

1103

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

ACC

10000/136/595

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

10000/136/595

CORRESPONDENCE, ACC
APR. - NOV. 1945

SECRET and IMMEDIATE

ALLIED COMMISSION

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (ALMLA)

C / 7

8 Nov 45

DIRECTIVE No. 1

HANDOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

GENERAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander therefore directs that the following arrangements be made for the handover of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government and for its future organization, training and administration.

II. HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the five BR-ITI combat groups that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied Military authorities. Such units will remain under the original command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will probably be reduced to 100,000. It is anticipated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June, 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied Military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel of units will be offered to the Italian Government.

(b) Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service units, less the Italian Navy and Air Force, will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and oversight authority of MAC 1, those of those of those which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 90,000 which will be

6017

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander therefore directs that the following arrangements be made for the handover of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government and for its future organization, training and administration.

II. HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no power of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied Military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is anticipated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June, 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel of units will be offered to the Italian Government.

(b) Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service units, less the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and oversight of the Italian Government of those or of which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 5,000 which will be maintained to any ceiling figure agreed in the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations

(c) The Supreme Allied Commander, Military Areas Theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to allocate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

R. J. .../2

6017

(b) The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

(c) Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

(a) An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

(b) The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALFA).

III. FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA.....	15,000
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland.....	25,000
Total.....	<u>40,000</u>

(b) Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

Total..... 50,000

6. Military Mission.

(c) An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

(b) The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALL).

III. FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines:

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA.....	15,000
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland.....	25,000
Total.....	<u>40,000</u>

(b) Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

Total..... 50,000

(c) Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters

Total..... 2,000

(d) Administration.

Total..... 51,000

(e) Training and Reinforcements.

Total..... 10,000

140,000

8. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMIA).

10. Administration.

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

(d) US-ITI Service units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri.

- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured

6015

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

(1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.

(2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

(d) US-ITI Service units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri.

(1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorised by Allied Force Headquarters.

(2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.

(3) Through the Italian Government import programs.

(c) As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11(b) above will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import programs, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11(b) above:

(1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13(c) below.

(2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

(d) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri ~~from civil stocks~~ and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one year's maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7, **6014** above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MILA

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7, **6014** above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MIA are rescinded.

(b) Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11(b)(2) above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

- 5 -

16. Accounting.

(a) Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in subparagraphs (b) and (c) below will apply.

(b) Accounting for Allied Military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI, ITI category.

(c) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BR-IT and US-IT units will follow established procedures of the British and US Forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through ANLC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

L. Browning

fd

Major-General,
Director,
Land Forces Sub Commission (AMFA)

6013

DISTRIBUTION:

MINISTRE OF WAR
- Chief Commissioner A.C.
Exec Commissioner A.C.
Navy Sub Commissioner A.C.
Air Forces Sub Commissioner A.C.
Senior MMIA LO c/o MMIA LO NW ITALY MILAN
MMIA LO NW ITALY MILAN
" " c/o 204 Sub Area
" " c/o 66 Area
" " c/o Signal Office GENOA
" " TURIN c/o 7 AREA
" " NW ITALY MILAN (attention Capt FOX)
" " BOLZANO 60 Sub Area c/o 68 Arty Regt
" " SICILY
" " 4th Floor Provincia Buildings NAPLES
" " c/o Liaison Sec PES
" " c/o FLORENCE CIVV Comd

above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

(c) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BR-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US Forces. Issues from US military stocks other than disposals through ANLC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

L. Browning

Major-General,
Director,
Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA)

6013

fd

DISTRIBUTION:

