

ACC

10000/143/48

10000/143/48

PONZA ISLAND
DEC. 1943 - FEB. 1944

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
APO 394

Ref/464/21/CA

11 February 1944

SUBJECT: PONZA Island - Film - AMG Activities
TO : Military Government Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. Reference your 062.2 of 13 January 1944, the circumstances under which the expedition to PONZA Island was made have now been investigated.

2. The Podesta of PONZA had informed the SCAC, Naples City, that some 16 or 17 members of the Publica Sicurezza, who had originally been sent to the island to guard a number of prisoners of war from the Balkans, were living on the population and had virtually been conducting a reign of terror by oppressing civilians with any American connections.

3. As a result of a request from the Flag Officer, Western Italy, to the Commanding General Fifth Army, the expedition was organized, its task being to investigate the general security position on the island from naval, military and AMG points of view.

4. On the arrival of the party, CIC agents conducted an investigation into the allegations, the result of which was that the island was not a menace to Allied Security from an intelligence security standpoint. Claims of discrimination against residents having relatives in America and against American nationals were found to be groundless.

5. However, on the strength of the statement by the Podesta that the 16 agents of Public Security were untrustworthy the SCAC decided to detain them on security grounds for 30 days, although he now reports that they were released after seven days.

6. This action was technically quite irregular and inconsistent with the recognized procedure for dealing with security arrests and will not be repeated.

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Despatched in Dwp. 13/2 L.

1567

PA B 1/2

CONFIDENTIAL*Keep for file when
it comes back.**(22)*

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO.394

AMC/464/PS

5 February, 1944.

Subject : PONZA Island.

To : Executive Commissioner.

The attached draft reply to AFHQ is submitted, together
with the relative file (AMC/464) following your minute of 10th 13

PAUL G. KIRK
Colonel, Infantry
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

Enclosures (2)

Draft letter to AFHQ
File AMC/464

1566

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 39A

DRAFT

February 1944

SUBJECT: PONZA Island - Film - AND Activities

TO : CG. AFHQ (for MGS)

Reference your 062.2 of 13 Jan. 44, the circumstances under which the expedition to PONZA Island was made, have now been investigated.

The Podesta of PONZA had informed the SCAG, NAPLES City, that some 16 or 17 members of the Publica Sicurezza, who had originally been sent to the island to guard a number of prisoners of war from the Balkans, were living on the population and had virtually been conducting a reign of terror by oppressing civilians with any American connections.

As a result of a request from the Flag Officer, Western Italy, to the Commanding General Fifth Army, the expedition was organized, its task being to investigate the general security position on the island from naval military and AND points of view.

On the arrival of the party, CIC agents conducted an investigation into the allegations, the result of which was that the island was not a menace to Allied Security from an intelligence security stand point. Claims of discrimination against residents having relatives in America and against American national were found to be groundless.

However, on the strength of the statement by the podesta that the 16 Agents of Public Security were untrustworthy the SCAG decided to detain them on security grounds for 30 days, although he now reports that they were released after seven days.

This action, whilst technically quite irregular and inconsistent with the recognized procedure for dealing with security arrests, was, in my opinion, not unwarranted under the circumstances.

BRIGADIER
Executive Commissioner

1565

0 464 2198
O-Gen Stafford 20
HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394, U.S. Army



1 February 1944

SUBJECT: Ponza Island.

TO : Main HQ, ACC, APO 394.

1. A CAO is being sent to Ponza Island for a week or more as quickly as transportation can be provided.

2. Members of the Pubblica Sicurezza have either been removed from the Island or are incarcerated there. Ref. your AMG/464/19 11 Feb 19.

For the Commanding Officer:

Douglas N. Batson
DOUGLAS N. BATSON,
1st Lt., CMP,
Actg Asst Adj Gen

1564

SUBJECT: Ponza Island.

A.M.G.,
H.Q.,
A.C.M.P.

TO: R.C.A.O. Region III.

19
AMG/464/19.
30 Jan 44.

Reference your endorsement of 25 Jan 44 forwarding a report on a visit to the Island of PONZA.

The D.C.C.A.O. requests you to confirm :

- (a) That a C.A.O. is being sent to the island for a weeks stay there.
- (b) That arrangements have been made for the withdrawal from the island of the members of the Polizia Sicurazia.

