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PWB DIRECTIVES
JULY 1944 - APR. 1945

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Office of the
Chief Commissioner

LIST OF PAPERS

ALLIED COMMISSION

File under No. 9263 PWB DIRECTIVES

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS

5112

APR 12 1945

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 10th APRIL 1945

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No change in military directive. Present news of operations factually and without comment. Do not speculate on these operations.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the inevitability of his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Bring out the constant danger to enemy troops from patriot activity.
- (d) Show the MAAT attacks on I. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. ENEMY TROOPS IN ITALY

- (a) Concentrate on factual and forceful reporting and exploitation of developments of the present operations on German soil in the East and West.

3. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Material addressed to patriots should adhere closely to General Clark's most recent instructions, which can be summed up as follows:
 - (i) Patriots will now reorganise personnel and overhaul equipment. Supplies will be sent to sustain bands at their present strength.
 - (ii) Patriots will not take large-scale action until the word is given from 15th Army Group HQ. Small actions to carry out specific tasks of sabotage or anti-scrub will continue.
 - (iii) When the time does come, their tasks will be to kill Germans, to prevent sabotage and destruction, and to help in preserving order in liberated territories. Preparations will now be made to carry out these tasks.
 - (iv) Patriots in the Central Apennines zone, in the rear of main enemy forces, will be ready to render specific assistance to the Allied armies shortly.
 - (v) Patriots whose area of operations lies on the enemy's escape routes will make specific preparations to hamper the enemy when the time comes.

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to prevent German scorched-earth tactics on existing

- (a) No change in military directive. Present news of operations favorably and without comment. Do not speculate on these operations.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the inevitability of his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Bring out the constant danger to enemy troops from patriot activity.
- (d) Show the MAAF attacks on L. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. ENEMY TROOPS IN ITALY

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3. NORTHERN ITALY

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 - (iv) Patriots in the Central Appenines zone, in the rear of main enemy forces, will be ready to render specific assistance to the Allied armies shortly.
 - (v) Patriots whose area of operations lies on the enemy's escape routes will make specific preparations to hammer the enemy when the time comes.
- (b) Continue the campaign to prevent German scorched-earth tactics on existing lines.

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4. LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Give full and factual coverage to war news, but avoid all rumours of peace negotiations. Official Allied statements about German peace feelers should be carried; bring out in comment that our terms are unconditional surrender.
- (b) Continue to cover preparations for the San Francisco Conference, bringing out its nature as a conference on International Organisation. (N.B. It is not a preliminary discussion of peace terms)
- (c) Full publicity should be given to the new Italian Treasury bond issue which started on April 5th. Stress the value of the loan as a weapon against inflation and as a means of financing the reconstruction of the country, and bring out its advantages to the buyer. Do not imply that the Allies are financially responsible or have guaranteed the loan.
- (d) Play up stories featuring rehabilitation stressing Italian initiative and self-help.
- (e) Use any factual stories about Italian workers liberated by the Allied advances into Germany. Avoid speculation about their repatriation.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff,

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
PWB, AFHQ.

E.M.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WORK BEGINNING 3rd APRIL 1945.

APR 4 1945

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the inevitability of his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Bring out the constant danger to enemy troops from patriot activity.
- (d) Show the MAF attacks on L. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. ENEMY TROOPS IN ITALY

- (a) Concentrate on factual and forceful reporting and exploitation of developments of the present operations on German soil in the East and West.

3. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Material addressed to patriots should adhere closely to General Clark's most recent instructions, which can be summed up as follows:
 - (i) Patriots will now reorganise personnel and overhaul equipment. Supplies will be sent to sustain bands at their present strength.
 - (ii) Patriots will not take large scale action until the word is given from 15th Army Group HQ. Small actions to carry out specific tasks of sabotage or anti-scorch will continue.
 - (iii) When the time does come, their tasks will be to kill Germans, to prevent sabotage and destruction, and to help in preserving order in liberated territories. Preparations will now be made to carry out these tasks.
 - (iv) Patriots in the Central Apennines zone, in the rear of main enemy forces, will be ready to render specific assistance to the Allied armies shortly.
 - (v) Patriots whose area of operations lies on the enemy's escape routes will make specific preparations to hamper the enemy when the time comes.

- (b) Continue the campaign to prevent German scorched-earth tactics on existing lines.

4. LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Give full and factual coverage to war news, but avoid all rumours of peace negotiations. Official Allied statements about German peace feelers should be carried; bring out in comment that our terms are unconditional surrender.
- (b) Continue to cover preparations for the San Francisco Conference, bringing out its nature as a conference on International Organisation (N.E. It is not a preliminary discussion of peace terms) Give only well authenticated statements on voting procedure. Use only official or authoritative statements or comment on Italian participation.
- (c) Full publicity should be given to the new Italian Treasury bond issue which starts on April 5th. Stress the value of the loan as a weapon against

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2. ENEMY TROOPS IN ITALY

- (e) Concentrate on factual and forceful reporting and exploitation of developments of the present operations on German soil in the East and West.

3. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Material addressed to patriots should adhere closely to General Clark's most recent instructions, which can be summed up as follows:
 - (i) Patriots will now reorganise personnel and overhaul equipment. Supplies will be sent to sustain bands at their present strength.
 - (ii) Patriots will not take large scale action until the word is given from 15th Army Group HQ. Small actions to carry out specific tasks of sabotage or anti-scorch will continue.
 - (iii) When the time does come, their tasks will be to kill Germans, to prevent sabotage and destruction, and to help in preserving order in liberated territories. Preparations will now be made to carry out these tasks.
 - (iv) Patriots in the Central Apennines zone, in the rear of main enemy forces, will be ready to render specific assistance to the Allied armies shortly.
 - (v) Patriots whose area of operations lies on the enemy's escape routes will make specific preparations to hamper the enemy when the time comes.
- (b) Continue the campaign to prevent German scorched-earth tactics on existing lines.

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- (c) Full publicity should be given to the new Italian Treasury bond issue which starts on April 5th. Stress the value of the loan as a weapon against inflation and as a means of financing the reconstruction of the country, and bring out its advantages to the buyer. Do not imply that the Allies are financially responsible or have guaranteed the loan.
- (d) Play up stories featuring rehabilitation stressing Italian initiative and self-help.
- (e) Use any factual stories about Italian workers liberated by the Allied advances into Germany. Avoid speculation about their repatriation.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff,

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
PWB, AFHQ.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 27th MARCH 1945

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the inevitability of his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Bring out the constant danger to enemy troops from patriot activity.
- (d) Show the MAAP attacks on L. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) In propaganda to the civilian population, anti-scorch should be given high priority. We encourage individuals to take action to save such resources as may be found in small garages and farms, as well as taking any necessary measures to protect factories, public utilities and industrial plant. Continue to back up the campaign by citing examples of German destruction in liberated Italy and other parts of the world, and by the use of statistics to show the importance to Italian life of the hydro-electric plant and industrial potential in the north.
- (b) Instructions to patriots remain unchanged. Patriots are to avoid large-scale operations and prepare for action in accordance with instructions which are given through "Italia Combatte" and normal channels.
- (c) Refer, as occasion arises, to General Clark's warning to civilians to avoid the neighborhood of military targets.

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Use all Easter messages and cover Easter celebrations throughout the world with particular reference to those countries which are celebrating Easter for the first time since liberation. In material specially directed to those areas of liberated Italy which last Easter were under German occupation, draw a comparison between their situation then and now.
- (b) Continue to bring home to Italians the world-wide nature of the food shortage, and the sufferings of other countries in Europe. (Recent material on Holland is a good example) Do not infer that this will end with the conclusion of the war.

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- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the inevitability of his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Bring out the constant danger to enemy troops from patriot activity.
- (d) Show the MAF attacks on I. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) In propaganda to the civilian population, anti-scorch should be given high priority. We encourage individuals to take action to save such resources as may be found in small garages and farms, as well as taking any necessary measures to protect factories, public utilities and industrial plant. Continue to back up the campaign by citing examples of German destruction in liberated Italy and other parts of the world, and by the use of statistics to show the importance to Italian life of the hydro-electric plant and industrial potential in the north.
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- (b) Continue to bring home to Italians the world-wide nature of the food shortage, and the sufferings of other countries in Europe. (Recent material on Holland is a good example) Do not infer that this shortage will end with the conclusion of hostilities in Europe. Bring out Europe's economic dependence on Asiatic raw material and the continued drain on Allied shipping which the war in the Pacific will still cause.

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- (c) Keep the San Francisco conference in the picture by reporting fully all preparatory work. The official title is "The United Nations' Conference on International Organization"; this indicates its scope and functions.
- (d) Full publicity should be given to the new Italian Treasury bonds, of which the issue starts on April 5th. Any prior official announcements should receive prominence. In commenting on the new loan which will have a 5-year maturity, bring out its importance both as a weapon against inflation and as a means of helping to pay for the reconstruction of the country. The new bonds will have the customary tax exemptions, can be used at the price of issue to subscribe to a large new issue which will be floated when the North is liberated, can be used to pay any new tax on capital, and can be used at par for the purchase of any materials imported for purposes of rehabilitation. The bonds will also have a 5-year period in drawing for one prize of two million lire, two prizes of one million lire and ten prizes of one hundred thousand lire each.
- (e) Last week's directive on peace feelers and German approaches for an armistice stands. Avoid all rumours. Official Allied statements should be carried and comment should make the point that our terms are unconditional surrender.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
FWB, AFHQ.

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MAR 21 RECD

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the inevitability of his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Bring out the constant danger to enemy troops from patriot activity.
- (d) Show the LAZY attacks on L. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Continue to urge the civilian population of North Italy to take all possible steps to prevent the Germans from destroying North Italian food stocks, public utilities and industrial potential. Illustrate the urgency of the need by quoting appropriate examples of German scorched earth policy in parts of Italy now liberated, and in the rest of Europe.
- (b) Instructions to patriots remain unchanged. Patriots are to avoid large-scale operations and prepare for action in accordance with instructions which are given through "Italie Combette" and normal channels.
- (c) Repeat General Clark's warning to civilians to avoid the neighbourhood of communications and other military targets.
- (d) Report fully all evidence of unity of purpose and discipline among resistance forces in the North.

