

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785021

ACC

10000/141/793

BOLZANO, PROPOSALS FOR
NOV. 1945 - MAR. 1946

10000/141/793

BOLZANO, PROPOSALS FOR AUTONOMY & PROTECTION OF MINORITY
NOV. 1945 - MAR. 1946

Ex C.S.

Please see para 3 of the last minute you may like to speak to Mr Jones about the Dr Angelis memo

CAS
29 Nov.

Handwritten signature

10

C.A.S.

Please let Mr Jones see the document & explain to him the latest position.

Handwritten signature

Ex C.S.

Mr Jones had a copy of the document on the 26th Nov. He was informed yesterday of what passed at the meeting with Dr Angelis

CAS
30 NOV 1945
X-525

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(12)

Handwritten note

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1001

FILE

DATE

MINUTES SPECIAL NO.

PAGE

27/11/45

To Director, Major Temple.

(6)

With reference to the draft decree concerning the political and juridical settlement of Alto Adige, Dr. Sorrentino confirmed to me over the telephone that the text of said draft sent to our Legal S/C is the same as the one recently submitted to the Council of Ministers and by the latter approved in principle (as reported by the newspapers). This draft decree has since been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work out some amendments. Dr. Sorrentino promised that the revised draft will be presented to us before it is submitted again to the Council of Ministers.

Dr. Sorrentino gave me the name of Dr. Casardi at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for reference. I called Dr. Casardi. His secretary replied he knew about this draft being revised and promised to call me back today to let me know the position.

Nice.

27/11/45

(7)

Reference above, Dr. Casardi called up to say that the revised draft was ready and will be forwarded together with a letter to the office of Admiral Stone. I asked Dr. Casardi to please send a copy of the draft also to this office. He agreed and offered to call on us if we would require some explanation of him.

Nice.

C.A.S.-

~~WTS~~

(8)

1. Lt. Col. White informed me that at the Exec. Commis. meeting yesterday Brig. Wash said that the Prefect's document had his 'blessing' and that L.G. S/C were to follow it up to see that the Ital. Govt. did not let it fall by the wayside. Col. White stated that I should get clearance from Polada.

4900

Polada.

2. I called Polad(B) (Mr. Hopkinson) who said he had told Brig. Wash he approved the document. He was also advising his Ambassador to recommend it to De Gasperi the Ital. Foreign Minister. However he invited my comments for his opinion.

3. I then spoke to Polad (A) (Mr. ...)

6. The latter approved in principle (as reported by the newspaper). This draft decree has since been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work out some amendments. Dr. Sorrentino promised that the revised draft will be presented to us before it is submitted again to the Council of Ministers.

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Nice.

C.A.S. -

(8)

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4900

2. I called Polad (B) (Mr. Hopkinson) who said he had told Brig. Marsh he approved the document. He was also advising his Ambassador to recommend it to De Gasperi the Ital. Foreign Minister. However he invited my comments for his observations.

3. I then spoke to Polad (A) (Mr. Jones) who said he got the impression that we would have an opportunity to comment on the document before anything was done by A.C. I then advised him of my conversation with Hopkinson. He also requested me to take no action on behalf of A.C. until he commented on the document.

Lt. Col. White informed of the foregoing.

R. K. Thompson

27/11/45

28 Nov.

FILE	DATE	MEMO NUMBER	PAGE
15 Nov.			
21 Nov.			

15 Nov. Note: Lt. Col. White called and said he had directed me to write to Brig. D'Amico to ascertain nature of the "pro-memoranda" (Ps. 1A) before I spoke to the U.P. I then spoke to the U.P. who suggested that perhaps it would be better to do that altho he saw no harm in showing it to Polade now. He asked me to send Brig. D'Amico a letter asking for an explanation of the pro-memoranda and a clarification of para. 2.

R. K. Temple, Major
Dir. L.G.S.C.

Exec. Comm. (thru G.S.)
(4)
1. Please refer to ps. 3. May we please have the document, or a copy thereof, mentioned in para. 3 of ps. 3.

R. K. Temple, Major
Dir L.G.S.C.

21 Nov. CA Section. 4-15
If you minute 4 - copy of translation of document mentioned therein, attached opposite 1A.
Note: - Italian original borrowed from Ex Comm's Office, copy made & filed at ps. 5. C.G.H.

3
ps. 4.

5.

FILE

DATE

1945

MINUTE SHEET NO.

PAGE

14 Nov.

②
Note: I conferred with V.P. re folios 1A, 1B. V.P. said that he didn't understand the type of memo folio 1A was - i.e. whether it was the original document left by the prefect or a note of the conference prepared by the P.C. The VP thought we ought to find out what it was before we did anything. I pointed out that we could assume, regardless of the form of the document, that it represented the views of the prefect. In that event, I thought that before we spent any time considering the document we consult Polada A & B to ascertain whether it is advisable & competent for AC to forward its views (i.e. the collective & approved observations of subcommittees) on the document. They might say it was better for the Italian Govt. to work out a plan of its own as it did in the case of Vol d'Arata. I personally think that is the better course. If the prefect wants to give his observations he can do so by addressing a letter to the Ministry which we will merely forward with-
 out comment.

12038

I have sent you 1 directed me to

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The V.P. agreed and directed me to sound out Polada before any action was taken. If Polada says to formulate an AC memo, then AC Virginia was to be asked to identify the document and also get some clarification of it.

R. R. Gumpfe, Major
Dir. L. G. S. P.

2038

FILE

DATE

MINUTE SHEET NO.

PAGE

Proposals for Reducing
+ Protection of Economy

VP.

This letter can be looked at

from two angles

a. high policy - naty, devel
to, as a matter domestic isb. policy - provincial level
with a possible question of

local autonomy developing.

If the principle recent is to

I think the letter should be on

EC. files and dealt with in his

note

on the other hand if the

principle recent is to, the

letter should be dealt with in

CA. files. in LG files.

~~Disposal instructions~~~~present~~

of the letter I prefer LG.

through the side memoise deals

with matters outside the strict

LG province. the principal

matter is the government of

the Province with which there

4893

VP.

This letter can be looked at

from two angles

a. high policy - treaty level
b. as a matter domestic toItaly - provincial level
with - possible question of

local autonomy developing.

If the principle meant is a)

I think the letter should be on

EC. files and dealt with in his

letter

on the other hand if the

principle meant is b). Then

letter should be dealt with in

CA. files. not LG files.

~~the principle~~~~mean~~

of the latter I prefer LG.

