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Headquarters
Allied Central Mediterranean Force

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25 January 1944

SUBJECT: Security Notes No. 8.

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Attached are AFHQ Security Notes No. 8 in two parts; which are forwarded for your information.

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Lieut General,
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

17 January 1944.

E-369, 314/10.

SUBJECT: Security Notes No. 3.

Attached are Security Notes No. 3 in two parts:

1. A translation of a French document describing the function of the Surete aux Armees. This corresponds to a considerable extent to our Field Security Sections and Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments.

2. Notes on the employment of Field Security Sections in Armoured Divisions.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

G. S. Hill-Ballantyne,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

DISTRIBUTION.

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JAF, War Office, London.
G.H.Q., Home Forces
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2. Notes on the employment of Field Security Sections in
Armoured Divisions.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1. S. S. HILL-BILLION,
Colonel, U.S.,
G-2 (C.I.) Section.

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32 Military Mission

1 (32) Arm. Div.

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"GURATE MILITARY"

The following instructions have been published by General STALIN's Headquarters to regulate the Decree of 4 November 1943 on the functions of the "Gurate aux armes".

These instructions are intended to define the rights and duties of personnel of the "Gurate aux armes" as well as their relationship with the "Service de Securite Militaire".

PRINCIPLES

The "Gurate aux armes" is formed from police officials incorporated in the armed forces.

This special character has been given to them to enable them to carry out the police side of their duties in complete independence and impartiality.

But, in the exercise of their police functions, the personnel of the "Gurate aux armes" enjoy a necessary independence they will retain subject to the rules of military discipline, and liable to its penalties and their employment will be governed by the requirements of the "Service de Securite Militaire".

FUNCTIONS

In all functions the officer in charge of the "Service de Securite Militaire" is responsible for the collection of all counter espionage reports, for the collection of which he is responsible. He will on the "Gurate aux armes", particularly in "civilian circles".

The "Service Militaire" will classify these reports. Those on which in his opinion immediate action can be taken, he will bring back to the "Gurate" with a request to investigate and report on the situation. In each case he will lay down the degree of importance and the priority. He is entitled, by virtue of the close collaboration and mutual confidence which must exist between them, to ask the Chief Commissioner of the "Gurate aux armes" for advice whenever he considers it will be helpful.

The actual execution of the mission and the choice of means and method are exclusively the province of the Chief Commissioner of the "Gurate aux armes". He and his staff are responsible for deciding on the steps to

But, if in the exercise of their police functions, the personnel of the "Sûreté aux armées" enjoy a necessary independence they will remain subject to the rules of military discipline, and liable to its penalties and their employment will be governed by the requirements of the "Service de Sécurité Militaire".

Conclusion

In all formation the officer in charge of the "Service de Sécurité Militaire" is responsible for the collection of all counter-espionage reports, for the collection of which he is independent from all the "Sûreté aux armées", particularly in "Civilian Circles".

The Security Militaire officer will classify these reports. Those on which in his opinion immediate action can be taken, he will hand back to the Sûreté with a request to investigate and report on the situation. In each case he will lay down the degree of importance and the priority. He is entitled, by virtue of the close collaboration and mutual confidence which must exist between them, to ask the Chief Commissioner of the "Sûreté aux armées" for advice whenever he considers it might be helpful.

The actual execution of the mission and the choice of means and method are exclusively the province of the Chief Commissioner of the "Sûreté aux armées". He and his staff are responsible for deciding on the steps to be taken to initiate judicial proceedings, also in the necessary cases. In his own initiative or at the request of the Security Militaire officer, the Head of the "Sûreté aux armées" will keep the former informed of the progress of his enquiries, judicial proceedings and of the conclusions.

It will be understood, of course, that in the absence of definite orders from the Security Militaire officer, the Sûreté will not remain inactive.

The collection of information, in particular counter-espionage information in civilian circles, is a constant and overriding responsibility of the Sûreté. This work will be carried out under the direction of the Commissioner by the special methods peculiar to the Sûreté. (1).

Finally, the Chief Commissioner of the "Sûreté aux armées" will at all times be responsible for the conduct, training and performance of his staff. From any level down to the individual he will be the inspiring and directing force.

- 1 -
SECRET
(Under British Control)

1860

SECRET
(Excludes British Subject)

POSITION OF THE "SURETE MILITAIRE" IN THE "SERVICE DE SECURITE MILITAIRE"

In every formation the "Surete aux Armes" will be an integral part of the "Service de Securite Militaire". The Chief of St M, through the intermediary of the Securite Militaire officer, will be the head of the whole organization, subject to the working independence of the Surete.

All correspondence will pass through the Chief of St M with the exception of to the correspondence between the "Surete aux Armes" and the various police services or other specialist departments.

The "Surete aux Armes" within the "Service de Securite Militaire" is entitled to equipment, in particular transport, which is allotted to it as part of its own establishment. The Securite Militaire officer is empowered to make temporary increases in its equipment at the request of the Chief Commissioner of the "Surete aux Armes". Conversely, when necessary, he can make temporary decreases upon the equivalent on charge to the Surete in order to carry out a mission of the Securite Militaire, which does not come within the scope of the Surete.

Attached as an appendix are instructions on the uniform to be worn by the "Surete aux Armes".

By Command of
Major General SERUD
Commander-in-Chief
Major P. LLOYD
Director of the "Service de Securite Militaire"
P. LLOYD

(1) Respectfully by setting up a network of information.

By Command of

RAY DONALD AIR ID
Commander-in-Chief

Major P. HILLOTT
Director of Intelligence

P. HILLOTT

(1) Respectfully by setting up a network of informants.

- 2 -
SECRET
(Charles British LITTON)

SECRET
(Transmittal Copy)

ANNEX A

UNIFORMS OF THE GUARTE AUX ARMEES

I. Personnel of the "Guarte aux Armes" will normally wear military uniform on the same conditions as officers and NCO's, namely:

For Officers

1. If the officials of the Guarte are on the strength of a large formation which has French equipment, they will be clothed at their own expense and will be provided for this purpose with the clothing card issued by the Commandant.

2. If they are on the strength of a large formation which has American equipment, they will be clothed at government expense, but their uniforms will not be their own property and must be handed in when they cease to belong to the "Guarte aux Armes".

For NCO's

In every case they will be clothed at government expense on the same scale as NCO's of the Reserve called back to the colors.

II. Officials of the "Guarte aux Armes" will wear on their uniforms badges of rank corresponding to the rank awarded them by the decree of the 4 November 1943. These badges, formed of silver stripes on a black background, do not confer on those who wear them any rights or privileges other than those specified in the article of the movement decree. In particular, they give them no power of command over the military, except in certain cases where it may be necessary to put troops at their disposal in order to carry out all defined and temporary mission. In that case they will be provided with a special letter of authority.

Officials of the "Guarte aux Armes" are subject to the existing regulations regarding the payment of compliments in the army. They are not entitled themselves to take disciplinary action against the military, but it is their duty to report to Headquarters lapses on the part of the military in order that they may be punished.

When wearing military uniform, officials of the "Guarte aux Armes" will wear the badge of their service which corresponds to the traditional badges of the various arms and services. The badge of the "Guarte aux Armes", corresponding to the regulation badge of the various arms and services, the badge of the "Guarte aux Armes", consisting of a double vertical line,

In every case they will be clothed at Government expense on the same scale as M.C.O.'s of the Reserve called to the colors.

II. Officials of the "Gurats aux Armes" will wear on their uniforms badges of rank corresponding to the rank earned them by the decree of the 4 November 1943. These badges, made of silver stripes on a black background, do not confer on those who wear them any rights or privileges other than those specified in the article of the decree itself. Except in certain cases, they give the no power to command over the military, except in certain cases where it may be necessary to put troops at their disposal in order to carry out a well defined and temporary mission. In that case they will be provided with a special letter of authority.

Officials of the "Gurats aux Armes" are subject to the existing regulations regarding the giving of compliments in the army. They are not entitled themselves to take disciplinary action against the military, but it is their duty to report to Headquarters lapses on the part of the military in order that they may be punished.

When wearing military uniform, officials of the "Gurats aux Armes" will wear the badge of their service which corresponds to the regulation badges of the various arms and services. The badge of the "Gurats aux Armes", corresponding to the regulation badge of the various arms and services, is the badge of the "Gurats aux Armes", consisting of a double centaur head, in the same as that of Police officials.

III. To enable them to carry out certain duties, Headquarters may authorize officials of the Gurats aux Armes to wear uniform or even the uniform of any corps or service of the army, the navy, or the air force.

In the latter case the uniform they carry the badge of rank of an official. It is not higher than that of the official in his own organization. Moreover, officials of the "Gurats aux Armes" authorized to wear military uniform, other than that of their own service will carry an official document giving this specific authority.

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EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD SECURITY SERVICES WITH ARMORED DIVISIONS

1. Introduction

The following account of the employment of a field security section with an armored division is based on three reports written and received some six months after the close of the Tunisian Campaign, one from an armored Division which fought throughout with the British in Tunisia and one each from 1 Armoured and 7 Armoured Divisions who came from the desert with the Eighth Army. The latter has since been detached on the U. S. Fifth Army front in Italy and has thus had a rather wider experience, in territory where Allied Military Government has functioned.

2. Phases of employment

Generally speaking the following phases have been experienced: the pre-operational stage, active operations, consolidation of localities, the Division in reserve, and the post-operational stage. These phases will be dealt with under the categories of static conditions and mobile conditions.

3. Static Conditions

a. Pre-operational stage. It is generally true that at this stage the work of the field security section will not greatly differ from that of an Inf. Div. During the planning they have an important part to play, preventing leakage of information and ensuring the security of their headquarters. Moreover this is the ideal time for the field security section to ensure that all ranks of the Division have some knowledge of how they work in operations; this can best be done by their being detached to brigades, where, in conversations with troops or by advice or by lectures, they can tell of the Division in security matters and make known their role. The work of the F.S.S. vis a vis the civilian population will not at this stage be extensive, though it is a time when rumors among civilians as well as troops should be carefully watched. The F.S.S. Section will have its own toiling to undertake during this time; there are three major ways in which this will differ from that of an Inf. Div. 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will be dealt with under the categories of static conditions and mobile conditions.

3. Static Conditions

a. The operational stage. It is generally true that at this stage the work of the Army Div. S.S. Section will not greatly differ from that of an Inf. Div. During the planning they have an important part to play, preventing leakage of information and ensuring the security of line-holding headquarters. Moreover this is the ideal time for S.S. Sec. to ensure that all ranks of the Division have some knowledge of how they work in operations; this can best be done by their being detached to brigades, where, in conversations with troops or by advice or by lectures, they can learn and locate the Division in security matters and make known their role. The work of the S.S. Sec. vis-a-vis the civilian population will not at this stage be extensive, though it is a time when rumors among civilians as well as troops should be carefully watched. The S.S. Section will have its own training to undertake during this time; there are three major ways in which this will differ from that of an Inf. Div. S. S. Sec.:

- (1) It requires a first hand knowledge of how an Army Div. fights.
- (2) It requires a high standard of German, because of the importance of the I (G) work, particularly for the recognition of captured documents.
- (3) It must make a wide study of maps of districts and towns and of lists of suspects, owing to the extent of ground which an Army Div. may be expected to cover after the break through.

b. The Division in reserve

At such periods the Division will very likely be in an area already covered for security by another S.S. Sec. If this is so, and if the length of stay of the Army Div. is uncertain, it has been found best for the S.S. Sec. not to interfere; this does however result in a period of comparative idleness. Emphasis is best laid on military security; troops may for instance be diverted and cautioned by Security platoons.

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c. Post-operational State. On the successful conclusion of a campaign the F.S.I. Div. will have considerable experience in the final consolidation of the area. In this work it will function very much like any other Section. Even where F.S.I. is preparing to set up its administration, there is likely to be a parallel in the immediate aftermath of the battle when F.S.I. have of great value in connection with matters affecting local inhabitants, acting as the link between the military and the much civil administration as it exists; they will also have an important part to play in ensuring the transfer of the local population and guarding against any potential post-operational danger to the security of the Division. In Tunisia, before the French administration had established itself, Sections were usually employed for many weeks on every aspect of civil administration; the French police and other authorities had been working under enemy direction and were completely stunned by the turn of events with the result that nearly all their work came to F.S.I. Some of this work of course was peculiar to F.S.I. Secs. working with F.S.I. Divs.

4. Mobile Conditions

a. Active Operations. It is in this phase that the F.S.I. Sec. is occupied chiefly in (a) work. It should be trained to carry out the following tasks:

- (1) Search of captured enemy HQ and (areas with the object of locating and exhuming documents and materials of Intelligence interest.
- (2) Interrogation of civilians in newly occupied zones, particularly those who have no free or through the enemy's lines, in order to secure information about enemy intentions and locations and to establish information about the country (the D, of vital importance to F.S.I. Secs.)
- (3) Selection of PW for interrogation by the Div. F.S.I. frequently they cannot all be interrogated and the F.S.I. Secs. must in choosing those likely to give best results.

F.S.I. Secs. have also been used in a propaganda role, distributing small leaflets to people in forward areas, giving reassuring news about the trend of the battle.

b. Consolidation of the Lines. It is impossible to foresee

- (1) Search of captured enemy mail and captured documents and materials of intelligence interest.
- (2) Interrogation of civilians in newly occupied areas, particularly those who have come from or through the enemy's lines, in order to secure information about enemy intentions and locations and to obtain intelligence information about the country ahead, of vital importance to the F.F.S.
- (3) Selection of PW for interrogation by the Div. I.O. Frequently they cannot all be interrogated and the F.F.S. can do little in choosing those likely to give best results.

F.F.S. have also been used in a propaganda role, distributing small leaflets to people in German areas, giving reassuring news about the trend of the battle.

b. Consolidation of the lines. It is impossible to pursue all the problems that may arise, as each will be one of many. The attitude of local inhabitants, and availability or otherwise of a F.F.S. in any case, the Div. being highly mobile, the F.F.S. will act as the main force either to more static F.F.S. sections following or to F.F.S. in the institution of certain security measures. Duties are likely to include:

- (1) Issuing to the local area and police forces, in co-operation with Provost, instructions and regulations regarding curfew, guarding of vulnerable points, looting, handling in of arms and ammunition, clearing of refugees and traffic from the roads.
- (2) Carrying out any arrests justified by information available before the battle and joined in the occupation of civilians since. Such arrests should preferably be delayed until the arrival of F.F.S. or more static sections, though the removal of one or two suspects in high position has been

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found to have an immediate salutary effect.

(3) Quick appreciation and recording of the security situation in the locality concerned, together with any action, such as the search for suspected radio transmitters, as may be urgently necessary. Action taken and all local information should be made available to the relieving section by the most expeditious means.

(4) Receiving enquiries about civil affairs matters and assuring civilians of the impending arrival of an organisation to deal with those matters.

A keen need is felt by the AND, Div. P.S. Sec. during this phase for some sort of "pending cry" in which to hold refugees and suspects and to feed them. The closer the pull up of some static sections the easier the task of the AND, Div. Sec. both in dealing with civilians and in handing over information.

