. ITALY has got to make a start on her own sometime and, within reason, the sooner the better.

For these reasons and also on the grounds of simplicity, the hand over of complete operational and administrative control (subject to safeguards) on a definite date seems the correct answer.

9. Position of Allied HQs and Troops.

(a) (i) Assuming hand over of complete operational and administrative control, Allied HQs and troops would become "free priority tenants" - a self-controlled organization superimposed on the self-controlled Italian State.

(ii) The Allied right of reassuming control in the event of disturbances to Allied interests; of priority use of accommodation, requisition and rail and port facilities; of receiving full and advance information and consultation on Italian projects; and finally of veto; would be safeguarded in the hand over.

570

(iii) The Ministry of War would work through its Territorial Regional HQs. Allied Armies, Districts and Base Sections would work in conjunction with these Regional HQs; Ministry of War with AFHQ, through MMLM.

(b) Assuming hand over of operational control only, the Italian forces authorized for this (Combat Groups, I.S. Divs, Guard Bns) would operate similarly to the CC.RR under the War Ministry through Territorial Regional HQs, Allied HQs being consulted beforehand.

(c) For efficient and economical effort to ensure Allied priority it would seem that Movement Control should still be retained by the Allies, the Italians bidding for what they require in this respect on a national (not military alone) basis.

(262)

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10. German P.W.

The respective functions of the Italian Government and the Allies as regards these would need to be specified.

11. Patriots.

The pre-requisite of any plan must be a solution of the difficulties between the CLNAI and the existing Italian Government, with, as a corollary, the complete patriot military organization being made subservient to the official Italian War Ministry.

12. Position of MMLA.

(a) Should the hand over of operational control only be permitted, MMLA will still require its full staff, as its duties will remain virtually unchanged.

(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, MMLA can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, information and inspecting staff, in order to ensure that nothing contrary to Allied interests occurs until the Peace Treaty and that after signature of the latter its terms are faithfully observed by ITALY.

PLAN.

13. Bearing in mind the Preamble, the Object and the above Factors, I suggest the following Plan:-

(a) Complete operational and administrative control to be handed over (subject to safeguards) on 1 Sep 45, except for Movement Control which will be retained by the Allies.

(b) "Interim Force" to be authorized, to be replaced by the "Peace Treaty Army" when known.

(c) A forecast of Italian Service Units required by the Allies on 1 Sep (and thereafter) to be obtained by AFHQ from Armies, Districts and Base Sections. Meanwhile these units can be progressively reduced when no longer necessary.

(d) An examination by AC in conjunction with the Italian Government as to the extent to which the Italian Economy can support the authorized "interim force" on 1 Sep (and thereafter) in order to ascertain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies and equipment, excluding armaments.

(e) A decision on the question of armaments.

569

(f) Acceptance by the Allies of the liability to supply the service units working for them.

(g) The functions and position of Allied HQs and troops and of MMLA in the new set-up, to be defined - MMLA establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesigned.

NOTE. I have specified 1 Sep 45 as the hand over date, as requested by Chief Commissioner, AC. I do not know whether the necessary decisions or the economic examination necessary can be made in time to work out the detailed plan and implement it by 1 Sep 45. I would stress that very early decisions

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

virtually unchanged.

(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, MMLA can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, information and inspecting staff, in order to ensure that nothing contrary to Allied interests occurs until the Peace Treaty and that after signature of the latter its terms are faithfully observed by ITALY.

PLAN.

13. Bearing in mind the Preamble, the Object and the above Factors, I suggest the following Plan:-

(a) Complete operational and administrative control to be handed over (subject to safeguards) on 1 Sep 45, except for Movement Control which will be retained by the Allies.

(b) "Interim Force" to be authorized, to be replaced by the "Peace Treaty Army" when known.

(c) A forecast of Italian Service Units required by the Allies on 1 Sep (and thereafter) to be obtained by AFHQ from Armies, Districts and Base Sections. Meanwhile these units can be progressively reduced when no longer necessary.

(d) An examination by AC in conjunction with the Italian Government as to the extent to which the Italian Economy can support the authorized "interim force" on 1 Sep (and thereafter) in order to ascertain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies and equipment, excluding armaments.

(e) A decision on the question of armaments.

(f) Acceptance by the Allies of the liability to supply the service units working for them.

(g) The functions and position of Allied HQs and troops and of MMLA in the new set-up, to be defined - MMLA establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesigned.

NOTE. I have specified 1 Sep 45 as the hand over date, as requested by Chief Commissioner, AC. I do not know whether the necessary decisions or the economic examination necessary can be made in time to work out the detailed plan and implement it by 1 Sep 45. I would stress that very early decisions will be necessary, so that a comprehensive directive may be issued by AFHQ, allowing adequate time to work out all details and inform all concerned, without rush.

(Signed) L. BROWNING,
Major General
M.M.I.A.

569

262

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject : Italian Army-Control of Movement for duty, Chief Commissioner Leave and Demobilisation.

Land Forces Sub Comm.A.C.
M.M.I.A.
R O M E.
A 020.

29th May 45

To : Ministry of War.

1. The following are the present regulations governing movement of Italian Troops on duty,leave and demobilisation:-

(a) The control line for movement of Italian Army,and Italian Cooperator personnel on authorised leave is now the line river PIAVE from mouth to road-river crossing, 86494 thence road VITTORIO VENETO 86712,- PIEVE DI CADORE 87562- S.STEFANO DI CADORE 88875 thence due NORTH to AUSTRIAN frontier.

(b) No moves for any Italian personnel is authorised EAST of this line nor into prohibited frontier zone,i.e.belt 25 Km in depth along FRENCH, SWISS and AUSTRIAN frontiers,except as in paras C and E below.

(c) Demobilised personnel may move EAST and NORTH of lines as(a+b) above with proper documents from M.M.I.A.(i.e.MMIA. L.Os. will countersign Demobilisation papers in cases where the individuals' home is EAST or NORTH of the control line s)

(d) Italian personnel on duty may travel as far as the Control Lines as(a+b) above with "Foglio di Viaggio" and Identity Documents.

(e) Italian personnel on duty may proceed EAST and NORTH of lines as(a+b) above only with permission of 15 Army Group or 8 Army.

2. M.M.I.A.letters A 020 dated 18 May and 7 May and INT/101/1 dated 14 May are cancelled.

J Pickle Colonel
for Major General
A.M.I..

Copies To : AFHQ (5)
HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
ALL MMIA LOs
ADDG

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. The following are the present regulations governing movement of Italian troops on duty, leave and demobilisation:-

(a) The control line for movement of Italian Army, and Italian Cooperator personnel on authorised leave is now the line river PIAVE from mouth to road-river crossing, G6494 thence road VITTORIO VENETO R6712,- PIEVE DI CADORE B7562- S.STEFANO DI CADORE B6875 thence due NORTH to AUSTRIAN frontier.

(b) No moves for any Italian personnel is authorised EAST of this line nor into prohibited frontier zone, i.e. belt 25 Km in depth along FRENCH, SWISS and AUSTRIAN frontiers, except as in paras C and D below.

(c) Demobilised personnel may move EAST and NORTH of lines as(a+b) above with proper documents from M.M.I.A. (i.e. MMIA. L.Os. will countersign Demobilisation papers in cases where the individuals' home is EAST or NORTH of the control lines)

(d) Italian personnel on duty may travel as far as the Control Lines as(a+b) above with "Foglio di Viaggio" and Identity Documents.

(e) Italian personnel on duty may proceed EAST and NORTH of lines as(a+b) above only with permission of 15 Army Group or 8 Army.

2. M.M.I.A. letters A 020 dated 18 May and 7 May and INT/101/1 dated 14 May are cancelled.

for Fidele Colonel
Major General
A.L.I.C.

Copies To : AFHQ (5)
HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
CG MTOUSA
CG COMZONE MTOUSA
AAFSC/MTO
REAR 8 ARMY
REAR 5 ARMY
HQ 1 DISTRICT
HQ 2 "
HQ 3 "
PBS
PBS (SOUTHERN)

ALL MMIA LOs
ADDG
HQ A.C. (10)
'F' BDE TRC ICF
AIR FORCE SUB COMM
NAVY SUB COMM
G11 (1) MMIA
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMM
CC BR CADRE 804 BRD
" " " 803 "
" " " 802 "
AI MMIA
G. INT. MMIA.

568
5-3/CC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

SECRET.

MAY 24 RECD

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ref: 8251/170/EC.

24 May 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organisation and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMMIA).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organised, disciplined units and a military organisation distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the North and in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps has enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organisation to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.

4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organisation for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the War Material Disposal Sub-Commission known as the Italian POW Division. This Division

220(270)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organisation and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organised, disciplined units and a military organisation distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the North and in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps has enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organisation to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.

4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organisation for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the War Material Disposal Sub-Commission known as the Italian POW Division. This Division should now be taken over by the Land Forces Sub-Commission forthwith and the whole problem dealt with by that Sub-Commission which normally deals with the Ministry of War.

(b) Clearance of Land Mines. It is submitted that immediate steps should be taken to employ all engineering units of the Italian Army for this purpose. Some of them must already be provided with apparatus: more can probably be obtained, even on loan from Allied troops. The employment of the Army

Sec (270)

260

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

for this vital matter in the rehabilitation of agriculture would earn the gratitude of a vast number of the population who are now prevented from following their normal vocations and would increase the local production of food.

Hitherto, this matter has been handled by a Division of the Civil Affairs Section, who, with assistance from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, have achieved remarkable results. It is clearly, I submit, a function which should now be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

Areas to be cleared and priorities to be given could be decided by the Italian Government and, if necessary, by the Allied Military Government.

(c) Harvest. In line with most Continental countries which practise conscription, it has been the custom in this country to release during harvest time a large number of troops either on agricultural leave or on temporary duty to assist in the harvest. There are many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organised than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in FOGGIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

5. I recommend, therefore, that the reception and welfare of Italian POW and the clearance of land mines should be undertaken by the Italian Army under the Italian supervision of the Ministry for War and under the Allied supervision of its counterpart in the Allied Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. I also recommend that the customary release of Italian service personnel for the harvest be approved.

6. There will be other fields in which I shall make recommendations for the employment of the Italian Army from time to time. It will need a reorientation in the ideas of the Ministry of War and a broadening of the directives of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It may need adjustment in the method of administration and the provision of food. But it is essential for the sake of the Army as well as for the rehabilitation of this country that we encourage the Italian Government to use the manpower they have at their direct command in the services of their country now no longer at war.

7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMLA). Unfortunately this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Commissioner's reply. I am in full agreement with the latter. The Land Forces Sub-Commission is an integral part of the Allied Commission and it must share with the other Sub-Commissions of this Commission the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation to which we have committed ourselves in this country. We must shift the balance from MMLA and its completely military chain of command and outlook to the Land Forces Sub-Commission

568

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Allied Military Government.

(c) Harvest. In line with most Continental countries which practise conscription, it has been the custom in this country to release during harvest time a large number of troops either on agricultural leave or on temporary duty to assist in the harvest. There are many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organised than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in FOGGIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

5. I recommend, therefore, that the reception and welfare of Italian POW and the clearance of land mines should be undertaken by the Italian Army under the Italian supervision of the Ministry for War and under the Allied supervision of its counterpart in the Allied Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. I also recommend that the customary release of Italian service personnel for the harvest be approved.

6. There will be other fields in which I shall make recommendations for the employment of the Italian Army from time to time. It will need a reorientation in the ideas of the Ministry of War and a broadening of the directives of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It may need adjustment in the method of administration and the provision of food. But it is essential for the sake of the Army as well as for the rehabilitation of this country that we encourage the Italian Government to use the manpower they have at their direct command in the services of their country now no longer at war. 566

7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMLA). Unfortunately this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Commissioner's reply. I am in full agreement with the latter. The Land Forces Sub-Commission is an integral part of the Allied Commission and it must share with the other Sub-Commissions of this Commission the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation to which we have committed ourselves in this country. We must shift the balance from AMLA and its completely military chain of command and outlook to the Land Forces Sub-Commission, the counterpart of the Ministry for War in the Italian Government.

8. I feel sure that you will welcome in this respect recommendations from this Commission as to the future of the Italian Army and their dispositions. If the Italian Army is to become part of the Italian nation we must detach them from their operational Allied commanders as rapidly as

258a 258b 260

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

possible and bring them, under the Ministry of War, more into the Italian picture as an instrument of the Italian Government rather than of the Allied command. I am requesting GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission to submit recommendations in implementation of this principle which, of course, will make the Land Forces Sub-Commission far more a part of the Allied Commission.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2)) With copies of relevant
Acting President) correspondence.
Chief Commissioner)
Land Forces Sub-Com(ITALY) (2)
CA Sec
Econ Sec
WMD & IPW Sub-Com
File
Float
Spares (3)

258 a+b

5683.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2)) With copies of relevant
Acting President) correspondence.
Chief Commissioner)
Land Forces Sub-Com(MMLA) (2)
CA Sec
Econ Sec
WMD & IPW Sub-Com
File
Float
Spares (3)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Ref: 8251/30.