DB
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

Lu 20

1563

MEMOD.C.C.A.O.27 Jan 44

1. Please see pp. 7-15.
2. The evidence on which the 16 agents of Public Security were dealt with by Lt-Col KINCAID is apparently that of the Podesta who on 31 Oct 43 informed him that they were "living on the population and had virtually been conducting a reign of terror by oppressing civilians with any American connection."
3. There is no evidence from any American citizen or former American citizen to support this statement nor does the statement of the two CIC agents at 8 and 9 go further than to describe the 16 men as untrustworthy.
4. The Podesta himself was suspect - see 15 -
5. It is conceivable that having been sent to the island to guard prisoners of War from the NAZIS and their job having come to an end - there is no mention of the Prisoners of War being still there - the 16 men would have no alternative to living on the people.
6. No doubt the people enjoyed the spectacle of these men being degraded in their eyes and made to do a cleaning job but I think Lt-Col KINCAID's action was quite unjustified. If the men were untrustworthy then they should have been removed after consultation with their own authorities.
7. As regards disposal of the case of these men I suggest that when the next schooner with supplies goes to POMBA a CAPO accompanied by a representative of the NAZIS Questore and a CIC agent should go over to the island, make a complete survey of the policing and prison problem and, if necessary, bring back to NAZIS the 16 agents of Public Security where, after proper screening, they can be employed elsewhere, interned or discharged as may be required in each case.
8. I would also draw your attention to the fact that the duplicate reports at 8 - 10 seem to have been sent to everyone but this Headquarters.
9. I am passing this to C.L.O. to add his comments.

Stefan

Lt-Colonel,

connection."

3. There is no evidence from any American citizen or former American citizen to support this statement nor does the statement of the two CIC agents at 8 and 9 go further than to describe the 16 men as untrustworthy.

4. The Podesta himself was suspect - see 13 -

5. It is conceivable that having been sent to the island to guard prisoners of war from the ITALIANS and their job having come to an end - there is no mention of the prisoners of war being still there - the 16 men would have no alternative to living on the people.

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7. As regards disposal of the case of these men I suggest that when the next schooner with supplies goes to POMPA a C.A.F.C. accompanied by a representative of the KALLES Questore and a CIC agent should go over to the island, make a complete survey of the policing and prison problem and, if necessary, bring back to NAPLES the 16 agents of Public Security where, after proper screening, they can be employed elsewhere, interned or discharged as may be required in each case.

8. I would also draw your attention to the fact that the duplicate ⁴⁵⁶² reports at 8 - 10 seem to have been sent to everyone but this Headquarters.

9. I am passing this to C.L.C. to add his comments.

Superintendent

Lt-Colonel,
Chief, Public Safety.

J. C. C. A. O.

I thoroughly agree that the treatment of the 16 agents was high-handed and untrustworthy. Their release gives a week's imprisonment very little. It is a problem for the present situation would be a further investigation of the present situation would be advisable. I should suggest that a less summary examination than that previously conducted by Col. Kincaid is called for. ^{9/10} _{and there} ₂₀

EO1-Kincaid, James L. (e-c)

1st Ind.

26 JAN 1944

CAK/jjf

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT, REGION III, A.P.O. 394, U.S.A., JANUARY 25, 1944

To: A.M.G., HQ, A.C.M.F., C.M.F.

1. The report requested in basic communication is attached.

Carl Krause
CARL A. KRAUSE
Lt. Colonel, S. Cor. Res.
Regional Civil Affairs Officer

Incl.
as above

1561

(16)

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

APO 394, U. S. Army

CAK/JJF

21 January 1944

TO: S.C.A.O. Naples Province
(Attention: Lt. Col. Kincaid)

1. The report in accordance with attached directive is requested earliest. Return the attached directive with the report through this office.