- MINISTRY OF WAR
- Chief Commissioner A.C.
- Exec Commissioner A.C.
- Navy Sub Commission A.C.
- Air Forces Sub Commissioner A.C.
- Senior MMIA IO c/o MMIA IO NW ITALY MILAN
- MMIA IO NW ITALY MILAN
- " c/o 201 Sub Area
- " c/o 66 Area
- " c/o Signal Office GENOA
- " TURIN c/o 7 ACRA
- " NW ITALY MILAN (attention Capt FOX)
- " BOLZANO 60 Sub Area c/o 66 Arty Regt
- " SICILY
- " 4th Floor Provincia Buildings NAPLES
- " c/o Liaison Sec PES
- " o/o FLORENCE CIVI Comd
- " c/o 3 District
- " c/o 54 Area
- Comd 50 BLU
- " 51 "
- " 52 "
- " 53 "
- " 56 "
- " 5th BL & TU

INTERNAL :

C of S	KE	War Diary (two)
Col A/Q	X	File : G/7
G (Five)	SE (Three)	Spare (twenty)
A (Four)	Med	
G (Five)	RECE	

SECRET

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM

On conditions in Bolzano Province from the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission to the President of the Council of Ministers

1 A number of problems have arisen in connection with the German speaking proportion of the population of BOLZANO and of certain other small areas - EGNA in Trento Province, CORONA MARFIZZO in Belluno Province and TARVISIO in Udine Province - and I should be glad to receive the views of the Italian Government thereon at the earliest possible moment.

Election Registers

2 As you are no doubt aware, the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939 made provision for Italian subjects of German descent, resident or originating in those parts, to opt for German nationality and to emigrate to the Reich.

Presently speaking there are four classes to be considered:

- a) Those who exercised their option and emigrated, but have now returned to Italy;
- b) Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
- c) Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian registers, but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
- d) Those whose names appear in both the Italian and German registers. The views of the Italian Government are requested as to which of these classes should be included in the electoral rolls about to be compiled in BOLZANO.

Educational Policy

3 Inasmuch as well over 50% of the population in BOLZANO are German speaking, it is a matter for determination as to what educational policy should be followed with regard to them. The schools are at present closed for the summer vacation but the views of the Italian Government are urgently requested.

Emigration

4 It has been pointed out that Allied Military Government General Order No. 35 (which adopts the principles of DML 159) is not entirely appropriate to meet the situation in BOLZANO as many persons are Nazis rather than Fascists and accordingly an amendment is being made to this Order to cover this point. The Government may also consider it desirable to amend DML 159 so as to ensure that in this case no loophole exists which may prevent Nazis from being emigrated.

The Commission's amendment to GO 35 will be handed to the Italian Government for its guidance as soon as completed.

- 2 As you are no doubt aware, the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939 made provision for Italian subjects of German descent, resident or originating in those parts, to opt for German nationality and to emigrate to the Reich. Broadly speaking there are four classes to be considered:
- aa) Those who exercised their option and emigrated, but have now returned to Italy;
 - b) Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
 - c) Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian registers, but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
 - d) Those whose names appear in both the Italian and German registers. The views of the Italian Government are requested as to which of these classes should be included in the electoral rolls about to be compiled in BOLZANO.

Educational Policy

- 3 Inasmuch as well over 50% of the population in BOLZANO are German speaking, it is a matter for determination as to what education policy should be followed with regard to them. The schools are at present closed for the summer vacation but the views of the Italian Government are urgently requested.

Purification

- 4 It has been pointed out that Allied Military Government General Order No. 35 (which adopts the principles of DIL 159) is not entirely appropriate to meet the situation in BOLZANO as many persons are Nazis rather than Fascists and accordingly an amendment is being made to this Order to cover this point. The Government may also consider it desirable to amend DIL 159 so as to ensure that in this area no loophole exists which may prevent Nazis from being expelled.
- The Commission's amendment to GC 35 will be handed to the Italian Government for its guidance as soon as completed.

CA Section
5 July 45

cc: Chief Commr.
Exec. Commr.
CA Sec.
Pol. Adviser (A)
Pol. Adviser (B)

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten signature

A L I E M E M O R I E

On conditions in Bolzano Province from the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission to the President of the Council of Ministers

1 A number of problems have arisen in connection with the German speaking proportion of the population of BOLZANO and of certain other small areas - BASSA in Trento Province, CORTINA D'AMPEZZO in Belluno Province and TARVISIO in Udine Province - and I should be glad to receive the views of the Italian Government thereon at the earliest possible moment.

