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SECURITY
JULY - OCT. 1943

SECURITY

RPS/341.2

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RPS/341.2

1008

SECURITY

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59

162

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THIS FOLDER

CONTAINS PAPERS

FROM WVG. 1943

TO OCT. 1943

CATALOGUE.

Subject: Overclassification of Documents.

22

file

EXOT/1002/73

EXOT H.

16 October 1963

TO : Security Officer.

1. This subject is generally treated as confidential.

2. Restricted would probably do: we await copy of the British document referred to in Para 2(d) of Security Instruction No. 3.

3. Noted.

Ramp
R. J. J. MARTIN,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Commissioner of
Public Safety.

PA

1961

9A 1008

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISIONTO SEE:

C.P.S.

D.C.P.S.

PRISON SECTION

LT. COL. MICHELL.

MAJ. LOPELANT.

CAPT. BROWN.

CAPT. ALDEN.

CIVIL POLICE SECTION

LT. COL. SNOOK.

MAJ. HEEFORD.

MAJ. RICHARDSON.

CAPT. MANUEL.

CAPT. WILLIAMS.

LT. GALE.

FIRE & C.D. SECTION

MAJOR MASON.

CAPT. WALLACE.

LT. BELLERMAN.

LICENSING & REGISTRATION

CAPT. FALLANCE.

1900

U.S. RESTRICTED
(Equals British RESTRICTED)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

CIRCULAR)
NUMBER 71)



11 October 1943

Consumer Goods for Civilian Labor I
Security Classifications II

I -- CONSUMER GOODS FOR CIVILIAN LABOR

So much of Section I, Circular Number 70, this headquarters, as reads: "Section IV, Circular No. 1" is amended to read as follows: "Section VI, Circular No. 1, this headquarters, as, is rescinded."

II - SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS

1. Circular Number 69, this headquarters, dated 29 September 1943, is rescinded.

2. Effective 1 October 1943, the following security classifications promulgated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff are established for this Theater of Operations:

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET and SECRET

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. RESTRICTED Equals British RESTRICTED

3. All classified documents and messages originated at Allied Force Headquarters or any combined headquarters in this theater will bear one of the following security classifications:

a. U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

b. U.S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

c. U.S. CONFIDENTIAL Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

d. U.S. RESTRICTED Equals British RESTRICTED

4. Security instructions pertaining to the definition, authorization and handling of classified documents and messages are contained in the following directives:

a. American - Army Regulations 380-5

-1-

U.S. RESTRICTED
(Equals British RESTRICTED)

1959

U.S. RESTRICTED
(Equals British RESTRICTED)

CIR # 71
AFHQ (cont'd)

b. British - "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents, 1943."

- (1) The term "Secret" as defined in par. 5 (a), "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents, 1943" is amended to read as follows:
(end of line 3) "For reasons of National Security".
This, in effect, raises the security value of the British classification "Secret".

5. The classification British SECRET, as well as U.S. SECRET and British MOST SECRET, will be reserved for those documents and messages requiring the highest degree of security. Misuse of these classifications will detract from their value as safeguards and will result in a serious overloading of cipher facilities.

6. Documents and messages originating from a purely British headquarters will normally be marked with one of the four British classifications and on receipt in a combined or a purely American headquarters will be handled in accordance with the above table of equivalents (para. 3, above).


7. Documents and messages originating from a purely American headquarters will normally be marked with one of the three American classifications. Owing to the uncertainty on receipt of such papers in a combined or purely British headquarters of deciding whether the U.S. Secret marking is the equivalent of British Most Secret or Secret, such papers will, in the first instance, be treated as the equivalent of British Most Secret. For subsequent handling, they will be classified as the equivalent of British Most Secret or Secret, as the case may be, according to definitions laid down in "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents, 1943".

8. No reclassification is necessary on any document or message issued prior to 1 October 1943.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

OFFICIAL:

J.F.M. WHITELEY
Major General, GS,
Acting Chief of Staff.


F. J. DAVIS,
Brigadier General, United States Army,
Adjutant General.

-2-

DISTRIBUTION:
"D"

U.S. RESTRICTED
(Equals British RESTRICTED)

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION.

ROUTING SLIP.

1008/PS

TO SEE :-

C.P.S. *Ball*D.C.P.S. *Ball*PRISON SECTION. *Ball*X CIVIL POLICE SECTION. *Ball*FIRE AND CIVIL DEFENCE
SECTION. *Ball*LICENSING AND REGISTRATION
SECTION. *Ball*

Please return as
soon as possible to
Public Safety Div,
Amgat Hq.

MEMORANDUM
NO. 44

HEADQUARTERS
ISLAND BASE SECTION
A.R.O. #550

10 October 1943

CENSORSHIP REGULATIONS

1. Par. 3, Memorandum No. 12, this Headquarters, is rescinded.
2. The following items will be accepted by APO's for mailing to the United States and will be passed by the censor:

Ancient Firearms, which are not usable
Badges, decoration
Belt Buckles
Buttons, all types
Cameras, small, civilian type
Flags and Emblems, German or Italian
or any other

Helmet, German
Knives, all types
Insignia, all types
Rifles, small size, for children
Swords and sabers

3. The following items are considered to be of military value and will not be accepted by APO's:

Aeroplane or Balloon Instruments, or
Controls
All Allied or enemy equipment unless
specifically mentioned in paragraph
2 above.

Articles whose combined length and
girth is more than five feet, or
of a weight in excess of twenty
pounds.