Carl Kraege

CARL A. KRAEGE
Lt. Colonel, S. Cor. Res.
Regional Civil Affairs Officer

Incl.
as above

Recd 1500 22 JAN

1560

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Headquarters Naples Province
Office of the Senior Civil Affairs Officer

23 January 1944

To: R.G.A.O. Region III

1. Pursuant to request dated 21 January 1944, received 1500 hours 22 January 1944, the following report regarding the Island of Ponza is submitted:

2. On 31 October, 1943, the Podesta of Ponza contacted me with a plea for food and assistance for the 8000 inhabitants of the Island belonging to Littoria Region IV. I contacted Brigadier Carr and we discussed the possibility of relief for the Island with the Officers of the Royal Navy. They pointed out that the Island was sixty miles out at sea in what they considered dangerous waters with German observation by plane and the possibility of contact by German E. boats. At this time the Navy did not consider it advisable to send ships to the island for any purpose. The Podesta had informed me that there were a large number of American citizens on the island who had virtually been held as prisoners since the declaration of war by sixteen or seventeen members of the Polizia Sicurezza who had originally been stationed on the island to guard a large number of Balkan prisoners of war. The Podesta alleged that these men of the Polizia Sicurezza were living on the population and had virtually been conducting a reign of terror by oppressing civilians with any American connections. The presence of about 40 American citizens in the island was confirmed.

3. On 22 December 1943, communication from the 5th Army Headquarters, copy of which is attached here to marked A, was delivered to me at the regular Sunday morning conference by Major Collins, liaison officer 5th Army. Colonel Lord Forrester asked me to take care of the situation. I conferred with the

SECRET

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Navy officers the same day and found it was then possible to get to the island under cover of darkness and return the next night. Several conferences ensued between R. Navy Officers and Special Agent Clelland and Agent Di Simone, C.I.C. 5th Army and a representative of O.S.S. with the undersigned. As a result of these conferences my letter of 30 December, 1943, copy of which is annexed hereto marked B was delivered to Navy House.

4. The trip was twice cancelled because of unfavorable weather conditions. Party eventually left on H.M.M.L. 538 at 0005 on the 4th of January 1944. Report of the trip is attached on label C.

5. Prior to this time Region III had dispatched three schooners to the island with necessary food and medical supplies. While on the island the Podesta gave me his record of these shipments and on my return checked them with Colonel Warren, C.S.O. Region III and we found that all deliveries had been made.

6. I have since been informed by Lanze Special Detachment G-2 X2 Branch (O.S.S.) that the two O.S.S. men on the island are alleged to have stolen certain funds from O.S.S. and are now under arrest.

7. Since the trip was made, additional food was sent to the island which will get them thru most of the month of January.

8. The 16 men of the Polizia Sicurezza were released after a week's detention.

9. Captain Whyte C.A.O. attached to Naples Province stationed at Ischia is in a position to contact with the island and arrange for future shipments needed.

10. It is assumed that proper instructions will be issued on this matter from competent headquarters.

1538

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/aar

James J. Kincaid

JAMES L. KINCAID
Lt Col, AUS
SCAO

United States **SECRET**
(Equals British MOST SECRET and SECRET)

C O P Y /ear

HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED NAVAL & AIRFORCE
US NAVAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON
NAPLES, ITALY

PAA/RWC
Ser. NILN/030

5 December 1943

S E C R E T

From: US NAVAL Intelligence Liaison Officer.
To: Officer in Charge, NIU, US Naval Forces,
NW African Waters, WFO 1925.

Subject: Isle of Ponza, Pro-Fascist activities on.

1. Confidential informant reports that during his recent stay on this Island he noticed what he believed to be a secret radio transmitter, utilized by one, MICHELLE REGINE, a radio technician at Corso Principe di Napoli, Ponza.

2. This suspect is and always has been an ardent Fascist, with strong pro-German leanings. Informant has noticed many visitors calling at the above address, all strongly pro-Fascist; and he suspects they gather for the purpose of transmitting information to the enemy.

3. The civil affairs and the food distribution to the Islanders are in the hands of former Fascist leaders, who are still in control of the Island's affairs. There is no Allied military government represented on the Island. Whenever Allied food is sent to the Island it is not distributed properly, with the result that the public receives a small percentage, while these leaders cache most of it for their own use.

4. The most prominent Fascists and those mostly responsible for this mismanagement are:

Giuseppe di Monaco - Mayor of the Island and till recently Director of the Bank of Naples;
Biaggio Zeccha - Municipal employee; formerly a director of the Fascist Youth Movement, G.I.L.;
Giuseppe Zeccha - Municipal employee; formerly a director of the Fascist Youth Movement G.I.L.;
Baglini, father & son - They were the Fascist Leaders on the Island. The father was the Director of the Fascist Dopolavoro Club. The son was the Fascist Party Secretary.