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Play up in all media the work of the Italian army and its part in Allied operations. Give prominence to all tributes to the Italian army by Allied leaders.
- (b) Stress all available material on the liberation of Italian workers by the Allied advance into Germany. Bring out the inhuman way in which they have been treated by the Germans.
- (c) Use the anniversary of the Fosse Ardeatine massacre to drive home to the Italians German brutality to occupied countries, and the complete disregard shown by German leaders for the laws of war between civilised nations.
- (d) Avoid all unconfirmed rumours about peace feelers and German approaches for an armistice. Official Allied statements should be carried and comment should make the point that our terms are unconditional surrender.
- (e) Use material describing conditions in other liberated countries to show that Italy is not alone in suffering. Allied shipping requirements for the prosecution of the war have to take priority and it has been impossible to meet more than the minimum requirements for any country. Do not imply that any

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2. NORTHERN ITALY
- (a) Continue to urge the civilian population of North Italy to take all possible steps to prevent the Germans from destroying North Italian food stocks, public utilities and industrial potential. Illustrate the urgency of the need by quoting appropriate examples of German scorched-earth policy in parts of Italy now liberated, and in the rest of Europe.
 - (b) Instructions to patriots remain unchanged. Patriots are to avoid large-scale operations and prepare for action in accordance with instructions which are given through "Italia Combette" and normal channels.
 - (c) Repeat General Clark's warning to civilians to avoid the neighbourhood of communications and other military targets.
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 - (d) Avoid all unconfirmed rumours about peace feelers and German approaches for an armistice. Official Allied statements should be carried and comment should make the point that our terms are unconditional surrender.
 - (e) Use material describing conditions in other liberated countries to show that Italy is not alone in suffering. Allied shipping requirements for the prosecution of the war have to take priority and it has been impossible to meet more than the minimum requirements of any liberated country. Do not imply that any sudden improvement will result from the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Give all instances of initiative in reconstruction and the exploitation of local resources.
 - (f) In reporting alleviation of conditions in liberated Italy, be careful to ensure that the reports are correctly presented. e.g. do not give the impression that measures concerning territory under Italian administration necessarily apply to the whole of liberated Italy.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,
Director,
FWD, AFHQ.

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P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 13th MARCH 1945

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
 - (b) The main themes continue: constant danger from patriot activity; ultimate retreat across the Po; Allied air attacks on I. of C.
2. NORTHERN ITALY
- (a) Repeat the warning to the civilian population to keep away from communications and other military targets.
 - (b) Urge patriots to continue to avoid large scale actions, but to keep their formations intact, and to prepare for the time when the Allied High Command gives the signal.
 - (c) Continue to impress the civilian population with the urgency and need to circumvent German scorched-earth tactics.
 - (d) Report fully all evidence of unity of purpose, discipline and action in the CINAI.

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Give full coverage to all evidence of increasing Italian military participation.
- (b) Use any allied press comment which shows increased Allied goodwill towards the Italian people.
- (c) Give prominence to the signature of the 50 million dollar agreement between the Italian Government and UNRRA. Use this opportunity to give informative talks and articles about the scope and constitution of UNRRA as an organisation for the relief and rehabilitation of devastated countries, to which all members of the United Nations contribute.
- (d) Report the closing stages of the Roatta case soberly and factually. Avoid sensationalism both in escape and rumoured-capture reports. While deploring the escape, and the consequent delay in justice, avoid passing judgment on Roatta until the results of the trial are announced. Condemn the use of undemocratic methods such as civil disorder and violence, which inevitably lead to terrorism and the exploitation of the people by violent and unscrupulous men. Avoid all reports and rumours as to individuals or organisations implicated in Roatta's escape.

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
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With the approval of the Chief of Staff,

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
PWB, AFHQ.



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MAR 8 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

P.M.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 5th March 1945.

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Feature prominently the MAAF attacks on L. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Continue to warn the civilian population to keep away from communications and other military targets.
- (b) Urge patriots to continue to avoid large scale actions against the enemy, repeating earlier directions to them to keep their patriot formations intact, so as to prevent disorganisation, and to prepare for action, obeying instructions which will come to them through known channels and "Italia Combate".
- (c) Continue to treat any reports that the Germans are withdrawing from Northern Italy with reserve.
- (d) Continue to exploit all evidence of unity of purpose and action among the patriot forces in occupied Italy.

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

(a) France-Italian Relations

Report fully all official news of the resumption of Franco-Italian relations, stressing all statements which endorse the need for Franco-Italian amity, such as the de Murville statement: "The peace of Europe will not be assured unless France and Italy stand side by side among the democratic nations". Give allied press comment welcoming the "burying of the hatchet" between the two countries, and the desire to settle their differences by discussion and democratic procedure. Do not report speculation about the identity of the Italian representative to the French Government. Await an official announcement.

(b) "New Deal" for Italy

Keep to the fore all news of Allied aid and encouragement.

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- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Feature prominently the MAF attacks on L. of C. in Northern Italy, Southern Germany and Austria, as part of the grand strategy in the final phase of the war against Germany.
2. NORTHERN ITALY
- (a) Continue to warn the civilian population to keep away from communications and other military targets.
- (b) Urge patriots to continue to avoid large scale actions against the enemy, repeating earlier directions to them to keep their patriot formations intact, so as to prevent disorganization, and to prepare for action, obeying instructions which will come to them through known channels and "Italia Combattente".
- (c) Continue to treat any reports that the Germans are withdrawing from Northern Italy with reserve.
- (d) Continue to exploit all evidence of unity of purpose and action among the patriot forces in occupied Italy.

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(b) "New Deal" for Italy

Keep to the fore all news of Allied aid and encouragement to reconstruct a democratic free nation, presenting all fresh steps as part of the consistent policy and development in the relations between the Allies and Italy since the Armistice. Follow Prime Minister Churchill's statement of February 27th, stressing whenever possible the fundamental implication of Allied confidence in the Italian Government's ability to represent the needs of the Italian people in the prosecution of the war and the reconstruction of a new Italy.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
PWB, AFHQ.

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P.M.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 2/14 FEBRUARY 19451. THE CAMPAIGN

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- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front on the existing lines. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and his ultimate retreat north across the Po. Do not speculate on the enemy's strategic intentions whether to stand on his present line or fall back to the Po and Adige, or to pull out of Italy altogether.
- (c) Play prominently the heavy air attacks on German lines of communication including the Brenner.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Give full coverage to General Clark's warning to civilians to keep away from communications and other military targets.
- (b) At the same time, continue to warn patriots that the time for general insurrection has not yet come. They must prepare for action, but must not come out in open revolt until they receive instructions both through known channels and "Italia Combattente". Continue to treat any reports that the Germans are withdrawing from Northern Italy with reserve, until confirmed by Allied sources.

- (c) Urge patriots to take every measure to prevent German "scorched-earth" tactics, cross-reporting evidence of the hardships which follow all Nazi occupations and German "scorched-earth" tactics.

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Turkey's Declaration of War

Use any allied comment which stresses the value of Turkish military support not only in the war against Germany, but also the war against Japan. While objectively reporting official statements that Turkey has declared war in order to earn her place at the Peace Conference, bring out the fact that the declaration is a natural consequence of Turkey's alliance with the Allies, which has proved a valuable support throughout the hardest periods of the war.

- (b) Return of the Mattioli-Quintieri Financial Mission from the States.

Do not report speculation on the results of this mission. Any official communique which may be issued will be given full coverage. Use the mission as an illustration of the readiness of the Allies to help Italy restore her economic situation, within the limits set by the demands of the war against Germany and Japan and Allied commitments to other liberated countries.

- (c) Macmillan's New Deal for Italy

Macmillan's press conference gives fresh impetus to our standard themes of Italian self-help aided and abetted by the Allies. Emphasize to fullest possible extent the

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- (c) Play prominently the heavy air attacks on German lines of communication including the Brenner.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Give full coverage to General Clark's warning to civilians to keep away from communications and other military targets.
- (b) At the same time, continue to warn patriots that the time for general insurrection has not yet come. They must prepare for action, but must not come out in open revolt until they receive instructions both through known channels and "Italia Combattente". Continue to treat any reports that the Germans are withdrawing from Northern Italy with reserve, until confirmed by Allied sources.
- (c) Urge patriots to take every measure to prevent German "scorched-earth" tactics, cross-reporting evidence of the hardships which follow all Nazi occupations and German "scorched-earth" tactics.

3. SCORCHED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Turkey's Declaration of War

Use any allied comment which stresses the value of Turkish military support, not only in the war against Germany, but also the war against Italy. While objectively reporting official statements that Turkey has declared war in order to earn her place at the Peace Conference, bring out the fact that the declaration is a natural consequence of Turkey's alliance with the Allies, which has proved a valuable support throughout the hardest periods of the war.

- (b) Return of the Mattioli-Quintieri Financial Mission from the States.

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- (c) Macmillan's New Deal for Italy

Macmillan's press conference gives fresh impetus to our standard themes of Italian self-help aided and abetted by the Allies. Emphasize to the fullest possible extent, the real meaning of the new measures, and of the active concrete steps taken by the Allies to promote Italian rehabilitation of economic and political independence, keeping prominently before the people Macmillan's words that Italy can and must help herself.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
PMB, AFHQ.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 21st FEBRUARY 1945

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front on the existing lines stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies through the mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from partisan activity and his ultimate retreat north across the Po.
- (c) Play prominently the heavy air attacks on German lines of communication including the Brenner.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) Give full coverage to General Clark's warning to civilians to keep away from communications and other military targets.
- (b) At the same time, continue to warn patriots that the time for general insurrection has not yet come. Reports that the Germans are withdrawing from Northern Italy must be treated with reserve until confirmed by Allied sources. They must prepare for action when the time comes, but should not come out in open revolt until they receive instructions both through known channels and "Italia Combattente".

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) Critical Conference
 Although Italy's name was not mentioned in the text, neither for that matter were the names of devastated Allied countries such as Belgium and Holland, the pledge to assist the peoples of Liberated Europe, to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems, applies equally to Italy. Pick up Allied comment which shows that this is appreciated by the American, British and Russian peoples.
- (b) Relief Measures
 While not detracting from the scope and extent of relief measures already carried out in Italy and other liberated areas, explain the tremendous problem of rehabilitating war devastated countries, giving prominence to the relief needs of other nations besides Italy.
- (c) World Trades Union Congress

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(e) No new directive.

(b) Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front on the existing lines stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies through the mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from partisan activity and his ultimate retreat north across the Po.

