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10000/143/54

ARCHIVE GROUP, F.2, SPARES
NOV. 1943 - JAN. 1944

Subject: Passive Air Defence & Civil Defence.

RE: AIR,
15 Army Group,
C. M. P.

copy

Headquarters,
AGF, 5th Army.
123, 8th Army.

AMG/ADP/
2. Nov. 52

The following suggestions and plan now under consideration for dealing with fires in the forward area are forwarded for your remarks:-

1. AMG with advancing Armies cannot re-establish complete fire-fighting organisation - there is no time, but can establish measures for handling fires and carrying out responses sufficient to meet possible needs.
2. Improvisation by Military, C.C.M.E., and local fire units necessary and the handling of Passive Air Defence should be controlled and directed by the local C.A.O., or better, by a C.A.P.O.
3. Equipment may require replacing and often complete replacement.
4. C.A.P.O.'s to check local fire fighting units and equipment. Consider what can be made operative at once and get the force into a working unit as soon as possible. Submit demand by signal of what is really necessary, followed by a written report and full requirements.
5. Senior Public Safety Officers to submit the immediate demands to AMG, 15 Army Group, at the same time endeavouring to obtain equipment from local sources and transferring any surplus from other towns which may be in a position to spare it.
6. The full report with a more complete demand to be sent to AMG HQ, 15 Army Group, with a copy to any Regional Organisation of AMG operating or about to operate, the Region when set up.
7. Equipment will include:-
Hoses and connections.
Buckets.
Picks & shovels.
Ladders.
Hoses.
Engines with fire-fighting equipment.
Motor vehicles for equipment.
Motor vehicles for ambulances.
8. Buckets, picks, shovels, and ropes, may be available on loan or might be collected from local stores. Ladders might be made

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1. AMB with advancing armies cannot re-establish complete fire-fighting organization - there is no time, but can establish measures for handling fires and carrying out repairs sufficient to meet possible needs.
2. Improvisation by Military, C.O.S.A., and local fire units necessary and the handling of Reserve Air Defense should be controlled and directed by the local C.O.S.A., or better, by a C.A.P.C.
3. Equipment may require repairing and often complete replacement.
4. C.A.P.C.'s to check local fire fighting units and equipment. Consider what can be made operative at once and get the force into a working unit as soon as possible. Submit demand by signal of what is really necessary, following by a written report and full requirements.
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6. The full report with a more complete demand to be sent to AMB HQ, 15 Army Group, with a copy to any Regional Organization of AMB operating, or about to operate, the region when set up.
7. Equipment will include:-
Hoses and connections.
Buckets.
Pickers & Shovels.
Ladders.
Ropes.
Engines with fire-fighting equipment.
Motor vehicles for equipment.
Motor vehicles for subterranean.
8. Buckets, picks, shovels, and ropes, may be available on loan or might be collected from local stores. Ladders might be made locally. The other items could not so easily be obtained.
9. It is proposed to obtain some mobile fire equipment to follow with AMB, divisions. This could be sent out as necessity arises and might be replaced later or packed up and be taken on again, leaving the town without possibly any equipment for a period.

MFL/76.

R.J.P. THOMAS
Colonel,
Senior Staff Officer.

Copy to: A.A.H.G. (H.C.S.) with this H.C. Letter MS/401/7

Dated 24 Nov 43.

1730

Subject: Organization of Fire Fighting Units

H.Q., AMG.,
15 Army Group,
C. I. P.

Military Government Section,
Allied Force Headquarters.

AMG/AFM/7
2. Nov. 43.

Reference HPM-386.51 dated 1. Nov. 43.

1. A plan for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in the forward areas is shown in the attached copy of letter of instructions to AMG, 5th and 8th Armies.
2. Improvisation will always be required but to have some simple equipment within call as defined in para. 3 would enable the Civil Defense units of towns to deal fairly effectively with fires should there be no serviceable equipment.
3. The requirements are:-
 - (a) Hose pipes and connections to form 4 units, each unit requiring some 100 to 300 feet.
 - (b) Ladders - one to extend 100 feet - for each unit.
 - (c) Rope, about 100 feet to each unit.
 - (d) Motor and fire-fighting trailer to each unit.
 - (e) Ambulance to each unit.
 - (f) Baskets, picks & shovels, etc.

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Each unit should have personnel of 6 to 8 as a fire-fighting team. All above items would be included in appurtenances with TRAILER FIRE PUMP (Medium 350/500 G.P.M.) as in use by the British Army Fire Brigade, with exception of ladders.

HPM/JE.

Major-General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

Para I
add sub-paragraph d. as follows:

"Throughout this memorandum, wherever the term 'occupied enemy territory' is quoted the conditions will apply equally to the territory of a co-belligerent power, with appropriate modifications as to the exercise of control. In the case of ITALIAN territory it is the duty of the Allied Control Commission or AMG 15 Army Group, whichever is responsible for the control of the particular territory, to provide such Civil Defense as may be required by the Allied Military Commander most immediately concerned with the area in question."

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COPY NO. 20

14 October 1943

OPERATION MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 40 :)

POLICY FOR PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE

IN OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORY AND IN THE
TERRITORY OF A CO-BELLIGERENT POWER.

1. GENERAL

a. Policy for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in North Africa is contained in General Order No. 16 dated 11 February, 1943.

This Memorandum defines the policy to be observed in occupied enemy territory.

b. Passive Air Defense in occupied territory, as elsewhere, is a normal military duty and will be carried out in accordance with military instructions on the subject.

Civil Defense in occupied territory is only of importance in so far as it affects military requirements. It is the duty of the Military Government Administration to provide such Civil Defense measures as are required by the military.

c. In any area of military importance, Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense will be closely related. It is essential therefore, that in such an area, the two should be planned and executed together under the direction of the Military Commander.

2. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

a. Civil Defense will be a military necessity in those areas where the failure of the Civil Defense will hinder military operations.

b. Civil Defense may be of importance even in areas of no military value, if the failure of the Civil Defense organization is likely to result in such damage to essential services, stocks of food, and communications, that ultimately the military will be encumbered by serious problems, of unrest, refugees, starvation, or disease amongst the civil population.

c. Where it is necessary to raise the standard of Civil Defense to meet military requirements, some assistance from the military

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POLICY FOR PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE

IN OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORY AND IN THE

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1748

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b. Civil Defense may be of importance even in areas of no military value, if the failure of the Civil Defense organization is likely to result in such damage to essential services, stocks of food, and communications, that ultimately the military will be encumbered by serious problems, of unrest, refugees, starvation, or disease amongst the civil population.

c. Where it is necessary to raise the standard of Civil Defense to meet military requirements, some assistance from the military will usually be necessary either by giving directions or advice, or by making available essential equipment and supplies which cannot otherwise be obtained by the civilian authorities.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

a. The relative importance of Civil Defense to military requirements will be defined by classifying areas of occupied territory as follows:-

CLASS "A"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as a military necessity, where the principle is accepted that every possible assistance is to be given to the organization of Civil Defense, including, if

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necessary, the lending without charge of essential equipment and the provision of essential materials.

CLASS "B"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as of military importance only in so far as there may be repercussions on the military in the event of failure of the Civil Defense organization. In these areas such equipment as is available may be sold or rented to the local authorities.

CLASS "C"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded of no military importance.

- b. The classification of areas as above, and their re-classification according to changing circumstances, will be the responsibility of Army Commanders in the Combat Zone, and of the District or Base Section Commanders in the Communications Zone (L of C).

4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN CLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas, pending the establishment of the Military Government Administration, the local military commander, assisted by Military Government officers, will be responsible for organizing minimum standards of Civil Defense.

When the Military Government Administration has been established, it will be the responsibility of this administration to organize and supervise Civil Defense services in accordance with the requirements of the military commander.

- b. In Class "B" areas organization and supervision of Civil Defense will be the responsibility of the Military Government Administration. If coordination with the military is required, such coordination will be the responsibility of the local military commander.

5. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN

CLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas it is a military responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide any necessary equipment or material.
- b. In Class "B" areas it is a Military Government Administration responsibility to decide the requirements, and to provide equipment to be sold or rented, subject to such equipment being available and within the limits of transportation allotted by the military to the Military Government Administration.

c. If equipment is available, the Military Government Administration

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded of no military importance.

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When the Military Government Administration has been established, it will be the responsibility of this administration to organize and supervise Civil Defense services in accordance with the requirements of the military commander.

- b. In Class "B" areas organization and supervision of Civil Defense will be the responsibility of the Military Government Administration. If coordination with the military is required, such coordination will be the responsibility of the local military commander.

5. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN

CLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas it is a military responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide any necessary equipment or material.
- b. In Class "B" areas it is a Military Government Administration responsibility to decide the requirements, and to provide equipment to be sold or rented, subject to such equipment being available and within the limits of transportation allotted by the military to the Military Government Administration.
- c. If equipment is available, the Military Government Administration may sell or rent it to suitable applicants from Class "C" areas.

6. ADVICE ON PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE

The P.A.D. and C.D. Advisor, AFHQ, will be responsible for giving advice as necessary on all matters of Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense, working through the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 and normal

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military channels with regard to military matters, and through the Military Government Section with regard to civil matters.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

M. B. SMITH,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Lowell W. Rocks
LOWELL W. ROCKS,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:*Love (W.D. Rabe)*

LOVELL W. HOOKS,

Major General, G.S.C.,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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 Return Quilts British Women.

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS.

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

0-338,502/1-10

25 December, 1943.

SUBJECT: Correction to orally message report for November 1943, dated 20 December, 1943.

TO : Distribution below.

Reference memo 2, para 4, of above mentioned report: for "Land mine" and "mine", please substitute "botage device" throughout.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. P. Hill-Diller

S. P. Hill-Diller.
 Colonel, G-2
 G-2 (OR) Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

7-309.502/1-5.

20 December 1943.

SUBJECT: Monthly Selotape Report for November 1943.

TO: Distribution below.

Attached for your information is summary of cases of sabotage reported to this headquarters during the month of November 1943.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

C. S. Williamson
C. S. WILLIAMSON,
Colonel, G.I.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

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RECENT CASES REPORT NOVEMBER 1943.

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

Nothing to report.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

A. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

(i) Mine-cutting.

1. On 6 and 8 October, two incidents of mine-cutting occurred in the OUELLUS (324, Sorvino Group) area. In each instance, the cutting was clumsily done, presumably by Arabs. Investigation was made by XII. Air Force.
2. During the night 12/13 October, and on the 20 and 25 October, the telephone line running from "G" battery to "H" battery, 112th A.A.A. Bn. (mob) was cut 1 mile N.W. of BOUZZAL. All these incidents appeared to have been caused in the same manner, i.e. the wire was cut by pinching it on a rock and striding it with another rock until it parted.

(ii) Shipping.

1. On 25 October, a fire occurred in the steamer's cabin of H.M.T. "STRENGTH 2.5713". The fire was discovered five minutes after outbreak, and little damage resulted. Investigation is being made by 56 P.S.S.
2. On 1 November 1943, an 18-inch length of copper tubing was recovered from the mechanical indicator of S.S. "CORINTH". Had the loss not been discovered, the main engine would probably have seized as with the ship put to sea. Investigation by 96 P.S.S. indicated that one CLIX-000000, a former member of the ship who had been aimed off, was probably the perpetrator. The act was probably committed through union rather than through desire to sabotage the war effort.

(iii) Railways.

Nothing to report.

II. CASES REPORTED.

A. WIRE-CUTTING.

(1) Wire-cutting.

1. On 6 and 3 October, two incidents of wire-cutting occurred in the CHERLUS (324 Service Group) area. In each instance, the cutting was obviously done, presumably by radio. Investigation was made by XII Air Force.
2. During the night 13-14 October, and on the 20 and 25 October, the telephone line running from "B" battery to "A" battery, 112th A.S., was cut twice N.W. of 2000 ft. All these incidents appeared to have been caused in the same manner, i.e., the wire was cut by placing it on a reel and striding it with another reel until it parted.

(ii) Shipping.

1. On 25 October, a fire occurred in the stern of the U.S.S. "STANLEY C. SMITH". The fire was discovered five minutes after outbreak, and little damage resulted. Investigation is being made by 25 P.S.S.
2. On 4 November 1943, an 18-inch length of center tubing was removed from the mechanical lubricator of S.S. "GUTHRIE". Had the loss not been discovered, the main engine would probably have wound up with the ship put to sea. Investigation by 96 P.S.S. indicated that one CLINTON G. GUTHRIE, a former seaman of the ship who had been signed off, was probably the perpetrator. The act was probably committed through alien rather than through desire to sabotage the war effort.

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(iii) Railways.

Nothing to report.

(iv) Miscellaneous.

1. On 14 October, North Price District reported sabotage to pipeline at LA GOULTRY-CROSBY. The case was investigated by 504 P.S.S. and it was found that the damage was a small pipe-hole, almost certainly caused by accident.

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2. On 28 October 1943, a Wellington bomber was damaged at OMDA airfield. In the incendiary bomb had been placed in the body of the plane and appeared to have been detonated by knocking with a blunt instrument. Enquiries have so far failed to trace the perpetrator, who clearly must have been familiar with both aircraft and the incendiary bomb used.

3. On 11 November, an attempt to sabotage a stock of gasoline at Dump No. 2, M.B.S., OMDA, was foiled by the sentries. A wooden box approximately 8 inches square had been placed in the stock of the dump. The box contained a time delay, explosive, and incendiary charges. It appears that only the detonator functioned, scattering the main explosive charge and incendiary material, some of the latter burning until extinguished by sentries. Investigations by OSS, WZ, and IIS, CIC indicated that the attempt was made by an unskilled saboteur, probably an Arab working under the GRU/IR organization in MEXICO.

4. On 22 November, 1943, a small landing was discovered packed between the back and seat cushion of a parachute belonging to the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron at OMDA. The mine, 6" x 3 1/2" in size, contained a liquid and is said to be an incendiary. Investigation by 16th Troop Carrier Squadron S-2 indicated that the mine had been slipped into the parachute in such a manner that additional weight would cause its explosion. Photographs and diagrams of the mine have been requested in order to identify it.

5. - SECRET.

(1) Time-delaying.

1. Communication lines from OMDA to POINT OLYMPIA in the area of the 62nd Troop Carrier Group were cut eight times by mine instruments. Guards have been placed all along the line, and VII... in force is proceeding with investigations.

(11) Chimney.

Nothing to report.

(111) Railways.

Nothing to report.

3. On 11 November, an attempt was made to place a gasoline at Dump No. 2, 4.3.3., 00000, was followed by the sentries. A wooden box approximately 8 inches square had been placed in the stock of the arm. The box contained a time delay, explosive, and incendiary charge. It appears that only the detonator functioned, scattering the main explosive charge and incendiary material, some of the latter burning with extraordinary intensity. Investigations by OSS, WAC, and IAS, CIB indicated that the attempt was made by an unskilled saboteur, probably an Arab working under the ARABER organization in 1943.

4. On 22 November, 1943, a well laid mine was discovered between the back and sentry position of a perimeter belonging to the 16th Troop Carrier Squadron at OMDA. The mine, 6 1/2" x 2 1/2" in size, contained a liquid and is said to be an incendiary. Investigation by 16th Troop Carrier Squadron S-2 indicated that the mine had been slipped into the perimeter in such a manner that additional weight would cause its explosion. Photographs and diagrams of the mine have been requested in order to identify it.

B. - SIGINT.

(i) Wire-captain.

1. Communication lines from DEL to POWES OLIVO in the area of the 62nd Troop Carrier Group were cut eight times by alarm instruments. Guards have been placed all along the line, and DEL. Mr. Jones is proceeding with investigations.

(ii) Enigma.

Nothing to report.

(iii) Railway.

Nothing to report.

(iv) Miscellaneous.

1. On 11 October, 1943, 2626 O.A. Brigade reported an explosion of enemy ammunition at DELTO BENDOCLE. It was concluded that no act of sabotage was responsible for the explosion.

2. On the 25 October 1943, a bomb was discovered in the DEL. - POWES OLIVO pipeline by the 433 O.A. Members of this organization

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3. Late in October 1943, a report was received from the C.I.S. Section that the restoration of service by actual force. One of the individuals arrested had a diary containing names of persons killed during of sabotaging the communication lines between the C.I.S. and the C.I.S. C.I.S. Section is still investigating.

4. On 24 November, information was received from the C.I.S. District that wires were found in the area discovered in the C.I.S. C.I.S. and that the case was under investigation. No further information on this case has been received so far.

C. - ITALY.

(i) Wire-cutting.

1. Between the 1 and 15 November 1943, the telephone lines running from Fifth Army to the C.I.S. were cut on several occasions. A 15-man guard was posted, and Fifth Army C.I.S. has recommended a military order, prescribing death penalty for wire-cutting.

(ii) Shipping.

Nothing to report.

(iii) Reductions.

1. On 21 October 1943, a person was allegedly containing German TNT were found to have been placed on a port train so that their explosion would cause serious damage, and simultaneously a switchboard on the main line had been so placed that it would result in a morning train. The latter was evidently done by a person well acquainted with railroad procedure. Recommendations were made for additional guards at night, but the perpetrators were not traced.

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2. A fire was reported on 27 October 1943, at the C.I.S. freight car, coupled between two ammunition cars. A full report is being awaited.

3. On 31 October 1943, agents of the C.I.S. Section, investigated the case of the discovery by Carabinieri of four packages, each about three inches in length and one inch square, wrapped in brown wax paper and scattered within a radius of two feet, under a loaded freight car at the Port of Naples during the night of 30 October 1943. One package had been broken open. The Carabinieri found, on returning to the scene, a small container with two detonators which had not been there at the time of the original discovery. The substance was an incendiary.

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mixture with a slight aluminium content. The fuses were of British origin. In addition no perpetrators were traced. Recommendations were made for the increase of rifle guard.

(27) Miscellaneous.

1. On the last of October - early November 1943, C.I.O. (P.S.S.) agent investigated an act of sabotage in the 6th Port Area, involving the severance and crude welding of two lines of the electrical system of the electrical control system, which caused a short circuit, and prevented other series of lights in the wiring system from functioning. Appreciation of the perpetrators appears highly improbable. Recommendations were made to increase guard personnel, and to distribute them according to the importance of the installation.

2. On 8 November, an ammunition dump exploded at UFWHIO causing some 100 casualties. About 50 tons of Italian mortar, ballistics, and other ammunition were involved. Investigation by J40 P.S.S. indicated that the explosion was the result of a fire which started in ballistics which was lying around the dump. The origin of the fire appears to have been either a spark from a cigarette, or the heat generated by the sun burning through glass. Sabotage is not indicated.

