

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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CORRESPONDENCE, MISC.
OCT. 1943 - SEPT. 1945

1997, p. 177, and the *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 36:10, 1997, p. 1100.

The above is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of Justice of the Peace for the year 1900. The names are given in alphabetical order.

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The agenda included all questions submitted for discussion by the three governments. Some of the questions called for final decision, and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken. These questions were referred for detailed consideration to committees specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions were disposed of by an exchange of views. The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have been in close consultation in all matters concerning the common war effort, but this is the first time that the four secretaries of the three governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were French and English discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared in order to make ready for the closest military cooperation.

for the United States of America: Mr. E. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States; Major-General John A. Deane, United States Army; Mr. E. Beckwith, Mr. James C. Dean, and experts.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, Ambassador; Mr. William Strang, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts.

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For the Soviet Union: Marshal M. K. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union; Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski; Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs; Mr. V. A. Sergeev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade; Major General A. A. Gurylov, of the General Staff; Mr. G. F. Sakulin, senior official for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

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In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the recognition by the three governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue in the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic, and social welfare of their people fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the conference and which was signed by the three foreign secretaries and the Chinese ambassador at Moscow, on behalf of their governments. This declaration published today provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three governments in the examination of European questions arising in the war zone. For this purpose the Conference decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three governments.

Provision was made for continuing when necessary the tripartite consultations of representatives of the three governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy to be composed in the first instance of representatives of the three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for addition to this Council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This Council will deal with day to day questions other than military preparations and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three foreign secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm by a declaration published today, the attitude of the Allied governments in favor of the restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three foreign secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement, account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make towards its own liberation. The Declaration on Austria is published today.

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The Foreign Secretaries issued at the Conference a Declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces, will be taken back to the countries in which their atrocious crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the Conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature but also questions concerning treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and assurance of general peace.

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 100 P.M., 5.7.44
MURDER, NOVEMBER 1, 1943. THE
PUBLISHED, WITH VIEW ON THIS IN THE

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the liberation of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local Government shall be created.
7. Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

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7. Fascist chiefs and army Generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three Governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them consent on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this Declaration is to operate against the right of the Italian people, ultimately to choose their own form of Government.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Rome, September 10, 1945

SECRET

My dear Admiral,

Thank you for your letter of September 8, 1945, regarding the proposed visit to Rome of Mr. Pechelz, Secretary to Machek. After consulting my office at Allied Force Headquarters I have sent a telegram to Paris along the following lines:

From a reliable source it has been learned that Subasic has asked the permission of Tito to go to Paris to see Machek and that Tito does not appear to be entirely averse to this suggestion although he has not given his approval. It would appear desirable, pending final decision on this matter, that Pechelz should not visit Krek at the present time. Should Krek, however, desire to go to Paris, AFHQ would presumably not object.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ A. Kirk

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

cc DIST

Exec. Comm.
CA Section.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

~~SECRET~~

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Rome, August 28, 1945

Dear Admiral Stone,

I am enclosing for your confidential information and for such limited distribution within AG as you deem appropriate, a copy of a secret report received by the Embassy from a source within the United States Government regarding alleged plans for the communization of Italy. You will understand of course that I am not in a position to vouch for the accuracy of the report.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ A. Kirk

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Enclosure

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

DISTRIBUTION BY CC OFFICE:

Exec Comm (Personal)
CA Section
for Public Safety SC (2)
US Filed
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CC Files

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten signature

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SECRETREPORTED PLAN FOR THE COMMUNIZATION OF ITALY

The following information has been received from a well-placed and usually reliable source in Bucharest:

The leadership of the KOMINTERN and the INKOSTRANVI OTDEL (Foreign Section) of the GURBEL Central Command, has initiated action which has as its ultimate objective the communization of Italy. In the opinion of this group Northern Italy is thought to be the most favorable place for the establishment of a KOMINTERN operational base for Western Europe and the Mediterranean Area. This plan has the approval of the POLIT BUREAU.

On April 23, 1945, a special train passed through Bucharest, in which were some two hundred GURBEL agents of the "INKOSTRANVI OTDEL", "OSOBELI OTDEL" (Special Section), "SEKRETNELI OTDEL" (Secret Section), and of the KOMINTERN 1st, 3rd and 4th Bureaus of Moscow. This group was headed by an Italian Communist named Giuseppe RAZZA, who had as his principal assistants, Iosif ARBITO, Nicola LEVITZER, Primo CUPILLO and Enoch LINSITTI.

The above-named are all well-trained Communists of Italian-Jewish descent who fled from Italy to USSR in the period from 1923 to 1936. They are expected to arrive in Yugoslavia and there will install themselves at Zare, Fiume, Trieste and Ljubliana. From these places the individual members of the group expect to enter Northern Italy gradually -- naturally depending on the vigilance of the Allied authorities there.

Colonel MAHAILOV, principal GURBEL agent formerly in Rome, is now in Milan where the KOMINTERN offices for Italy will be located.

Gesualdo CARAGIACCI, an Italian KOMINTERN agent who reportedly is one of the best agents trained for Communist revolutionary activity in Italy, passed through Bucharest on his way to Fiume, 2 May 1945.

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Translation

Plenipotentiary
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Advisory Council for Italy

N. 212

19 July 1945

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

I have the honor to inform you that as of 18 July of
this year the duties as representative of A.S.R. for Repatri-
tion of Soviet citizens in Italy is vested in Colonel G. G.
Iakovlev. The former representative, Colonel A. E. Rissin,
because of reasons of health is returning to the Soviet Union.

/s/ Major General Vasiliev

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/s/ Major General Vasiliev

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DOCUMENT A

TERMS OF RESTORATION OF ITALIAN TERRITORY

WHEREAS, in the course of their conduct of the war against the Axis powers, the Allied Forces have occupied certain Italian territory and

WHEREAS, an Armistice has been concluded with the Italian Government pursuant to which the United Nations may take such measures within and in regard to such territory as they may deem necessary for the protection of the Allied Forces and for the successful prosecution of the war and may occupy such other portions of Italian territory as they may deem necessary, and

WHEREAS, the Italian Government has declared war on Germany and has become a co-belligerent with the United Nations, and

WHEREAS, the Italian Government has requested that certain areas now occupied by the Allied Forces be restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, and

WHEREAS, it is necessary for the successful prosecution of the war that certain rights, powers and immunities in all Italian territory which has been liberated from German domination be retained by the Allied Forces,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SIR HAROLD R.L.G. ALEXANDER, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., General, Military Governor, by virtue of authority vested in me by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., KCB, D.S.O. Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, hereby terminate Allied Military Government in the territory described below. The Italian Government will resume the government of that territory, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.

Territory Restored: That portion of the Mainland of Italy south of the northern boundaries of the Provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, and Sicily and Adjacent Islands (but not Pantelleria or Lampedusa or Linosa).

Terms of Restoration: Without prejudice to any rights, powers and immunities of the United Nations under the Armistice terms heretofore granted to the Italian Government, all of which remain in full force and effect throughout all Italian territory, there is hereby reserved to the United Nations and to the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces and to such officers or other representatives, including the Allied Control Commission, as he may designate, the rights, powers and immunities described below, in any part of the said territory and in all other Italian territory which has been liberated from German domination and is now under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, hereinafter referred to as "the Unoccupied Territory".

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1. There will be made available to the Allied Forces such facilities, utilities and installations as may be required by the Allied Commander in Chief or his agents for such disposition, use or operation as may be determined.
2. The right to maintain and quarter troops in such parts of the Unoccupied Territory as they may see fit.
3. The right to hold or require the Italian Government to hold in custody prisoners of war and civilian internees as may be directed by the Allied Commander in Chief.
4. The right to declare any area to be a Military Zone and to exercise therein the rights of an occupying power or enforce such other controls as may be determined by the Allied Commander in Chief.
5. The right to convene Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of any person violating any order or regulation issued by the Allied Military Authorities and of any person otherwise doing any act hostile to the Allied Forces or any member thereof in any part of the unoccupied territory, and to inflict such punishment upon such person as such tribunals may direct.
6. The right to conduct and carry to ultimate conclusion the trial by Allied Military Tribunals of any person charged with an offense heretofore committed and cognizable under any proclamation or order heretofore issued by or on behalf of the Allied Commander in Chief.
8. The right to requisition private and public property and services.
9. The right to reoccupy the whole or any part of the Unoccupied Territory at any time or to take such other steps or exercise such other powers in any part of such territory as may from time to time be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war.
10. The right to import and export and to control and supervise the distribution to the civilian population of such civilian supplies as the Allied Forces may determine without the payment of any impost, tax, charge, or duty of any kind whatsoever either to the Italian Government or to any of its political subdivisions or agencies except as may from time to time be agreed by the Allied Commander in Chief.
11. The right to engage in such operations and import and export such military or other supplies or property of any nature as may be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war free from the imposition of any impost, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.
12. Any official or other representative or, in respect of any activities for official account, any agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, may enter and remain within the Unoccupied Territory free from the imposition of any impost, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.

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13. No member of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be brought to trial in any Italian Court for any cause whatsoever either civil or criminal without the consent of the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces.

14. All expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of Allied Troops or other personnel within the Unoccupied Territory will be chargeable to the Italian Government as a part of the costs of occupation.

15. Proclamations or Decrees to carry out the purposes set forth in Document D, annexed hereto and made a part of these terms and conditions, will be issued by the Italian Government at the time of transfer of the territory.

(sd) H. R. Alexander
General,
Military Governor.

I have read the above terms and on behalf of the Italian Government agree to accept the territory to be restored on such terms. I further undertake to execute and publish a Proclamation by the Italian Government (hereto annexed as Document C) and to issue to the Italian people a message in the form of Document E.

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I also agree that the said restoration shall take place on the 11th day of February 1944.

(sd) Pietro Badoglio

Witness: (sd) Noel MacFarlane
Lt General

Witness: (sd) Franco Montanari

c o p y

S E C R E T

DOCUMENT B

PROCLAMATION NO. 16

WHEREAS, I assumed all powers of government and jurisdiction in the Territory of Italy and Sicily occupied by my troops and over its inhabitants and established military government to exercise these powers in such territory under my direction, and

WHEREAS, in the exercise of such powers, Proclamations and Orders have been issued from time to time by me under by authority throughout such territory, and

WHEREAS, the Italian Government has declared war on Germany and has become a co-belligerent with the United Nations, and

WHEREAS, the United Nations have consented at the request of the Italian Government to restore as such of the occupied territory to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government as may be compatible with military exigencies,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SIR HAROLD R L G ALEXANDER, G C B C S I D S O 6158,
M C General, Military Governor of all the Occupied Territory, by virtue
of authority vested in me by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G B E
K C B D S O Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, hereby Proclaim as
follows;

Allied Military Government established by me and all Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by me or under my authority in that portion of the Mainland of Italy south of the northern boundaries of the provinces of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari, and Sicily and Adjacent Islands (but no Pantelleria or Lampedusa or Linosa) are hereby terminated as of 0001 hours on 11 day of February 1944. The Italian Government will thereafter administer the above territory, subject to all powers, rights and immunities of the United Nations and of the Allied Commander in Chief and Allied Control Commission.

(sd) H. R. ALEXANDER
General
Military Governor

SECRET

DOCUMENT C

Proclamation by the Italian Government to be signed by Marshal Badoglio

To the Italian People:

WHEREAS, the United Nations have agreed to the request of the Italian Government that certain territory heretofore occupied by the Allied Forces be relinquished and restored to the Italian Government upon such terms and conditions as are necessary for the proper prosecution of the war,

NOW, THEREFORE, I,

hereby proclaim as follows:

1. Military government in the territory restored having been terminated by the Allied Military Government, all powers of government and jurisdiction in the territory restored and over its inhabitants, and final administrative responsibility, subject only to the rights reserved to the United Nations, are vested in the Government of Italy.
2. All Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by the Military Governor or under his authority in the said territory and which have been terminated therein by the Military Governor as upon its restoration, are hereby recognized by the Italian Government as having been validly issued and are declared to be of the same legal effect as if they had been issued by the Italian Government in accordance with Italian law, and they will be so recognized by all Italian Courts and officials.
3. All acts done by any member of the Allied Forces in pursuance of such Proclamations or Orders, and all official action of any nature taken by the Allied Military Government in pursuance thereof including all appointments to and removals from any office, public or private, will be recognized by all Italian Courts and officials as legal, valid and binding.
4. All sentences imposed by Allied Military Courts are hereby recognized by the Italian Government as valid and legal and of the same effect as if imposed by an Italian Court and will be so recognized by all Italian Courts and Italian officials unless set aside or modified by or with the consent of the Allied Control Commission.

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~~Secret~~

To His Excellency Marshal Pietro Badoglio

DOCUMENT D

1. Your Excellency is requested to move the seat of the Italian Government to Salerno at a date not later than the date of restoration of territory.

2. Your Excellency is also requested to pass and to publish in the Official Gazette before the date of restoration the following decrees:

(a) A decree stabilizing wage rates, maximum prices, charges for services; maximum quantities of grain to be held by anyone; as existing at the date of restoration and pending the future policy being agreed upon between us.

(b) A decree to implement paragraph 5 of Document A providing for the establishment of Allied Military Courts to try offences entailing any hostile act against the Allied Forces and empowering any member of the Allied Forces to arrest any person whom such member had reasonable grounds for believing is concerned in such an act, except in the case of an Italian officer or an Italian high official in which case the Italian Government or the local superior Authority concerned should be asked to cooperate in action.

3. In addition, Your Excellency is requested to give me your assurance that you will proceed, with all possible expedition, to pass decrees dealing with the following matters:

(a) To implement so far as may be necessary the terms set out in Document A and the Terms of the Proclamation (Document C) to be signed by you.

(b) Financial Matters

- (1) Re-enacting by decree if necessary the terms of Bando No. 61 AC dated 24 Sept 43 in relation to notes of exchange of Allied Military Currency.
- (2) Barring all transactions in land and buildings so far as necessary to prevent inflation as may be agreed upon by A C C and the Italian Government.
- (3) If necessary and in so far as not already provided for in existing legislation; except as permitted or licensed by the Minister of Finance, all transactions in foreign exchange, import or export of coins, currency, securities or gold or silver bullion and barring financial, commercial or other transactions involving trade or communication with any person outside the territory actually administered by the Italian Government except as between such territory and Italian territory still occupied by the Allied Military Forces and except transactions, imports or exports for the Allied authorities or authorized by them.

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- (4) Authorising the competent Ministers in their discretion as a war measure to prohibit the entering into or carrying on of any type of business except upon such terms or in such areas as they may prescribe; and authorising them to require any property in which there are reasonable grounds for believing that any enemy or Fascist interests, direct or indirect exist, to be delivered to any agency designated by them to be blocked or to become subject to some other form of control; and providing that subject to the terms prescribed by the Minister of Finance property now held in a blocked account shall remain in its present status, and further providing that financial institutions holding blocked accounts are to make semi-monthly report to the Minister of Finance showing any dealings in these accounts.
- (5) Requiring all future initial openings of safe deposit boxes and delivery of contents to be made only in presence of representatives designated by the Minister of Finance.

(c) United Nations and Enemy Property

Conferring administrative powers upon the Allied Director of Property Control in relation to the property of any of the United Nations or of any national of the United Nations including property of France and French Nationals.

(sd) Noel MacFarlane
Lt General

I agree to accept the above terms.

(sd) Pietro Badoglio

SECRET

DOCUMENT E

Proclamation of Marshal Badoglio to the Italian People

ITALIANS,

The United Nations, following the request of the Royal Government, have ordered that the major part of our territory, until now occupied by the Allied Forces, be returned to us.

Naturally, in effect will remain those clauses and conditions necessary for the conduct of war.

In the name of His Majesty the King and of all the Italian People, I thank the Allies for this generous gesture, which in addition to being a gesture, is at the same time a proof of faith.

No one can escape the importance and meaning of this event. This is the first stage toward the renewed unity of the Fatherland, and which should be our supreme purpose and aspiration. The first stage after the blind course toward the abyss, into which the Italian People have been forced for twenty years by a Regime, from which we wish to redeem ourselves completely, in the name of Liberty, that is dear to us, but not in the name of license, into which no people can fall without extreme danger.

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ITALIANS,

The Allied Forces are fighting victoriously with us against the common German enemy, this same enemy against whom we have fought together on the Carso, Isonzo and the Piave. On the result of this fight depends the future of Italy and the world. All Italians, in every sector of national life, from the most humble to the highest, must contribute thereto by all their means and with all their strength, without reservations, without hesitation, without argument.

Our brothers await us in eternal Rome, in all the cities and villages still held down by the Nazi Bayonette.

The war can be won only by the most loyal, frankest and most intimate collaboration with the free and great Allied Peoples. Whosoever commits acts which in any way hinder our and the Allied Armed Forces, and impedes the war effort and in any way assist the enemy, will without delay be judged and exemplarily punished.

An this, after so many dark and tormented days, is our first happy day. Because, if we realize and desire it, holds the roots of our salvation which can only come from the resolute, united and unanimous endeavor of all.

Italians, rise to the height of this event, in the name of this Fatherland of ours, which bleeding and grieving is returning from the abyss to a new life.

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~~SECRET~~REPORT ON REORGANIZATION OF THE CARABINIERI AND
OTHER POLICE FORCES OF ITALY

R/0010

7 April 1945

INTRODUCTION

The Committee is sensitive to the realization that the most basic need for the achievement and maintenance of a sound democracy in Italy is law and order. During these months, even with the presence of thousands of Allied military personnel, law and order has been weak. Progress has been made in the moral and physical rehabilitation of the police forces, but the progress has been slow. Certainly, the progress has not kept pace with the economic and social forces which foment crimes of violence and political disorders.

The Committee believes that the United States and Great Britain are genuinely interested in helping Italy to establish itself as a sound democracy. Hence, our two nations must be vitally concerned with the improvement of the Carabinieri and other police forces in Italy. Only if our two nations are not interested in the internal peace of Italy at the cessation of military operations can the following recommendations be ignored.

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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. "Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?"

The Committee answers that it is desirable and feasible. There is no explicit inhibition in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN 487). There is ample latitude in the directive to permit the Allied Commission to assume a live interest and to undertake concrete steps to assist in the reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces. In paragraph one of the directive, a specific reservation of the powers contained in the Armistice and surrender instrument is made for any case in which military needs are involved. Inasmuch as the Carabinieri are inextricably linked with the Italian War Ministry, sound basis can be found for any action on the part of the Allied Commission. Paragraph 3(b) of the directive does not prevent the effectuation of any of the recommendations made by the Committee. The directive contemplates that law and order is fundamental that the police forces of Italy, both in Italian Government territory and AMG territory, are entwined and that accordingly the Public Safety Sub-Commission has a wide scope of authority and responsibility. There is nothing in the directive which pares the authority and responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

The Committee realizes that a heavy strain will be placed on all police forces as soon as Northern Italy is liberated. However, it is the judgment of the Committee that a substantial program of reorganization can be instituted and carried out even in the face of the situation that will develop in the North. The Committee feels that it is not too late for the Allied Commission to undertake the steps proposed in this report.

- b. "If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about?"

The Committee recommends that the Chief Commission confer with the Prime Minister

with the purpose of presenting to the Prime Minister the Allied Commission's appraisal of the weakness of the Carabinieri and of the other police forces and the great need of their revitalization. The Chief Commissioner should ask the Prime Minister to have the Italian Government, and not merely the Minister of War or the Minister of the Interior or the Head of the Carabinieri, prepare and submit to the Allied Commission a concrete plan for the reorganization of the Italian police forces. The concrete plan should be discussed, formulated, and approved by the entire cabinet, and be submitted to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper. One reason for this is to obtain in advance the agreement of the various ministers representing different political attitudes. Once the cabinet plan is submitted, the Allied Commission can take appropriate action.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission has, of course, been having conferences with General Brunetti, the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and he is at the moment engaged in the preparation of a plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri. The General intends to submit his plan to the Public Safety Sub-Commission. The Committee feels that, as indicated above, any plan submitted should come to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper.

The Chief Commissioner should also point out to the Prime Minister that the cabinet paper ought to set forth not merely proposals of structural changes of the police forces, which may well be the temptation since it is the simplest task, but the paper should contain definite recommendations for the recruiting of new personnel, replacement of ineffective personnel, training, administration and discipline, and also more strengthening of the police. The cabinet paper should likewise contain definite recommendations on the demarcation of responsibility between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Interior with respect to training, administration and discipline, and particularly operational direction of the police forces. The Committee believes that the basic weakness of practical police operation in Italy is the divided responsibility. Technically, the Questura has authority operationally over the Carabinieri, but practically it is most difficult to achieve. The Italian Cabinet ought to focus its attention on this basic weakness of Italian law enforcement.

The cabinet paper should also set forth specifically to what extent the Italian Government desires the assistance, both as regards personnel and equipment, of the Allied Commission and, also, whether it believes that a special commission of Allied experts - Allied Police Mission - would be desired by the Italian Government. 6152

- c. "If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission or the Public Safety Sub-Commission?"

The Committee believes that the respective responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission should correspond exactly with those of the War Ministry and Ministry of the Interior of the Italian Government. In the performance of the functions of these two Commissions, this line has not been followed in the past. As a result, many tasks which should have been performed have been totally ignored through no fault of either sub-commission.

The Chief Commissioner should issue a directive defining the responsibilities of the two sub-commissions in accordance with the recommendations made above. In other words, this directive would make the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri a responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. The Public Safety Sub-Commission would be concerned only with the operational performance of the Carabinieri as a law enforcement agency. For instance, up to

the present time there has not really been an effect a job done by either sub-commission following through and inspecting what occurs in the clothing, equipping, arming, and feeding of the Carabinieri. The Land Forces Sub-Com. has not undertaken the task as it does with regular units of the Army. On the other hand, the Public Safety Sub-Commission has not assumed the task because it lacks the authority inasmuch as those matters come under the authority of the Italian Ministry of War. And with this Ministry, the Public Safety Sub-Commission does not deal.

Once the Italian Government submits its concrete plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces, and a new line of demarcation is proposed by the Italian Government between its Ministry of War and its Ministry of the Interior, the Allied Commission in its work can make corresponding changes with respect to the duties of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission.

- d. "What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri.

The Committee is of the opinion that the reorganization of the members of the Guardia Nazionale, formerly the Agents of Public Security, is more urgent and vital even than that of the Carabinieri. The Guardia Nazionale has proven in practical operation to be a weak and ineffective force. The Committee recommends that the Chief Commissioner ask the Italian Government to include in a cabinet paper for the reorganization of the Guardia Nazionale. The Committee sees no reason why a reorganization of both the Carabinieri and Guardia Nazionale cannot proceed simultaneously. The Committee makes no recommendation in respect to the Royal Guardia di Finanza or the Guardia Forestale.

(Sgd)

CHARLES POLETTI, COL.,

W. FIDLEY COL.,

JOHN W. CHAPMAN COL.

6151

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~~SECRET~~

FROM : London

Via F.O. & Brit. Deb.

TO : Rome

Three D
Summary

DATE: 22nd February 1945

No. 101. In addition to the 1500 lorries asked for by MACMILLAN, THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES CONCERNED HAVE ASSIGNED TO ITALY the 500 lorries asked for by us.

The total therefore is 2000 motor vehicles with a carrying capacity of 6000 tons. They are not new ones. Their dispatch from the U.S.A. will be -----during March.

Although intended for civil use, this assignment is being made on the basis of the so-called programme of military supplies and is therefore not subject to delay.

I am moreover informed that discussions are going on in ROME regarding purchases under programme B.i.e. material intended for Reconstruction, ----- not immediately put into effect. I am assured by the office concerned that it would not be useless if a general scheme of ----- or of our needs were to be presented here meanwhile. According to what I have heard, an Italian Commission should come to LONDON about that programme.

CARANDINI

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marginal

C O P YC O P YS E C R E T

20 February, 1945.

SUBJECT : Italian Patriots and Carabinieri

MEMO TO : Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.

Reference is made to your 3267/12/COB dated 16 January, 1945.

1. The question of the disposal of the increasing numbers of Italian Patriots now being encountered in the Army area having been reviewed, a general policy is hereby established for the induction of Italian Patriots into the Italian Army as individuals to fill the current deficiency of approximately 48,000 under the present ceiling.

2. With the object, however, of making the most advantageous use of the fighting capabilities of the Patriots, the Land Forces Sub-Commission have been requested to submit recommendations to this Headquarters on a proposed organization for the formation of Reconnaissance Companies (comprising Patriots in their own bands), to operate with the existing five Italian Gruppi. The present patriot bands fighting with the Armies will continue to operate with their present formations.

3. Your request to raise the ceiling of the Italian Army by an addition of up to 100,000 cannot at this stage be entertained. If, however, after operational experience of the Reconnaissance Companies has been obtained, it is considered desirable to form further units of a similar nature to operate with other Allied formations, the necessity for an increase in ceiling to cover the estimated future intake of Patriots will be reviewed.