20 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Relegation of control of Italian Army.

TO : CCC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MTA).

239

1. Your memo S/6 of 2 April 1945 was written while hostilities were in process. We should clearly now make a new approach to the problem and put forward definite proposals as required by the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, in his letter of 28th February.

2. The final composition of the Italian Army, in common with the other fighting services, will be decided if and when a Peace Treaty is made between the Allies and Italy. Consideration of this will take many months but this delay should not deflect us from carrying out the policy of the Allied Governments to hand over control of Italy to the Italian Government progressively and rapidly.

3. The situation in the north and the general state of affairs in Italy predict the wisdom of expediting the turn over of civil administration, and I am recommending as a provisional date that we should make plans to do so by September 1st. Events and developments may prove my appreciation wrong but I wish all Sections of the Commission to work to this end.

4. The control of the Army is essential to any Government and, with certain provisos which will safeguard Allied military interests, such control could and should, in my opinion, be given to the Italian Army. Many difficulties of administration will have to be overcome: but we should overcome these without delay and this Commission should submit plans to meet them.

5. We should, as I view the problem as a logman, approach the matter as follows.

6. Once Phase II has been reached in N.Italy the combat groups of the Italian Army will presumably pass from the command of the 5th and 8th Armies and their disposal must be considered.

7. Immediate consultation should take place between yourself and AFHQ, at G-3(Ops) level, and yourself and the Minister for War, with regard to the location of these groups, having regard to the overall requirements of [illegible] and the Allied Armies in Italy. We should then recommend that these combat groups be placed under the Ministry for War who would put them under the command of the Regional military administrations which you have already distributed throughout Italy, always with the provision that they would be at the disposal of the Allied Military Commanders if needed.

257

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8. A simultaneous review of the location of the security battalions should also be made and these also should pass to the command of the Italian Regional commander with the same proviso.

9. The employment of large numbers of German POW will, it is hoped, release a similar number of Italian service units now working for and under the command of the Allied forces. It is a matter for immediate consideration as to how many of these service units will be required for the Italian Army and the Minister of War will presumably submit proposals.

10. With regard to maintenance of the Army, I fully realise that it is far from self-supporting and that many administrative difficulties will have to be overcome if control is handed over to the Italians. But we should adopt the policy of decontrol as early as possible and in this respect I do not agree with your recommendation that the date of the hand-over of control should be that of the signing of the Peace Treaty. We must make plans for the interim stage when the Italian Government is in control of this country but is not yet legally at peace with the Allies, just as we are doing with the other activities of the Italian Government.

11. I realise that much of the action suggested above may have already been taken by you, but from now onwards I think that the Allied Commission should take the initiative in its proposals for the composition, location and employment of the Italian Army, remembering that now that hostilities have ceased, military necessity should become military convenience and that the Commission must lay before AFHQ the needs, as we see them, of the Italian Government which, as I have said above, cannot function properly as a Government unless it has some control over its national army.

12. I shall be glad if you will forward your proposals to me as soon as possible.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5, AFHQ

259

COPY

SECRET

Ref: 8251/158/EC

18 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

158

1. I should like to reply in detail to your A/019 of 17 May because I think if we try to reorientate our views on the disposal and functions of the Italian Army, many of your objections can be met. Such reorientation does include a change in the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, or rather, a shift of balance from its purely military aspect, i.e., MMIA, to its function as an integral part of the Allied Commission in which the Land Forces Sub-Commission is the counterpart of the Ministry of War. This Ministry is part of the Italian Government and has already undertaken, on behalf of the Italian Government, a great many of these commitments which you describe as civil and which, in fact, are the duty of the Government.

2. In this respect I join issue with the great distinction which you draw between the Allied Commission and MMIA. If we think in terms of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, then there is no distinction and if as the Head of the Land Forces Sub-Commission you can review the use to which the Italian Army can be put for the rehabilitation of Italy now that it has completed its task as a fighting force, then I think it will be possible for you to agree that as part of the Allied Commission the Land Forces Sub-Commission can undertake functions in this plannedreconstruction just as the Ministry of War is doing in the Italian Government.

3. If we accept this premise then I would give the following answers to your para 1:

(a) Para 1(a). We all agree.

(b) Para 1(b). Such units as can be spared by the Allied military authorities having in view the great number of German POW now at their disposal. The recommendation in this respect would come from the Land Forces Sub-Commission who, with their knowledge of the present dispositions of the Italian Army, are in the best position to initiate such recommendations.

(c) Para 1(c). The responsibility for control and organisation lies with the Allied Commission who will use its Land Forces Sub-Commission as its functional agent.

4. Replies to para 2 are as follows:

( ) Land Forces Sub-Commission should make recommendations

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

1. I should like to reply in detail to your A/019 of 17 May because I think if we try to reorientate our views on the disposal and functions of the Italian Army, many of your objections can be met. Such reorientation does include a change in the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, or rather, a shift of balance from its purely military aspect, i.e., MMIA, to its function as an integral part of the Allied Commission in which the Land Forces Sub-Commission is the counterpart of the Ministry of War. This Ministry is part of the Italian Government and has already undertaken, on behalf of the Italian Government, a great many of these commitments which you describe as civil and which, in fact, are the duty of the Government.

2. In this respect I join issue with the great distinction which you draw between the Allied Commission and MMIA. If we think in terms of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, then there is no distinction and if as the Head of the Land Forces Sub-Commission you can review the use to which the Italian Army can be put for the rehabilitation of Italy now that it has completed its task as a fighting force, then I think it will be possible for you to agree that as part of the Allied Commission the Land Forces Sub-Commission can undertake functions in this plannedreconstruction just as the Ministry of War is doing in the Italian Government.

3. If we accept this premise then I would give the following answers to your para 1:

(a) Para 1(a). We all agree.

(b) Para 1(b). Such units as can be spared by the Allied military authorities having in view the great number of German POW now at their disposal. The recommendation in this respect would come from the Land Forces Sub-Commission who, with their knowledge of the present dispositions of the Italian Army, are in the best position to initiate such recommendations.

(c) Para 1(c). The responsibility for control and organisation lies with the Allied Commission who will use its Land Forces Sub-Commission as its functional agent.

4. Replies to para 2 are as follows:

(a) Para 2(a). Land Forces Sub-Commission should make recommendations with regard to availability in consultation with AFHQ having regard again to German POW.

(b) Para 2(b). A strong case could be made for the rationing and clothing of such men by the Allies in view of the undoubted assistance they would bring towards the early rehabilitation of Italy which, in its turn, must prevent disease and unrest. The Allied Commission, briefed by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, would make such a case.

258 b

See 260

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

5. Replies to para 3:

(a) Para 3(a). I agree that AFHQ must make the final decision but I consider that the Allied Commission, again briefed by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, can make a case with regard to (a).

(b) Para 3(b). We should immediately make recommendations for the transfer of such units to the Italian Army from the Allied military authorities to the Ministry for War, having regard to military needs, 2(b) and 3(d).

The solution is by no means easy but the initiative in preparing the way and finding a solution should come from us.

6. Replies to para 4 have been, in part, met in my preamble:

(a) Para 4(b). The responsibility of the Allied Commission will be delegated to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

(b) Para 4(c). For "LFSC" read "Land Forces Sub-Commission" which, I repeat, is an integral part of the Allied Commission. I agree that the greater must include the less.

(c) Para 4(d). I protest - members of the Land Forces Sub-Commission attend the Chief Commissioner's and Executive Commissioner's meetings and are in the picture. A very small transfer of staff from other Sub-Commissions to the Land Forces Sub-Commission would settle the matter.

(d) Para 4(e). The plan is working satisfactorily but there are endless difficulties because several Sub-Commissions are dealing with the Ministry of War who naturally would find it far easier to deal with one. The line of command appears to be wrong.

(e) Para 4(f). The fact that during hostilities the proposal to handle POW was rejected by AFHQ does not make me desist from endeavouring to put these matters on a proper basis now that hostilities have ended. Formidable as may be the present task of the Land Forces Sub-Commission I do not think that the extra commitments which are being supervised at present by a very small Allied staff, would present an insuperable problem to the Land Forces Sub-Commission with the considerable staff and machinery for implementation at its command.

7. Your para 5:

(a) The aspects of the problems of POW as set out in Appendix "A" exaggerate some of the difficulties. It would seem far easier for the Land Forces Sub-Commission, with a purely military staff, to be able to organize camps and movements, than the IPOW Sub-Com which has to wrestle with another Sub-Commission for every soldier they obtain. And surely it would be just as

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

military authorities to the Ministry for War, having regard to military needs, 2(b) and 3(d).

The solution is by no means easy but the initiative in preparing the way and finding a solution should come from us.

6. Replies to para 4 have been, in part, met in my preamble:

(a) Para 4(b). The responsibility of the Allied Commission will be delegated to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

(b) Para 4(c). For "LFSC" read "Land Forces Sub-Commission" which, I repeat, is an integral part of the Allied Commission. I agree that the greater must include the less.

(c) Para 4(d). I protest - members of the Land Forces Sub-Commission attend the Chief Commissioner's and Executive Commissioner's meetings and are in the picture. A very small transfer of staff from other Sub-Commissions to the Land Forces Sub-Commission would settle the matter.

(d) Para 4(e). The plan is working satisfactorily but there are endless difficulties because several Sub-Commissions are dealing with the Ministry of War who naturally would find it far easier to deal with one. The line of command appears to be wrong.

(e) Para 4(f). The fact that during hostilities the proposal to handle POW was rejected by AFHQ does not make me desist from endeavouring to put these matters on a proper basis now that hostilities have ended. Formidable as may be the present task of the Land Forces Sub-Commission I do not think that the extra commitments which are being supervised at present by a very small Allied staff, would present an insuperable problem to the Land Forces Sub-Commission with the considerable staff and machinery for implementation at its command.

7. Your para 5:

(a) The aspects of the problems of POW as set out in Appendix "A" exaggerate some of the difficulties. It would seem far easier for the Land Forces Sub-Commission, with a purely military staff, to be able to organise camps and movements, than the IPOW Sub-Com which has to wrestle with another Sub-Commission for every soldier they obtain. And surely it would be just as easy for the Land Forces Sub-Commission to cooperate and work jointly with the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission as does the POW Division of the WMD & IPOW Sub-Commission. We should reduce complications by making it a matter for two Sub-Commissions instead of three. A distinction must always be drawn between POW and ordinary refugees whoever handles the matter.

(b) Similarly with regard to Appendix "B", the functions in para 2 are carried out by one G.II in Civil Affairs Section. It has been made a civilian matter for the reason that the mines have got to be cleared and failing assistance in organisation from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, somebody had to do it. But there seems no

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

reason why it should not be handled by Italian military units now presumably not fully employed under the organisation of the Land Forces Sub-Commission who will, as part of the Allied Commission, work in very close contact with the other organisations of the Italian Government and Allied Military Government responsible.

8. Your para 6:

(a) Para 6(a)(i). If you ask the Italian Government who is responsible for POW and mine clearance, they will say, "the Minister for War" who is part of the Italian (Civil) Government. I see no reason why the Land Forces Sub-Commission should not assume an equivalent responsibility in the Allied Commission which deals with both civil and military matters.

(b) Para 6(a)(ii). If these functions are dealt with in the Allied Commission by that part of the Commission which deals with the Ministry for War rather than by two other Sub-Commissions, it must lead to greater efficiency.

(c) Para 6(a)(iii). Every part of the Allied Commission has to assume formidable and new tasks as the whole of Italy is liberated. It is in an attempt to make an equal distribution of these new tasks and to affect simplicity in their handling within the Allied Commission that it is proposed to make these recommendations to AFHQ. Your objections and this reply will be attached to the Chief Commissioner's letter.

(Signed) M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

560

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782015

responsible for POW and [illegible]; they would say, "... Minister for War" who is part of the Italian (Civil) Government. I see no reason why the Land Forces Sub-Commission should not assume an equivalent responsibility in the Allied Commission which deals with both civil and military matters.

(b) Para 6(a)(ii). If these functions are dealt with in the Allied Commission by that part of the Commission which deals with the Ministry for War rather than by two other Sub-Commissions, it must lead to greater efficiency.