Through the side memo we deal

with matters outside the strict

LG provinces - the principal

matter is the government of

the Province with which there

other matters are related or

principally concerned. Their file

is most suitable and on such

issues they coordinate with

other interested

to your instructions

please

H. (H. 10.6)

C.A.S.
9/10/66

4868

AC/45/12/LG.

SUBJECT : Note of interview AC HQ

DATE : 8 March 1946

PRESENT : Dott. INNOCENTI Silvio, temporarily Prefect of Bolzano
Major C.G.R. Williams, Executive Officer Local Government S/O.

1. Special Commission Dr. I. said the Government were going ahead with this and a Decree constituting a Special Commission would be published, he thought, before the end of March. His idea was a Commission of 15 of whom at least 5 would be German-speaking representatives such as a Minister of Religion, two Sindaci, a Judge and so on.

2. Autonomy Dr. I. himself is working on a project of administrative autonomy. His great difficulty, he said, was to ~~provide~~ ^{ensure} guarantees for a minority. Whatever were the boundaries of the new autonomy region there would be a minority. If the new region were Bolzano Province only there would be an Italian minority; if it were Bolzano and Trento Provinces combined there would be a German minority. (Note:- I rather think, from I's attitude, that the autonomous region will be Bolzano and Trento). In either case the problem is not so much one of writing guarantees into a Decree as of providing appropriate administrative institutions or procedures to ensure that the guarantees are observed.

3. Dr. I. reminded me of D.L.L. 22 December No. 824 (S/G.U. 16 January 1946 No. 13) providing for the use of German in Bolzano Province. One of his main jobs at present was working out details of this, ^{he} intended to see, for instance, that there was one at least bilingual official in every public office.

4. Preparation of Electoral Lists Dr. I. confirmed the position as disclosed in his report to the Ministry of the Interior of 8 February 1946 (for period 16 - 31 January 1946) i.e.

- a) All Communes in Bolzano (91) have compiled their male and female lists;
- b) None of the lists have been approved by Electoral Commissions;
- c) Electoral Commissions are dealing with the lists by : -
 - i) Examining the validity of the Sindaco's proceedings; then
 - ii) Examining the entitlement to be registered of those whose Italian citizenship is clear;
 - iii) Leaving cases of doubtful citizenship on one side at present.

5. Dr. I. said the Electoral Commissions would not proceed any further until the Special Commission had settled cases of doubtful citizenship. He confirmed therefore that there would be no communal elections in Bolzano Province this spring, neither would any of the electoral lists be ready in time for the anticipated date of the elections to the Constituent Assembly at the end of May. 4896

6. He did not think that these facts would produce any unfavourable reaction among the population. Among the German-speaking inhabitants, the pro-Austrian was more interested in the possibility of participating in an Austrian Parliament than in an Italian Constituent Assembly. As to the remaining allogeni, before the date of the Constituent Assembly elections the scheme of autonomy would have been published and the allogeni would be more interested in electing their own regional assembly than in sending delegates (deputati) to the Costituyente. This, he thought,

- 2 -

would also be the attitude of the Italian-speaking population.

7. Dr. I. said he did not think it would be possible to publish the scheme of autonomy before the Special Commission got to work on the citizenship problem. He did not think the absence of an autonomy scheme would have any great influence upon those who may be called upon to exercise a fresh option for Austrian or Italian citizenship. He thought the D.L.L. (quoted above) as to the use of the German language had gone a good way to meet this point and indicated the intentions of the Italian Government.

8. Alto Adige among German POWs Dr. I. referred to the number of natives of the Alto Adige who had served in the German Army, had been taken prisoner and were now held in POW camps in various parts of Italy. Many of these had written to the Prefecture and elsewhere to ask if they could be released and go home to their native places and the Italian Government were rather anxious about this. The problem is, of course, bound up with that of citizenship, but I gathered that the Italian Government did not object in principle to the release and return to their native places even of those who had opted under the German 1939 Accords, providing the Italian Government were sure after enquiries made by them that :-

- a) the prisoners did in fact have a home and family in the Alto Adige ;
- b) they had a reasonable prospect of supporting themselves there.

The question of their citizenship would be dealt with by the Special Commission in any event.

I pointed out that this problem was not within the competence of this S/O and all I could do was to bring Dr. I.'s observations to the notice of my superior Officers. Dr. I. said that on this matter there had been some correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chief Commissioner last August. He thought it would be well if he mentioned the subject to Col. Miller. I said I thought there could be no objection to this and that Col. Miller as CIO Bolzano would no doubt communicate on the matter with this Hq.

W
C.C.R. WILLIAMS
Major
Executive Officer
Local Government Sub Commission

CCRR/WW

Distribution : 45/12/1
45/29
File
Float

4885

EXCERPT from "TEMPO" of 21 December 1945

ALTO ADIGE DEFENDED BY DE GASPERI

The frontiers of Italy are not at the mercy of Mr. Renner

.....Coming to speak about Alto Adige, the President of the Council said:

"Unification of Italy places ourselves in direct contact with Alto Adige. It is not necessary for me here to repeat declarations of program already made by me; but since elsewhere there have been public solemn and formal requests, I must state with equal explicitly that we cannot admit that the question of the frontier of a State of 45 million Italians should be decided by a small fraction living in a border province, so much so when a good portion of this small minority distinguished itself both before and during the war for its cordial acceptance of nazism and for its participation to the war on the side of Hitler until the last moment; so that as a result of past options the citizenship itself of many who are still given hospitality on this side of the Brenner is being questioned.

We are ready to make all the concessions which can be done by a democratic State based on the principles of equality, but we expect that our hand stretch out in all loyalty, be accepted with the same loyalty, and we trust may we know that in this way thinks the majority of the population of the province of Bolzano.

With new Austria which is marching towards an autonomous and democratic life we shall be glad to resume diplomatic contacts; however in order that such relations be proficuous, it is necessary that no unacceptable claims of territorial character be made.

1884

Ref: AQ/15/12/1/10

21 December 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

My letter of the 30 Aug expressed the view that the electoral registers in Alto Adige should be compiled according to the existing Italian Law and that the functions of the Special Commission should be confined to ascertaining facts.

Before your predecessor's letter of Nov 9th reached me and in the absence of any communication from him on this matter, the Regional Commissioner of Venice was instructed that the lists must be compiled in accordance with the existing Italian law. He was informed that according to the advice which the AC had received as to the existing law, he should include therein not only the two classes of electors referred to in Para 2 (b) of my letter but also German speaking Italians who had opted for German nationality but had taken no other step to acquire that nationality. It is noted that this instruction is in general accord with the provisions contained in the draft decree forwarded in your letter of the 16 November.

