

ACC

10000/142/1013

LEGAL S/C OF A
SEPT. 1943

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LEGAL S/C OF ACC, GENERAL INFO ON AMGOT
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for the execution of this order. They shall surrender all explosives and all war supplies to the nearest unit of the German Army.

The following are not included in this delivery:

- a) arms and munitions, for which the holder has permission granted by a German Authority;
 - b) arms and munitions in possession of the Public Force, the Navy, the jurisdiction of a German military authority;
 - c) side arms, ancient arms, which are not of other, and air gun.
- Any person, who does not obey the order of the delivery of arms, shall be punished by death and in slighter cases by imprisonment or detention.
- by death in the city or/and special orders are issued.

PAR. 2

Any person, who makes an attempt upon the life of persons adverse to members of the German Armed Forces or to any German unit, is punishable by death and in less grave cases by imprisonment or arrest.

PAR. 3

Any person, who gives any help whatever to members of enemy armed forces, shall be punished by death and in less grave cases by imprisonment or arrest. The same thing is for those, who harbor or aid members of enemy armed forces in any other manner.

PAR. 4

Any person, who damages the interests of the occupying German forces, by stopping work without good reason or by refusing to employ workers, any person, who investigates strikes or sit-down strike or damages in whatever manner the good state of the work shall be punished by imprisonment, arrest or fine. In serious cases they shall be punished by death.

PAR. 5

The printing and the distribution of leaflets adverse to German interests are prohibited. These leaflets must be delivered by whoever shall come into possession of them, to the nearest German unit or service station or R.A. The delivery can be also made to the Mayor's office. Any person who shall not obey this order, is punishable by arrest or imprisonment and in more serious cases by death.

PAR. 6

The possession of radio transmission sets and spare parts for such sets of whatever kind, include also amateur radio transmitting sets and their various accessories are prohibited. Any person who has the possession of the German military authority to keep such apparatus is excluded from this order. Transmitters are punishable by death.

PAR. 7

Any person who shall show disapproval of the orders issued by the German Military Authorities about the work, service, and conditions, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine.

PAR. 8

Any person who taking advantage of the temporary scarcity of goods, unlawfully keeping them and particularly of those of daily use, allotted for the need of the population, is punishable by death; in slighter cases the penalty can be reduced to one of imprisonment or arrest.

The same penalty is applicable to any person, who, taking advantage of the scarcity of goods and specially of those of daily need, claims and accepts a disproportional profit, which is not in proportion with the true value of same goods.

PAR. 9

Any person who is not giving full work service, asked by the Superior Commandant of South or by other H., authorized by him, or any person who is complying with these orders in such manner that their purpose is being completely or partly flouted, is punishable by imprisonment, or arrest or fine.

The fine may be added to imprisonment or arrest.

Any person who prevents others complying with such orders or however tries to flout the work of third persons, is equally punishable by the same penalties.

PAR. 10

Any person who is not complying with the orders of the Superior South Command or of a service section charged by it, is not giving the necessary statement of residence or limitation of residence, is punishable by imprisonment or arrest, provided that such person is not liable to more severe penalties.

PAR. 11

The property of the State and that of private persons is under the protection of the German Armed Forces. Theft and sacking of others properties shall be punishable under the War Law, by death and in slighter cases by imprisonment or arrest.

PAR. 12

The population is prohibited to circulate on the streets or halt outside of his house from 1900 to 0500 hrs. The local H. can make exceptions in favour of war industries' workers. The Curfew Order is not effective for any person who is charged with maintaining public order.

PAR. 13

No inhabitant can leave his residence, without written order of the Mayor. For evacuations for the approval of the German Command upon whom the locality depends, it is necessary.

The transgressors shall be punishable by the War Law.

PAR. 14

All actions punishable in conformity with the German Law shall be judged in conformity with this Law.

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PAR. 15

The present proclamation comes into force with effect of this issue.

All previous proclamations, not in accordance with the present, are avoid.

THE FIELD COMMANDANT

VON ZANTHIER

Major General

Toromo, 5 October 1943.

