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SABOTAGE & LOOTING
SEPT. 1943 - JAN. 1944

785016

SECRET.
By Auth: CinC, A.F.
25 January, 1944.
Initials:

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

25 January, 1944

B-389.502/1-D.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for December 1943.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of December 1943.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

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S.S. HILL-DILLON.
Colonel, G.S.
G-2 (CI) Section.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of December 1943.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

42
S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.
G-2 (CI) Section.

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Copy to:- D.S.M.

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MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1943.

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

From 26 December 1943 to 6 January 1944, a series of incidents occurred at the CAZES Air Base, CASA MANCA, of which two are considered by a C.I.C. investigator to be the result of intentional sabotage.

On 31 December 1943 it was found that the trailing edge of the aileron cut-off of a B-26 plane had been bent upwards with a blunt instrument, interfering with the air flow and almost causing the craft to crash on the take-off. Enquiry showed that in the interim between the last inspection on 29 December and the flight on 31 December, a crew guard was not posted. It was deemed virtually impossible to detect the damage unless it were specifically looked for, which indicated that the culprit had a working knowledge of aero-dynamics.

On 6 January it was discovered that a cable to the cross-fed brake of a C-47 plane, last inspected on 4 January, had been crushed by a blunt instrument resulting in the rupture of two strands of the cable.

No suspects have been apprehended in either case. On or about 9 January, however the FRENCH Bureau S.M., with whom the Air Force then had no effective liaison, apprehended in the vicinity of the CAZES Air Base two Arab Saboteurs trained at a Sabotage School in BELGIUM, who had been instructed to concentrate on the aircraft and Air installations in AFRICA. It is not yet established whether they were responsible, but a fuller report on the case will be given next month.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

This month has seen a decline in sabotage cases reported, and that follows mainly refers to wire-cutting. It has not been thought worth while to give these in detail.

1. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

With the exception of the above, and the possible exception of TUNISIA, (see below) no cases of sabotage have been reported. Wire-cutting has figured prominently. In the latter half of December, an increase in the cutting of telephone lines, both civilian and military, was reported in the ALGIERS area.

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No suspects have been apprehended in either case. On or about 9 January, however the FRENCH Bureau S.I.L., with whom the Air Force then had no effective liaison, apprehended in the vicinity of the GAZES, in Base two Arab Saboteurs trained at a Sabotage School in BERLIN, who had been instructed to concentrate on the aircraft and Air installations in AFRICA. It is not yet established whether they were responsible, but a fuller report on the case will be given next month.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

This month has seen a decline in sabotage cases reported, and what follows mainly refers to wire-cutting. It has not been thought worth while to give these in detail.

1. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

With the exception of the above, and the possible exception of FUELDE, (see below) no cases of sabotage have been reported. Wire-cutting has figured prominently. In the latter half of December, an increase in the cutting of telephone lines, both civilian and military, was reported in the ALGERS area. The only culprits so far apprehended have been small boys, apparently not impelled by malice.

On 12 December 1943, Seaman Einar G. FUELDE of BALTIMORE, Md., was removed from the S.S. "WILLY BROOS," at BIZERTE for complicity in suspected sabotage. A collision between the S.S. "WILLY BROOS" and another ship in the convoy was nearly produced by the closing, during FUELDE's watch, of the valves in the engine room controlling exhaust from the steering engine. The suspect, a Norwegian living in the U.S. since 1937, is being repatriated to U.S.A. for full investigation of his background, but it is not considered that the case was enemy-inspired.

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B. SICILY.

Reports from I.D.S. indicate that continued cases of wire-cutting are still motivated by theft. Proclamations imposing heavy penalties have, however, again reduced the incidence of such cases. Wire-cutting in CATANIA Province was made easier by the irregularity of C.O.M. patrols, and shortage of personnel. However, the re-laying of wire away from the main roads has effected some improvement.

A case of apparently deliberate go-slow sabotage occurred in SICILY in December 1943. Arturo CAPACCIO, employed as a co-ordinator of railway traffic by I.D.S., a known Fascist and Squadrista, and alleged to be an agent of the OVRA, was apprehended on December 8 by the G.I.O. near the town of MARCELLONA for having indirectly delayed for some 7 hours on December 6 the urgent loading of boats at RILIANO, bound for ITALY. CAPACCIO was en route to RILIANO from which point he was to embark on a long-planned return to ITALY. Although twice instructed within three hours to move twenty cars of ammunition on 6 December from RILIANO to RILIANO, he failed to have these instructions executed. CAPACCIO's efficiency had also been questionable at TRAPANI where he was employed after the Allied occupation. It has been recommended that he be turned over to A.M. for trial.

C. ITALY.

Sabotage of communication lines has increased in ITALY. In 15 my Group area, wire-cutting increased in the period 16 November - 30 November, the latest survey period. At FOGGIA, in November, Giampetro SANTO, a civilian, was arrested in the act of cutting a telephone wire, and was subsequently sentenced by A.M. Military Court to twelve months imprisonment. S. has requested stiffer sentences from A.M. as a deterrent. In the period 24 November - 14 December 1943, there was a marked increase in the cutting and removal of operational telephone wires in the LECCE area, implying the possibility of organized sabotage. Many cables were cut with pliers and wire-cutters. Units were instructed to organize armed patrols on such lines at night. S. has also reported in late December some recurrence of recent cases of wire-cutting.

Few other cases have been reported. In late November, a steel wedge driven between the tracks connected to a switch nearby caused the derailment of a train at TRATTINIGIONE. Enquiries proved inconclusive. On November 9, the petrol pipe line from MANTREDONIA to an aerodrome near FOGGIA was punctured as a result of the impact of a sharp object. Enquiries again proved inconclusive.

case of apparently deliberate sabotage reported in SICILY in December 1943. Arturo CARACCIO, employed as a co-ordinator of railway traffic by I.R.S., a known Fascist and Squadrista, and alleged to be an agent of the OVRA, was apprehended on December 6 by the C.I.C. near the town of MARCELLINO for having indirectly delayed for some 7 hours on December 6 the urgent loading of boats at RAIUNO, bound for ITALY. CARACCIO was en route to JERUSALEM from which point he was to embark on a long-planned return to ITALY. Although twice instructed within three hours to move twenty cars of ammunition on 6 December from BRUNOCCI to RAIUNO, he failed to have these instructions executed. CARACCIO's efficiency had also been questioned at TRAPANI where he was employed after the Allied occupation. It has been recommended that he be turned over to AMG for trial.

C. ITALY

Sabotage of communication lines has increased in ITALY. In 15 Army Group area, wire-cutting increased in the period 16 November - 30 November, the latest survey period. At TOGGI, in November, Giampetro S. VITO, a civilian, was arrested in the act of cutting a telephone wire, and was subsequently sentenced by AMG Military Court to twelve months imprisonment. S. VITO has requested stiffer sentences from AMG as a deterrent. In the period 24 November - 14 December 1943, there was a marked increase in the cutting and removal of operational telephone wires in the LECCE area, implying the possibility of organized sabotage. Many cables were cut with pliers and wire-cutters. Units were instructed to organize armed patrols on such lines at night. S. VITO, too, reported in late December some recurrence of sabotage cases of wire-cutting.

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PART III. NOTES FOR C.I.C./T.S.P.

The decline in sabotage cases reported may be attributable partly to improved control as the area in rear of the front becomes more stabilised. On the other hand, it is still considered probable that the enemy has not yet given up his sabotage plans for ITALY in general, and no precautions should be relaxed.

