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DATA FOR ADMIRAL STONE
MAR. 1944 - SEPT. 1946

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
A P O 394

30 September 1946

AIDE MEMOIRE

REORGANIZATION - ITALIAN POLICE FORCES

1. Officers of the Allied Commission have for the past three years worked in very close touch with the Italian Police Agencies, and it has been very evident to them that allowing for disorganization as the result of the war, the state of efficiency of the Italian Police Forces leaves much to be desired.
2. It is generally agreed that for a Police Force to be effective and efficient certain basic principles are necessary.
For example:
 - (a) All Police Forces in a country should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.
 - (b) They must be adequately clothed, equipped and housed; efficient schools of Instruction with a standard code of training should exist.
 - (c) There should be reasonable pay and conditions of service.
 - (d) The arming of Police should be kept at a minimum compatible with security.
 - (e) Police forces should be divorced from the Armed (Defence) Forces of the country and they should, as far as possible be without any political bias.
3. At the present time there are in Italy three major Police Forces i.e. Carabinieri, Corps of Public Safety Agents and Finance Guards, together with other smaller forces, all of which work more or less independently of each other.

It is obvious that this must lead to overlapping, inefficiency and a waste of man power, furthermore the above mentioned basic principles are in general not applied.

Even allowing for the consequences of the war, housing and office conditions are to large degree inadequate.

Conditions of clothing and equipment, although improving are very poor.

F 6898

Classes of instructions are in operation but there is little co-ordination between the Forces.

The pay and conditions of service are unsatisfactory.

Although it is appreciated that conditions at present are abnormal, the Police Forces are undoubtedly being overarmed and a wrong mentality is thereby being fostered amongst both the Police and the Public.

Beyond doubt large sections of certain police bodies identify themselves with certain Political Parties.

6897

4. The Allied Commission will be closing down in the near future, but before it does so, I propose that my Public Safety Officers submit a comprehensive report on the general efficiency of the Police Forces of Italy, together with their recommendations for improvement. To enable them to compile a detailed report, it will be necessary for them to seek information from Italian Police Officials and records. I am sure, that you will be only too pleased to give instructions for such information to be made available.

On completion I shall submit the report to you. If you are in general agreement with the recommendations contained therein, you may then care to consider:

- (a) whether the Italian Police Forces are able to implement the recommendations unaided or,
- (b) whether you would wish to ask the services of an Anglo-American Police Mission to assist in their implementation.

Rel'd to PM 1715 - 30/IX

EWS
CC

Copies to: Polad A
Polad B
Ex Comm
Pub Safety, CA Sec
CC

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

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APO 394

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No. 44

BRITISH EMBASSY

ROME

February 21st, 1946

PRESS HEADLINESFOREIGN AFFAIRS

6392

Mr. Macmillan's speech in the House of Commons.

News agency summaries of the speech with which Mr. Harold Macmillan opened the Foreign Affairs debate in the Commons yesterday are prominently reported in practically all newspapers. Unità and Popolo, however, make no mention of the speech. The following are some of the most significant headings: Giornale del Mattino, "The solution of the Italian problem energetically demanded by Macmillan in the Commons. The former Chairman of the A.C. declares: 'I am convinced that the re-establishment of Italy as a stable and democratic Power in the Mediterranean is a British and a world interest'; Tempo, "Clear words by Macmillan in the Commons. Let Italy have her peace in the interest of the civilized world"; Italia Libera, "Macmillan in the Commons - Peace with Italy is an urgent necessity. But progress is slow in Lancaster House"; Libera Stampa, "Macmillan in the Commons - Immediate peace with Italy is necessary to England and the world"; Avanti, "Conservative Macmillan speaks. Peace with Italy is a necessity that cannot be put off."

The Peace Treaty with Italy: Venezia Giulia -

Several newspapers (Giornale del Mattino, Tempo, Libera Stampa, Momento, Italia Nuova) give prominence to the information received by the "U.P." from the Allied authorities in Rome, that Marshal Tito has concentrated 7 Divisions with 200 tanks along the demarcation line in Venezia Giulia, against two Allied Infantry Divisions. The same sources describe the Russo-Yugoslav diplomatic offensive against the Polish troops in Italy as an invention for the purpose of justifying the imposing deployment of Tito's troops.

A Trieste despatch to Giornale del Mattino, signed G.C., states that, with the announcement of the arrival of the Allied Commission, tens of thousands of Slavs crossed the Morgan Line with the evident object of increasing the number of Slavs in the areas where the Italians are numerically stronger. In the Gorizia Province Slav propaganda expenses total six million lire a month. Slav propaganda is also being intensified in the neighbourhood of Monfalcone, where Yugoslav inscriptions, such as "Zivel Tito, Hocemo Tito, Hocemo Yugoslawso", are to be seen. The inhabitants react by attending en masse the political meetings organized by the various Parties. These meetings have, however, been disturbed by Slav in a propagandists. Last week the Youth Front (F.G.N.I.) was to hold a meeting/ Monfalcone theatre; but elements of the Italian-Slovene Anti-Fascist Union (U.A.I.S.) succeeded in boycotting the meeting by occupying the theatre. To meet the situation a Political Committee has been set up in Trieste; the 5 C.L.N. Parties and the Republican Party have adhered to it. Lorries laden with Yugoslav flags continue to arrive in Trieste; a sum of between 3,000 and 5,000 lire is offered for flying the Yugoslav flag.

Giornale del Mattino, in common with other papers, publishes the Tass denial of the report that, in the course of their recent interview, Vyshinsky told Carandini that the Soviet Government would "convince Marshal Tito not to insist upon the Yugoslav claims to Trieste" (see Headlines No. 42).

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Avanti announces that, at a special meeting held on 17th Feb., the Executive of the Trieste Federation of the Socialist Party passed an order of the day denouncing the prearranged methodical action carried out by elements at the orders of the Slovene Nationalist organization, "U.A.I.S.", tending to prevent any demonstration on the part of men and parties who do not agree with the preliminary condition of the annexation by the Yugoslav State of Trieste and the whole of Venezia Giulia.

- The Italian Armistice -

Giornale della Sera publishes a Washington report to the effect that the terms of the two Armistice instruments are being considered by the Service Departments of the U.S.A.. As soon as this study is completed, concrete proposals for Italy's new provisional status would be sent by the State Department to the British and Russian Governments.

- The Latin-American States' attitude.

6891

In Giornale del Mattino Berlinguer stresses the significance of the step taken by the Latin-American Republics which, through their diplomatic representatives, have expressed to the State Department in Washington their unanimous wish that the peace treaty with Italy should be rapidly concluded.

The Italian character of Ventimiglia: a Communist initiative.

Unità announces that, on the initiative of the Communist Party Federation of Imperia, the local C.L.N. Parties passed an order of the day demanding that the competent authorities should take quick and energetic steps to ensure that the valleys and towns in the Ventimiglia district, which have always been Italian, remained united to the Fatherland.

Polish troops in Italy.

Italia Libera reports the statement made by Mr. Bevin in reply to several questions put by Labour M.P.'s concerning the Polish Second Corps in Italy, under the heading "Are there any political relations between the Qualunquisti and the Poles? Vague reply by Mr. Bevin to a question in the Commons." Italia Nuova carries the headline: "Bevin defends Anders' troops - 'I cannot forget that this great Army helped us to attain victory'".

Risorgimento Liberale. According to the Polish news agency "P.A.P.", the head of the Polish Military Mission in Italy, Col. Sidor, recently visited the Cervinara Camp, from where 14,000 Polish soldiers belonging to the Corps stationed in Italy, have already left for Poland. The Camp Commandant informed Col. Sidor that, on an average, between 100 and 150 soldiers a day arrive at the camp. On the basis of these figures, it may be assumed that by next spring the large majority of the Polish soldiers will have abandoned the Second Corps to return home.

Stalin's speech of February 9th.

Libera Stampa publishes a belated comment by Zingarelli on the speech broadcast by Stalin on the eve of the Russian general elections. After recalling Stalin's criticisms of the capitalist countries, and his statement that the inequality among capitalist countries usually leads to a sharp disturbance of balance in the entire world, Zingarelli asks why Stalin omitted to explain to the

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world how best to eliminate a constant source of conflicts. The tendency to seize the source of raw materials remains unchanged. Why didn't Russia begin by giving the good example? On the contrary, she has revealed herself desirous of controlling as many oil and coal fields as possible. "Against a monopoly on a capitalist basis has been set another monopoly on a Communist basis. For the needy countries, the result is the same. The last war has been a strange war of liberation. If it liberated the world from the Fascist regimes, it did not liberate any country from want, which has indeed become more acute. The world is still divided between victors and vanquished, and to the latter is added the new strange category of the occupied countries. Persia, who did not take part in the war and is neither a victorious nor a defeated Power, is an occupied State; Denmark, whose noble attitude during the war is beyond question, has one of her islands, Bornholm, occupied by Russian troops. Not to speak of the occupation of Italy, and of the indirect control exercised by means of economic pressure." Stalin uttered a serious warning, but his speech, far from dispelling doubts and apprehensions, gives rise to new anxieties.

Nitti on the "Times" leading article of January 23rd.

6890

Giornale della Sera publishes an interview granted by Nitti to its editor, Tullio Benedetti, commenting upon the "Times" leading article, entitled "Italian Needs" published on January 23rd. Nitti says that nothing can be more useful than the readmission of Italy to the comity of the United Nations; "it is to be hoped that this may happen on the initiative of Great Britain." The "Times" article of Jan. 23rd was very interesting because of the writer's awareness of the state of moral uneasiness and humiliation existing in Italy. The writer of the article expounded just and honest views which are no doubt shared by all those who earnestly desire peace and reconstruction. Nitti agrees with the "Times" writer's opinion that Italy's present troubles are due to moral, as well as to economic, causes. Although Italy should now be the first of the defeated nations to be given United Nations membership, she is still being kept out and feels that she is being ignored. This is harmful to Italy, but certainly does not make for world peace. It is in the interest of the Allies, and in the first place of Great Britain, to break this deadlock. With the collapse of Germany, Italy is, after Russia, the most thickly inhabited country in Europe. She will undoubtedly rise to her feet again. She may contribute either to peace or to the state of permanent disorder which threatens the existence of a large part of Europe. It is in the interest of the victors that she should contribute to peace. The same policy was pursued by Italy after the first world war. "As head of the Italian Government, I attended all the conferences which took place in 1919 and 1920 after the Versailles Treaty. I constantly followed the policy of European reconstruction. Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Lord Curzon never dissented from me, and the great British leaders never departed from those principles even vis-à-vis the defeated countries. When, in order to break all relations with Fascism, I left Italy as an exile, I looked upon the British politicians as my best friends, and they, particularly Macdonald, showed much sympathetic confidence in me" Italy now pays for the mistakes committed by Fascism; but Fascism enjoyed for too long a period the confidence and approval of many of the victorious countries. The crisis through which Italy is passing will come to an end if the policy of a just peace prevails. "If Italy is to find the strength to rise on her feet again and to embark upon national reconstruction, she must first of all have confidence in herself, and it is for this reason ^{that} those countries which were her friends and which must become her friends again, like England, must show confidence in her. Let us not forget that Italy has the same interests and, in due proportion, the same problems as

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England Whatever may be the solution of specific problems, Italy and England must regard political freedom and economic freedom as the fundamental bases of their relations with the rest of the world. Even if now they are so far from each other, England and Italy will, inevitably and providentially, find themselves side by side."

Alto Adige.

Popolo reports that on the night of Feb. 19th unknown individuals tried to blow up the monument to Andreas Hofer in Meran. The base of the monument was damaged. President De Gasperi has given orders for the discovery and punishment of the individuals who committed the outrage and has sent the following telegram to the Prefect of Bolzano: "I deplore most profoundly the hateful attempt against the Andreas Hofer monument and reaffirm the firm will of the Government to ensure the respect for the traditions of the inhabitants of Alto Adige solidly united to the common Italian Fatherland."

Prisoners of war.

Risorgimento Liberale reports that over 412,000 Italian prisoners of war still have to be repatriated: 21,668 from the U.S.A.; 133,000 from Great Britain; 29,549 members of the armed forces and 11,000 civilian internees from East Africa; 35,378 members of the armed forces and 4,500 civilian internees from North Africa; 51,489 members of the armed forces and 1,300 civilian internees from the Middle East; 25,758 members of the armed forces and about 800 civilian internees from India; and 16,367 members of the armed forces and 4,500 civilian internees from Australia, etc. The situation concerning the Italian prisoners in Yugoslavia remains obscure; the Head of the Allied Displaced Persons Section has asked for permission to go to Belgrade to discuss the question personally.

INTERNAL AFFAIRSPowers of Constituent Assembly: American jurists' opinion -

Popolo of February 20th, commenting on a statement in "Epoca" of Feb. 19th that "the Constituent Assembly presupposes a revolution that has destroyed the fundamental institutions on which the community previously rested", disagrees with this premiss, and adds that the fact it is proved by the document forwarded to the Italian Government by the American jurists of the U.S. State Department, in which they maintain that the Italian Constituent Assembly cannot have that typical revolutionary aspect which characterized the principal European Constituent Assemblies aiming at ratifying a fait accompli. The American jurists prefer to refer to the concept of Constitutional 'Convention' in the typical American sense of the word: a Convention which does not necessarily presuppose a revolution, and which does not imply the assumption by the Constituent Assembly of powers of Government, which can be exercised independently of the specific activity of the constituent organ. According to the American jurists, the Italian Constitutional revival would not come about as the result of a genuine revolution, but in consequence of a lost war and in relation to a deal put through under the aegis of the Allies and ratified in the decree of June 1944. In view of this particular historical situation, it seems logical that the powers of the Constituent Assembly should be regulated on the basis of the law which created that Assembly, a law which was precisely promulgated under the aegis of the Allied authorities and which confers on the Italian Constituent Assembly a character different from that which Constituent Assemblies have traditionally assumed in European countries. ² that not everybody is prepared to accept

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Risorgimento Liberales publishes an "A.P." message from Washington that on Feb. 20th certain representatives of the American Government had stated that the attitude of the U.S.A. towards the Italian Government "remains the same as it has always been - namely that the Constituent Assembly will have the power to draft the new Constitution and consequently to decide the question of the Monarchy." The American Government considers that the Assembly ought not to try to exercise governmental powers, but ought to leave them to the authorities to whom the task of governing would be entrusted and who would also be responsible for it in the eyes of the Assembly. The representatives of the American Government also made it clear that the Italian Government has been kept au fait with this attitude and that the situation has been discussed unofficially by the U.S. Ambassador, Kirk, and the Italian authorities. It is however remarked that Kirk may have left some written note of his conversations but no official Note has been handed to Italy. The only thing that America is concerned about is that Italians may have absolutely free elections.

