

ACC

10000/136/568

DUPLICATE LETTERS,
NOV. 1943; FEB. - AUG. 1944

10000/136/568

DUPLICATE LETTERS, CMDRE STONE & STAFF, SECRET & TOP SECRET
NOV. 1943; FEB. - AUG. 1944

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/EJP

A/CC 000.1

20 August 1944

SUBJECT: Representation to the Italian Government

TO : Vice President, Economic Section, Hq ACC

1. Reference is made to your letter of 16 August 1944 (ES/FA) on the above subject.

2. I agree that, in the absence of exact statistical information, your statement and conclusions in paragraphs 2 and 3 are very probably a sound basis for action. With reference to your suggestions, however, I would appreciate being furnished with more information before making any representations to the Italian Government.

3. I am informed that Italy has an extensive relief and social security system. Does your 3(a) mean that this system should be abandoned in favor of some new system, or should the present system be overhauled and strengthened? If the latter, have you any specific suggestions for changes in either the organizational structure or the relief now granted?

4. The Council of Ministers on 5 August 1944 organized a committee charged with the preparation of a rehabilitation program. On August 9, 1944, according to Italian newspapers, the extent of such a program was discussed by Bonomi, Gronchi and the secretary of the C.G.I.L. Do you feel that a new committee should be established in addition to this committee?

5. I am in thorough accord with your belief that the prevention of possible disorder in Italy brings your proposal within the scope of Allied Control Commission responsibility.

2424

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNI
Acting Chief Commissioner

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.

DISPATCHED

Date-Time 21 Aug 1640

Via 2144g.

Route WKR.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) of (E)

Dec 14, 1974

NARS Date 4/15/77

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
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ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 21 Aug 1600
Via *Wagon*
Initials *WMP*

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)
Yes Jan 4, 1974
NAHS, Date *4/16/74*

SECRET

~~SECRET~~SUBJECT:- Italian CarabinieriHEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.
1605/50/44/3(SD1)

13 Aug 44

COPY

ACC

Ref your A/CO ODA.13 of 1 Aug 44.

1. It will be appreciated that the manpower ceiling for the Italian Army, of which the Carabinieri form part, has been reduced and that it is essential, therefore, that the reduced number pay the best dividend in the interest of the war effort as a whole.

2. It is regretted that approval to hold personnel in excess of 55,000 and to pay such personnel a ration allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, petrol etc all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of:-

- (a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.
- (b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

4. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing:- 2422

- (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri
- (b) present strengths and location of all units and detachments
- (c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of Italy.

This information will serve as a basis for further examination of the problem.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS Jan 4, 1974
4/26/77

/s/

for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.Copy to:- 15/IA, MA to CGS, MA to CAO, DCAM
G(Ops), A, Q~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. Nevertheless even if there may be an element of surprise in their initiative, it seems to all of us concerned here, and I have consulted Mr. Alexander Kirk and Sir Noel Charles, that it will be difficult to refuse the Italian request for publication except on the basis of countervailing and compelling considerations of a military character.

6. I shall be grateful if I may be informed as soon as possible what reply I should send to Signor Deadi; in the meantime I have merely acknowledged his letter and impressed upon him the importance of no publicity being given to his initiative. A copy of my letter is enclosed.

7. In the event of the decision being to authorize publication, the Italian Government would no doubt wish, if possible, to coordinate the date and terms of the announcement to be made before action is taken either in the Allied capitals or in Rome.

ELMER K. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Coordinator

cc: Gen. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles

2426

37 224

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 15 Aug 1945
Via NY
Initials P.H.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EAS/ase

14 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean Theater

1. With reference to your telegram No. 1-72793 dated 16 July 1944 about the question of the publication of the terms of the Italian Armistice, I now forward a translation of a letter which I have received from the Italian Prime Minister in which he states that the Italian Government today considers it necessary that such publication should take place at a not too distant date.
2. There are certain points about the Prime Minister's letter to which I should like to draw your attention. In paragraph 2, Signor Bonomi implies that he had understood that the question of publication had been decided by the Allies and that in fact publication was imminent. If this was Bonomi's understanding of the position, he has misunderstood the representations which I made to him; for I was careful to explain that I was inquiring what the Italian attitude might be if, and only if, the Allied Governments on their side decided in favor of publication.
3. As time as it may, the situation is now altered by the present Italian initiative. It would in fairness be said that both the Secretary General of the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister himself have informed the Political Section that the main reason for the Italian initiative has been the expectation that the war with Germany was shortly come to an end within a few months, and the conviction that the publication of the Italian Armistice Terms more or less simultaneously with the publication of a German Armistice would have a deplorable effect in Italy. It would emphasize the association of Germany and Italy at the very moment at which the present Italian Government was trying its best to turn back to older and better days.
4. While there is undoubtedly substance in this argument, so far as the stability and standing of the Italian Government in Italy is concerned, it is also obvious from the enclosed letter that the Italian Government greatly hopes that it will be the Allied intention to sweeten the pill by making some simultaneous concession such as the granting of leniency. The fact that some time has passed since our approach to the Italian Government in June without publication of the Armistice Terms may not naturally have led them to the conclusion that for some reason concerning Allied interests, we ourselves had been reluctant in publishing. They may, therefore, have hoped that pressure on their part for publication would dispose us all the more to make some concession of the kind suggested.

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- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(c) of (E)
JCS Jan 4 1974
NARS, Case 4352

SECRET

5. Nevertheless even if there may be an element of maneuver in their initiative, it seems to all of us concerned here, and I have consulted Mr. Alexander Kirk and Sir Noel Charles, that it will be difficult to refuse the Italian request for publication except on the basis of countervailing and compelling considerations of a military character.

6. I shall be grateful if I may be informed as soon as possible what reply I should send to Signor Rumor; in the meantime I have merely acknowledged his letter and impressed upon him the importance of no publicity being given to his initiative. A copy of my letter is enclosed.

7. In the event of the decision being to authorize publication, the Italian Government would no doubt wish, if possible, to coordinate the date and terms of the announcement to be made before action is taken either in the Allied capitals or in Rome.

ELIAS W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Mr. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles

2418

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 15 Aug 1945
Via 179
Initials W.R.R.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

EWS/ajp

A/CG 000.1

6 August 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Constitutional Developments

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
(Att: G-5 Section)

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum CMS/CF/jjr of the 29th July, informing of the desire of the Supreme Allied Commander that the Advisory Council should be apprised of my letter A/CG 091.1 of the 3rd July, as well as of any subsequent developments relating to the solution of the institutional question at the end of the war.

