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LETTERS, BADOGLIO, ARMISTICE
SEPT. - NOV. 1943

LETTER FROM MARSHALL PIETRO BACCALIO to:
President ROOSEVELT and Prime Minister CHURCHILL.

20 November 1943.

Mr. President:

I should be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would find time and leisure to consider some brief considerations on the amendment regarding the armistice and the naval clauses which I, as head of the Italian Government and Admiral De Courten, as Minister of the Navy, have found ourselves in the harsh necessity of being obliged to sign today, after having vainly suggested a modification which, in our opinion, would have been without doubt more in keeping with the de jure and de facto situation now existing between our countries.

I shall sum up my thought briefly:

The armistice signed by General Castellano on the 3rd of September by my order contained no clause which referred to the surrender of Italy. They were, as you know, principally military clauses. At that time I was told that later further clauses would be presented to me but only civil ones.

On the 29th of September when on our part we had already given loyal execution to all the terms of the armistice and when, with the full approval of the Anglo-American Mission, the phase of real collaboration had begun, I was compelled, at Malta, to sign the additional clauses which altered and made more burdensome the conditions of the armistice signed the 3rd of September, and which were entitled "unconditional surrender of Italy."

On my remonstrance General Eisenhower pledged himself to present to the Allied governments the reason for my disagreement and to propose to them the cancellation of various sentences particularly and needlessly harmful to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion to the common cause which it was and is my firm purpose to maintain with all means at my disposal.

General Eisenhower in fact wrote me - among other things - what follows (letter dated 29 September):

And even more explicitly the Head of the Allied Mission assured me formally and in writing on Oct 17:

However and notwithstanding the further transition from cooperation to cobelligerency and the assurances I had been given, the document was returned to me corrected in part but still containing the word "surrender" which not occur in the original clauses.

Similarly too for the naval conditions.

On the 23rd of September this question was discussed exhaustively and

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Similarly too for the naval conditions.

On the 23rd of September this question was discussed exhaustively and at length by Admiral Cunningham and Admiral Pofourten and brought to a conclusion agreed upon by both parties.

Now, more than thirty days after, a new document is presented to me, a new amendment in which there is finally conceded the cancellation - previously promised and announced - of the words which had occasioned my remonstrances, but, at the same time, signature by the Allies is conditioned on our acceptance of another naval clause which turns again on a matter already agreed upon after discussion and weighs heavily on the position of Italy.

I have been compelled, I repeat, to sign this amendment which I nevertheless hope you will be able to have reconsidered on the basis of the modification suggested by me.

- 2 -

May I be allowed to point out that at this time three quarters of the Italian naval forces are collaborating with the naval forces of the Allies; that Italian forces have fought in Sardinia and in Corsica; that Italian forces are fighting in the Aegean islands at the side of English forces; that Italian forces are fighting, under particularly hard and trying circumstances, in Crete, Montenegro and Greece in unity with Greeks and Serbs; that our patriots are fighting in Northern Italy, in desperate conditions, against the Germans and are sabotaging lines of communications and supply.

May I be allowed also to recall that in the liberated zone we have not only complied with all the requests of the Allies but we have continued to insist that our troops take part in the liberation of the country - a place that has been finally granted in part.

My Government which, in its present temporary formation, ensures, in my opinion under present circumstances those surteases of order and stability which it is in your interest to maintain, and which as you know must be replaced as soon as Rome is reached, by another which may better and more completely represent the new Italy, my Government, born as it was among the difficulties of war and extremely difficult domestic conditions, watches with a certain bitterness this progressive and constant aggravation of conditions already discussed and agreed upon by the Allied governments. It finds some difficulty in understanding this, deprived as it is of communications, of any source of information in the outside world, without direct contact with the tens of millions of Italians who live abroad or with its representatives in other countries, without, in a word, these elementary attributes of liberty which on our part we yet intend to introduce into our country.

And it is for this reason that I permit myself to turn directly to you, Mr President; in order that being aware above all of the numerous, grave and painful difficulties which beset the Italian nation, of the firm purpose of my Government and myself to fight at your side against the common enemy; of my desire to give the country those free democratic institutions which form your strength, you may continue to find in-spiration for your actions in our regard in those standards of human equity of which you undoubtedly are among the greatest and most respected champions in the world.

4275

LETTER FROM MARSHALL ELMER BACCHIO TO:
President ROOSEVELT and Prime Minister CHURCHILL.