PART III. CONCLUSIONS AND NOTES FOR C.I.O. AND P.S.S.

1. As will be seen from the foregoing, the anticipated increase in enemy sabotage activities in UFWHIO has not so far revealed itself in any very concrete form. Wire-cutting has decreased, and the only cases reported to this headquarters which may possibly have been enemy-inspired are cases reported under "C", UFWHIO, para. iii, Nos. 1 and 3, and para. iv, No. 1. This should not however be taken to imply that the danger is past. It is believed that the enemy may have made preparations for post-occupational sabotage in the UFWHIO area, and C.I.O./P.S.S. should not relax in checking up on protection of likely targets, such as were set out in the recent circular on Enemy Sabotage Methods sent out from this headquarters. (3-589,502/3 of 29 November 1943). In this connection, it is also recommended that exercises be arranged from time to time in UFWHIO to test security of access to important installations, or trying to gain entrance undetected. It may be that this is already being done, but if not, it should be instituted.

2. Where any evidence of the existence of a known enemy device is found, arrangements should if possible be made to have it

(17) Miscellaneous.

1. On the last of October - early November 1943, a C.I.C. (P.O.S.) agent investigated an act of sabotage in the 6th Port Area, involving the surveillance and crypto system of the lines of the electrical system of the electric main line, which involved a short circuit, and prevented either series of lights in the wiring system from functioning. Reproduction of the perceptive errors likely in probable. Recommendations were made to increase guard personnel, and to distribute them according to the importance of the installations.

2. On 2 November, an ammunition dump exploded at RYPSIO causing some 100 casualties. About 60 tons of Italian ordnance, ballistics, and other ammunition were involved. Investigation by 310 P.O.S. indicated that the explosion was the result of a fire which started in ballistics which was lying around the dump. The origin of the fire appears to have been either a spark from a cigarette, or the heat generated by the sun burning through glass. Sabotage is not indicated.

PART IV. CONCLUSIONS AND NOTES FOR C.I.C. AND P.O.S.

1. As will be seen from the foregoing, the anticipated increase in enemy sabotage activities in T.M.I. has not so far revealed itself in any very concrete form. Wire-cutting has decreased, and the only cases reported to this headquarters which may possibly have been enemy-inspired are cases reported under "C", T.M.I., para iii, Nos. 1 and 2, and para iv, No. 1. This should not however be taken to imply that the danger is past. It is believed that the enemy may have made preparations for post-occupational sabotage in the T.M.I. area, and C.I.C./P.O.S. should not relax in checking up on protection of likely targets, such as wire set out in the recent circular on Enemy Sabotage Methods sent out from this headquarters. (A-509.502/1 of 29 November 1943). In this connection, it is also recommended that exercises be arranged from time to time in T.M.I. to test security of access to important installations by trying to gain entrance undetected. It may be that this is already being done, but if not, it should be instituted.

2. Where any evidence of the existence of a known enemy device is found, arrangements should if possible be made to have it photographed, (or a diagram made) at once, and a copy of the photograph or diagram, together with a copy of the investigation report, should be forwarded direct to T.M.I. It is emphasized that unless this is done, this information cannot keep its relevance up to date, and cannot consequently distribute fresh intelligence until it is too old to be of any value.

3. It is hoped shortly to issue a descriptive booklet of known enemy devices which should assist in recognition.

H. B. STOUT

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

18 November 1943.

3-389.502/1-3.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for October 1943.

TO: Distribution Below.

1. Attached for your information is summary of cases reported under this heading during the month of October.
2. Attention is drawn to Part III, "Notes for CIC and P3 personnel".

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. S. HILL-BILLON,
Colonel, U.S.A.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

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SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for October 1943.

TO: Distribution Below.

1. Attached for your information is summary of cases reported under this heading during the month of October.
2. Attention is drawn to Part III, "Notes for CIC and IS Personnel".

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S.S. Hill-Billion

S.S. HILL-BILLION,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

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MONTHLY SAUSAGE REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1943

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

Delay-action Explosions.

1. Three explosions of GERMAN time-bombs in LINDERS have come to notice:
 - a. One in a 'main street near the Port' on or about 9 October 1943.
 - b. One in the Postal Building, where Fifth Army Headquarters was situated on or about 10/11 October 1943.
 - c. One in the Prince of Piedmont Barracks on 15 October 1943.

So far only a report on c has been received, though this refers also to an explosion on 9 October in the same building, which may be that referred to at a.

The time-delay used in this case was the S. WEHR 504, already known as a standard GERMAN army demolition device, with a delay up to 21 days. The dates of the explosions indicate that the charges were put in place before the CHARGES left, and in fact it appears that, immediately before their evas- uation, the areas concerned were roped off and barred to civilians. It is not considered therefore that these explosions were arranged by saboteurs of either the WEHR or SD, but by normal army demolition units.

This assumption is confirmed by the fact that no explosions of this type have been reported since the 21 day time limit expired.

2. With regard to the second special case mentioned in Security Notes No. 3, Security of Material during September, Part I, it is regretted that the full report hoped for is still not available.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

The following cases have been reported:

a. Wire Cutting:

1. Between 5-8 October, cases of cut signal lines were reported at PARSANO, SAN SEBASTIANO, ZEMME and C. SOREL. In only one out of 8 cases was the culprit traced, and in this case no security motive can be attributed as she was an old woman who had removed some wire under the impression that it was old German wire left behind in the retreat. 10 Corps S. S. P. investigation points to ignorance and desire for the wire as possible motives. After posted notices, pointing out that offenders were liable to the death penalty if

1. Three explosions of CHUM time-bombs in WILLES have come to notice:
 - a. One in a 'Main street near the Port' on or about 9 October 1943.
 - b. One in the postal building, where Fifth Army Headquarters was situated on or about 10/11 October 1943.
 - c. One in the Prince of Piedmont Barracks on 15 October 1943.

So far only a report on c has been received, though this refers also to an explosion on 9 October in the same building, which may be that referred to at a.

The time-delay used in this case was the S. MEXER 504, already known as a standard CHUM Army demolition device, with a delay up to 21 days. The dates of the explosions indicate that the charges were put in place before the CHUM left, and in fact it appears that, immediately before their action, the areas concerned were roped off and barred to civilians. It is not considered therefore that these explosions were arranged by saboteurs of either the WEHR or SB, but by normal Army demolition units.

This assumption is confirmed by the fact that no explosions of this type have been reported since the 21 day time limit expired.

2. With regard to the second special case mentioned in Security Notes No. 3, Security of Material during September, Part I, it is regretted that the full report hoped for is still not available.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

The following cases have been reported:

A. Wire Cutting:

1. Between 5-8 October, cases of cut signal lines were reported at RASSANO, SAN SEVERINO, VIESTE, and CASERTA. In only one out of 8 cases was the culprit traced, and in this case no security motive can be attributed as she was an old woman who had removed some wire under the impression that it was old German wire left behind in the retreat. 10 Corps P.S.I. investigation points to ignorance and desire for the wire as probable motives. After posted notices, pointing out that offenders were liable to the death penalty if detected, and no repetitions have since been reported.

2. It was reported that on 15 October 1943, an attempt was made by 2 Italian civilians to cut the main telephone wire on the CEMONT road (15 Army Group District). The civilians were apprehended and handed over to P.S.I., 15 Army Group. The identity of these civilians has not yet been revealed.

3. On 15 October 1943, an Arab was caught in the act of cutting U.S. Signal Corps lines on the ... Circuit at MEDEL TAMEL Airfield. The offender was handed over to the ... for appropriate action.

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4. On 24 October 1943, Signal wires LIN REID. - THERESA were cut by individuals (arabs) believed to have a sabotage motive. CONSTRUCTION F.S.S. are handling the case, and preventative measures are being taken.

5. At CHOTWILL Airfield, telephone lines were cut on the 2, 6, and 7 October. Eighth Army F.S.S. investigated, with no result. F.S.S. in conjunction with German divisions have taken steps to improve the security arrangements of the Airfield as a whole.

6. During October 1943, several instances of interference with telephone lines of 1 Para. Regt. at LAMMERS were reported. Two children were caught while cutting and taking away wire, but intentional sabotage is not suspected.

7. Three cases of wire cutting occurred on 26, 28 and 29 October 1943 at ORAN F.S.S. Investigation conducted by 12 F.S.S. disclosed that the wires were undoubtedly cut deliberately, but the perpetrators were not traced.

8. On 25 October 1943, telephone lines between 6 Rd. Pk. Coy. and 243 Rd. Coy., 1 Para. Div. were cut. This action was reported to the G.O.C. who called upon the G.O.C. to investigate and report.

B. Shipping.

9. On 9 October 1943, incendiary bombs were discovered in Hold No. 5, S.S. PORT STAMER, which was being loaded with rails and spikes by Italian P.S. in the Port of LAMMERS. Investigation by 66 Port Security Section and interrogation of Italian P.S. concerned by S.S.C. Section, LAMMERS, while not conclusively eliminating sabotage, pointed to probability of carelessness or ignorance as cause of accident.

10. It was reported that on 8 October 1943, the compass of the S.S. GUSSEL was interfered with. This incident was the culmination of a series of similar acts committed over a period of six months. Investigation by 96 F.S.S. indicated that A.M. J. PROUSE was responsible. He appears to be an unbalanced individual, and is being repatriated to Great Britain for disposal.

11. On 22 October 1943, while the S.S. THOMAS S. ROBERTSON was coming into ORAN Harbour, Joseph FLINCHUM, who was at the wheel, in disobedience of orders placed the wheel at half right. Crash with another ship was avoided only by the prompt intervention of the Master. Investigation by ORAN CIO indicated FLINCHUM's actions were the result of personal grievances; his loyalty is not in question.

12. In October 1943, it was reported that the engines of S.S. W.L. FLOYD had been damaged. Investigation disclosed that JOHN F. DUNCAN threw sand into the ship's bearings following disciplinary action from the ship's officers. Suitable punitive measures have been taken.

C. Railway.

7. Three cases of wire cutting occurred on 26, 28 and 29 October 1943 at GUEIRA. Investigation conducted by 12 P.S.S. disclosed that the wires were undoubtedly cut deliberately, but the perpetrators have not been traced.

8. On 25 October 1943, telephone lines between 6 Rd. 24. 24. 24. and 243 Rd. 24. 24. 24. Div. were cut. This matter was reported to the Gail, who called upon the Gueira to investigate and report.

B. Shipping.

9. On 9 October 1943, incendiary bombs were discovered in Hold No. 5, S.S. ROYAL GUYANA, which was being loaded with rails and spikes by Italian P.S.S. in the Port of GUEIRA. Investigation by 86 Port Security Section and intervention of Italian P.S.S. concerned by G.L.C. Section, J.F.C., while not conclusively eliminating sabotage, pointed to probability of carelessness or ignorance as cause of accident.

10. It was reported that on 6 October 1943, the compass of the S.S. GUYANA was interfered with. This incident was the culmination of a series of similar acts committed over a period of six months. Investigation by 96 P.S.S. indicated that J.F.C. was responsible. He appears to be an unbalanced individual, and is being repatriated to Great Britain for disposal.

11. On 22 October 1943, while the S.S. THOMAS R. MONTGOMERY was coming into GUEIRA Harbour, Joseph MINCHUM, who was at the wheel, in disobedience of orders placed the wheel at half right. A crash with another ship was avoided only by the prompt intervention of the Master. Investigation by G.L.C. CIO indicated MINCHUM's actions were the result of personal grievances; his loyalty is not in question.

12. In October 1943, it was reported that the engine of S.S. W. FLOYD had been damaged. Investigation disclosed that JOHN J. BROWN threw sand into the ship's bearing following disciplinary action from the ship's officers. Suitable punitive measures have been taken.

C. Railway.

13. On 20 October 1943, five ribs and an Italian, Arnoldo STILL, were arrested near GUEIRA, by the Gendarmerie on charges of having caused 24 railway accidents between the stations of GUEIRA and GUEIRA. During period November 1942 - 1943, one of the natives is said to have admitted placing a spike in the points at GUEIRA on one occasion, while STILL is stated to have been responsible for directing the whole affair. A full report has been requested of the D.S.M.

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14. On 25 October 1943, the Provost Marshal reported that a small box of TNT had been placed between the brake drum and wheel of a freight car in the port area at MATTEL. MATTEL P.S.S. presently investigating.

D. Miscellaneous.

15. On 1 October 1943, a case of apparent sabotage occurred in the No. 1 Vehicle Assembly Shops at WPA. Vehicles were found damaged in a way which precluded accidental cause. Investigation, while not positively identifying the perpetrators, indicated that Mauritian soldiers working in the shops, who were dissatisfied as a result of a pay dispute, probably caused the damage. Preventive measures have been recommended by 95 Field Security Section.

16. On 3 October 1943, the boom mechanism of the CONSUME Port was found to have been tampered with, and damaged as follows: 3 plug leads cut, petrol tank moved out of position, petrol pipe twisted, and four feet missing. Investigation by 51 Field Security Section indicated the damage probably to have been "wilful", but the perpetrator was not traced.

PART III. NOTES FOR CIG AND WEP.

1. It will be seen that notices of liability to the death penalty have proved a satisfactory cure for outbreaks of wire cutting. It is suggested that this method should be adapted in all areas where outbreaks of this type occur, and that it might also be extended to include interference with railways. It should be borne in mind however that such notices, if wrongly placed, may in some cases have the reverse of the desired effect by drawing the attention of potential saboteurs to vulnerable points. In the case of railways, stations would appear to be the most practical sites.

2. There are indications that ITIJ may present a greater counter-sabotage problem than NORTH AFRICA, and it is therefore urged that CIG and F.S. personnel should familiarise themselves with the various enemy sabotage devices of which notification has from time to time been sent out from this Headquarters. In the event of any such device being found, this Headquarters should be informed by cable immediately.

were dissatisfied as a result of a pay dispute, probably caused the damage. Preventative measures have been recommended by 96 Field Security Section.

16. On 3 October 1945, the boom mechanism of the BONGER Port was found to have been tampered with, and damaged as follows: 3 plug leads cut, petrol tank moved out of position, petrol pipe twisted, and four feet missing. Investigation by 51 Field Security Section indicated the damage probably to have been "willful", but the perpetrator was not traced.

PART III. MEASURES FOR CIG AND ROP.

1. It will be seen that notices of liability to the death penalty have proved a satisfactory cure for outbreaks of wire cutting. It is suggested that this method should be adopted in all areas where outbreaks of this type occur, and that it might also be extended to include interference with railways. It should be borne in mind however that such notices, if wrongly placed, may in some cases have the reverse of the desired effect by drawing the attention of potential saboteurs to vulnerable points. In the case of railways, stations would appear to be the most practical sites.

2. There are indications that LXXXI may present a greater counter-sabotage problem than NORTH AMERICA, and it is therefore urged that CIG and P.S. personnel should familiarise themselves with the various enemy sabotage devices of which notification has from time to time been sent out from this Headquarters. In the event of any such device being found, this Headquarters should be informed by cable immediately.

1740

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- 3 -

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SUBJECT: Passes

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.DR SECRET EQUALS US SECRET.2548/1112/1/G(Ib)

17 November 1943.

1. Considerable difficulty and confusion is being caused in this theatre of operations by the numerous and varied passes, many of them in most unsatisfactory form, which are issued by various authorities to civilians and others.

Many such passes are mere "scraps of paper" which can be easily transferred or forged, and cannot be easily recognised as genuine.

2. Some of the more common weaknesses of such makeshift passes are:

(a) They are frequently not properly identified with the person to whom they are issued; or the following wording is common: "Please allow bearer to....." and "This Italian is working for us and is authorised to" etc.

(b) The issuing authority is not clearly shown; or illegible signature, issuing officer's appointment not given, no office stamp etc.

(c) The period of validity is seldom included.

3. Passes of this nature are a danger to security, they are of little value to the bearer, and they cause considerable trouble and delay to our security/counter-intelligence organizations and to the military police, particularly as regards road checks and their other duties in connection with the Security control of movement.

4. It is requested that all concerned should take all possible steps to rectify this present unsatisfactory position regarding passes, and that the following principles should be followed in this connection.

(a) In general, the issue of passes should be kept to the minimum.

Circulation passes should only be issued to civilians after careful consideration as to the justification of their reasons for wishing or requiring to move or circulate.

Passes should not normally be required by Allied military personnel in uniform, if challenged when circulating in the course of their duties, the production of their identity document and a brief explanation of their business should normally prove adequate to convince them to continue without hindrance.

(b) The two normal and standard types of passes in general use in this theatre of operations are:

(i) Passes or permits issued by the theatre of operations authorities.

Many such passes are mere "scraps of paper" which can be easily transferred or forged, and cannot be easily recognized as genuine.

2. Some of the more common weaknesses of such makeshift passes are:

(a) They are frequently not properly identified with the person to whom they are issued; as the following wording is common: "Please allow bearer to...." and "This Italian is working for us and is authorized to" etc.

(b) The issuing authority is not clearly shown; as illegible signature, issuing officer's appointment not given, no office stamp etc.

(c) The period of validity is seldom included.

3. Passes of this nature are a danger to security, they are of little value to the bearer, and they cause considerable trouble and delay to our security/counter-intelligence organizations and to the military police, particularly en route road checks and their other duties in connection with the Security Council of Movement.

4. It is requested that all concerned should take all possible steps to rectify this present unsatisfactory position regarding passes, and that the following principles should be followed in this connection.

(a) In general, the issue of passes should be kept to the minimum.

Circulation passes should only be issued to civilians after ~~careful~~ consideration as to the justification of their reasons for wishing or requiring to move or circulate.

Passes should not normally be required by Allied military personnel in uniform, if challenged when circulating in the course of their duties, the production of their identity document and a brief explanation of their business should normally prove adequate to enable them to continue without hindrance.

(b) The two normal and standard types of passes in general use in this theatre of operations are:

(i) Passes or permits issued by AMV to civilians authorizing certain movement or certain action prohibited to the population as a whole.

AMV H.Q. has been requested to supply all AMV officers with standard printed pass forms for this purpose.

(ii) The standard "Brown Security Passes," printed in English and Italian, headed "MILITARY PERMIT. FIDELITY MILITARY, and bearing an embossed stamp showing an eagle, and a lion on a crown. These are for special and strictly limited issue by intelligence staffs.

(c) These two types of pass should cover most normal requirements.

There are occasions, however, when certain military authorities require to issue other special passes or permits for various purposes.

In such cases, these passes should:

- (i) State precisely what the holder may do or where he may go.
- (ii) Be properly identified with the person to whom issued; the latter's name, identity card number and signature should appear on the pass.
- (iii) Bear the legible signature and appointment of the issuing officer.
- (iv) Be typed and stamped with an office stamp.
- (v) Show the period of validity.

