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P. A. J.
JAN.

10000/142/891

P.A.D. & C.D. ARRANGEMENTS IN ITALY
JAN. - MAR. 1945

FILE CLOSED 17 March 1945

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

AG/14529/FS

17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Post-Raid Measures.

TO:	Economic Section	Copy No.
" "	for Finance Sub-Commission	60
" "	" Food Sub-Commission	61
" "	" Labour Sub-Commission	62
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" "	" Industry Sub-Commission	64
" "	" Commerce Sub-Commission	65
	Legal Sub-Commission	66
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1. Following a meeting held on 31 Jan 45 in Public Safety Sub-Commission, at which you were represented, there is attached for your study a copy of A.F.E.Q. letter Reference AG 384.5/069 GGT-O dated 29 Jan 45, together with a copy of Report on P.A.D. and G.D. measures to deal with L.R.P. in the European theatre.

2. Particular attention is drawn to paragraphs 1 (c) and 1 (d) of AG 384.5/069 GGT-O. In order to implement the instructions it is considered necessary to call a further meeting to coordinate in more detail the work of various Sub-Commissions concerned, and to formulate the plans to be adopted with regard to Post-Raid Measures.

3. Will you therefore please arrange to be present at a meeting to be presided over by Vice President, Civil Affairs Section in Room 58 (5th Floor) at 1500 hours on 21 March 45.

REC/pr →

LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION	
CLO	
DCLO	
Chief Counsel	
CIO	
Italian Section	
CL RKS	
18 MAR 1945	

R. R. Cripps, Col.
CEO CA Section.

I will attend the meeting
Please let me know how
matter now stand.

W.S.

15

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SECRET

AP 782

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RHF/at

: **SECRET** :

: Auth: SAC MT :

: Initials: RHF :

: 29 January 1945 :

: : :

66

AG 384.5/069 GCT-0

29 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
 (THRU: Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512)
 General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District, CMF
 General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District, CMF
 President, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. With reference to letter, this headquarters, file AG 384.5/233 GCT-0, dated 8 December 1944, subject as above, there are still no positive indications of use of V-1 or V-2 weapons against targets in this theater. However, in view of a report on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense reorganization and modifications in the European Theater, the following Passive Air Defense measures will be put into force forthwith:

a. Passive Air Defense training in units will be intensified. Details of training of instructors at an AFHQ school will be issued shortly.

b. On the assumption that LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA are the most likely targets, commanders of static headquarters concerned will consider what measures will be necessary for the dispersal of personnel and stores if "V" attacks start or definite information of their imminence is received. Orders for putting these plans into effect will be prepared so that they can be issued without delay. The orders should include the closing of places of entertainment, limitation of numbers of military personnel, so far as may be practicable, to a maximum of fifty (50) in any one building, and the staggering of mess hours. It may be assumed that instructions will be issued from this headquarters to stop the use of these towns as leave centers.

c. The Allied Commission will insure that the Civil Defense Organization is reactivated in LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA. The Civil Defense Organization in these places should be sufficiently self-supporting to deal with a medium scale attack involving all but serious incidents.

d. The Allied Commission will insure that post-raid measures are organized at all levels to insure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 384.5/069 GCT-O,
 dtd 29 Jan 45 (cont'd)

2. Copy of report on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense measures to deal with long range projectiles in the European Theater, referred to above, is attached for your information.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

1 Incl
 Report on PAD&CD in ETOUSA

C. W. Christenberry
 C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
 Colonel, AGD,
 Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Each addressee (15th Army Group - 6)
- 1 - C in-C Med
- 3 - MAAP
- 1 - G-1
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3
- 1 - G-4
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - Rome Area
- 1 - Third District
- 10 - PAD & CD
- 1 - AA & CD
- 2 - GWS
- 2 - AG Records (1 cy w/incl)
- 1 - AG M & D (w/o incl)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
P.A.D. & C.D. Section
A.P.O. 512

SEHD/lp

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles - Visit to European Theater
of P.A.D. & C.D. Advisor

TO : A. G. of S. G-3, AFHQ
A. C. of S. G-5, AFHQ

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the visit was to observe the effects of long range projectiles and to study the modifications rendered necessary to P.A.D. and C.D. organization in the places involved. The following places were visited:

BRUSSELS
GHENT
EINDHOVEN

LIEGE
ANTWERP

2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

a. Effect of Attacks on Military Operations. So far the "V" attack on Antwerp has not appreciably reduced the operation of the port, although military effort has been diverted to provide manpower to deal with incidents. A number of Heavy Rescue Parties have to stand by to the exclusion of any other duties and at one time in Antwerp there were 575 military personnel (U.S. and British) actually deployed at the scene of military and civil incidents. To reduce this call on skilled military personnel a Civil Defense Regional Column of 12 rescue parties has been sent to Antwerp from U.S. Also strenuous efforts are being made by Civil Affairs to reorganize the various local Civil Defense Services. To prevent a similar dissipation of military effort in cities in Holland yet to be liberated, Dutch Civil Defense Columns are being formed and trained to move in as required.