Your predecessor's letter of 9 Nov agreed in principle to the immediate preparation of the lists and to the provisional inclusion therein of names which might be subsequently struck out, if it was found that they had been erroneously included; but, your letter of the 16 Nov suggests that the preparation of the lists should be suspended until agreement as to the draft law has been reached. The preparation of the lists will take most time. As the difference between the draft decree and the present instructions are only of relatively minor degree it is felt that the compilation of the lists should continue. If names are included therein which should, according to later agreement, be excluded, it will be far more expeditious to strike those out later than to delay the work of compilation now. It is proposed therefore to continue with the compilation; otherwise the lists may not be ready by the time of the elections.

The draft decree is being studied and will be the subject of a separate communication.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Henry W. Stone

Doth. Aloisio DE GANDIA
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
R O M E

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

27 NOV. 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
NO 374
Office of the Executive Commissioner

45/29

12

Ref: 505/25/45

28. November 1945

28 NOV 1945

SUBJECT: Situation in Poland

TO : G-5, AMB

1. Reference your G-5: 093 of 19 November 1945.

2. Our 505/25/45 of 15 November 1945 was sent in reply to your G-5: 093 Bureau of 10 November 1945.

3. In this letter it was stated that many petitions had been received by this Headquarters and were being held here pending a decision from the Foreign Office as to where they should be sent.

4. In the above quoted letter it was stated that some of the petitions had been forwarded to the British Embassy in Moscow. This, in fact, is not the case; they are all being held in this Headquarters.

5. If you prefer, the petitions can be forwarded to you for whatever action you may think necessary.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copied to:
Poland (A)
Poland (B)
CA Section
HC, Economic Region



4727/LG

TO : ROAD A & B
Local Govt S/C

Herewith papers on Bolsano handed to the Ex. Commissioner by the Prefect
of Bolsano to-day.

CA Section
29 Nov 45

[Signature]
S.M. WHITE Lt Col,
A/VP-CA Section

4891

CC O P I 10

The Prime Minister
to Admiral Stone

Rome,

My dear Admiral,

considering the coming restitution of the Province of Bolzano the Italian government has reexamined and confirmed its decision to give to the Alto Adige a satisfactory and sure order for the ethnical minority.

The government has already taken important resolutions in favour of the german-speaking population. It proposes to endow the Alto Adige, within a short time, with a special legislation, corresponding fully to the interests of the people, protecting with opportune dispositions the traditional values and finally instituting in the region a pattern of administration.

To this end the government has decided to send to Bolzano a high Delegate, whose principal task will be to direct local politics and to prepare in cooperation with the most competent south-tyrolians, the new order. The text of the decree and the note, which I beg to enclose, state the functions of the Delegate and the ideas which have induced the government to adopt this measure. With a separate letter I shall request your opinion on the person of the Delegate.

Bearing in mind your suggestions on the South Tyrol problem, I am sure that you will like the decision which I communicate in the present letter. The request of your approval wants to express above all the sincere appreciation of the Italian government and of myself for your and your officers co-operation for preparing the new order of South Tyrol.

I avail myself of this opportunity to communicate to you the view of the government that the restitution of the Province of Bolzano be followed shortly by the appointment of an Italian ambassador to Vienna. The government wishes to create as soon as possible the basis for the good relations to be established with the neighbouring state.

Very truly yours,

4890

Relazione al Consiglio dei Ministri sull'istituzione dell'ufficio di
Delegato straordinario del Governo in Alto Adige

Il decreto proposto esprime l'intendimento, ispirato ai principi democratici che guidano il Governo, di dare alla minoranza di lingua tedesca dell'Alto Adige un ordinamento legislativo che le garantisca l'esercizio delle libertà civili nell'uguaglianza dei diritti e dei doveri di tutti i cittadini e nel rispetto dei valori etnici, linguistici e culturali che le sono propri.

Al consiglio dei Ministri è nota la richiesta del Governo austriaco rivolta ad ottenere dalle Nazioni Unite l'annessione dell'Alto Adige all'Austria. Questa richiesta, che attenta all'unità geografica conseguita dall'Italia al termine delle guerre del risorgimento e l'unità della Nazione, è priva di qualsiasi fondamento giuridico. Inoltre, l'Italia ha consacrato dopo il 1918 il suo diritto alla frontiera del Brennero con un complesso imponente di opere che rende l'economia dell'Alto Adige inseparabile da quella delle altre province settentrionali.

Cio' premesso, l'Italia ha tutto l'interesse, sia nazionale sia internazionale, a tutelare lo stato della minoranza etnica di lingua tedesca in modo soddisfacente e sicuro.

L'Inghilterra e gli Stati Uniti non hanno mancato di manifestare al Governo italiano il loro punto di vista in proposito. I loro suggerimenti coincidono con la volontà del Governo di promulgare tutte le disposizioni legislative atte a dotare l'Alto Adige, entro un breve periodo di tempo, di un'amministrazione rispondente alle aspirazioni ed agli interessi della popolazione.

Il decreto proposto ubbidisce anzitutto al concetto di elaborare l'ordinamento della minoranza di lingua tedesca con il concorso dei suoi cittadini più competenti.

La nomina di un Delegato straordinario è suggerita:

- a) dalla situazione particolare dell'Alto Adige distinta dall'esistenza di una forte corrente separatista nel periodo compreso fra la riconsegna allenta del territorio e la conferenza della pace che deciderà della frontiera con l'Austria;
- b) dalla necessità di accentrare in un'autorità superiore ai Prefetti la preparazione di una legislazione e l'attuazione di una politica che interessano la popolazione dei comuni compresi in tre Province;
- c) dall'opportunità di dare speciale risalto internazionale, all'azione del Governo in Alto Adige.

Dati i recenti risultati negativi degli Alti Commissariati si è creduto utile limitare le funzioni delegate alla condotta politica degli interessi locali e al coordinamento delle iniziative riguardanti la minoranza di lingua tedesca.

I poteri legislativi del delegato straordinario, il cui ufficio è temporaneo,

sono limitati in modo da mantenere al Governo centrale la massima autorità nelle decisioni.

L'istituzione dell'ufficio del Delegato assicura l'unità e il coordinamento fra l'iniziativa politica locale e l'iniziativa del Governo centrale, anche nei riflessi internazionali.

L'ufficio è composto dal Delegato, da un Segretario Generale, e da un funzionario col il grado di Consigliere di Prefettura, da un traduttore e da due stenografate.

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

C O P Y 7

Draft of a decree for the institution of the office of
extraordinary Delegate of the government in South Tyrol

Having seen.....;
Having heard the Council of Ministers;
On proposal of the Prime Minister, in agreement with the Ministers of.....;

We have decreed and decree:

Art 1

Depending from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers is created the
office of extraordinary Delegate of the government in South Tyrol, in Bolzano.
The office has temporary character.

