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**TOP SECRET**



E.A.VOIGT

*Katastrofa*  
**POLSKA**  
THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

PRZEKŁAD ARTYKUŁU Z MIESIĘCZNIKA «THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER» WRZESIEŃ 1945



# THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

W numerze wrześniowym angielskiego miesięcznika o długoletniej tradycji najlepszej tribuny krytyki politycznej i kulturalnej „THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER” ukazał się artykuł, pisma znanego publicysty i myśliciela politycznego F. A. VOLGTA. Artykuł ten jest głosem sumienia narodu angielskiego i demokracji zachodnich, nawoływaniem do naprawienia popełnionych błędów. Ze względu na coraz ciekawiej kształtujące się stosunki międzynarodowe, gdy zła wola i właściwe cele ZSRR przestają być przesłaniane, mglawieją oportunizmu, podajemy przekład polski artykułu z nie-

In September edition of the well-known political monthly „THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER” we find an interesting article of Mr. F. A. Voigt on the so called „Polish problem”.

The article seems to represent the opinion of all informed Englishmen who have not been misled by Soviet Propaganda.

The following is the reproduction of the article.



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It is convenient to forget the fate of Poland, or, whenever the inconvenient reality challenges forgetfulness, to conclude, by a process of deception and self-deception that the fate of Poland is not what it is, and that the consequences will not be what they will be. What for more than two hundred years has been known as the „Polish question” remains unsolved. But the fearful foreboding of Maria Theresa and the grave admonishments of Edmund Burke and Sheridan retain all their force and, until „The Polish question” has been solved, neither „the German question” nor the larger „European question” will have been solved.

The mere catalogue of pledges — of promises, assurances, guarantees, pacts, treaties and charters — that commit Great Britain politically, morally, and juridically to the restoration of Polish independence, would fill many pages. There has not been a debate in the House of Lords or Commons, with Poland

Jest rzeczą wygodną zapominać o tym, jaki jest los Polski, lub gdy niewygodna rzeczywistość nie daje dojść do głosu chęć zapomnienia, utrzymywać, za pomocą oszukiwania innych i samego siebie, że los Polski inny jest niż w rzeczywistości, i że skutki stanu rzeczy w Polsce będą inne od tych, jakie w istocie będą. Problem, który od dwóch setek lat był znany pod nazwą „Kwestia Polska” pozostaje w dalszym ciągu nierozstrzygnięty. Tę nie mniej smętne przepowiednie Marii Teresy, ważkie ostrzeżenia Edmunda Burke’a i Sheridan zachowują w pełni swe znaczenie i dopóki nie zostanie rozstrzygnięta „Kwestia Polska” nie doczekają się rozstrzygnięcia ani „Kwestia Niemiec” ani o wiele szersza „Kwestia Europy”.

Sam rejestr zobowiązań (przyrzeczeń, zapewnień, gwarancji, paktów, traktatów i kart), które zobowiązały Wielką Brytanię politycznie, moralnie i prawnie do odbudowy niepodległości Polski, za-

\*) Najwybitniejszy przedstawiciel parlamentaryzmu angielskiego w epoce Rewolucji Francuskiej, prekursor nowoczesnej demokracji, ulubiony wzór Churchilla.



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for its subject (and there have been many such debates), in which one or the other of these pledges has not been repeated and re-affirmed, from the time when the Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed, on August 25th, 1939, until the meeting of the „Big Three” at Potsdam, where these pledges have found their burial place.

It has been asserted, and is widely believed, that although Poland has lost her eastern territories — to which, so we are falsely told, she had no right — she has received „compensation” at the expense of the common foe, so that what has been achieved on her behalf and in fulfilment of so many pledges, may not be altogether what the Poles desire, may not be entirely what Great Britain intended when she went to war „for Poland”, but is, on the whole (and considering the difficulties and the changed circumstances) a „solution” of the „Polish problem”, a solution which, if it does not satisfy the Poles, ought to satisfy them; which does, broadly speaking, honour the pledges given by Great Britain and her Allies, and is, taking it all in all, the fulfilment of one of her principal declared war aims, the restoration of Polish independence.

But the truth is that these pledges have not been honoured — either severally or all in all — and that the declared war aim has not

been fulfilled. Przy każdej okazji omawiania spraw Polski w Izbie Gmin lub Lordów (a okazji takich było wiele) — powtarzano i potwierdzano to lub inne zobowiązanie. Taki stan rzeczy trwał od podpisania 25 sierpnia 1939 r. Anglo-Polskiego Traktatu o Wzajemnej Pomocy, do spotkania „Wielkiej Trójki” w Poczdamie, gdzie znalazł on swój grób.

Zapewnia się i szeroko się w to wierzy, że chociaż Polska straciła swe wschodnie obszary, co do których fałszywie nas się informuje, że nie miała do nich prawa, otrzymała za to „rekompensatę” kosztem wspólnego wroga. A zatem, to, co się stało w wyniku zawartych zobowiązań nie jest może tym czego życzyli sobie Polacy, nie jest tym czego życzyła sobie W. Brytania, gdy szła do wojny „o Polskę”, jest jednak wobec zmienionych okoliczności „rozwiązaniem” „Polskiego Problemu”, rozwiązaniem, które jeśli Polaków nie zadowala, to powinno ich zadowolić. Jest to — ujmując rzecz szerzej — rozwiązaniem, które zwała W. Brytanię i jej sprzymierzeńców z zacięgniętych zobowiązań, rozwiązaniem, które jest zadośćuczynieniem jednego z głównych, publicznie ogłoszonych celów wojny — odbudowy niepodległości Polski.

Prawda jednak jest inna. Zobowiązania nie zostały dotzymane — ani w całości ani w poszczególnych częściach i ogłoszone światu cele wojny nie zostały osiągnięte.



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been achieved, for the extinction of Polish independence is complete.

It is not our purpose, here, to recapitulate all the pledges\*, but to remark on the one which is the most important, after the guarantee which was honoured when Great Britain went to war with Germany, although its significance is unknown, or hardly known, to the public.

We refer to the „Secret Protocol” which was first disclosed by Mr. Peithers in the House of Commons on February 28th, 1945. It is appended to the Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance and is described in the Pact itself as an „integral part” thereof.

Under paragraphs 1 and 2, article 6, of the Pact of Mutual Assistance Great Britain and Poland agreed to inform each other about new „undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may give to other States”. Under paragraph 3 of the same article, they agree that „any new undertaking” by either party „shall neither limit their obligations” under the Pact, nor „indirectly create new obligations between the contracting party not participating in

ponieważ likwidacja niepodległości Polski została przeprowadzona całkowicie.

Nie zamierzamy tu powtarzać wszystkich zobowiązań\*), lecz tylko zwrócić uwagę na jedno, które pod względem wagi stoi na następnym miejscu za zobowiązaniem się Wielkiej Brytanii do wypowiedzenia Niemcom wojny. Znaczenie tego zobowiązania jest ogólnie nieznane lub prawie nieznane.

Powołuję się tu na „Tajny Protokół”, który 28 lutego 1945 r. został po raz pierwszy ujawniony przez p. Peithersa w Izbie Gmin. Został on dołączony do Angielsko-Polskiego Paktu o wzajemnej pomocy i określone go w samym Pakcie jako jego „część integralną”.

Paragraf 1 i 2, artykuł 6, Paktu o wzajemnej pomocy, mówi, że Wielka Brytania i Polska uzgodniły między sobą, iż będą się informować o nowych „krokach mających dać pomoc, lub która już przyniosła pomoc innym państwom przeciwko agresji”. W paragrafie 3 tego samego artykułu oba państwa postanawiają, że „udzielone innemu państwu nowe tego rodzaju zobowiązanie” przez którąkolwiek ze stron „ani nie ograniczy powziętych w stosunku do siebie w traktacie zobowiązań”, ani „nie

\*) For the principal pledges made from August 1939 until January 1945 v. the „Nineteenth Century and After” June 1943, February 1944, February 1945.

\*) Co do głównych zobowiązań poczynionych od sierpnia 1939 r. do stycznia 1945 r., patrz „Nineteenth Century and After” ze stycznia 1943 r., lutego 1944 r. i lutego 1945 r.



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these undertakings and the third State concerned".

The agreement between Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, which was adumbrated at Teheran, confirmed at Yalta, and formally integrated in the European order at Potsdam, with regard to the status and the frontiers of Poland, is not compatible with this last paragraph in so far as it "indirectly" created "new obligations" between Poland, who did not "participate" and Russia, the "third state concerned".

In Article 1 of the "Secret Protocol", Great Britain and Poland declare — what is not stated in the published text of the Pact (the text, that is to say, minus the Protocol) — that aggression, not by Russia, but by Germany alone, will be regarded as a *casus belli*. Article 3 of the "Protocol", however, lays down in clear, even if clumsy, language, that "undertakings" of the kind referred to in Article 6 of the Pact must "be so framed that this execution should at no time prejudice either the sovereignty or territorial inviolability of the other contracting party" — that is to say, of Poland or of Great Britain.

At Yalta, Great Britain not only agreed to the so-called "Curzon Line" (which she had herself proposed) as the Eastern frontier of Poland, but also to the "Lublin Committee" as "the basis" for the future Government of Poland. The agreement indubitably "prejudiced" the "sovereignty" and the "territorial

stworzy w sposób pośredni zobowiązań między stroną nie udzielającą tej pomocy a zainteresowanym trzecim Państwem".

Umowa między W. Brytanią, St. Zjednoczonymi i Rosją, naszkicowana w Teheranie, potwierdzona w Jaltie i formalnie wstawiona w ład europejski w Poczdamie, stoi w sprzeczności z przytoczonym paragrafem Paktu, jeśli chodzi o położenie i granice Polski, jako że "zainteresowanym państwem trzecim" jest Rosja, Polska była "stroną nieudzielającą pomocy", powstało więc "pośrednie zobowiązanie".

W artykule 1 „Tajnego Protokołu” Wielka Brytania i Polska oświadczają — co nie jest wyłączone w opublikowanym tekście Paktu (tzn. bez „Tajnego Protokołu”), że jako „*casus belli*” traktować będą agresję nie ze strony Rosji, lecz samych tylko Niemiec. Jednakże artykuł 3 „Protokołu” wyjaśnia, choć może w sposób nie dość zgrabny, że „kroki”, o których mowa w artykule 6 Paktu, muszą „być czynione w ten sposób, by ich wykonanie w żadnym razie nie naruszyło suwerenności lub niekalkności terytorialnej drugiej strony umawiającej się” — tzn. Polski lub Wielkiej Brytanii.

W Jaltie Wielka Brytania wyraziła zgodę nie tylko na t. zw. fałszywie „Linie Curzona” jako granicę wschodnią Polski (którą sama zaproponowała), lecz także na „Komitet Łubelski” jako „podstawę” przyszłego Rządu Polski. Bez żadnej wątpliwości zgoda ta „działała na szkodę” „suwerenności” i



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rial integrity" of Poland. It therefore violated the fundamental treaty between Great Britain and Poland, the Pact of Mutual Assistance.

The „settlement" negotiated between Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, and imposed upon Poland by force, is illegal. The new frontiers of Poland are illegal, the new Polish Government is illegal, and all the decrees and laws enacted by the „Government", and all its agreements and treaties with other Powers are illegal.

The Polish Republic, within the frontiers as they were in August 1939 (the district of Tschern excepted), its President, Raczkiewicz, its Government in London, with its Prime Minister, Arciszewski, its Ambassador, Count Raczyński, and its other ambassadors, ministers, and consuls abroad — these, and these alone, are legal. The „Government" established in Warsaw, with Mr. Osóbka-Morawski as Premier, is a „government" of usurpers. It would be swept out of existence overnight if it were not sustained by the irresistible power which Russia is able to exercise in association with Great Britain and the United States. Its „representatives" abroad no more „represent" the lawful Polish State and the Polish nation than the „representatives" of Vidkun Quisling would have „represented" the lawful Norwegian State and the Norwegian nation if any such had been despatched to take over the Norwegian legations and consulates thro-

„integralności terytorialnej" Polski. A zatem łamała podstawowy Traktat o Wzajemnej Pomocy, zawarty między Polską a Wielką Brytanią.

„Uгода" zawarta między Wielką Brytanią, St. Zjednoczonymi oraz Rosją i siłą narzucona Polsce, jest nielegalna. Nielegalne są nowe granice Polski, nowy rząd, wszystkie prawa i dekrety przez niego wydane, oraz wszystkie umowy i traktaty zawarte między nim a innymi mocarstwami.

Legalna jest tylko i wyłącznie Rzeczpospolita Polska w granicach z sierpnia 1939 r. (z wyłączeniem obszaru Gieszyña), z jej Prezydentem Raczkiewiczem, z jej Rządem w Londynie, Premierem Arciszewskim, Ambasadorem Raczyńskim, oraz z wszystkimi podległymi instytucjami i placówkami dyplomatycznymi i konsularnymi. „Rząd" ustanowiony w Warszawie, z p. Osóbka-Morawskim jako premierem, jest rządem uzurpatorskim. Zostałby on zmieciony z powierzchni ziemi w ciągu jednej nocy, gdyby nie poparcie Rosji, którego ona udziela w porozumieniu z W. Brytanią i St. Zjednoczonymi. Jego „przedstawiciele" zagranicą „reprezentują" Państwo i Naród Polski nie w większym stopniu niż „przedstawiciele" Vidkuna Quislinga „reprezentowaliby" Norweski Naród i Norweskie Państwo i na tej podstawie miałyby przejąć norweskie poselstwa i kon-



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against the world. The new Polish Government is seizing the assets — the investments, the shipping, and so on — which are the lawful property of the Polish State and the Polish nation abroad. This seizure is surely illegal.

The dark and lamentable thing that has been done to Poland with the connivance of Great Britain, adds the tarnished glory of British arms, appears the darker and the more lamentable by contrast with the transparently honorable attitude of Great Britain, not only towards Poland but towards Eastern Europe as a whole, during the year 1939.

Great Britain was, in that year, unable to negotiate an alliance with Russia, because the price demanded was a price she had no right to pay — namely, connivance in the partition, not only of Poland, but of all Eastern Europe, between Russia and Germany. Speaking in the House of Lords on December 5th 1939, Lord Halifax said: „Earlier in the year (i. e. 1939) we tried to improve our relations with Russia, but always maintained the position that rights of third parties must remain intact and unaffected by our negotiations. I think that events have shown that the judgment and instinct of the British Government in refusing agreement with the Soviet Government in the terms of formulas covering cases of indirect aggression in the Baltic States were right, for it is now obvious that these formulas might well have been the cloak of ulte-

rality on behalf of Russia. Now we find that the British Government has seized the assets of the Polish State and the Polish nation abroad. This seizure is surely illegal.

Ponura i godna ubolewania krytyka, która wyrażała Polakom z przyzwoleniem Wielkiej Brytanii, ukazuje się w jeszcze ciemniejszej świetle na tle nieograniczonego honorowego stanowiska, jakie zajmowała Wielka Brytania, nie tylko wobec Polski, ale i wobec całej Europy Wschodniej w r. 1939.

Wielka Brytania nie miała wtedy możliwości zawrzeć przymierza z Rosją, ponieważ żądano za to od niej ceny, której nie miała prawa zapłacić, chociażby ustanowione o zezwolenie na rozbiór, nie tylko Polski ale całej Europy Wschodniej, między Rosją i Niemcami. Przemaszynało w Izbie Lordów dnia 5 grudnia 1939 r. Lord Halifax powiedział: „Na początku bieżącego roku usiłowaliśmy doprowadzić do poprawy naszych stosunków z Rosją, stale jednak stojąc na stanowisku, że prawa stron trzecich nie mogą ulec pogwałceniu wskutek naszych negocjacji. Myślę, że późniejsze wypadki wykazały, że to zdanie oraz intuicja rządu brytyjskiego, które nie pozwoliły mi pójść na ugodę z rządem sowieckim w postanowieniach, kryjących w sobie pośrednią agresję na Państwa Bałtyckie — były słuszne, ponieważ postanowienia te mogłyby równie dobrze, stać się pretekstem do dalszych zamierzeń.



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rior desings, and I have little doubt that the people of this country would prefer to face difficulties and embarrassments rather than feel that we had compromised the honour of this country and of the Commonwealth."

