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10000/136/481

10000/136/481

ITALIAN ARMY, GENERAL
JULY - DEC. 1946

O. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 20, 1945

8253/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

LIST OF PAPERS

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 8253/ ITALIAN ARMY

~~TOP SECRET~~

From 1 July 46

3-6708

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
367	Ltr 90247/1.2.1	19 Dec 46	Adm Stone	Req approval of appointment Gen Marras
368	Cbl 5860	20 Dec 46	AFHQ	Infrm AFHQ of resignation of Gen Cadorna
369	Cbl F 73879	21 Dec 46	CC	Approval of appointment Gen Marras
370	Ltr CC 8253	23 Dec 46	IK	Infrm PM of SAC approval of Marras

845

~~TOP SECRET~~

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

G. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 24, 1915**LIST OF PAPERS**

8253/CC

Office of the
Chief CommissionerFile under No. 8253 ITALIAN ARMY

ALLIED COMMISSION

From: 01 Jul 46

~~SECRET~~Vol. VII Page 1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
357	Ltr 8251/EC Lush	1 Jul 46	Browning	Future of It Army - Appointment of Service Ministers fr It Govt
358	Ltr Brodie	11 Jul 46	CC	Report on -Gen Nobile-
359	Cbl F 70654 SACMED	17 Aug 46	MMIA	Move of 5 Territorial Headquarters
360	Ltr 8270/146/EC	24 Aug 46	AFHQ	It Army Call-Up (Pending revision in AFHQ Memo 10 of 20 Feb 45)
361	Ltr 70506/16644.11	29 Aug 46	CC	Assignment of funds fr services of 808 Btn C.S.
+ 362	Ltr 2621/EC	3 Sep 46	AFHQ	Evacuation of Italian Armed Forces Encl cbl 4822 of 3 Sep 46
+ 363	Ltr 8270/148/EC	24 Sep 46	AFHQ	Italian Army Call Up
364	Cbl FX72474	4 Oct 46	Disper	It army barracks at Padua Verona
365	Cbl FX 73403 SACM	24 Nov 46	MMIA	Future of MMIA & Organ, reduct, etc Encl FX 72745 of 17 Oct 46
366	Ltr G-5 970.31-1P	25 Nov 46	CC	Properties of It PWs belonging to Republican Army

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

~~SECRET~~

CC's file

CC 8253

23 December 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In reply to your letter of 19 December 1946 concerning the appointment of a new Army Chief of Staff, I have been authorized by Allied Force Headquarters to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander has no objection to the appointment of General Efisio Marras to succeed General Raffaele Cadorna.

Very sincerely yours

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

8253/10

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

843

Distribution:- 1 Exec. Comm.
1 Land Forces S/C

(14-10)

INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

G. Comn;
DEC 23 1946

Originator's Reference: F 73879
Date/Time of Origin: 211126A DEC

Message Centre No: H/8726
Date Time Rec'd: DEC 230915
Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG
TO: ALCOM.ROME

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Para 1. You are authorized to inform the Italian Prime Minister Reur 5860 that SAC has no objection to the appointment of General Morros as relief for Generale Cadorna.

AC DIST

ACTION : CHIEF COMMISSIONER 2

INFO : EX COMMISSIONER

LAND FORCE

FILE

FLOAT

ACTION

0/2
DEC 23 1946

RESTRICTED

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F 73879
211126A DEC

11/8725
DEC 230915
PRIORITY

AMHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHCBG
ALCOM ROME

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Para 1. You are authorized to inform the Italian Prime Minister
Reur 5860 that SAC has no objection to the appointment of General
Marros as relief for Generale Cadorna.

AC DIST

ACTION : CHIEF COMMISSIONER 2
INFO : EX COMMISSIONER
LAND FORCES
FILE
FLOM

RESTRICTED

041
DEC 23 1946

Spare
825/100

~~SECRET~~

ALCOM CITE ACSOC FROM ADMIRAL STONE

201015A DECEMBER 1946

AFHQ FOR ACTION CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INFO GEORGE FIVE

5860

~~SECRET~~

PRIME MINISTER HAS INFORMED ME BY LETTER NINETEEN DECEMBER THAT GENERAL CADORNA HAS SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND ALL FURTHER ACTIVE COMMAND IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RETIREMENT PROVISIONS PD UNLESS ALLIED COMMISSION HAS OBJECTION CMA PRIME MINISTER PROPOSES TO DESIGNATE AS CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EFTSIO MARRAS PRESENTLY MILITARY TERRITORIAL COMMANDER AT MILAN PD

