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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

10/143/34

Security and Politics
Dec. 1943 - Jan. 1944

2232

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

AMG/448

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Security Center

(3)

DECLASSIFIED

440 907527

By LDC NARS, Date 11/7/87

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Security Folder

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DECLASSIFIED
BY SP-10 907527
DATE 11/2/81

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THIS FOLDER
CONTAINS PAPERS
FROM DEC - 43
TO JAN - 44
CATALOGUE.

SUBJECT:-

Political Activities.CONFIDENTIAL.

U.S., A.M.S.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMC/30/73

11th January 1944

The following new political directive to the C. in C. has been received from A.F.H.Q. defining the revised policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. Within your discretion, the Italian people may be permitted to participate in such political activities (other than Fascist) as do not lead to rioting and disorder.
2. These will include the right of peaceful assembly, attendance at meetings of political committees, publication and distribution of political works and such other activities of similar nature as you may determine to be advisable.
3. Upon their release, political prisoners shall be cautioned that political activity on their part which gives rise to or tends to give rise to rioting or disorder will not be tolerated.

Although paragraphs 1 and 2 of this directive call for a substantial modification of policies which have heretofore been observed in the enforcement of the provisions of Section 1, Article IV, and Section 2, Article 5, of Proclamation No. 11, those provisions are not abrogated by the directive, nor will a General Order be issued altering the methods of control.

3. The directive, however, requires a greater liberalism in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 11 than has heretofore been considered appropriate. Permits for particular meetings may hereafter be granted with more freedom and containing permits to trustworthy groups may be issued more freely than they have been in the past. Discretion to deny permits may still, of course, be exercised when there is reason to believe that the proposed meeting will lead to disorder.

4. With regard to the publication of newspapers a programme of control is presently being formulated by the Allied Publication Board and a directive on the licensing procedure will be issued shortly.

Instructions of paragraph 3 in

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The following new political directive to the G. in C. has been received from A.F.H.Q. defining the revised policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. Within your discretion, the Italian people may be permitted to participate in such political activities (other than Fascist) as do not lead to rioting and disorder.
2. These will include the right of peaceful assembly, attendance at meetings of political committees, publication and distribution of political works and such other activities of similar nature as you may determine to be advisable.
3. Upon their release, political prisoners shall be cautioned that political activity on their part which gives rise to or tends to give rise to rioting or disorder will not be tolerated."

Although paragraphs 1 and 2 of this directive call for a substantial modification of policies which have heretofore been observed in the enforcement of the provisions of Section I, Article IV, and Section 2, Article 5, of Proclamation No. 11, those provisions are not abrogated by the directive, nor will a General Order be issued altering the methods of control.

The directive, however, requires a greater liberalism in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 11 than has heretofore been considered appropriate. Permits for particular meetings may hereafter be granted with more freedom and continuing permits to trustworthy groups may be issued more freely than they have been in the past. Discretion to deny permits may still, of course, be exercised when there is reason to believe that the proposed meeting will lead to disorder.

With regard to the publication of newspapers a program of control is presently being formulated by the Allied Publication Board and a directive on the licensing procedure will be issued shortly.

You will be careful to see that the instructions of paragraph 3 in the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff are carried out in all cases in which persons imprisoned by the Fascist government are released.

Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

W. H. C. Brigadier,

A.C.C. Brindisi	(1)
A.M.C. H.Q.	(1)
G.S.I. (b) 15 Army Group	(1)
Finance	(1)
Medical	(1)
Legal	(1)
Public Safety	(1)
Property Custodian	(1)

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A.M.F.A.	(1) E. & S. (1)

1390

Subject:-

Security & Politics.CONFIDENTIAL.AMV HQ.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.Ref. AMB/448/8
13 January 44.S.C.A.O., AMB Fifth Army.
S.C.A.O., AMB Eighth Army.
R.C.A.O., Region III.
R.C.A.O., Region IV.

Further to this office No. AMB/448/ of 28 Dec 43,
the D.C.C.A.O. wishes you to co-operate with F&S/OIC Sections
and/or detachments on the basis of the principles laid down
in the 15th Army Group Directive forwarded therewith, and to
report to this Headquarters any breaches of these principles.