5. Dislocation, Transport and Detachment of P.S.I.

a. In its I (a) role the Section is probably best concentrated at Div. H.Q. where the latest requirements of the "G" Branch and the I.O. in particular, can be made known and from where P.S.I. can be detached on specific missions. It may be advisable however, for detachments to remain with brigades and assist rigid I.O.'s in a similar manner.

In its I (b) role, when the capture of a town is imminent P.S.I. will generally break away from formation H.Q.'s, particularly if the greater part of the Division is likely to bypass or to avoid remaining in the town.

b. The mobility of the P.S. Sec. is of prime importance. Motor cycles alone have proved inadequate for almost all the tasks outlined above, whilst 15-cwt or 30-cwt trucks often prove cumbersome along the roads crowded by purely military traffic. The ideal vehicle is that the ideal form of transport is the Jeep, the number required being sufficient to guarantee self-sufficient, independent mobility to the P.S. Sec. and at least three pairs of I.O.O.'s; the rest of the Section, forming Sec. H.Q. would be provided with one truck and motor cycles.

c. Other items of equipment which have been considered essential are:-

- (1) Diverco, 1 x 100 lb. and 6 x 2 men.

5. Disposition, Transport and Equipment of I.S.S.

a. In its I (a) role the Section is probably best concentrated at Div. H. I. There the I best requirements of the "P" Branch and the I.O. in particular, can be made known and from where P.S.I. can be demonstrated on specific missions. It may be advisable however, for detachments to remain with brigades and assist rigade I.O.'s in a similar manner.

In its I (b) role, when the capture of a town is imminent P.S.I. will generally break away from formation H. I.'s, particularly if the greater part of the Division is likely to bypass or to avoid running in the town.

b. The mobility of the I.S. Sec. is of prime importance. Motor cycles alone have proved inadequate for almost all the tasks outlined above, whilst 15-cwt or 30-cwt trucks often prove cumbersome along the roads crowded by purely military traffic. The general belief is that the ideal form of transport is the Jeep, the number required being sufficient to guarantee self-sufficient, independent mobility to the I.S. Sec. and at least three pairs of I.C.O.'s; the rest of the Section, forming Sec. H. I., would be provided with one truck and motor cycles.

c. Other items of equipment which have been considered essential are:-

- (1) Binoculars, 1 x 140 Ix. and 6 x 20s.
- (2) 200 yd. compass and sighting utensils.
- (3) Lamp or additional set of torches.
- (4) Filley lamp.

6. Conclusion

1862

From the foregoing, it may be said that the security work of an Arm. Div. P.S. Sec. in static conditions presents few features to differentiate it from the work of an inf. Div. Sec.

In mobile conditions its use on security work has been found to be limited, whilst its I (a) role depends very much on transport being adequate for cross-country manoeuvre. The proportion of I(a) to I (b) work in such conditions is estimated to be 75% to 25%.

Feb 15 AM 10:00

P.S

15. 5/14/44, 4/25/44(b).

Up to January 1944.

1. It is believed that through an oversight the copy number was not indicated on the copy of the 15 Aff Group Security Summary No. 9, forwarded to you under cover of even reference dated 13 Jan 44.
2. A copy should be numbered 6.

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all these countries, still continue studies by which any ill revealed a serious lack of any real long-term planning for distribution of chlorine (PVC) production and table manufacturing during a period of economic boom and recession.

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that "because of our mutual friendship reported to me by the FBI and because of one or three names too distant in thought and placed in the FBI files, several investigations were investigated by FBI and possibly performed in the United States. In the investigation in the U.S. the FBI is advised that the person whose name was given to me had been arrested."

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total of 119 arrests of violations of security regulations was reported during the period covered. The following is a list of the violations of these regulations:-

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City of Dallas
County of Tarrant
State of Texas

• *Journal of the American Medical Association* 2000;283:2686-2692

• <http://www.ams.org>
• <http://www.ams.org>
• <http://www.ams.org>

evaluated. These criteria were:

(5) derivative vacuum and constant velocity.

Encouragement given to members of the Soviet Union, who were used as informers, has resulted in more cases of over-exaggerated self-importance. The party begins to adopt an excessively independent line which clashes with the
..... fundamentals.....

Subject:- 15 Army Group Security Summary No.9.

H.Q. 15 Army Group, G.H.Q.

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Reewith 15 Army Group Security Summary No.9 for period 16 Dec to 31 Dec 43.

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15 - 21 GROUP SECURITY SUMMARY No. 9

Period covered 16 Dec to 31 Dec 43

GENERAL SURVEY.

A large part of the time and attention of RIF/SIC in the Army areas continued to be devoted to the control of civilian movement. The casualization of refugees from enemy occupied territory southwards through the RIF's was increasingly effective and the rear Army control line appeared to be working well and serving a useful purpose. The limiting factor has been shortage of man-power with which to enforce this control.

In addition to their primary I(b) function of acting as a security screen for refugees, the RIF's have been proving a valuable source of security intelligence for future operational areas and have also provided a useful cover on reports received from other sources.

On 4 Jan 44 the Fifth Army portion of the Army control line was moved to be a line between the River Elbe and the River Rhine. Its move to the River Elbe, between the River Elbe and the River Rhine, was the line of the River Elbe and the River Rhine.

In addition to the three agents whose arrest was reported in our last summary six more were captured in the Fifth Army area during the period covered. These were all Italian agents of the short-range type, sent by the Germans through the Allied lines in order to bring back information on Allied troop movements, formation signs, gun positions, etc. a further short-range agent of Italian nationality was also arrested in the Fifth Army area.

The loss was reported of a number of RIF/SIC Operation Instructions, issued by the RIF and stolen in 1943 on 3 Jan 44 while in custody of a British officer. These documents were later recovered by the French police but it is not yet known whether the contents have been compromised or not. A careful study of the documents involved revealed that knowledge of their contents would prove of limited value to the enemy except in a general way.

Security arrests reported during the period numbered 119 divided as follows:-

- 20 for trial on a specific charge (Category A).
- 63 for internment (Category B)
- 7 for detention pending further investigation (Category C).

A few cases of wire cutting were reported, mainly from the Fifth Army area. In one case there were indications of possible sabotage but further investigation showed no further results. No other incidents involving possible or

moved for the to the following the River Suddo from its mouth to the River Gambia and Volungo is hitherto.

In addition to the three points where arrest was reported in our last survey six more were reported in the Fifth Army area during the period covered. These were all Italian agents of the short-range type, located by the Germans through the Allied lines in order to bring back information on Allied troop movements, formation signs, gun positions, etc. A further short-range agent of Italian nationality was also arrested in the Eighth Army area.

The last was reported of a number of ROSS Secret Operation Instructions, issued by this HQ and several in mid-June on 3 Jan 44 while in custody of a British officer. These documents were later recovered by the French police but it is not yet known whether the contents have been compromised or not. A careful study of the documents involved revealed that knowledge of their contents would prove of limited value to the enemy except in a general way.

Security measures reported during the period numbered 149 divided as follows:-

- 29 for trial on a specific charge (Category A).
- 63 for internment (Category B).
- 7 for detention pending further investigation (Category C).

A few cases of wire cutting were reported, mainly from the Fifth Army area. In one case there were indications of possible sabotage but further investigation was pending. No other incidents involving possible or suspected saboteurs were reported.

Incidents reported during the period under survey included a number occasioned by the capture of General KOTLIKOFF, which led to much speculation among troops on the possible transfer to the UK of certain other key personnel and formations. The publication by J.P. of the newspaper, "The Carriers Alliance", in December was reported to be providing a counter to success in quelling the flow of extremely optimistic or pessimistic rumors current among the civilian population. A few reports were also received that the Fifth Army was receiving news in England and Ireland.

During the fortnight concerned, a considerable amount of security intelligence in the form of reports and subject lists was supplied from I(b) and I(c) sources to the GCHQ for the purpose of the current on the

- 2 -

Army 31st CB units operated in both army areas under the direction of PSL(b)/G-2(CI) which fairly satisfactory results, but a certain amount of natural suspicion and on Justice has to be overcome before they can be fully and sympathetically accepted by Corps and Divisions.

Liaison has been maintained with the Sécurité Militaire, as well as with the French G-2 Service. The French Corps is responsible for security coverage of its area, under the direction of the Army G-2(CI) Staff. All relevant security records have been passed to the CI, and security personnel familiar with the area and its personalities are accompanying 31st Agents in their initial work in the area.

Receivable reports have been received on the cooperation provided to PSL/CIS by the G-2.

Contact was made by G-2(b) this morning with the G-2 Staffs of 12th and 15th Air Forces, and agreement was reached concerning the division of security responsibility between Air Force G-2 personnel and PSL/CIS of the ground force, and the way in which the activities of both should be coordinated in order to achieve a minimum of operational inefficiency and to eliminate any possible source of overlapping or friction.

Contact was also made with G-2 No. 3 District, established in SRI, and the latter has been supplied with all relevant security directives issued by this Headquarters.

PAGE II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) Several MGL 32000 documents were lost in 1943 when the personal kit of a British officer was stolen on 3 Jan 44. The documents involved included copies of instruction 15 Army Group Operation Instructions, eleven 15 Army Group Standing Operation Instructions, and a copy of the title of Organization of SIM Fifth Army. These documents have since been recovered by the French Police and an opinion is held from PSL regarding the possibility of compromised letters; any action is initiated. A general study of all the documents concerned, with the exception of the T/O for SIM, showed that they would prove of only limited value to the enemy. Fifth Army has been asked for a report on the security aspect of a possible compromise of the SIM document.

(ii) Fifth Army Security personnel investigated a report that General of Brigade Enrico MATTEOLI of the Italian Supreme Command had been alerted and letters by Italian personnel before leaving alerted for MATTEOLI. General MATTEOLI stated that he was ignorant of any censorship violation and was merely bringing a few letters to the families of Italian in Africa. The letters were taken from him, and passed to IMC Fifth Army for appropriate action. It has been found that Italian military personnel in general have only a preliminary idea of the security regulations and comprehensive regulations are being

1. MILITARY SECURITY(a) Security of Information

(i) Several MOW documents were lost in 1944S when the personal kit of a British officer was stolen on 3 Jan 44. The documents involved included copies of thirteen 15 Army Group Operation Instructions, eleven 15 Army Group Standing Operation Instructions, and a copy of the T/O of the Organization of SLAF Fifth Army. These documents have since been recovered by the French Police and in opinion is being retained regarding the possibility of compromise before any action is initiated. A careful study of all the documents concerned, with the exception of the T/O for SLAF, showed that they would prove of only limited value to the enemy. Fifth Army has been asked for a report on the security aspect of a possible compromise of the SLAF document.

(ii) Fifth Army security personnel investigated a report that General of Brigade Enrico MATTEOLI of the Italian Supreme Command had been handed some letters by Italian personnel before leaving MATTEOLI for Naples. General MATTEOLI stated that he was ignorant of any compromise violation and was merely bringing a few letters to the families of Italian POWs in MATTEOLI. The letters were taken from him, and passed to INC Fifth Army for appropriate action. It has been found that Italian military personnel in general have only a preliminary idea of the principles of military censorship, and comprehensive regulations are being drawn up by INC, AMC in order to improve the standard of security of Italian troops' mail.

(iii) Routine checks by Fifth Army CIC revealed a certain laxity in some senior headquarters regarding the destruction of classified documents and their safeguarding during a move. Corrective action was taken.

(b) Security of Material and Installations

(i) No violations were reported by wire tapping.

(ii) Two cases of cut signal lines were reported in the Eighth Army area, and in one of these cases the culprit was caught and passed to AMI for trial. Several instances were investigated by Fifth Army security personnel in widely dispersed localities in the SLAF MATTEOLI - MATTEOLI - MATTEOLI area. In practically all cases lengths of wire had been removed. Deliberate sabotage was not suspected.

(iii) Cable containing several trunk lines between two Corps headquarters in the Fifth Army area was found cut at the cable stub and otherwise mutilated. No effort had been made to remove the cable which was buried, thus indicating possible sabotage. Investigations at the scene of the incident provided no further clues.

34

4. (c) Geometry of square to find by Pythagoras.

Nothing to report.

(a) Security of Personnel.

contribute to the report.

S. GINTIS & S. DUDLEY.

(a) Infusorial Supports.

(2) - Further six further agents were requested in the Fifth Army zone, all over each part through our Second positions by the army of about 100 miles, movements, identified back information concerning troop reports on all these areas have been forwarded to 25th. The first table sought have since been tried by Military Court and sentenced to death.

(ii) -- similar type of content in connection by HQ on 13 Dec 43 at ROCC, Madison (Prov. CHINE). He has also been kept through the allied lines by the enemy on a short-range reconnaissance mission. He has now been interrogated by the enemy on a long distance, "Unit and by GSDIC, H.H.H. A check on his story is being made with the Liaison, "A" Force, and a full report will be forwarded to HQ, almost immediately. The danger of this man is now being considered.

[illegible]

(65) Mr. Paresse, former director of C.I.F.O.B.I.O., whose present address was reported to be 11, rue de la Paix (Paris), advised that he reached the personal intervention of President E. DE GAULLE, who reached within the territory administered by the Italian Government.

(7) -- total of 100

[illegible]

• Rejection in court

Buch und Kunstverlag Gröschel
Karlshagen am Curia Berlin

(12) - similar type of report was arrested by FBI on 13 Dec 43 at NOGA, SALONICA (Prov. CHIRI). He has also been sent through the allied lines by the enemy on a short-term vacation mission. He has not been interrogated by the 21st Div, 1st S.I. (13) This case by 21st Div, 1st S.I. a check on his story is being made with the 3rd Div, 1st S.I. and a full report will be furnished to the 21st Div immediately. The details of this case are now being considered.

(14) SALONICA, CHIRI, as listed in Part II, whose story was reported in Part II, 21st Div, 1st S.I. (15) Army Group Security Summary 15-30 Nov 43, are both to be transferred to 21st Div, 1st S.I. for further investigation by 21st Div. The former, alleged deserter, is now a deserter and considerably greater suspicion, in the light of his most recent interrogation.

(16) SALONICA, CHIRI, former deserter of 21st Div, 1st S.I., whose arrest and interrogation are reported in Part II, 21st Div, 1st S.I. (17) of 15 Army Group Security Summary 15-30 Oct 43, are both to be transferred to 21st Div, 1st S.I. for further investigation by 21st Div. The former, alleged deserter, is now a deserter and considerably greater suspicion, in the light of his most recent interrogation.

(18) - total of 113 arrests of civilians on security grounds was reported during the period covered. Details are shown in Appendix "B". The following is a general analysis of these arrests:

Public Officials.

Of the 113 arrested officials
of the 1st S.I.

2

Public Officials.

Of the 113 arrested officials
of the 1st S.I.

2

11

Minor Public Officials (including 1st S.I.)

22

Public Officials.

Of the 113 arrested officials
of the 1st S.I.

58

24

113

(19) Subversive Movements and Organizations.