5. It is stressed that, in view of the number of the authenticity and the extent of the areas involved, the co-operation of all concerned is essential, if the issue and use of passes in ITALY is to be an asset rather than a liability to our security, and it is requested that all possible steps be taken to improve the present position on the lines indicated in para 4 above.

DISTRIBUTION

Fifth Army
 Sixth Army
 No. 2 District
 P.S.S.
 H.Q. Special Forces, No. 2 District
 AMG H.Q. 15 Army Group
 Tac H.Q. "A" Force
 No. 2 S.I. (b) Unit
 No. 3 S.I. (b) Unit
 No. 1 I(U) Section
 16 F.S. Section
 Gen/Lt JONSTON, Allied Control Commission
 Major PAGE, Allied Control Commission
 Lt. Col. ROBE, c/o G.S.I. No. 2 District
 Major LEE, c/o 16 F.S. Section
 15 Army Group (Special Forces)
 for information - AFHQ, G-2 (C.I.)

W.D. Gibson 14-66
 W. D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
 Major General,
 Chief of General Staff,
 15 Army Group.

- (iii) Bear the legible signature and appointment of the issuing officer.
 (iv) Be typed and stamped with an office stamp.
 (v) Show the period of validity.

5. It is stressed that, in view of the number of the authorities and the extent of the areas involved, the co-operation of all concerned is essential, if the issue and use of passes in Italy is to be an asset rather than a liability to our security, and it is requested that all possible steps be taken to improve the present position on the lines indicated in para 4 above.

DISTRIBUTION

Fifth Army
 Eighth Army
 No. 2 District
 P.S.S.
 H.Q. Special Forces, No. 2 District
 AMB H.Q. 15 Army Group
 Tac H.Q. "A" Force
 No. 2 S.I.(b) Unit
 No. 3 S.I.(b) Unit
 No. 1 I(U) Section
 15 P.S. Section
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 Major PAGE, Allied Control Commission
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 Major LEE, c/o 16 P.S. Section
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WDG/EHK

W. D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
 Major General,
 Chief of General Staff,
 15 Army Group.

SUBJECT: Passes

ER SECRET ENUALS US SECRET.

15AG/1112/4/E(10)

17 November 1943.

1. Considerable difficulty and confusion is being caused in this theatre of operations by the numerous and varied passes, many of them in most unsatisfactory form, which are issued by various authorities to civilians and others.

Many such passes are mere "scraps of paper" which can be easily transferred or forged, and cannot be easily recognised as genuine.

2. Some of the more common weaknesses of such makeshift passes are:

(a) They are frequently not properly identified with the person to whom they are issued; eg the following wording is common: "Please allow bearer to...." and "This Italian is working for us and is authorized to...." etc.

(b) The issuing authority is not clearly shown; eg illegible signature, issuing officer's appointment not given, no office stamp etc.

(c) The period of validity is seldom included.

3. Passes of this nature are a danger to security, they are of little value to the bearer, and they cause considerable trouble and delay to our security/counter-intelligence organisations and to the military police, particularly as regards road checks and their other duties in connection with the Security control of movement.

4. It is requested that all concerned should take all possible steps to rectify this present unsatisfactory position regarding passes, and that the following principles should be followed in this connection.

(a) In general, the issue of passes should be kept to the minimum.

Circulation passes should only be issued to civilians after careful

consideration as to the justification of their reasons for wishing or requiring to move or circulate.

Passes should not normally be required by Allied military personnel in uniform if challenged when circled in the centres of their division, the production of their identity document and a brief explanation of their business should normally prove adequate to enable them to continue without hindrance.

(b) Two normal and standard types of passes in general use in this

theatre of operations are:

(1) Passes or permits issued by AID to civilians authorising certain

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no foreigner can be easily transferred to another country, which can be easily transferred to another country.

Some of the more common workplace passes are:

(a) They are frequently not properly identified with the person to whom they are issued; or the following wording is common: "Please allow bearer to...." and "This Italian is working for us and is authorized to...." etc.

(b) The issuing authority is not clearly shown; or illegible signature, issuing officer's appointment not given, no office stamp etc.

(c) The period of validity is seldom involved.

3. Passes of this nature are a danger to security, they are of little value to the bearer, and they cause considerable trouble and delay to our security/counter-intelligence organizations and to the military police, particularly as regards road checks and their other duties in connection with the Security control of movement.

It is requested that all concerned should take all possible steps to rectify this present unsatisfactory position regarding passes, and that the following principles should be followed in this connection.

(a) in general, the issue of passage should be kept to the minimum.

Circulation passes should only be issued to civilians after careful consideration as to the justification of their reasons for wishing or requiring to see or circulate.

Passes should not normally be received by Allied military personnel in a uniform; if challenged when circulating in the course of their duties, the production of their identity document and a brief explanation of their business should normally prove adequate to enable them to continue without hindrance.

(b) The two normal and standard types of papers in general use in this theatre of operations are:

(ii) Passon or permits issued by AMI to civilians authorizing certain movement or certain action prohibited to the population as a whole.

Alt. H. 2. has been requested to supply all AMT OFFICERS with a booklet of photographs used and Alt. H. 2. associated with this purpose.

(ii) The standard "Women's Security Pages," printed in English and Italian, headed "Women's Security Pages," appeared in the Italian newspaper showing an eagle, an eagle, and a lion on a crest. These are for special and officially limited issue by intelligence staffs.

(c) These two types of pass should cover most normal requirements.

There are occasions, however, when certain military authorities require to issue other special passes or permits for various purposes.

In such cases, these passes should:

- (i) State precisely what the holder may do or where he may go.
- (ii) Be properly identified with the person to whom issued; the latter's name, identity card number and signature should appear on the pass.

(iii) Bear the legible signature and appointment of the issuing officer.

- (iv) Be typed and stamped with an office stamp.
- (v) Show the period of validity.

5. It is stressed that, in view of the number of the authorities and the extent of the areas involved, the co-operation of all concerned is essential, if the issue and use of passes in ITALY is to be an asset rather than a liability to our security, and it is requested that all possible steps be taken to improve the present position on the lines indicated in para 4 above.

DISTRIBUTION

Fifth Army
 Eighth Army
 No. 2 District
 P.S.S.
 H.Q. Special Force, No. 2 District
 AMG H.Q. 15 Army Group
 Tac H.Q. 42nd Force
 No. 2 S.I.(b) Unit
 No. 3 S.I.(b) Unit
 No. 1 I(U) Section
 16 F.S. Section
 Sen/Lt JONES, Allied Control Commission
 Major PAGE, Allied Control Commission
 Lt. Col. REED, G.O.S.I. No. 2 District
 Major LEE, G.O.S.I. Section
 15 Army Group (Special Forces)
 For Information - AMB., G-2 (C.I.)

W. D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
 Major General,
 Chief of General Staff,
 15 Army Group.

Subject: Control of Movement

H.Q. 15 Army Group
C.M.F.

SECRET

35AG/1101/10/1A(1B)

First Army
Eight Army

27 Nov 43

Ref this H.Q. letter of even number dated 19 Nov 43.

1. The Control line described in para 5(a) of the above letter will be established forthwith.

2. The nature of control will be as set out in para 5(b) and (c) of the above letter.

3. Armies will be responsible for organising the check points and patrols.

When Eighth Army rear boundary moves forward to the FORCUE River, the question of the provision of personnel for check points on this River should if necessary be co-ordinated by Eighth Army with No. 2 District.

4. Apart from Allied military personnel, and Italian military personnel on duty, only those persons holding passes issued in accordance with the principles laid down in this H.Q. letter 15 A.G. 1412/4/CI(b) dated 17 Nov 43 will be allowed to cross this control line from the South-East.

5. As regards the issue of passes to civilians by A.A.G. officials, A.A.G. is arranging for the following procedure to be adopted for such passes. Any civilian wishing to cross the Control line from S.E. to S.W. must apply to the nearest Civil Affairs Officer or Allied Control Commission representative: if the latter gives the application, he will forward it to the C.A.O. of the town or Province to which the civilian wishes to proceed: the latter C.A.O. will then issue the pass, if approved.

In this way passes (through their S.A.O.) will control the number of persons permitted to enter this forward restricted zone and the degree of restrictions to be applied in the granting of passes.

A.A.G. is arranging for the publicity to be given to the Civil population as to the existence of this restricted zone, and to the above pass procedure.

6. Access to NOGL Province is also to be restricted.

The same principles and procedure, as described above, are to be applied with regard to the issue of passes to enter this Province from the South or West.

The control is to be enforced by C.A.O. and S.A.P. should supervise their efficient enforcement thereof on a spot-check basis.

A.A.G. is arranging for the necessary publicity to be given to this restriction.

1737

1. The Control Line described in para 5(a) of the above letter will be established forthwith.
2. The method of control will be as set out in paras 5(b) and (c) of the above letter.
3. Areas will be responsible for organizing the check points and patrols.
4. About 2000 Allied military personnel, and Indian military personnel on duty, only those persons holding passes issued in accordance with the principles laid down in this H.Q. letter 15 H.Q. 14/12/43(h) dated 17 Nov 43 will be allowed to cross this control line from the South-East.
5. As regards the issue of passes to civilians by A.I.S. officers, A.I.S. is arranging for the following procedure to be adopted for such passes. Any civilian wishing to cross the Control Line from S.E. to N.W. must apply to the nearest Civil Affairs Officer or Allied Control Commission representative. If the latter approves the application, he will forward it to the C.A.S. of his town or Province to which the civilian wishes to proceed; the latter C.A.S. will then issue the pass, if approved. In this way passes (through which S.E. to N.W.) can control the number of persons permitted to enter this armed restricted zone and the degree of restrictions to be applied in the granting of passes. A.I.S. is arranging for the facility to be given to the Civil population as to the existence of this restricted zone, and to the above pass procedure.
6. Access to FOGOLA Province is due to be restricted. The same principles and procedure, as described above, are to be applied with regard to the issue of passes to enter this Province from the South or West. The control is to be enforced by C.A.S. R.: P.3.2. should supervise their efficient enforcement thereof on a spot-check basis. A.I.S. is arranging for the necessary publicity to be given to this restriction.
7. Persons wishing to move from FOGOLA Province to the Farward 3.2.2. area will be subject to the same restrictions as regulations as persons from any other Province.

Copy to: ...T.H. (16-2 H.Q.)

No. 2 District.

P.H.S.

12 Air Force.

...H. H.Q. 15 Army Group.

Lt. Col. Webb, C/O G.S.I. No. 2 District.

R.D. GIBSON, Lt-Col.,
for Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 ARMY GROUP.

1737

Subject:- Permits and Passes.

AD HQ,
15 Army Group,
C.I.P.

Ref. AM/405/41.
15 December 43.

S.O.A.A.O. thru S.O.A.O. HQ 5 Army.
" " " " HQ 8 Army.
" " " " HQ 13 Army Region III.
" " " " HQ 15 Army Region IV (Adm).

In order to carry out the instructions contained in memorandum 1540/1412/4/e(Ib) dated 27 Nov 43, circulated under this HQ AM/405/41 dated 24 Nov, to enforce control over movement as laid down in memorandum 1540/1401/10/e(Ib) dated 27 Nov 43, a supply of special pass forms is forwarded.

2. An issue of General Pass forms and Permits is also made :-

General Pass form	-	in books of 100	-	3,000
Special Pass form	-	in books of 100	-	3,000

3. These new passes and permits will be used in all new issues or re-issues.

4. If you consider that a further supply of these forms will be required within the next few months will you please submit demand to Public Safety, AM HQ, 15 Army Group, on the attached form at an early date.

YH/ES.

J. K. Pollock
J. K. POLLOCK,
Lt. Colonel,
Public Safety.

Copy to:- HQ 15 Army Gr. (C.S.F.) with 3 copy of General and Special Pass forms.

A.C.O. Brindisi.
A.E.O. (A.C.O.) Palermo.
Region I.
Region II.

173 B

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In order to carry out the instructions contained in memorandum 1540/1112/L/C(Ib) dated 17 Nov 43, circulated under this HQ AMB/405/16 dated 24 Nov, to enforce control over movement as laid down in memorandum 1540/1101/16/C(Ib) dated 27 Nov 43, a supply of special pass forms is forwarded.

2. An issue of General Pass forms and permits is also made :-

General Pass Form	-	in books of 100	-	3,000
Special Pass Form	-	in books of 100	-	3,000

3. These new passbook and permits will be used in all new issues or re-issues.

4. If you consider that a further supply of these forms will be required within the next few months will you please submit demand to Public Safety, AMB HQ, 15 Army Group, on the attached form at an early date.

187/53.

Handwritten: J. R. HOLLAND, Lt. Colonel, Public Safety.

Copy to:- HQ 15 Army Gr. (G.S. B.) with 1 copy of General and Special pass forms.

A.C.C. Principal.	"
A.E.C. (A.C.C.) Colonel.	"
Region I.	"
Region II.	"

++ Per information.

173 b

SUBJECT: - Control of Movement.

H.A. 15 Army Group.
C.M.F.

BR SECRET - U.S. SECRET

15AG/1401/10/GI(b)

19 Nov 43.

Fifth Army
Eighth Army

1. The security problem and danger presented by the movement of refugees etc. South-Eastwards through our forward positions has led to the preparation and issue of a comprehensive scheme for the proper security control of such persons. (Ref AFHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 33 dated 13 Nov 43.)

2. It is considered desirable that movement North-Westwards into the forward Army Areas should also be subject to security control, with the object of preventing (a) the infiltration of unauthorized persons into Allied into German-occupied Italy, and (b) the circulation of such persons in the forward areas, where vital military moves and dispositions may be observed either wilfully or casually, with consequent danger of leakage of information.

3. It is realized that certain controls of this nature are already enforced at various points in Army or Corps Areas, but it is thought that these should be co-ordinated and a continuous line of control established across the ITALIAN Peninsula, so that the possibility of unauthorized movement North-Westward may be reduced to the minimum.

4. In selecting the most suitable line, the following considerations must be taken into account:

(a) A natural obstacle, preferably a river, should be followed where possible, thus facilitating the establishment of check points.

(b) The restricted zone should include as few large towns and important civil centres as possible, as otherwise great difficulties would arise in the strict limitation of access thereto.

5. It is therefore suggested that:

(a) The following line would prove most suitable for the purpose: River FORQUA from its mouth to river junction R 2115 near BASILICE (N 5793) thence road BASILICE - SAN CARO (H 7201) - PRACENIC (N 5294) - PONTE (N 5793), thence River CALORE and River VOLTURNO to latter's mouth.

(b) Check points should be established at all road crossings of the Rivers FORQUA, CALORE and VOLTURNO (where these follow the control line) and at appropriate points on the road BASILICE - PONTE.

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2. It is considered desirable that movement North-Westwards into the forward Army Areas should also be subject to security control, with the object of preventing (a) the infiltration of unauthorized persons from Allied into German-occupied Italy, and (b) the circulation of such persons in the forward areas, where vital military moves and dispositions may be observed either willfully or casually, with consequent danger of leakage of information.

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(a) A natural obstacle, preferably a river, should be followed where possible, thus facilitating the establishment of check points.

(b) The restricted zone should include as few large towns and important civil centres as possible, as otherwise great difficulties would arise in the strict limitation of access thereto.

5. It is therefore suggested that:

(a) The following line would prove most suitable for the purpose: River FORORE from its mouth to River junction H 8113 near BASILICE (H 7700) thence road BASILICE - SAN MARCO (H 7301) - FRAGNETO (N 6394) - PONTE (N 5790), thence River CALORE and River VOLTURNO to latter's mouth.

(b) Check points should be established at all road crossings of the Rivers FORORE, CALORE and VOLTURNO (where these follow the control line) and at appropriate points on the road BASILICE - PONTI.

(c) These check points should be manned by one N.C.O. of the CC.RR (Territoriale or C.S.) and one N.C.O. of the Military Police and/or one N.C.O. of the Rep/CIC, according to the importance of the post and the availability of personnel.

Carabinieri Territoriale patrols should be organized between the posts on that part of the line where there is no river barrier.

(d) Apart from Allied military personnel, only those persons holding passes issued in accordance with the principles laid down in this Hc letter 15G.1412/4/GI(b) dated 17 Nov 43 should be allowed to cross this control line from the South-East.

A.A.G. would be requested to instruct all Civil Affairs Officers to limit to really essential cases the issue to civilians of passes authorizing movement North-Westwards across this control line.

- 2 -

6. Will you please forward to this HQ your comments on the above proposals, and give particulars of any existing measures which may be in force in your zone for the control of civilian movement North-Westward.

WDG/GMD

W D Gibson Lt Col

W. D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy To:- A.P.H.S. (G-2)
No. 2 District
P.B.S.
A.H.G., Hqs. 15 Army Group.
Lt. Col ROES c/o G.S.I. No. 2 District

Subject: Civilian Internees.

S.C.A.C., AMB, 5th Army.
S.C.A.C., AIC, 8th Army.
S.C.A.C., AIC, Region III.
S.C.A.C., AIC, Region IV.

U.S., A.M.C.,
15 AMX GROUP,
C. H. P.

AMC/436/

Dep. Adm.

The arrangements for the arrest, detention and release of civilians arrested on security grounds have been reviewed and the following instructions will be observed in future.

(A). Arrests.

Wherever possible arrests will be made by personnel of the Security Services, i.e., C.I.C. or R.C.C. The officer or R.C.C. making the arrest will make out an arrest slip (specimen attached) in quadruplicate. The disposal of the person arrested will depend on whether he is recommended for:-

- (a) Prosecution in an Allied Military Court;
- (b) Internment; or
- (c) Further investigation.

Cases under (a) will be handed over to the nearest C.A.C. or C.A.P.O. for disposal and a copy of the arrest slip will accompany the person arrested. Such cases may be held in C.I.C. cells or local prisons pending disposal.

The disposal of cases under (c) will be the same as for (a) or (b) according to the nature of the investigation required. ~~Where necessary~~ is contemplated they will be dealt with as under (a).

When a C.A.C. or C.A.P.O. decides the arrest of an individual on security grounds the signature of the nearest RMC/CIC section will be

1734

(a) or (b)

The arrangements for the arrest, detention and release of civilians arrested on security grounds have been revised and the following instructions will be observed in future.

(A). Arrests.

Whenever possible arrests will be made by personnel of the Security Services, i.e., C.I.D. or P.I.D. The officer or P.I.D. making the arrest will make out an arrest slip (specimen attached) in quadruplicate. The disposal of the person arrested will depend on whether he is recommended for:-

- (a) Prosecution in an Allied Military Court;
- (b) Internment; or
- (c) Further investigation.