2. After consultation with the American representative on the Advisory Council and the British High Commissioner, I would request authority for postponing the presentation of this particular problem to the Council. Our main reason for making this request is the following. In my previous conversations with the President of the Council and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I was informed that the Italian Government had no present intention of debating these matters: in fact, the President of the Council was particularly anxious that his government should avoid such topics and get down to the many pressing problems of administration that confronted them. By this means he hoped that he would be able to weld his government, made up as it is of six disparate elements, into a team. Any other course and in particular, debate of such problems as the institutional question, would, he felt, tend to divide rather than to unite. That he has been correct in this estimate has been amply shown by the Roman press during the last month. If this question were now presented to the Advisory Council in Rome, it is most improbable that the Italian Government would long remain unaware that it had come up for discussion. The consequence could only be to stimulate an immediate discussion in the Italian Government, and there can be no knowing what the effect of such discussion might be on the stability of the government.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

A/CC 000.1

6 August 1944 - contd

might lead to underisable local repercussions, there are, of course, other means by which the British and American Governments can consult the other governments represented on the Advisory Council.

ELDERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copies to:

British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
Sir Noel Charles
Mr. Alexander Kirk

2416

~~SECRET~~

EVB/dfo

A/OC 014.13

1 August 1944

Subject: Strength of Carabinieri Reali

To: Hq, AAI

1. By airmail dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July, the following information was received:

"RESTRICTED (...) spoke HAMPDEN McQUEEN (...) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 Jun and recommended subsequently to AFSA total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed fifty-five thousand (...) 1605/50/3/G (SBI) of 19 Jun refers."

The office of origin was Main AAI: the addressee was MBIA.

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the GCRs nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of AGC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the AGC organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

a. The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.

b. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 65,000, exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength. 2415

c. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,300.

d. In addition to the foregoing, the following duties, coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

225 July 78
JRS, JRS 8/26/77

~~SECRET~~

occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali:

- (1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.
- (2) Dealing with refugees.
- (3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.
- (4) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilians and troops.
- (5) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
- (6) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
- (7) Enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

e. The uncertain state of public discipline, following in the wake of war and the overthrow of the Fascist government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrants a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions.

f. Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

g. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jan is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is admitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

- a. That the ration ceiling be lifted, or if that is impossible,
- b. That the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5. In the opinion of the Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situation as it exists, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 41,872, making maximum use of

-4-
SECRET

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the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the FISA-RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6. If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the FISA-RIMINI line, i.e., the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 3 of this letter, this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

7. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

WILLY H. GUNDE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

Ref: C-5, AFHQ

2413

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EHE/dfc

A/CC C14.13

1 August 1944

Subject: Strength of Carabinieri Regli

To: Hq, AAI

1. My signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July, the following information was received:

"REMITTED (..) spoke HAWPINE REGHRE (..) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 Jun and recommended subsequently to AFM: total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed fifty-five thousand (..) 1605/50/3/5 (SDI) of 19 Jun refers."

The office of origin was Main AAI: the addressee was ISIA.

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CCRA nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of ACC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ACC organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) of (1)

JCS Jan 4, 1974
MARK DATE 4/24/77

~~SECRET~~

occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali:

- (1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.
- (2) Dealing with refugees.
- (3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.
- (4) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilians and troops.
- (5) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal diseases among troops.
- (6) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
- (7) enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

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f. Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

4. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jan is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is submitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

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- b. that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

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ALBERT W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5, AFHQ

Admin. Sec.

2410

Hq AGC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 3 Aug 1940
Via AG m/c
Initials <i>WFF</i>

- 3 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

O.R.

(t): H.A.A.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

BWS/dfo

MEMORANDUM:

29 July 1946

COMANDO SUPREMO

The Italian Comando Supremo is the organ through which certain functions of the three Armed Forces, Army, Navy and Air, are coordinated.

The Comando Supremo today has four main functions: 1. SIM (Military Intelligence Service); 2. Military Law and Justice; 3. General Administration; 4. Epuration.

The operations undertaken by SIM, (Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Security, Sabotage) which is directly under the command of the Comando Supremo, are so well known to Allied Military Intelligence and Security Authorities that no purpose is served here in discussing this service in detail. It does not seem desirable to separate SIM into three separate intelligence services--Army, Navy and Air. It should remain under coordinated direction, but there may be grave repercussions if this organization were to come under political direction of any Ministry, through the abolition of the Comando Supremo, rather than under its present military direction.

Recognizing this same principle, ACC with AAI concurrence, recently transferred Italian civil censorship (mails, telegraph and telephone) from the political control of the Minister of Interior to the Comando Supremo, where it had been before Mussolini transferred it to the Ministry of Interior for political intelligence purposes. Public reaction was excellent. It is believed that if the Comando Supremo were abolished and civil censorship were restored to the Minister of Interior or to the Army, the public reaction would not be good.

Military Law and Justice. The Comando Supremo exercises control ²⁶⁶⁹ over wartime military penal justice. The institution, modification, the suppression of wartime military courts and the designation of the highest officials of such bodies is a function of the Comando Supremo. The Comando Supremo also issues, through proclamations, regulations having the force of law on matters concerning laws and penal procedure in wartime as well as judicial military organization.

General Administration. The Comando Supremo coordinates policy as to disciplinary measures, general personnel rules, promotions, and, in particular, the nomination of general and flag officers. At the moment, the Comando Supremo has adopted a policy of opposing the creation of additional admirals and generals, notwithstanding, apparently, the strong desire on the part of the Navy to create new admirals. It is believed that if the Comando Supremo were abolished, there would be considerable pressure on the government by the services, and by members of the govern-

825
JUL 31 1946
4/26/77

~~SECRET~~

ment itself, to create a number of unnecessary general and flag officers.

Epuration and Defascistization of Officers. This is a new function recently delegated by the Government to the Comando Supremo, and it seems obvious that something of the kind is desirable to insure that epuration is carried on in an identical manner in all three Armed Forces, free of political favoritism. If the Comando Supremo were abolished under Allied pressure, the public and press might feel that we desired to hinder the work of epuration. This function, however, could quite properly be assigned to each of the services - the Comando Supremo relinquishing entirely its work in this field.