On movement given to members of the Partito d'Azione, CAPPODOLLO, who were useful as informers, has resulted in some cases of over-exaggerated self-importance. The 21st Div, 1st S.I. to adopt an extremely independent line which clashed with the regular mission of the administrative staff, and in consequence two of the principal anti-Partito d'Azione (CAPPODOLLO) are now in jail for offenses under Italian Law No. 2.

3. (c) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

Relations between troops and civilians continued to be generally good. One of the main sources of dissatisfaction on both sides was the high prices charged for certain commodities, for which each holds the other responsible.

(b) Civilian Reaction to the Operations.

(1) Little change has been noted during the period, the availability of food and other essential commodities still being the deciding factor. There have been one or two smaller demonstrations directed against the local civil administration, notably in Catania and Siracusa (Prov. Siracusa), but no evidence of any popular anticolonial feeling. Scarcity of food is invariably raised in the popular mind with the continuance in office of inefficient or Fascist officials, and such popular demonstrations have occurred when inspired mainly by war enthusiasm and anti-Fascist sentiments.

(2) In TORINO DI SICILIA (Prov. Siracusa), the two main towns in principal strength of resources, i.e., Piazza Giovanni XXIII and Via Benedetto Croce, Via Libertà, etc., have been enthusiastically approved by the inhabitants. A consumer drive painting has appeared in the town to the effect that on 7 Nov 49 the prices of all goods were reduced by 10% and the quality of goods was improved by 10%.

(3) The lack of postal facilities in CATANIA has caused a great amount of discontent among the population, and both sides and the UNO administration are blamed. An explanatory notice in the town published in the town newspaper, "Il Corriere Siciliano."

(c) Summary.

(4) Areas of Interest.

That the Germans shot all the money (about 100,000) for a ransom to yield the weapons belonging to the monastery. (Fifth Army area).

That the German General Commander in Catania was shot to death by a special order of the Fifth Army and was ordered to be shot immediately for having failed to carry out the complete and systematic destruction of the city of Catania. The city was to have been burnt. (Fifth Army area).

That the Fifth Army will be replaced in the near future by Second US Army and will leave Italy for an unknown destination, probably the US. (Fifth Army area). Source requested to be a more reliable source.

That Lt. Colonel is to be appointed Italian Governor of Catania.

(TORINO DI SICILIA).

That Italian troops are coming to fight with the Allies.

(CATANIA).

That the Allies are using Catania as a base for clearing the Sicilian coast.

(c) Remarks.

(E) German Civilians.

That the Germans met all the needs of MONTE CASINO for refusing to yield the treasure belonging to the monastery. (Fifth Army area).

That the former German Commander in this area was too late to destroy by special order of HIMMLER and was ordered to be shot immediately for a flag failed to carry out the order to and systematic destruction of the city of NUREM.

That Fifth Army will be replaced in the near future by Second US Army and will leave Italy for an unknown destination, probably the US. (Fifth Army area).

Source believed to be a former radio operator.

That the German is to be appointed Allied Governor of Italy.

(TURNING DE LAYING).

That German troops are coming to Italy to fight with the Allies.

(GARRISONING).

That the Allies are using German for carrying out operations (GARRISONING).

(12) German Troops.

That an ambitious leading role to be made on the beaches near CIVITAVECCHIA.

(Reported on 16 Dec by a Fifth Army officer to be carried across bridge under his command)

That Fifth Army will return to Germany to prepare for the invasion in the west, leaving Italy to the Canadians. (Troops in Germany area).

That 5 Corps will be back in Germany by the end of January. (5 Corps Troops, TUNIC).

That some German army staffs and formations are to return to the UK for the Second Front. (13 Corps Troops).

That 1 Can Div will be on its way back to England by 15 Mar 44.

(1 Can Div).

That 1 Can Div will take part in operations in France and will be in England by 1 June 44. (1 Can Div).

3. (a) Current Status of General Security Interest.

(i) The condition of refugees from enemy occupied territories, in this area through the RFP's was increasingly effective, and the RFP Army Central line appeared to be working well and serving a useful purpose. The Italian factor has been shortage of man-power with this, to enforce these controls. This difficulty has been particularly apparent in the more sparsely populated parts of the Italian Army Forward Area, where local CCRA resources are far from adequate. At a recent solution also was requested to fill the gap by local recruitment of auxiliaries, although the quality and efficiency of the latter are likely to be limited. The movement of displaced persons from Forward localities, although not seriously speaking in I(b) responsibility, also presented security personnel with a problem of some magnitude, since large numbers of this type of refugee intermingled with those who had fled their way from enemy occupied territory, thus creating a considerable extra burden on security personnel manning the control points. This problem became particularly acute during the occupation of the Central area where initially the situation appears to have been beyond the control of local resources.

(ii) Cases continue to occur of Italian military personnel in the Army areas on Italian leave (Comando Italiano) in spite of the order prohibiting leave personnel from entering such areas.

(iii) Two civilians were arrested by RFP at CORTEO AL VALLE for operating a ferry service for civilians across the G. Verde. They were tried by AM's military court and fined. In order to reduce the possibility of ferry services, all boats lying on the lower G. Verde have been collected and removed.

(iv) On 14 Dec 42, it was reported to PM in VASIO that six Italians had been overheard to say that they intended to cross the line into Northern Italy. The men had already left that morning. RFP carried out a rapid investigation on the spot and man was to establish the route by which the party intended to travel. A staff of immediately contacted to another RFP detachment located further north along this route. As a result the party was intercepted and removed. They were turned by AM's military court and have been sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment.

(v) A scheme for issuing all civilians in the Italian Army area (AM's) identity cards has been agreed upon by the AM in being put into effect as soon as sufficient stocks of identity cards can be secured. The issued are Italian G. Verde identity cards in to be used.

(vi) During the period under review, Fifth Army GIC conducted an intensive security survey of the G. Verde at G. Verde. The main problem was found to be shortage of personnel for G. Verde. Recommendations were also made in order to provide for the investigation of civilian personnel employed in the operation of the G. Verde in view of responsibility.

0137
SUBJECT: 15 Army Group Security Summary.

3.O.A.O. HQ. AD, 5th Army,
3.O.A.O. HQ. AD, 5th Army,
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3.O.A.O. HQ. AD, 5th Army,
3.O.A.O. HQ. AD, 5th Army.

URGENT.

15 Army Group,
C.I.B.

20/10/47.

3 Jan. 48.

The following extracts from 15 Army Group Security Summary for the period
1 Dec to 15 Dec 47, are forwarded for information.

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

URGENT.

Extracts from:-

15 ARMY GROUP SECURITY SUMMARY
PERIOD 1 DEC - 1 DEC to 15 DEC 47.

PAGE 1

General Survey.

Detailed instructions for both the restriction of civilian movement northwards across the rear Army Control Line (V-STRUCK - PARTIAL) and the centralization and security check of refugees from enemy occupied territory southwards were issued and implemented. Preliminary reports on the effectiveness of these controls were favourable. In the Eighth Army area along the frontiers for movement of movement regulations were reported during the period.

At Appendix 'D' (Army only) is a copy of the 150 Notices revoking the control of movement across the Army Control Line, and also a copy of the Provincial Order No. 4 (P.O. 4) imposing control of entry into the Province of PARANA immediately to the southeast of the Eighth Army rear boundary.

Some lack of uniformity continued to be noted in the issue of travel permits to civilians but reports indicated that in general the present situation was showing an appreciable improvement.

371 W Group has been designated by M. 100 for the detention of civilian internees and will shortly be set up in a District. The establishment of this interment camp should solve the various administrative problems of interment.

During the period covered, a new type of arrest form was introduced by both armies. This new form should simplify the maintenance of records and permit of greater exactness in indicating precise reasons for arrest and recommendations for disposal. The type of form put into use by Fifth Army is shown at Appendix 'E' (Army only). The Eighth Army arrest form is similar in design.

During the period under review reviewed 102.

Detailed instructions for both the restriction of civilian movement northwards across the rear Army Control Line (WUJUNGO - NAGUON) and the coordination and security check of refugees from enemy occupied territory southwards were issued and implemented. Preliminary reports on the effectiveness of these controls were favorable. In the Eighth Army area alone 26 arrests by the rear for infringement of movement regulations were reported during the period. At Appendix 'D' (Army only) is a copy of the 10 Notice invalidating the control of movement across the Army Control Line, and also a copy of the Provincial Order No. 4 (JUNTA) imposing control of entry into the Province of YENLOU immediately to the southwest of the Eighth Army rear boundary.

The lack of uniformity continued to be noted in the issue of travel permits to civilians but reports indicated that in general the pass situation was showing an appreciable improvement.

374 PW Camp has been designated by HANNO for the detention of civilian internees and will shortly be set up in 2 District. The establishment of this internment camp should solve the various administrative problems of internment.

During the period covered, a new type of arrest form was introduced by both ARVN. This new form should simplify the maintenance of records and permit of more for explicitness in indicating precise reasons for arrest and recommendations for disposal. The type of form put into use by Fifth Army is shown at Appendix 'E' (ARVN only). The Eighth Army arrest form is similar in design.

Security arrests reported during the period under review numbered 102, divided as follows:

- 32 for trial on a specific charge (Category A),
- 58 for internment (Category B)
- 12 for detention pending further investigation (Category C),

PART II

(b) Security of Material and Installations.

1850

(11) Cases of wire cutting continued to be reported, but in no great numbers. In no case was there any evidence of deliberate sabotage. Certain of the cases which occurred in the Fifth Army area were ascribed either to negligence on the part of repair men or to damage to telephone poles by army trucks. ARVN Eighth Army arranged for the printing of large numbers of notices precluding the death penalty for tampering with Allied communications. Stocks of these were to be held by G.O.s, who would arrange for them to be posted at the request of F.O.s, wherever necessary. A similar type of notice is already in use in the Fifth Army area.

.....(0).....

(c) Security of Access to Military Establishments.

(1) Four civilians arrested by the Army during the week ending 3 Dec 43 for entering the area of the HQ, Eighth Army without authority were turned over to AG for trial.

2. CIVIL PERSONNEL.

(a) Individual Suspects.

(1) The most important arrests made during the period were of three Italian youths, aged 17-18 old, employed by the Germans as short range intelligence agents. These men, all fascists, left BARI on the arrival of the Allies to join General Mussolini's Fascist Army. Once inside the German lines they were contacted by German intelligence, and agreed to undertake short-range espionage missions behind the Allied lines on behalf of the Germans. On the completion of each mission they were to make their way back through the lines and report to a German intelligence headquarters. These missions consisted largely in noting down unit and formation signs in the areas through which they passed. Three such missions were accomplished apparently without incident, and the fourth they were instructed to go to the rear and report on shipping in addition to troop identifications noted on the way. Shortly after crossing the Allied lines, however, they aroused the suspicions of a patrol in the 10 Corps area, and were arrested. Interrogation reports indicated that these individuals were probably employed by the intelligence staff of a German headquarters, possibly of Fifth Army HQ, rather than by the ABWIR or the SS. They are to be tried by a Military Court, and the case is now in the hands of AG Legal Division. This case was the subject of a special report to AG under reference 13 G/1455/3(1)/14 (1b) dated 18 Dec 43.

(2) During the period under survey a total of 102 security arrests was reported, of which details are shown at Appendix "B". Of these 58 were for internment, 12 were for detention pending further investigation, and 32 were for trial for a specific offence. All arrests made with a view to internment are considered individually by G-2(0.1.)/0.3.1(b), in consultation with Army AG, before a final decision is made. In a number of cases it will be noted that a review of the case was recommended at the end of a certain period of time.

(3) The following is a general analysis of the arrests shown in Appendix "B":

<u>Public Officials.</u>				
State and Municipal Officials	...	...	...	1
Clergy and Civil Police	...	...	...	1
<u>Party Officials.</u>				
Inspector of Police	...	...	...	2
...	...	...	...	8
<u>Minor Fascist Officials (including Squadristi)</u>				
<u>Miscellaneous.</u>				
Italian Civilians	...	...	...	53
Italian Armed Forces	...	...	...	18
				102

...or ... they are to be tried by a Military Court, and the case is now in the hands of the Legal Division. This case was the subject of a special report to AMM under reference 136, 1455/3(1)/(b) dated 18 Dec 43.

(11) During the period under survey a total of 102 security arrests was reported, of which details are shown at Appendix "B". Of these 53 were for internment, 12 were for detention pending further investigation, and 32 were for trial for a specific offence. All arrests made with a view to internment are considered individually by G-2(3.1.1)(b), in consultation with Army AGF, before a final decision is made. In a number of cases it will be noted that a review of the case was recommended at the end of a certain period of time.

(12) The following is a general analysis of the arrests shown in Appendix "B":

Public Officials.			
State and Municipal Officials	...	...	...
Clerical and Civil Police	...	...	4
Party Officials.			
Inspectors of Arms	...	...	2
...	...	...	3
Minor Fascist Officials (including Squadristi)	...	...	17
Miscellaneous.			
Italian Civilians	...	...	53
Italian Armed Forces	...	...	18
			102

3. (a) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

Apart from a few isolated incidents, the relations between troops and civilians were generally good. There were reports of dissatisfaction expressed by troops over the high prices charged by shopkeepers.

(b) Civilian Morale and Reactions.

(1) The condition of civilian morale continued to depend largely upon the availability of food. When food is scarce, the shortage is attributed frequently to those officials who held office under the Fascist Regime, and who have not since been dismissed. This when a public disturbance took place at S. MARIA DEL CASTELLO (Fifth Army Area) on 7 Dec 43, it was necessary to place six of the food officials in the custody of the Carabinieri to protect them from the violence of the crowd. The prevailing high prices and the existence of a flourishing black market have also done much to lower the morale of the population as a whole.

.....(v).....

(v) The usual stream of denunciations against former fascists still in office continued. Many of the complaints were found, on investigation, to be motivated by feelings of personal spite or hopes of personal advancement. However, a report dated 7 Dec 43 from LAMOLANO, Prov. CHIARI, described a remarkable amount of charity shown by the people to ex-fascists. Apart from some strong socialist elements most of the people appeared to be anxious to put in a good word for them.

(d) Other Matters of General Security Interest.

(i) In order to control and canalize the movement of refugees in the forward areas, Eighth Army has instituted a forward belt of control, lying between the enemy lines and the forward lateral road within the Allied lines. Within this belt refugees are rounded up by forward units and CAS and evacuated through the Brigade PM Collecting Points. Along the lateral road static posts and mobile patrols of CAS and Carabinieri are established and twenty-four hour mobile patrols supplied by forward PM sections ensure that a continuous network of control is maintained day and night.

0142

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

1854

0143

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

Subject: 15 Army Group Security Summary No. 8.

21

15 Army Group.

20 DEC 49

DR SECRET - U.S. EYES

15AG/1404/1/CI(8)

A.C. of S. 8-2, A.F.H. 1.

20 Dec 49.

Re: 15 Army Group Security Summary No. 8 for period
1 Dec to 15 Dec 49.

Shaw Capt

for Brigadier:
P.C.S. (I).
15 Army Group.

Copy to:-
1 Gdn Corps
No. 2 District
A.F.H.
AG Hq 15 Army Group.
No. 2 S.I. (S) Unit.
No. 3 S.I. (S) Unit.