Election Registers

2 As you are no doubt aware, the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939 made provision for Italian subjects of German descent, resident or originating in those parts, to opt for German nationality and to emigrate to the Reich.

Broadly speaking there are four classes to be considered:

- a) Those who exercised their option and emigrated, but have now returned to Italy;
 - b) Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
 - c) Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian registers, but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
 - d) These three names appear in both the Italian and German registers.
- The views of the Italian Government are requested as to which of these classes should be included in the electoral rolls about to be compiled in BOLZANO.

Educational Policy

3 Inasmuch as well over 50% of the population in BOLZANO are German speaking, it is a matter for determination as to what education policy should be followed with regard to them. The schools are at present closed for the summer vacation but the views of the Italian Government are urgently requested.

6011

Migration

4 It has been pointed out that Allied Military Government General Order No. 25 (which adopts the principles of DLI 159) is not entirely appropriate to meet the situation in BOLZANO as many persons are Nazis rather than fascists and accordingly an amendment is being made to this Order to cover this point. The Government may also consider it desirable to amend DLI 159 so as to ensure that in this area no loophole exists which may prevent Nazis from being enumerated.

The Commission's amendment to GO 25 will be handed to the Italian Government for its guidance as soon as completed.

2 As you are no doubt aware, the Hitler-Mussolini Agreement of 1939 made provision for Italian subjects of German descent, resident or originating in those parts, to opt for German nationality and to emigrate to the Reich.

Exceedingly speaking there are four classes to be considered:

- a) Those who exercised their option and emigrated, but have now returned to Italy;
- b) Those who exercised their option but did not emigrate;
- c) Those who exercised their option and have been struck off the Italian registers, but can produce no evidence of acquisition of German nationality;
- d) These three classes appear in both the Italian and German registers. The views of the Italian Government are requested as to which of these classes should be included in the electoral rolls about to be compiled in BOLZANO.

Educational Policy

3 Inasmuch as well over 50% of the population in BOLZANO are German speaking, it is a matter for determination as to what education policy should be followed with regard to them. The schools are at present closed for the summer vacation but the views of the Italian Government are urgently requested.

8021

Expatriation

4 It has been pointed out that Allied Military Government General Order No. 25 (which adopts the principles of D.L. 159) is not entirely appropriate to meet the situation in BOLZANO as many persons are Nazis rather than Fascists and accordingly an amendment is being made to this Order to cover this point. The Government may also consider it desirable to amend D.L. 159 so as to ensure that in this area no loophole exists which may prevent Nazis from being expatriated.

The Commission's amendment to GO 35 will be handed to the Italian Government for its guidance as soon as completed.

CA Section
5 July 45

cc: Chief Commr.
Exec. Commr.
CA Sec.
Pol. Adviser (A)
Pol. Adviser (B)

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

14 May 1945.

PRO MEMORIA

The Allied authorities believe that German prisoners should be made to work so long as they are held in Italy. With this in mind, the Allied Command at A.F.M.Q. is considering a plan for turning over a portion of the German prisoners to the Italian Government to assist in rehabilitation. It is desired to ascertain from the Italian Government whether it would be prepared in principle to accept German prisoners for this purpose upon the following terms:

- (a) The Germans would continue to be prisoners of the U.S. and U.K. and so would be fed and maintained by the latter.
- (b) They would be administered in large contingent areas by U.S. and U.K. and guarded by Italians.
- (c) They would be guarded on work projects by the Italians, who would have full supervision of such projects.
- (d) Materials, tools, etc., for their work would be furnished by the Italians.

The numbers involved are as yet indefinite, but for present purposes should be assumed to be within the range of one hundred to one hundred fifty thousand. If the Italian Government is prepared in principle to accept German prisoners on the above terms, it is desired to receive the Government's best estimate as to the numbers that could be usefully employed and the localities in which they

should be

S. E. 14
6103

my paper

1120

should be concentrated.