(c) Para 6(a)(iii). Every part of the Allied Commission has to assume formidable and new tasks as the whole of Italy is liberated. It is in an attempt to make an equal distribution of these new tasks and to effect simplicity in their handling within the Allied Commission that it is proposed to make these recommendations to AFHQ. Your objections and this reply will be attached to the Chief Commissioner's letter.

(Signed) M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

560

258

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPY

SECRET

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army for Civilian purposes

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMLA)

A/019

17 May 45

TO : HQ ALLIED COMMISSION
(for EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER)

Ref your draft letter on the above, my comments are as follows.

1. ASPECTS

The three matters you mention (as will be the case in similar matters with a civil genre) present the same problem with 3 main aspects.

(a) Should the Italian Army be used for these purposes ?

(b) What soldiers of the Italian Army can be used for these purposes ?

(c) Where should the responsibility for control and organization lie ? i.e. A.C., as at present, or MMLA ?

2. REF 1(a) ABOVE

In principle I agree that Italian soldiers should be used to assist, provided that:-

(a) They are available after the military needs of AFHQ have been met.

(b) The Allies are prepared to ration and clothe such men, taking into account world wide shortage and demand.

3. REF 1(b) ABOVE

AFHQ alone is in possession of knowledge of all the factors to decide this and would have to consider:-

(a) The category and international supply aspect.

(b) The fact that over 85% of the Italian Army are under the direct command of Armies, Districts and Base Sections whose military needs presumably have to be met first.

(c) The factor as in 2(b).

(d) Whether German P.W. can replace Italian Service Units.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref your draft letter on the above, my comments are as follows.

1. ASPECTS

The three matters you mention (as will be the case in similar matters with a civil genre) present the same problem with 3 main aspects.

(a) Should the Italian Army be used for these purposes ?

(b) What soldiers of the Italian Army can be used for these purposes ?

(c) Where should the responsibility for control and organization lie ? i.e. A.C., as at present, or MMLA ?

2. REF 1(a) ABOVE

In principle I agree that Italian soldiers should be used to assist, provided that:-

(a) They are available after the military needs of AFHQ have been met.

(b) The Allies are prepared to ration and clothe such men, taking into account world wide shortage and demand.

3. REF 1(b) ABOVE

AFHQ alone is in possession of knowledge of all the factors to decide this and would have to consider:-

(a) The category and international supply aspect.

(b) The fact that over 85% of the Italian Army are under the direct command of Armies, Districts and Base Sections whose military needs presumably have to be met first.

(c) The factor as in 2(b).

(d) Whether German P,W. can replace Italian Service Units.

The solution is not as easy as might appear on the face of things.

4. REF 1(c) ABOVE

(a) This where I oppose your proposals most strongly.

(b) The existing responsibility is the civilian one of A.C. The mere fact of putting more troops at the disposal of A.C. does not alter that responsibility.

258a

See 258b

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(c) The major portion of the responsibility (clothing, rations, accomodation, transport, contacts with Italian civil ministries etc) is civil. The greater must include the less. Otherwise MMIA is put in the position of handling projects, the main elements of which are dependent on A.C.

(d) MMIA is not in the picture. The plan has been designed by A.C. and is in motion. Continuity would be broken by transfer to MMIA, who, in view of all their other commitments, have neither the controlling staff nor the time to take up the reins at this advanced stage of the proceedings. Transfer of P.W. Section A.C. to MMIA does not solve this, as the Senior Staff Officers MMIA would still have to assume control, under me.

(e) If the A.C. plan is working satisfactorily, why change it ? If it is NOT, surely MMIA should not be saddled with the task of putting it right ?

(f) Last November, provided certain essentials were guaranteed to me, at your request I was prepared to take over P.W. I foresaw at that time an ample period to organize and get the whole business going. These conditions do not now apply.

Nevertheless, your November proposal to AFHQ to this effect was turned down, mainly on the grounds that MMIA had a specific charter from C.C.S. and had quite enough "on its plate". Now MMIA has even more on its plate and is faced as well with a serious loss of Officers (estimated 40% of American officers, for instance, in the next few days) whose replacements will take time to learn our complicated procedure and set-up.

Under these circumstances I cannot agree to accept new and formidable responsibilities. Our main task is to compete with the official Italian Army and there must be no risk of breakdown in this objective.

5. IMPLICATIONS

(a) At Appendix "A" I attach some more detailed implications of the task you propose I should take on as regards P.W.; and at Appendix "B" ditto as regards Mine Clearance.

(b) From these it is clear that the work involved is very considerable and by no means as simple and straightforward as might be thought without analysis of the Executive action necessary.

(c) It is not enough just to give orders to Italians. To achieve success (as you so kindly state in respect of our creation of the Italian Army) we have found that supervision and inspection are necessary.

6. CONCLUSION.

(a) [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783013

Staff Officers MMLA would still have to assume control, [illegible]

(e) If the A.C. plan is working satisfactorily, why charge it ? If it is NOT, surely MMLA should not be saddled with the task of putting it right ?

(f) Last November, provided certain essentials were guaranteed to me, at your request I was prepared to take over P.W. I foresaw at that time an ample period to organize and get the whole business going. These conditions do not now apply.

Nevertheless, your November proposal to AFHQ to this effect was turned down, mainly on the grounds that MMLA had a specific charter from C.C.S. and had quite enough "on its plate". Now MMLA has even more on its plate and is faced as well with a serious loss of Officers (estimated 40% of American officers, for instance, in the next few days) whose replacements will take time to learn our complicated procedure and set-up.

Under these circumstances I cannot agree to accept new and formidable responsibilities. Our main task is to compete with the official Italian Army and there must be no risk of breakdown in this objective.

5. IMPLICATIONS

(a) At Appendix "A" I attach some more detailed implications of the task you propose I should take on as regards P.W.; and at Appendix "B" ditto as regards Mine Clearance.

(b) From these it is clear that the work involved is very considerable and by no means as simple and straightforward as might be thought without analysis of the Executive action necessary.

(c) It is not enough just to give orders to Italians. To achieve success (as you so kindly state in respect of our creation of the Italian Army) we have found that supervision and inspection are necessary.

6. CONCLUSION.

(a) In view of the above therefore:

(i) I strongly disagree with your proposals as regards transfer of responsibility from A.C. to MMLA in respect of P.W. and Mine Clearance, both of which functions are purely and wholly the responsibility of the civil Government, and have no connection with the Army other than for provision of personnel.

(ii) I do not see that they can conduce to efficiency or continuity, considering all the factors involved.

258a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(iii) I feel that it is NOT right that these formidable extra civil tasks and responsibilities should be imposed on my organization at this late stage in the proceedings, contrary to the policy long since laid down by AFHQ and at a time when we will be suffering severe losses in personnel and yet trying to compete with the innumerable difficult problems of the Italian Army proper, converting from a war basis through a transition period to a post-war layout, which is our main task.

(b) Should you still wish to represent your proposals to AFHQ, I must ask that a copy of this letter of mine go with them, in order that my full views may be made known.

(Signed) L. BROWNING

(Major General)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ask that a copy of this letter of mine go with them, in order that my full views may be made known.

(Signed) L. BROWNING

(Major General)

258a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Appendix "A" to MMIA letter
A/019 dated 17 May 1945.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF PRISONERS OF WAR (ITALIAN)

GENERAL

1. (a) The repatriation of a Prisoner of War is normally one of the responsibilities of his own Army using its own resources. In this theatre, however, the Italian Army has little or no resources of its own. It is dependent on the Allies for its rations, clothing, transport etc - in the same way as the civilian is largely dependent on A.C.

(b) Moreover, the Italian Army for which MMIA by its charter is responsible today consists of soldiers enrolled de nuovo since the Italian Armistice. All other pre-Armistice soldiers, including P.W., are therefore civilians. This is the ruling of the C.C.S.

(c) Thus the conditions mentioned in (a) and (b) constitute a different state of affairs to normal and fundamentally affect the whole issue.

PERSONNEL INVOLVED

2. Repatriation which has taken place and is now taking place is of both alleged POW's and civilian refugees. The 250,000 now in the PO Valley Area consist of returning forced labour, republican forces, displaced persons and refugees as well as P.W. - and are all housed in the same camps.

3. Repatriation from the Balkans comprises both civilians and ex-soldiers - Since last November 40,000.

4. Personnel now involved number over a million all over the world.

To compete with P.W. taken by the British alone, there is at the W.O. a Maj Gen and relative staff.

ADMINISTRATION

550

5. Rations, clothing, accommodation and transport must be provided from civilian sources. Contacts are with civil ministries.

ORGANIZATION

6. I am told that there are eight civil camps, three Eighth Army Camps and three Fifth Army Camps now operating in the North for all classes of refugee irrespective of ex military or civil status. A further ten are planned.

7. I gather that these camps are not on any War Establishment, are run by civilians, paid and voluntary, and military personnel. They are assisted by two Nuclei which operate jointly with AMG, Displaced Persons and Repatriation

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

this theatre, however, the Italian Army has little or no resources of its own. It is dependent on the Allies for its rations, clothing, transport etc - in the same way as the civilian is largely dependent on A.C.

(b) Moreover, the Italian Army for which MMA by its charter is responsible today consists of soldiers enrolled de nuovo since the Italian Armistice. All other pre-Armistice soldiers, including P.W., are therefore civilians. This is the ruling of the C.C.S.

(c) Thus the conditions mentioned in (a) and (b) constitute a different state of affairs to normal and fundamentally affect the whole issue.

PERSONNEL INVOLVED

2. Repatriation which has taken place and is now taking place is of both alleged POW's and civilian refugees. The 250,000 now in the PO Valley Area consist of returning forced labour, republican forces, displaced persons and refugees as well as P.W. - and are all housed in the same camps.

3. Repatriation from the Balkans comprises both civilians and ex-soldiers - Since last November 40,000.

4. Personnel now involved number over a million all over the world.

To compete with P.W. taken by the British alone, there is at the W.O. a Maj Gen and relative staff.

ADMINISTRATION

550

5. Rations, clothing, accommodation and transport must be provided from civilian sources. Contacts are with civil ministries.

ORGANIZATION

6. I am told that there are eight civil camps, three Eighth Army Camps and three Fifth Army Camps now operating in the North for all classes of refugee irrespective of ex military or civil status. A further ten are planned.

7. I gather that these camps are not on any War Establishment, are run by civilians, paid and voluntary, and military personnel. They are assisted by two Nuclei which operate jointly with AMG, Displaced Persons and Repatriation S.C., A.C. and the POW Division of WMD and IPW S.C., A.C.

POLICY

8. The present Italian Army ceilings as laid down by C.C.S. are full and will be reduced gradually, beginning almost immediately. The ex-soldier

258a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

P.W's will therefore not be absorbed into the Italian Army (except in the case of a few specialists) and will remain civilians.

CONCLUSION

9. If the responsibility for Italian P.W. were now switched to MMLA - thereby transferring the problem to the control of another intermediary - the following would be involved immediately;-

(a) Establishment of parallel organizations for administration of displaced persons and refugees on the one hand and of alleged P.W's who are ex-soldiers on the other, both of which are a civilian commitment.

Endless argument would ensue as to whether an individual was a displaced person or an ex-soldier. At the present time no satisfactory distinction has been made among the 250,000 in the PO valley who are being dispersed as rapidly as possible.

(b) Re-coordination by MMLA with all agencies involved both here in A.C.: with AMG and Regional Commissioners; with the Italian Government civilian High Commissioner for POW, and his ministry; with the Italian General who has been working with the P.W. Division of WMD and IPW S.C.; with 15 Army Group and with G-5 at AFHQ.

(c) Re-organization of that part of the two parallel repatriation organizations dealing with ex-soldiers on proper WE's; replacement of civilian personnel; on a military order of Battle.

(d) Establishing a military chain of command and integrating the 6,000 personnel from BR-ITI Combat Ceiling allotted to A.C. with the present civilians - AMG - A.C. chain.

(e) Producing some method of administration. MMLA has no rations, clothing or transport from civilian sources under its control.

10. For the future, the problem is bound up with international policy and world politics. Matters of international allocation of labour are involved; as also international legal questions, e.g. Italian P.W. interned by neutrals or in U.S.S.R. controlled territories; the status of P.W. awaiting shipment to ITALY post-peace Treaty etc.

It is clear that the problem has enormous scope, with potentialities of the highest international and economic order. These can only be settled satisfactorily by A.C. and NOT as an offshoot of MMLA.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(a) Establishment of parallel organizations for administration of displaced persons and refugees on the one hand and of alleged P.W's who are ex-soldiers on the other, both of which are a civilian commitment.