Art 2

The extraordinary Delegate:

- a) superintends the preparation of the legislative order to be instituted in the Alto Adige for the status of the ethnical minority of german language. Particularly, he institutes the local commissions of study of the various branches of the order, predisposes and coordinates their work;
- b) issues in name of the central government decrees for the temporary regulation of the matters outlined under a);
- c) proposes, approves, revokes, the decrees of the Prefects of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno dealing particularly with the political, administrative and economic interests of the south tyrolian population;
- d) proposes to the Council of Ministers the drafts of laws elaborated by the commissions of study;
- e) directs and coordinates in the three provinces the activity of the statal administrations, of the enti, the institutes of public right and of all "enti" under the protection or the vigilance of the state, in order to assure that the ordered cohabitation of ethnical south tyrolian group be based on the principle of equality of rights and duties of all citizens and be carried out with the respect of the special laws and dispositions for the south tyrolians.

Art 3

.....

EXCERPT FROM the newspaper "IL TEMPO" of 22 november 1945

The political and juridical settlement of Alto Adige approved by the Council of Ministers.-

The Council of Ministers at yesterday's meeting at the Vittoriale, besides other matters of ordinary administration, has approved a draft decree of great importance for the political and juridical settlement of Alto Adige.

This scheme aims to solve the problem of the citizenship of the "Alto Atesini" in connection with the various situations created by the application of the known agreements between Italy and Germany of 1939.

(Translation of) :

La sistemazione politica e giuridica dell'Alto Adige approvata dal Consiglio dei Ministri.

Il Consiglio dei Ministri, riunitosi ieri mattina al Vittoriale, oltre ad alcuni provvedimenti di ordinaria amministrazione, ha approvato uno schema di provvedimento di grande importanza, per la sistemazione politica e giuridica dell'Alto Adige.

Il provvedimento intende risolvere il problema della cittadinanza degli altoatesini in relazione alle varie situazioni determinatesi per effetto dell'applicazione dei noti accordi italo-tedeschi del '39.

RELAZIONE RISERVATA DEL PREFETTO DI BOLZANO

al Governo Italiano

sugli sviluppi della questione dell'Alto Adige

Relazione al Governo Italiano sugli sviluppi della questione dell'Alto Adige

13 Novembre 1945

L'A.M.G. di Bolzano non e' mai stato un comune Provincial Government, ma un centro politico i cui compiti hanno stretta attinenza con la decisione internazionale per l'alto Adige.

Le mie conversazioni con esponenti alleati e la loro approvazione dei miei punti di vista, le notizie da me raccolte sia per mezzo di informatori italiani e stranieri sia personalmente, l'attento esame della principale stampa estera che ricevo dalla Sviz era, mi persuadono a suggerire al Governo di precisare senza ritardo il suo indirizzo nella questione dell'Alto Adige e di attuare una politica locale che gli ultimi sviluppi internazionali consigliano piu' chiara e vigorosa e meglio orientata verso l'Austria.

La mia iniziativa di Prefetto, anche se e' stata ed e' molto estesa sia in ragione del consenso alleato sia per l'assenza di decisioni e persino di informazioni da parte del Governo, non puo' evidentemente superare certi limiti senza perdere di valore.

Sono certo che il Governo e' a conoscenza del fatto che l'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti nella questione del Sud Tirolo e' di recente mutato a nostro sfavore.

Ho l'impressione che sulla politica degli Stati Uniti abbiano potuto influire la lentezza ed una certa negligenza del Governo di Roma nel manovrare la questione dell'alto Adige e cio' mi induce ad esporre il mio punto di vista sulla situazione e sull'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti, e a presentare alcune proposte che tra l'altro servono a precisare la responsabilita' del Governo Italiano.

Devo aggiungere che le mie proposte sono conosciute dagli Alleati, e ho ragione di credere che essi ne ritengano indispensabile l'adozione.

Dal maggio al novembre, ho diretto la mia politica, agendo generalmente d'iniziativa:

- 1) - a evitare qualsiasi conflitto e disordine, sia da parte italiana sia sudtirolese, che potesse influenzare negativamente l'opinione internazionale e il pacifico accoglimento "in loco" della futura decisione alleata;
- 2) - a preparare un ambiente favorevole alla cooperazione tra gli italiani e i cittadini di lingua tedesca;

1) A.M.G. di Bolzano non e' mai stato un comune Provincial Government, ma un centro politico i cui compiti hanno stretta attinenza con la decisione internazionale per l'alto Adige.

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La mia iniziativa di Prefetto, anche se e' stata ed e' molto estesa sia in ragione del consenso alleato sia per l'assenza di decisioni e persino limiti senza perdere di valore.

Sono certo che il Governo e' a conoscenza del fatto che l'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti nella questione del Sud Tirolo e' di recente mutato a nostro sfavore.

Ho l'impressione che sulla politica degli Stati Uniti abbiano potuto influire la lentezza ed una certa negligenza del Governo di Roma nel manovrare la questione dell'alto Adige e cio' mi induce ad esporre il mio punto di vista sulla situazione e sull'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti, e a presentare alcune proposte che tra l'altro servono a precisare la responsabilita' del Governo Italiano.

Devo aggiungere che le mie proposte sono conosciute dagli Alleati, e ho ragione di credere che essi ne ritengano indispensabile l'adozione.

Dal maggio al novembre, ho diretto la mia politica, agendo generalmente d'iniziativa:

- 1) - a evitare qualsiasi conflitto e disordine, sia da parte italiana sia sudtirolese, che potesse influenzare negativamente l'opinione internazionale e il pacifico accoglimento "in loco" della futura decisione alleata;
- 2) - a preparare un ambiente favorevole alla cooperazione tra gli italiani e i cittadini di lingua tedesca;
- 3) - a mettere nella maggiore evidenza presso gli Alleati l'importanza decisiva del lavoro compiuto dagli italiani in Alto Adige dopo il 1918, e a dimostrare loro la necessita' di garantire alla nuova economia italiana il sicuro possesso degli impianti idroelettrici da noi costruiti;
- 4) - a limitare l'influenza della propaganda austriaca e l'atteggiamento anti italiano nel Nord Tirolo;
- 5) - a indurre il nostro Governo a prendere una posizione piu' netta nella questione dell'Alto Adige e a svolgere una politica piu' comprensiva e sollecita verso la popolazione di lingua tedesca, in particolare risolvendo il quesito degli stati di cittadinanza.