Bayonets, all types
Binoculars, all types
Blankets
Cameras, military type
Canteens and cups
Canvas packs
Compasses

Empty brass or copper shells (weigh-
ing more than two pounds)
Enemy clothing, including caps and
hats

Explosives
Firearms
Fire control instruments and
accessories
Gas Masks
Helmets, Italian
Inflammable material, matches,
lighter fluid
Literature, propaganda
Medical supplies including samples
Mess kit sets, all types
Name plates removed from captured
equipment
Optical instruments and accessories
Rifles and pistols, German or
Italian, usable or unusable
Shells, bullets, explosives,
grenades, duds, fuse cases,
exploded or unexploded or ammu-
nition of any kind
Shell cases, or portions thereof

4. Additional Censorship Regulations issued by 15th Army Group, 18 June 1943, have been amended with respect to troops on Sicily (but not as to troops in Italy) and the following applies:

- a. Postage Stamps may be mailed in limited amounts.
- b. Foreign coins and currency in small denominations (up to and including 100 Lires in value) may be dispatched from the theater.

c. Picture post cards which do not reveal location of units more specifically than "Somewhere in Sicily" may be mailed. (Subsequent correspondence must not connect by direct statement or inference geographical location of unit with places shown on cards.)

d. Correspondence may now be carried on with local inhabitants, provided censorship regulations are followed and mail is transmitted only through Army Post Offices.

5. Films.

a. Developed films of no military value (individuals, ancient ruins, etc.) may be mailed only when accompanied by corresponding and identifiable prints. Such films may be developed only by one of the six approved photographic firms listed below:

Russo	54 Via Cavour	Palermo
Parlazzola	280 Corso Vittorio Emanuele	"
Angelo Randazzo	31-33 Via Ruggero Settimo	"
Foto Ottica	135 Via Roma	"
Luigi Di Bartolo	122 Via A. Veneziano	"
Vito Lo Verso	9 Corso Camille Pinocchiaro Aprile	"

b. No unexposed or exposed undeveloped black and white film will be placed in the mail, or otherwise dispatched from Sicily.

c. Color film and movie film can not be processed in this theater and therefore will be handled as follows:

(1) The address of the sender plus the name and address of a person in the United States to whom the developed negatives are to be sent will be indicated on a slip of paper securely tied to each roll of such undeveloped film.

(2) Such rolls will be classified "Confidential" and will be transmitted as official mail to the Chief Base Censor for handling and disposition.

(3) The negatives of such rolls cannot be mailed to this theater by the developing agency in the United States.

(4) All negatives and prints not passed by the censor will become the property of the United States Government and will be disposed of as directed by the War Department, Washington, D. C. or by the Theater Commander.

6. Censorship Authority.

Except as provided above, the regulations of MATOUSA Circular 86, as amended by Circular 146, 166, 169, cs, will control correspondence of all Army Personnel and Civilians under military jurisdiction, in this section.

By Order of Colonel SEARS:

Reproduced by Hq AMCOT,
11 October 1943 for
Distribution.

/s/ F. F. Bonsteel
/t/ F. T. BONSTEEL
Colonel, A. C. D.
Adjutant General

File

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISIONTO SEE:

C.P.S.

D.C.P.S. *Duffy*PRISON SECTIONLT. COL. MICHELL. *Ben*~~MAJ. LORENT.~~CAPT. BROWN. *S.*CAPT. ALLEN. *W.A.*CIVIL POLICE SECTION

LT. COL. SNOOK.

MAJ. HEFFORD.

MAJ. RICHARDSON.

CAPT. MANUEL.

CAPT. WILLIAMS.

LT. GALE.

FIRE & C.D. SECTIONMAJOR MASON. *John*~~CAPT. WALLACE.~~LT. BELLERSON. *W.D.*LICENSING & REGISTRATIONCAPT. BALLANCE. *W.D.*All clerks to note
and remember.St. W. L. *W.D.*
Pte. McL. *W.D.*
Pte. L. *W.D.*
Pte. Jones.
T. S. B.

Return to CC

Proctor
19/10

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3

AMGOT/392/RQ

1. Pass System. All persons entering this Ho. must identify themselves to guards. Personal inconvenience and congestion at entrance will be minimized if officers will approach doorway with pass (or identity card) in hand. Prompt report to this office of unchallenged entrance will be appreciated. Security depends upon your cooperation.
2. Classified Documents.
 - (a) Letters classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or MOST SECRET should be mailed in double sealed envelopes, inner envelope being marked with appropriate classification. Outer envelope should bear no indication that contents are classified.
 - (b) Officers are reminded that civilians are not to be allowed access to classified documents.
 - (c) Files containing classified papers should be clearly marked with the highest classification therein (cover of file containing five "Confidential" and one "Secret" letter should be marked "SECRET").
 - (d) Persons dealing with classified documents should be familiar with contents of U.S. AR 380-5 or British "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents, 1943". This office will obtain copies of these regulations, for distribution, in the near future.
3. Cryptographic Security. All originators of messages which are to be enciphered are cautioned to avoid stereotyped beginnings and endings. No message should start or end with such phrases as: "rural", "in answer to", "yours", "request", "ship", "reference" or proper names, dates, and geographical locations.
4. Leave Talk. A civilian or stranger is a potential enemy agent. The enemy wants to know what you know, but what he doesn't know won't hurt you. Keep it secret. The telephone is public, not secret.
5. Warning. Large quantities of "Confidential", "Secret", and "Most Secret" papers were found on desks between 12:15 and 12:30, this afternoon. This is a gross breach of security which may subject the officer directly responsible, and his superior (who is indirectly responsible), to severe disciplinary action by court-martial. All officers are again warned that such documents must be properly guarded; when leaving offices check should be made to see that documents classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and MOST SECRET are locked away or deposited with Central Registry for safe-keeping. Carelessness can not be tolerated.

J. L. EVANS,
Captain, M.I.,
Security Officer.

2. Classified Documents.

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- (d) Persons dealing with classified documents should be familiar with contents of U.S. AR 380-5 or British "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents, 1943". This office will obtain copies of these regulations, for distribution, in the near future.