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Sin 33
Should not
Capt. Sweeney be
informed? Pass file
to him for Daily Orders?
15/1/44.

Comp. Ladd.

Please see file 404
initial to 32.
Copies of "The Tin Can"
for you. The information
is secret. but should
be brought to notice
of all ranks.

15/1/44

MSH mjm

447

32
SECRET.Subject: - "SPRINGWELL" Oil Tin Sabotage Bomb.AMC HQ.,
15 Army Group,
C.N.P.Ref. AMC/HQ/32
15 January 44.S.C.A.G. Fifth Army.
S.C.A.G. Eighth Army (Main).
S.C.A.G. Region III.
S.C.A.G. Region IV.

Description of "SPRINGWELL" oil tin sabotage bomb is forwarded. The information will be communicated to all ranks.

Eight copies of the diagram are enclosed.

DeWitt
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

Am
445

"BOMBERS" Oil Tin Sabotage
Bomb.

The accompanying diagram shows the subject device.
Its size may be judged by the 3" ruler.

2. The small oil tin is in plain metal, with a paper label wrapped round, background yellow, with blue vertical stripes and the name "BOMBERS" in red. There is an error in the maker's address, which is printed as "57 and 56, Lower Thomas St" instead of "56 & 57 Lower Thomas Street". A false bottom permits it to contain oil to a depth of 1.5". The lower part of the tin is filled with oil. The bomb is set off by a detonator inserted in the oil and connected to an electrical dry-battery through a clock delay device.

3. Information from a source recently in contact with the enemy, which has proved reliable in the past and which it is of paramount importance to safeguard, indicates that this device is likely to be used behind allied lines, most probably in Italy. It is requested that the necessary warning be issued.

4. If any instances of the device being used comes to notice, it is requested that this HQ be informed by signal, and that a copy of the investigation report, together with photographs if possible, be forwarded to this HQ as soon as practicable thereafter.

JAN 10 1947
JAN 1947
KS

Subject: "SPEEDWELL" oil tin Sabotage Bomb

SECRET
6/25/2009
22 Jan 44

DISTRIBUTION: List 'A'

2 District letter 2012/60 dated 9 Jan 44 is forwarded for your information and necessary action.

The contents of this letter will be communicated to all ranks under your command, pointing out that this letter is sent so far as other persons outside the service are concerned.

11.1.47
Thrup - R. H. L.

Major,
General Staff,
HQ 6 Army Sub Area.

TR/DLM

COPY

2012/60 dated 9 Jan 44

"SPEEDWELL" oil tin Sabotage Bomb

1. The accompanying diagram shows the subject device. Its use may be judged by the 3" ruler.
2. The small oil tin is in plain metal, with a paper label wrapped round, background yellow, with blue vertical stripes and the name "SPEEDWELL" in red. There is an error in the maker's address, which is printed as "57 and 56 Lower Thames St" instead of "56 and 57" Lower Thames Street. A false bottom permits it to contain oil to a depth of 1.4/8". The lower part of the tin is filled with it. The bomb is set off by a detonator inserted in the HE and connected to an electrical dry-battery through a clock delay device.
3. Information from a source recently in contact with the enemy, which has proved reliable in the past and which it is of paramount importance to safeguard, indicates that this device is likely to be used before allied lines, most probably in Italy. It is requested that the necessary warnings be issued.

information and necessary action.

The contents of this letter will be communicated to all ranks under your command, pointing out that this information is for the use of other persons outside the service area, and that it is to be kept confidential.

1. R. E. Weston

Major,
General Staff,
HQ 6th Army Area.

TR/ETM

COPY

HQ 6th Army Area
2012/10/10 9.10 AM

"SPEEDWELL" oil tin Sabotage Bomb

1. The accompanying diagram shows the subject a view. It is also to be judged by the 3" ruler.
2. The small oil tin is in plain metal, with a paper label wrapped round, background yellow, with blue vertical stripes and the name "SPEEDWELL" in red. There is an error in the mark of the address, which is printed as "57 and 56 Lower Thames St" instead of "56 and 57" Lower Thames Street". A false bottom permits it to contain oil to a depth of 1.2/8". The lower part of the tin is filled with HE. The bomb is set off by a detonator inserted in the HE and connected to an electrical wire-battery through a clock delay device.
3. Information from a source recently in contact with the enemy, which has proved reliable in the past and which it is of paramount importance to safeguard, indicates that this device is likely to be used behind allied lines, most probably in Italy. It is requested that the necessary warnings be issued.
4. If any instances of the device being used come to notice, it is requested that this HQ be informed by signal, and that a copy of the investigation report, together with photographs if possible, be forwarded to this HQ as soon as practicable thereafter.

(Capt) R. Weston, Capt
For Lieutenant-Colonel,
General Staff.

29

"SPEEDWELL" Oil Tin Sabotage Bomb.



443

Illustration of the "SPEEDWELL" Oil Tin Sabotage Bomb.

1256
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- 6 JAN 1944
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ALLIED HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

APD 512.

FDG/wb.

AMG/004.02/AD

5 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Communications - Line Sabotage.

TO: R.C.A.O., Region 1.
R.C.A.O., Region 11.

1. Quoted herewith in part is letter, A.F.H.Q. M.G.S.
subject: "Communications - Line Sabotage", dated 28 December
1943:

"1. This Headquarters is concerned at the continued instances of wire cutting and interference with signals communications in Sicily and on the mainland.

2. It is essential that the utmost vigilance be exercised by the Civil Police in this connection. All offences must be carefully investigated and prosecuted vigorously. The prosecution must insist on calling any evidence which may assist the court in coming to a conclusion, particularly where sabotage is suspected. The prosecution must not be deterred by the serious penalties necessarily involved in a conviction for that crime. In cases where it is not proved that wire cutting amounted to sabotage, prosecutors will be instructed to press for salutary penalties, in view of the serious military consequences of damage to signal installations."

2. The offences abovementioned are clearly within categories defined in paras. 3a and b of letter from Legal Sub-commission, this HQ. dated 6 December 1943, subject "Office of Director of Special Prosecutions". The procedure therein outlined (paras. 4 to 7 inclusive) will be complied with.

785016

TO: R.C.A.O., Region I.
R.C.A.O., Region II.

1. Quoted herewith in part is letter, A.F.H.Q. M.G.S.
subject: "Communications - Line Sabotage", dated 28 December
1943:

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2. The offences abovementioned are clearly within categories defined in paras. 3a and b of letter from Legal Sub-commission, this HQ. dated 6 December 1943, subject "Office of Director of Special Prosecutions". The procedure therein outlined (paras. 4 to 7 inclusive) will be complied with.

3. Civil Police agencies subject to your jurisdiction will again be impressed with the importance of exercising maximum vigilance in the security of signal communications and of investigating offenses with complete thoroughness.

By Order of Commanding Officer:

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature
Mr. CHARLES M. SPOFFORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
D. C. C. A. O.

Distribution on reverse.

Copy to: A.F.H.Q., M.G.S. (3)
15 Army Group A.M.G.
Public Safety Sub-commission.
Legal Sub-commission.
Interior Sub-commission.
File (2)

785016

Subject: Sabotage of Comms

DISTRIBUTION: List 'A'

Consequent on the recent conference held by Comd No.2 District, all units in this Sub Area will take all practical precautions towards safeguarding signal cable in their neighbourhood.

Unit Comds are reminded that interference with signal cable is an act of sabotage and is punishable as such by the death penalty.

In these circumstances, orders should be issued that anyone found interfering with cable should be prevented by all means, including the use of fire-arms and arrested. Should it be necessary to shoot, all ranks should be instructed to shoot to kill.