Elimination of the Comando Supremo, in my judgment, would therefore have three unfortunate results:

- a. It would tend to make the administration of the Army, Navy, and Air political rather than military.
- b. It would make the Italian services more acutely a political problem than they are today with damage to the war effort.
- c. At a time when the Italian public is clamoring for greater military effort by Italy, the announcement of the abolition of the Comando Supremo would have a disquieting effect in all moderate circles.

In present circumstances, however, there is no doubt that General Browning is correct in contending that, as a matter of logic, the Comando Supremo is a "fifth wheel" so far as operational functions are concerned. It is therefore recommended that:

- (1) The name of the Comando Supremo be changed to "Stato Maggiore Generale", its pre-war designation.
- (2) It relinquish its functions of epuration to the three service Ministries.
- (3) It be issued a clear directive that it is to exercise no command or operational functions with respect to the Italian Armed Forces. 2308

Based on informal discussions with the Prime Minister, I am certain that the foregoing recommendations would be acceptable to the Italian Government without undue Allied pressure.

KILRY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Sir Noel Charles
Gen. Browning

~~U. S. SECRET~~
 Equals British SECRET

BRS/njp

27 July 1944

A/CO 324.5

SUBJECT: The Patriot Movement

TO : Mr. John Rayner, DPWD, FWB, 62 Via Veneto, Rome

1. Reference is made to your letter of 19 July, with copy to this Headquarters.
2. The Italian Government did not adopt the recommendations of Undersecretary Palermo but instead recognized patriots as a part of the Italian war effort.
3. The Government's resolution also stated that any support given by it to the patriot movement would be by approval of the Allies. Undersecretary of War, General Oxilia, under direction of General Browning, of the Army Sub-Commission this Headquarters, is working in close touch with Colonel McCarthy, Head of the Patriot Branch of this Commission.

MILITARY W. STONE
 Captain, USAR
 Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: B.G.S. (Ops), Hq., AAI

2467

Hq. A.C.C. - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date - Time 22/144.5
Via 2/10
Initials H.T.P.

~~U. S. SECRET~~
 Equals British SECRET

Scrymgeour

X
12SECRET

19th July, 1944

Subject: The Patriot Movement

To: B.G.S.(Ops), HQ., A.A.I.

1. You will have seen the report yesterday of the announcement by the Italian Government that they are recognising patriots as an integral part of the Italian Armed Forces.
2. This announcement follows upon an interview given by Mario Palermo, Communist Under Secretary of State for War, to a P.W.R. Officer. A copy of this statement is attached.
3. Particular points of interest in this statement are:
 - (a) The suggestion that the Italian patriots should be recognised as members of the Italian Army.
 - (b) The suggestion that an Italian General should direct the partisans from Liberated Italy.
 - (c) That he would be supported by a political leader, who would watch the political aspects of the patriot movement.
 - (d) The suggestion that a military intelligence office should be established for the purpose of propaganda to patriots, and propaganda about patriots to liberated Italy.
 - (e) The suggestion that the Italian Government should be consulted before dropping arms.
 - (f) The suggestion that a Brigade of volunteers should be created which will eventually form a small army of patriots.
4. We feel that if the Italian Government were to continue on this line independently, there might arise some difficulties.

With regard to (a) and (f) above, our understanding is that there are considerable difficulties in regard to the ceiling of the Italian Army.

The suggestion under (b) would seem to conflict with the conception at present obtaining of a patriot movement under the direct orders of your headquarters.

2406

In regard to (c), our own feeling from the propaganda point of view, and, as I understand it, that of No. 1 Special Force from the operational point of view, is that this is most undesirable.

In regard to (d), from the security point of view alone, we suggest that the present method of handling propaganda of both kinds is the right one. Apart from the possible operational value of the L'Italia Combatta programme in so far as direct appeals are concerned, there is also its value from what might be called the "A" Force point of view.

In regard to (e): this is a matter which concerns No. 1 Special Force, who, we understand, do not regard it as desirable.

5. We understand that A.C.C. will be glad to have any recommendations from your headquarters and ourselves on this matter for immediate action. It is clear also that from the political point of view there are wide implications in the Under Secretary's statements.

6. We would be very glad, therefore, to have your views on our comments so that the matter may be taken up with A.C.C. as soon as possible.

/s/ John Reynar
D.P.W.O.

Copies to: Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.
Commander Holdsworth, No. 1 Special Force.

2405

Report of an interview by a P.W.B. representative with Mario Palermo, Communist Undersecretary for War.

In conversation with a P.W.B. Officer, Mario Palermo, the Communist Under-Secretary of State for War, talked at length of the problem of the partisans. He said that he had been asked by his government to prepare a project for the solution of this problem. The project would be presented to the Cabinet at its first meeting in Rome on Saturday. If the Government approves the plan will be submitted to the Allies.

The project might be summarized as follows: the government would publicly recognize as soldiers of the Italian army all Italians fighting the Germans and Fascists in occupied Italy. The government would appoint a general who would direct and co-ordinate the military efforts of the partisans from this side. He would of course have to be an efficient and honest general, capable of inspiring confidence among the partisans. He would naturally be in close contact with the military leaders of the resistance movements in occupied Italy. This general would be flanked by a political leader, whose function would be to interest himself in the political aspects of the partisan movement and, in particular to maintain liaison with his opposite numbers in occupied Italy. Under these two heads there would be a branch of military intelligence which would collect all material connected with the partisan movement and a propaganda section. The latter would be responsible for collecting material useful for propaganda in liberated Italy, so as to increase the interest among Italians in this part of Italy in the war, and particularly in the heroic struggle carried out by Italians in occupied Italy.