Cases under (a) will be handed over to the nearest C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. for disposal and a copy of the arrest slip will accompany the person arrested. Such cases may be held in C.C. MR cells or local prisons pending disposal.

The disposal of cases under (c) will be the same as for (a) or (b) according to the nature of the investigation required. ~~Unless representation is submitted they will be dealt with as under (a).~~

When a C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. desires the arrest of an individual on security grounds the assistance of the nearest PWS/CIS section will be obtained but where this is not feasible the subject will be retained in the C.C. MR station until the PWS/CIS can take over custody.

Arrests by the C.C. MR on security grounds will be dealt with in the same way.

(B). Retention.

All civilian internees will be detained in No. 374 Prisoners of War Camp at CHERVELLA DI MARINA, Province of POTENZA (No. Ref. T.4194.) (copy of A.D.I.Q. Adv. Ad. Mob. Instruction No. 3075/4/A.2 of 18. Dec. 45 is attached.

Under the circumstances...

Under no circumstances will civilian internees be detained in civil prisons; the detention of such persons is the sole responsibility of the Army.

(C). REVIEW.

It will be seen from para. 8 of the A.F.M.C. Adv. Adm. Pol. Instruction that releases are only authorized by I(b)/C.I. of 15 Army Group, Arides, Districts and P.R.S. The reviews of ~~cases~~ ^{detainees} in which AMB officers have assisted will not be necessary.

In order, however, that the views of AMB in respect of persons arrested at the instance of AMB or of the C.I. AMB can be given due consideration, C.A.P.O's with Regions and Arides will be consulted by the appropriate I(b)/C.I. section before action is taken on reviews of such cases carried out at the P.R. Camps.

It may frequently occur that additional information may come to the notice of S.C.A.O's regarding persons arrested by PMS/CIS either on their own initiative or at the instance of AMB officers or the C.O. AMB; this information may have a bearing on the disposal of the particular case and it will be in order for the S.C.A.O. concerned to make representations to the appropriate I(b)/C.I. section. If this is impracticable, the circumstances will be reported to this Headquarters so that the matter can be taken up with GAI(b), 15 Army Group.

*L. Long - AMB conditions prevail in Reg 1733
ACAPs should be advised of when.*

Districts and P.O.s. The reviews of *substantive* cases in which AM officers have assisted will not be necessary.

In order, however, that the views of AM in respect of persons arrested at the instance of AM or of the C.I. can be given due consideration, G.A.P.O's with Regions and Arides will be consulted by the appropriate I(b)/C.I. section before action is taken on reviews of such cases carried out at the P.O. Camps.

It may frequently occur that additional information may come to the notice of A.C.A.O's regarding persons arrested by PSC/CIO either on their own initiative or at the instance of AM officers or the C.I. This information may have a bearing on the disposal of the particular case and it will be in order for the A.C.A.O. concerned to make representations to the appropriate I(b)/C.I. section. If this is inadvisable, the circumstances will be reported to this Headquarters so that the matter can be taken up with GIX(b), 13 Army Group.

Is long on 1966 and has been provided in Ref 1733
Ref 1733 should be advised of reference.

7 Aug 13

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Information of Civilians on Security
Grounds - April 1954

15 Army Group

Main Highways, Camp

15th Army (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th)

West 10 (Camp)

No. 2 District

J.B.S.

15th Army Group
Camp 15

30/10/54

15th Army Group

1. 15th Army Group on 14 Dec 53 it was agreed that the operation, custody and administration, including maintenance, of civilian P.W.s was the responsibility of the Army and not of J.B.S.

2. Divisions involved in security grounds in forward areas will be placed in P.W. camps and operated through the normal P.W. channels as instructed. On arrival in these Army areas, civilian P.W.s will be segregated and maintained in an internment camp. For this purpose 574 P.W. Camp has been earmarked and will be established as soon as possible by No. 2 District at a location suitable by rail from both 15th and 16th.

3. Divisions involved in the rear areas will be evacuated directly to 574 P.W. Camp via forward camps where necessary.

4. Civilian P.W.s, in addition to certain prohibition by international law, and on no account will they be placed in civilian prisons unless some civilian prisons are taken over by the military authorities and run as P.W. or internment camps.

5. For political reasons it is extremely important that this procedure is carried out carefully.

6. In all cases of civilians arrested and evacuated in civil P.W. camps, a normal roll will accompany the convoys, together with a short list of names ("Arrest List"), in each case. These documents will be handed over to Commandant 574 P.W. Camp on arrival.

7. Commandant records of arrest, officially authorizing internment, will be sent periodically to the Commandant 574 P.W. Camp by airmail, directed to J.B.S., signed by a responsible officer, unless a certificate of release is submitted in the normal roll referred to above.

8. The release of civilian P.W.s will only be authorized by the 15th Army Group, J.B.S., Districts or P.W.s. Commandant 574 P.W. Camp will be responsible for completing such releases when authorized.

9. 574 P.W. Camp will be responsible for all administration and documentation of P.W.s, and an intelligence officer will be attached to Camp, West 10, in the service of J.B.S.

1732

1. It is hereby stated that the 15 Army Group on 14 June 45 is agreed that the evacuation, assembly and administration, including transportation, of civilian prisoners is the responsibility of the Army and not of G.I.C.
2. Civilians arrested on security grounds in forward areas will be placed in P.O. Camps and transported through the normal P.O. channels as appropriate. Civilians arrested in rear army areas, civilian P.O.s, will be transported and accounted for in internment camps. For this purpose 374 P.O. Camps are being established and will be established as soon as possible by No. 2 District as a location recommended by P.O. Camps from No. 2 G.I.
3. Civilians arrested in the rear areas will be evacuated down to 374 P.O. Camps via forward camps where necessary.
4. Civilians are now entitled to certain protection by International Law, and no account will be taken of civilians in civilian prisons unless such civilian prisoners are taken over by the military authorities and then as P.O.s in internment camps.
5. For political reasons it is extremely important that this procedure be carried out correctly.
6. In all cases of civilians arrested and evacuated as Civil P.O.s, a separate detailed roll will accompany the escort, together with a short record of arrest ("Arrest Slip") in each case. These documents will be handed over to Commandant 374 P.O. Camp on arrival.
7. Detailed and records of arrest, officially authorizing internment, will be sent officially to the Commandant 374 P.O. Camp by airmail, airmail, or P.O.s, signed by a responsible officer, unless a certificate to this effect is included in the normal roll referred to above.
8. The release of civilian P.O.s will only be authorized by H.C.I. of Army Group, P.O.s, Districts or P.O.s. Commandant 374 P.O. Camp will be responsible for implementing such releases when authorized.
9. 374 P.O. Camps will be responsible for all administration and record-keeping of P.O.s, and an Intelligence Officer will be attached to Camp Headquarters for liaison in the matter of airmail.
10. Further instructions regarding arrest, and recommendations as to periods of imprisonment and procedure regarding internment in accordance with International Law, will be issued by H.C.I. if any change in the current.

17/10/45.

Comd 101st

G.I.C.

G-4.

For Information,
H.C.I.

1792

PUBLIC SAFETY - A.S.S. 15 ARMY GROUP

Report for Month of Nov. 42

A Public Safety Branch was not set up till end of October, but C.A.P.Os were operating with forward units of 5th and 8th Armies. The organization allows for a staff with each Army and a staff at HQ 15 Army Group :-

HQ 15 Army Group.	1 Lieut. Colonel.
	1 Major.
	1 Captain.
5th Army.	1 Lieut. Colonel.
	2 Captains with 10 C.A.P.Os.
8th Army.	1 Major.
	2 Captains with 10 C.A.P.Os.

It is anticipated that the officers selected to fill these appointments will have taken up duties during December.

The principles guiding the method of how Public Safety will operate with forward Armies is as laid down in the "Book of Instructions" and the Staff with Headquarters at Armies act under the orders of the S.C.A.Os.

2. The main problems which have been met with are :-

- (a) Movement of civilians through forward areas moving away from the battle.
- (b) Movement of civilians forward behind tactical formations endeavouring to get back to their old homes.
- (c) Dealing with Political Prisoners (Internees).
- (d) Establishing relationship between the Military Forces and Civil Police.
- (e) Police control over Civil Population.
- (f) Detention of Civilians in Prisons awaiting trial.
- (g) The Black Market.
- (h) Brothels and Prostitutes.

With regards to -

(a) Refugees - This is being handled by Public Health (Welfare). Use is made of Civil Police by the Staff Officers handling the problem in forward areas. C.A.P.Os are required to co-operate and assist.

(b) Civilians moving close to the forward fighting units were causing difficulties. A Stop Line has been settled which is laid down in 15M/1401/10/5(1b) dated 27 Nov. It is roughly the line of the Rivera Volturno - FORTONE. Posts have been established at points along this line to stop all forward civilian movement. Checks on civilians entering the Province of Foggia from all directions was found to be necessary. Posts have been established around the province and only special cases are permitted to

1731

It is anticipated that the officers selected to fill these appointments will have taken up duties during December.

The principles guiding the method of how Public Safety will operate with forward armies is as laid down in the A.M.O. "Book of Instructions" and the Staff with Headquarters at Armes act under the orders of the S.C.A.Os.

2. The main problems which have been met with are:-

- (a) Movement of civilians through forward areas moving away from the battle.
- (b) Movement of civilians forward behind tactical formations endeavouring to get back to their old homes.
- (c) Dealing with Political Prisoners (Internees).
- (d) Establishing relationship between the Military Forces and Civil Police.
- (e) Police control over Civil Population.
- (f) Detention of Civilians in Prisons awaiting trial.
- (g) The Black Market.
- (h) Brothels and Prostitutes.

With regards to -

(a) Refugees - This is being handled by Public Health (Welfare). Use is made of Civil Police by the Staff Officers handling this problem in forward areas. C.A.P.Os are required to co-operate and assist.

(b) Civilians moving close to the forward fighting units were causing difficulties. A Stop Line has been settled which is laid down in 1540/1401/10/6(II) dated 27 Nov. It is roughly the line of the River Volturno - FORTONE. Posts have been established at points along this line to stop all forward civilian movement. Checks on Civilians entering the Province of Poggia from all directions was found to be necessary. Posts have been established around the province and only special cases such as those requiring to enter for agricultural purposes etc., are permitted to enter. On the Fortium boundary Control of Civilian movement as in (a) above presents some difficulties.

(c) Political Prisoners - All arrests of civilians on security grounds are investigated at Armes, released or passed back to P.O.W. Camps. It is hoped that special P.O.W. Camps will ultimately be established by A.F.H.Q. on the Mainland. Civil prisoners are still being used for confinement of some such prisoners and in the early stages it may be necessary, but P.S. in rear areas do put some cases into Civil Prisons, some, too, are being arrested by Civil Police and put into prison without any report of reason for arrest.

Rolls of all cases are sent in from HQ 15 Army Group. These are compiled from the fortnightly returns from Armes.

All persons who held any Government position confined for security reasons are reported specially by this Office to A.F.H.Q.

.....(d).....

(a) Military and Civil Police - No cases of interference by Military with Civil Police has actually been reported, but there have been cases where Civil Police have not been able to enforce their orders owing to interference by soldiers. I refer to cases of civilians riding on Military vehicles. The Civil Police cannot remove these civilians, but with the establishment of posts near the C.C.P.R. act with Military Police this should improve. There are undoubtedly a number of civilians being carried in Military vehicles. Consistently along roads civilians endeavour to stop cars to get a lift. I have reason to believe that the relationship between the Military Police and the Civil Police is good.

(e) The Civil Police have co-operated well and have shown enthusiasm in carrying out curfews, looting by civilians, prostitutes soliciting in the streets and accounting of soldiers by pumps are crimes frequently reported. Arrests are being made and there is no doubt that the constant attention in the hope of reducing the nuisances or arriving at some means by which they can be stopped.

(f) Many cases of civilians lingering in prisons waiting trial have come to my notice. Cases have been waiting since 1938. These cases are all being hurried but it seems a slow process and I would represent that we obtain lists of all untried prisoners at a very early date for submission and investigation. Public Safety Officers are being instructed to give this early consideration by collecting the names immediately prisoners are visited.

(g) Black Market - Price control is established but in accordance with local conditions. A Provincial Price List does not seem possible. Hidden supplies have been found and are looked for. There are black market prices, and I believe any form of control in the forward areas will always be difficult, but enforcement and control of prices will become a possibility as provinces are handed over to Regional Staffs.

(h) Brothels and Prostitutes. Brothels have been closed to the Military and all unlicensed places for civilians receive the necessary attention. Prostitutes and pimps found trading in the streets are arrested.

3. Fire Fighting and U.X.B.

(a) Application has been made for mobile fire fighting equipment in accordance with a request for suggestions from A.D.I.B. Mobile equipment to be operated by Italian personnel has in the case of Bogda been found to be a necessity, and it is anticipated will be required in other towns and cities as we advance.

(b) Special teams to deal with unexploded bombs are expected to be attached to Armies, and can be called on by A.N.G. Officers.

7 December 43.
Ref. A.G. 427/4.

H.P. LOTTIE,
Major,
Public Safety.

out our wishes. Looting by civilians, prostitutes soliciting in the streets and accounting of soldiers by pimps are crimes frequently reported. Arrests are being made and these arrests will have constant attention in the hope of reducing the menaces or arriving at some means by which they can be stopped.

(f) Many cases of civilians lingering in prisons awaiting trial have come to my notice. Some have been waiting since 1939. These cases are all being handled but it seems a slow process and I would represent that in obtain lists of all untried prisoners at a very early date for submission and investigation. Public Safety Officers are being instructed to give this early consideration by collecting the names immediately prisoners are visited.

(g) Black Market - Price control is established but in accordance with local conditions. Provincial Price list does not seem possible. Hidden supplies have been found and are looked for. There are Black Market prices, and I believe any form of control in the forward areas will always be difficult, but enforcement and control of prices will become a possibility as provinces are handed over to Regional Staffs.

(h) Brothels and Prostitutes. Brothels have been closed to the military and all unlicensed places for civilians receive the necessary attention. Prostitutes and pimps found trading in the streets are arrested.

3. Fire Fighting and V.V.B.

(a) Application has been made for mobile fire fighting equipment in accordance with a request for suggestions from A.F.M.O. Mobile equipment to be operated by Italian personnel has in the case of Foggia been found to be a necessity, and it is anticipated will be required in other towns and cities as we advance.

(b) Special teams to deal with unexploded bombs are expected to be attached to armies, and can be called on by A.M.C. Officers.

7 December 43.
Ref. AUC/417/4.

H.P. LOTTIAN,
Major,
Public Safety.

Copies to:- C.S.O. 4/15 Army Group.
AFC 5th Army.
AFC 8th Army.
AIR Region I II (thru 5 Army)
AIR Region 4 Main.
War Diary.
File.

2. Nov. 43.

REPORT ON VISIT TO AMS, 5TH ARMY BY MAJOR LOTHIAN,
2. Nov. 43. 6. Nov. 43.

1. Consulted with Lt. Col. WILSON, Public Safety Officer, who had
a staff of 4 officers, two of whom are earmarked to remain for Region III.

Lt. Col. W. L. WILSON. (A)
Major A. P. WILSON. (B)
Captain EUGENE DELL'ORSO. (A)
Captain A. E. JEFFERSON. (B)
Captain HENRIKSEN. (A)

Major WILSON and Capt. DELL'ORSO have been ordered to remain for
Region III. I consider it important that these two officers be posted to
Public Safety with 15 Army Group. Major WILSON is an experienced Civil
Police Officer and has been under Col. WILSON since the landing in Italy;
likewise Capt. DELL'ORSO who has the additional advantage and value of
speaking Italian fluently. This is a good team and I should be disturbed
if it were broken up. Capt. HENRIKSEN has been loaned but his duties are
to be that of a C. I. O. He is a police officer and could be usefully
employed by Public Safety.

I found a very experienced Police Officer (Indian Police) serving
in an office task at 341,000, viz., Capt. DAMSON. I believe he would be a
valuable addition to the Public Safety team and I should like to see him at
8th Army as Senior Public Safety Officer. I have no knowledge of this
officer's work and have only met him, but I judge him to be suitable and
would be of great assistance.

My visits in RAILWAY were made at the end of my tour. They were
to A. E. H. G. (Adv. Adm. Gen.), where I called on the P. J. A. G.; to the S. C. A. P. O.,
HARLES, Lt. Col. DUNNERY (more of a private call); to the Central Prison and
to the Prison Reformatory. I was disappointed in both these two latter
places and in particular with the two Directors. These places require more
attention and direction.

2. Visits were paid to 5 and 10 Corps, to 45, 34, 3, 46 and 56 Div.
H. Q. At all these H. Q. I met officers who expressed appreciation of the
work already done by AMS but all asked for more officers forward. I
formed an impression that such should be the case and that an AD officer,
certainly Public Safety at least, should be always at Div H. Q. and, with
American Divs. in close contact with the Inspecting General and with
British Divs. in close contact with Field Security, and with a C. I. O. Liaison
Officer with A. A. & G. H. Q.

3. Refugees going South all filtered under direction of Field
Security organizations with the Divs.

(A)
(B)
(A)
Captain WILLIAM DUNN, JR.
Captain A.E. JEFFERSON.
Captain HARRISON.

Major WILSON and Capt. DILLON have been ordered to remain for Region III. I consider it important that these two officers be posted to Public Safety with 15 Army Group. Major WILSON is an experienced Civil Police Officer and has been under Col. WILSON since the landing in Italy; likewise Capt. DILLON who has the additional advantage and value of speaking Italian fluently. This is a good team and I should be disturbed if it were broken up. Capt. HARRISON has been posted but his duties are to be that of a C.A.O. He is a police officer and could be usefully employed by Public Safety.

I found a very experienced Police Officer (Indian Police) serving in an office task at SILENT, viz., Capt. DAWSON. I believe he would be a valuable addition to the Public Safety team and I should like to see him at 15th Army as Senior Public Safety Officer. I have no knowledge of this officer's work and have only met him, but I judge him to be suitable and would be of great assistance.

My visits in NAPLES were made at the end of my tour. They were to A.E.H.O. (adv. adm. sec.), where I called on the S.A.A.C.; to the S.C.A.F.O.; MARINS, Lt. Col. DOWNEY (more of a private call); to the Central Prison and to the Prison Refractory. I was disappointed in both these two latter places and in particular with the two directors. These places require more attention and direction.

2. Visits were paid to 5 and 10 Corps, to 45, 34, 3, 45 and 56 Div. H.Q. At all these H.Q. I met officers who expressed appreciation of the work already done by AMF but all asked for more officers forward. I found an impression that such should be the case and that an AMF officer, certainly Public Safety at least, should be always at Div H.Q., and, with American Divs. in close contact with the Inspecting General and with British Divs. in close contact with Field Security, and with a C.A.O. Liaison Officer with A.A. & G.I.C.