4. The present Carabinieri ceiling of 55,000 being now full, approval is being sought from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a further increase to 65,000. Pending receipt of this approval, recruitment beyond the present figure of 55,000 cannot be authorized. 8:49

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARCHAL ALEXANDER

JOHN L. HARRING,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

RMR/mmc

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Shortly after the Allied occupation he became Assistant to General Imbelli. He used this post for his personal advantage in representing various firms and in handling various matters in the port (he had been in the shipping business most of his life). He was sufficiently in the confidence of General Imbelli that he has dictated letters to General Pence for the signature of General Imbelli. In March 1944, Borriello was removed by order of Colonel Poletti from his post as Director of Manifattura Cotoniere Meridionale on the grounds that his continuance in office was deemed to be dangerous to the safety and security of the Allied forces. The original report on which this was based recommended immediate internment. Ten reports on Borriello were prepared prior to 27 March 1944. The first nine, prepared by P23, G2, GIC, SIM and AGO Legal Division are all derogatory. The last report by General Imbelli is favourable. GIC took the position that Borriello's presence in the office of the Commanding General of Metropolitan Base Section had reached the proportions of a major scandal. They recommended his removal from that position and his internment on security grounds. He was however protected by General Imbelli and was regarded as his "protege". General Imbelli made two unsuccessful personal efforts to have the accounts of Borriello unblocked while he was in Naples. He made a further effort in August 1944 by personal application to the Acting Chief Commissioner. This also was denied.

The foregoing is based on confidential reports of Regional Security Officer, Region III, and GIC. Both reports are based on the ten prior reports mentioned above.

The following is mere gossip and the writer has no support for it. Through the German occupation the most notorious meeting place for the German officers was the night-club called the Casanova. General Imbelli became extremely friendly with its proprietress on his arrival in Naples. In consequence for some months it was the only night club permitted to operate in Naples. Finally the woman was interned by GIC. Her club was then taken over and operated under the name of Churchill Downs by Metropolitan Base Section for the benefit of officers generally.

J.J.L.

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surplus

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
OF OPERATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

1. The Supreme Allied Commander wishes the utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CLNAI will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLNAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.
2. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CLNAI) will, on behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.
3. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.
4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CLNAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CLNAI will recog-

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4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CLNAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CLNAI will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such

orders to disband and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation in Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the CLNAI in common with all other anti-fascist organisations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; a monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CLNAI and all other anti-fascist organisations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

LIIGURIA	20
PIEDMUNTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when provinces are liberated.

6. Allied Missions attached to the CLNAI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-sewerch and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by CLNAI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

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Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

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EMILIA 20
VENETO 35

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

/s/ H. Maitland Wilson
General

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL

LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

/s/ Pietro Longhi

/s/ Maurizio

/s/ Mare

/s/ E. Sogno

TOP SECRET

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General

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL

LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

/s/ Pietro Longhi

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/s/ E. Segno

D.R.A.F.T.

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under the name of Churchill Downs by Metropolitan Base Section for the
benefit of officers generally.

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TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION : HEADQUARTERS SOLOC

INFORMATION TO: 6TH ARMY GROUP - DELTA BASE SECTION

Now possible to give following definite information as to first party of political persons referred to in our F 53342 of 16 November to CA HQ 6837 Civil Affairs Regiment. This information passed to you in pursuance of your LX 14581 of 24 November and ComZone signal EX 67243 of 25 November also refers.

Party of political persons as previously notified to you has been modified and extended to include certain relatives. Complete list now comprising this party is as follows:

Senator Gasparatto
Count Iacini
Professor Colonnati and wife
Professor Einaudi and wife
Professor Carnelutti
Duke Gallarati Scotti
Professor Marchesi
Mr. Doeri (previously notified as Mr. Doer)
Mr. Facchinetti and wife
Mr. Alessandrini and his mother, and
Mr. Ambrogio Orlando.

Above party will gather in Geneva on 6 December and will proceed in a group to Hotel National in Annemasse to arrive there 1000 hours 7 December. Party allowed 100 pounds baggage per person. Party will require accommodation night 7 December with view to take off early morning 8 December.

Vip plane to bring back above party from Brun Lyon Airfield will arrive there 6 December at approximately 1400 hours bearing Signor Berio who is proceeding to Berne to take up appointment as Counsellor to Italian Legation there and will be carrying diplomatic bag. Vip plane will also carry Major Pearson of Allied Commission who is to conduct political party to Italy. It is requested that Berio plus Pearson may use the transportation you are providing to take them to the border and that accommodation be provided for them night of 6 December.

Arrangements for 2nd party of HRH Princess of Piedmont and suite being made and after Vip flight has brought political party to Italy a 2nd journey will be made to pick these up in similar manner. Further details on this party with firm times will follow soonest.

PRIORITY

Co-ordinated with: U.S. Political Adviser

TOP SECRET

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PRIORITY

Co-ordinated with: U.S. Political Adviser

~~TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET

October 9, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-2 (C.I.)
G-3 Special Operations
G-5
British Resident Minister
Political Section, ACO,
Ambassador Kirk, Rome

SUBJECT : Transfer of dollar credits from Soviet accounts to
order of Yugoslav Partisans in Italy.

The Department of State has suggested that we bring to the attention of the appropriate military authorities at AFHQ and of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, the following matter:

The Bank of Naples was recently authorized to pay in lire the equivalent of \$90,000 to Ivan Milutinovic, "Representative and Attorney for Financial Affairs National Committee People's Liberation of Yugoslavia." It would appear that this transaction was ordered by the head of the Yugoslav Partisan Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

Similar transactions, it is important to note, in the amounts of \$130,000 and \$30,000 respectively were made on August 3 and August 26.

The Department has suggested that this series of transactions be brought to the attention of the military authorities concerned with the activities of the Soviet Mission to the Partisans, as well as to the Control Commission, in view of recent reports concerning what appear to be excessive rates of expenditures on the part of the Soviet Representative of \$250,000 in a two months' period may also be in excess of the sum necessary for balancing the accounts of the Partisan Mission in Moscow and the Soviet Mission to the Partisans. The possibility that a part of these funds may be used for political purposes under the direction of the Soviet Missions in this theater cannot be excluded.

6139

Your views on the foregoing would be appreciated, particularly with respect to the question of the approval of future transactions of this kind. In this connection it is pointed out, however, that these transactions could be stopped only with some difficulty since up to the present they represent only transfers from Soviet accounts.

For the U.S. Political Adviser:

G. F. Reinhardt

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

29 September 1944

C
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Honorable John J. McCloy
Chairman, Combined Civil Affairs Committee
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. McCloy,

As you undoubtedly know, at its second Session in Montreal just closed, the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration adopted a resolution establishing the scale and nature of relief and rehabilitation operations to be undertaken in Italy. In addition, the Council adopted another resolution authorizing operations in enemy and ex-enemy territory directed to the care and repatriation of displaced persons of United Nations nationality and to the control of epidemics. I am enclosing copies of these resolutions.

6738

The resolution concerning Italy confines our operations to three types of assistance: the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies; assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons; and care of, and welfare services for, children and nursing and expectant mothers. The resolution also limits our expenditures of foreign exchange for these purposes to \$ 50,000,000. The resolution concerning assistance to displaced persons of United Nations nationality and epidemic control work imposed no budgetary limitations.

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UNRRA Programs for Italy

Our programs for Italy, pursuant to these resolutions, are briefly summarized below. It must be understood, of course, that this statement is quite tentative and is subject to modifications as result of further study of the Italian situation and as a result of negotiations with the appropriate authorities.

1. Assistance to Children and Mothers.

Our efforts under the first resolution mentioned above will be chiefly directed to providing care of, and welfare services for, children of school and pre-school age, and nursing and expectant mothers. The major part of the expenditures for this purpose will be for supplies to supplement the provision already being made for these classes of the population. Because of the limitation of our budget, we expect to confine this assistance to approximately 1,700,000 children and 300,000 mothers. This means that only one out of every five children of the ages included will receive this assistance. The recipients will be those children who are suffering from the more serious cases of undernourishment and malnutrition. The program will furnish each recipient, on the average, additional food up to the value of 750 calories daily. It is understood that such food will be in addition to the basic rations provided by other authorities.

Our operations in this respect will be centered largely on the bigger cities. We are not planning to furnish such supplies in the country or in the smaller communities, except in those which are not agriculturally self-supporting. So long as military operations in Italy continue, we shall, of course, also limit our operations to those areas which may be regarded as in repose.

Our present estimates indicate that the children and mothers program will require approximately 15,000 tons of supply per month, the major commodities being:

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Dry skimmed milk	3,100 tons
Sugar	860 tons
Fats	820 tons
Flour	5,000 tons
Pulses	2,150 tons
Farina	315 tons
Fish	1,500 tons
Miscellaneous	1,255 tons

The ultimate distribution of these supplies to the recipients will in all likelihood be handled primarily by two Italian organizations, Opera Nazionale per la Protezione della Maternità e dell'Infanzia (ONMI) and the Italian Ministry of Education. The ONMI will be expected to conduct the distribution of supplies to the children of pre-school age and the nursing and expectant mothers. The exact method of distributing food, whether by issue for consumption at home or by other means, will be determined by agreement in the field to meet local conditions. The supplies for children of school age will be distributed by the Ministry of Education, the food being distributed most probably through school lunches.

2. Medical and Sanitary Aid and Supplies.

Our assistance along these lines will consist of the dispatch of medical personnel whose primary function will be the rendering of advice in the restoration of the Italian Public Health Services, and the furnishing of up to 7 3,000,000 worth of medical and sanitary supplies, particularly of commodities not now included in the military supply program, over the period

of a year

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- 4 -

of a year, to supplement the supplies now being furnished to Italy. With the medical supplies which are being imported into Italy at the rate for all of Italy of approximately \$ 1,000,000 worth a month, this will provide a total of up to \$ 20,000,000 worth for the whole country over a period of one year, an amount which appears extremely modest for a population of 45,000,000.

Included in the items to be furnished will be raw material from which certain medical supplies may be manufactured in Italy.

Our plan for distribution of medical supplies in Italy is to follow the system being used by A.C.C.

3. Displaced Persons of Italian Nationality.

We are not at present prepared to set forth a program of assistance for displaced persons of Italian nationality, because we do not intend to undertake any work along this line which the Italian Government can itself perform. An equitable division of responsibility between ourselves and the Italian Government can only be reached after further study. Most expenditures, in any event, will be in local currency, and only a small amount of import tonnage will be involved.

4. Displaced Persons of United Nations Nationality.

At the request of the Military, we shall be willing to assume responsibility for the camps in Italy which are already caring for several thousand refugees of United Nations nationality. We are also prepared to expand the program, if necessary.

5. Epidemic Control.

We have not yet formulated any program under this heading. Before taking any definite action, we will consult with A.C.C. and its advisers regarding the nature and scope of our activities in this field.

6. Budget.

On the basis of the foregoing, we have made the following tentative budget allocation for one year of activities in Italy under the first three programs described above:

1172

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- 5 -

Child Care and Mothers	£ 36,000,000
Medical Aid and Supplies	9,000,000
Unallocated Reserve	5,000,000

The budgets for displaced United Nations nationals and for epidemic control will be in addition to the £ 50,000,000.

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SECRET

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II

Administration

As indicated above in connection with the programs for assistance to children and mothers and for the furnishing of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, we intend to place the responsibility for distribution upon the Italian government or upon Italian organizations. Consequently, for these purposes, a relatively small staff will suffice. This will probably consist of a small group of executives and a number of technicians, for example, the medical personnel referred to in Section I (2) above. Our operations will undoubtedly start with a small number to which we will add from time to time, as need develops but, at the maximum, we do not expect our mission to exceed 75 professional personnel and 20-30 clerical. Other personnel, as needed, will be recruited in Italy.

This statement does not include personnel who may be needed for work in connection with displaced persons of United Nations nationality and epidemic control.

III

Relations with the Military Program

As indicated in several places above, the assistance which UNRRA is planning to give pursuant to the resolution authorizing operations in Italy is intended to be additional to, and not in substitution for, assistance which is now being given or which will be given as a basic measure for the benefit of Italy generally. The UNRRA Council authorized these operations on the understanding that the scale of supply by the military or other authorities will be maintained or increased without deduction for the assistance which UNRRA is to afford.

IV

Relationship with Military Authorities

In our operations in Italy, we shall, of course, be guided by general policies laid down by the appropriate military authorities. Subject to such general policies, we should aim to operate as an autonomous organization, with complete control over our personnel and our programs. In dealing with the Italian government we would, of course, clear in advance all questions of general policy with the appropriate military authorities and would keep them informed of our arrangements.

SECRET

In delivering supplies to Italian governmental or charitable organizations, however, we should expect to be free to establish the prices at which we make the transfer and the conditions of the distribution of the supplies by the organizations, including the classes of persons to whom the distribution is to be made and the prices at which the supplies are to be sold (unless given away). The prices for sale to the ultimate consumers, however, would not be higher than the prices fixed by the appropriate price control authorities.

V

Assistance from the Military

In carrying out these programs, we are completely dependent upon the military authorities in view of their control over supply, shipping and internal transport, and over many phases of government and economic life within the country. I am writing to ask you, therefore, if you will obtain for us the issuance of directives to the appropriate authorities to facilitate the proposed operations and, in particular, to accomplish the following arrangements:

1. Transportation

(a) Beginning with October 1944, it is essential to have an allocation by the theater commander of 15,000 tons of shipping monthly from east coast U.S. ports to appropriate ports in Italy, over and above existing shipping allocations.

(b) As a beginning supply, we need the transfer, from military stocks in Italy or afloat, of 30,000 tons of the foods listed in Section I (1) or of appropriate substitutes. UNRRA is agreeable to reimbursing the military for these supplies promptly in cash or in kind. 6832

(c) Supplies beyond the 20,000-ton beginning stock can be provided by UNRRA through its own efforts, so long as shipping space is allocated as indicated under (a) above; but if the military authorities prefer, UNRRA would accept an arrangement under which the military procured and shipped all or any part of the needed supplies for delivery to UNRRA in Italy against reimbursement by UNRRA in the United States in cash or in kind.

(d) To the extent that we ship in our own supplies, we should wish to be able to avoid delays in deliveries and unnecessary long and cross-hauls, by making arrangements in the theater (subject to military operational requirements) for deliveries from military stocks against replacement at later dates or other points.

(e) Our operations will require the use not only of ocean trans-

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portation facilities, but also of storage warehouses and facilities for local transportation in Italy. We would, of course, be prepared to pay appropriate charges for the service of transportation, handling and warehousing, in foreign exchange where incurred outside Italy, and in lire where incurred locally.

We understand that the most serious possible obstacle to this proposal is the existing shortage of local transport. UNHRA cannot discharge its obligations unless it has an adequate and unbroken supply line. Of necessity, we will require the same transport priorities as are accorded to A.C.C.

2. Assistance to UNHRA Personnel

We should like very much to have the cooperation of the appropriate military authorities in securing for our personnel assigned to the Italian program (subject of course to the limitations imposed by military necessity) necessary transportation, shelter, food, clothing, medical aid, communication facilities, and the use of Post Exchange or PX facilities. This cooperation is essential to our effective operation, in view of the disorganization and inflationary conditions now existing in Italy. Of course, payment would be made for all supplies and services so furnished. As in other theaters under military control, we should also like to have for our personnel certificates of identity, entitling them to be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, if captured.

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I appreciate that most of the details of the arrangements referred to above cannot be settled in Washington but must be taken up with the military authorities in the theater, and in some cases, with the Italian government. Within this limitation, I respectfully request that the appropriate directives be procured from the Combined Chiefs of Staff so as to enable UNHRA to launch its programs at the earliest possible moment. Should the necessary assistance be forthcoming, we would be prepared to commence operations on a limited scale on November 1, 1944.

Representatives of the Administration are waiting to leave for Italy to attempt to negotiate detailed arrangements along these lines, and it would therefore be appreciated if we could have your reply at your earliest convenience.

Cordially,

/s/
Herbert H. Lehman
Director General

SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR
NORTHERN ITALY.

1. ^(by the Italian Govt) The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) is recognised ^{as the} established body representing ~~the~~ anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The C.L.N.A.I. for its part accepts the Italian Government, recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor ^{to} ~~of~~ the Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.
2. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government wish the utmost co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are ^{active} in the resistance movement. The C.L.N.A.I. will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.L.N.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.
3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.L.N.A.I.) will, on behalf of the C.L.N.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.
4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the C.L.N.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied

Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government wish the utmost co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The C.I.N.A.I. will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.I.N.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.I.N.A.I.) will, on behalf of the C.I.N.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like degradation by the enemy.

4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the C.I.N.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, C.I.N.A.I. will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. and

-2-

will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including orders to disarm and surrender their arms, ^{when} ~~as~~ required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the C.L.N.A.I. in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory: a monthly contribution not exceeding 100 million lire will be made to meet the expenses of the C.L.N.A.I. and all other anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in those areas:

LIGURIA	12 1/2
PIEMONTE	37 1/2
LOMBARDIA	16
EMILIA	16
VENETO	18

0:29

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied Missions attached to the C.L.N.A.I., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any of their components, will be consulted in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular to matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch, and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. and transmitted through the Missions concerned will be carried out by C.L.N.A.I., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in these areas:

LIIGURIA	12½
PIEMONTE	37½
LOMBARDIA	16
EMILIA	16
VENETO	18

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied missions attached to the C.I.N.A.I., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any of their components, will be consulted in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular to matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch, and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by C.I.N.A.I., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

TOP SECRET.

DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.

1. *x* (in the Italian Government) The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) is recognised as the established body representing the anti-fascist parties in Italian enemy occupied/territory. The C.L.N.A.I. for its part accepts the Italian Government, recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor to the Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.
2. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government wish the utmost cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The C.L.N.A.I. will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.L.N.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.
3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEER OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.L.N.A.I.) will, on behalf of the C.L.N.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.
4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the C.L.N.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of

Government which signed the armistice terms, ~~and~~ as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government wish the utmost cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The C.L.N.A.I. will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.L.N.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.L.N.A.I.) will, on behalf of the C.L.N.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.

4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the C.L.N.A.I. ~~would~~ exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, C.L.N.A.I. will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including orders to disband and surrender their arms.

agreed to do so.

Voluntary

5. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER is pleased to note the appointment by

C.L.N.A.I. of General Raffaele CADORNA as head of the General Command of Volunteers of Liberty and Messrs PARRI and GALLI as General CADORNA's joint deputy commanders.

During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the C.L.N.A.I. in common with all other anti-fascist organisations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory: a monthly contribution not exceeding 100 million lire will be made to meet the expenses of the C.L.N.A.I. and all other anti-fascist organisations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

LIGURIA	12½
PIEMONTE	37½
LOMBARDIA	16
EMILIA	16
VENETO	18

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

67. Allied missions attached to the C.L.N.A.I., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any ~~other~~ of their components, will be consulted in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular to matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch, and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AAI and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by C.L.N.A.I., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,

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Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

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67. Allied missions attached to the C.L.N.A.I., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any other of their components, will be consulted in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular to matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch, and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AAI and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by C.L.N.A.I., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS)))

FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: - Administration of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY.

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/G(Ops)

6 Sep 44.

Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission

1. In reply to your 805/3/CA of 1 Sep 44 the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problem raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:-

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
- (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
- (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
- (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.

2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

/s/ A. F. Harding
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

1. In reply to your 805/3/CA of 1 Sep 44 the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problem raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONTE and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:-

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
- (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
- (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
- (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.

6128

2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

AFHQ/bps

Copy to:- A.F.H.Q.

/s/ A. F. Harding
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

TOP SECRET

A 200

C O P Y

SUBJECT: - Administration of PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY.

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/3(Ops)

6 Dec 44.

Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission

1. In reply to your COS/3/CA of 1 Sep 44 the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problem raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:-

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
- (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
- (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
- (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.

2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

/s/ A. F. Harding
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

61

1. In reply to your letter of 28 October 1944, I have been careful consideration to the problem raised by you. As a result, I have decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PINDAR and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:-

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
 - (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
 - (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
 - (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.
2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.
 3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.
 4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

AFHQ/bps

Copy to:- A.F.H.Q.

/s/ A. F. Harding
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

FILES A.B.

Delivered by hand
FEB 1 1945
FRANK
CENTER.
CAPTAIN A.G.D.

FEB 1 1945

FRANK

CAPTAIN A.G.D.

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY.

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/G(Ops)

6 Sep 44

Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

1. In reply to your 805/3/GA of 1 Sep 44, the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problems raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY shall be governed by the following principles:

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
- (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
- (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
- (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.

2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

1. In reply to your 805/2/CA of 1 Sep 44, the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problems raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONT and LOREARDY shall be governed by the following principles:

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
- (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
- (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organization can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
- (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organization must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.

2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.

4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

AFH/bps

Copy to:- A.F.H.Q.

(C O P Y)

/s/ A. F. Harding
/t/ A. F. HARDING
Lieutenant-General
Chief of General Staff.

ROME ALLIED AREA COMMAND
REAL ESTATE SECTION
APO 794, U.S. Army

SECRET

FILE: REQ 313

August 22, 1944

Subject: 116 Via Nomentana

To : The Office of the Chief Commissioner
HQ ACC (att. Major QUAYLE)

1. Reference your A/CC 386.8 dated 18th August 44 relating to the above property.
2. It is regretted that an earlier reply has not been given to your query, but this was impossible in view of the political implications raised and the uncertainty of the position of the Officers Mess now in occupation.
3. It is now possible to state that the property could be surrendered in approximately 2 to 3 weeks time.
4. Will you please state whether this suggestion meets with your approval.
5. It is understood that if earlier surrender is insisted upon, considerable inconvenience may be caused.

/s/ R. H. Camrass
/t/ R. H. CAMRASS
Lt Col AQMG
Real Estate Officer

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S-E-C-R-E-T

ROME ALLIED AREA COMMAND
APO #794, US ARMYTKB/AL/jg
17 August 1944

Subject: Complaint of Polish Anti-Soviet Propaganda.

To : AFHQ, APO #12, US Army.

1. On Tuesday, 15th August 1944, Major General A. F. VASILIEV called upon Brigadier LOW, Deputy Commissioner, Rome Allied Area Command.

2. After discussing other matters of business, Major General VASILIEV inquired who was the authority responsible for permitting exhibitions in Rome. Brigadier LOW asked what particular exhibition was in mind, and Major General VASILIEV replied that there was at present in Rome a Polish exhibition. Brigadier LOW said that this exhibition had been opened without notification to, or authority from this Headquarters and that he was unaware of its existence. Major General VASILIEV then said that his representative had visited the exhibition and had reported on it as being very hostile to the Soviet Union. He expressed the hope that steps would be taken to prevent Anti-Soviet propaganda being carried on in Rome, and said that he would submit a written memorandum.

3. This memorandum, dated 16th August, was received at this Headquarters on 17th August. A copy is at "A".

4. The matter was reported to Brigadier General BROWN immediately on his arrival on the 15th of August. A signal was dispatched to AFHQ, with copy to Headquarters, AAI, on 15th August, requesting instructions. A copy is appended at "B".

5. Colonel ASTLEY, D.D.P.R., was informed of this matter on the 15th of August and it was understood from him that no notification had been made to him of any intention to open this exhibition.

6. The exhibition was opened on 1st of August, and it was to have closed on 15th August, but it appears to have been decided to keep it open for two additional days. It seems to be under the auspices of the Polish Military Office of Culture and

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Propaganda. Invitations were fairly widely issued, but none were addressed to the Commanding General, or to any of the senior Staff officers at this Headquarters. Copy of invitation is appended at "G".

7. Lt. Col. COUNT de SALIS, Liaison officer of AFHQ at this Headquarters, visited the exhibition on the 16th of August and a copy of his note is appended at "D".

8. An officer of the Intelligence Section of this Headquarters visited the exhibition today and a copy of his report is appended at "E".

9. A copy of a letter received at this Headquarters from Lt. W. SKORUPSKI, in charge of the exhibition is appended at "F".

10. It will be seen that though the verbal representations of the Deputy Soviet Representative mentioned only the exhibition, the memorandum also takes execution to the matter displayed in the Polish Public Relations Office in Rome.

11. May instructions be given as to the course to be followed in this matter?

THOMAS K. BROWN,
Brigadier General, US Army,
Commanding

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"A"

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE
ALLIED ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY

16th August 1944

Subject: Polish Anti-Soviet Propaganda.

To : Brigadier A. Low, Deputy Commander,
Rome Allied Area Command.Copy : Captain Ellery W. Stone,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

The Soviet Delegation to the Advisory Council for Italy has the honour to bring to consideration of the Deputy Commander, Rome Allied Area, certain facts of the Anti-Soviet propaganda, which is being spread by Poles in Rome.

A map of the so called "Central European Union" drafted by the Polish reactionary circles is demonstrated by the Public Relations Office of the Polish H.Q. in Italy. A copy of this map is exhibited in one of the shopwindows, Corso Umberto 300.

Into the boundaries of this "union" are entirely included the territories of the Soviet Socialist Republics - Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and that of the Western regions of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as well as the Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. The map has an inscription stating that this plan is "the foundation of Europe's freedom", and "must not fail".

The map of the same kind and a series of various anti Soviet photoes and posters are exhibited at the Polish Exhibition organized in the foyer of the Italian Teatro degli Arti, Via Sicilia 59.