b. Scale of Attack and Main Targets. The V-2 attack has been chiefly directed against Antwerp and approximately 20 V-2 fall in and around that city in 24 hours. V-1 attack is divided between Antwerp, Liege, and to a lesser extent Brussels. During conditions of bad visibility in a similar period up to 50 V-1 may be expected to fall in or near Antwerp and Liege respectively. The V-2 appears to be a more accurate weapon than the V-1 and a number of V-2 have fallen within a short distance of each other in Antwerp. Although both V-1 and V-2 have fallen at Ghent it is considered unlikely that this city and port will become a main target until the port is operated on a large scale.

c. Casualties and Damage. The total casualties up to 31 December 1944 from "V" weapons were:

ANTWERP Military 538 killed 632 seriously wounded

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c. Casualties and Damage. The total casualties up to 31 December 1944 from "V" weapons were:

ANTWERP	Military	538 Killed	632 seriously wounded
	Civil	1631 "	3242 "
ELSEWHERE	Military	79 Killed	434 seriously wounded
	Civil	317 "	1566 "

The average number of casualties per projectile is low but in one incident involving a cinema at Antwerp the casualties were 500 killed, 450 wounded, 500 of these casualties were military.

As far as is known no ship has been hit although several berths have been damaged. There have been hits on the electric power station at Antwerp and on a military telephone exchange. At Liege a petrol and oil dump was set on fire by a V-1 and 200,000 gallons of fuel were destroyed. Military damage has been caused at railway yards and vehicle parks.

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d. Reporting of Incidents. In order to obtain a complete picture of the points at which V-1 and V-2 fell, it was essential that all military units reported incidents whether they had suffered damage or not. Civil Affairs Detachments made arrangements for collection of information in less populated areas for direct transmission to Army Group. In large cities much assistance was provided by use of observation posts manned by Civil Defense personnel.

As a result of lack of P.M.D. organization before the attack started, it was necessary in one town to improvise a reporting system by using a continuous patrol of 4 radio jeeps.

At Hq. 21st Army Group, a special information room has been established under P.M.D. arrangements. The density of attack and choice of targets are shown on maps. Charts give details of damage and casualties. Daily Sitreps (VFP 21Ds) are issued.

e. Warning Arrangements. At Brussels a siren warning is given when a V-1 is known to be approaching. After 3 minutes an "All Clear" is sounded. At Liege the "All Clear" is omitted, it being understood that if nothing has happened in 3 minutes that the danger has passed. No warning is available in the case of V-2 attack. At Antwerp no warning is given except for attack by aircraft.

f. Medical Arrangements. The use of Medical Inspection Posts (Dispensaries) to provide additional First Aid Posts proved satisfactory. Evaluation of casualties was smooth and efficient and was adequate for the largest incident. The practice introduced at Antwerp of sending a Medical Officer with the ambulance called to each new incident was effective. Apart from taking charge of medical arrangements on the spot he was able to assess the amount of any further medical assistance required.

It has been found necessary to widen the scope of rescue training to cover First Aid.

g. Effect on Civil Population. The maintenance of morale in ports is a military necessity otherwise migration of labor from the docks and essential public utilities would cause a cessation of work or require the diversion of very considerable military manpower. Morale has been good particularly in Antwerp where some 15,000 Flemish dock workers have shown much determination. The weakness of the local Civil Defense organization and the total absence of Post Raid Measures caused a serious situation for a time. These subjects will be covered in paragraph 5 below.

h. Tactical use of V-1. Although primarily intended as a long range weapon, considerable numbers of V-1 were launched from a range of 30 to 40 miles on Forward areas prior to the German attack on 16 December 1944. The targets appeared to be Forward dumps and billeting areas.

i. Army Fire Service. To date few fires have been caused by "V" weapons. With the exception of the petrol dump at Liege they have not been serious. To reduce the strain on manpower of the U.S. Engineer Fire Service, a National Fire Service Column from U.K. has been asked for to cover a number of Rear areas fire

news patrol of 4 radio jeeps.

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The communication and reporting organization of the Army Fire Service provides an additional reporting agency for "V" incidents.

3. MODIFICATIONS TO NORMAL P.A.D. OPERATIONS

a. Permanent State of Alert. Owing to the fact that V-1 and V-2 attack may take place at any time during the 24 hours, the P.A.D. organization has to be maintained in a permanent state of alert. This involves continuous manning of the Control Centers in target areas. A Control Room staff consists of 3 officers and

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6 O.Rs/E.M. divided into 3 shifts. There is in addition one NCO for day duty only. All units with a strength of 50 and over are required to provide at a few minutes notice an Incident Officer and a Light Rescue Party (NCO and 6 ORs). Larger units have to move further parties to a state of readiness to replace those sent out. Specified technical units have Heavy Rescue Parties standing by to the exclusion of other duties. Equipment is kept ready loaded on vehicles. Work Parties to assist in rescue work and to cordon incidents are available from specified units on short call. Permanently manned Control Centers and standby conditions are in operation at Antwerp City, Antwerp Port, Brussels and Liège. Similar arrangements are being made for Ghent City and Ghent Port.