(a) Play prominently the heavy air attacks on German lines of communication including the Brenner.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

(a) Give full coverage to General Clark's warning to civilians to keep away from communications and other military targets.

(b) At the same time, continue to warn patriots that the time for general insurrection has not yet come. Reports that the Germans are withdrawing from Northern Italy must be treated with reserve until confirmed by Allied sources. They must prepare for action when the time comes, but should not come out in open revolt until they receive instructions both through known channels and "Italia Combattente".

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

(a) Crimta Conference

Although Italy's name was not mentioned in the text, neither for that matter were the names of devastated Allied countries such as Belgium and Holland, the pledge to assist the peoples of Liberated Europe, to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems, applies equally to Italy. Pick up Allied comment which shows that this is appreciated by the American, British and Russian peoples.

(b) Relief Measures

While not detracting from the scope and extent of relief measures already carried out in Italy and other liberated areas, explain the tremendous problem of rehabilitating war devastated countries, giving prominence to the relief needs of other nations besides Italy.

(c) World Trades Union Congress

Invitations to take part in the Congress, which included Italy eventually, were issued by the Trades Unions themselves. Stress that the initial absence of representatives from Italy and other enemy countries was the concern of the Trades Union Congress alone. Bring out also, the fact that the exact status will again be determined by the Trade Union. Give full coverage to any interviews or statements made by returning Italian representatives.

(d) Washington's Birthday - 22nd February

Use this anniversary to recall U.S.A.'s contribution to democracy.

-2-

(e) Red Army Day - 23rd February

- (1) Pay tribute to the magnificent deeds of the Red Army and its contribution to the victory of the United Nations, covering fully Allied as well as Russian congratulatory messages.
- (11) Highlight all war reports which stress the unified strategic plans governing the actions of the Allied armies in the West, South and East, and the almost daily support given by the American and British airforces to the Red Army offensive.

(f) Scout Meeting - 25th February

Give full coverage to reports on the meeting of 1,200 Italian boy scouts in Rome on 25th February, stressing the fact that this is their first meeting since the Scout movement was disbanded by the Fascist government. Contrast the principles and aims of the voluntary Scout movement, which develops initiative and citizenship, with the compulsory militarised discipline of Fascist youth movements whose adherents were taught only "to believe, obey, fight".

With the approval of the Chief of Staff,

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,

Director,
FMB, AFHQ.

FEB 13 1943

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 13th FEBRUARY 1943

1. THE CAMPAIGN

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of an ultimate retreat north across the Po.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) The special instructions to Italian patriots in the North issued by 15th Army Group on 1st February remain in force. Reports that the Germans are withdrawing from North Italy must not be taken as a signal for revolt or mass uprising. Remind them that when the time comes, instructions will be given both through known channels and over "Italia Combatta". Meanwhile urge them to complete preparations for that time. Continue the call for the people of Northern Italy to thwart German plans to destroy public utilities and installations, and carry off food and other supplies.

3. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

- (a) "Big Three" Meeting
Special guidance will be issued if necessary. Avoid speculation on scope or effect of the decisions reached, particularly those relating to Italy's status. Meantime, use the conference to quash finally enemy wishful expectations of Allied disunity.
- (b) Italian Armistice Terms
Limit the coverage on either interpretation and/or possible revision requests of the Italian armistice terms, including the financial and future of colonies clauses, to official statements by Allied or Italian government and responsible public officials.
- (c) Italian Government Broad Subsidy.
This is an Italian domestic problem and must be treated as such. Government and opposition statements will be reported factually on their news value.

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consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of an ultimate retreat north across the Po.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

- (a) No new directive.
- (b) The special instructions to Italian patriots in the North issued by 15th Army Group on 1st February remain in force. Reports that the Germans are withdrawing from North Italy must not be taken as a signal for revolt or mass uprising. Remind them that when the time comes, instructions will be given both through known channels and over "Italia Combattente". Meanwhile urge them to complete preparations for that time. Continue the call for the people of Northern Italy to thwart German plans to destroy public utilities and installations, and carry off food and other supplies.

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Limit the coverage on either interpretation and/or possible revision requests of the Italian armistice terms, including the financial and future of colonies clauses, to official statements by Allied or Italian Government and responsible public officials.
- (c) Italian Government Bread Subsidy.

This is an Italian domestic problem and must be treated as such. Government and opposition statements will be reported factually on their news value.

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(d) Franco-Italian Relations

While awaiting official statements that diplomatic relations between Italy and France are to be resumed, give full coverage to statements which show sincere desire on the part of either country to re-establish good relations.

(e) February 11th Anniversary

Use the first anniversary of the transfer of territory back to Italian control to recall the progress made since then in the war effort; the re-birth of democracy in Italy; the setting up of a free press; the preparations for holding administrative elections; the vote for women; the results of the general Trade Union Congress at Naples (syndical unity and that 1,300,000 Italians in liberated Italy are now members of the CGIL); reconstruction - giving full credit to Allied and Italian efforts in this field; and the gradual but steady elimination of Fascism and Fascist roots from the body politic of Italy.

With the approval of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) RUSSELL BARNES,
Director,
PWB, AFHQ.

FEB 7 1945

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
LIBERATED ITALY HQ.

P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING
3rd February 1945

I. THE CAMPAIGN

1. No new directive.
2. Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of his retreat north across the Po.

II. NORTHERN ITALY

1. The special instructions to Italian patriots in the North issued by 15th Army Group on 1st February remain in force. Reports that the Germans are withdrawing from North Italy must not be taken as a signal for revolt or mass uprising. Remind them that when the time comes, the signal will be given both through known channels and over "Italia Combattente". Meanwhile urge them to complete preparations for that time. Continue the call for the people of Northern Italy to thwart German plans to destroy public utilities and installations, and carry off food and other supplies.
2. Show, by keeping alive the results of the Naples General Union Labour Conference, that the great mass of the workers in Liberated Italy are solidly organised behind Italy's war effort in support of the present Italian government. (Should Italy be admitted to the International Labour Office, play up that event, reporting fully any statements which acknowledge that the Northern Italian Labour record of strikes in 1943, 1944 and 1945 has accelerated Italy's recognition.)

III. OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED ITALY

1. Use the present trials of Raita Suvich etc. to show what Fascism has really meant in practice, and support the Italian Government's all-out attempt to pillory the former Fascist regime by highlighting the revelations which come out during the trials. Emphasise the complete Fascist disregard of personal responsibility for choosing between right and wrong; the use of hooliganism, murder and sabotage, the essentials of gangsterdom, as accepted weapons of the ruling clique; the hollowness of the so-called elections; in fact, the complete moral as well as economic bankruptcy of the regime.

2. Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of his retreat north across the Po.

II. NORTHERN ITALY

1. The special instructions to Italian patriots in the North issued by 15th Army Group on 1st February remain in force. Reports that the Germans are withdrawing from North Italy must not be taken as a signal for revolt or mass uprising. Remind them that when the time comes, the signal will be given both through known channels and over "Italia Combattente". Meanwhile urge them to complete preparations for that time. Continue the call for the people of Northern Italy to thwart German plans to destroy public utilities and installations, and carry off food and other supplies.
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2. Encourage the call up with full coverage of all favourable returns. In this context stress that combat groups of the new Italian army are already in the front line, recalling Allied tributes of Allied Command and emphasising that the services rendered by the Italian Army are an integral part of Italy's contribution to the war effort.
3. While keeping the news in perspective, give full play to the American advance in the Philippines, using reports, as announced, of increasing participation by other Allied nations in the Far East war as part of the gradual implementation of their pledge to see the war through to the end.
4. Report Salvarizza case factually and objectively. Until full implications are legally established, avoid sensational details of complicity of high Italian officials and Italian political parties.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
LIBERATED ITALY H.Q.

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P.W.B. ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 30th January 1945

I. THE CAMPAIGN

1. No new directive.
2. Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of his retreat north across the Po.

II. LIBERATED ITALY

1. The Naples Trade Union Congress will be reported fully. A Special Directive will be issued if necessary.
2. Otherwise no new directive. Continue to give full publicity to
 - (a) the activities of the Italian armed forces in the line and their work in the L. of S., and,
 - (b) German looting of industrial equipment, food and art treasures and the deportation of Italian labour.
3. Keep alive German responsibility for the devastation and wrecking of Italian public services and Fascist responsibility for the deplorable condition of Italy's economy.
4. Report with full attribution the industrial strikes in Northern Italy, if confirmed from Swiss sources.

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JAN 21 1945

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

P/B ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEX FOR WEEK BEGINNING
20th JANUARY 1945.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

- 1. No new directive.
- 2. Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of his retreat north across the Po.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

- 3. Churchill's speech.
- (a) Continue to refer to Churchill's apprehensive picture of the prospect for Northern Italy following German withdrawal, in order to force upon Italians a realisation of the very grave dangers and difficulties which lie ahead and which will demand from people and government alike discipline, unity and wise statesmanship.
- (b) Stress that throughout the speech, Britain, in line with U.S. statements, is not playing power politics but that Britain's guiding principle to Italy, as to all liberated countries, is one of "a government of the people, by the people, for the people".
- 4. Tarchiani's Appointment. Report fully press and radio comment on the appointment of Tarchiani as Ambassador to the United States.
- 5. Italian Armed Forces. The standard directive for full coverage for all news concerning Italian Armed Forces, both in combat and in their valuable work on the L. of C. is given impetus with the news that Italian combat groups are in the line. Use this coverage to build up Italian self-respect, to create confidence among the civilian population and so help the call-up. Give prominence to Italian government welfare measures for the armed forces. Report all stories of patriot

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I. THE CAMPAIGN.