The Soviet Delegation to the Advisory Council

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- 2 -

for Italy considers that the demonstration in Italy liberated by the Allies of such a map and the above-mentioned anti-Soviet materials is directed against the Soviet Union.

The Delegation expresses its confidence that the Allied Command will take measures to prevent the repetition of any kind of hostile anti-Soviet propaganda spread by the Polish reactionaries in liberated Italy.

/s/ A. Vasiliev
/t/ A.F. VASILIEV
Major General, R.A.
Deputy Soviet Representative,
Advisory Council for Italy.

Distribution:

- 1 copy - Brig. A. Low.
- 2 copy - Capt. Stone
- 3 copy - ACI

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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L'UFFICIO MILITARE POLACCO di CULTURA
e PROPAGANDA ha l'onore di invitare _____

ad intervenire ad un The offerto alla Galleria di Roma

Via Sicilia, N. 59 in occasione della Mostra

Polacca, martedì 15 Agosto 1944 alle ore 17.

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"D"

HEADQUARTERS
ROME ALLIED AREA COMMAND

16th August 1944

BRIGADIER LOW

The Polish Exhibition is closing down tomorrow. I have been over it.

It consists of a few photographs of poor quality and of no particular interest, and a number of crude posters, maps, etc.

From a cursory inspection, I consider that there are only the following items to which the Soviets could take exception:

1. Maps. There are some crude historical maps of the Middle Ages, showing former Polish frontiers reaching so far into Russia that SMOLENSK is shown as being inside Polish territory. Jagellon Period.

Other maps show the POLISH CORRIDOR as distorted to many times its true area.

2. EXPLANATORY NOTICES

These are more Anti-Czarist than anti-Soviet, and only in two cases can the style be described as 'unfortunate'.

3. Towns VILNA and LNOW are shown as Polish towns, which they were until September 15th 1939. Types of peasants of the VOLHYNIA AND POLESSI districts are shown as Polish, but these are from behind the CURZON line; there is practically no Polish population in those districts.

My impression is that the atmosphere is unfriendly to the Soviets, but very little tangible evidence can be produced to prove the case.

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Subject: Polish Exhibition at 59 Via SiciliaRESTRICTED

1. This is a propaganda exhibition which sets out openly to win public sympathy for a small nation which has suffered for 500 years or more, a continuous series of partition of territory between three great Powers. GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY and RUSSIA. The case for POLAND is presented almost entirely from a historical and factual points of view. It is illustrated and explained by a number of maps, photographs and prints, together with captions in English, French, Polish and Italian.
2. The three Powers who have periodically dismembered POLAND are treated very much alike. Each successive partition and each successive Polish revolution is given as a historical fact. Some statements concerning RUSSIA are undoubtedly blunt. The November Insurrection of 1830 is described as "the incessant abuses and violations of the Polish constitution by the Russian authorities". The hundreds of executions and the thousands of deportation of Poles to Siberia after the 1863 insurrection are badly stated but without comment. Tsarist depredations and atrocities are given equal prominence with similar German and Austrian aggression. The German, Tsarist and Austrian eagles are shown attacking POLAND from all sides throughout the centuries.
3. More controversial perhaps, are the captions, maps and photographs treating of events of the last 30 years. POLAND's mediaeval frontiers are shown and contrasted with her present ones. WHITE RUSSIA and the Baltic States are shown as having formed part of the old historic Kingdom of Poland, as indeed they did. One map illustrating the situation at the opening of the present war shows how while GERMANY attacked from the West, RUSSIA did the same from the East. A caption on this subject reads "while POLAND was fighting desperately against the Germans her Eastern frontier was crossed by a Soviet army of 39 Inf. Divs, 12 Mechanised Bdes and 10 Cavalry Divs". Another caption headed "Polish forces in USSR" runs "such Polish units as found themselves in the Polish Eastern Provinces By the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 30 Jul 1941 a Polish Army was formed out of these deportees and prisoners. 140,000 civilians were evacuated from RUSSIA with the forces." There are photographs of Polish children in the USSR with captions which describe them as "ragged, suffering children whose appalling misery no-one can describe... or explain" and "our roofless, orphan children in the USSR who were taken under the care of the Polish Army." But side by side with these, there are photographs of German hangings of Polish civilians, shootings and other atrocities.
4. The exhibition illustrates many aspects of Polish life, history, and culture; her contributions to art and science and also to the fighting forces of the Allies during the present war. The sufferings of POLAND at the hands of Germany are set out with facts, figures and pictures, but no attempt is made to conceal the historical

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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fact that she has also suffered much at the hands of RUSSIA. The general tone of the exhibition however, cannot conceivably be described as anti-Russian. The impression created is that the case for POLAND is stated clearly, fairly and objectively, but with no glossing over of hard facts.

/s/ E.W. Gold

/t/ G.S.C.3(1)
Rome Allied Area Command

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Lt. W. Skorupski,
Public Relations Branch,
Polish Army

16 August '44

Brigadier General Thoburn K. Brown,
Commanding
Rome Allied Area Command.

In reply to your letter of today I beg to report as follows:

Polish exhibition which is now being shown in Rome was originally designed, in spring 1943, as an education exhibition planned and executed by the Polish soldiers for the Polish soldier. It had been shown in all Polish camps in Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt. While in Palestine it aroused some interest among the British soldiers so we decided to add explanatory texts in English (all maps and graphs are worked out in Polish) and to show the exhibition to the general public. This was done in Jerusalem and - with additional French texts - in Cairo. In that latter city, in the presence of the British Minister of State - Lord Moyne.

This same exhibition arrived with the Polish Public Relations in Italy and was again shown in May, June and July in various camps of the 2nd Polish Corps and Polish Adv. Base. Then, after the Italian text was added, it was open for a fortnight in Rome on August 1 on the authority of Lt. Gen. W. Anders, G.O.C. 2nd Polish Corps, Col. Astley, ADPR AFHQ having been informed.

Yesterday, upon the request of the visiting public we decided to prolong it for two more days, i.e.: it will be closed to-morrow August 17th at 2000 hrs. and I see no reasons why it should be closed forthwith.

I may add that I was summoned this morning to Col. Astley's office where in the presence of Brig. General McChrystall I explained at length the whole matter.

/s/ W. Skorupski, Lieut.
/t/ W. SKORUPSKI, Lieut.

Copy to: Polish DLPR
ADPR, AFHQ.

6113

Report by Major Camronski

15 August 1944

TO: Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

When I came through from Rome after the Armistice last September, I was asked to write a report on the political situation in Italy. The conclusions of that report were the following:

1. There existed in the Italian Anti-Fascist world no group of men capable of forming an efficient administration.
2. Direct Allied control was therefore an inevitable necessity; it should be based not so much on a central administration but rather on a local self-government.
3. The best solution of the delicate monarchical question was a double abdication and a regency for the baby prince of Naples by his mother.

When developments during last winter tended to prove that these conclusions were not far from being right, it was said that when Rome was liberated the situation would be improved through the men to be found there. In May I wrote a report stating that I considered such hopes to be purely illusions. Today, while keeping up the same conclusions, I again venture to maintain that the liberation of Northern Italy will by no means remove the reasons which caused the present crisis.

It is generally obvious that the present government is not a success. Critics say that they talk and will not get down to work on the enormous task of reconstruction which lies before them. It could not be otherwise. The members of the government had been chosen not for their administrative efficiency but as the most prominent representatives of political parties. As is usually the case in party politics, they have mostly just talked themselves into prominence, not worked for it, and when it comes to setting down to work their eloquence proves as useless as the weapons of a soldier after the war has been won. Besides, as party bosses--and nothing but that--not one of them knows his job. They are mostly not only unacquainted with their task and with the workings of the Ministry entrusted to them, but are totally innocent of what a Ministry in general is and ought to be. It is true that political men as heads of technical departments have proved to be a success in other countries. Yes, but that is possible only when the ministerial offices have a long tradition of uninterrupted team work and can therefore carry on without--and often in spite of--the outsider who tries to direct them. That is decidedly not the case in Italy where all the

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Croce, undoubtedly the most lucid brain in Italy, saw well that so composed the government could only be a failure. As he told me, he demanded that the political parties should be represented in the Cabinet by ministers without portfolio, but that the Ministries should be entrusted to experts. When that was refused, he went out. But not only have they no capacity for their jobs, they have no interest in them. They are all party men and their main interests are party interests. From what members of the government work or at Cabinet meetings there is little sign of real team work or of

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common effort to cope with common difficulties; it is always a tug-of-war and the main issue is usually "not what is to be done" but "who is to do it". The main object is to get as many party friends into posts of vantage and the anti-Fascist purge gives ample possibilities of doing so. Between themselves Cabinet ministers are quite outspoken on the subject. They admit that at times they are making out Mr. A. to be a hardened Fascist mainly because they want to get Mr. B. into that job. Difficulties are normally settled by barter: "I will help you blackmail Mr. X if you help me do the same with Mr. Y". To my former statements on this anti-Fascist purge, I only wish to add that, as now conducted, it is rapidly rebuilding a new Fascist party. As this new party has to keep underground and its membership brings no personal advantages to it, it will be a strong party of confined men. Their present program of "saving the country from the chaos into which liberalism and democracy will lead it" will once again find an enthusiastic following as it did 25 years ago. If the question had been treated at the outset in a truly democratic way, i.e., if Fascist crimes had been punished, not opinions, and people had been allowed to join the Fascist party like any other political party provided they did so openly, the party would have rapidly dwindled into ridicule. Today it is a growing force.

Unfortunately in some places the Allied authorities are still more uncompromising than the Italians on the subject of former Fascists. It is they who often demand the elimination of men whom the Italians want to keep as irreplaceable experts. Thus the administrative epuration is becoming even more disruptive to the sole satisfaction of the Communists whose main object in cooperating with the other parties is the disruption of the State machinery in order to create a situation which would pave the way for their hold.

Just as there is no team work within the Government so also there is no true cooperation between the Cabinet and the Crown. I have dwelled on the reasons for it in my previous report. The main one is that Prince Umberto has not the necessary qualities for this task.

Without going into further details, it is clear that the political situation in Italy is hopeless and can only get worse through growing discontent especially when the cold winter sets in and through growing diffidence between public opinion, the Government and the Allies: as it stands it can only lead to dramatic developments which will pave the way for communist rule.

It is often said that as soon as we get north the situation will improve. In the Salerno days the same hopes were stated on the liberation of Rome. I stated in my report that these hopes were unfounded. I again wish to stress the point that the liberation of Northern Italy will make the situation worse but in no case better. The north the men are tougher which makes them

new fascist party. As this new party membership brings no personal advantages to it, it will be a stream of confined men. Their present program of "saving the country from the chaos into which liberalism and democracy will lead it" will once again find an enthusiastic following as it did 25 years ago. If the question had been treated at the outset in a truly democratic way, i.e., if fascist crimes had been punished, not opinions, and people had been allowed to join the fascist party like any other political party provided they did so openly, the party would have rapidly dwindled into ridicule. Today it is a growing force.

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ceived says that bloody street riots, etc., are generally expected. The Communists here are the only people satisfied with the political developments here. Never in private talks do they even suggest that their present cooperation with the other parties is nothing but tactics. They are preparing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat under their personal rule and they see the situation ripening for it far quicker than they expected. They feel sure that another few months of publicly approved inefficiency to cope with the situation on the part of the present regime, with the additional hope of the hardships of winter, will usher in their triumph especially if by then Northern Italy has been reached.

It is undoubtedly a matter of opinion whether this can, or should be, prevented and whether letting the Communists have the responsibilities of government would be the best way of disarming a mine field which was intended to explode. I will not dwell on the very far reaching implications of this question, but if it is considered that allowing the situation to slip that way, and in the end obviously quite out of control, would not be to the greater advantage of all concerned, I think an attempt might be made to cope with it on the following lines:

I am fully aware of the presumption of making any suggestions, unaware as I am of so many details of the situation which I know only through old acquaintances with many of the political leaders. If I venture to make them, it is only because I was explicitly asked to do so. The main root of the present evil is that the Allies have based their policy in Italy on the illusion that party leaders represent the country and its interests, as they do in England and America. The Allies are pledged to foster democracy in liberated Europe. But this does not necessarily imply that democracy should be implemented by the same kind of institution as have proven their worth in England and America. The basic principles of democracy, from which no departure can ever be made, is "Government by the people, for the people". This has been successfully done by two Anglo-Saxon democracies by the party system, because the elected members of the various parties really represent the trend of public opinion and feel morally responsible of duly representing the views of their constituents. This is not the case in Italy today where the leaders of the mostly non-existent political parties represent nothing but themselves and their own personal interests. Government through them is anything but a "Government by the people, for the people". That is the illusion that is the source of all evil. Effective democracy in Italy can not be merely based on the introduction of imported customs and institutions, even if these have proved suitable elsewhere. Totally different local conditions must be taken into consideration. Policy can only be based on realities. In the Italian state there are two dominant features which must be the foundation of any realistic policy:

1. The enormous majority of the Italian population are tired

or should be, prevented and whether letting the responsibilities of government would be the best way of disarming a mine field which was intended to explode. I will not dwell on the very far reaching implications of this question, but if it is considered that allowing the situation to slip that way, and in the end obviously quite out of control, would not be to the greater advantage of all concerned, I think an attempt might be made to cope with it on the following lines:

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1. The enormous majority of the Italian population are tired of politics and want nothing else but bread, work, and reconstruction, with a guarantee of public order, no matter under what regime, democratic, fascist or communist, and under what rule, Italian or Allied. They know nothing of the self-appointed party leaders and will have nothing to do with their purely political programs. But what they want they are ready to take from anybody who brings it to them, be it communist, fascist, Italian or foreign. Therefore an appeal for cooperation on purely economic grounds made by Allied authorities over the heads of the government would meet with an enthusiastic reception.
2. The Italians at large have little interest for the Italian state. It has no tradition behind it. During the 70 years of its existence, it was looked upon as an experiment. Today it is general-

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ly considered rather a liability than an asset and nobody is ready to make any sacrifice to keep it going. There is therefore no chance of it being a success if it is run as a highly centralized organization. But there is in Italy a more than a thousand years old tradition of efficient local government. Local interests are far more apt to arouse enthusiasm and self-sacrifice than a centralized government which is still regarded as an impostor.

Only a policy which reckons with these two basic facts can meet with success in Italy today, i.e., 1--it must be run on purely economic and administrative lines to the exclusion of all politics; 2--it must be based on local government and not on a centralized administration.

Communal elections held as soon as possible would be the best way to implement such policy. The elections should be preceded by an appeal to the population, openly stating that the economic situation is bad and will probably grow worse, explaining that neither the Italian Government or the Allies can do the necessary to eliminate it, and asking the population to take in hand the local organization of self-help which would then be aided by the Allies to the limit of their material possibilities. "Help yourself and we will help you." To this end the people should choose the men whose administrative efficiency and integrity they think they can most trust, laying aside all consideration of politics. These men would then locally cooperate with the Allied authorities to alleviate the sufferings of the coming winter. I am sure that in the provinces self-help legally organized on a communal basis will do more to meet the difficulties of the situation than anything that could be done centrally. I see everywhere people waiting for something to come from above; if they know it cannot come, they will set about helping themselves. A fair amount of local autonomy would be an incentive to local ambitions and, by kindling them, would be an incentive to efficient self-help. This help would be obviously not sufficient to cope with difficulties of big cities or big industrial concerns. These would remain a burden on the hands of the Allies. But I believe that this burden to a great extent would be eliminated as regards the greater part of the Italian territory.

It is often said that it would be dangerous to hold elections in the present general discontent as communists may easily come out on top. The answer is that unless communal elections, which are the only true democratic measure possible in Italy, are to be postponed till quieter times, i.e., for many years, the more months we wait now the worse the chances of law and order will be. Besides, those now elected might perhaps once be called together as the first constituent assembly. Elected as they will be on an economic and political basis, they will surely form a far more levelheaded chamber than any subsequently elected in the turmoil of the coming crisis.

of holding elections are often

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politics; 2--it must be based on local government and not on a centralized administration.

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It is often said that it would be dangerous to hold elections in the present general discontent as communists may easily come out on top. The answer is that unless communal elections, which are the only true democratic measure possible in Italy, are to be postponed till quieter times, i.e., for many years, the more months we wait now the worse the chances of law and order will be. Besides, those now elected might perhaps once be called together as the first constituent assembly. Elected as they will be on an economic or non-political basis, they will surely form a far more levelheaded chamber than any subsequently elected in the turmoil of the coming crisis.

The technical difficulties of holding elections are often exaggerated. In war time it would be justified to organize them in a far simpler and household way without the paraphernalia of peacetime elections. The local Allied authorities would see to it that the elections should be run in an unbiased way and that the really best men should come out. The results would then be readily accepted as a temporary wartime solution even if all the rules had not been strictly kept.

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Such a solution would have many advantages. The temporary elimination of the Savoia family would satisfy those who have personal grudges against the King and his son. Vesting sovereign rights in representatives of the nation would appeal to all convinced liberals. But above all, this would put an end to the present controversy on the monarchy and reserve the whole question for another decade. If the situation is left as it is, a crisis must soon come with implication which it is difficult to foresee.

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Report by Major Geronzi

16 August 1944

TO: Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

When I came through from Rome after the Armistice last September, I was asked to write a report on the political situation in Italy. The conclusions of that report were the following:

1. There existed in the Italian Anti-Fascist world no group of men capable of forming an efficient administration.
2. Direct Allied control was therefore an inevitable necessity; it should be based not so much on a central administration but rather on a local self-government.
3. The best solution of the delicate monarchical question was a double abdication and a regency for the baby prince of Naples by his mother.

When developments during last winter tended to prove that these conclusions were not far from being right, it was said that when Rome was liberated the situation would be improved through the men to be found there. In May I wrote a report stating that I considered such hopes to be purely illusions. Today, while keeping up the same conclusions, I again venture to maintain that the liberation of Northern Italy will by no means remove the reasons which caused the present crisis.

It is generally obvious that the present government is not a success. Critics say that they talk and will not get down to work on the enormous task of reconstruction which lies before them. It could not be otherwise. The members of the government had been chosen not for their administrative efficiency but as the most prominent representatives of political parties. As is usually the case in party politics, they have mostly just talked themselves into prominence, not worked for it, and when it comes to settling down to work their eloquence proves as useless as the weapons of a soldier after the war has been won. Besides, as party bosses--and nothing but that--not one of them knows his job. They are mostly not only unacquainted with their task and with the workings of the Ministry entrusted to them, but are totally innocent of what a Ministry in general is and ought to be. It is true that political men as heads of technical departments have proved to be a success in other countries. Yes, but that is possible only when the ministerial offices have a long tradition of uninterrupted team work and can therefore carry on without--and often in spite of--the outsider who tries to direct them. That is decidedly not the case in Italy where all the

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Croce, undoubtedly the most lucid brain in Italy, saw well that so composed the Government could only be a failure. As he told me, he demanded that the political parties should be represented in the Cabinet by ministers-without-portfolio, but that the Ministers should be entrusted to experts. When that was refused, he went out. But not only have they no capacity for their jobs, they have no interest in them. They are all party men and their main interests are party interests. From what members of the Government tell me, at Cabinet meetings there is little sign of real team work or of

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common effort to cope with common difficulties; it is always a tug-of-war and the main issue is usually "not what is to be done" but "who is to do it". The main object is to get as many party friends into posts of vantage and the anti-Fascist purge gives ample possibilities of doing so. Between themselves Cabinet ministers are quite outspoken on the subject. They admit that at times they are making out Mr. A. to be a hardened Fascist mainly because they want to get Mr. B. into that job. Difficulties are normally settled by barter: "I will help you blackmail Mr. X if you help me do the same with Mr. Y". To my former statements on this anti-Fascist purge, I only wish to add that, as now conducted, it is rapidly rebuilding a new Fascist party. As this new party has to keep underground and its membership brings no personal advantages to it, it will be a strong party of confined men. Their present program of "saving the country from the chaos into which liberalism and democracy will lead it" will once again find an enthusiastic following as it did 25 years ago. If the question had been treated at the outset in a truly democratic way, i.e., if Fascist crimes had been punished, not opinions, and people had been allowed to join the Fascist party like any other political party provided they did so openly, the party would have rapidly dwindled into ridicule. Today it is a growing force.

Unfortunately in some places the Allied authorities are still more uncompromising than the Italians on the subject of former Fascists. It is they who often demand the elimination of men whom the Italians want to keep as irreplaceable experts. Thus the administrative epuration is becoming even more disruptive to the sole satisfaction of the Communists whose main object in cooperating with the other parties is the disruption of the State machinery in order to create a situation which would pave the way for their hold.

Just as there is no team work within the Government so also there is no true cooperation between the Cabinet and the Crown. I have dwelled on the reasons for it in my previous report. The one is that Prince Umberto has not the necessary qualities for this task.

Without going into further details, it is clear that the political situation in Italy is hopeless and can only get worse through growing discontent especially when the cold winter sets in and through growing diffidence between public opinion, the Government and the Allies: as it stands it can only lead to dramatic developments which will pave the way for communist rule.

It is often said that as soon as we get north the situation will improve. In the Salerno days the same hopes were stated on the liberation of Rome. I stated in May that these hopes were unfounded. I again wish to stress the point that the liberation of Northern Italy will make the situation worse but in no case better. It is true that in the North the men are tougher which makes them

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ceived says that bloody street riots, etc., are generally expected. The Communists here are the only people satisfied with the political developments here. Never in private talks do they even suggest that their present cooperation with the other parties is nothing but tactics. They are preparing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat under their personal rule and they see the situation ripening for it far quicker than they expected. They feel sure that another few months of publicly approved inefficiency to cope with the situation on the part of the present regime, with the additional hope of the hardships of winter, will usher in their triumph especially if by then Northern Italy has been reached.

It is undoubtedly a matter of opinion whether this can, or should be, prevented and whether letting the Communists have the responsibilities of government would be the best way of disarming a mine field which was intended to explode. I will not dwell on the very far reaching implications of this question, but if it is considered that allowing the situation to slip that way, and in the end obviously quite out of control, would not be to the greater advantage of all concerned, I think an attempt might be made to cope with it on the following lines:

I am fully aware of the presumption of making any suggestions, unaware as I am of so many details of the situation which I know only through old acquaintances with many of the political leaders. If I venture to make them, it is only because I was explicitly asked to do so. The main root of the present evil is that the Allies have based their policy in Italy on the illusion that the party leaders represent the country and its interests, as they do in England and America. The Allies are pledged to foster democracy in liberated Europe. But this does not necessarily imply that democracy should be implemented by the same kind of institution as have proven their worth in England and America. The basic principles of ~~democracy~~ ^{democracy} from which no departure can ever be made, is "Government by the people, for the people". This has been successfully done in the two Anglo-Saxon democracies by the party system, because the elected members of the various parties really represent the trend of public opinion and feel morally responsible of duly representing the views of their constituents. This is not the case in Italy today where the leaders of the mostly non-existent political parties represent nothing but themselves and their own personal interests. Government through them is anything but a "Government by the people, for the people". That is the illusion that is the source of all evil. Effective democracy in Italy can not be merely based on the introduction of imported customs and institutions, even if these have proved suitable elsewhere. Totally different local conditions must be taken into consideration. Policy can only be based on realities. In the Italian state there are two dominant features which must be the foundation of any realistic policy:

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1. The enormous majority of the Italian population are tired of politics and want nothing else but bread, work, and reconstruction, with a guarantee of public order, no matter what regime, democratic, fascist or communist, and under what rule, Italian or Allied. They know nothing of the self-appointed party leaders and will have nothing to do with their purely political programs. But what they want they are ready to take from anybody who brings it to them, be it communist, fascist, Italian or foreign. Therefore an appeal for cooperation on purely economic grounds made by Allied authorities over the heads of the Government would meet with an enthusiastic reception.
2. The Italians at large have little interest for the Italian state. It has no tradition behind it. During the 70 years of its existence, it was looked upon as an experiment. Today it is general-

ly considered rather a liability than an asset and nobody is ready to make any sacrifice to keep it going. There is therefore no chance of it being a success if it is run as a highly centralized organization. But there is in Italy a more than a thousand years old tradition of efficient local government. Local interests are far more apt to arouse enthusiasm and self-sacrifice than a centralized government which is still regarded as an impostor.

Only a policy which reckons with these two basic facts can meet with success in Italy today, i.e., 1--it must be run on purely economic and administrative lines to the exclusion of all politics; 2--it must be based on local government and not on a centralized administration.

Communal elections held as soon as possible would be the best way to implement such policy. The elections should be preceded by an appeal to the population, openly stating that the economic situation is bad and will probably grow worse, explaining that neither the Italian Government or the Allies can do the necessary to eliminate it, and asking the population to take in hand the local organization of self-help which would then be aided by the Allies to the limit of their material possibilities. "Help yourself and we will help you." To this end the people should choose the men whose administrative efficiency and integrity they think they can most trust, laying aside all consideration of politics. These men would then locally cooperate with the Allied authorities to alleviate the sufferings of the coming winter. I am sure that in the provinces self-help legally organized on a communal basis will do more to meet the difficulties of the situation than anything that could be done centrally. I see everywhere people waiting for something to come from above; if they know it cannot come, they will set about helping themselves. A fair amount of local autonomy would go far to satisfy local ambitions and, by kindling them, would be an incentive to efficient self-help. This help would be obviously not sufficient to cope with difficulties of big cities or big industrial concerns. These would remain a burden on the hands of the Allies. But I believe that this burden to a great extent would be eliminated as regards the greater part of the Italian territory.