Avanti writes: "We think we are not lacking in respect for the U.S.A. in saying that the Allied Nations have nothing to do with the question of the methods and procedure adopted for solving the institutional question. The Allies have undertaken a solemn and irrevocable pledge to recognize the right of the Italian people to give itself the institutions it prefers. They have attached one condition to the exercise of this right and that is that it should be exercised by Constitutional means. We accept this condition. The question will be settled by Constitutional methods. 'How' and 'When', i.e. the manner of doing so ⁶⁸⁸⁸ concerns the Italians and the Italians alone."

Unità carries the inset: "Every time it was sought to ratify a democratic law in Italy, our reactionaries rebelled declaring that Italy is the 'Mother of Law'. Let us hope they will remember this today also when it is desired on the ⁶⁸⁸⁸ a suspicious lesson in Constitutional Law." Unità also comments as follows: "The news published yesterday by 'Popolo' and reproduced by 'Quotidiano' of a Note from the American Government to our Government about the question of the powers of the Constituent Assembly was the subject of much comment in political and journalistic circles yesterday. Although it is difficult to appraise the substance of the document, it seems, judging by the indiscretions which for the moment only two Catholic dailies have been able to glean, that it consists of a sort of survey of Italian Constitutional problems drawn up by a group of American journalists and forwarded, with a covering letter of 'recommendation' from the U.S.A. Ambassador in Rome, to the Premier. Whether it is an official Note or a piece of 'friendly advice', it is nevertheless certain that the American gesture constitutes neither more nor less than an attempt on the part of a foreign Power to interfere (intervene), at a particularly delicate moment, in the solution of a problem which is the exclusive concern of the Italian people. Until today, indeed, no doubt had been raised as to the right of the Italian people to choose freely their future forms of Government. According to the Armistice, the Italian people is not called upon to submit to the permission of any foreign Power so far as this question is concerned; on the contrary, the ideals for which the war against Fascism was fought and won, and a series of official documents of international scope guarantee to the Italian people the right to choose its own institutions unaided. As this right is still unchanged, it seems to be beyond doubt that it is for the Italian people itself to define the technical policy according to which the popular will is to express itself. It is therefore lawful to suppose that the American 'Note' ought to be reduced to the limits of a simple voluntary contribution to the study and solution of the problems connected with the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, although even in that case one cannot understand why the Italian people must wait

② other side of the Atlantic to teach us

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on the advice of other nations in order to arrive at decisions which concern it only. If we put the matter on this plane, nothing would prohibit the Italian people from wanting to hear the advice, not only of the U.S.A. Government, but also that of the other Great victorious Powers, in appraising this problem.

"In short, there is no doubt that, whatever the real intentions of the State Department may be, intentions which, in the light of existing information, are difficult to appraise, the American gesture has already created undeniable surprise because of its nature of interference, both arbitrary and entirely unasked, in the internal affairs of our country. For this reason the official reactions of the Italian Government are awaited with extreme interest, reactions which ought not to be too long in coming in view of the fact that the Cabinet Council will not fail to examine the document in question at its meeting this morning."

- Cabinet Council discussion.

Giornale del Mattino states that yesterday morning the Cabinet Council continued its discussion of the powers of the Constituent Assembly and cognate problems, such as the institutional question, relations with the Government, and relations with the head of the State. The Six Party representatives showed their desire to reach an agreement as soon as possible and with this end in view no one's attitude became stiffer. 6887

At the beginning they resumed their discussion of the details given by the Premier of the opinion of the American jurists of the State Department. De Gasperi drew their attention to the fact that the document of the American jurists is only of value as an indication of what international opinion on the matter is.

At yesterday's meeting some progress was made in the sense of taking for discussion a possible plan of agreement which is understood to consist of defining the powers of the Constituent Assembly in a law which, by means of a referendum, would be submitted to the electors in order that they may express their opinion on it by saying "Yes" or "No". If this law can also envisage the demand of the Left Parties for a civil regency during the period of activity of the Constituent Assembly, the above-mentioned referendum would in practice assume the character of a referendum on the institutional problem and would make possible the exclusion of a specific referendum of this nature. As will be seen, this plan seeks to reconcile the demand of the Liberals for two referendums and the opposition of the Left Wing Parties to the institutional referendum. At any rate the discussion will be continued at today's meeting and it is hoped, according to what Minister Molè said, that the agreement will really be reached next Saturday.

Cabinet crisis rumours.

Ricostruzione and Secolo XX referred yesterday afternoon to the rumours of the possible formation of a new Government. Secolo XX carried an headline: "Nitti will apparently preside over a Coalition Government." This morning's Libera Stampa insists that a provisional Government, like the present one, cannot take upon itself the enormous responsibility of facing the elections without including all the parties which have a real political consistence. The democratic Bonomi-Labriola-Zaniboni alliance comprises considerable forces, and yesterday certain dailies declared that De Gasperi is considering his resignation.

Both Giornale del Mattino and Popolo deny these rumours. The former paper conducted an inquiry in the Viminale circles and in other political quarters, which pointed out that a Cabinet reshuffle at a time when the Government was trying to reach an agreement on the Constituent Assembly and on the institutional question,

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was inadvisable. "It is much more logical to hasten the elections so that the country may have a Government that represented its will." When Togliatti was asked whether he and Nitti had broached the subject (see Headlines No. 42, page 5), he denied it energetically, affirming: "Let us rather hold the elections in May." Popolo, in its turn, reports that the rumours of a broadening of the basis of the Government (there was talk of Nitti and Bonomi entering it, the latter as Minister of Foreign Affairs - see yesterday's Headlines) are unfounded at present. Being entirely taken up with the examination of the difficult questions connected with the Constituent Assembly, the Government does not seem to be able to discuss the "broadening" which was left in suspense at the moment of the formation of the De Gasperi Cabinet.

The Consultative Assembly: the debate on the electoral law.

Giornale del Mattino of Feb. 20th reported that on Feb. 19th the Consultative Assembly discussed articles 3-14 of the draft electoral law. A Communist proposal to lower the age limit of the electors from 21 to 18 was defeated. Minister Romita warned the Assembly that the electoral law must be promulgated by March 12th. Today's Giornale del Mattino says that the Assembly held two sittings yesterday in which articles 14-54 of the law were discussed.

6886

Socialist motion favouring the Single Party.

Momento reports that Lizzadri, Mancinelli, and Gaeta, of the Socialist Party Executive, together with various secretaries of Socialist Federations and Trade Union organizations, have drawn up a motion favouring the unity of the working classes with the object of submitting it to the Socialist Party Congress to be held in Florence from April 11th to 15th.

After recalling the antecedents of the question and the vote of the Party's National Council last July, giving by a very large majority, in favour of the development of the policy of unity, the motion denounces the attitude of the Party fractions which follow "Critica Sociale" and "Iniziativa Socialista": the former because of its opposition to the Single Party of the working class and the Pact of United Action, and the latter because of its anti-Communism and its opposition of the Soviet Union. The motion attributes the scant influence of the working classes on the Government, the failure of epuration, the delay in beginning the reconstruction of the country, to the absence of unity among the working classes and affirms that "this unity is and remains the people's best weapon for the fight for the Constituent Assembly, and for the defence of that Assembly and its achievements, and represents the fundamental condition of the democratic development of our country." The motion considers it necessary that the "united action of the working classes should develop into a new instrument which will be a guarantee against reactionary intrigues and attacks", and ends with the hope that "the Federation of the Socialist and Communist Parties, brought about in accordance with the procedure and conditions to be agreed upon between the two Parties, will lay the foundations of the great Single Party of the Workers, for the conquest of Socialism."

Parri's new Party.

Risorgimento Liberale reports that yesterday the Action Party leaders who did not agree with the line of policy adopted by it in the recent Congress met at Parri's house. The meeting was attended by more than 100 persons. La Malfa made a speech in which he enumerated the fundamental reasons for their disagreement

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with their old comrades in the struggle, and the principles giving rise to the necessity to bring into being a new movement in which the democratic and republican forces of the country will be grouped together. The meeting decided to form a new Party which will take the name of "Democratic Republican Movement." Within a few days a manifesto will be issued officially announcing the formation of the Party.

The Consistory.

Commenting upon the creation of the new Cardinals, A. Donini says in Unità that, if Cardinal Spellman is actually nominated Secretary of State, the significance of the event will perhaps be more clear. At the time of Lincoln the Vatican looked diffidently to the United States, where a bold and progressive form of bourgeois democracy was being elaborated. Today the centre of all the forces of social preservation has shifted towards the U.S.A., and the high clergy of the United States views with increasing diffidence the new forms of progressive democracy which are developing in Europe.

CONFIDENTIAL

6885

Ref: 633/26/EG

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM BY THE ALLIED COMMISSION ON THE RELATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF THE SUGGESTED G-5 SECTION AFHQ IN ROME
AND THE RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

1. Before discussing the detailed functions of the two organizations we think it may be helpful to examine the basis of the proposed relations between SACI and the Italian Government.

2. It is the policy of the Allied governments that the Italian Government should assume the fullest possible responsibility for the government of the country compatible with Allied military needs, and that Allied military intervention shall only take place where or when Allied military interests are concerned. This policy, initiated by the Moscow Declarations and continued in PAN 487, make Italy different from, say, Germany and Austria, which are under full military occupation. *(As Allied military intervention is limited to matters affecting Allied military interests, intervention can only be carried out under the Armistice Terms. SAC's sole instrument for executing the Armistice Terms, and therefore for intervening with the Italian Government, is the Allied Commission, vide Article 37 of the Long Terms which reads as follows:*

"There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."

3. The origin of the G-5 staff sections at Army Headquarters was the necessity of creating military government sections at Army Headquarters. It is true that, as has happened at AFHQ, the G-5 Section may assume staff responsibilities for matters which do not pertain to military government itself. But in this theatre the Deputy President of the Commission remains the principal advisor to SAC on civil affairs. *(The real work is Italian administration as such)* G-5 has rightly had no direct contact with the Italian Government and without changing the Armistice Terms it does not seem possible to *change this state of affairs. It has been noted that G-5 should deal through*

should assume the fullest possible responsibility for the government of the country compatible with Allied military needs, and that Allied military intervention shall only take place where or when Allied military interests are concerned. This policy, initiated by the Moscow Declarations and continued in FAW 437, make Italy different from, say, Germany and Austria, which are under full military occupation. *Never such* ~~As Allied military intervention is limited to matters affecting Allied military interests,~~ intervention can only be carried out under the Armistice Terms. SAC's sole instrument for executing the Armistice Terms, and therefore for intervening with the Italian Government, is the Allied Commission, ~~made~~ *6804* Article 37 of the Long Terms which reads as follows:

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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- (c) Captured Enemy Materials. The function of this branch as regards Italian materials is an implementation of the Armistice Terms (not as regards German materials).
- (d) Transportation. Here again the use of the Italian State Railways and their ports is an implementation of the Armistice Terms. It is true that AFHQ have been dealing direct ~~with~~ ^{by way of} the Railway Board with the ICR but the representation of the Allied Commission has been strong and essential because of the Armistice Terms.
- (e) Finance. The whole of the Allied financial policy in this country depends from the Armistice Terms.

5. It would seem therefore that the setting up of a G-5 AFHQ of SACI in Rome would merely represent duplication of functions by a body which has no authority to deal with the Italian Government. Quite apart from the legality of the situation, the Italian Government would regard the arrival of a G-5 Section of SACI as a retrogressive movement smacking of increased military control and contrary to declared policies of the Allies. The Russian and French

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6803

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Ref: 633/26/EC

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FUNCTIONS OF THE SUGGESTED G-5 SECTION AFHQ IN ROME
AND THE RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

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6. As was originally contemplated for G-5 Sections at Army Headquarters the primary task of any G-5 Section established by SACI would be to deal with AMG matters in Venezia Giulia and Udine. Even on these matters the Section would have to use the Allied Commission as their agent in Rome for any dealings with the Italian Government. If in spite of the arguments put forward in the Allied Commission paper of March 5th it is decided not to effect considerable delegation to the Deputy President but to establish a G-5 Section to advise SACI as President, there would appear to be no reason for the considerable waste of manpower in duplicating the section by establishing part of it in Rome, where SACI's Deputy and instrument for civil affairs already exists. In the opinion of the Allied Commission, however, the greatest conservation of manpower will be effected by adopting the proposals put forward in their paper mentioned above dated March 5th.

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American Ambassador (copy #11)
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GOC, XIII Corps (copy #13)

INTERNAL:

Chief Commr
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VP CA Section
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Polad (A)
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11 March 1946

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 TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Ref: 633/26/EC

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11 March 1946

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 TOP SECRET

0032

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Q. M. C. Form 358 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1918**LIST OF PAPERS**

File under No. _____

Montagna File

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1) H 808	Bachofner	17 March	CC	
2) Reg. Ord. #27	Regim. II	18 "	Genl. Dist. Dist.	
3) (Mime)	Col. M. M. J. J. J.	22 "	???	
4) Memo	Min. Col. M.	30 March	Col. Evans	
5) ACC/5074/IC	Col. Evans	30 "	Col. Adams	
6) ES/14	Col. Adams	4 April	CC	
7) —	Montagna	8 "	Col. Polite, cc to CC.	
8) Rymt AI-170	Montagna + Gilman	11 "	ACC Info. Div.	
9) SP/140	Col. Polite	13 "	CC	
10) 2/60 H.L.	CC	13 "	Col. Polite, cc to CC.	
11) CC/P/142	Montagna	11 May	" "	
12) CC/P/147	CC	22 "	Montagna	

6851

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

NLM/rj

*also SF
except references*Ref. CC/P/307.

22nd. May, 1944.

I acknowledge receipt of your letters of April 8th. and May 11th..

2. I am informed that you are not in custody and that you are in fact at liberty.
3. I understand that you have been removed from the board of management of an Italian company for reasons which were deemed good by my subordinates. I have every confidence in these subordinates and as your liberty has not been affected and as I clearly have not the time at my disposal to deal personally with individual personal pleas verbally I am not prepared to grant you an interview.

6850

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Signor G.C. Montagna,
Ambasciatore di Sua Maesta,
Senatore del Regno.

(12)

To Lt.Colon CHARLES POLETTI

Regional Commissioner, Region III HQ. ACC/AMG - Naples

Sir,

I have to date received no reply to my communication to you dated April 8th. 1944.

I hereby formally request the honour of an interview with you, at your earliest convenience, whereby I may be permitted to defend myself.

The Democracies avowed their intention of bringing liberty and justice to Italy and a fundamental principle of the system of justice in those countries is that no man shall be condemned without hearing, whereas, in my case, I wish most strongly to point out, I have been accused of crimes of which I am not guilty and have been condemned without a single opportunity to state my case or to defend myself.