b. Additional Officers. Much difficulty has been experienced in providing trained officers as the 21st Army Group SO P.D. Pool had been kept as small as possible. When the attack developed many formations who hitherto had retained somewhat aloof as regards P. D., demanded officers at very short notice. It was necessary to increase the War Establishment of the 21st Army Group P.D. Staff Officers pool. At Antwerp an additional SO P.D. became necessary and full-time Staff Officers have been attached to two of the Corps in 2nd Army as well as at HQ, 2nd Army. U. S. Army Headquarters already had full-time P.A.D. Officers. To man Control Centers, officers have been drawn from Training or similar depots and hurriedly instructed. A War Establishment for these Centers is under discussion. In Communication Zone (U.S. Army) the additional officers are provided from Replacement Depots and placed on Temporary Duty.

c. Intensification of Training. P.A.D. training had been maintained in both 12th and 21st Army Groups and fullest use had been made of facilities provided by the Ministry of Home Security in U.K. The new form of continuous attack has shown however that no only has training been insufficient but not nearly enough officers and NCOs have been trained. This has been particularly noticeable as regards training of officers in Incident Control and NCOs in rescue technique. Training in reporting of incidents had also proved inadequate.

To meet the sudden demand for training, three instructors have been sent out by the Ministry of Home Security. Schools have been established at Brussels, Antwerp and Eindhoven. At each of these schools approximately 60 officers per week are trained in Incident Control (one day course) and 40 NCOs are trained as Rescue Party Leaders (five day course). The 2nd Army school at Eindhoven has been made available to U.S. officers and NCOs from 1st and 9th Armies. Vacancies are allotted to all types of units and it is intended to proceed with training at this rate until a very high percentage of officers of all arms have been trained in Incident Control. Lack of this training has considerably added to the difficulties in clearing up serious incidents. Training in rescue technique will also be continued and the Ministry of Home Security experts retained until sufficient military instructors are competent to relieve them.

The training at the above schools is supplemental to and not in place of unit training.

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4. MODIFICATION OF P.A.D. POLICY

a. Reduction of numbers in individual buildings. As a result of the disaster at the Cinema in Antwerp, attendance has been drastically curtailed at Cinemas, Theaters, Churches, and, in fact, all places where large numbers of civilians or troops normally congregate. This policy cuts across Welfare organization and dispersal of entertainment presents such difficulty. Nevertheless, in places subject to "v" attack, it has been considered preferable to avoid a "casualty risk". A direct hit on an R.A.F. mess led to a decision to stagger the hours of meals in officers and other messes. Every endeavor is made to limit the casualty potential to 50 in any one building. Headquarters and billets are therefore dispersed.

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The policy has been accepted to apply the lessons of Antwerp to Ghent when that port is opened in order that the same lessons do not have to be learned at great cost.

b. Reduction of number of troops in target areas. Large cities such as Antwerp, Liege, and Ghent offer considerable facilities for entertainment, and it has been necessary to discontinue the use of Antwerp and Liege as leave centers, and the exclusion of Ghent is also under consideration. The removal of a large Canadian reinforcement depot from the immediate vicinity of Ghent is also contemplated. The unheralded nature of "W" attack makes it undesirable for large numbers of persons to be exposed unless some definite military purpose is served. A V-2 which fell at a main crossroad in the center of Antwerp destroyed 5 tanks and several hundred passers-by were killed and wounded.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS' RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Local Civil Defense Organization. Both in Belgium and Holland very considerable leeway has had to be made up in getting Civil Defense reorganized. Absence of air attack from Normandy onward had diminished the importance of Civil Defense in the list of other Civil Affairs' responsibilities, and the specialist Civil Defense officers labored under certain difficulties. When "W" attack commenced the Belgian and Dutch Civil Defense Services were quite unable to cope with the situation and unnecessary strain was placed on military resources to deal with Civil incidents.

The work of the Civil Affairs Officers concerned has been beyond praise and they received full cooperation from the local authorities. It was not possible however to effect in a few weeks a reorganization that normally requires months. Lack of training in Incident Control and rescue technique was even more serious in the civil organization than in P. D. Much delay in restoring the local Civil Defense Services was caused by the slowness of the administrative machinery to provide such items as vehicles, tires and batteries, and other essential equipment. This also applied to the provision of clothing and extra rations to enable Civil Defense rescue personnel to carry on with the heavy task of rescue work at high pressure.

b. Post Raid Organization. By far the most difficult problems in dealing with air or similar attack on civilians are those generally known as "Post Raid". These include:

- (1) Feeding, clothing, and housing the survivors immediately after an incident, also housing those who homes have become permanently or temporarily untenable.
- (2) Arrangements for "first aid" repairs to less severely damaged premises. This includes freezing and control of building material and labor.
- (3) Provision of Information Centers.
- (4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and effects from wrecked houses.