5. Informant also states that the security on the Island is not functioning properly, and that the Commissioner of Public Security was a strong Fascist and one of the Fascist Party supporters.

1557

PAA/KMC
Ser. NINL/030

SECRET

5 December 1943

From: US NAVAL Intelligence Liaison Officer.
To: Officer in Charge, NIU, US Naval Forces,
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Subject: Isle of Ponza, Pro-Fascist activities on.

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COPIES TO:
SCI
CIC
File

P.A. ALFIERI
Lt. USNR.

United States **SECRET**

(Equals British MOST SECRET and SECRET)

United States ~~SECRET~~
(Equivalent British MOST SECRET and SECRET)

C O P Y /sar

SECRET

PRO FASCIST ACTIVITIES ON ISLAND OF PONZA

FROM: Flag Officer, Western Italy, Naples

DATE: 15th December, 1943.

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, 5th ARMY.

No. POWIT 655.

With reference to attached memo. NIN/OSO from U.S. M.I.L.O. re Fascist activities on Ponza. It is considered that immediate steps should be taken to have the situation examined and the necessary action taken to have these activities stopped. There is no doubt that if these statements are correct valuable information not only regarding movements of ships, but also on other vital matters could be obtained and passed on to the enemy.

2. As I consider this to be an urgent matter I have instructed my Staff Officer Intelligence to contact your G. 2 with a view to formulating a plan for dealing with the situation.

/s/ Jarninic

DEAR ADMIRAL

1556

FROM: Flag Officer, Western Italy, Naples
DATE: 15th December, 1943.
TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, 5th ARMY.
No. FOWIT 655.

With reference to attached memo. MILM/CSO from U.S. N.I.L.O. re Fascist activities on Ponza. It is considered that immediate steps should be taken to have the situation examined and the necessary action taken to have these activities stopped. There is no doubt that if these statements are correct valuable information not only regarding movements of ships, but also on other vital matters could be obtained and passed on to the enemy.

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/s/ Jernindc

PEAR ADMIRAL

1556

United States **SECRET**
(Equivalent British MOST SECRET and SECRET)

COPY

B. 11

Naples, Italy.
30 December, 1943.

TO: H.C.I.C. Navy House.

Will you be good enough to have the Royal Navy arrange for suitable transportation to the Island of Ponza for A.M.C. personnel as discussed at 1430 hrs. on 30 December, 1943, at conference held at Navy House between representative A.M.C. 5th. Army C.S.S. and Royal Navy.

The details of the movements as discussed today contemplated the use of an M.L. leaving Pier Vecchio 0001 on the night of Saturday 1 - 2 January, 1944, or first suitable night. Party will consist of seven A.M.C. and two 5th Army C.I.C. personnel. Lieutenant P. McDonald, Fleet Base Section Officer will accompany party.

Purpose of the trip is to arrange for the security and safety of forty-five Americans and their dependents whom it is alleged have been persecuted by detachment of Italian Public Security Police stationed on the Island of Ponza.

Any change in details set forth above to be communicated to the undersigned.

JAMES L. KINCALL,
Lt. Col., A.U.S.
S.S.A.C.

JLK/er

1555

4 January 1944

Report by James L. Kincaid, Lt Col, AUS, SCAO Naples Province.

Re PONZA

The A.M.G. party consisting of Lt Cols Kincaid and Werner, T/Sgt Lazzerino and two carabinieri left Naples port on ML558 at 0005 January 4, 1944 with other Army personnel, transport provided by Royal Navy. After a stop at ISCHIA to pick up Cepts Whyte and Inter, party landed at PONZA 0715 Jan. 4, 1944.

No radio was found at Anania Theater or house of owner as indicated in letter from Sixteen members of Publica Sicurazza were placed in custody, made to clean local jail and then held therein for 30 day sentence for security reasons. One of the 16 was brought to Naples, Innocenzi Luciano for detention in Naples City for the same reason. Com Comm Capo Vasall Salvatore, Comd. P.S. who left the island on 27 Dec for Hosp in Naples, should be held in Naples jail for same reason for same period.