*Appendix "B" enclosed for
file containing lists of persons
detained, etc.*

(p 2 a)

Dr. SECRET - U.S. SECRET.

15 ARMY GROUP SECURITY SUMMARY No. 8
Period Covered - 1 Dec to 15 Dec 43.

PART I.

GENERAL SITUATION.

The main event of security significance during the period covered was the apprehension in the 10 Corps area on 3 Dec 43 of three Italian youths, employed by the Germans on short-range intelligence missions behind the Allied lines. Further details are contained in Part II, p. 2(a)(1) below.

Detailed instructions for both the restriction of civilian movement northwards across the River Army Control Line (VOLTRIO - MONTECASSINO) and the evacuation and security check of refugees from enemy occupied territory southwards have issued and implemented. Preliminary reports on the effectiveness of these controls were favorable. In the Eighth Army area along 26 fronts by EGP for infringement of movement regulations were reported during the period. Appendix "D" (EFG only) is a copy of the AMI Notice proclaiming the control of movement across the Army General Line, and also a copy of AMI Provincial Order No. 4 (10GG-L) imposing control of entry into the Province of PUGLIA immediately to the southeast of the Eighth Army rear boundary.

Some lack of uniformity continued to be noted in the issue of travel permits to civilians but reports indicated that in general the present situation was showing an appreciable improvement.

374 PW Camp has been designated by FL-ABO for the detention of civilian internees and will shortly be set up in 2 District. The establishment of this internment camp should solve the various administrative problems of internment. During the period covered, a new type of arrest form was introduced by both armies. This new form should simplify the maintenance of records and permit of greater explicitness in indicating the reasons for arrest and recommendations for disposal. The type of form put into use by Fifth Army is shown in appendix "E" (Army only).

The type of form put into use by Fifth Army is shown in appendix "E" (Army only). The Eighth Army arrest form is similar in design. Security arrests reported during the period under review numbered 102, divided as follows:

32 for trial on a specific charge (Category A),
58 for internment (Category B)
12 for detention pending further investigation (Category C).

3. I. 4. C. 3. Unit was organized for attachment to H. Fifth Army.

This unit will be engaged on counter-intelligence work under the direction of G-2(C.I.) in a similar way to the C. 3. Unit already working under the control of G. 3. I. (b) 21st Army.

The French Sécurité Militaire was reported by Fifth Army to be in full operation and to be collaborating closely with Corps and Army headquarters on all security measures undertaken.

of the Fifth Army rear boundary.

Some loss of uniformity continued to be noted in the issue of travel permits to civilians and reports indicated that in general the same situation was showing an appreciable improvement.

374 PW Camp has been designated by FL-480 for the detention of civilian internees and will shortly be set up in 2 District. The establishment of this internment camp should solve the various administrative problems of internment.

During the period covered, a new type of arrest form was introduced by both armies. This new form should simplify the maintenance of records and permit of greater effectiveness in indicating precise reasons for arrest and recommendations for disposal. The type of form put into use by Fifth Army is shown in appendix "B" (5th only). The Eighth Army arrest form is similar in design.

Security arrests reported during the period under review numbered 102, divided as follows:-

- 32 for trial on a specific charge (Category A).
- 56 for internment (Category B)
- 12 for attention pending further investigation (Category C).

3.1.4. C.3. Unit was organized for attachment to 1st Fifth Army. This unit will be engaged on counter-intelligence work under the direction of G-2(C.I.) in a similar way to the C.3. Unit already working under the control of G.3.1.(V) 1st Army.

The French Sécurité Militaire was reported by Fifth Army to be in full operation and to be collaborating closely with Corps and Army headquarters on all security measures undertaken.

No cases of sabotage were reported. There were further reports of the cutting of signal lines, but on a minor scale only.

Rumours continued to be prevalent among the civil population concerning the possible conclusion of hostilities and impending announcements of great importance resulting from recent allied conferences.

With effect from 1 Dec 43 Eighth Army rear boundary was moved forward to the northern boundary of the Province of BOGALA. All security records pertaining to the area were transferred to H.Q. No.2 District.

1850

PART II.

1. MILITARY SECURITY.

(a) Security of Information.

(4) Investigations were continued by Fifth Army into the loss on the C.3.1.4. AREA road of a mail pouch, reported in our previous summary, PART II 1(a)(ii). Enquiries reveal that in this case, as in others, couriers were handling official mail along with personal mail and had not been impressed with the importance of the proper handling of official mail. Steps were taken to remedy this situation.

- 2 -

(ii) Possible breach of security was investigated by Fifth Army with respect to an article published in the Morning edition of the "STARS AND STRIPES". The article was entitled "Invaders Supply Stricken Troops", and the methods employed were described in great detail. This story had been held up for 36 hours until the situation was evident to the enemy and it was believed by the Commander that nothing of value to the enemy was being revealed. The Commander has been warned to exercise greater care in the performance of his duties.

(iii) On 10 Dec 43 an officer on the staff of B-5 Div was told by a civilian the new location of that division and was scheduled to go for the move. These were details which the officer himself did not yet possess. Investigations into this leakage of information are proceeding.

(iv) The Command Secretary of LAMCOL (LAWSON) informed a senior officer of the AFM, during through the town, given him details of Allied engineering losses sustained during the invasion on B-5 Div's front on the night of 3 Dec 43. Those details indicated the statement that a ship containing mustard gas was damaged and that the gas was expected to be used at any moment. Fifth Army has taken a serious view of this matter and investigations are proceeding.

(b) Security of Material and Installations.

(i) Routine checks on the security of camps and installations continued to be carried out by security personnel, and in general, the situation was regarded as satisfactory. Observed instances where reports of camps being inadequately guarded are directly to a shortage of manpower for the purpose. These deficiencies were being remedied as far as possible.

(ii) Cases of wire cutting continued to be reported, but in no great numbers. In no case was there any evidence of deliberate sabotage. Certain of the cases which occurred in the Fifth Army were described either to negligence on the part of regular men or to damage to telephone poles by enemy trucks. Efforts are being made for the finding of large numbers of notices prohibiting the use of wire for temporary communication lines. Stoppers of these wires to be held by G.O.M., who would arrange for them to be posted at the request of G.O.M., wherever necessary. -- Similar type of notice is already in use in the Fifth Army area.

(iii) On 8 Dec 43 a railway bridge near LAMOLI was seriously damaged as the result of an explosion. Investigations showed that a British soldier was fishing near the bridge at the time, using German detonators stolen from a railway wagon in LAMOLI siding. It is thought that a detonator was used.

(ii) Cases of wire cutting continued to be reported, but in no great numbers. In no case was there any evidence of deliberate sabotage. Certain of the cases which occurred in the Fifth Army area were ascribed either to negligence on the part of repair men or to change to telephone poles by Army trucks. The Fifth Army arranged for the printing of large numbers of notices explaining the authority for tampering with allied communications. Stocks of these notices were held by G.O.s, who could print them and post them at the request of RSOs, whenever necessary. A similar type of notice is already in use in the Fifth Army area.

(iii) On 8 Dec 43 a railway bridge near MUDOLI was seriously damaged as the result of an explosion. Investigations showed that a British soldier was fishing near the bridge at the time, using German detonators stolen from a railway wagon in a MUDOLI siding. It is thought that a detonator thrown by him into the water caused the explosion of a charge left in the bridge by the Germans. The soldier in question has been arrested and the case is now in the hands of CIP (SIB) MUDOLI.

(iv) 4000 wirens arriving in MUDOLI were found to be carrying two quails only, irrespective of their length or of the nature of the materials carried. Wirens were arriving increasingly loaded, and in many cases when broken into. A report on this matter was sent to HQ & Tr. 24th Army and following previous representations on this subject, referred to in P.I.T II (1)(iv) of 15 Army Group Security Summary 4 Nov - 15 Nov 43.

(v) On the evening of 2 Dec 43 the white types marking the road leading down from SAGHMO on to the main road ANOM - CAPHMO (Eight Army Area) were found to be cut. Had this not been discovered promptly, a serious accident might have resulted. An investigation by CIP produced no results.

(c) Security of Access to Military Establishments.

(i) Four civilians arrested by FAF during the week ending 3 Dec 43 for entering the area of The HQ, Eighth Army without authority were turned over to AGS for trial.

(ii) Routine checks by FAF on the security of petrol and ammunition dumps in the vicinity of MUDOLI disclosed unsatisfactory control of access in general. The results in question have since been put out of bounds to civilians and the necessary measures are being taken to enforce this restriction.

- 3 -

(iii) The control of access to L'Esplanade railway station and sidings was reported by RFP in intelligence. Recommendations were made to the RFO for the improvement of security, including the removal of a wagon containing German explosives from one of the sidings. (It was from this wagon that the British soldier mentioned in para 1 (b)(iii) obtained his detonator).

(d) Security of Personnel.

At appendix "B" (iii) only) is a copy of the pamphlet "We Protest", which was found in the G.I. VTC box by troops of 1 Arm Div. The pamphlet refers to 26 of German origin and is thought to have been left behind by a German patrol.

2. CIVIL SECURITY.

(a) Individual Suspects.

(i) The most important arrests made during the period were of three Italian youths, aged 17-18 etc., employed by the Germans as short range intelligence agents. These men, all Fascists, left Bari on the arrival of the Allies to join General Sir John's 15th Army. Once inside the German lines they were contacted by German intelligence, and agreed to undertake short-range espionage missions behind the Allied lines on behalf of the Germans. On the completion of each mission they were to make their way back through the lines and report to a German intelligence headquarters. These missions consisted largely in noting down unit and formation signs in the areas through which they passed. Three such missions were accomplished apparently without incident, and for the fourth they were instructed to go to MARLES and report on shipping in addition to troop identifications noted on the way. Shortly after crossing the Allied lines, however, they were the suspicious of a PS 800 in the 10 Corps area, and were arrested. Intelligence reports indicated that these individuals were probably employed by the intelligence staff of a formation in the area, possibly of 10th Army HQ, rather than by the 15th Army or 15th Army HQ. They are to be tried by a Military Court, and the case is now in the hands of the 10th Army Division. This case was the subject of a special report to RFP, under reference 15.3/1457/3(L)/4(Ib) dated 18 Dec 43.

(ii) During the period under survey a total of 102 security arrests were reported, of which details are shown at appendix "B". Of these 58 were for internment, 12 were for detention pending further investigation, and 32 were for trial for a specific offence. All arrests made with a view to internment are considered individually by G-2(C.I.)/3.3.1(b), in consultation with Army HQ, before a final decision is made. In a number of cases it will be noted that a review of the case was recommended at the end of a certain period of time.

(iii) The following is a general analysis of the arrests shown in appendix "B":--

Arrested Officials.

State and Municipal officials	...	...	...
CO. and Civil Police	...	...	...
Party Officials	...	...	...

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Shortly after crossing the Allied lines, however, they were sent the suspicions of a US AG in the 10 Corps area, and were arrested. Intelligence reports indicated that some individuals were probably employed by the Intelligence staff of a formation in the area, possibly of Tenth Army HQ, rather than by the 3rd AF or 5th AF. They are to be tried by a Military Court, and the case is now in the hands of the 10th AF Division. When was the subject of a special report to HQ, under reference 15.3/10.55/3(1)/4(Ib) dated 18 Dec 43.

(ii) During the period under survey a total of 102 security arrests was reported, of which details are shown in Annex "B". Of these 58 were for internment, 12 were for detention pending further investigation, and 32 were for trial for a specific offence. All arrests made with a view to internment are catalogued individually by 5-2(6.1)/3.3.I(b), in consultation with Army AG, before a final decision is made. In a number of cases it will be noted that a review of the case was recommended at the end of a certain period of time.

(iii) The following is a general analysis of the arrests shown in Annex "B":-

Enemy Officials.

Senior and Municipal Officials 4

CO. HQ and Civil Police 4

Party Officials.

Leaders of the 2

AGN 3

Minor Fascist Officials (including Squadristi) 17

Miscellaneous.

Italian Civilians 53

Italian Armed Forces 18

1850

102.

(iv) ... certain BENIGNI Lino di Giusepe was arrested at TORINO on 29 Nov 43 whilst trying to cross into enemy territory. He had in his possession ten letters given him by Lino, 14 AG of 141, which he had promised to deliver to AG's brother, L. BENIGNI, (then in enemy territory) for one retransmission to addresses in Northern Italy, in return for a payment of 10,000 lire on his return to RARI. BENIGNI was also carrying a detailed route map which he said had been provided by AG. The text of the letters contained nothing of any security significance, but they were used by 2.3.I(b) Unit for export examination. No. 2.3.I(b) Unit has arranged with 5th AF, AG to AG, 141, under observation pending receipt of the report on the letters. AG, AG has been AG for 14 AG's brother in LANCIA (now in our hands). AG AG traces of him have been found. Meanwhile BENIGNI is being AG.

(v) Subversive Movements and Organizations.

(i) No political activity of any importance was reported by either Army.

(11) Communication was maintained between CIG and PWE and AMF, and cases or information of family political nature were passed to the latter agencies.

3. (a) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

Except from a few isolated incidents, the relations between troops and civilians were generally good. There were reports of dissatisfaction expressed by troops over the high prices charged by shopkeepers.

(a) Of Italian Troops and Reactions.

(i) The condition of civilian life continued to depend largely upon the availability of food. When food is scarce, the shortage is attributed frequently to those officials who held office under the Fascist regime, and who have not since been dismissed. Thus when a public demonstration took place at S. Giulio, the COMI (Fifth Army group) on 7 Dec 45, it was necessary to place six of the food officials in the custody of the Carabinieri to protect them from the violence of the crowd. The prevailing high prices and the existence of a flourishing black market have also gone much to lower the morale of the population as a whole.

(ii) In the December 1945 public demonstrations were held that troops were paying upon prohibitive prices for foodstuffs that civilians were unable to compete with them. This is an interesting corollary to the complaints made by troops concerning the high prices they are forced to pay by civilians.

(iii) Little interest was shown in the war and the major political issues, due in large part to the confused political situation. Neither the KING nor RUDOLPHIC could make to persuade the full confidence of the people and some bitterness has been expressed as to the high-ranking officers of the Italian Army. Complaints for not taking more energetic steps to free the country of the Germans after the armistice.

(iv) Italian troops soon moving to the front in the Fifth Army area were greeted with hostility at times of price demonstrations, though some were able to make their way to the shops that troops were forced to over-ride to get the KING, and that in the event of an anti-demonstration revolt, they would be obliged to support the House of SAVOY.

(v) The usual stream of demonstrations against the King still in office continues. Many of the demonstrations were for food, or transportation, to be motivated by feelings of personal spite or jealousy of personal advancement. However, a report dated 7 Dec 45 from LUGLIO, PROV. GROSSETO, described a considerable amount of activity shown by thousands to be ex-Communists. At that time strong Socialist elements must of the people appeared to be anxious to put in a good word for them.

(a) Reactions.

that the Italian Army in Allied occupied Italy was full and was accepting no more recruits." (Reported as current in German occupied territory).
 "That the Russian Mission to L.A.M.F.O. was spreading Communist propaganda in Italy, and was harassing arrests of fascists for alleged actions of violence committed in 1929, and was using terrorist methods." (G.M.O.S. area-22000, T.M.O.10).