20 November 1943.

Mr. President:

I should be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would find time and leisure to consider some brief considerations on the amendment regarding the armistice and the naval clauses which I, as head of the Italian Government and Admiral de Courten, as Minister of the Navy, have found ourselves in the harsh necessity of being obliged to sign today, after having in vain suggested a modification which, in our opinion, would have been without doubt rats in keeping with the de jure and de facto situation now existing between our countries.

I shall sum up my thought briefly:

The armistice signed by General Castellano on the 3rd of September by my order contained no clause which referred to the surrender of Italy. They were, as you know, principally military clauses. At that time I was told that later further clauses would be presented to me but only civil ones.

On the 29th of September when on our part we had already given loyal execution to all the terms of the armistice and when, with the full approval of the Anglo-American mission, the phase of real collaboration had begun, I was compelled, at Malta, to sign the additional clauses which altered and made more burdensome the conditions of the armistice signed the 3rd of September, and which were entitled "unconditional surrender of Italy."

On my reconnaissance General Eisenhower pledged himself to present to the Allied Governments the reasons for my disagreement and to propose to them the cancellation of various sentences particularly and needlessly harmful to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion to the common cause which it was and is my firm purpose to maintain with all means at my disposal.

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On my resignation General Eisenhower pledged himself to present to the Allied governments the reasons for my disagreement and to propose to them the cancellation of various sentences particularly and needlessly harmful to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion to the common cause which it was and is my firm purpose to maintain with all means at my disposal.

General Eisenhower in fact wrote me - among other things - what follows (letter dated 25 September):

And even more explicitly the Head of the Allied Mission assured me formally and in writing on Oct 17:

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On the 25th of September this question was discussed exhaustively and at length by Admiral Cunningham and Admiral Repington and brought to a conclusion agreed upon by both parties.

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I have been compelled, I repeat, to sign this amendment which I nevertheless hope you will be able to have reconsidered on the basis of the modification suggested by me.

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May I be allowed also to recall that in the liberated zone we have not only complied with all the requests of the Allies but we have continued to insist that our troops take part in the liberation of the country - a plea that has been finally granted in part.

My Government which, in its present temporary formation, ensures, in my opinion under present circumstances those guarantees of order and stability which it is in your interest to maintain, and which as you know must be replaced as soon as Rome is reached, by another which may better and more completely represent the new Italy, my Government, born as it was among the difficulties of war and extremely difficult domestic conditions, watches with a certain bitterness this progressive and constant aggravation of conditions already discussed and agreed upon by the Allied Governments. It finds some difficulty in understanding this, derived as it is of communications, of any source of information in the outside world, without direct contact with the tens of millions of Italians who live abroad or with its representatives in other countries. Without, in a word, these elementary attributes of liberty which an our people has yet intend to introduce into our country.

And it is for this reason that I permit myself to turn directly to you, Mr President; in order that being aware above all of the numerous, grave and painful difficulties which beset the Italian nation, of the firm purpose of my Government and myself to fight at your side against the common enemy; of my desire to give the country those free democratic institutions which form your strength, you may continue to find inspiration for your actions in our regard in those standards of human equity of which you undoubtedly are among the greatest and most respected champions in the world.

4213

PROTOCOL OF AMENDMENT TO THE LONG ARMISTICE TERMS

It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "additional conditions of Armistice with Italy". The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "Governments" and "on the one hand". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature".

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments," and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the (1) Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments".

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government" (1).

In Article 1a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender".

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to (2) this purpose will be followed."

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the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature".

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In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government" (1).

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The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at Brindisi.

NOEL MACFARLANE
Lt. General
For the Allied
Commander-in-Chief

Il Capo del Governo
Italiano
BADOGLIO

0 2 7 5

LETTER FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER TO MARSHAL BADOLIO

29th September, 1943.

My dear Marshal Badoglio,

The terms of the armistice to which we have just appended our signatures are supplementary to the short military armistice signed by your representative and mine on September 3rd, 1943. They are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognised by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also recognise that it is not at this time in the power of the Italian Government to carry out certain of the terms. Failure to do so because of existing conditions will not be regarded as a breach of good faith on the part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so.

It is to be understood that the terms both of this document and of the short military armistice of September 3rd may be modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of co-operation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable.

Sincerely,

DAUGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces

His Excellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio
Head of the Italian Government

4264

(Lettera del Maresciallo Badoglio
al Presidente Roosevelt e al Primo Ministro Churchill)

20 novembre 1943.