- 1. No new directive.
- 2. Continue to treat the present lull on the Italian Front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions, stressing the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Continue to remind the enemy of the constant danger from patriot activity and the inevitability of his retreat north across the Po.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

- 3. Churchill's speech.
 - (a) Continue to refer to Churchill's apprehensive picture of the prospect for Northern Italy following German withdrawal, in order to force upon Italians a realisation of the very grave dangers and difficulties which lie ahead and which will demand from people and government alike discipline, unity and wise statesmanship.
 - (b) stress that throughout the speech, Britain, in line with U.S. statements, is not playing power politics but that Britain's guiding principle to Italy, as to all liberated countries, is one of "a government of the people, by the people, for the people".
- 4. Tarchiani's Appointment. Report fully press and radio comment on the appointment of Tarchiani as Ambassador to the United States.
- 5. Italian Armed Forces. The standard directive for full coverage for all news concerning Italian Armed Forces, both in combat and in their valuable work on the L. of C. is given impetus with the news that Italian combat groups are in the line. Use this coverage to build up Italian self-respect, to create confidence among the civilian population and so help the call-up. Give prominence to Italian Government welfare measures for the armed forces. Report all stories of patriot absorption into the armed forces.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING
13th JANUARY 1945.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Treat the present lull on the Italian front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions. Do not imply that the Allied Armies have come to a full stop for the winter, nor commit them to an immediate continuation of the advance should the weather improve.
2. Stress the difficulties of supplying the armies in the snow-bound mountains. Give prominence to the fact that, though bad weather is momentarily preventing full use of Allied air supremacy, enemy troops and lines of communications will be subjected to the same preponderance of Allied air power, throughout the winter whenever weather permits.
3. Play up the fortitude of Allied soldiers on the Italian front. Remind the enemy of the constant danger of partisan activity in his rear and on his lines of communication.

4. Although there was a lull in the battle, constantly press home to the enemy the inevitability of his retreat north of the Po and out of Italy.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

5. Strikes in Northern Italy, resulting from further German attempts to deport Italian labour and machinery to Germany, must be reported fully. In output to both Liberated and Occupied Italy, recognise the courage displayed by the workers in these mid-winter strikes. To Liberated Italy, report fully German counter-measures as evidence of the importance for the Germans of Northern Italy's industrial resources. To Occupied Italy, although we cannot take responsibility for inciting further strikes under such unfavourable

FWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR THE BEGINNING
13th JANUARY 1945.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Treat the present lull on the Italian front as a consequence of the rigorous weather conditions. Do not imply that the Allied Armies have come to a full stop for the winter, nor commit them to an immediate continuation of the advance should the weather improve.
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3. Play up the fortitude of Allied soldiers on the Italian front. Remind the enemy of the constant danger of partisan activity in his rear and on his lines of communication.
4. Although there may be a lull in the battle, constantly press home to the enemy the inevitability of his retreat north of the Po ~~area~~ ^{area} out of Italy. R1 19

II.

LIBERATED ITALY.

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6. Sicilian disturbances: Report factually and briefly, keeping them in perspective with the news from the rest of the world. (For Sicilian press and radio: Whenever possible, peg down the disorders as work of Fascist agents in German service, who are using the Sicilians as tools in further attempts to impede Allied war effort. Show that recourse to mob law

- 2 -

- only retards Sicily's chances of recovery, alienates her friends, and embarrasses Italian war effort. Where the disorders are directly linked with separatist elements, state that, contrary to enemy insinuations and separatist claims, the Western democracies do not support the separation of Sicily from the mainland of Italy.)
7. Fascist responsibility for Italy's present conditions: In view of the recrudescence of Fascist activity use every opportunity to bring home to Italians the bankruptcy of Fascism which has meant for Italy war on her own soil and German occupation.
8. Report fully all possible details of the activities of the Italian Army to counteract the impression that the Allies are receiving insufficient use of Italian military aid.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PUB ITALY DIRECTIVE NUMBER FOR WEEK BEGINNING
6th J. NU. RY 1945.

I. THE C. T. P. I. G. N.

- 1. No new directive.
- 2. Continue to report the allied steady pressure on the 8th Army Front, avoiding speculation on either allied or enemy intentions.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

3. The return of the Italian news service to Italians in Rome and PVB's newspaper Il Corriere di Roma to private ownership (to be followed shortly by similar measures affecting radio and publicity services in Italian Government territory) will be shown as yet another step in the progressive restoration of Italian independence and the removal of allied control. Take this opportunity to remind Italians that, after twenty years, liberation has restored to them within the last eighteen months freedom of speech. The new story is an illustration of allied confidence that the Italian people are now able to use and respect this freedom.

4. Give full publicity to the forthcoming Italian Government measures for the Cleari del Popolo. Support the determination of the Italian Government to ensure the harvesting and pooling of the oil crop, pointing out that if the harvest reaches the regular channels of distribution it will be adequate to supply the needs of liberated Italy and build up reserves for the yet unliberated territory. Stress that the entire crop will be devoted to this end, and to this end alone.

5. Give full publicity to all authentic instances of Fascist malpractices which may be revealed in connection with the coming trial of General Roatta.

6. Report the visit of British Members of Parliament, giving prominence to any interviews or statements which reveal understanding for Italy's problems.

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II. LIBERATED ITALY.

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- 5. Give full publicity to all authentic instances of Fascist malpractices which may be revealed in connection with the coming trial of General Roatta.
- 6. Report the visit of British Members of Parliament, giving prominence to any interviews or statements which reveal understanding for Italy's problems.

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pw 13 Directive

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS - S
Psychological Warfare Branch
Italian Theatre Headquarters.

6th January 1945

Special Guidance on German Offensive in West.

- Some modification in the existing directive is needed to bring us into line with SHAEP. Would you please note the following points:
1. Maintain the restrained and objective statement of the news.
 2. While continuing to place the principle emphasis on the 'bulge' treating them as complementary attacks.
 3. Continue to report German appreciation and claims, particularly in output to the enemy.
 4. Maintain our forthright presentation of the consequences to Germany of continued war, with specific emphasis on casualties to bombing. Bring out the heavy German commitment of, and losses sustained by, the Luftwaffe in the Western operations, at the expense of home defence.
 5. Our mood of reportage remains as before 'without unwarranted optimism' we have justifiable confidence in the outcome.'

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- Some modification in the existing directive is needed to bring us into line with SHAEP. Would you please note the following points:
1. Maintain the restrained and objective treatment of the news.
 2. While continuing to place the principle emphasis on the 'bulge' action, give a balanced and objective coverage to other German operations, treating them as complementary attacks.
 3. Continue to report German surrendition and claims, particularly in output to the enemy.
 4. Maintain our forthright presentation of the consequences to Germany of continued war, with specific emphasis on casualties to bombing. Bring out the heavy German commitment of, and losses sustained by, the Luftwaffe in the Western operations, at the expense of home defence.
 5. Our mood of reportage remains as before 'without unwarranted optimism' we have justifiable confidence in the outcome.'

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

FWB ITALY DIRECTIVE - APPROX FOR WEEK BEGINNING
30TH DECEMBER 1944.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. The current phase of the Italian campaign will be treated factually and without speculation as to Allied plans or to the possibility of a major German attack developing on the 5th Army front.
2. Should the Germans renew their attacks, our news coverage will be matter of fact, confident in tone, reporting the developments as fully as military security permits.
3. Present the continuing Allied pressure on the rest of the Italian front as part of the overall steady advance.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

4. Do not minimize the seriousness of the German counter-offensive on the Western Front; use it to stimulate Italians to 'band again to the common task'. Avoid any suggestion that the Germans' capacity to maintain the offensive is by any means exhausted. Do not detract from the Germans' appreciation and claims so that the counterblow, when it comes, may meet fully on the enemy's morale.
5. Avoid all attributions to Hitler for the responsibility and strategy of the German offensive, except when quoting German sources direct.
6. Do not imply that Allied air power can in itself be decisive. Refrain from comparisons with March 1918, with 1940 or the branches counter-attack. Report hard news of German losses in men and materiel.
7. Offset any criticism that insufficient forces are being employed on the Italian front by giving prominence to Allied casualty figures in the West.
8. Use the opening of the New Year to re-state the United Nations' earnest desire to see established an Italy with free Government.

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II. LIBERATED ITALY.

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6. Do not imply that Allied air power can in itself be decisive. Refrain from comparisons with March 1918, with 1940 or the Frenches counter-attack. Report hard news of German losses in men and material.

7. Offset any criticism that insufficient forces are being employed on the Italian front by giving prominence to Allied casualty figures in the West.

8. Use the opening of the New Year to re-state the United Nations' earnest desire to see established an Italy with free democratic institutions taking its place in a world concert of peace-loving nations determined to solve mutual problems of the post-war era in a spirit of co-operation and good-will.

9. Give full publicity to any official statement of Franco-Italian agreement.

10. Keep in the news, stories from French and other Allied territories of the peaceful solution of post-liberation problems, to combat possible Italian fatalism or complacency at this juncture of the war.

11. Continue to report Greek crisis soberly and factually.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Psychological Warfare Branch
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

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Special guidance on the German offensive.

The London directive for the present German counter-offensive contains the following points which should guide our handling of the situation until further notice.

1. Our military counter-blow, when it comes, may well be decisive so far as German resistance in the west Rhine is concerned. Political warfare's aim must be to make the psychological recoil equally decisive inside Germany itself.
2. In relation to the war in general, and to the western campaign in particular, present the battle as a concentrated effort on one sector in a desperate bid to relieve pressure along a wide front and so halt the inexorable Allied advance towards and into the Western wall. Funstedt has been forced, by a steadily deteriorating situation, to give battle west of the Rhine instead of waiting for the battle to come to him.
3. Within these limits, recognize frankly the importance of this major operation, refraining from any comment or qualification likely to detract from the Germans' own appreciation and claims. It suits our purpose to allow them the temporary intoxication of false hope centred upon this one bright spot amidst otherwise unrelieved gloom, even though Goebbels, in desperate need of a short-term morale-builder, is following the same line regardless of the inevitable recoil.
4. Considered in vacuo the German counter-offensive is a model of its kind, planned and executed with textbook efficiency. The initial success has been rapidly exploited with appreciable gains of ground, and the assumption of local initiative. Accept it at its face value, reporting developments as they come, neither committing the Germans to reach, nor the Allies to acting on specific geographical objectives.
5. Our tone should be one of matter of fact military detachment since we are confident of the outcome.
6. Meanwhile refrain from comparisons with March 1918, with 1940 or with counter-attack at Avranches, and from playing up Hitler's strategy except in so far as the Germans themselves commit him. All this will come later. Treat it as a general's battle, conducted on purely professional lines to meet the exigencies of a purely military situation.

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Chief Commissioner you wish to include your suggestions has

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been incorporated. Sheldan
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 24th
DECEMBER 1944.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Last week's directive on the present phase of the fighting in Italy continues for another week, avoiding as before all speculations on either present or future objectives.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

2. Use the present German counter-offensive in the West to bring home to Italians:

- (a) the reality and sacrifice of war.
- (b) the contribution that other nations are making for this supreme effort - e.g. Britain's new mobilisation decree, U.S. freezing of civilian production.
- (c) that Italy is expected to match the gallantry and determination of the Allied troops now opposing the enemy with a renewed and re-invigorated effort to devote all her energies to backing up the United Nations' war effort and, in doing so, continue to work her passage home and thus hasten the end of the war.