The Italian Government was, Palermo said, most anxious to increase Italy's contribution to the war effort, and there was no doubt that the most effective contribution so far carried out on land was being given by the Partisans in occupied Italy. He felt therefore that it was the duty of the Italian Government directly to encourage in every way possible Italian resistance in Central and Northern Italy. He was passionately interested in the resistance movement and felt that this movement should be sponsored by the Italian Government. He hoped the Allies would allow the Italian Government to take a direct interest in the movement of resistance, though naturally the final control would rest with the Allies. Although he was a Communist, he did not look at this problem from a Party point of view, but from a national point of view. He believed that at this moment everything should be subordinated to winning the war, and therefore those monarchists who were sincere should be encouraged to fight. It was essential in these grave moments to have a united Italy. He thought that Pogliattelli's praise of the monarchist naval officers who had come over to fight was both wise and opportune, as certain naval officers, after the formation of the Bonomi Government had been reluctant to continue fighting. They had, after all, he said shown that they were prepared to fight the resistance and nothing, he thought, should be done

2404

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He believed that the Italian Government should be responsible for organising and directing the partisan movement in cooperation with the Allies. He believed that when territory was liberated the partisans should be given the opportunity of volunteering to fight immediately against the Germans. He himself was ashamed of the small contribution given by Italy to the common fight against the Germans. The Allies had declared that Italy must redeem her part by her contribution to the common war effort. He agreed with this, as only in this way would

the Allies be able to judge the good faith of the Italians. But the Italians needed arms in order to fight. Wherever he travelled, he was besieged by requests from Italians anxious to fight, but in view of the restrictions placed by the Allies on the number of Italians permitted to be at the front, it was impossible to satisfy these requests. It was said to watch the enthusiasm of these volunteers being dampened. It was particularly sad to see the disillusion coming over the partisans who had actually fought and whose only desire was to continue the fight. If only the Allies would agree to provide a small quantity of arms, then a brigade or a division of volunteers could be founded. Gradually more and more of the partisans could be incorporated into the army and a really popular - even if small - army created.

He felt also that the Italian government should be consulted as to how, when and where arms should be dropped in occupied Italy; otherwise there was a danger of civil war after the peace because many dangerous elements might come into possession of arms. The Italian government did not know where the arms were being dropped and it was essential to avoid the possibility of civil war later.

There was little time to lose. The war appeared to be drawing to a close. Italy's contribution must therefore be intensified during the next few weeks. And it was through the partisans that Italy could most effectively aid the Allies.

Palermo talked with great enthusiasm about the partisans. He gave the impression that he was really anxious to improve the existing Italian army by introducing partisan elements and at the same time to see that their fight had not been in vain.

He also expressed his desire to visit the Italian troops fighting in Yugoslavia on the side of Tito's army. He had received discouraging reports as to the relations between the Italian soldiers and the Yugoslavs. He had received an invitation from the Yugoslav committee in Bari and he hoped it would be possible for him to go there; as he believed his visit might do something for the morale of the Italian troops there. He was not afraid of the risks involved.

Palermo said he was returning to the South but hoped to be back in Rome towards the end of the week, when he would start work at the War Ministry.

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C. S. O. ←

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

LDD/hjp

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

A/CC 000.7

13 July 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda

1788
21 JUL 1944

TO : Director General, Allied Force Military Railway Service, APO 400

1. Reference is made to attached letter from PWB Italian Theatre Headquarters, FWB Unit No. 8, APO 512, of 22 June, attached to which is copy of letter dated 17 June from your headquarters.

2. In referring to the "we" in paragraph 1 of letter 17 June from your headquarters, it is not clear who is meant by the term "we". However, we did check the matter with Mr. Raynor who says that Headquarters A.A.I. approved the quotation and Raynor is of the opinion that the C-in-C gave it his personal approval.

3. The Acting Chief Commissioner requests that you indicate whether or not release of the suggested propaganda will in any way interfere with your operation.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner

L. D. DENSMORE 2402

L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, Sig C
Chief Staff Officer

2 Incls:

As per para 1 above

1st Ind.

Hq Mil Ry Serv (Adv Ech) APO 400, USArmy. 18 July 1944.

To: Hq A.C.C., APO 394, USArmy. (Attn: Chief Commissioner)

Returned. The release of the suggested propaganda will in no way interfere with our operations.

For the Director General: E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

JCS Jan 4/1974

By: J. K. Tully

J. K. TULLY
Colonel, TC

Ass't to Director General

HEADQUARTERS
20 JUL 1944
A.C.C.~~SECRET~~

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COPY

EAS/hjp

A/CC 091.1

5 July 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Allied Force Headquarters
 (Attention: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
 GBE, ECH, DSO, ADC)

1. In the communique of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws."

"This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly to decide the new Constitution of the State".

2. In order to elucidate exactly what this part of the communique meant, I made enquiries from the Italian Government and received the following explanation from the President of the Council and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were emphatic that it did not mean that the Cabinet had approved any particular scheme whereby the country should choose between a monarchical or a republican form of government. It might appear from the wording of the communique that the scheme in mind was that this question should be decided by a Constituent Assembly. This was not the case. The Government had not yet decided and had no present intention of discussing whether the decision should be made by a direct referendum or by the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, whose double task would be first to decide between monarchy and republic and,

(Attention: General Sir Henry Dyer)
GSE, ECB, DSO, ADC)

1. In the communique of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws.

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(DECLASSIFIED)

EO 11652, SEC. 1.4 AND 1.5

8/20/10
R. J. [Signature]
4/26/17

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

3. In taking note of this explanation, I made it plain that the subject was one of considerable interest to the Allied Governments. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt has a number of occasions affirmed their intention that the Italian people should be free to choose in this matter at the proper moment. The Italian Government should therefore presume that the Allied Governments would wish for full details of any scheme under consideration before it becomes law. In order that this point shall be on record and should not be lost sight of, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has made a minute for the files of the President of the Council.

4. At this stage I would only make one comment. It is clear to me and my advisers that the best chance of a fair decision of the issue between monarchy and republic would be a referendum or plebiscite- preferably under Allied supervision. Even if Allied supervision is not deemed expedient, we are all of the opinion that a referendum under Italian auspices would still be preferable to the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, with the doubtful duty of deciding both the principle and the exact form of government. The reason is simple. In countries such as Italy, with limited experience in recent years of democratic government, and under the circumstances presently existing here, it is unrealistic to expect that no attempt will be made by domestic or external interests to secure the result desired by them. It will be clearly far more difficult to manipulate a referendum throughout the whole country than to lobby and cajole the members of a Constituent Assembly.

5. It is hoped that the Italian Government will maintain their resolve not to discuss this question further for the time being. But sooner or later they will do so and I shall be grateful for instructions on the line which the Control Commission should adopt.

6. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the British High Commissioner and the United States delegate to the Advisory Council, as well as to the British Resident Minister and the United States Political Adviser.