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Maj. Gen. Sir P. H. Robertson, Rt,
Chief Administrative Officer,
HQ ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY.
5001/9/CAO

Dear Captain Stone:

A 1966 1 Aug 44.
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HQ ACE, APO 394
352 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 2 Aug 1120
By BPA.

Thank you for your letter of 27 Jul enclosing particulars of requisitioned plants and requesting that steps should be taken to release them from Allied control where possible.

This matter is receiving detailed examination and to date I can only give you information in respect of some of the properties. This is as follows:-

(a) Reference para 5 - Soda Solway Plant, ROSIGNANO.

This is a question of some operational significance and it is most important that every facility be given to enable LUGNOWN port operation to proceed. The matter is being taken up with the Royal Navy to see what can be done.

(b) Para 6 - Montecatini Plant, MONTECATINI.

The position here has in no way changed since our letter dated 10 Jun 44. The depot is still in operation and holds the main British reserves of all our stores.

(c) Para 9 - TERNI.

This HQ letter 2114/92 of 11 Jul 44 explains the position. In brief we are as anxious as you to get it working since it will absorb many of its former employees.

I will let you have a complete answer as soon as my staff are able to obtain the necessary details. As you will appreciate, this involves considerable investigation, especially as both British and American interests are concerned. In order to make the work of my staff easier, I should be most grateful if, in future, you would kindly use my references when referring to properties which are located in the lesser-known towns or villages, since some of the places are extremely difficult to find. As a particular case in point, my staff have so far failed to identify TUSCOLANO.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ P. H. Robertson

31
Capt. Ellery W. Stone, USNR
HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

5001/9/CAO
1 Aug 44

COPY

004:04
J 001:33

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

Maj. Gen. Sir D. H. Robertson, Bt.,
Chief Administrative Officer,
HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY,
5861/9/CAO

1 Aug 44.

HQ ACC, APO 394

352 Sec'y Gen.

Rec'd: 2 Aug 11 20

By: DRR

Dear Captain Stone:

Thank you for your letter of 27 Jul enclosing particulars of requisitioned plants and requesting that steps should be taken to release them from Allied control where possible.

This matter is receiving detailed examination and to date I can only give you information in respect of some of the properties. This is as follows:-

(a) Reference para 5 - 2000 Colony Plant, MONTICELLI.

This is a question of some operational significance and it is most important that every facility be given to enable MONTICELLI port operation to proceed. The matter is being taken up with the Royal Navy to see what can be done.

(b) Para 6 - Montecelli Plant, MONTICELLI.

The position here has in no way changed since our letter dated 10 Jun 44. The depot is still in operation and holds the main British reserves of all our stores.

(c) Para 8 - VERNA.

This HQ letter 2111/02 of 11 Jul 44 explains the position. In brief we are as anxious as you to get it working since it will absorb many of its former employees.

I will let you have a complete answer as soon as my staff are able to obtain the necessary details. As you will appreciate, this involves considerable investigation, especially as both British and American interests are concerned. In order to make the work of my staff easier, I should be most grateful if, in future, you would kindly use map references when referring to properties which are located in the lesser-known towns or villages, since some of the places are extremely difficult to find. As a particular case in point, my staff have so far failed to identify TUSCOLINO.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ B. H. Robertson

Capt. Wilfrid W. Stone, USMC
HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

COPY

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~Maj. Gen. Sir B. H. Robertson, St.
Chief Administrative Officer,
HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

5001/9/CAC

HQ ACSI, APO 394

1 Aug 44. 352 Sec'y Gen.

Rec'd 2 Aug 1120

By SPK

Dear Captain Stone:

Thank you for your letter of 27 Jul enclosing particulars of requisitioned plants and requesting that steps should be taken to release them from Allied control where possible.

This matter is receiving detailed examination and to date I can only give you information in respect of some of the properties. This is as follows:-

(a) Reference para 5 - Bozza Railway Plant, BOZZA.

This is a question of some operational significance and it is most important that every facility be given to enable LEGATION port operation to proceed. The matter is being taken up with the Royal Navy to see what can be done.

(b) Para 6 - Montecchini Plant, MONTICCHINI.

The position here has in no way changed since our letter dated 10 Jun 44. The depot is still in operation and holds the main British reserves of all our stores.

(c) Para 8 - TERNI.

This HQ letter 2114/02 of 11 Jul 44 explains the position. In brief we are as anxious as you to get it working since it will absorb many of its former employees.

I will let you have a complete answer as soon as my staff are able to obtain the necessary details. As you will appreciate, this involves considerable investigation, especially as both British and American interests are concerned. In order to make the work of my staff easier, I should be most grateful if, in future, you would kindly use map references when referring to properties which are located in the lesser-known towns or villages, since some of the places are extremely difficult to find. As a particular case in point, my staff have so far failed to identify TUSCOLANO.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ B. H. Robertson

Capt. Ellery W. Stone, USMC
HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

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COPY
 OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AT BARI
 OF THE MINISTER RESIDENT AT ALLIED
 FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
 24, Via Salvatore Cognigni, BARI

22nd July 1944.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Repatriation sick and wounded of "Garibaldi" Division.

TO: Army Sub-Commission, Main Headquarters (157A), Legione (157C).

I have received your letter of the 29th June (marked ASG/22/27). I cannot confirm or refute the statement made by Marshal Messe about the six Allied aircraft which landed at Barone on the night of the 17th June.

It seems possible, however, that the Italian Supreme Command are not aware of the number of Italian soldiers who have been evacuated from Yugoslavia with Allied assistance, and, in this connection, I suggest that you might inform Marshal Messe that from Barone alone 315 Italians were evacuated during June. In the same period 380 Partisans were brought out from Dalmatia, all of whom were badly wounded whilst many of the Italian evacuees had not been injured in engagements with the enemy but were merely exhausted by the conditions under which they had been serving.

All concerned have been informed that the Italian Government are prepared to accept all Italian sick and wounded whom it may be possible to evacuate. Marshal Messe can be reassured on this point.

The question of the despatch of an Italian Military Mission to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslavia Army of National Liberation has been discussed by the Balkan Air Force Policy Committee, and I have referred the matter to Mr. Gascia with the Allied Control Commission, Naples, to whom I am also sending a copy of this letter.

On political grounds it is considered undesirable that such a mission should be formed, as it will raise difficulties with Allied Governments who may wish to send similar missions.

I should, therefore, be grateful if you could discourage the proposal and point out the machinery of the Allied Control Commission exists for such purposes.

A copy of my previous communication to Mr. Gascia is enclosed for your information.

(5/2) R. P. P. P.

148938-301

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SECRET*purples*MEMORANDUM:PROCEEDINGS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL IN ROMEJULY 15, 1944

The meeting of the Advisory Council for Italy was presided over by the new Chairman in office, Sir Noel Charles, Gt., K.C.M.G.

Captain Hilary W. Stone, G.B.M.B., Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, presented a short report on the political situation.

Next on the agenda was consideration of Captain Stone's recommendation that additional territory in Italy be returned from Allied Military Government to the Italian administration, under supervision of the Allied Control Commission. Captain Stone proposed, in accordance with the aide memoire which he had sent on July 9th to Sir Noel Charles, that on July 20th the Provinces of Naples, Benevento, Avellino, Foggia, and Campobasso be transferred to the Italian administration with the exception of the Comune of Naples which for military reasons would be designated a military zone under Allied Military Government. He further proposed that on August 15th the Provinces of Rome, Littoria and Frosinone would be transferred from Allied Military Government to the Italian administration under Allied Control Commission supervision.

Captain Stone pointed out that this proposal had been approved in principle by General Wilson (SACRED), subject to the concurrence of AAI and a favorable recommendation of the Advisory Council. He stated that he had secured AAI's agreement on July 14th. After a short discussion, the Council agreed to approve Captain Stone's recommendations and a telegram to that effect was drafted to SACRED.

Ambassador Kim, the U.S. Delegate to the Advisory Council, brought up the question of future financing of supplies for civilian relief in Italy. He asked the Advisory Council to recommend that these supplies in the future be financed by UNRRA, stating that the United States War Department was no longer able to finance such supplies out of its budget. Mr. Henry Grady, Vice President of the Economic Section, was present and spoke in favor of the proposal.

A considerable discussion followed. The representatives for U.S., France, Russia, Yugoslavia and Greece all stated that they were uninstructed in this matter and would be required to communicate with their respective governments. In particular, the representative for Yugoslavia stated that it had been definitely understood that the funds at the disposal of UNRRA were to be used for the relief of non-Axis countries.

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and he therefore questioned the propriety of recommending to UNRRA that such a sweeping revision in its charter be made as would permit the expenditure of its funds for civilian relief in Italy, an ex-Axis country. The delegate for Russia, M. Bogomolov, stated that his government would want to know a great deal more about the objectives of UNRRA before it could support Mr. Kirk's proposal. It was agreed that all delegates would consult their respective governments further on this matter.

At this point, Captain Stone, Dr. Grady, and other representatives of the Allied Control Commission at the meeting, withdrew from the meeting. It is understood that the question of the future residence of the King, i.e., whether he should be permitted to move from Salerno to Naples, was discussed but that no decision was taken and the subject was reserved for the next meeting.

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COPY

OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AT BARI
OF THE MINISTER PRESIDENT AT ALLIED
FORCE HEADQUARTERS, BARI.

10 July 1944.

My dear Harold

You will probably seen a copy of a minute sent by the Army sub-Commission off Allied Control Commission to Force 399 on the 19th June (marked 8/6/1) about Italian troops in Yugoslavia.

This question was discussed at a meeting of the new Policy Committee on the 23th June.

It was decided that there was no military objection to an Italian Military Mission being sent to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, but it was pointed out that this was a matter for arrangement solely between the Italian Military authorities and Marshal Tito.

The meeting emphasized the great practical difficulties in the way of any large-scale evacuation in the present military situation and pointed out that Italian doctors had already been infiltrated into Yugoslavia and an increasing number of Italian wounded had been brought out.

Any communications which the Italians may wish to make to Marshal Tito should be addressed the British Military Mission for onward transmission.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

H. Canale, Esq.,
Allied Control Commission,
Naples.

6004

TOP SECRET

File A+B/7000

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TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY

MEMORANDUM

DSH 1618
10 JUL 1944

concerning the publication of the long Armistice terms, the Department of State concurs with the views of Admiral Stone and those expressed by the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy. The internal Italian reaction to publication at the present time, as well as the military implications of such Italian reaction must be considered. While there is no way of ascertaining the effect upon the activities of the Italian patriots in German-occupied Italy, it seems safe to assume that they will be unfavorable and may even result in considerable military disadvantage. Furthermore, publication at this stage of the war might be psychologically inept as publicity for the harsh political and economic terms imposed upon the Italians would reveal to the Germans and the satellite nations the nature of unconditional surrender terms.

The Department now has under consideration the British proposal that the Allies substitute the present Armistice terms with a preliminary peace treaty and it would seem advisable to postpone publication until announcement could be made simultaneously of a substitute for the present Armistice regime.

6493

Naples, July 7, 1944.

TOP SECRET

DSH
10 JUL 1944

SUBJECT: Repatriation of General AZZI
and Staff from ALBANIA

SECRET

H. Q. Force 399,
C.M.F.

SF/621/A/131/IB
6 July 44

TO: Acting Chief Commissioner
HQ Allied Control Commission,
A.P.O. 394,

COPIES TO: GSI(b), 2 District, CMF.
CSDIC (Sub-Center East), c/o 2 District, CMF.

FROM: Commander, Force 399.

1. Reference your A/CC 014.33 of 30 June 44.
2. General AZZI and his staff arrived in ITALY from enemy occupied territory where they had been in contact with the enemy and with the Allied Military Mission. It was, therefore, necessary that the customary security check should be made. The Army Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission were informed of this in a letter of 16 June 44, reference 2022/90. GSI written by GSI(b) HQ 2 District. The security check was carried out according to normal procedure.
3. The conditions under which General AZZI and his staff were detained are not under the control of this H.Q. On this subject reference should be made to GSI(b) HQ 2 District and CSDIC (Sub-Centre East).

.....Lt.Col.
(HARCOURT)
Comd. Force 399.

N.B. Copies of A.C.C. correspondence attached for
information of GSI(b) 2 District and CSDIC.

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014.33
marginalia

Subject: Repatriation of General AZZIZ and Staff
from ALBANIA

CSL (Sub-centre East)
No. 2 District, C.M.F.

OSD/C/E/11/16/0744

11 Jul 44

To: HQ, AGC,
Office of the Chief Commissioner, AGO 394.
Copy to: Commander, Force 399, CMF.

Reference yours A/CC 014.53 dated 30 Jun 44 transmitted to us via 399 Force.

It is noted that a complaint was lodged by General AZZIZ alleging harsh treatment during his two days detention at 300 Mobile Unit, pending security investigations.

The matter has been investigated and found to be grossly exaggerated.

Whilst it is realised that high ranking Italian officers expect the special treatment due to their rank under any circumstances, it must be born in mind that 300 Mobile Unit is not able to provide the comforts and amenities of a modern hotel. The quarters are mainly designed to house refugees.

Adequate notice of the arrival of the above party was given, but none of the organizations directly concerned with its disposal made any preparation for arranging suitable accommodation. At the same time, 300 Mobile Unit could hardly be expected to bear the cost of any comforts which General AZZIZ seemed to expect, especially as no funds are available for this purpose.

With regard to the separate complaints raised, the following may be said:-

- (1) The party was searched in accordance with security instructions received. The search was however carried out by an officer who used all necessary tact and correctness for this unpleasant task.
- All articles were returned before the party left, except certain documents which were returned a few days later and the gold currency which was handed back to the British authorities concerned, with the General's full approval in writing. A balance of 19 gold sovereigns which the party claimed to be their own personal property was returned to him and a receipt is held by this office.

- (2) Re-accommodation, it might be said that the whole top floor of the refugee quarters with the exception of one room was placed at the disposal of General AZZIZ's party. Living and sleeping quarters were separate.

The sleeping accommodation consisted of double bunks and in view of the absence of any mattresses, blankets were issued on the liberal scale of FIVE per man i.e. three more than the summer scale for our own troops.

- (3) It is ridiculous to state that meals were served in a 'spot' or 'hall'. China tableware not being available in this theatre of war, all food was served on army issue tin plates and tea bowls.

- (4) The rations which did not seem to please the General were British Field Service rations and identical to those consumed by the officers and men of the unit.

- (5) All interrogations of the party were carried out on the premises by SIO

1 2 3 4

It is noted that a complaint was lodged by General AZZI alleging harsh treatment during his two days detention at 300 Mobile Unit, pending security investigations.

The matter has been investigated and found to be grossly exaggerated.

Whilst it is realised that high ranking Italian officers expect the special treatment due to their rank under any circumstances, it must be born in mind that 300 Mobile Unit is not able to provide the comforts and amenities of a modern hotel. The quarters are mainly designed to house refugees.

Adequate notice of the arrival of the above party was given, but none of the organizations directly concerned with its disposal made any preparation for arranging suitable accommodation. At the same time, 300 Mobile Unit could hardly be expected to bear the cost of any comforts which General AZZI seemed to expect, especially as NO funds are available for this purpose.

With regard to the separate complaints raised, the following may be said:-

- (1) The party was searched in accordance with security instructions received. The search was however carried out by an officer who used all necessary tact and correctness for this unpleasant task.

All articles were returned before the party left, except certain documents which were returned a few days later and the gold currency which was handed back to the British authorities concerned, with the General's full approval in writing.

A balance of 13 gold sovereigns which the party claimed to be their own personal property was returned to him and a receipt is held by this office.

- (2) Re-accommodation, it might be said that the whole top floor of the refugee quarters with the exception of one room was placed at the disposal of General AZZI's party. Living and sleeping quarters were separate.

The sleeping accommodation consisted of double bunks and in view of the absence of any mattresses, blankets were issued on the liberal scale of FIVE per man i.e. three more than the summer scale for our own troops.

- (3) It is ridiculous to state that meals were served in a 'spot' or 'pail'. China tableware not being available in this theatre of war, all food was served on army issue tin plates and tea bowls.

- (4) The rations which did not seem to please the General were British Field Service rations and identical to those consumed by the officers and men of the unit.

- (5) All interrogations of the party were carried out on the premises by SIO personnel, who to the best of our knowledge did this on a formal and correct manner.

In addition to the above it should be pointed out that the Italian speaking officer of the unit, a Maltese Lieutenant, went out of his way to reduce the so called discomforts sustained by the party and earnestly apologised to the General for the inadequate conditions under which they were forced to exist for two days (actually 36 hours). At the same time the party was given free of charge, 200 cigarettes and a 2 oz tin of tobacco out of the unit's officers' rations.

CSMC/ 11/16/07/44

In conclusion it might be said that the only time the General voiced a complaint during the two days in question, was that their first breakfast was not properly served. This was immediately rectified and the services of a young Yugoslav were placed at the disposal of the party.

HGFC/PG

(H.G.F. Greenham) Capt.
for Officer i/c CSDIC (Sub-
centre East) G.M.F.

6430

SECRET *File A (B)*

SUBJECT:- Apprehension of Escaped
Italian PW (Co-operators).

HQ ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY

AAI/3072/A(O).

4 Jul 44.RA, A.C.C.

1. Copy of this HQ letter of even number dated 25 Jun 44, addressed to Army Sub-Commission AGC, is forwarded, together with a copy of General Browning's reply.
2. Will you please consider the question and approach the Italian Government in accordance with para 6 of the first quoted letter.

/s/

Brigadier,
D.A.G.

TW/II.

Gill 

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C O P Y

8 JUL 1944

SECRET

SUBJECT: - Apprehension of Escaped
Italian POW (Co-operators).

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

MAI/3072/A(G).

OS/1023
8 JUL 1944

4 Jul 44

HQ, A.C.G.

1. Copy of this HQ letter of even number dated 25 Jun 44, addressed to Army Sub-Commission ACC, is forwarded, together with a copy of General Browning's reply.
2. Will you please consider the question and approach the Italian Government in accordance with para 6 of the first quoted letter.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Col.
for Brigadier,
E.A.G.

TM/IX.

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*Implicite
indict file*

C O P Y

SUBJECT: Apprehension of Escaped
Italian PW. (Co-operators).

S E C R E T

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main Hq (MIA)
LEQUILS (LECCO)
AQ/11/1.
29 June 44.

H.Q. AAI.

Your AAI/3072/A(C) dated 25 June -

1. I agree in general with your letter as above.

2. The position of P of W is anomalous and no solution has been come to by the Allied Governments. I understand that the Italian Government will NOT "play" and so no "formula" is likely to be produced. But this is a matter for ACC to advise on. Therefore, we must act independently as best we can.

3. The following are some ideas on this subject:-

(a) P of W have for long past been used for work for the Allies in organized units with better privileges than the ordinary Italian soldier. They are thus unlikely to desert permanently.

(b) We need this manpower, particularly if the Italian Army ceiling is reduced to 447,300 as proposed by AFHQ.

(c) Therefore we must take these 10,000 P of W and do the best we can with them. If they slip off to see their families and do not come back under a fortnight, we tell CC.M. If they come back we say and do nothing.

If CC.M. picks them up, those of non-military age are demobilised, those of military age are enrolled in the Army - without punishment for deserting, except to demand back their P of W uniforms. We must hope they will not desert, but if they do, we can do nothing about it, except as above.

(d) We must treat them as they have been treated in NORTH AFRICA, but try and keep them separate from other Italian troops.

(e) Presumably they would only be used for labour and not (armed) Guard duties.

4. The above are only my personal ideas. I think it is really a political matter which should be advised on by ACC. I know General MAC-FARLANE made many efforts to achieve a solution which failed due to factors outside his control.

1. I agree in general with your letter as above.
2. The position of P of W is anomalous and no solution has been come to by the Allied Governments. I understand that the Italian Government will NOT "play" and so no "formula" is likely to be produced. But this is a matter for ACC to advise on. Therefore, we must act independently as best we can.
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 - (b) We need this manpower, particularly if the Italian Army ceiling is reduced to 447,300 as proposed by AFHQ.
 - (c) Therefore we must take these 10,000 P of W and do the best we can with them. If they slip off to see their families and do not come back under a fortnight, we tell CC.M. If they come back we say and do nothing.
 - (d) If CC.M. picks them up, those of non-military age are demobilised, those of military age are enrolled in the Army - without punishment for deserting, except to demand back their P of W uniforms. We must hope they will not desert, but if they do, we can do nothing about it, except as above.
 - (e) We must treat them as they have been treated in NORTH AFRICA, but try and keep them separate from other Italian troops.
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(Sgd) L. Browning.

Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

tvb.LB.

COPY

Fila A (B)

SECRET

SUBJECT: Apprehension of Escaped
Italian PW. (Co-operators).

Army Sub-Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ (MILA)
LEQUILLE (LECOLE)
AG/11/1.
29 June 44.

E.C. AAI

Your AAI/3072A(9) dated 25 June -

1. I agree in general with your letter as above.

2. The position of P of W is anomalous and no solution has been come to by the Allied Governments. I understand that the Italian Government will not "play" and so no "formula" is likely to be produced. But this is a matter for ACC to advise on. Therefore, we must act independently as best we can.

3. The following are some ideas on this subject:-

(a) P of W have for long past been used for work for the Allies in organized units with better privileges than the ordinary Italian soldier. They are thus unlikely to desert permanently.

(b) We need this manpower, particularly if the Italian Army ceiling is reduced to 447,300 as proposed by AFHQ.

(c) Therefore we must take these 10,000 P of W and do the best we can with them. If they slip off to see their families and do not come back under a fortnight, we tell CC.RR. If they come back we say and do nothing.

If CC.RR picks them up, those of non-military age are demobilized, those of military age are enrolled in the Army - without punishment for deserting, except to demand back their P of W uniforms. We must hope they will not desert, but if they do, we can do nothing about it, except as above.

(d) We must treat them as they have been treated in NORTH AFRICA, but try and keep them separate from other Italian troops.

(e) Presumably they would only be used for labour and not (armed) Guard duties.

4. The above are only my personal ideas. I think it is really a political matter which should be advised on by ACC. I know General MONTARLONE made many efforts to achieve a solution which failed due to factors outside his control.

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If CC.RR picks them up, those of non-military age are demobilized, those of military age are enrolled in the Army - without punishment for deserting, except to demand back their P of W uniforms. We must hope they will not desert, but if they do, we can do nothing about it, except as above.

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4. The above are only my personal ideas. I think it is really a political matter which should be advised on by ACC. I know General MCPARLANE made many efforts to achieve a solution which failed due to factors outside his control.

tvs.LB.

(sgd) L. Browning.

Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

C O P Y

SUBJECT:- Apprehension of Escaped
Italian PW. (Co-operators).

Army Sub-Commission,
ACC.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
CHP

25 Jun 44
LAI/3072/A(O)

Reference AG 38J.6 dated 30 May 44 from CG PBS.

1. AFHQ intend shortly to import into ITALY 10,000 Italian PW who can play a vital part in the maintenance of this Force. As carefully organized and equipped units they are of far greater value to us than equivalent units of the Italian Army. On this basis, our policy must be to keep these PW units intact.

2. When the 10,000 PW are imported there will be a natural tendency for personnel to desert in order to visit their families and for other reasons. The only deterrent which the system of the PBS applies is the fact that on apprehension the absconder rejoins the Italian Army with its lower standard of living. This penalty is not sufficiently hard to prevent desertion.

3. Presumably deserters within the demobilization categories would not be returned to the Italian Army and would be demobilized on apprehension.

4. In view of the foregoing, the arrangements in force as described in PBS letter quoted above are not acceptable.

5. The status of Italian PW employed in formed units by the Allied Forces is not officially described as "Co-operator". They are employed in the same manner as other units of the Italian Army and, therefore, cannot be regarded in a true sense as PW. That being so, the argument by CG Italian Forces in CAMPANIA that the international military code obliges an officer to assist in the escape of PW of his own nationality must be interpreted in a broader sense, in view of the abnormal state of affairs in ITALY and the employment of units in conjunction with the Italian Army as stated above.

6. It is considered that the matter should be taken up with the Italian Government, in order that they may produce a formula by which the scruples of their officers are satisfied and the deserters returned to the units in which they are employed, as it is only by the co-operation of the Police, Military Authorities and Carabinieri that deserters can be apprehended.

7. Will you please consider the matter and let us have your views.

(Sgd) T. Welch. Col.
For General,
Commander-in-Chief.