3. Refugees going South all filtered under direction of Field Security organisations with the Divs.

4. I met with no complications regarding arrests of anti-filial political persons, but I did not make extensive enquiries. I believe there are hardships but these can only be ascertained on full enquiry. I do not consider AM Forward will be able to make much of a check but will have to leave this to the core established Regional organization. Instructions will be issued for Public Safety officers of AM to attend to this matter and enquire into important cases, when Public Safety personnel have taken up their appointments.

To Sheet 2...../

-2-

5. A serious problem was met with in the movement of civilians moving forward closely behind the field units, some even as far forward as, and beyond, Brigade H. These people are anxious to get early into their own old villages and towns. To assist I have suggested a rear line, forward of which civilians will not be permitted from the South. C.O.R.R. posts could be established on all or most roads to stop all civilians, until the line is moved forward as judged suitable by S.O.A.O's with armies, when the posts would be established further forward.

The suggested line for the present might be:-

R. VULturno to CAria along river to junction with R. CALORE just north of RIVERVINO and along railway to SAVIGNANO d'AVELLA, thence along R. CERVARO to Gulf of JUVENEDOLA.

6. The appointment of Italians to administrative posts in towns and provinces requires careful vetting before final selection. P.S. and C.I. officers informed me that in several cases appointments had been made by AMG officers of individuals who according to intelligence reports were unsuitable. It was appreciated that changes would be difficult to make if the individuals held office for any length of time after being selected by AMG.

This can, and will be, improved by Public Safety officers checking up with P.S. and C.I. of individuals to be selected for office by C.A.O.s. We require, however, to be supplied with a "black list" from P.S. & C.I. within one week of the capture of the locality.

7. According to C.I. at 5th Army, CAVALLAZZIERI was appointed as Prefect of Naples Province by Marshal MACCHI. He is not a satisfactory person and one, ROSINO, is favoured. ROSINO has the recommendation of Sig. CRONE and Count SPURZA.

8. (a) Complaints were made that the field army continues to treat the C.O.R.R. with contempt and abuse, even putting some in prison. There have been cases too, where junior C.O.R.R. persons have been dismissed and other promoted, no reference being made to any AMG officer.

(b) C.O.R.R. could be more fully employed along the L of C and I am sure if this was started by the Civil Police working alongside the Military Police they must be made to advise, help and encourage, the C.O.R.R., ultimate relief of military personnel would result.

9. The position of C.O.R.R. in NAPLES is doubtful now that units of the Italian Army are resident there. The Military Commander may want to issue orders and administer the C.O.R.R. This would not be suitable to AMG. It is a Region III matter but AMG, 5th Army is concerned as they have not yet divorced personnel of Region III and still operate the two organisations.

10. For the purpose of Public Health and accommodation of troops.

6. The appointment of Italians to administrative posts in towns and provinces requires careful vetting before final selection. P.S. and C.I. officers informed me that in several cases appointments had been made by AMG officers of individuals who according to intelligence reports were unsuitable. It was appreciated that changes would be difficult to make if the individuals held office for any length of time after being selected by AMG.

This can, and will be, improved by Public Safety officers consulting up with P.S. and C.I. of individuals to be selected for office by C.A.Os. We require, however, to be supplied with a "Black List" from P.S. & C.I. within one week of the capture of the locality.

7. According to C.I. at 5th Army, CAVALIERE MARIO was appointed as Prefect of NAPLES Province by Marshal BARCELLO. He is not a satisfactory person and one, ROMINO, is favoured. ROMINO has the recommendation of SIG. GRACE and Count SPANZA.

8. (a) Complaints were made that the Field Army continues to treat the C.C.R.R. with contempt and abuse, even putting some in prison. There have been cases too, where junior C.C.R.R. personnel have been dismissed and other promoted, no reference being made to any AMG officer.

(b) C.C.R.R. could be more fully employed along the L of C and I an area if this was started by the Civil Police working alongside the Military Police who must be made to advise, help and encourage, the C.C.R.R., ultimate relief of military personnel would result.

9. The position of C.C.R.R. in NAPLES is doubtful now that units of the Italian Army are resident there. The Military Commander may want to issue orders and administer the C.C.R.R. This would not be suitable to AMG. It is a Region III matter but AMG, 5th Army is concerned as they have not yet divorced personnel of Region III and still operate the two organisations.

10. For reasons of Public Health and accommodation of troops' billets and hospitals, the Field Army may require to use Reformatories and Prisons. I believe this can be arranged and to the common good, provided the Field Army will supply the necessary transport to evacuate these places. C.A.O's at Corps should be empowered to give their approval at once. They should advise Public Safety officers who would then handle the evacuation to a prison or reformatory further in the rear.

11. Reports on Police, Fire and Prisons are required by Public Safety at AMG HQ, 15 Army Group, giving any particulars of Police Forces available; of fire equipment and personnel; and of location of prisons, capacity, numbers of prisoners, staff employed and state of buildings mainly security. A special report is also necessary giving numbers of persons detained for political reasons and of any special cases.

To Sheet 3...../

2. It is necessary that Public Safety, AMI Adviser, pass to Public Safety of Regions full information on:-

- (a) Prisons and prisoners held.
- (b) All information on persons held in prison for political reasons.
- (c) Records of all civilians holding administrative positions.
- (d) Records of civilian persons used in any capacity by AMI.
- (e) G.C.R.R. posts on L. of C.
- (f) Passes and control of civilians.
- (g) Fire stations and personnel.
- (h) Fire-fighting appliances.

13. Detaining Civilians for Security.

A.P.H.Q. have authorized the use of P.O.E. Camps. This is to the good as they should not be detained in a Civil Prison. Otherwise I would advise that a civil prison be set aside in each Region and if necessary and available, a small prison in each province.

Copy of A.P.H.Q. Adv. Min. Sch. Signal 423 dated 28.0ct.43 attached herewith.

Notes of visits paid attached to original copy.

WPL/JG.

M. P. LATHAM,
Major,
Public Safety Division.

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SECRET

VISIT to 5th ARMY AREA, 2nd to 6th Nov. 43.

Date	Serial No.	Formation	Officers seen.	Location	Map Ref. 1/200,000	Special Remarks
2. Nov. (Tues)	1.	AMH, 5 Army.	Col. Hume. Col. Ashley. Lt. Col. Wilson.	NAPLES.	-	All HQ officers Naples with off. Region 3 and some Region 4.
3. Nov. (Wed).	2.	HQ. 5 Army.	Surgeon Major Spingarn (OTO)	CASERTA.	Sh. 19 - 2874	See Special note
-do-	3.	HQ. 6 Corps.	Surgeon & C.I.C.	BRUNEL.	Sh. 19 - 2997	-do-
-do-	4.	HQ. 45 Div.	Surgeon.	RAVIGLIANO.	Sh. 18 - 1847	-do-
-do-	5.	HQ. 34 Div.	Surgeon.	PRATA.	Sh. 18 - 1515	-do-
-do-	6.	HQ. 109 Pz. Ab.	Officer Comd.	S. ARCEA.	Sh. 18 - 2107	Spend the night.
4. Nov. (Thurs).	7.	HQ. 3 Div.	Ins. Gen. of Div.	TAVERNANOVA.	Sh. 19 - 1099	Need for more officers.
-do-	8.	Hospital.	Surgeon - 3 Div.	PEZZE.	Sh. 19 - 0995	
-do-	9.	HQ. 10 Corps.	Col. G.O. and Col. Ogilthorpe.	SPARBISE.	Sh. 19 - 0887	See Special Note
-do-	10.	HQ. 45 Div.	A.D.M.S. A.A.O.R.O.	FRANCOLINE.	Sh. 19 - 0586	
-do-	11.	AMH & HQ 46 Div.	Capt. Anderson, P.C. Capt. Jacobson, RMC.	SANTERAMO.	Sh. 19 - 0201	
-do-	12.	HQ. 56 Div.	D.A.D.M.S. G.S.I.	TRANO.	Sh. 19 - 0693	Need for more officers forward
-do-	13.	Rear B. 10 Corps.	D.A.D.M.S. Col. Ogilthorpe.	S. MARIA.	Sh. 19 - 2175	See notes. D.D. raised 2 points Public Safety.
-do-	14.	AMH 5 Army.	Col. Hume & others.	NAPLES.		Spend Night.

Contd.../

SECRETVISIT to 5th ARMY AREA, 2nd to 6th Nov. 43.

Serial No.	Formation.	Officers seen.	Location.	Map Ref.	Special Remarks.
1.	ASL, 5 Army.	Col. Hume. Col. Ashley. Lt. Col. Wilson.	NAPLES.	1/200,000	All HQ officers at Naples with officers Region 3 and some Region 4.
2.	HQ. 5 Army.	Surgeon Major Spingarn (CIC)	CASERTA.	Sh. 12 - 2874	See Special notes.
3.	HQ. 5 Corps.	Surgeon & M.I.C.	DEGGIO.	Sh. 12 - 2597	--do--
4.	HQ. 45 Div.	Surgeon.	RAVASCANTIA.	Sh. 12 - 1907	--do--
5.	HQ. 34 Div.	Surgeon.	PISTA.	Sh. 12 - 1515	--do--
6.	Pl. 109 Pl. Amb.	Officer Comdg.	S. ANGELO.	Sh. 12 - 2107	Spent the night.
7.	HQ. 3 Div.	Ins. Gen. of Div.	TESSANOTICOLA.	Sh. 12 - 1099	Need for more AMB officers.
8.	Hospital.	Surgeon - 3 Div.	PERITO.	Sh. 12 - 0995	
9.	H. 10 Corps.	CST. CGO. and Col. Ogilthorpe.	SPANNING.	Sh. 12 - 0857	See Special Notes.
10.	H. 46 Div.	A.D.M.S. A.A.M.S.	FRANCOLISE.	Sh. 12 - 0506	
11.	ASL & RS 46 Div.	Capt. Salscent, P.S. Capt. Jacobson, AMB.	BARONIA.	Sh. 12 - 0281	
12.	HQ. 96 Div.	D.A.B.M.S. G.S.I.	TRANO.	Sh. 12 - 0593	Need for more AMB officers forward.
13.	Rear Hq. 10 Corps.	D.B.M.S. Col. Ogilthorpe.	S. MARYA.	Sh. 12 - 2175	See notes. D.B.M.S. raised 2 points for Public Safety.
14.	ASL 5 Army.	Col. Hume & others.	NAPLES.		Spend Night.

Contd.../

Sheet -2-

SECRET.

Date	Serial No.	Formation	Officers nom.	Location	Map ref. 1/20,000	Special Re
5. Nov (Fri).	15.	Adv. Mtn. Battalion A.P.H.Q.	Surgeon. D.A.H.Q.	HA-ONE.		
	16.	7A/ADV.	Surgeon 7 & Adv.			
	17.	ADV. 5 ADV.	Public Safety - Lt. Col. Wilson. Col. Ashley.	HAFOUR.		
6. Nov. (Sat).	18.	ADV. 5 ADV.				Returned MARI.

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Sheet -2-

SECRET.

Date	Serial No.	Position.	Officers seen.	Location.	Exp. Ref. 1/300,000	Special Remarks.
Nov (Fri).	15.	Adv. Ass. Colonel A.F.H.Q.	Burgess. D.A.H.Q.	HAROLD.		
Dec	16.	74/Div.	Burgess 7 A/Div.			
Jan	17.	HQ, 5 Army.	Public Safety - Lt. Col. Wilson. Col. Asaley.	HAROLD.		
Mar. (Sat).	18.	HQ, 5 Army.				Returned to HARL.

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12

Spent 4517

Report on visit by Major Lothian - Public Safety - AGUILA PROVINCE
Region IV. - 2 - 6 Dec 62

1. I spent the time at AGUILA with Lt. Col. C. BARRON S.C.A.F.O. and carried out some inspections submitting reports on prisons direct to him. Colonel Barron has been alone up to a few days ago when 2 officers joined his staff. These officers are only on loan from another Province, and neither have experience nor been trained in Public Safety affairs. There are C.A.F.O.s at the bases of AGUILA, LUZENA, MANABANDA, S. SEVERO and OERIGNOLE. One experienced junior officer is recommended as assistant to S.C.A.F.O. Instead of the 2 officers at present with him.

2. CIVIL POLICE

(a) The Carabinieri in the province have co-operated well and duties have been efficiently carried out. Other Civil Police forces have performed their duties calling for no comment.

(b) At Foggia there is a C.C. force of 130 all ranks and at Lucrea a force of 40. The total in the province is 600. I visited the barracks at Foggia, Lucrea and Oerignole.

(c) At Lucrea I found a Brigadiere had come in from CARABINIERI to report difficulty in accommodation there. The place normally has a population of 3,000, now there are 50 many troops it is much overcrowded. The C.C. were ordered to hand over their barracks, required for troops. I instructed the Brigadiere to report to C.A.F.O. LUZENA and reported to S.C.A.F.O. who agrees that the barracks should not be handed over. He is attending to the matter.

(d) Co-operation between Civil Police and Allied Forces good throughout the province.

3. PRISONS

(a) There are some 30 prisons in the province. The main ones are at LUZENA, and S. SEVERO. The prison at AGUILA does not now exist - a little casualty.

(b) I carried out inspection of these two prisons and also a local prison at OERIGNOLE. Reports have been submitted to S.C.A.F.O. Province.

The prison at LUZENA is large and well built. It is in satisfactory order, but requires some further supervision. The Director and staff are satisfactory.

The prison at S. SEVERO is not in good order. Administration poor and the place is very dirty with prisoners idling and slovenly. The Director is the local Prefect who attends only if convenient, and I gained the impression that the Commandant was not entirely to blame for a poor show. He requires to be given a greater hand and under direct supervision of AGI. Medical attention is lacking.

The prison at OERIGNOLE is a poor place but is a MACDONALD and is suitable only for confinement of prisoners awaiting trial. It is badly looked after, dirty and overcrowded.

4725

(a) The administration in the province were co-ordinated well and duties have been efficiently carried out. Other Civil Police forces have performed their duties calling for no comment.

(b) At Poggia there is a CO. EN force of 130 all ranks and at Lucera a force of 40. The total in the province is 65. I visited the barracks at Poggia, Lucera and Cerignola.

(c) At Lucera I found a Brigantiemented camp in from CASTELNUOVO to report difficulty in accommodation there. The place normally has a population of 3,000, now there are 50 army troops it is much overcrowded. The CO. EN were ordered to hand over their barracks, required for troops. I instructed the Brigantiement to report to G.A.P.O. Lucera and reported to G.A.P.O. who agrees that the barracks should not be handed over. He is attending to the matter.

(d) Co-operation between Civil Police and Allied Forces good throughout the province.

3. PRISONS.

(a) There are some 30 prisons in the province. The main ones are at Lucera, and Cerignola. The prison at Poggia does not now exist as a Mobile Company.

(b) I carried out inspection of these two prisons and also a local prison at 725 Cerignola. Reports have been submitted to G.A.P.O. Province.

The prison at Lucera is large and well built. It is in satisfactory order, but requires more further supervision. The Director and staff are satisfactory.

The prison at Cerignola is not in good order. Administration poor and the place is very dirty with prisoners idling and slovenly. The Director is the local respect who attends only if convenient, and I gained the impression that the Commandant was not entirely to blame for a poor show. He requires to be given a freer hand and wider direct supervision of all. Medical attention is lacking.

The prison at Castelluccio is a poor place but is a NUTRIMENTAL and is suitable only for confinement of prisoners awaiting trial. It is badly looked after, dirty and overcrowded.

(c) The number of places of confinement in the province is excessive. G.A.P.O. will consider closing some as soon as convenient. He is also considering the appointment of Dr. ALBERTO VITO - Director of Lucera Prison as Provincial Prison Director. This would help supervision and control, and is desirable.

(d) Industries require to be introduced into prisons, but this is found everywhere. I believe the best plan is to tackle prison industries provincially, and later co-ordinate on a regional plan.

4. POLITICAL PRISONERS.

Interference.

(a) Persons arrested by P.S. as suspects are still being confined in Civil Prisons. This is understandable in cases suggested by P.S. up to Division in the Technical Force, but they should not be detained in such a prison for more.

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more than a few days. I found one case at CHICHULA confined by back security and also orders for confinement signed by a sergeant.

(b) It would also appear that cases put into prison by P.S. have to be referred to the town.

(c) I attach - Appendix "A" - communication regarding release of one SOMMERHART. It is suggested that he should not have been confined in a Civil Prison. Likewise Appendix "B", case of 4 men arrested by CO. 88 and handed over to P.S. during October on charges of co-operating with the enemy.

(d) There were 7 Political Prisoners detained at LUCHE, Appendix "C", none at S. 88, and 10 at CHICHULA. Particulars of those at CHICHULA at Appendix "D". No record or order was given to the prison for confinement.

5. CONTROL OF CIVILIANS. Passes.

(a) Control into the Province is established. The instructions from ANG to with pass forms etc., is omitted.

(b) Trading goes on however from 5 Army area into PASA by civilians being escorted by soldiers entering in vicinity of SAVIEN. The movement is along the KARIS- PUELA Road. Orders have been issued for CO. 88 and Allied Military posts at Railway and Road crossings.

(c) S.O.A.P.O. also required movement by road from PASA to be controlled and this has been put in hand by the CO. 88 Commander at PASA. I interviewed this Officer on 4 December and made suitable arrangements which I shall report verbally to CO. 88 No. 1 Logistic Co. at PASA.

6. COFFE.

So much depends on means of conveyance that the lack of vehicles hinders the administration. Officers have difficulty in getting around. On a particular day I saw Colonel Briggs, S.O.A.P.O. going off to attend a meeting at 8.30 Army in a motor car. The CO. 88 have been able to produce Motor-Cycles and act as L.A.S. between towns. There are now in operation about 12 cycles and a good system has been laid down by Major ACHAMET - Gen and Supplies.

7. RAID & RINGS.

(a) Raids have been made by S.O.A.P.O. with good results. Raiding forces consist of 1 Officer, CO. 88 personnel and Allied Military or S.A.P. Police.

5. CONTROL OF CIVILIANS.

- (a) Control into the Province is established. The instructions from AMG HQ with pass forms etc., is sent.
- (b) Trading goes on however from 5 AM to 10 PM by civilians being escorted by soldiers entering in vicinity of AMSTERDAM. The movement is along the MARLBOROUGH ROAD. Orders have been issued for CO. III and Allied Military ports at Railway and Road crossings.
- (c) D.O.A.P.O. also required movement by road from AMSTERDAM to be controlled and this has been put in hand by the CO. III Commander at AMSTERDAM. I interviewed this Officer on 4 December and made suitable arrangements which I shall report verbally to CO. III No. 2 Legion HQ at AMI.