/s/ EWS

4. At this stage I would only make one comment. It is clear to me and my advisers that the best chance of a fair decision of the issue between monarchy and republic would be a referendum or plebiscite- preferably under Allied supervision. Even if Allied supervision is not deemed expedient, we are all of the opinion that a referendum under Italian auspices would still be preferable to the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, with the double duty of deciding both the principle and the exact form of government. The reason is simple. In countries such as Italy, with limited experience in recent years of democratic government, and under the circumstances presently existing here, it is unrealistic to expect that no attempt will be made by domestic or external interests to secure the result desired by them. It will be clearly far more difficult to manipulate a referendum throughout the whole country than to lobby and cajole the members of a Constituent Assembly.

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5. It is be hoped that the Italian Government will maintain their resolve not to discuss this question further for the time being. But sooner or later they will do so and I shall be grateful for instructions on the line which the Control Commission should adopt.

6. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the British High Commissioner and the United States delegate to the Advisory Council, as well as to the British Resident Minister and the United States Political Adviser.

8/10/2017

/s/ MURRAY W. STONE
Captain, USMA
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: British High Commissioner in Italy
U.S. Delegates to the Advisory Council
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY

EWS/LJP

A/CC 091.1

5 JULY 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Allied Force Headquarters
 (Attention: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
 GCH, ECH, DSO, ADC)

1. In the communique of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws.

"This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly to decide the new Constitution of the State".

2. In order to elucidate exactly what this part of the communique meant, I made enquiries from the Italian Government and received the following explanation from the President of the Council and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were emphatic that it did not mean that the Cabinet had approved any particular scheme whereby the country should choose between a monarchical or a republican form of government. It might appear from the wording of the communique that the scheme in mind was that this question should be decided by a Constituent Assembly. This was not the case. The Government had not yet decided and had no present intention of discussing whether the decision should be made by a direct referendum or by the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, whose double task would be first to decide between monarchy and republic and,

(Attention: General Sir Henry Vaitland Wilson,
GSE, ECB, DSC, ADC)

1. In the communique of the 3rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 2nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws.

"This measure established, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly to decide the new Constitution of the State".

2. In order to elucidate exactly what this part of the communique meant, I made enquiries from the Italian Government and received the following explanation from the President of the Council and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were emphatic that it did not mean that the Cabinet had approved any particular scheme whereby the country should choose between a monarchical or a republican form of government. It might appear from the wording of the communique that the scheme in mind was that this question should be decided by a Constituent Assembly. This was not the case. The Government had not yet decided and had no present intention of discussing whether the decision should be made by a direct referendum or by the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, whose double task would be first to decide between monarchy and republic and, after that, on a form of monarchical or republican government. All that the Government had so far decided was that it was expedient in their first communique to reaffirm publicly their intention to ensure that the Italian people should in due course be free to choose their form of government and that a Constituent Assembly would be elected. There were many forms of monarchical and republican government and it was clear that a new Constitution would undoubtedly have to be drawn up.

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- 2 -

3. In taking note of this explanation, I made it plain that the subject was one of considerable interest to the Allied Governments. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt has a number of occasions affirmed their intention that the Italian people should be free to choose in this matter at the proper moment. The Italian Government should therefore presume that the Allied Governments would wish for full details of any scheme under consideration before it becomes law. In order that this point shall be on record and should not be lost sight of, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has made a minute for the files of the President of the Council.

4. At this stage I would only make one comment. It is clear to me and my advisers that the best chance of a fair decision of the issue between monarchy and republic would be a referendum or plebiscite- preferably under Allied supervision. Even if Allied supervision is not deemed expedient, we are all of the opinion that a referendum under Italian auspices would still be preferable to the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, with the double duty of deciding both the principle and the exact form of Government. The reason is simple. In countries such as Italy, with limited experience in recent years of democratic government, and under the circumstances presently existing here, it is unrealistic to expect that no attempt will be made by domestic or external interests to secure the result desired by them. It will be clearly far more difficult to manipulate a referendum throughout the whole country than to lobby and cajole the members of a Constituent Assembly.

5. It is to be hoped that the Italian Government will maintain their resolve not to discuss this question further for the time being. But sooner or later they will do so and I shall be grateful for instructions on the line which the Control Commission should adopt.

6. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the British High Commissioner and the United States delegate to the Advisory Council, as well as to the British Resident Minister and the United States Political Adviser.

/s/ EWS

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/s/ EWS

/t/ ALLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: British High Commissioner in Italy
U.S. Delegate to the Advisory Council
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser.

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EWS/ljp

A/CC 091.1

5 July 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Allied Force Headquarters
 (Attention: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
 GBE, ECB, DSO, ADC)

1. In the communique of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws.

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2. In order to elucidate exactly what this part of the communique meant, I made enquiries from the Italian Government and received the following explanation from the President of the Council and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were emphatic that it did not mean that the Cabinet had approved any particular scheme whereby the country should choose between a monarchical or a republican form of government. It might appear from the wording of the communique that the scheme in mind was that this question should be decided by a Constituent Assembly. This was not the case. The Government had not yet decided and had no present intention of discussing whether the decision should be made by a direct referendum or by the election of delegates to a Constituent Assembly, whose double task it was first to decide between monarchy and republic and,

(Attention: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson)
 GBE, ECB, DSO, ADC)

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6. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the British High Commissioner and the United States delegate to the Advisory Council, as well as to the British Resident Minister and the United States Political Adviser.

/s/ EWS

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/s/ EWS

/t/ ELLERY W. SCONE

Captain, USMA

Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: British High Commissioner in Italy

U.S. Delegate to the Advisory Council

British Resident Minister

U.S. Political Adviser.

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20/632

A/CC 091.1

3 July 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

3 JUL 1944

To: Allied Force Headquarters
 (Attention: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GCB, GBE, OM, AIC)

1. In the communique of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

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DECLASSIFIED

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

By: *[Signature]* Date: 4/24/72~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

drawn up.

3. In taking note of this explanation, I made it plain that the subject was one of considerable interest to the Allied Governments. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had on a number of occasions affirmed their intention that the Italian people should be free to choose in this matter at the proper moment. The Italian Government should therefore presume that the Allied Governments would wish for full details of any scheme under consideration before it becomes law. In order that this point shall be on record and should not be lost sight of, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has made a minute for the files of the President of the Council.

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6. I am sending copies of this memorandum to the British High Commissioner and the United States Delegate to the Advisory Council, as well as to the British Resident Minister and the United States Political Adviser.