TW/JD

1. AFM intend shortly to import into ITALY 10,000 Italian PW who can play a vital part in the maintenance of this Force. As carefully organized and equipped units they are of far greater value to us than equivalent units of the Italian Army. On this basis, our policy must be to keep these PW units intact.
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3. Presumably deserters within the demobilization categories would not be returned to the Italian Army and would be demobilized on apprehension.
4. In view of the foregoing, the arrangements in force as described in PBS letter quoted above are not acceptable.
5. The status of Italian PW employed in formed units by the Allied Forces is now officially described as "Co-operator". They are employed in the same manner as other units of the Italian Army and, therefore, cannot be regarded in a true sense as PW. That being so, the argument by CG Italian Forces in CAMPANIA that the international military code obliges an officer to assist in the escape of PW of his own nationality must be interpreted in a broader sense, in view of the abnormal state of affairs in ITALY and the employment of these units in conjunction with the Italian Army as stated above.
6. It is considered that the matter should be taken up with the Italian Government, in order that they may produce a formula by which the scruples of their officers are satisfied and the deserters returned to the units in which they are employed, as it is only by the co-operation of the Police, Military Authorities and Carabinieri that deserters can be apprehended.
7. Will you please consider the matter and let us have your views.

TW/JD

Copy to G(SD)

(sgd) T. Welch, Col.
For General,
Commander-in-Chief.

S E C R E T *copy*

SUBJECT:- Apprehension of Escaped
Italian (Co-operators).

HQ ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY

AAI/3072/A(0).

4 Jul 44HQ. A.C.C.

1. Copy of this HQ letter of even number dated 25 Jun 44, addressed to Army Sub-Commission ACC, is forwarded, together with a copy of General Browning's reply.
2. Will you please consider the question and approach the Italian Government in accordance with para 6 of the first quoted letter.

/s/

Brigadier,
D.A.G.

TW/IV.

6084

C O P Y

SUBJECT: Apprehension of Escaped
Italian PW. (Co-operators).

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
OMF

25 Jun 44
AAI/3072/A(O)

Army Sub-Commission,
AC.

Reference AG 382.6 dated 30 May 44 from CG PBS.

1. AFHQ intend shortly to import into ITALY 10,000 Italian PW who can play a vital part in the maintenance of this Force. As carefully organized and equipped units they are of far greater value to us than equivalent units of the Italian Army. On this basis, our policy must be to keep these PW units intact.
2. When the 10,000 PW are imported there will be a natural tendency for personnel to desert in order to visit their families and for other reasons. The only deterrent which the system of the PBS applies is the fact that on apprehension the absconder rejoins the Italian Army with its lower standard of living. This penalty is not sufficiently hard to prevent desertion.
3. Presumably deserters within the demobilization categories would not be returned to the Italian Army and would be demobilized on apprehension.
4. In view of the foregoing, the arrangements in force as described in PBS letter quoted above are not acceptable.
5. The status of Italian PW employed in formed units by the Allied Forces is now officially described as "Co-operator". They are employed in the same manner as other units of the Italian Army and, therefore, cannot be regarded in a true sense as PW. That being so, the argument by CG Italian Forces in CAMPANIA that the international military code obliges an officer to assist in the escape of PW of his own nationality must be interpreted in a broader sense, in view of the abnormal state of affairs in ITALY and the employment of these units in conjunction with the Italian Army as stated above.
6. It is considered that the matter should be taken up with the Italian Government, in order that they may produce a formula by which the scruples of their officers are satisfied and the deserters returned to the units in which they are employed, as it is only by the co-operation of the Police, Military Authorities and Carabinieri that deserters can be apprehended.
7. Will you please consider the matter and let us have your views.

(Sgd) T. Welch. Col.
For General,
Commander-in-Chief.

TW/JD

Copy to G(50)

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7. Will you please consider the matter and let us have your views.

(Sgd) T. Welch, Col.
For General,
Commander-in-Chief.

TW/JD

Copy to G(SD)

COPY

SUBJECT: Ceiling of Italian Army.

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.

Main Hq (MIA)

Liaison (LICO)

C/5/1

27 June 1944.

H.Q. AAI

1. At the conference at AAI on 17 June, it was agreed that if, despite the opinion of Supreme Allied Commander, C.C.S. insist on a reduction of the Italian Army to 347,000, the distribution should be:

(a) G.I.L.	25,000
(b) Tps employed by Allies	164,000
(c) Italian Administration	
Actual	27,000
Desires	13,000
	40,000
(d) I.S.	53,300
(e) Carabinieri	55,000
(f) A.A. & G.P.	5,000
(g) GOMERICA	5,000
	<u>347,300</u>

2. (a) We estimate that at 31 July there will be 91,500 tps still left in SAUDINIA. These must be borne on the ration strength of the Italian Army as we cannot demobilize them in SAUDINIA.

(b) Assuming reduction to 347,300 on above basis is ordered to be made by July 31, estimated figures on that date will be:-

In SAUDINIA	91,500
In CORBIA	4,850
In STICILY	12,800
On KARNLAND under Allies	
(Incl AA & GP, 5,000 picked up in field and C.I.)	165,000
Carabinieri	55,000
	<u>329,150</u>

3001

(c) This leaves only 12,150 to cover all Italian Administration (Central and Services) including reinforcements.

(a) C.I.L. 25,000

(b) Tps. employed by Allies 164,000

(c) Italian Administration
Actual 27,000)
Reinforce 13,000) 40,000

(d) I.S. 53,300

(e) Carabinieri 55,000

(f) A.A. & G.S. 5,000

(g) COMITA 5,000

347,300

2. (a) We estimate that at 31 July there will be 91,500 tps still left in SARDINIA. There must be borne on the nation strength of the Italian Army as we cannot debilitate them in SARDINIA.

(b) Assuming reduction to 347,300 on above basis is ordered to be made by July 31, estimated figures on that date will be:-

In SARDINIA 91,500

In CORSICA 4,850

In STILLY 12,900

On MAINLAND under Allies
(Incl AA & GS, 5,000 picked
up in 1942 and C.I.L.) 165,000

Carabinieri 55,000

329,150

3001

(c) This leaves only 15,150 to cover all Italian Administration (central admin, static formations and services) including reinforcements, and all I.S. formations on the mainland. This potentially may have to cover all ITALY if we break the FISA-SIEM line.

3. If therefore reduction to 347,300 is enforced by 31 July:

(a) The STILLY Garrison, which also does guard and labour duties must remain. Chief Commissioner considered 2 I.S. five (40,000) necessary in that turbulent island.

(b) All I.S. formations on the mainland, except 4 has now on guard duties under command of the Allies, will have to be debilitated irrespective of age (classes). Apart from the I.S. aspect, there will be 40 men for other guard duties. Such as, for instance, two has to guard the vital power installation at the SILENT HARBOR. Allied manpower would have to replace.

(c) Some 55,000 all told would have to be demobilized, Italian administration on Mainland, their reinforcements, being reduced to 28,150.

(d) From July 31 onwards, I.S. Dives on Mainland will have to be built up afresh, (as tps can be shipped from SAUDIYA) the older classes being demobilized and the younger ones recently demobilized as in 3 (b) brought back to the Colonies again.

(e) From July 31 onwards, Italian administration will have to be built up again to 40,000 with the same difficulties as in 3 (d) after having broken up a working and intricate organization.

(f) The transport question in respect of 3 (b) and (c) appears to be quite impossible in the time available.

(a) Apart from the I.S. and guard duties aspect, I need hardly emphasize the complete chaos that would ensue in this colossal turnover (involving tps working for the Allies) - a turnover I do not consider possible in terms of transport alone.

(b) The effect on the Italian Army and people would be incalculable.

(c) All this would be happening at a time when we may be breaking the PISA-RHINI line and advancing to the Alps through NORTH ITALY where there is a far more turbulent population than the agrarian people of the South.

(a) The factor which has caused all this is because in of course the shipping one. I have repeatedly stressed this over the last 2 months, though apparently, provision of more shipping has not been possible.

(b) Yet the fact remains that insistence on a fixed ration ceiling of 347,300 after July 31 would:

(1) defeat US on policy that rations are to be issued only to those who are "in fact effective". We would be demobilizing effectives on the Mainland while retaining ineffective in SAUDIYA.

(ii) cause chaos at a critical time when we may well be enlarging the area for which effectives are required.

(iii) necessitate substitution of Allied manpower in the matter of an enormous pool of Italian manpower available and desirous to be used.

6. There appears to be 2 alternatives:-

(a) acceptance of your proposals in LAL 1605/50/30 (SPT) dated 19 June which Supreme Allied Commander agrees with.

04100

4. (a) Apart from the I.O. and guard duties aspect, I need hardly emphasize the complete chaos that would ensue in this colossal turnover (involving tons working for the allies) - a turnover I do not consider possible in terms of transport alone.

(b) The effect on the Italian Army and people would be lamentable.

(c) All this would be happening at a time when we may be breaking the ISEA-GRINIA line and advancing to the Alps through NORTH ITALY where there is a far more turbulent population than the agrarian people of the South.

5. (a) The factor which has caused all this impasse is of course the shipping one. I have repeatedly stressed this over the last 2 months, though apparently, provision of more shipping has not been possible.

(b) Yet the fact remains that insistence on a fixed ration ceiling of 347,300 after July 31 would:

(i) defeat CCS war policy that rations are to be issued only to those who are "in fact effective". We would be demobilising effectives on the mainland while retaining ineffectives in SARDINIA.

(ii) cause chaos at a critical time when we may well be enlarging the area for which effectives are required.

(iii) necessitate substitution of Allied manpower in the midst of an enormous pool of Italian manpower available and desirous to be used.

6. There appears to be 2 alternatives:-

(a) acceptance of your proposals in LAF 1605/50/3 G (SOT) dated 19 June which Supreme Allied Commander agrees with.

(b) acceptance of AFM figure of 347,300 for the Italian Army, postponing the date of enforcement to permit of one month to carry out rearrangement on mainland after all surplus troops in SARDINIA have been shipped to the mainland. This would, of course, be dependent on shipping provided which as I have mentioned above, is the vital factor in the whole business.

7. I cannot believe that all the practical implications and repercussions of this problem have been realised and I therefore feel it necessary to point out, as above, the harmful military and political results that would accrue if a rigid enforcement of a reduction to 347,300 in the ration ceiling by July 31 were made. A decision is obviously a matter of extreme urgency, since rations must be shipped from the United States accordingly.

lvs. 11.

copy to: Chief Commissioner, ACC

/s/ L. Browning
Major General,
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

CONF

SUBJECT: Colling of Italian Army.

SECRET

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main Hq (MIA)
LEQUILS (LECCO)
C/6/1

27 June 1944.

H.Q. AAI

DSH 1374
- 8 JUL 1944

1. At the conference at AAI on 17 June, it was agreed that if, despite the opinion of Supreme Allied Commander, C.C.S. insist on a reduction of the Italian Army to 347,000, the distribution should be:

(a) C.I.L. 25,000

(b) Tps employed by Allies 164,000

(c) Italian Administration

Actual 27,000)

Reinfts 13,000) 40,000

(d) I.S. 53,300

(e) Carabinieri 55,000

(f) A.A. & G.D. 5,000

(g) COMBICA 5,000

347,300

2. (a) We estimate that at 31 July there will be 91,500 tps still left in SARDINIA. These must be borne on the ration strength of the Italian Army as we cannot demobilise them in SARDINIA.

(b) Assuming reduction to 347,300 on above basis is ordered to be made by July 31, estimated figures on that date will be:-

In SARDINIA 91,500
In COMBICA 4,850
In SICILY 12,800
On MAINLAND under Allies
(Incl AA & GD, 5,000 picked
up in ROM and C.I.L.) 165,000
Carabinieri 55,000

329,150

(c) This leaves only 18,150 to cover all Italian Administration (central admin, static formations and services) including reinforcements,

(a) G.I.L.	25,000
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(c) This leaves only 18,150 to cover all Italian Administration (central admin, static formations and services) including reinforcements, and all I.S. formations on the Mainland. This potentially may have to cover all ITALY if we break the PISA-RIMINI line.

3. If therefore reduction to 347,300 is enforced by 31 July.

(a) The SICILY Garrison, which also does guard and labour duties must remain. Chief Commissioner considered 2 I.S. Divs (20,000) necessary in that turbulent island.

(b) All I.S. formations on the Mainland, except 4 Bns now on guard duties under command of the Allies, will have to be demobilised irrespective of age (classes). Apart from the I.S. aspect, there will be 40 men for other guard duties. Such as, for instance, two Bns to guard the vital power installation at the SILAN LAKES. Allied manpower would have to replace.

(c) Some 55,000 all told would have to be demobilised, Italian Administration on Mainland, incl reinfite, being reduced to 15,150.

(d) From July 31 onwards, I.S. Divs on Mainland will have to be built up afresh, (as tps can be shipped from SARDINIA) the older classes being demobilised and the younger ones recently demobilised as in 3 (b) brought back to the Colours again.

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4. (a) Apart from the I.S. and guard duties aspect, I need hardly emphasise the complete chaos that would ensue in this colossal turnover (involving tps working for the Allies) - a turnover I do not consider possible in terms of transport alone.

(b) The effect on the Italian Army and people would be lamentable.

(c) All this would be happening at a time when we may be breaking the FUSA-BITUMI line and advancing to the ALPS through NORTH ITALY where there is a far more turbulent population than the agrarian people of the South.

5. (a) The factor which has caused all this impasse is of course the shipping one. I have repeatedly stressed this over the last 2 months, though apparently, provision of more chipping has not been possible.

(b) Yet the fact remains that insistence on a fixed ration ceiling of 347,300 after July 31 would:

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(b) acceptance of AFHQ figure of 347,300 for the Italian Army, post-

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 - (b) acceptance of AFHQ figure of 347,300 for the Italian Army, postponing the date of enforcement to permit of one month to carry out rearrangement on Mainland after all surplus tps in SARDINIA have been shipped to the Mainland. This would, of course, be dependent on shipping provided which as I have mentioned above, is the vital factor in the whole business.
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tvs.LB.

copy to: Chief Commissioner, AGC

/s/ L. Browning
Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, 25, D.C.

MEMO-A 210.482
(30 Jun 44)

30 June 1944.

Subject: Movement Orders.

Thru : Director, Foreign Economic Administration,
Temporary Building 7,
14th and Constitution Avenue, NW,
Washington, D. C.

SECRET
AUTH: E.A.G.
INITIALS: J.H.D.
DATE: 30 June 44

To : Officers Involved.

1. Each of the following-named officers, assigned to duty with the Foreign Economic Administration, for service with the Allied Control Commission in Italy, will report to the Commanding Officer, Washington Aerial Port of Embarkation, Room 2069, Air Annex No. 1, Cravell Point, Virginia, for processing and air transportation. He will proceed on or about 5 July 1944, from Washington, D. C., and/or New York, N.Y., and/or Miami, Florida, to Algiers, Algeria, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, for temporary duty for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of the Director of the Foreign Economic Administration. He will proceed from Algiers, Algeria to such places in Italy as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this mission. Upon the completion of this temporary duty he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

Colonel William O'Dwyer, 0164604, AG

Major John M. Hartagh, 0294305, AG

Major Jerome K. Garbach, 0908736, AG

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 1-5000 P 432-02, 03 A 0425-24, 25. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft from Washington, D. C., and/or New York, N. Y., and/or Miami, Florida, to Algiers, Algeria, and to such other places as may be necessary, and return to Washington, D. C., is directed as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APP-1-222079-41P. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of twenty-five (25) pounds, official documents, is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft. In lieu of subsistence a flat per diem of \$41.23 is authorized while traveling on official business and while absent from permanent station, in accordance with existing law and regulations.

3. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary address, APO 4268, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y. Provisions of FOR apply. Designated as special officer courier.

SECRET

COPY

COPY

Cholera, typhus and yellow fever immunizations will be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of this order. Baggage, not to exceed 110 pounds, will be shipped in care of the Port Transportation Officer, New York Port of Embarkation, Brooklyn, N. Y.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. D. DALEY
Adjutant General

OFFICIAL (SEAL)

Incls:

AG Ltr 28 Apr 44.
AGO Form No. 45
Travel Book

Distribution:

Each Officer (4)
Officer In, Record Section, AGO
CG, AAF, 5D-1082, The Pentagon
Lt. Col. MacMillan, 1050 Munitions.
Major Roach, 1C-915, The Pentagon
Mobilization Division, Movement Br, ASF, Major Bailey, 45-265, The Pentagon
CO, 503d AAFH, Washington Aerial Port of Embarkation, Room 2069, Air Annex,
No. 1, Gravelly Point, Va. (3)
OIC, Embarkation APO, 464 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y. (2)
CO, Embarkation APO, Miami, Florida.
Army Postal Service, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2)
Port Transportation Officer, NME, Brooklyn, N. Y. (2)

Destination Commander:

6012-

COPY

C O P Y

SUBJ: - Apprehension of Escaped
Italian PW. (Co-operators).

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY
CMF
25 Jun 44
IAI/3072/A(0)

Army Sub-Commission,
ACC.

Reference AG 383.6 dated 30 May 44 from CG PBS.

1. AFHQ intend shortly to import into ITALY 10,000 Italian PW who can play a vital part in the maintenance of this Force. As carefully organized and equipped units they are of far greater value to us than equivalent units of the Italian Army. On this basis, our policy must be to keep these PW units intact.
2. When the 10,000 PW are imported there will be a natural tendency for personnel to desert in order to visit their families and for other reasons. The only deterrent which the system of the PBS applies is the fact that on apprehension the absconder rejoins the Italian Army with its lower standard of living. This penalty is not sufficiently hard to prevent desertion.
3. Presumably deserters within the demobilization categories would not be returned to the Italian Army and would be demobilized on apprehension.
4. In view of the foregoing, the arrangements in force as described in PBS letter quoted above are not acceptable.
5. The status of Italian PW employed in formed units by the Allied Forces is now officially described as "Co-operator". They are employed in the same manner as other units of the Italian Army and, therefore, cannot be regarded in a true sense as PW. That being so, the argument by CG Italian Forces in CAMPANIA that the international military code obliges an officer to assist in the escape of PW of his own nationality must be interpreted in a broader sense, in view of the abnormal state of affairs in ITALY and the employment of these units in conjunction with the Italian Army as stated above.
6. It is considered that the matter should be taken up with the Italian Government, in order that they may produce a formula by which the scruples of their officers are satisfied and the deserters returned to the units in which they are employed, as it is only by the co-operation of the Police, Military Authorities and Carabinieri that deserters can be apprehended.
7. Will you please consider the matter and let us have your views.

CGI

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7. Will you please consider the matter and let us have your views.

(Sgd) T. Welch. Col.
for General,
Commander-in-Chief.

TW/JD

Copy to G(SD)

C O P Y

TOP SECRETALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVY SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

DEP/tum

18 June 1944

SUBJECT: Naval Activities in Rome Area, Report of.

TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

1. I am at present Flag Officer Liaison with Italian Ministry representing C. inC. and F.O.W.I.T.

2. First objective is to raise necessary officers and men for northern ports and allocate as desired by F.O.W.I.T.

3. Commander Butler is with me representing Commodore Ziroli. General Johnson, Area Commander has informed me that the Caserma Regia Marina-Italian Naval Barracks is required as an American hospital. At a meeting yesterday I pointed out it was our Drafting Centre and if taken would completely disorganise our present plans for the early manning of the ports now urgently required for meeting Army Transport supplies.

4. Owing to the urgency of the needs of the wounded, I agreed that I required therefore alternative accommodation for at least 600 officers and men. This has not yet been found.

5. To ensure that in the future no dislocation should occur and to encourage the Italian personnel, a ruling re: paras. 19-20 of Hq. AAI TOP SECRET letter 66/C(ops) of 3 June 1944, as it appears to me that no planning can be arranged for future administration if operational requirements still override and it is pointed out that manning of the ports is very much an operational requirement.

6. In order to guard against the many authorities that visit the Italian Naval Authorities in the Ministry, I have set up an office there to insure close contact.

7. I have called on General Johnson and Brigadier Sub-Area.

/s/ I. M. Palmer

6070

COMMODORE

TOP SECRET

C O P Y

COPY
O
P
Y

TOP SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVY SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

DAP/tum

18 June 1944

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1. I am at present Flag Officer Liaison with Italian Ministry representing C. inc. and F.O.W.I.F.

2. First objective is to raise necessary officers and men for northern ports and allocate as desired by F.O.W.I.F.

3. Commander Butler is with me representing Commodore Ziroli. General Johnson, Area Commander has informed me that the Caserma Regia Marina-Italian Naval Barracks is required as an American hospital. At a meeting yesterday I pointed out it was our Drafting Centre and if taken would completely disorganize our present plans for the early manning of the ports now urgently required for meeting Army Transport supplies.

4. Owing to the urgency of the needs of the wounded, I agreed that I required therefore alternative accommodation for at least 600 officers and men. This has not yet been found.

5. To ensure that in the future no dislocation should occur and to encourage the Italian personnel, a ruling re: paras. 19-20 of Hq. AAI TOP SECRET letter 66/G(Ops) of 3 June 1944, as it appears to me that no planning can be arranged for future administration if operational requirements still override and it is pointed out that manning of the ports is very much an operational requirement.

6. In order to guard against the many authorities that visit the Italian Naval Authorities in the Ministry, I have set up an office there to insure close contact.

7. I have called on General Johnson and Brigadier Sub-Area.

/s/ I. M. Palmer

COMMODORE

6869

TOP SECRET

COPY
O
P
Y

TOP SECRET

H.Q. S.O.(M).,
C.M.F.

Ref: G/105

8 Jun. 44.

A.F.H.Q.

Copy to A.C.C.
Form 266.

T-42273

1. Reference your unnumbered signal dated 6 May, repeated to A.C.C. It was ruled that no large scale evacuation of Italians from ALBANIA was practicable or desirable on grounds of security.
2. The German drive against the Partisan bridge-head in southern Albania has again brought this problem into prominence.
3. The Naval Authorities have expressed the view that a limited number of Italians evacuated by Italian vessels engaged on operations to Albania would have a valuable effect on the morale of Italian crews.
4. At a meeting of SOC today, S110 stated that from a security angle it should be possible to handle up to 500 Italians evacuees per month.
5. May confirmation be given that the evacuation of 500 per month would not be regarded as a large scale evacuation which was prohibited in your signal under reference.
6. Would emphasize that the continued presence of a large number of Italians in guerrilla areas without any prospect of reducing their numbers, presents a serious problem and may adversely affect current operations.

signed for

6067

(W.A.M. Stawell,
Maj. Gen.
Comd.)ACC DIST.Dep. CC
Army Sub-Com. (Col Offenbauer)

TOP SECRET

H.Q. S.O.(M).,
C.M.F.

Ref: G/105

8 Jun. 44.

A.F.H.Q.

Copy to A.C.C.
Force 266.

P-12273

1. Reference your unnumbered signal dated 6 May, repeated to A.C.C. It was ruled that no large scale evacuation of Italians from ALBANIA was practicable or desirable on grounds of security.
2. The German drive against the Partisan bridge-head in Southern Albania has again brought this problem into prominence.
3. The Naval Authorities have expressed the view that a limited number of Italians evacuated by Italian vessels engaged on operations to Albania would have a valuable effect on the morale of Italian crews.
4. At a meeting of SOC today, SISO stated that from a security angle it should be possible to handle up to 500 Italians evacuees per month.
5. May confirmation be given that the evacuation of 500 per month would not be regarded as a large scale evacuation which was prohibited in your signal under reference.
6. would emphasize that the continued presence of a large number of Italians in guerrilla areas without any prospect of reducing their numbers, presents a serious problem and may adversely affect current operations.

signed for

6068

(W.A.M. Stawell,
Maj. Gen.
Comd.)ACC DIST.Dep. CC
Army Sub-Com. (Col Offenbauer)

U.S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET

SPECIAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT
 OF MEMBERS OF THE ITALIAN FORCES UNDER CONTROL AS PRISONERS OF WAR OF THE
 GOVERNMENTS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES.

GENERAL SIR HENRY DENTON HUGHES, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED
 FORCES, action by authority of the Government of the United Kingdom of
 Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of Canada, the Government
 of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Government of New Zealand, the Govern-
 ment of the Union of South Africa, and the Government of India (hereinafter
 referred to as the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations), and
 the Government of the United States, and in the interests of the United
 Nations, and

MARSHAL PIETRO BADOLIO, FMA ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE
 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, taking note of the Declaration of War by Italy and of
 the expressed intention of the Italian Government to cooperate with the
 United Nations in the defeat of Germany;

Having decided to make arrangements whereby members of the
 Italian Forces who are Prisoners of War under the control of the respective
 Governments of the United Nations named above, may be able to assist in the
 War against the common enemy;

Recognizing that for the realization of these aims it is
 desirable to modify the treatment now accorded to these members of the
 Italian Forces;

And confirming the arrangements already made by General DENTON
 HUGHES with Marshal PIETRO BADOLIO;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

All members of the Italian Forces who from time to time are
 under control as Prisoners of War of the Government of the United States
 or and of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, may,
 pending repatriation, be given the opportunity at the discretion of the
 Government under whose control they are to volunteer to serve in units or
 formations organized on a Military Basis, or to be otherwise employed under
 United States, British, or other United Nations Command, in any part of the
 world, in such duties as may be considered appropriate in the interests of
 the Common Cause by any of the said Governments. While so serving or employed
 they will retain their status of Prisoners of War, but their treatment will
 be ameliorated so far as circumstances permit. Italian Prisoners of War who
 are not willing to volunteer, or whose serve as volunteers is considered
 impracticable or undesirable by any of said Governments shall be liable to
 be employed wherever and in such duties as the Government by which they are
 detained may determine. The treatment of these last mentioned members of the

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U.S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET

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 [Signature]

ARTICLE I (continued)

Italian forces shall be generally on the same basis as prior to the Armistice signed on 3 September 1943, between General EISENHOWER and Marshal BADOLIC, except as otherwise provided in this agreement.