The ethics and the policy that inspired Lord Halifax's declaration are those that inspired the Pact of Mutual Assistance and the "Secret Protocol" — indeed the very language reveals the same underlying conception. Russia planned the seizure of the Baltic States in disregard of international treaties, both specific and general, ostensibly because they might be used as a base for German "indirect aggression" (as it was termed) against herself. But the truth — as events were soon to show — was that she planned and executed the seizure by arrangement with Germany. It was by arrangement with Germany that she carried out the partition of Poland in 1939 (and, later on, of Roumania) — to be deprived of her share by Germany in 1941, to renounce that share by treaty with Great Britain and Poland in the same year, only to reassert her claim with a political craftsmanship and an inflexible resolution which, in the end, forced Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt and then President Truman to recognise those conquests which Stalin had, in 1939 and 1940, made by arrangement with Hitler.

The attitude of Great Britain in 1939 was as realistic as it was ho-

nie mam zaś wątpliwości, że społeczeństwo w naszym kraju woli stanąć wobec trudności i kłopotów niż dowiedzieć się, że skompromitowaliśmy honor Anglii i Brytyjskiej Wspólnoty Narodów.

Zasady etyczne i polityczne, które natchnęły deklarację Lorda Halifaxa były również natchnieniem Paktu wzajemnej pomocy oraz „Tajnego Protokołu”; tym samym językiem wyłożono te same podstawowe idee. Rosja planowała zabór Państw Bałtyckich, z pogwałceniem umów międzynarodowych, zarówno o charakterze ogólnym jak i szczegółowym, pozornie dlatego, ponieważ tereny te mogły zostać przez Niemców użyte jako bazy (jak to określono) „pośredniej agresji” przeciwko niej. Wypadki wnet wykazały, że prawda wyglądała inaczej. To Rosja uplanowała i dokonała zaboru w porozumieniu z Niemcami. Również w porozumieniu z Niemcami dokonała ona późniejszego rozbioru Polski w 1939 r., jeszcze później Rumunii, po to, aby zostać pozbawioną swego łupu przez Niemcy w 1941 r., aby wyrzec się tego działu w umowie z Wielką Brytanią i Polską w tym samym roku, a to znów tylko po to, by na nowo podnieść swe żądania z taką nieugiętą gwałtownością i politycznym sprytem, że w końcu wymusiła na Churchillu, Rooseveltcie, a później Trumanie, przyznanie jej podbojów, których dokonała w 1939 i 1940 dzięki porozumieniu z Hitlerem.

Postawa Wielkiej Brytanii w r. 1939 była równie trzeźwa jak god-



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nourable. Had the alliance been concluded on Russia's terms, the only terms possible, namely the partition of Eastern Europe — and perhaps of even more — Germany would have become master of Europe — and more — without an armed effort.

The decisive „No” to German aggression could not have come from Poland, for Poland would not have existed. Nor could it have come from Britain, still less from wavering France, for they would have forfeited the occasion and, therefore, the possibility of going to war. There are some, today who have deep misgivings and doubt, by no means lightly or irresponsibly, whether it was not a terrible mistake on the part of Great Britain to have concluded the alliance with Poland and to have gone to war at all. We are convinced that they are themselves mistaken. The alternative would have been the peaceful conquest of the whole European mainland by the Germans. The end would have been the dissolution of the British — and of the Russian — Empires.

It was because Poland — together with Great Britain — said „No” to Germany and, together with Great Britain, said „No” to Russia in 1939, that war came, and did not come too late, and, because it

na. Gdyby zawarte zostało przy mierze na jedynych możliwych warunkach proponowanych przez Rosję, to znaczy rozbiór Europy Wschodniej a może jeszcze czegoś więcej. Niemcy stałyby się panami Europy i to bez wysiłku zbrojnego.

Polska nie mogłaby już wtedy zdecydowanie powiedzieć „Nie” na agresję niemiecką, gdyż Polska już wtedy nie istniałaby. Nie mogłaby też zostać owe „Nie” wypowiedziane przez Wielką Brytanię, jeszcze mniej możnaby się go spodziewać od chwiejnej Francji, ponieważ oba te państwa raz straciwszy okazję, straciły przez to również możliwość wypowiedzenia wojny. Są tacy jeszcze i dziś, którzy mają poważne obawy i wątpliwości wcale nie lekkiej, czy nieodpowiedzialnej natury, czy Wielka Brytania nie popełniła straszliwego błędu, zawierając sojusz z Polską i wogóle przysięgając do wojny. Wiemy dobrze, że ci ludzie są w błędzie. Gdyby stało się inaczej oznaczałoby to nie innego jak tylko pokojowy podbój całego kontynentu europejskiego przez Niemców. W dalszym ciągu — oznaczałoby to koniec Imperium Brytyjskiego, a także Imperium Rosyjskiego.

Tylko dzięki temu, że Polska razem z Wielką Brytanią powiedziała Niemcom „Nie” i powiedziała „Nie” Rosji, również z Wielką Brytanią — w r. 1939 wybuchła wojna i nie wybuchła za późno. A ponieważ nie wybuchła za późno —



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did not come too late, it was victorious. The British and the Russian Empires survive — and the American Empire will have removed a deadly menace to its own greatness and security—because Poland said „No”.

After the war had begun, Russia tried to restore a situation which, had it endured, would have been her own undoing, for without the aid of Great Britain and the United States, she could not have withstood the power of Germany — it is even conceivable that she would have capitulated „peacefully” to that power.

Nevertheless, her principal purpose after the outbreak of war was to persist in her great error — an error which was, fortunately, overwhelmed by Germany's even greater error in 1941 and redeemed, to the salvation of all, by her own valour, sacrifice and resolution.

She strove not only for the closest possible association with Germany but for the augmented power of Germany as a necessity for the „peace of Europe”. And „peace” it would have been, no doubt, for a while at least. But it would have been a Pax Germanica extending from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Russian policy, in those days, was disclosed by Mr. Molotov in three speeches as following quotations will show, plainly enough. We give them without comment, for they need none:

została zakończona zwycięstwem. Brytyjskie i Rosyjskie Imperia ocalały, Imperium Amerykańskie uniknęło śmiertelnego zagrożenia dla swego bezpieczeństwa i wielkości — tylko dlatego, że Polska powiedziała „Nie”.

Po wybuchu wojny, Rosja usiłowała ponownie stworzyć sytuację, która byłaby jej własnym nieszczęściem i klęską, ponieważ bez pomocy W. Brytanii i St. Zjednoczonych nie byłaby w możności oprzeć się Niemcom. Można nawet przypuszczać, że musiałaby przed nimi „pokojuowo” skapitulować.

Tym nie mniej, jej główną troską po wybuchu wojny było trwać w swym wielkim błędzie, który na jej szczęście został przewyższony jeszcze większym błędem popełnionym przez Niemcy w r. 1941 i który okupiła na pożytek dla wszystkich swym zacięciem, poświęceniem i odwagą w walce zbrojnej.

Rosja zmierzała nie tylko do możliwie najbliższego związania się z Niemcami ale dążyła do dopomożenia im w zdobyciu jak największej potęgi, traktując ją jako konieczną „dla pokoju w Europie”. I byłby to bez wątpienia „pokój” przynajmniej na jakiś czas. Byłby to jednak „Pax Germanica” na przestrzeni od Atlantyku po Ural.

Polityka rosyjska w tym czasie została dostatecznie jasno określona w trzech następujących cytatach z przemówień Molotowa. Podajemy je bez komentarzy, bowiem są one zbyt oczywiste.



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Speech on August 31st 1939\*)

.....the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the U.S.S.R. and Germany is of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union" (p. 11)

.....people ask, with an air of innocence, how could the Soviet Union consent to improve its political relations with a State of Fascist type?..... It is not a question of our attitude towards the internal regime of another country but of foreign relations between two states" (p. 17)

„The fact that our (i. e. Germany's and Russian's) outlooks and political systems differ must not and cannot be an obstacle to the establishment of good political relations" (p. 19.)

Speech on October 31st. 1939.

„Today..... Germany is in the position of a State which is striving for the earliest termination of war and for peace, while Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favour of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace" (p. 28).

\*) These speeches were collected in a volume published by Laurence and Wishart in 1941, under the title „Soviet Peace Policy", with an introduction by D. N. Pritt. The pages indicated are the pages in that volume.

Przemówienie 31 sierpnia 1939\*)

„...zawarcie paktu o nieagresji między ZSRR i Niemcami posiada kolosalną wartość pozytywną, ponieważ usuwa niebezpieczeństwo wojny między Niemcami a Związkiem Sowieckim" (str. 11).

„...Są ludzie, którzy z niewinną miną pytają, jak mogły Sowjety zdecydować się na poprawę swych stosunków politycznych z państwem o typie faszystowskim?... nie chodzi tu o nasze zdanie w sprawie wewnętrznych stosunków innego kraju, lecz o stosunki między dwoma państwami" (str. 17).

„Fakt, że nasze (tzn. rosyjskie i niemieckie) poglądy i systemy polityczne są różne, nie może być przeszkodą w ustaleniu dobrych stosunków politycznych" (str. 19).

Przemówienie z dnia 31 października 1939.

„Dzisiaj... Niemcy są państwem dążącym w kierunku jak najszybszego zakończenia wojny i w kierunku pokoju, podczas gdy Wielka Brytania i Francja, które jeszcze wczoraj deklamowały przeciwko agresji, wypowiadają się za dalszym jej prowadzeniem i sprzeciwiają się zawarciu pokoju" (str. 28).

\*) Mowy te zebrane zostały w tomie wydanym przez firmę Laurence and Wishart w 1941 r., pt. „Pokoje polityka Sowietów", ze wstępem D. N. Pritt'a. Liczby w nawiasach odpowiadają stronom tego wydawnictwa.



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„The British and with them their French supporters of the war have declared something in the nature of an „ideological” war on Germany, reminiscent of the religious wars of olden times... Is it back to the Middle Ages, to the days of religious wars, superstition and cultural deterioration that the ruling classes of Britain and France want to drag us?... and ideology cannot be destroyed by force... it cannot be eliminated by war. It is, therefore, not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as a war for the „destruction of Hitlerism” camouflaged as a fight for „democracy” (p. 29).

„It is fear of losing world supremacy that dictates to the ruling circles of Great Britain and France a policy of fomenting war with Germany... The imperialistic character of this war is obvious to anyone who wants to face realities and does not close his eyes to facts. One can see from all this who is interested in this war that is being waged for world supremacy. Certainly not the working class” (p. 30).

„Here (i.e. in Russia) development has proceeded along the line of strengthening our friendly relations, extending our practical co-operation and rendering Germany political support in her efforts for peace” (p. 31).

„We have always held that a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for durable peace in Europe. It would be ridiculous to think

„Brytyjczycy, a z nimi ich francuscy pomocnicy wojenni, wypowiedzieli coś w rodzaju „ideologicznej” wojny przeciwko Niemcom, wspomnienie wojen religijnych z dawnych czasów... Czyż warstwy rządzące w Wielkiej Brytanii i Francji mają, zawlec nas napowrót w czasy Średniowiecza, przesądów i kulturalnej ruiny?... a ideologii nie można zniszczyć siłą... nie można jej zlikwidować za pomocą wojny. Jest zatem rzeczą nie tylko pozbawioną sensu ale zbrodnią prowadzić wojnę dla „zniszczenia hitlerizmu” pod płaszczykiem walki o „demokrację”. (str. 29).

„Politykę prowadzenia wojny z Niemcami dyktuje warstwowemu rządzącym w Wielkiej Brytanii i Francji obawa przed utratą stanowiska supremacji w świecie”...

„Charakter imperialistyczny tej wojny jest oczywisty dla każdego, kto zechce zdać sobie sprawę z rzeczywistości i nie przynika o-czu na fakty. W tym wszystkim można zobaczyć kto jest zainteresowany w prowadzeniu wojny o supremację w świecie. Z pewnością nie klasa robotnicza”. (str. 30).

„Tu (t. zn. w Rosji) rozwój poszedł po linii wzmacniania naszych przyjaznych stosunków, rozszerzania praktycznego naszej współpracy i udzielania Niemcom politycznego poparcia w ich wysiłku pokojowym”. (p. 31).

„Utrzymywaliśmy zawsze, że silne Niemcy są niezbędnym warunkiem trwałego pokoju w Europie. Byłoby śmieszne sądzić, że Niem-



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that Germany could be „simply put out of commission”.... The Powers which cherish this foolish and dangerous dream ignore the deplorable experience of Versailles”.... „Today our relations with the German State are based on friendly relations, and our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace” (p. 33).

Speech on August 1st, 1940:

.....particularly the British and Anglophile Press has been frequently speculating on the possibility of disagreements between the Soviet Union and Germany..... These attempts have been expressed more than once by ourselves as well as by Germany and have been swept aside as worthless. We can only reiterate that in our opinion the good neighbourly and friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany are not based on fortuitous considerations of a transient nature, but on the fundamental interests of both the U.S.S.R. and Germany” (p. 73).

Although the British Communists, then as always, supported Russian policy and were in open opposition to the „Imperialistic War” and although even amongst prominent British politicians and publicists there were some who, although they had little sympathy with Communism, were in favour of a negotiated peace, the nation and its chosen leaders, with insight, high principle, and unswerving de-

cy mogą zostać poprostu „wytrącone z gry”... Mocarstwa, które snują takie szalone i niebezpieczne marzenia zapominają o oplakany doświadczeniu Wersalu”. „Dziś nasze stosunki z Rzeszą Niemiecką bazują się na stosunkach przyjacielskich i na naszej gotowości do pomoczenia niemieckim wysiłkom nad ustanowieniem pokoju”. (str. 33).

Przemówienie z dn. 1 sierpnia 1940 r.

.....szczególnie prasa brytyjska i anglofilska spekulują często nad możliwościami nieporozumienia między Związkiem Sowieckim a Niemcami... Na usłowania te wskazywaliśmy nieraz zarówno my, jak i Niemcy, odrzucając je jako daremne. Możemy tylko powtórzyć raz jeszcze, że zdaniem naszym dobre sąsiedzkie przyjazne stosunki między Związkiem Sowieckim i Niemcami i nie są oparte na przesłankach przypadkowych i przemijającej natury, lecz na fundamentalnych interesach ZSRR i Niemiec”. (str. 73).

Choć i komuniści brytyjscy, wtedy, tak jak zawsze popierali politykę rosyjską i stali w otwartej opozycji do „imperialistycznej wojny”, chociaż nawet wśród wybitnych brytyjskich polityków i publicystów byli tacy, którzy nie żywiąc co prawda sympatii dla komunizmu, skłaniali się do zawarcia pokoju, to jednak naród i wybrani przezeń przewodcy, obdarzeni zdolnościami przewidywania, głębokimi zasadami i nieugiętą wolą, prowadzili nadal wojnę poprzez popełnianie błędów, poprzez ponoszone klę-



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termination continued the war through error, defeat, and the proximity of utter calamity, until the armed might of Germany was broken. They were lavish — and sincere — in their pledges to Poland. The chivalrous spirit of the Prime Minister, above all, was caught up by the great deeds accomplished by the Poles on land, on the sea, and in the air, and by the fearful sacrifices of the Polish nation to whom his country owed so much (as none knew better than he).

Lord Halifax, in his speech on the 1st. August 1940, went back, in imagination, to the eighteenth century, so as to point the contrast between English honour and Prussian perfidy. Then, as in 1939, he said, quoting Macaulay „England was true to her engagements”. And, in Macaulay's words, he condemned „the selfish rapacity” of Frederick the Great.

It was Frederick, who by arrangement with Catherine of Russia (with Maria Theresa as a reluctant, apprehensive third) consummated his own „rapacity” by the extinction of Polish independence.

Both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are men of honour, neither is a cynic as Frederick the Great was a cynic, both are wholly free from the „rapacity” which Frederick shared with Catherine. Both have endeavoured in all sincerity to save

ski, i mimo ciągłej bliskości własnej klęski ostatecznej — prowadził wojnę aż do złamania potęgi wojskowej Niemiec. W swych zobowiązaniach w stosunku do Polski byli hojni i szczerzy. Przede wszystkim rycerski duch Premiera został oczarowany wielkością czynów dokonanych przez Polaków na lądzie, morzu i w powietrzu — ujęły go też straszliwe ofiary polskiego narodu, któremu kraj pod jego pozostającej rządy, zawdzięczał tak wiele, a o czym nikt nie wiedział lepiej niż on sam.

W swym przemówieniu 1 sierpnia 1940 r. Lord Halifax cofnął się aż do osiemnastego stulecia, by wykazać kontrast między brytyjskim honorem a pruską perfidią. „Wówczas, tak jak w r. 1939 — mówił Lord Halifax, cytując Macaulaya”) — Anglia pozostała wierna swym zobowiązaniom”. A dalej, używając słów Macaulaya, potępił Halifax „samolubną żarłoczność” Fryderyka Wielkiego.