Lt. Colonel,
Chief, Public Safety.

C.O.S.

Handled thru by Lt Col Gibson.

His directive is all that we can want.

I should like to see that they should

1. sent a copy of the force that they should cooperate with the force on these principles and report her any breaches thereof.

When told Lt Col Gibson my voice is civilian interest. He is placing them all in a

camp near Pottery. Here I suggest they

2. could be screened by the force and again by the force & a limited number of movement, procedure a board, & on restriction of movement.

785016/44

Public Supply

Please take action in Da Luanth

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cooperate with
and report her any
breaches thereof.

When told that Gibson was near the
civilian inmates. He is placing them all in a

camp near Pottery.
Here I suggest they
could be screened by
Gibson's Col. & again
by FSS & a limited number released on
parole & bond, & on restriction of movement.

785016/44

Public Supply

Please take action in Da Conant

A. W. Gibson m3.

R.G.
J.G./44 1388

P.S. ~~Chd~~

1. Copies were sent to SCAs, RAs on 25 Dec; do you think an additional memo should be sent instructing them to report breaches. You will remember that G. Col. Gibson could you the draft.
2. will take up at earliest opportunity. They are being guaranteed in Pottery Prison & for convenience of administration, July 7/44

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CONFIDENTIAL.MEMORANDUM ON AMG/FSP RESPONSIBILITIES.

1. Extract from Eighth Army Security Intelligence Summary No.7.

"In order to reduce the amount of time spent by FSS on investigation of civilians with a view to determining whether they should be interned on the grounds of their political status, past or present, a firm list of Fascist appointments has been compiled, the incumbents of which will be arrested. The list is comprehensive and it is reckoned that arrests carried out on the basis of this list will break the back of any covert Fascist activity.

The justification for employing FSS on this political work has been the fear that the Fascist Party would an eventual security danger to military operations.

In effect, this danger has been found to be extremely remote, and civil security should be more strictly employed on the investigation of those civilians who are actually suspected to be engaged in espionage or other enemy-inspired activity.

It is clear that to relieve FSS of political work, AMG should have an executive branch in co-ordinating RCOs for the purpose of:-

- (a) Political investigation and arrest.
- (b) The close supervision and re-organisation of Carabinieri and police.

Until this takes place we will be obliged to continue devoting a considerable amount of time to matters which do not come within the scope of military and civil security proper.

It is considered that effective and positive security control and intelligence can be obtained within the existing framework of the organisation of I(b) and FSS, providing means can be devised of shedding gradually those activities relating to AMG, FSB, SIB and CMF, which are undertaken generally rather too readily by FSS".

2. This H.Q. directive "Security and Politics" dated 23 Dec 43.
(Attached).

3. Letter to Eighth Army "FSP and Politics" dated 24 Dec 43.

"Reference your Security Intelligence Summary No.7.

Careful consideration has been given to your comments in the "GENERAL" paragraph of the above Summary, concerning the employment of FSP on political investigation, and the matter has been discussed with the C.C.A.O.

It was, in fact, your paragraph which led to the issue of this HQ letter of even reference dated 23 Dec 43, subject "Security and Politics". The latter sets out our views as to the extent to which it is justifiable and desirable for FSP to concern themselves with political, particularly Fascist investigations. The decision with the question of a "Special Branch" of AMG for political

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fear that the Fascist Party would an eventual security danger to military operations.

In effect, this danger has been found to be extremely remote, and civil security should be more strictly employed on the investigation of those civilians who are actually suspected to be engaged in espionage or other enemy-inspired activity.

It is clear that to relieve FSS of political work, AMG should have an executive branch in incorporating NCOs for the purpose of:-

- (a) Political investigation and arrest.
- (b) The close supervision and re-organisation of Carabinieri and police.

Until this takes place we will be obliged to continue devoting a considerable amount of time to matters which do not come within the scope of military and civil security proper.

It is considered that effective and positive security control and intelligence can be obtained within the existing framework of the organisation of I(b) and FSS, providing means can be devised of shedding gradually those activities relating to AMG, FWS, SIB and CMP, which are undertaken generally rather too readily by FSS".