(11) German Troops.

Rumours among troops were confined mainly to the local speculation regarding future operations and the possible return of formations in units to the U.K. Some speculation was also reported among troops concerning a possible sudden and early end of the war.

The following are examples:-

"That 15 Dec 43 would be a vital date in the history of the war and that after that date victory could be calculated for a definite time." (U.S. Listed personnel in Fifth Army area).

"That 1st Arm Div under command Gen Corps will shortly either join Fifth Army in the capture of Rome, land in VULCANIA, or land on 'some islands'". (R.O.S. area-22000).

"That Eighth Army units were seen to be moved to North Africa, in order to eliminate speculations for an invasion of NORTH AFRICA that 12, as cover for the real invasion." (Eighth Army Troops).

"That General MONTGOMERY with one of the two Corps of Eighth Army would be withdrawn from Italy to enter another country before the end of winter." (Eighth Army Troops).

"That the whole of 13 Corps was being taken out of the line for one month's rest prior to an invasion of the Balkans." (13 Corps Troops).

"That 13 Corps and 5 Div were returning shortly to the U.K." (13 Corps Troops).

(11) Every effort is made by R.A./O.C. to trace rumours of a notorious type to their sources and to counteract any deleterious effect they may have on security or morale.

(a) Other Aspects of General Security Interest.

(1) In order to control and contain the movement of refugees in the forward areas, the Army has instituted a forward belt of control, lying between the enemy lines and the forward lateral road within the Allied lines. Within this belt, all movements are rounded up by forward units and are escorted through the Brigades to collecting points. Along the lateral road static posts and mobile patrols of the 1st and 2nd Divisions are established and twenty-four hour mobile patrols

(RCS, AFONE).
"That 11th Army units were seen to be moving to NORTH AFRICA, in order to simulate preparations for an invasion of SOMALILAND. It is noted for the real invasion." (Eight Army Troops.)
"That General MONTGOMERY with one of the two wings of British Army would be withdrawing from Italy to enter another country before the end of winter." (Eight Army Troops).

"That the whole of 13 Corps was being taken out of the line for one month's rest prior to the invasion of the BALKANS." (13 Corps Troops.)
"That 13 Corps and 5 Div were returning shortly to the U.K." (13 Corps Troops).

(iii) Every effort is made by FIA/DIC to ensure removal of a nervous type to their sources and to counteract any deleterious effect they may have on security or morale.

(E) Organization of General Security Interest.

(1) In order to control and channel the movement of refugees in the forward areas, 11th Army has instituted a forward belt of control, lying between the enemy lines and the forwardmost lateral road within the allied lines. Within this belt refugees are rounded up by forward units and then evacuated through the Brigade 2nd Collection points. Along the lateral road static posts and mobile patrols of 3rd and 4th Divisions are established and twenty-four hour mobile patrols supplied forward. These actions ensure that a continuous network of control is maintained at all times.

(ii) As a result that refugees were being forced across the SAMHO to one point was investigated by FIA. It was found that a soldier from a nearby A. site had been operating the ferry with the well-intentioned motive of "relieving the traffic across the bridge". It was suspected that he was also relieving the passengers of a small contribution for them. The matter was taken up with the unit concerned.

(iii) In AFONE on 13 Nov 43 a German was killed by an Italian civilian, as a result of which reprisals were citizens formed a local force consisting of about 12 officers and 100 men under the command of a retired Divisional Commander, 188th of CARLOMARINO. They are near the electric plant and maintained patrols on the disposal of the town. When the Germans arrived, the General put his force at the disposal of the 1st Army commander, but it was agreed that it had achieved its purpose and it was disbanded.

(iv) The Italian Mule Coy attached to 2 Hq Div was reported to be working extremely well, in spite of some casualties suffered.

(v) Several reports were received by Eighth Army to the effect that German troops in occupation of the GUSTAFIA area - ALL PATROL WILLING district used to wear civilian overcoats over their uniforms when conducting raids. In one instance actually witnessed by an informant they used this disguise to intercept civilians who were trying to leave their village.

(vi) At approximately "C" is a summary of information on an organization and functions of CEMA and its position in the national police. This work, called by Eighth Army from information supplied by RIG and resources contacted by the I(2) St. N. Contact. It will be noted that it agrees with the information obtained from the Italian Government, but is more detailed.

(vii) At approximately "A" is a location list of RA Sections and CIG Detachments, controlled by 15 Army Group.

D. A. P. O.

Security
Most recent Intelligence
Summary from H.S. 15 D/9p.
pp. 21-24. Please.

26/12/43

W. B. Latham

I am afraid 60% of the
value to me is lost because
of the illegibility of the copy.
Can we improve this?

DCCSO

The original is
at pp 21 to 24

Rush
28/12

W. B. Latham

Thank you ML

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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OBTAIN

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(b) The Commission has been requested to be assisted by the following persons:

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(iv) It appears that in the course of the investigation and analysis of the various cases, the Ministry has been found to be involved in the investigation of the various cases.

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(v) It appears that in the course of the investigation and analysis of the various cases, the Ministry has been found to be involved in the investigation of the various cases.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

SUBJECT: Security Notes

SECRET

File
I.N.G.,
H.Q. A.C.P.F.

AM/410/54

28 Jan 44

SCAFD AM Fifth Army
SCAFD Main AM Eighth Army
(Through SCACs)

The attached copy of AMHQ Security Notes No. 3
are forwarded for your information.

Chief
Lt. Colonel
Chief, Public Safety

1840

Subject:- 15 Army Group
Security Summary.

H.Q., 15 Army Group,
C.M.P.

SECRET

Br. SECRET = U.S. SECRET.

15 AG/1404/4/G (B).

A.C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.S.

19 Dec 43.

Herewith Security Summary for period 16-30 Nov 43.

W.D. Gibson, Lt-Col

W.D. GIBSON, Lt-Col.,
Brigadier,
A.C.S.(1),
15 ARMY GROUP.

Copy to:-

1 Cdn Corps
No. 2 District.
P.B.S.

A.C.S., H.Q., 15 Army Group.

available in office
of G.I. L. 26/11.

There is no appendix A. - see last sentence p. 7

I have reviewed the list of names for
for file 414

W.D. Gibson

1840

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785016

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LHO

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Subject: 15 Army Group
Security Summary.

H.Q., 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

SECRET

Br. SECRET = U.S. SECRET.

15AG/1104/1/G IB).

A.C. of S., G-2, A.P.H.

19 Dec 43.

Herewith Security Summary for period 16-30 Nov 43.

W.D. Gibson, Lt-Col

W.D. GIBSON, Lt-Col.,
Brigadier,
A.C.S.(1),
15 ARMY GROUP.

Copy to:-

1 Cdn Corps
No. 2 District.
P.B.S.
A.C.S., H.Q., 15 Army Group.

available in office
of G.I. L. 26/12.

There is no appendix A. - Section Sentence p. 7

I have numbered the list of names
for file 414 MK

21/12/43

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217

SECRET15 ARMY GROUP SECURITY SUMMARYPERIOD COVERED - 16 Nov to 30 Nov 43PAGE IGENERAL SURVEY

An encouraging aspect of security in the 15 Army Group area during the second half of November was the definite improvement noted in the control of movement. The consolidation and security checking of refugees through the establishment of Refugee Interrogation Posts in the two Army areas was in process of being organized and was beginning to function, and this promises to provide a very satisfactory solution to what has been for some time a pressing security problem.

An improvement was also noted in the control and restriction of civilian movement northwards across the rear Army boundaries. The system of control posts straddling across the Italian peninsula along the general line of the Volturno and Pontore rivers was proving effective and minor weaknesses and loopholes were being remedied as soon as discovered.

Control of movement has been considerably improved by the practice of drivers of army vehicles giving lifts to civilians. A "drive" against this practice was instituted by Eighth Army GPF, resulting in disciplinary action against a number of drivers and a subsequent marked improvement in this particular aspect of security.

The security problem occasioned by the existence of numbers of Italian wearing Allied uniform is now in process of solution as a result of the PLANO order prohibiting the issue of British and U.S. Army jackets, coats and blankets to Italian soldiers ordering the withdrawal of any such issues already made.

Security control of the coast line was effected by FIP/CIC, through the CO.ER, (G.P.A.) at Pinerola etc and a network of local informants, in collaboration with the Navy. In general, this scheme worked satisfactorily.

Security arrests for the period under review numbered 120, divided as follows:-

50 for movement, in many cases with the provision that the case should be reviewed at a later date.

34 for trial on a specific charge.

6 to be held pending further investigation.

The problems and difficulties concerned with the disposal of civilian

loopholes were being remedied as soon as discovered.

Control of movement has been considerably hampered by the practice of delivery of army vehicles giving lift to civilians. A "drive" against this practice was instituted by Eighth Army HQ, resulting in disciplinary action against a number of civilians and a subsequent morale improvement in this particular aspect of security.

The security problem occasioned by the existence of numbers of Italian wearing Allied uniforms is now in process of solution as a result of the MUNDO order prohibiting the issue of British and U.S. Army jackets, coats and blankets to it lines and ordering the withdrawal of any such issues already made.

Summary control of the coast line was effected by JEP/CHC, through the OJ.RR, and with the assistance of a network of local informants, in collaboration with the Navy. In general, this system worked satisfactorily.

Security measures for the period under review numbered 123, divided as follows:-

20 for internment, in many cases with the provision that the case should be reviewed at a later date.

34 for trial on a specific charge.

6 to be held pending further investigation.

The substantial difficulties concerned with the disposal of civilian internees were related, owing to the absence in Italy of an internment camp, but it is hoped that such a camp will now shortly be established.

The case of ROBERT H. Helmut, a German deserter, and ZUPAN BOGIC, a Yugoslav who claimed to have escaped from "resistance surveillance" in Northern Italy were in process of investigation by 3 ST(b) Unit. ZUPAN BOGIC admitted to having accepted an espionage mission behind the Allied lines on behalf of the Germans but claimed that he did so only in order to effect his escape, and he gave himself up immediately on arrival. No positive evidence of an incriminating feature has as yet been proved against BOGIC but his background and qualifications were not entirely clear. He was not initially recruited for army intelligence. Further details are given below in Part 2(a)(iv).

No cases of espionage were reported. Cases of wire-cutting showed an increase over the previous period but the position was not serious. No evidence of deliberate sabotage was found in any of these cases.

Security continued to be a matter of some concern, particularly in connection with the processing of photographs for developing and printing. In a number of cases photographs of military installations and equipment were included. It is likely that this danger to security will continue until a firm photographic policy is issued and processing facilities are provided.

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- 2 -

The loss of two bags of official mail was reported, one in MOLENTU and one along the C. 300th - 310th MGL road. In the former case all but two of the missing packages were recovered. The possibility of a leakage of important military information was considered to be slight.

A number of items in the rumors reported of current among civilians was the preselection for topics concerned in the end of the war, U.S. peace talks between the allies and Germany, the fate of Italy after the war, the death of Hitler, etc. Such rumors were far more prevalent among civilians than troops.

"Close and profitable" liaison continued to be maintained by ECP/CIC with CI(5), GSS, military police, etc., 17th, 3rd, 5th and 6th. The first of the CC, RR Centro Spionaggio units to be employed on security duties in the army areas under the direction of the army security staff was sent forward during this period for assignment to HQ Eighth Army. Since it had not yet had time before the end of the month to settle down and to begin functioning properly, an opinion on its usefulness and efficiency must be reserved for a later report.

On the 21st of French and Italian troops in the Fifth Army area contact was made between 1-2(CI) and the Security Liaison and Italian Intelligence Staff, and the foundation was laid for close and effective cooperation on security matters.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY.

(a) Security of Information.

(i) Instances continue to be reported of troops taking films to unauthorized local photographers for a developing and printing. In certain cases these films contained pictures of military equipment, installations, etc. A number of photos of military equipment to be developing films exposed by U.S. troops and containing violations of military positions are being reported. In this particular case the violation was considered serious since the photographer himself was a suspect. A further case was reported from 17th, 3rd, 5th and 6th. Pictures of reg. taken and prints belonging mainly to U.S. and German personnel were discovered by ECP in a local photographer's shop. Many of these photos were of Allied aircraft, assault landing units and other military equipment. These cases have been passed to 1-2, VII Air Force. However, since the prints, etc. were not returned, the prints were not returned, and wherever possible the unit concerned is notified.

(ii) The cases with reports of the loss of official documents whilst in transit between headquarters. The army concerned a mail pouch containing the word book - Army's recognition code for the work beginning 1st Dec 43, the Fifth Army personnel list for the 8th week and other documents, which were lost between 31st Dec 43 and 31st Dec 44. Investigations are proceeding and CC, RR 1-2, V, been instructed to interview all persons living along this road.

(2) Security or Information.

(2) In cases continuing to be reported of troops taking films to unauthorized local photographers for developing and printing. In certain cases these films contained pictures of military equipment, insect illustrations, etc. A C-119, photo-regular was found to be developing films exposed by U.S. troops and containing views of military installations and landing gear. In this particular case the violation was considered serious since the photographer was suspected. A further case was reported from FORT L. where considerable quantities of negatives and prints belonging mainly to U.S. Air Corps personnel were discovered by FBR in a local photographer's shop. Many of these photographs were of Allied aircraft, assault landing craft and other military equipment. This case has been passed to A-2, Air Force. Whenever such cases arise, the films and prints are confiscated, and wherever possible the unit concerned is notified.

(3) Two cases were reported of the loss of official documents while in transit between investigators. The first concerned a mail pouch containing the World War aircraft recognition codes for the week beginning 1st Dec 43, the Fifth Army personnel list for the same week, and other documents, which was lost in the air. The second case concerned a person living along this route.

The second case was the loss on the evening of 1 Dec 43 of an Eighth Army dispatch bag which was stolen from a utility truck proceeding from Eighth Army to 15 Army Group. The theft occurred in Romania where the driver left his vehicle unattended for five or ten minutes. Invaluable items were immediately carried out by FBR and AF and by 5 Dec 43 all five too of the missing documents had been recovered. One of the letters was brought into the CC.RR addressed by a small boy who had found it in the street. The letters were discovered in a garden by the road where they were apparently been abandoned by the thief. Some of the packages had been opened, including two containing copies of Eighth Army Intelligence Summary No. 614 dated 15 Nov 43, classified SECRET. Almost all the other mail opened was returned to the Pay Office and a lot had nothing of any apparent use. Anything in the nature of the lost documents had yet recovered and saved anything of a compromising nature. It is thought that the bag was stolen in the hope that it contained food or valuable items. When this was found not to be the case, the contents were abandoned. The circumstances leading to the loss are being investigated by the 31st Air Group.

(4) As a result of many checks carried out by Eighth Army FBR on printing establishments it was found that troops had been leaving X-ray cases of their own doing in various places. Notably all cases the area disclosed the identity of the soldiers unit. This matter was taken up with the C.O. of the unit concerned in each case.

(b) Security of Material and Installations.