Fryderyk był tym, który układem z Katarzyną rosyjską oraz niechętną Marią Teresą jako trzecim partnerem nakarmił swą „żarłoczność” zniszczeniem niepodległości Polski.

Obaj, p. Churchill i p. Eden, są ludźmi honoru, żaden z nich nie jest cynikiem jakim był Fryderyk Wielki, żaden nie ma w sobie nic z „żarłocznością”, którą obdarzony był Fryderyk Wielki i Katarzyna. Obaj czynili wysiłki zupełnie szcze-

\*) Wybitny historyk angielski zeszłego stulecia.



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Polish independence. Both have failed.

They were, from the beginning, outmanoeuvred by Stalin, who has much more in common with Frederick and Catherine than they have. By their endeavour to save one half of Poland by sacrificing the other half, they lost the whole. Stalin chose his own ground and on that ground he fought. It is evident that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden inadequately grasped the Russian thesis and did not grasp the Polish thesis at all. It is evident that they were ill-advised and ill-briefed. They and Stalin used the same words, but with different meanings. And it was Stalin's meaning that invariably prevailed. They and Stalin were often in agreement as to the form. But they did not see the content which the form concealed from them, though not from Stalin. Just as words were made to mean what Stalin meant, so the content, revealed by little as the husk dropped off, was the content which Stalin, not they, had willed. Their public statements, especially those made in the House of Commons, on the subject of Poland abound in historical inaccuracies and are lacking in any deeper insight into Eastern European history and the Eastern European situation. It is true, that if we examine Russian public pronouncements on the same subject, we shall find many errors and much misrepresentation. But all these errors and misrepresentations had

re by uratować niepodległość Polski. Oba przegrał.

Już na samym początku zostali wywiedzeni w pole przez Stalina, który ma dużo więcej od nich wspólnego z Fryderykiem i Katarzyną. Dzięki swemu wysiłkowi by uratować jedną połowę Polski przez poświęcenie drugiej połowy, zaprzepaścił całość. Stalin sam wybrał sobie pole i na tym polu walkę przeprowadził. Jest rzeczą oczywistą, że pp. Eden i Churchill nie zrozumieli tezy przedstawionej przez Sowiety wystarczająco dobrze, a tezy Polskiej nie zrozumieli w ogóle. Jest oczywiście, że mieli złych informatorów i złych doradców. I oni i Stalin używali tych samych słów ale w zupełnie innym sensie. Zawsze i nieodmiennie zwyciężał sens który im nadawał Stalin. Formalnie byli oni często zgodni w swych słowach ze Stalinem. Nie widzieli jednak treści, którą forma przed nimi zakrywała, choć doskonale ją widział Stalin. I zupełnie tak samo jak słowa oznaczały w końcu to, co chciał Stalin, tak też i treść, powoli, w miarę jak opadała z niej łuska, okazywała się treścią, która wyrażała nie ich a Stalina wolę. Ich oświadczenia publiczne, szczególnie te, które składał przed Izłą Gmin roją się od historycznych nieścisłości i brak im jakiegokolwiek głębszego wejścia w historię Europy Wschodniej i we wschodnio-europejską sytuację. Prawda, że i rosyjskie publiczne oświadczenia na ten temat zawierają wiele błędów i fałszywych przedstawień. Lecz te wszy-



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a purpose they served a policy and helped that policy to triumph.

Unlike Stalin, Mr. Eden and Mr. Churchill were deceived by their own opinion at home, because British public opinion was never enlightened by the conformist British press. What the daily newspapers imparted with regard to Poland — and not only with regard to Poland — was not enlightenment, but propaganda.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden treated irrelevances like the „Curzon Line” as relevant. What Stalin wanted, in the first place, was the line he had negotiated with Hitler — the so-called „Ribbentrop-Molotov Line”. He got it, simply by calling it, or rather, by allowing Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, and the press and wireless to call it, „The Curzon Line”. Had the „Curzon Line”, as originally proposed in 1919, been readopted, the Polish title to the territory east of that line would not be prejudiced. The allegiance of that territory would be decided at a future Peace Conference, and there can be no doubt at all that if fair dealing and legality prevailed, the Polish Republic would be reconfirmed in the possession of her territories as far as the line negotiated to the satisfaction of both parties at Riga in

stkie błędy i fałszerstwa mają cel — służą one planowej polityce i pomogły tej polityce odnieść triumf.

W odróżnieniu od Stalina, pp. Eden i Churchill zostali oszukani przez swą własną opinię krajową, ponieważ bryt. jaka opinia publiczna nigdy nie była oświecana przez odpowiednią prasę brytyjską. To, co w związku z Polską i z innymi sprawami podawały dzienniki, nie było oświecaniem, lecz propagandą.

Pp. Churchill i Eden traktowali rzeczy, których treść wcale nie jest istotna jak np. „Linia Curzona” — jako coś posiadającego znaczenie istotne. To czego Stalin chciał, przede wszystkim, to była linia graniczna, którą ułożył między sobą a Hitlerem, tzw. „Linia Molotowa-Ribbentrop”. Uzyskał ją dzięki temu, że nazwał ją, lub lepiej — pozwolił nazwać pp. Churchillowi i Edenowi, prasie i radiu — „Linia Curzona”. Gdyby rzeczywiście stało się ponownie na stanowisku „Linii Curzona”, jak to proponowano w r. 1919, prawo Polski do terytoriów na wschód od niej położonych, nie ucierpiałoby na tym. Przynależność tych ziem zostałaby zdecydowana na przyszłej konferencji pokojowej i nie może być nawet cienia wątpliwości, że gdyby przeważały zasady legalizmu i uczciwego postępowania, Rzeczpospolita Polska zostałaby utwierdzona w posiadaniu terytorium na przestrzeni do granicy, która ku zadowoleniu obu stron została ustalona w Rydze w r. 1921 i została



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1923, and accepted without the slightest demur by all the other Powers — a line that represented a fair compromise after an inconclusive war, a line that strikes a just balance between the frontiers drawn in successive Partitions, a line corresponding with the wishes of the peoples concerned and with economic, political and juridical realities.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden accepted the principle of „compensation”. By doing so they lent a spuriously legal and moral sanction to the loss of eastern Poland without saving western Poland. Worse than this, they inflicted upon Poland, under the appearance of an award, a terrible penalty, for the cession of German territories vaster than any claimed by the Polish nation or by the lawful Polish Government must perpetuate and exacerbate to an unprecedented degree the age-long strife between Pole and German.

So far from being solved, the Polish problem has been made more intractable and more perilous than ever. Germany will never accept the loss of her eastern territories. But it provides her with a demand upon Poland which Russia — not Poland — can grant when the time comes to establish a *modus vivendi* between Germany and Russia. It provides Russia with a powerful means of achieving an association with Germany and of preventing any association between Germany

and Poland. It is a line that is accepted without the slightest demur by all the other Powers — a line that represents a fair compromise after an inconclusive war, a line that strikes a just balance between the frontiers drawn in successive Partitions, a line corresponding with the wishes of the peoples concerned and with economic, political and juridical realities.

Pp. Churchill i Eden przyjęli zasadę „kompensaty”. Czyniąc to dali sankcję moralną, oraz nieprawą sankcję legalności na stratę Wschodniej Polski, nie ocalając zresztą Polski Zachodniej. Co gorzej, narzucili Polsce straszliwe dziedzictwo, ponieważ cesja terytoriów niemieckich, znacznie rozleglejszych niż było to życzeniem Narodu Polskiego i niż opiewały żądania prawowitego Polskiego Rządu, musi podnieść i utrwalić do niespotykanego dotąd stopnia wiekową nienawiść między Polakami a Niemcami.

Zamiast go rozwiązać, uczyniono problem Polski jeszcze bardziej trudny i bardziej zgubny niż kiedykolwiek. Niemcy nigdy nie zgodzą się na utratę swych wschodnich terytoriów. Co gorzej, daje im to w rękę żądanie, które Rosja — nie Polska — uznała za słuszne, gdy ustali się w przyszłości *modus vivendi* między nią a Niemcami. Da to Rosji potężny środek stałego sprzężenia się z Niemcami i zapobieżenia ciżnieniu Niemiec ku Europie Zachodniej; w rzeczy samej pozwoli to Rosji utrzymywać



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and western Europe, indeed of sustaining permanent Germany hostility to the west. The principal claim which Germany will make, and must make, some day — the claim to her eastern territories — cannot be met by the Western Powers, cannot be met by Poland, but can be met, with one stroke of the pen, by Russia alone.

However the Polish situation may change, the gainer will be Germany, Russia will not be the loser. Only Poland will be the loser.

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were sincere, beyond a doubt, in wishing for a strong, democratic and independent Poland. So were and are the people of England. So does Stalin, but what he means by a strong, democratic and independent Poland, is a Poland strong as part of the Russian Empire, democratic as that Empire is democratic, and independent of Europe. And he has had his way, because he has made words mean what he wants them to mean.

The Poland of today is, according to the European meaning of words, which is also the Polish meaning, not only weak, but impotent; not only undemocratically, but tyrannically governed; not only dependent, but a vassal. It makes no difference if there are a few

Niemcy w stałej wrogości w stosunku do Zachodu. Główne żądania które Niemcy wysuną i muszą wysunąć pewnego dnia — żądania swych terytoriów wschodnich, nie będą mogły zadowolnić mocarstw zachodnich, nie zadowolą tego Polska, lecz może to zostać zadowolone przychylnie jednym pociągnięciem pióra przez Rosję i tylko przez Rosję.

Jakikolwiek zmianom uległaby wtedy sytuacja Polski, wygra Niemcy, Rosja nie przegra, przegra jedynie Polska.

Nie ma co do tego wątpliwości, że pp. Churchill i Eden byli szczerzy, gdy żądali silnej, demokratycznej i niepodległej Polski. Równie szczerze było i jest społeczeństwo Anglii. Tego samego chce również Stalin, lecz dla niego Polska silna, demokratyczna i niezawisła, znaczy Polska silna jako część składowa Rosyjskiego Imperium, demokratyczna, jak demokratyczne jest Imperium Rosyjskie i niezawisła od Europy. I postawił on na swoim, ponieważ nadał słowom takie znaczenie, jakie chciał im nadać.

Polska dzisiejsza, w znaczeniu europejskim, które jest tak samo znaczeniem polskim — jest nie tylko słaba, lecz bezsilna; nie tylko niedemokratycznie, lecz tyranicznie rządzona; nie tylko zależna, lecz wassalna. Nie czyni to żadnej różnicy, że znajdziemy tam paru demokratów, nawet prawdziwych demokratów, lub paru Polaków z Londynu, jak p. Mikołajczyk lub prof. Grabski — którzy zaskładają



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democrats, even genuine democrats, or a few Poles, like Mr. Mikolajczyk or Professor Grabski, from London in the „Government” at Warsaw. That „Government” remains the instrument of the Kremlin. It could not resist, or even deviate, even if it wished to, for the coercive powers of the modern state, especially of the Russian State, are irresistible. Irresistible coercion is exercised not only from without and above, but also from within and below, as it were. The „Government” is but a faithful transmitter and matters little compared with the municipal and rural councils, the judges and the juries, the management of the banks, the factories, of transport, of the co-operatives, of electric power, of the trade unions and of the political parties, indeed of all organised life, including books, newspapers, and the wireless. It makes no difference whether elections are held or not, for if held they will be organised in advance by the real administrators of the country, that is to say, in a last analysis, by the instruments of Russian rule. These elections, if held at all, will serve but one purpose — to convince those who are still somewhat hard of belief that they are mistaken, that the Polish people want what Stalin, and not Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden or Mr. Truman, mean by a strong, democratic and independent Poland.

But if words still have a true meaning, then Poland has lost her

w „rządzie warszawskim”. „Rząd” ten pozostaje i tak instrumentem w ręku Kremia. Nie ma on mocy opierania się, nawet gdyby chciał się oprzeć, lub mocy zmiany decyzji rosyjskiej, ponieważ środki przymusu, jakie stoją do dyspozycji państwa nowoczesnego, a szczególnie już państwa rosyjskiego, są nieprzewyciężone. Przymus nie możliwy do odparcia, idzie nie tylko z zewnątrz i z góry, lecz i od wewnątrz i z dołu. „Rząd” jest tylko wiernopoddanym przekazicielem i mało znaczy w porównaniu z sowietami miejskimi i wiejskimi, z sędziami i sądami przysięgłych, z zarządem bankami, fabrykami, komunikacją, spółdzielniami, gospodarką energią elektryczną; w porównaniu ze związkami zawodowymi, partiami politycznymi i deprawdy, z wszelkim życiem zorganizowanym wraz z wydawnictwem książek, czasopiśm i radiem. Nie będzie miało żadnego znaczenia, czy odbędą się wybory czy nie, ponieważ jeśli się odbędą, to będą przygotowane z góry przez prawdziwą administrację kraju tzn. w ujęciu ostatecznym, przez organy rosyjskiej władzy. Gdyby się te wybory wogóle miały odbyć, ich jedynym celem będzie przekonanie tych, którzy ciągle jeszcze nie mogą uwierzyć, że Naród Polski chce Polski silnej, demokratycznej i niepodległej w tym sensie, jaki słowem tym nadaje Stalin a nie panowie Eden, Churchill i Truman.

Lecz jeśli słowa jeszcze znaczą to, co znaczą, to faktem jest, że Polska straciła swą niepodległość



## KATASTROFA POLSKA

national independence, and the Poles have lost their individual liberties to an extent that would have been inconceivable under the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns or even under the Tsars. What was done by Frederick, Catherine and Maria Theresa, has been far outdone by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Truman and Marshal Stalin in Frederick's own city, Potsdam, and in his own palace, Sans Souci.

The independence lost is the more unendurable when it wears the outward aspect of independence regained. The Polish catastrophe is the more catastrophic because it is misunderstood by the outside world, which is but too willing to misunderstand. It is a catastrophe endured in isolation. The misunderstanding deepens and widens the abyss, that separates Poland from Europe and severs her the more hopelessly from the Christian and Graeco-Roman heritage which was always hers in common with Europe, even under the Tsars.

The catastrophe is the more catastrophic by reason of the fearful sacrifice that has been made in vain, of the terrible wrongs endured not only at the hands of the common foe but of the ostensible friend — the deportation of a million Polish men, women and children to the Russian Empire, where hundreds of thousands are still eating out their hearts with nostalgia for their lost native land and are being killed off by hard labour.

i że Polacy stracili swobody osobiste i to w takim stopniu jak byliby nie do pomyślenia pod rządami Habsburgów, Hohenzollernów lub nawet carów. To czego dokonali Fryderyk, Katarzyna i Maria Teresa zostało daleko prześcignięte przez dzieło pp. Churchilla, Trumana i marsz. Stalina, a dokonane we własnym mieście Fryderyka w Poczdamie i jego własnym pałacu Sans Souci.

Utrata niepodległości jest tym bardziej straszna, gdy nosi zewnętrzne pozory niepodległości odzyskanej. Katastrofa Polski jest o tyle bardziej straszna, że jest niezrozumiana przez świat zewnętrzny, który tak łatwo potrafi rozumieć złe. Jest to nieszczerze znieszone w odczuleniu. To niezrozumienie pogłębia i poszerza przepaść oddzielającą Polskę od Europy i odrywa ją od dziedzictwa chrześcijańskiego i Greko-rzymskiego, dziedzictwa, które było jej udziałem zawsze — nawet pod carami.

Katastrofa staje się tym straszniejsza, że stają przed oczyma rozmaite przerażających poświęceń, które czyniono na próżno, straszliwych krzywd poniesionych nie tylko z rąk wspólnego wroga, lecz i z rąk pozornego przyjaciela — deportacja milionów polskich kobiet, dzieci i mężczyzn w głąb Rosyjskiego Imperium, gdzie jeszcze dziś setki tysięcy spośród nich usycha z tęsknoty za utraconą Ojczyzną i głodzie z przepracowania, głodu, chorób i zycia w klimacie



### THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

disease, and exposure to a rigorous and unaccustomed climate in regions as far afield as Komi and Kamchatka; the inhuman suppression of the Home Army, elite of the Polish nation, by the ostensible liberator, after a heroic and sanguinary struggle in the common cause; the public arrests and deportations; the annihilation of high, though not unreasonable hopes in the pledges and promises broken by the one-time friend and ally, Great Britain; and, most grievous of all, the Partition, carried out by Russia with the connivance of Great Britain and the United States which has made one half of Poland part of the Russian Empire and the other half the helpless vassal of that same Empire.