Endless argument would ensue as to whether an individual was a displaced person or an ex-soldier. At the present time no satisfactory distinction has been made among the 250,000 in the PO valley who are being dispersed as rapidly as possible.

(b) Re-coordination by MMLA with all agencies involved both here in A.C.: with AMG and Regional Commissioners; with the Italian Government civilian High Commissioner for POW, and his ministry; with the Italian General who has been working with the P.W. Division of WMD and IPW S.C.; with 15 Army Group and with G-5 at AFHQ.

(c) Re-organization of that part of the two parallel repatriation organizations dealing with ex-soldiers on proper WE's; replacement of civilian personnel; on a military order of Battle.

(d) Establishing a military chain of command and integrating the 6,000 personnel from BR-ITI Combat Ceiling allotted to A.C. with the present civilians - AMG - A.C. chain.

(e) Producing some method of administration. MMLA has no rations, clothing or transport from civilian sources under its control.

10. For the future, the problem is bound up with international policy and world politics. Matters of international allocation of labour are involved; as also international legal questions, e.g. Italian P.W. interned by neutrals or in U.S.S.R. controlled territories; the status of P.W. awaiting shipment to ITALY post-peace Treaty etc.

It is clear that the problem has enormous scope, with potentialities of the highest international and economic order. These can only be settled satisfactorily by A.C. and NOT as an offshoot of MMLA.

2586

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Appendix "B" to MMIA letter
A/019 dated 17 May 1945

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF MINE CLEARANCE

1. At present, mine clearance is undertaken by A.C., with the under-mentioned:

(a) Central Mine Clearance Office } 130
(b) Personnel and dets engaged on trg civilians } ITI-ITI
(c) Four Mine Clearance Coys - each 209 equals 836 ITI-ITI.
(d) Civilian Mine Clearance Gangs A.C.

2. If the present and future work were to be undertaken by MMIA, as a continuation of the present A.C. set-up, we should have to do the following:

(a) Find out location of all areas to be cleared. This would involve liaison with Italian Local Government bodies. The existing mine clearance organization works on a civilian regional system.

(b) Form an estimate of the task to be undertaken and the personnel and equipment required for all ITALY.

(c) Negotiate with AFHQ and 15 Army Group for Tps to perform such tasks. Civil Affairs Sec A.C. estimate they require a total of twelve coys for the work (i.e. 2508 personnel).

(d) Depending on A.C. rulings, allot priority of work, including the allocation of tasks at present performed by civilian mine clearance teams.

(e) Request AFHQ for an allotment of mine detectors and arrange for same to be distributed according to priorities and task decided.

(f) Arrange for Allied Officers to see that the work detailed is in fact being carried out. No personnel now available.

(g) Collection and collation of reports.

(h) The undermentioned variety of personnel would be engaged on mine clearance and arrangements would have to be made for the administration, clothing, food, pay, accomodation, transport, etc of such personnel.

Civilian Gangs
Trg Dets
Mine Clearance Coys ITI-ITI

554

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Enclosure.

(a) Central Mine Clearance Office } 130
(b) Personnel and dets engaged on trg civilians } ITI-ITI

(c) Four Mine Clearance Coys - each 209 equals 836 ITI-ITI.

(d) Civilian Mine Clearance Gangs A.C.

2. If the present and future work were to be undertaken by MMLA, as a continuation of the present A.C. set-up, we should have to do the following:

(a) Find out location of all areas to be cleared. This would involve liaison with Italian Local Government bodies. The existing mine clearance organization works on a civilian regional system.

(b) Form an estimate of the task to be undertaken and the personnel and equipment required for all ITALY.

(c) Negotiate with AFHQ and 15 Army Group for Tps to perform such tasks. Civil Affairs Sec A.C. estimate they require a total of twelve coys for the work (i.e. 2508 personnel).

(d) Depending on A.C. rulings, allot priority of work, including the allocation of tasks at present performed by civilian mine clearance teams.

(e) Request AFHQ for an allotment of mine detectors and arrange for same to be distributed according to priorities and task decided.

(f) Arrange for Allied Officers to see that the work detaild is in fact being carried out. No personnel now available.

554

(g) Collection and collation of reports.

(h) The undermentioned variety of personnel would be engaged on mine clearance and arrangements would have to be made for the administration, clothing, food, pay, accomodation, transport, etc of such personnel.

Civilian Gangs	
Trg Dets	ITI-ITI
Mine Clearance Coys	ITI-ITI
Fd Coys	BR -ITI
Other Units	BR -ITI or US-ITI
? PW Units	
Allied supervisory personnel	British or US

(i) Arrange with AFHQ for stores, transport and equipment without which work could not satisfactorily proceed.

3. From the above, it is clear that this is a civilian matter of considerable scope which can only be handled by A.C. with military Executive assistance and NOT as an offshoot of MMLA.

258a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

91
MAY 091745B

E/265
MAY 102150B
PRIORITY

GEN ROBERTSON

AFHQ AND ALCOM

SECRET

I find that Italian service troops are deserting wholesale to return to their homes in north ITALY. I request that MFIA take this up as strongly as possible and insist that energetic measures be taken to stop it.

Dist

Action - Land Forces SC 2
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm
File

5

553

E/5528

258

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ref: 2804/EC. 3 May 1945.

Following message handed to Major GIBSON for transmission to MILAN for HOPKINSON, MACLEAN and POLETTI:

Begins:

CONFIDENTIAL.

WITH APPROVAL OF SACMED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE APPOINTED GENERAL CADORNA AS CHIEF OF ARMY GENERAL STAFF WITH PERMISSION FOR HIM TO REMAIN IN NORTH UNTIL HE CAN CONVENIENTLY BE RELEASED FROM PRESENT DUTIES.

Ends.

15 Army Group and IV Corps advised.

Copy: CC
Ex Com

257

5-2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

15 ARMY GROUP RPTD FOR INFO TO FOURTH CORPS

6819 5 May 1945 PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL FD

SUBJECT IS APPOINTMENT GENERAL CADORNA FD

PARAH TO 15 ARMY GROUP RPTD FOR INFO TO FOURTH CORPS FROM HQ ALCOM

CITE ACCIO PARAH

WITH APPROVAL OF SACMED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE APPOINTED GENERAL CADORNA AS CHIEF OF ARMY GENERAL STAFF WITH PERMISSION FOR HIM TO REMAIN IN NORTH UNTIL HE CAN CONVENIENTLY BE RELEASED FROM PRESENT DUTIES FD PLEASE ADVISE WHEN IT IS EXPECTED THESE DUTIES WILL BE COMPLETED

Dist
CG
Ex Com.

Major E. Talbot

Exec. Commissioner

300

Major

256

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

JAQ/dfe

CC 8253

3 May 1945

Major Talbot:

253 257 254

1. Attached is reply to our 6756 of 2 May.

2. I have informed Signor Bonomi's office that General Cadorna's appointment is approved by SACMED.

3. Chief Commissioner directs that a signal be sent to 15th Army Group along following lines:

"WITH APPROVAL OF SACMED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE APPOINTED GENERAL CADORNA AS CHIEF OF ARMY GENERAL STAFF WITH PERMISSION FOR HIM TO REMAIN IN NORTH UNTIL HE CAN CONVENIENTLY BE RELEASED FROM PRESENT DUTIES PD PLEASE ADVISE WHEN IT IS EXPECTED THESE DUTIES WILL BE COMPLETED"

See 256

/s/ J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

255

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

JAQ/dfe

CC 8253

3 May 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The appointment of General Raffaele Cadorna as Chief of Army General Staff, as proposed in your letter of 2 May 1945, is approved.

It is, however, desired that General Cadorna remain in Northern Italy until he can conveniently be released from the duties of his present office.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
(per J.A.Q.)

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

CC DISTRIBUTION:
Executive Comm'r
Civil Affairs Section
Land Forces S/C
Political Adviser (A)
Political Adviser (B)
Chief Comm'r Files

1923

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F-69530
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 021915

MESSAGE CENTER NO.: 126/02
Date Time Rec'd: MAY 022033
Precedence: OP-PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG

TO : ALCOM ROME

252

APPROVAL GIVEN TO APPOINTMENT GENERAL CADORNA TO POSITION NAMED BY YOU. REUR 6756 CITE ACSCC. DESIRED THAT CADORNA STAY IN NORTH UNTIL HE CAN CONVENIENTLY BE RELEASED FROM PRESENT DUTIES

See 254

DISTRIBUTION BY CC - 3 MAY 45

ACTION - Chief Commissioner

INFO - Executive Commissioner
Civil Affairs Section
Land Forces Sub-Commission
Pol Adv (A)
Pol Adv (B)

558

253

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

14

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

MAY 4 [illegible]
CC. 0944

9121

/mlm AP 740

: S E C R E T :
:AUTH: SAC, MT :
:Initials: :
:Date: 2 May 1945 :

AG 091.711/173 GCT-O

2 May 1945

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops Outside Italy.

TO: President, Allied Commission
President, Allied Commission For: Land Forces Sub-Commission, PMIA
Commanding General, 15th Army Group, AFO 777
Headquarters Fifth Army British Increment *
Headquarters Eighth Army
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District *
General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District

1. Reference is made to letter, PMIA file G/6 dated 10 April 1945.

2. The following general policy has been established regarding the employment of Italian troops outside Italy:

a. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian troops in VENEZIA GIULIA.

b. The following exceptions to the above policy will be authorized:

(1) Use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and employment of Italian personnel at that port.

(2) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as, for military reasons, might be unavoidable.

3. British Headquarters and units to which Italian troops are attached will shed such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Edmund R. Shugart

EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Each Addressee
(*) With copy of PMIA letter G/6 of 10 Apr 45
1 - SACS
1 - CAO
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-3 (Org-2)
2 - G-3(Org)Foreign
1 - G-5
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M&D

57 copies to:
Ex Commissioner
Navy S/C
Land Forces S/C

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

COPY

AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

6756 2 MAY 1945 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET PD

TO CEMENT RELATIONS WITH PATRIOT MOVEMENT IN NORTH CMA BONOMI AND MINISTER OF WAR ANXIOUS TO APPOINT MAJOR GENERAL CADORNA AS CHIEF OF ARMY GENERAL STAFF AT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING THURSDAY MAY THIRD PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACSCC FROM ADMIRAL STONE PAREN

PRESENT CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL RONCO IS WILLING REMAIN AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PD IF ALLIED AUTHORITIES DESIRE CMA GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING LEAVE CADORNA TEMPORARILY IN NORTH TO ASSIST IN WORKING OUT PATRIOT SITUATION PD GENERAL BROWNING JOINS ME IN STRONGLY RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OF CADORNA AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND RONCO AS DEPUTY PD GRATEFUL FOR REPLY THIS AFTERNOON

Chief Commissioner

222

AUTHENTICATED:

DISTRIBUTION:

Political Adviser (A)
Political Adviser (B)
Executive Commissioner
Land Forces Sub-Commission
C.A. Section
CC Files

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CHIEF COMM'R'S FILE

SECRET

MAY 2 RECD
CC 0855

Rome, 2 May, 1945

Dear Admiral,

I have agreed with the Minister of War on a nomination that would certainly be very welcome to the patriots of Northern Italy and would help to join them even more intimately to the regular army.

Their present chief - by designation of the Government, is, as you well know, Divisional General Raffaele Cadorna. Now it is proposed to nominate Cadorna - a name illustrious for family traditions - Chief of Army Staff.

The present Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ronco, is willing, with great nobility of feeling, to remain, as Deputy Chief of Staff, under Gen. Cadorna.

I should like to be able to make this appointment during the Council of Ministers of tomorrow, Thursday, and I would therefore require the consent of the Allied Commission to-morrow morning.

I earnestly beg you to stress to Marshal Alexander the political and military importance of this solution

Truly yours,

See 252 s. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

(251)

EC Hist - 2 MAY 45

ACTION: CHIEF COMM'R
INFO: EXEC COMM'R.
C A SEC
NAND FORCES SC
Pol. Advsr. (A)
Pol. Advsr. (B)

77/S-529

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 2 maggio 1945

Caro Ammiraglio,

col ministro della Guerra ho concordato una nomina che certo sarebbe assai gradita ai patrioti del Nord d'Italia e servirebbe a congiungerli anche più intimamente con l'esercito regolare.

Il loro attuale capo - per designazione del Governo - é, come Ella ben sa, il gen. di Divisione Raffaele Cadorna. Ora si propone di nominare il Cadorna - nome illustre per tradizioni familiari - Capo di Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito.

L'attuale capo di S.M. gen. Ronco accetta - con nobile sentimento di restare come sottocapo alle dipendenze del Cadorna.