I ask for one thing only - the opportunity to receive a hearing and produce evidence at which I, proud in the knowledge of my integrity and my life long attachment to the Democracies, am confident that I can undo this travesty of justice which I have suffered.

Naples, May 11th. 1944
Via A. Manzoni, 61

I am, Sir, your obedient servant

G. B. Montagna
(Giulio Cesare Montagna)
Ambassador and Senator of Italy

Copy to Lt.General Sir Noel Mason Mac FARLAN

HQ. Allied Control Commission

NAPLES

Received
22
11

0035

785015

From Tony. Humbel's office

HQ ACC, APO 394
Cable Gen.
Rec'd 13 Apr 1944
By *[Signature]*

SRZ

Naples, 11 April 1944

Report No. Al-170

To: Capt. Heath
From: Lanza and Gilardi
Subject: Senator GIULIO CESAIRE MONTAGNA

1. Born in 1874, he started his diplomatic career in 1897. Promoted to the rank of Ambassador 1 December 1923, he was assigned the post of Rio de Janeiro on 23 July 1925. He was forced to retire on 1 February 1927 because of his failure to take up membership in the Fascist party. Was back in Italy in May 1927.
2. In March 1930, he was elected a member of the board of directors of the "Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali" by the assembly of stockholders, at the suggestion of its president, On. Giuseppe PARATORE. He was then a creditor of this concern for 320.000 liras in cash and 401.600 liras in stock.
3. In the beginning of 1934 he was offered the Fascist Party membership card ante-dated 31 July 1933. Having seen his diplomatic career broken at the early age of 53 because of his lack of enthusiasm towards the Fascist Party, he may have regretted the chances he missed and let it be known that he was ready to come in line.
4. On 24 April 1939, with considerable delay on his legitimate expectation as a retired ambassador, he was made a Senator.
5. He claims however that his activity of thought and word adverse to the Fascist Regime was well known in Rome, and that his son Francesco in the 1940 examination for the diplomatic career was the only candidate out of 30 competitors who was not admitted to the oral examination by order of Secretary CIANO.
6. Another of his sons, however, is now one of the leaders of the Fascist styled "Associazione Monarchica Liberale per la Ricostruzione" of Via Cavalierizza a Chiaia 37. **6844**
7. Sen. MONTAGNA was asked to intercede with Col. SCHOLL, German Commandant of Naples, in order to save the city and population at the time of the German retreat, but he refused to do so on the grounds that he never had nor wished to have any contacts with the Germans.
8. Sen. MONTAGNA also claims to have been the first personality to approach the Allied authorities at the time of occupation, and to have collaborated wholeheartedly with them, and acting with them as an interpreter for the Civil authorities.
9. The Badoglio Government called upon him to accept the post of High Commissary for the City of Naples, position which he at first refused. On further insistence, he accepted, but the nomination was not made (according to him) because it was felt that he did not accept willingly.

(8)

SENATOR GIULIO CESARE MONTAGNA
Rep. A1-170/ 11 Apr.'44. Contd.

10. At the present time he has no party affiliation, since he believes "that this is not the time for politics".

11. Sen. MONTAGNA has been President of "Consorti Riuniti Bonifica" for quite some time.

6843

⑧

ENTI INDUSTRIALI IN CUI L'AMBASCIATORE G.C.MONTAGNA
ENTRO* COME CONSIGLIERE DI AMMINISTRAZIONE NEGLI ANNI
1934 e 1935

- 1) Società Anonima Commercio Internazionale Metalli
Capitale di costituzione Lire 5.000.000, poscia ri-
dotto a Lire 100.000 (Dopo pochi mesi sciolta)
- 2) Istituto Napoletano di Beni Stabili
Capitale Lire 10.000.000, versato Lire 7.000.000
Sede Napoli (Soppresso nel 1942)
- 3) Società Italo-Belga per l'industria dello Zucchero
Capitale Lire 6.500.000 - Sede Brusselle-Roma
(Da molto tempo senza notizie circa la sua attività)
- 4) Società Strade Ferrate Secondarie Meridionali
(Circumvesuviana) Capitale Lire 15.000.000, nel 1936
aumentato a Lire 40.000.000 - Sede Napoli

Compensi approssimativi a ciascun membro dei Consi-
gli di Amministrazione rispettivi

- 1) Lire Nulla
- 2) " 2000 o 3000 lorde (annue)
- 3) " idem.
- 4) " da 5000 ad 8000 (annue) lorde

In complesso intornò alle Lire 12.000 all'anno

GOVERNO MILITARE ALLEATO

C O P I A

N. B. - Penalità severissime, di prigione e di ammenda sono previste per chiunque facesse delle dichiarazioni false nella presente scheda.

SCHEDA PERSONALE

1. Nome e cognome Dott. Giulio Cesare MONTAGNA *di fu Francesco*
a) Luogo di nascita R O M A b) Data di nascita 4 - 8 - 1874
2. Indirizzo attuale Via A. Manzoni, 61 Napoli a) Residenza permanente N A P O L I
3. Professione Ambasciatore di S.M. il Re d'Italia - Senatore del Regno
4. Eravate iscritto al P. N. F.? S I a) Da quando dal 31 - 7 - 1933
5. Appartenevate ad uno dei seguenti gruppi (Sì o No): NO
a) Sansepolcristi NO b) Squadristi NO c) M. V. S. N.? NO
- d) Se eravate nella Milizia, in quale delle seguenti unità avete prestato servizio? (Indicare con un SI od un NO l'unità e la data negli spazi rispettivi):

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO	
(Specificare se servizio effettivo o nei quadri)	
Milizia ordinaria?	NO
Milizia Ferroviaria?	NO
Milizia Postale?	NO
Milizia Portuale?	NO
Milizia Forestale?	NO
Milizia Stradale?	NO
Milizia Confinaria?	NO
Milizia Universitaria?	NO
Milizia Antiaerea?	NO
Milizia Artiglieria Marittima?	NO
« Moschettieri del Duce »?	NO
Partigiani M. S.?	NO

6833

1. Nome e cognome Dott. Giulio Cesare MONTAGNA *M* in Francesco
 a) Luogo di nascita R O M A b) Data di nascita 4 - 8 - 1874
2. Indirizzo attuale Via A. Manzoni, 61 Napoli a) Residenza permanente N A P O I I
3. Professione Ambasciatore di S.M. il Re d'Italia - Senatore del Regno
4. Eravate iscritto al P. N. F.? SI a) Da quando dal 31 - 7 - 1933
5. Appartenevate ad uno dei seguenti gruppi (SI o NO): NO
 a) Sansepolcristi NO b) Squadristi NO c) M. V. S. N.? NO

d) Se eravate nella Milizia, in quale delle seguenti unità avete prestato servizio? (Indicate con un SI od un NO l'unità e la data negli spazi rispettivi):

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO

(Specificare se servizio effettivo o nei quadri)

Milizia ordinaria?	NO
Milizia Ferroviaria?	NO
Milizia Postale?	NO
Milizie Portuale?	NO
Milizia Forestale?	NO
Milizia Stradale?	NO
Milizia Confinaria?	NO
Milizia Universitaria?	NO
Milizia Antiaerea?	NO
Milizia Artiglieria Marittima?	NO
« Moschettieri del Duce »?	NO
Battaglioni « M »?	NO

e) Se avete militato solo in tempo di guerra, siete entrato nella Milizia da volontario o in seguito a regolare chiamata? NO

6. Avete ricoperto una delle seguenti cariche nel Partito Fascista (rispondete SI o NO e indicate i periodi di servizio o di ciascuna carica negli spazi rispondenti):

7

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO

- a) Segretario nel P. N. F.? NO
- b) Membro del Direttorio Nazionale? NO
- c) Segretario Federale? NO
- d) Membro del Direttorio Federale? NO
- e) Ispettore del Partito? NO
- f) Ispettore Federale? NO
- g) Segretario politico di un Fascio? NO
- h) Fiduciario di un Gruppo Rionale? NO
- i) Membro di un Gruppo Rionale? NO
- j) Capo settore? NO
- k) Capo ufficio? NO
- l) Una posizione autorevole nella G. I. L.? NO
- m) Una posizione autorevole nel G. U. P.? NO

n) Una posizione autorevole nei Fasci Fem-

minili?

NO

o) Qualche altra carica nel Partito NESSUNA

Quale?

//

7. Siete stato in qualche periodo membro dell' OVRA? NO Quando?
8. Avete fatto parte dell' ufficio politico dei CC. RR.? NO Quando?
9. Avete fatto parte di un ufficio politico della P.S.? NO Quando?
10. Siete stato in qualche periodo funzionario in una delle seguenti organizzazioni:

a) in una Corporazione?

NO

Quale?

NO

Denominazione della carica

NO

b) in una unione sindacale?

NO

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO

f) Ispettore Federale? NO
 g) Segretario politico di un Fascio? NO
 h) Fiduciario di un Gruppo Rionale? NO
 i) Membro di un Gruppo Rionale? NO
 j) Caposegretario? NO
 k) Capomacchia? NO
 l) Una posizione autorevole nella G. I. L.? NO
 m) Una posizione autorevole nel G. U. F.? NO

n) Una posizione autorevole nei Fasci Fem-
 minili? NO

o) Qualche altra carica nel Partito NESSUNA

Quanto? //

7. Siete stato in qualche periodo membro dell' OVRA? NO Quando?
 8. Avete fatto parte dell' ufficio politico dei CC. RR.? NO Quando?
 9. Avete fatto parte di un ufficio politico della P.S.? NO Quando?
 10. Siete stato in qualche periodo funzionario in una delle seguenti organizzazioni:

	PERIODO DI SERVIZIO
a) in una Corporazione?	NO
Quale?	NO
Denominazione della carica	NO
b) in una unione sindacale?	NO
Quale?	NO
Denominazione della carica	NO
c) in un Consorzio Agrario?	NO
Quale?	NO
Denominazione della carica	NO

PER DO DI SERVIZIO

a) in qualche altra organizzazione corporati

va o sindacato?

NO

Quale?

NO

Denominazione della carica

NO

11. Indicate le cariche nazionali, provinciali o comunali - governative o parasindacali - occupate da voi dal 1921, come segue:

NOME DELL' ISTITUTO	PERIODO DI SERVIZIO	MODO DI ASSUNZIONE
CONSORZIO DI BONIFICA DI CALVI E CARDITELLO - Vice-Presidente per elezione dei proprietari consorzati, dal Dicembre 1938 al Febb. 1943 Carica gratuita		
CONSORZI RIUNITI DI BONIFICA DELLA CAMPANIA, Commissario per nomina con Decreto del Prefetto, in data 9 - XI - 1943-		

12. Indicate le principali fonti dei vostri introiti durante il regime Fascista:

FONTI	MEDIA ANNUALE	INTROITO DEL 1942
(1) Proventi patrimonio privato (Lire 80 mila circa) - (2) Pensione di Ambasciatore (Lire 24 mila circa) - (3) Emolumento da Senatore (Lire 24 mila) - (4) Consigliere di Amministrazione della S/A Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali, dal Febbraio 1930 (Tre anni prima dell'iscrizione al Partito Fascista) (Lire 100 mila circa di cui 50 mila circa per diarie); (5) Consigliere di Amministrazione della Società per Risanamento di Napoli - Di-missionario il 28 - 6 - 1943 (Lire 20 mila circa).		

13. Avete prestato servizio militare? SI

a) In quale arma? Fanteria

b) Quando? 1894

c) Quale grado rivestivate ultimamente? Soldato in congedo ass.

d) Dove avete prestato servizio? R O M A

e) Siete stato « volontario » nella guerra civile Spagnola? NO

f) Siete stato « volontario » nella campagna dell' Africa Orientale? NO Del Nord Africa? NO

g) Avete goduto di qualche esonero dal servizio militare? NO

Per quale motivo? //

14. Avete fatto parte dal 1922 in poi di qualche organizzazione politica diversa dal Partito Fa-

scista? NO Nome dell'organizzazione //

Periodo di appartenenza? //

GIURO CHE LE PRECEDENTI DICHIARAZIONI SONO VERE.

Firma Giulio Cesare Spagnola

dal 1921, come segue:

NOME DELL'ISTITUTO PERIODO DI SERVIZIO MODO DI ASSUNZIONE
CONSORZIO DI BONIFICA DI CALVI E CARDITELLO - Vice-Presidente per elezione
dei proprietari consorziati, dal Dicembre 1938 al Febb. 1943 Carica gratuita
CONSORZI RIUNITI DI BONIFICA DELLA CAMPANIA, Commissario per nomina con De-
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12. Indicate le principali fonti dei vostri introiti durante il regime Fascista:

FONTE MEDIA ANNUALE INTROITO DEL 1942
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sciatore (Lire 24 mila circa) - (3) Emolumento da Senatore (Lire 24 mila) -
(4) Consigliere di Amministrazione della S/A Manifatture Cotoniere Meri-
dionali, dal Febbraio 1930 (Tre anni prima dell'iscrizione al Partito Fa-
scista) (Lire 100 mila circa di cui 50 mila circa per diarie); (5) Consi-
gliere di Amministrazione della Società per Risanamento di Napoli -.Di-
missionario il 28 - 6 - 1943 (Lire 20 mila circa).

13. Avete prestato servizio militare? SI e) In quale arma? Fanteria
b) Quando? 1894 c) Quale grado rivestivate ultimamente? Soldato in congedo ass.
b) Dove avete prestato servizio? R O M A
c) Siete stato « volontario » nella guerra civile Spagnola? NO 6831
f) Siete stato « volontario » nella campagna dell' Africa Orientale? NO Del Nord Africa? NO.
g) Avete goduto di qualche esonero dal servizio militare? NO

Per quale motivo? //

14. Avete fatto parte dal 1922 in poi di qualche organizzazione politica diversa dal Partito Fa-

scista? NO Nome dell'organizzazione //

Periodo di appartenenza? //

GIURO CHE LE PRECEDENTI DICHIARAZIONI SONO VERE.

Firma *Giulio Cesare Bonifazi*

Data Napoli, 3 Aprile 1944-

N. B. - Rileggere prima di consegnare la scheda, e se avete scritto il falso, correggete. Vi ricordiamo che le superiori dichiarazioni sono state fatte sotto giuramento e che pene severe sono stabilite per il falso giuramento.

7

Copie

AL Ten.Colonnello CARLO POLETTI
Commissario Regionale del Governo Militare Alleato
N A P O L I

Appena venni a conoscenza della Sua Ordinanza, n.27 del 18 marzo u.s., volevo rivolgermi a Lei onde si procedesse ad un rapido ed accurato riesame delle accuse dirette contro la mia persona.