But the Polish catastrophe is not Polish only. It is the vortex of a much bigger catastrophe that has engulfed more than a hundred million Europeans from the Arctic to the Grecian border.

Amid the resplendent victories achieved by British arms, it stands out as a dark and terrible political defeat. Amid the uncertainties of our day, one thing is as sure as anything can be in politics — that what was done at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam cannot last, that the catastrophe is so deep and wide

surowym, do którego nie są przyzwyczajeni, w miejscowościach rozrzuconych tak daleko, jak Komi lub Kamczatka. Staje przed oczyma niehumanitarnie wyłączenie Armii Krajowej, elity polskiego narodu przez pozornych oswobodzicieli po bohaterskiej i krwawej walce dla wspólnej sprawy; aresztowania i deportacje, nie zniszczenie się dalekosiężnych, lecz przede wszystkim nie-realnych zobowiązań i przyrzeczeń, złamanych przez niegdyś przyjaciela i sprzymierzonego — Wielką Brytanię i wreszcie, jako najboleśniejże ze wszystkiego, zabór i rozbiór dokonany przez Rosję z przyzwoleniem Wielkiej Brytanii i St. Zjednoczonych, który z jednej połowy Polski uczynił część Imperium Rosyjskiego, a z drugiej bezsilnego wasala tegoż samego Imperium.

Lecz katastrofa polska nie jest wyłącznie katastrofą polską. Jest ona punktem szczytowym o wiele większej katastrofy, która ogarnęła ponad sto milionów Europejczyków od morza Arktycznego aż po granice Grecji.

Wśród świetnych zwycięstw oręża brytyjskiego, stoi ona jak ciemna plama okropnej klęski politycznej. Wśród znaków zwycięstwa, które cechują naszą dzisiejszą rzeczywistość, jedna rzecz jest tylko pewna do granic możliwości istnienia rzeczy pewnych w polityce, a mianowicie, że to, co zostało uczynione w Teheranie, Jaltie i Poczdamie nie może trwać, że katastrofa jest tak głęboka i o tak szerokim zasięgu, że nie da się jej ani



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KATASTROFA POLSKA

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that it cannot be patched up or passed over, and that Great Britain will, some day, have to grapple with the consequences in defence of her national and imperial security, of her own future, and of Europe's future which, as she will find, is inseparable from her own.

F. A. VOIGT.

zakończyć byle czem, ani przejść nad nią do porządku. Wielka Brytania będzie musiała pewnego dnia stanąć przeciwko skutkom tej katastrofy we własnej obronie, w obronie własnego narodowego i imperialnego bezpieczeństwa, przyszłości swojej własnej i przyszłości Europy, która, jak o tym Anglia się przekona, jest nierozdzielnie z nią złączona.

F. A. VOIGT



· I NIE USTANIEM W WALCE  
SIŁĘ SŁUSZNOŚCI MAMY  
I SIŁĄ TEJ SŁUSZNOŚCI  
WYTRWAMY I WYGRAMY



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POLAD (B)

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TOP SECRET

*Return to Chief  
Cover!*



CONFIDENTIAL  
Serial No. 0112.

July 22 1946

From : Combined S.U.S.N.I.O.I. North-East and North-West Representatives.  
To : Senior U.S. Navy Liaison Officer, Italy, Rome.

Subject: Communist Program for Italy.

1. A highly reliable informant was interviewed on subject matter. He has been in close contact with a Russian agent propagandist who has recently returned from Russia after having absorbed Communist schooling and instructions for 18 years. This agent returned to Italy for "health reasons". He admitted to the informant that he is a Communist cell leader and that he is being paid through Russian sources. He is not a cultural or intellectual type and merely repeats the stock phrases and ideas absorbed in Communist schools.

2. At present the Russian policy within Italy is to spread its agents of propaganda into every section of Italy and every field of endeavor. There are estimated hundreds of these agents already subverting Italian efforts of unity. Their program is to foment strife and to encourage disorders and strikes. They are to provoke demonstrations everywhere and of every type and sort. They rely on and encourage dissatisfaction and hope for increased unemployment. Their aim is to wipe out completely the 200 largest industrial groups or families of Italy, thereby destroying capitalism in Italy. They hope to attain this by discouraging these industrialists through financial losses, continued work stoppages, and rendering their business lives impossible. They play upon the ignorance of the vast majority of Italy's workers. They take advantage of Italy's lack of all basic materials and accuse the Americans and English of not "keeping faith" and supplying these materials to a needy Italy. They admit that Russia has given Italy nothing materially but they stress that Russia has never promised such material aid to Italy, and thereby has never broken its word to Italy. past/a

3. However, and this is the aim of the Russian plan, when Italy decides to abolish capitalism and definitely decides to become pro Communist in Government and public opinion sentiment, then Russia will offer her entrance into the Russian sphere of interest or even entrance into the Soviet Republic. With this step, Russia will provide Italy with all the needed basic materials and will guarantee Italy favorable commercial treaties and protection against all "foreign" encroachments upon Italy.

4. The informant reports that the agents are highly satisfied with results at present both in the industrial strife and Italian Government's desorganization. They admit gleefully that they are making good progress in their program.

Anthony J. Marzullo

M

(24)



Dear Elley -  
For your info  
Old stuff! But  
up to the minute.  
Delegating ONI with  
such reports.

Robert

Robert

5

Robert



9258/CC

## LIST OF PAPERS

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TOP SECRET

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| SERIAL<br>NUMBER | FROM—                            | DATE      | TO—             | SYNOPSIS                                                                                             |
|------------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1                | Ltr Lush 367/CA                  | 11 Aug 44 | Reg Comm Reg 4  | Comments on poster & report, pls                                                                     |
| 2                | Ltr AAI/BOS(I)/DO<br>Brig Hirsch | 15 Aug 44 | Stone           | Comments pls on incl rpt of<br>communist plans & activities                                          |
| 3                | Ltr R/2214 Poletti               | 16 Aug 44 | Exec Comm       | Rpt seems to be inaccurate                                                                           |
| 4                | Ltr Stone                        | 18 Aug 44 | Lush            | Pls let me have views re atchd                                                                       |
| 5                | Ltr Pollock Reg 4                | 18 Aug 44 | Poletti         | Hinted trouble on 15 Aug did not<br>come off. Dispositions.                                          |
| 6                | Ltr BOS(I)/DO<br>Brig Hirsch     | 19 Aug 44 | Stone           | Further to my ltr, here are more<br>details on projected communist plan                              |
| 7                | Memo Stone CCG.1                 | 20 Aug 44 | Lush            | Comments pls re para 12 of atchd                                                                     |
| 8                | A/CC CCG.1 Stone                 | 21 Aug 44 | Brig Hirsch     | Reports run contrary to declared<br>communist plans. Will inform you                                 |
| 9                | Ltr Security Br AC               | 21 Aug 44 | A/CC            | Communist party - recruiting of<br>Ital officers. 3 ENCLS.                                           |
| 10               | A/CC CCG.1 Stone                 | 30 Aug 44 | Brig Hirsch     | Encl is rpt from ACC Security Br                                                                     |
| 11               | A/CC CCG.1-1 Quayle              | 30 Sep 44 | Exec Comm       | Pls take atchd rpt from RAAC to<br>Security Br for investigation                                     |
| 12               | Ltr SD/151 Chapman               | 10 Oct 44 | A/CC            | RAAC rpt seems not well founded.                                                                     |
| 13               | Ltr SD/151 Cripps                | 17 Oct 44 | CCS             | Fwdg Chappens report                                                                                 |
| 14               | 6514/17/COS Stone                | 30 Oct 44 | CG RAAC         | Transmittal of Pub Safety S/C<br>inquiry.                                                            |
| 15               | 532/27/C'S Lush                  | 31 Oct 44 | SCAC AMG 8 Army | Request for withdrawal of CCS<br>rpt on communist intentions                                         |
| 16               | Memo Stone                       | 26 Jan 45 | Kirk & Charles  | Atchd for info is Memo 25 Jan fr<br>Upjohn to COS: account of arms<br>seized in raid on Communist Hq |
| 17               | Memo, Lush                       | 27 Jan 45 | CC              | Report of raid on Unione Proleta-<br>ria Hq & Salvarezza's accusations<br>against Togliatti & Nenni. |

TOP SECRET



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MAR 7 RECD

Communist Party of ItalyAims and significance at the present moment.Introductory

On the widely fanned out offensive front of Soviet imperialism against Western Europe, Italy is undoubtedly the most important objective to be overpowered from the point of view of the Soviet left wing. Having dominated the Balkans and Hungary, the road to the Adriatic coast having been open by Tito, the Soviet Union has occupied on wide front on the striking line for a potential move to dominate the Mediterranean sea, thus creating a basis for a deep penetration of African Coast and cutting the communication lines of Great Britain with the Near and Far East.

This action must be devoid of success without domination of Appenine Peninsula and such essential areas which are indispensable from the political and geo-strategic point of view.

Italy is the plain friction of Soviet interests with Anglo-American interests but predominately British interests, to even a greater extent than in Balkan States, which area at the present moment is entirely lost for Western Europe. The Italian territory is the last obstacle in Southern Europe impending the onward march of USSR in the direction of France and Iberian Peninsula. "strong, disciplined and democratic Italy; guarantee of independence and development of small Nations in Mediterranean Basin" as is worded one of British declarations, would cancel almost entirely the possibility of Soviet expansion into Southern Europe and make possible the plans of USSR with respect to Northern Africa and severance of British communication lines with the East as well as handicapping Russia in her freedom of manoeuvre in the Eastern part of Mediterranean.

The domination of Italy then is indispensable to Soviet Union if it does not want to abandon temporarily or permanently its plans in the respective parts of Europe and Africa. In this general setup the



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Communist Party of Italy assumes special importance as the vanguard of Soviet offensive, the vanguard whose task is to prepare the terrain for decisive action, thus facilitating the conquest.

The Italian Nation is undowed with very old and very rich tradition of insurrectionary struggles, based on national, political as well as social background. It is safe to assume, that since the Great French Revolution, Italy lives under continual tension of revolutionary unrest. The were number of factors such as: political structure of the country, subdivision into small states, unusually high development of political life, social and economic differences, finally interdependence of foreign interests on Italian territory together with national temperament of the Italians, have contributed to this state of affairs.

This is to be remembered as at present Italy again becomes a territory, very susceptible to new upheavals and precipitate changes to the right or left and consequently a very desirable territory from the point of view of the Communist Party and interests of the Soviet Union.

#### Communist Party of Italy.

The Communist Party of Italy played a considerable part in the most recent history of the Italian Nation. In the year 1915, Italy joined the war under the influence of accurate calculation of political interests and not because of any ideological impulses. She finished the war exhausted, having suffered enormous casualties, without having scored any brilliant successes and with meagre gains. The period of first post war years became the first phase of great activity of Italian Communists. Taking advantage of war weariness, disappointment of the masses, economical difficulties and inefficiency of the Government, the Communist Party managed to build up a very strong position threatening at a certain moment the whole state structure as well as economical and social setup of Italy. It is no exaggeration to state, that Italy at the moment when Fascism took power, Italy was



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on the verge of communist revolution.

Fascism stopped the progress of Communism, foiled a left wing "coup" but it was unable to eradicate entirely the Communist Party. When in the year 1943, the Fascist Italy collapsed under the blows of the Allies, the Communist Party of Italy emerged from the underground and took stand in the open struggle for power, stronger than it was reasonable to assume.

The situation of this Party in 1943, was incomparably more advantageous than after World War I. At that period the Communists acted almost in perfect seclusion even though they commanded full support of Moscow but very small material help. The Soviet Union was fully aware of the importance of Italian territory but it was too weak itself to extend necessary help, it was handicapped by general political situation and finally Italy was not the immediate foreground of Soviet activity. The methods of action at that time were neither worked out nor were they properly tested. The word "Communism" was universally unpopular and the party in Italy was incapable of independent struggle without resorting to and receiving help from other left wing groups.

In the autumn of 1943, the Communist Party has emerged well prepared for action, supported, lead and financed by Soviet Union which had the most powerful army on the continent of Europe and was actually dictating conditions of life in Europe.

Almost immediately after the downfall of Mussolini regime, the Communist Party has published a number of very important declarations which were indispensable to camouflage the real aims and part that was to be played. In October 1943, Doctor Eugenio Reale, the Leader of Communist Party in Southern Italy declared that the Italian Communist Party is independent and has no connections with Moscow. This declaration was indispensable to throw dust into the eyes of Italian masses and public opinion of the Non-Soviet world but in the first place it was done for the benefit of the credulous opinion of America:



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A further step to camouflage the real work of Communist Party was a declaration published in "Civita Proletaria", to the effect that the program of the Party aims at association of the laborers into a society which would organize a rational planning and distribution of production.

In order to appease the public opinion it was also published that Communist Party will only aim to abolish large property but that small property holders and tenants will be considered as proletariat and that the program of the Party will be realized without resorting to force, since "We, revolutionaries by instinct and upbringing, claim that we will bring about our revolution by legal means".

The management of the Party did not fail to determine its standpoint with respects to monarchy. It was not so much necessary for internal consumption but for the outside world, particularly the English. The Communists have declared that "the problem of monarchy is immaterial to the Communist Party. In the Communist State there will be no King but up to the time of realization of that ideal the form of government makes no difference providing the rights and freedom of the Communists will be respected".

All theses declarations were published in the first period after capitulation of Badoglio. Their contents and form vividly remind us of the first period of the Russian revolution, from March to July 1907, when there were heard fine sounding utterances about "a bloodless" revolution and of cooperation with provisional government and democratic parties.

Upon completion of the introductory "camouflage action" accomplished by means of the above mentioned program declaration, the Party could begin the prearranged action according to Soviet guidance and under strict supervision of Moscow representative.

As in all the Communist Parties, the Italian one is also the vanguard of Soviet Imperialism, preparing the country for domination



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by armed forces of the Soviet Union and can not be considered as some sort of Italian ideological movement or international labor movement but as one of the elements of an organized Soviet action interwoven at the flanks and in the rear with the forces of Communist Parties of other nations either openly or secretly.

The Party organization.

The highest and legislative authority of the Communist Party in Italy is the Party Congress convoked periodically or annually. The executive authority of the Party is represented by its central committee headed by the Secretary of the Party, which post is at present occupied by Palmiro Togliatti, Ministers of Justice in Parri's Coalition Government.

The organization of the Party is based on the Soviet scheme. As Stalin is at the same time Secretary and Head of all Communist Party so Togliatti is the real Chief of the Italian Party and Chief Liaison link with Moscow.

Togliatti has the oldest "Party Status" in the Italian Communist Party. When the first leader of the Party was arrested by the Fascists, Togliatti took his place. His predecessor Grandoi died in prison and Togliatti was compelled to flee from Italy to Russia. Until official dissolution of the Comintern, Togliatti was representing officially the Italian Communists in the Third International under the assumed name of "Ercoli" Togliatti and is a Soviet citizen.

The Central Committee has under it the provisional Committees which in turn are subdivided into groupcommittees. Groupcommittees are composed of a number of Communist nuclei.

There is a separate nucleus in the Party, the "O.M." the armed force of the Party. The "O.M." occupies itself with training combat units, storing of arms and ammunition, preparation of revolution by means of an armed struggle and is working hard towards this integration of the army and is particularly keen to dominate the Navy. All the navies play a conspicuous part in Soviet methods.



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/Historical examples: Kronstadt, Sebastopol and Odessa in 1917 and Kiel in 1918/. The military organization is working in strictest secrecy.

It is not clear yet whether the military organization is identical with so called "L'apparato" which is a secret organization, destined for preparation of strikes initiation of riots and also sabotage on a large scale. The "L'apparato" is headed by an Italian Ruggero Grieco, who is a Soviet citizen.

"L'apparato" as a Party revolutionary combat team is organized on the principle of the groups of three, where liaison between groups is maintained by only one of the group. The internal discipline is very strict and it is based on military principles. Considerable percentage of this group is composed of soldiers and former POW's sent from Russia where they were specially trained. "L'apparato" endeavours to infiltrate into basic institutions of the country such as press, public utilities, banks and so on, planting therein, its own men. It is quite conceivable that there exists in the Communist Party of Italy a duality of authorities that means: Togliatti as the official chief of the Party is supervising Grieco, who handles "L'apparato" and vice versa. This is the more probable as both of them are well known at Moscow and were trained there, so the degree of confidence in them from the part of "Centrale" may be the same. In USSR the system of mutual control and spying is a traditional method of government.