2. This H.Q. directive "Security and Politics" dated 23 Dec 43.
(Attached).

3. Letter to Eighth Army "FSP and Politics" dated 24 Dec 43.
"Reference your Security Intelligence Summary No.7.

Careful consideration has been given to your comments in the "GENERAL" paragraph of the above Summary, concerning the employment of FSP on political investigation, and the matter has been discussed with the C.C.A.C.

It was, in fact, your paragraph which led to the issue of this HQ letter of even reference dated 23 Dec 43, subject "Security and Politics". The latter sets out our views as to the extent to which it is justifiable and desirable for FSP to concern themselves with political, particularly Fascist investigations. It also deals with the question of a "Special Branch" of AMG for political investigations and arrests.

As regards the "Supervision and re-organisation of Carabinieri and Police", it is considered that C.A.F.O's should be able adequately to deal with this, assisted by FSP in the Security aspect. 1387

It is thought that your firm list of Fascist appointments, the incumbents of which will normally be arrested will go far towards attaining your object in cutting down time spent by FSP on political enquiries."

Security
Extract from Eighth Army/Intelligence Summary No.8.

"A tendency has been noted in the English Press of having AMG written up by people who appear to be very ill-informed on the on the details of AMG organisation.

The investigation of Fascist Party and Fascist Political organisations and the arrest of Fascist officials and the break-up of the Fascist Party, are all ascribed to the efforts of AMG.

In fact.....

- 2 -

In fact, all these investigations and the break-up of the Fascist Party have been effected entirely by the Army, as distinct from the AMG, using the FSS as their executive.

All initiative in the issuing of policy directives, in investigations and in arrests, has been taken by the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff and the FSS, and AMG were consulted only in order to help them, with their limited staff of officers, to re-start the machinery of government.

As has frequently been pointed out, the AMG organisation does not allow for any action in the sphere of political re-organisation, and it is felt that for the work of the Army and the FSS to be written up as the effort of the "specially organised AMG", is the sort of mis-information which will not be of assistance in obtaining for AMG an executive branch, as recommended in Summary No. 7.

5.

Letter from Eighth Army "Security and Politics" dated 31 Dec 43.

"Reference your 15AG/1451/2/GI(b) of 23 Dec 43.

Your views on the inter-relation of security and politics are noted.

As regards AMG intelligence organisation. It has been put forward by us that AMG should have an executive arm which would not only enable them to make their own investigations, but also make their own arrests, supervise Carabinieri on the ground etc.

It is stressed that although the principle may exist that C.A.C.'s should be their own intelligence officers, in practice this Branch has not found that C.A.C.'s had the time to make such investigations."

WDG/JH.

assistance in obtaining for AIG an executive branch, as recommended in C.A.O. No. 7".

5.

Letter from Eighth Army "Security and Politics" dated 31 Dec 43.

"Reference your 15AG/L451/2/GI(b) of 23 Dec 43.

Your views on the inter-relation of security and politics are noted.

As regards AIG intelligence organization. It has been put forward by us that AIG should have an executive arm which would not only enable them to make their own investigations, but also make their own arrests, supervise Carabinieri on the ground etc.

It is stressed that although the principle may exist that C.A.O.'s should be their own intelligence officers, in practice this Branch has not found that C.A.O.'s had the time to make such investigations."

WLG/JH,

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SUBJECT: Security and Politics.

U.S. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

DR CONTINUITY - U.S. COMMISSIONER

15AG/1451/2/31(0)

29 Dec 42.

Fifth Army
Sixth Army

1. In order that TSP/CIC may best fulfill their proper function, and that their activities may be directed along the most useful and effective lines, it is desired to set out the general principles which should be followed regarding the relationship between security and politics.

It is most important that military security personnel should not "dabble in politics", whether local or national, more than is necessary for the performance of their security duties. Such "dabbling" can only prejudice their normal security work, owing to the time wasted, and it may incidentally have a detrimental effect on the political situation. At the same time it cannot be said that TSP/CIC should not concern themselves at all with politics.