3. Cryptographic Security. All originators of messages which are to be enciphered are cautioned to avoid stereotyped beginnings and endings. No message should start or end with such phrases as: "retel", "in answer to", "yours", "re-guest", "ship", "reference" or proper name, dates, and geographical locations.

4. Loose Talk. A civilian or stranger is a potential enemy agent. The enemy wants to know what you know, but what he doesn't know won't hurt you. Keep it secret. The telephone is public, not secret.

5. Warning. Large quantities of "Confidential", "Secret", and "Most Secret" papers were found on desks between 12:15 and 12:30, this afternoon. This is a breach of security which may subject the officer directly responsible, and his superior (who is indirectly responsible), to severe disciplinary action by court-martial. All officers are again warned that such documents must be properly safeguarded; when leaving offices check should be made to see that documents classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and MOST SECRET are locked away or deposited with Central Registry for safe-keeping. Carelessness can not be tolerated.

J. M. EVANS,
Captain, M.I.
Security Officer.

NO. 100107

9 October 1943

Distribution: All ARCT H. Q. Officers.

Copy sent to J. M. Evans

ODCPS
(copy to all offices)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2.

AMGOT/392/HQ.

18
P.S.D.
Ruf

1. All matters concerning the internal security of H.Q. AMGOT should be referred to Capt. J.M. EVANS, Room 29, tel. 12.
2. Requests for passes and report of lost passes should be made to this office. It is imperative that loss of pass be reported immediately.
3. All officers are requested to sign visitors' "out slips" on completion of interview. In order to leave building, visitors must show time of departure on signed slip.
4. Attention is drawn to the fact that carbon paper used in the typing of classified documents is itself classified, and must be treated accordingly; this is also true of stencils, rough drafts, and stenographic notes used in the preparation of classified documents.
5. Waste-baskets containing classified waste should be emptied at Central Registry, Room 12, when offices are left vacant.

H.Q. AMGOT.
6 Oct. 1943.

J. M. Evans 1956
J. M. EVANS
Capt., M.I.
Security Officer.

Instn. No. 1 at 17.

17
 121008
 No. 1
ORDERS FOR THE SECURITY OF H.Q. AMSCOT.

General.

There are 6 British personnel who will act as Police for the security of the H.Q.

The Police will be situated at the entrance to H.Q. and on floors occupied by AMSCOT personnel, and it is their duty to ensure that no unauthorized person enters the building.

All persons will be in possession of a pass, whether permanent or temporary, and will be required to produce it on demand by the Police.

Security of Offices

It is the duty of every officer to ensure that papers are locked away.

Most Secret files left on tables will always be the personal responsibility of an officer, who should be aware that he is in charge of the file once it is handed to him. If, therefore, there are only two officers in a room at any given time and one wishes to go out, leaving "Most Secret" files on his desk, he will inform the remaining officer that he is leaving the files out and place them in his charge. If all officers leave the room, then all files will either be locked up (highly desirable), or placed in charge of the Chief Clerk of the Division.

In general there should only be a limited number of files out at any one time. Each file when disposed of will be returned to the appropriate place. The presence on desks of a large number of files renders it most difficult for them to be adequately supervised.

When "Most Secret" files are passed from one office to another they will be placed in an envelope marked "Most Secret".

Civilians.

Civilians will not be permitted to use corridors to confer. They will be dealt with by the person with whom they have an interview as expeditiously as possible, and their pass out duly completed. No pass out will be accepted at entrance unless it is completed.

Destruction of Secret Waste.

It is the personal responsibility of the Chief Clerk of the Division to ensure that all Secret waste is destroyed by burning daily.

The "Security No's and Details" issued as Appendix "A"

The Police will be summoned to the building to ensure that no unauthorized person enters the building.

All persons will be in possession of a pass, whether permanent or temporary, and will be required to produce it on demand by the Police.

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Destruction of Secret Waste

It is the personal responsibility of the Chief Clerk of the Division to ensure that all Secret waste is destroyed by burning daily.

Attention is drawn to "Security Do's and Don'ts" issued as Appendix "A" to this instruction.

H.O. MCGOT.
18 Sept. 1943.

Security Officer

Ad. J. J. J.
Security Officer
Copy sent to all Sections.
Copy submitted to Clerk
19. 19

APPENDIX "A"

SECURITY DO'S AND DON'T'S

- DON'T assume that any small piece of information you may know is unimportant, NO information is unimportant to the enemy.
- DON'T assume that everyone knows what you do; they may trust to.
- DON'T be drawn into giving away information, by someone also making a pretence of knowing what you know.
- DON'T discuss operational matters with your friends, even when they are officers; this is a serious offence.
- DON'T assume that Sicilians are:
 Fools, and ignorant of English anyway.
 They may not be.
 So Don't talk in the presence of any strangers.
- DON'T air your foreign languages in public, unless they are:
 Italian
 French
 Arabic
- DON'T forget that the inhabitants are NOT all friendly to us. Lots of them aren't.
- DO remember that thousands of men's lives, including perhaps your own, depend on you keeping YOUR mouth shut.
- DO remember that all information or even gossip about military operations is of value to the enemy.
- DO appreciate that while you may not realise the meaning or importance of some piece of information, the enemy probably does. So don't tell it to him.
- DO remember NOT to leave secret papers about; the consequences will be serious.
- DO realise that in this building your office is not secure if you lock the door but have left the window open.
- DO remember that the proper place for a file which is not actually in use is the Registry, and that this is also the most secure place for it to be kept in.
- DO remember SECURITY depends on you. One careless individual can send thousands

of knowing what you know.

DON'T discuss operational matters with your friends, even when they are officers; this is a serious offense.

DON'T assume that Sicilians are:

 Fools, and ignorant of English anyway.

 They may not be.

 So Don't talk in the presence of any strangers.