In any case it is to be assumed that at the moment of outbreak of open communist revolt the supreme authority in the action will be exercised by "L'apparato". The usually well informed American magazine "Time" calls the management of the Communist Party in Italy the "scythe with two blades".

The Party disposes of few periodicals. The main and official is the daily "Unità".

The members and adherence of the Party are recruited from all



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social strata, depending on regions and specific economical, political and social conditions of Italy. In the North, where the greatest concentration of industrial centres are to be found a considerable percentage is composed of laborers. In the South, there is a considerable gravitation of the "Lazzaroni" towards Communist Party. Outside of these regions there are susceptible to communism the unemployed in ports, and workers of docks and shipyards. Considerable percentage of adherence to communism is built of mental employees and city youth.

It is to be born in mind that both laborers and members of the intelligentsia have formerly swelled considerably the ranks of anarchists. At present the Communist Party has absorbed in its ranks the majority of anarchist elements of which it will take advantage as long as it will be expedient. Probably at a proper time, as for instance when the Party will take power, the anarchists both inside and outside the Party will quickly be annihilated mercilessly as such procedure was adopted with respect to Russia anarchists in 1916.

Italian comparty /Russian abbreviation for Communist Party/ is not yet entirely orthodox from the point of view of Russia doctrines and standards of Comintern. It is still too young, it has too recently emerged from the underground and it is too weak to indulge in any large scale purge. Inside of the Party there compete various currents and deviations from the orthodox of which the most important are: the Moscow group composed of the orthodox and pure Soviet Communists headed by Togliatti, than the "ministerial group" headed by Scoccimare, Spano and Nagarville. This group is more moderate though also bound with the Soviet Embassy at Rome, than a group of idealist Communists /they could be denominated National Communists/ and the Anarchist group. The National Communists who are branded by their Moscow opponents as Fascists may to a certain extent be compared with a group that existed formerly in the Ukraïn called "National Communists" who were annihilated in 1930. The Moscow group calls the existing, in the Party Anarchists,

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trockists. The "Troekists" strive to bring about the immediate outbreak of communist revolution.

It is difficult to assess the numericle strength of the Party in Italy. It is more numerous in the North than in the South. In order to establish accurate numbers, there would have to be substracted a considerable percent of "opportunistic" members of the Party, that means such members who have joined it out of fear. The later cathegory do not admit their Party membership but keep their Party ticket for the eventuality "just in case". This class of members is recruited from people whose conscience is not very clear from Fascists times and desire to be covered by Party ticket in case of a great purge, "epurazione".

The methods of work and the activity of Comparty in the years 1944-1945 :

The following methods which were tried out and in accord with instructions received from Moscow, follow the road of "bourgeois-revolution" in partnership with Italian version of "Kierenski regime", wresting the power in the state from the hands of great capital and handed it over to the Committees of National Liberation, which institutions are weak and without any tangible spine. There are six Parties represented in the Committees of National Liberation: Communists /Partito Comunista/, Socialists, Christian Democrats, the Party of Action /Partito d'Azione/, Liberal Party and Progressive Party. The Committees of Liberation represent to a considerable extent small burgers, intellectual circles and peasants. The Republican and Democratic Parties have not joined the Committees because of their irreconcilable standpoint with respect to Communists.

The Comparty has undertaken cooperative work together with Committees of National Liberation but only outwardly. In reality it strives to disintegrate them within. It supports them in decision in moves, it cultivates hesitancy in decisions of those Committees, taking advantage of every occasion to ridicule them and at the same time never



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refraining from sharp and malicious criticism to which these Committees give more than ample ground.

Similar tasks are allotted to Comparty in the Government, in which it is particularly responsible for paralyzation of any anti Communist trends of the Cabinet as well for the normal intelligence work for itself and its "great trustee" in Moscow.

The Party congress was convened twice so far. First convention took place at Naples 1944 and second in April 1945 at Rome. The second convention of Communist Congress has in a certain measure completed the first phase of Comparties activities, i.e. creation of a strong base in wide masses of the society and frightening, all such whose conscience is not clear by great purge. The method of fomenting panic in general by propagating purges is of great importance as a moral factor. Since, in reality should there take place an "epurazione" directed by Communists then there would be annihilated in the first place not so much the collaborationists as all opponents of Communists or such circles and people undesirable for Moscow. In that respect the Comparty can draw from fine examples of purges in the Soviet Union and countries "liberated" by USSR.

It may be assumed at present that Comparty has entered in the second phase of its activity which is assumption of power. The instructions issued by the Congress point in number of directions. All activities must still be well camouflaged. A serious pressure is exerted towards qualitative selection of people absorbed by the Party, with simultaneous initiation of elimination of untrustworthy and undesirable elements in the Comparty. This is not as yet, a full scale purge but a mere introduction to it. Special instructions were issued to gain the support of women for the Comparty, they being the most conservative element in Italy. Also the importance of recruitment of educated youth into Comparty was particularly stressed.

The management of Comparty has given special attention to the



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low ebb of popularity of Communism in Italy in the last two months. This phenomenon was chiefly caused by the standpoint adopted by Comparty with respect to Yugoslav claims which supported territorial demands of Tito but this low ebb resulted from counteraction of other political groups. In order to widen the activities and to speed them up, reinforcements came from Russia in persons of highly trained agents and instructors.

With respect to other parties the Comparty followed the policy of allurements and cooperation. This was chiefly applied to numerically strong groups and disposing of great influence upon the masses, such as "Democrazia Christiana", representing the peasants and the Socialist Party. The attempts to obtain the upper hand among Christian Democrats ended in failure and the cooperation with Socialists is a pretence. Demerger of Comparty with the Socialist Party failed to materialise, neither at convention in Paris in August 1945, where this merger was torpedoed chiefly by Leon Blum nor at the Rome convention in August. In face of that the Comparty did not abandon the plan of this integration and overpowering of Socialist movement but has reverted to the tactics of slow and deeply hidden infiltration.

One of the sectors, of these tactics are the Committees of National Liberation, which the Comparty endeavours to dominate, preparing at the same time ground to launch the slogan "all power to the Committees". This is only a repetition of tactics used by the Bolsheviks in the initial period of the revolution, namely, domination of the Soviets of "laborers, soldiers and peasants deputies" by own men, or collaborators of bolshevism, propagating at the same time the slogan of "vsia vlast sovietam" /the whole power to the soviets/. This tendency should be watched with particular care as its intensification may signal the approach of final blow.

An important realm of Party's activities is the exploitation of economic difficulties and particularly of food supplies, organization

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of riots and turning them to advantage of own aims. This is also one of the ways of undermining the prestige of the government and of the Committees of National Liberation, both of these institutions more often than not are unable to cope with the situation of the country exhausted by war, with the population of slackened discipline. The events at Lecce on 24th and 25th of September are typical of this sort of activity. The reports about those demonstrations have stated that: "the Communists did not take advantage of the situation and behaved quietly", but the incidents were organized by Comparty, who really appeared in force at the funeral of the victims. The objective was attained, the local authorities were surprised and had to resort to force to quench the disturbances, blood was shed and there were victims.

A separate chapter represents the action against the Western Allies. This sector is a very delicate play of Comparty, as on one hand it must pursue anti-allies activity, on the other it should not provoke them officially. It is difficult however for the Comparty to preserve its equanimity with respect to instructions received from above. The assault of "Unità" on Churchill in September 1945, during his visit in Italy is the best illustration of it. Although the "Unità" has stressed that rumours about preparation of "coup d'état" by the communists are untrue and ridiculous, it could not abstain from pointing out to Churchill that he is interfering with internal affairs of Italy. As a matter of principle the attacks against the Allies should be launched by other groups, directed by so called "third hand". The Communists should restrict themselves to the defence of prestige of the Italian Nation, as an "Italian" Party. On this sector the Comparty is protecting the foremost positions of the Soviets because the USSR is mostly interested in Italy from a political point of view where as the Western Allies are interested equally in Italy both from economical and financial point of view as well as political.



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It is permissible, even essential, to strike at one branch of Allied troops, that is the Polish troops. The Poles are Allies but they are not English or American. They represent a considerable portion of the British armed forces in Italy, therefore they represent an undesirable element as all Western troops. The attitude of the Poles to the Soviets and Comparty is so inimical that the fight with it is not only a particular interest of the Italian Comparty but lays in sphere of major USSR's interests. The Poles in Italy are for the Soviets the classical "nail in the shoe", which does not incapacitate a person in walking but makes it very unpleasant. The action of spreading leaflets in Ancona and other localities is a good example of communist work well planned in advance. It is calculated to stir up essential but painful to population, in question such as billeting of troops, damage of private property by the soldiers and the like. Most characteristic were the leaflets distributed in Ancona, on the 7th of October in which the Poles were asked to go home. In those leaflets the heroism of the Poles was elaborated upon, remarking at the same time that "Polish banditism" must be done away with. Italian Communists applauded the effort of all who fought with Fascism.

These leaflets contained another characteristic point namely the demand to convoke a constitutional assembly "because we want order and freedom". This is a typical Moscow rhetorical manoeuvre copied from 1917, when Bolsheviks were supporting the demand for convocation of "Uczreditelnavo Sobranie" Constitutional Assembly/ to coin out of ridiculed and contemptible "Constitutional" shortly afterwards, a synonym of backwardness and counterrevolution.

As it was stated before, in the last few months there could be observed a decline of popularity of Comparty in the society. This was caused undoubtedly, apart of tactical errors such as question of Trieste, Soviet demands of enormous reparations from Italy, by counteraction of other groups. Among these are: Christian Democrats, Social-



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lists and Democratic Party /Partito Democratico Italiano/. The last name is allegedly in possession of large amount of arms, continuing to store some more, disposing as well of large financial resources for political work and purchases of arms. A considerable part is played in antiCommunist activities by the newly created party of "Uomo Qualunque", the man of the street party. This party was build up by masses of readers of a new periodical under the same name, founded and edited by Guglielmo Giannini, a scene director who was never engaged in any politics. Giannini is critising severely inflation of politics in parties and groups who foment their own interest paying no attention to welfare of the masses, the man of the street. The readers of that periodical represent a serious political group demanding care and protection of the interests of the masses. The "Uomo Qualunque" is suspected of being a camouflaged new variety of Fascism. It is now financed, so it is said not only "by the man of the street" as was the case initially but by great capital which hopes to find in it a serious obstacle to development of Communism.

The cooperation of Italian Communist Party with Compatries of other Nations.

The lack of adequate data does not permit us yet a detailed setting up of net of international contacts of Italian Comparty and its cooperation with other Nations. Just the same the available information permits to sketch the outline of the organization as well as drawing of proper conclusions. Of course there is no doubt about the strictest cooperation between Comparty and Moscow. Money is flowing from USSR to finance the work and press. Instructions are coming from there guiding the political organization as well as personal and military components. The Soviet Embassy at Rome with a staff of 300 as well as other posts and missions as for instance in Bologna embody inspecting nuclei representatives of NKVD included. Outside of official and unofficial Russians, the controlling, inspect-



- 14 -

ing duties are performed by Italian Communists, trained in Russia. These activities are carried on not only in Italy but also outside, for Italy. In Italian POW and repatriation camps, adepts are being recruited for the intelligence work in Italy. The best example of it is the Soviet General who tried to contact Italian officers in the Lublin repatriation camp, in the spring of this year where he tried to engage these officers by means of persuasion or threats to cooperate with Soviet Intelligence Branch and NKVD.

The cooperation of Italian Comparty with USSR is based on a relation of a subaltern to a superior. Moscow manages the Italian Comparty as one of its subsidiaries.

With other Nations it is a cooperation on equal bases. There are strong contacts between Italian Comparty and Tito's Yugoslav Government. It is an established fact that Tito men are supplying arms to Italian Communists over land, through localities in Venezia Giulia province as well as over-sea. Under cover of "repatriation" offices, Tito's nuclei are pursuing intelligence activities for themselves and USSR in conjunction with Italian Comparty.

Particular attention is to be drawn to Togliatti's declaration about the indispensability and justice of cession of Venezia Giulia province to Yugoslavia.

As we have mentioned at the beginning, the activities of the Italian Comparty is interwoven with activities of neighbouring Comparties. Such a neighbour in the East is Tito and the winks of that cooperation are covered by Comparties of Austria and Germany. So far data pertaining to that cooperation are meagre but it is quite clear that Austrian Communists who act under direct protection of the Russians and while, the British and Americans who are their "partners" in Austria are not counteracting very energetically, they have wide possibilities of vivid and organized cooperation. Through Austria and Czechoslovakia pass the roads to main operational Soviet bases in



- 15 -

Central Europe, the occupied Poland. The best evidence of the existing cooperation between the Austrian and Italian Comparties which is subordinated to Moscow guidance is the support of Italian Comparty to Austrian claim of Brenner.

The first political party to be registered officially in Bavaria, was the Communist Party of Germany. Geographically is a Northward extention of Italian territory separated from it by a narrow strip of Austrian Tyrol, which is being occupied at present by the French. The contacts between Bavarian and Italian Communists therefore, is to be reckoned with seriously, or that they will be established in near future. If we consider the already mentioned American incapability manifested in political management of Germany and the vivid activity of Soviet missions at München, Nürnberg and Bayreuth where they are active for some months and where there are to be found many Italians still, will become clear that such contacts are indispensable and could be easily developped.

A very important locality from the point of view of Italian Comparty is Frankfurt on Main, and the whole territory called Rhein-Main Wirtschaftsgebiet. The relations of Italy: economical, cultural and political are very wide with this part of Germany and have an old traditions. The Comparty in that region was always very strong particularly at Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Frankfurt. It is to be expected that the traditions of cooperation will now be taken advantage of by Italian Comparty and that Frankfurt will again become the hub point of communist communication as it was 1937 linking Hamburg with Southern Europe.

The next territory of intensive communist cooperation is France and then Iberian Peninsula. In these regions the Comparty of Italy can render very valuable services to USSR in that area. On the other hand the Comparty of France is a very important support for Italian Comparty particularly now when the position of French

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communists in the left wing political block is so strong. The declaration of General Secretary of French Comparty Maurice Thorez at the meeting of Party's Central Committee on 3rd. of November, to the effect that Communist Party of France is ready to assume responsibility for the Government of France, was beyond doubt "encouraging" for Italian Communists.

The plan of our counteraction.

This short and superficial outline of aims and significance of Communist Party in Italy points clearly in what direction the studies and penetration of Italian Communist work, should be conducted.

The first and most important is to study the organization and methods of work of Soviet posts on Italian territory. For this purpose there would be created a serie of observation posts, in important and sensitive points.

Such points in the first place are: Rome, as the capital of the country and seat of Soviet Embassy. Then, Milano and Torino: centers of Northern Italy. Bologna: important cultural and economic locality in a great road hub, and Trieste: a very touchy point of great international significance and important port. Then great ports such as Genova and Naples. Naples is especially important as a point of permanent Soviet interest, because of its connections with Black Sea ports of Odessa, Novorossisk and Batum. Finally the ports of Taranto and Bari are important observation points in which there are large centers of Italian communist activity and Bari is a port linked up with Yugoslav coast.

It would be advisable to establish observation posts outside of Italian boundaries to watch Soviet activities in neighbouring countries and to intercept contacts with Italian Comparty and the net of Soviet activities in Italy. The localities in which such posts are to be established are: Vienna, Klagenfurt and Innsbruck, which would be sufficient to watch Austrian sensitive points.

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- 17 -

There are also indispensable two observation points on German territory nearest to Italy: at Munich for Bavaria and Frankfurt am Main for the rest of Western Germany.

The task of these observation points, would be: observation and detection of Soviet agencies, their activity and contacts with Comparty of Italy or of the country where the post is situated. They should undertake a very thorough of Soviet infiltration into political, economical and cultural life of the society with particular attention to the work of Soviet agencies directed independently of given Communist Parties. Also the detection of Communist Parties, military organization nuclei and observation of their work and contacts. . .

A separate and very important branch of work of these posts, would be the observation of purely military intelligence work carried by Soviet agencies.

The posts should have good and quick communications with the centre.

The work of organization of opposition to Soviet communist activities would have to rest entirely in hands of the centre. The posts cannot be burdened with organization of local counteraction which if not coordinated could bring about a very harmful compromise of our work.

Our situation being very delicate and the problems very finally interwoven, we must in the first place camouflage most intensely both internally and externally of all our activities and institutions.

For guidance of work of the centre there should be prepared a special instruction, which would regulate i.a. very accurately our cooperation in this matter with interested Allied exponents. This particularly necessary with respect to Americans, with whom the political convictions collided often times with orders received.