3. Italian Elections. Do not commit the Italian Government to holding administrative elections in the Spring. (An ambiguity in the original text has led to certain misinterpretations. It is unlikely, for purely technical reasons, that the electoral lists can be completed in time.)

4. Give no further publicity to the recognition by the Bonomi Government of the CLNAI unless from an official source.

5. Main themes continue. Give all examples of German plundering of occupied Italy; German responsibility for the deplorable economic plight of Italy; and the wilful destruction of utility services.



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6. Give prominence to any reports of treatment meted out by the Germans to Italians transported to Germany.

7. Show that the widening of the powers of the local government in Sicily and Sardinia is part of the declared policy of the Bonomi government to meet the wishes of the people, consistent with the demands of the Italian war effort.

- 8. Report factually all statements from Allied and Italian officials as well as from the CLN on Sicilian Separatism and recall British and American statements denying Allied support of the Separatist movement.
- 9. Last week's directive on Sicilian disturbances is repeated: state bluntly that recourse to mob law or intimidation in furtherance of sectional interests or ambitions of political parties of whatever colour is not only inconsistent with democratic principles but also detrimental to the war effort. Suggest that participants in these disturbances may themselves be the innocent victims of enemy propaganda.
- 10. Continue to report the Greek crisis factually and soberly. Give prominence to statements which reflect Britain's as well as United States' desire and interest to see that the people in liberated territories shall have a chance freely to elect their own government.
- 11. Give authenticated cases of capture of Germans serving in the Greek guerrilla forces, though avoiding generalizations and rumours as to German participation in the fighting.
- 12. Report fully despatches on food distribution to Athens civilian population. Do not attempt to follow party manoeuvres in the Regency question.

DEC 21 1944

CONFIDENTIAL.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 24th
DECEMBER 1944.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Last week's directive on the present phase of the fighting in Italy continues for another week, avoiding as before all speculations on either present or future objectives.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

2. Use the present German counter-offensive in the West to bring home to Italians:

- (a) the reality and sacrifice of war.
- (b) the contribution that other nations are making for this supreme effort - e.g. Britain's new mobilisation decree, U.S. freezing of civilian production.
- (c) that Italy is expected to match the gallantry and determination of the Allied troops now opposing the enemy with a renewed and re-invigorated effort to devote all her energies to backing up the United Nations' war effort and, in doing so, continue to work her passage home and thus hasten the end of the war.

3. Italian Elections. Do not commit the Italian Government to holding administrative elections in the Spring. (An ambiguity in the original text has led to certain misinterpretations. It is unlikely, for purely technical reasons, that the electoral lists can be completed in time.)

4. Give no further publicity to the recognition by the Bonomi Government of the CLNAI unless from an official source.

5. Main themes continue. Give all examples of German plundering of occupied Italy; German responsibility for the deplorable economic plight of Italy; and the wilful destruction of utility services.

6. Give prominence to any reports of treatment meted out

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10. Continue to report the Greek crisis factually and soberly. Give prominence to statements which reflect Britain's as well as United States' desire and interest to see that the people in liberated territories shall have a chance freely to elect their own government.
11. Give authenticated cases of capture of Germans serving in the Greek guerilla forces, though avoiding generalisations and rumours as to German participation in the fighting.
12. Report fully despatches on food distribution to Athens civilian population. Do not attempt to follow party manoeuvres in the Regency question.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

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PROP. DIRECTIVES

17th December 1944

SPECIAL GUIDANCE ON GREECE.

The following AFHQ directive on the Greek situation, although primarily intended for use by those engaged in broadcasts directed to Greece, should govern our coverage in both press and radio, news and comment.

1. British forces have been called into action solely to defeat attempted solution of political issues by pressure of arms.
2. All talk about our abetting Fascism is nonsense. We are now in the sixth year of war against Nazism and Fascism. In spite of many offers we have refused to arm Athens volunteers from Right wing organisations and have disarmed many.
3. Our objective is solely to establish conditions in which Greeks can vote freely on their future government. We do not care if this is a Monarchy or a Republic, Right, Left or Centre.
4. The present wasteful strife.
 - a) Pins down our troops and prevents their going forward to the battle fronts to hasten Germanys final defeat.
 - b) Prevents the arrival of food and supplies for the relief of the people of Greece. Even so, we are trying to organise relief for the hungry population of Athens on both sides of the battle.
 - c) Creates conditions under which the Greek people cannot express its will nor exercise its right to choose freely the form of government it desires.

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SECRET

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THINKING HEADQUARTERS

PWB ITALY DIRECTIONAL ANNEVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING
1/11 DECEMBER 1944

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Last week's directive holds good for another week, steady progress being treated as part of the continuing relentless advance of the Allied Armies. Avoid speculation on either present or future objectives.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

2. The official declaration of policy by the Italian Government, when known, will be reported textually and in full. Declarations of policy from responsible opposition parties, (Action, Socialist, Republican and Democratic Union) should be given.
3. Remind Italy that until final victory, unity behind the war effort must be the primary consideration. Recall the joint British and American desire for a stable and efficient government commanding Italian confidence.
4. Point out that such a government is essential in order that the Allies, when the northern provinces are liberated, may receive effective Italian support in tackling the deplorable economic conditions created by the Germans.
5. Use all stories of Italian initiative in reconstruction and self help to encourage more widespread co-operative action. Continue to stress contribution made by Italians to Allied war effort and their own economic rehabilitation, to which the Allies are contributing to the fullest extent compatible with the exigencies of the war.
6. Civil unrest will be reported briefly and objectively. Remind Italians of their own responsibility for maintaining public order and other national services in territory under Italian jurisdiction.
7. In reporting the riots in Sicily, state bluntly that recourse to mob law or intimidations in furtherance of sectional interests or ambitions of political parties of whatever colour, is not only inconsistent with democratic principles, but also

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relentless pressure of future objectives.

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7. In reporting the riots in Sicily, state bluntly that recourse to mob law or intimidations in furtherance of sectional interests or ambitions of political parties of whatever colour, is not only inconsistent with democratic principles, but also detrimental to the war effort. Suggest that the participants in these may themselves be the innocent victims of enemy propaganda.
8. Report further developments in the Greek crisis soberly by using official communiqués, balances American and British commentaries and hard news. Avoid, so far as possible, political or ideological labels, such as "Foyalist" and "Communist" or "Right" and "Left".

FILES A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

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SPECIAL GUIDANCE ON THE POLISH SITUATION.

- 1 While the Polish Government now in London continues to be officially recognised by U. S. and British Governments, we report news concerning the Lublin Committee of National Liberation frankly, objectively balanced with news of the Polish Government in London.
- 2 Do not criticise either party unless clearly quoting official statements of United Nations leaders, or debates in the Commons or Congress.
- 3 Continue to report efforts to achieve freedom, stability and representative government.
- 4 Use only official statements (e.g. Churchill's Commons 15.12.44) on territorial changes.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

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PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 9th
DECEMBER.

I.

THE CAMPAIGN.

1. No new directive.
2. Any progress in the present phase of the Italian campaign will be treated as part of the continuing steady advance of the Allied armies in Italy.
3. There will be no speculation on either present or future objectives.

II.

LIBERATED ITALY.

4. (a) We will welcome the formation of the new Italian Government.
(b) We will recognise that the changes should strengthen and increase its efficiency.
(c) Stress the paramount need for all parties whether inside or outside the Government to continue to unite behind the war effort, to which they are already committed, and to leave political differences to be settled later by legal means.
5. Do not commit the Italian Government to carrying out the six point programme outlined by Togliatti and de Gaspari unless officially adopted. We will then give publicity to the fact that it closely resembles the programme endorsed by the six parties at the beginning of the crisis.
6. In all media show that there are many ways besides military activity whereby the Italians can participate effectively in the war effort against the common enemy. Continue to give all hard news of Italian military rehabilitation and of the activities of Italian military Groups.
7. Give prominence in fact to all actions taken by Italians to help themselves and to make the best use of their own resources. At the same time continue to use reports of conditions...

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7. Give prominence in fact to all actions taken by Italians to help themselves and to make the best use of their own resources. At the same time continue to use reports of conditions in other liberated areas which emphasize the sacrifice others have to make for the common good.
8. Press comment from British and American sources on conditions in liberated areas should be used to give a balanced picture of opinion in those countries. Isolated and sensational quotations will be avoided.

9. In reporting civil unrest in other liberated territories avoid juxtaposition with news from liberated Italy. Avoid whenever possible any suggestion that troubles in other liberated territories provide a parallel to the situation in Italy.
10. In reporting the Greek crisis allied communiques and official statements by the Greek government will be given in full. Statements made by leading Greek statesmen and by the resistance movements (EAM, ELAS and EDES) should be summarized as briefly as possible.
11. The third anniversary of the declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the USA, which falls on December 11th, will be used to remind Italians that the responsibility for the war against the United States as well as against Britain and the USSR was shared by Italy.
12. Use the anniversary of the signing of the Soviet Czech pact (December 12th) to stress Russia's respect for the rights, independence and political integrity of small nations and her desire to co-operate in post war Europe.

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6 DECEMBER 1944

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATER HEADQUARTERS

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PWB ITALY STANDING GREEK DIRECTIVE DATED 6 DECEMBER

- I. Communiqués from Allied Military HQ and official statements from the Greek Government should be issued in full.
- II. Statements made by leading Greek statesmen, i.e., party leaders and former Greek cabinet ministers, should be summarized as briefly as possible.
- III. Statements issued in the name of the Resistance Movements (EAM, ELAS AND EDPS) should be summarized as briefly as possible.
- IV. The roundup of correspondents' stories of developments during the day will be issued each evening for the use of the following day's press (afternoon papers will be provided with the roundup of the previous day together with later official statements). The roundup will omit hearsay elements and all speculation on the future attitude of the parties or future composition of the Government. The roundup should be soberly worded and uncolored.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
Italian Theatre Headquarters

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PWS ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNALS FOR MEXY BEGINING 6 AND DECEMBER

I THE CAMPAIGN:

1. No new directive.
2. The present steady progress on the Italian front will be presented as the continuation of the inexorable Allied advance despite determined enemy resistance, bad weather and formidable river barriers.
3. We will not speculate on the likelihood of more rapid progress nor of ultimate objectives.