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- (3) Provision of Information Centers.
- (4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and effects from wrecked houses.
- (5) Organization of a system for provision of funds to those requiring temporary relief.
- (6) Replacement of civil documentation, a serious matter in European countries and involving normally much screening procedure.

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All these and other Post Raid matters are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defense and that responsibility for Post Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer who alone can coordinate all the many services concerned. In important places the appointment of an expert deputy is contemplated or arrangements made for the training of an existing deputy.

It will be recalled that in U.K. failure to appreciate the great importance of Post Raid problems caused the only weakness in morale during the early stages of the air attacks. As a result a highly efficient coordinated organization was built up. One of the leading experts in Post Raid measures from the Ministry of Home Security has been attached to SHARP Mission to Belgium to assist in this matter. The necessary measures at Belgian Government level having been effected, this officer is now being attached to Civil Affairs 21st Army Group.

c. Lack of Emergency Legislation. Great difficulty was met by Civil Affairs Officers in Belgium and Holland owing to lack of emergency legislation. For example, it was not possible for the local authority to remove timber from a wrecked house to effect temporary repairs or emergency strutting to neighboring houses. Such timber and also the debris belonged to the estate of the dead buried in the ruins. No legislation existed to prevent migration of labor from Civil Defense rescue parties to more lucrative work. Building materials could not be frozen and used as directed by the local authority and a black market in roof tiles, tarpaulins and window screening material had already started. This, as well as the fear of looting lowered morale and tended to make the doctor or railwayman stay in his damaged home or move to a less troubled town. Coordination of voluntary and mutually jealous welfare bodies proved a highly complex matter until local authorities were provided with emergency powers and could be persuaded to use them.

6. CONCLUSION

P.A.D. and C.D. measures as developed and modified to meet the new form of attack have proved sound and were effected in a very short period. This was due to the high degree of training and experience of the P.A.D. and C.D. officers concerned and the existence of plans to meet special emergencies.

Ref: 1243

S. E. D. D.

S. E. D. D. DAW
Lt. Colonel
PAD & CD Advisor

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S. B. H. DAW
Lt. Colonel
PAD & CD Advisor

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AC/481/L

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File

5A

Lt. Col. Daw Passive Air Defense officer for A717 addressed conference. He told of his tour of inspection made of areas which were hit by V1 and V2 bombs in Antwerp, Belgium.

No post raid measures had been taken in the area. All was chaos. Morale of people sagged. They did nothing. A great burden was placed upon the civil affairs officer. He found that the necessary powers to deal with first aid repairs to houses were lacking. C.A. Branch of 21 Army Group was asked to take hold of the situation. The Belgium mission from staff was liaison to get necessary legislation passed.

V-1 Tremendous blast effect-area within radius of half mile of hit effected. 600 houses were damaged by one bomb.

V-2 No audible warning. 3 min. to travel 150 to 200 miles. More accurate

Finance Representative was advised that his sub commission should be prepared to advance money for shelter, food and repairs to homes damaged in attack

Legal to aid to the extent of seeing that proper legislation made it possible to take material from completely damaged homes to be used for repair to others.

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4A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/JJJr

G-5: 384.51

7 February 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. As a corollary to the action to be taken under AG memo 384.5/069 GCT-0 of 29 January addressed inter alia to HQ Allied Commission, the Chief of Staff this HQ has directed certain action to be taken here. This includes the following "G-4 and G-5 to study provision or earmarking of supplies, equipment and transport for specified towns now in Allied hands and for anticipated future requirements".

2. It is proposed to hold a meeting at this HQ with interested staff sections to implement the above - the purpose of the meeting would be to discuss a method of provision of vehicles, supplies and equipment at short notice and also the advisability of creating stock piles in the possible target areas namely Leghorn, Florence and Ancona.

3. It is considered desirable that a representative from HQ Allied Commission should attend the meeting who could speak as to the desires of Allied Commission in the matter.

4. It is requested that you will confirm that you will be represented and give the name of the officer who will attend together with the earliest date he could attend here for that purpose.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel

Copy to: PAD & CD - your IRS of 4 Feb. refers.

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AP 782

RHF/at 9205

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512: **SECRET** :
: Auth: SAC MT :
: Initials: *RHF* :
: 29 January 1945 :
: : 3A

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AG 384.5/069 GGT-0

29 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
 (THRU, Commanding General, MTOUSA, APO 512)
 General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District, CMF
 General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District, CMF
 President, Allied Commission, APO 394

*Not received
at legal*

1. With reference to letter, this headquarters, file AG 384.5/233 GGT-0, dated 8 December 1944, subject as above, there are still no positive indications of use of V-1 or V-2 weapons against targets in this theater. However, in view of a report on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense reorganization and modifications in the European Theater, the following Passive Air Defense measures will be put into force forthwith:

a. Passive Air Defense training in units will be intensified. Details of training of instructors at an AFHQ school will be issued shortly.

