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10000/136/538

ANSA
NOV. 1944 - JAN. 1945

9264/CC

Office of the
Chief Commissioner

ALLIED COMMISSION

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 9264 ANSA

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1a	Memo, Fielden	8 Jan 45		Negotiations re News Agencies: Resume
1	Ltr Reynolds Packard	9 Jan 45	Stone	Pls tell us conditions governing participation of foreign news agencies in ANSA
2	Minutes Technical Sub-Committee News Agencies	9 Jan 45		
3	Ltr Fielden 20a/PRB	10 Jan 45	Stone	1st Mtg Technical subcommittee on News Agencies.
4	Ltr, INS (Chinigo)	13 Jan 45	Stone	INS protests coercion being used by ANSA.
5	Ltr Stone 20a/PRB	16 Jan 45	Munro	INS protests coercion being used by ANSA.
6	Ltr, Munro	19 Jan 45	Chinigo	INS protests coercion used by ANSA.

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JAN 19 RECD
JAN 19 RECD

ALLIED PUBLICATIONS BOARD
62 Via Veneto
Rome

19 January 1945

Mr. Michael Chialga,
Chief of Rome Bureau,
International News Service,
Corso Umberto 380, Roma.

This is to confirm my telephone call of this morning, as follows:

There will be a meeting of the Allied Publications Board at 62 Via Veneto, first floor, this afternoon (Friday, January 19) at 3:00 o'clock when your letter of January 13 to Admiral Ellery Stone concerning the ANSA Agency will be brought up for consideration and action in accordance with a request of the Admiral. The Chairman of the Board has asked me to tell you that he would be very happy to have you attend, if you care to, so that the Board may hear any further information which you may wish to provide.

1581
I. S. MUNRO,
Lt. Colonel,
Executive Secretary.

cc: Admiral Ellery W. Stone

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①

20a/PRB

16 Jan. '45.

Lieut. Colonel I.S. Munro,
Executive Secretary,
Allied Publications Board.

The attached letter has been received from the
International News Service.

You will doubtless agree that the complaint
regarding the withdrawal of newsprint allotment is a
most serious one. If Signor Sciavisco has at any
time made such a threat and is in a position to carry
it out, the matter clearly falls under the heading of
"undemocratic practices" on which the Allied Publica-
tions Board reserved the right to intervene.

I trust that you will take immediate action to
investigate the complaint since it reflects very
seriously on the competence of the Italian Press Com-
mission.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

Encl: 1

Copies for Admiral Stone's files.

C.O.S.

The attached letter was seen, as you will remember, by Mr. Macmillan, yourself and Mr. Hopkinson at the Meeting on Friday. Chinigo came yesterday to see the Chief Commissioner who feels that the matter should be taken up at once through the Allied Publications Board. I submit a draft.

16 Jan. '45.

(Sgd.) Lionel Fielden,
Major.

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(5)

(COPY) - *Original sent to Gen. Muller*

INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE

January 13, 1945

Admiral Ellery Stone
Allied Commissioner
Via Veneto
Rome.

Dear Admiral :

I wish to go on record with a formal protest against the coercion being used by the forming ANSA agency to force Rome newspapers to participate in the enterprise rather than operate on a free and independent basis by purchasing one or more world press services.

The UNIONE EDITORI called a meeting and when the editors of Rome papers appeared they were REQUESTED NOT TO SIGN UP with any foreign news agency UNTIL THE ANSA MATTER IS STRAIGHTENED OUT.

To supplement this action a certain signor SCIAVICCO has advised editors that any who would not participate in ANSA or choose, in its place, any foreign press news agency, would HAVE THE PWB paper and ~~newspaper~~ newsprint allotment WITHDRAWN.

International News Service has been directly hit by the two ANSA moves.

Not ONE of FIVE Rome newspapers which had agreed verbally to take INS are now willing to go on with the agreement.

I frankly do not feel that Gen. Alexander can allow this sort of thing to go on where Americans and British soldiers have died for the ideal of freedom.

Sincerely,
Michael Chinigo.
INS

See (5)

(4)

Mr. Macmillan
To see
my

0076
JAN 10 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
APO 394.

20a/PRB

SUBJECT : Min

TO : The

Major Quayle.

You
meeting. I unde
(Mr. Barnes and
tomorrow. Perha

Mr. Macmillan has seen.

Returned with thanks.

John Wipulham :

15.1.45.

Encl:

C.C.

Have you any further use
for this before it is filed?

NO ✓ 5 -

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MINUTES OF MEETING OF TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE HELD ON

9 JANUARY, 1945.

Present : Admiral Stone
 Colonel Reeves
 Colonel Henderson
 Mr. Edman
 Colonel Hayden
 Colonel Souder
 Major Fielden.