The Tax Collector of Ponza who had been following the official party all day in a suspicious manner was held in Ponza jail for the night of 4-5 Jan 1944 to protect sailing of ML558 to Naples at 2359 Jan 4.

The matter of black markets in the island was carefully investigated, no evidence found to warrant any action. Every complaint was gone into and while high prices are notdoubt demanded for certain articles by local merchants, they in turn have purchased these articles on the black market in Naples or Pozzuoli, and because no AMG officer is station in Ponza there is no possible check on these transactions.

The podesta seems to be the best available man on the island for the position and although a thorough investigation was made into the matter and all persons representing the opposition were given a full opportunity to be heard, it was the consensus of opinion that no change should be made at this time. All personal transactions were checked, claims of discriminations against residents having relatives in America and against American Naturals were found groundless.

After a careful survey and a conference with the Podesta, it is recommended that the number of carabinieri be reduced to 5, and the number of Finance Guards to 4. No more are needed. They could be used to great advantage in Naples.

In my opinion the two OSS men, according to their own statements, no on Ponza, should be recalled at once as they are disturbing factors and are without funds and living on the people of the islands.

By Fleet Base Security Officer - Lt. P. McDonald, RNVR
(Acting as Naval Observer)

1554

One of the more obvious places for investigation from the Naval security point of view was the Semaphore Station. This is situated upon the highest peak of Ponza. Four Italian naval ratings were found in occupation of the building, the officer in charge being away in Naples drawing their pay. The ratings appeared to be entirely without work, due to the dilapidated condition of their ancient equipment. They assured me that they had been in communication with no one for a long time, the last message being a mutilated signal from Ventotene by Submarine telegraph just before Christmas.

The cables were from Ponza to Ciorello on the mainland, and these to Rome and Gaeta; also to Ventotene and onwards to Ischia, Province of Naples. These cables

(9)

though possibly intact in themselves at the Ponza end, depend upon an array of corroded glass jar batteries which are unlikely to be of use.

Radio transmitting equipment consists of - 100 Watt (Regia Marina type) working on 5-/100 metres working from 24 volt batteries (but uncharged and unattended).

There is also a "flag deck" and a lantern room - worked by gas cylinders, giving a beacon on heavings to Gaeta, Circello and Vent ne, depending upon the window selected.

The station was left in possession of 16 rifles, 4 pistols (not seen) 1 box of grenades and a small quantity of ammunition. A demolition charge was taken to the station but no use was found for it.

As may be seen by the remainder of the report, other security aspects of the situation in the island were covered as well as could be owing the short visit of the party.

The officers and even the ML558 gave all the assistance and cooperation in their power.

By Commanding Officer H.M. ML558

In accordance with instructions ML558 left Naples harbour at 0005 on the 4th January 1944 with AMG party, two cameramen and two carabinieri aboard. The ship called in at Ischia to pick up Capt. Whyte and his interpreter. The passage was completed without incident and the party was landed at Ponza at 0715.

A survey was made of the harbour and the details as shown on the plan on Admiralty Chart No. 1733 were found to be correct in most essentials. A road now runs along close to Spaggia S. Antonio, Spaggia Ciangos and Spaggia S. Maria; also a small quay for rowing boats has been built in the western corner of Spaggia S. Antonio. The depths of water shown in the port are correct except at the western ends of the North mole and South quay. The depths shown as 3 fathoms along the north mole are now 2 fathoms and a depth of one fathom was found along the entire length of the south quay. Depths in the centre of the port remain as shown. A small conical mooring buoy has been laid 50 yards 180° from the western end of the north mole.

The harbour should be useful for sheltering Coastal Force Craft but no facilities exist for repairs, stores or maintenance. There are no unloading facilities of any kind but the beaches of S. Antonio and S. Maria, both in the port, are very suitable for landing craft, with the road easily accessible. A small ship for local fishing boats is situated at the end of the port.

A tour of the island was made but nothing was observed which has not been fully dealt with in the accompanying reports.