b. On the assumption that LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA are the most likely targets, commanders of static headquarters concerned will consider what measures will be necessary for the dispersal of personnel and stores if "V" attacks start or definite information of their imminence is received. Orders for putting these plans into effect will be prepared so that they can be issued without delay. The orders should include the closing of places of entertainment, limitation of numbers of military personnel, so far as may be practicable, to a maximum of fifty (50) in any one building, and the staggering of mess hours. It may be assumed that instructions will be issued from this headquarters to stop the use of these towns as leave centers.

c. The Allied Commission will insure that the Civil Defense Organization is reactivated in LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA. The Civil Defense Organization in these places should be sufficiently self-supporting to deal with a medium scale attack involving all but serious incidents.

d. The Allied Commission will insure that post-raid measures are organized at all levels to insure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 384.5/069 GCT-O,
 dtd 29 Jan 45 (cont'd)

2. Copy of report on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense measures to deal with long range projectiles in the European Theater, referred to above, is attached for your information.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenberry
 C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
 Colonel, AGD,
 Adjutant General.

1 Incl
 Report on PAD&CD in ETOUSA

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Each addressee (15th Army Group - 6)
- 1 - C in-C Med
- 3 - MAAF
- 1 - G-1
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3
- 1 - G-4
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - Rome Area
- 1 - Third District
- 10 - PAD & CD
- 1 - IA & CD
- 1 - DWS
- 2 - AG Records (1 cy w/incl)
- 1 - AG M & D (w/o incl)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
P.A.D. & C.D. Section
A.P.O. 512

SEHD/lp

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles - Visit to European Theater
of P.A.D. & C.D. Advisor

TO : A. C. of S. C-3, AFHQ
A. C. of S. C-5, AFHQ

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the visit was to observe the effects of long range projectiles and to study the modifications rendered necessary to P.A.D. and C.D. organization in the places involved. The following places were visited:

BRUSSELS
GHENT
EINDHOVEN

LIEGE
ANTWERP

2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

a. Effect of Attacks on Military Operations. So far the "V" attack on Antwerp has not appreciably reduced the operation of the port, although military effort has been diverted to provide manpower to deal with incidents. A number of Heavy Rescue Parties have to stand by to the exclusion of any other duties and at one time in Antwerp there were 575 military personnel (U.S. and British) actually deployed at the scene of military and civil incidents. To reduce this call on skilled military personnel a Civil Defense Regional Column of 12 rescue parties has been sent to Antwerp from U.K. Also strenuous efforts are being made by Civil Affairs to reorganize the various local Civil Defense Services. To prevent a similar dissipation of military effort in cities in Holland yet to be liberated, Dutch Civil Defense Columns are being formed and trained to move in as required.

b. Scale of Attack and Main Targets. The V-2 attack has been chiefly directed against Antwerp and approximately 20 V-2 fall in and around that city in 24 hours. V-1 attack is divided between Antwerp, Liege, and to a lesser extent Brussels. During conditions of bad visibility in a similar period up to 50 V-1 may be expected to fall in or near Antwerp and Liege respectively. The V-2 appears to be a more accurate weapon than the V-1 and a number of V-2 have fallen within a short distance of each other in Antwerp. Although both V-1 and V-2 have fallen at Ghent it is considered unlikely that this city and port will become a main target until the port is operated on a large scale.

c. Casualties and Damage. The total casualties up to 31 December 1944⁷ from "V" weapons were:

ANTWERP	Military	538 killed	632 seriously wounded
	Civilian	1631 "	3212 "

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c. Casualties and Damage. The total casualties up to 31 December 1944⁷ from "v" weapons were:

ANTWERP	Military 538 killed Civil 1631 "	632 seriously wounded 3242 "
ELSEWHERE	Military 79 killed Civil 317 "	434 seriously wounded 1366 "

The average number of casualties per projectile is low but in one incident involving a cinema at Antwerp the casualties were 500 killed, 450 wounded. 500 of these casualties were military.

As far as is known no ship has been hit although several berths have been damaged. There have been hits on the electric power station at Antwerp and on a military telephone exchange. At Liege a petrol and oil dump was set on fire by a V-1 and 200,000 gallons of fuel were destroyed. Military damage has been caused at railway yards and vehicle parks.

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d. Reporting of Incidents. In order to obtain a complete picture of the points at which V-1 and V-2 fell, it was essential that all military units reported incidents whether they had suffered damage or not. Civil Affairs Detachments made arrangements for collection of information in less populated areas for direct transmission to Army Group. In large cities much assistance was provided by use of observation posts manned by Civil Defense personnel.

As a result of lack of P.I.D. organization before the attack started, it was necessary in one town to improvise a reporting system by using a continuous patrol of 4 radio jeeps.