- 2 -

Si deve sperare che il Governo Italiano abbia misurato le gravi difficoltà e i favorevoli risultati del mio lavoro. Le une e gli altri sono conosciuti dagli Alleati, ciò che ha molta importanza.

Vorrei invece sottolineare il fatto che i miei interventi presso il Governo Italiano per ottenere una maggiore interessamento e una più acuta vigilanza hanno avuto risultati insufficienti.

Dal principio ho considerato necessario che il nostro Governo prendesse una decisione rapida e chiara nel problema delle opzioni, problema che condiziona gli stati di cittadinanza e la preparazione delle liste elettorali. La decisione, se tempestiva, avrebbe permesso gli Stati Uniti della nostra effettiva buona volontà di sistemare l'Alto Adige in forme democratiche, e avrebbe di conseguenza limitato l'efficacia morale delle insistenze austriache. Il problema poteva essere risolto con tanto maggiore successo quanto prima fosse stato affrontato.

Una mia prima proposta di regolamento, presentata al Governo alla fine di maggio, subì il ritardo di un mese in seguito alla crisi ministeriale. La mia seconda proposta, approvata alla fine di luglio dalla Presidenza del Consiglio e successivamente dall'Ammiraglio Stone, ha determinato il consenso alleato all'istituzione in Bolzano di una Commissione per la revisione degli stati di cittadinanza. Alla Commissione era assicurato il duplice vantaggio di essere nominata dal Governo Italiano e di avere il gradimento alleato. Per i suoi lavori, avevo già ottenuto la partecipazione dei principali esponenti di lingua tedesca.

Per la ragioni accennate, devo ritenere un errore che la Commissione sia mancata. L'errore sembra più grave quando si consideri che l'Ammiraglio Stone ha sollecitato inutilmente una risposta immediata del nostro Governo il 20 agosto, il 21 settembre, il 19 ottobre. Il Governo Italiano non gli ha risposto, come non ha risposto alle mie numerose sollecitazioni. Perché? Sia stata una mancanza involontaria del Governo o sia stato un modo per ritornare sulla propria precedente approvazione del progetto per cause che non riesco a spiegarmi e che avrebbero comunque dovuto essere comunicate al Prefetto di Bolzano, questo episodio ha avuto una influenza negativa sull'opinione alleata e sul prestigio della nostra politica in Alto Adige.

La divulgazione ufficiale di un preciso piano per la sistemazione dell'Alto Adige e un immediato principio di esecuzione di tale piano sarebbero ancora oggi graditi alla Commissione Alleata in Italia e sembrano anzi necessari per ingluire sull'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti; alla condizione che una tale dimostrazione sia messa in funzione dei fattori internazionali che ormai influiscono sulla questione, e quindi concertata con quella delle grandi Potenze che ci sostiene più decisamente al Brennero, ed è l'Inghilterra. All'Inghilterra dobbiamo affidare il compito di ricondurre gli Stati Uniti da valutazioni sentimentali alle considerazioni di "real Politik" che determinano il problema dell'Alto Adige a nostro vantaggio.

Il Governo Italiano non deve sorprendersi se le sincere dichiarazioni del Presidente Parri e del Ministro De Gasperi, se gli accenni alle autonomie regionali (l'unione delle province di Bolzano e di Trento potrà essere esaminata dopo la decisione internazionale ma oggi non avrebbe efficacia per influenzarla) e altri non chiudono la questione.

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- 3 -

Ho l'impressione che il nostro Consiglio dei Ministri, quando prende in esame le questioni dell'Alto Adige, subisca uno stato d'animo che lo induce a domandarsi che cosa mai voglia dal Governo Italiano questa esigente minoranza di lingua tedesca. Sarebbe molto piu' ragionevole domandarsi che cosa vogliono gli Alleati nella questione del Brennero. A mio giudizio per risolvere a nostro vantaggio il problema, dobbiamo anzitutto porci questa domanda, con la massima chiarezza.

In questo momento internazionale, la politica dell'Austria sembra avere una portata non troppo inferiore a quella dell'Italia. Su tutti i rapporti internazionali, e quindi sul nostro problema, pesa in modo decisivo il conflitto potenziale tra Occidente ed Oriente. Se alla conferenza di Londra la Russia si e' dichiarata in-differente al problema del Sud Tirolo, essa ha cosi' lasciato all'Austria di Renner una responsabilita' di piu' nel difficile equilibrio europeo; e se Renner ha abilmente spostato tutto il peso della sua attuale politica estera sulla rivendicazione del Sud Tirolo, (al Governo italiano non puo' essere sfuggita l'importanza europea, e non solo austriaca, della scelta di Gruber, capo del Nord Tiroler Volkspartei, a Ministro degli Esteri a Vienna) e' stato per attribuire a sua volta alle Potenze occidentali una parte di responsabilita' nella sua scelta di domani.

Oggi il peso della decisione del Sud Tirolo spetta dunque principalmente all'Inghilterra, che non puo' astrarre dalla situazione internazionale creata dalla dichiarazione russa e dalla presa di posizione austriaca.

Qual'e' il massimo interesse dell'Inghilterra al Brennero ?

- a) - risolvere il problema dell'Alto Adige in modo da non rendersi ostile ne' l'Austria ne' l'Italia;
- b) - cercare anzi di avvicinare per quanto possibile i due Stati, cosi' da fare della stessa questione che potrebbe dividerli una condizione per unirli.

L'Inghilterra e' senza dubbio interessata a sostenere l'Italia al Brennero. In particolare essa e' sospinta a funzioni di conciliatrice fra l'Italia e l'Austria dall'interesse di avvicinare i due Stati, dalla dichiarazione di indifferenza della Russia, e dal mutato atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti per il Sud Tirolo.

Le ragioni piu' profonde del suo interesse si possono trarre perfino dalle recenti dichiarazioni di Togliatti che ha ravvisato nel confine "democratico" del Brennero il limite necessario per la difesa della nuova Italia da altre invasioni barbariche.

Se le premesse che ho esposto sono esatte, si deduce che...

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Se le premesse che ho esposto sono esatte, si delinea chiaramente la linea politica che conviene all'Italia di adottare: trattative dirette con l'Austria sotto gli auspici del Governo alleato ¹⁴⁸⁸³ Italia, e prima ancora prontissimo, efficace riconoscimento dei diritti della minoranza di lingua tedesca.

Occorre a mio giudizio che il Governo Italiano si prepari sin d'ora, tenendo assolutamente fermo sul confine nazionale allo spartiacque del Brennero e sull'intera disponibilita' dell'energia elettrica per le nostre industrie del Nord alle piu' ampie concessioni verso l'Austria e verso la minoranza etnica.