(1) Reports of wire cutting showed an increase over the previous period under survey, although there was no evidence of deliberate sabotage in any of these cases. Telephone lines in 10 Corps area were cut on several occasions, following which plain clothes patrols were sent out, QJRR notified and warnings posted. As a result of these measures no further instances were reported in that area. In the 6 Corps area a length of wire one mile long was removed in one sector and, in another, three acres of wire cutting was reported within a week. Investigations by GTO in still in progress.

Five instances of cut signal lines were reported by 547th Army, all of them in the rear area. Countermeasures instituted locally by the 547th and the 84th included OCAL patrols, searching of 4 mm-courts for wires, and notices delivered by the Town Mayor and proclaimed by the Town Clerk to the effect that anyone found interfering with telephone wires was liable to the death penalty. At 2000L, a civilian was arrested by 547th after having been caught in the act of cutting a telephone wire. This civilian was reported as one of malicious damage and the civilian was subsequently interrogated by 547th military court to determine possible espionage. 547th Army has requested 547th to ward attorney sentences in such cases as a deterrent.

(ii) It was reported from Daikichi Army PAP that the Italian box-cars, eleven 6 mm anti-personnel missiles, one case of gelatinite and an unknown number of hand grenades had been stolen from a camp at H. 9553 near S. F. 10. 10. 10. (H. 9. 5. of S. F. 10. 10. 10). Subsequent enquiries into the theft proved abortive. It was thought that perhaps they have been the motive for the theft, and the Guardia di Finanza are warned to act effect. It appears that this camp was not an Mischief Army camp but was being forced by a Italian who was collecting ammunition and explosives lying about in the area the request of the. The reports of military sources authorities have since been informed of the location and contents of the camp.

(2004).¹⁵ The results of an early study on determining the possibility of smuttings in the general area of the - Gidya hills - are published in an accessible survey of the territory with a value of 100% for all possible populations taken. The investigation was reported.

(c) Quantity of records to submit by date of submission.

(4) In violations of property of persons to marry out of limitations.

(21) No parts of any size were located in the 15 army group zone, the report being negative. Here would be both men in control of wire fence and the gun system installed was reported to be working satisfactorily. We have recommended the starting of the whole frontage of the port on the end of the ported after every two minutes required for this work was again not feasible. The control of which, based on other craft was considered to be within satisfactory and full

eleven German anti-personnel mines, one case of cellenites and an unknown number of hand grenades had been stolen from a dump at H. 5658 near SHERAFOLA (N.W. of SAN SEVERO). Subsequent enquiries into the theft proved abortive. It was thought that, failing by explosion, they have been the motive for the theft, and the Guardia di Finanza was warned to that effect. It appears that this dump was not an Eighth Army dump but was used, I judged by a Italian who was collecting ammunition and explosives lying about in the area, that the west coast of Sic. The appropriate military service authorities have since been informed of the location and contents of the dump.

(iii) as a result of an early warning concerning the possibility of a general strike in the USSR. - DUT. AIR. - MONROE. Ref. - Submitting an immediate survey of the territory in question in all reasonable precautions taken. No incidents yet reported.

(c) Security of access to children's establishments.

(2) If violation of security of access to military establishments were reported.

(11) No parts of my area were located in the 15 Army Group area, the closest being Hammerhead. Now, since all both holes is controlled by mine forces and the loss system function was reported to be within a short distance. The two recommendations the wiring of the whole frontage of the part but not the end of the period under survey has material required for this work was still undecidable. The control of Fishan was an other craft was a number to be within sufficiently and full co-operation was being given by the 14 Lion Chapter of the area and by the General, 14 Pioneer.

(17) at present the following order was issued to the chief of Pinaro-
California.

These operations have been well known to the local fishing community and have been co-ordinated with the Royal Navy. The further protection & control of COAST along the coast has also arranged.

(c) Security of Personnel.

was reported from cells. evidence that "detached" ships was being sold to troops by division. It is also learned from the Division Hospital in the camp that there had been two cases of syphilis among the troops as a result of which brought forward a source. C. (S), was informed and was being made.

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2. CIVIL SECURITY.(a) Individual Subjects.

(i) During the period covered a total of 120 arrests of civilians on security grounds was reported. Of these, 60 were interned, 6 were being held pending further investigation and 54 were arrested for trial for a specific offence. An appendix to this is a consolidated list of arrests for the period under survey. It will be noted that the British Army list includes 18 who were arrested for offences against movement regulations. A further 23 arrests were recorded by Fifth Army but have been referred back for further details. These will be included in the next report.

(ii) The 120 persons arrested were divided as follows:-

Public Officials.			
State and Municipal Officials	...	...	3
CCMG and Civil Police	...	...	4
Party Officials			
National Secretaries	...	...	1
Vice Party Secretaries	...	...	2
WVE	...	...	15
Minor Fascist Officials (including additional Secretaries and Squaristi)	...	...	17
Miscellaneous.			
Italian Civilians	...	...	67
Italian Armed Forces	...	...	9

			120

(iii) The following are details of the more interesting arrests made.

DR. SUGNOLI Stefano: Former Secretary, INTELLIGENTIA. Squadrata, Officer of NOV. S.M. Described as a man who took part in the violent persecution of Intellectuals, who is a person of very most extreme measures and who is convinced of the return of MUSOLINI.

S. SUGNOLI Silvio
da Leopoldo: Stated that he had returned to Italy by the secret air transport service from N. Africa. Arrested by British Army IP whilst attempting to pass through the lines to PIANO (Prov. MOEN). Admitted he had deliberately avoided the main blocks at Verona.

(44) The following are details of the more interesting arrests made.

DE SIMONE Stefano:

General Secretary, DEMOCRATICI. Squadrists, Officer of F.V.S.M. Described a French who took part in the violent persecutions of anti-fascists, who in opinion of the last extreme fascists and who is convinced of the return of MUSSOLINI.

MACULI Silvio
di Lombardo:

Stated that he had crossed to Italy by the American Air Transport Service from Africa. Arrested by British Army Air Staff attempting to pass through the lines to FFIHQ (Prov. MOBILE). Admitted he had deliberately avoided the R.I. planes at V.ATO. Further details have been requested from British Army concerning his alleged trip to Italy by U.S. aircraft.

MACULI, Carlo
di Giovanni:

Director of G.ROMANO Colliano, former Political Secretary. Vice President Secretary of G.ROMANO 1942.

MACULI, Antonio
di Giuseppe:

Director of Curia, Province. Secretary of G.M.F. 1934-36, General Secretary of FFIHQ 1937-38, General Secretary of FFIHQ 1938 - July 1942.

Reference 15 Army Group Security Summary 16-31 Oct 42, Part II, 2 (iv) (iv) it has since been learnt that MACULI, Antonio, having resigned his post, has been informed in the authority of P.S.S.

22

(iv) the following cases are under investigation by J SI(4) Unit:-

ALFRED ROBERTS - Allegedly he claimed to have organized an anti-Fascist front in JUCHUMILLO after the country had been overtaken by the Germans, and that he is a recruit he was imprisoned by plain clothes Italian police. According to his story he was later transferred to "prisoner surveillance" in H. ITALIA, from which he attempted to escape; he then attempted to join the allies but was captured by the Germans whilst in German lines; in order to facilitate his eventual escape he pretended to be very pro-German and agreed to undertake an intelligence mission into the allied lines where he was picked up by U.S. troops, allegedly of the 4th Air Force.

He was fully interrogated and his story was checked as far as possible; there was no doubt that he was not telling the truth. At the time of writing his case is being reconsidered in the light of additional information to our effect that he was seen in a Allied occupied area just two weeks before capture.

ROBERT H. HINDMAN, Born 1904, a German deserter, active as an interpreter to the Aufbruchkorps, a small unit stationed in Italy, the series of which were to operate in the German army in 1940 to 1941 in western Italy. He was captured in 1941 in Italy. On joining the German army in 1940 he was sent to the Volksgrenadier School for Infantry Officers (no identification in 1941) and then in addition to training. During the summer of 1942 he was sent to Hildesheim for an interview, during which he was asked if he would be sent to England (nature of work, to Hildesheim). He mentioned he was sent to Hildesheim to Hildesheim and he is nothing more of the proposed assignment.

He pretended to be very anti-Nazi and pro-British and anxious to work for the allies in some special capacity. He admits having had a close relationship with a German doctor in Italy. His background and certain details of his story may be not entirely correct for German intelligence and his case was being investigated with that possibility in view. No firm conclusion has yet been reached, but he is regarded as probably innocent.

(v) Enquiries are being made by fifth unit into the case of a man in uniform, ALFRED H. HINDMAN. It has been reliably reported that when the 1st Air Corps was dissolved this man came to Hildesheim, his birthplace, to examine a

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The official Italian opinion appears to be that there is a possibility of disarmed Fascists insinuating themselves into the Communist Party. This is hinted that he already had some knowledge of specific cases. This may conceivably serve as an excuse for enquiries into and action against the Communist Party. Instructions have been issued by Eighth Army for this line of investigation to be discontinued.

(iii) At present "C" is in account of the organization and activities of the Organized Crime Chapters of the P.N.F. This information was collated by Eighth Army from captured documents and is considered reliable.

3.

(a) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

As far from isolated incidents, relations between troops and civilians continued to be satisfactory. No adverse reports were received on the co-operation afforded to the Allies by the Italian military and civil authorities, with the exception of the case noted in 2(c) (vi) above.

Fifth Army report that many civilians resent the security measures taken for the control of movement.

(b) Civilian Morale and Reactions.

In spite of the slow rate of progress by the Allied Forces of high civilian morale and generally civility continued to be received from the forward areas. Several instances were mentioned of civilians and their assistance given by civilians formally in enemy, now in Allied occupied territory to assisting Allied prisoners of war. One case is known of a woman in the tiny village of PESCOLA MELLAIO (Prov. CANTÙ. 533) who had 10 men for 39 days, feeding them and providing civilian clothes.

In the rear area the civilian population is quickly tapped into a state of apathy and is inclined to wait itself of war conditions. In fact in quarters discontent has been expressed with the present regime on the well-known grounds that too many requisitions have been retained in their old posts. In the majority of cases this criticism springs from political convictions than from material needs and deficiencies. It is noteworthy that the responsibility for any scarcity of food, employment, etc., is attributed invariably to the Italian administration, rather than to Axis. During the minor disturbances in the 15 Corps area reported in the previous Security Summary Part II, 3(a)(i), a single shot fired in the field to disarm a crowd of 200 strong which was gathered to demonstrate against the local civil authorities on account of the food shortage.

(c) Summary.

(i) Army Troops

crises. Several instances were mentioned of civilians being given by civilians formerly in enemy, now in Allied occupied territory, to escaping Allied prisoners of war. One case is known of a poor woman in the tiny village of PABOOL-MOLLO (Prov. CARUGNANO) who hid 10 men for 39 days, feeding them and providing civilian clothes.

In the near future the civilian population has quietly slipped into a state of apathy and is reluctant to risk itself of war conditions. In fact in waters discontent has been expressed with the present regime on the Italian mainland that too many scientists have been retained in their old posts. In the majority of cases this criticism springs less from political convictions than from material needs and deficiencies. It is noteworthy that the responsibility for any severity of food, employment, etc., is attributed invariably to the Italian administration, rather than to the Germans. During the minor disturbances in the 15 Corps zone reported in the previous Security Summary Part II, 5(2)(1), a single case of violence and the to disturbance of crowd 200 strong which has resulted in a demonstration against the local civil authorities in one of the food shortages.

(c) Summary.

(1) Army Moves

That 5 Div will be home by February '44. (CARPANO area).
That 6th. Mont. Army has started that Fifth Army will occupy Rome before Fifth Army (CARPANO area).

That British 9 Corps and 13 Corps troops have moved in Part (13 Corps).

That 13th. Corps is relieving 13 Corps which will return to the UK (13 Corps).

That 12 Div has moved up so that 78 Div can go home (5 Corps).

(11) Among Civilians.

That American patrols in uniform have been seen in Rome (13th Army zone, reported in Rome different occasions).

That General B. D. C. M. O. has publicly disassociated himself from the KKK, saying that he was one of the great things of the world for sympathy for the people of the left and that he could not run country to such a party. (Fifth Army area).

That in the latter part of November a German medium tank escorted by two American fighter planes landed in a field near Berlin and shortly afterwards took off in the direction of North Africa (Fifth Army area).

That 2003 VLT and CHURCHILL are now in Italian discussion peace terms with a German colony to. (Fifth Army area).

SUBJECT: Security Summary.SECRET

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H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.S.C.A.O. Ninth Army.
S.C.A.O. Eighth Army.20
AMG/1110/7
7th December 1943

The following extracts from 15 Army Group Security Summary for the period 1st to 15th November 1943 are submitted for information.

TTS/ECI

R.J.P. THORNE THORNE,
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

SECRET15 ARMY GROUP SECURITY SUMMARYPeriod covered - 1 Nov to 15 Nov 43.PART IGENERAL SURVEY

The general security picture in the 15 Army Group area showed little change during the period under review.

The main problem continued to be the control of refugees and of civilian movement in general. Local measures taken by FSP/CIC visited on the whole satisfactory results, having regard to the resources at their command, and the situation should be more fully under control once the system of R.I.P.'s is set up in the Army areas. The problem was rendered more difficult by the ease with which civilians were able to cross the rear Army boundary and to circulate within the Army zone. Control of entry into the Army areas from the rear is now to be effected by the establishment of a line of control points stretching from coast to coast; this line is to be in the vicinity of the rear Army boundaries. Control of movement was further complicated by the large number of unofficial, irregular or vaguely worded passes in circulation. This unsatisfactory state of affairs has now been brought to the

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

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Numerous cases continued to be reported of troops taking private films to local civilian photographers for developing and printing. In a number of cases pictures of military equipment and installations were involved. The provision of a proper scheme for the processing of films exposed by unit photographers is urgently required in order that this potential source of leakage of information may be removed. A theatre policy with regard to the use of cameras and taking of pictures by troops, uniformed British and American, is also urgently required.

There was some evidence of political activity on the part of the more radically anti-fascist sections of the population, and isolated instances occurred of manifestations of discontent over the present political and economic situation in Italy. The decision to grant to the Italians an increased freedom of political expression was received with general satisfaction.

Over a third of the persons arrested by Fifth Army on security grounds since the invasion have proved to have been former Squadristi. Fifth Army security personnel have adopted the practice of recommending the exclusion or removal of all Squadristi

PACB

SECRET

- 2 -

from positions where their authority in any way affects the interest of Allied Forces.

The sabotage situation continued to be bad. A petrol pipe-line was found to be punctured at a point near ANTHANALIA. Apart from a few instances of sabotage as not proved. Apart from a few instances of wire cutting, no other cases of possible or suspected sabotage were reported.

PART II.

1. MILITARY SECURITY

Security of Information

(i) In the 10 Corps area F.S.I. had to close all photographers' shops in order to prevent troops from taking private films to such shops for developing and printing. Similar steps were in process of being taken in the VI Corps area.