Signor Presidente, (1)

Vi sarei molto grato, Signor Presidente, se vorrete trovare tempo e modo di esaminare alcune brevi considerazioni sull'argomento riguardante l'armistizio e le clausole navali che io, come Capo del Governo italiano, e l'Ammiraglio De Courten, come Ministro della Marina, ci siamo trovati nella dura necessità di dover firmare oggi, dopo aver invano proposto una modificazione che, a nostro avviso, sarebbe stata indubbiamente più rispondente alla situazione di diritto e di fatto attualmente esistente fra i nostri Paesi.

Riassumo in breve il mio pensiero:

L'armistizio firmato per mio ordine il 3 settembre dal Generale Castellano non conteneva alcuna clausola che accennasse alla resa dell'Italia. Erano, come Voi sapete, clausole prevalentemente militari. Mi fu detto allora che, in seguito, mi sarebbero state presentate ulteriori clausole, ma soltanto civili.

Il 29 settembre, quando già avevamo da parte nostra dato locale esecuzione a tutte le disposizioni dell'armistizio e quando era stata già iniziata, con la piena approvazione della Missione anglo-americana, la fase della vera e propria collaborazione, fui costretto, a Malta, a firmare le clausole aggiuntive che alteravano e aggravavano le condizioni dell'armistizio firmato il 3 settembre e che avevano per titolo "resa incondizionata dell'Italia".

Dinanzi alle mie rimostranze, il Generale Eisenhower si impegnò peraltro a rappresentare ai Governi alleati le ragioni del mio contrasto e a proporre loro la cancellazione di diversa fraesi specialmente ed inutilmente lesive per il buon nome della nuova Italia e pregiudizievoli, a mio avviso, alla causa comune che era ed è mio fermissimo proposito di sostenere con ogni mezzo a mia disposizione.

Il Generale Eisenhower del resto, in data del 29 settembre, mi scriveva fra l'altro quanto segue:

"The supplementary terms of the Armistice are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent."

E ancora più esplicitamente il 17 ottobre scorso il Capo della Missione Alleata mi assicurava formalmente per iscritto: "In confirmation of the statement which I have already made to you orally, I have the honor to inform you that the American, British and Soviet Governments have approved the amendments to the document containing the Long Armistice terms which you desired."

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Comunque, e nonostante l'ulteriore passaggio dalla cooperazione alla collaborazione e le assicurazioni datemi, il documento mi venne restituito corretto in parte, ma tuttora contenente le parole "resa", non esistente nelle clausole primitive.

Così' avvenne anche per le condizioni navali.

Il 23 settembre quest'ultima questione fu lungamente ed esaurientemente discussa fra l'Ammiraglio Cunningham e l'Ammiraglio De Courten e portata ad una conclusione concordata fra le due Parti.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Ora, a più di 30 giorni di distanza, mi si presenta un nuovo emendamento in cui si concede finalmente la promessa e annunciata cancellazione delle parole che avevano dato motivo alle mie rimostranze, ma, insieme, si condiziona la sua firma da parte Alleata all'accettazione da parte nostra di una ulteriore clausola navale, che torna ancora una volta su una materia già concordata e discussa e aggrava sensibilmente la posizione dell'Italia.

Sono stato costretto, ripeto, a firmare tale emendamento, che spero tuttavia, Signor Presidente, vogliate trovare modo di far riesaminare sulla base della modificazione da me presentata.

Mi sia lecito ricordare che in questo periodo i tre quarti delle forze navali italiane collaborano con le forze navali alleate; che forze italiane si sono battute in Sardegna ed in Corsica contro i tedeschi; che forze italiane si battono, in condizioni particolarmente dure e difficili, in Croazia, Montenegro, Grecia insieme a Greci e Serbi; che forze italiane si battono nelle isole dell'Egeo insieme a forze inglesi; che nostri patrioti si battono in Alta Italia, in condizioni disperate, contro i germanici e ne sabotano le linee di comunicazione e di rifornimento.

Ma sia lecito altresì ricordare che, nella zona liberata, non solo abbiamo soddisfatto a tutte le richieste degli alleati, ma abbiamo anche insediato sempre perché nostre truppe possano concorrere alla liberazione del Paese, ciò che ci è stato infine parzialmente concesso.

Il mio Governo che, nella sua presente temporanea formazione, assicura, a mio giudizio, nelle circostanze attuali, quelle garanzie d'ordine e di stabilità che è interesse nostro e Vostro mantenere, e che dovrà del resto, come Voi sapete, essere sostituito, appena giunti a Roma, da altri che meglio e più compiutamente rappresentino la nuova Italia, nata faticosamente fra difficoltà di guerra ed interne estremamente dure, vede dunque con qualche amarezza questo progressivo e costante aggravarsi di condizioni già disperse e concordate da parte dei Governi alleati. E di ciò stenta veramente a rendersi conto privo com'è di comunicazioni, di qualunque fonte di informazione col mondo esterno, di contatti diretti con le decine di milioni di italiani che vivono oltre confine e con le sue rappresentanze all'estero, senza cioè quegli elementari attributi di libertà che pur intendiamo da parte nostra introdurre lealmente nell'interno del Paese.