This plan obviously as a mere outline for the projected counteraction. A detailed plan calls for special lay out and coordination



-18-

With responsible military and political elements.



The list of Arms and Munitions found in Italian houses.

26.IX.45 Sino Freschi Nervesa  
via Gen.Gandolfo

1 Ack-ack gun, 4 Maxim machineguns  
1 sub-machinegun, barrels and spare  
parts, 219 kilos of Italian explosives,  
30 kilos of gun powder, 29 Italian  
mortar shells, 17 shells for  
light mortar and 53 Ack-ack shells

26.X.45 Giuseppe Desti Etanatoglia

1000 rounds of ammunition for rifle  
and light machinegun

31.X.45. Anna Bendanti Russi  
via Trieste 9

2 Maxim machineguns, 1 Schmeisser  
and number of cases of ammunition

3.XI.45. Giuseppe Angiellati  
S.Bagio ad Osimo

84 aerial bombs of 24 lbs.  
1 case of German Mg. ammunition

3.XI.45. Enrico and Luigi  
Glorio, S.Bagio

312 aerial bombs 20 lbs.  
1 revolver cal.6,35.



30 August 1945.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is to acknowledge receipt of  
your secret letter of 28 August 1945. Thank  
you for the information contained therein.

Sincerely yours,

MILRAY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

The Honorable Alexander Kirk,  
American Ambassador,  
119 Via Vittorio Veneto,  
Rome.

cc. Cx Comm.  
cc file

5258/11

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000.1-1

DSG ACC

"A" Files

## LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1-1 POLITICS, (COMMUNISTS &amp; SOCIALISTS)

TOP SECRET

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|---------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 65            | Memo Quayle<br>A/CG 000.1-1      | 30 Sep 44         | Exec Comm                  | Report of Communist Intentions                                                                      |
| 66            | Ltr CGS, On Sec<br>SB/451        | 17 Oct 44         | Chief of Staff             | Report of 'Communist Intentions' by Public Safety Subcommittee. INCL: Ltr SB/451, 10 Oct 44.        |
| 67            | Ltr, Lush<br>6513/CCS            | 18 Oct 44         | Soviet Rep, ACC            | Distribution in Italy of films produced by Soviet industries.                                       |
| 68            | Ltr, Mr. Caccia                  | 21 Oct 44<br>9257 | Col Young, Security Branch | Distribution of biography of Lenin written by Trotsky in Rome.                                      |
| 69            | Ltr, Commo Stone<br>A/CG 000.1-1 | 22 Oct 44         | G-5, AFHQ                  | Distribution in Rome of biography of Lenin written by Trotsky.                                      |
| 70            | Ltr, Commo. Stone                | 30 Oct 44         | CG, RAAC                   | Report of Communist Intentions, by Public Safety Subcommittee.                                      |
| 71            | Ltr, Brig Lush                   | 31 Oct 44         | SSAO ANG 8 Army            | CGS report on Communist-Socialist maneuvers in ANG 8 Army areas. INCL: Rept No A2-212, 15 Oct, OSS. |
| 72            | Ltr AFHQ G-5:461                 | 7 Nov 44          | Hq AC                      | Allied authorities will not stop distribution of Trotsky's 'Life of Lenin'.                         |
| 73            | Ltr Stone 6512/42/<br>CCS        | 20 Nov 44         | Shalensky                  | AC will not stop distribution of Trotsky's 'Life of Lenin'.                                         |

TOP SECRET





SECRET

SECRET

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

cc 1145  
AUG 28 1945

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Rome, August 28, 1945

Dear Admiral Stone,

I am enclosing for your confidential information and for such limited distribution within AC as you deem appropriate, a copy of a secret report received by the Embassy from a source within the United States Government regarding alleged plans for the communization of Italy. You will understand of course that I am not in a position to vouch for the accuracy of the report.

Sincerely yours,

A. W. H.

Enclosure

DISTRIBUTION BY CC OFFICE:

Exec Commr (Personal)  
CA Section  
For Public Safety SC  
US Polad  
British Polad  
CC Files

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,  
Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Commission,  
Rome.

SECRET

9258/cw

(71)



SECRET

REPORTED PLANS FOR THE COMMUNIZATION OF ITALY

The following information has been received from a well-placed and usually reliable source in Bucharest:

The leadership of the KOMINTERN and the INOSTRANYI OTDEL (Foreign Section) of the GUGBEZ Central Command, has initiated action which has as its ultimate objective the communization of Italy. In the opinion of this group Northern Italy is thought to be the most favorable place for the establishment of a KOMINTERN operational base for Western Europe and the Mediterranean Area. This plan has the approval of the POLIT BUREAU.

On April 28, 1945, a special train passed through Bucharest, in which were some two hundred GUGBEZ agents of the "INOSTRANYI OTDEL", "OSOBEIJ OTDEL" (Special section), "SECRETNEIJ OTDEL" (Secret section), and of the KOMINTERN 1st, 3rd and 4th Bureaus of Moscow. This group was headed by an Italian Communist named Giuseppe RAZZA, who had as his principal assistants, Iosif ARDITTO, Nicola LEVISITZKI, Primo CUPILLO and Burah LISSITTI.

The above-named are all well-trained Communists of Italian-Jewish descent who fled from Italy to USSR in the period from 1923 to 1938. They are expected to arrive in Yugoslavia and there will install themselves at Zara, Fiume, Trieste and Ljubliana. From these places the individual members of the group expect to enter Northern Italy gradually -- naturally depending on the vigilance of the Allied authorities there.

Colonel MAHAILOV, principal GUGBEZ agent formerly in Rome, is now in Milan where the KOMINTERN offices for Italy will be located.

Oswaldo CARAGACCI, an Italian KOMINTERN agent who reportedly is one of the best agents trained for Communist revolutionary activity in Italy, passed through Bucharest on his way to Fiume, 2 May 1945.

SECRET

SECRET



SECRET

JUN 16 1945

16 June 45.

Ref: 942/80.

Subject: Recruitment for Communist Party from Army.

To: Land Forces Sub-Commission (ISMA).

Attached please find for your information a report from a secret source on recruitment for Communist party from the Italian Army.

B. Talbot

✓ Brigadier  
Executive Commission.

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9258/cr

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COPI

ITALY

POLITICAL

RECRUITING FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY FROM THE ARMY

1. A usually reliable source who has a contact in the Communist Party reports that the Communists are now approaching a number of N.O.s in the Italian Army with the object of recruiting them for the party.
2. According to a statement made by one of the N.O.s to source the Communists are offering all interested in their proposition the equivalent of their Army pay as an additional income against a promise of secrecy and clandestine registration on the part of the N.O.s.

3 June 45.

20



Ref: 542/152/53.

11 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Political Report.  
TO : Regional Commissioner,  
LIGURIA Region.

The following report, received from a Secret source, is passed to you for information.

"A usually well informed source reports the standing in MILAN in early May of the following dissident Communist parties:

- (a) GRUPPO COMUNISTA LIGURISTICO
- (b) GRUPPO COMUNISTA APENNINICO

The GRUPPO COMUNISTA LIGURISTICO, the existence of which is confirmed by an independent informant, is reported by source to be led by a certain NICHIA and to have established its H.Q. in the former office of the newspaper "LIBERTA DEL POPOLO" in VIA ROMANESI, MILAN. The party is said to be very extreme Left and to number over ten thousand members."


E. Talbot

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

19

92558/CC





*Ministero delle Corporazioni*

DIREZIONE GENERALE DEL SEGRETARIATO  
DEL CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELLE CORPORAZIONI  
DEGLI AFFARI GENERALI E DEL PERSONALE

IL DIRETTORE GENERALE

Admiral .

CITRARDINI has left with me the  
attached (Naval) Italian Intelligence Report.

It is very general, contains  
nothing that can be acted on, & (submit-  
is unworthy of any distribution.

J.A. Quaglini.

14-4

(18)

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TRANSLATION

31 March 1945

## ACTIVITIES OF THE EXTREME LEFT

A reliable source informs us that the directors of the above Movement and those of the other movements of the extreme left met together recently at the headquarters of the Communist Movement in Via Nazionale to coordinate a plan of action to be unfolded when the English and American troops meet those of the Soviet.

*(No details from Communist Party)*

This plan of action would be as follows;

1. Establish immediate contacts with the North, where there would already be an equipped revolutionary nucleus of the movements of the extreme left which at the moment of the juncture in question should provoke a bloody reactionary movement against the fascists. At Rome it will be necessary to act at the same time with extreme resolution.
  2. Give Italy a government that reflects the will of the people, provoking with all possible means the fall of the present government.
  3. Mount protection over the great industries of the North, which have already been ceded by the Social Republic to the workers, so that groups of financiers cannot get back their direction and control by means of public force.
  4. Provoke disorders at Rome, in such a way as to permit the occupation of industries in Liberated Italy as well.
  5. Await, before acting, the orders of the agents of Stalin, who would already be in contact with the Movement.
  6. Carry out in the meantime the work of propaganda against the English and American troops, emphasizing particularly that the indiscriminate destruction done by their Air Force to our cities has no parallel in the war conducted in Germany or elsewhere by Russia. Provoke in the people, finally, strong ill-feeling against Great Britain and America, making all sympathies turn instead to Russia.
  7. Give prominence to the Armistice terms, when they are published, making it apparent that Russia would not have treated Italy so harshly.
- 9258/CC



9258/20

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7. Give prominence to the Armistice terms, when they are published, making it apparent that Russia would not have treated Italy so harshly.
8. Get in touch with those units of the Army which will be informed in due time and in which exist elements faithful to the Movement.
9. It is furthermore communicated that the adherents of the Movement have at their disposal an effective force of about 10,000 men skilled in combat and armed with machine guns, machine pistols, light machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, and ammunition in abundance. All these arms are hidden in small caches, very well concealed and changed weekly by a few faithful and highly-paid men.

Trans - LWS/lws

(18)



31 marzo 1945

## MOVIMENTI DI ESTREMA SINISTRA.=

Fonte attendibile segnala che in Via Nazionale, presso la sede del Movimento Comunista, si sono recentemente riuniti i dirigenti del Movimento suddetto e quelli degli altri Movimenti di estrema sinistra per coordinare un piano di azione da svolgersi quando le truppe anglo-americane si congiungeranno con quelle sovietiche.

Tale piano di azione sarebbe il seguente:

- 1°)= Stabilire immediati contatti con il nord, ove esisterebbe già un'attrezzatura rivoluzionaria dei Movimenti di e.s. che dovrebbe provocare, al momento del congiungimento in questione, un movimento sanguinoso di reazione contro i fascisti. A Roma si dovrà agire contemporaneamente con estrema risolutezza.
- 2°)= Dare all'Italia un Governo che rispecchi la volontà del popolo, provocando con tutti i mezzi la caduta del Governo attuale.
- 3°)= Presidiare le grandi industrie del nord, già concesse dalla Repubblica Sociale agli operai in modo che i gruppi finanziari non possano, a mezzo della forza pubblica, riprenderne la direzione ed il controllo.
- 4°)= Provocare disordini a Roma, in modo da permettere la occupazione delle industrie anche nell'Italia Liberata.
- 5°)= Attendere, prima di agire, gli ordini degli agenti di Stalin, che sarebbero già a contatto con il Movimento.
- 6°)= Compiere nel frattempo opera di propaganda contro le truppe anglo-americane, mettendo particolarmente in rilievo che le distruzioni indiscriminate provocate dalle loro Aviazioni nelle nostre città, non trovano riscontro nella guerra condotta in Germania o altrove dalla Russia. Provocare insomma nel popolo un forte malumore contro Gran Bretagna e America, facendo invece rivolgere tutte le simpatie alla Russia.
- 7°)= Mettere bene in evidenza le clausole dell'armistizio, quando verranno pubblicate, facendo risaltare che la Russia non avrebbe trattato l'Italia così duramente.
- 8°)= Prendere contatto con quei reparti dell'Esercito che verranno segnalati a tempo debito e in cui esistono elementi fidati del Movimento.
- 9°)= E' inoltre segnalato che gli aderenti al Movimento dispongono di una forza effettiva di circa 10.000 uomini atti al combattimento, armati di: mitragliatori - pistole mitragliatrici - mitragliatrici leggere - pistole - bombe a mano - munizionamento in abbondanza.

Tutte queste armi sono nascoste in piccoli depositi, ottimamente occultati e che vengono cambiati settimanalmente da pochi uomini fidati e superpagati.=



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

SECRET.

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

27th January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

1. You will have seen extracts from L'Unita and Avanti on the activities of the Partito di Unione Proletaria, the head of which is SALVAREZZA who was expelled from the Communist Party some time ago. You will remember that the famous gangster "Gobbo" was shot in the entrance to the party's offices.

2. Salvarezza is reputed to have said that he held papers incriminating TOGLIATTI and NENNI with Communist organisations in other countries. As a result of reports received the Government decided to raid the premises of the Partito di Unione Proletaria and a force of CC.RR carried out the raid this afternoon. There were found there a box containing grenades, several sub-machine guns, a weapon that looks like a bazooka, also a case containing what is reported to be "diplomatic papers".

3. Salvarezza was not found and the rumour is that he has been SHOT.

4. It is not known what the papers contain but the Government action is probably wise because Togliatti and Nenni on the one hand were accusing Salvarezza and his party of being supported by high personages in the Italian State and Salvarezza was levelling treasonable accusations against Togliatti and Nenni so that the Government are on a firm wicket.

5. Above reported by RC, Lazio Umbria, who will give us further news.

MSL/JG.

MSL  
Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

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9258/cc



ITS/cfs

26 January 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Attached, for your information, is a  
minute sent by the DOCS Civil Affairs Section  
to the Chief of Staff.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Hon. Alexander Kirk  
American Ambassador  
119 Via Vittorio Veneto  
Rome

cc: COS  
A Files ✓

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9258/c c



EWS/efe

26 January 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Attached, for your information, is a minute sent by the D003 Civil Affairs Section to the Chief of Staff.

Sincerely,

/s/ Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Sir Noel Charles, Bt., K.C.M.G.  
British Ambassador  
84, Via Venti Settembre  
Rome

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394

Chief of Staff

Confirming our conversation.

Public Safety report that the Carabinieri, early this morning, Thursday, 25 Jan 45, raided the offices of the Movimento Comunista d'Italia in Via dei Giubbonari, and seized, in good condition:

- 40 rifles,
- 57 machine guns or automatic rifles,
- 100 hand grenades,
- 20 mortar bombs,
- 30 packages of explosives,
- 1 box S.A. ammo.,
- 200 packages Small Arms Ammo.

There were no casualties or injuries.

/s/ G. R. UPJOHN  
Vice President  
Civil Affairs Section

25 January 1945.

16 IN CC



# INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief of Staff

'A' FILE

Ref: 532/27/CES.  
[REDACTED]

31 October 1944.

SUBJECT: C.M.A. Reports.

TO : HQ, 8th Army.

1. I forward for your information copy of a report dated 15th October which comments unfavourably in the last paragraph on the activities of 8 Army A.M. personnel. You will notice that a copy of this report has been sent to London and Washington. It seems to me that the Army Commander would be interested to hear these criticisms of his staff officers from an independent and original source.

2. For your information I have already asked AMM that the report be withdrawn.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

(15)

31 Oct

00011



COPY.

AFO 534.

CONFIDENTIAL.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE

AC2 Branch - P. Section

Report No. A2-212  
15 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Communist-Socialist Manoeuvres.

1. There is a gradual increase in popular clamour for the quick and harsh punishment of the people responsible for the ruin and cruelties inflicted upon them by the Fascists in collaboration with the Germans, with the gradual liberation of the northern regions. This is due to the greater sacrifice suffered by the people of those regions. The example of Florence was already indicative of what public reaction would be further north, which is confirmed by the news from Romagna, Marche and upper Tuscany.

2. This general attitude of the public entails the tendency in political circles to concentrate all powers and political initiatives including government functions in the hands of the Committees of Liberation, as the only national organisation functioning at the time of liberation.

3. Such a tendency appears to be strongly supported by Pietro BONGI and the Communists (see "AVANTI" and "UNITA" of the last few days) with a view to repeating the already attempted manoeuvre to determine a Cabinet crisis to be solved in favour of the extremist parties.

4. The Committees of Liberation in the front line regions are often dominated by the Communists because of the presence there of Garibaldi Brigades made of partisans under Communist control, regardless of their fighting value. On the other hand, AM-8th Army authorities are paralysing the non-Communist left parties, thus creating a situation unfavourable to the authority of the BONGI Cabinet.

DISTRIBUTION: A.C. Information Div  
R & A  
Sant, Washington  
Saint, London.