PARA TWO PD THE PROBABILITY OF THIS CHANGE WAS KNOWN TO GENERAL GOULDURN AND ME BEFORE GENERAL GOULDURN'S DEPARTURE AND HE AND I AGREED THAT GENERAL MARRAS IS ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE PD

PARA THREE PD REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INFORM PRIME MINISTER THAT THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL MARRAS AS RELIEF FOR GENERAL CADORNA PD

PARA FOUR PD GRATEFUL FOR URGENT REPLY

DISTRIBUTION:
 Land Forces S/C
 Ex Comd
 CC

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten: 8253/LC
 040

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MEM Chief Commissioner

JOHN R. HAYES
 MAJOR ACB
 ADJT

SECRET

ALCOM CITE ACSCC FROM ADMIRAL STORE

201015A DECEMBER 1946

AFHQ FOR ACTION CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INFO GEORGE FIVE

5860

SECRET

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PARA TWO PD THE PROBABILITY OF THIS CHANGE WAS KNOWN TO GENERAL GOULEBURN AND ME BEFORE GENERAL GOULEBURN'S DEPARTURE AND HE AND I AGREED THAT GENERAL MARRAS IS ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE PD

PARA THREE PD REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INFORM PRIME MINISTER THAT THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL MARRAS AS RELIEF FOR GENERAL CADORNA PD

PARA FOUR PD GRATEFUL FOR URGENT REPLY

DISTRIBUTION:
Land Forces S/C
Ex Commr
CC ✓

~~SECRET~~

099

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MEM Chief Commissioner

JOHN R. HAYES
MAJOR ACD
ADJT

14687 222

MILERY W. STORE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Rel
90847/1.2.1

Date 19 Dec 48

Dear Admiral Stone,

as a result of a demand submitted by General Raffaele Cadorna to be relieved from active service, it has become necessary to proceed with his replacement as Army Chief of Staff.

General Efisio Marras, who is at present Military Territorial Commanding Officer in Milano has been designated to succeed General Cadorna.

I would be very grateful if you would kindly let me have a word of approval in this connection.

KROM

P. Gaspari

8153/62

028

(607)

*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri
90247/1.2.1*

Roma, 19 dicembre 1946.

Caro Ammiraglio,

In dipendenza della domanda di collocamento nella riserva presentata dal generale Raffaele CADORNA, si deve predisporre la di lui sostituzione nella carica di capo di Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito.

A tale carica è designato il generale di corpo d'armata Efisio MARRAS, che attualmente è comandante militare territoriale di Milano.

La prego di compiacersti comunicarmi un cenno di benessere al riguardo

Legnamy

Al signor Ammiraglio
ELLERY W. STONE
Commissario Capo della
Commissione Alleata

ROMA

027

C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

Leahy CC me
29/11
25 November 1946

G-5: 970.31-1 P

SUBJECT: Properties of Italian Prisoners of War
belonging to the Republican Army.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

1. Reference your letter, Italian Prisoners of War Division, file 9013/68/EG, dated 14 November 1946. The acceptance by the IPW Division, ALCOM, of claims from members of the Italian Republican Army instead of passing them to the proper U.S. authorities appears to be one reason for the delay in finalizing the problem. Instructions are now being issued transferring Lt. Col. Regis and the files of the IPW Division affecting claims against the United States, to the Peninsular Base Section.

2. In the future no U.S. personnel, military or civilian, in ALCOM will be assigned duties pertaining to prisoners of war or their claims.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

/S/ A.L. Hamblen,
/T/ A.L. HAMBLLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

C O P Y

see Minutes of Meeting
in 558/CC
(18 Nov 46)

025

CC was seen
29 Nov 46

366

2253/CC

SECRET

NOV 26 1946 C. C.

PX 73403
NOV DPT

B/R112
NOV 25 1200
IMPORTANT

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FPGOT
ALCOM INFO: SHC GMP

SECRET.

SUBJECT IS WHIA.

End

REFERENCE YOUR PX 72745 OF 17 OCTOBER 46.