Malgrado l'atroce sorpresa e l'amarezza che ne provai, decisi di attendere che Ella e le altre Autorità locali Alleate compissero la generosa, assidua ed efficace opera di salvataggio e di assistenza delle popolazioni colpite dalla catastrofica eruzione vesuviana.

Avevo anche sperato che nel frattempo sopravvenisse qualche atto destinato a correggere quell'errore che ha ingiustamente ferito nell'onore e nella reputazione rimasti in me sempre indiscussi.

Non fui fascista, ma un forzato, molto tardivo tesserato.

Non ebbi mai nè onori, nè prebende nè favori di qualsiasi specie dal regime fascista.

Nè fui, al contrario, una vittima sia dal punto di vista morale che materiale.

Non cessai tuttavia di esplicitare ovunque e sempre che mi fosse possibile silenziosa e tenace attività anti-fascista.

Il mio Avo paterno - nato e residente in Marigliano (Napoli) liberale e patriotta fervente, nel 1848 a stento sfuggì alla pena di morte, ma rimase soggetto al confino di polizia sinchè non venne abbattuta la tirannide borbonica.

Mio padre Francesco, per oltre 30 anni partecipò attivamente alla vita politica interna nel campo democratico liberale e fu, per molte legislature, deputato al Parlamento inviatovi dagli elettori di un collegio della Provincia di Caserta.

Il mio genitore scomparso un mese prima dell'avvento del fascismo al potere.

Nacqui circa settanta anni addietro a Roma ove compii gli studi classici e conseguì la laurea di Dottore in Giurisprudenza. Nel 1899 in

- 2 -

seguito ad esame di concorso, entrai nella carriera Diplomatica, che percorresi regolarmente, ma a grandi passi. Ministro Plenipotenziario a 37 anni, Ambasciatore a 49.

Non ho mai appartenuto ad alcun partito. Nutro però radicali tendenze democratico-liberali. Nel campo della politica internazionale fui sempre un fervente assertore della classica dottrina cavourriana che fondava il bene e la fortuna d'Italia nell'intesa costante e nella sincera amicizia dell'Italia con l'Inghilterra e la Francia. Indirizzo del resto seguito dalle sfere dirigenti Italiane prima del fascismo ignorante e sovvertitore.

Durante i 30 anni circa di servizio all'Esterio ho avuto quindici posti. Fra i primi furono Londra e Washington. Oltre un anno (1901-1902) nella prima residenza che già conoscevo per prolungati soggiorni fattivi da studente; sei (1902-1908) nella seconda. A Washington ressi in due periodi l'Ambasciata, in qualità di incaricato d'affari per due anni circa.

Mentre appresi a meglio conoscere le due Grandi Nazioni, quella permanenza ebbe una sensibile influenza sulla formazione della mia cultura politica e del mio carattere.

Considerai come offesa alle tradizioni Italiane la dichiarazione di guerra di Mussolini alla Gran Bretagna ed alla Francia (1940) e l'analogo inconsulto gesto del tiranno verso gli Stati Uniti d'America delitto contro-natura.

Nel corso della carriera diplomatica contai fra i colleghi delle tre Grandi Potenze Occidentali i più e migliori amici.

Tali rapporti si allargarono e si cementarono durante la Guerra Mondiale e negli anni che la seguirono. Presso le missioni permanenti, nei Congressi e nelle conferenze internazionali: a Parigi (1919) in Polonia (1919) a Losanna (1922-23).

Potrei produrre una lunga lista di spiccate personalità della diplomazia e della politica di quelle Nazioni che mi confortarono della loro stima e della loro simpatia: Lord Curzon, Lord W. Tyrrell, gli Ambasciatori, Ammiraglio Bristol, Joseph Grew, Sir Esme Howard, Sir Ronald Lindsay e tanti altri uomini eminenti di Gran Bretagna e d'America.

Posseggo un'interessante documentazione della collaborazione co-

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struttiva e concorde svolta con alcuni di essi, gli atti ufficiali di quei consessi internazionali.

L'ascesa del fascismo al potere mi trovò Ministro d'Italia ad Atene. Declinai vari lusinghieri inviti ad iscrivermi al partito.

A motivo, suppongo, della particolare competenza richiesta nella circostanza, fui, appena un mese dopo nominato delegato plenipotenziario d'Italia alla conferenza di Losanna per la pace d'O-riente.

Il favorevole esito di quei lavori mi fece guadagnare un'altra promozione a scelta e la nomina ad Ambasciatore a Costantinopoli.

Nel maggio del 1925 - continuando io a rimanere fuori del partito - il fascismo mi inferse un primo rude colpo. Una imponente manifestazione popolare di simpatia, a Marigliano, in occasione della prima mia visita alla tomba del mio genitore defunto due anni e mezzo prima, senza che potesse accadere al suo capezzale, per bieche mire di miserabili politicanti fu rappresentata come una dimostrazione antifascista. Per ordine dell'allora Ministro dell'Interno Luigi Federzoni la riunione venne sciolta con la forza. Io stesso, Ambasciatore in carica, fui oltraggiato e vilipeso da forti nuclei di camicie nere e per colmo di spregio sottoposto a stretta vigilanza di polizia.

Tornato a Costantinopoli, dopo poche settimane, venivo improvvisamente e brutalmente trasferito a Rio de Janeiro: da un'Ambasciata squisitamente politica ad un'altra per l'Italia di prevalente interesse sociale ed economico. Preparavasi il terreno alla mia cacciata dalla carriera.

A Rio de Janeiro mi toccava la disavventura di avere come addetto di quella Rappresentanza il noto Galeazzo Ciano. In breve il futuro, ma non promettente Ministro degli Affari Esteri di Mussolini, provocava disordine ed indisciplina nell'Ambasciata. Si avvantaggiava della protezione del gerarca suo padre. Resistetti e dominai la situazione. Senonchè il turbolento collaboratore veniva improvvisamente trasferito ad altro posto, ma io con telegramma di Mussolini del 14 gennaio 1927 ero informato del mio imminente collocamento a riposo.

Avevo allora da poco compiuto i 52 anni di età. Veniva così spezzata la mia carriera senza speranza di ^asvantaggio. Da una vita a larghi mezzi finanziari, passavo ad una ristretta posizione pecuniaria. Mi ritirai a Mari-

- 4 -

gliano con la mia famiglia, soggiornandovi per 10 anni circa. Durante i primi 3 anni, rimasto sempre fuori del partito fascista nessuna porta mi si aprì ad occupazioni dignitose. Sinchè nel gennaio del 1930, fui, in termini deferenti e lusinghieri invitato dalla nuova Amministrazione dell'Azienda ad accettare il posto di Consigliere nella S.A. Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali. Trattandosi di una Società a capitale privato, scevra da ingerenze Governative fu ancora possibile la mia ammissione senza essere tesserato. Non bastò che mi tenessi tranquillo ed appartato. Tre anni dopo, alla fine di Ottobre 1933, dovetti sottostare all'umiliante ingiunzione rivoltami da Galeazzo Ciano, con minacce più o meno velate di rappresaglia. Per il bene della mia famiglia (moglie e tre figli adolescenti) lasciai che mi si tesserasse con decorrenza dal 31/7/1933, ultimo termine per le ammissioni al partito fascista. Se non avessimo avuto i tre ragazzi, mia moglie ed io avremmo certamente emigrato all'Esterio. Più per beffa che a resipiscenza del molto male già causato da Galeazzo Ciano qualche tempo dopo, di sua iniziativa, mi faceva nominare Consigliere di Amministrazione in quattro modeste Società Industriali i cui gettoni raggiungevano appena un totale di 12 mila lire annue.

Ecco a che cosa si riducono i grandi benefici pecuniari elargitimi da quel regime che pur aveva rudemente abbattuto la mia elevata posizione economica di Ambasciatore.

6827

In quanto a benefici di carattere morale il fascismo non me ne ha dato alcuno. Però esso - e lo dico con fierezza - non ha neppure tentato di distruggere il grande patrimonio morale che mi sono creato in Italia e all'Esterio in virtù di un lavoro indefesso ed assiduo coronato da ottimi risultati nel campo della pubblica amministrazione e particolarmente in quello della Diplomazia. E' stato fatto invece, ora, certamente ad opera di elementi irresponsabili, con infondate, tendenziose e malevole insinuazioni.

Il fascismo che trasse vantaggio dai servigi che io avevo resi all'Italia, non mi affidò mai nè cariche nè incarichi di natura politica, nè mai i suoi governi mi consultarono su problemi di carattere internazionale.

Forse fu per me preferibile !

Solo (vedi ironia del risveglio) nel settembre 1941 fui ufficialmente sollecitato a partecipare alla fondazione della sezione napoletana dell'Asso-

- 5 -

ciazione italo-germanica ed il 6 maggio 1942 ad assumere la Presidenza della Sezione Napoletana della "Società Amici del Giappone". Declinai in buona, ma recisa forma ambedue gli inviti.

La mia nomina a Senatore non avvenne per favore del fascismo. Escluso da tutte le precedenti liste di colleghi di carriera, fui compreso insieme ad altri cinque alti Funzionari della diplomazia, nell'ammissione dell'aprile 1939, in base alla 6ª Categoria (gli Ambasciatori) contemplata dall'art. 33 dello Statuto concernente la composizione del Senato. La nomina mi spettava se non altro per ragioni tradizionali. Ma mi venne con circa quindici anni di ritardo!

In Senato non volli far parte di alcuna commissione di carattere politico interno od internazionale. Nell'estate dello scorso anno fui, contro il mio volere, assegnato di ufficio alla commissione degli Affari Esteri, ma non intervenni ad alcuna seduta. Mi occupai invece nella commissione economica sovente e con impegno di lavori legislativi nel campo dell'assistenza sociale a varie categorie di lavoratori. Attività costruttiva e doverosa in qualunque regime.

Come possono, certificare numerosi Senatori, nell'Alto consesso fui sempre nei contatti extra-ufficiali, con opportune cautele, strenuo e convinto assertore della vittoria finale degli Alleati. Previdi con precisione matematica l'infelice sorte riserbata all'Italia dal mal governo e dalle aberrazioni politiche del regime fascista e la sicura caduta di questo, prima della fine dell'attuale guerra.

Già nei primi giorni di settembre 1939 in Senato, in presenza di molti colleghi, affermai ad alta voce che la "Gran Bretagna non sarebbe rimasta soccombente nell'attuale guerra". Manifestazione che procurò un richiamo a maggiore riserva e non poche noie. L'uno e le altre accrebbero la diffidenza che si nutriva verso di me negli ambienti fascisti. Tuttavia perseverai nell'intensa opera di propaganda contro il fascismo ed il nazismo ed a favore delle Grandi Potenze Alleate. In momenti di scoraggiamento fui un fervente animatore degli animi e delle speranze di colleghi ed amici.

Niun dubbio che quella mia linea di condotta indusse il regime a darmi nuovi dispiaceri. Il mio primo figlio preparatissimo per il concorso di am

(7)

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missione alla carriera diplomatica, venne respinta, come seppi in seguito, per ordine esplicito del Ministro Ciano. In nessun tempo, da noi si trattò in tal guisa il figlio di un Ambasciatore.

Il fascismo non ha mai cessato di farmi oggetto di angherie e di avversità. Lungi dal favorirmi esso non mi ha neppure permesso di elevarmi dalla mediocre posizione conseguita nel campo industriale.

Tuttavia esso non ha mai potuto distruggere la posizione sociale di rispetto da me acquisita nelle sfere dirigenti del paese per i servizi resi all'Italia quale suo rappresentante diplomatico all'Esteri.

Ho sempre avuto in orrore i tedeschi in ispecie per il modo barbaro e crudele di condurre la guerra. Essi hanno devastato la mia casa in Marigliano. Il mio secondo figlio ed io siamo a stento sfuggiti alla loro brutalità.

Desiderai ansiosamente l'arrivo dei liberatori a Napoli. Credo di essere stato il primo Italiano di qualche posizione a dare il benvenuto ai primi ufficiali Alleati che entrarono in Città all'inizio del mese di Ottobre u.s. : il Col. Hume, il T.Col. Kraege, il Magg. Knight.

Mi misi subito a disposizione per facilitare i primi loro contatti con le Autorità Italiane. Da allora ho collaborato con impegno e ben volentieri, quasi ogni giorno, in svariati campi, con l'A.M.G.

Ho in proposito, ricevuto e posseggo lusinghieri e palpabili attestati di riconoscimento e di apprezzamento da parte delle Autorità Alleate. Conto fra queste estimatori e preziose amicizie.

Ed ora improvvisamente mi si colpisce con la più atroce delle offese.

Mi si taccia di sostenitore e di profittatore del fascismo, di quell'abborrito regime che per oltre un ventennio ha funestato l'Italia, che ho sempre detestato e che ha causato umiliazioni, danno ed amarezze a me ed alla mia famiglia.

E questa ferita al cuore ed all'onore mi viene inflitta quando legittimamente mi attendevo riparazione e compenso per le ingiustizie e per i torti subiti.

Dopo una lunga vita pubblica e privata, onesta, illibata, rettilinea, senza tentennamenti che si è soprattutto estrinsecata in profonda devozione alla Patria, nell'amore per la famiglia e, nell'ultimo ventennio, nell'odio verso la tirannide, nella sete di libertà, nel più schietto antifascismo non

- 7 -

meritavo un tale trattamento.

Questa mia obbiettiva, franca e leale esposizione si basa su fatti positivi o sostanzianti attraverso elementi e prove inoppugnabili, quale la mia "Scheda Personale" informativa da me redatta sotto il vincolo del giuramento. L'ho già rimessa personalmente a codesto Comando pel tramite della Sezione Agricoltura, Reg. III^a. Tuttavia mi faccio premura di inviarne qui acclusa una copia identica. Mentre molti altri documenti autentici sono pronto ad esibire a Sua richiesta, mi tengo a disposizione per fornire qualsiasi chiarimento o notizia possa desiderarsi in merito alle questioni qui trattate.

Sono sicuro che le Autorità Alleate ispirandosi ai principi di giustizia ed ai sensi di squisita morale che caratterizzano l'alta civiltà delle Grandi Nazioni cui esse appartengono, vorranno, al più presto, correggere l'errore in cui sono involontariamente cadute.

Occorre un palese loro attestato diretto ad orientare onestamente la pubblica opinione sviata nel giudizio sulla mia persona. Un attestato che valga a reintegrare il mio prestigio, la mia dignità ed il mio decoro menomati in ispecie nel confronto dei miei connazionali.