Ed è per questo, Signor Presidente, ch'io mi permetto di rivolgermi direttamente a Voi perché, tenendo soprattutto conto delle molte, gravi, dolorose difficoltà che la Nazione italiana attraversa; del fermissimo proposito mio e del mio Governo di battersi al Vostro fianco contro il nemico comune; della mia volontà di dare al Paese quelle libere istituzioni democratiche che sono la Vostra forza, vogliate continuare ad ispirare la Vostra azione nei nostri confronti a quei criteri di umana equità di cui Voi indubbiamente siete fra i più grandi e rispettati assertori nel mondo.

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RADDOLIO

4207

(1) Nella lettera al Primo Ministro Churchill le parole "Signor Presidente" sono sostituite con le parole "Signor Primo Ministro".

(Lettera del Maresciallo Badoglio
al Presidente Roosevelt e al Primo Ministro Churchill)

20 novembre 1943.

Signor Presidente, (1)

Vi sarei molto grato, Signor Presidente, se vorrete trovar tempo e modo di esaminare alcune brevi considerazioni sull'esandamento riguardante l'armistizio e le clausole navali che io, come Capo del Governo italiano, e l'Ammiraglio De Courtes, come Ministro della Marina, ci siamo trovati nella dura necessità di dover firmare oggi, dopo aver irruvato proposta una modificazione che, a nostro avviso, sarebbe stata indubbiamente più rispondente alla situazione di diritto e di fatto attualmente esistente fra i nostri Paesi.

Riassumo in breve il mio pensiero:

L'armistizio firmato per mio ordine il 3 settembre dal Generale Castellano non conteneva alcuna clausola che necessasse alla resa dell'Italia. Erano, come Voi sapete, clausole prevalentemente militari. Mi fu detto allora che, in seguito, mi sarebbero state presentate ulteriori clausole, ma soltanto civili.

Il 29 settembre, quando già si avevano da parte nostra dato locale esecuzione a tutte le disposizioni dell'armistizio e quando era stata già iniziata, con la piena approvazione della Missione anglo-americana, la fase della vera e propria collaborazione, fui costretto, a Malta, a firmare la clausola aggiuntiva che alterava e aggravavano le condizioni dell'armistizio firmato il 3 settembre e che avevano per titolo "resa incondizionata dell'Italia".

Dinnanzi alle mie rimostranze, il Generale Eisenhower si impegnò peraltro a rappresentare ai Governi alleati le ragioni del mio contrasto e a proporre loro la cancellazione di diverse frasi specialmente ed inutilmente lesive per il buon nome della nuova Italia e pregiudizievole, a mio avviso, alla causa comune che ora ed è mio fermissimo proposito di sostenere con ogni mezzo a mia disposizione.

Il Generale Eisenhower del resto, in data del 29 settembre, mi scriveva fra l'altro quanto segue:

"The supplementary terms of the Armistice are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Government on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent."

E ancora più esplicitamente il 17 ottobre scorso il Capo della Missione Alleata mi assicurava formalmente per iscritto: "In confirmation of the statement which I have already made to you orally, I have the honor to inform you that the American, British and Soviet Governments have approved the amendments to the document containing the Long Armistice terms which you desired."

Comunque, e nonostante l'ulteriore intervento della commissione alla

4205

e di fatto attualmente esistente fra i nostri Paesi.

Riassumo in breve il mio pensiero:

L'armistizio firmato per mio ordine il 3 settembre dal Generale Castellano non conteneva alcuna clausola che si riferisse alla resa dell'Italia. Erano, come Voi sapete, clausole prevalentemente militari. Mi fu detto allora che, in seguito, mi sarebbero state presentate ulteriori clausole, sia soltanto civili.

Il 29 settembre, quando già' avevamo da parte nostra dato leale esecuzione a tutte le disposizioni dell'armistizio e quando era stata già' iniziata, con la piena approvazione della Missione anglo-americana, la fase della vera e propria collaborazione, fui costretto, a Malta, a firmare le clausole aggiuntive che alteravano e aggravavano le condizioni dell'armistizio firmato il 3 settembre e che avevamo per titolo "resa incondizionata dell'Italia".