Io desidererei poter fare questa nomina nel Consiglio dei Ministri di domani giovedì, e perciò dovrei avere nella mattinata di domani il consenso della Commissione Alleata.

Io la prego vivamente di voler illustrare al Maresciallo Alexander l'importanza politica e militare di tale soluzione.

Cordialmente.

I. Bonomi

554

Al sig. Ammiraglio
ELLERY W. STONE
Capo Commissione Alleata
R O M A

(251)

19281

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Tel Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LMG/ei

Ref: 8269/59/NC

19 April 45

SUBJECT: Territory Layout in Northern Italy (Key Officer Personnel - Italian Army)

TO : Regional Commissioners, Emilia Region
Liguria Region
Lombardia Region
Piemonte Region
Venezia Region

1. Your attention is invited to the enclosed copy of letter (Incl #1) to the Minister of War outlining the policy to be followed in appointing key officer personnel for Italian Army in Northern Italy, and also to the Minister of War's approved list (Incl #2) as it stands this date.

2. It will be appreciated that, in accordance with the policy outlined, these appointments are flexible and subject to change. However, the Chief Commissioner desires that you be acquainted with the present approved list of appointees.

Major L. W. STEARNS

NORMAN E. FIKE
Colonel
Acting Executive Commissioner

2 Incls.
as above

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

553

SECRET

1429

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

18 April 1945

DO Ltr, Stone to Spofford

On turn-over of control of It Army to It Govt.

Document Rept in US Army Field Safe in Major Quayle's office.

TOP SECRET

552

249

1930

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SD/94/30.

239a

13 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The desire expressed in your letter, 274 of 2 April to transfer the 210, 228 and 231 Divisions and Units under their administrative command from Category 3 to Category 2 status is fully appreciated.

The basic difference between Category 2 and Category 3 does not, however, lie in a differentiation between the tasks, which the Italian troops operating in this theatre are called up to do, but solely in the provision of equipment. Category 2 troops are equipped entirely with clothing, personal weapons, guns, specialist equipment and vehicles similar to those in use by British fighting troops. Category 3 units do not have British clothing similar to that in use by the British Army and are only equipped with British equipment when Italian Army equipment is not available. The number of troops which can be included in Category 2 is determined, therefore, by the quantity of all types of equipment, which can be spared over and above current British Army requirements.

When Field Marshal ALEXANDER discussed, in LONDON, the question of raising an Italian Combat Force, the War Office agreed to make available the equivalent of 5 British Infantry Divisions' worth of equipment for 6 Italian Combat Groups. Since then the scale of equipment for the Combat Groups has been increased and might well be increased again, so that it is unlikely that there will be any surplus equipment available after the requirements of the five Combat Groups and the Italian Reinforcement Training Centre (i.e. present ceiling of 57,000) are met. Any increase in the number of Units for which equipment must be found from this original allocation will thus react unfavourably on the scale which can be provided for the Combat Groups.

I regret, therefore, that the transfer of 210, 228 and 231 Divisions from Category 3 to Category 2 cannot be agreed to and I am sure that from the above you will realise why this is not possible.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

551

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

248

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 8253.

11 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This will confirm the approval already given by me orally to the adoption of the draft decree left with me by Dott. Montanari dealing with the reorganization of the Italian General Staff (formerly Comando Supremo).

The appointment of General Trezzani as Chief of the Italian General Staff, vice Marshal Messe, is approved.

Yours very truly,

ELLIOTT B. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

cc. Executive Commissioner
Land Forces Sub-Commission
Navy Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Political Advisor (A) & (B)
C.A. Section
File

1932

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 1012

APR 12 RECD

SECRET

F 58754
APRIL 11/0010B

D/7423
APRIL 12/0931
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FED3

ACTION: ALCOMMROS

ACTION

243

SECRET.

Reur 5000 of 7 April.

Approval is given to appointment General TRIZZANI as head Italian General Staff vice Marshal MESSE. Confirmation given your action in approving proposed decree.

DIST

ACTION : SO to CHIEF COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
DEP COMMISSIONER (2)
AIR SC
NAVY SC
LAND F CRCES SC
CA SEC
FILE

HEADQUARTERS
12 APR 1945
A. C.

SECRET

246

CC 1012/3

519

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PERSONAL

10 April 1945.

My dear Emerel,

Replying to your letter of 10 April regarding the Army officers for Regions, I know of no reasons to object to any of the appointments listed.

Yours Sincerely

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Major General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC,
Director, Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Policy - Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Com., A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: G/6

10 April 1945.

TO : AFHQ (2)
through A.C. (1 copy for retention)

I wish to raise the question of the employment of Italian Forces outside ITALY.

1. The immediate problem concerns EIGHTH Army.

2. (a) Today, four Italian Combat Gps (approx 10,000 each) are committed. The fifth moves into the operational area in the next few days.

Presumably these Groups will remain in ITALY for internal security.

(b) This Combat Force has an authorised strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11,250.

There are in addition :-

(i) The proposed force of five patriot recce battalions - ceiling 2,500.

(ii) The proposed GARIBALDI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaing - which might well prove a steadying influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,700.

3. 44,000 Service Troops in the national categories BR-ITI and US-ITI are also employed in the Army Areas and are directly under command of the Army concerned.

(a) 27,000 of these are BR-ITI.

(i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer Companies (6,700 personnel).

(ii) 16,000 are now under command FIFTH Army (Br Incr), 10,566 of these are authorised for labour.

(iii) There are 14 BR-ITI Pack Transport Companies serving in the Army Areas - each 500 strong - a total of 7,000 Muleteers.

(b) The remaining 17,000 are US-ITI and are under command FIFTH Army. The Engineer Combat Group for example has an authorised strength of 1362. There are 15 Pack Transport Companies each on a T/O of 400 all ranks, a total of 6,00 Italian soldiers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Forces outside ITALY.

1. The immediate problem concerns EIGHTH Army.

2. (a) Today, four Italian Combat Gps (approx 10,000 each) are committed. The fifth moves into the operational area in the next few days.

Presumably these Groups will remain in ITALY for internal security.

(b) This Combat Force has an authorised strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11,250.

There are in addition :-

(i) The proposed force of five patriot recce battalions - ceiling 2,500.

(ii) The proposed GARIBALDI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaing - which might well prove a steadying influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,700.

3. 44,000 Service Troops in the national categories ER-ITI and US-ITI are also employed in the Army Areas and are directly under command of the Army concerned.

(a) 27,000 of these are ER-ITI.

(i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer Companies (6,700 personnel).

(ii) 16,000 are now under command FIFTH Army (Br Incr), 10,566 of these are authorised for labour.

(iii) There are 14 ER-ITI Pack Transport Companies serving in the Army Areas - each 500 strong - a total of 7,000 Muleteers.

(b) The remaining 17,000 are US-ITI and are under command FIFTH Army. The Engineer Combat Group for example has an authorised strength of 1362. There are 15 Pack Transport Companies each on a T/O of 400 all ranks, a total of 6,00 Italian soldiers.

(c) There are in addition a proportion of hospitals and Adm installations some of which are in the ITI-ITI Category. These however, except for the Guard Bns, are under command of the Army for local Adm only.

See 257a

...2/..

245a

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

4. I do not know how EIGHTH Army would be affected operationally if the Italian Service Troops did not accompany it across the border into AUSTRIA.

5. The international aspect is of importance. If Italian Forces, cobelligerents, cross the border and assist in conquering and occupying enemy country a political handle might be given to the Italian Government. If it is essential that Italian manpower be made available to the Allies outside Italian borders it may be considered desirable to take the risk of greater demands being made by ITALY at the Peace Treaty, the general outline of which may of course have already been arranged.

6. (a) The size and composition of the Italian Army after the war is a further factor. The date by which the new Army is to be implemented is the governing factor, and whether Italian Soldiers could remain operating outside ITALY at that time.

(b) Control of the Army will no doubt be handed over to the Italian Government again, but the question remains whether we or ITALY should maintain a large number of Italian Soldiers outside the country - perhaps for some time.

7. As this matter is imminent I would greatly appreciate an early answer.

/s/ L. BROWNING
Major General
M. M. I. A.

516

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

outside Italian borders it may be considered desirable to take the risk of greater demands being made by ITALY at the Peace Treaty, the general outline of which may of course have already been arranged.

6. (a) The size and composition of the Italian Army after the war is a further factor. The date by which the new Army is to be implemented is the governing factor, and whether Italian Soldiers could remain operating outside ITALY at that time.

(b) Control of the Army will no doubt be handed over to the Italian Government again, but the question remains whether we or ITALY should maintain a large number of Italian Soldiers outside the country - perhaps for some time.

7. As this matter is imminent I would greatly appreciate an early answer.

/s/ L. BROWNING
Major General
M. M. I. A.

516

SECRET

245a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E
DO/2
10 Apr 1945

My dear Admiral

Reference our conversation :-

1. Herewith the list of proposed Commanders for the Territorial H.Q. in NORTH ITALY. My 13/G/12 of 26 Dec refers.

2. CERICA I told you about. He has done well at FLORENCE and has been in touch with the Patriots working in BOLOGNA area.

3. PRALORMO is a high class officer with ties TURIN way.

4. FRATTINI commanded FOLGORE Div at EL ALAMEIN, so must have been considered one of their best. I liked the look of him when we met.

5. CADORNA, head of the "Corps of Liberation" in PIEDMONT. A great name and an excellent choice.

6. NEGRONI, I believe a good officer. I have not met him.

7. ARMELLINI - you know of. He has a brother with the patriots in the UDINE area, I am told.

8. The Minister of War has selected all these and the junior commanders as well personally with great care. I propose to say we approve. Do you agree?

Yours Sincerely
Langley Browning

(Major General)

Chief Commissioner, A.C.

545.

245

See 246

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION

From: The Minister for War
To: Major General Browning, M.M.I.A.

Ref:
Date: 7.4.45.

It is my intention to entrust the following appointments in the Territorial Commands to be formed for Northern Italy to the officers listed hereunder:

Bologna Mil. Territorial HQ.

C.O. — Lt! Gen. CC.RR. CERICA Angelo, already nominated in accordance with previous agreements.

Arty. Commdr. — Arty. Col. ROSTAGNO Carlo. He is at present under investigation for promotion to Brig. after his return from a PW camp.

Eng. Commdr. — Brig. PETROMILLI Luigi.

Torino Mil. Territorial HQ.

C.O. — Major Gen. BERARDO DI PRALORMO Emanuele

Arty. Commdr. — Brig. MOROSINI Luigi

Eng. Commdr. — Brig. NICOTRA Giovanni

Genoa Mil. Territorial HQ.

C.O. — Maj. Gen. FRATTINI Enrico

Arty. Commdr. — Brig. RODA Alberto. Should Gen. Roda be appointed Mil. Attaché in Berne he would be replaced in this appointment by Brig. PALMA Vittorio.

Eng. Commdr. — Lt. Col. FERRERO Augusto, director of the Works Branch and Acting temporary Eng. Commdr. He is on schedule for promotion to Col.

Milan Mil. Territorial HQ.

C.O. — Maj. Gen. CADORNA Raffaele

Arty. Commdr. — Brig. FROIO Guido

Eng. Commdr. — Col. GIANNELLI Alessandro, Senior Staff Officer of the Eng. HQ. and Acting Temporary Eng. Commdr.

Bolzano Mil. Territorial HQ!

C.O. — Maj. Gen. NEGRONI Giacomo

Arty. Commdr. — Brig. MORO Federico

Eng. Commdr. — Brig. FAZIO Antonio

215

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Udine Mil. Territorial HQ.

C.O. Lt. Gen. ARMELLINI Quirino

Arty. Commdr. Brig. FERRARI Augusto

Eng. Commdr. Lt. Col. GRILLANTINI Ettore, director of the Works Branch and Acting Temporary Eng. Commdr.

In the selection of these officers it has been endeavoured to follow the policy selecting officers already acquainted with the territories to which they are being posted.

A separate list will be made of the officers to be born in mind should it be necessary at a later date to appoint Deputy Generals for said Territorial HQs.

I will be very grateful for your approval at your earliest convenience in order that I may be able to issue the necessary warnings.

THE MINISTER

(Sgd.) A. Casati

FMDeJ.

5. N 2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

5125 10 APR 45 PRIORITY

IN THE CLEAR PD

GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY REPLY

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACSCC SIGNED STONE PAREN

TO MY FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO OF SEVEN APRIL

242

2662

247

See

543

244

Chief Commissioner

222

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

SECRET

SECRET

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 21
9th April 1945

K 140

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

SEE FILE 3015/56

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 372 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC(P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(b) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port.)