At HQ. 21st Army Group, a special information room has been established under P.I.D. arrangements. The density of attack and choice of targets are shown on maps. Charts give details of damage and casualties. Daily Sitreps (VEE P.Ds) are issued.

e. Warning Arrangements. At Brussels a siren warning is given when a V-1 is known to be approaching. After 5 minutes an "All Clear" is sounded. At Liege the "All Clear" is omitted, it being understood that if nothing has happened in 5 minutes that the danger has passed. No warning is available in the case of V-2 attack. At Antwerp no warning is given except for attack by aircraft.

f. Medical Arrangements. The use of Medical Inspection Rooms (Dispensaries) to provide additional First Aid Posts proved satisfactory. Evaluation of casualties was smooth and efficient and was adequate for the largest incident. The practice introduced at Antwerp of sending a Medical Officer with the ambulance called to each new incident was effective. Apart from taking charge of medical arrangements on the spot he was able to assess the amount of any further medical assistance required.

It has been found necessary to widen the scope of rescue training, to cover First Aid.

g. Effect on Civil Population. The maintenance of morale in ports is a military necessity otherwise migration of labor from the docks and essential public utilities would cause a cessation of work or require the diversion of very considerable military manpower. Morale has been good particularly in Antwerp where some 15,000 Flemish dock workers have shown much determination. The weakness of the local Civil Defense organization and the total absence of Post Raid Measures caused a serious situation for a time. These subjects will be covered in paragraph 5 below.

h. Tactical use of V-1. Although primarily intended as a long range weapon, considerable numbers of V-1 were launched from a range of 30 to 40 miles on Forward areas prior to the German attack on 16 December 1944. The targets appeared to be Forward dumps and billeting areas.

i. Army Fire Service. To date few fires have been caused by "V" weapons. With the exception of the petrol dump at Liege they have not been serious. To reduce the strain on manpower of the U.S. Engineer Fire Service, a National Fire Service Column from U.K. has been asked for to cover a number of Rear areas fire risks.

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The communication and reporting organization of the Army Fire Service provides an additional reporting agency for "V" incidents.

3. MODIFICATIONS TO NORMAL P.I.D. OPERATIONS

a. Permanent State of Alert. Owing to the fact that V-1 and V-2 attack may take place at any time during the 24 hours, the P.I.D. organization has to be maintained in a permanent state of alert. This involves continuous naming of the Control Centers in target areas. A Control Room staff consists of 3 officers and

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6 O.As/E.M. divided into 3 shifts. There is in addition one NCO for day duty only. All units with a strength of 50 and over are required to provide at a few minutes notice an Incident Officer and a Light Rescue Party (NCO and 6 ORs). Larger units have to move further parties to a state of readiness to replace those sent out. Specified technical units have Heavy Rescue Parties standing by to the exclusion of other duties. Equipment is kept ready loaded on vehicles. Work Parties to assist in rescue work and to cordon incidents are available from specified units on short call. Permanently manned Control Centers and standby conditions are in operation at Antwerp City, Antwerp Port, Brussels and Liège. Similar arrangements are being made for Ghent City and Ghent Port.

b. Additional Officers. Much difficulty has been experienced in providing trained officers as the 21st Army Group SO P.D. Pool had been kept as small as possible. When the attack developed many formations who hitherto had remained somewhat aloof as regards P. D., demanded officers at very short notice. It was necessary to increase the War Establishment of the 21st Army Group P.D. Staff Officers Pool. At Antwerp an additional SO P.D. became necessary and full-time Staff Officers have been attached to two of the Corps in 2nd Army as well as at HQ. 2nd Army. U. S. Army Headquarters already had full-time P.D. Officers. To man Control Centers, officers have been drawn from Training or similar depots and hurriedly instructed. A War Establishment for these Centers is under discussion. In Communication Zone (U.S. Army) the additional officers are provided from Replacement Depots and placed on Temporary Duty.

c. Intensification of Training. P.D. training had been maintained in both 12th and 21st Army Groups and fullest use had been made of facilities provided by the Ministry of Home Security in U.K. The new form of continuous attack has shown however that no only has training been insufficient but not nearly enough officers and NCOs have been trained. This has been particularly noticeable as regards training of officers in Incident Control and NCOs in rescue technique. Training in reporting of incidents had also proved inadequate.

To meet the sudden demand for training, three instructors have been sent out by the Ministry of Home Security. Schools have been established at Brussels, Antwerp and Eindhoven. At each of these schools approximately 60 officers per week are trained in Incident Control (one day course) and 40 NCOs are trained as Rescue Party Leaders (five day course). The 2nd Army school at Eindhoven has been made available to U.S. officers and NCOs from 1st and 9th Armies. Vacancies are allotted to all types of units and it is intended to proceed with training at this rate until a very high percentage of officers of all arms have been trained in Incident Control. Lack of this training has considerably added to the difficulties in clearing up serious incidents. Training in rescue technique will also be continued and the Ministry of Home Security experts retained until sufficient military instructors are competent to relieve them.

The training at the above schools is supplemental to and not in place of unit training.