Dimandai alle mie rimpatrianze, il Generale Eisenhower si impegna' peraltro a rappresentare ai Governi alleati le ragioni del mio contrasto e a proporre loro la cancellazione di diverse frasi specialmente ed inutilmente lesive per il buon nome della nuova Italia e pregiudizievoli, a mio avviso, alla causa comune che era ed e' mio fermissimo proposito di sostenere con ogni mezzo a mia disposizione.

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Comunque, e nonostante l'ulteriore passaggio dalla cooperazione alla collaborazione e le assicurazioni dettate, il documento mi venne restituito corretto in parte, ma tuttora contenente la parola "resa", non esistente nelle clausole primitive.

Così' avvenne anche per le condizioni navali.

Il 23 settembre quest'ultima questione fu lungamente ed esaurientemente discussa fra l'Ammiraglio Cunningham e l'Ammiraglio De Courton e portata ad una conclusione concordata fra le due Parti.

Ora, a più di 30 giorni di distanza, mi si presenta un nuovo espediente in cui si concede finalmente la promessa o annunciata cancellazione delle parole che avevano dato motivo alle mie rimostre, ma, insieme, si condizionano la sua firma da parte Alleata all'accettazione da parte nostra di una ulteriore clausola navale, che torna ancora una volta su una materia già concordata e discussa e aggrava sensibilmente la posizione dell'Italia.

Sono stato costretto, ripeto, a firmare tale espediente, che spero tuttavia, Signor Presidente, vogliate trovare modo di far riesaminare sulla base della modificazione da me presentata.

Mi sia lecito ricordare che in questo periodo i tre quarti delle forze navali italiane collaborano con le forze navali alleate; che forze italiane si sono battute in Sardegna ed in Corsica contro i tedeschi; che forze italiane si battono, in condizioni particolarmente dure e difficili, in Croazia, Montenegro, Grecia insieme a Greci e Serbi; che forze italiane si battono nelle isole dell'Egeo insieme a forze inglesi; che nostri patrioti si battono in Alta Italia, in condizioni disperate, contro i germanici e ne sabotano le linee di comunicazione e di rifornimento.

Mi sia lecito altresì ricordare che, nella zona liberata, non solo abbiamo soddisfatto a tutte le richieste degli alleati, ma abbiamo anche insediato sempre perché le nostre truppe possano concorrere alla liberazione del Paese, ciò che ci è stato infine parzialmente concesso.

Il mio Governo che, nella sua presente temporanea formazione, assicura, a mio giudizio, nelle circostanze attuali, quella garanzia d'ordine e di stabilità che è l'interesse nostro e vostro mantenere, e che dovrà del resto, come Voi sapete, essere sostituito, appena giunti a Roma, da altri che meglio e più compiutamente rappresentino la nuova Italia, nata felicemente fra difficoltà di guerra ed interne estremamente dure, vede dunque con qualche amarezza questo progressivo e costante aggravarsi di condizioni già discusse e concordate da parte dei Governi alleati. E di ciò stenta veramente a rendersi conto privo com'è di comunicazioni, di qualunque fonte di informazione col mondo esterno, di contatti diretti con le decine di milioni di italiani che vivono oltre confine e con le mie Rappresentanze all'estero, senza cioè quegli elementi attribuiti di libertà che pur intendiamo da parte nostra introdurre lealmente nell'interno del Paese.

Ed è per questo, Signor Presidente, ch'io mi permetto di rivolgermi direttamente a Voi perché, tenendo soprattutto conto delle molte, gravi, delose difficoltà che la Nazione italiana attraversa; del ferocissimo proposito mio e del mio Governo di batterci al Vostro fianco contro il nemico comune; della mia volontà di dare al Paese quelle libere istituzioni democratiche che sono la Vostra forza, vogliate continuare ad ispirare la Vostra azione nei nostri confronti a quei criteri di umana equità di cui Voi indubbiamente siete fra i più grandi e rispettati esponenti nel mondo.

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RADOLICO

4205

- (1) Nella lettera al Primo Ministro Churchill le parole "Signor Presidente" sono sostituite con le parole "Signor Primo Ministro".

(Lettera del Maresciallo Badoglio
al Presidente Roosevelt e al Primo Ministro Churchill)

20 novembre 1943.

Signor Presidente, (1)

Vi sarei molto grato, Signor Presidente, se vorrete trovar tempo e modo di esaminare alcune brevi considerazioni sull'emendamento riguardante l'armistizio e le clausole navali che io, come Capo del Governo italiano, e l'Ammiraglio De Courten, come Ministro della Marina, ci siamo trovati nella dura necessita' di dover firmare oggi, dopo aver invano proposta una modificazione che, a nostro avviso, sarebbe stata indubbiamente piu' rispondente alla situazione di diritto e di fatto attualmente esistente fra i nostri Paesi.