(1)

I come to the military situation and in particular to the work which has been done by the Allied Military Government in Sicily. As I listened to this Debate I thought some hon. Members did not seem to have a very clear picture of what this organisation is and what its officers have to do. Their charge in the first instance is not in the main a political one but a practical one. They come into cities utterly devastated, cities which have been subjected to aerial bombardment, which are probably without either light or water, with the dead lying around the streets and without food, probably, even for the next day. Their task is to try to restore something in the nature of normal life to those cities, to try to get transport going again- and when two armies have passed through a town there is not very much transport left - to try to get food in from neighbouring countries, to try to prevent the outbreak of epidemics of typhus and other diseases. It is an immensely difficult task of organisation. Those have been the main tasks upon which this military government has concentrated. I have watched its work with great care. I have had sent to me at the Foreign Office the reports of the work of this organisation, and I can tell the House that they have done very fine work there.

Now I come to one of the criticisms that have been made. First it is said that we have created this organisation to maintain Fascist officials in office. That is not so. Let me give Sicily as an example, and here let me say that in Sicily Fascism has never been a really popular creed. Fascism has been imported into Sicily; most of the senior officials in Sicily were imported from the North. Its senior officials have almost without exception been removed from the moment of our possession of the territory. Sicily is divided into nine areas, what the French would call prefectures, under prefects. All of these were under Fascist, all of whom have been got rid of. They either fled or were removed after we arrived - most of them fled. In more than 50 percent of them the local mayors, the *podestà*, have also been changed from the moment of our arrival; the organisation has done what it could to choose a mayor who had a certain amount of popular backing and who was generally acceptable-not of course by the process of holding an election, but by a sounding of the population - to take the place of the Fascist official. A number of Fascists have of course been arrested. I have not the exact figures, but the latest report is that about 1,000 prominent Fascists in Sicily remained behind are at present interned.

I have come to another criticism, that of the hon. Member for Cambridge University, who asked, Why use the Carabinieri? The House knows that they are not an organisation of exclusively Fascist traditions. On the contrary, they existed in Italy a very long time before the Fascist Regime. The bad organisation, the organisation which we may call sinister in its influence, what corresponds to the Gestapo in Ovra, the secret police that Mussolini and the Fascists used to employ. That organisation has been completely broken up and destroyed in Italy, and the Fascist Party organisation with it, and all the members of Ovra and all the Fascist political officials in Sicily have been arrested, though many of them fled before they could be arrested. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we had not used the Carabinieri. What would we have to do? We should have had to employ at least 10,000 British troops to do their job-not so well-and that would have taken men from the fighting forces. We discussed all this before we went into Sicily and I am absolutely certain that our system is right.

I come to the next criticism- Why do you put a ban on political activity- that is a perfectly fair question. It would have been very much more

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I come to the next criticism- Why do you put a ban on political activities? That is a perfectly fair question. It would have been very much more popular, I have no doubt, with many in Sicily if from the moment of our landing and before the island was clear we had had a bit of "free for all" political strife of the kind we enjoy in this country. We just felt that we could not enjoy that luxury at this stage. I am coming to the time-table in a moment. Many hon. members probably know Sicily much better than I do. If they do, they know that it is an island of intensely active rival political factions. Perhaps the strongest party of all in Sicily is the party that stands for separation from the Italian mainland altogether. Then there is the clerical party and there is the party of the extreme Left, all in violent divergence. (Interruption). I think I am talking sense. These matters have been studied with some care.

Mr. Ivor Thomas: Would the right hon. Gentleman allow me to say this? It is agreed, I think, among Italians that there is no separatist movement in Sicily. There is a desire for regional freedom but no desire for separation, and I am

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Mr. Thomas (Cont'd.) afraid that if the right hon. gentleman says that the strongest party in Sicily is the separatist party, it will encourage the idea that Great Britain intends to annex the island.