TER/ETM

Major
General Staff,
HQ 6 Base Sub Area.

SECRET

26

Subject:- Sabotage Report.

ASG Hqs.,
15 Army Group,
C.B.F.

Ref. ASG/129/26
2 January 44.

S.C.A.F.C. Region III, } Thru S.C.A.F.Cs.
" " Region IV. }

One copy of A.P.H.Q. Sabotage Report for month of November, with amendment, and copy ASG letter dated 28 Dec 43, is forwarded for information. The report referred to in para 3 of the letter is not enclosed as it refers to Sicily only. — p. 8

2. The Civil Police will have their attention drawn to the necessity for constantly being on the watch for interference with communications. Offenders, even where no malicious intent is disclosed, should be arrested and brought before a Military Court for trial.

Rushy
Lt. Colonel,
Chief, Public Safety.

Copies to:- S.C.A.F.C. AND Fifth Army, } Thru S.C.A.F.Cs. for
" " ASG Eighth Army. } information.

440

785016

SUBJECT: - Monthly Sabotage Report for November. *ps*H.Q. 15 Army Group.
C.M.F.

31 DEC 1943

RR SECRET - U.S. SECRET15AG/142/11/GI(b)30 Dec 43.

TO: Distribution below.

The enclosed AFHQ Sabotage Report(s) for the month of November and amendment are sent for your information.

Ryanhope

Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

RHSW/GSD

DISTRIBUTION:

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* AUTH. C-1-0, C-2 *
* Initials: *
* 25 December, 1943. *

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2

22

25 December, 1943.

D-339.502/1-D

SUBJECT: Connection to Outline Sabotage Report for November 1943, dated 20
December, 1943.

TO : Distribution below.

Reference page 2, para 4, of above mentioned report; for "Land mine"
and "mine", please substitute "sabotage device" throughout.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2:

J. J. Hill - Litter

made p/b 1/1/44.

S. W. PL-DILO.
Colonel, C-2
C-2 (OB) Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

3-389.502/1-D.

20 December 1945.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for November 1945.

TO: Distribution Below.

Attached for your information is summary of cases of sabotage reported to this headquarters during the month of November 1945.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

*S.S. Hill-Bloom*S.S. HILL-BLOOM,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (S.I.) Section.DISTRIBUTION

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By Auth: CincC, M

Initials (M)

20 December 1945

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for November 1943.

CC: Distribution Below.

Attached for your information is summary of cases of sabotage reported to this headquarters during the month of November 1943.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

W. H. H. Dill

S. S. THOMSON,
Colonel, G-2,
G-2 (S.I.) Section.

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MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 1943.

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

Nothing to report.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

A. AIR FORCE.

(1) Mine-cutting.

1. On 6 and 8 October, two incidents of mine-cutting occurred in the UTAH (324 Service Group) area. In each instance, the cutting was clumsily done, presumably by hand. Investigation was made by XII Air Force.
2. During the night 18/19 October, and on the 20 and 25 October, the telephone line running from "B" battery to "C" battery, 112th A.S.S. Bn. (406) was cut 3 miles N.W. of OZARK. All these incidents appeared to have been caused in the same manner, i.e. the wire was cut by placing it on a rock and striking it with another rock until it parted.

(ii) Shipping.

1. On 25 October, a fire occurred in the Stamula a bin of U.M.T. "GARDIAN" type. The fire was discovered five minutes after outbreak, and little damage resulted. Investigation is being made by B6 P.S.S.
2. On 4 November 1943, an 18-inch length of copper tubing was removed from the mechanical lubricator of S.S. "GARDIAN". The tube had not been discovered, the main origin would probably have been up with the ship out to sea. Investigation by 96 P.S.S. indicated that one CLIFF 436 was a former son of the ship who had been signed off, was probably the perpetrator. The act was probably committed through sheer rather than through desire to sabotage the war effort.

(iii) Railways.

Nothing to report.

2. WIRE CUTTING.

A. WIRE CUTTING.

(i) Wire-cutting.

1. On 6 and 8 October, two incidents of wire-cutting occurred in the GUYANE (32) Barrage (32) Barrage. In each instance, the cutting was obviously done, presumably by hand. Investigation was made by XII Air Force.
2. During the night 13/14 October, and on the 20 and 25 October, the telephone line running from "B" battery to "C" battery, 112th A.S.S. (not) was cut 1 mile N.W. of QZL. All these incidents appeared to have been caused in the same manner, i.e. the wire was cut by placing it on a rock and striking it with another rock until it parted.

(ii) Blowing.

1. On 25 October, a fire occurred in the Stenard's cabin of H.M.T. "STANDARD CARRIER". The fire was discovered five minutes after outbreak, and little damage resulted. Investigation is being made by G.S.S.
2. On 4 November 1943, an 18-inch length of copper tubing was removed from the mechanical lubricator of S.M. "STANDARD". The loss not been discovered, the main engine would probably have ceased to work the ship put to sea. Investigation by G.S.S. indicated that one of the crew, a former seaman of the ship who had been signed off, was probably the perpetrator. The act was probably committed through malice rather than through desire to sabotage the war effort.

(iii) Railway.

Nothing to report.

(iv) Miscellaneous.

1. On 11 October, North Africa District reported sabotage to pipeline at LA GUYANE-200000. The sabotage was discovered by G.S.S. and it was found that the damage was a small pipe-hole, almost certainly caused by accident.

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2. On 28 October 1943, a Wellington bomber was damaged at ALDI airfield. An incendiary bomb had been placed in the body of the plane and appeared to have been detonated by landing with a blunt instrument. Enquiries have so far failed to trace the perpetrator, who clearly must have been familiar with both aircraft and the incendiary bomb used.

3. On 11 November, an attempt to sabotage a stock of gasoline at Dump No. 2, K.A.S., OUDA, was foiled by the sentries. A wooden box approximately 8 inches square had been placed in the stock of the dump. The box contained a time delay, explosive, and incendiary charge. It appears that only the detonator functioned, scattering the main explosive charge and incendiary material, some of the latter burning until extinguished by sentries. Investigations by OSS, ITC, and IIS, CIO indicates that the attempt was made by an unskilled saboteur, probably an Arab working under the IREMER organization in EGYPT.

Safety Data

4. On 22 November, 1943, a small ~~Kasino~~ was discovered packed between the beds and seat cushion of a parachute belonging to the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron at OUDA. The ~~size~~, 5" x 3 1/2" in size, contained a liquid and is said to be an incendiary. Investigation by 16th Troop Carrier Squadron 3-2 indicated that the ~~size~~ had been slipped into the parachute in such a manner that additional weight would cause its explosion. Photographs and diagrams of the ~~size~~ have been requested in order to identify it.

Safety Data

3. - SECRET.

(i) Time-outing.

1. Communication lines from GEL to COMET OLIVO in the area of the 62nd Troop Carrier Group were cut eight times by snare instruments. Guards have been placed all along the line, and XII...ir Force is proceeding with investigations.

(ii) Shipping.

Nothing to report.

(iii) Railways.

Nothing to report.

wooden box approximately 8 inches square had been placed in the stock of the gun. The box contained a time delay, explosive, and incendiary charge. It appears that only the detonator functioned, scattering the main explosive charge and incendiary material, some of the latter burning until extinguished by sentries. Investigations by OSS, WFF, and HBS, CIO indicates that the attempt was made by an unskilled saboteur, probably an Arab working under the RAZIER organization in ISRAEL.

Sabotage Demand.