Admiral Stone said he was puzzled by the attitude of the PWB towards ANSA. Did they want to create a monopoly?

Mr. Edman said that ANSA was only a monopoly in the sense of being a cooperative monopoly : it could not in fact be called a monopoly because it was jointly owned.

Admiral Stone said that he could not see how a private agency could set up business in requisitioned offices.

Mr. Edman said that ANSA would of course have to pay for office space.

Admiral Stone objected that ANSA was already, as far as he understood, using the PWB offices without payment.

Mr. Edman said that the PWB was ready to help any agency over the first difficult steps.

Admiral Stone asked who controlled the circuits.

Colonel Reeves said they were controlled by the Italian Government if derequisitioned.

Admiral Stone asked whether in fact it was the Government or the terminal companies.

Colonel Reeves was not sure.

Admiral Stone pointed out that military circuits could not be given to a private news agency.

Colonel Henderson said that PWB used military circuits : there were no others.

Admiral Stone said that in that case circuits would have to be released for private agencies which would have to pay for them.

Colonel Henderson said that the release of PWB time - 3 to 4 hours per day - would not release whole circuits.

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Colonel Henderson said that the release of PWB time - 3 to 4 hours per day - would not release whole circuits.

Admiral Stone asked how PWB time was taken.

Colonel Reeves said it had last priority.

Mr. Edman said that the circuits were used as a back-stop on their Morse transmissions.

Admiral Stone asked what PWB had in the way of radio facilities.

Mr. Edman said that they had shortwave, medium and long wave transmitters at Terranova. There were 5 transmitters, 3 being used for Italy, 1 for the Balkans and 1 for Moscow. The equipment was Italcable equipment much rehabilitated by PWB.

(2)

(3)

- 2 -

Admiral Stone gave the Committee a summary of the discussions leading up to the Committee's appointment and read the terms of reference. He said that in spite of the warning against monopoly and the AC alteration of the PWB release as submitted, the original PWB release referring to ANSA had appeared in the Stars and Stripes.

Mr. Edman said that the PWB had had nothing to do with that release. He had never seen it until he read it in the Stars and Stripes.

Admiral Stone said he would not deal further with Rome for the moment. Our chief directives were (a) to settle distribution outside Rome, and (b) to avoid monopoly. PWB had elected to withdraw some of its activities from Liberated Italy: that was PWB's affair. But the new agency, ANSA, must not have a preferential position. The UP and other agencies would fight against that. PWB must permit all agencies, including other Italian agencies which might arise, to compete on an equal footing. The Committee would have to study time requirements as well as financial requirements in conjunction with the Italian Government or the terminal companies. He thought there were already certain facilities for provincial papers: the possibilities of long-distance telephone must be explored. As to radio facilities, if PWB was not going to carry news some facilities must be restored to the agencies but not as a free gift.

Mr. Edman said that ANSA should be treated as any other agency. He understood that Reuters and AP would have their own men sitting in ANSA.

Admiral Stone said he believed that Italcable had operated a number of high-speed circuits before the war and some of these might be restored.

Colonel Reeves said he did not understand ANSA's connection with Italcable. All Italcable property was requisitioned by him for military use and could not be given over to private enterprise.

Admiral Stone asked if ANSA personnel were not already there.

Mr. Edman said that some were there; some were on PWB's payroll.

Colonel Reeves said that all space there had been authorized by him and unauthorized persons could not be permitted. He thought Italcable themselves wanted the premises back.

Admiral Stone said that UP would make a terrific blast if there were any question of monopoly by ANSA. We should see that Italcable was open to all and there should be no preferential rates. He asked whether PWB would be taking ANSA's news to the North and if in that case Southern papers could not pick up PWB's transmissions.

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Mr. Edman said he thought Southern papers would have to carry a tag-line but of course they might pirate.

Admiral Stone said he began to wonder whether there was really any distinction between PWB and ANSA.

Mr. Edman said that he did not see how piracy could be prevented.

Admiral Stone asked if PWB would recommend the Italian Government to prosecute it.

Mr. Edman assented.

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Admiral Stone said that he thought an address system might be possible, Italcable acting as a common carrier. The Italian Government could then prosecute in Italian territory and AC in AC territory. He did not know what possibilities there were of wire services.

Colonel Henderson said that telegraph services were picking up. He thought that perhaps the best plan would be to restore Italcable's services as far as possible. He would go into the matter with Colonel Reeves.

Admiral Stone asked if newspapers in the South still had a lot of PWB equipment.