Napoli, 8 aprile 1944
Via A. Manzoni, 61

6824
Antonio Basile

Allegato: una copia di "Scheda Personale" riempita.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394, U.S. Army

REGIONAL ORDER)

NUMBER 27)

18 March 1944

Whereas, Biagio Borriello, Luigi Piscitelli, Giulio Cesare Montagna and Tullio Tagliavini have been acting as the Managers and Directors of Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali, and subsidiaries and affiliates thereof (called MCM herein);

Whereas, MCM is a supplier and potential supplier of materials for the Allied Forces;

Whereas, a substantial and controlling interest in MCM is owned by the Banco di Napoli, a parastatal institution which made or influenced the selection of the Management of MCM during the tenure of the former Fascist government; and it appears that the activities of MCM were controlled by the Fascist Government;

Whereas, the abovenamed Biagio Borriello, Luigi Piscitelli, Giulio Cesare Montagna and Tullio Tagliavini were intimately connected with the Fascist government and held significant offices therein or in industry as a result of their connection with that government; and their continuance in office is deemed to be dangerous to the safety and security of the Allied Forces and to the welfare of the inhabitants of the area occupied; and

Whereas, the necessity for a new management has been recommended to me by the President and Manager of the Banco di Napoli and the action below ordered is being taken after consultation with, and consideration of the advice of, said official of the Banco di Napoli; therefore

I, CHARLES POLETTI, Lieutenant Colonel, Regional Commissioner, Region 3, Allied Military Government, by virtue of the authority vested in me, do order as follows:

1. The abovementioned Biagio Borriello, Luigi Piscitelli, Giulio Cesare Montagna and Tullio Tagliavini be and they are hereby removed from any position or office of honor, trust or profit in MCM, and any company subsidiary to or affiliated with MCM. 681.7

2. Quirino Finiani, Lucio Azzoni, and Leonide Pentangelo, are hereby appointed as the members of the Management Committee of MCM.

3. The Management Committee is hereby given full and complete authority, subject to other provisions of this order, to do all things necessary to conduct the business and manage the affairs of MCM, provided, however, that:

a. They shall report or account monthly for their management, in such form and manner as they shall be directed to do by appropriate official of the Allied Military Government;

b. They shall furnish to any duly authorized official of the Allied Military Government such data as may be requested;

c. They shall not contract any loans, other than temporary advances obtained in the normal course of business, pledge any of the assets of MCM, or terminate the business or any substantial part thereof, without prior approval of the Regional Commissioner or other appropriate official of the Allied Military Government.

4. The appointment made in paragraph 2 hereof may be changed or modified at any time by order supplementary hereto, issued by the Regional Commissioner, without affecting any other provision of this order. The powers and authorities of the Management Committee, and the limitations and restrictions thereon specified in paragraph 3 above may be changed, modified, restricted or supplemented by order supplementary hereto, issued by the Regional Commissioner or any official duly authorized by him. 2

0052

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

(2)

5. No person shall knowingly interfere in any manner whatsoever with the management and operation of MCM by the Management Committee appointed hereunder, or by order supplementary hereto, except pursuant to lawful authority.

Charles Poletti

CHARLES POLETTI
Lieutenant Colonel
Regional Commissioner

DATE

HP 100 100 30
 Recd 18 Mar 1930
 by J.F.

File No. 808

Salerno, 17 March 1944

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT

My Dear General MacFarlane:

From information received today it appears that Lt. Col. Poletti, so as to regularize the administrative position of the Company "Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali", has the intention of appointing three Commissioners, one chosen from among the workers and one from the employees of the Company.

This matter is of the utmost importance, not so much as regards the selection of these persons, whose names are not known and who are not relevant, but for reasons of principle, because a kind of Soviet of workers and employees would be created, absolutely incompatible with the tenets of Italian Law and the requirements of the National Economic Life.

I do not believe that the Commission has the intention of introducing in Italy criteria of socialization of industries and reforms on a communist basis; and therefore am making a warm request to you to intervene with Lt. Col. Poletti, to avoid appointment of commissioners in this manner, as regards the "Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali", or any other Companies in the same position.

Very cordially Yours.

BADOGGIO

TO: GENERAL NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
 Chief of the Allied Control Commission
 Naples

V.P. Economic Sect 6816

I would like to discuss this
 with you and the Director of the
 Labor Sub Commission. I thought
 he had legislation on this sort
 of question in preparation.

LP
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NR. 808 DI PROT.



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

SALERNO, Lì 17 MARZO 1944

CARO GENERALE MAC FARLANE,

DA INFORMAZIONI OGGI PERVENUTE RISULTA CHE IL TEN.COL. POLETTI, PER REGOLARIZZARE LA SITUAZIONE AMMINISTRATIVA DELLA SOCIETÀ "MANIFATTURE COTONIERE MERIDIONALI", AVREBBE INTENZIONE DI NOMINARE TRE COMMISSARI, DEI QUALI UNO SCELTO TRA GLI OPERAI ED UNO TRA GLI IMPIEGATI DELLA SOCIETÀ.

LA QUESTIONE È DELLA MASSIMA IMPORTANZA, NON TANTO PER LA SCELTA DELLE PERSONE, DI CUI NON SI CONOSCONO I NOMI E CHE NON HANNO RILEVANZE, MA PER RAGIONI DI PRINCIPIO, PERCHÉ SI CREEREBBE UNA SPECIE DI SOVIET DEGLI OPERAI E DEGLI IMPIEGATI, ASSOLUTAMENTE INCOMPATIBILE CON L'ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO ITALIANO E CON LE ESIGENZE DELLA VITA ECONOMICA NAZIONALE.

681.

IO NON CREDO CHE LA COMMISSIONE ABBAIA IL PROPOSITO DI INDURRE IN ITALIA CRITERI DI SOCIALIZZAZIONE DELLE INDUSTRIE E RIFORME A BASE COMUNISTA; E PERCIÒ LE RIVOLGO VIVA PREGHIERA DI INTERVENIRE PRESSO IL TEN.COL.

./.

(1)



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

- 2 -

POLETTI, PER EVITARE LA NOMINA DI COMMISSARI IN QUESTA
FORMA, SIA PER LE "MANIFATTURE COTONIERE MERIDIONALI",
SIA PER LE ALTRE AZIENDE CHE SI TROVANO NELLA STESSA
SITUAZIONE.

MOLTO CORDIALMENTE

AL SIGNOR GENERALE

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA
DI CONTROLLONAPOLI

6814

(1)

0056

785015

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. ARMY

HQ ACC, APO 394
Rec'd 16 Apr 1944
By *[Signature]*

CP/mo
3/6011.L

13 April 1944

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Protest from H.E. Corbino,
Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor
on the Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali.

TO : Chief Commissioner, Hq A.C.C.

1. I have a memorandum dated 30 March 1944, written at the direction of the Director, Industry and Commerce Sub-Commission, and pursuant to your instructions, concerning my action in changing the management of the above-mentioned firm for reasons of security and effective administration of this Region. Since the problem involves basic policy, I have thought it appropriate to communicate directly with you on this subject.

2. The memorandum from Minister Corbino attached to the Director's communication protests that my action is "juridically without foundation" under the Italian law, and sponsors the calling of a stockholders meeting to elect a new management. The Director of the Industry and Commerce Sub-Commission recommends that the proposal of the Minister of Labor be adopted "if only for 'face saving' purposes".

3. These memoranda indicate some apparent misconception of the basis, purpose and results of my action. Regional Order 27 of this Region, copy of which is enclosed, was adopted after careful consideration by the Regional Legal Officer and is based on my powers as Regional Commissioner under Military Law, including the Proclamations and Orders issued by Allied Military Government. I did not act under Italian law but rather pursuant to the authority of Allied Military Government and in the interests of Military government.

It will be recalled that General Order Number 8, issued on November 23, 1943 by Command of Brigadier General McSherry, delegated to the Regional Civil Affairs Officer authority commensurate with his responsibility "for the administration of military government in his region". The limitations on that authority, as contained in General Order Number 8, do not appear to be pertinent to the case at hand. I might point out that the action taken by me was similar to that taken by General Hume in other cases. There have also been cases under Allied Military Government in other Regions.

4. My action in displacing the old management was required by the facts of the case. Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali is a large organization currently employing some 2000 employees and engaged in the production of cloth which is of considerable importance to our Armed Forces.

For some time before my assumption of command in this Region, there had been difficulties at the plant and an investigation of the company had been undertaken, which disclosed mismanagement and more serious defections. Our investigation of more recent date has disclosed serious violations of our orders, relating to the control of merchandise distribution, and criminal charges are now pending against certain of the managers.

(9)

Equally important were the investigations conducted by C.I.C. of F.B.S. and our own Security Officer which indicated that the Managers were persons dangerous to our cause. They had been men of considerable importance in industrial and political circles for many years during the Fascist regime. One had been very active in the Fascist program, was a collaborator of the highest Fascist officials, and was decorated by the Nazi Government for his industrial and political activities. He has now been blacklisted in this Region. Another was an ambassador and senator during the period of Fascism and the third as an intimate of many high Fascist officials and one of the early financiers of the Fascist Party.

5. The suggestion, now made by Minister Corbino, that a stockholders meeting be called was originally considered by us, but I discarded it because that procedure seemed to me to be inappropriate. In the first place, more than half of the stock is held by persons not in the liberated area. The proportionate number of stockholders located in the north is even greater since the Banco di Napoli owns almost 40%. The same reasons which have been advanced in respect to the holding of elections in the south of Italy to constitute a government for all of Italy apply with particular force in this case. How can you justly hold a stockholders meeting when the largest number of stockholders and more than a majority of the stock are in the regions of Italy occupied by the Germans? The Italian law cited by Minister Corbino does not apply since it is impossible even to advise stockholders in German held Italy, let alone their attending a meeting.

My action does not freeze the management selected. It provides an honest management that will co-operate with Military Government during the time Military Government has the responsibility.

6. You have also received a communication from the Italian Government criticizing the action on the ground that I am "sovietizing" industry. Such a charge is unadulterated twaddle. It is a demagogic charge. I am surprised that the true facts should have been misrepresented to the Italian Government. The property rights of stockholders have in no degree been modified or impaired. Of course, I realize the power of the men we threw out and their connections and also realize their habit of resorting to any technique to achieve their purpose.

I entertained a number of nominations in this case. One name advanced was that of Sig. Randone who is, I believe, an important official in Minister Corbino's office. His name was rejected because of information in our files casting serious doubt upon his fitness for this post.

7. The Bank of Naples which owns 40% of the stock urged me to remove the old management. And the selection of the new management was made after conferences with the Bank of Naples and with the approval of the Bank of Naples. This agreement with the Bank is set forth in the regional order.

The management finally selected was composed of a technical expert recommended by the Banco di Napoli, the largest stockholder; one executive who has been with the concern for some 14 years and appears to be co-operative and well acquainted with the affairs of the company; and a sound worker who is very familiar with the administrative and labor problems of the company, and has been employed by the company for years.

8. The effect of my action has been to indicate to the Italian people that the Allied Military Government has the courage to do its job. As a result, I am sure that confidence in our government has increased.

It is being whispered in this area that Minster Corbino will attempt to put his own nominees into the management of the company. It seems to me that considerations of high importance require the continuation of the management I have selected. If a change in management occurred, it would appear that Allied Military Government was incapable of taking effective action in the face of a protest from the Italian government or any of its officials, whatever their purpose. Any such indication, however baseless it might be, would not only make it difficult to take effective action in meeting various other problems but would affect the confidence of the people generally in Allied Military Government.

Charles Poletti

CHARLES POLETTI
Lieutenant Colonel
Regional Commissioner

6843

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CC/F/192

NF
only
FINDA/rj

13th. April. 1944.

I have received from ex-Senator Montagna a copy of a very long letter which he recently sent to you. Next time we meet I would very much like to have another talk with you about this old man.

My warm congratulations on your broadcast of last night. It was first class.

6848

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Lieut-Colonel C. Foletti, USA,
Regional Commissioner,
Region III.

(10)

Copy

Lieut. Colonel CHARLES PO. ITTI
Regional Commissioner for the A. M. G.

N A P L E S

18th

No sooner did I know of your Order, N° 27 of March last, than I... thought to appeal to you to the object that the charges laid against my own person should be searched again and promptly and carefully re-examined.

Notwithstanding the atrocious surprise and bitterness which affected me at that news, I resolved to wait as long as the Allied Local Authorities were busy in fulfilling the generous, sedulous and efficient work of rescuing and assisting the people in the zone ravaged by the catastrophic eruption of Vzsuvius.

Moreover I was in hopeful expectation that in the meantime some new fact would arise, apt to redress the mistake that has so unjustly wounded my honour and my reputation which have always been beyond discussion.

I was never a fascist, but only a forced tardy card-holder.

I Never got either honour, offices or favours of whatever kind from the fascist regime.

On the contrary, I was a victim of it, both from the moral and material points of view.

However I did not stop displaying wherever and whenever I could a silent and tenacious anti-fascist activity.

My paternal grandfather - born and residing at Marigliano (Naples) - was a fervent liberal and patriot; in 1848 he hardly escaped capital punishment, though remaining subject to police confinement till the abatement of the Bourbonic tyranny.

My father Francesco, for more than 30 years, took an active part in the home political life in the democratic-liberal field and was for several legislatures a member of Parliament, deputed by the electors of a constituency of the province of Caserta.

My parent died a month before the accession of fascism to power.

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- 2 -

I was born about 70 years ago in Rome where I followed my classical studies and got my degree as D. of Law. In 1899, after a successful competition exam, I entered the diplomatic career, which I followed regularly, rising to ranks of dignity and honour in a very short lapse of time. I was a Plenipotentiary Minister at the age of 37 and an Ambassador at 49.

I never belonged to any party whatever. Still my feelings have a liberal democratic trend. In the field of international policy I have always been an assertor of the classical doctrine of Cavour which founded the welfare and fortune of Italy upon the constant good terms and sincere friendship of Italy with England and France. A course which was after all followed by the ruling Italian spheres before the rise of ignorant subversive fascism.

6840

During my almost 30 years' service abroad I filled 15 posts. Among the first were London and Washington. I was for more than one year (1901-1902) in the former residence which I already knew for my long stay there when a student; six years (1902-1908) in the latter. In Washington during two different periods I held the Embassy in the quality of Chargé d'Affaires for about two years.

While giving me the opportunity to better know and appreciate those two great Nations, those stays had a remarkable influence in the training of my political culture and in forming my character.

The declaration of war by Mussolini to Great Britain and France (1940) was deemed by me as an offense to Italian traditions, and the same rash gesture towards the U.S.A. I considered an unnatural crime.

In the course of my Diplomatic career the largest number and best friends were among my colleagues of the three Great Western Powers.