4. On 22 November, 1943, a small ~~landmine~~ was discovered packed between the back and seat cushion of a parachute belonging to the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron at OUDA. The mine, 6 1/2" x 3 1/2" in size, contained a liquid and is said to be an incendiary. Investigation by 16th Troop Carrier Squadron B-2 indicated that the ~~mine~~ had been slipped into the parachute in such a manner that additional weight would cause its explosion. Photographs and diagrams of the mine have been requested in order to identify it.

Sabotage Demand.

3. - SECRET.

(i) Time-delaying.

1. Communication lines from GEL. to PONTE OLIVO in the area of the 62nd Troop Carrier Group were cut night time by enemy instruments. Guards have been placed all along the line, and III Air Force is proceeding with investigations.

(ii) Ships.

Nothing to report.

(iii) Railways.

Nothing to report.

(iv) Miscellaneous.

1. On 11 October, 1943, 2626 O... Brigade reported an explosion of enemy ammunition at PONTO EMBROCCO. It was concluded that no act of sabotage was responsible for the explosion.

2. On the 25 October 1943, a break was discovered in the GEL. - PONTE OLIVO pipeline by the 433 C... Members of this organization

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While working on telephone wires in the vicinity heard an explosion and observed a car moving up the road nearby. The image is believed to have been caused by a grenade, inasmuch as the pipe was bent inward at the point of the break, and a small bit of an Italian "Red Devil" grenade was found near the break. C.I.C. Sub-Section, GILLESPIE. Province investigated and have recommended collection of miscellaneous grenades and explosives which are scattered throughout the area.

3. Late in October 1943, a plot was uncovered in SMITH which had for its purpose the restoration of fascism by armed force. One of the individuals arrested had a diary containing sworn statements telling of sabotaging the communication lines between MILAN and BERGAMO. I.C.S. C.I.C. Section is still investigating.

4. On 21 October, information was received from No. 1. District that wired enemy lines had been discovered in S.S.P., GILLESPIE, and that the case was under investigation. No further information on this case has been received so far.

2. - THREAT

(i) Wire-cutting.

1. Between the 1 and 15 November 1943, the telephone lines running from Fifth Army R.W. Camp towards MILES were cut on several occasions. A 15-man guard was posted, and Fifth Army C.I.C. have recommended a military order, prescribing death penalty for wire-cutting.

(ii) Shooting.

Nothing to report.

(iii) Railways.

1. On 24 October 1943, packages, allegedly containing German TNT were found to have been placed on a post train so that their explosion would cause serious damage, and simultaneously a switchboard on the main line had been so placed that it would derail a morning train. The latter was evidently done by a person well acquainted with railroad procedure. Recommendations were made for additional guards at night, but the perpetrators were not traced.

2. A fire was reported on 27 October 1943, KILLES, on a freight car, coupled between two ammunition cars. A full report is still

3. Late in October 1943, a plot was uncovered in STILLY which had for its purpose the restoration of Fascism by armed force. One of the individuals arrested had a diary containing sworn statements telling of sabotaging the communication lines between MILWAUKEE and CHICAGO.

I.B.S. C.I.C. Section is still investigating.

4. On 21 November, information was received from No. 1. District that wired enemy messages had been discovered in B.S.D., CHICAGO, and that the case was under investigation. No further information on this case has been received so far.

C. - ITALY

(i) Warrenting

1. Between the 1 and 15 November 1943, the telephone lines running from Fifth Army P.W. Camp towards I.F.E.S. were cut on several occasions. A 15-man guard was posted, and with Army C.I.C. have reported a military order, proclaiming death penalty for wire-cutting.

(ii) Shipping

Nothing to report.

(iii) Railways

1. On 24 October 1943, packages, allegedly containing German TNT were found to have been placed on a port train so that their explosion would cause serious damage, and simultaneously a switchboard on the main line had been so placed that it would derail a morning train. The latter was evidently done by a person well conversant with railway procedure. Recommendations were made for additional guards at night, but the perpetrators were not traced.

2. A fire was reported on 27 October 1943, KALLES, on a freight car, coupled between two ammunition cars. A full report is still awaited.

3. On 31 October 1943, agents of the C.I.C. Section, P.B.S. investigated the case of the discovery in Garbiniere of four packages, each about three inches in length and one inch square, wrapped in brown wax paper and scattered within a radius of two feet, under a loaded railroad car at the Port of ILLIUS during the night of 30 October 1943. One package had been broken open. The Garbiniere found, on returning to the scene, a small container with two detonators which had not been there at the time of the original discovery. The substance was an incendiary.

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mixture with a slight aluminum content. The fuses were of British origin. Again no perpetrators were traced. Recommendations were made for the increase of railroad guards.

(iv) Miscellaneous.

1. On the last of October - early November 1943, a C.I.C. (P.B.S.) agent investigated an act of sabotage in the 6th Port Area, ITALY, involving the severance and crude splicing of two lines of the electrical system of the air raid warning signal, which created a short circuit, and prevented either series of lights in the warning system from functioning. Apprehension of the perpetrators appears highly improbable. Recommendations were made to increase guard personnel, and to distribute them according to the importance of the installations.

2. On 8 November, an ammunition dump exploded at REGGIO causing some 100 casualties. About 60 tons of Italian cordite, ballistite, and other ammunition were involved. Investigation by J40 P.B.S. indicated that the explosion was the result of a fire which started in ballistite which was lying around the dump. The origin of the fire appears to have been either a spark from a cigarette, or the heat generated by the sun burning through glass. Sabotage is not indicated.

PART III. CONCLUSIONS AND NOTES FOR C.I.C. AND P.B.S.

1. As will be seen from the foregoing, the anticipated increase in enemy sabotage activities in ITALY has not so far revealed itself in any very concrete form. Wire-cutting has decreased, and the only cases reported to this headquarters which may possibly have been enemy-inspired are cases reported under "C", ITALY, para iii, Nos. 1 and 2, and para iv, No. 1. This should not however be taken to imply that the danger is past. It is believed that the enemy may have made preparations for post-occupational sabotage in the ROE area, and CIO/PBF should not relax in checking up on protection of likely targets, such as were set out in the recent circular on Enemy Sabotage Methods sent out from this headquarters. (B-389,502/D of 29 November 1943). In this connection, it is also recommended that exercises be arranged from time to time in ITALY to test security of access to important installations by trying to gain entrance undetected. It may be that this is already being done, but if not, it should be instituted.

2. Where any evidence of the existence of a known on-

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1. On the last of October - early November 1943, a C.I.C. (P.D.S.) agent investigated an act of sabotage in the 6th Port Area, Naples, involving the severance and crude splicing of two lines of the electrical system of the aircraft warning signal, which created a short circuit, and prevented either series of lights in the warning system from functioning. Apprehension of the perpetrators appears highly improbable. Recommendations were made to increase guard personnel, and to distribute them according to the importance of the installations.

2. On 8 November, an ammunition dump exploded at REGGIO causing some 100 casualties. About 60 tons of Italian cordite, ballistite, and other ammunition were involved. Investigation by 340 P.D.S. indicated that the explosion was the result of a fire which started in ballistite which was lying around the dump. The origin of the fire appears to have been either a spark from a cigarette, or the heat generated by the sun burning through glass. Sabotage is not indicated.

PART III. CONCLUSIONS AND NOTES FOR C.I.C. AND P.D.S.