Plans are also being developed by the U.S. Military Command in Italy by which German prisoners may be substituted for Italian military personnel at present in the employ of the U.S. Armed Forces. These include both Cooperator prisoners of war units and the so-called "US-ITI" units. The objective of these plans would be to release Italian personnel from their present duties. Obviously the future disposition of personnel so released is a matter which requires careful consideration by the various agencies concerned and will be the subject of fuller discussion as the plans develop.

cc: US Ambassador
British Ambassador
Executive Commission
CC files

6008

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSIC
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

14 May 1945.

PRO MERCKIA

The Allied authorities believe that German prisoners should be made to work so long as they are held in Italy. With this in mind, the Allied Command at A.F.H.Q. is considering a plan for turning over a portion of the German prisoners to the Italian Government to assist in rehabilitation. It is desired to ascertain from the Italian Government whether it would be prepared in principle to accept German prisoners for this purpose upon the following terms:

- (a) The Germans would continue to be prisoners of the U.S. and U.K. and so would be fed and maintained by the latter.
- (b) They would be administered in large contingent areas by U.S. and U.K. and guarded by Italians.
- (c) They would be guarded on work projects by the Italians, who would have full supervision of such projects.
- (d) Materials, tools, etc., for their work would be furnished by the Italians.

6007

The numbers involved are as yet indefinite, but for present purposes should be assumed to be within the range of one hundred to one hundred fifty thousand. If the Italian Government is prepared in principle to accept German prisoners on the above terms, it is desired to receive the Government's best estimate as to the numbers that could be usefully employed and the localities in which they

should be

1122

should be concentrated.

Plans are also being developed by the U.S. Military Command in Italy by which German prisoners may be substituted for Italian military personnel at present in the employ of the U.S. Armed Forces. These include both Cooperator prisoners of war units and the so-called "US-III" units. The objective of these plans would be to release Italian personnel from their present duties. Obviously the future disposition of personnel so released is a matter which requires careful consideration by the various agencies concerned and will be the subject of fuller discussion as the plans develop.

- cc. *US. Ambassador*
- British Ambassador*
- Executive Commission*
- CC files*

6000

SECRET**REPORT ON REORGANIZATION OF THE CARABINIERI AND
OTHER POLICE FORCES OF ITALY**

R/0010

7 April 1945

INTRODUCTION

The Committee is sensitive to the realization that the most basic need for the achievement and maintenance of a sound democracy in Italy is law and order. During these months, even with the presence of thousands of Allied military personnel, law and order has been weak. Progress has been made in the moral and physical rehabilitation of the police forces, but the progress has been slow. Certainly, the progress has not kept pace with the economic and social forces which foment crimes of violence and political disorders.

The Committee believes that the United States and Great Britain are genuinely interested in helping Italy to establish itself as a sound democracy. Hence, our two nations must be vitally concerned with the improvement of the Carabinieri and other police forces in Italy. Only if our two nations are not interested in the internal peace of Italy at the cessation of military operations can the following recommendations be ignored.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. "Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?"

The Committee answers that it is desirable and feasible. There is no explicit inhibition in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN 487). There is ample latitude in the directive to permit the Allied Commission to assume a live interest and to undertake concrete steps to assist in the reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces. In paragraph one of the directive, a specific reservation of the powers contained in the Armistice and surrender instrument is made for any case in which military needs are involved. Inasmuch as the Carabinieri are inextricably linked with the Italian War Ministry, sound basis can be found for any action on the part of the Allied Commission. Paragraph 3(b) of the directive does not prevent the effectuation of any of the recommendations made by the Committee. The directive contemplates that law and order is fundamental that the police forces of Italy, both in Italian Government territory and AMG territory, are entwined and that accordingly the Public Safety Sub-Commission has a wide scope of authority and responsibility. There is nothing in the directive which pares the authority and responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

The Committee realizes that a heavy strain will be placed on all police forces as soon as Northern Italy is liberated. However, it is the judgment of the Committee that a substantial program of reorganization can be instituted and carried out even in the face of the situation that will develop in the North. The Committee feels that it is not too late for the Allied Commission to undertake the steps proposed in this report.