(ii) The question of Carabinieri gathering information concerning the locations and identifications of Allied troops stationed in their area was taken up with Colonel DALLA CHIESA, head of the 1st Legion of the CC.RR. The latter explained that his order was misconstrued as a result of a typists error and that it has since been countmanded. CC.RR. reports on particulars of Allied units were destroyed in the presence of F.S.I. and the Colonel undertook to ensure that activities of this nature on the part of the CC.RR. would cease forthwith.

2. CIVILIAN SECURITY

Individual suspects and arrested persons.

(1) During the period under survey 66 persons were reported as having been arrested on security grounds. Of these 6 were in the Fifth Army area and 60 in the Eighth Army area. It is thought that this disproportion can be accounted for to a limited degree by the considerable difference in size of the two Army areas during this period. Practically all were arrested with a view to internment, in a number of cases for a limited period only.

The following is a general analysis showing the various classes of persons arrested:

Public Officials

State Officials	-	2
Magistrates	-	1

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Public Officials

State Officials	-	2
Magistrates	-	1
CC.RR.	-	2

Party Officials

M.V.S.M.	-	17
Minor Fascist Officials and Squadristi	-	35

Miscellaneous Italian Civilians

	-	9
TOTAL		66

186

(ii) The following are the names of the more important persons arrested.

D'AMBROSIO Luigi.	-	Magistrate, DELICATO.
SPALLA Ignazio	-	Lieutenant, CC.RR. VASTO.
MARFI Francesco	-	Colonel, M.V.S.M. DELICATO.

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(iii) General Domenico PIRANELLI, head of the President of CASERTA, commanding about 1500 troops, who refused to offer resistance to the Germans and left with them when they evacuated the town, was ordered not to leave CASERTA without the permission of security personnel.

(iv) Records are being compiled by HEP/CIC of civilians known to have collaborated extensively with the Germans, and such persons are kept under surveillance. Lists of suspects and possible contacts are also in process of being compiled for future operational areas.

Subversive Movements and Organizations.

(i) A further anti-fascist organization called COMITATO DI SALUTE PUBBLICA has been reported in TIRANO Province (enemy occupied ITALY). This organization, which appears to be of local significance only, claims a membership of about 300 and is organized into groups of 6 or 7. It is said to be armed with rifles and grenades and to be at present engaged in assisting Italian soldiers and British PW to escape southwards. and E.O.I. have been informed.

(ii) MUSCONE's Fascist Republican Party has had little success in Allied occupied ITALY and appears to be completely discredited. One or two cases were reported in forward areas of attempts to recruit members for this party, but the prompt arrest of the persons responsible was having a salutary and reassuring effect on the population in general.

Relations between Troops and Civilians.

In general, relations between troops and civilians in both Army areas were satisfactory, and few incidents were reported. A tendency was noted for country folk to be, on the whole, more cooperative than townspeople. This has been the experience, too, of numbers of Allied troops occupying from enemy occupied ITALY. Economic conditions continued to colour to a certain extent the attitude adopted towards the Allies, particularly in the fifth Army area where the food situation is difficult in certain districts. In the forward areas a certain sympathy and indifference towards Allied troops was noted after an initial display of enthusiasm on their arrival.

SECRET

dislocation of local administration and public services were all giving rise to a certain degree of discontent and impatience in the more thickly populated areas of the West.

Generally the Italian is not taking a long range view of the welfare of himself and his fellows. He is quite selfishly considering only the immediate present, and, therefore, not prone to supporting Government or movement which does not immediately increase his material comfort.

Other matters of general security interest.

(i) 13 Corps reported that minor civil disturbances occurred over a period of four weeks up to 13 Nov 43 in certain small towns in the Corps area. A.M.C., C.M.P., and A.C.P. cooperated in dealing firmly with these incidents and careful investigations have been carried out. No evidence was found to suggest that these disturbances were brought about by any particular organizations and it was thought that the trouble was due to the inherent inability of the people to formulate requests to the local authorities without public demonstrations. The situation is being carefully watched.

(ii) Control of civilian movement was reported to be hampered by the presence in the Army areas of large numbers of Italian Military personnel on leave. This matter was taken up with the Italian military authorities with the result that members of the Italian armed forces on leave will no longer be permitted to enter the Army area without special reasons and permission.

(iii) Certain reports were received from F.S.P. in the Corps area to the effect that the Carabinieri and other Italian police had not proved universally satisfactory. It was alleged that certain of them had conducted more closely than was necessary with the German Army, and that some were still inclined towards Fascism. Unsatisfactory or doubtful elements were being weeded out and it is expected that once the situation becomes more settled the C.C. R. will cooperate just as satisfactorily in this area as elsewhere. In the meantime, however, the situation will continue to be carefully watched.

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* * * * *

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Subject: 15 Army Group Security Summary

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2 DEC 1945

H. A. 15 Army Group

C. A. 15

Equals B. 15

By 1501 1/3 (1b)

30 Nov 45

16

Security Summary for period 1 - 15 Nov 45.

410.

W. D. G. Kean Lt. Col

15 H. A. 15 Army Group

1501 1/3 (1b)

15 Army Group

1840

...with military security...
 ...the use of troops taking private films to...
 ...local civilians. Photographic equipment and printing. In a number of cases...
 ...pictures of military equipment and installations were involved. The provision...
 ...of a proper system for the processing of films exposed by unit photographers is...
 ...urgently required in order that the potential source of leakage of information...
 ...may be removed. The use of policy with regard to the use of cameras and taking...
 ...of photographs by troops, civilians for news printing, is also urgently...
 ...required.

There has been evidence of political activity on the part of the more...
 ...radically minded sections of the population, and isolated instances...
 ...occurred of demonstrations and pickets over the present position and economic...
 ...situation in Italy. The Italian Government has to the Italian a increased freedom...
 ...of political expression now realized with some relief.

Over a period of the past several months by Fifth Army in security grounds since...
 ...the invasion has, passed to have been further down. Fifth Army security...
 ...personnel have adopted the practice of communicating the exclusion or removal of...
 ...all Squadrini from positions where their authority in any way affects the interests...
 ...of Allied Forces.

The situation since then continues to be... A patrol, this time was found...
 ...to be furnished with a point northward but no other was not proved. Part...
 ...from a few instances of wire cutting, no other cases of possible or suspected

...with the Italian civilian authorities continued to be satisfactory

In general, although there were some serious reports (see para 2d) on the CC.HH.

and local civil police from east in districts in the Fifth Army area.

Towards the end of last month the parts of Addabia, Ball, BRINDISI and...
 ...MARTO passed under the control of No. 2 District for security purposes. This...
 ...was done under the jurisdiction of the Italian Section. No reports of...
 ...size were therefore too far in the 15 Army Group area during the period under...
 ...survey.

1830

Page 11.

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of the Administration

(1) In the... Corps... to check all photographic work... in order...
 ...to prevent troops from taking pictures... to such... for developing and printing.

(2) The question of the... further information... the VI Corps...
 ...and... of... in the... with...
 ...the... of the... the... since

- 2 -

been countermanded. CC.RR. reports on particulars of allied units were destroyed in the presence of P.S.R. and the Colonel undertook to ensure that activities of this nature on the part of the CC.RR. would cease forthwith.

(c) Security of material and installations.

(i) On 9 Nov 43 the petrol pipe line running from LAKEHED.NL to an aerodrome near MOCALA was found to be punctured at a point approximately 12 miles from LAKEHED.NL, evidently as a result of the impact of some sharp object. Enquiries as to whether the damage was due to accident or sabotage proved inconclusive.

(ii) Three cases of wire cutting were reported from the Eighth Army zone. At CHILWIT it was discovered on 1 Nov 43 that 500 yards of quad cable had been removed from a line running along the road from CHILWIT to CHILWIT. Since the weight of wire removed would be approximately 3-cwt, it appeared likely that a suspect had been used to carry it away. On 4 Nov 43 three farm workers reported that on 31st Oct 43 they saw about 20 vehicles (believed to be Bren carriers) stop near the place in question. Several soldiers got out and put the cable and placed it on one of the carriers. The soldiers were stated to be wearing black berets with a silver band but no further details were given which might assist in the identification of the unit concerned. The other two cases occurred at LAKEHED.NL (prev. C.A. 001.33). The culprit has not been traced, but the Colonel was warned that any recurrence would lead to severe collective punishment.

(iii) The Eighth Army zone instances of the cutting of signal lines have been small. On 6th Nov 43 a line was cut near MOCALA and the culprit was arrested. Witnesses include that, however, that soldiers who were not intended. It was also learnt that the telephone line running from Fifth Army C.A. zone towards MOCALA had been cut on several occasions and had necessitated the maintenance of a military guard of 15 men. It was therefore recommended to P.S.R. that the Fifth Army order prohibiting the death penalty for the crime with allied communications be passed in the vicinity and that the patrol of the line should be made the responsibility of the CC.RR.

(iv) Several reports were received by Eighth Army concerning the inactivity of units containing military supplies. These reports were often being boarded at points by civilians and on one occasion civilians were found smoking on weapons in food with ammunition and petrol. Suitable steps were taken to improve the situation.

The following is a general analysis showing the various classes of persons contacted:

2014-2015 Projects

Stato Civile	1	2
Professione	1	2
Religione	1	2

2000 (May 18)

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Wissenschaften IT & den Privaten

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(2) The reaction of the acid to the catalyst is not investigated.

D. MANCINI Luigi
E. D. I. MASIE
GIULIO FR. MOSCO
- A. GIARDINO, MILANO.
- MONTANARI, C. C. A., VARESE.
- COLONNARI, M. C. S. P., ROMA VENTO.

(114) On 31 Oct 43, J.G. Baumbach, formerly R. 200th, Liebert was ordered to accompany to a Creation Air Force Captain on a journey from A. 100th to A. 100th by 10 am. During the flight the Captain gained control of the plane by means of the fuel control and with the agreement of the pilot brought the plane to A. 100th. The pilot claimed that in a 100th shot was happening after a while but was no attempt to stop it as he was only too glad to be out of the war. Intervention by C.G.D. 100th showed that it had been to A. 100th to report 3 which was ordered on a special accuracy article on the 100th of C. in 100th. The, and his personal papers indicated connections with the GASTRO and the SIGMA 100th. He was escorted back to A. 100th. The further details intervention.

(iv) ZDUNICHEN, Georgeino, of KASSACHIA, who has lived a long time in the United States where he had the police record, was arrested for passing to Allied Military personnel as a former member of the M.B.I., and as an alien, questions of a military nature.

(v) General Denuncio Añibarril, head of the Brigade of Cavalry, commanding about 1500 troops, who refused to order resistance to the Germans as left with them when they occupied the town, was ordered not to leave Calicut without the

- 4 -

which appears to be of local significance only, claiming a membership of about 300 and is organized into groups of 6 or 7. It is said to be armed with rifles and grenades and to be at present engaged in assisting Italian soldiers and British PW to escape southwards. "A" Force and S.O.S. have been informed.

(ii) RUSSIAN/Communist Republican Party has had little success in Allied occupied Italy and appears to be completely discredited. One or two cases were reported in Rome and areas of attempts to recruit members for this party, but the prompt arrest of the persons responsible was having a salutary and reassuring effect on the population in general.

3. (a) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

In general, relations between troops and civilians in both army areas were satisfactory, but few incidents were reported. A tendency was noted for country folk to be, on the whole, more co-operative than townspeople. This has been the experience, too, of numbers of Allied troops escaping from enemy occupied Italy. Economic conditions continued to colour to a certain extent the attitude adopted towards the Allies, particularly in the Fifth Army zone where the food situation is difficult in certain districts. In the Seventh Army zone a certain quality and indifference towards Allied troops was noted prior to initial display of enthusiasm on their arrival.

(b) Civilian Morale and Reactions.

(i) Civilian morale continued to be satisfactory, but a certain degree of impatience was expressed in certain quarters with the present internal political situation. At Bari a demonstration was scheduled to take place to protest against the continuation in office of the Mayor on political grounds. That the demonstration was called off was due in part to the restraint imposed by the leaders of the anti-fascist groups who had given orders to their members not to participate.

(ii) It was reliably reported that General Zivkovic, a leading anti-fascist, had refused to co-operate further with the Yugoslav Government in any official capacity and had reported that this feeling of dissatisfaction with the present regime was widely widespread. The appointment of Josip G. Vukobratovic as prefect of Trieste was reported to be the result of an oblique reference on the part of the forces of the Allies and the ex-fascists who hoped thereby to continue to hold their old positions.

(iii) The membership of Italian soldiers was reported to be having a good effect, although only small numbers were being absorbed. Unemployment, scarcity of food, high prices and dislocation of local administration and public services were all giving rise to a certain degree of discontent and impatience in the more thickly populated areas of the West.

(ii) Civilian members continued to be arrested, but a certain degree of impudence was observed in certain quarters with the present internal political situation. At Lima a demonstration was scheduled to take place to protest against the continuance in office of the Mayor on political grounds. That the demonstration was called off and was in part to the restraint imposed by the leaders of the anti-fascist groups who had given orders to their members not to participate.

(iii) It was reliably reported that General VILLALBA, a leading anti-fascist, had refused to cooperate further with the Peruvian Government in any official capacity in Lima and reported that this feeling of discontent with the present regime was fairly widespread. The appointment of Enrique O. VILLALBA as Prefect of Arequipa was reported to be the result of an obvious intention on the part of the forces of the right in the ex-fascists was hoped thereby to continue to hold their old positions.

(iv) The reorganization of Italian soldiers was reported to be having a good effect, although only small numbers were being absorbed. Unemployment, scarcity of food, high prices and dislocation of local administration and public services were all giving rise to a certain degree of discontent and impudence in the more thickly populated areas of the coast.

(v) Generally the Italian is not taking a long range view of the war so of himself and his fellows. He is quite solidly considering only the immediate present, and, therefore, it appears to support any government or movement which does not immediately increase his material comfort.

(c) Rumours

The following is a selection of rumours current in the Army Group area during the period.

(i) Army Divided Troops

That divisions are being trained and formed into an Airborne Division. (Eight Army area).

That General Montalban is going home and will be replaced by General Martinez. (This rumour was also reported in the previous security summary and seems general among troops in the LUCMA area).

That Eighth Army is going back to U.S. and Fifth Army is taking over the western side of Italy (LUCMA).

That (Gandhi) has revolted and is organizing resistance against the Germans in India. (Gandhi 1933, 1934 and 1935).

That training has been made at OTT was an abundance of

That the allies have joined North of wall (DRAINING TROV. CATTLE, 3000).
That the King has abdicated and TROV. has been appointed as the
the Hierarchy. (TROV. 200).

(iii) Back Garden - 1000 sq. ft.

The Italians observed from Gormaul Island caught at boat on 27 Oct 43 that the following measure were current when Gormaul was taken. THE CAPTAIN

th to Berlin and Germany had reported to Washington on 22 October 1943. The German press reported that the German High Command was not surprised.

The 3 babies had opened her frontlets to steal, and that night troops were in Ouzumbekia on 24th October.