It is hoped that the following guidance will enable them to strike the right balance in dealing with the political aspect of their work.

2. In general, it can be said that the political situation has an effect on the security situation, and that the political beliefs and background of an individual have a bearing on the potential danger which he may present or the possible assistance which he may afford to our security.

This situation is particularly pronounced in Italy, where the country is divided into two, not only militarily by the opposing Allied and German armies, but also politically by the corresponding Italian Governments.

There is no doubt that, other things being equal, the long-standing, predominant and ardent Fascist is likely to present a greater danger to our security than the person who was never a true supporter of Fascism or who suffered under the Fascist regime for his lack of enthusiasm for the Party. Similarly, an extreme Communist who believes in Revolution by violence is a greater potential danger than a moderate democrat.

3. The interrelation of politics and security indicates that it is right and proper that military security personnel should take into account the political aspect of a case when attempting to assess its security implications. In view, however, of the limited nature, time and qualifications of such personnel, a distinction must be made between the direct and indirect influences of politics on our security.

TSP/CIC should only concern themselves with politics insofar as these have a direct bearing on our military security. It is difficult to define this more precisely, but, as a general guide, TSP/CIC should continue

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1. In order that FSP/CIC may best fulfill their proper function, and that their activities may be directed along the most useful and effective lines, it is desired to set out the general principles which should be followed regarding the relationship between security and politics.

It is most important that military security personnel should not "dabble in politics", whether local or national. While there is no necessary connection between security and politics, such "dabbling" can only prejudice their normal security work, owing to the time wasted, and it may incidentally have a detrimental effect on the political situation. At the same time it cannot be said that FSP/CIC should not concern themselves at all with politics. It is hoped that the following guidance will enable them to strike the right balance in dealing with the political aspect of their work.

2. In general, it can be said that the political situation has an effect on the security situation, and that the political beliefs and background of an individual have a bearing on the potential danger which he may present or the possible assistance which he may afford to our security.

This reaction is particularly pronounced in ITALY, where the country is divided into two, not only militarily by the opposing Allied and German armies, but also politically by the corresponding Italian Governments. There is no doubt that, other things being equal, the long-standing, prominent and ardent Fascist is likely to present a greater danger to our security than the person who has never a true supporter of Fascism or who suffered under the Fascist regime for his lack of enthusiasm for the Party. Similarly, an extreme Communist who believes in Revolution by violence is a greater potential danger than a moderate democrat.

3. This interrelation of politics and security indicates that it is right and proper that military security personnel should take into account the political aspect of a case when attempting to assess its security implications. In view, however, of the limited number, time and qualifications of such personnel, a distinction must be made between the direct and indirect influences of politics on our security.

FSP/CIC should only concern themselves with politics insofar as these have a direct bearing on our military security. It is difficult to define this more precisely, but, as a general guide, FSP/CIC should confine their political investigations and enquiries to cases where the political aspect may have an immediate and specific effect on the security aspect of a particular situation, person or group of persons.

When politics merely have an indirect bearing on our military security, they should not be regarded by FSP/CIC as a proper subject for their attention. Investigation or enquiries that is to say, military security personnel should not concern themselves with a political situation or with the political sympathies and activities of individuals, which have only an indirect, general, long-term effect on our security, which are not limited to any specific security situation or case.

This type of indirect relationship between politics and security may be described as a "political security" matter, and, as such, falls within the sphere of A.M.S. and P.W.D., rather than F.C.I. It should therefore be watched and handled, as necessary, by the former, and FSP/CIC should not concern themselves with it, unless asked for assistance in limited and specific instances, or unless it develops into a matter of direct security interest.

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4. It follows that the arrest and internment of civilians should not be initiated by FSP/CIC in the grounds for internment of persons whom they consider dangerous to our military security. The fact that such internment cases are frequently, even usually, based on political record or sympathies, does not affect this principle, and should not be allowed to lead military security personnel into a misconception of their functions and responsibility. Thus, when, for example, ex-Federal Secretaries are arrested by FSP/CIC and interned, (as they normally should be), they should be regarded, not merely as holders of a Fascist political appointment, but rather as persons whose past tenure of such appointment makes them out as probably having been leading, active and violent fascists, and, as such, a potential danger to our security.