ELMER E. SMITH
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: British High Commissioner in Italy
U.S. Delegate to the Advisory Council
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser

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HQ. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

JLR/hjp

Office of the Deputy Chief Commissioner

A. P. O. 394

In reply refer to:
DCC 311.2
C/6/2/22

13 April 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Civil External Cable and Radio Communications

TO : A.F.H.Q. (Attention: Chief Signal Officer)

1. Reference this HQ cable No. 2584 of 7 April, and your reply F 30593 dated 11 April (copies attached for reference).


2. The question was raised because the transfer of the Cable and Radio Censorship Section from Palermo to Naples was ordered, and officers have arrived in Naples, which led us to assume that the early resumption of civil external telecommunication facilities was contemplated.

3. It was also known that permission had been given for the commercial cable and radio companies to begin operation on the cables from Naples and Brindisi, and to install and operate radio services from Naples to the United States and United Kingdom, and that these channels are in effective operation, and in a position to accept civil traffic in addition to Press.

4. As however cable F 30593 dated 11 April states that the resumption of civil external telecommunications is not in early prospect, the policy that is being followed is not clear to this Commission; in order to clarify the situation, a statement on the subject would be welcomed.

2353

For the Chief Commissioner:



MELROY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

2 Incls:
As in para 1 above

cc: Telecomm & Posts Subcom

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
by *[Signature]* Date *4/28/77*
NARS, Data *4/28/77*

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0563

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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OSH 725
6 MAY 1944

X426

1st Ind.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, SIGNAL SECTION, APO 512, U. S. ARMY, 29 April 1944. 4054

TO: Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission, APO 394, U. S. Army.

1. Basic communication has been referred to G-2, INC and MGS at this headquarters for policy decision and the statements contained in our F30593 have been reaffirmed. It is not believed that opening of Italian external communications by cable and radio is desirable at this time and there is, therefore, no intention to sanction them.

2. Circuits referred to in basic letter were opened primarily for the purpose of handling official Allied press, SCM and similar types of traffic other than Italian commercial.

R. W. Minckler
R. W. MINCKLER
Colonel, Signal Corps
Actg Chief Signal Officer

2 Incls: n/c



2382



DECLASSIFIED
803 Jan 4, 1974
By [signature]

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

/epc

TELCONS
JLH/mar

OUTGOING

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

FATIMA REAR

FREEDOM

APR

REQUEST ADVICE WHEN EXTERNAL TELEGRAPHS ON COMMERCIAL RADIO
AND CABLE CIRCUITS LIKELY TO BE PERMITTED PAREN TO FREEDOM FOR
CSO AND INC FROM FATIMA REAR FROM HENDERSON SIGNED MACFARLANE
PAREN AND WHAT RESTRICTIONS WILL BE PLACED ON TYPE OF TRAFFIC

AUTHENTICATED:

E.J. CHIOCCA
CWO USA
Asst AdjDISTRIBUTION

- 1 - AG File
- 1 - DSG
- 1 - DCC
- 1 - Col Henderson Telecoms

2302

Incll

C O P Y

/enc

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO: 48/11

CLASS: RESTRICTED

REF NO: F50-93

PREC: ROUTINE

FILED : APR 112117B

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHSIG

REC'D : APR 121300B
Via ACC Courier

TO : FATIMA REAR Reur 2584 April 7

Present plans do not contemplate granting permission for sending external messages on commercial circuits in the immediate future. If this policy is changed specific restrictions will be formulated.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AG File
- 1 - DCC Info
- 1 - DSG Info
- 1 - Telecoms ACTION

2306

/ac/ 2

~~SECRET~~

WAS/hjp

In reply refer to:
DCC 383.6

25 March 1944

SUBJECT: General Gazzera, AAI Letter, AAI/1402/4/9(15), 12 March 44
TO : Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy

Attached is a result of inquiries which have been made as requested in the subject letter concerning General Gazzera. Until further evidence is produced, there do not appear to be grounds for a refusal by the Commission to accept Marshal Badoglio's nomination of General Gazzera to handle matters with reference to Prisoners of War.

ALBERT W. DORR
Captain, USMC
Deputy Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
Report on Gen. Gazzera

2309

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By *[Signature]* Date *4/24/77*

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25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM:GENERAL GAZZERA

General Gazzera had rapid promotion in World War I, rising from the rank of Captain to the rank of Brigadier General by the end of the war. During this period, however, he was not in the field but in the operations section of the General Staff.

In 1920, a Commission, headed by Badoglio, was appointed to examine the record of each general officer of the army to report whether (a) he should be reduced in rank, (b) he should be retired, or (c) if retained, he would have prospects for future advancement. In the case of General Gazzera, the Commission held that he should be retained but because he had not actually commanded a unit in the field, his chances for future advancement would not be good.

Following publication of the Commission's report, General Gazzera elected to go on half pay of leave which permits an Italian officer within three years to request reassignment to active duty. After trying to make some headway in industrial life, Gazzera decided after four months that he preferred duty in the army, requested orders to active duty, and was reassigned to active duty in 1920, serving continuously thereafter.

His first assignment was as head of a Military Tribunal in Turin. Subsequently he served as the Italian Army member of an Albanian Boundary Commission for the League of Nations, and in 1924 became head of the Italian Army Staff College at Turin.

Referring to Appendix "B" to the report dated 12 February 1944 on this officer, the statement that "General Gazzera was not in the Permanent Army" when Fascism came into power is therefore incorrect. Moreover, he was not appointed Minister of War until 1928. It is understood that he received this appointment because of his work as head of the Staff College and because he had the reputation of being a strict disciplinarian without political ties, and therefore could be expected to bring an efficient administration to the Italian Army at a time when it was at a low ebb.

During his tenure as Minister, however, he made many enemies among both Fascist officials and officers of the Army because of his efforts to break up political and military cliques within the Army and his insistence on efficiency and discipline regardless of political position. He was dismissed as Minister of War in 1932 because of his continuous

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opposition to Mussolini's plan to incorporate the Fascist Militia into the Regular Army.

It is understood that Count Sforza in a speech made in Italy shortly after his return referred to General Gazzera as the only Army General whom the Fascists sacrificed.

Contrary to the interpretation put on it in the appendix "C" report, it is believed that the first line of his speech of 7 Nov 43 reading as follows, "Officers, non-coms, corporals, soldiers, sailors, airmen and Militia" is consistent with his refusal to accept the Militia as part of the Army. If he had become reconciled to considering the Militia as members of the Army, his salutation to "soldiers" would have been adequate. It is probable that he still did not consider Militia prisoners as soldiers of the Army, but because they were fellow Italian prisoners and present before him, he referred to them in his salutation.