DON'T air your foreign languages in public, unless they are:

 Italian

 French

 Arabic

DON'T forget that the inhabitants are NOT all friendly to us. Lots of them aren't.

DO remember that thousands of men's lives, including perhaps your own, depend on you keeping YOUR mouth shut.

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DO appreciate that while you may not realize the scoring or importance of some piece of information, the enemy probably does. So don't tell it to him.

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DO realise that in this building your office is not secure if you lock the door but have left the window open.

DO remember that the proper place for a file which is not actually in use is the Registry, and that this is also the most secure place for it to be kept in.

DO remember SECURITY depends on you. One careless individual can send thousands of men to their deaths.

1934

Subject:- Security Matters.

To:- HQ AMGOT PALERMO

From:- AMGOT LIAISON.

Ref. AL/4/94

8 Sep 43.

Will you please arrange that all decisions on Security Matters are communicated as soon as possible to G.S.I. (b) 15 Army Group with a copy to this Section.

HP/ES.

Copy to:- G.S.I. (b).
15 Army Gp.



Captain,
Staff Captain,
Amgot Liaison.

Lt. Col. Clough

Maj. Raffae

Maj. Smith

E. J. Clough

10 Sec atms

TS.

1 Day to Police for file
Study New file
 SUBJECT: Security Summary



SECRET
 1510/2404/4/3(16)

7 Sep 43

G-2, A.P.R.G.

Herewith Security Summary for period 10 July - 31 Aug 43.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
 C.I.P.

W.D. Gibson. H-68
 f Brigadier,
 B.C.E.(I).

COPY TO:

Agot H.Q. PALERMO
 G (Ops)
 A

Copy sent
 Civil Police Section
 B. 11/9. 1943

SECURITY SUMMARY

10 JUL to 31 AUG 63

SECRET

PART I

GENERAL SITUATION

The general security situation in SICILY for the period under review has been good. The local population appears quite content for the island to be occupied by the Allies and in general the local officials are cooperating satisfactorily.

One of the chief security problems has been the cutting of signal cables and telephones wires, but in the great majority of cases this was the result of ignorance and need rather than vicious intention. There have been no serious cases of sabotage reported.

No members of the enemy intelligence services or persons known to be working for them have as yet been run to earth. No evidence has been found of any enemy post-convictional organization or plans for espionage, sabotage or subversive activity. It is, however, too early to assess with confidence that lack of such evidence implies lack of their existence.

A large number of prominent and ardent Fascists conspired to constitute a threat to our cause have been arrested. In this, and wherever the interests of security and military government overlap, the Allied security organization has in general worked in close cooperation with ADMG. In most cases the requirements of security and civil administration have been satisfactorily balanced and coordinated.

Certain weaknesses have been found in the disposal of arrested civilians and the records of their arrest, but the resultant complications are now in process of being cleared up. In this respect, valuable lessons have been learnt during this operation and it is hoped as a result the correct formula has now been established for the efficient and expeditious handling of arrested civilians in future operations.

All ports in the island worked by Allied Forces are covered by British or American security sections. Naval port security measures have been instituted and security in the ports is satisfactory.

Security control measures such as curfew, restricted circulation, surrender of arms, cameras etc., are in general working reasonably well, and the local police are cooperating in their enforcement.

The general military security discipline of the troops has been good.

1951

PART II

1. Enemy Intelligence Operations

No members of the Abwehr have been found. There is reason to believe that those known to have been in SICILY at the time of our invasion (including those who were in the island before the completion of the landings).

No members of the enemy intelligence services or persons known to be working for them have as yet been run to earth. No evidence has been found of any enemy post-occupational organization or plans for espionage, sabotage or subversive activity; it is, however, too early to assert with confidence that lack of such evidence implies lack of their existence.

A large number of prominent and ardent Fascists considered to constitute a threat to our cause have been arrested. In this, and wherever the interests of security and military government overlap, the Allied security organization has in general worked in close cooperation with RAAF. In most cases the requirements of security and civil administration have been satisfactorily balanced and coordinated.

Certain weaknesses have been found in the disposal of arrested civilians and the records of their arrest, but the resultant complications are now in process of being cleared up. In this respect valuable lessons have been learnt during this operation and it is hoped as a result the correct formula has now been established for the efficient and expeditious handling of arrested civilians in future operations.

All ports in the island worked by Allied forces are covered by B2, B3 or American security sections. Naval port security measures have been instituted and security in the ports is satisfactory.

Security control measures such as curfew, restricted circulation, surrender of arms, etc., are in general working reasonably well, and the local police are cooperating in their enforcement.

1931

The general military security discipline of the troops has been good.

PART II

1. Enemy Intelligence Organizations

No members of the Spanish have been found. There is reason to believe that those known to have been in Sicily at the time of our invasion (including Major von GERSHTEIN) left the island before the evacuation of the port area.

Similarly, no contact has been made with any members of the Italian G.I., though certain information concerning this organization has been obtained from Carabinieri Counter Espionage Officers (see para. 2. below).

Moreover there has so far been no evidence of any person in the island working for either of the above organizations. Although, like the secretary and close associate of GERSHTEIN, has been arrested at TIGHILL and is being detained on suspicion pending further investigation is being possible that the one charged with certain post-occupational activities, but so far no evidence to this effect has been obtained.

Although no evidence of espionage, organized sabotage, or limited subversive activity have been discovered, it is too early to assume that the enemy uses no plan in this direction, and security work is being carried out on

the assumption that the money has in fact, made provision for such activities.

2. Carabinieri Counter Espionage Organization

It was already known that the Carabinieri, besides constituting a police force similar to the Carabinieri, also provided officers and men for the counter espionage branch of S.I.A., known as the Centro Contro Spionaggio (C.C.S.). These counter espionage officers, who usually operated in plain clothes, had instruction to put on uniform and report to the nearest C.C.S. station in the event of an Allied invasion, and in certain cases it is even that this had been done.