1. As will be seen from the foregoing, the anticipated increase in enemy sabotage activities in ITALY has not so far revealed itself in any very concrete form. Wire-cutting has decreased, and the only cases reported to this headquarters which may possibly have been enemy-inspired are cases reported under "C". ITALY, part III, Nos. 1 and 3, and part IV, No. 1. This should not however be taken to imply that the danger is past. It is believed that the enemy may have made preparations for post-occupational sabotage in the ROE area, and CIO/FBP should not relax in checking up on protection of likely targets, such as were set out in the recent circular on Enemy Sabotage Methods sent out from this headquarters. (B-389,502/D of 29 November 1943). In this connection, it is also recommended that exercises be arranged from time to time in ITALY to test security of access to important installations by trying to gain entrance undetected. It may be that this is already being done, but if not, it should be instituted.

2. Where any evidence of the existence of a known enemy device is found, arrangements should if possible be made to have it photographed, (or a diagram made) at once, and a copy of the photograph or diagram, together with a copy of the investigation report, should be forwarded direct to AWHQ. It is emphasized that unless this is done, this headquarters cannot keep its records up to date, and cannot consequently distribute fresh intelligence until it is too old to be of any value.

3. It is hoped shortly to issue a descriptive booklet of known enemy devices which should assist in recognition.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

DSJ/as

Military Government Section

28 December 1943

SUBJECT: Communications - Line Sabotage.

TO : HQ. ACC.
AMG 15 Army Group. ✓
HQ. AMG.

1. This Headquarters is concerned at the continued instances of wire cutting and interference with signals communications reported in Sicily and on the mainland.
2. It is essential that the utmost vigilance is exercised by the Civil Police in this connection. All offences must be carefully investigated and prosecuted vigorously. The prosecution must insist upon calling any evidence which may assist the court in coming to a conclusion, particularly where sabotage is suspected. The prosecution must not be deterred by the serious penalties necessarily involved in a conviction for that crime. In cases where it is not proved that wire cutting amounted to sabotage, prosecutors will be instructed to press for salutary penalties, in view of the serious military consequences of damage to signal installations.
3. Copy of recent report to this Headquarters is enclosed for information.

D. S. Jackling
D.S. Jackling
Lt Colonel

1 Incl

434

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No. 53

SUBJECT:- Communications- Line Sabotage.

1. The following are instances of line sabotage, in which the culprits have been caught and tried by civil courts, with punishments awarded.

(1) 535 S/L Bty.
Caught an offender in MISTER BLANCO area. His name is unknown but he was tried by civil court on 5 Oct and awarded 6 months hard labour.

(11) 21 LAA Rept.
Two civilians were caught cutting wire outside RUC on 12 Sep handed over to ANCOOT at LAMTINI and were tried on 16 Sept. One was given the option of a fine of 5000 lire or 6 months imprisonment and paid the fine immediately. The other was severely reprimanded.

(111) 31 LAA Regt.
Two more civilians caught on Sep 20 in almost the same position.
Handed over to AMGOT at LENTINI and given the option of 6 months imprisonment or a fine of 5000 lire. As both civilians were later seen at liberty it is assumed that they paid the fine.

(iv) 1B AA Ops Room.
Caught a man cutting lines on the SYRACUSE - CASSIDILE road on 10 Aug. He was taken to the P4 Security Section SYRACUSE. Result of trial is not known.

(v) 104 HAA Regt.
A Sicilian was caught by 329 HAA Bty interfering with telephone lines on 6 Oct 43. He received 2 years hard labour at CATANIA.

(vi) 104 HMA Regt.
Two Sicilians caught by 329 HMA Bty on 9 Oct 43 cutting telephone wire. Tried at CATANIA. One sentenced to 2 years hard labour, the other fined 5000 lire with 6 months suspended sentence.

(vii) On 17 Oct two Sicilians were caught by Signallers from RMU cutting telephone wires. Each sentenced to 2 years imprisonment at CATANIA.

2. Other units report numerous cases in which culprits were not caught.

/s/ R.C.M. Haikes
Brigadier
Comd 73 AA Brigade

Field.
14 Dec 43

he was tried by civil court on 5 Oct and awarded 6 months hard labour.

(ii) 21 LAA Regt.

Two civilians were caught cutting wire outside RHQ on 12 Sep handed over to AMCOF at LENTINI and were tried on 16 Sept. One was given the option of a fine of 5000 lire or 6 months imprisonment and paid the fine immediately. The other was severely reprimanded.

(iii) 21 LAA Regt.

Two more civilians caught on Sep 20 in almost the same position. Handed over to AMCOF at LENTINI and given the option of 6 months imprisonment or a fine of 5000 lire. As both civilians were later seen at liberty it is assumed that they paid the fine.

(iv) 18 AA Ops Room.

Caught a man cutting lines on the SYRACUSE - CASSIMIR road on 10 Aug. He was taken to the Fd Security Section SYRACUSE. Result of trial is not known.

(v) 104 HAA Regt.

A Sicilian was caught by 329 HAA Bty interfering with telephone lines on 6 Oct 43. He received 2 years hard labour at CATANIA.

(vi) 104 HAA Regt.

Two Sicilians caught by 329 HAA Bty on 9 Oct 43 cutting telephone wire. Tried at CATANIA. One sentenced to 2 years hard labour, the other fined 5000 lire with 6 months suspended sentence.

(vii) On 17 Oct two Sicilians were caught by Signallers from RHQ cutting telephone wires. Each sentenced to 2 years imprisonment at CATANIA.

2. Other units report numerous cases in which culprits were not caught.

Field.
14 Dec 43
AJH/WDC

/s/ R.C.M. Raikes
Brigadier
Comd 73 AA Brigade

433

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SUBJECT: Wrongful possession of Allied Forces Property.

HCH-

H.Q. A.M.C.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

TO: H.Q., AM 5 Army.
S.L.O., AM 8 Army.
H.Q.L.O., AM Region III.
H.Q.L.O., AM Region IV (Main)

AM/205/110.
18. Dec. 43.

Proclamation 2 Art. 2, Section 40
Charges for wrongful Possession of Allied Forces
Property.

A large number of cases of charges for wrongful possession of Allied Forces Property is occurring. The situation is that members of the Forces are parting with the issues of cigarettes and other commodities purchased or received as rations from Army sources, and these commodities come into the possession of Italian civilians and are sold and dealt in at high profit.

2. It has been decided that the large scale traffic which is occurring is obnoxious, as the commodities mentioned were never intended for the Italian civilian population.

3. Allied Military Courts will convict persons proved to be in possession of the above-mentioned commodities, unless such persons can produce proper official authority for the possession. The possession itself is sufficient prima facie evidence to require the accused to account for it.

4. Prosecutions will not, however, be brought for the ordinary small case where a civilian has a packet or two of cigarettes, probably given to him by a member of the Forces. The cases which will be prosecuted are those where possession of large quantities shows definite commercial traffic which must be put an end to.

5. You are requested to put into practice in your area or Region the above procedure and to report in due course to this H.Q. the results which are obtained and with any recommendations for its continuance or amendment.

/RAC.

W. J. H.
Lieut. Colonel,
Chief Legal Officer.

432

Copy to: Public Safety Division.
File AM/207.

for AM/40.

785016

SUBJECT: - Italy Sabotage Report
for October24 NOV 1943
Hq, 1st Army Group,
C.I.C.

5

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15/16/17/18/19/20/21/22/23/24/25/26/27/28/29/30/31/

13 Nov 43

TO: Distribution Salon

1. The enclosed AFM Sabotage Reports for the month of October are sent for your information.

2. Attention of F.S.C. and C.I.C. is drawn to Part III which stresses the fact that sections should familiarize themselves with the various sabotage devices.