- b. "If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about."

The Committee recommends that the Chief Commission confer with the Prime Minister

with the purpose of presenting to the Prime Minister the Allied Commission's appraisal of the weakness of the Carabinieri and of the other police forces and the great need of their revitalization. The Chief Commissioner should ask the Prime Minister to have the Italian Government, and not merely the Minister of War or the Minister of the Interior or the Head of the Carabinieri, prepare and submit to the Allied Commission a concrete plan for the reorganization of the Italian police forces. The concrete plan should be discussed, formulated, and approved by the entire cabinet, and be submitted to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper. One reason for this is to obtain in advance the agreement of the various ministers representing different political attitudes. Once the cabinet plan is submitted, the Allied Commission can take appropriate action.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission has, of course, been having conferences with General Brunetti, the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and he is at the moment engaged in the preparation of a plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri. The General intends to submit his plan to the Public Safety Sub-Commission. The Committee feels that, as indicated above, any plan submitted should come to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper.

The Chief Commissioner should also point out to the Prime Minister that the cabinet paper ought to set forth not merely proposals of structural changes of the police forces, which may well be the temptation since it is the simplest task, but the paper should contain definite recommendations for the recruiting of new personnel, replacement of ineffective personnel, training, administration and discipline, and also moral strengthening of the police. The cabinet paper should likewise contain definite recommendations on the demarcation of responsibility between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Interior with respect to training, administration and discipline, and particularly operational direction of the police forces. The Committee believes that the basic weakness of practical police operation in Italy is the divided responsibility. Technically, the Questura has authority operationally over the Carabinieri, but practically it is most difficult to achieve. The Italian Cabinet ought to focus its attention on this basic weakness of Italian law enforcement.

The cabinet paper should also set forth specifically to what extent the Italian Government desires the assistance, both as regards personnel and equipment, of the Allied Commission and, also, whether it believes that a special commission of Allied experts - Allied Police Mission - would be desired by the Italian Government.

- c. "If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission or the Public Safety Sub-Commission?"

The Committee believes that the respective responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission should correspond exactly with those of the War Ministry and Ministry of the Interior of the Italian Government. In the performance of the functions of these two Commissions, this line has not been followed in the past. As a result, many tasks which should have been performed have been totally ignored through no fault of either sub-commission.

The Chief Commissioner should issue a directive defining the responsibilities of Commissions in accordance with the recommendations made above. I o

1125

- COPY *

Public Safety Sub-Commission has not assumed the task because it lacks the authority insomuch as those matters come under the authority of the Italian Ministry of War. And with this Ministry, the Public Safety Sub-Commission does not deal.

Once the Italian Government submits its concrete plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces, and a new line of demarkation is proposed by the Italian Government between its Ministry of War and its Ministry of the Interior, the Allied Commission in its work can make corresponding changes with respect to the duties of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission.

- d. "What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri.

The Committee is of the opinion that the reorganization of the members of the Guardia Nazionale, formerly the Agents of Public Security, is more urgent and vital even than that of the Carabinieri. The Guardia Nazionale has proven in practical operation to be a weak and ineffective force. The Committee recommends that the Chief ^ACommissioner ask the Italian Government to include in a cabinet paper ^{A PLAN} for the reorganization of the Guardia Nazionale. The Committee sees no reason why a reorganization of both the Carabinieri and Guardia Nazionale cannot proceed simultaneously. The Committee makes no recommendation in respect to the Royal Guardia di Finanza or the Guardia Forestale.

(Sgd) CHARLES POLETTI, COL.,
 W. PIDSLEY COL.,
 JOHN W. CHAPMAN COL.

5000

* COPY -