II. LIBERATED ITALY

4. The Italian Political Scene
 - a. Developments in the Italian political scene will be reported factually and objectively.
 - b. Official statements from Allied and Italian authorities will be given textually.
 - c. Reasoned Allied press comment both adverse and favourable, will be quoted briefly for the record. On the Sforza incident care will be taken not to... a wedge between the Allies.
 - d. Allied confidence in the new government will depend on the extent it demonstrates its determination to put first things first, i.e. the Italian war effort, and to submerge all other questions to their proper perspective.
 - e. Italian confidence in the ability of the new government must depend upon its actions rather than its promises. No extravagant claims will be reported on the new government's behalf and speculation as to its chances of success will be left to the local Italian press.
 - f. Publicity will be given to the personal records and achievements of the new ministers so that the administration may receive the public response it will need if it is to lead the Italian people, and so that the people may be given every opportunity to judge for themselves the strength and calibre of the new ministers.

5. The third anniversary on December 7th of the entry of the United States into the war will be used to recall the progress, speed and effectiveness with which the United States has mobilised her immense forces with those of the other United Nations for the European as well as the Pacific theatres. This anniversary will

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5. The third anniversary on December 7th of the entry of the United States into the war will be used to recall the progress, speed and effectiveness with which the United States has mobilised her immense forces with those of the other United Nations for the European as well as the Pacific theatres. This anniversary will also be used as a peg to show the United States' increasing interest, responsibility and participation in international affairs.
 6. Main themes for the winter campaign continue as before. They include: German guilt for Italy's economic plight; the criminal looting of foodstuffs from Northern Italy; Oltari del Popolo campaign; and full backing and publicity for the reorganised forces of law and order in Italy.
 7. The visit of U.S. Congressmen to Italy will be given full coverage. Statements reflecting understanding and appreciation of the Italian scene should be given prominence.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATER HEADQUARTERS

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEX FOR WEEK BEGINNING 25TH NOVEMBER

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. The present steady progress on the Italian front will be presented as the continuation of the inexorable Allied advance despite determined enemy resistance, bad weather and formidable river barriers. We will not speculate on the likelihood of more rapid progress nor of ultimate objectives.
2. Activities of Italian combat groups including parades may be factually reported, i.e. do not overplay or feature until further directives are issued.
3. We avoid any comment or speculation as to when they will be committed to action and infer, rather, that they are proceeding north for further training.
4. All reports of Italian patriot activities will stress (a) that these activities are geared to the general strategy of the Italian campaign and that the new instructions are adapted to the winter phase; and (b) that the importance of organised resistance during this phase is as great as at any other time.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

5. German responsibility for the economic plight of Italy will continue to be stressed e.g. the destruction of communications, social services, the slaughter of livestock. The continued German looting of food in North Italy will be given every prominence.
6. A broader coverage of Allied press comment and criticism will be given to demonstrate that (a) freedom of speech and press does exist in the Western democracies and that (b) responsible criticism, as opposed to irresponsible criticism, is not only practised but encouraged in these countries.
7. News from other liberated territories will be given full coverage so that Italy will understand that she is only one of many countries facing trying circumstances.
8. Report all news and press comment from Britain on Carandini's work in London.
9. Social unrest in Rome and elsewhere will be reported factually and objectively. Responsibility for maintaining peace and order among Italian citizens in territory under Italian jurisdiction lies with the Italian authorities. Credit will be given to those authorities whenever possible for the proper handling of such situations.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING
15TH NOVEMBER.

I. THE CAPTAIN.

1. Information from interrogations shows that the German soldier in Italy is expecting to retreat sooner or later and is apprehensive about his chances of ever getting over the Po alive.
2. Without in any way suggesting that an Allied attack is imminent, or committing us to preventing the Germans from escaping across the Po, the propaganda line will be aimed at intensifying German fears on this score.
3. Informationally, the Germans are likely to be able eventually to withdraw across the river successfully, but the more apprehension we can create without making boomerang prophesies, the more likely they are to seize opportunities to desert before coming to the river.
4. The general directive will continue as last week: any advances on the Italian front will be presented as steady in the face of continuing bad conditions due to weather. The front will continue to be treated as a whole and except where news communiques specify armies no emphasis will be given to either the 5th or 8th individually.

LIBERATED ITALY.

II.

5. Any changes in the Italian Government will be reported as action taken by it to strengthen and increase its efficiency.
6. Full publicity will continue to be given to Allied and Italian co-operation in their efforts to improve conditions. German responsibility for those conditions will be stressed. The line that self-help is better than self-pity will also be continued.
7. Reports on reconstruction plans, both national and international will be used to encourage discussion and stimulate thought and action on Italian reconstruction and post war problems. The difficulties that will face the world at the end of the war will not be minimised.
8. Carandini's departure for Britain will be used as

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- 8. Carandini's departure for Britain will be used as a peg to emphasize the historic ties of friendship and understanding between the two countries. Full coverage will be given to British and American press comment on Carandini's assumption of duties.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING
11TH NOVEMBER.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Any advances on the Italian front will be presented as steady in the face of continuing bad conditions due to weather. The front will continue to be treated as a whole and except where news communique specify armies no emphasis will be given to either the 5th or 8th individually.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

2. With the inevitable deterioration of conditions in winter and a consequent lowering of morale propaganda will be directed to reducing to the minimum the let-down in the Italian war effort. This will be attempted by emphasizing:

- (a) coverage of Allied and Italian efforts to improve the conditions and lessen the hardships.
- (b) the campaign of blaming the Germans for the destruction of the vital services.
- (c) the point that self-help is more profitable than self-pity (e.g. Remind them of Roosevelt's recognition in his reply to Bonomi's Columbus Day Greetings that "the Italian contribution in the war against Germany will not be in vain.... Italy will continue to work with the United Nations in the common task of constructing a lasting peace.")
- (d) that Churchill's call for the final spurt was addressed to Italians as well as to everyone else.
- (e) stories from Allied countries to show the sacrifice others are making for the

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- (c) the point that self-help is more profitable than self-pity (e.g. Remind them of Roosevelt's recognition in his reply to Bonomi's Columbus Day Greetings that "the Italian contribution in the war against Germany will not be in vain.... Italy will continue to work with the United Nations in the common task of constructing a lasting peace.")
- (d) that Churchill's call for the final spurt was addressed to Italians as well as to everyone else.
- (e) stories from Allied countries to show the sacrifice others are making for the common good. (Contrast raid-free Rome with London with its nightly attacks from VIs and V IIs.)

3. Full play will be given to any developments arising from Mr. MacMillan's appointment as President and Commodore Stone's as Chief Commissioner of A.C.

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FILES A

Emphasis will be given to the significance of the appointment of a Cabinet Minister to direct the activities of the Commission, particularly in the economic sphere.

4. Demands made by the Union of Italian Women for suffrage and representation in relief and reconstruction organisations will be reported fully.
5. Official statements only on separatist activity in Sicily will be used. It will continue to be linked with sabotage of the war effort.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEX FOR WEEK BEGINNING
24th NOVEMBER.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Emphasize the appalling weather conditions which have made movement of armour even on good roads almost impossible and reduced our air superiority to a minimum. There will be no speculation on the speed or direction of further Allied gains. In commentaries the front will be dealt with as a whole and not separately by armies.

II. LIBERATE ITALY.

2. Full use will be made of the announcement of the appointment of Italy's Ambassador to the United States to stress the fact that Italy's progressive restoration to independence results from and will continue to depend upon her contribution to the Allied war effort.

3. The new police organisation will be played up, and wherever security considerations permit we shall use stories of their successes both as a build-up for their own morale and to re-establish public confidence. The Carabinieri, who are a separate entity from the police, are now the subject of political contention and their present role should not be overplayed.

4. Fullest coverage will be given to the Presidential Election, the opportunity being taken to explain and illustrate at length the method of balloting and election.

5. Strikes will be handled factually when they occur. If any Allied authorities are involved it will be

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PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE WAXED FOR WEEK BEGINNING
21 NOVEMBER

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Emphasize the appalling weather conditions which have made movement of armour even on good roads almost impossible and reduced our air superiority to a minimum. There will be no speculation on the speed or direction of further Allied gains. In commentaries the front will be dealt with as a whole and not separately by armies.

II. LIBERTY ITALY.


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4. Fulllest coverage will be given to the Presidential Election, the opportunity being taken to explain and illustrate at length the method of balloting and election.

5. Strikes will be handled factually when they occur. If any Allied authorities are involved it will be specifically indicated which.

6. The Oltari del Popolo and German looting campaigns will be continued.



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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEX FOR WEEK BEGINNING
28th OCTOBER.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. While we will not speculate on the likelihood of more rapid progress, we will continue to emphasize the steady inexorable advance of both 5th and 8th Armies in spite of hampering bad weather. This line will be strictly adhered to.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

2. Full prominence will be given to all official statements on the diplomatic recognition of Italy. Stress will be given in all propaganda to occupied and liberated Italy to the fact that Italy's progressive restoration to independence results from and will continue to depend upon a contribution to the Allied war effort.
3. Prominence will be given to any statements from Allied sources which refer to the trials which face the Italian people during the coming Winter. German responsibility for these conditions will be recalled in full detail.
4. All available reports on German destruction and looting of food supplies in Northern Italy will be used. In addition to the longer term usefulness of this line it is an indirect counter to Fascist propaganda blaming the Allies for the food situation in liberated Italy.
5. Full coverage will be given to commemoration of the anniversary of the Italian Armistice of the last war (November 4th).
6. The Clari del Popolo campaign will continue to be plugged.

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND COMBATS IN POSITION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

WAR ITALY DIRECTIVE NUMBER FOR WEEK BEGINNING 21 OCTOBER.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

- 1. No new directive.


We will continue the line of the last two weeks that the 6th and 8th Armies are advancing inexorably in the face of very adverse weather conditions. We will not speculate on the possibility of their advance being faster when the Plains are reached.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

- 2. Without in any way directly attributing the riots in Sicily to separatist activities we will use all statements about separatism by e.g. the Italian Government and responsible local bodies such as the Palermo Committee of National Liberation which support the line that separatism is working against the war effort and therefore for the enemy. We will recall whenever possible British and American statements on the subject.

- 3. We will continue to plug Ciampi del Penon campaign. We will also continue emphasizing the German responsibility for conditions in Italy.