542

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC(P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(b) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port.)

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.

(b) Authorise, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paragraphs 4 (a), (b) and (c) above.

/s/ I.G. STEERMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

243a

SECRET COPY

542

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

5000 7 April 1945 PRIORITY

SECRET PD

ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS APPROVED DRAFT DECREE RESTRICTING THE DUTIES OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF PAREN FORMERLY COMMANDO SUPREMO PAREN TO ITS PREWAR FUNCTIONS OF CONSULTATION AND ADVICE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON TECHNICAL MATTERS AFFECTING TWO OR MORE OF THE THREE ARMED FORCES. PD IT WILL BE HEADED BY A GENERAL OR LIEUTENANT GENERAL OR EQUIVALENT GRADE OF THE NAVY OR AIRFORCE PD IN EFFECT THE DECREE LEGALIZES THE PRESENT STATUS QUO OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF AS IT WAS WORKED OUT BY ME IN AUGUST ONE NINE FOUr FOUR WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF COMMANDING GENERAL AHLE ABLE ITEM PD THE NEW DECREE IS PERSONALLY FAVORED BY EACH OF THE SERVICE MINISTERS AND BY THE HEADS OF MY SERVICE SUBCOMMISSIONS AND ACCORDINGLY I HAVE NOTIFIED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THERE IS NO ALLIED OBJECTION TO THE PASSAGE OF THIS DECREE PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACSGC SIGNED STONE PAREN

PARA TWO THE ELIMINATION OF THE GRADE OF MARSHAL AS HEAD OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF MEANS THE REMOVAL OF MARSHAL MESSE ITS PRESENT HEAD PD IT IS PROPOSED TO APPOINT GENERAL TREZZANI AS HEAD PD HE IS PERSONALLY ACCEPTABLE TO EACH OF THE

241

243

Answered by 246a

1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

THREE SERVICE MINISTERS AND BY THE HEADS OF MY SUBCOMMISSIONS AND I RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO APPROVE HIS SELECTION

To AG 1920 hrs., 7 April
Cleared signals 2220 hours.

cc: Executive Comm's.
Army S/C
Naval S/C
Air S/C
Political Adviser (A)
CA Section — (10/4/45)

313

Chief Commissioner

222

/s/ L.W. STERRNS
for
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

540

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

7 Apr 45

DRAFT

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PRECEDENCE Priority

TO: AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

Italian Council of Ministers has approved draft decree restricting the duties of the Italian General Staff (formerly Comando Supremo) to its prewar functions of consultation and advice to the Prime Minister on technical matters affecting ~~[illegible]~~ two or more of the three armed forces. It will be headed by a General or Lieutenant General or equivalent grade of the Navy or Air Force. In effect the decree ~~[illegible]~~ legalizes the present status quo of the Italian General Staff as it was worked out by me in August 1944 with the concurrence of Commanding General AAI. The new decree is personally favored by each of the service ministers and by the heads of my service subcommissions and accordingly I have notified the Prime Minister that there is no Allied objection to the passage of this decree.

The elimination of the grade of Marshal as head of the Italian General Staff means the removal of Marshal Messe its present head. It is proposed to appoint General Trezzani as head. He is personally acceptable to each of the three service ministers and by the heads of my subcommissions and I recommend ~~[illegible]~~ that you authorize me to approve his selection.

Draft

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Generale di C. d'A. Comand. design. d'arm. TREZZANI Claudio

Nato a Savigliano il 22.3.I88I. Sottotenente di fanteria nel I90I.

Partecipò alla campagna libica durante la quale esercitò le funzioni di avvocato fiscale presso il Tribunale di guerra e di ufficiale informatore della 4 Divisione speciale.

Prese parte alla guerra I9I5-I8 come ufficiale di S.M. presso grandi unità coi gradi da capitano a colonnello (da capitano e maggiore in servizio di S.M. presso la 34 divisione e il II C. d'A.; da tenente colonnello presso il XXIV C. d'A. e presso la 34 divisione come capo di S.M.; da colonnello presso il Comando Supremo e presso il comando della 8 armata di cui fu capo ufficio operazioni).

Dopo la guerra fu assegnato alla divisione Stato Maggiore del Ministero della Guerra; insegnante di tattica presso la Scuola di guerra; capo ufficio addestramento presso il comando del corpo di S.M.; comandante il 90° regg. fanteria ed infine capo di S.M. del C. d'A. di Udine.

Generale di brigata per meriti eccezionali nel I932, fu prima comandante la 7 brigata di fanteria, poi capo di S.M. del comando designato d'armata di Bologna ed infine capo reparto presso il comando corpo S.M.

Promosso generale di divisione nel I936 ebbe il comando della 2 divisione celere.

Generale di C. d'A. per meriti eccezionali nel giugno I938 fu nel novembre detto nominato comandante del corpo d'armata celere.

Alla vigilia della dichiarazione di guerra (5 giugno I940) fu destinato ad Addis Abeba per assumervi la carica di capo di S.M. del Governo Generale dell'A.O.I.

./.

2/26

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL ELLERY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

DATE: 7TH APRIL, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

I have seen H.E. GASPAROTTO with reference to the attached papers. He is in complete agreement with the decree, and with the amendment which cancels "Marshals of Italy".

2. He says that it is exactly the measure that he would have liked to have put through when he was Minister for War in 1921.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

File
Stato Magg Stati
(Comando Supremo)

TRANSLATION

PROJECT OF THE DECREE OF THE LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF THE REALM ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA

PRINCE OF PIEDMONT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF THE REALM

By virtue of the authority in Us invested;
In view of the Royal Decree Law No.661 dated 27/6/41, converted into law under No. 1507 dated 5/12/41;
In view of the Royal Decree Law No.158 dated 25/6/44;
In view of the decision of the Council of Ministers;
On the proposal of the Prime Minister, in agreement with the Ministers for the Treasury, War, Navy, and Air Force;
We have sanctioned and promulgated the following :

ARTICLE I

The Chief of the General Staff acts as consultant to the Prime Minister, President of the Defence Committee, on all the main technical matters affecting in common two or more Armed Forces, insofar as such matters affect the present situation or possible future developments. He submits studies and proposals in respect of said matters to the Prime Minister, either on his own initiative or upon request.

The Chief of the General Staff is chosen amongst the Generals, Acting Generals, Lieutenant Generals, and equal ranks of the Navy and Air Force. He is appointed by a Decree of the Lieutenant General of the Realm on the proposal of the Prime Minister advised by the Council of Ministers.

ARTICLE II.

In the execution of his above mentioned duties the Chief of General Staff is under the direct control of the Prime Minister, President of the Defence Committee.

ARTICLE III.

The Chief of the General Staff deals with the Chiefs of Staff of each of the Armed Forces through their respective Ministers.

The Chiefs of Staff of each of the Armed Forces are in duty bound to keep him informed, through their respective Ministers, of all matters dealt with by them which can in any way whatsoever affect his activities.

536

ARTICLE IV

For the carrying out of his duties the Chief of the General Staff has at his disposal an office of his own directed by a Brigadier or Colonel (or officer of equal rank of the Navy or Air Force) chosen by him.

This office, in addition to the Director, is staffed by nine officers of the three Armed Forces appointed, in the ratio of three officers per Armed Force, by their respective Ministers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

In view of the decision of the Council [illegible]
On the proposal of the Prime Minister, in agreement with the Ministers for the Treasury, War, Navy, and Air Force;
We have sanctioned and promulgated the following :

ARTICLE I

The Chief of the General Staff acts as consultant to the Prime Minister, President of the Defence Committee, on all the main technical matters affecting in common two or more Armed Forces, insofar as such matters affect the present situation or possible future developments. He submits studies and proposals in respect of said matters to the Prime Minister, either on his own initiative or upon request.

The Chief of the General Staff is chosen amongst the Generals, Acting Generals, Lieutenant Generals, and equal ranks of the Navy and Air Force. He is appointed by a Decree of the Lieutenant General of the Realm on the proposal of the Prime Minister advised by the Council of Ministers.

ARTICLE II.

In the execution of his above mentioned duties the Chief of General Staff is under the direct control of the Prime Minister, President of the Defence Committee.

ARTICLE III.

The Chief of the General Staff deals with the Chiefs of Staff of each of the Armed Forces through their respective Ministers.

The Chiefs of Staff of each of the Armed Forces are in duty bound to keep him informed, through their respective Ministers, of all matters dealt with by them which can in any way whatsoever affect his activities.

596

ARTICLE IV

For the carrying out of his duties the Chief of the General Staff has at his disposal an office of his own directed by a Brigadier or Colonel (or officer of equal rank of the Navy or Air Force) chosen by him.

This office, in addition to the Director, is staffed by nine officers of the three Armed Forces appointed, in the ratio of three officers per Armed Force, by their respective Ministers.

ARTICLE V

The Chief of the General Staff is considered to be excluded from the cadre of the war establishment of his own Armed Force. The other officers, to which preceding article IV refers, are included among those allowed by the war establishment stipulated by the mobilisation laws of each Armed Force.

Sec 247

241

2nd Draft

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ARTICLE VI

The Chief of the General Staff had under his control the office of the General Delegate with the Commission for the Technical Studies of Italian Frontiers which functions at the Foreign Office (one General or Colonel, two officers).

ARTICLE VII

The Prime Minister can appoint the Chief of the General Staff to preside or supervise commissions of any kind whatsoever dealing with matters affecting two or more Armed Forces.

ARTICLE VIII

Salary and every other allowance for the Chief of the General Staff are a charge on the Budget of the Armed Force to which he belongs. This also applies to all expenses entailed by the running of his office.

Salaries of the personnel assigned to said office are a charge on the budget of each of the Armed Forces to which said personnel belong.

ARTICLE IX

All regulations in any way contrary to this Decree are hereby cancelled.

This Decree comes into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Realm.

We order whomsoever it may concern to comply with this Decree and enforce its compliance as a Law of the State.

535

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

affecting two or more Armed Forces.

ARTICLE VIII

Salary and every other allowance for the Chief of the General Staff are a charge on the Budget of the Armed Force to which he belongs. This also applies to all expenses entailed by the running of his office.

Salaries of the personnel assigned to said office are a charge on the budget of each of the Armed Forces to which said personnel belong.

ARTICLE IX

All regulations in any way contrary to this Decree are hereby cancelled.

This Decree comes into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Realm.

We order whomsoever it may concern to comply with this Decree and enforce its compliance as a Law of the State.

525

(311)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SCHEMA DI DECRETO LEGISLATIVO LUOGOTENENZIALE .. aprile 1945,n° ..

- Attribuzioni del capo di stato maggiore generale.

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA
PRINCIPE DI PIEMONTE
LUOGOTENENTE GENERALE DEL REGNO

In virtù dell'autorità a Noi delegata;
Visto il regio decreto legge 27.6.1941, n°661, convertito in legge 5.12.1941 n°1507;
Visto il regio decreto legge 25.6.1944, n°158;
Viste la deliberazione del consiglio dei ministri;
Sulla proposte del presidente del consiglio, di concerto con i ministri per il tesoro, per la guerra, per la marina e per l'aeronautica;
Abbiamo sanzionato e promulghiamo quanto segue :

Art.1

Il capo di stato maggiore generale ha funzioni consultive presso il presidente del consiglio dei ministri, presidente del comitato di difesa, per le principali questioni tecniche riguardenti in comune due o più forze armate, nei riflessi della situazione contingente e dei possibili sviluppi avvenire: sottopone studi e proposte relative a dette questioni, d'iniziative o su richiesta, al presidente del consiglio.

Il capo di stato maggiore generale è scelto tra i generali di armata o designati di armata, i generali di corpo d'armata e gradi corrispondenti della marina e dell'aeronautica. Egli è nominato con decreto luogotenenziale su proposta del presidente del consiglio dei ministri, sentito il consiglio dei ministri.

./.

241

File "Comando Supremo"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Art.2

Per l'esercizio delle attribuzioni sopraindicate, il capo di stato maggiore generale dipende dal presidente del consiglio dei ministri, presidente del comitato di difesa.

Art.3

Il capo di stato maggiore generale corrisponde con i capi di stato maggiore delle singole forze armate per il tramite dei rispettivi ministri.

I capi di stato maggiore di ciascuna forza armata hanno l'obbligo di tenerlo informato, tramite i rispettivi ministri, sulla materia da essi trattata che possa comunque interessare la sua attività.

Art.4

Per l'esercizio delle sue attribuzioni, il capo di stato maggiore generale dispone di un proprio ufficio retto da un generale di brigata o colonnello (o ufficiale di grado corrispondente della marina o dell'aeronautica) da lui scelto.