Although enemy counter espionage activity as such presents no direct threat to our security, it was considered that, in view of the connection of the C.C.S. with the S.I.A. and espionage proper, those Carabinieri counter espionage agents definitely constituted a potential danger, the more so since ASST have made the C.C.S. the basis of their civil police force. ASST and the P.2.7/C.I.C. have therefore been and are continuing to investigate the counter espionage Carabinieri from the ordinary members of the C.C.S. The former, whose names have been and still are being created and increased.

Col. DE LEO, the C.C.S. Chief for SICILY, definitely associated with some of his subordinates to the mainland. His former headquarters at CAVALLIO were searched after his departure, and although the bulk of the documents had already been destroyed, those which remained provided a number of names and addresses together with a general idea of S.I.A. organization on the island. These addresses are presently being investigated by security personnel. To date the following officers of DE LEO's organization have been interned, in addition to a number of NCO's:

Capt. <u>THIROLI</u>	(Head of <u>PALERMO</u> office)
Capt. <u>SALAMONE</u>	(<u>TRAPANI</u>)
Capt. <u>SCAPA</u>	(<u>SAINT CATALDO</u>)
Major <u>VASSO</u>	(<u>TRAPANI</u>)

Capt. DE LEO, late of SINIGUJA has not yet been arrested, but is under surveillance at ROMA.

3. O.V.A.

A certain number of minor O.V.A. agents have been arrested and interned. These do not appear to have been designed for any other purpose than petty political police, nor to be of the calibre to constitute a serious threat to our security. FORRESTA, O.V.A. chief of SICILY, has not yet been traced. It has been reported that O.V.A. agents had instructions to report to ROMA in the event of an Allied landing.

4. Malta

Since the arrival of the Allies there has been a slight outbreak of possible Mafia activity in the south, including certain civilian murders. There is no reason to believe, however, either that the Mafia functions in any organized form or that it contains any direct threat to Allied security.

of the C.C.S. with the C.I.S. and the C.I.S. are definitely considered a potential danger, the more so since the C.I.S. have made the C.C.S. the basis of their civil police force. The C.I.S. and the P.S.P./C.I.S. have therefore been endeavoring to segregate the counter espionage Committee from the ordinary members of the C.C.S. The former, where some, have been and still are being arrested and interned.

Col. DE LEO, the C.C.S. Chief for SICILY, definitely escaped with some of his subordinates to the mainland. His former headquarters at SICILY were searched after his departure, and although the bulk of the documents had already been destroyed, those which remained provided a number of names and addresses together with a general idea of C.I.S. organization on the island. These addresses are gradually being investigated by security personnel. To date the following officers of DE LEO's organization have been interned, in addition to a number of HQ's:

Capt. TURPINI	(Head of Palermo office)
Capt. SALAMONE	(MILITARY)
Capt. SCARPA	(SAN CATALDO)
Major VESCO	(MILITARY)

Capt. DE LEO, late of SICILY, has not yet been arrested, but is under surveillance at AGRIGENTO.

3. C.I.S.

A certain number of minor C.I.S. agents have been arrested and interned. There do not appear to have been designed for any other purpose than petty political police, nor to be of the calibre to constitute a serious threat to our security. JONAS, C.I.S. chief of SICILY, has not yet been treated. It has been reported that C.I.S. agents had instructions to report to JONAS in the event of an Allied landing.

4. Mafia

Since the arrival of the Allies there has been a slight outbreak of possible Mafia activity in the south, including certain civilian murders. There is no reason to believe, however, either that the Mafia functions in any organized form or that it contains any direct threat to Allied security.

5. Conclusions

No enemy consular officials have been found. It is not thought that neutral consulates as yet are capable of any hidden activity detrimental to the Allied cause, but enquiries are proceeding and the more likely ones are being kept under observation.

6. Substance

No evidence has been found of any sabotage organization operating in SICILY, and no reports have been received of sea-borne or air-borne landings of sabotage. There have been some cases of suspected sabotage on the railway in the British Army area but this may very well be due to the extremely low level of maintenance of the track.

The worst sort of problem has been wire-cutting. At one time this was done in various proportions, particularly in the South-East. In a few cases deliberate sabotage is suspected but the offenders have not been caught. A considerable number of cases have been traced down to illiterate peasants and laborers, who used the wire for repairing farm implements, handling straw etc. Sometimes the excuse has been made that the wire was German or Italian and that the offender was unaware that the Allies were now using them. A number of offenders have been caught and tried by Military Courts but incomplete evidence and the apparent humanness of the motive have usually meant a short term of imprisonment or a small fine. However a recent trial for wire-cutting produced a sentence of twenty years, and the situation is improving through propaganda, and widespread publicity of convictions and penalties.

7. Baselets

Large numbers of prominent and active Fascists have been arrested and interned, many of them at the request of AMGYT. The security object in these arrests was to destroy possible foci of resistance and subversion. Such arrests continue, but on a reduced scale. It has proved a most difficult task to distinguish the most deserving candidates for arrest, since laudable denunciations are made by local informers from personal dislike or for personal gain, and since many are performing useful functions from which they cannot lightly be spared. As expected, there are complaints by the civil population that harmless persons have been arrested while dangerous Fascists are still at large, but in general it can be said that our object has been achieved in that Fascism, as such, is now unlikely to prove a danger to our security (in its widest sense) in Sicily.

For further particulars of Fascists' arrest, see Appendix 'A'.

8. Arrests

The biggest problem in respect of arrested civilians has proved to be that of records. These have tended to show insufficient details of the reasons for the arrest, so that numbers of civilian prisoners have been held in AMGYT goals and P/W camps with no clear indication as to their ultimate disposal. In some cases details of the arrest were entirely lacking, but part, if not all, of this number would be accounted for by combat troops who made arrests of civilians in forward areas, passing them back through ordinary P/W channels without reference to PSP/IC. The situation was further complicated by the fact that during the campaign of formations and their security sections were moving rapidly forward while P.W. were in general moving back.