Mr. Eden: My hon. Friend should not dive too deep in attributing motives to everything that is said. We have not the least intention of annexing the island, nor should we, at any time. The report I have from our officers on the spot is that the Sicily independence movement is extremely strong. There is nothing in the least new in that. Really, the hon. Gentleman is not the only person who knows something about the matter. It is a perfectly well-known movement. What shade of independence it requires, whether it be a form of home rule, as the agitation used to be here, or for complete separation, is another matter; but there is a movement—if you like to call it a home rule movement you can, but it is a matter of common knowledge—for separation. I do not want to take up time on this point, which does not affect my argument, which is simply that there are these parties in Sicily, violently antagonistic. Some want one thing and some want another. My hon. Friend may think I have described the position wrongly, but I am sure that he will not disagree with my statement that these parties disagree with one another with very great vehemence. In the existing military situation, and while we were using this island for the preparation of the advance upon Naples, it was impossible to allow free rein to these various political parties. The hon. Gentleman can well ask—(An Hon. Member: "Is there freedom of political discussion?") Of course there is. These regulations are not at all tightly applied. There is a great deal of political discussion. There is freedom of the Press to say what they like about each other, and even about AMMOT. I am informed, that after 20 years of Fascist rule, the Press are not in the least happy at being told that they can say what they like. They have been so used to having a directive that they do not quite like it when they do not get it. (Interruption.) It is so. After 20 years of not being allowed to express your opinions and of having to say exactly what the Government tell you, a week after you are released you are liable to be a bit puzzled. I have no doubt that they will very soon have criticisms of the work we are doing, just as we have it in this House.

I want to deal with one other point of this kind. It has been said that the exchange rate was very unfairly fixed by this organisation. In fairness to the organisation and to the officers concerned, I wish to make it quite plain that they had no responsibility in this matter. The fixing of the rate was done on the responsibility of the two Governments principally concerned and not by this organisation. Whether the decision was right or wrong, it was not the fault of that organisation. Let me deal with the point whether the organisation shall continue. It is not, of course, intended to be permanent. It is bound up with the future of Italy herself, about which I am going to say something in a moment. We do not want to have these burdens of administration on our hands. The sooner we can find an Italian administration that can take these burdens off our hands the better we shall be pleased. We do not want to re-enter Italy, or even Europe, on the basis that we are going to be the people who will administer and run the countries. We want, as soon as we can, that the people shall run the country for themselves.

Capt. Alan Graham: On what lines?

Mr. Eden: On the lines that they wish to. Now I come to the cognate question about which I have been asked, and I am obliged to the hon. Member who raised this matter. What is our policy in respect of friendly countries? There we do not propose to apply the same principles, of course; we have never intended to do.

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Mr. Cocks: Does it apply to France?

Mr. Egan: Certainly, at the earliest moment, though it is more complicated in the case of France, as the hon. member will realize. The French people shall express their own view, but we shall do what we can to use French officials and French people.

Mr. Cocks: Will you use the National Committee?

Mr. Egan: Of course we shall. We are in relation with the Committee, it is they who have sent the troops to Ajaccio, where they are fighting. It is an instance of what is going to happen. It is an experiment. We shall see how it works.

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Extract from Speech in House of Commons by Anthony Eden on AUGUST (22 Sept. 43)

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I want to deal with one other point of this kind. It has been said that the exchange rate was very unfairly fixed by this organisation. In fairness to the organisation and to the officers concerned, I wish to make it quite plain that they had no responsibility in it is matter. The fixing of the rate was done on the responsibility of the two Governments principally concerned and not by this organisation. Whether the decision was right or wrong, it was not the fault of that organisation. Let us deal with the point whether the organisation shall continue. It is not, of course, intended to be permanent. It is bound up with the future of Italy herself, about which I am going to say something in a moment. We do not want to have these burdens of administration on our hands. The sooner we can find an Italian administration that can take these burdens off our hands the better we shall be pleased. We do not want to re-enter Italy, or even Europe, on the basis that we are going to be the people who will administer and run the countries. We want, as soon as we can, that the people shall run the country for themselves.

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Genl. Alan Grahame: On what lines?

Mr. Eden: On the lines that they wish to. Now I come to the cognate question about which I have been asked, and I am obliged to the hon. Member who raised this matter. That is our policy in respect of friendly countries? There we do not propose to apply the same principles, of course; we have never intended to do. We have already entered into conversations with the various Governments concerned. It is our intention from the earliest possible moment after the landing over to the military position allows that the administration shall be turned over to the friendly Government, the liberated Government with whom we are in relation, or to some authority representing that country. That applies to all of them, and we are in discussion as to how to do it. Even at the very beginning, when the Commander in Chief must have full powers, when the battle is in progress, we want to use the native officials of the friendly liberated countries and not apply a system of military government as we have done in Sicily. This matter is being cleared up. It is one of the subjects we shall discuss when we have the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries so that the matter may be cleared beyond any shadow of doubt.

(5)

Mr. Cohen: Does that apply to France?

Mr. Eden: Certainly, at the earliest moment, though it is more complicated in the case of France, as the hon. Member will realize. The French people shall express their own view, but we shall do what we can to use French officials and French people.