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4. MODIFICATION OF P.A.D. POLICY

a. Reduction of numbers in individual buildings. As a result of the disaster at the Cinema in Antwerp, attendance has been drastically curtailed at Cinemas, Theaters, Churches, and, in fact, all places where large numbers of civilians or troops normally congregate. This policy cuts across Welfare organization and dispersal of entertainment presents such difficulty. Nevertheless, in places subject to "V" attack, it has been considered preferable to avoid a "calamity risk". A direct hit on an R.A.F. mess led to a decision to stagger the hours of meals in officers and other messes. Every endeavor is made to limit the casualty potential to 50 in any one building. Headquarters and billets are therefore dispersed.

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The policy has been accepted to apply the lessons of Antwerp to Ghent when that port is opened in order that the same lessons do not have to be learned at great cost.

b. Reduction of number of troops in target areas. Large cities such as Antwerp, Liege, and Ghent offer considerable facilities for entertainment, and it has been necessary to discontinue the use of Antwerp and Liege as leave centers, and the exclusion of Ghent is also under consideration. The removal of a large Canadian reinforcement depot from the immediate vicinity of Ghent is also contemplated. The unheralded nature of "W" attack makes it undesirable for large numbers of persons to be exposed unless some definite military purpose is served. A V-2 which fell at a main crossroad in the center of Antwerp destroyed 5 tanks and several hundred passers-by were killed and wounded.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS' RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Local Civil Defense Organization. Both in Belgium and Holland very considerable leeway has had to be made up in getting Civil Defense reorganized. Absence of air attack from Normandy onward had diminished the importance of Civil Defense in the list of other Civil Affairs' responsibilities, and the specialist Civil Defense officers labored under certain difficulties, and the attack commenced the Belgian and Dutch Civil Defense Services were quite unable to cope with the situation and unnecessary strain was placed on military resources to deal with Civil incidents.

The work of the Civil Affairs Officers concerned has been beyond praise and they received full cooperation from the local authorities. It was not possible however to effect in a few weeks a reorganization that normally requires months. Lack of training in Incident Control and rescue technique was even more serious in the civil organization than in P. D. Much delay in restoring the local Civil Defense Services was caused by the slowness of the administrative machinery to provide such items as vehicles, tires and batteries, and other essential equipment. This also applied to the provision of clothing and extra rations to enable Civil Defense rescue personnel to carry on with the heavy task of rescue work at high pressure.

b. Post Raid Organization. By far the most difficult problems in dealing with air or similar attack on civilians are those generally known as "Post Raid". These include:

- (1) Feeding, clothing, and housing the survivors immediately after an incident, also housing those who homes have become permanently or temporarily untenable.
- (2) Arrangements for "First Aid" repairs to less severely damaged premises. This includes freezing and control of building material and labor.
- (3) Provision of Information Centers.
- (4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and other

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- (4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and effects from wrecked houses.
- (5) Organization of a system for provision of funds to those requiring temporary relief.
- (6) Replacement of civil documentation, a serious matter in European countries and involving normally much screening procedure.

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All these and other Post Raid matters are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defense and that responsibility for Post Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer who alone can coordinate all the many services concerned. In important places the appointment of an expert deputy is contemplated or arrangements made for the training of an existing deputy.

It will be recalled that in U.K. failure to appreciate the great importance of Post Raid problems caused the only weakness in morale during the early stages of the air attacks. As a result a highly efficient coordinated organization was built up. One of the leading experts in Post Raid measures from the Ministry of Home Security has been attached to SHAFF Mission to Belgium to assist in this matter. The necessary measures at Belgian Government level having been effected, this officer is now being attached to Civil Affairs 21st Army Group.

c. Lack of Emergency Legislation. Great difficulty was met by Civil Affairs Officers in Belgium and Holland owing to lack of emergency legislation. For example, it was not possible for the local authority to remove timber from a wrecked house to effect temporary repairs or emergency strutting to neighboring houses. Such timber and also the debris belonged to the estate of the dead buried in the ruins. No legislation existed to prevent migration of labor from Civil Defence rescue parties to more lucrative work. Building materials could not be frozen and used as directed by the local authority and a black market in roof tiles, tarpaulins and window screening material had already started. This, as well as the fear of looting lowered morale and tended to make the dock or railwayman stay in his damaged home or move to a less troubled town. Coordination of voluntary and mutually jealous welfare bodies proved a highly complex matter until local authorities were provided with emergency powers and could be persuaded to use them.

6. CONCLUSION

P.A.D. and C.D. measures as developed and modified to meet the new form of attack have proved sound and were effected in a very short period. This was due to the high degree of training and experience of the P.A.D. and C.D. officers concerned and the existence of plans to meet special emergencies.

Ref: 1243

S. E. D. D.
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Lt. Colonel
PAD & CD Advisor

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S. E. D. DAW
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Lt. Colonel
PAD & CD Advisor

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AG/11529/PS

30 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles, P.A.S.

TO : Director, Commerce Sub-Commission
Director, Finance Sub-Commission
Director, Food Sub-Commission
Director, Industry Sub-Commission
Director, Labor Sub-Commission
Director, Legal Sub-Commission
Director, Public Health Sub-Commission

1A

1. Reference our letter of even number dated 26 January 1945.
2. Will you please note that the meeting arranged will now take place at 3.30 P.M. (not 2.30 P.M.) Wednesday 31st January 1945 in the office of the Director, Public Safety.