The ship left Ponza at 0502 after having signalled, unsuccessfully, for a weather report, by wireless. At first the weather was fair but at 0330 a strong wind blew from the West. Owing to the extra weight being carried in the form of the AMG party and one prisoner it was necessary to jettison two 5 cwt. sinkers which were stowed on deck and also two depth charges. About this time the starboard engine

1553

(8)

developed a defect and could not be made to pull its weight which made steering with a following sea very difficult. The wind veered at about 0630 and by 0730 had reached force 9 from the North East the sea being very confused. Shelter was sought in the lee of Ventotene with the object of repairing the engine but no suitable shelter was found and course was set of Ischia. The wind moderated at 1030 and Ischia was reached at 1140 it having been necessary to do practically the whole of the passage at slow speed. The party was disembarked and remained in Ischia for the night.

P. Fellows, Lieut R.N.V.R.

Subj. Ponza

Re: Security Check

As directed by the Officer in Charge, these agents met with AMG and British Naval Officials on 3 January 1944 at Naples and left at midnight by boat for the Island of Ponza to conduct a preliminary security investigation of conditions on the island.

At approximately 0700, January 4, 1944, the party arrived at Ponza where they proceeded immediately to search the dwelling, store building and movie theater owned by Michele Regine, Corso Principe di Napoli, Ponza, who was alleged to have in his possession a radio transmitting device. A thorough search of these three places failed to reveal any evidence of radio sending devices. From talking with various persons on the island it was ascertained that said Regine had in the past been an active member of the Fascist Party, however, he is not considered to a dangerous individual from Allied security standpoint although a more complete investigation of Regine would be advisable.

During the course of routine checking numerous persons of apparent reliability were questioned as to the existence or non-existence of radio transmitters on the island. It was revealed that no one had any knowledge of any such transmitting sets, in particular one, Frank Faola, owner of the local electric power plant stated emphatically no such sets were present, or in use, on the island.

Various alleged Fascist leaders were questioned by these agents, and all denied having taken any active part in any such activities since Facism was abolished in Italy. Among these people were Giuseppe di Monaca, podesta; Biaggi Zecca; Aristide Bagloi and his son Bagloi. It was reported by numerous people that secret meetings are being held by nine people on the island, including some of the aforementioned. Time did not permit the proving of this point.

As regard general security on the island there were 16 untrustworthy members of the Pubblica Sicurezza arrested and confined to jail, so as not to hinder normal police functions. It was also ascertained that the Carabinieri maintain a 24 hour patrol of the entire island coastline. As regards entry and departure of persons, the port harbor master, Capt. Giovanni Di Cecca, assured these agents a complete check is maintained, and no strangers are admitted to the island without proper credentials. 1552

As an immediate security measure these agents arrested and immediately jailed one Michele Klein, local tax collector, who had been acting in a suspicious manner during the day and late in the afternoon, found loitering in the vicinity of the party vessel. He is to be released the day following the departure of the boat from the island.

⑦

It was the concurrent opinion of all persons questioned that there had been no German agents or soldiers present on the island within the past two months.

In conclusion it is believed that from an intelligence security standpoint, the island at present is not a menace to Allied Security, and should any problems arise, they could adequately be handled by CIC agents of PBS at Ischia.

Delman L. Cleland
Spec. Agent, CIC

Jack A. De Simone
Agent CIC

DISTRIBUTION:

Fleet Base Security Officer
Lieut Col Marlean Clarke
Naval Officer in charge,
" " " "
Port Security Officer
Flag Officer, Western Italy
S.C.A.O. Region III A.M.G.
G-2 Region III A.M.G.
Brigadier Carr
C.I.C. 5th Army
C.O. ML558 (2) Navy House
Col. Warner (2)
Col. Kincaid (3)
Col. Warren, Prefettura
Capt. Gordon

Navy House
" "
Naples
Ischia
Naples
Navy House
Prefettura
"
Provincia

1551

URGENT. SECRET.

Subject:- Expedition to Island of PONZA.

AMC,
HQ, ACOMF,
C.M.P.

Ref. AMG/464/6
21 January 44.

R.C.A.O., Region III.

It is reported that at dawn on 4 Jan 44 a party of Intelligence and AMC Officers under the command of Lt. Col. KINCAID, S.C.A.O. NAPLES area was landed by the Royal Navy on the Island of PONZA.

It is stated that 16 former Fascist Secret Police found on the island were ordered by Lt. Col. KINCAID to clean the local prison and were then summarily sentenced by him to thirty days imprisonment or detention for security reasons, there was insufficient evidence to convict them of a civil offence.