Every effort has been made by this Headquarters and the two Armies to bring past records up to date and the situation is now fairly satisfactory. In collaboration with AMGYT a small committee has been set up to review all cases of civilians arrested in July and August and to authorize their disposal under one of the following categories:

- (a) those to be charged and tried for a security offense
- (b) those to be interned
- (c) those to be detained for further investigation
- (d) those to be released.

Here given as instructions have now been issued on procedure for the arrest of civilians on security grounds. Categories of arrest and detention, records, disposal of the prisoner and division of responsibility with AMGYT are now more clearly defined, and it is considered that a workable scheme has now been evolved.

At Appendix 'A' is a summary in tabular form of the appropriate numbers and

1949

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For further particulars of Fascist arrests, see Appendix 'A'.

2. Arrests

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More precise instructions have now been issued on procedure for the arrest of civilians on security grounds. Categories of arrest and detention, recovery, disposal of the prisoners and division of responsibility with AMCOY are now more clearly defined, and it is considered that a workable scheme has now been evolved.

At Appendix 'A' is a summary in tabular form of the approximate numbers and types of civilians arrested to date.

3. Reports of German Prisoners Perceived Still Unreleased

It has been reported that German soldiers are still at large in the interior of the island, but since the cessation of hostilities none has so far been discovered. However recently a case was reported near CHIAVARI (north of SICILIA) of a former being forced at pistol point to give food to a party of eight men, alleged to be Germans, and a search of the area is being made. PW and CIC are on the look-out for any members of the German Armed Forces in the event that any still remain unaccounted for.

10. Port Security

All ports used by Allied Forces are covered by British or U.S. Port Security Sections working in conjunction with the Naval Authorities. Liaison with the latter has been facilitated in the East by the presence of Lt. Cdr. MAY and Lt. McDONALD, Fleet Base Security Officers.

The security situation at the ports is satisfactory. Access to the dock areas is controlled and no sabotage of ships or installations has been reported.

No special difficulties have as yet been encountered in respect of merchant seamen. The normal shore leave pass system is in force and seamen are allowed ashore.

In SIRACUSA, MILITARY Courts try merchant seamen for offences committed ashore and penalties are imposed.

11. Security Organisation

All SICILY is "covered" from the territorial security point of view by British or U.S. security personnel, but very thinly in inland areas where there are few or no troops.

This Headquarters has assumed direct responsibility for security in the rear half of the Eighth Army area in order to free Eighth Army of that task.

Security in the Western half of the island is the responsibility of Seventh Army. S.E.S., under Seventh Army, controls four C.I.C. Port Sections who between them "cover", from the territorial point of view, the whole of the area occupied by U.S. troops. C.I.C. detachments with the formations of Seventh Army are dovetailed into this scheme but are responsible primarily for the security of the particular formation to which they are attached.

One S.I.(b) officer is stationed in PALERMO and one in the CATANIA - TACOMINA area.

1948

APPENDIX 'A'

CIVILIAN ARRESTS

1. Seventh Army Area.

Complete reports of arrests in Seventh Army area are not yet to hand, but the number is estimated at about five hundred.

An analysis of the first 300 shows that practically all were arrested as dangerous Fascists. About half a dozen suspected O.V.R.s. agents were also included.

The following are some of the more important arrests made in this area:

NAME	ARRESTED AT	REMARKS
CARBONI Scandalo	AGRIGENTO	Prefect
PACCUCCI Renato	CALTANISSETTA	Prefect
SALMONI Alfredo	PALEMO	Capt. member of Carabinieri C.F. Organisation.
SCAFA Felice	PALEMO	"
TRIPODI Eugenio	PALEMO	"

2. Eighth Army Area.

Arrests effected in the Eighth Army area for the period 10 July to 20 Aug 43 numbered 534, divided as follows:

Government	
Prefects	2
Podesta	7
Questore	1
Fascist Party	
Vice-Federal Secretaries	1
Political Secretaries	50
M.V.S.R. (Officers)	43
M.V.S.R. (Other Ranks)	20
Squadristi and minor Fascist members	332
C.F. Organisation	
Members of C.C.F. Counter-Expionage Organization	12
O.V.R.s. Agents (suspected)	6

Miscellaneous

Deserters (in uniform or

CARBONI Stimulato	ACQUARO	Prefect
PASQUCCI Renato	CALABRITTA	Prefect
SALAMONE Alfredo	PALIANO	Capt. Member of Carabinieri C.E. Organization.
SCAFA Felice	PALIANO	"
TRIPOLI Eugenio	PALIANO	"

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Prefects	2
Podests	7
Questore	1

Fascist Party

Vice-Federal Secretaries	1
Political Secretaries	20
M.V.S.N. (Officers)	43
M.V.S.N. (Other Ranks)	20
Squadrista and minor	
Fascist members	352

C.E. Organization

Members of C.E.M. Counter	
-Espionage Organization	12
C.V.R.A. Agents (suspected)	6

Miscellaneous

Resisters (in uniforms or	58
swift)	
German Nationals	2
TOTAL	534

The following are names of the more prominent persons arrested:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ARRESTED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
ALBERTI, Bavario	SIRACUSA	Secretary of C.V.R. SIRACUSA
AMICLO, Vincenzo	MODICA	Comandante Legione M.V.S.N. SIRACUSA
BOONAFRUTO, Ascleo	SIRACUSA	Lt. Col. M.V.S.N. Judge of Military Court Foggia
CONICELLI, Oreste	CATANIA	Secretary C.V.R. Prof. of Law at University