It is believed that the reports against him arise from fellow officers against whom he may have been severe in his program of efficiency and discipline.

2357

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2.1 and 2.2 of 11
By *JS* Jan 4, 1978
4/26/77

- 2 -
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COPY

Subject: - General GAZZERA.

Headquarters
Allied Armies in Italy.

Br. SECRET - US SECRET

AAI/1402/L/G(Ib)

12 Mar 44.

A.C.C.

1. Attached is the copy of a report which has been received from A.F.H.Q.
2. It would be appreciated if further enquiries could be made concerning General GAZZERA, as it appears that he may be unsuitable from the security point of view to hold an official position.
3. May we be informed of the result in due course.
4. Please return attached correspondence with your reply.

/s/ Young, Major
for Lieut-General,
Chief of General Staff.

SF.

3 2306

NOTE:
Enclosures (original) returned to
AAI with letter of 25 Mar 44,
per par 4 above.

~~SECRET~~COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

B-387.450

8 March 1944.

SUBJECT: General GAZZERA and other repatriated Italian Officers.

TO : G(1b) Allied Central Mediterranean Force.
Military Government Section (conversation JACKMAN - BURGESS-ROLFE refers).

1. Herewith a copy of a report dated 17 February 1944 on General Pietro GAZZERA and certain other Italian officers who were P.W. in the U.S.A. and who have been released and repatriated.
2. Nothing further is known against any of these officers at this H.Q.; it is possible that the information is not reliable; will you please have enquiries made and inform this H.Q. in due course.
3. General GAZZERA has been nominated by Marshal BADOLLI "to take up with the A.C.C. all matters in reference to Prisoners of War" and will be at SALERNO (See message No. 1390 of 28 February 1944 from PATIMA (PARCO) from MACFARLANE Personal to A.F.H.Q. for Chief of Staff and M.G.S. repeated H.Q. A.C.C.F.).

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

. 2303

/s/ R. Boggis-Rolfe,
/t/ R. BURGESS-ROLFE,
Major, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

Encl.

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EO 11652 Sec. 3(e) and 5(f) or (g)
By *[Signature]* Date *4/26/77*

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COPY

Information concerning the six General Officers and four other Officers, all Italian Prisoners of War, who recently departed from Monticello, Arkansas, presumably for repatriation.

1. These ten officers left Monticello in three groups as follows:

- a. On 1 December 43:

General Designato d'Armata PIERO GAZZERA (1201-SAF)
 Generale di Brigata FRANCESCO GUSCO (97-MS)
 Generale di Corpo d'Armata Aerea PIERO PINNA (15659)
 colonnello MARIO PEZZI (1566)

- b. On 23 December 43:

Capitano VINCENZO MARINI (48135-SAF)
 Tenente di Vascello GINO CIRINDELLO (510-646-NA)

- c. On 22 January 44:

Generale di Divisione PIERO BELLETTI (31-I-913)
 Generale di Divisione GUIDO BUSELLI (31-I-1005)
 Generale di Divisione FRANCESCO LA FORIA (31-I-1006)
 Contrammiraglio GIUSEPPE SANFREDI (NA/T-6530)

2. The most important information which has come to light regarding the loyalty of any of these departed officers concerns the former spokesman for the General Officers at Monticello, General Gazzera who was the senior Italian General Officer prisoner of war. During the course of an interrogation with a high-ranking Italian prisoner of war, certain documentary evidence was discovered which may be a good reason to urge extreme caution in accepting this General as a collaborator. The evidence, as well as other information on General Gazzera, is submitted herewith:

3. Lt. Colonel LIBRIO PETRICALVINA (1563) who upon interrogation proved to be a wholehearted collaborator and anti-Fascist willing to furnish information concerning other Italian prisoners of war, is a member of the Italian General Staff Corps, very intelligent and discreet, and it is believed that he constitutes a definitely reliable source. He was among a group of Italian Officer prisoners who were located at a Prisoner of War Camp at Dehra Dun, India, for some time after the fall of Italian East Africa. (Gen GAZZERA was formerly Governor of Ethiopia under the Duca d'Aosta, who was Viceroy and Governor General of all Italian East Africa, the entire organization of which was captured by the British during the summer of 1941). General GAZZERA who was the spokesman at Dehra Dun and spread a great amount of propaganda in the POW Camp for the Fascist cause, established a Fascist Combat Unit among the Italians at that Camp. Membership to this organization was compulsory rather than a matter of choice. General GAZZERA caused a membership card to be drawn up for each using the reverse of a paper 1-anna (1/16 of a rupee) canteen coupon which consisted of: inscription of the rank and name of the officer to whom it was issued, date of the first organization of this Fascist organization (23 March 1942), and the personal signature in black ink of General GAZZERA in the lower right corner. Upon renewal of membership,

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28 October 1942, the twenty-first anniversary of the March on Rome, General GAZZERA resigned the card in red ink along the right edge. (Sample of 1-Anna attached with Lt. Col. Petracalvina's name blocked out to avoid wrong impressions as to his loyalty). A translated report with further details on General GAZZERA will be found attached as Appendix C. The primary interest of General GAZZERA is General GAZZERA. He cannot be trusted for loyalty any further than it serves his own selfish interests and he is extremely disliked by everyone. He has many personal enemies among the General Officers as well as among the other officers, the NCO's and soldiers. He has been a cruel disciplinarian in Italian East Africa where it is reported he resorted to such methods as staking soldiers out unclothed on the desert sands for a whole day as punishment for certain infractions of regulations. A reliable American officer who was in daily contact with General GAZZERA during his four months at this camp reports that his personal impression of General GAZZERA is "a selfish, egotistical pig who does not enjoy the respect of any other Italian except Brig. General BADOLIO". These two Generals left Monticello together. General GAZZERA "is heartily disliked by his own nephew, Captain Marini who left this camp shortly after his uncle did". "That any organization headed by General GAZZERA will fail if Italian prisoners from Monticello are placed in it" is confirmed by the same American officer who gave the above statements.