6. CHINE.

To much depends on means of conveyance that the lack of vehicles hinders the administration. Officers have difficulty in getting around. On a particular day I saw Colonel Briggs, S.O.A.P.O. going off to attend a meeting at R. 8 Army in a motor car. The CO. III have been able to produce motor-cycles and not as much between towns. There are now in operation about 12 cycles and a good system has been laid down by Major AGNEW - Gen and Supplies.

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7. RACE & RIOTS.

- (a) Riots have been made by S.O.A.P.O. with good results. Sending forces consist of 1 officer, CO. III personnel and Allied Military or R.A.P. Police.
- (b) Supplies are satisfactory. Riots are not anticipated.
- (c) There is no price control at present but one is being established. A fixed price for supplies cannot be made for the Province, as prices vary in districts and towns. Prices have therefore to be settled locally.

8. ARRESTS, CAPTURES AND SLAVERY.

This is a case of an Italian and a Yugo Slav arrested for forging an AMG Officer's signature and of regulation in his name. Sachs was arrested in possession of British uniform and a web belt (No. A27035), no badge in cap. He was in an internment camp in 1941 and released 1942. Both men are now very comfortably housed in the prison at S. SEVERO.

9. LOITERING.

No serious trouble from loitering, but there has been considerable by the Italians. There is actual proof in possession of the S.O.A.C. and arrests have been made.

10. PROSTITUTION & V.D.

Prostitution

(a) *Prostitution* have been closed and are watched by Allied Military Police and Civil Police. Patrols arrest any women found wandering the streets for prostitution.

(b) A case of interest was that of a woman sent for inspection by an Italian doctor, who was reported clear of disease, but when examined by a R.A.M.C. Officer was reported to be suffering from V.D.

11. WIRE FENCING.

There is now a fine fighting force and some equipment for the Province. The force consists of 60 men. It is centralized in PUGLIA town with a detachment at MONTESANTO. Considered satisfactory but too thin on the ground for a full Provincial force.

12. CHIEF OF BARRACKS.

All civilians employed by AM are checked in regards suitability for employment on security grounds. Copy of form introduced in STORIA and in use at AM, 15 Army Group has been supplied. The present system in the Province is highly satisfactory.

13. CIVIL SERVICES.

There are no adverse reports on the Civil Police, Prison Service nor Fire Service. The universal need is an increase of salaries and wages, and the crying need for uniforms and boots.

14. TRAINING.

(a) Behaviour satisfactory and there is good relationship between Italian Authorities and Allies.

(b) There is one serious case of rape, which unfortunately means entirely

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11. FIRE EQUIPMENT.

There is now a fire fighting force and some equipment for the Province. The force consists of 60 men. It is centralized in BOCCA town with a detachment at BENEVENTO. Considered satisfactory but too thin on the ground for a full Provincial force.

12. POLICE OR BARRACADES.

All civilians employed by AG are checked as regards suitability for employment on security grounds. Copy of force introduced in SICILY and in use at AG, 15 Army Group has been supplied. The present system in the Province is highly satisfactory.

13. CIVIL ADVISERS.

There are no adverse reports on the civil police, Prison Services nor Fire Service. The universal need is an increase of salaries and wages, and the crying need for uniform and boots.

14. TROOPS.

(a) Behaviour satisfactory and there is good relationship between Italian authorities and Allies.

(b) There is one serious case of rape, which unfortunately seems unlikely to be brought to trial owing to lack of identification.

The case concerns an Italian woman with a young child, who were given a lift in a vehicle by three coloured African soldiers. All three soldiers are supposed to have had the woman by force.

Provincial AG. Reports to move to TRENTO MARITIME, about 4 miles west of BENEVENTO very soon. This should be a great improvement as BOCCA is now very crowded.

9 Dec 43.

For: O.S.O. AG 15 Army Group,
Copy to: Region 4 (Main)
S.C.O.O. BOCCA.

Major,
Public Safety,
AG 15, 15 Army Group.

W. K. T. T.

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Notes on inspection visit to Naples, Italy, I and IV by Lt. Col. Martin.

Confidential

4 to 8 Dec 44

Mr. AMB
Public Safety
Division.

Discussed proposed administrative instruction re civilian Intomese with Col. Pitt who agreed with basic proposals. (copies of draft already sent to C.S.C., F.I.O., AMB 15 A.Gp. and Lt. Col. Gibson, GSI(b) 15 A.Gp. file AMB/411).

AMBs have proposed special identity card for Italian officials. B. AMB have drafted a suitable card and was asked to agree this on behalf of AMB 15 Army Group. Agreed the draft but doubted the necessity for it as Italian Civilian Identity cards should suffice south of the Army Control Line. North of that line the special pass would still be necessary.

Fire equipment. (File AMB/438) AMB 15 A.Gp. have asked AMB 15 A.Gp. and H. AMB GHP for minimum requirements of fire equipment. H. AMB, GHP, have already prepared data by cities for whole of Italy. Discussed those affecting Regions III and IV and Fifth and Eighth Army Areas and agreed that H. AMB should submit comprehensive estimate for whole country in two sections, viz:- Priority I King's Italy and that portion occupied by Allies.

Priority II Remainder

of Italy, i.e. portion in heavy occupation.

H. AMB will state that their estimate is made by agreement with us and will send us a copy.

Registration of Vehicles. (File AMB/439) Discussed steps to be taken by both AMB in to ensure uniform procedure in regions. AMB Adv. Adm. Ech. Instruction No. 12 of 1 Dec 43 quite inadequate for registration of vehicles. Saw Major Todd, AMB and Mr. West of Pet. Section, FLAMP. Agreed necessity for some orders imposing penalties relating to supply of petrol. Discussed proposals with R.C. 42.88 Section and Supply officers Regions III and IV. Following decisions resolved:-

(a) H. AMB will submit draft amendments to FLAMP Adv. Instruction No. 12 to FLAMP. Points to be covered agreed with H. AMB.

(b) Both AMB will issue or arrange for issue of Orders codifying offences relating to registration of motor vehicles and issue of petrol. G.I.O. to decide on whether Order issued by H. AMB, R.C.A.Os or S.C.A.Os of provinces.

(c) Both AMB will issue Adv. Instructions to accompany the Orders issued under (b).

So far as petrol is concerned, rationing must be on a monthly basis as in FLAMP Adv. Instruction No. 12 but registration of vehicles will be on a monthly basis, periods ending 30 Apr, 31 Aug and 31 Dec. In order not to interfere with plans already made by FLAMP as to petrol rationing, the first issue of vehicle permits

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South of the Army Control Line. North of that line the special pass would still be necessary.

Fire equipment. (File AM/138) MS AMG have asked AMG 15 AGs, and H. AG for minimum requirements of Fire Equipment. H. AG, AMG, have already prepared data by cities for whole of Italy. Discussed these affecting Regions III and IV and Fifth and Eighth Army Areas and agreed that H. AG should submit comprehensive estimate for whole country in two sections, viz: - Priority I King's Italy and that portion occupied by Allies.

Priority II Remainder

of Italy, i.e. portion in enemy occupation.

H. AG will state that their estimate is made by agreement with us and will send us a copy.

Registration of Vehicles. (File AM/433) Discussed steps to be taken by both AMG H. to ensure uniform procedure in regions. AMG Adv. AGs. AGs. Instruction No. 12 of 1 Dec 43 quide instructions for registration of vehicles. Saw Major Todd, MS and Mr. West of 1st Section, FLAMCO. Agreed necessity for some orders imposing penalties relating to supply of petrol. Discussed proposals with H. AGs. On Region and Supply officers Regions III and IV. Following decisions reached :-

(a) H. AG will submit draft amendments to FLAMCO Adv. Instruction No. 12 to FLAMCO. Points to be covered agreed with H. AGs.

1722

(b) Both AMG H. will issue or arrange for issue of Orders codifying offences relating to registration of motor vehicles and issue of petrol. G.A.G. to decide on whether Order issued by H. AGs, N.G.A.Gs or G.A.Gs of provinces.

(c) Both AMG will issue Adv. Instructions to accompany the Orders issued under (b).

So far as petrol is concerned, rationing must be on a monthly basis as in FLAMCO Adv. Instruction No. 12 but registration of vehicles will be on 4 weekly basis, periods ending 30 Apr, 31 Aug and 31 Dec. In order not to interfere with plans already made by FLAMCO as to which instructions have been issued, the first issue of vehicle permits will cover February only, whilst the second will be for the two months ending 30 Apr.

Region III.

Saw Lt. Col. Frago who had no special problems requiring assistance. Position of N.G.A.G. temporarily notified by posting of Lt. Col. Francis (M). Lt. Col. Warner (A) who arrived from FLAMCO with Lt. Col. Francis posted as G.A.G. Region City. Lt. Col. Doherty (B) has been acting in latter capacity, was on sick list but I understood it was intended to make him deputy to Lt. Col. Francis. This may lead to his returning as Lt. Col. Doherty's appointment in Civil Life was Asst. Chief Constable of Glasgow whereas Lt. Col. Francis was a Chief Inspector in the Metropolitan Police. The latter, however, is senior in military rank. All this, as well as similar attention in Region IV and elsewhere, points to necessity of co-ordination of senior Public Safety appointments by this H. I submit that those appointments should not be made by H. or the British Administrative Headquarters at FLAMCO.

...Saw Lt. Col.

- 2 -

Saw Lt. Col. Prud'homme and discussed with him monthly reports, arrest forms, new procedure for civilian informants and improved on his necessity for personnel contact in the field between his staff and provincial officers. He will forward a list of all C.A.F.O.s in the region, their civil experience and their present employment.

The divorce of the Fifth Army from Region III not yet accomplished.

Lt. Col. Prud'homme has no officer at his disposal qualified to cover Special Police work, i.e. political, industrial and subversive activities and general liaison with Security Service. There should be one such officer in each region and Major A. May, late Metropolitan Police, who is believed to be still at PINE OILS is suggested for Region III.

If additional Carabinieri are required for duty in Naples City in connection with the typhus epidemic they can be found from existing personnel.

The prison situation is adversely affected by the occupation of prisons, restaurants, etc., by troops as quarters. Details will be included in the monthly report for December. The operation of prisons is rendered difficult by the indiscriminate "requisitioning" by troops of furniture, utensils, etc., which is not recognized by hirings, and is, in effect, looting. Details of cases in point will be included in the monthly report.

C.O.P.E. and Police agencies are receiving a special scale of rations and it is intended to apply this scale to prison staffs also.

AND Fifth Army.

Saw Colonel Howe and Colonel Ashby. Major Chambers a Police officer of considerable experience and seniority has been employed hitherto as an Administrative Officer under Col. Ashby. He is anxious to perform C.A.F.O. duties and has been nominated for the home town. In view of his relative seniority and service he is reluctant to serve in subordinate capacity. As no final appointment as C.A.F.O. with the Fifth Army has been made, I advised appointment of Major Chambers. Major Wilcox, a capable officer, but much younger and less experienced, was suitable in my opinion for provincial or liaison job in forward area. Col. Ashby understood Wilcox had offer of another appointment in rank of Lt. Colonel as to which Col. Howe was to see Col. Long (APO) on 8 Jan. Before making my recommendation to Major Chambers, whom I had not met before, I had a talk with him about his position.

Before I saw Colonel Howe and Ashby I had a talk with Major Wilcox who was under no delusion as to the necessity for the AND Fifth Army C.A.F.O. being much further forward.

activities and general liaison with Security Service. There would be one such officer in each region and Major A. May, late Metropolitan Police, who is believed to be still at Tizi Ouzou is suggested for Region III.

If additional Carabinieri are required for duty in Naples City in connection with the typhus epidemic they can be found from existing personnel.

The prison situation is adversely affected by the occupation of prisons, reformatories, etc., by troops as quarters. Details will be included in the monthly report for December. The operation of prisons is rendered difficult by the indiscriminate "requisitioning" by troops of furniture, utensils, etc., which is not recognized by Mirage, and is, in effect, looting. Details of cases in point will be included in the monthly report.

CO. 42 and police agencies are receiving a special scale of rations and it is intended to apply this scale to prison staffs also.

AND FIFTH ARMY.

Saw Colonel Bess and Colonel Ashley. Major Chambers a police officer of considerable experience and seniority has been employed hitherto as an Administrative Officer under Col. Ashley. He is anxious to perform C.O.D.O. duties and has been nominated for the Bess team. In view of his relative seniority and service he is reluctant to serve in subordinate capacity. As no final appointment as S.O.A.S.O. with the Fifth Army has been made, I advised appointment of Major Chambers. Major Wilcox, a capable officer, but much younger and less experienced, more suitable in my opinion for provincial or liaison job in forward area. Col. Ashley understood Wilcox had offer of another appointment in rank of Lt. Colonel as to which Col. Bess was to see Col. Young (JAG) on 8 Jan. Before making my recommendation to Major Chambers, whom I had not met before, I had a talk with him about his position.

Before I saw Colonel Bess and Ashley I had a talk with Major Wilcox who was under no delusion as to the necessity for the AND Fifth Army C.O.D.O. being made further forward.

Region IV.

Saw Colonel Marshall, Chief of Staff to R.O.A.S.O. who was away. Col. Morgan (A) S.O.A.S.O. had been ordered home and they were in some difficulty as to his successor. Lt. Col. Millhouse, who was Chief Constable of Sassari, a small force of 45 men, was acting S.O.A.S.O. and I was asked for my advice. I recommended Lt. Col. Briggs who was Superintendent of a division in London with 1,000 men under him as more suitable both by reason of his experience and also as being senior in military rank to Millhouse.

Later saw Brigadier Carr, S.O.A.S.O. who was exercised about Millhouse's position on the home front, he being senior, in rank at any rate, to Lt. Col. Collock. Brig. Carr was also perturbed at the posting to Region IV of Lt. Col. Lynch Blose who had given a great deal of trouble in the planning stage at Tizi Ouzou. Brig. Carr was in doubt as to what to do with Lynch Blose. I told him that I understood that Lynch Blose was being posted as a C.O.D.O. but that did not simplify matters as there is a large number of Lt. Colonels posted to

....Region IV.....

Region IV and awaiting assignment.

Lt. Col. Millhouse had no particular difficulties regarding assistance and I discussed the same subjects with him as with Lt. Col. Francis, Region III.

CO. RR.

Saw Major General Semino, Commanding the Naples Division. Having worked in close touch with him in Sicily I feel that his appointment should facilitate harmonious relations between the CO. RR and S.C.A.F.Os. Gen. Semino was glad of an explanation of the relative responsibilities of AMJ 15 A. Sp. AMJ CIG, and AGI.

AVAILING.

S.C.A.F.O. Major Hall (A) has only occupied post since 27 Dec. S.C.A.F.O. Capt. Goodacre (B) assisted by Lieut. Foster (B). When I arrived S.C.A.F.O. was concluding a conference with Questors and Police Officials. Commander of CO. RR Group appointed by previous S.C.A.F.O. had proved unsatisfactory and S.C.A.F.O. had dismissed him. Uncertain whether his appointment had been confirmed by Naples. Pointed out to S.C.A.F.O. that appointments and removals of CO. RR officers must be carried out through CO. RR own officials. S.C.A.F.O. has also removed Questors. CO. RR ineffective but Agents di P.S. doing good work. Food supply is key to general situation. Only 2 - 3 days supply available. Plack market prevalent. 70% being carried in military vehicles sometimes unwittingly but cases found where troops taking active part in black market.

A good deal of trouble with troops (Quadian) - a reinforcement unit. New form of arrest slip introduced by region to cover all admissions to prisons. Military police either unwilling or unable to complete forms properly, consequently much extra trouble for S.C.A.F.Os in preparing cases for courts. Treatment of CO. RR by troops most unsatisfactory. Barracks occupied and CO. RR exposed to indignities. Advised contact with A.F.M. which is being done but with little effect.

No S.C.A.F.Os outside provincial capital, 700 bridges blown and transport available is entirely inadequate.

Suppression of V.D. presents difficulties. S.C.A.F.O. issued order making it an offence to impart V.D. to members of Allied Forces. Under declared ultra vice by region but removal of notices left to weather. Informed S.C.A.F.O. that our S.C.A.F.O. is considering some similar order.

ARMYMENT.

S.C.A.F.O. Major Armstrong (B) previously S.C.A.F.O. 1721
class Police Officer. 150 bridges blown in province. All S.C.A.F.Os concentrated at provincial Hq. Major Stephens (B) S.C.A.F.O. Very short of transport. No other large town in province. CO. RR doing their best but morale badly affected by treatment at hand of troops. Prisoners released by troops and CO. RRs arm taken off them. Barracks requisitioned by army. Shortage of CO. RR. Agents di P.S. inferior to CO. RR but capable of doing a good job with allied support. Prison in bad state. Grants made by agents but forceful measures necessary

arrived S.C.A.O. was concluding a conference with Quaters and Police officials. Commander of CC.MR Group appointed by previous S.C.A.O. had proved unsatisfactory and S.C.A.O. had dismissed him. Uncertain whether his appointment had been confirmed by Naples. Pointed out to S.C.A.O. that appointments and removals of CC.MR Officers must be carried out through CC.MR own officials. S.C.A.O. has also removed Quaters. CC.MR ineffective but Agenti di P.S. doing good work. Food supply is key to general situation. Only 2-3 days supply available. Black Market prevalent. 70% being carried in military vehicles sometimes unwittingly but cases found where troops taking active part in black market.

A good deal of trouble with troops (Canadian) - a reinforcement unit. New form of arrest slip introduced by region to cover all admissions to prisons. Military Police either unwilling or unable to complete forms properly, consequently much extra trouble for S.C.A.O.s in preparing cases for courts. Treatment of CC.MR by troops most unsatisfactory. Barracks occupied and CC.MR exposed to indignities. Advised contact with A.P.M. which is being done but with little effect.

No S.C.A.O.s outside provincial capital, 700 bridges blown and transport available is entirely inadequate.

Suppression of V.B. presents difficulties. S.C.A.O. issued Order making it an offence to impart V.B. to members of Allied Forces. Order declared ultra vires by region but removal of notices left to weather. Informed S.C.A.O. that our S.C.A.O. is considering some similar order.

PARAVANTO.

S.C.A.O. Major Armstrong (N) previously S.C.A.O. 1721
class Police Officer. 150 bridges blown in province. All S.C.A.O.s concentrated at provincial Hq. Major Stephens (N) S.C.A.O. Very short of transport. No other large town in province. CC.MR doing their best but morale badly affected by treatment at hand of troops. Prisoners released by troops and CC.MR are taken off there. Barriers requisitioned by army. Shortage of my/CCA. Agenti di P.S. inferior to CC.MR but capable of doing a good job with allied support. Prices in bad state. Grants made by Quaters but forceful measures necessary to get action.