ARTICLE II

As far as is deemed possible, by the Government of the United States or the Government of any member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, these units and formations shall bear the character of Italian Units and Formations under Italian Officers and noncommissioned officers, and may be distinguished by Italian uniforms and badges of rank with their own language.

ARTICLE III

While the Government of the United States and the several Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, respectively, will retain the final control in all matters of discipline, promotion, and internal administration, and all members of these units and formations will be subject to such orders and regulations as the said Government may consider necessary, it is intended that whenever legal and military considerations in its judgment permit discipline, promotion, and internal administration shall be exercised by competent Italian authorities. The extent to which these units and formations may exercise their own discipline, promotion, and internal administration must depend upon the circumstances in which they are serving.

ARTICLE IV

The provisions of the GENEVA Prisoners of War Convention of 27 July 1929, concerning functions of the Protecting Power and its representatives are replaced by direct relation between the Government of the United States and the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, respectively, on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand.

ARTICLE V

The Italian Government shall give such orders and directions to members of the Italian Forces and shall take such steps to give effect to this agreement as may be required by the Government of the United States or any of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

ARTICLE VI

Detailed arrangements required to give effect to this agreement, as determined from time to time by the appropriate authorities of the United Nations Government concerned, may be made administratively by such authorities with the appropriate authorities of the Italian Government.

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

ARTICLE VII

This agreement shall come into force on signature. It may be terminated at any time without notice by the Government of the United States or by any one of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations so far as its own rights and obligation thereunder are concerned without prejudice thereby to its continued validity as regards the rights and obligations of any other of the Governments of the United Nations who are parties to this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

The application of all provisions of the GENEVA Prisoners of War Convention of 27 July 1929, inconsistent with the foregoing is, as between the contracting parties, hereto suspended.

ARTICLE IX

In view of the desirability for the personnel protected under the International Convention for the amelioration of the condition of sick and wounded or ailing in the field of 27 July 1929, to be able to continue to perform their present services for the members of the Italian Forces under the control as Prisoners of War of the Government of the United States or any of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, any provisions of that convention which might be understood as in any way hindering the continued performance of such services shall, as between the contracting parties, be suspended. Where, however, such personnel are NOT required to continue to perform their present services, they may be employed on such other duties as may be considered appropriate.

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U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

1 Copy to
Legal Dept

Is there
any more
than? Yes

U.S. SECRET
 EQUALS BRITISH SECRET

SPECIAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT
 OF MEMBERS OF THE ITALIAN FORCES UNDER CONTROL AS PRISONERS OF WAR OF THE
 GOVERNMENTS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES.

GENERAL SIR HENRY Maitland Wilson, Commander in Chief of the Allied
 Forces, action by authority of the Government of the United Kingdom of
 Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of Canada, the Government
 of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Government of New Zealand, the Govern-
 ment of the Union of South Africa, and the Government of India (hereinafter
 referred to as the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations), and
 the Government of the United States, and in the interests of the United
 Nations, and

MARSHAL PIETRO BADOLIO, PMHA ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE
 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, taking note of the Declaration of War by Italy and of
 the expressed intention of the Italian Government to cooperate with the
 United Nations in the defeat of Germany;

Having decided to make arrangements whereby members of the
 Italian Forces who are Prisoners of War under the control of the respective
 Governments of the United Nations named above, may be able to assist in the
 War against the common enemy;

Recognizing that for the realization of these aims it is
 desirable to modify the treatment now accorded to these members of the
 Italian Forces;

And confirming the arrangements already made by General DWIGHT
 D. EISENHOWER with Marshal PIETRO BADOLIO;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

All members of the Italian Forces who from time to time are
 under control as Prisoners of War of the Government of the United States
 or and of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, may,
 pending repatriation, be given the opportunity at the discretion of the
 Government under whose control they are to volunteer to serve in units or
 formations organized on a Military Basis, or to be otherwise employed under
 United States, British, or other United Nations Command, in any part of the
 world, in such duties as may be considered appropriate in the interests of
 the Common Cause by any of the said Governments. While so serving or employed
 they will retain their status of Prisoners of War, but their treatment will
 be ameliorated so far as circumstances permit. Italian Prisoners of War who
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 be employed wherever and in such duties as the Government by which they are
 detained may determine. The treatment of these last mentioned members of the

U.S. SECRET

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~~U. S. SECRET~~~~REMAINS OF SECRET~~ARTICLE I (continued)

Italian Forces shall be generally on the same basis as prior to the Armistice signed on 3 September 1943, between General EISENHOWER and Marshal BADOLLO, except as otherwise provided in this agreement.

ARTICLE II

As far as is deemed possible, by the Government of the United States or the Government of any member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, these units and formations shall bear the character of Italian Units and Formations under Italian Officers and noncommissioned officers, and may be distinguished by Italian uniforms and badges of rank with their own language.

ARTICLE III

While the Government of the United States and the several Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, respectively, will retain the final control in all matters of discipline, promotion, and internal administration, and all members of these units and formations will be subject to such orders and regulations as the said Government may consider necessary, it is intended that whenever Legal and Military considerations in its judgment permit discipline, promotion, and internal administration shall be exercised by competent Italian authorities. The extent to which these units and formations may exercise their own discipline, promotion, and internal administration must depend upon the circumstances in which they are serving.

ARTICLE IV

The provisions of the GENEVA Prisoners of War Convention of 27 July 1929, concerning functions of the Protecting Power and its representatives are replaced by direct relation between the Government of the United States and the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, respectively, on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand.

ARTICLE V

The Italian Government shall give such orders and directions to members of the Italian Forces and shall take such steps to give effect to this agreement as may be required by the Government of the United States or any of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

ARTICLE VI

Detailed arrangements required to give effect to this agreement, as determined from time to time by the appropriate authorities of the United Nations Government concerned, may be made administratively by such authorities with the appropriate authorities of the Italian Government.

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~~U. S. SECRET~~
~~REMAINS OF SECRET~~

U. S. SECRET
Equivalent British SECRET

ARTICLE VII

This agreement shall come into force on signature. It may be terminated at any time without notice by the Government of the United States or by any one of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations so far as its own rights and obligation thereunder are concerned without prejudice thereby to its continued validity as regards the rights and obligations of any other of the Governments of the United Nations who are parties to this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

The application of all provisions of the GENEVA Prisoners of War Convention of 27 July 1929, inconsistent with the foregoing is, as between the contracting parties, hereto suspended.

ARTICLE IX

In view of the desirability for the personnel protected under the International Convention for the amelioration of the condition of sick and wounded or armies in the field of 27 July 1929, to be able to continue to perform their present services for the members of the Italian Forces under the control as Prisoners of War of the Government of the United States or any of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations, any provisions of that convention which might be understood as in any way hindering the continued performances of such services shall, as between the contracting parties, be suspended. Where, however, such personnel are NOT required to continue to perform their present services, they may be employed on such other duties as may be considered appropriate.

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U. S. SECRET
Equivalent British SECRET

~~SECRET~~
 Signal Section 572

SPECIAL AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT
 OF MEMBERS OF THE ITALIAN FORCES UNDER CONTROL AS PRISONERS OF WAR OF THE
 GOVERNMENTS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES.

GENERAL SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED FORCES, action by authority of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of Canada, the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Government of New Zealand, the Government of the Union of South Africa, and the Government of India (hereinafter referred to as the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations), and the Government of the United States, and in the interests of the United Nations, and

MARSHAL PIETRO BADOLIO, PMIA ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, taking note of the Declaration of War by Italy and of the expressed intention of the Italian Government to cooperate with the United Nations in the defeat of Germany;

Having decided to make arrangements whereby members of the Italian Forces who are Prisoners of War under the control of the respective Governments of the United Nations named above, may be able to assist in the War against the common enemy;

Recognizing that for the realization of these aims it is desirable to modify the treatment now accorded to these members of the Italian Forces;

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~~SECRET~~
 Signal Section 572

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

ARTICLE I (continued)

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ARTICLE VI

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U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

U. S. SECRET

Remains British SECRET

ARTICLE VII

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U. S. SECRET

Remains British SECRET

3. "If necessary and in so far as not already provided for in existing legislation, (forbidding) except as permitted or licensed by the Minister of Finance, all transactions in foreign exchange, import or export of goods, currency, securities or gold or silver bullion and paying transfers, export, or other transactions involving trade or communication with any person outside the territory actually administered by the Italian Government except as between such territory and Italian territory still occupied by the Allied Military Forces and exempt transactions, imports and exports for the Allied authorities authorized by them."

This item was implemented by para 1 Art. 2 of the above mentioned R.E. No. 32 which reads as follows:

"For the purpose of the prosecution of war the Chief of the Government is given authority to impose in the aforementioned territories (i.e. territory restored to the Italian administration), in agreement with the competent Ministers and as the cases may arise, special directives for or limitations upon the exercise of any productive or commercial activities and also to fix the zone in which such activity may be conducted."

The Finance Commission should be consulted as to administrative instructions in point.

4. Authorizing the competent Ministers in their discretion as a war measure to prohibit the entering into or carrying on of any type of business except upon such terms or in such zones as they may prescribe, and authorizing them to require any property in which there are reasonable grounds for believing that any enemy or fascist interests, direct or indirect exist, to be delivered to any agency designated by them to be blocked or to become subject to some other form of control; and providing that subject to the terms prescribed by the Minister of Finance property now held in a blocked account shall remain in its present status, and further providing that financial institutions holding blocked accounts are to make semi-monthly reports to the Minister of Finance showing any dealings in these accounts.

This item was embodied partly in para 1 of Art 2 of R.E. No. 32 set out above under 3, partly in para 2 of the same Art 2 which reads as follows:

"Furthermore the Minister of Finance is given authority:

(a) to sequester or provide for any other form of controlled administration under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance of any property or undertaking in which fascists or enemy nationals, be they physical or judicial persons, hold any direct or indirect interest;

(b) to keep frozen the values and bank deposits already affected by such measure, to determine the respective procedures and likewise to provide that the banking institutions holding such values or deposits report every 15 days all affected operations to the Ministry of Finance."

5. Requiring all future initial openings of safe deposit boxes and delivery of contents to be made only in presence of representatives designated by the Minister of Finance. The financial subcommission should be requested to information on administrative instructions issued on this subject.

(c) Under the heading "United Nations and Enemy Property" paragraph 2 imposes upon the Italian Government the duty to pass a decree conferring administrative powers upon the Allied Director of Property Control in relation to the property of any of the United Nations or of any national of the United Nations including property of States and private individuals."

upon the exercise of any productive or commercial activities and also to fix the area in which such activity may be conducted."

The Finance Commission should be consulted as to administrative instructions in point.

4. Authorizing the competent Ministers in their discretion as a war measure to prohibit the entering into or carrying out of any type of business except upon such terms or in such areas as they may prescribe, and authorizing them to require any property in which there are reasonable grounds for believing that any enemy or fascist interests, direct or indirect exist, to be delivered to any agency designated by them to be blocked or to become subject to some other form of control; and providing that subject to the terms prescribed by the Minister of Finance property now held in a blocked account shall remain in its present status, and further providing that financial institutions holding blocked accounts are to make semi-monthly reports to the Minister of Finance showing any dealings in those accounts.

This term was embodied partly in para 1 of Art 2 of RDL No. 32 set out above under 3, partly in para 2 of the same Art 2 which reads as follows:

"Furthermore the Minister of Finance is given authority,

(a) to sequester or provide for any other form of controlled administration under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance of any property or undertaking in which fascists or enemy nationals, be they physical or judicial persons, hold any direct or indirect interest.

(b) to keep frozen the values and bank deposits already affected by such measure, to determine the respective procedures and likewise to provide that the banking institutions holding such values or deposits report every 15 days all affected operations to the Ministry of Finance."

5. Requiring all future initial openings of safe deposit boxes and delivery of contents to be made only in presence of representatives designated by the Minister of Finance. The financial subordination should be requested to information on administrative instructions issued on this subject.

(c) Under the heading "United Nations and enemy property" document B imposes upon the Italian Government the duty to pass a decree conferring administrative powers upon the Allied Director of Property Control in relation to the property of any of the United Nations or of any national of the United Nations including property of France and French nationals."

All a result of extensive and at times difficult negotiations a machinery has been designed which met the wishes of the Director of the Property Control in respect to the above term. Administrative instructions have been issued to the prefects and a draft decree is ready for publication which repeals the restricting Italian regulations regarding property owned by the United Nations, France and their respective citizens. The particulars can be obtained from the Property Control Subcommission.

/s/ G. H. JACOB
G. H. JACOB, Colonel
Chief Legal Officer.

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785015

COPY

SECRET

Subject: Italian Army - Calling up of Classes.

19 May

Chief Commissioner, A.C.C.

1. I saw Brig. Gen. HAMBLEEN about attached today.

2. If you will instruct Army, Navy and Air Force Sub-Commissions that in accordance with HQ AAI letters 3110/A(O) dated 17 Mar and 3074/A(O) dated 20 Mar, 4 May and 11 May exemption procedure for all three services should be carried out as stated, that will meet the request of HAMBLEEN in para 5 of his AAI/3074(A(O) dated 12 May.

3. I do not know if all three sub-commissions have got copies of the letters referred to in para 2. The distribution list makes me doubt this. Your Secretary General could check this--and if not, I suggest that copies be typed by your HQ and attached to your instructing letter as in para 2. This would save time in getting copies from AAI and we want to get this exemption procedure functioning quickly.

/s/ L. BROWNING
Maj Gen
Army Sub-Commission, ACC

*May 19th, 44

Naples

6051

SECRET

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Legal Subcommittee
PO 394

ES/emf

ACC/4140/L

16 May 1944

SUBJECT: Execution of the Documents for Transfer of Territory

TO : V.P. Admin. Section.

1. Reference is made to the letter of AFHQ MDS 387.4-2 of 3 May 1944. A survey of Italian legislation implementing the terms of the above documents together with the corresponding provisions of the said documents is set out below.
2. By virtue of para 2 of Document D the Italian Government undertook to publish in the Official Gazette before the date of restoration the following decrees:

(a) "A decree stabilizing wage rates, maximum prices, charges for services; maximum quantities of grain to be held by anyone; as existing at the date of restoration and pending the future policy being agreed upon between us."

In compliance with this obligation the Royal Decree Law No. 32 of 11 Feb. 1944 was published in Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 7, Art. 1 of which reads as follows:

"The wages of private employees, the fixed maximum prices of all kinds of goods and the maximum tariffs for services in effect in the territories restored to the Italian Administration on February 11 at 0000 hours, remain in force without change. The regulations regarding the maximum quantities of rationed products allowed to be kept remain likewise unchanged."

Subsequently the Italian Government, in agreement with the respective branches of the Allied Control Commission, has passed a number of decrees changing rationing rules of certain goods and the prices of certain products and regulating the quantities of grain to be retained by certain classes of persons, (the last by the Ministerial Decree of 2nd May 1944 on Regulations for collecting grain and barley harvested in 1944, published in G.U. No. 24 of 3 May 1944.). The particulars of the changes effected in this field may be obtained from the respective subcommissions.

(b) "A decree to implement paragraph 5 of document A providing for the establishment of Allied Military Courts to try offences *entailing* any hostile act against the Allied Forces and empowering any member of the Allied Forces to arrest any person whom such member had reasonable grounds for believing is concerned in such an act, except in the case of an Italian officer or an Italian high official in which case the Italian Government or the local superior authority concerned should be asked to cooperate in any action."

The Italian Government fulfilled this undertaking by publishing the Royal Decree Law of 11 Feb. 1944 No. 31, Art. 3 which in its original form

A survey of Italian legislation implementing the terms of the above documents together with the corresponding provisions of the said documents is set out below.

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(b) "A decree to implement paragraph 5 of document A providing for the establishment of Allied Military Courts to try offences ~~against~~ any Forces to arrest any person whom such member had reasonable grounds for believing is concerned in such an act, except in the case of an Italian officer or an Italian high official in which case the Italian Government or the local superior authority concerned should be asked to cooperate in any action."

The Italian Government fulfilled this undertaking by publishing the Royal Decree Law of 11 Feb. 1944 No. 31, Art. 3 which in its original form read as follows:

"Whoever within the liberated Italian territory commits a hostile act or offence against property to the prejudice of the Allied Military Forces or of any member thereof or of any functionary, representative or agent of United Nations, or whoever takes part in seditious demonstrations against the Allied Forces or commits any act which in whatever way may hamper the war effort or help the enemy, shall be punishable under Italian penal law and shall be tried in Allied Military Courts according to their own procedure."

"In the case contemplated by the preceding paragraph 1 any member of the Allied Armed Forces can effect the arrest of any person who may be reasonably believed to be implicated in acts herein above set out, except where an

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Italian officer or high government official is concerned, in which case the Italian Government or the appropriate superior local authority will be requested to cooperate in the premises to the extent necessary."

Upon request of the Allied Control Commission this Article was amended by R. Decree Law No. 112 of 13 April so as to permit the Italian Courts to take jurisdiction over the offences against Allied interests unless the Allied authorities direct otherwise. The new Art. 3 reads:

"Whoever within the territories restored to Italian administration commits any hostile act or offence against property to the prejudice of the Allied armed forces or of any member thereof or of officials, representatives or agents of the United Nations or is guilty of any seditious demonstration against the Allied Forces or of any action whatsoever that impedes the prosecution of the war or aids the enemy, shall be tried by the Italian Courts according to the Italian penal laws.

"However the jurisdiction of the Allied Military Tribunals is acknowledged in all cases which they shall decide to retain for their own jurisdiction. In such cases the Allied Military Tribunals will follow their own procedure but will apply the Italian penal laws.

"In such cases as set out in the first paragraph any member of the Allied Armed Forces may arrest any person when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting him to be implicated in any act therein set out, save only in the case of an Italian officer or high Italian official.

"In such a case except in matters of special urgency the Italian Government and the competent superior local authority shall be requested to take all necessary steps."

In the opinion of this Subcommittee the Italian Government has fully complied with their obligation in this respect.

3. Furthermore, the Italian Government gave their assurance "to proceed with all possible expedition to pass decrees dealing with the following matters" (Para 3 of document D):

(a) To implement so far as may be necessary the terms set out in Document A and the terms of the Proclamation (Doc. C).

(i) Doc. A. The general clause affirming the continuance in full effect of all armistice terms throughout all Italian territory obviously does not need any implementation and is binding upon the Italian Government as part of the restoration agreement under International law.

The specific rights reserved for the United Nations in Doc. A stated below in an abbreviated form of headings together with an indication whether or not the obligations of the Italian Government arising out of each reserved right were embodied into a rule of municipal Italian law:

1. Right to use facilities, installations etc. No legislative provision enacted. Army, Navy and other Subcommittees concerned can supply information as to whether administrative regulations were issued. *Office*
2. Right to quarter troops. No legislative provision issued. The Interior, Army Subcommittee might supply particulars as to admin. instructions.

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2. Right to quarter troops. No legislative provision issued. The Interior, Army Subcommittee might supply particulars as to admin. instructions.

3. Right to hold or require the Italian Government to hold in custody PWs and civilian internees. No legislative provision issued. For administrative instructions see Army and Public Safety Subcommittees.

4. Right "to declare any area to be a Military Zone and to exercise therein the right of an occupying power or enforce such other controls as may be determined by the Allied Commander in Chief."

In compliance with this term the RDI 11 Feb. 1944, No. 31 contains the following provision:

Art. 4. Whenever military zones are established in liberated Italian territories by Allied Armed Forces, such Forces will retain also all police powers within said zones, including the power to issue and enforce rules and regulations.

5. The right to convene Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of any person violating any order or regulation issued by the Allied Military Authorities and of any person otherwise doing any act hostile to the Allied Forces.

Art. 3 and 4 of RDL No. 31 set out above under 2(b) and 4 respectively, were issued in compliance with this term.

6. The right to try offences committed before restoration in violation of AMG proclamations or orders then in force.

This term was implemented by Art. 2 of the RDL No. 31 which provides as follows: "Proceedings in the Allied Military Courts for offences heretofore committed contemplated by the Proclamations and orders mentioned in Art. 2 (Note: should read "in Art. 1") shall be continued and disposed of by said Courts in accordance with the provisions of said Proclamations and Orders."

7. No removal of AMG appointed officials without consent of C in C.

In this respect Art. 1 para 2 of the RDL No. 31 states as follows: "The efficacy of the acts undertaken by the Allied Military Authorities shall remain in force including the appointments and dismissals of public or private officials, which shall be recognized in every case as having full and valid legal effect as if they had been made by the Italian Government. The legal and financial status of those who have been placed in public office by the Allied Military Government will be regulated by the rules of Italian laws."

In addition to the above an exchange of correspondence took place between the Chief Commissioner and the Chief of Government in which the latter confirmed the necessity of previous consent by the A.C.C. to any change in the status of officials appointed by the AMG in the restored territory (Marshal Badoglio's letter of 13 March 1944 No. 759). As far as this Subcommittee is concerned the Minister of Justice gave his assurance to adhere to this agreement in respect to judicial officials in a meeting held on 21 March 1944.

8. The right to requisition property or services. No legislation on this subject was published and no difficulties seem to have arisen. Interior Subcommittee and the Army Subcommittee may supply information as to administrative instructions.

9. The right to reoccupy or take any steps necessary for prosecution of war. No need for legislation on this point has arisen.

10 & 11. Right of import, export and distribution of civilian supplies for civilian population without duty and right of import and export of military and other supplies necessary for prosecution of war.

Most probably arrangements have been made in this respect between Finance Subcommittee and other Subcommittees concerned on one side and the Italian Government on the other. These Subcommittees will be able to furnish particulars.

12. Free movement and immunity from taxation for any representative of the United Nations.

No legislative provision published. There might be some administrative directives issued in agreement with Interior and Finance Subcommittee.

604b

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8. The right to requisition property or services. No legislation on this subject was published and no difficulties seem to have arisen. Interior Subcommission and the Army Subcommission may supply information as to administrative instructions.

9. The right to recovery or take any steps necessary for prosecution of war. No need for legislation on this point has arisen.

10 & 11. Right of import, export and distribution of civilian supplies for civilian population without duty and right of import and export of military and other supplies necessary for prosecution of war.

Most probably arrangements have been made in this respect between Finance Subcommission and other Subcommissions concerned on one side and the Italian Government on the other. These Subcommissions will be able to furnish particulars.

12. Free movement and immunity from taxation for any representative of the United Nations. No legislation published. There might be some administrative directives issued in agreement with Interior and Finance Subcommission.

13. Immunity of the representatives of the United Nations from the jurisdiction of Italian Courts.

No need for a legislative provision has arisen; to this Subcommission's knowledge the Italian authorities scrupulously avoided any claim of jurisdiction over United Nations personnel.

14. Costs of maintaining Allied troops within the unoccupied territory chargeable to the Italian Government.

This matter was dealt with by the Financial Subcommission which will be able to supply particulars.

(ii) Document C. The terms contained in Document C were all put into effect by RDL No. 31. The terms of Document C are stated below together with the corresponding Articles of RDL No. 31:

Document C

RDL No. 31

1. Military government in the territory restored having been terminated by the Allied Military Government, all powers of government and jurisdiction in the territory restored and over its inhabitants, and final administrative responsibility, subject only to the rights reserved to the United Nations, are vested in the Government of Italy.

2. All Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by the Military Governor or under his authority by its delegates in the said territory and which have been terminated therein by the Military Government or as upon its restoration, are hereby recognized by the Italian Government as having been validly issued during the time they were operative and are declared to be of the same legal effect as if they had been issued by the Italian Government in accordance with Italian law, and they will be so recognized by all Italian Courts and officials.

3. All acts done by any member of the Allied Forces in pursuance of such Proclamations or Orders, and all official action of any nature taken by the Allied Military Government in pursuance thereof including all appointments to and removals from any office, public or private, will be recognized by all Italian Courts and officials as legal, valid and binding.

4. All sentences imposed by Allied Military Courts are hereby recognized by the Italian Government as valid and legal and of the same effect as if imposed by an Italian Court and will be so recognized by all Italian Courts and Italian officials unless set aside or modified by or with the consent of the Allied Control Commission.

ART. 1. Allied Military Government, having been terminated, all proclamations and orders heretofore emanating from the Military Governor General of the Allied Forces or from his delegates lose their validity in the territories formerly under the jurisdiction of the Allied Military Government.

The efficacy of the acts undertaken by the Allied Military Authorities, referred to in the preceding paragraph, by virtue of the said proclamations and orders shall remain in force including the appointments and dismissals of public and private officials, which shall be recognized in every case as having full and valid legal effect as if they had been made by the Italian Government.

The legal and financial status of those who have been placed in public office by the Allied Military Government will be regulated in accordance with the rules of Italian laws.