The range of such connections was by and by enlarged and they were put to the test during the World War and the following years. With the permanent Missions, in the international Congresses and Con-

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- 3 -

ferences: in Paris (1919), Poland (1919), Losanne (1922-1923).

I could produce a long statement from outstanding personalities of Diplomacy and politics of those Nations who comforted me with their esteem and sympathy: Lord Curzon, Lord W. Tyrrell, the Ambassadors, Admiral Bristol, Joseph Grew, Sir Esme Howard, Sir Ronald Lindsay and many other eminent men of Great Britain and America.

I possess an interesting documentation of the constructive and concordant collaboration displayed with some of them, in the official records of those international meetings.

The ascent of fascism to power, found me Minister for Italy in Athens. I declined many flattering requests to enter the party.

On account, I suppose, of the particular competence required in that circumstance, I was soon a month afterwards appointed Plenipotentiary Delegate for Italy at the Losanne Conference for the East peace.

The success of these works gained for me another choice promotion and the appointment as Ambassador in Constantinople.

In May 1925, as I continued to remain outside the party, fascism inflicted me the first hard blow.

An imposing popular manifestation of sympathy at Marigliano on occasion of my first visit to the grave of my father who had died two years and half before without my being possible to assist him, was - on account of ambiguous objects of some miserable would-be politicians - considered as an anti-fascist demonstration. In consequence of an order of the Interior Minister Luigi Federzoni, then in function, the meeting was dispersed by force. I was myself - an Ambassador in charge - offended and ill-used by large groups of black shirts and - to fill the measure - of this outrageous conduct against me - I was put under the strict supervision of the police.

When returned to Constantinople, after a few weeks, I was suddenly and abruptly transferred to Rio de Janeiro. That is to say from an

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- 4 -

Embassy exquisitely political to another of a prevalent social and economical interest for Italy. It was evident that the ground for the discharge from my career was getting ready.

In Rio de Janeiro I had the misadventure to have as attaché of that Embassy the well-known Galeazzo Ciano. Within short the "to be" but not promising Mussolini's secretary for Foreign Affairs provoked confusion and indiscipline in the Embassy. He took advantage from the protection of his hierarch father. I disapproved this state of things and opposed it vehemently and succeeded in dominating the situation. The consequence was that my turbulent collaborator was suddenly removed to another place, but as for myself I was, through a wire of Mussolini, dated 14th. January 1927, informed of my imminent retirement.

I was then hardly 52. My career was in such a way cut short without any hope of rescue. From a standard of life provided with large means I was passing to a mean pecuniary position. I retired to Marigliano with my family, where I remained for about 10 years. For the first 3 years, during which I remained always outside the fascist party, no door was disclosed to me for an honorable office.

Only in January 1930 with flattering and deferent terms I was invited by the President of the new Board of Directors of the concern to accept the place of member of the same board of the "Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali" (The Southern Cotton Manufactures" Joint Stock Co.) established on private capital, free from Government interference, my admission to the Co. was still possible without being a card holder .. fascist. But my keeping quietly aside from politics was not sufficient. Three years afterwards, at the end of October 1933, I had to undergo the humiliating injunction from Galeazzo Ciano, with threats more or less disguised, of retaliation. For my family's sake (wife and three young children) I submitted to be ticked^{ok. (surrender)} from the 31st. July 1933 expiration time for admission to the party.

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- 5 -

But for our three children, we should, my wife and I, have emigrated abroad. More from scorn than for a return to good sense and repiscence of the great harm which he had caused me, G.Ciano some time afterwards, of his own initiative, took steps to have me appointed member of the Board of Directors with ^{for} small industrial Companies, whose miserable check hardly reached a total yearly amount of 12.000 Lire.

These are on the whole the great pecuniary benefits I was granted by the fascist regime that still had so harshly ruined my high economical position as an Ambassador.

As to benefits of a moral character, fascism never gave me any. Nevertheless - and ^{can} boast of it - it has not even attempted to undo the great moral patrimony which I had accumulated in Italy and abroad owing to an undefatigable and sedulous activity which was crowned by splendid success in the field of public management and particularly in that of Diplomacy. Nay, this harmful deed comes to me now and certainly through irresponsible elements with ungrounded, false and malevolent insinuations.

Fascism, which had drawn advantage from the services ^{I had already} rendered to Italy, never intrusted me with offices or appointments of a political nature, nor did its Government ever consult me about problems of an international character.

Very likely it was all the better for me!

Only in September 1941 (mark the irony of awakening) I was officially urged to share in the foundation of the Neapolitan section of the Italo-German Association, and on 6th. May 1942 to accept the Presidency of the Neapolitan Section of the "Società Amici del Giappone" (The friends of Japan's alliance) I declined both requests in a polite but in the same resolute manner.

My appointment as a Senator was by no means due to a favour of fascism being excluded from all the preceding lists of colleagues of career, I was included together with 5 other high officials of Di

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- 6 -

Diplomacy in the rolls of April 1939, according to the 6th. category (Ambassadors) foreseen by the 33d. Art. of the Statute", concerning the settlement of the Senate. I had a right to this appointment if not for other reasons, at least for traditional rules. But it was given me with about 15 years delay.

In the Senate I did not want to be a member of whatever Commission having a home or foreign political character. Last summer against my will I was officially appointed in the "Commission for foreign affairs" but never went to any meeting held by it. I instead often and eagerly worked in the economical Commission about legislative works in the field of social assistance for several categories of labourers: a constructive activity dutiful under any regime.

In my extra-official contacts in the high Assembly I always was, as many Senators can witness, cautiously, but strenuously convinced assertor of the final Victory of the Allies. I foresaw with mathematical precision the unfortunate fate which would befall on Italy through her misgovernment and the political aberrations of the fascist regime and also the certain fall of it before the end of the war.

Already in the first days of September 1939, in the presence of many colleagues, I strongly asserted aloud that "Great Britain would not be overcome in this war". This statement procured me a rebuke and not little trouble and augmented the distrust that the fascist circles had of me. Nevertheless I kept on in my deep activity of propaganda against fascism and nazism in behalf of the Allied Nation. When discouraged I fervently enlivened the mind and the hopes of my colleagues and friends.

No doubt my way of behaving let the regime to give me further trouble. In fact my eldest son who was very well prepared to go through a competition for his admittance to the diplomatic career was black-balled, as I knew afterwards, owing to an express order of Minister Ciano. In no time in Italy was an Ambassador's son treated in such a way.

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- 7 -

Fascism never ceased to make of me the object of vexations and adversities. Far from favouring me it prevented me from rising above the modest situation obtained in the industrial field.

However it never succeeded to undo the social position of respect I had acquired in the ruling classes of our country for the services rendered to Italy as a Her diplomatic representative abroad.

I always kept in abhorrence the Germans, particularly for their savage and cruel way of leading the war. They have pillaged my house at Marigliano; my second son and I have hardly escaped their brutality.

I anxiously longed for the arrival of ~~xx~~ our liberators in Naples. I think I have been the first Italian of some social position to welcome the first Allied officers who entered the city at the beginning of October ~~xxxx~~ last, namely: Colonel Hume, Lt.Colonel Kreage, Major Knight.

I at once put myself at their disposal in order to facilitate their first contacts with the Italian Authorities. Since then I have collaborated quite willingly, nay, with enthusiasm almost, one day after the other, in different fields with the A.M.G.

On the subject I have received and I still keep many ~~1845~~ ⁶⁸⁴⁵ ringing and actual testimonials of acknowledgment and appreciation from the Allied Authorities and reckon among them fair judges and precious friends.

And now all of a sudden I have been wounded with the most atrocious offences. I have been charged of being a supporter of fascism and as one who took advantage from that hated regime which, for more than 20 years has distressed Italy and which I have always ~~xxxxxx~~ opposed and has caused humiliations, harm and bitterness to me and to my family.

And this new blow to my heart and to my honor has been inflicted to me when by right I expected an amend and a reward to the injustice and wrongs I had undergone.

After long years of a public and private life, an honest blame-

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- 8 -

blameless ~~lightful~~ life without waverings, which I have, above all, spent in a deep devotion for my beloved Italy, in the love for my family, and during the last 20 years in hatred for Tyranny, in eagerness for liberty, in the sincerest anti-fascism, I should not ^{have} deserved such a treatment.

This objective sincere and loyal statement is based on actual facts or positively evidenced by elements and unimpeachable proofs, such as my informing personal file (Scheda Personale) drawn up by me upon oath.

I have already delivered it personally to your Command through the Agriculture Section, Region IIIrd.

However I take care to send here-with enclosed another identical copy. I ~~will~~ state that I am ready to produce many other documents in their original if requested, and I keep myself at your disposal in order to supply any information or news you might want about matters dealt herewith.

I feel sure that the Allied Authorities inspired to principles of Justice and to an exquisite sense of morality which characterize the ~~high~~ high civilization of the Great Nations to which they belong, will, at their earliest convenience, correct the mistake in which they have unvoluntarily fallen.

What I need from them is a prompt searching clear evidence, intended to honestly redress public opinion on my own person: an evidence which may reinstate my prestige, dignity and decorum lessened especially with ~~the~~ regards to my country fellows.

Naples, April 8th. 1944

(Signed) Giulio Cesare Gonzales

Enclosed please find the Italian text of this letter

(7)

*Henry Poletti*VIA A. MANZONI, 61
VILLA MARIA
NAPOLI

April 8th. 1944

Sir:

I have the honour to forward here-with a copy of a letter I have addressed to Lt.Colonel Charles Poletti, Regional Commissioner of A.M.G. Naples.

I would be very grateful to you if you would give this matter your attention and be so kind as to grant me the honour of an audience at your convenience.

With many thanks I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Giulio Cesare Fontana

Italian Ambassador and Senator

Lieut. General
Sir NOEL MASON MC.FARLANE
Chief Commissioner - A.C.C.
NAPLES

*Political Section**I would be**glad to**view.*

*not quite happy about this case
but there are possibly other
factors?*

Wm. 4

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
APO 394

DSA/sen

ES/14

4 April 1944

SUBJECT: Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali.

MEMO TO: General MASON MACFARLANE. ←

HQ ACC. APO 394

4 Apr. 1944
JLD

Colonel Evans talked to Mr. Corbino on this matter and latter then wrote a letter recommending action desired. This has been discussed with Lt. Colonel Poletti, who will have his legal officer check the proposal and if the latter approves, will authorize the company to proceed accordingly.

This in effect will result in the approval by the Company of the Managers selected by Colonel Poletti and satisfy all concerned. He advises that the men he appointed were agreed beforehand with the Bank of Naples.

D. S. Adams

D. S. ADAMS
Colonel, C. E.
Executive Officer
Economic Section

Col. Adams

*OK. I have
spoken to Col. Poletti
Please return
papers.*

Wm 4/4

*Noted
Adams
Action moved
to the Economic
Office*

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INDUSTRY & COMMERCE SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

JGZT/361

Ref. ACC/3074/IC

30 March 1944

SUBJECT: Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali

TO : Recnoide Section
(Attn: D. B. Adams, Col.)

1. In accordance with instructions received from General Mason MacFarlane, the Director discussed this matter with H.E. the Minister of Industry, Commerce & Labor.

2. The Minister put forward certain written proposals dealing with the regularization of the matter.

3. We append herewith translations of the Minister's proposals.

4. After giving careful consideration to the Minister's proposals, the Director wishes to express the opinion that, on grounds of policy, it would be wise if the procedure suggested by the Minister were adopted, if only for "face saving" purposes.

5. Should you have any further instructions to him on the matter, the Director will be pleased to continue his discussions with the Minister on this subject.

2 Incls.
Translation re MEM
" of memo
from HM Corbino to
Col. W.P. Evans

W. P. EVANS
Colonel
Director, Industry & Commerce
Sub-Commission

6823
6823

Copy to:
File 3142

(5)

TRANSLATION OF MEMO HANDED BY M. E. CORPINS TO COL. F. P. BYARS

It has been observed that in spite of an antifascist president, the Council of the Manifattura Cotonieri Meridionali is composed of fascist elements, some of which hold prominent positions in the national life.

This is easily explained by the fact that the President was neither a shareholder or a representative of a group of shareholders. He adhered to a request of a majority syndicate constituted amongst the shareholders to safeguard the interests of the Company, by taking over the effective management with the sole purpose of rehabilitating, in the interests of the Region and of the working classes, one of the most important industrial units amongst the few existing in Southern Italy. The Council was therefore representative of the shareholders as a body and could not reflect the policy of the President.

The majority syndicate in view of the very fact that the President was a notorious antifascist and unpopular with all Federal Secretaries for his refusal to any compromise, preoccupied that this attitude would render impossible his task of reorganising the business, requested him to surround himself with *personae grates* to the Government. The President adhered to the request by not opposing the nomination of those who forced the Council, but once they formed part of the Council he endeavoured to utilise them to the best advantage in the Company's interests.

30 March 1944

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Translation of Memo by H.E. Corbino, Minis of
Industry, Commerce & Labour, on the Manifatture
Cotoniere Meridionali.

With the Order of March 20th dismissing the three existing counsellors, members of the executive committee of the Company, Messrs. Finiani, Ascoli and Pantangelo have been nominated members of the executive committee, thereby creating a situation which juridically is without foundation as "delegatus non potest delegari" the nominees not being members of the Council.

This Order, as admitted by Colonel Polatid himself, must be considered as of a temporary character pending a return to normality and legality in the administration of the Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali and therefore it is suggested that an extraordinary meeting of the shareholders be convened in agreement with the Allied Authorities of Region III.

The meeting should be called by the auditors, in absence of the Administrators, and by request of a number of shareholders representing at least one fifth of the subscribed capital (art. 2367 Civil Code).

The number of shares held in Naples represents from 40 to 45% of the subscribed capital and therefore the extraordinary will be validly constituted, in accordance with the Company Statutes, in second meeting and the vote will be valid if carried by at least 30% of the shareholders representing the entire subscribed capitals.

The meeting should be convened for the 17th April as the first meeting and for the 18th as the second meeting and on request to the Tribunal the latter could be expedited with the following notice:

"The general extraordinary meeting of the shareholders of the Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali is convened at 10.00 hours of April 17th as first meeting and if necessary as second meeting, on April 18th of the same month and at the same hour in Naples at the seat of the Bank of Naples, General Management, Via Roma, with the following agenda:

"Defascistisation of the Council of Administration and nomination of new Counsellors in lieu of those retiring.

All shareholders inscribed in the shareholders register at least five days prior to the convening of the meeting will be entitled to attend".

Of the old Council in addition to Messrs. Barriello, Montagna and Piscitelli, Messrs. Organo, Mosconi, De Michelis, Chigvolino, should also be dismissed, whereas Messrs. Paratore, Senni, Zani and Benincove as representatives of a large number of shareholders and not for political reasons, should remain as members of the Council.