Mr. Cohen: Will you use the National Committee?

Mr. Eden: Of course we shall. We are in relation with the Committee, it is they who have sent the troops to Ajaccio, where they are fighting. It is an instance of what is going to happen. It is an experiment. We shall see how it works.


A hand-drawn map of Italy, showing the outlines of the major regions. The regions labeled are: PIEDMONT (top left), LIGURIA (top left, below Piedmont), EMILIA (top center), TOSCANA (center right), and BASILICATA (bottom left). Cities marked with dots include GENOVA (top left), BOLOGNA (top center), FLORENCE (center right), and POTENZA (bottom left). The map is drawn on a piece of paper with a vertical crease down the middle. There are some additional markings, including arrows and small circles, possibly representing rivers or specific locations. The drawing is done in pencil or light ink.




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
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MAP OF ITALY SHOWING PROVINCE, COMPARTIMENTO & REGIONAL BOUNDARIES





Extract from Speech in House of Commons by Anthony Eden on 22 Sept. 45)

(1)

I come to the military situation and in particular to the work which has been done by the Allied Military Government in Sicily. As I listened to this Debate I thought some hon. Members did not seem to have a very clear picture of what this organisation is and what its officers have to do. Their charge in the first instance is not in the main a political one but a practical one. They come into cities utterly devastated, cities which have been subjected to serial bombardment, which are probably without either light or water, with the dead lying around the streets and without food, probably, even for the next day. Their task is to try to restore something in the nature of normal life to these cities, to try to get transport going again- and when two armies have passed through a town there is not very much transport left - to try to get food in from neighbouring countries, to try to prevent the outbreak of epidemics of typhus and other diseases. It is an immensely difficult task of organisation. Those have been the main tasks upon which this military government has concentrated. I have watched its work with great care. I have had sent to me at the Foreign Office the reports of the work of this organisation, and I can tell the House that they have done very fine work there.

Now I come to one of the criticisms that have been made. First it is said that we have created this organisation to maintain Fascist officials in office. That is not so. Let me give Sicily as an example, and here let me say that in Sicily Fascism has never been a really popular creed. Fascism has been imported into Sicily; most of the senior officials in Sicily were imports from the North. Its senior officials have almost without exception been removed from the moment of our possession of the territory. Sicily is divided into nine areas, what the French would call prefectures, under prefects. All of these were under Fascist, all of whom have been got rid of. They either fled or were removed after we arrived - most of them fled. In more than 50 percent of them the local mayors, the *podestà*, have also been changed from the moment of our arrival; the organisation has done what it could to choose a mayor who had a certain amount of popular backing and who was generally acceptable-not of course by the process of holding an election, but by a sounding of the population - to take the place of the Fascist official. A number of Fascists have of course been arrested. I have not the exact figures, but the latest report is that about 1,000 prominent Fascists in Sicily remained behind are at present interned.

I have come to another criticism, that of the hon. Member for Cambridge University, who asked, Why use the Carabinieri? The House knows that they are not an organisation of exclusively Fascist traditions. On the contrary, they existed in Italy a very long time before the Fascist Regime. The bad organisation, the organisation which we may call sinister in its influence, what corresponds to the Gestapo in Ovra, the secret police that Mussolini and the Fascists used to employ. That organisation has been completely broken up and destroyed in Italy, and the Fascist Party organisation with it, and all the members of Ovra and all the Fascist political officials in Sicily have been arrested, though many of them fled before they could be arrested. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we had not used the Carabinieri. What would we have to do? We should have had to employ at least 10,000 British troops to do their job-not so well-and that would have taken men from the fighting forces. We discussed all this before we went into Sicily and I am absolutely certain that our system is right.

I come to the next criticism- Why do you put a ban on political activity- 1945? That is a perfectly fair question. It would have been very much more

those cities, to try to get transport going again- and when two armies have passed through a town there isn't very much transport left - to try to get food in from neighbouring countries, to try to prevent the outbreak of epidemics of typhus and other diseases. It is an immensely difficult task of organisation. Those have been the main tasks upon which this military government has concentrated. I have watched its work with great care. I have had sent to me at the Foreign Office the reports of the work of this organisation, and I can tell the House that they have done very fine work there.