There is no objection to FSP/CIC carrying out a purely political arrest at the request of an officer of AHP; in fact, this would be the normal procedure, as all persons arrested and interned on political grounds become civil POW, and FSP/CIC are the most convenient operating agency for the purpose: but in such cases the arrests should be initiated by AHP and the part played by FSP/CIC confined to the physical removal to custody of the persons concerned. If no FSP/CIC are available such arrests will be effected by AHP and the persons disposed of in the normal way to a POW Camp.

5. In this connection, it has sometimes been argued in defense of undue political emphasis on the part of FSP/CIC that, since AHP has no intelligence organization, it must rely on military security personnel to supply C.I.C.B. with information on the local political situation and personalities and other matters of interest to AHP. This principle, however, is contrary to the policy of both this HQ and AHP HQ. The D.C.I.C. has laid down that Civil Affairs Officers must be their own intelligence officers and that they should, by their own observation and contacts, keep themselves informed on local political matters, and on the administrative efficiency or financial integrity of officials, etc: they should, in general, only rely on FSP/CIC for information and action in the sphere of security.

6. The above policy applies equally to economic as to political matters. FSP/CIC should only concern themselves with economic questions, e.g. Black Market, if these have a direct bearing on security. For example, they should not devote their attention to investigating a Black Market or other "racket", unless they consider it likely to become the direct and imminent cause of so much discontent and ill feeling as to create a situation which would positively threaten our military security.

7. Although, as laid down above, FSP/CIC should not concern themselves with political and economic matters unless security is directly involved, it is appreciated that, in the course of their security investigations and enquiries, they may well obtain information on such matters which would be of value to other agencies. Any such items of information should, of course, be passed to the agency concerned, such as AHP, FTD, CIP(AM) etc.

Are purely political. They should confine their attention to the internment.

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leading, active and latent fascists, and, as such, a potential danger to our security.

There is no objection to FSP/CIC carrying out a purely political arrest at the request of an officer of AMI; in fact, this would be the normal procedure, as all persons arrested and interned on political grounds become civil POW, and FSP/CIC are the most convenient arresting agency for the purpose; but in such cases the arrests should be initiated by AMI and the part played by FSP/CIC confined to the physical removal to custody of the persons concerned. If no FSP/CIC are available such arrests will be effected by AMI and the persons disposed of in the normal way to a POW Camp.

5. In this connection, it has sometimes been argued in defence of undue political emphasis on the part of FSP/CIC that, since AMI has no intelligence organization, it rests with military security personnel to supply C.I.O.s. With information on the local political situation and generalization and other matters of interest to AMI.

This principle, however, is contrary to the policy of both this HQ and AMI HQ. The C.I.O.O. has laid down that Civil Affairs Officers must be their own intelligence officers and that they should, by their own observation and contacts, keep themselves informed on local political matters, and on the administrative efficiency or financial integrity of officials, etc; they should, in general, only rely on FSP/CIC for information and action in the sphere of security.

6. The above policy applies equally to economic as to political matters.

FSP/CIC should only concern themselves with economic questions, e.g. Black Market, if these have a direct bearing on security. For example, they should not devote their attention to investigating a Black Market or other "racket", unless they consider it likely to become the direct and imminent cause of so much discontent and ill feeling as to create a situation, which would positively threaten our military security.

7. Although, as laid down above, FSP/CIC should not concern themselves with political and economic matters unless security is directly involved, it is appreciated that, in the course of their security investigations and enquiries, they may well obtain information on such matters which would be of value to other agencies. But such items of information should, of course, be passed to the agency concerned, such as AMI, FSB, CSE(SIP) etc.

W. D. Gibson. W-62
Chief of Major-General,
General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy To:-

- 0-2 AMHQ
- 1 Cdr Corps
- 2 District
- P.B.S.
- 12 Air Force
- 15 Air Force
- 4.11.3. HQ 15 Army Group.
- 16 P.S. Section.