S.C.A.O. overworked and understaffed. Complained of obsession of region by Naples complex resulting in lack of appreciation of province's problems. Visits of regional division heads a rarity.

Black Market assisted by military who are far too free in giving lifts to civilians; unable to question civilians as to their loads or difficult for CC.MR to carry out effective check.

*****NOMIA*****

WCHIA.

3.C.5.3. out and 3.C.5.4.1.0. engaged on General Military Court.
Group Captain RAF has sent 3.C.5.4.0. glowing appreciation of work of
Italian Five Brigade in tackling and putting out fire in crashed
Wellington bomber on 30 Dec. Can result Five Brigade getting adequate
supplies of petrol and great impetus to their morale. On this
occasion Italian Brigade arrived and were in action long before
Service Brigade.

9 Jan 44.

W. J. J. J.
Lt. Colonel,
Chief Public Safety.

SUBJECT: - Venereal Diseases.

CONFIDENTIAL.

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMC/531/1

5th December 1942

A.M.G. Fifth Army (10)
A.M.G. Eighth Army (10)
A.M.G. Region III (10)
A.M.G. Region IV (10)

1. At a recent conference on Venereal Diseases in the Armies held at Naples and attended by the D.D.H., A.F.H.Q., - the advisor on V.D., A.F.H.Q., A.D.H. Adv. Adm. Echelon I.F.H.Q., and the Director of Public Health A.M.G. 15 Army Group, the possibility of further cooperation between the Armies and A.M.G. was discussed.

2. The problem of V.D. in Naples and other large cities is becoming a very serious one and unless checked by every means possible is likely to increase. The present ratio per 1000 calculated on recent weekly figures is alarming.

3. While it will be essentially the concern of the Army to take every action possible in the way of discipline, education, inspection of men, establishment of P.H.Q. and Prophylactic Centres, control of the treatment in forward areas, propaganda of various sorts, there are certain important features in an anti-venereal campaign which are essentially matters for the civil authorities and so A.M.G.

4. Naples has an evil reputation as a port with a high incidence of V.D. Moral opportunities exist but it is felt that the amount of touting for custom which is now obvious all over the town calls for action by the police and later by the Legal Division. It is considered that an anti-'pimp' campaign should be launched and that penalties should be severe, and the widest publicity should be given to convictions.

5. There is evidence that many infections come from the unauthorised or unlicensed 'House' and irregular, including 'door step' prostitution while, on the other hand, the regular house, in which inspection of men and E.M.G. have been instituted by Army authorities, do not appear to be coming out so badly and provide some, though obviously not full protection.

6. Police should be instructed to check up on the Italian medical inspection of the inmates of the houses. While it is impossible to place much faith on these medical inspections, they do appear statistically to diminish the incidence of infection, especially gross infection. They certainly are of great help in dealing with louse and scabies disinfection and the louse position is important with the arrival of typhus.

7. During my visit I saw many cases of soldiers having bottles of disinfectant in their hands in broad daylight by these harpies or their

1720

held at various times and places. Echelon A.F.H.Q., and the on V.D. A.F.H.Q., A.D.A. Adm. Echelon A.F.H.Q., and the Director of Public Health A.D.A. 15 Army Group, the possibility of further cooperation between the Amides and A.M.G. was discussed.

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3. While it will be essentially the concern of the Army to take every action possible in the way of discipline, education, inspection of men, establishment of P.M.O. and Prophylactic Centres, control of the treatment in forward areas, propaganda of various sorts, there are certain important features in an anti-venereal campaign which are essentially matters for the civil authorities and so A.M.G.

4. Naples has an evil reputation as a Port with a high incidence of V.D. Normal opportunities exist but it is felt that the amount of touting for custom which is now obvious all over the town calls for action by the police and later by the Legal Division. It is considered that an anti-'pimp' campaign should be launched and that penalties should be severe, and the widest publicity should be given to convictions.

5. There is evidence that many infections come from the unauthorised or unlicensed "house" and irregular, including "door step" prostitution while, on the other hand, the regular house, in which inspection of men and P.M.O. have been instituted by Army authorities, do not appear to be coming out so badly and provide some, though obviously not full protection.

1720

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They certainly are of great help in dealing with louse and scabies infestation and the louse position is important with the arrival of typhus.

7. During my visit I saw many cases of soldiers having bottles of wine thrust into their hands in broad daylight by these harpies or their agents. It is felt that the "sale" or the "gift" of wine in bottles on the streets or even in shops might well be prohibited.

8. The question of control of cases of V.D. in the civil population require investigation by the Public Health Division of A.M.G., with special regard to the early re-establishment of V.D. clinics as necessary. I should like a report on this in a month's time. So far as is known there is no scarcity of suitable drugs for the treatment of these diseases.

9. It will be appreciated if these points can receive your consideration and cooperation to effect the desired improvement.

D. GORDON CHILME,
Colonel,
Director of Public Health.

100/SCH

Copy to:

A.M.G. Palermo (6) DMS 8 Army (8) Surgeon 5 Army (8)
DMS Adv Adm Ech A.M.G. (4) Legal Div (8) Public Safety Div (8)
DMS No. 2 District (4)

SUBJECT:-- Veneral Disease.SECRET.
(Equals BRITISH MOST SECRET)H.Q., A.M.C.,
15 Army Group,
G.M.P.A.M.C., British Army (10)
A.M.C., British Army (10)
A.M.C., Region III (10)
A.M.C., Region IV (10)

AMC/511/11

15th December 43

Further to this R.O. memo AMC/511/1 dated 5th December 43, copies of correspondence received from A.M.C. on Veneral Diseases, which further stresses the importance of taking immediate action to check V.D., are given herewith for information, and necessary action.

Report made by Lt
D. GORDON CHEANE,
Colonel,
Director of Public Health.

DGC/SOF

Copy to: A.C.C. Palermo (6)
IGMS Adv Adm 2nd AFM (4) (8)
DEMS No. 2 District (4) (8)
DEMS 6 Army (5) (8)

CCTI

U.S. MOST EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section
JCH/RS/JSR

8 December 1943

MES - 720

SUBJECT:-- Veneral Disease

TO: H.Q. A.M.C. 15 Army Group
H.Q. A.M.C., G.M.P.

The attached report reference V. 56/24/1 of 6 December on the incidence of Veneral Diseases is forwarded. Will you please make a report to this Section in duplicate as to what steps have been taken to prevent the spread of this disease.

Energetic steps will be taken in accordance with para 4 of the attached report.

1719

- 2 -

2. This is due to:-

- (a) The presence and availability of large numbers of infected women in brothels and on the streets.
- (b) The abundance of wine.
- (c) Inadequate welfare facilities.
- (d) Discomfort of life in quarters.

AMERICAN TROOPS.

<u>Formation.</u>	<u>V.D. Rate/1000/annum.</u>
A.S.S.	104.13
M.D.E.	12.06
E.R.S.	16.98
Hq Command Am	61.09
Fifth Army	63.66
Seventh Army	56.79
12th Air Force	65.57
P.S.S.	145.79
I.S.S.	297.05
C.D. MSB	212.40
TOTAL	90.61

NOTE:- These rates are based on incomplete returns.

BRITISH TROOPS.

<u>Formation.</u>	<u>V.D. Rate/1000/annum.</u>
Eighth Army	24.0
10 Corps	108.9
2 District Total	104.2
Barletta Area	135.9
Total ITALY	51.2
1 District North Africa	76.7
TOTAL FORCE	28.2
	47.7

NOTE:- These figures are not in any sense comparable owing to the presence of many factors which are not common to both armies.

PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. The attention of Commanding Generals of Formations is drawn to the present serious menace of V.D.
2. The services of Brigadier E. Lees, Consulting Venereologist M.E. who is now available, be accepted to work in conjunction with the advisers in the various formations.

1st S.	12.00
2nd S.	40.98
3rd S.	61.09
4th S.	69.66
5th S.	36.79
6th S.	65.57
7th S.	145.79
8th S.	297.95
9th S.	212.40
TOTAL	80.21

NOTE:- These rates are based on incomplete returns.

BRITISH TROOPS.

Formation.	V.D. Rate/1000/annum.
Eighth Army	24.0
10 Corps	108.9
2 District Total	104.2
Barletta Area	185.9
Total ITALY	51.2
1 District	72.7
North Africa	28.2
TOTAL FORCE	43.7

NOTE:- These figures are not in any sense comparable owing to the presence of many factors which are not common to both Armies.

PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. The attention of Commanding Generals of Formations is drawn to the present serious menace of V.D.
2. The services of Brigadier R. Lees, Consulting Venereologist M.E. who is now available, be consented to work in conjunction with the Advisers in Venereology A.F.M.C. and Chief Medical Officers, A.M.C.
3. That the present campaign against V.D. be intensified, i.e. talks by Commanding Officers, addresses by M.C.s, Press propaganda and discussions by Chaplains be carried out to capacity.
4. A.M.C. be requested to organize and undertake treatment for all women to whom V.D. is attributable, including police supervision and compulsory segregation.
5. Drinking hours to be restricted.
6. Brothels to be placed off limits.
7. American Red Cross and Welfare Activities to be enlarged and assisted.

- 3 -

in every possible way. This includes organized entertainment and recreation, coffee bars and canteens staffed by suitable ladies. It is suggested that every static unit is held responsible for its own organization.

8. Static units and formations to organize adequate Prophylactic Treatment Centres. Out of 17,000 percent treatments in Algeria only 11 cases contracted V.D.

9. These recommendations apply chiefly to Sicily and Italy.

10. The V.D. case now seriously threatens to limit the effectiveness of armies and formations. In some instances the V.D. case is equal to the Malaria rate, larger than the infective hepatitis rate and is the chief cause of sickness.

11. In conclusion:-

- (i) The V.D. rate is everywhere steadily rising.
- (ii) V.D. is now a serious menace to the health and effectiveness of troops of all formations.
- (iii) Urgent and immediate action is required.

(Signed)

S. H. COWELL

Major-General,

Surgeon, D.M.S., A.F.H.Q.

6 Dec 43.
RWC/AML

CONFIDENTIAL

US OFFICE DESEROR
IN

DDIC No. C5070
13 DEC 43

FROM: AMR SIGNED RESECTOR CITE BHTS

TO: AIRPORT FOR AMR

INFO: 9,200

DDIC No. 1542.

TO: 1953A.15.
TCN 0347A.1A.

1710

REPORT OF MEDICAL PUBLIC HEALTH 15 AND GROUP ON VENERAL DISEASES DATED 5 DECEMBER TOGETHER WITH DATA NOW IN HANDS OF SURGEON INDICATE EXTREME URGENCY IMMEDIATE MEASURES OF CONTROL. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH DES URGE IMMEDIATE ACTION BY ALL INTERESTED SUPERSTIONS IN ELABORATE ROUT, SEVEN AND EIGHT WITH FAMILY REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ON ACTION TAKEN. ADD SHOULD IMMEDIATE SIMILAR ACTION IN AREAS NOW UNDER CONTROL.

AMC 4 ACTION

DDIC 0156A.1A.

T.2. C5070.1A. JH.

9. These recommendations apply chiefly to Suez and Italy.

10. The V.D. rate not seriously threatens to limit the effectiveness of malaria and typhoid. In some instances the V.D. rate is equal to the malaria rate, larger than the infective hepatitis rate and is the chief cause of sickness.

11. In conclusion:-

- (i) The V.D. rate is everywhere steadily rising.
- (ii) V.D. is now a serious menace to the health and effectiveness of troops of all formations.
- (iii) Urgent and immediate action is required.

(Signed)

D. L. CUNELL

Major-General,

Surgeon, D.M.S., A.F.M.Q.

6 Dec. 43.
20.11.43.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

US CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

FORM NO. 05070
13 DEC 43

FROM: AMB SIGNED ENVOY/AMC
TO: FILIPPO FOR AMB
INFO: PARC
OIC. NO. 13492.

TOO: 1954.13.
TOR 0347.14.

1710

REPORT OF DIRECTOR PUBLIC HEALTH 15 ADULT GROUP ON VENEREAL DISEASES DATED 5 DECEMBER TOGETHER WITH DATA NOW IN HANDS OF SURGEON INDICATE EXTREME URGENCY EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF CONTROL. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH DUE URGE IMMEDIATE ACTION BY AMB IN IMPLEMENTING SUGGESTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS FOUR, SEVEN AND EIGHT WITH EARLY REPORT TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ON ACTION TAKEN. AMB SHOULD INITIATE SIMILAR ACTION IN AREAS NOW UNDER CONTROL.

AMB 4 ACTION

SUB 0156A.14.
T. 1. 0500A.14 JT.

Forwarded under this HQ letter AMB/511/1 of 5 Dec. 43.
Report of action taken should reach this H.Q. by 28 Dec. 43.

REGION IV

HEADQUARTERS

ITALIAN

Brig. H. Carr

Capt. D. B. Bertelli

Major A. B. Chowil

Lt. Col. P. R. CRT Bartley

Lt. D. B. Beveridge

Capt. L. J. Celler

Capt. A. R. F. Becker

Lt. L. A. Buchanan

Col. R. G. Miller

Major G. Kader

Capt. Bates

Capt. H. Vic Hanery

Major P. Alker

Major Montague

Capt. B. J. Harvey

Lt. Col. R. J. Arnold

" J. L. Holmes

" H. A. Robinson

" C. R. Tempertly

Lt. Col. C. R. Briggs

" R. F. Millhouse

Major O. C. Eugene

AMERICAN

R. C. A. O.

F. C. A. O.

C / S

2nd Lt. A. G. De Belles

Col. R. E. Marshall

Lt. L. J. Lau

Major L. O. Hall

Lt. D. B. Morrison

Capt. C. C. S. Benson

Major E. Brown

Lt. T. F. Spriggs

Capt. R. J. Johnson

Lt. R. J. McVire

LOCAL

Lt. Col. J. L. Chapman

Major L. E. Levitt

Lt. Const. M. Mammario

Lt. E. Gagliano

Col. C. H. Morgan

Major R. V. Fischer

Capt. A. J. Monongal

Lt. E. A. Campbell

Lt. L. A. Glenn

Col. O. M. Gevers

Lt. Col. R. C. Andrews

" A. A. Le Garsten

" R. E. Norton

" H. A. Parsons

" J. B. Thornhill

" J. D. Schultz

Lt. Col. J. S. Arnold

" C. H. Gernell

Major A. S. Cicalales

Capt. J. H. E. Cosan

" J. B. Glibbreath

1717

PUBLIC SAFETY

BUREAU

S. O. A. O. 's

C. A. P. O. 's

SHIPLEY

Lt. E. A. Richards
 " A. H. Ellis
 " T. L. Clancy
 " G. H. O. Liddle
 " A. P. Shaw

CALFORNIA

Lt. J. J. Coonen
 " H. J. Anderson
 " J. J. Lynch
 " P. C. Styles
 " J. L. Malch

SUMMARY SKILLS CAPABILITYESTABLISHMENT

H. C. 6

Lt. Colonels

Majors

Captains & Lieutenants

18

33

PERSONNEL

H. C. 5

1

36

1716

Numbers of Civilians confined in Civil Prisons on Security Grounds, etc., or Dismissed Government App

By		A	B	C	D	E	OFFICIALS		
							Arrested By		Dismissed
							ARMY	CIF or FBI	
FIFTH ARMY	Jan								
	Feb								
	Mar								
EIGHTH ARMY	Jan								
	Feb								
	Mar								
REGION III	Jan								
	Feb								
	Mar								
REGION IV	Jan								
	Feb								
	Mar								

1715

[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS
SECTION 3, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 194, U.S. ARMY
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF PUBLIC SAFETY

17 January 1944

SUBJECT: Public Safety Report for the month of December 1943.

TO: HQAG, AND Section 3.

A. POLICE.

1. Police Efficiency.

Carabinieri. On the whole these are reasonably efficient and are co-operating well, but the standard of efficiency cannot be compared with that in America or Great Britain. Some individuals have been found to be most capable and have done excellent work. Others have been found to be much less efficient and enthusiastic but there is a definite trend towards improvement. Lack of efficiency and initiative in certain areas was found to be largely because the officer in command was lacking in energy or ability. Certain recent transfers of officers is likely to have beneficial results. The strength of this body is insufficient to meet the heavy demands made upon it.

Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza. Generally speaking these also are fairly efficient and good co-operation exists when requested by us. Some of the Agents have shown zeal and efficiency, especially in combatting the 'black market' activities. A definite improvement is gradually appearing and in future I think we shall see greater activity. In the Province of Avellino it was necessary to replace the Quastore by a younger and more active man. The Metropolitani are inclined to be slack but steps have already been taken to smarten them up.

Guardia di Finanza. These have functioned as well as could be expected and are fast showing improvement. They have co-operated well in their sphere of activity.

Forest Guards.

Municipal Guards.

} Fairly efficient and quite co-operative.

...../The undersigned

- 2 -

The uniformed bodies are feeling the lack of clothing and boots, and shortage of transport and communication facilities. It has been possible to slightly increase their food ration.

2. State of Crime.

This is becoming more normal and offences and arrests are decreasing. As regards Naples City this to some extent is accounted for by the fact that the City is 'out of bounds' to visiting troops during the typhus epidemic. The various police agencies are improving in their preventive work.

The main types of crime and offence are:-

- (a) Black Market. - this cannot be cured by prosecutions and will not cease until sufficient supplies are available. The most to hope is that it will not increase and active steps are being taken to this end. The 'Black Market' is on occasions assisted by Allied Troops who steal and sell to civilians and until recently have often conveyed civilians and their property in army vehicles.
- (b) Wrangful possessions. - usually of PD property, especially furdstuffs and cigarettes. There are many prosecutions and at times Allied soldiers are concerned.
- (c) Unlawful assembly and Disorders. - These have occurred in widespread parts of the provinces. They are not purely political but usually to vent a grievance against individuals or a system.
- (d) Prostitutions. - Increasing numbers of prostitutes are being arrested and medically examined with a view to checking the VD scourge.

In all above cases special measures are being taken to deal with them.

3. Conduct of Allied Troops.

In the City of Naples until recently the discipline and conduct of Allied Troops was bad. A special order, coupled with the placing of the City 'out of bounds' owing to the typhus outbreak has made for considerable improvement. Throughout the Region conduct is not as good as could reasonably be expected, especially in the rear areas. The chief source is drink and complaints have been received of theft and robbery and violence towards individuals.