1. FOREIGN OFFICE ARE ON THE POINT OF DISCUSSING THOSE QUESTION OF POST TREATY MISSIONS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT PRIOR TO ELLECTING INDICATION OF VIEWS OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE NOT AT PRESENT RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF UNTIL WE KNOW THE RESULT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS.

THE ABOVE IS WAR OFFICE SIGNAL 72619(MO3) AND IS REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

MESSAGE CENTRE NOTE only COPY OF PX 72745 IS IN POSSESSION OF WHIA AND WAS ADDRESSED PERSONALLY TO GEN GOULBURN.

AC DIST

ACT: WHIA.

INFO: C. COMN

EX COMN

POLAD (A)

POLAD (B)

FILE

SECRETION

- Mr Jones - US Embassy

SECRET

365

NOV 25 1946

C O U N T

ROUTINE
SECRET

NOV 26 1946

BRITISH ARMY CHEPER MESSAGE SIGS SERIAL 1251 171820 A
FROM AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT
TO WAR OFFICE LONDON
INFO GHQ CMB MMIA FOR MAJOR GEN GOULBURN
FX 72745

SECRET

YOUR 66306 (MO3) OF 28 AUGUST.

PARA ONE (.) IN VIEW OF FACT THAT PRESENT MILITARY MISSION TO ITALIAN ARMY IS A JOINT ANGLO - AMERICAN ORGANISATION , AND THAT AFHQ IS AN INTEGRATED HQ, CONSIDER THAT QUOTE ANY UNQUOTE VIEWS ON FUTURE OF THE MISSION OR THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING IT BY 1st JANUARY ~~1947~~ CAN ONLY BE PUT UP TO CGS ON ALLIED BASIS. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHETHER YOU WISH US TO TAKE ACTION ON THESE LINES.

PARA TWO. MEANWHILE WE HAVE OBTAINED VIEWS OF GENERAL GOULBURN, HEAD OF MMIA, FROM BRITISH POINT OF VIEW, AND ARE FORWARDING TO YOU UNOFFICIALLY THROUGH GHQ. WE ARE FURNISHING MTOUSA WITH COPIES FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

AC DIST

ACT: MMIA
INFO: C COMN
EX COMN
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
FILE
SKELETON
MR JONES US EMBASSY

933-2

365

COPY

C.C.

SIGNED SACRED CITE FIGEC
ALCOM ROME FOR DISPER INFO GHQ CMF FOR Q

CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT IS ITALIAN ARMY BARRACKS PADUA VERONA ROAD.

1. GHQ CMF REQUIRE ABOVE MENTIONED BARRACKS TO HOUSE AN INFANTRY BATTALION PD
2. IT IS UNDERSTOOD BARRACKS NOW CONTROLLED BY MINISTRY POST WAR REHABILITATION AND OCCUPIED BY ITALIAN REFUGEES.
3. PLEASE EXPEDITE REPRESENTATIONS TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ADVISE TAKE OVER DATE

8253/42

ALCOM DISTRIBUTION:

- DISPER 2 ACTION
- CHIEF COMMISSIONER
- FILE
- FLOAT

NOTE: CABLE UNDATED - PRESUMABLY 3 OCT.

364

032

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

See 363 in 8253/00
19 " 901/00

831

363

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

See 210 in 2610/CC

8253/CC

830

362

Chief Comm ^{SEP} 3 1946

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

70506/18644.14/19.11

Rome, 29 August 1946.

Dear Admiral,

With reference to your letter No. 9251/52 of 15 May 1946, I can assure you that, according to precise information received from the Ministry of Treasury, the assignment of funds for the services of the 809 Bn C.S. remains unchanged and that the Ministry of War has been enabled to carry out the payments left in suspense.

Cordially yours,

For the President

The Undersecretary of State

/s/ Paolo Cappa

82528

7

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

EC Dist - 30 Aug

ACTION: Ex Comm

INFO: LAND FORCES S/

CC 009

Spare

8153/u

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 29 August 1946.

70606/16644.14/19.LI

Dear Admiral,

With reference to your letter No. 8351/DC of 16 May 1946, I can assure you that, according to precise information received from the Ministry of Treasury, the assignment of funds for the services of the 808 Bn C.S. remains unchanged and that the Ministry of War has been enabled to carry out the payments left in suspense.

Cordially yours,

For the President

The Undersecretary of State

/s/ Paolo Cappa

8351/DC

B

Admiral Elery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

E.C. DIST - 30 Aug

ACTION - E.C.