R.R. STANHOPE-WRIGHT, Capt.
for Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
1st Army Group.

Fifth Army	25
Eighth Army	25
No. 2 District	1
F.S.C.	1
AG, Hq, 1st Army Group	1
16 F.S.C.	1
G. Special Ops	1
War Room	1
1st Air Force (US)	1
File	1
Spare	1

P.S.

circulation of this
for reference to all units pp 5

Dec 1943

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

B-389.502/1-D.

18 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for October 1943.

TO: Distribution below.

1. Attached for your information is summary of cases reported under this heading during the month of October.
2. Attention is drawn to Part III, "Notes for CIC and FS Personnel".

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

V. B. Dillon - Dillon
S. E. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

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NATOUSA.

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1. Attached for your information is summary of cases reported under this heading during the month of October.
2. Attention is drawn to Part III, "Notes for CIO and P3 Personnel".

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

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Copy to: D.S.M.

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11. 6. 1900

WARRANTS - S. 10176 REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1943

PART I. STING L. C. 1073.

Delay-Action Explosions.

1. Three explosions of German time-bombs in MELBIS have come to notice:
- a. One in a 'main street near the Port' on or about 9 October 1943.
- b. One in the Postal Building, where Fifth Army Headquarters was situated on or about 10/11 October 1943.
- c. One in the Prince of Piedmont Barracks on 15 October 1943.

So far only a report on c has been received, though this refers also to an explosion on 9 October in the same building, which may be that referred to at a.

The time-delay used in this case was the J. EDGAR 504, already known as a standard COTWIN Army demolition device, with a delay up to 21 days. The dates of the explosions indicate that the charges were put in place before the COTWINS left, and in fact it appears that, immediately before their evacuation, the areas concerned were roped off and barred to civilians. It is not considered therefore that these explosions were arranged by saboteurs of either the EDGAR or ED, but by normal Army demolition units.

This assumption is confirmed by the fact that no explosions of this type have been reported since the 21 day time limit expired.

2. With regard to the second special case mentioned in Security Notes No. 3, Security of Material during September, Part I, it is regretted that the full report hoped for is still not available.

PART II. CITIES & COUNTIES.

The following cases have been reported:

Wire Cutting:

1. Between 5-8 October, cases of cut signal lines were reported at PESSANO, SAN SEVERINO, VERMI, and CERNI. In only one out of 8 cases was the culprit traced, and in this case no security motive can be attributed as she was an old woman who had removed some wire under the impression that it was old German wire left behind in the retreat. 10 Corps D.O.P. investigation points to ignorance and desire for the wire as probable motives. JMWOT posted after cut that offenders were liable to the death penalty if

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1. Three explosions of German type occurred at the following locations:
 - a. One in a main street near the Port on or about 9 October 1943.
 - b. One in the Postal Building, where Fifth Army Headquarters was situated on or about 10/11 October 1943.
 - c. One in the Prince of Piedmont Barracks on 15 October 1943.

So far only a report on c has been received, though this refers also to an explosion on 9 October in the same building, which may be that referred to at a.

The time-delay used in this case was the J. WDMR 504, already known as a standard German Army demolition device, with a delay up to 21 days. The dates of the explosions indicate that the charges were put in place before the Germans left, and in fact it appears that, immediately before their evacuation, the areas concerned were roped off and barred to civilians. It is not considered therefore that these explosions were arranged by saboteurs of either the WEHR or SD, but by normal Army demolition units.

This assumption is confirmed by the fact that no explosions of this type have been reported since the 21 day time limit expired.

2. With regard to the second special case mentioned in Security Notes No. 3, Security of Material during September, Part I, it is regretted that the full report hoped for is still not available.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

The following cases have been reported:

1. Wire Cutting:

1. Between 5-8 October, cases of cut signal lines were reported at PLEASANT, SAN SEBASTIAN, REYNOLDS, and C. JORDAN. In only one out of 8 cases was the culprit traced, and in this case no security motive can be attributed as she was an old woman who had removed some wire under the impression that it was old German wire left behind in the retreat. 10 Corps M.D.P. investigation points to ignorance and desire for the wire as probable motives. M.D.P. posted notices, pointing out that offenders were liable to the death penalty if detected, and no repetitions have since been reported.

2. It was reported that on 15 October 1943, an attempt was made by 2 Italian civilians to cut the main telephone wire on the CANTON road (15 Army Group District). The civilians were apprehended and handed over to M.D.S., 15 Army Group. The identity of these civilians has not yet been revealed.

3. On 15 October 1943, an Arab was caught in the act of cutting U.S. Signal Corps lines on the ... Circuit at MENZEL TRIMM Airfield. The offender was handed over to the Commandant at MENZEL TRIMM for appropriate action.

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4. On 24 October 1943, Signal wires LIN REIDA - THESSA, were cut by individuals (Arabs) believed to have a sabotage motive. CONSTITUTION F.S.S. are handling the case, and preventative measures are being taken.

5. At GOTTALIE airfield, telephone lines were cut on the 2, 6, and 7 October. Eighth Army F.S.S. investigated, with no result. F.S.S. in conjunction with Carabinieri have taken steps to improve the security arrangements of the airfield as a whole.

6. During October 1943, several instances of interference with telephone lines of 1 Para. Regt. at JIJUR were reported. Two children were caught while cutting and taking away wire, but intentional sabotage is not suspected.

7. Three cases of wire cutting occurred on 25, 28 and 29 October 1943 at GUERAS. Investigation conducted by 12 F.S.S. disclosed that the wires were undoubtedly cut deliberately, but the perpetrators were not traced.

8. On 25 October 1943, telephone lines between 6-Pk. Coy. and 248 Pk. Coy., 1 Br. Inf. Div. were cut. This matter was reported to the Gaid, who called upon the Gaid to investigate and report.

B. Shipping.

9. On 9 October 1943, incendiary bombs were discovered in Hold No. 5, S.S. FORT SWAGER, which was being loaded with rails and spikes by Italian Ps. in the Port of JIJUR. Investigation by 86 Port Security Section and interrogation of Italian Ps. concerned by C.I.C. Section, JIJUR, while not conclusively eliminating sabotage, pointed to probability of carelessness or ignorance as cause of accident.

10. It was reported that on 6 October 1943, the compass of the S.S. GUSSE was interfered with. This incident was the culmination of a series of similar acts committed over a period of six months. Investigation by 96 F.S.S. indicated that W.B. J. THOUET was responsible. He appears to be an unbalanced individual, and is being repatriated to Great Britain for disposal.

11. On 22 October 1943, while the S.S. THOMAS B. ROBERTSON was coming into ORN Harbour, Joseph BLANCHET, who was at the wheel, in disobedience of orders, placed the wheel at half right. A crash with another ship was avoided only by the prompt intervention of the Master. Investigation by ORN CIC indicated BLANCHET's actions were the result of personal grievances; his loyalty is not in question.

12. In October 1943, it was reported that the engines of S.S. W4. FLOYD had been damaged. Investigation disclosed that JOHN J. DUNCAN threw sand into the ship's bearings following disciplinary action from the ship's officers. Suitable punitive measures have been taken.

7. Three cases of wire cutting occurred on 26, 28 and 29 October 1943 at CERRAS. Investigation conducted by 12 F.S.S. disclosed that the wires were undoubtedly cut deliberately, but the perpetrators were not traced.

8. On 25 October 1943, telephone lines between 6-M. Pt. Cox. and 243 M. Coy., 1 Br. Inf. Div. were cut. This matter was reported to the Gail, who called upon the Chelish to investigate and report.