4. While at Monticello, General GAZZERA began to trim his sails in view of the new turns of events, particularly the declaration of war by Italy against Germany. No effort was made to go out of his way to collaborate. In fact, he showed great opposition to the idea of collaboration unless the path were cleared and made a matter of command by Badoglio. In view of General GAZZERA's position and seniority, he made no move to win other Italian prisoners to the side of Badoglio and collaboration with the allies. During the month of November when he spoke to an assembly of Italian officer prisoners, he indulged in generalities and addressed himself not only to the members of the Regular Army but also to the members of the Fascist Militia, a dissolved organization of two months previous. His departure from this camp was viewed by practically all of the intelligent cooperative Italians as a serious mistake on the part of the American authorities. If he returned at Badoglio's request, the presumption was this request was due not so much to a desire to use him in the present situation, but rather to place him well out of harm's way and to remove him from a position where he could seriously hurt Italo-American collaboration on this side of the Atlantic. In view of the above information, it is recommended that extreme caution be exercised by American military authorities which have or ever will have dealings with General GAZZERA.

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5. Concerning the other nine recently-departed officers, the following information is submitted as having been secured from sources believed to be reliable, for whatever action you deem advisable.

Gen. RUASCO: He is generally regarded as an argumentative and hateful man and is described by other Italian Generals as a mere lawyer, in no sense a soldier. He is alleged to have inspired such hatred among his fellow prisoners of war that several of them have expressed their intention to kill him upon their return to Italy. Several reputable sources have claimed that he conducted himself in a highly criminal fashion while in Italian East Africa, and that he ordered the shooting of many of the Ascaris (native troops used by the Italians in those colonies). This man seems to have won his way into the affections of General Gazzera to such an extent that the latter will do nothing without his advice and approval. It is believed that much of the legal and juridical opposition to collaboration which we found on the part of these two Generals upon the occasion of our former visit to this camp was not entirely due to legal and juridical opposition, but that this opposition was a blind for antipathy to the Allied cause.

Gen. PINNA: This Air Force General is said to be a likable, jolly officer who is generally respected by all Italian officers. He is believed to be entirely loyal to the King of Italy. It is believed that he is one of the strongest anti-Fascists among all the General officers mentioned in this report.

Col. PIZZI: This Air Force Colonel is said to be a cold-blooded, emotionless soldier who has no personal friends nor enemies. It is believed that this man is above politics and will do exactly as ordered by the King. It is claimed that he could pass for a Vermont Yankee. Prisoner of war sources believed to be reliable claim that he, together with Gen. Pinna, constituted the core of the anti-Fascist bloc among these 10 officers. It will be remembered that Colonel PIZZI holds the world record for altitude flying, having reached some height between 14 and 15 miles. 2302

Capt. MARINI: He is said to be a dull, unimaginative, quiet, unobtrusive, likable fellow and probably utterly harmless. He is General Gazzera's nephew and it is believed that his return to Italy was due to the influence of his uncle.

Naval Lt. BRIGNELLI: It is claimed by a number of independent sources that he is a loyal Fascist and that he indulged in a great deal of propaganda while at Monticello, even to the very end. He seems to be a brilliant engineer, and authority on baby submarines. He speaks careful, precise English and wins the friendship of all who meet him. Great amazement was expressed at this camp at his being allowed to return to Italy, where it is generally supposed he went.

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Gen. BELLETTI: he is said to be a good-natured, fat, unimpressive man who asks for many small favors but never causes any real trouble. When told that he was to return to Italy, he broke into tears and said that he had been praying for this opportunity of helping his country. There is nothing definite against him on the score of loyalty.

Gen. BOSCHI: His loyalty to the King seems to be certain. He seems to be a very nervous, high-strung General who was not taken too seriously by the other prisoners of war. One reliable source claims that he is definitely anti-Fascist, but there does not seem to be much unanimity on this point.

Gen. LA PERLA: Said to be an ordinary individual without any distinctive personality. Many independent sources among the prisoners of war claim that he is still Fascist and definitely pro-Nazi. He continued to wear German decorations until advised not to do so. Extreme doubt exists as to his loyalty to the Allied cause.

Adm. MANFREDI: His return caused an enormous amount of surprise among the remaining Generals and the other officers at this camp. He is generally regarded as being pro-German and pro-Nazi, as well as having been violently Fascist in the old days. He is a most cultured, charming and intelligent individual personally and caused no trouble to the American authorities. Further information on him, all pointing more or less to the same general conclusions, will be found available in reports submitted from 11A2 during the months of August and September 1943.

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APPENDIX C (From notes by Lt. Colonel Petracalvina of Nov. 43)

General GAZZERA constitutes a great danger because he undoubtedly is one of the champions of the Fascist "trap" that must disappear completely.

General GAZZERA--already Minister of War (for Mussolini) and Fascist Senator--was not the purely technical adviser with limited political tendencies, but rather the true Fascist exponent of the Reg theory. The whole doctrine of Fascism is more or less included in the word "Fascismo". Through his activities as Minister, GAZZERA proved to be the most dangerous exponent of that theory, and does not fall into the category of those "Fascists" who were compelled to belong to the Party because of practical reasons or for reasons of livelihood. General GAZZERA was not in the ranks of the Permanent Army when Fascism acquired power by force, but as soon as Fascism rose to power he was immediately recalled to service and appointed Minister of War, a position obtainable only after showing unwavering loyalty to Fascism. General GAZZERA who has sponsored intensive Fascist activities, also sponsored secret circulars in India which kept him in contact with many prisoner camps. These circulars kept the flame of Fascism burning in the hearts and minds of all prisoners of war. The English, after unweaving such activities, wrote General GAZZERA an official letter requesting he cease his subversive activity which was indeed intolerable.

General GAZZERA's position has been ambiguous and uncertain since the "coup d'etat" of 25 July 1943, for he has assumed an attitude of expectancy, a position which manifests doubt. After the Armistice and especially after Italy's declaration of war against Germany, General GAZZERA never felt the need of taking sides or of expressing any definite opinion. Absenteeism was more convenient for him and his uncompromising nature.

Although he hardly ever showed his face in the compound for officers other than Generals, he was present at a commemoration of the dead on 7 November. He made a speech at this function, the first line of which went thus: "Officers, non-coms, corporals, soldiers, sailors, airmen and Militi". In his mind, members of the Mussolini Militia forces still exist. His speech was so written as to please everyone including Mussolini and Hitler. "A foot in five stirrups"--that is General GAZZERA, a dangerous element who, because of his inflated ego, is capable of anything.

GAZZERA worships General Guiseo whose postulate is "The Fascist doctrine shall never die; it is always full of life and it shall rule forever."

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