- 4 -

In linea di fatto, poiche' sembra necessaria un'impostazione nuova per influenzare l'opinione internazionale e arrestare il suo movimento di deriva verso la tesi dell'Austria, suggerisco di procedere alla nomina, con il gradimento alleato, di un delegato italiano per l'Alto Adige che abbia il compito principale di preparare "in loco" la sistemazione della minoranza etnica, fondando lo studio e l'elaborazione di tutti i provvedimenti da adottare sulla collaborazione attiva degli esponenti di lingua tedesca.

Richiamo l'attenzione del Governo sul fatto che nel caso in cui il delegato abbia il gradimento degli Alleati, i rappresentanti politici della minoranza si sono gia' dichiarati pronti a collaborare con lui, e nelle Commissioni da costituire, per la compilazione del nuovo statuto.

Il delegato dovrebbe avere i compiti di :

- 1) - mantenere i rapporti con gli organi alleati, per quanto si riferisce all'Alto Adige e alle relazioni con l'Austria;
- 2) - iniziare e svolgere, in assoluto accordo con il Governo alleato in Italia, i sondaggi e le trattative con l'Austria;
- 3) - predisporre, istituire e coordinare i lavori delle diverse commissioni necessarie a studiare il nuovo ordinamento (per la revisione degli stati di cittadinanza, per la legge elettorale, per la bilinguita' nell'amministrazione della giustizia, per i ruoli ed i concorsi a incarichi pubblici di persone di lingua tedesca, ecc);
- 4) - emanare decreti legislativi per la regolamentazione provvisoria della materia relativa alle questioni etniche;
- 5) - promuovere a revocare i decreti del Prefetto;
- 6) - proporre al Consiglio dei Ministri le leggi approvate dalle commissioni locali. Tali legge dovrebbero acquistare piena validita' con la loro approvazione da parte del Consiglio dei Ministri;
- 7) - coordinare l'azione di tutti gli organi provinciali ai fini politici della democratica convivenza dei due gruppi etnici, nel quadro dello Stato Italiano.

Se queste proposte sono giudicate dal Governo degne di considerazione, mi permetto di insistere perche' esse siano discusse entro il piu' breve termine.

La rapidita' di una decisione in materia e' a mio giudizio, e non soltanto a mio giudizio, un importante fattore di successo.

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(Bruno De Angelis) 4882

TRANSLATIONCONFIDENTIAL REPORT BY THE PREFECT OF BOLZANO TO THE
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE FRONTIER
BETWEEN ITALY AND AUSTRIA (ALTO ADIGE)

The AMI of BOLZANO has never been an ordinary Provincial Government, but really a political centre whose tasks are strictly in connection with the international decision on the frontier problem.

My conversations with leading Allied authorities and their approval of my views, the news which I collected either through Italian and foreign reporters or personally, the attentive examination of the main foreign press which I receive from SWITZERLAND, are inducing me to suggest to the Government to determine, without delay, its political direction on the question of the "Alto Adige" and to adopt a local policy which the latest international events suggest to be more clear and energetic and rather oriented towards Austria.

My initiative, as a Prefect, even if it has been and it is still very wide, in virtue of the Allied approval and because of the absence of decisions and even of information from the Government, obviously cannot surpass certain limits without losing value.

I am sure that the Government is aware of the fact that the United States' attitude on the question of the Southern Tyrol has recently emerged to our disadvantage.

My own impression is that the aloneness and a certain carelessness shown by the Government in BOHEMIA in handling the question of the frontier, has influenced the United States' policy, and that fact is inducing me to expose my own view on the situation, on the attitude of the United States, and also to submit some proposals which I think will help to determine the responsibility of the Italian Government.

I must add that the proposals which I am going to expose are well known by the Allies and that I am inclined to believe that they deem their adoption quite indispensable.

During the period May to November I directed my policy, acting generally by initiative:

- 1 - to avoid any conflict or incident either from the Italian or South Tyroleans, which could have influenced negatively the international opinion and a peaceful acceptance "in loco" of the future Allied decision.
- 2 - to prepare an atmosphere favourable to cooperation between the Italians and the German speaking citizens.
- 3 - to demonstrate to the Allies the importance of the works performed in the "Alto Adige" by the Italians after 1918 and to evidence the necessity of securing for the new Italian economy the possession of the hydro-electric plants which have been built by us.

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of my views, the news which I collected from the main foreign press reporters or personally, the attentive examination of the main foreign press which I receive from SWITZERLAND, are inducing me to suggest to the Government to determine, without delay, its political direction on the question of the "Alto Adige" and to adopt a local policy which the latest international events suggest to be more clear and energetic and rather oriented towards Austria.

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My own impression is that the slowness and a certain carelessness shown by the Government in Rome in handling the question of the frontier, has influenced the United States' policy, and that fact is inducing me to expose my own view on the situation, on the attitude of the United States, and also to submit some proposals which I think will help to determine the responsibility of the Italian Government.

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- 2 - to prepare an atmosphere favourable to cooperation between the Italians and the German speaking citizens.
- 3 - to demonstrate to the Allies the importance of the works performed in the "Alto Adige" by the Italians after 1918 and to evidence the necessity of securing for the new Italian economy the possession of the hydro-electric plants which have been built by us.
- 4 - to limit the influence of Austrian propaganda and the anti-Italian attitude shown by the Northern Tyrol.
- 5 - to induce our Government to take an open position towards the question of the frontier between ITALY and AUSTRIA and to adopt a more comprehensive policy towards the German speaking people, particularly bringing the problem of citizenship to a solution.

I hope that the Italian Government consider the serious troubles and the favourable results of my work. All of them are known by the Allies, which is very important.

Since the beginning, I consider it necessary that our Government took a quick and clear decision on the problem of option, a problem which would condition the matter of citizenship and the compilation of the electoral lists. The decision, if timely, would have convinced the United States of our real willingness to settle the question of the "Alto Adige" in a democratic way, and consequently the solution of the problem would have been more successful if faced long ago.

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- 2 -

My first proposal for settlement which I submitted to the Government at the end of May was a month late owing to the ministerial crisis. My second proposal, approved at the end of July by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and afterwards by Admiral Stene himself, had the Allied approval on the establishment in BOLZANO of a commission for the revision of the citizenship problem. Said Commission had the double advantage of being appointed by the Italian Government and being approved by the Allies. Besides I obtained the participation on the Commission of high ranking German speaking people.