B. Shipping.

9. On 9 October 1943, incendiary bombs were discovered in hold No. 5, S.S. FORT STANLEY, which was being loaded with rails and spikes by Italian Ps.W. in the Port of JOLIES. Investigation by 86 Port Security Section and interrogation of Italian Ps.W. concerned by C.I.C. Section, J.W.H., while not conclusively eliminating sabotage, pointed to probability of carelessness or ignorance as cause of accident.

10. It was reported that on 6 October 1943, the compass of the S.S. OUSEL was interfered with. This incident was the culmination of a series of similar acts committed over a period of six months. Investigation by 96 F.S.S. indicated that J.B.J. THOMAS was responsible. He appears to be an unbalanced individual, and is being repatriated to Great Britain for disposal.

11. On 22 October 1943, while the S.S. THOMAS E. ROBERTSON was coming into ORAN Harbour, Joseph WILKINSON, who was at the wheel, in disobedience of orders, placed the wheel at full right. A crash with another ship was avoided only by the prompt intervention of the Master. Investigation by ORAN CIC indicated WILKINSON's actions were the result of personal grievances; his loyalty is not in question.

12. In October 1943, it was reported that the engines of S.S. W.A. FLOYD had been damaged. Investigation disclosed that JOHN J. DUFFIN threw sand into the ship's bearings following disciplinary action from the ship's officers. Suitable punitive measures have been taken.

C. Railway.

13. On 20 October 1943, five Arabs and an Italian, Arnaldo STILLA, were arrested near ROUTE. By the Commissioner on charges of having caused 24 railway accidents between the stations of ALGER and OUED DJEL. During period November 1942 - May 1943, one of the natives is said to have admitted placing a spike in the points at ALGER on one occasion, while STILLA is stated to have been responsible for directing the whole affair. A full report has been requested of the D.S.M.

U.S. SECRET
Equals British Secret

14. On 25 October 1943, the Provost Marshal reported that a small box of TNT had been placed between the brake drum and wheel of a freight car in the port area at MILLB. MARTIN F.S.S. presently investigating.

D. Miscellaneous.

15. On 1 October 1943, a case of apparent sabotage occurred in the No. 1 Vehicle Assembly Workshops at BOW. Vehicles were found damaged in a way which precluded accidental cause. Investigation, while not positively identifying the perpetrators, indicated that Australian soldiers working in the shops, who were dissatisfied as a result of a pay dispute, probably caused the damage. Preventative measures have been recommended by 96 Field Security Section.

16. On 3 October 1943, the boom mechanism of the ROCKET Port was found to have been tampered with, and damaged as follows: 3 plug leads cut, petrol tank moved out of position, petrol pipe twisted, and four feet missing. Investigation by 51 Field Security Section indicated the damage probably to have been "wilful", but the perpetrator was not traced.

PART III. NOTES FOR CIG AND ESR.

1. It will be seen that notices of liability to the death penalty have proved a satisfactory cure for outbreaks of wire cutting. It is suggested that this method should be adopted in all areas where outbreaks of this type occur, and that it might also be extended to include interference with railways. It should be borne in mind however that such notices, if wrongly placed, may in some cases have the reverse of the desired effect by drawing the attention of potential saboteurs to vulnerable points. In the case of railways, stations would appear to be the most practical sites.

2. There are indications that I.I.F. may present a greater counter-sabotage problem than N.W.A.F.B., and it is therefore urged that CIG and F.S. personnel should familiarise themselves with the various enemy sabotage devices of which notification has from time to time been sent out from this Headquarters. In the event of any such device being found, this Headquarters should be informed by cable immediately.

16. On 3 October 1945, the boom mechanism of the SOURCE Port was found to have been tampered with, and damaged as follows: 3 ply leads out, petrol tank moved out of position, petrol pipe twisted, and four feet missing. Investigation by 51 Field Security Section indicated the damage probably to have been "wildcat", but the perpetrator was not traced.

PART III. NOTES FOR CIG AND PSP.

1. It will be seen that notices of liability to the death penalty have proved a satisfactory cure for outbreaks of wire cutting. It is suggested that this method should be adopted in all areas where outbreaks of this type occur, and that it might also be extended to include interference with railways. It should be borne in mind however that such notices, if wrongly placed, may in some cases have the reverse of the desired effect by drawing the attention of potential saboteurs to vulnerable points. In the case of railways, stations would appear to be the most practical sites.

2. There are indications that IWM may present a counter counter-sabotage problem than HMTF AREA, and it is therefore urged that CIG and F.S. personnel should familiarise themselves with the various enemy sabotage devices of which notification has from time to time been sent out from this Headquarters. In the event of any such device being found, this Headquarters should be informed by cable immediately.

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U. S. SECRET
Equals British Secret

785016

SECRETAIRALS MESSAGE
INFOLIO NO 07567
19TH NOV 43

FROM : DISTRICT
TO : ACTION AREA
IN O 55 AREA 56 AREA 59 AREA 15 ARMY GROUP
2 DISTRICT 1 CDM CORPS 40 DIV
ORIG. NO: 0 710

TOO 1810A
THI 2230A/19
T.R 1750A/21

SITREP 181800A.

1ST. NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN 171600A AND 171900A
AREA PUNAGLA J 1535 ON ITALIAN COASTAL DEFENSE SITE.
CASUALTIES D AND 2 OFFRS INJURED 20 ORS ALL 1 CDM ARMED INGT.
CAUSE UNKNOWN INVESTIGATION PROCS D.

2ND. 151 COY PC ARRIVED SYRACUSE 16 NOV.

3RD. REAR PARTY H. T. S.S. HIDE MOVED OUT DET 74 LMC MOVED INTO
56 AREA.

4TH. REF SITREP O 696 OF 181700A. HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCH OF BARRIO
REVEALED SOME WEAPONS AND SOME STOLEN GRAIN RECOVERED. NO FURTHER
INCIDENTS.

G(OPS)
SD
RA
G.I

4 ACTION
5
2
3

SPEC OPS
WAR ROOM
A/ - G
AMGOT

3
1
2
4

SEC. 1905A/21
T.T. 1950A/21. JGD.

427

785016

NOV 1943

3

SECRET

BR MESSAGE IN BY AIR

FOLIO NO: 06969
 DATE 18 NOV '43
 TOO 1700A/18
 THI 18.5A/18
 TOR 1800A/19

FROM: DISTONE

TO: (1) AFHQ INFO: (2) 55 AREA
 (3) 56 AREA (4) 59 AREA
 (5) 15 ARMYGROUP (6) NUMBER 2 DISTRICT
 (7) 1 CDM CORPS

ORIG NO: 0 696 FILE 1538/G

SITREP 171800AFIRST.

1 CDM NED REGT LEFT 56 AREA FOR ISLAND.
 ADV PARTY 1 CDM CORPS TROOPS MOVED IN.

SECOND.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE OCCURRED BETWEEN 161100 AND 161500A.

APPROX 1000 PERSONS INVOLVED.

CAUSE NO BREAD PAID TWO DAYS.

GUARDIA MUNICIPAL FIRED INJURING CHILD.

GUARDIA SUBSEQUENTLY THROWN BY CROWD FROM SECOND FLOOR AND INJURED.

BAKERY RECORDS DESTROYED.

(3) POSSIBILITY SUCH DISTURBANCE FOR FURTHER.

MORE COMING DETAILED.

SIC DISTRIBUTION.