CONFIDENTIALSubject: - Security and Politics.

ASST. H.Q.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.S.

Ref. 15/155/
25 December 53.

G.C.M.C. 155 Hq. Fifth Army.
G.C.M.C. 155 Hq. Eighth Army.
G.C.M.C. 155 Hq. Region III.
G.C.M.C. 155 Hq. Region IV.

Copy of 155/155/2/151(b), dated 23 to 43, and
mandate, prescribing the duties of 155/155 personnel in
relation to politics is forwarded for information.

There is also a bearing on the disposal of persons
arrested for security reasons, and to which separate
instructions are being issued.

155/155.

[Signature]
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

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28 DEC 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

PSK

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Subject:- Security and Politics.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

Br. CONFIDENTIAL = U. . CONFIDENTIAL.

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15AG/1451/2/G(Ib).

Fifth Army (25)
Eighth Army (29)

26 Dec 43.

Amended

Reference this H.Q. instruction of even number dated 23 Dec 43 on the above subject.

The following amendment should be made:

Delete first sentence para 4 and substitute:

"It follows that the arrest and internment of civilians should not be initiated by FEP/CIO if the grounds for internment are purely political. They should confine their attention to the internment of persons whom they consider dangerous to our military security."

Dr. H.

W. D. Gibson. Lt Col

Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 ARMY GROUP.

Copy to:-

- G-2, A.F.H.Q.
- 1 Gen Corps.
- 2 District
- P.B.S.
- 12 Air Force
- 15 Air Force
- A.M.G., H.Q. 15 Army Group (5) —
- 16 P.S. Sec.

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SUBJECT: Security and Politics.

H.Q. 15 Army Group.
C.M.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

REF CONFIDENTIAL - U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

LSAC/1451/2/GI(2)

Fifth Army
Eighth Army

23 Dec 43.

1. In order that FSP/CIC may best fulfil their proper function, and that their activities may be directed along the most useful and effective lines, it is desired to set out the general principles which should be followed regarding the relationship between security and politics.

It is most important that military security personnel should not "dabble in politics", whether local or national, more than is necessary for the performance of their security duties: such "dabbling" can only prejudicially their normal security work, owing to the time wasted, and it may incidentally have a detrimental effect on the political situation. At the same time it cannot be said that FSP/CIC should not concern themselves at all with politics.

It is hoped that the following guidance will enable them to strike the right balance in dealing with the political aspect of their work.

2. In general, it can be said that the political situation has an effect on the security situation, and that the political beliefs and background of an individual have a bearing on the potential danger which he may present or the possible assistance which he may afford to our security.

This reaction is particularly pronounced in ITALY, where the country is divided into two, not only militarily by the opposing Allied and German armies, but also politically by the corresponding Italian Governments.

There is no doubt that, other things being equal, the long-standing, prominent and ardent Fascist is likely to present a greater danger to our security than the person who was never a true supporter of Fascism or who suffered under the Fascist regime for his lack of enthusiasm for the Party. Similarly, an extreme Communist who believes in Revolution by violence is a greater potential danger than a moderate democrat.

3. This interrelation of politics and security indicates that it is right and proper that military security personnel should take into account the political aspect of a case when attempting to assess its security implications. In view, however, of the limited numbers, time and qualifications of such personnel, a distinction must be made between the direct and indirect influence of politics on our security.

FSP/CIC should only concern themselves with politics insofar as these have a direct bearing on our military security. It is difficult to define this more precisely, but, as a general guide, FSP/CIC should confine their political investigations and supplies to cases where the political aspect may have an immediate and specific effect on the security aspect of a particular situation, person or group of persons.

that their activities may be directed along the most useful and effective lines, it is desired to set out the general principles which should be followed regarding the relationship between security and politics.

It is most important that military security personnel should not "dabble in politics", whether local or national, even when it is necessary for the performance of their security duties: such "dabbling" can only prejudice their normal security work, owing to the time wasted, and it may incidentally have a detrimental effect on the political situation. At the same time it cannot be said that TSP/CIC should NOT concern themselves at all with politics.

It is hoped that the following guidance will enable them to strike the right balance in dealing with the political aspect of their work.