For the above-mentioned reasons I believe the failure to establish that Commission is an error. That error appears even greater if it is considered that Admiral Stene urged an answer from our Government on 20th August, 21st September and 19th October. The Italian Government has neither answered his requests nor my repeated messages. Why? Whether it was an involuntary omission of the Italian Government or whether it was a way to recall its own previous approval to the plan for reasons which I cannot understand and of which, in any case, the Prefect of Bolzano should be informed, this episode has had a negative influence on Allied opinion and also the reputation of our policy towards the Alto Adige problem.

The divulgence officially of a plan for the settling of the frontier problem and an immediate execution of such plan would satisfy, even today, the Allied Commission in Italy and it seems that such note would influence the United States' attitude, on the condition that such demonstration be dependent on the international factors which now influence this matter, and should, of course, be arranged with that of the big powers who supports us more decisively at the Brennero. That is England. To England, therefore, we should commit the task of bringing back the United States from sentimental valuations to consideration of "real politics" which would turn the Alto Adige problem to our advantage.

The Italian Government should not be surprised then if the sincere statements of President PIERI and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, DE CASPARI, the allusions to regional autonomy (the joining of the Provinces of BOLZANO and TRIESTE will be examined after the international decision as today it would not have enough influence, but on the contrary, to those who do not know the situation very well it would appear as an expedient), the example of the concessions to the VAL D'AOSTA, those gestures which have been decided in 1906 before being discussed in BOLZANO with the leading German speaking authorities, had such a poor impression on international impression.

My own impression is that our Council of Ministers, when it examines the problem of the frontier between Italy and Austria, is influenced by a special disposition of mind which induces it to put to itself the question: "What does this exigent minority of German speaking people want from the Italian Government?" It would be more reasonable if they put to themselves the question: "What is the interest of the Allies in the Brenner question?". In my opinion, to solve this problem advantageously to us, we should address that question to ourselves, in the clearest manner.

At this international moment the Austrian policy appears to be of a range not inferior to that of Italy. On all the international relations and on our problem too, lies heavily the potential conflict between the East and the West. If at the conference in London Russia has shown indifference towards the Southern Tyrol problem, it is because she intends to throw on Germany's Austria another responsibility.

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My own impression is that our Council of Ministers, when it examines the problem of the frontier between Italy and Austria, is influenced by a special disposition of mind which induces it to put to itself the question: "What does this exigent minority of German speaking people want from the Italian Government?" It would be more reasonable if they put to themselves the question: "What is the interest of the Allies in the Brenner question?". In my opinion, to solve the problem advantageously to us, we should address that question to ourselves, in the clearest manner.

At this international moment the Austrian policy appears to be of a range not inferior to that of Italy. On all the international relations and on our problem too, lies heavily the potential conflict between the East and the West. If at the conference in London Russia has shown indifference towards the Southern Tyrol problem, it is because she intends to throw on Renner's AUSTRIA another responsibility. If Renner has most cleverly reaped all the weight of his present policy on the vindication of the Southern Tyrol, (it did not escape Italy's attention the importance, European and not only Austrian, of the appointment of Gruber, Chief of the Northern Tyrol Volkspartei, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in VIENNA), it was only to throw on the Western Powers a share of responsibility of his future appointment.

Today the decision on the Southern Tyrol question remains with England who cannot abstract herself from the international situation originated by the Russian statement and by the Austrian attitude.

What is the greatest interest of England in the Brenner question?

- (a) to solve the Alto Adige problem in the best manner, that is to say avoiding resentment either of ITALY or AUSTRIA?
- (b) to try to approach, as much as possible, the two nations in order to make of the question which divides them, a condition to join them.

- 3 -

England is undoubtedly interested in supporting Italy on the Roman question. She is driven to act as a reconciler between Italy and Austria by her interest in supporting the two nations and by the indifference shown by Russia and also by the changed attitude of the United States towards the Southern Tyrol problem. But the principal reason for her eager interest could be drawn by the recent statements of WOODROW WILSON who was in the "unmistakable" boundary line of the Roman the necessary limit for the defense of Italy against other barbarian invasions.

If the facts which I exposed above are correct, Italy's political line of conduct in the future should be as follows:

Direct negotiations with AUSTRIA, under the auspices of the Allied Governments in Italy, and before that, a prompt and efficient acknowledgment of the rights of the minority of German speaking people.

In my opinion it is necessary that the Italian Government propose itself to make the largest concessions to AUSTRIA and to the ethnic minority, but will maintain itself on the national ethnic border of the Roman and will request the whole availability of the electric energy which is most essential for our industries in North Italy.

As a matter of fact the necessity of giving the Italian policy a new turn appears to be most urgent in order that it might influence the international opinion and thus its drifting movement towards the Austrian thesis. I suggest therefore, that the Italian Government appoint, with the agreement of the Allies a delegate for the Alto Adige whose principal task would be to prepare "in loco" the settlement of the ethnic minority problem, by the study and elaboration of all proposals to be adopted on the collaboration of the leading members of the German speaking group.

I would like to draw the attention of the Government to the fact that, in case the delegate obtain the approval of the Allied authorities, the political representatives of the minority should have agreed in anticipation to collaborate with him in the compilation of the new "statute".

The delegate's main tasks would be:

- 1 - to keep himself in constant touch with the Allied organizations in order to deal with matters regarding the Alto Adige problem and political relations with Austria;
- 2 - to start, in full accordance with the Allied Government in Italy, negotiations with Austria;

3 - to see-arrange, establish and coordinate the work of the different committees (revision of the citizenship problem, the electoral law, the administration of justice in both languages, the administration of German speaking people).

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If the facts which I mention above are correct, Italy's position
 time of contact in the future should be as follows:

German negotiations with Austria, under the auspices of the
 Allied Governments in Italy, and before that, a prompt and efficient
 acknowledgment of the rights of the minority of German speaking people.

In my opinion it is necessary that the Italian Government
 prepare itself to make the largest concessions to Austria and to the
 official minority, but will maintain itself on the national ethical
 border of the Brenner and will request the whole availability of the
 electric energy which is most essential for our industries in North
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 in order to deal with matters regarding the Alto Adige problem
 and political relations with Austria;
- 2 - to start, in full accordance with the Allied Government in Italy,
 negotiations with Austria;
- 3 - to pre-arrange, establish and coordinate the work of the
 different commissions (revision of the citizenship problem, the
 electoral law, the administration of justice in both languages,
 the competition to public posts by German speaking people);
- 4 - to have a legislative session for the temporary settlement of
 matters relative to the ethnic problem;
- 5 - to prepare or to revise the projects of legislation;
- 6 - to prepare the laws to be submitted to the Council of Ministers
 for consideration as soon as they are passed by the local authorities.
 Such laws acquire full validity at the moment they have been
 approved by the Council of Ministers.