The D.C.C.A.O. requires immediately a full report from Lt. Col. KINCAID on the proceedings. The status of the persons dealt with should be clearly defined.


Lt. Colonel,
Chief, Public Safety.

1550

D.C.C.A.O.
21

14

You may have received a report of this operation.

It is not clear from the report whether the "former Indochinese Secret Police" were still operating after being disarmed, and, if so, in what capacity.

If this reputation was such as to reserve the treatment given them, I should have thought there would have been sufficient evidence on which to base proceedings before an Allied Military Court in due form but the summary sentencing of the men to 30 days imprisonment for security reasons would appear to call for explanation bearing in mind the principle that civilian P.W. cannot be held in civil prison.

C.L.O., is taking up the legal aspect with R.C.L.O. Region III.

19 Jan 44.

Allen Martin
154

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PS R
8 JAN 1944

3

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

DSJ/DW/jjr

MGS: 062.2

13 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Film - AMG activities.

TO : HQ AMG, AFI.

Reference is made to the attached copy of a Secret Dope Sheet, prepared by an officer of the Army Film Unit now photographing AMG activities in Italy.

1. Your views are requested regarding the matters therein mentioned, particularly as to the propriety of the action whereby fifteen prisoners were summarily sentenced.

2. For your information. A copy of the Dope Sheet is being forwarded to the War Office (C.A. 2A), with the request that the interests of AMG shall be watched in the preparation and composition of the final film.

D. S. Jackling

D. S. JACKLING
Lt Colonel.

Incls:
as above.

1548

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

ARMY FILM AND PHOTO SECTION
SECRET DOPE SHEET

CASUALTY:-- Lieut. G. C. Lang
 STAFF:-- A.M.G. PRIMITIVE EXPEDITION
 LOCATION:-- ISLE OF PINZA. (56 Miles N.W. of Naples).
 4th January, 1944.
 LENGTH:-- 200 feet.

A small party of Intelligence and A.M.G. Officers under the command of Lieut. Col. KINCAID, S.C.A.O. (Senior Civil Affairs Officer) Naples area, were landed by the Royal Navy at dawn 4th January, 1944 on the Isle of PINZA.

It's mission was to investigate complaints which had been brought against sixteen former Fascist Secret Police of maldistribution of food and money which had been sent to the Island for the relief of some forty American citizens living there. These police were known to be still of Fascist tendencies, and had returned about two hundred Yugoslav political prisoners to the Germans after the Italian Armistice.

They had been disarmed by Captain John WHITE, A.M.G., Governor of all islands in the vicinity, on a previous visit to the island, but it was possible they might still have had weapons and attempt to use them, and possibly try to get in touch with the enemy by radio - the island is only twenty miles from German occupied Italy.

These fears, however, proved unfounded. A search revealed no radio, and the men were rounded up very soon after the party landed.

To lower their prestige before the civil population, Col. KINCAID paraded the sixteen men publicly, issued them with brooms and pails, and marched them off to the local goal, and gave them three hours to clean it out. This was a necessary operation as the jail was very dirty, and the prisoners were to occupy it for thirty days, though they didn't yet know this.

While this task was being accomplished, the complaints of the islanders were investigated. There was not enough evidence to convict any of the prisoners of any civil offence, but Colonel KINCAID later summarily sentenced them to thirty days each for Security reasons.

One prisoner was taken aboard to be properly cross-examined in NAPLES regarding the treatment of the prisoners handed back to the Germans.

The whole proceedings met with obvious approval by the islanders, who had undoubtedly been imposed upon in the past by these Secret Police. It was on this island that MUSSOLINI was first held captive after his downfall.

Roll No. 1

Shots, Medium, Long and Close-ups of the prisoners lined up outside their barracks. One M.L.S. of prisoners being taken aboard M.L.

Roll No. 1 - 100 feet. 1547

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Roll No. 1 - 100 feet. 1547

Roll No. 2.

M.L.S. Prisoners picking up brooms and pails, and marching away.

M.S. Prisoners marching up the hill to the goal.

Shots in goal of prisoners sweeping up mess - some ground level - some from high up. One insert of the refuse.

Roll No. 2. - 100 feet.