15/11/44



EAC/ajp

Ref: 6514/17/CIS

30 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Communist Intentions

TO : Commanding General, Rome Allied Area Command

1. Reference your letter EAC/jp dated 27 September 44, addressed to AFHQ. I have caused enquiry to be made by my Public Safety Sub-Commission into this matter. The following paragraphs 2 to 7 indicate the view of the Sub-Commission, and I am in agreement with them.

2. "Information which has been received for some time past has indicated a great activity in the Communist Party in enrolling new members.

3. It is also known that the Communists are obtaining areas of all descriptions, and there is no doubt their intention to use these for the furtherance of their political objective.

4. There is nothing to indicate, however, that the time is ripe for anything in the nature of a revolution. They will no doubt wait for the Northern Provinces to be freed when their numbers will be increased by the acquisition of the strong Communist element in the large cities.

5. The report to the CIC agent was probably caused through:

- a. the anticipation that the German resistance might collapse,
- b. the fear of other parties gaining strength individually,
- c. the declaration of the Six Parties composing the Government confirming the alliance between them. (This has greatly annoyed the Left Wing Communists).

6. There is also evidence that the Communists are intent on causing trouble against the Allies by insidious propaganda and will undoubtedly seek to exploit any channel which will excite disorders in the coming difficult months.

7. Although the report on the timing of the revolution seems premature, I feel the general implications should not be overlooked."

8. The Italian people have yet to determine what form of government they will adopt, and as you are aware this decision has been deferred by agreement among the parties until such time as it is possible to hold a national vote in the matter.

File  
APP



9. This Commission is therefore not in any position either to back or to condemn any one particular party. I would, however, mention that I wrote to the Prime Minister on 25 September impressing upon him the necessity for enforcing laws against carrying or possession of arms in Italian Government territory.

HARRY W. STONE  
Commodore, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

c.c. G-5 Sec., AFHQ.

cc- COS  
"a" file ✓



CopySECRETMEMORANDUM

Ref:- SD/151

TO :- C.O.S.

SUBJECT:- Communist Intentions.

17 Oct '44.

Attached report prepared by Public Safety is submitted for information of A/CC in compliance with A/CC.0001.1 dated 30 Sept '44.

/s/ R.R.Cripps Col.

/t/ R.R. GRIPPS. Col.  
C30 CA Sec.

Encl: "A" Ref: SD/151 dated 10 Oct '44 Report on Communist Intentions to A/CC from Col. J.W. Chapman, Director Public Safety s/c.

"B" a/CC 000.1-1 dated 30th Sept Report on Communist Intentions to A/CC from Maj. J.A. Quayle. Passed to Security Dr. P.S. s/c on 3 Oct.

"C" Ref. 15102 dated 27 Sept on above subject to Commanding General AFHQ, U.S. Army from orig. Gen. T.X. Brown.

"D" Report on e/n subject by Rene R. Francuzzi, Special Agent C.I.C. dated 23rd Sept.

To C of S

9.

Please prepare letter to Gen. Brown forwarding our impressions, as per 6. You may wish to have DCS (Civil Affairs) review this entire situation.

10/20

/s/ STONE  
Commodore

A/CC

000.1-1



Attached report prepared by Public Safety  
is submitted for information of A/CC in compliance with  
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You may wish to have DCOS (Civil Affairs) review  
this entire situation.

/s/ STONE  
Commodore

10/20

REC/ymb.

4/30

000.1-1

17 Oct



COPY

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION  
SECURITY DIVISION  
APO 394

Ref: SB/151

10th October, 1944

Subject: Report of Communist Intentions

To : Acting Chief Commissioner (Through Vice President,  
Civil Affairs Section)

1. Information which has been received for some time past indicated a great activity in the Communist Party in enrolling new members.
2. It is also known that the Communist are obtaining arms of all descriptions, and there is no doubt their intention to use these for the furtherance of their political objective.
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(b) the fear of other parties gaining strength individually,  
(c) the declaration by the six Parties composing the Government confirming the Alliance between them.  
(This was greatly annoyed the Left Wing Communists).
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6. Although the report on the timing of the revolution seems premature I feel the general implications should not be overlooked.

SJE/tfc

/s/ John W. Chapman  
/t/ JOHN W. CHAPMAN  
Colonel, J.A.G.D.  
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC SAFETY  
SUB COMMISSION

(12) ANGL



SECRET

JAG/hd

Office of Acting Chief Commissioner

Report of Communist Intentions  
Executive Commissioner

A/CC 000.1-1

30 September 4

The Acting Chief Commissioner has directed me to pass the attached on to you with the request that you take it up with Security Branch and report in due course.

mt  
returned

1 Incl:  
Ltr RAAG 27 Sep 44 on above  
subject with inclosure thereto.

J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R. A.  
Chief Staff Officer

Sec (Ltr)

56 408  
Hq. A.C.C. Sec'y Gen.  
DISPATCHED  
Des. Time 1 10.10.44  
via Insp. 11.20  
initials CM.

(11) Suspended - 8 Oct

30 Sept

SECRET

FILES (A) B

000.1-1



CONFIDENTIAL

WRS/ejp

A/CC 000.1

30 August 1944

Dear Brigadier Hirsch:

Supplementing my letter of 21 August 1944, same file number, relative to Communist Party, attached for your information is copy of letter SB/260.05 from Security Branch, Hq. Allied Control Commission, dated 21 August, same subject.

Yours sincerely,

MILBY W. STONE  
Captain, USMR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Brigadier C. E. R. Hirsch,  
Hq Allied Armies in Italy,  
C. M. F.

c.c. Political Section,

FILES

000.1-1 Comm. for the  
X-000.1-2 010000  
(with ref. 1930)  
d/p

|                     |
|---------------------|
| Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen. |
| DISPATCHED          |
| Date: 30 Aug 1944   |
| Via: HV             |
| Initials: WRS       |

CONFIDENTIAL

10  
30 Aug



Col. D.  
Forward to  
Supplementary  
report to  
Hirsch of  
RRI. See my  
recent letter to  
Region IV report  
Gus



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
SECURITY BRANCH

21st August 1944

Ref: SE/260.05

Subject: Communist Party - Italian Officers.

To : Acting Chief Commissioner.

31 AUG 1944

HQ ACC. APO 394

778 y. Gen.

Rec'd 23 Aug 1945

acc.

file 000.1 A  
part 4

1. Further to my report under even number dated 6 August, 1944.
2. So far, PRO have been unable to contact Mr. Tucker who may now have gone to France.
3. The enquiry has continued and the following paragraphs sum up the situation.
4. It is true that a group of regular officers, whose number is growing, have made it very clear to the Ministry of War that unless the Ministry pays them promptly for the period from September 1943 to June, 1944, during which time they were in hiding or fighting with the partisans, they would go to the Communist Party here in Rome to be inscribed in a body and to ask financial help.
5. This threat was not carried out but there is a danger that it might be unless the Ministry of War makes urgent provision for these officers.
6. It is true however, that many non-commissioned officers have been inscribed in the party and have been given some small financial aid.
7. The seat of the trouble seems to be in the War Ministry itself and I append a report received from a reliable source which indicates that a little house-cleaning would be beneficial.
8. I submit this report in duplicate in order that, should you agree, the matter can now be referred, with your comments to the Army Sub-Commission for further action.

FOR THE DIRECTOR

*John A. McKay*  
JOHN A. MCKAY.  
MAJOR.  
SECURITY BRANCH

(9)  
21 Aug  
**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

Many officers, specially Generals and Colonels, who were before 8 September at the War Office, are now again at the principal branches of this Office. They have assumed again their posts, as if nothing happened from the armistice until today. Perhaps many of them did not take an oath to the Fascist Government, but certainly Col. Bonelli and Col. Balzano are of those who worked during 10 years with Gen. Baistrocchi, Sodda, Sorice, etc., in order to destroy the Italian Army.

They are men, who, without being exposed to risks and responsibilities, had promotions and money; they, although have now high ranks, occupy the same posts, which they had when they entered the War Office.

The said officers continue to work there, but the Commission, called in order to judge the proceeding of the officers during the German occupation, has not given its verdict in regard to them.

The said Commission is composed with old Generals, who judge to-day the persons of the War Office; on the contrary, they themselves should be judged.



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Gen. Ado and Gen. Guidi, for instance, were among those who at once presented themselves after the ban of Gen. Graziani.

The said Generals, who are interested only in their own career, are certainly unfit to be in a Commission, which will judge some officers, who did not consent to the orders of Gen. Graziani, exposing themselves to dangers and persecutions.

44



CONFIDENTIAL

It is said that all the officers of General Staff took their leaves for a period of 15 days: this is thought to have been done in order to remove the said officers, in order to re-engage them later, or to give them other posts.

All military and civil people have reacted badly to the choice of Gen. Oxilia as a Under-Secretary of State. He is one of those Generals of General Staff, who never held a real Command of troops and who did not succeed when, for a short period, he commanded them. He had been always Military Attaché abroad, and, before his promotion, Head of General Staff of the Duca di Pistoia. Promoted General, he was at first Head of General Staff of the Duca di Bergamo, and afterwards, called by Mussolini, he was the Military Councillor of the Poglavnic Anto Pavelic. Having been appointed to command a Division in Libya, after a short time, he was sent away for incapacity. At Milan he was known as a penniless and exploiter.

General Oxilia succeeded in Croatia, holding the Command of the "Garibaldi" Division, which went together with the bands of Mar. Tito; but the people say that such an unable man cannot occupy so an important post.



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PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

PRB/R10

July 29 1944  
Trend of copy filed by correspondents.

KENNEDY (AP) : Has interviewed Giacomo Matteotti, son of the socialist leader who was assassinated by Fascists. He was 3 years old when his father was killed, and is now 23. He does not remember anything of the actual event, but he has been studying as a lawyer and for some years has been slowly collecting evidence to establish the guilt of those responsible.

COE (Blue Network)

....."Transportation is a great problem in Rome. There is a shortage of current for running the trams and trolley-buses. Bicycles are now appearing on the streets. The Germans had forbidden their use. The hiring of bicycles became very profitable until racketeers began stealing the machines. Now in order to hire a bicycle it is necessary to put down a deposit of \$ 120. One set of racketeers set up a bicycle parking place outside a cinema, for the use of those arriving on bicycles to see the show. When the cinema goers came out they found all their bicycles had gone."

TUCKER (AP) : Sends a 3 page despatch on the disillusionment felt by many of the younger generation in Italy, and especially the girls. They do not wish to marry Italian men as they foresee years of misery and struggle ahead, but would give almost anything to marry American or Englishmen in order to get away from the country. "There is some justification for this pessimism" writes the correspondent. "The wage scale in Italy, in terms of buying power, is a social crime. Labourers are earning less under Allies than they did under the Germans. One effort was made to raise the scale, but General Sir Harold Alexander, commander of Allied forces in Italy, set it aside, saying the raise would be "reviewed". That was weeks ago and nothing has been done yet. One immediate result of this was an increase of Communist rolls. In one instance 116 Italian Army officers who had received no pay in months called round to Communist HQ and signed on the dotted line. The Communists pay \$ 20 to newcomers. \$ 20 is not a great deal but it looks good to a man who remembers the look of hunger on the face of his wife and children."

PRB (AP)



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OOE (Blue Network)

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BRIA (AP) Sends a story of an attempt by Mussolini to end his life by cutting his wrist with a razor blade at the time he was a prisoner at Gran Sasso. It is said to be from a very reliable source.

BUCKLEY (Reuter): The Italian Govt. is fighting a harvest battle in liberated areas. The grain is coming in steadily but slowly. It is too early to draw any definite conclusions on what the final harvest yield will be. The Italian Govt.

INCL 3

58



H.

figures up to July 25th for 26 provinces of the mainland show nearly 50,000 tons handed over by farmers. This is not a complete figure as no returns have been made for some areas and for several weeks large quantities of grain now being threshed will come in. Nevertheless some 8 million people in liberated Italy require 800,000 tons in order to maintain the present daily ration of 300 grammes bread and macaroni throughout the year. By means of propaganda the Government, aided by ACC, are working to get in the grain. There are over 2,000 agricultural committees now working on how much grain each farmer should be able to turn in after retaining his own needs. Today the Allies offered extra motor transportation from Rome to help in collecting the grain.

#### MCWRER ("Chicago News")

"Italia Libera" voices the suspicion that Italian liberation corps is intended to be a new royal army for the House of Savoy. The recent visit of Prince Umberto to the front line where Italian troops are in action, and Allied praise for the work of those troops has led to this outburst. These visits are an attempt to demonstrate that the army is the property of the royal house.

MATTHEWS ("New York Times") has interviewed Bonomi. The Prime Minister said that only by allowing Italy to join the community of nations and receiving Lease-Lend aid now can she expect to survive her present terrible plight. It is reasonable to suppose, comments the correspondent, that this request is being conveyed to Washington by Mr. Grady, late head of the Economic Section of the AGC. Bonomi agreed that Republicanism is strong in Italy today and can be expected to gain strength. He gave the impression that the liberation of Northern Italy and a consequent Plebiscite would show that a majority of the country is against the Monarchy. The Prime Minister did not expect civil strife or revolution so long as the Allies remained in Italy as a steady influence. Asked about Russia's role in Italy confirmed what the correspondent had heard from other sources, namely that Russia is leaving. Italy to the British sphere of influence and is not coercing or interfering in any way. This was something none expected when the Russians first made moves in Italy last Winter.

SPRIGGE (Reuter) : The Bishops of Abruzzi and Marche have paid a public tribute in the name of these provinces for the excellent Christian behaviour of the Polish troops in those



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Under Secretary Canavari's conversations with Russian representatives took place at the request of the latter. Participants were Canavari and Secretary Malfatti for the Italian Govt. while the Russian representatives were Alexander Bogdanov, the Russian representative on the Allied Advisory Council, and Michael Kosteylov, accredited representative to the Italian Government. Conversations with the Russians have taken place from time to time but this is the first time public attention has been drawn to them, but the tenor of the talks has not been disclosed.



3.

PACKARD (UP) : In the most important international speech he has made since the Allied occupied Rome the Pope in addressing Polish troops yesterday said that all nations should take note of their debt towards Poland and give a to her the place which is due according to the concepts of justice and peace. The Pope exhorted the Poles to disdain revenge.

This is considered to be a hint to the Russians in their relations with Poland.

BRIE (AP) : The Italian Cabinet has abolished the death sentence which the Fascists had re-introduced in 1926. This abolition does not apply to the military code nor to the law for the punishment of fascist criminals.



**TOP SECRET**

EWS/bjp

A/CC 000.1

21 August 1944

Dear Brigadier Hirsch:

Many thanks for your letter of 15 August enclosing a copy of a report of the 13th August stating that, as a result of a secret meeting, the Communist and Socialist Parties would activate a revolution as soon as the Italian Government took power in Rome.

I of course consulted the Regional Commissioner for Rome at once about this report and he took the view with which I agreed that it was unconvincing. There are many inaccurate statements in it and a revolution on the lines of the report runs basically contrary to the present policy of the Communist Party in Italy. Meanwhile I had also been taking what steps are open to me to verify whether any secret meeting of the kind suggested ever took place between the Communist and Socialist Parties in Rome. So far my evidence is that it did not. In fact the only meeting that did occur resulted in the alliance (not fusion) of the Parties which was announced on the 9th August.

I am far from belittling the importance from an Allied point of view of keeping a close check on what the Communist Party are planning and I shall be most grateful therefore if you will let me have any further such reports that may come into your hands. If you come down to Rome, I hope that you might find time to have a further word about this subject.

Sincerely,

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.  
**DISPATCHED**  
 Date-Time 21 Aug 1530  
 Via 144  
 Initials WRR.

ELERY W. STONE  
 Captain, USMR  
 Acting Chief Commissioner

Brigadier C.E.R. Hirsch  
 Hq., Allied Armies in Italy  
 C.M.F.

cc: Political Sec.

**TOP SECRET**

300-1 Russian Politics

File 117406

21 Aug.



Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

Communist Activities

A/CC 000.1

20 August

Brigadier M. S. Lush  
Political Section

Your recommendations are requested with respect to paragraph  
12 of attached memorandum.

Incl-  
as above.

Stone.

Files

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.

DISPATCHED

Date-Time 21 Aug 1955

Via Regd Mag

Initials RR

20 Aug



HQ ASIC, APO 384

719 Sacy Gen.

Rec'd 20 Aug 1944

By [Signature]

SECRET

IN ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

EUS(I)/DO

19 AUG 44

Stone

A 2255  
22 AUG 1944

I wrote to you on 15 August under the same reference, enclosing a report which we had received from RAAC concerning a possible Communist conspiracy.