...../ours

- 3 -

Hours of sale of intoxicants have been restricted and every effort is being made to suppress the illicit sale of wine and local police, working with MP's, are doing good work.

The rate of VD among the troops is alarmingly and disgracefully high, again more in the rear areas than in the Corps areas, and, to a large extent, over-indulgence in liquor is the primary cause. Local police and MP's, with joint patrols, are taking every step possible to deal with prostitutes, tents and brothels. All brothels are now 'off limits' to troops and parts of the City of Naples will shortly be 'off limits' to all military personnel. The joint patrols were necessary as local police were practically powerless to deal with women in the company of soldiers.

4. Relations with Military Police.

Excellent. The closest co-operation is maintained, conferences are held where mutual problems are discussed, and very considerable assistance has been given in providing road checks and drives against prostitution. CC, MP have been furnished to Military Police to assist them in clearing military routes, establishing control points, guarding communications, railways, docks etc.

5. Refugees.

No serious problem, except in the Province of Avellino where at the time of our first occupation the problem was very acute. All the Eastern side of the Province was full of refugees from Foggia and the Western side with refugees from Naples. The greatest problem was the feeding of these people and it has been the lack of food that has made many of these refugees return home. The food shortage compelled everybody with sufficient means to go to the 'black market'. In a few communes in this Province the problem still remains, although not so acute.

6. Special Problems.

In the field of the Administration of Criminal Justice the highest type of police co-operation and co-ordination is necessary in order to accomplish the aim of the Department of Public Safety and that is the prompt arrest, detention and presentation for trial of offenders against the laws and proclamations of the Allied Military Government. During the period preceding the 14th December 1943 there was experienced a great deal of difficulty due to the fact that there was not the proper co-ordination between all agencies concerned and as a consequence the system broke down. We were faced with the problem of persons in prison

...../without

without charges, having been placed there by numerous agencies without any report and consequently proper charges could not be brought against the individuals concerned.

Beginning on 14th December 1943 the Department of Public Safety put into effect a new form of Arrest Report designed to get all the necessary information upon the arrest of an individual so that the case could be followed from arrest to trial. This necessitated conferences with all police agencies, civilian and Military, in order that the procedure could be properly explained. In addition an agent of the Pubblica Sicurezza was placed on duty 24 hours a day with the Military Police Booking Sergeant and the Arrest Reports were filled out at the time the individual was being "booked" by the Police. 3 copies were made out and distributed in the following manner: one copy stays in the files of the arresting agency, two copies accompany the offender to the prison and there one of the copies remains in the files of the Prison, and the third copy goes to the Prosecuting Office where the charges are prepared, witnesses summoned and the case put in the Court Calendar.

As a result of the co-operation received from the civilian and military agencies, this system has been successful and there have been to date no persons imprisoned without a proper arrest report. All the Prison Directors have been instructed to refuse admittance to anyone brought there by a police agency unless they have the proper reports.

Considerable difficulty has been experienced going to units requisitioning civilian police buildings and barracks and compelling the CC.RR or other police agency to seek accommodation elsewhere. This applies also to prisons, which is dealt with later. Furthermore certain Unit Commanders consider they have the right to call upon various police agencies for any purpose, thus depriving the community of their services. While always willing to assist the Allied Forces, especially Combat Units, I consider that a strong order should be issued forbidding these practices except with the approbation of AMG.

Another problem is shortage of AMG staff, both officers and other ranks. It is impossible to effectively carry out the duties which devolve on us when there are so many Headquarters establishments who take officers, who are doing a real job of work, for other duties. Many of these transfers are unnecessary as often the officers are taken for some future task and remain practically unemployed for a time. I feel most strongly that there should be only one authority who can fix an establishment

...../and

- 5 -

and that no officer or man should be employed or transferred without definite orders in writing from that authority.

Bad communications and lack of transport. In Avellino Province it is stated that 700 bridges have been destroyed. This makes communications very difficult and there are many communes beyond the reach of a motor vehicle. This means that food cannot be brought in and there is unrest among the inhabitants. One of the most important roads that is useless by reason of a broken bridge is the one from Avellino to S. Angelo dei Lombardi, via Montemarano. A by-pass and a temporary bridge was washed away when the rains came and in spite of repeated examinations by Army officers nothing has yet happened. This is a vital road for quick access to a large part of the Province and is also of military importance as it is a direct road from Naples, through Avellino to Frosinone.

B. SECURITY.

1. General State of Public Morale.

Fairly good and will improve if increased food supplies become available. Among a small section there is some unrest, but at present not given to violence. The controlling factor is food and if flour and bread distribution is lowered or ceases for a time there is likely to be trouble.

2(a) Attitude of Public towards AMG.

Satisfactory. I think the people have a genuine feeling of regard for AMG and our officers are welcomed wherever they go. They (the public) however, expect more than we can give them.

(b) Attitude towards the Italian Government.

Rather too early to estimate this as the majority evince little interest. They do not seem too keen on the Badoglio Government and the present King is not popular. The general opinion seems to be that it would be well for AMG to maintain control for some time yet.

3. Political Activities.

These are many and varied. The most active is the National Committee of Liberation, supposed to represent the six leading political parties and whose idea seems to be the establishment of a Republican form of government in Italy when the time is opportune. All meetings require sanction by AMG and permits are being granted with considerable latitude. There have been no disturbances of any consequence. There is some antipathy between the various parties and each delights in denouncing the members of

...../the other

- 6 -

the other party as being Fascists. In my opinion the Italian people are now trying to exercise that freedom of speech that has so long been denied them and they are not able to control themselves. Many of their expressions are simply so much 'hot air'.

4. Riots and Civil Disturbances.

There have been a number throughout the Region. Some have been caused by lack of food, others have been against taxation and assessment of grain, and others against the local administration on the ground that they are still Fascist. Some of the disturbances have been almost entirely by women who complain about the failure to pay the arrears of military pensions.

A small political disturbance between students and G.D.R. occurred on 11 December 1943.

At Frattamaggiore a disturbance was caused by trouble over the hemp industry, but this is now straightened out.

In two cases a fire was started at the Municipio and some damage was caused and records burned.

With a tightening up on police organisation and the severe penalties imposed on offenders it is hoped that less trouble in this respect will be caused in the future.

5. Industrial agitation and industrial conditions generally.

There is no indication of any trouble in this respect. Many factories are not yet functioning. Outside Naples the inhabitants are to a large extent engaged in agriculture. Considerable cultivation is going on and crops should be normal.

6. Strikes, lock-outs etc.

Only two minor strikes reported to date, few persons being affected and settled amicably.

7. Sabotage directed against Allies or Italian Government.

No definite cases of sabotage have been reported. There has been some interference with and cutting of Army telephone wires but there is no evidence that this is sabotage. In the majority of cases it cannot even be said whether these acts were committed by troops or civilians. In my opinion the cutting is due to theft by civilians who use the wire for lighting purposes or on their farms.

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- 7 -

8. Control of Movement, Passes and Permits.

This is being controlled as far as possible and circulation permits are issued to civilians who have legitimate reasons for travelling more than 10 kms. Standard forms have been printed and permit issues are kept to a minimum. There are, however, far too many individuals who think they have a right to issue passes and permits. Some forged passes are in circulation.

An Army Control Line has been established along the Volturno and Calore rivers. Five control points, manned jointly by Military Police and CC.PP have been established at bridges and only persons in possession of Special Passes are allowed to cross.

There is undoubtedly some illicit movement but with increased police checking and prosecutions the control is getting tighter.

Civil train passengers have now to be vetted both in and out of Naples.

9. Civilian Internees (PCI).

The position of internees in civilian prisons has been the subject of a recent Order and steps are being taken to rectify this. Most of these had been arrested by FAS and CIC for security reasons.

Of a number of internees in Avellino Province, a goodly proportion were Jugo Slavs and they, for the greater part, have been moved to Bari. The conditions of the remainder of these former internees was serious owing to cessation of allowances. Advances had to be made to them by ASD as it was impossible for them to find work or to live on the Government allowance of 10 lire a day. Positions have been found for some of them, especially those qualified to act as interpreters, but the condition of the remainder is still very precarious.

10. Curfew.

Curfew is still from 7 pm to 3.30 am. It is enforced by KMA and local police. Offenders are tried by ASD Courts. In country districts it cannot be said that the regulations are strictly observed or enforced.

C. PRISONS.1. General.

Generally speaking, the condition of the Prisons in this Region is satisfactory. They cannot, of course, be compared with our own, but, apart from a few black spots, the causes of which are

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dealt with under the various headings below, the conditions compare favourably with those prior to our occupation.

2. Administration.

On the whole the Italian prison system is efficient, and as it is our policy to utilize the Italian machinery at our disposal rather than to impose our own system, our efforts have been more in the sphere of a 'polishing up' process.

The prison staff have had to contend with many difficulties - lack of food, bomb damage, insufficient staff, requisitioning of buildings and equipment, and the fact that hundreds of prisoners were thrust upon them with little or no information regarding charges, which led to confusion in the prison records.

Efforts have, and still are being made to iron out these problems and some results have been achieved, especially regarding prison records, where, by the institution of a uniform arrest form, a complete record of each inmate is now held in the prison.

3. Sanitation.

In undamaged prisons the conditions are not too bad. There is a definite lack of disinfectants, but a lot has been accomplished by the plentiful application of water.

In the prisons which received bomb damage nearly all the bathing facilities were put out of action, and although efforts are being made to get them repaired and temporary arrangements have been made, the conditions are still very poor.

Typhus cases have been confined to one prison - Poggioreale - (1200 inmates) in which over a period of four weeks nine cases have been reported, one of which proved fatal. Every effort is being made to combat the epidemic. Both staff and inmates of prisons in Naples area have been inoculated, and it is hoped that in the very near future all prisons in the Region will have been treated.

All new inmates are segregated until such time as they have been bathed, disinfected and inoculated.

...../4. Discipline.

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- 9 -

4. Discipline.

Discipline, apart from one or two disturbances over the lack of food, is quite good. Supervision of the inmates would, according to our standards, appear to be lax, but I am informed that this has always been the case under the Italian system.

Segregation of those serving sentences and those awaiting trial, of the sexes, and of adults and minors, is enforced.

5. Buildings.

The larger prisons, apart from Avellino and Foggioraale which were badly damaged, are intact. Most of the Mandamentali prisons have received minor damage, but are able to carry on. Generally speaking the buildings are old and need renovating.

6. Food.

There are two ration scales in issue to prisons at present - "A" - 150 gr of bread and 25 gr of soup, and "B" - 300 gr of bread and 50 gr of soup, and it would appear that the difference is that at some prisons there is a practice which allows inmates' relatives to bring along food for them and to this type of institution the smaller scale is issued, not however, to individuals, but to the prison as a whole.

This procedure would be satisfactory if all prisoners received food from their relatives. But on investigation I find that only a small percentage receive food in this manner, due to various reasons such as poverty, no relatives, and, as many of the prisoners' relatives live at great distances from the prisons, travel facilities. Therefore, the majority of the inmates have to depend on the official rations.

Representations have been made to Economics and Supply Section with a view to having this adjusted, but so far without result.

The Italian Alimentation are responsible for the issue of potatoes, rice and oil etc., to the prisoners, but as only very small amounts are available, the prisons have to depend largely on the bread and soup issued by ASG.

Imprisonment under present conditions must, of course, be of a deterrent nature, and as such the restriction of food must play its part. Bearing in mind, however, that prisoners, once imprisoned, lose all rights to fend for themselves, I feel that it is our responsibility to see that they receive sufficient food to keep them in a decent state of health.

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MP

Ration increased
subject local availability
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It is suggested, therefore, that 15 Army Group issue a Directive on the subject which will provide a minimum uniform ration of 300 gr of bread and 50 gr of soup.

7. Political Prisoners.

Records of all security prisoners are being kept.

Foggioraale is at present the only prison in which political internees are lodged. To date there are 28 of them.

8. Prisoners awaiting trial.

There were at first a very large number of prisoners awaiting trial in the prisons and much difficulty was experienced in bringing them to trial through the absence of correct records of charges.

In the initial phase of our occupation, persons were placed in the prisons by all manner of people who did not provide the prison staff with sufficient data of arrest, and then in quite a number of instances failed to prefer charges of any kind. Consequently numbers of people lingered in prison for considerable periods until it could be definitely established that they could not be connected with charges.

This situation, during the past month, has eased considerably and every effort is being made to reduce the period of awaiting trial to a minimum.

9. Prison accommodation.

Great difficulty is being experienced in accommodating prisoners in the Naples area, particularly juveniles. There is a high rate of juvenile crime in Naples - 90 minors are awaiting trial at present - and the Courts are handicapped in combatting it due to the lack of institutions.

Prior to our occupation there were four institutions for minors. Now, when juvenile delinquency is becoming more apparent, only one remains at our disposal. Of the other three, two, Misida and Portici, have been taken over by the Allied Services to house troops, while the third, Filangeri, we ourselves have had to use to accommodate female prisoners due to the fact that the women's wing at Foggioraale has been taken over to house Sc. 1 Sikh Engineer Bn.

...../At Foggioraale

1705

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At Foggiorale the conditions are most unsatisfactory. There are no proper laundry facilities available. There is quite a good laundry situated in the women's wing and in which it was the practice of the female prisoners to take care of all the prison laundry, but now, due to the presence of the Indian troops, this is not available.

This is deplorable in view of the fact that there have been nine cases of typhus reported to date.

If the Indian troops, of whom there are some 420, could be removed from the women's wing it would serve two purposes - firstly the female prisoners could be returned to Foggiorale which would leave Milangieri free to accommodate juveniles, and secondly the women could then resume their normal functions of taking care of the laundry at Foggiorale.

It is appreciated that the requirements of the Services have to be met, but if this Department is to fulfil its task of maintaining public order, which is of primary importance to these Services, we must have the means at our disposal to properly house those persons arrested, detained and sentenced for breach of Proclamations, Orders and Italian Law.

D. FIRE AND CIVIL DEFENCE.

1. Fire Brigade: Efficiency - equipment - Personnel.

- (a) Within the City and Province of Naples, the Vigili del Fuoco had only to respond to full period fires during this month. They operated in a satisfactory manner and, apart from routine drills which are carried out daily, there is no necessity for any special programme to increase the efficiency of the Corps.
- (b) The equipment situation has improved steadily during the month. The workshop is hampered by the lack of spare parts, but everything possible is being done to improve the general situation.
- (c) Adjustments in the strength have been made because of the reorganisation of the UNFA service.

In Avellino and Benevento Provinces it has only been possible so far, to supply minimum requirements in the way of equipment. The efficiency of these brigades is an unknown factor, because they have not been in operation and in both Provinces I have reduced the strength to the lowest figure compatible with present requirements.

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2. Unione Nazionale Protezione Antigrana (UNPA) - Efficiency - equipment - personnel.

- (a) During the month, because of the proved inefficiency of the existing UNPA service, a complete reorganization was made and the strength of the whole time employees was reduced from 630 to 200.

The entire duty of the UNPA is now to provide only a wardens service. Light rescue work has been handed over entirely to the Vigili del Fuoco, within which Corps, a special Rescue Service has been established. This has been possible without extending the strength to any considerable degree and it is hoped that the new system will prove more satisfactory than the old.

- (b) All existing UNPA rescue equipment has been passed to this new rescue service. Wardens posts have been established in suitable ground floor premises and it is proposed now to explain the new system to the public by the individual distribution to householders of clear information regarding these posts and the service they can render to the public.

3. Disposal of UXBs and Mines.

Some difficulty has been experienced during the month in arranging the disposal of UXBs in the forward area. I was able to arrange with Captain Erolin, PAB Officer, 5th Army, that AMG could depend on service wherever the existence of unexploded mines was crippling the development of normal civilian conditions. I am now advised from 5th Army HQ that the removal of mines in the 5th Army area is an AMG responsibility.

This situation is most unsatisfactory, as I do not have any civilian mine disposal unit, and I do not consider it possible to organize such a unit in a satisfactory way. I am therefore making new representations to the 5th Army PAB Officer in order that Ordnance may again take over this responsibility.

B. STAFF.

1. Names of Public Safety Officers (CAPOs) and how employed.

See Page 13.

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REPRESENTATIVES

Lieut. Colonel C.T. Francis	-	Commissioner of Public Safety
Lieut. Colonel W. Doherty	-	Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety
Captain A. Dell'Osso	-	Administration of Justice
Captain A.A. Lewis	-	Civil Police
Captain J.R. Macfarlane	-	Fire and Civil Defence.
Lieut. G.R. Daley	-	Prisons
Captain C.H. Owen (Attached)	-	Black Market
Lieut. Lynch	-	Courts

AVELLINO

Captain T. Goodacre - CAPO
 Lieut. L. Toes - "
 Lieut. Scafuti (CAG at Montell)
 Lieut P.R. Edwards (Attached)

BRINDISI

Major F.G. Armstrong - A/CAPO
 Major D.P.M. Stephens - CAPO
 Capt. E.J. Benson - CAPO (attd)
 Capt. J.N. Cowan - CAG
 Lieut. T.W. Glasspool - CAPO

NAPLES PROVINCE

Captain Whyte	-	CAG Ischia
Lt. Col. Arnold	-	Courts (Attached)
" " Cornwell	-	" "
Captain Mitchell	-	CAPO "
Lieut. Sciffe	-	" "
Lieut D.S. Robertson	-	" "

NAPLES CITY

Lt. Col. Warner	-	CAPO
Captain Gordon	-	Court - external
Captain Ladill	-	Court - internal
Lieut. Fielding	-	CAPO
Captain Hoelscher	-	CAPO (Attached)
Captain Luckman	-	" "
Lieut. Glegg	-	" "
Captain Gray	-	" "

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2. Changes of Staff.

Lt. Col. C.T. Francis (Region 8)

Assigned as Commissioner of
Public Safety

Lt. Col. W. Doherty

Transferred from Naples City to
Region H.

Lt. Col. Warner

Assigned as S.C.A.P.C. Naples

Major A.F. Wilcox

Transferred to 5th Army

Major W. Huntsicker

" " " "

Major R.E. MacDonald

Left - returned to Great Britain

Major D.F.W. Stephens

Transferred from Naples Province
to Benevento

Captain S.J. Harvey (Region 4)

Transferred to Rome Planning

Captain W.M. Scott

" " " "

Captain Kadill

Transferred from Region H. to
Naples City

Lieut. Paolino

Transferred to 5th Army

Lieut. Kolster (Region 8)


Transferred to Foggia Province

" Lornam (Reg. 4)

Transferred to 5th Army

Capt. Griswold, killed in the execution of his duty 26th Decr 1943.

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C.T. FRANCIS
Lieut. Colonel, G.I.,
Commissioner of Public Safety.

CTF/jb

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