8

NAME	ARRESTED	REMARKS
CONTELLANO, Campero	CIACUSA	Podesta. Ardent Fascist.
COSE, Don. Salvatore	CIACUSA	Prefetto of Prov. of CIACUSA. Ardent Fascist.
FORTUNI, Antonio	CIACUSA	Vice Podestato P.M.P. CIACUSA
GIUSTOLISI, Giuseppe	RAIUSA	Comandante G.I.L. Political Secretary
GIUGLIANO, Paolo	LENTINI	Comandante G.I.L. Political Secretary
MOLTESMITH, Carmelo	LICODIA RUBIA	Ex Comandante G.I.L. Political Secretary
MODONI,	RAIUSA	Prefetto
PISANELLE, Giuseppe	RAIUSA	Comandante M.V.S.M.
SALMONO, Livio	CARLANTINI	Comandante G.I.L. Political Secretary
SECCO, Cav. Giovanni	RAIUSA	Questore. Violent Fascist.
CIACUSA, Mario	MINO	Comandante G.I.L.
VANO,	RAIUSA	Major G.C.M.
BUCCANELLO, Tommaso	PALACCHIA	Comandante M.V.S.M.

3. It will be noted that in the above lists that no Fascist Federal Secretaries and few Prefects have been arrested. The reason for this is of course that such officials fled to the mainland on the arrival of the Allies.

1946

C.S.O.

Rebuck from CCAD's minute at 6.

P.S.D. and Admin. have had shots at his letter
and are now submitted is an amalgamation of
both

C.S. 25/8.

Note

Ref. above.

1945

Draft destroyed as his matter had already been
replied to GS 15 by CCAD and replied to in last
para of 37/223/HQ TS PA

Extract from CCA's minute
of Feb 70 of File 5007 C.S.

I particularly want the (6)
following point dealt with:-

Arrests of persons without
consulting AMSO and the
breakdown the cases.

Draft letter for me to sign
to D.D.M.I. 15 A.S. giving
specific cases noted.

Extd. from Lt. Col. Hays report.
date 13.8.43

Para 14. Security. Bob CIC and FSA
are causing difficulty by arresting civilians
without consulting AMST. At Syracuse
a handworking wood spical named LUARA
was arrested and SCRO has obtained only
a 10 day suspension. At RASUSA a Capt
Robinson (F.S.S.) arrested the chief doctor
on an obviously false accusation; at MONT
ROSSO is released Sicilian prisoners were
suddenly re-arrested and ~~work ceased~~
by F.S. M.C.O.; the staff at the Soap factory
at SYRACUSE were all arrested and work
ceased; the vets in SYRACUSE have been
arrested so meat killing has ceased.

It is suggested that the price 17 S.1 (6)
be considered at a high level, and that
the Committee envisaged in AMST plan
F Para 45 be set up at once.

19
8
43
(date 18.8.43)

Subject: Security

To : Maj. Harold Smith
Major Harold Smith
Lt. Brown

2. General Namoli gave me an urgent message to be copied about 12:40 this noon. He verbally being on duty I went to the central newspaper room which was cluttered. I investigated further and found there were no copies or editorial personnel in the registry, photograph room, mail room or personnel department. Further investigation disclosed that I was the only Allied personnel on this floor and that the reception clerk at the door had also gone to lunch. At this time there were three unidentified American civilians in the hall with the two Commanders as well as half a dozen American women who were unidentified while waiting in the central registry and in the other room.

3. In the absence of anyone in the building I personally maintained a watch over that part of the office until about 1:10 when an American enlisted man appeared looking for mail. I pointed him to the mail and registry sections and told him to stay there until some of our duty personnel should return.

4. With everything over 300 enlisted personnel at Palermo, including the full guard company, there is absolutely no reason why the offices should be deserted during any period of the day or night, and particularly during an hour when Italian personnel were free access to the offices and files.

5. Steps should be taken immediately to provide duty clerks and operators not only for the registry and mail room but for the general supervision of the offices during the lunch hour when papers are at necessity left unattended and unlocked.

Harold Smith
23 Army Group

CHARLES L. STANFORD
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
Chief Staff Officer

1943

18/8/43

File
4

1000/1000/100

17 April 1943

HEADQUARTERS
1008/PS
10 AUG 1943
AMGOT

15 AUG 1943/2/10/10

1. AM. 15.

8 AUG 1943

SUBJECT: ~~Security at Base~~

After the departure of Second Battalion Para H.Q., Capt J.S. COLE, G(ops), will deal with local security matters affecting Para H.Q.

He will also be in a position to supply information, if required, concerning geographical code names, SIGOT procedure, etc.

H.Q. 15 Army Group.
FIELD.

RECOMMENDATION: ~~None~~


H.M. 15 - North Major 1944

H.M. 15 (1).

To 36K
Capt DAVIS

P/A
11/8

10/8



15AG/1471/G(Ib)

6 Aug 43

LIST 'A' (Less 6, 23, 31, 41, 42, 44, 46)

The War Office has stated that there have been cases of British troops in SICILY sending cables to the United Kingdom notifying their safe arrival in the Island.

It is probable that these cables were passed to CAIRO or MALTA for transmission.

It should be noted that such a practice constitutes a breach of security and cannot be permitted.

All ranks are authorised to reveal their presence in SICILY in their private letters home, but NOT in cables.

H. 15 Army Group,
B.M.A.F.

To SER 1941
CAPT DAVIS

W D G. v. 1-101
Brigadier,
R.G.S.(I).

SECRET

Security Conference held at A.V.G.O.T. Headquarters
on 24 July, 1943.