John S. Shappan
JOHN S. SHAPPAN
Colonel, J.A.C.B.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

FTW/jwf

Copy to:
Lt Col Law. (A.F.H.Q.).

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Added to Capt Levy

LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION	
CIO	
CIO	
Chief Clerk	
CJO	
Italion Section	
CL RK5	
Capt Levy	✓
30 JAN 1945	

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

40/11529/75

28 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles, P.A.D.

TO : Director, Commerce Sub-Commission
Director, Finance Sub-Commission
Director, Food, Sub-Commission
Director, Industry Sub-Commission
Director, Labour Sub-Commission
Director, Legal Sub-Commission
Director, Public Health Sub-Commission

1. Attached is an extract entitled "Post Raid Organization" taken from an AFHQ directive dated 10 January 1945 on the subject of Long Range Projectiles.

2. P.A.D. and C.D. arrangements in this theatre are being revised as a result of experience gained in the European theatre recently.

3. "Post Raid" organization will affect in some degree, each of the sub-commissions listed above in addition to Public Safety Sub-Commission.

4. Lt Col Daw, P.A.D. and C.D. Advisor to AFHQ who has recently visited the European Theatre, has requested a meeting of representatives of the sub-commissions named at 2.30 P.M. Wednesday 31st January, 1945 to discuss problems arising from the use of V-1 and V-2.

5. Will you please arrange for a representative to attend. *Col Chapman*
where?

LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

C/O

C/O

RJR/jws

Chief Counsel

C/O

Hollan Street

Ct RKS

Capt Luy.

29 JAN 1945

Handwritten signature
JOHN E. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.U.S.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

Col Chapman's office

54L F1 - Room 8

SECRET*for action. LWS*

3

COPY

CIVIL AFFAIRS' RESPONSIBILITIES

a) Local Civil Defense Organization. Both in Belgium and Holland very considerable leeway has had to be made up in getting Civil Defense reorganized. Advance of air attack from Normandy onward had diminished the importance of Civil Defense in the list of other Civil Affairs' responsibilities, and the specialist Civil Defense officers labored under certain difficulties. When "V" attack commenced the Belgian and Dutch Civil Defense Services were quite unable to cope with the situation and unnecessary strain was placed on military resources to deal with Civil incidents.

The work of the Civil Affairs Officers concerned has been beyond praise and they received full cooperation from the local authorities. It was not possible however to effect in a few weeks a reorganization that normally requires months. Lack of training in Incident Control and rescue technique was even more serious in the civil organization than in P.A.D. Much delay in restoring the local Civil Defense Services was caused by the slowness of the administrative machinery to provide such items as vehicles, tires and batteries, and other essential equipment. This also applied to the provision of clothing and extra rations to enable Civil Defense rescue personnel to carry on with the heavy task of rescue work at high pressure.

b) Post Raid Organization. By far the most difficult problems in dealing with air or shell attack on civilians are those generally known as "Post Raid". These include:

- 1) Feeding, clothing, and housing the survivors immediately after an incident, also housing those whose homes have become permanently or temporarily untenable.
- 2) Arrangements for "First Aid" repairs to less severely damaged premises. This includes freezing the control of building material and labor.
- 3) Provision of Information Centers.
- 4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and effects from wrecked houses.
- 5) Organization of a system for provision of funds to those requiring temporary relief.
- 6) Replacement of civil documentation, a serious matter in European countries and involving normally much paperwork.

All these and other Post Raid matters are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defense and that responsibility for Post Raid measures be assured by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer who alone can coordinate all the many services concerned. In important places the appointment of an expert deputy is contemplated or arrangements made for the training of an existing deputy.

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It will be recalled that in U.K. failure to appreciate the great importance of Post Raid problems caused the only weakness in morale during the early stages of the air attacks. As a result of a highly efficient coordinated organization was built up. One of the leading experts in Post Raid measures from the Ministry of Home Security has been attached to SHAW Mission to Belgium to assist in this matter. The necessary measures at Belgian Government level having been effected, this officer is now being attached to Civil Affairs 21st Army Group.

c) Lack of Emergency Legislation. Great difficulty was met by Civil Affairs officers in Belgium and Holland owing to lack of emergency legislation. For example, it was not possible for the local authority to remove timber from a wrecked house to effect temporary repairs or emergency strutting to neighboring houses. Such timber and also the debris belonged to the estate of the dead buried in the ruins. No legislation existed to prevent migration of labor from Civil Defense rescue parties to more lucrative work. Building materials could not be frozen and used as directed by the local authority and a black market in roof tiles, tarpaulins and window screening material had already started. This, as well as the fear of looting lowered morale and tended to make the dockers or railwaymen stay in his damaged home or move to a less troubled town. Coordination of voluntary and mutually jealous welfare bodies proved a highly complex matter until local authorities were provided with emergency powers and could be persuaded to use them.

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