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I come to the next criticism- Why do you put a ban on political activities? That is a perfectly fair question. It would have been very much more popular, I have no doubt, with many in Sicily if from the moment of our landing and before the island was clear we had had a bit of "free for all" political strife of the kind we enjoy in this country. We just felt that we could not enjoy that luxury at this stage. I am coming to the time-table in a moment. Many hon. members probably know Sicily much better than I do. If they do, they know that it is an island of intensely active rival political factions. Perhaps the strongest party of all in Sicily is the party that stands for separation from the Italian mainland altogether. Then there is the clerical party and there is the party of the extreme left, all in violent divergence. (Interruption). I think I am talking sense. These matters have been studied with some care.

Mr. Ivor Thomas: Would the right hon. Gentleman allow me to say this? It is agreed, I think, among Italians that there is no separatist movement in Sicily. There is a desire for regional freedom but no desire for separation, and I am

(2)

Mr. Thomas (Cont'd): afraid that if the right hon. Gentleman says that the strongest party in Sicily is the separatist party, it will encourage the idea that Great Britain intends to annex the island.

Mr. Eden: My hon. Friend should not dive too deep in attributing motives to everything that is said. We have not the least intention of annexing the island, nor should we, at any time. The report I have from our officers on the spot is that the Sicily independence movement is extremely strong. There is nothing in the least new in that. Really, the hon. Gentleman is not the only person who knows something about the matter. It is a perfectly well-known movement. What shade of independence it requires, whether it be a form of home rule, as the agitation used to be here, or for complete separation, is another matter; but there is a movement—if you like to call it a home rule movement you call, but it is a matter of common knowledge—for separation. I do not want to take up time on this point, which does not affect my argument, which is simply that there are these parties in Sicily, violently antagonistic. Some want one thing and some want an other. My hon. Friend may think I have described the position wrongly, but I am sure that he will not disagree with my statement that these parties disagree with one another with very great vehemence. In the existing military situation, and while we were using this island for the preparation of the advance upon Naples, it was impossible to allow free rein to these various political parties. The hon. Gentleman can well ask—(An Hon. Member: "Is there freedom of political discussion?") Of course there is. These regulations are not at all tightly applied. There is a great deal of political discussion. There is freedom of the Press to say what they like about each other, and even about AMROY. I am informed, that after 20 years of Fascist rule, the Press are not in the least happy at being told that they can say what they like. They have been so used to having a directive that they do not quite like it when they do not get it. (Interruption.) It is so. After 20 years of not being allowed to express your opinions and of having to say exactly what the Government tell you, a week after you are released you are liable to be a bit puzzled. I have no doubt that they will very soon have criticisms of the work we are doing, just as we have it in this House.

I want to deal with one other point of this kind. It has been said that the exchange rate was very unfairly fixed by this organisation. In fairness to the organisation and to the officers concerned, I wish to make it quite plain that they had no responsibility in it is matter. The fixing of the rate was done on the responsibility of the two Governments principally concerned and not by this organisation. Whether the decision was right or wrong, it was not the fault of that organisation. Let me deal with the point whether the organisation shall continue. It is not, of course, intended to be permanent. It is bound up with the future of Italy herself, about which I am going to say something in a moment. We do not want to have these burdens of administration on our hands. The sooner we can find an Italian administration that can take these burdens off our hands the better we shall be pleased. We do not want to re-enter Italy, or even Europe, on the basis that we are going to be the people who will administer and run the countries. We want, as soon as we can, that the people shall run the country for themselves.

Capt. Alan Graham: On what lines?

Mr. Eden: On the lines that they wish to. Now I come to the cognate question about which I have been asked, and I am obliged to the hon. Member who raised this matter. What is our policy in respect of friendly countries? There we do not profess to apply the same principles, of course; we have never intended to do.

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(3)

Mr. Cocks: Does that apply to France?

Mr. Egan: Certainly, at the earliest moment, though it is more complicated in the case of France, as the hon. Member will realize. The French people shall express their own view, but we shall do what we can to use French officials and French people.

Mr. Cocks: Will you use the National Committee?

Mr. Egan: Of course we shall. We are in relation with the Committee, it is they who have sent the troops to Ajaccio, where they are fighting. It is an instance of what is going to happen. It is an experiment. We shall see how it works.