Riassumo in breve il mio pensiero:

L'armistizio firmato per mio ordine il 3 settembre dal Generale Castellano non conteneva alcuna clausola che accennasse alla resa dell'Italia. Erano, come Voi sapete, clausole prevalentemente militari. Mi fu detto allora che, in seguito, mi sarebbero state presentate ulteriori clausole, ma soltanto civili.

Il 29 settembre, quando gia' avevamo da parte nostra dato leale esecuzione a tutte le disposizioni dell'armistizio e quando era stata gia' iniziata, con la piena approvazione della Missione anglo-americana, la fase della vera e propria trattativa, fui costretto, a Malta, a firmare le clausole aggiuntive che alteravano e aggravavano le condizioni dell'armistizio firmato il 3 settembre e che avevano per titolo "resa incondizionata dell'Italia".

Dinanzi alle mie rimostanze, il Generale Eisenhower si impegno' peraltro a rappresentare ai Governi alleati le ragioni del mio contrasto e a proporre loro la cancellazione di diverse frasi specialmente ed inutilmente lesive per il buon nome della nuova Italia e pregiudizievoli, a mio avviso, alla causa comune che era ed e' mio fermissimo proposito di sostenere con ogni mezzo a mia disposizione.

Il Generale Eisenhower del resto, in data del 29 settembre, mi scriveva fra l'altro quanto segue:

"The supplementary terms of the Armistice are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent."

E ancora piu' esplicitamente il 17 ottobre scorso il Capo della Missione Alleata mi assicurava formalmente per iscritto: "In confirmation of the

ficazione che, a nostro avviso, sarebbe stata indubbiamente piu' rispondente alla situazione di diritto e di fatto attualmente esistente fra i nostri Paesi.

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Comunque, e nonostante l'ulteriore passaggio dalla cooperazione alla cobelligeranza e le assicurazioni datemi, il documento mi venne restituito corretto in parte, ma tuttora contenente la parola "resa", non esistente nelle clausole primitive.

Così' avvenne anche per le condizioni navali.

Il 23 settembre quest'ultima questione fu lungamente ed esaurientemente discussa fra l'Ammiraglio Cunningham e l'Ammiraglio De Courten e portata ad una conclusione concordata fra le due Parti.

Ora, a piu' di 30 giorni di distanza, mi si presenta un nuovo emendamento in cui si concede finalmente la promessa e annunciata cancellazione delle parole che avevano dato motivo alle mie rimostanze, ma, insieme, si condiziona la sua firma da parte Alleata all'accettazione da parte nostra di una ulteriore clausola navale, che torna ancora una volta su una materia gia' concordata e discussa e aggrava sensibilmente la posizione dell'Italia.

Sono stato costretto, ripeto, a firmare tale emendamento, che spero tuttavia, Signor Presidente, vogliate trovar modo di far riesaminare sulla base della modificazione da me presentata.

Mi sia lecito ricordare che in questo periodo i tre quarti delle forze navali italiane collaborano con le forze navali alleate; che forze italiane si sono battute in Sardegna ed in Corsica contro i tedeschi; che forze italiane si battono nelle isole dell'Egeo insieme a forze inglesi; che forze italiane si battono, in condizioni particolarmente dure e difficili, in Croazia, Montenegro, Grecia insieme a Greci e Serbi; che nostri patrioti si battono in Alta Italia, in condizioni disperate, contro i germanici e ne sabotano le linee di comunicazione e di rifornimento.

Mi sia lecito altresì ricordare che, nella zona liberata, non solo abbiamo soddisfatto a tutte le richieste degli alleati, ma abbiamo anche insistito sempre perché le nostre truppe possano concorrere alla liberazione del Paese, ciò che ci è stato infine parzialmente concesso.

Il mio Governo che, nella sua presente temporanea formazione, assicura, a mio giudizio, nelle circostanze attuali, quelle garanzie d'ordine e di stabilità che è interesse nostro e Vostro mantenere, e che dovrà del resto, come Voi sapete, essere sostituito, appena giunti a Roma, da altri che meglio e più compiutamente rappresentino la nuova Italia, nata faticosamente fra difficoltà di guerra ed interne estremamente dure, vede dunque con qualche amarezza questo progressivo e costante aggravarsi di condizioni già discusse e concordate da parte dei Governi alleati. E di ciò stanta veramente a rendersi conto privo com'è di comunicazioni, di qualunque fonte di informazione col mondo esterno, di contatti diretti con le decine di milioni di italiani che vivono oltre confine e con le sue Rappresentanze all'estero, senza cioè quegli elementari attributi di libertà che pur intendiamo da parte nostra introdurre lealmente nell'interno del Paese.