(See also above 3(a)(i)7)

ART. 2. The sentences pronounced by the Allied Military Tribunals shall remain in force and shall in all respects be recognized as though pronounced by Italian Tribunals unless revoked or modified by the Allied Control Commission or with the consent of the said Commission.

(B) Document D enumerates under the heading "Financial matters" a series of steps to be taken by the Italian Government 1.8.

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3. All acts done by any member of the Allied Forces in pursuance of such Proclamations or Orders, and all official action of any nature taken by the Allied Military Government in pursuance thereof including all appointments to and removals from any office, public or private, will be recognized by all Italian Courts and officials as legal, valid and binding.

4. All sentences imposed by Allied Military Courts are hereby recognized by the Italian Government as valid and legal and of the same effect as if imposed by an Italian Court and will be so recognized by all Italian Courts and Italian officials unless set aside or modified by or with the consent of the Allied Control Commission.

(B) Document D enumerates under the heading "Financial matters" a series of steps to be taken by the Italian Government i.e.:

1. Reenacting by decree if necessary the terms of Rendo No. 61 of 24 Sept. 1943 in relation to notes of exchange of Allied Military Currency.
Rendo No. 61 was published in the Gazzette Ufficiale, Special Series, No. 1/B, 18 Nov. 1943 and the Finance Subcommittee has not requested its republication in form of a decree.

2. Barring transactions in lands and buildings so far as necessary to prevent inflation.
In agreement with the Finance Subcommittee the policy of imposing limitations upon the above transactions has been abandoned.

the jurisdiction of the Allied Military Government.

The efficacy of the Acts undertaken by the Allied Military Authorities, referred to in the preceding paragraph, by virtue of the said proclamations and orders shall remain in force including the appointments and dismissals of public and private officials, which shall be recognized in every case as having full and valid legal effect as if they had been made by the Italian Government.

The legal and financial status of those who have been placed in public office by the Allied Military Government will be regulated in accordance with the rules of Italian laws.

(See also above 3(a)(17))

APP. 2. The sentences pronounced by the Allied Military Tribunals shall remain in force and shall in all respects be recognized as though pronounced by Italian Tribunes unless revoked or modified by the Allied Control Commission or with the consent of the said Commission.

3. "If necessary and in so far as not already provided for in existing legislation; (forbidding?) except as permitted or licensed by the Minister of Finance, all transactions in foreign exchange, import or export of coins, currency, securities or gold or silver bullion and barring financial, commercial or other transactions involving trade or communication with any person outside the territory actually administered by the Italian Government except as between such territory and Italian territory still occupied by the Allied Military Forces and except transactions, imports and exports for the Allied authorities authorized by them."

This term was implemented by para 1 Art. 2 of the above mentioned RDL No. 32 which reads as follows:

"For the purpose of the prosecution of war the Chief of the Government is given authority to impose in the aforesaid territories (i.e. territory restored to the Italian administration), in agreement with the competent Ministers and as the cases may arise, special directives for or limitations upon the exercise of any productive or commercial activities and also to fix the zone in which such activity may be conducted."

The Finance Commission should be consulted as to administrative instructions in point.

4. "Authorizing the competent Ministers in their discretion as a war measure to prohibit the entering into or carrying on of any type of business except upon such terms or in such areas as they may prescribe, and authorizing them to require any property in which there are reasonable grounds for believing that any enemy or Fascist interests, direct or indirect exist, to be delivered to any agency designated by them to be blocked or to become subject to some other form of control; and providing that subject to the terms prescribed by the Minister of Finance property now held in a blocked account shall remain in its present status, and further providing that financial institutions holding blocked accounts are to make semi-monthly reports to the Minister of Finance showing any dealings in these accounts."

This term was embodied partly in para 1 of Art 2 of RDL No. 32 set out above under 3, partly in para 2 of the same Art 2 which reads as follows:

"Furthermore the Minister of Finance is given authority:

(a) to sequester or provide for any other form of controlled administration under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance of any property or undertaking in which fascists or enemy nationals, be they physical or judicial persons, hold any direct or indirect interest.

(b) to keep frozen the values and bank deposits already affected by such measure, to determine the respective procedures and likewise to provide that the banking institutions holding such values or deposits report every 15 days all effected operations to the Ministry of Finance."

5. Requiring all future initial openings of safe deposit boxes and delivery of contents to be made only in presence of representatives designated by the Minister of Finance. The Financial Subcommission should be requested to supply information on administrative instructions issued on this subject.

(c) Under the heading "United Nations and Enemy Property" Document D imposes upon the Italian Government the duty to pass a decree "confering administrative powers upon the Allied Director of Property Control in relation to the property of any of the United Nations or of any national of the United Nations including

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is given generally, in agreement with the competent Ministers and as the cases may arise, special directives for or limitations upon the exercise of any productive or commercial activities and also to fix the zone in which such activity may be conducted."

The Finance Commission should be consulted as to administrative instructions in point.

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(c) Under the heading "United Nations and Enemy Property" Document D imposes upon the Italian Government the duty to pass a decree "confering administrative powers upon the Allied Director of Property Control in relation to the property of any of the United Nations or of any national of the United Nations including property of France and French nationals."

As a result of extensive and at times difficult negotiations a machinery has been designed which met the wishes of the Director of the Property Control in respect to the above term. Administrative instructions have been issued to the Prefects and a draft decree is ready for publication which repeals the restricting Italian regulations regarding property owned by the United Nations, France and their respective citizens. The particulars can be obtained from the Property Control Subcommission.

G. R. Wiggins
G. R. WIGGIN, Colonel
Chief Legal Officer.

SECRET

COPY

SECRETsubject:- Italians of slav origin

Smyle
 Army Sub Commission, ACC
 Main HQ (MMIA)
 Lequile (Iscece)
 I/103/T
2 May 44

Chief Commissioner, ACC

1. I enclose a letter to me from the Minister of War, I understand the Slav trouble still continues.
2. I suggest that a strong letter from you personally to the Slav leader or leaders in ITALY is the best move under the circumstances.
3. If you approve and write such a letter, would you let me know so that I may reassure General ORLANDO.
4. I feel he has some justification for this alarm, and I know you are dead against this Slav intrigue. I have told General ORLANDO of the latter.

LB/cc

(sgd) L. Browning
 Maj Gen
 Army Sub Comm, ACC

Note by C.C.
Political Section

*for draft
 with
 HAC 16/5*

*Who can I most
 usefully approach?*

6043

MM 12/5

SECRET

Copy
DO/COs/236.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL.

HEADQUARTERS 3.

ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

3rd May, 1944.

My dear Mason MacFarlane

1. Many thanks for your letter No. CC/P/253 dated 1 May 44. I am glad that steps are being taken to tighten up and accelerate action against spies. I know you realise the vital importance of stopping espionage activities. Anything further that you and your staff can do in that respect will be the greatest help not only to the Armies here but to all Allied Forces.

2. The C.L.O.'s figures, given in the appendices to your letter, do in fact reveal some unnecessary delay which I feel can be eliminated in future.

In the first place the four cases confirmed and commuted by General Alexander were in January and not therefore relevant as they fall in a period long before the six weeks in question. Sixteen of the seventeen cases which were outstanding on the date of my letter (26 April) are shown in your C.L.O.'s appendices. He seems to have omitted the seventeenth, VIVIANI, possibly in error. The details are as follows: -

Name	Date of Confirmation or commutation according to C.L.O.	Date Notification received by AMG Legal Branch, Fifth Army.	Date Notification received by GAI(h).
Palesse	18 Apr	22 Apr	27 Apr
Aschieri	22 "	27 "	27 "
Tapoli	22 "	27 "	27 "
Tedesco	22 "	27 "	27 "
Scarpellini	25 "	30 "	1 May
Pellegrini	18 "	22 "	27 Apr
Acqua	18 "	22 "	27 "
Alberti	18 "	22 "	27 "
Catani	22 "	27 "	27 "
Trefiro	22 "	27 "	27 "
Pavera	22 "	27 "	27 "
Calligaro)			
Donnini)			
Sebastianelli)			
Guadagni)			
Soro)			
Viviani	Omitted from C.L.O.'s list.		

You will see that, although most of these sixteen sentences were either confirmed or commuted by you between 18 and 22 April, this E.Q. was not notified before 27 April, the day after my letter to you. Thus between five and nine days were lost before we were informed and therefore in a position to fix the date of execution.

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Tapoli	22 "	27 "	27 "
Tedesco	22 "	27 "	27 "
Scarpellini	25 "	30 "	1 May
Pellegrini	18 "	22 Apr	27 Apr
Acqua	18 "	22 "	27 "
Alberti	18 "	22 "	27 "
Catani	22 "	27 "	27 "
Trefiro	22 "	27 "	27 "
Pavera	22 "	27 "	27 "
Calligaro	Not yet notified.		
Donnini			
Sebastianelli			
Guadagni			
Soro			
Viviani	Omitted from C.L.O.'s list.		

you will see that, although most of these sixteen sentences were either confirmed or commuted by you between 18 and 22 April, this H.Q. was not notified before 27 April, the day after my letter to you. Thus between five and nine days were lost before we were informed and therefore in a position to fix the date of execution.

Incidentally there has been no delay, as your C.L.O. suggests, occasioned by "doubts of H.Q. A.A.I. to recognize your authority to confirm death sentences", which was quite clear here. Fifth Army did, indeed, ask for confirmation that this point was in order before carrying out the execution. This was obtained for them and the executions were carried out on the day for which they had been arranged, i.e. 30 April.

3. As regards the period allowed for petition for review of death sentences, I realise that this is not the main factor as the defendant would normally not delay in appealing. When I told ALLEY that you had mentioned this 30 day period to me, he did, in fact, point out as you have done, that so far there had only been delay in one case on these grounds. However, I realise that delay might occur and I very much hope you will be able to reduce the period which, I understand, is provided for in the A.M.G. proclamation, but does not otherwise seem to be laid down as applicable to spies in war. The whole point of having/.....

Copy

of having to shoot a spy at all is to ensure security of operations by the most rapid and severe deterrent, so it can hardly come within the same category as other offences. The ideal arrangement would be for a spy condemned to death to be marched away from the court and shot. The nearer we can get to that the better from our point of view. The certainty of prompt trial, judgment and execution if condemned is, as I am sure you will agree, the greatest deterrent, and also, in my opinion, the most humane. Will you let me know what you can do to reduce the period for appeals?

4. Many thanks too for your CC/P/256 dated 1 May 44. The officer you promised ALLEY to send up to discuss details has not yet appeared. I understand he rang up this morning to say he was too busy to come till to-morrow, which leaves me with the feeling that the urgency and importance of these security measures are not fully appreciated by everyone. I should be grateful if you could rub that point well into everyone concerned.

Yours ever

/s/ JOHN HARDING

Deut.-General Sir F. Noel Mason MacFarlane,
KCB, DSO, MC,

Chief Commissioner,
H.Q. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

ANSWERED + ACTION TAKEN. S/S
NMM

6043

COPY/EXTRACT

SUBJECT: Control of Escaped Allied PW SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

AAI/3075/A(0)

3 May 44

1. Ref AFI Adv Adm Ech Administrative Instruction No. 31 issued under reference 3152/9/A1 dated 21 Feb 44.

2. The following redesignations of HQ PW Sub-Commission, PW Transit Camps etc., will be taken into use forthwith.

(b) Former Designation	(d) New Designation	(e) New Location	(f) Intercomm
HQ PW Sub-Commission (PW Repatriation Directorate)	HQ Allied PW Repatriation Unit	Naples	Tel. Naples 17599. Signals: ADIAP for ALLIED PW REPAT UNIT
No. 1 PW Transit Camp	Disbanded	-	-
No 2 PW Transit Camp (PW Collection Camp)	No 2 Allied PW Repatriation Camp	Resina N 3045	Tel. Naples 55409
No 1 PW Distribution HQ	Disbanded	-	-
No 1 PW Distribution HQ Collection Camp	No 1 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	Taranto	'X' TRANSIT Camp TARANTO
PW Subcommission Rep	No 2 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	Casoli H 2491	c/o 23 Town Major
"	No 3 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	Torino di Sangro C 4503	c/o Fwd Det 202 Transit Camp
-	No 4 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	Presenzano H 0708	c/o 115 F.M.C. 6042

/s/ ? , Major
for

Major General
Chief Administrative Officer..

TEG/HFL

SUBJECT:- Control of Escaped Allied PW SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

AAI/3075/A (O)

3 May 44

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(a) serial	(b) Former Designation	(c) Former Location	(d) New Designation	(e) New Location	(f) Intercomm
(i)	HQ PW Sub- Commission (PW Repatria- tion Directorate)	BARI	✓ Hq Allied PW Repatriation Unit	NAPLES	Tel: NAPLES 17599 Signals: ADWAP for ALLIED PW REPAT UNIT
(ii)	No 1 PW Transit Camp	BARI	Disbanded	--	--
(iii)	No 2 PW Transit Camp (PW Collection Camp)	RESINA	No 2 Allied PW Repatriation Camp	RESINA No 3045	Tel. NAPLES 55409
(iv)	No 1 PW Distribution HQ	TARANTO	Disbanded	-	-
(v)	No 1 PW Distribution HQ Collection Camp	TARANTO	No 1 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	TARANTO	'X' TRANSIT Camp TARANTO
(vi)	PW Sub-Commission Rep	TERMOLO	No 2 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	CASOLI H 2491	c/o 23 Town Major
(vii)	"	ATESSA	No 3 Det Allied PW Repatriation	TORINO DI SANGRO	c/o Forward Det 202 Transit

383.6 POW Ser

0031

0031

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2. The following redesignations of HQ PW Sub-Commission, PW Transit Camps, etc., will be taken into use forthwith.

(a) serial	(b) Former Designation	(c) Former Location	(d) New Designation	(e) New Location	(f) Intercomm
(i)	HQ PW Sub- Commission (PW Repatria- tion Directorate)	BARI	✓ Hq Allied PW Repatriation Unit	NAPLES	Tel: NAPLES 17599 Signals: ADNAP for ALLIED PW REPAT UNIT
(ii)	No 1 PW Transit Camp	BARI	Disbanded	--	--
(iii)	No 2 PW Transit Camp (PW Collection Camp)	RESINA	No 2 Allied PW Repatriation Camp	RESINA No 3045	Tel. NAPLES 55409
(iv)	No 1 PW Distribution HQ	TARANTO	Disbanded	-	-
(v)	No 1 PW Distribution HQ Collection Camp	TARANTO	No 1 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	TARANTO	'X' TRANSIT Camp TARANTO
(vi)	PW Sub-Commission Rep	TERMOLO	No 2 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	CASOLI H 2491	c/o 23 Town Major
(vii)	"	ATESSA	No 3 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	TORINO DI SANGRO Unit C 4503	c/o Forward Det 202 Transit Camp
(viii)	-	-	No 4 Det Allied PW Repatriation Unit	PRESENZANO H 0708	c/o 115 F.M.O.

(43)

A H I / 3075/A(0)

3 mar 44

Lupol

File / Jans

383.6 POW Rep

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TDG/HFL

s/ Signature illegible
for t/ Major General
Chief Administrative Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

As for Adm Instr No 31

A TRUE COPY:

Nicholas Piccino
NICHOLAS PICCINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

6203

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

HEAD HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Legal Subcommittee,
APO 394

29th. April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Espionage Cases.

TO: Chief Commissioner, A.C.C..

1. The position with regard to the above cases (in which I include cases of persons coming through the German lines for sabotage purposes, although the charge may not have been technically spying) where the death sentence has been imposed by the Court is as follows:

A. In nine cases the death sentence has been confirmed by you or by General Alexander (See list at App. A) of which 7 were in the last 6 weeks.

B. In nine cases the death sentence has been commuted by you or by General Alexander (See list at App. B) of which 7 were in the last 6 weeks.

C. Three cases involving six persons who have been sentenced to death are under review (App. C). These are very recent cases but without fail will be delivered to you for final review on Monday.

2. The actual execution of the death sentence is the responsibility of HQ AAI and not of the Allied Control Commission, and there I believe some delay has been occasioned by doubts of HQ AAI to recognise your authority to confirm death sentences. However, I have sent a certified copy of General Alexander's delegation to them today in response to their telephone call.

3. I hope the above figures will satisfy the Chief of Staff that matters are dealt with expeditiously. He will I am sure appreciate that a certain delay is necessarily involved after sentence as the defendants have 30 days within which to petition for review of the case.

4. I am entirely in favour of publicity in cases where the death sentence is imposed and had already instructed legal officers that this was permissible. However, HQ AAI, by their letter AAI/1458/CI(b) dated 14 April, to the Executive Commissioner, have suggested they should control this publicity, and there does not seem any objection to this course.

(signed) G.R. UPJOHN, Colonel,
Chief Legal Officer.

6040

SUBJECT: Political Propaganda in ITALIAN Army

SECRET

Army Sub Commission A.C.C.
Main H.Q. (MIA) 13 APR 44 TO 394
LEQUILE (LECCE) 21 APR 44
I/112 18 APR 44
DFE

NE
SF
also

HQ ACC(2)

Copy to (less pamphlet): Adv HQ Army Sub Commission ACC SALERNO

1. HQ 2 District have referred the matter outlined in paras 2 to 5 below to this Sub Commission.
2. Gen LERICI, GOC 9 Italian Corps, BARI, last year issued instructions that Italian Army personnel would not engage in politics. Copies of these instructions are held by 2 District.
3. On 12 Mar 44 Gen PIRZIO-BIROLI, President of the National League of Reserve Officers, distributed about 100 pamphlets (one example attached) in MATERA when he addressed a meeting of demobilised Italian officers. During his address BIROLI said that at all costs power must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the so-called Anti-Fascist parties, which were recruited from jail-birds and ex-political prisoners. The classes which had risen to positions of responsibility under the Fascist regime, and were still in power, represented the only solid, reliable, political elements in the country.
4. The pamphlets are a defence of the King against GROCE and SPORZA, and were written about 29 Nov 43 by a Lieut Giuseppe RISPOLI as propaganda (apparently not distributed) for 210 Coastal Division.
5. They were permitted to be printed recently by Gen LERICI on an Army printing press in his HQ.
6. HQ 2 Dist in forwarding the matter to us state that they consider it to be undesirable for Italian Senior Officers to engage in this kind of political activity.
7. The matter is now referred to you for your instructions. Will you please inform us what action you wish us to take, and what orders, if any, you wish us to pass on to the Italian Army in connection with indulging in this type of political propaganda.

CGL.

L. Browning 6039
Maj Gen,
Army Sub Comm A.C.C.

150

SECRET

HQ AGC, APO 394
Sec'y Gen
Rec'd 3 Apr 1945
BY DFEHQ A. A. I.

8653/7/BCS

2 April 44

Subject: Entry of Italian Troops into ROME.
To: Allied Control Commission.

1. Ref your letter CG/G/144, above subject, dated 20 March.
2. Your views were submitted to A.F.H.Q. who now agree that a small number of Italian troops should enter ROME shortly after the official Allied entry. If a ceremonial parade is desired by the Italian forces, this parade should be held after the Allied ceremonial parade.
3. When arrangements are complete for the appointment of Gen. BRANCIVANCA as administrator of forces of law and order in ROME during the interval between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies, may this HQ be informed, as we wish to explain the position to General JOHNSON, Chief of the ROME City Administration.

/s/

for Lt.-General,
Chief of General Staff.

GSKG/lk

6038

SECRET

1297

785015

SECRET

HQ ACC, AFO 394
Sec'y Gen
Rec'd 3 Apr 1735
BY DFE

HQ A. A. I.

subject: Entry of Italian Troops into ROME.
To: Allied Control Commission.

8055/7/BGS

2 April 44

1. Ref your letter CC/C/144, above subject, dated 20 March.
2. Your views were submitted to A.F.H.Q. who now agree that a small number of Italian troops should enter ROME shortly after the official Allied entry. If a ceremonial parade is desired by the Italian forces, this parade should be held after the Allied ceremonial parade.
3. When arrangements are complete for the appointment of Gen. BENCIVENGA as administrator of forces of law and order in ROME during the interval between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies, may this HQ be informed, as we wish to explain the position to General JOHNSON, Chief of the ROME City Administration.

/s/

for Lt.-General,
Chief of General Staff.

HSCW/lk

6037
Loyd

SECRET

1298

Enclure

SECRET
HQ AAI ADM ECH,
CEP.

SUBJECT: - Italian Army - calling up of classes

3074/A(0)

20 MAR 44

1. The following amendments are made to this HQ 5110/A(0) dated 17 Mar 44.

(a) It is the intention that the calling up of classes referred to shall apply only to illegal absentees:-
After "authorities" in para 1 insert
"illegal absentees of"

(b) Delete para 4 and substitute:-
"In such cases employing units etc of Services concerned may make application for exemption. These exemptions will be considered and decided by the undermentioned authorities whose decision will be final:

- (i) Comds of Districts, Base Sections or equivalent formations.
- (ii) FOAII, AAI/CO/ATO and Adv HQ 214 Group RAF.

Any cases of dispute will be referred to 'A' Branch, HQ AAI (ADM ECH).

The exempting authority will complete Coln 9 of the pro-forma in respect of all personnel classified (e) or (b), indicating whether or not exemption has been granted and the pro-forma will be signed in such cases.

Where exemptions are authorised the employing unit will be informed and a certificate (see Annexure 'A') will be given to each exempted Italian as evidence for production to the Italian Military Authorities.

L. Welch, Lt. Col.

for Major-General,
C.A.O.

DISTRIBUTION Main Eighth Army
5 (US) ARMY
etc., etc.

6036

(see over)

091.711-

(b) Delete para 4 and substitute:-

"In such cases employing units etc of Services concerned may make application for exemption. These exemptions will be considered and decided by the undermentioned authorities whose decision will be final:

- (i) Comds of Districts, Base Sections or equivalent formations.
- (ii) FOWIT, AFISG/ATO and Adv Hq 2Lt Group RAF.

Any cases of dispute will be referred to 'A' Branch, Hq MAT (Adm Ech).

The exempting authority will complete Coln 9 of the pro-forma in respect of all personnel classified (a) or (b), indicating whether or not exemption has been granted and the pro-forma will be signed in such cases.

Where exemptions are authorised the employing unit will be informed and a certificate (see Annexure 'A') will be given to each exempted Italian as evidence for production to the Italian Military Authorities.

L. Welch, Lt. Col.

for Major-General,
G.A.O.

DISTRIBUTION Main Eighth Army
2 (US) Army
etc., etc.

(see over)

6036

1300

785015

Annexure 'A' to AAI
3074/A(3) of 20 Mar 44

DICHIARAZIONE
(Certificate)

Al Comando del Distretto Militare di.....
(To the Command of the Military District of)

Si dichiara che il Sig.....(Nome e cognome)
(This is to certify that) (name)

della classe.....presta servizio presso.....(occupazione)
(is employed by) (occupation)

Si prega volerlo esonerare dal richiamo alle armi.
(It is requested that he be exempted from Military Service)

Firmato.....
(Signed)

Lollo FF.AA. Campania
(Italian HQ Stamp)

Napoli.....(data)
(date)

3500

SECRET

SECRET
HQ AAI ADM ECH,
CMF.

SUBJECT: Italian Army - Calling up of Classes

3074/A(O)

20 Mar 44

1. The following amendments are made to this HQ 3110/A(O) dated 17 Mar 44.

(a) It is the intention that the calling up of Classes referred to shall apply only to illegal absentees. After "Authorities" in para 1 insert "illegal absentees of"

(b) Delete para 4 and substitute:
"In such cases employing units etc of Services concerned may make application for exemption. These exemptions will be considered and decided by the undermentioned authorities whose decision will be final:

(1) Comds of Districts, Base Sections or equivalent formations

(11) POWIT, AAFSC/LTO and Adv HQ 214 Group RAF.

Any cases of dispute will be referred to 'A' Branch, HQ AAI (Adm Ech).

The exempting authority will complete Coln 9 of the pro-forma in respect of all personnel classified (a) or (b), indicating whether or not exemption has been granted and the pro-forma will be signed in such cases.

Where exemptions are authorized the employing unit will be informed and a certificate (see Annexure 'g') will be given to each exempted Italian as evidence for production to the Italian Military Authorities.

L. Welch, Lt. Col.

for Major-General,
G.A.O.

6033

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In such cases, exemptions will be considered and decided by the undermentioned authorities whose decision will be final:

(i) Comds of Districts, Base Sections or equivalent formations

(ii) FOWIF, AAFSC/MTD and Adv HQ 214 Group RAF.

Any cases of dispute will be referred to 'A' Branch, HQ AAI (Adm Ech).

The exempting authority will complete Coln 9 of the pro-forma in respect of all personnel classified (a) or (b), indicating whether or not exemption has been granted and the pro-forma will be signed in such cases.

Where exemptions are authorized the employing unit will be informed and a certificate (see Annexure 'g') will be given to each exempted Italian as evidence for production to the Italian Military Authorities.

L. Welch, Lt. Col.

for Major-General,
G.A.O.

6033

SECRET

SECRET

1303

785015

C O P Y

S E C R E T

C O P Y

Annexure 'A' to AAI
3074/A(O) of 20 Apr 44

DICHIARAZIONE
(Certificate)

Al Comando del Distretto Militare di
(To the Command of the Military District of)

.....