Extracts from Parliamentary Debates on AMOY

General Sir George Jeffreys: Similarly, AMOY is essential, especially for carrying out of local government in occupied territories. We may compare it to the military government of the Rhineland which we found it necessary to set up after the Armistice following the last war, and which relieved the military commander, as AMOY will relieve military commanders, from the responsibility of dealing with civil affairs, of preserving law and order and preventing crime, and generally keeping the population in a quiet and, as far as possible, peaceful state. Have we in this war no controls in this country which, for military reasons, interfere with the liberty of the subject to do as he likes? Of course we have. Still more are such controls necessary in an occupied country where war is still actually going on. I propose to say only two things about the Far East....

Mr. McGovern: AMOY after all is a peculiar name for the bankers' and bondholders' battalion which is being sent in behind the military in order to make the world safe for capitalism.

Mr. John Dugdale: I wish to refer to two points. The first of them is AMOY. The hon. Gentleman... Mr. Astor made most interesting observations on the difficulties of occupying territories and the difficulties involved in getting municipal services to run again, the hard task of the army and how important it was that they should advance quickly. I agree with that. I agree entirely that military considerations must come first. In territories that are just being occupied and are immediately behind the front line, by all means let AMOY rapidly improvise an organization, but that about the territories further behind? No one could say, as the hon. Member suggested, that it is possible to hold a general election in Naples. Nobody wants to hold a general election now in Naples, but it is possible for some degree of normal life to start again now in Sicily, and it will be possible, no doubt, within a comparatively short time for it to start in Sardinia. If the advance in Italy goes along with some speed, it may be possible to start normal life further on there behind the lines. But some of us are afraid that military expediency may be used for keeping on this kind of rule after it is necessary.

I would like to ask a few questions about the method of training of the people who have joined AMOY. Are they taught anything of the Italian language? I understand that a large number of them are altogether ignorant of it. Are they taught Italian history, particularly that of the democratic movements that existed in Italy? Are they told anything about Garibaldi? I do not know; I hope they are. At no course which took place not long ago one of the students asked what should be their attitude to the organization called Ova? Were they to go with Ova, what were they to do? Considering that Ova is comparatively friendly to the Gestapo it would be well of these men were given some knowledge of how to deal with it. I hope that they are getting that knowledge. The studies that I have had about AMOY are of no importance whatever but studies which voiced by the Russian Government are of considerable importance. The paper called "Moscow Review of the War and Working Classes" stated that "The Theory and practice of AMOY are liable to lead to apprehension among all who understand the political significance of the task of destroying fascism in the liberated countries. The work of restoration is for the people themselves." We have been told that the Russians are to participate in the new Mediterranean conference or set up that has been envisaged by the Prime Minister.

Still more are such controls necessary in an occupied country where war is still actually going on. I propose to say only two things about the Far East....

Mr. McGovern: AMNOT after all is a peculiar name for the bankers' and bondholders' battalion which is being sent in behind the military in order to make the world safe for capitalism.

Mr. John Duggan: I wish to refer to two points. The first of them is AMNOT. The man Gentlemen ... Mr. Gentlemen most interesting observations on the difficulty of occupying territories and the difficulties involved in getting municipal services to run again, the hard task of the army and how important it was that they should advance quickly. I agree with that. I agree entirely that military considerations must come first. In territories that are just being occupied and are immediately behind the front line, by all means let AMNOT rapidly improve an organization, but what about the territories further behind? No one could say, as the hon. Member suggested, that it is possible to hold a general election in Naples, but it is possible for some degree of normal life to start again now in Sicily, and it will be possible, no doubt, within a comparatively short time for it to start in Sardinia. If the advance in Italy goes along with some speed, it may be possible to start normal life further on there behind the lines. But some of us are afraid that military expediency may be used for keeping on this kind of rule after it is necessary.

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We have been told that the Russians are to participate in the new Mediterranean conference or set up that has been envisaged by the Prime Minister. Will the Russians be allowed to send officers to take part in the organization of AMNOT? Will Russian officers work side by side with our officers in AMNOT in the occupied territories in the Mediterranean? Will they be part of the organization? I hope they will. I would like to ask another question which is of some importance. A statement was made emanating I think from Quebec that AMNOT rule only applied to ex-enemy territory. I understand that the teaching given to people who are going out to work for AMNOT provides for instruction on how to run other territories such as France, Belgium and Holland. If in fact AMNOT is only going to run ex-enemy territories is its teaching of how to run Allied territories to be continued?