Ed è per questo, Signor Presidente, ch'io mi permetto di rivolgermi direttamente a Voi perché, tenendo soprattutto conto delle molte, gravi, dolorose difficoltà che la Nazione italiana attraversa; del fermissimo proposito mio e del mio Governo di battersi al Vostro fianco contro il nemico comune; della mia volontà di dare al Paese quelle libere istituzioni democratiche che sono la Vostra forza, vogliate continuare ad ispirare la Vostra azione nei nostri confronti a quei criteri di umana equità di cui Voi indubbiamente siete fra i più grandi e rispettati assertori nel mondo.

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BADOGLIO 4232

- (1) Nella lettera al Primo Ministro Churchill le parole "Signor Presidente" sono sostituite con le parole "Signor Primo Ministro".

AIDE-MEMOIRE TO ACCOMPANY CONDITIONS OF ARMISTICE

(QUEBEC DOCUMENT)

These terms do not visualise active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations however state without reservation that wherever the Italian Forces or Italians fight the Germans or destroy German property or hamper German movement they will be given all possible support by the forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile provided information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied Allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect movements and operations of German forces.

Cessation of hostilities between United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

Italian Government must undertake to proclaim armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

The Italian Government must at hour of armistice order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by Germans shall be immediately released.

The Italian Government must at the hour of armistice order Italian fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

Meanwhile there is a good deal that Marshal Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines suggested.

(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without Germans knowing.

(ii) Minor sabotage throughout the country particularly of communications and air fields used by Germans.

(iii) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should be released.

(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

(v) No merchant shipping be allowed to fall into German hands.

Merchant shipping in Northern ports should if possible be sailed to ports South of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

4250

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(vi) The Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian coast defences. Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast with a view to their being taken off to Italy by the United Nations.

(This Aide-Memoire is known as the Quebec Document and was presented in Lisbon to General Castellano by General Smith. Its full title is: "Aide-Memoire to accompany conditions of Armistice, presented by General Eisenhower to the Italian G in C").

Smith

AIDE-MEMOIRE TO ACCOMPANY CONDITIONS OF ARMISTICE

(QUEBEC DOCUMENT)

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(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

(v) No merchant shipping be allowed to fall into German hands.

Merchant shipping in Northern ports should if possible be sailed to ports South of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled.

All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

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enemy is immediately and regularly supplied Allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect movements and operations of German forces.

Cessation of hostilities between United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

Italian Government must undertake to proclaim armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

The Italian Government must at hour of armistice order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by Germans shall be immediately released.

The Italian Government must at the hour of armistice order Italian fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

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Meanwhile there is a good deal that Marshal Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines suggested.

(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without Germans knowing.

(ii) Minor sabotage throughout the country particularly of communications and air fields used by Germans.

(iii) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should be released.

(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

(v) No merchant shipping be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should if possible be sailed to ports South of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

(vi) The Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian coast defences. Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast with a view to their being taken off to Italy by the United Nations.

(This Aide-Memoire is known as the Quebec Document and was presented in Lisbon to General Castellano by General Smith. Its full title is: "Aide-Memoire to accompany conditions of Armistice, presented by General Eisenhower to the Italian G. in C").

These terms do not visualize active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favour of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations however state without reservation that wherever the Italian forces or Italians fight the Germans or destroy German property or hamper German movement they will be given all possible support by the forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile provided information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied Allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect movements and operations of German forces.

Cessation of hostilities between United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower.

Italian Government must undertake to proclaim armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the Allies and to resist the Germans.

The Italian Government must at hour of armistice order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by Germans shall be immediately released.

The Italian Government must at the hour of armistice order Italian fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

Meanwhile there is a good deal that Marshal Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines suggested.

(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without Germans knowing.

(ii) Minor sabotage throughout the country particularly of communications and air fields used by Germans.

(iii) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of war. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should be released.

(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

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(This Aide-Memoire is known as the Quebec Document and was presented in Lisbon to General Castellano by General Smith. Its full title is:

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(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without Germans knowing.