The new Council should be constituted of men acceptable both to the Allied Authorities, the political parties and the largest shareholders, namely the Bank of Naples.

PRO-MEMORIA - MANIFATTURE COTONIERE MERIDIONALI

Con il provvedimento del 20 marzo, destituiti i tre consiglieri presenti, membri del Comitato direttivo della Società, sono stati nominati componenti del Comitato direttivo i signori Fimiani, Azzone e Pentangelo, creando una situazione giuridicamente senza base perchè " delegatus non potest delegari " e i sostituiti non sono membri del Consiglio.

Dovendosi a detta dello stesso Colonnello Polatti, considerare provvisorio il provvedimento preso, in attesa di un ritorno alla normalità ed alla giuridicità nella Direzione delle Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali, si propone la convocazione dell'assemblea straordinaria degli azionisti, d'accordo con le autorità Alleate 3^a Regione, ordinata dai Sindaci in mancanza degli amministratori, e su domanda di tanti soci che rappresentano almeno il quinto del capitale sociale (art. 2367 Codice Civile).

Poichè in Napoli esiste circa il 40 e 45% del capitale sociale, l'assemblea straordinaria sarà validamente costituita a norma dello Statuto sociale in seconda convocazione ed il voto sarà valido se raggiungerà almeno il 30% degli azionisti rappresentanti l'intero capitale sociale.

L'assemblea dovrebbe essere convocata per il 17 aprile in prima ed il 18 aprile in seconda convocazione e facendo richiesta al Tribunale si potrebbero abbreviare detti termini col seguente avviso:

- 2 -

" L'assemblea generale straordinaria degli azionisti
" delle manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali è convocata per
" le ore 10 del 17 aprile in prima convocazione e occorren-
" do il 18 dello stesso mese alla stessa ora in seconda
" convocazione, in Napoli e presso la sede del Banco di Na-
" poli, Direzione Generale, Via Roma, col seguente ordine
" del giorno:
" 1) Defascistizzazione del Consiglio di Amministrazione
" e nomina dei nuovi Consiglieri in sostituzione degli u-
" scenti.

" Possono intervenire tutti gli azionisti scritti nel
" libro dei soci almeno 5 giorni prima della convocazione
" dell'Assemblea".

Dal vecchio Consiglio dovrebbero essere destituiti,
oltre i signori Borriello, Montagna e Piscitelli, i signori
Orgera, Mosconi, De Michelis, Chiavolino, mentre rimarreb-
bero in carica i signori Paratore, Senni, Zarà e Benincove,
che facevano parte del Consiglio quali rappresentanti di
notevoli gruppi di azionisti e non per ragioni politiche.

Il nuovo Consiglio dovrebbe essere composto di uomi-
ni accettati alle Autorità Alleate, ai partiti politici, e al
maggior azionista, Banco di Napoli.

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
③

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. _____


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INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.



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* Same Individual
To Hq Comd AF

ALLIED COMMISSION
ORGANIZATION
14 April 1945

2189

CONFIDENTIAL-CONTROL

JN - 102

SUBJECT : RUBBER TIRES SITUATION
IN NAPLES AREA AS IT
AFFECTS REHABILITATION PROGRAM

ITALIAN DIVISION, S1, MEDTO
HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
807TH RECONSTRUCTION OSS (PROV)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

BACKGROUNDS:-

1. Under a joint United States - British arrangement, three main truck storage and rubber tire dumps have been set up in the Naples area, whose main function had been to salvage the usable materials and to hold the rolling equipment in reserve for possible use in the north. It has since been agreed that the usable materials, particularly the rubber tires, would be sent to the Pacific theatre or held in reserve and the balance would be distributed on Italian police permits at established prices to transportation and engineering firms engaged in civil rehabilitation.

SALVAGE DUMPS:-

2. The three main salvage dumps in the Naples area are as follows:-

a) Torre Annunziata (near Castellammare), controlled by the British. Here there are about 27,000 tons of usable tires and at least 20,000 tons of salvagable tires and scrap. The tires are approximately 90% United States manufactured. There are also 1000 trucks, mostly of British manufacture, all containing usable tires.

b) Casalnuovo (between Naples and Nola), also controlled by the British. Here, for more than 8 months, there have been stored some 17,000 trucks which have not been moved in all that time. Here, as at Torre Annunziata, "the tires are rotting on the trucks and nothing is being done to preserve them".

c) Caserta, the United States Army Ordnance salvage dump. Here there are at least 15,000 tons of usable and salvagable tires which are not being put to any use.

REHABILITATION PROGRAM:-

3. The Public Works and Utilities Division of FEA, under the direction of the Allied Army authorities, is constantly being called upon by Allied Army authorities to undertake the reconstruction of various roads, bridges, docks, utilities and strategic installations. This work is completely justified on the grounds of military necessity, since troops and materials must still be moved and maintained, the more so now

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CONFIDENTIAL-CONTROL

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that Naples has become Italy's chief port of embarkation.

4. The PW&U, Southern Division has been calling upon 150 civilian engineers and contractors to do this work. These contractors, using their own equipment, have completed or have contracted to complete 11 Billion Lire (\$110,000,000) of work. To date, 628 bridges have been restored; 10,000 miles of highways and roads; 2500 miles of rail lines; 10,000 billets and buildings; and most of the pre-existing electric, water, gas and sewer facilities. In Naples harbor, ships have been raised and many of the docks have been put in usable condition.

5. The rolling equipment owned and being used by the civilian contractors has been supplemented to some small extent by a few military trucks loaned on a fee basis, however these represent only about 10% of final requirements. While the storage and non-use of available trucks is itself seriously affecting the continuance of this rehabilitation program, a greater problem is in keeping the civilian trucks, now in use, still rolling. The problem becomes increasingly acute and already some contractors have been forced to abandon their contracts.

TRANSPORTATION:-

6. The lack of transportation has long been one of the major contributing factors to the continuance of the vast Black Market which operates in the Naples area. The coming harvest has all the appearance of being a good one but its benefits will be restricted within narrow zones unless the crops are brought to the city markets. Again the rubber scarcity is making a proper crop distribution impossible.

7. The same situation applies to the public carriers. Before the war Naples and its Province was serviced by six major bus lines (exclusive of the tourist bus services), four funiculars and five electric railways. The major bus lines have been withdrawn; some of the rolling stock having been taken by the Germans, some by the Allies and the balance has been dismantled or lies idle because of lack of tires. The funiculars and electric railways furnish irregular and unreliable service.

AVAILABLE CIVILIAN EQUIPMENT:-

8. Available in the Naples area and ready to return to service, except for the lack of tires, is the following civilian equipment:-

- a) 48 or 50 - 60 passenger wheel auto buses;

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- b) 36 pieces of ~~AME~~ (Società Meridionale d. Elettricità) rolling equipment, consisting mainly of trucks and buses;
- c) 1000 (approx) privately owned trucks;
- d) 100 light and heavy trucks owned or controlled by Genio Civile (Italy's engineering and contracting monopoly);
- e) An unestimated number of privately owned heavy-body vehicles adaptable to maintenance work or transportation.

9. In order to maintain the equipment presently in use and to recall into service some of the above available equipment, the salvage officers through AC requested the PW&U, Southern Region to make formal application for purchase of salvaged tires. By December 1944 some 500 applications were prepared and approved by the PW&U Officer, Southern Region, requesting a total of more than 3000 tires which were offered to be paid for in one transaction. The applications were all approved after interminable delay, and space and organization was arranged for their distribution.

BRITISH POLICY:-

10. In March 1945 Lt. Clark (British) inherited the tire department of AC in the Naples area and the requisitions were turned over to him for processing. However no tires have yet been released.

11. The PW&U Officer, Southern Region, in pursuing the matter with the English authorities after learning that a number of tires had been removed from the British dumps and loaded on British ships, was informed that ^{the} tires were first-quality-usable and were being loaded for shipment to India to be used in the Pacific theatre. In making further unofficial inquiries this PW&U Officer came to suspect and now charges that the tire-loaded ships have been diverted to England. One British Officer stated flatly to the PW&U Officer that the tires belonged to the British and could be shipped and used by them in any way they saw fit.

ATTACHMENT:- Three photographs of the Torre Annunziata Salvage dump, taken about May 1945.-

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JN - 103

SUBJECT : RUBBER TIRE SITUATION
IN NAPLES AREA AS IT
AFFECTS REHABILITATION PROGRAM

ITALIAN DIVISION, SI, MEDTO
HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
3877TH AIRBORNE MEDICAL GROSS (PROV)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

NOTE : See Report No JN - 102

1. Lt. Plumley (British) of the British Salvage Depot at Torre Annunziata, advised that he was ready to release the usable and salvagable tires stored at his depot to Public Works and Utilities Section, Southern Division, FEA, "upon proper orders". Some six hundred applications, requesting more than 3000 tires, were then processed by the PW&U Officer, Southern Section, and these were approved in all respects by April 1945.

2. Col. Pennycuik (British), who was to effect distribution from the British Salvage Depot, then advised that 10,000 tires had been allocated to Southern Italy and that 1000 of these would be allocated to the 600 applicants filing through PW&U, Southern Division.

3. On 17 May the British advised that they had allocated 1000 tires for the Naples Prefect, none of which would be distributed to the applicants who had filed through the PW&U Officer, Southern District.

4. In the meantime the British Storage depots are being depleted by the shipment of first-class-usable tires on British ships and by allocations to preferred "customers". A certain Italian citizen named R.H. Cognazzo, who is being permitted by the British to represent himself as a British Army lieutenant and who wears that uniform (which he is reputed to have earned "for services to the British in Bari"), is able to visit British Storage depots at Torre Annunziata and Casalnuovo and to select tires at will. What distribution Cognazzo makes of these is not known. He appears to be attached in some capacity to the AC Headquarters in Rome.

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CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROL

CONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
2377TH REGIMENT CSS (PROV)

JN - 106

SUBJECT: APO 512, U. S. ARMY
SOUTHERN COTTON MANUFACTURERS SOCIETY.
("SOCIETA' MANIFATTURE COTONIERE MERIDIONALI").

1. One of South Italy's most important, and probably most damaged industry is the Southern Cotton Manufacturers Society, a joint stock company with a paid-up capital of 90,000,000 lire. The major subscriber was the Bank of Naples and no foreign investors participated.
2. Before the war the company had power looms at Naples, Upper and Lower Poggioreale, Fratte di Salerno, Angri, Nocera, Frattamaggiore and Piedimonte d'Alife. It employed 10,100 workers and had a daily production of 60,000 to 70,000 meters of cloth.
3. The Upper and Lower Poggioreale installations were heavily damaged by the war. On the requisition of these buildings by the British Army, the machinery installations then became completely destroyed.
4. The plant at Piedimonte d'Alife was completely destroyed by the Germans. The only factories now operating are the works at Fratte di Salerno, Angri, Nocera and Frattamaggiore, and these are only in partial operations and are only employing some 1,500 workers. The AC has released some raw materials so that these plants could remain in production.
5. As is the general cry of all manufacturers in the south, the Society desires to have their plants de-requisitioned so that they may be reconstructed and again placed in operation. However, it will be a considerable time before the Society is again in full production, and in the meantime raw materials, particularly hemp, continue to pile up and remain unprocessed.

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JN - 111

SUBJECT : INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS
REQUISITIONED BY THE ALLIES
IN NAPLES PROVINCE

ITALIAN DIVISION, SI. MEDTO
HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
2677TH REGIMENT OSS (PROV)
APO 612, U. S. ARMY

1. The industrial establishments which follow have been requisitioned by the Allies in Naples and its Province. None in the following list has been derequisitioned and there is no official indication as to when derequisitioning will take place. It is anticipated that since Naples is becoming the chief port of troop debarkation for the Italian theatre, most of these buildings will be held by the Allies while debarkation continues. The establishments follow:-

METAL PLANTS

<u>Name of Plant</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Requisitioned by</u>
S.A. ANSALDO	POZZUOLI	16 th BASE WRSP. REME ROYAL NAVY
I.M.M. INDUSTRIE MECC. MERIDIONALI	NAPLES	AIR DEPOT GROUP
SILURIFICIO IT.	BAIA	
OFFICINE MECCAN. NAVALI	NAPLES	
CANTIERI METALLURG. IT.	CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA	REME
S.A. LA PRECISA	NAPLES	
SOC. MAGNAGHI	S. ANASTASIA	
S.A. NAVALMECCANICA	CASTELLAMARE STABIA	
S.A. ASPERA	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	TOWN MAJOR
CANTIERI E BACINI SCALI NAPOLETANI	CASTELLAMARE STABIA	
SOC. ALFA ROMEO	NAPLES	351 CASL BN. MOTOR TRANS- OFFICE HQ. BATTERY
SOC. FIAT	NAPLES	57 AREA ADM. ROYAL
" "	"	5th ARMY BASE SECTION ORD. SECTION HGR P.B.S.
" "	"	ORD. SECTION HGR P.B.S.
SOC. GALLO & BACCIALLI	"	499 QUARTERMAST. CAR CO FBS
OFFICINE SUSS.Industr.	"	REME

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JN - 111

Name of PlantsLocationRequisitioned by

S.A. DE BONIS
SOC. REDABELLI
DRUSI & VITTOZZI

NAPLES
NAPLES
"

ENGINEER SERVICE HG P.B.S
ROYAL AIR FORCE MU 113-214
GROUP

OFFICINE SUSSIDIARIE
DI AVIAZIONE

"

RAF 113 MU 214 GROUP
ROYAL NAVY R.E.O.

S.I.A.

"

FRANCESCO GROSSI
RIP. AUTOMEZZI

"

U.S. NAVAL DETACHMENT
HQ. P.B.S. ENGINEER SERVICE
APO 782 U.S. ARMY

IMPRESA MERLINO

"

693 BASE MANUFACTURING
WSPS REME

OFFICINE MECC. MERID.

"

REME

O.M.N.I.A. LAMPADE

"

OFFICINA COSTRUZ. MET.
E FONDERIA

"

496 CO. ENGINEERS HEAVY PBS

FRATELLI RICCIADE

TORRE ANNUNZIATA

CASSEFORTI STANZIERI

NAPLES

FOOD INDUSTRIES -

PINTO RAFFAELE

TORRE ANNUNZIATA

274 WORKS SECTION R.E.

DI NOLA GIOVANNI

GRAGNANO

125 FIXED BAKERY

FRATELLI BIZZARRO

S. GIOVANNI A TED.

B.W.S. 16 REME

GIOBBE GIUSEPPE

TORRE DEL GRECO

FOR USE OF IT. SOLDIERS OF
516 ARTILLERY

LANDOLFI GIUSEPPE

BALSAMO

POMPEI

MONACO & C.