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7 - to coordinate the actions of all provincial organs for the political purpose that the two ethnic groups should live together in a democratic way within the framework of the Italian state.

Should the Italian Government deem the above proposal worthy of consideration, I will take the liberty to insist in my report that they be discussed as soon as possible.

The openness of a decision on the subject is, in my opinion, and not only in my opinion, a condition for a successful result.

BY HENRI DE ARMENTA

JKD/zm

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 VENEZIE REGION
 Allied Military Government
 APO 394

TO : HQ. Allied Commission
 Civil Affairs Section

SUBJECT : Bolzano

FILE NO : RXII/850.12

Ref your AC/45/29/LG of 15 Nov received today.

- 1.
2. The notes enclosed with our RXII/850.12 of 6 November were a typewritten transcript of M.S. notes made by Col. Miller at and after the visit made by the Prefect to Col. Miller on 29 October. They were sent in that form because they represented, to a certain extent, the actual phraseology used by the Prefect. The notes do not however constitute formal proposals; they indicate a line of thought.

3. The situation has now developed further in that the Prefect has sent to Rome by the hand of his Vice Prefect, an important letter to the Italian Government setting out in considerable detail his recommendations as to Italian Government policy in respect of Bolzano. A copy of this document has been handed to the Executive Commissioner and he is bearing it to Rome.

4. You asked about the second paragraph in the notes. The Prefect appreciates the difficult position created in Bolzano by the recent arrival of a number of immigrant Italians. He wishes to send these away, and is prepared to do so by decree. At the same time he sees a political difficulty if only Italians are sent out of the Province. Therefore, he wishes to link the move out of Italian immigrants with the simultaneous move out of Reich Germans of various categories. I have already written to you on the present position in respect of the evacuation of Reich Germans. I am afraid that we must plead guilty in this office to a misprint - Col. Miller's original was quite correct - The date mentioned should of course be 8 Sept 1943, the date of the Italian armistice.

5. I have taken advantage of the visit of the Executive Commissioner to discuss several aspects of the Bolzano problem. You will understand that it has not been very easy to indulge in planning for this Province when its future has been uncertain. Moreover, theoretically, any day since 1st Sept 45 might have brought a message for turn over within ten days. It is for that



17 Nov 45

19 NOV 1945

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6. I hope that we may make progress in this difficult problem in the course of the next few weeks.

John H. D. G.
Regional Commissioner



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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION

Tel: 489084
Ext. 495

AG/45/29/10

15 November 1945

SUBJECT: Bolzano - Proposals of Prefect.

TO : TO Venesia Region

1. Reference is made to your letter of 6 November 45 (File No. RXII/850.12) with enclosure copy of which is attached hereto.
2. Before any action is taken, the Vice President Civil Affairs Section has directed that the exact nature and a clarification of the enclosed document be ascertained.
3. Is it the original paper left by the Prefect, or a note of a conference prepared by the PG, or something else? You will observe that it is entitled "Visit of the Prefect to Col. Miller - October 29th 1945 - 1600 hours", and is unsigned. If there is an original document already prepared by the Prefect in Italian or English may it please be sent to us.
4. The second paragraph of the memo headed "Immigration" is not clear. It speaks about "sending away all Italians etc." and then quotes the proposed decree "to turn out... all enemy aliens etc.". Is the date stated correct, viz. September 8, 1945? In short what does the paragraph mean?
5. An early response will be greatly appreciated.

RBT

RAJAH R. TEMPLE
Major
Director
Local Government Sub Commission

RRT/ma
Encl as in (1) above

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JKD/zm

9 NOV 1945

Important & Confidential

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

8 NOV 1945


6 Nov 45

TO : HQ. A.C.
Attn: Vice President Civil Affairs Section

SUBJECT : Bolzano - Proposals of Prefect

FILE NO : RXII/850.12

1. Further to my reports on the subject of my recent visit to Bolzano, I attach herewith a promemoria of a recent discussion between Colonel Miller and the Prefect De Angelis.
2. The promemoria, which I attach in its exact original wording, represents the proposals which De Angelis considers should be forward to the Italian Government. As you see, he recommends that such proposals should be incorporated in the constitutional law of Italy.
3. It is clear that the various suggestions made by him are of fundamental importance. They go far beyond the scope of prefeterial action though there are certain matters upon which preliminary steps can be taken at once.
4. I have, for example, told the Prefect that I should like to have action taken at once, in a discret way, for the use of both languages on streets, public offices, etc.
5. The bulk of the proposals are however for discussion on your level with the Italian Government.
6. I should be glad to have your further instructions and comments as soon as possible.


Regional Commissioner

Copy to : P.C. Bolzano

Encl.

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Appendix to RX11/850-12 dated
6th Nov.

COPY

Visit of the Prefect to Col. MILLER
 October 29th, 1945 - 1600 hrs.

DOUBLE LANGUAGE

By decree of the Prefect all streets and shops will have signs in two languages, as established by a mixed communal commission. Also all public offices will have signs in the two languages.

Authenticated copies of Italian laws are absolutely necessary, according to the Prefect and will be asked for.

Sentences of Tribunale will be written in Italian with an authenticated German translation.

Hearings in Tribunale will be in Italian if both prosecutor and defendant are Italian-speaking, in German if they are both south Tyrolians. In the event of one of them being of the other ethnical group, hearings will be in both languages. Therefore it will be necessary to have a special law, allowing German speaking lawyers to become judges and creating the posts of German speaking chancellor and official interpreter. A commission will be set up by the Prefect to decide upon these legal matters before making the proposal to the Rome Government.

2. IMMIGRATION

A decree is being prepared by the Prefect, sending away all Italians without a job arrived after September 8th, 1945. reading in part as follows: "whereas Allied authorities, in agreement with the Italian Government have taken the necessary steps to turn out, as early as possible, all enemy aliens still in this Province".

3. OPTIONS

According to the Prefect there should be set up a mixed commission to judge on doubtful cases, with an Italian president and a South Tyrolian vice-president, to be interchangeable every week.

4. COMMUNAL SECRETARIES

For a proportional representation in communes. At present there is no South Tyrolian secretary, although there are many Italian secretaries who speak German. A course of instruction should be set up for South Tyrolians in order that they may pass the necessary examinations, specially organized for this Province.

5. GUARANTEES

According to the Prefect the special ethnical laws and decrees should be guaranteed by embodiment in the constitutional laws of Italy. Besides a possible treaty for the minorities between Italy and Austria could be guaranteed by a great power or by the U.N.

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