33	5 OTHER
BR NED	1
SPECIAL OPS	3
R1	2
MGOT	4
✓-G4	2

SIC 1915A/19
 TT 2010A/19
 KJ

426

785016

~~SECRET~~
(Equals British ~~SECRET~~ and ~~SECRET~~)

SECRET

(Auth; CO, Region 3,
Allied Mil Govt)

15 Oct 1943

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 464, U. S. Army# 3-15-10AMC³

15 October 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Rioting and Mass Looting by Civilians.

TO: G.O.C., I Corps (Attention Q Rear)

1. This is in reference to your message No Q-7 dated 5 October 1943 addressed to Fifth Army and 15th Army Group.

2. Your report of rioting and mass looting in the Molt-Palma area appears to have been based on incorrect information. Investigation has shown that there has been no rioting or looting in that area. The only disturbance that has been verified took place at Sarno where civilians were found taking beds out of a hospital that had been left unguarded by its Italian staff and the Military. This looting was stopped by Civil Affairs Officers Major WRAY and Lieutenant RAY, assisted by four (4) British soldiers.

3. It is requested that you arrange to have any such reports in the future investigated initially by the Civil Affairs Officers attached to your Headquarters.

For the Commanding Officer:

*Paul Revere*PAUL REVERE,
Major, A. G. C.,
Adjutant General.

COPIES TO:

XCorps Main
16th Div
Fifth Army
15th Army Group
AMG, 15th Army Group ✓

This is the copy, ps.
RL
19/10

~~SECRET~~
(Equals British ~~SECRET~~ and ~~SECRET~~)

- 1 -

425

18 Sept. 943

LOOTING

Fortunately no looting on a large scale has taken place since we entered on 3.9.943.

At the outset I think should be emphasized that during the months of May, June, July, and August the Germans were virtually in occupation of the town. From enquiries I have made from at least twelve reliable sources, the Germans systematically looted from the town practically everything of real value, e.g. civilian motorcars and lorries, tyres, machinery, machine tools, valuable paintings and even antique furniture.

When the Allies commenced their heavy bombing at the end of July and the whole of August when we were heavily shelling the place, no less than 60,000 civilians fled to various places in the provinces. Thousands left their homes without taking their effects with them. More than 70 per cent. of shopowners left the town and have not yet returned.

In these circumstances therefore we can anticipate many complaints from the public when they return. In my view practically all claims for compensation must be resisted, except a few where there is evidence that our military have taken away any property.

Specific cases of property being taken by our soldiers dealt with by me personally are as follows:

"I^o)" Between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m. on 4.9.43 I patrolled the town and found seven Canadian soldiers in possession of property, a brand new sewing machine, adding machine, three typewriters, stationery, etc. The soldiers in question were attached to the 1st C.I.B. Workshops Canadian. As to account for their possession of the articles, they explained that they had been instructed by their major to collect these articles.

As a result I contacted the DAQMG, First Canadian Division, who told me that he accepted responsibility for the orders given by Major DEMAIQ to requisition everything necessary for their operations. I held a receipt in my official pocketbook by the DAQMG, First Canadian Division, for some of the articles taken.

At 10 a.m. today 8.9.43 Colonel Gerry interviewed in my presence Major DEMAIQ who explained the reasons why he sanctioned the taking of the above articles, also watch parts, wire wireless valves and equipment. Major DEMAIQ also explained that his men did break into certain premises for this purpose. The new NECCHI sewing machine was handed over against receipt to Major DEMAIQ who said it had been taken from a railway truck and that it was necessary for their military requirements. I have the names of all the soldiers concerned if wanted at any time.

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As a result I contacted the DAQAC, First Canadian Division, who told me that he accepted responsibility for the orders given by Major DEMAIO to requisition everything necessary for their operations. I hold a receipt in my official pocketbook by the DAQAC, First Canadian Division, for some of the article taken.

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20) Woman and boy looting shop. At 11 a.m. on 5.9.43 I cleared out from a chemist's shop four soldiers of 84 BRIC who were helping themselves to first-aid equipment, bandages, etc. They said that a few of their comrades had been injured in the beach landing and that's why they went into the shop. This being feasible I let them take sufficient for immediate needs and made them return to shop all the rest. Military police informed.

Inside the shop I also found an elderly woman aged 78 and a boy of 16 rummaging through the shop and taking several articles of small value. I arrested them and they have been since imprisoned. The woman is seriously ill with cancer and owing to her advanced age I have since released her from prison.

30) Seven Indian soldiers arrested at 6.30 p.m., 5.9.43, for looting in a hardware and stationery establishment. Handed over to Military Police.

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62) = At 7 p.m., 5.9.43, two soldiers were arrested by Major Simcock who found them inside a shop. In their possession were odd article of jewellery, two watches, cigarette cases, lighters, rings. Handed over to Military Police.

59) = During afternoon of 5.9.43 the house of the O.C. of the Carabinieri in Reggio Town was forcibly entered and every room ransacked. Some Jewellery chocolate, cigarettes and soap were taken. Major Pollock took up the inquiry and traced two Canadian soldiers (Cpl. POLANSKI and Pte REID, both of No. 2 FDS, Canadian Division), who both admitted that they entered the house.

Major Pollock found in their possession a watch, chocolate, cigarettes and soap which were immediately identified by the O.C. Carabinieri. The soldiers admitted that they took the property from his house. Colonel GORMAN (the men's O.C.) and Major GILMUTH, also over them, were present and said that severe disciplinary action would be taken by the Canadian authorities quite apart from any action by the British Provost Marshal. Case handed over by Major Pollock to Major Lunday, A.P.M. with full report, of statements and evidence.

60) = At 8.30 p.m. on 7.9.43 Major Watts caught two Moroccan soldiers stealing articles of furniture in a bombed house. One of the Mauritanians drew a knife and attempted to strike Major Pollock who intervened. A scuffle followed and unfortunately both men were able to effect their escape in the darkness. A search of their billets followed and one man had still not returned. He is probably the culprit and enquiries are still in hand to identify him.

70) = Civilian police have arrested some 27 persons for petty stealing who will be dealt with in due course. In some cases the evidence against them is very weak. S.S. some said the article of furniture were their own property and that they were moving from one house to another or again that Canadian soldiers had actually given them some small articles as presents. Major Pollock is examining each case soon as opportunity occurs and they will be dealt with according to circumstances.

80) = At 4 p.m. on 6.9.43 Lieut Beresford arrested two soldiers found in a shop and over to Military Police.

On the question of looting generally, this serious problem was tackled as effectively as possible from the start. Within six hours of the Allied landing sixty Carabinieri were in the streets patrolling and from the morning of 4.9.43 were on duty the following:-

107 Carabinieri (uniformed with armbands)	420
42 Questorini (do do)	
33 Questorini (plain clothes with armbands)	
30 Municipal Guards (uniformed with armbands)	
8 Guardia Finanza (do do)	

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
Generally speaking, they are not any means efficient but all are being vetted and examined, will receive individual instruction in due course and will be licked into shape.

Again generally speaking, all of the above are most anxious to cooperate and so far I have found no obstruction in them. We are apt to regard them as a useless lot but they are paid low wages and have not been very well

= 3° =

fed for some months. Another important factor which should not overlook is this - Since July the town has been subjected to heavy bombing and, later, shelling day and night. This has had a most serious effect on the morale of town officials who have been compelled to remain on duty. I know from personal experience what 90 successive days of bombing may be and I cannot help feeling a great measure of sympathy with these officials.

However I have determined to get the best possible out of these men before I leave Reggio.


MAJOR

C.A.P.O., Reggio Province.

0 8 9 1