Mr. Edman said no; but in any case it would not be given away to them; they would have to pay. He thought PWB still had receivers in Catanzaro and Cosenza.

Colonel Henderson said that a common carrier would only serve the major towns, except for radio. He wondered whether it should be Italcable or the State.

Admiral Stone said it was a question not only of politics but also of efficiency. He had an open mind on it. On the whole he thought there were more objections to State control.

Colonel Reeves said that he doubted whether there would be spare circuits for lease to Italcable.

Admiral Stone said that the important point was that Italcable should be a common carrier serving ANSA, UP or any other agency equally.

If there were only one wire it would have to be split up, as had been done at Algiers. There was always the additional possibility of telephoning news.

Colonel Reeves remarked that many partially destroyed transmitters had been rebuilt with Allied material and it would be a tough problem to unscramble that. Most Italcable employees were now paid by PWB.

Admiral Stone said that he thought we could get no further for the moment. The technical possibilities should be examined without delay by Colonel Henderson and Colonel Reeves.

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NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING NEWS AGENCIES FOR THE RECORD

1. The Italian Prime Minister first expressed in writing, in a letter to the Chief Commissioner of September 29, the desire that the Italian Government should have an official News Agency. In this letter the Prime Minister alluded to the fact that Capt. Anderson, PWB News Editor, had been to see him and suggested that the Agency should be a cooperative one, owned by the daily newspapers already in existence. The Prime Minister remarked that such an agency could not work in Italy and proposed a Government information agency "above party competition".
2. On October 7 the "Association of Daily Newspaper Editors" put forward to the Undersecretariat for the Press a plan for an Information Agency which "would replace the Stefani Agency in all its services", to be called the Italian Telegraphic News Agency.
3. On the same day the AP representative in Rome filed a FYI message stating that he had contacted this agency and had suggested that AP would pay "whole cost service excepting its distribution in Italy". He added that the organisers would be consulting American-British agencies, but "ours is first contact and think we have inside track".
4. On October 23 the Chief Commissioner addressed AFHQ G-5 on the question of the future of Italian news agencies, broadcasting and films. He stated that "there is nothing in the Armistice to prevent the Italian Government from authorising the establishment of Italian news agencies nor from deciding as they wish the question of how much, if any, of the mechanism or personnel of the United Nations News Service should be taken over as released by PWB". He added that the Allied Commission felt strongly that "any attempt to establish exclusive contracts by whatever agency" should be resisted "Irrespective of any Armistice right".
5. On October 25 the Secretary of the AFHQ Political Committee submitted a note stating that the Psychological Warfare Committee "felt that it would cause considerable embarrassment in censorship and possibly elsewhere if private agencies were allowed to bring in and disseminate news while fighting continues in Italy" and recommending that so long as Italy remained a theatre of operations, private news agencies should not be allowed to start up.
6. At the meeting of the AFHQ Political Committee on November 15, Mr. Russell Barnes stressed the view that private news agencies and radio stations should not be allowed to operate. Lieut. Col. Eyres Monsell supported this view. Admiral Stone and Mr. Macmillan favoured the introduction of agencies. SACMED

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7. After a meeting in Rome, the Chief Commissioner, on December 4, informed the representatives of the Agencies that they would probably be permitted to operate from January 15.
8. At the meeting of ^{the} Political Committee on November 18 the AC was not represented but PWB and G-2 insisted on their views previously expressed, and proposed putting forward "stronger arguments".

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File "Press"

8 Jan

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9. On December 13, PWB submitted a long paper including arguments for and against the introduction of private agencies and suggesting that if an Italian agency were permitted the only possible candidate was the newly-formed ARTI, which was an association of editors and with which "PWB could work in the preliminary stages of the transfer". On December 16 the Secretary of the Political Committee asked for SACMED's ruling, PWB taking the view that they "would not interpose any objection to the entrance of private news agencies" but that this might "(a) retard the progress of a non-monopolistic private Italian agency, and (b) impair the political situation", and G-2 sharing the same view on the last point. On December 19 SACMED "agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in Italy at the earliest moment consistent with the military security" but appointed a sub-committee to examine and report :

- (a) at what juncture the operation of private agencies should be permitted
- (b) what safeguards there should be against monopoly
- (c) what measures should be taken against publication of material likely to lead to disorder.

The tentative date of January 15 was therefore postponed.