- 4. We will use the Philadelphia findings, giving geographical and historical feature stories, as further proof of the determination of the United Nations to redeem their pledges.



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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND DEPT 3033 IN 3 NOV 45
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WAR CAMPAIGN.

1. We will continue last week's line in regard to the weather. The allies are still going slowly forward in spite of weather which has reduced the movement of aircraft to practically nothing and to some extent that of aircraft. We will not imply that when the weather lets up the allies will go forward faster, but that the weight of onslaught will greatly increase.

LIBERATED COUNTRIES.

2. We will give fullest play to the Moscow Conference, stressing by implication only the unity of allied policy toward both war and post-war problems.

3. We will continue to play German responsibility for long term economic dislocation and suffering in occupied and liberated countries.

4. We will give all available stories from U.S. and G.D. on war conditions in these countries - shortages, taxation, war damage, etc. (stories should be requested from OVI and I.I.).

5. We will play to a maximum the olive oil collection and play the slogan "Oliari foliolo".

6. Special attention will be given to special directive on patriots. We will continue the crucial play down of reports in liberated Italy of patriot activities, correspondingly playing up the activities of Italian armed forces.

R 30 PWB Directives

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ALLIED FORCES IN ITALY
OPERATIONAL POLICY
1. THE ALLIED ADVANCE

THE ALLIED ADVANCE ON THE EVENING OF 7th OCTOBER.
THE CAPTURE

1. The time has now come when we can reverse our policy of not referring beyond official communiques to the effect of weather on the campaign - a policy the main reason behind which is that this line gives the impression of making excuses. We will now take the line that weather conditions are very bad, indeed so bad that further operations are not possible, but that nevertheless the Allied armies have steadily and slowly advanced on Bologna and the plains of Lombardy. The Allied advance is overwhelming and inexorable in the face of weather.

2. We will not speculate on swift Allied movement when we reach Bologna and the plains (i.e. it is expected that the advance will be faster than it is at present but not spectacularly so.) We will not refer to the Po as the last line of defence before the Alps. There are many other river lines where the enemy can stand and fight if he chooses.

3. The weather the speed of advance, Messerschmitt's army can be referred to as 'doomed army', and this slogan will be used in all forms of propaganda wherever possible. We will however not mention any specific figures from Italy, the army will be broken.

4. We will insist on the closings of the back door of north-east Italy by interposing whatever possible news of Russian advances across Yugoslavia.

MESSERSCHMITT

5. Last week's disaster in the north-west Italy will be reported in liberal and Italy of front activities will continue to be carried out. We will stick to purely factual report. (The disaster in propaganda to northern Italy remains the same - the restriction of output to northern Italy shows the interpositions and while reporting all newsworthy activity of the Wehrmacht the activities of the Allies are not mentioned.)

6. Give prominence to conditions in Italy liberated countries, bringing out the responsibility of the Germans in suppressing the increasing demands for Allied sources of supply and of support.

have not been able to open to and air attack reduced practically to nothing; but that nevertheless the Allied armies have steadily and slowly advanced on Bologna and the plains of Lombardy. This Allied advance is overwhelming and inexorable regardless of weather.

6. We will not speak to or swift Allied movement when we reach Bologna and the plains (27.1. it is expected that the advance will be faster than at present but not spectacularly so.) We will not refer to the Po as the last line of defence before the Alps. There are many other river lines where the enemy can stand and fight if he chooses.

7. But whatever the speed of the Wehrmacht, Messersing's Army can be referred to as a Doomed Army, and this slogan will be used in all forms of propaganda wherever possible. Even though attempts may escape from Italy, the Army will be broken.

8. We will hint at the closing of the back door of north-east Italy by juxtaposing wherever possible news of Russian movements across Jugoslavia.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

9. Last week's directive on the very gradual playing down reporting in liberated Italy of subversive activities will continue to be carried out. We will stick to purely factual reports. (The directive for propaganda to northern Italy remains the same - the restriction of output to purely military news and instructions and while reporting all newsworthy activity of the patriots the avoidance of singling out any particular group for special notice.)

10. Give prominence to conditions in newly liberated countries, bringing out the responsibility of the Germans and stressing the increasing demands on Allied sources of supply and transport.

11. Play up the anniversary of the Italian Declaration of war against Germany on October 17th as an opportunity to survey the growth of the Italian war effort in the last twelve months.

12. Colonies: statements of Allied policy should be carried verbatim without comment as they appear.

13. Play up all statements about Italy's future by Allied Statesmen but without comment.

14. Report fully the trial of Mussolini.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

CORRIGENDUM OF FIVE ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEX FOR WEEK
BEGINNING 7th OCTOBER.

Delete paragraph 1 and insert the following:
THE CAMPAIGN.

I.

1. The time has now come when we can reverse our policy of not referring beyond official communiques to the effect of weather on the campaign - a policy the main reason behind which is that this line gives the impression of making excuses. We will now take the line that weather conditions have been very bad, indeed so bad that tanks have not been able to operate and the weight of air attack has also been seriously hampered, especially in support of forward troops, but that nevertheless the Allied armies have steadily and slowly advanced on Pologna and the plains of Lombardy. The Allied advance is overwhelming and inexorable regardless of weather.

Delete paragraph 3.

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Captain Stone

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 30 SEPTEMBER.

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Continue to play up fully news of Allied progress on Adriatic and Central Sectors of the front against desperate German resistance. Treat German counter attacks as logical sequence of events after the enemy has been evicted from prepared positions.
2. Stress in all propaganda output that not even the Appennine Chain, strengthened by the powerful Gothic Line defences, have stemmed the inexorable steam roller advance of the Allied armies. The enemy's advantages of the terrain have been overcome by the superior fighting qualities of the 5th and 8th Armies.
3. Do not speculate, however, on any rapid Allied break through or on the possibility of trapping large enemy forces in the Adriatic Sector by the favourably developing strategic situation.
4. The Germans are being forced back from the Gothic Line to the last line of defence before the Alps - the Po. Point out that from Sicily on, the enemy has in every case been driven from one supposedly impregnable defence line after another.
5. In propaganda to the enemy present the question - With Allied armies already fighting inside Germany, what is left for him to fight for? What prepared defence line now protects him from the Allied onslaught?
6. Emphasize that the German armies in Italy are being made to fight an ultimately hopeless battle with little chance of escape.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

7. We should watch for and play up developments arising out of the Roosevelt-Churchill statement of September 26 and of Mr. Churchill's speech of September 26.

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German resistance. Great German... sequence of events after the enemy has been evicted from prepared positions.

2. Stress in all propaganda output that not even the Appenine Chain, strengthened by the powerful Gothic Line defences, have stemmed the inexorable steam roller advance of the Allied armies. The enemy's advantages of the terrain have been overcome by the superior fighting qualities of the 5th and 8th Armies.

3. Do not speculate, however, on any rapid Allied breakthrough or on the possibility of trapping large enemy forces in the Adriatic Sector by the favourably developing strategic situation.

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6. Emphasize that the German armies in Italy are being made to fight an ultimately hopeless battle with little chance of escape.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

7. We should watch for and play up developments arising out of the Roosevelt-Churchill statement of September 26 and of Mr. Churchill's speech of September 28.

8. In propaganda to patriots in the North of Italy care should be taken to maintain the programme on a strictly military level; its appeal should be wide and general and not to any particular band of patriots or group of Italians.

9. In propaganda to Liberated Italy we should begin to play down the activities of the patriots and the treatment we are giving them when we overtake them. This, however, should be tapered off gradually to avoid giving the impression that there is a new directive and thus giving a handle to internal Italian criticism.

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JK

Captain: Stone
U.S.N., A.C.C.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND COMRADESHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

FWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEX FOR WEEK BEGINNING 23 SEPTEMBER

I. THE CAMPAIGN.

- 1. While we will play up fully our steady progress on the Adriatic and Central sectors of the front we will not speculate on the chances of a break through. There is no reason yet to suppose that the enemy will cease contesting bitterly every inch of the ground.
- 2. German troops in Italy will continue to be told that they are being made to fight hopelessly with main escape routes closed behind them while the Allies are in Germany itself in the west.

II. LIBERATED ITALY.

- 3. In reporting UNRRA Conference we will stick to hard news and not speculate. Prominence will be given to the reconstruction needs of other nations besides Italy.
- 4. We will give fullest play to Churchill report on his return to parliament and to any authoritative statements from the American side.
- 5. Should the Fascists take reprisals threatened for Caruso's execution, follow the special guidance already issued as follows:-

"We will report Fascist statements without undue prominence. There will be no question of any threats being allowed to interfere with the course of justice; if the Fascists take the threatened action justice will in turn inevitably and inexorably catch up with them."

In all stories dealing with epuration we will emphasize the aspect of inexorable justice catching up with Fascists.

Spec titles

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In all stories dealing with operation we will emphasize the aspect of inexorable justice catching up with fascists.

6. In dealing with Russian/Polish relations we will restrict ourselves absolutely to official statements by governments.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEKE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 9 SEPTEMBER

I. THE CAMPAIGN

The Directive continues on the same lines as last week. The importance of the substantial breach in the Goth Line will continue to be stressed, but not to the exclusion of significant developments in other parts of the front. We will continue to aim at increasing the enemy's apprehension of a major attack elsewhere. Apart from official communiques, we will not allow references to the weather to appear to be excuses for delay and it will not be suggested that there is a delay. Do not use reports of Germans pulling out of Northern Italy except from official sources.

II. LIBERATED ITALY

1. We will follow up features and stories exploiting the anniversary of the Armistice by further treatment, stressing the aspect of Italian initiative in self-rehabilitation. The President's statement can be used in comment as an incentive to encourage renewed effort on the part of Italians and should be linked with the Prime Minister's statement before he left.
2. We will publicise to the fullest through all media the Epuration campaign, giving it full support.
3. We will not discuss financial questions, either in regard to occupied or liberated Italy, apart from official statements.
4. Follow last week's directive to give full publicity to the visit of the Trades-Union Officials.

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Col M. J. ...

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
(ITALY)

CONFIDENTIAL

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR WEEK BEGINNING 22nd JULY, 1944

1. PROPAGANDA TO GERMANS IN ITALY

The attempt on Hitler's life and subsequent stories will continue to be played up without any exaggeration or speculation. It will be treated as part of the General "the war is in its final phase" line, with particular emphasis on the Fifth Front. We will plug the five fronts in every possible way - Russia, Italy, Normandy, the Air and Inside Germany. We will stress the encirclement of Germany, implying that no-one can tell where the next attack will come. Our propaganda will be so firmly confident as to make the suggestion inevitable to the individual German soldier that it is not worth being killed in the last five minutes.