As this story did not seem to me to ring very true, I asked our Special Counter-Intelligence Organisation to go into the matter further with the SIM (Italian Intelligence), and to let me have fuller particulars with regard to the source etc, and their evaluation of the information.

I now enclose a copy of their memorandum on the subject. I think that this probably gives a more balanced and accurate picture of the situation. The Officer Commanding the SIM/CS (Italian Security Organisation) is a level-headed individual, whose conclusions are likely to be fairly sound.

<sup>out</sup> You will no doubt give consideration to the recommendations set in para 12 of the attached memorandum.

*I shall still be grateful for your views on the subject, for information of the Commander-in-Chief*

Yours sincerely

*Ed Rappoport*

Captain E.W. STONE, U.S.N.,  
H.Q., A.C.C.



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*Ed R. R. R. R. R.*

Captain E.W. STONE, U.S.N.,  
H.Q., A.C.C.

(6)

19 Aug.

A 213  
22 AUG 1944



COPY

SECRET

Memo on COMMUNIST COUP d'ETAT in ROME

The Source of the SIM CS report referred to is Max MUGNANI .

2. MUGNANI is a SIM CS informer with contacts amongst ex-Fascist, Socialist and Communist circles in ROME, and supplies both SIM CS and CIC with fairly regular reports of Political Security interest.
3. He has been told by SIM to penetrate subversive organisations (especially in the BARI area) in the past and his information has on the whole proved fairly reliable and has produced quite good results.
4. In the case in point, information was referred to MUGNANI by contacts who had attended Socialist and Communist Party meetings, at which the so-called Communist Coup d'Etat was discussed and planned.
5. It was to take the following form: first of all an ultimatum to the Italian Government to increase the wages of Italian workmen in ROME.
6. When this Ultimatum was refused (as it undoubtedly would be) Italian Government buildings would be seized by Armed Bands of Communists and other terrorist acts committed.
7. The coup d'Etat would roughly coincide with the Italian Government's assumption of power in ROME.
8. CC SIM CS is convinced that the substance of these reports are accurate and that "paper plans" on the lines mentioned above have in fact been drawn up at meetings of extremist elements of the Socialist and Communist Party.
9. The CC.PP. had also made preparations to meet a possible Communist riot and their information appears to have come from a completely independent source.
10. Lastly an indication that something was in the air was the noticeably more moderate tone of the Socialist newspaper "AVANTI", which has stated recently that its policy of collaboration with the Government in the interest of the general war effort is unfortunately not shared by more extremist elements. It was hinted in fact that the latter might be contemplating acts of violence, from which supporters of the "AVANTI" were anxious to disassociate themselves.
11. When forwarding the report in question O.C. SIM CS stressed that it should not be taken too seriously as the threatened coup d'etat was, in all probability, little more than bluff, intended really to precipitate Allied intervention in the wage disputes at present existing between extremist left wing elements and the Italian Government.
12. O.C. SIM CS suggested that the A.C.C. should at once call up the Communist and Socialist leaders and make it quite clear to them that they would be held responsible for any disturbances which might occur. Meanwhile he suggested that some precautions might be taken to meet a possible development of the situation.



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5. It was to take the following form: first of all an ultimatum to the Italian Government to increase the wages of Italian workmen in Rome.
6. When this Ultimatum was refused (as it undoubtedly would be) Italian Government buildings would be seized by Armed Bands of Communists and other terrorist acts committed.
7. The coup d'Etat would roughly coincide with the Italian Government's assumption of power in Rome.
8. OC SIM CS is convinced that the substance of these reports are accurate and that "paper plans" on the lines mentioned above have in fact been drawn up at meetings of extremist elements of the Socialist and Communist Party.
9. The CC.RR had also made preparations to meet a possible Communist riot and their information appears to have come from a completely independent source.
10. Lastly an indication that something was in the air was the noticeably more moderate tone of the Socialist newspaper "AVANTI", which has stated recently that its policy of collaboration with the Government in the interest of the general war effort is unfortunately not shared by more extremist elements. It was hinted in fact that the latter might be contemplating acts of violence, from which supporters of the "AVANTI" were anxious to disassociate themselves.
11. When forwarding the report in question C.C. SIM CS stressed that it should not be taken too seriously as the threatened coup d'etat was, in all probability, little more than bluff, intended really to precipitate Allied intervention in the wage disputes at present existing between extremist left wing elements and the Italian Government.
12. O.C. SIM CS suggested that the A.C.C. should at once call up the Communist and Socialist leaders and make it quite clear to them that they would be held responsible for any disturbances which might occur. Meanwhile he suggested that some precautions might be taken to meet a possible development of the situation.
13. O.C. SIM CS does not know what action has been taken following his recommendation but is still carrying out further investigations.

(6) Inc

16.8.44.



C O P Y.

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT,  
REGION IV,  
APO 394

721-250-1  
Rec'd 24 Aug 1944  
by CEB

Public Safety Division.

18th August 1944.

SUBJECT: Hinted trouble on 15th August 1944.

TO : Col. Charles Poletti, Regional Commissioner, Rome.  
Brig. Lush, ACC HQ.  
Col. Kirk, Chief, Public Safety Sub-Com, ACC HQ.

A 68  
18 AUG 1944

1. With reference to previous reports as to anticipated trouble on 15th August, 1944, on the taking over of Rome by the Italian Government, 16th special police reserves were held at certain points in the city on 15th, 16th and 17th August 1944.
2. No trouble, no demonstrations and no assemblies of any kind have been reported.
3. On 15th, 14th August, I made certain contacts with members of parties so that we could be ready for any trouble that might have arisen.
4. Late in the evening of 14th August, 1944, Maj. Coxhead and I visited five addresses of suspects but there was no evidence to indicate any organised attempt at disorder.
5. The situation has been closely watched but no serious trouble is expected anywhere.
6. I also had an unofficial chat with Avv. Fausto GULLO on 5.30 pm on 11th August 1944. Mr. Gullo is one of the heads of the Communist party and Minister of Agriculture. I contacted him because he cooperated and helped me when I was faced with trouble in Cosenza Province last year.
7. Avv. Gullo has without doubt his fingers right on the pulse of the Communist movement, and I was satisfied after my interview with him that recognised communists themselves were not out to create trouble.
8. There are probably a few non communist extremists, who are out, if they can to sabotage the work of the communist party so that if trouble occurred these few would try to lay the blame at the door of the communists. The matter is being closely watched.

(Sga) J.R. POLLOCK, Lt. Col.  
Chief, Public Safety,  
Region IV.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner, HQ. ACC.  
Brigadier Low, Rome Area Command.

19th August 1944

000.1 Communist & the Politics  
X-250.1  
X-602.3



1. With reference to previous reports as to anticipated trouble on 15th August, 1944, on the taking over of Rome by the Italian Government, special police reserves were held at certain points in the city on 15th, 16th and 17th August 1944.
2. No trouble, no demonstrations and no assemblies of any kind have been reported.
3. On 13th, 14th August, I made certain contacts with members of parties so that we could be ready for any trouble that might have arisen.
4. Late in the evening of 14th August, 1944, Maj. Coxhead and I visited five addresses of suspects but there was no evidence to indicate any organised attempt at disorder.
5. The situation has been closely watched but no serious trouble is expected anywhere.
6. I also had an unofficial chat with Avv. Fausto GULLO on 5.30 pm on 11th August 1944. Mr. Gullo is one of the heads of the Communist party and Minister of Agriculture. I contacted him because he cooperated and helped me when I was faced with trouble in Cosenza Province last year.
7. Avv. Gullo has without doubt his fingers right on the pulse of the Communist movement, and I was satisfied after my interview with him that recognised communists themselves were not out to create trouble.
8. There are probably a few non communist extremists, who are out, if they can to sabotage the work of the communist party so that if trouble occurred these few would try to lay the blame at the door of the communists. The matter is being closely watched.

(Sgd) J.R. POLLOCK, Lt. Col.  
Chief, Public Safety,  
Region IV.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner, HQ. ACC. *[Signature]* 19th August 1944  
Brigadier Low, Rome Area Command.

FROM : Executive Commissioner, HQ. ACC.

I am directed by the Executive Commissioner to forward you copy of the above report for your information.

(5) *cc [Signature]* FILES A-B *[Signature]*

MA to Executive Commissioner.

18 Aug

X-1-200-1 Communist & Soc. Politics  
X-1-200-1  
X-1-200-1



**TOP SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner  
APC 394

*file*  
*copy*  
*ds/hjp*

18 August 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, RC & MG Section, Hq. ACC.  
Political Section, Hq. ACC.

1. Reference attached top secret letter Hq AAT (AAI/EGS(I)/DC), dated 15 August with a report from the Servizio di Informazioni Militari by RMAC, dated 15 August.

2. Note I have been requested to give my views as soon as possible.

3. Your comments and recommendations as to appropriate reply will be appreciated.

*W*  
WILLIAM H. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

2 Incls:  
as stated above

4

54567

|                              |
|------------------------------|
| Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.          |
| <b>DISPATCHED</b>            |
| Date-Time <i>19 Aug 0900</i> |
| Via <i>Magu</i>              |
| Initials <i>MR</i>           |

**TOP SECRET**

18 Aug.

*files* *PA/3/00*

000.1 Russian Politics



S E C R E T

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
REGION IV  
AFO 394

R/2214

16 August 1944

SUBJECT: Comments on Report Submitted by S.I.M. on Communist Activities  
in Rome

TO : Executive Commissioner  
Headquarters, Allied Control Commission

- (1)
1. The report does not convince me. It runs basically contrary to the present policy of the Communist Party in Italy.
  2. The report is replete with what seems to me to be inaccurate statements.

/s/ Charles Poletti  
/t/ CHARLES POLETTI  
Colonel  
Regional Commissioner

S E C R E T

(3)  
16 Aug.



**TOP SECRET**

HQ DC, APO 324  
 190 Sec'y Gen.  
 Rec'd 18 Aug 0950  
 By DRR

**TOP SECRET**

Headquarters,  
 A.A.I.

AM/DSE(I)/DC.

15 Aug 44

Dear Stone

I am sending you the attached copy of a report received from the Servizio di Informazioni Militari by Rome Allied Area Command and forwarded to A.A.I. for information of the C in C. Its substance has not so far been confirmed by any other source, but, if true, it is clearly of such consequence that I feel you should know of it at once and I should be very grateful to have your views as soon as possible.

We have been provided any further information which may come to light and I will of course keep you in the picture, but in the meantime I am inclined to think that Roche propaganda is responsible for a good deal of the story - but not all of it.

Yours sincerely

CLR Mivch

9254/20

**TOP SECRET**

15 Aug



# TOP SECRET

THE D'GALLES

ENTRADA: 12-01-2011

office of the U. S. of S. C-2  
to maintain records

13 Aug., 1944.

THESE RESULTS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH 2.5 NOTIONS:

COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE AMONG THE UNITED STATES

As has been announced in the newspaper, there took place in R4103 a meeting between the Socialists and the Communists, which resulted in the fusion of the two parties.

so says the press, but the truth is different.

So says the press, and they were there to be told the meeting was of a secret nature, and they arrived some time ago in the orders which Stalin had sent through Blazoff, who arrived some time ago in Italy after having crossed the lines - or so the party papers say.

These orders were that the Communist-Socialists should activate a revolution as soon as the Italian Government took power in Rome, in such a way as to face the Allies with an accomplished fact, demanded and executed by the free Italians, who, according to the Atlantic Charter, have the right to choose the government they want.

...to take place in two phases:-

first - in the form of a request for a daily allowance to be given to the workers and employees for the high cost of living. (It is to be pointed out that this is the first time that they speak of employees, and it must not be forgotten that there have been previous articles which declared that the middle class would have to march together with the proletarian).

Second - the occupation of the factories and the "airfields". This was part of the request made by the workers to the Government as part of their claims, at the same time that they requested the allowance for the high cost of living. This second phase will be accomplished in one of two ways; either the Government will concede to their requests, or the workers will present the Government, and the allies, with an accomplished fact.

The matter is so serious that the Pope, who had been informed called immediately for Minister De Gerveret to explain what he had been doing inside the Government, that he had been unable to give warning or what was about to happen.

The only party which could give any opposition to this revolution is the Partito di Azione, but even with this party agreements had been made for the taking place as soon as the strict collaboration, or even outright merging, to take place as soon as the government would create an advisory board of men elected by all parties (says De Gasperi), an advisory board which would serve as a consultation board for the Government in deliberations of great importance. It seems that there would be a proportional representation on this board, according to the strength of the party and it is not known which and how many parties will be called upon to form it. Even here, they (presumably the Communists) have studied a system similar with which to sanction any measure.



The meeting was of a secret nature, and they were there to be told the orders which Stalin had sent through BLAGH, who arrived some time ago in Italy after having crossed the lines - or so the party papers say.

These orders were that the Communist-Socialists should activate a revolution as soon as the Italian Government took power in Rome, in such a way as to face the Allies with an accomplished fact, furnished and executed by the free Italians, who, according to the Atlantic Charter, have the right to choose the government they want.

This revolution is to take place in two phases:-

First - in the form of a request for a daily allowance to be given to the workers and employees for the high cost of living. (It is to be pointed out that this is the first time that they speak of employees, and it must not be forgotten that there have been previous articles which declared that the middle class would have to march together with the proletariat).

Second - the occupation of the factories and the "aziende". This was part of the request made by the workers to the Government as part of their claims, at the same time that they requested the allowance for the high cost of living. This second phase will be accomplished in one of two ways; either the Government will concede to their requests, or the workers will present the Government, and the Allies, with an accomplished fact.

The matter is so serious that the Pope, who had been informed called immediately for Minister De Gasperi to explain what he had been doing inside the Government, that he had been unable to give warning of what was about to happen.

The only party which could give any opposition to this revolution is the Partito di Azione, but even with this party agreements had been made for strict collaboration, or even outright merging, to take place as soon as the factories had been occupied. Besides this, the government would create an advisory board of men elected by all parties (says De Gasperi), an advisory board which would serve as a consultation board for the Government in deliberations of great importance. It seems that there would be a proportional representation on this board, according to the strength of the party and it is not known which and how many parties will be called upon to form it. Even now, they (presumably the Communists) have studied a system by which they can have a majority with which to sanction any measure.

The manoeuvre of the Russians is clearly seen. While officially they promise the Allies that they will not meddle in what pertains in Italy, which should remain either an English or an American sphere of influence, undoubtedly they are manoeuvring to grab this sphere of influence by causing discord between the Allies, and by presenting them with an accomplished fact brought about by the will of the Italians.

Minister Togliatti has full knowledge of these facts and he received this information from one of his intimate friends, a person whom Togliatti himself says he completely trusts.

Much of this is blamed on the fact that the so-called excretion, which was anything but rational and was carried out with sectarian instincts, left many persons out in the street and these elements are now turning to

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- 2 -

Communism, which promises them a livelihood. Another serious question - and the Italian press attacks this point always more clearly - is that the Allies have not kept any of the promises which they made on the radio and in their propaganda. In fact, today in Italy there is nothing more than hunger, hunger and more hunger. No work has been begun, nothing which points to work in the immediate future; there is a complete feeling that the country is occupied and that the Allies have not liberated anyone, although they fight their own war, which is an economic war of conquest of economic markets and for economic expansion. Add to this the impressions made by La Guardia's statements and the serious repercussions thereof, and you have a clear picture of the situation, and it can easily be seen how simple it is for Russia to make realistic-sounding promises and for her to attract the backing of the masses. Everyone knows how much Russian gold has been in circulation during the past months, how the Communists have distributed money and food to their members and how easy it is to attract hungry masses who had blindly believed a propaganda for which they had given thousands of lives, but which actually turned out to be just empty promises.

This is the situation which is developing at the moment.

From another source we learn that the order of occupation has been extended to all government offices, important private offices and all stores. There are conservative elements which fear the Allied reaction to this manifestation but they can do nothing to sway the rest of the mass.

We think we shall be able to give the date and the hour when this action is to take place, with perhaps a few hours advance notice.

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TOP SECRET



C O P Y

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 167/CA

14th August 1944.

SUBJECT: Communist Activities in Italy

TO : Regional Commissioner,  
Region IV.

1. I attach two documents: (1) translation of a poster found in the city of ROME this morning, and (2) translation of a report submitted by S.I.M.

2. I should be glad of your views on the second document as early as possible.

3. Please treat this as highly confidential.

/s/ M. S. Lush  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

14 Aug.



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