10. On December 20 the Chief Commissioner informed the representatives of the Agencies of the postponement. While appreciating the circumstances the representatives asked, since they had already opened negotiations, for permission to start on January 15 in Rome only. The request was discussed at the meeting of the Political Committee on December 26 and the Chief of Staff directed that the following recommendations be reported to the SAC :

- (1) Private news agencies should be allowed to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after January 15, 1945.
- (2) A technical sub-committee be set up to investigate time and methods for distribution of news to the remainder of liberated Italy.
- (3) No Italian news agency be permitted for the time being to distribute news in Italy outside Rome. The time when ARTI or other Italian news agency be permitted to enter the field of news distribution to be investigated by the technical sub-committee.
- (4) That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken.

11. On December 30 the SAC directed :

- (a) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after January 15, 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner should so inform them.

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- (a) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after January 15, 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner should so inform them.

- (b) That the technical sub-committee be formed of

Chief Commissioner, AC - Chairman
 Director, PWB
 Chief, INC
 Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ.

- (c) That the sub-committee have particular regard to safeguards against the establishment of a monopolistic indigenous news agency in Italy.

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(d) That no measures other than normal censorship be adopted, unless in the opinion of the competent military authorities a situation prejudicial to military security should be imminent.

12. On January 5 and 6 representatives of Reuters, AP and UP called on the Chief Commissioner. Reuters representative stated that as AP had already signed a contract with ANSA (the new designation of ARTI) for news distribution, Reuters felt that they would have to do the same. The AP representative stated that it had always been the custom and intention of AP to work through an agency. The UP representative stated that UP wished to work directly with the newspapers, that the setting-up of ANSA had resulted in UP being unable to get the subscriptions of two Roman newspapers and that UP would strongly object if PWB material and equipment were transferred to ANSA in such a way as to give it a monopoly over the remainder of Italy.

The Chief Commissioner advised the Reuter and AP representatives that SACMED's permission extended only to the selling of news direct to the newspapers and that their contracts should be with them and not with an Agency. He said that if the newspaper editors wished to set up a post office for distribution purposes he could not object, but it must be perfectly clear that :

- (a) ANSA should distribute the entire file of any news given to them for distribution
- (b) that all papers and agencies should be free to buy from ANSA, and
- (c) that papers and agencies should be free to purchase news from, or distribute news through, any other Italian agency.

8 January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

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8 January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

Noted R. T. Remond.

[Signature]
Commissioning S/C.

10 Jan.

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JAN 11 1945

RELEVANT EXTRACTS FROM POLITICAL COMMITTEE'S MEETINGS ON
QUESTION OF MONOPOLY.

15 November 1944

MR. BARNES, amplifying the paper, stressed that PWB wished to avoid the eventual establishment of a government controlled agency such as Stefani had been. He believed that if private agencies were allowed to start up while ITALY still remained a theatre of operations they might bring in news injurious to military operations or to Allied Policy. Thus, for example, there would be no machinery to stop agencies reporting criticism of ITALY in Congress. He added that the problems regarding Italian broadcasting were very similar.

19 December 1944

MR. BARNES said that PWB was perfectly willing to hand over to the Italians the press facilities which they at present controlled in ITALY. However, he pointed out that this might give rise to three difficulties. In the first place, as all incoming news was now screened by PWB, it might be necessary for military reasons to impose a political censorship by AFHQ, the repercussions of which might on occasion be severe. In the second place it was difficult to see how private agencies could be provided with the means of communication necessary to distribute their news throughout the country unless some assistance could be provided by army signals. In this connection, he pointed out, in reply to a remark by Admiral Stone, that it would not meet the case if the existing PWB communications were handed over to an Italian agency, as such action would automatically place that agency in a position of monopoly.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, as the Allies had now been in ITALY for more than a year, we should be prepared to sacrifice certain advantages in order to give the Italians greater liberty in the management of their internal affairs, provided always that no serious interference with military operations resulted.

MR. BARNES confirmed that this was the aim towards which PWB had been working. The only question for decision was in regard to the timing of the proposed transfer of responsibility. PWB had been endeavouring to build up an Italian non-monopolistic private news agency. However, he did not yet consider that this agency was sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, disagreeing with Mr. Barnes, observed that the Italians themselves thought they were ready to stand on their own feet and applications from external private news agencies indicated that they were of this opinion also.

24 December 1944

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What Italian news agencies are available to operate?

(Presumably the only one which could enter the field is ARTI (Agenzia Radiotelegrafica Italiana); a mutual Italian press association organised with the assistance of PWB, which includes all of the newspapers of the principal cities in liberated ITALY, except one of the NAPLES papers, but it is not yet in operation. The Italian staff of editors and reporters now working for PWB, however, could be turned over to it intact if PWB ceases to supply news to Italian papers. The membership of ARTI includes papers with all shades of opinion. Therefore, so long as such continues to be the case, its policies can be expected to be impartial. ARTI would have few, if any, foreign correspondents,

and would have to depend upon the foreign private news agencies for foreign news. On the other hand, the foreign agencies would have little or no local Italian news to sell. ARTI can be ready to function on 30 days notice).