2. ITALIAN FRONT

Fullest publicity will continue to be given to the capture of Livorno and Ancona, with emphasis on the speed with which our Naval and Army Engineers are able to open up port facilities, even after the heaviest demolitions by the enemy. Point out that in spite of the importance to the enemy of these two ports and their consequent fierce defence of them, we were able to capture both simultaneously.

3. OCCUPIED ITALY

As for German troops in Italy, we will take the same confident line; the intention being to suggest, in this case overtly, that the time has come when action by patriots against Germans, which only a few weeks ago would have been considered too dangerous, can now be taken with impunity.

4. LIBERATED ITALY

(a) While the 5th Front will be plugged to Liberated Italy, it will be done with this difference; that more care will be taken not to give Italians the impression that the war is over and all they need do is to sit back still further. Recall the Cabinet statement here that the first task of Italy is the speedy completion of the war. The fact that they are to whatever extent contributing to one of the five fronts makes this propaganda line practicable under difficult circumstances.

(b) Give fullest publicity to the activities of patriots North of the line and...

see file

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(b) Give fullest publicity to the activities of patriots North of the line and if possible to statements of patriots North of the line (only as reported by Italia Combatto) to the fact that they look to the people of Liberated Italy to help them in this moment of approaching triumph.

(c) The provisions now being made for patriots when overtaken by the Allies will be given fullest publicity. The line is: having laid down their arms, they must roll up their sleeves.

(d) Now that threshing has begun in Apulia, give particular emphasis to the Grani del Popolo campaign in that area. The Grani del Popolo campaign will be trailed in advance in order to build up interest in it. We will take

see files

full advantage of the fact that the immediate interest of the film for most Italians will be the pictures of the members of the Government at work.

(c) The forthcoming promulgation of the Government epuration and de-fascistization decrees will be used as a peg for continuing publicity on this.

(f) The Government will be built up by all possible means, whenever possible such as those mentioned above offer themselves. The fact that the Allies have agreed to hand over Rome on the 15th August shows the extent of confidence we now have.

5. ROME

The electricity campaign, having now achieved its purpose of explaining the reasons for the shortage, will be quickly tailed off.

Capt. Stone

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
(ITALY)

CONFIDENTIAL

PWB ITALY DIRECTIVE ANNEXE FOR JEMK BEGINNING 22nd JULY, 1944

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Free Press
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(b) Give fullest publicity to the activities of

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HQ AFCC, AFPS 1944
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Rec'd 16 Aug 1944
By [Signature]

Capt. Stone
AFCC

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

SECRET

FWB DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE.

I. GENERAL PROPAGANDA TREATMENT

(a) Military

1. Treat the operation as a further blow against the enemy, launched by the Allies at their chosen time and place. Show how this blow further tightens the complete encirclement of Germany and complements the operations in Normandy.
2. Do not present the operations as final or decisive blow, thus leaving open the possibilities of further landings at any point on the coasts of Europe, and particularly at any point on the Mediterranean coasts.
3. Play up "The Mediterranean Wall" and the time which the Germans have had to fortify it. Then, by use of hard news items, show that the Mediterranean can no more protect the Germans than could the Atlantic Wall.
4. Exploit to the utmost the Naval and air support given the operation, bringing out to the maximum the overwhelming superiority of allied arms which permitted the launching of the operation without prejudice to the tremendous allied blows in all other theatres, both Europe and the Far East.
5. Subject to Regional or target area needs, underline the role of all national participants in the preparatory Naval and air phases of the operation as released in communiques or briefings.
6. To all targets play up the military participation of French. Armed and equipped with American material, they are throwing their full weight into this most recent blow for the destruction of German armed might and for the liberation of France. Give maximum play to echelons of French command

Spec File

Spec Files

(a) Military

1. Treat the operation as a further blow against the enemy, launched by the Allies at their chosen time and place. Show how this blow further tightens the complete encirclement of Germany and complements the operations in Normandy.
2. Do not present the operations as final or decisive blow, thus leaving open the possibilities of further landings at any point on the coasts of Europe, and particularly at any point on the Mediterranean coasts.
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6. To all targets play up the military participation of French. Armed and equipped with American material, they are throwing their full weight into this most recent blow for the destruction of German armed might and for the liberation of France. Give maximum play to echelons of French command when released, in order to show the French troops, commanded by their own Generals, as partners in this allied blow. While primarily Franco-American operation, the vital roles played by Navies, air fleets and ground troops of the Allied Nations under the supreme Allied Commander, General Sir Henry D'Almeida Wilson, make this operation a mighty demonstration of Allied unity and should be so portrayed.
7. Stress heavily to all target areas the role of the French Forces of the Interior and - by editorial devices such as choice of terms and placing of items - give to the action of the FFI a tone of military reporting similar to that which prevails in the treatment of actual battle fronts.

3. Don'ts

Do not speculate on initial or distant objectives unless these are specifically mentioned as such in official communiques or releases. This point must be strictly followed during the first phases and

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ADDITION TO PAGE 2 - SECRET - EMB DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATIONS
AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE

4.2

Recall to French people the absolute military necessity for our aerial bombardments. Make no apologies for these military measures but recognize and make listeners and readers realize that we recognize the need for precautions is constant and that simple measures such as keying our air raid attacks can save many lives such as keying streets and roads, taking refuge, avoiding bridges and their vicinity.

precludes the use of such phrases as "Allied troops striking up the road to X --",

Do not speculate on the rate of Allied advances. Do not refer to landings as a "front" and do not enumerate the "fronts" now in operation.

Do not recall expression "soft underbelly of the Axis".

Do not actually compare operations in Southern France with those in Normandy in June. Though analogies may be presented to show Allied strength unfolding where and when needed, actual comparison is not desirable since it would inevitably be favourable to one or the other of the two operations. This would be in either case unsound and above all inexact, since conditions in the North and South differ widely.

(b) Political

1. The political aspects of the operation should be strictly subordinated to military aspects, particularly during the first phases.

2. When the operation reaches the stage where releases are issued concerning Civil Affairs, civilian life and civil administration, exploit fully the role of French authorities in these phases of the return of freedom to France. When the news permits, show Allied Military Authorities turning over to French administration of justice, public works, postal and other civil departments, and explain that these are normal measures which are being and will be carried out as fast as actual operational needs and military security permit.

II. SPECIAL PROPAGANDA TREATMENT.

(a) To France

1. Follow the General Propaganda treatment, especially I(a) 6 and 7 and (b)2. We may expect, judging from the fighting of French troops in the Italian campaign, that the performance of the French army will be splendid. Such any implication should be fully reported to France, but without France in the eyes of the world. Rather show that with equipment superior to that of the Axis.

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3. Urge French populations to observe the same discipline and the same precautions as called for in Normandy. They must facilitate the military operations in every possible way and will receive instructions or such aid through Allied Radio broadcasts and leaflets.
- 4.B Pending further and fresh guidance, do not call for a "levee en masse", either directly or by quoting speeches or articles which explicitly or implicitly make such an appeal.

French needs, the absolute military

ADDITION TO PAGE 3 -- SECRET -- PWB DIRECTIVE FOR
OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE

(e) Follow the general propaganda treatment, stressing particularly the freedom of initiative of Allies and their inexhaustible resources for launching these attacks when and where they decide.

- 3 -

sidings and yards, factories and gas dumps etc.

6. Activities of the French Forces of the Interior should be given fullest coverage. Frenchmen in territory near the zones of battle, but not yet liberated, should not be urged to join the FFI indiscriminately, without arms or provisions. Such recruits, at this date, might prove a hindrance rather than a help to the organized FFI who have not the extra material necessary to equip unlimited numbers of new members. Advice such volunteers to apply to resistance leaders personally known to them for instructions as to where and how they can best serve.

(b) To German troops in the rear of operations

1. Radio programs must not be broadcast with "front line" troops in mind. They will not be listening.
2. To German troops in rear of battle areas, play the news of landings along the line that for them this spells the end of the war. To the North are the Allies pushing back and cutting off the German armies. To the South are the Allies in full attack. Behind them are lines of communication which pass through territory under the threat of the most powerful units of the FFI. There is no avenue of escape and on the flanks are coasts available for more Allied landings. It is for the individual German soldier to decide how he will finish the war, as a prisoner of war, or in death.

Play heavily the theme "do you wish to die during the last five minutes?" "You are the lost bodies, the sacrificed units. Nothing but your own decision can save you now. The German High Command is powerless to come to your help, even if it wished to do so".

(c) To German troops in other areas.

The plight of the German troops in Southern France should be fully explained and it must be implied that fresh offensives, further landings and renewed attacks are always possible.

Particularly to German troops in the Balkans, but also to those in Italy, we can use the theme: "Do you think that you can be reinforced now? Remember that Southern France is still another field to add to the East Front and to Northern France. You must see clearly now that you live under the threat of being left behind, the forgotten troops of the Reich".

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(d) To foreign troops in German service in France.

To such troops in Southern France, state that they are faced with annihilation unless they take immediate steps to detach themselves from German units. Specifically, they must come over to the Allies, using force against the Germans if necessary. Point out to them that they are being used as "human land mines" in a desperate effort and a futile one to save German blood. If they continue, they will share the fate of the doomed German armies.

(e) To Polish Allied countries

- 4 -

that fresh blows are imminent, but say nothing that could be taken as ruling out this possibility.

(f) To Satellite countries

Follow the general propaganda line and here too, orient comment and editorials so as to leave in the minds of the listeners and readers the question: "whose turn is next?"

In output to Rumania, stress the role of the French armed forces and FFI. Rumanian Francophile sentiment will very probably react favourably to such news.

(g) To Italian audiences.

1. German-occupied Italy - Follow the general propaganda line and stress particularly the role of the FFI, Without ever making actual comparisons or flat statements, convey, whenever possible, the feeling that the FFI and Italian patriots are part of a grand army of resistance in Europe which is so greatly contributing to the downfall of Germany. Recall the importance of lines of communication, and show that now more than ever, every delay to German troops on the move is a step towards earlier victory.

2. Liberated Italy - Follow the general propaganda line.

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