2. In general, it can be said that the political situation has an effect on the security situation, and that the political beliefs and background of an individual have a bearing on the potential danger which he may present or the possible assistance which he may afford to our security.

This reaction is particularly pronounced in ITALY, where the country is divided into two, not only militarily by the opposing Allied and German armies, but also politically by the corresponding Italian Governments.

There is no doubt that, other things being equal, the long-standing, predominant and urgent Fascist is likely to present a greater danger to our security than the person who was never a true supporter of Fascism or who suffered under the Fascist regime for his lack of enthusiasm for the Party. Similarly, a extreme Communist who believes in Revolution by violence is a greater potential danger than a moderate democrat.

3. This interrelation of politics and security indicates that it is right and proper that military security personnel should take into account the political aspect of a case when attempting to assess its security implications. In view, however, of the limited numbers, time and qualifications of such personnel, a distinction must be made between the direct and indirect influence of politics on our security.

TSP/CIC should only concern themselves with politics insofar as these have a direct bearing on our military security. It is difficult to define this more precisely, but, as a general guide, TSP/CIC should confine their political investigations and enquiries to cases where the political aspect may have an immediate and specific effect on the security aspect of a particular situation, person or group of persons.

Where politics merely have an indirect bearing on our military security, they should not be regarded by TSP/CIC as a proper subject for their attention, investigations or enquiries: that is to say, military security personnel should not concern themselves with a political situation or with the political organization and activities of individuals, which may have only an indeterminate, general, long-term effect on our security, and which are not linked to any specific security situation or case.

This type of indirect relationship between politics and security may be described as a "political security" matter, and, as such, falls within the sphere of A.M.S. and P.W.D., rather than I/C.I. It should therefore be watched and handled, as necessary, by the former, and TSP/CIC should not concern themselves with it, unless asked for assistance in limited and specific instances, or unless it develops into a matter of direct security interest.

*It follows that the arrest and internment of
 civilians should not be initiated by FSP/CIC
 if the grounds for internment are purely
 political. They should confine their attention
 to the internment of persons whom they
 consider dangerous to our military security.*

security.

There is no objection to FSP/CIC carrying out a purely political arrest at the request of an officer of AMB; in fact, this would be the normal procedure, as all persons arrested and interned on political grounds become civil POW, and FSP/CIC are the most convenient arresting agency for the purpose. But in such cases the arrests should be initiated by AMB and the part played by FSP/CIC confined to the physical removal to custody of the persons concerned. If no FSP/CIC are available such arrests will be effected by AMB and the persons disposed of in the normal way to a POW Camp.

5. In this connection, it has sometimes been argued in defence of undue political emphasis on the part of FSP/CIC that, since AMB has no intelligence organization, it rests with military security personnel to supply C.I.C.s. With information on the local political situation and personalities and other matters of interest to AMB.

This principle, however, is contrary to the policy of both this HQ and AMB HQ. The C.O.A.M.O. has laid down that Civil Affairs Officers must be their own intelligence officers and that they should, by their own observation and contacts, keep themselves informed on local political matters, and on the administrative efficiency or financial integrity of officials, etc: they should, in general, only rely on FSP/CIC for information and action in the sphere of security.

6. The above policy applies equally to economic as to political matters.

FSP/CIC should only concern themselves with economic questions, e.g. Black Market, if these have a direct bearing on security. For example, they should not devote their attention to investigating a Black Market or other "racket", unless they consider it likely to become the direct and imminent cause of so much discontent and ill feeling as to create a situation which would positively threaten our military security.

7. Although, as laid down above, FSP/CIC should not concern themselves with political and economic matters unless security is directly involved, it is appreciated that, in the course of their security investigations and enquiries, they may well obtain information on such matters which would be of value to other agencies. Any such items of information should, of course, be passed to the agency concerned, such as AMB, FWD, CIE(SIB) etc.

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G-2 AMHQ
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2 District
P.D.S.
12 Air Force
15 Air Force
A.H.S. HQ, 15 Army Group.
16 F.S. Section.

W.D. Gibson. Lt-Col
Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

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