INFO - LAND FORCES S/L

- CC

8351

361

CC

Ref: 6270/146/ED

24 August 1946

SUBJECT: Italian Army-Call-up.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters.

1. AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 10 dated 20 February 45 entitled "Conditions under which Italians will be exempted from Military Service" was written at a time when Italy, as far as liberated, was under control of the Allied authorities and when the Italian Army, for which recruits were being called up, was largely operating under control of AFHQ. Since then practically the whole of Italy has been handed back to the Italian Government and the interior Italian Army has been returned to the control of the Italian Ministry of War vide AFHQ AGO91.714 GSB/O of 2 December 1945.

2. The Italian War Ministry is now calling up new age groups for limited service in the Italian Army in order to maintain it at the strength authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as laid down in the above-quoted letter. Now that active operations have ceased and in view of the fact that the labour market is far more open to the Allied authorities due to unemployment and also that few men liable to military call-up can be regarded as key men, the retention by Allied military authorities of these young men would not appear to be advisable.

3. In these circumstances it is recommended that exemption from Military Service should now be left entirely in the hands of the Italian Government and that the above quoted Administrative Memorandum either be cancelled or suitably amended.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

Copy to : C.C.
Land Forces S/O
AIR FORCE S/C
NAVY S/C

360

see []

8252/10
+ 40/1/10

Document 359

Removed - ^{to} Cipher

Cables 3753

Cable No 70654

dated

Aug 18

A.O.C.

Gen Nobile

Confidential

General Aimone-Cat rang me up at lunch time and said that he had spoken to the Air Minister on the question of General Nobile.

Cevolotto said that as there was the possibility of the new Government being formed today and it would therefore be as well to drop a hint to De Gasperi through the Chief Commissioner that Nobile is unsuitable, if necessary, sending details and reasons later. This would avoid the unfortunate position of having to refuse him the post after he is nominated.

11.7.46

Subegato celo

2.

Chief Commissioner

Please see above and attachment No 1 which admittedly is not a cast iron case against General Nobile.

2. I spoke with Gen Aimone Cat (Italian C.A.S.) this morning & part of attachment No 1 is his side of the story - the two generals do not like each other!

3. I also attach a newspaper article written by Nobile - at attachment No 2. It's worth reading his article because

it indicates what manner of a man Nobile is.

4. We don't want Nobile as he was Air Minister & will appreciate your help.

11 July 46.

File *Gen Nobile*
Gen E. P. Brodie
AFSC

358

8257/c

025

Confidential ①

Memorandum For Air Vice Marshal I.B. Brodie.

At the present moment the Italian Air Force needs an Air minister who is of stable character and who does at least have the respect of the personnel. From the information we have been able to obtain the past career of General Nobile has shown him to be an opportunist, an adventurer without scruples and a man whose word cannot be trusted.

2. Nobile is not a soldier. He was given a direct Commission in the engineering branch of the I.A.F. as a Lt. Colonel by examination.

3. In 1926 he directed the second of his Polar Expeditions by airship. He and his crew were left on the pack until rescued by a Swedish aircraft. In spite of the fact that he was directing the expedition and there were wounded men in the crew, he allowed himself to be rescued first, and alone. This caused a world-wide scandal as a result of which he was put under enquiry and dismissed the service. Subsequently he went to Russia and America and returned to Italy after the liberation.

4. He then brought pressure to bear on the present C.A.S., both personally and through Prime Minister Bonomi and Scialoja, to get himself reinstated and promoted. In order to end this case and quieten Nobile, C.A.S. arranged for this to be done in spite of the opposition of the promotion commission and others, and his own unwillingness, and also because General Nobile promised that this should only be a token measure in order that he could teach dynamics in Naples. Nevertheless General Nobile immediately demanded all the benefits of his new position, including a vast sum in arrears of pay and the right to return to the service for another year in order to be eligible for further promotion. At this, he was sent about his business by

both the Air Minister and the C.A.S. as there was no possibility

him to be an opportunist, an adventurer without scruples, a man whose word cannot be trusted.

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5. In the political sphere Nobile then turned to the Christian Democrats and when he could get no guarantee of support from this quarter, he turned to the Communists, just before publication of the electoral lists, in which he was placed second. This sudden change of heart has resulted in the most moderate opinion turning against him.