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(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to ensure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

(v) No merchant shipping be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in northern ports should if possible be sailed to ports south of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

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(This Aide-Memoire is known as the Quebec Document and was presented in Lisbon to General Castellano by General Smith. Its full title is: Aide-Memoire to accompany conditions of Armistice, presented by General Eisenhower to the Italian C in C).

General Smith

PROTOCOL OF AMMENDMENT TO THE LONG ARMISTICE TERMS

It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "Additional conditions of Armistice with Italy". The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

In the first paragraph of the preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "Governments" and "on the one hand". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature".

In the fourth paragraph of the preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments," and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the (1) Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments".

In paragraph six of the preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government" (1).

In Article 1a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in 427, question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender".

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to (2) this purpose will be complied with."

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"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature".

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments," and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the (1) Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments".

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government" (1).

In Article 16 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in 427, question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender".

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to (2) this purpose will be complied with".

The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at Brindisi.

MOEL MACFARLANE
Lt. General
For the Allied
Commander-in-Chief

Il Capo del Governo
Italiano
BADOGLIO

PROTOCOL OF AMMISTICE TO THE LONG AMMISTICE TERMS

It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Valtice on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "Additional conditions of Ammistance with Italy". The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "Governments" and "on the one hand". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Ammistance dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature".

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Ammistance of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the (1) Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments".

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government" (1).

In Article 1a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender".

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to (2) this purpose will be complied with."

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature".

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"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the (1) Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments".

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

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In Article 16 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in ~~42~~ 16 question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender".

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

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The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1945 at Brindisi.

MUEL MCFARLANE
Lt. General
for the Allied
Commander-in-Chief

IL Capo del Governo
Italiano
BADIOGLIO

LETTER FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER TO MARSHAL BADOLIO

29th September, 1943.

My dear Marshal Badoglio,

The terms of the armistice to which we have just appended our signatures are supplementary to the short military armistice signed by your representative and mine on September 3rd, 1943. They are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognised by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also recognise that it is not at this time in the power of the Italian Government to carry out certain of the terms. Failure to do so because of existing conditions will not be regarded as a breach of good faith on the part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so.

It is to be understood that the terms both of this document and of the short military armistice of September 3rd may be modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of co-operation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable.

Sincerely,

WRIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces

His Excellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio
Head of the Italian Government

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signatures are supplementary to the short military armistice signed by your representative and mine on September 3rd, 1943. They are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also recognize that it is not at this time in the power of the Italian Government to carry out certain of the terms. Failure to do so because of existing conditions will not be regarded as a breach of good faith on the part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so.

It is to be understood that the terms both of this document and of the short military armistice of September 3rd may be modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of co-operation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable.

Sincerely,

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DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces

His Excellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio
Head of the Italian Government

SHORT ANNOUNCEMENTS OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1943.

Sicily, September 3rd, 1943.

The following conditions of an armistice are presented by General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces acting by authority of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of the United Nations, and are accepted by MARSHAL PIETRO BADOLATO, Head of the Italian Government.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.
2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.
3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.
4. Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.
5. Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.
6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.
7. Immediate guarantee of free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies. 4244
8. The immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.
9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to ensure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.
10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and, in particular, the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

5. Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

7. Immediate guarantee of free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies. 4244

8. The immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to ensure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and, in particular, the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.

12. Other conditions of a political, economic, and financial nature, with which Italy will be bound to comply, will be transmitted at a later date.

The conditions of the present Armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The English version will be considered the official text.

Marshal UGO BARTOLLO
Head of the Italian
Government

FRANK D. EISENHOWER
General, U. S. Army,
Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces

RV: /s/ Giuseppe Castellano
Brigadier-General,
attached to the Italian
High Command

RV: /s/ Walter B. Smith
Major General,
U.S. Army, Chief of Staff

SHORT AMISTICE TERMS OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1943.

Sicily, September 3rd, 1943.

The following conditions of an armistice are presented by General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces acting by authority of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of the United Nations, and are accepted by MARSHAL PIRO D'ALICOLLO, Head of the Italian Government.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.
2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

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8. The immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to ensure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and, in particular, the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

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9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to ensure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

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11. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.

12. Other conditions of a political, economic, and financial nature, with which Italy will be bound to comply, will be transmitted at a later date.

The conditions of the present armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The English version will be considered the official text.

Marshal PIETRO BADOLLO
Head of the Italian
Government

DAVID D. EISENHOWER
General, U. S. Army,
Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces

RV: /s/ Giuseppe Castellano
Brigadier-General,
Attached to the Italian
Army Command

RV: /s/ Walter B. Smith
Major General,
U.S. Army, Chief of Staff

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