TORRE ANNUNZIATA

TOWN MAJOR SERIAL N 6855

BORRELLI CARMINE

TORRE ANNUNZIATA

D'APUZZO GAETANO

GRAGNANO

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CONFIDENTIAL

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<u>Name of the Plants</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Requisitioned by</u>
PAGANO & CIRILLO	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	156 FIRE FIGHTING TRAIN.SCHOOL
CASO ANTONIO	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	TOWN MAJOR
FRATELLI MOSCA	GRAGNANO	
PAGANO ANIELIO	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	CANADIAN TROOPS
FRATELLI IMPROTA	S.ANTIMO	5th ARMY U.S.
MARESCA V.	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	TOWN MAJOR
MOLINI MERID.MARZOLI	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	TOWN MAJOR
CIRILLO & FABBROCINO	" "	" "
RUOCCO & FIGLI	GRAGNANO	" "
LIGUORI A.	"	" "
DI MARTINO	"	" "
FRANZO GRANDE	NAPLES	ENGLISH COMMAND
FAELLA G.	GRAGNANO	" "
DI NOLA & PROTA	"	" "
CIPOLLA & DI NOLA	"	
GAROFALO ALFONSO	"	
MASCOLO ANDREA	"	
FRATELLI BARBATO	S.PAULO BELSITO	
CRISCUOLO MICHELE	CASTELLAMARE STABIA	
MORMONE ANTONIO	" "	
FRATELLI PARISI	S.MARIA CAPUA VETERE-GENIO-MILITARE ITALIANO	
SOC. CIRIO	S.GIOVANNI A TED.	ALLIED COMMAND
DEL GAIZO & SANTAR- SIERO	" " "	
FRATELLI BEVILACQUA	NAPLES	G.M.A.

ELECTRO-MECHANIC SHOPS

C. & L.BORGHESE	NAPLES	REME 6 PORT
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JN - 194

<u>Name of the Plants</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Regu. litioned by</u>
CURCI A.& FIGLI	NAPLES	PBS APO 782
FABBRICA ACCUMULATORI PARTENOPEA	CASALNUOVO	D/I A.B.W. REME

<u>AVIATION</u>		
BREDA ERNESTO	NAPLES	AIR FORCE DEP. 38 Th GROUP
C. COPPOLA	CASTELLAMARE	RAF 113 M.U.

CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

SOC. AGRICOLA INDUSTR. DEGLI ALCOOL	NAPLES	P.B.S.
VITALE GIROLAMO	AVERSA	RASC 856 A
DISTILLERIE ITALIANE	NAPOLI	NAAFI EPI
SOC. NAP. PRODOTTI ALDA	NAPLES	GENIO MILITARE ITALIANO
FARMOCHIMICA G.L.F.F.	NAPLES	ALLIED WAREHOUSE
NARDI GIUSEPPE	NAPLES	57 B.P.
IND. MER. AZOTO E DER RIVATI	NAPLES	102 C.A.BTR O-319441 U.S.
D'AVANZO PIETRO	NOLA	268 W.K.S.
SOC. MONTECATINI	BAGNOLI	PBS 878 HEAVY MAINTENANCE CO.
MAIONE FRANCESCO	NAPLES	AVITECOT 38th
SOC. MIRA LANZA	NAPLES	FIRE DEPOT
STAZIONE SPERIMENT. INDUSTRIE PELLI	NAPLES	
ISTITUTO SIEROTERAPICO	"	

CORK INDUSTRIES -

LAVORAZIONE SUGHERO AFFINI	NAPLES	709 SIGNAL CO. DEPOT ARM APO 258 ./.
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JN - 111

<u>Name of the Plants</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Requisitioned by</u>
<u>WOOD INDUSTRIES</u>		
BERGAMASCO LEONE	TORRE ANNUNZIATA	01/C.21 ABPO 73 WKS SECT.CRE
OFFICINE MERIDION. INDUSTRIE DEL LEGNO	NAPLES	D.T.W.
C.& V. BOTTIGLIERO	AVERSA	3323 TRUCK CO.37 9 MBN APO 782
SOC.ELECTA	NAPLES	ORDINANCE SERVICE
SOC.RUEPING	NAPLES	DW BRITISH ARMY
FELTRINELLI & CO.	NAPLES	DAODS PURCHASE & PRODUCTION

TANNERIES

FRANCESCO MEROLLA	NAPLES	C.H.CLUB ORD BASE DEPORT I
RUSSO GIORGIO & G.	NAPLES	PASS REQUIRED FROM DEPOT OFFICE

TEXTILE INDUSTRY

SOC.COTONIERE MER.	Naples	REME
" " "	ANGRI	
" " "	FRATTE DI SALERNO	
" " "	NOCERA INFERIORE	FRENCH COMMAND
ASS.PRODOTTI CANAPA	NAPOLI	FRENCH COMMAND
SNIA VISCOSA	S.GIOV.A TEDUCCIO	ALLIED COMMAND

BUILDING -

SOC.ETERNIT	BAGNOLI	PBS 605 ORDIN.BASE ARMY MAINT. BATTN.
GILARDI & CO.	NAPLES	
BUONASORTE	NAPLES	

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JN - 111

<u>Name of the Plants</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Requisitioned by</u>
CALZENATI MARINO	NAPLES	PBS ENGINEER SECTION 16 APO 782
SANMARCO ANTIMO	NAPLES	BRITISH ARMY
BOURELLY	NAPLES	REQUISITIONED BUT NOT OCCUPIED
CAVA REGIA POZZUOLI	POZZUOLI	REGIMENTAL SUPPLY OFFICER 338 Eng.APO

CLOTHING -

SCUDIERI	OTTAVIANO	DAD - CLAIMS & HIRINGS
FIPAN	NAPLES	PBS APO 782
C.I.S.A.	NAPLES	557 D.O.D.
FRATELLI AVETA	NAPLES	BRITISH COMMAND
MANIFATTURE PALCO		
S.A. IND.CONFEZIONI	NAPLES	M.U. 113 RAF
PALOMBO ADOLFO	NAPLES	RETURNED STORE CO.557 AOD BR.

NAVIGATION -

LLOYD TRIESTINO	NAPLES	PORT BATTALION U.S.A.
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GLASS INDUSTRY

VETRERIA RICCARDI	NAPLES	PORT COMMAND
VETRERIA ITALIANA	NAPLES	HQ.675 ARTISAN WKS CO. R.B.

INSTRUCTION -

IST.TECHN. GLEON. DA VINCI - NAPLES		C.CLOTHING & REPAIR FACTORY
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RUBBER

GLOBUS	NAPLES	10 SUB+WKS HOP 80 EBW SA -EG ./.
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

JN - 111

<u>Name of the Plants</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Requisitioned by</u>
<u>HYDROTHERMIC INDUSTRY</u>		
SOC. TERME AGNANO	AGNANO	GEN. HOSP. & OFFICER OF MEDICAL U.S.A.
TERME RAJA	ARCO FELICE	ALLIED FORCES
INDUSTRIE DEL FREDDO		" "

TRANSPORTATION 3

BERTI & C.	NAPLES	782 & 220 QM CO. BASE DEPOT REPAIR SHOP
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LAUNDRIES AND TAILORS -

LAVATOIO LANARIO	CASTELLAMARE	WORKING FOR THE ALLIES
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COMMENT:

2. The above information is submitted as a precursor to future reports which will indicate the general clamor of the people in the area to have their properties de-requisitioned. The list is probably not inclusive and does not include the numerous private dwellings, hotels, apartments and garages which have been requisitioned. Many of the owners of the establishments listed and a number of apartment house and villa owners are claiming that requisitioning, and the continuance thereof, has been discriminate, unfair and, in some cases, unnecessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
267th REGT. OSS (PROV)
APO 512 U.S. ARMY
Italian Division, SI, MEDIO

2 June 1945

Subject: Italian negotiations in Switzerland and Genoa

The following report is from OSS, Milan

1. A well informed industrialist in Milan reports that the Adriatica Group, represented by Volpe and Cini, was negotiating in Zurich during the past week with a certain Henry Woods, whose affiliations are not known. It is believed that the discussions were in connection with the holdings of the Adriatica Group, which include ship lines, water, gas, and power companies, and secondary railroads.
2. In Genoa, the Genova Contri shipping and ship building firm is concluding negotiations for the sale of assets to British interests.

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SECRET

SECRET
CONTROL

Italian Division, SI, M DTD
Headquarters Detachment
2677th REGIMENT (Prov)

30 May 1945

SECRET - CONTROL
CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

JR-2060

278

COUNTRY Yugoslavia/Italy

SUBJECT Political

ORIGIN Rome
THEATRE MED-HQ DET

SOURCE Z, Krestos
SUB SOURCE

EVALUATION C-3

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

ORIGINAL RPT. JR-2060

DATE OF INFO. 11 May 1945

DATE OF RPT.

DISTRIBUTED 30 May 1945

CONFIRMATION
SUPPLEMENT

NO. OF PAGES 2

ATTACHMENTS

Minority Opposition to Tito
Reported Within Yugoslavia.

1. The strongest opposition to Tito and Communism in the various regions of Yugoslavia is encountered among the former officers in the Royal Yugoslav Army, among the Catholics in Slovenia, and in Croatia, among the Ustasci, the Nationalists, and those who still follow the ideas of Macek. These groups are not united among themselves, nor has there been any success in moves to join with similar anti-Communist elements in Bulgaria because of the traditional hatred existing between the two countries. Long standing antagonism between Serbs and Croats is a source of potential danger to Tito who hopes to solve the problem by granting equal rights and a certain amount of autonomy to these racial groups. The Italian population in Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia presents still another difficulty; Tito intends to consider all but the most recent immigrants as Yugoslav nationals.

2. Foreign interference further complicates the situation in Yugoslavia. While the Russians, with Tito's approval, continue their propaganda and infiltration techniques, particularly in the rural sections where Communism has little appeal for small land owners, the British have reportedly met and given protection to Mikhailovitch in Venezia Giulia. They will presumably hold him until they consider the time right for him to return. British newspapers there, the British have

Minority Opposition to Tito
Reported Within Yugoslavia

1. The strongest opposition to Tito and Communism in the various regions of Yugoslavia is encountered among the former officers in the Royal Yugoslav Army, among the Catholics in Slovenia, and in Croatia, among the Ustasci, the Nationalists, and those who still follow the ideas of Macek. These groups are not united among themselves, nor has there been any success in moves to join with similar anti-Communist elements in Bulgaria because of the traditional hatred existing between the two countries. Long standing antagonism between Serbs and Croats is a source of potential danger to Tito who hopes to solve the problem by granting equal rights and a certain amount of autonomy to these racial groups. The Italian population in Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia presents still another difficulty; Tito intends to consider all but the most recent immigrants as Yugoslav nationals.

2. Foreign interference further complicates the situation in Yugoslavia. While the Russians, with Tito's approval, continue their propaganda and infiltration techniques, particularly in the rural sections where Communism has little appeal for small land owners, the British have reportedly met and given protection to Michailovitch in Venezia Giulia. They will presumably hold him until they consider the time right for him to cover British manoeuvres there. The British have already managed to gain control over the small Yugoslav Navy: approximately 15 military craft which were anchored at Malta were to have been scuttled by their commanding officers following the order to return to Yugoslavia. Tito's request to England for the return of the merchant

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fleet was refused with the promise that British ships would be sent instead.

3. The Jewish problem is almost non-existent; those few who were found in concentration camps have been accorded the same treatment as the other internees. Those who fled to Italy do not intend, for the present, to return to Yugoslavia for they, together with the American Slavs backing the Croatian movement, fear that their capital would be taken over by the present government.

4. In spite of these manifestations of increasing unrest, Russian prestige is still high among the majority of the population, especially in Serbia, and Tito is generally regarded with favor. The Communist Party is the only officially recognized party and it is evident that the Communists will continue in their policy of putting down disorganized resistance with a heavy hand where their political moves and promises are not enough to overcome traditional ill feeling and a spirit of rebellion.

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28 May 1945

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COUNTRY Italy

SUBJECT Economic

ORIGIN Milan

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Report on Activities of Northern Italian Financial Groups

1. Many of the leaders of Italian big business in the North are reported to be in Switzerland where they are engaging in negotiations with the Swiss, the French, and particularly the British. Because of the group structure of Italian industry, these men are in a position to sell their very large holdings outright to foreign interests. Their precarious personal status in Italy is being used by the British for bargaining purposes.
2. Among the groups now represented in Switzerland is the Adriatica, headed by Volpecinigaglia. Adriatica has wide interests in Venezia Giulia as well as along the entire Adriatic coast, and controls many of the secondary Italian railroads.
3. Valerio, head of the Edison hydro-electric group, is also in Switzerland; he is reported to be negotiating primarily with the British through Swiss and French interests which are either a front for, or have a share in, the British companies.
4. A third financial group is composed of Pirelli, Orlando, and the Ciano family all of whom are negotiating jointly with the British.
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4. A third financial group is composed of Pirelli, Orlando, and the Ciano family all of whom are negotiating jointly with the British.
5. Snia Viscosa has actually completed a deal whereby control of the company passes to the British. It was accomplished by group director Marinotti who sold the 16 per cent of the stock which he controlled and thus brought the British holdings to 52 per cent. In return, he is alleged to have been assured of British protection upon his return to Italy where he will face expatriation charges, and will probably be retained as director of Snia Viscosa. He and his group now also possess large supplies of British currency for new investments.

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INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

British Attitude Toward Italian Industrialists in Milan

1. A source recently in conversation with C. C. C. Pirelli officials has reported a British government and British industry conflict over the vast Pirelli industrial interests in Italy and abroad. The government is for favorable treatment, but British industrial interests do not share the same attitude.
2. When Milan representatives of Pirelli conferred with British Major Lister, head of AMG Industrial Division, on future raw material needs for resuming production, they received very little encouragement. There was a reason for the uncertainty with regard to aid, Major Lister said, but it could not be disclosed. He advised that requests for material should continue to be made but that the requirements should be kept to a modest minimum.
3. The Pirelli representatives were nonplussed by Major Lister's attitude. They said they

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3. The Pirelli representatives were nonplussed by Major Lister's attitude. They said they thought his remarks had a mysterious air. It is believed that the uncertainty is due perhaps to the present situation with Tito and generally with Russia.

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British Economic Activity in North Italy

1. The British are reported to have obtained control of stock in Snia Viscosa, largest Italian artificial textile concern, and to be negotiating for the purchase of the controlling interest in the Corriere della Sera, outstanding Italian daily, published in Milan.
2. Control of Snia Viscosa was obtained by increasing British stock holdings from 36 percent to 51 percent.

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