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6. Leaving aside political parties, the Italian Air Force regards General Nobile in the worst light. The possibility of his nomination to Air Minister has caused alarm and despondency and there is no doubt that there would be many resignations from personnel who would refuse to work with a man of this character. The first of these would be the C.A.S. who would almost certainly make a public issue of it.

7. The Italian Air Force, therefore, needs an Air Minister who has the interests of the Service at heart and can be trusted not to use his position to further his own personal ends in the political field, ~~activity~~ etc., and whose character is respected both inside and outside the I.A.F.

Shuleyev

11.7.46.

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Sublegato

11.7.46.

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358

Unità-19.4.46.

2

WHY NOBILE IS WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

General Nobile has sent the following letter to the Roman Press:

In the "Popolo" and in the right papers the accusation has been made that I decided to accept the candidacy, as independent, in the Communist lists, driven by a disgusting calculation that in the elections I would be more certain to be successful with the Communists.

I must point out that, although I did not remain aloof from the discussion of the problems of the moment which we are passing through, in fact often verbally and in writing I have tried to air and discuss them, until a few weeks ago I did not even think of taking an active part in political competition, although I am convinced that every good citizen, within the limits of his own capacity, has a duty to do this today. My attitude was due to the fact that the ideas and convictions which have been acquired since my youth would have forced me, on the day on which I decided to intervene in politics, to stand with the left. A decision of this kind would have had the inevitable consequence of causing an open rupture with the circles to which I am bound by ties of gratitude and devotion, and the sacrifice of friends and affection. This is therefore a heritage, not of ideas but of sentiment, which was no less dear to me.

This was still my position a few weeks ago when I suddenly received an official invitation to present myself as a candidate for the Christian Democrats in the Avellino and Salerno constituency, a province in which I have ties of birth, parentage and friendship. This was followed a few days later by an invitation to contact a personality of the Christian Democrat Party which showed me the advisability of rather of appearing in the Naples list. I received this offer on the following morning, 9th April.

As the Christian Democrat Party had kept out of competitive political circles and appeared to me to be a sincerely democratic party, within which I was told there was a tendency towards the left, I did not refuse but replied that I should have to think about it. After all; my definitely socialist leanings, my great sympathy for the U.S.S.R. and what it had achieved, my great convictions as to the necessity for an effective and radical renewal both social and political, were already well-known to

the elections I would be more certain to be successful with the Communists.

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As the Christian Democrat Party had kept out of competitive political circles and appeared to me to be a sincerely democratic party, within which I was told there was a tendency towards the left, I did not refuse but replied that I should have to think about it. After all; my definitely socialist leanings, my great sympathy for the U.S.S.R. and what it had achieved, my profound convictions as to the necessity for an effective and radical renewal both social and political, were already well-known to public opinion, and therefore also to the Christian Democrats, and perhaps it could have been useful to have a person within this party to express the urgent necessity for the country of a programme of revalidation, both social, economic and political.

But my indecision was of short duration. On the evening of 10th April I sent an express telegram to the C.D. Party in Naples, in which I declined the offer "because I was afraid of embarrassing them and embarrassing ~~myself~~ myself". The contrast of ideas was evident.

On the following day however, at Naples, where I had with renewed urgent engagements, they returned to this question with renewed

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and more insistent requests in order to induce me to revoke my refusal and pointing out that an immediate reply was necessary. Although I was not convinced I ended up by accepting but shortly afterwards, when I came into contact with C.D. circles I felt that I could not give the party the unconditional adhesion which had been asked of me in Rome. On the following day my state of mind worsened *after*, having had information about the game of electoral preferences, which previously I knew nothing about. I then became convinced that really my inclusion in the C.D. Lists was not suggested by the desire to have me participate in the work of the Costituente but simply by the political game and I therefore withdrew my support.

Meanwhile, almost at the same time, the Communist Party had invited me to take part in the battle for the Costituente at its side, assuring me that I should have complete independence.

The old conflict between my affections and my ideas was renewed. The temptation to take part in political life, at such a decisive moment in our national life, fighting at the side of a party to which I felt very near for many reasons, was too strong. And so, at the end of a long battle within myself, I decided, choosing freely.