L'ufficio è composto, oltre che dal capo ufficio, da nove ufficiali delle tre forze armate, designati, nella proporzione di tre per ciascuna forza, dal rispettivo ministro.

533

Art.5

Il capo di stato maggiore generale è considerato fuori quadro nel ruolo organico della propria forza armata. Gli altri ufficiali di cui al precedente articolo 4 sono compresi tra quelli stabiliti dalle tabelle organiche previste dalle leggi di ordinamento di ciascuna forza armata.

../..

241

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Art.6

Il capo di stato maggiore generale ha alle dipendenze l'ufficio del generale delegato presso la commissione per lo studio tecnico dei confini italiani istituita presso il ministero degli affari esteri (un ufficiale generale o colonnello, due ufficiali).

Art.7

Il presidente del consiglio dei ministri può incaricare il capo di stato maggiore generale di presiedere o sovraintendere a commissioni di qualsiasi natura che trattino argomenti interessanti due o più forze armate.

Art.8

Gli assegni ed ogni altra competenza per il capo di stato maggiore generale sono a carico del bilancio della forza armata cui egli appartiene; così pure tutte le spese per il suo ufficio.
Gli assegni per il personale addetto all'ufficio medesimo sono a carico del bilancio delle singole forze armate alle quali detto personale rispettivamente appartiene.

Art.9

E' abrogata ogni altra disposizione contraria al presente decreto.
Il presente decreto entra in vigore il giorno successivo a quello della sua pubblicazione sulla gazzetta ufficiale del regno.
Ordiniamo, a chiunque spetti, di osservarlo e farlo osservare come legge dello stato.

Dato a Roma, addì.....aprile 1945

241

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Translation

War Department

Attributions of the Chief of Staff

1. - On August 10th 1944 the denomination of Supreme Command was changed in that of General Staff, to show that this organ, in accordance with the new requirements, practically resumed, with the name, its peace time functions,

2. - For various motives, its present abnormal structure was left to the said organ, which can be considered as the synthesis of a General Staff:

- almost entirely based on the activity of the Ufficio Informazioni (which has passed under the dependence of the War Department through a recent regulation);

- formed for the most part of officers of the army, and for this reason, it partly became a double of the general staff of the army (while on the contrary, the navy and the air-force are not included); in any case too heavy for requirements;

- its functions are not well defined; this has practical consequences which are sometimes most prejudicial;

- it has no longer any reasons to exist, except as advisory organ for the president of the council (for important questions, concerning two or more army forces) : it must be enabled to fulfill this function with efficiency (being composed, equally of officers of the three armed forces).

3. - To normalize the military high central organs, as it is being done, and in relation with the mentioned changes of dependence of the Ufficio Informazioni, it seems necessary that a new structure of the General Staff, in relation with the above mentioned advisory function, should correspond to the new name (c.f. para. 1) and, above all to the present situation and to the present requirements.

We enclose the draft of a decree of the Lieutenant, in this sense

See 241

531

e.c.

240

1st Draft

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Translation

Draft of Legislative Decree of the Lieutenant ..... March 1945, n. ....
- Attributions of the Chief of Staff.

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA

PRINCIPE DI PIEMONTE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF THE KINGDOM

By the authority which was entrusted to us;

Considering the royal law-decree 27.6.1941, n. 661 converted into law 5.12.1941 n. 1367;

Considering the royal law-decree 25.6.1944, n. 156;

Considering the deliberation of the Council of Ministers;

On the proposal of the president of the council, in agreement with the Ministers of Treasury, War, Navy, and Air;

We have approved and promulgate what follows:

Art. 1

The Chief of Staff is advisory organ of the President of the Council of Ministers for the chief technical questions concerning two or more armed forces, on the repercussions of the contingent situation and of the possible developments which may take place: he submits studies and proposals concerning these questions, either on his own initiative or on request, to the President of the Council.

The Chief of Staff is to be chosen from among the Marshals of Italy, the generals of army or appointed so, the generals of army corps (and the corresponding ranks in the Navy and Air-force); he will be appointed by a decree of the Lieutenant on the proposal of the President of the Council of Ministers, after the Ministers will have been consulted.

Art. 2

For the fulfillment of his attributions, the Chief of Staff depends directly from the President of the Council of Ministers.

Art. 3

The Chief of Staff contacts the chiefs of staff of the various army forces through the respective ministers.

The chiefs of staff of every army force have to inform him, through their respective ministers, about the matters with which they deal and which might interest his activity.

230

310

1953

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Art. 4

For the exercise of his attributions, the Chief of Staff disposes of an office of his own directed by a brigadier or a colonel (or navy or air force officer of corresponding rank).

Including the director of the office, the office is composed of ten officers of the three armed forces, appointed in the proportion of one for every three, for each force, by their respective ministers.

The officers mentioned in the former para. are included among those mentioned by the organic lists foreseen by the regulation of every armed force.

Art. 5

The Chief of Staff has in his dependence the office of the general delegated to the commission for the technical study of the Italian borders, formed in the State Department (a general or a colonel and two officers).

Art. 6

The checks and all other expenses for the Chief of Staff will be charged to the budget of the armed force to which he belongs; also all the expenses for his office.

The checks for the personnel of the office will be charged to the budget of the various armed forces to which this personnel belongs.

Art. 7

Any other regulation in opposition with the present decree is cancelled.

The present decree will be enforced on the day following its publication on the Gazzette ufficiale of the Kingdom.

To whom it may concern, be order to respect it and have it respected as a State law.

Rome ..... March 1945

c.c.

240

1959

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

N.

Ministero della Guerra

GABINETTO

ATTRIBUZIONI DEL CAPO DI S.M.GENERALE

1.- In data 10 agosto 1944 la denominazione di comando supremo fu mutata in quella di stato maggiore generale, volendo significare che tale organo, in base alle nuove esigenze, riprendeva praticamente, col nome, le funzioni del tempo di pace.

2.- Motivi d'ordine vario concorsero finora a lasciar sussistere l'attuale anormale struttura dell'organo in questione, che può sintetizzarsi in uno stato maggiore generale :

- poggiato quasi esclusivamente sull'attività dell'ufficio informazioni (che con provvedimento recente è stato passato alle dipendenze del ministero guerra);
- in massima parte costituito da ufficiali dell'esercito e che, anche per questo, è parzialmente diventato un doppione dello stato maggiore esercito (mentre per contro gli sfuggono marina ed aeronautica); comunque pletorico rispetto alle necessità;
- con funzioni non ben determinate, con conseguenze pratiche talvolta assai dannose;
- che non ha più ragione di esistere se non come organo consultivo del presidente del consiglio (per le questioni, rilevanti, interessanti due o più forze armate): funzione questa che deve essere messo in grado di compiere effettivamente (tra l'altro, con composizione paritetica di ufficiali delle tre forze armate).

./.

240

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3.- Sembra necessario quindi, nell'ordine di idee della normaliz=
zazione degli alti organi centrali militari, che si sta attuan=
do, ed in relazione all'accennato cambio di dipendenze dell'uf=
ficio informazioni, che al nuovo nome (v. comma 1) e, soprattut=
to, alla attuale situazione ed alle attuali esigenze, corrispon=
da una nuova struttura dello stato maggiore generale, in rela=
zione alla suddetta funzione consultiva.

In tal senso, unito schema di decreto legislativo luogotenenziale.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SCHEMA DI DECRETO LEGISLATIVO LUOGOTENENZIALE .... marzo 1945,nº....
- Attribuzioni del capo di stato maggiore generale.

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA
PRINCIPE DI PIEMONTE
LUOGOTENENTE GENERALE DEL REGNO

In virtù dell'autorità a Noi delegata;
Visto il regio decreto legge 27.6.1941 nº661 convertito in legge 5.12.1941 nº1507;
Visto il regio decreto legge 25.6.1944 nº158;
Vista la deliberazione del consiglio dei ministri;
Sulla proposta del presidente del consiglio,di concerto con i ministri per il tesoro,per la guerra,per la marina e per l'aeronautica;
Abbiamo sanzionato e promulghiamo quanto segue :

Art.1

Il capo di stato maggiore generale è organo consultivo del presidente del consiglio dei ministri per le principali questioni tecniche riguardanti in comune due o più forze armate,nei riflessi della situazione contingente e dei possibili sviluppi avvenire: sottopone studi e proposte relative a dette questioni,di iniziativa o su richiesta,al presidente del consiglio.

Il capo di stato maggiore generale è scelto tra i marescialli d'Italia,i generali di armata o designati di armata,i generali di corpo d'armata (e gradi corrispondenti della marina e dell'aeronautica); è nominato con decreto luogotenenziale su proposta del presidente del consiglio dei ministri,sentito il consiglio dei ministri.

./.

(240)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Art.2

Per l'esercizio delle sue attribuzioni, il capo di stato maggiore generale dipende direttamente dal presidente del consiglio dei ministri.

Art.3

Il capo di stato maggiore generale corrisponde con i capi di stato maggiore delle singole forze arma= te per il tramite dei rispettivi ministri.
I capi di stato maggiore di ciascuna forza armata hanno l'o. .ligo di tenerlo informato, tramite i ri= spettivi ministri, sulla materia da essi trattata che possa interessare la sua attività.

Art.4

Per l'esercizio delle sue attribuzioni, il capo di stato maggiore generale dispone di un proprio uf= ficio retto da un generale di brigata o colonnello (o ufficiale di grado corrispondente della marina o dell'aeronautica).
L'ufficio è composto, complessivamente incluso il capo ufficio, di dieci ufficiali delle tre forze arma te, designati, nella proporzione di tre per ciascuna forza, dal rispettivo ministro.
Gli ufficiali di cui ai precedenti comma sono com= presi fra quelli stabiliti dalle tabelle organiche previste dalle legge di ordinamento di ciascuna forza armata.

Art.5

Il capo di stato maggiore generale ha alle dipen=

../..

(240)

denze l'ufficio del generale delegato presso la commissione per lo studio tecnico dei confini italiani istituita presso il ministero degli affari esteri (un ufficiale generale o colonnello,due ufficiali).

Art.6

Gli assegni ed ogni altra competenza per il capo di stato maggiore generale sono a carico del bilancio della forza armata cui egli appartiene;così pure tutte le spese per il suo ufficio.
Gli assegni per il personale addetto all'ufficio medesimo sono a carico del bilancio delle singole forze armate alle quali detto personale rispettivamente appartiene.

Art.7

E' abrogata ogni altra disposizione contraria al presente decreto.
Il presente decreto entra in vigore il giorno successivo a quello della sua pubblicazione sulla gazzetta ufficiale del Regno.
Ordiniamo,a chiunque spetti,di osservarlo e farlo osservare come legge dello Stato.

Dato a Roma,addì .. marzo 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Art.6

Gli assegni ed ogni altra competenza per il capo di stato maggiore generale sono a carico del bilancio della forza armata cui egli appartiene;cosi pure tutte le spese per il suo ufficio.
Gli assegni per il personale addetto all'ufficio medesimo sono a carico del bilancio delle singole forze armate alle quali detto personale rispettivamente appartiene.

Art.7

E' abrogata ogni altra disposizione contraria al presente decreto.
Il presente decreto entra in vigore il giorno successivo a quello della sua pubblicazione sulla gazzetta ufficiale del Regno.
Ordiniamo,a chiunque spetti,di osservarlo e farlo osservare come legge dello Stato.

Dato a Roma,addi .. marzo 1945

525

240

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APR 4 RECD C.C. 10

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
27½

Rome, 2 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

among the auxiliary forces which, besides the operating ones, the Italian Army put at the disposal of the Allies, are the 210, 228, and 231 divisions which are operating in contact with and in the zone of the big allied operating units.

Of these, the 210 division operates under the 5th American army; the 228 under the 8th British army; and the 231 under the 5th American army for the services of the XXIII British army corps.

Because of the tasks assigned to the said divisions, they include among others, various pack trains, pioneers, and engineers units, for supply in advanced zones, mine-clearing, road-repairs, etc.

While fulfilling their duty, these units, to which 1500 men have to be sent monthly to make up for the losses they suffer, have now had numerous fighting episodes, and many allied acknowledgements; among which the one which appeared in the communique of March 20th of the Command of the 5th Army.

However, the troops of the said three divisions are included in the 3rd category, together with the units which are employed in the country for the maintenance of harbours, depots and such like.

Therefore, for reasons of justice, and leaving aside all other motives, the 210, 228, and 231 divisions ought to be transferred from the third to the second category, in addition to the 37.000 men of the combatant formations to which they actually belong.

Such a regulation would of course have a great effect on the moral and therefore on the efficiency of the troops concerned.