1. The following were present :-

Chairman. Lt. Col. Gerry, A.V.G.O.T.
Chief Finance Officer. A.V.G.O.T.
G.2 I(b), Eighth Army.
G.A.O., SYRACUSE.
G.A.O., SYRACUSE Province.
G.A.P.O., SYRACUSE.
G.P.M., 6 Base Sub-Area.
G.2, 6 Base Sub-Area.
A.P.M., 6 Base Sub-Area.
Town Major.
G.I.B. rep.
G.3 Military I(b), Eighth Army.
G.3 Civil I(b), Eighth Army.
P.S.O., 263 P.S.S.
P.S.O., 314 P.S.S.
P.S.O., 21 Fort S.S.

2. G.2 I(b) proposed that a weekly Security Conference for SYRACUSE should be held. It would be attended by representatives of interested Departments and Branches.

It was agreed that the conference should be held every Friday at A.V.G.O.T. HQ at 1000 hrs until further notice.

3. The following points were raised by G.2 I(b), Eighth Army.

(a) Restriction of Civilian movement.

(i) In SYRACUSE Town.

The control of civilian movement in the close proximity of prohibited areas may be necessary. This point is to be investigated by interested parties, and in case of necessity the evacuation of adjacent buildings may be recommended to Sub-Area and the total prohibition of movement in the vicinity may be undertaken.

C.A.O., SYRACUSE.
 C.A.O., SYRACUSE Province.
 C.A.O., SYRACUSE.
 C.A.P.O., SYRACUSE.
 M.F.M.
 G.2., 6 Base Sub-Area.
 A.P.M., 6 Base Sub-Area.
 Town Major.
 G.2.B. rep.
 G.3 Military I(b), Eighth Army.
 G.3 Civil I(b), Eighth Army.
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(ii) In SYRACUSE Province.

Closer control and more stringent restriction of civilian movement on main roads was recommended. It was pointed out that in the Proclamation, civilians are allowed to move freely for a distance of 10 Kms from their homes. **It was decided to take this matter up on an Army level and to recommend temporarily the reduction of 10 Kms to 2 Kms.** It was recommended that prohibition of lifts to civilians in W.D. vehicles should be ordered, except where the driver is in possession of authority to lift civilians for special reasons. 6 Base Sub-Area agreed to issue necessary orders.

(b) Curfew. /.....

P/A 9/8 R

- 2 -

(b) Curfew.

Attention was drawn to the almost total disregard of curfew regulations.

It was recommended that the time of curfew be reduced to the period from 2100 hrs to 0430 hrs, and that civilians should definitely be required to remain either within their houses or within shelters during curfew hours. In the event of air raids they are not to leave their houses if they elect to stay at home for the night rather than go to a shelter.

G.2 Sub-Area and G.2 I(b) agreed to arrange for strict enforcing of the curfew.

Subsequently G.2 Sub-Area called to see Col. Gerry and G.2 I(b), and informed them that the Commander had stated that he would prefer hours of curfew to be 2000 hrs to 0500 hrs.

This was agreed to.

4. Carabinieri and Police.

The question of the issue of arm-bands to Carabinieri and Police and the registration of Carabinieri arms was raised.

It was agreed that A.V.G.C. should issue the arm-bands as soon as possible, and that the GSI(b) Pass Office will proceed with the registration of arms and the issue of special identity documents, after vetting by P.S.S.

It was agreed that Carabinieri should be employed during curfew hours.

5. Guardia di Finanza.

The question of the retention of their uniforms by Guardia di Finanza was raised by A.V.G.C.

It was agreed that they would continue to wear their uniforms, with arm-bands as for Carabinieri, but would not carry arms.

6. Civilian Passes and Identity Documents.

G.2 I(b) pointed out that the policy regarding passes had been circulated widely in Twelfth Army Security Instructions Nos. 9 and 12, dated 11 June and 16 June 1943, but that certain minor points needed adjustment.

The policy provides for uniformity and the centralisation of the vetting through GSI(b) of Eighth Army. The passes which

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- (a) A.H.G.O. Passes.
Long and short journeys after names had been vetted by GSI(b).
Circulation pass after curfew to doctors, nurses etc., also after vetting by GSI(b).

(b) G.S.I. (b) Passes. /

- 3 -

- (b) G.S.I. (b) Passes.
- White Pass. To civilians of allied nationality, members of Welfare organisations such as V.V.C.A. et Brown Pass. For agents employed by Military Intelligence.
 - Permits to civilian personnel employed by Allied forces, contractors for labour etc.
 - Permits for entry of civilians into prohibited military areas.
- The issue of permits to labour will not be undertaken but lists of labourers employed will be sent in to the GSI(b) Pass Office.
7. The organisation for dealing with the issue of passes consists of one pass Officer attached to Main HQ and one pass officer each attached to 86 Area, 151 Sub-Area and 6 Base Sub-Area. At those places where pass Officers are not located, GSI(b) passes will be issued by F.3.3., always with prior reference to GSI(b), Main HQ Eighth Army.

8. Identity Documents.

The pass system as laid down is linked with the identity documents system.

It has been noted that many civilians are not in possession of civilian identity cards.

In order to regularise this, GSI(b) are taking over all stocks of blank identity cards and will issue them to civilians after establishing their identity.

It was requested by GSI(b) that if any passes or permits were found to have been issued not in accordance with the above they should be confiscated and sent to GSI(b), Main Eighth Army.

9. Enemy soldiers in civilian clothes.

Policy in connection with the above is as follows :-

- (a) Italian soldiers on agricultural leave and in possession of the correct certificate may be allowed to continue at liberty. 19.9
- (b) Self demobilised Italian and German soldiers and deserters will be rounded up and put into P.W. Cages.

10. Wireless receiving sets.

Wireless receiving sets owned by civilians will be

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10. Wireless receiving sets.

Wireless receiving sets owned by civilians will be retained by them and will be registered forthwith with A.M.G.C.C.,

11. Photographic film and printing materials are required by Army. A.M.G.C.C. agreed to make arrangements for their impounding and to inform GSI(b) where such materials may be examined and collected.