Today I am accused of having "bargained" with my candidature, of having sold myself to the highest bidder. If this were true, even 48 hours ago, I could have accepted nomination by the C.D. Party, heading the list for Avellino and Salerno, which meant for me a certain seat at the Costituente, acquired without running the risk of accusations and injury. Instead I preferred a bitter struggle at the side of the Communist Party, in a position which I knew would cost me friendships which are dear to me.

UMBERTO NOBILE.

Seen by Ex Comm & Brig Carr on 24 May 46. UNB

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UMBERTO NOBILE.

Seen by Ex Comon & Brig Carr on 24 May 46. JMS

021

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SECRET

Subject: General Umberto NOBILE

1. Subject, son of Vincenzo and Maria TORRACA was born 21 January 1885 in the province of AVELLINO.
2. In 1909 was an engineer in the Central Administration of Public Works. In 1915 was transferred to the Air Corps Experimental station. He was nominated Lt. Col. in 1923. Promoted to Col. in 1925. Commanded the Dirigible N1 during the expedition to the North Pole in 1926. Promoted to General in 1926. On 7 March 1929 his resignation from the rank of General was accepted. Returned to Rome following the liberation and was reinstated with full pay retroactive to the date of his forced resignation. Was promoted simultaneously from Major General to Lt. General.
3. Leaving Italy after the unfavorable findings of a military court (composed of Admiral VALLI, DE PINEDO etc) subject was a consultant to the Japanese Navy in 1927 at KASUMIGAURA. From 1931 to 1936 he was a technical director of Dirigibles in Russia. From 1939 to 1941 he was an aeronautical engineer in the US.
4. An Italian Air Corps officer states that the Allies have been misled to consider Subject the object of Fascist persecution. He was in fact an ardent Nationalist and following his successful voyage to the North Pole with Amundsen, came back to Italy to head a similar expedition composed solely of Italians. A struggle took place between Subject's personal ambition to play along with the Fascist creed of nationalism

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4. An Italian Air Corps officer states that the Allies have been misled to consider Subject the object of Fascist persecution. He was in fact an ardent Nationalist and following his successful voyage to the North Pole with Amundsen, came back to Italy to head a similar expedition composed solely of Italians. A struggle took place between Subject's personal ambition to play along with the Fascist creed of nationalism and superiority and other officers in the Air Corps who regarded the trip as foolhardy. Through well-placed contacts, Subject received the Duce's permission and embarked upon the voyage which resulted in a disaster. He was tried by straight military personnel against the wishes of the Fascists. He was judged to have been guilty of dereliction of duty in not properly caring for his men. Fascists intervened to prevent the de-

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graduation of this officer. Instead he was permitted to resign his commission. Going abroad he attempted to gain the aura of a political exile, though in fact he remained in Italy one or two years after his trial.

5. It is stated that members of the Italian Air Force will resign should subject be appointed Minister. They regard his record as indicating that subject is morally unfit to command.

6. Attention is also called to the fact that during his first months in Rome he was close to the Demo-christians but on the eve of the elections was entered on the P.C.I. list. This is attributed to his close friendship with Togliatti whom he knew in Russia.

7. In view of the above, it is strongly recommended by Italian Air Corps officers that any other civilian be chose for the key position with either PELLEGRINO, GIOVINE, or ALMONTE-CAT as under-secretary.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

SECRET

Ref.: 8251/33

1 July 1946

I have discussed your letter No. 6/6 of 21 June on the subject of the future of the ITALIAN army with the Chief Commissioner.

We both agree with your two recommendations as it is undoubtedly the policy of the U.S. and U.K. Governments that the ITALIAN army shall be brought to a high state of efficiency, but I should hesitate to say that this is the policy of the French and U.S.S.R. Governments who are co-negotiators in the present armistice treaty, and I think it is perhaps going too far to expect that the conditions mentioned in paragraph 3 shall be carried out "as essential and vice versa non, etc".

I think that it would not be politic to extract conditions from the Prime Minister before he considers appointing his Service Ministers, although I do think a hint, and a broad one, could be made that Service Ministers in the new Government should be good administrators rather than politicians.

The rest is very much a matter for your Service Sub-Commission to carry out itself and the Chief Commissioner realises that it will be a laborious process.

The Chief Commissioner will, however, bear all this in mind when the question of appointment of Service Ministers in the new Government is raised.

M. S. LUSH

Major General L. Browning C.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C., (MIA).
Rome.

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Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

2612/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

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INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

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