I therefore beg you to see whether it would be possible to change the category of the said divisions.

Truly yours,

See 248 s. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the
Allied Commission
Rome

239a

c.c.

E. C. DIST - APR 3 1945

ACTION - LAND FORCES 524

INFO - CH. COM.
EX. COM.

Q

28

5 3 1 C

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CC 1205

APR 3 RECD

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army TOP SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: G/6
2 April 45.

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission
(For Chief Commissioner)(2).

237 238

1. Ref your letter 8251/SC of 28 Mar and our conversation the same day, herewith two copies of a Memorandum giving my views on the whole subject.

53 NO 218

2. (a) I have already sent you copies of the letters referred to in my Memorandum viz TS/G/12 of 4 Oct and 26 Dec 44 and TS/G/11 of 11 Oct 44.

(b) I also sent Brig. LUSH copies of same which he wanted for Mr. MACMILLAN on 6 Jan 45.

Encs.

See 239

L. Browning

Major General
M.M.I.A.

E.C. DIST - 2. APRIL 45.

ACTION - EX. COM
INFO - C. COM. 523

239

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: G/6
7 April 45.

1. GENERAL

(a) Plans have been laid in accordance with the policy of the "new deal" for ITALY progressively to hand over control of ITALY to the ITALIAN Government.

(b) Nevertheless, in order to continue to obtain the max-imum value from the Italian Army and its resources in aid of the Allied War Effort, the Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q. in a letter dated 28 Feb directed that temporarily there would be no change in control as regards this aspect i.e. that the "status and functions of the Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.)" A.F.H.Q. letter A.G. 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 44 and the system of "Command and Administration of the Italian Army" A.F.H.Q. letter A.G. 091.711/169 of 16 Nov 44, would remain unchanged.

2. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to examine how Allied control of the Italian Army can in due course be relaxed and eventually handed over to the Italian Government.

3. FACTORS

(a) Transition Phases

There are three phases to be considered. The first, which exists at present, is complete Allied control. The third will be the establishment of the Italian Army under its own control on its post-war footing. Between the first and third phase lies the Second, which is the subject of this memorandum and specific plans for which cannot be made until further information on dec-isions re the third phase is available.

(b) Italian Army Territorial Organisation

(i) Whatever the size and composition of the post-war Italian Army may be, an Administrative military organisation by areas covering all ITALY must be a component part. This is equally necessary now, in order that the Italian military authorities may sort out, administer and control their army (including ex-soldiers) military installations etc. both in liberated territory and North of the GOTHIC LINE as the remainder of ITALY is progressively

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(a) Plans have been laid in accordance with the policy of the "new deal" for ITALY progressively to hand over control of ITALY to the ITALIAN Government.

(b) Nevertheless, in order to continue to obtain the max-imum value from the Italian Army and its resources in aid of the Allied War Effort, the Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q. in a letter dated 28 Feb directed that temporarily there would be no change in control as regards this aspect i.e. that the "status and functions of the Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.)" A.F.H.Q. letter A.G. 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 44 and the system of "Command and Administration of the Ital-ian Army" A.F.H.Q. letter A.G. 091.711/169 of 16 Nov 44, would remain unchanged.

2. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to examine how Allied control of the Italian Army can in due course be relaxed and eventually handed over to the Italian Government.

3. FACTORS

(a) Transition Phases

There are three phases to be considered. The first, which exists at present, is complete Allied control. The third will be the establishment of the Italian Army under its own control on its post-war footing. Between the first and third phase lies the Second, which is the subject of this memorandum and specific plans for which cannot be made until further information on dec-isions re the third phase is available.

(b) Italian Army Territorial Organisation

(i) Whatever the size and composition of the post-war Italian Army may be, an Administrative military organisation by areas covering all ITALY must be a component part. This is equally necessary now, in order that the Italian military authorities may sort out, administer and control their army (including ex-soldiers) military installations etc. both in liberated territory and North of the GOTHIC LINE as the remainder of ITALY is progressively liberated.

(ii) My proposals for this were set out in my TS/G/12 of 4 Oct 44, were agreed to by A.F.H.Q. and were implemented in my TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44.

(iii) To this extent the stage is set.

(c) Post-war Italian Army

At the request of Brig. NICHOLSON G-3(Plans) A.F.H.Q. I wrote a memorandum TS/G/11 of 11 Oct 44 on this matter. This showed that definite conclusions or proposals were impossible for me to state, as these depend on high policy decisions by the Allied Governments.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3. FACTORS (Contd)

(c) Post-war Italian Army (Contd)

The memorandum, however, outlined the main factors that would have to be considered. This whole matter, I understand is now under active consideration by the C.C.S. at WASHINGTON.

(d) Allied assistance in maintenance of the Italian Army.

(i) The Italian Army is far from self supporting. The greater part of its rations, clothing, boots etc. is sup-plied by the Allies. In order to ensure correct and efficient distribution, an independent inter-Allied agency was set up by the C.C.S. under their FAN 338 of 26 Feb 44. M.M.I.A. is that agency and responsibility is on the "Country of ownership" basis, American or British. Control of the Italian Army must thus continue while FAN 338 is in force.

(ii) It is a matter of high policy as to whether the Allies would be prepared to hand over to the Italians con-trol of the Italian Army, while still providing the latter with the essential means to exist. Moreover, if the Allies were prepared to do so, it would be possible for the Italians (by e.g. a reduction in the ration scale) to main-tain a larger army than the 313,000 authorised. This would obviously be undesirable, particularly as I do not envisage the Italians being allowed by the Peace Treaty an Army as big as 313,000.

(iii) Certain administrative difficulties would have to be overcome. For instance it takes some 60 days after issue of supplies before full information becomes available to M.M.I.A. to complete its accounting procedure and correctly charge the Italians with the amounts owed to the British and American Governments. It would be possible to hand over the surplus supplies in depots in bulk on a given date, but we should have to insist on accurate returns for supp-lies issued up to that date and M.M.I.A. would have to continue its work for these 60 days.

(iv) The Italian Army is also very largely dependent on the Allies for all major items of fighting equipment such as M.T., guns, mortars, carriers etc. No Italian factories are producing these. It is a matter of high Allied policy as to whether the Italians shall be permitted to manufac-ture these or to what extent the Allies would provide, if desirable.

521

(e) Date of hand-over of control of the Italian Army

(i) The Italian military authorities already possess a large measure of internal autonomy, subject

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(i) The Italian Army is far from self supporting. The greater part of its rations, clothing, boots etc. is supplied by the Allies. In order to ensure correct and efficient distribution, an independent inter-Allied agency was set up by the C.C.S. under their FAM 338 of 26 Feb 44. M.M.I.A. is that agency and responsibility is on the "Country of ownership" basis, American or British. Control of the Italian Army must thus continue while FAM 338 is in force.

(ii) It is a matter of high policy as to whether the Allies would be prepared to hand over to the Italians control of the Italian Army, while still providing the latter with the essential means to exist. Moreover, if the Allies were prepared to do so, it would be possible for the Italians (by e.g. a reduction in the ration scale) to maintain a larger army than the 313,000 authorised. This would obviously be undesirable, particularly as I do not envisage the Italians being allowed by the Peace Treaty an Army as big as 313,000.

(iii) Certain administrative difficulties would have to be overcome. For instance it takes some 60 days after issue of supplies before full information becomes available to M.M.I.A. to complete its accounting procedure and correctly charge the Italians with the amounts owed to the British and American Governments. It would be possible to hand over the surplus supplies in depots in bulk on a given date, but we should have to insist on accurate returns for supplies issued up to that date and M.M.I.A. would have to continue its work for these 60 days.

(iv) The Italian Army is also very largely dependent on the Allies for all major items of fighting equipment such as M.T., guns, mortars, carriers etc. No Italian factories are producing these. It is a matter of high Allied policy as to whether the Italians shall be permitted to manufacture these or to what extent the Allies would provide, if desirable.

521

(e) Date of hand-over of control of the Italian Army

(i) The Italian military authorities already possess a large measure of internal autonomy, subject to the orders or veto of S.A.C. through M.M.I.A. The policy throughout has been to try and make them stand on their own feet. They are being ridden more and more on the snaffle and less and less on the curb. Looked at in this way, virtual relaxation of control is thus already in progress. I consider that this state of affairs should continue until we hand over complete control officially on a given date; nor do I think that the Italians would object to this.

(ii) An Army is an entity with all its components interrelated. I do not see that we can relax control of one part while controlling the rest. Let us avoid further complications in an already complicated situation and have a clear-cut transfer of control on a given date, perhaps that of signing the Peace Treaty.

22

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3. (Contd)

(f) Position of M.M.I.A.

(i) The Allies will lay down certain terms in the Peace Treaty as regards the post-war size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army. It will therefore presumably be necessary to have an Allied Disarmament Commission to ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty are carried out. It appears logical that, with their special experience and knowledge, the Service Sub Commission, A.C., should become this Disarmament Commission in a reorganised form. This form might be that of one Commission with 3 branches (Navy, Army, Air), the head being responsible to S.A.C. initially and in due course perhaps to the U.S. and British Governments through their respective Ambassadors in ROME.

(ii) Though acting as a Disarmament Commission, the Allied (or British, if it is decided to leave ITALY to British control) personnel could also perform the functions of Military Attaché, while at the same time giving such advice and help to the Italians as they might require.

(iii) If however a Disarmament Commission for co-belligerent ITALY is not considered necessary or desirable, I think it should be made mandatory on the Italians to accept an Allied Military Mission with carte blanche to go anywhere and obtain any information necessary. Only thus could the Allies ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty were implemented.

4. CONCLUSION

From all the above, I submit that: -

(a) the present system of "benevelent control" is not irksome to the Italians, is working well and should continue.

(b) control cannot be relaxed gradually. It must be clear-cut on a given date under definite conditions, which are a matter of high Allied policy to decide.

(c) control should be continued at any rate until the situation is clearer after the cessation of hostilities in ITALY (which is likely to coincide with cessation in EUROPE) and perhaps till the signing of the Peace Treaty.

(d) the major factor on which any plans for transfer of control must be based is a decision on the size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army.

(e) even when control is transferred, some kind of Allied organisation (either in the shape of a Disarmament Commission

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 795015

branches (Navy, Army, Air), the head being responsible S.A.C. initially and in due course perhaps to the U.S. and British Governments through their respective Ambassadors in ROME.

(ii) Though acting as a Disarmament Commission, the Allied (or British, if it is decided to leave ITALY to British control) personnel could also perform the functions of Military Attaché, while at the same time giving such advice and help to the Italians as they might require.

(iii) If however a Disarmament Commission for co-belligerent ITALY is not considered necessary or desirable, I think it should be made mandatory on the Italians to accept an Allied Military Mission with carte blanche to go anywhere and obtain any information necessary. Only thus could the Allies ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty were implemented.

4. CONCLUSION

From all the above, I submit that: -

(a) the present system of "benevolent control" is not irksome to the Italians, is working well and should continue.

(b) control cannot be relaxed gradually. It must be cleared-cut on a given date under definite conditions, which are a matter of high Allied policy to decide.

(c) control should be continued at any rate until the situation is clearer after the cessation of hostilities in ITALY (which is likely to coincide with cessation in EUROPE) and perhaps till the signing of the Peace Treaty.

(d) the major factor on which any plans for transfer of control must be based is a decision on the size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army.

(e) even when control is transferred, some kind of Allied organisation (either in the shape of a Disarmament Commission or an accredited Mission to the Italian Army with wide powers of search) will be necessary to ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty are implemented.

L. Browning

Major General
M.M.I.A.

tvs.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8251/EC

28 March 1945

236

Dear General -

I should be grateful if upon your return you would have a word with me on the subject of the attached letter.

28 Mar 45

Ys-

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

239

Major General L. Browning
GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

cc: Exec. Comm'r
CC Files

519

237

1974

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

EWS/hjp

8251/100 28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.
(Attention: Chief of Staff)

233 232

1. Reference is made to your letter of 28 February and this Headquarter's reply--8251/100/EC of 11 March.

2. In view of the possible cessation of hostilities in Italy in the near future I am taking steps to have re-examined the decision contained in this Headquarters reply--8251/100/EC of 11 March, and will shortly communicate to you further on this subject.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5 AFHQ
GOC Land Forces S/C, AC
Exec Comm, AC
CC Files

See 237

8251/100/EC

518

236

SECRET

1975

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. CIPHER COMMUNICATIONS (FOR ITALIAN GOVERNMENT)

TOP SECRET

TEMPORARY COVER

EXTRACTED FROM CC 8765

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS

517

TOP SECRET

1976