Si Dichiaro che il Sig (Nome e cognome)
(This is to certify that) (name)

della classe presta servizio presso (occupazione)
(is employed by) (occupation)

Si prega volentieri esonerare dal richiamo alle armi.
(It is requested that he be exempted from Military Service)

Firmato
(Signed)

Napoli (data)
(date)

Bollo FF.AA. Campania
(Italian HQ Stamp)

6034

.....

Si dichiara che il sig (Nome e cognome)
(name)

della classe presta servizio presso (occupazione)
(is employed by) (occupation)

Si prega volerlo esonerare dal richiamo alle armi.
(It is requested that he be exempted from Military Service)

Firmato
(signed)

Napoli (date)
(date)

6434

Bollo FF.AA. Campania
(Italian HQ Stamp)

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

SECRET

HQ AAI ADM ECH
CMF.

3074/A (O)

20 Mar 44

SUBJECT :- Italian Army - Calling up of Classes

1. The following amendments are made to this HQ 3110/A(O) dated 17 Mar 44.

- (a) It is the intention that the calling up of Classes referred to shall apply only to illegal absentees :-
After "Authorities" in para 1 insert
"illegal absentees of"
- (b) Delete para 4 and substitute :-
"In such cases employing units etc of Services concerned may make application for exemption. These exemptions will be considered and decided by the undermentioned authorities whose decision will be final:

- (i) Comds of Districts, Base Sections or equivalent formations.
- (ii) FOMIT, AFSC/WFO and Adv HQ 214 Group RAF.

Any cases of dispute will be referred to 'A' Branch, HQ AAI (Adm Ech).

The exempting authority will complete Coln 9 of the pro-forma in respect of all personnel classified (a) or (b), indicating whether or not exemption has been granted and the pro-forma will be signed in such cases.

Where exemptions are authorised the employing unit will be informed and a certificate (see Annexure 'A') will be given to each exempted Italian as evidence for production to the Italian Military Authorities.

Major-General,
C.A.O.

TW/ATN

DISTRIBUTION

Main Eighth Army
5 (US) Army
5 (US) Army (Br Iner)
5 Corps
1 Dist
2 Dist
3 Dist
PBS
C-in-C Med
HQ MAAF
HQ 2 NZEF
HQ 2 UDF, CMF

6038

(a) It is the intention that the following apply only to illegal absentees :-
After "Authorities" in para 1 insert "illegal absentees of"

(b) Delete para 4 and substitute :-
"In such cases employing units etc of Services concerned may make application for exemption. These exemptions will be considered and decided by the undermentioned authorities whose decision will be final:

- (i) Comds of Districts, Base Sections or equivalent formations.
(ii) POWIT, AFSC/MTO and Adv HQ 214 Group RAF.

Any cases of dispute will be referred to 'A' Branch, HQ AAI (Adm Ech).

The exempting authority will complete Coln 9 of the pro-forma in respect of all personnel classified (a) or (b), indicating whether or not exemption has been granted and the pro-forma will be signed in such cases.

Where exemptions are authorised the employing unit will be informed and a certificate (see Annexure 'A') will be given to each exempted Italian as evidence for production to the Italian Military Authorities.

Major-General,
C.A.O.

TW/AJM

DISTRIBUTION

Main Eighth Army

5 (US) Army
5 (US) Army (Pr Incr)
5 Corps
1 Dist
2 Dist
3 Dist
PMS
C-in-C Med
HQ MAF
HQ 2 NZEF
Adm HQ UDT, CEF
Rear Pol Base
ANG FOGGIA Province
List 'B'

Copies to :-

AFHQ G-1 (Br)
HQ AAI (25)
Force 133
ACC (6)
G-4
IBS
Wat Diary.

6038

Annexure 'A' to AAI
3074/A(O) of 20 Mar 44

DICHIARAZIONE
(Certificate)

Al Comando del Distretto Militare di
(To the Command of the Military District of)

Si dichiara che il Sig (Nome e cognome)
(Name)

della classe presta servizio presso (occupazione)
(is employed by) (occupation)

Si prega volerlo esonerato dal richiamo alle armi.
(It is requested that he be exempted from Military Service)

Bollo FF. AA. Campania
(Italian HQ Stamp)

Firmato
(Signed)

Espresso (date)
(date)

SECRET

HQ AAI ADM ECH,
CMF.

3110/A (O)

17 ar 44

SUBJECT:- Italian Army-Calling up of Classes

1. In accordance with arrangements made with the Italian Military Authorities the following classes are being called up for Military Service in the Italian Army :-
1920, 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 classes.

2. A number of Italians eligible to be called up are at present employed as civilians with the Allied Forces and in order to avoid undue dislocation of labour it has been decided to call up only one class at a time.

3. It is also appreciated that certain technical personnel employed as skilled labour may be more valuable to the war effort in continuing their present work for the Allies than in the Armed Forces.

4. In such cases employing units etc, may make a plication for exemption from call up. These applications will be considered by AFHQ Local Resources (ITALY) Board whose decision will be final.

5. Italian PW employed by the Allied Forces are not affected by this order.

6. In order that call up of these classes may be properly enforced and applied to all-eligible Italians employed by the Allied Forces, the attached pro-formas will be completed by all units employing Italian male nationals of the classes affected.

7. Pro-formas will be forwarded through the normal channels to HQ Armies Corps and Districts who will despatch them to Colonel NEGROMI, Italian Liaison Officer, HQ AAI.

8. Pro-formas will show clearly :-

- (a) Skilled men to be retained and for whom exemption is required.
- (b) Unskilled men who are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other Italian personnel.
- (c) In the case of personnel under (a) and (b) the nature of their present employment will be clearly stated.

TW/AJM

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5 (US) Army
5 (US) Army (Br Incr)
5 Corps
1 Dist

(Info- Army S.C., Lecce 2
Army S.C., Salerno
Army S.C., L.O. PO Hldg
Room. Sec

Major-General, **6051**
C.A.O.

3. It is also appreciated that certain technical personnel employed as skilled labour may be more valuable to the war effort in continuing their present work for the Allies than in the Armed Forces.
4. In such cases employing units etc, may make application for exemption from call up. These applications will be considered by AFHQ Local Resources (ITALY) Board whose decision will be final.
5. Italian PW employed by the Allied Forces are not affected by this order.
6. In order that call up of these classes may be properly enforced and applied to all eligible Italians employed by the Allied Forces, the attached pro-forma will be completed by all units employing Italian male nationals of the classes affected.
7. Pro-formas will be forwarded through the normal channels to HQ Armies Corps and Districts who will despatch them to Colonel NECHROMI, Italian Liaison Officer, HQ AAI.
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 - (c) In the case of personnel under (a) and (b) the nature of their present employment will be clearly stated.

TW/AJM

DISTRIBUTION:-

Main Eighth Army
 5 (US) Army
 5 (US) Army (Br Incr)
 5 Corps
 1 Dist
 2 Dist
 3 Dist
 PBS
 C-in-C Med
 HQ MAAF
 HQ 2 NZEF
 Adm HQ IDF, CMF
 Rear Pol Base
 AMG FOGGIA Province
 List 'B'

Copies to :-

AFHQ G-1 (Br) (25)
 HQ AAI
 Force 133 (6)
 ACC
 G-4
 IRS
 War Diary

Major-General, **6041**
 C.A.O.


(Info- Army S.C., Lecce 2
 Army S.C., Salerno
 Army S.C., L.O. PO Bldg
 Recn. Sec
 CARR.)

MINOR POINTS DISCUSSED WITH BADOGLIO ON 18 MARCH 1944

1. Badoglio wishes to appoint Bincibenga as chief in Rome for the interim period between departure of Germans and arrival of Allied troops. Bincibenga would have absolute power and control of all the forces of law and order, of administration and in fact everything connected with the maintenance of normality. On the arrival of the Allied Comando of the Rome area it would be with Bincibenga with whom he would work and under his orders and directions Bincibenga would be responsible for the carrying out of everything required by the Allied Comando.
2. Without being absolutely certain, Badoglio thinks that the person suggested under the initial "T" as substitute for Motta is Turbato, late of the Ministry of Interior. Badoglio proposes to leave the confirmation of otherwise of this nomination entirely to Bincibenga.
3. Badoglio proposes to visit Sicily to give Musatto some moral support towards the end of this week. He said he would be very glad if I could accompany him if I ~~fit~~ like visiting Sicily in the near future.
4. Badoglio asked me to find out from the Finance Sub-Commission the situation regarding the provision of money for Armellini in Rome by means of transaction in valuta involving principally and preferably Swiss francs.
5. I promised Badoglio to give him an answer regarding making 200 Carabinieri available for Sicily by the 20th inst.
6. I promised Badoglio to arrange to send a telegram for him to his daughter-in-law in Tangier through Gibraltar.

G.D.O.

G.D.O.



COPY

SUBJECT:- Italian Army-calling up of Classes

HQ AAI AEM ECH,
CAF.

3110/A(0)

17 Mar 44

1. In accordance with arrangements made with the Italian Military Authorities the following classes are being called up for Military Service in the Italian Army :-
1920, 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 classes.

2. A number of Italians eligible to be called up are at present employed as civilians with the Allied Forces and in order to avoid undue dislocation of labour it has been decided to call up only one class at a time.

3. It is also appreciated that certain technical personnel employed as skilled labour may be more valuable to the war effort in continuing their present work for the Allies than in the Armed Forces.

4. In such cases employing units etc may make application for exemption from call up. These applications will be considered by AFHQ Local Resources (ITALY) Board whose decision will be final.

5. Italian PW employed by the Allied Forces are not affected by this order.

6. In order that call up of these classes may be properly enforced and applied to all eligible Italians employed by the Allied Forces, the attached pro-forma will be completed by all units employing Italian male nationals of the classes affected.

7. Pro-formas will be forwarded through the normal channels to HQ Armies Corps and Districts who will despatch them to Colonel NEGROTI, Italian Liaison Officer, HQ AAI.

8. Pro-formas will show clearly :-

- (a) Skilled men to be retained and for whom exemption is required.
- (b) Unskilled men who are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other Italian personnel.
- (c) In the case of personnel under (a) and (b) the future of their present employment will be clearly stated.

/s/ L. Welth, Lt. Col.
for Major-General,
U.A.C.

TM/ATL

DISTRIBUTION: Main Eighth Army.
2 (US) Army
etc etc

ACC DISTRIBUTION:
(Info) C.A. Br.

of labour it has been

3. It is also appreciated that certain technical personnel employed as skilled labour may be more valuable to the war effort in continuing their present work for the Allies than in the Armed Forces.

4. In such cases employing units etc may make application for exemption from call up. These applications will be considered by AFHQ Local Resources (ITALY) Board whose decision will be final.

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- (c) In the case of personnel under (a) and (b) the future of their present employment will be clearly stated.

/s/ L. Walth, Lt. Col.
for Major-General,
C.A.O.

TW/ATM

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5 (US) Army
etc etc

copies to : -

ACC (6)

ACC DISTRIBUTION:
(Info) C.A. Br.
Secn Sec
ARMY SC LOGGE 2
" " Salerno
" " IO

P.T.O.

PRO-FORMA

PARTICULARS OF ALL ITALIAN MALE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED

by (unit of HQ of formation)
and liable for Military Service

1. SURNAME	2. <u>CHRISTIAN</u> <u>NAME</u>	3. <u>MILITARY</u> <u>NO</u>	4. <u>MILITARY</u> <u>CLASS</u>	5. <u>NAME OF LAST</u> <u>UNIT WHICH</u> <u>SOLDIER SERVED</u>	6. <u>MILITARY</u> <u>DISTRICT TO</u> <u>WHICH SOLDIER</u> <u>BELONGS</u>	7. <u>CLASSIFICATION</u> (a) or (b)	8. <u>NATURE</u> <u>OF</u> <u>PRES</u> <u>EMPL</u>
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Note :- Col 7 will be completed where applicable by inserting (a) or (b) denoting :-

(a) Skilled men to be retained and for whom exemption is required.

(b) Unskilled men who are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other

Col 8 will only be completed in respect of personnel classified in col 7.

6088

PRO-FORMA

PARTICULARS OF ALL ITALIAN MALE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED

by (unit of HQ of formation)
and liable for Military Service

<u>4.</u> <u>MILITARY</u> <u>CLASS</u>	<u>5.</u> <u>NAME OF LAST</u> <u>UNIT WHICH</u> <u>SOLDIER SERVED</u>	<u>6.</u> <u>MILITARY</u> <u>DISTRICT TO</u> <u>WHICH SOLDIER</u> <u>BELONGS</u>	<u>7.</u> <u>CLASSIFICATION</u> <u>(a) or (b)</u>	<u>8.</u> <u>NATURE</u> <u>OF</u> <u>PRESENT</u> <u>EMPLOYMENT</u>	<u>9.</u> <u>REMARKS</u>
--	--	--	---	--	-----------------------------

ed where applicable by inserting (a) or (b) denoting :-
e retained and for whom exemption is required.
c are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other Italian personnel.
pleted in respect of personnel classified in col 7.

END

8209

~~SECRET~~
COPY

SECRET

SUBJECT:- Italian Army-Calling up of Classes

HQ AAAI ADM ECK,
CMF.

3110/A(0)

17 Mar 44

1. In accordance with arrangements made with the Italian Military Authorities the following classes are being called up for Military Service in the Italian Army:-
1920, 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 classes.

2. A number of Italians eligible to be called up are at present employed as civilians with the Allied Forces and in order to avoid undue dislocation of labour it has been decided to call up only one class at a time.

3. It is also appreciated that certain technical personnel employed as skilled labour may be more valuable to the war effort in continuing their present work for the Allies than in the Armed Forces.

4. In such cases employing units etc may make application for exemption from call up. These applications will be considered by AFHQ Local Resources (ITALY) Board whose decision will be final.

5. Italian PW employed by the Allied Forces are not affected by this order.

6. In order that call up of these classes may be properly enforced and applied to all eligible Italians employed by the Allied Forces, the attached pro-forma will be completed by all units employing Italian male nationals of the classes affected.

7. Pro-formas will be forwarded through the normal channels to HQ Armies Corps and Districts who will despatch them to Colonel NEGRONI, Italian Liaison Officer, HQ AAAI.

8. Pro-formas will show clearly:-

- (a) Skilled men to be retained and for whom exemption is required.
- (b) Unskilled men who are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other Italian personnel.
- (c) In the case of personnel under (a) and (b) the future of their present employment will be clearly stated.

/s/ T. Welch, Lt. Col.
Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

TS/ADM

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5 (US) Army

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of labour it has been decided to call up only one class at a time.

3. It is also appreciated that certain technical personnel employed as skilled labour may be more valuable to the war effort in continuing their present work for the Allies than in the Armed Forces.
4. In such cases employing units etc may make application for exemption from call up. These applications will be considered by AFHQ Local Resources (ITALY) Board whose decision will be final.
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 - (b) Unskilled men who are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other Italian personnel.
 - (c) In the case of personnel under (a) and (b) the future of their present employment will be clearly stated.

/s/ T. Welch, Lt. Col.
Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

TS/ADM

DISTRIBUTION: Main Eighth Army
5 (IS) Army
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SECRET

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PRO-FORMA

PARTICULARS OF ALL ITALIAN MALE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED

by(unit of HQ of formation)
and liable for Military Service

1. <u>SURNAME</u>	2. <u>CHRISTIAN NAME</u>	3. <u>MILITARY NO</u>	4. <u>MILITARY CLASS</u>	5. <u>NAME OF LAST UNIT WHICH SOLDIER SERVED</u>	6. <u>MILITARY DISTRICT TO WHICH SOLDIER BELONGS</u>	7. <u>CLASSIFICATION (a) or (b)</u>	8. <u>NAT</u>
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Note:- Col 7 will be completed where applicable by inserting (a) or (b) denoting :-

- (a) Skilled men to be retained and for whom exemption is required.
 (b) Unskilled men who are useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by others

Col 7 will only be completed in respect of personnel classified in Col. 7.

PRO-FORMA

PARTICULARS OF ALL ITALIAN MALE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED

by(unit of HQ of formation)
and liable for Military Service

1. SERIAL	4. MILITARY CLASS	5. NAME OF LAST UNIT WHICH SOLDIER SERVED	6. MILITARY DISTRICT TO WHICH SOLDIER BELONGS	7. CLASSIFICATION (a) or (b)	8. NATURE OF PRESENT EMPLOYMENT	9. REMARKS
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where applicable by inserting (a) or (b) denoting :-
 (a) retained and for whom exemption is required.
 (b) not useful but who could be recalled to Military Service on replacement by other Italian personnel.
 completed in respect of personnel classified in Col. 7.

~~SECRET~~

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

DS 3 114
8 MAR 1944

FIS/ajp

E-329.506/72-2 ADV

8 March 1944

SUBJECT: Travel Control,
Messrs. Verrando and Manzini.

TO: Commanding General, Allied Forces Headquarters,
APO 512.

1. Forwarded herewith are military travel authorizations Nos. 124 and 125 issued for Messrs Verrando and Manzini respectively.

2. These authorizations arrived here after the party in question had left, and are, therefore, forwarded to you for disposition.

3. Acknowledgement of receipt is requested by endorsement hereon.

For the Deputy Chief Commissioner:

FRANK J. SLAUGHTER
Captain, AGD
Deputy Secretary General

2 Incls:

Incl 1 - Authorization #124
Mr. Verrando
Incl 2 - Authorization #125
Mr. Manzini.

Supplement

6046

60-7

61

8 MAR 44

~~SECRET~~

D SG 122

CC/P/48

SECRET AND PERSONAL

12 Feb 44

I have just received my very delayed copy of Freedom telegram 50145. Do you wish me to ask Duchesne, MacGregor and Foster urgently for their respective opinions?

As you will see from the political memorandum which I am also sending you, an abdication by the King would apparently now be followed by the succession of the Crown Prince. All my information goes to show that the opposition parties have agreed on this.

Clearly, therefore, an abdication under these conditions would cause much less repercussion in monarchist circles than an abdication including the elimination of the Crown Prince and the establishment of a Regency.

Voluntary abdication by the King would obviously cause less comment than an abdication under Allied pressure unless such pressure were very discreetly and secretly applied.

My personal view for what it is worth is that an abdication by the present King in favour of the Crown Prince would be unlikely to cause serious repercussions in the armed forces.

Would you please let me know by my returning messenger what action, if any, you would like me to take on the telegram under reference.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander
G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C.,
C-in-C

copy

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U. S. SECRET
Equal Rights SECRETCOPYSUBJECT: Arrest of Questore of TARANTOSECRETHQ 2 District CMF
2022/10 GACC3 Feb 44Copy to 52 Area

1. Continuous bad reports have been received by this HQ concerning the Questore of TARANTO. General DOWLER gave instructions for his arrest and internment. The arrest was to be postponed pending the arrival of 410 FSS in the area.
2. Normally civilian arrests are made in co-operation with the BADOGLIO Government or its representatives but overriding powers remain in Allied hands if the military situation requires.
3. A request was received on 31 Jan by this HQ from OC 52 Area for the immediate removal of the Questore. In consequence the overriding power was exercised and FSS instructed to proceed with a representative of CCRR to the immediate execution of the arrest as ordered by GOC No 2 District.
4. This HQ had no information that it was proposed to supersede the Questore.

TOS 0830 A

Major-General
Commanding 2 District

JHC

6048

U. S. SECRET
Equal Rights SECRET

3 Feb

~~U. S. SECRET~~
~~Signals British SECRET~~

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SUBJECT: Arrest of Questore of TARANTO

SECRET

HQ 2 District CMF
2022/10 G

3 Feb 44

ACC

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TOS 0830 A

Major-General
Commanding 2 District

JHC

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~~Signals British SECRET~~

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

MDT/dfo

18 JAN 1944

In reply refer to:
014.33

7 January 1944

Subject: Repatriation of Italian Officer Prisoners of War.

To: Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.

3962/OP
22 Dec 43
1. Attached hereto is the request of Marshal Messe for the repatriation of 526 Italian Officer Prisoners of War. Authority to submit this list was given Marshal Messe at his meeting with the Commander-in-Chief at Headquarters 15 Army Group, 20 December 1943.

2. The Italian High Command states that these officers are necessary to vitalize the Italian Officer Corps and to permit the Army to develop its full role under co-belligerency. The Allied Control Commission considers that it is most desirable to meet this Italian request insofar as practicable.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

5 Incls.

- 1 - Ltr N. 3962/OP
- 2 - Lists of Officers
- 3 - Ltr N. 1404 of Prot.
- 4 - Ltr N. 4159/OP
- 5 - Ltr N. 62 fr Marshal Badoglio

Duplicate

014.33

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Equals British SECRET

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Terms of Reference for the Advisory Council
for Italy

3, November 1943

An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith composed in the first instance of representatives of the U.K., U.S., Soviet Union, and French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable in view of the special interest of these two countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.

2. Each representative will be assisted when necessary by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational problems. Members of the Council will be supplied by their respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on Political and military developments effecting their work. They will make joint or several representations to their Governments or to the French Committee, but will not have the power to take final decisions. They will not of course concern themselves with military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of machinery of control in Italy which enforce the terms of surrender. **See**

5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Control Commission and will have the

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4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of machinery of control in Italy which **6822** enforce the terms of surrender.
5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations over matters affecting the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.
6. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the U.K. and U.S. Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of Italy's administration

1326

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

tion to an end, the Commander-in-Chief will relinquish the
Presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory
Council for Italy will thereupon assume direction of the
work of the Allied Control Commission.

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Headquarters,
Mediterranean Air Command.

Reference:-
S.549/ACMT/MAC.

5th October, 1943.

To:- Allied Mission to Italian Government.

I. A. F. Organization.

1. I have now examined the proposals which have been made to me for the future organization of the Italian Air Force. In my view the requirements are two:-

- Firstly, to form an operational force from existing material and personnel to give direct assistance to Allied operations.
Secondly, to re-organize air resources in Italy as the Allied move Northward.

2. As regards the operational force, I propose to use it on the right flank of the Allied forces. From a review of the Italian Air Units available, I consider that it should be a composite force consisting of a fighter wing, a bomber transport wing, and a marine wing. It will be subordinate to the Allied Air Command operating in Italy, and its headquarters should be composed of administrative as well as operational sections. The Italian Air Force Commander will come under the direct orders of the Allied Air Commander in the area concerned, and will have attached to each wing a suitable Italian Commander and his sub-ordinate officers should be young, energetic, and of proved worth in this war. I will wish to review the nominations suggested by the Italian Air Command before the senior officers are actually appointed.

3. The second requirement of re-organization can best be carried out by the Air Minister, supported by an appropriate staff. Although preliminary work can now be done, I do not recommend the setting up of any extensive organization until the Italian Government is again functioning in Rome.

4. The first task to be undertaken by the Air Minister should be the re-establishment of industrial organizations in order to provide a backing for existing I.A.F. units and to augment the base installations which the Allied Air Forces are now beginning to establish in Italy. I appreciate that until the industrial areas of Northern Italy are freed, only very limited output of Italian made equipment is possible but it is important that energetic action should be taken to develop any resources, however slight, in the zones captured by us. In addition the re-organization and the placing at my disposal of skilled technical labour, surplus to the limited needs of the Italian Air Force, will represent a sound contribution to the Allied cause.

5. The Air Ministry in Rome would, of course, also undertake the basic administration of the Italian Air Force on the lines on which it is at present constituted, and would be the channel through which demands from the operational

- 2 -

command for equipment, men and material would pass.

6. In sum, I wish for:-

Firstly, a compact operational command to be formed out of the remnants of the Italian Air Force which is to be placed unreservedly under the Allied Air Force Commander in Italy.

Secondly, the establishment of a government department in Rome of which one of the main functions will be to re-organize and develop all industrial resources both in machinery and manpower so that maximum assistance can be given to Allied Operations in this theater of war.

(sgd) A. W. TEDDER
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL
AIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

60+0

Copy

D R A F T C - B L E

ACTION: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND
TO CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

THIS IS NAF

Reference FAN 634 and NAF 1096.

1. The immediate hand-back of the Northern Provinces raises the question of whether the rights of the Italian Government in the Franco-Italian frontier zone are to be in any way restricted.

2. It is clear that unless we do restrict the employment of Italian troops in this zone pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the U.S., U.K., and French Governments, we risk provoking the French into precipitate action.

3. Logically the Italian Government when responsible for the administration of the provinces of PIEMONTE and LIGURIA should be permitted to station such troops as they consider necessary anywhere in these provinces. I repeat I am reluctant to attach further formal conditions to the hand over of territory, but I feel that the present restriction on the employment of Italian troops in the frontier zone (NAF 1641.1.5 refers) should be maintained until this question is settled with the French Government.

4. I therefore propose at time of hand-over to obtain an undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 13 miles of the Franco Italian border. This undertaking will be given no publicity.

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4. I therefore propose at time of hand-over to obtain an undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 15 miles of the Franco Italian border. This undertaking will be given no publicity. The Italian Prime Minister will be informed now that some such condition may be imposed.

5. I estimate that the hand-over of the Northern Provinces will be effected about 31 December. I urge that the question of restrictions in Franco-Italian frontier zone be settled with the French Government by that date.