Are sufficient signal communication facilities available to carry the traffic which would exist if private agencies are admitted?

(It is estimated that if private news agencies are to sell direct to newspapers, there must be an increase in the volume of news material transmitted from ROME of about two hundred per cent, since there will be much overlap in subject matter between the stories of the various agencies. Assuming that the military communication facilities now available to PWB will be made available to the foreign private agencies and to ARTI, such an increase in volume cannot be absorbed by the military circuits mentioned. Full information as to Italian government circuits is not at hand at this writing, but it is believed that the necessary increase in traffic could not be accommodated by them).

Reference question (ii) put by the SAC, as to what should be the safeguards against a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

(1) To whom are the foreign private news agencies to sell their news?

(There are two alternatives:

- (a) to ARTI, which would in turn sell to the individual newspapers, or
- (b) direct to the newspapers themselves.

The former alternative would permit ARTI to act in effect as a screening agency and give it a monopoly within ITALY. Freedom of the Italian press would then depend upon the continued independence and impartiality of one Italian agency - not safe or desirable for the long-run future. A free press thus demands that the private agencies sell direct to the newspapers, but to this there are major communication obstacles (see 2 (a)(3) above).)

(2) What precautions would have to be taken against any efforts of the Italian Government to dominate the furnishing of news? (A move of the government to institute a telegraphic agency for the dissemination of government decrees has heretofore been headed off, and would need still to be watched for. This would resemble too closely the establishment of a governmental news agency).

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MR. BARNES, referring to the second question put to the

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(1) To whom are the foreign private news agencies to sell their news?

(There are two alternatives:

(a) to ARTI, which would in turn sell to the individual newspapers, or

(b) direct to the newspapers themselves.

The former alternative would permit ARTI to act in effect as a screening agency and give it a monopoly within ITALY. Freedom of the Italian press would then depend upon the continued independence and impartiality of one Italian agency - not safe or desirable for the long-run future. A free press thus demands that the private agencies sell direct to the newspapers, but to this there are major communication obstacles (see 2 (a)(3) above).)

(2) What precautions would have to be taken against any efforts of the Italian Government to dominate the furnishing of news? (A move of the government to institute a telegraphic agency for the dissemination of government decrees has heretofore been headed off, and would need still to be watched for. This would resemble too closely the establishment of a governmental news agency).

26 December 1944

MR. BARNES, referring to the second question put to the sub-committee by the SAC, as to measures for the prevention of monopoly, asserted that the Italian Government must be prevented from setting up any telegraphic agency for the distribution of government decrees and announcements to various points of ITALY.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE expressed the view that this would not be objectionable if there were at the time competing news agencies, and pointed out that in the United States the government sends telegrams to various parts of the country for delivery at those points to newspapers.

MR. BARNES stated that the presence of competing news agencies would not prevent such a government agency from becoming a monopoly in its field because the government would always get its announcements to the papers before the news agencies.

Chief Commissioner

For information

Fielden

Major Fielden for Admiral Stone.

The Manager.
ANSA News Agency.
Rome.

January 9th. 1945.

Dear Sir.

With reference to the article which appeared in
Stars and Stripes yesterday regarding the foundation of ANSA.

We would be glad to know the conditions governing
the participation of Foreign News Agencies in ANSA.

Specifically we would be glad to know the financial
terms in so far as selling news to, and buying from, your
Agency is concerned.

Sincerely,
In awaiting your reply,
I remain,
Yours faithfully,

Cosy R.P.

Reynolds Packard.

Mediterranean Manager
of the United Press.

9264/cc

(1) File
"ANSAT" ←

Major Fielden for Admiral Stone.

Al Signor Direttore
dell'Agenzia ANSA.
Via San Nicola da Tolentino 21.
Roma.

9 Gennaio 1945.

Riferendoci all'informazione apparsa sul giornale Stars
and Stripes di ieri, riguardante la costituzione dell'ANSA,
vi saremmo grati se vorrete fornirci i seguenti chiarimenti:

Disidereremmo sapere le condizioni che regolerebbero la
partecipazione delle Agenzia di Stampa Straniere, all'ANSA.

Inoltre, ci interesserebbe conoscere la posizione dell'ANSA
nella compra - vendita di notizie.

Rimandando in attesa di una vostra cortese risposta,
distintamente vi salutiamo.

Reynolds Packard.

Direttore per L'Italia ed il
Mediterraneo.

Copy R. P.

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