(a) underwritten of super I scientific entirement

(4) 13 Corps reported that minor civil disturbances occurred near Ajo, S. Cal. up to 15 Nov 43 in certain small towns in the Coachella and Imperial valleys. These disturbances were reported in local newspapers and in local radio broadcasts. It was thought that the trouble was due to the inherent inability of the people to formal to requests to the local authorities without public demonstrations. The situation is being carefully watched.

(ii) Control of civilian movement was reported to be hampered by the presence in the army ranks of large numbers of Italian military personnel on leave. This matter was taken up with the Italian military authorities with the result that members of the Italian armed forces on leave will no longer be permitted to enter the army zone without special permits and registration.

(iii) certain reports were received from P. S. I. in the 16 Corps area to the effect that the Central Board was either too lax or too strict and not proved universally satisfactory. It was alleged that certain of them had experienced very slowly that was necessary with the Central Board, the others were still dealing with the same. Unsatisfactory or doubtful elements were being weeded out and it is expected that once the situation becomes

(2) Under review of general security interest.

(i) 13 Dec. reported that minor civil disturbances occurred over a period of 2000 hours in 13 Nov-13 in certain small towns in the Congo area. U.S.A. and U.S.A. accompanied in similar manner when these incidents and several arrests have been carried out. No serious was found to suggest that these disturbances were brought about by any religious or religious. It was thought that the trouble was due to the inherent inability of the people to formal the requests to the local authorities without public demonstrations. The situation is being carefully watched.

(ii) Control of civilian movement was reported to be hampered by the presence in the area of large numbers of Italian military personnel on leave. This matter was taken up with the Italian military authorities with the result that members of the Italian armed forces on leave will no longer be permitted to enter the area without special reasons on permission.

(iii) Certain reports were received from P.S. in the 10 Congo area to the effect that the Carabinieri and other Italian police had not proved unduly effective. It is alleged that certain of them had co-operated with closely than was necessary with the Congo army. The fact that some were still in the area is expected that the situation becomes more settled the C.C. will confer to just as serious activity in this area as elsewhere. In the meantime, however, the situation will continue to be carefully watched.

(iv) It is noted that the location list of the 15 Army Group area.

Appendix "A" to
15 Army Group Security
Summary 1 Nov-15 Nov-43

Distribution of F.S. and C.I.C. Sections as on 15 Nov

<u>Section</u>	<u>Attached to</u>	<u>Location</u>
15 Army Group 15 F.S.S.	15 Army Group	ARI.
Fifth Army 305 C.I.C.	First Army	USATEL.
151 C.I.C.	1st Army Div	C. IVANC.
202 C.I.C. 136 C.I.C.	II Corps 36 Inf Div.	PARTICIANO. PIGMAI.RO.
206 C.I.C. 103 C.I.C. 134 C.I.C. 145 C.I.C.	VI Corps 3 Inf Div 34 Inf Div 45 Inf Div	PRATA SCUTTA. ALIMANO. VENETRO PILASTRANO.
278 F.S.S. 270 F.S.S. 31 F.S.S. 35 F.S.S.	X Corps 7 Army Div 45 Div 56 Div	SE. R. NINE MONDAGONE FR. COLISE ROCCANGELI.
Eighth Army 203 F.S.S.	Eighth Army	LUCCERA.
68 F.S.S. 88 F.S.S. 406 F.S.S.	V Corps 78 Div 8 Inf Div.	PERIOLI ASTO RUNCHEG
412 F.S.S. 1 Can F.S.S. N.Z. F.S.S. 17 F.S.S.	XIII Corps 1 Can Div 2 N.Z. Div. 5 Div	VINCIGLIANO CA. POR. GSO. GIBBI CA. M. LHO
47 F.S.S.	Eighth Army (L. of C.)	FOGLI.

SUBJECT:- Security Summary.

SECRET

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

S.C.A.O., Fifth Army.
S.C.A.O., Eighth Army.

AMG/410/9
27th November 43

The following extracts from 15 Army Group Security Summary for the period 16th to 31st October 1943 are submitted for information.

DOP/SCH

Major,
Military Assistant to
Chief Civil Affairs Officer

SECRET

15 ARMY GROUP SECURITY SUMMARY

Period covered: 16 Oct - 31 Oct 43

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

The period under survey was characterised by no happenings of outstanding security significance, and the security scene underwent little change since the previous fortnight.

The main problem continued to be that of the control of refugees arriving by land and by sea. Improvised schemes for canalisation and "vetting" were set up locally in the forward areas but a comprehensive scheme to cover the whole of Allied occupied ITALY must be put into operation before the refugee question can be said to be under proper control. Much a scheme has now been worked out and is expected to be put into effect shortly.

The Italian population in general continued to be friendly and co-operative. A tendency was noted for anti-Fascist parties and groups to become more organised and more numerous but none appeared to be exciting any wide-spread enthusiasm; most of them were spending a great deal of their time collecting evidence, frequently by

GENERAL SURVEYPART I

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With effect from 24 Oct 43 No. 2 District assumed security responsibility for the area South of Eighth Army rear boundary, and PIS for SALERNO and NAZOLI Provinces South of the Fifth Army boundary. The question of responsibility in the latter area, however, was subject to certain fluctuation and uncertainty.

PART II1. MILITARY SECURITYSecurity of Information.

The problem of control of movement was rendered more difficult by the number of unofficial and irregular travel permits in circulation. One A.M.G. officer was found to be issuing passes to civilians authorising journeys into enemy occupied ITALY. Instances were also discovered of passes signed by Allied officers or Italian officials who had no authority to do so. Many of these passes were written on old scraps of paper and worded in the vaguest manner.

SECRET

One Italian soldier was caught by a forward unit while trying to pass through the unit area and was found to be in possession of a pass forged by himself; he was put into TARANTO jail pending trial. Steps have now been taken to rectify the position regarding the issue of irregular and unsatisfactory passes.

Security of Personnel.

Nothing to report apart from two cases involving prostitutes. The first concerned a woman in the Eighth Army area, who was following troops under an assumed name and armed with a forged identity card and a pass issued by "Allied Military Mission (AMCOT)" at TARANTO permitting her to travel between TARANTO and BRINDISI. The case was handed over to the Italian authorities.

2. CIVIL SECURITY.Individual Suspects, Arrested Persons.

It will be noted that a number of civilians arrested for internment were placed in the first instance in civil jails. This was only pending Army H.Q. authorization for internment, on receipt of which such persons were transferred to the civilian compartment of a P.W. cage. This latter arrangement is, however, not entirely satisfactory, since P.W. cages have no accommodation for women; they are frequently overcrowded, and also it is on the whole undesirable for civilian internees to be shipped out of Italy to N. Africa along with ordinary military P.W. The solution of this problem of disposal by the early establishment of internment camps on the Italian mainland under the Italian authorities is now being taken up by A.M.C. and No. 2 District.

Subversive Movements and Organizations.

(i) Political activity in Allied occupied ITALY continued to be on a minor scale and was of no great security interest. The Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale which includes seven anti-Fascist groups continued to supply Fifth Army with useful information, but largely of a political character. The CASALTA group of anti-Fascists, representing the Partito di Azione, the Christian Democratic Party and the Communist Party were also compiling reports on public officials and others considered to be of doubtful sympathies. The reliability of

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Subversive Movements and Organizations.

(i) Political activity in Allied occupied Italy continued to be on a minor scale and was of no great security interest. The Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale which includes seven anti-Fascist groups continued to supply Fifth Army with useful information, but largely of a political character. The CACENIA group of anti-Fascists, representing the Partito di Azione, the Christian Democratic Party and the Communist Party were also compiling reports on public officials and others considered to be or doubtful sympathies. The reliability of such information is treated with the suspicion which it deserves.

(ii) There was little evidence of support for the Republican Fascist Party. Reports from CAMPOBASSO stated that considerable support for this movement had existed in the town but that it had been suppressed by the arrests made by P.S.B. 1834

Civilian Morale and Reactions.

The general attitude of the Italian population towards the Allied occupation continued to be satisfactory, but was conditioned in part by the degree of thoroughness with which the Allied authorities were carrying out their task of purging the Italian administration of known Fascist elements. Wherever the Allies had taken a strong line civilian morale assumed a healthier tone.

SECRET

- 3 -

Two P.S. Sections in the "Mice" of Italy (which is part of the "Kingdom" and therefore outside the jurisdiction of A.M.G.) spoke of the considerable disgust felt by the people that many Fascist were still in their old positions. The present regime was referred to as "a Fascist overcoat turned inside out."

Other matters of General Security Interest.

A plan for the canalization and screening of refugees in the forward area of 5 Corps, was put into operation and was working satisfactorily. Forward troops were instructed to round up all refugees passing through the Allied lines and pass them back through P.S. channels to the Army where arrangements were made for a further interrogation then would have been possible in the forward area. An officer and two N.C.O.s were especially allotted for this task. It is proposed that a comprehensive scheme on similar lines for the control of refugees will be put into force in S. Italy as a whole.

At the request of A.M.G. who wished to re-open courts of justice as quickly as possible, a check of the officials of the Italian courts was made by security personnel. It was found that the courts had built up no small reputation for resistance to Fascist domination. The only exception was the First President of the Court of Appeals who had been appointed to that post for the purpose of forcing the other judges to accept the arbitrary decisions of the regime.

A report was received that the NAPLES branch of the Italian Red Cross had been trafficking in automobile permits. The Red Cross was alleged to be submitting for A.M.G.'s approval a list of permits in excess of its own requirements. The extra ones were then being sold for 3000 lire to civilians who were not entitled to them. A report on the matter was passed to A.M.G.

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*File*CONFIDENTIAL

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Subject: Security Notes No. 6.H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.AF/AG/1.21 November, 45.A.C.C. & A.M.G. H.Q., Palermo. (2)
R.C.A.C. Region III (1)
R.C.A.C. Region IV (1)*see 7*

1. Hawthth Security Notes No. 6 describing field security work with an Infantry Division in SICILY.


 for Colonel,
Colonel Staff Officer

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IN/EF.

10 1943

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Equals British Most Secret and Secret

SECURITY SUMMARY

H. A. 25 Army Group.

U.S.A.F.

~~DO NOT REPRODUCE OR DISSEMINATE~~

1003/110/3/5(15)

TO: A.C. of C., 1-2,
AFHQ.

10 November 1943

Attached herewith is Security Summary for the period
10 - 31 Oct 43.

W. J. Gibson. Lt. Col.

W. J. Gibson, Lt. Col.,
Brigadier,
I.C.S.(1).

M. A. to see

TO: 1-2

Col, No. 2 District
H. A. 25 Army Group
AFHQ.

Seen by P.S.

CSO

To see

On the whole good. Thank

Extract parts
referring to AFHQ +
S. A. 25 Army Group.
S. A. 25 Army Group.
S. A. 25 Army Group.24
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SECRET~~NO SECRET~~ ~~NO SECRET~~

From British Maritime Security and Control
 IS JURY GROUP SECURITY SURVEY

Period covered: 16 Oct - 23 Oct 43.

PART 1

GENERAL SURVEY

The period under survey was characterised by no change of outstanding security significance, and the security scene underwent little change since the previous fortnight.

The main problem continued to be that of the control of refugees arriving by land and by sea. Improved schemes for canalisation and "vetting" were set up locally in the forward areas but a comprehensive scheme to cover the whole of Allied occupied Italy must be put into operation before the refugee question can be said to be under proper control. Such a scheme has now been worked out and is expected to be put into effect shortly.

The situation with regard to the security of the coastline and the control of fishing continued to be unsatisfactory. Efforts were initiated in conjunction with the British Naval authorities to ensure effective security control, with particular reference to the eastern seaboard.

Security in the ports was satisfactory and showed steady improvement.

The sabotage situation for the period covered was good. No cases were reported apart from two involving the cutting of signal lines. In both cases lengths of wire were removed suggesting that the offenders had cut the wire for personal use.

The C.I.M. continued to afford valuable assistance to Allied security agencies in the control of refugees, the guarding of military establishments and the investigation and arrest of suspects. For example at GIBLA DEL GOLLE the Carabinieri carried out a number of raids simultaneously, arresting 25 local squatters, who were brought before an Italian commission working from Bell.

Co-operation with the Carabinieri C.I.M. organisation was increased and extended.

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Co-operation with the Carabinieri C.C. organisation has increased and extended.

Preliminary arrangements were made for organising C.I.L. counter-espionage sections for security duties in the Army areas under the direction of G-2/I(b). When formed, these sections, by reason of their training and local knowledge, should be of valuable assistance to the Allied security agencies in the forward areas.

No. 2 MI(b) Unit was in continuous contact with 15 Army Group and the Allied Military Mission while No. 3 MI(b) Unit and Fifth Army continued to work closely together. In addition the Army Security Staffs and F.C.M./C.I.C. worked in close and effective co-operation with the staff officers operating in the Army areas.

The Italian population in general continued to be friendly and co-operative. A tendency was noted for anti-Fascist parties and groups to become more organized and more numerous but none appeared to be exciting any wide-spread enthusiasm. Most of them were spending a great deal of their time collecting evidence, frequently biased and unreliable, against former Fascists and new Fascists for transmission to the Allied security services.

18.10

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With effect from 24 Oct 43 No. 2 District assumed security responsibility for the area South of Eighth Army rear boundary, and 286 for SALUNO and NAPOLI Provinces South of the Fifth Army boundary. The question of responsibility in the latter area, however, was subject to certain fluctuation and uncertainty.

A location list of F.S. and C.I.C. sections is given in Part II page 3 (e).

Part II

I. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) Only one violation was reported for the period covered. On 22 Oct 43 the Fifth Army Password List for the week 28 Oct. - 3 Nov. 43 and Administrative Order No. 3 dated 20 Oct 43 (both classified U.S. SECRET) were lost in the NAPOLI dock area as the result of having been left lying on the seat of an unattended truck. Neither document has been recovered but the Password List was immediately cancelled and a new one published for the period affected.

(ii) The passage of civilians through the Allied lines continued to give security personnel in forward areas a certain amount of trouble. Every effort was made by FSP/CIC, with the assistance of the C.C.F. and units in the forward areas, to channel these civilians through control points, but a number inevitably manage to come through with no security check whatsoever.

One case was reported from TUNOBI of an ex-convict of TURIN approaching farm workers with the offer to set up a guide through the lines back to TUNOBI. He was arrested by F.S.F. and is now in the civil jail awaiting trial.

(iii) The problem of control of movement was rendered more difficult by the number of unofficial and irregular travel permits in circulation. One ALG officer was found to be issuing passes to civilians authorizing journeys into enemy occupied TUNOBI. Instances were also discovered of passes signed by Allied officers or Italian officials who had no authority to do so. Many of these passes were written on odd scraps of paper and worded in the vaguest manner. One Italian soldier was caught by a forward unit while trying to pass through the unit area and was found to be in possession of a pass signed by himself; he was put into TUNOBI jail.

on the seat of an unattended truck. Atoms to but the Password List was immediately cancelled and a new one published for the period affected.

(ix) The passage of civilians through the Allied Lines continued to give security personnel in forward areas a certain amount of trouble. Every effort was made by FSP/CIC, with the assistance of the U.S. and units in the forward areas, to enable these civilians through control points, but a number inevitably manage to come through with no security check whatsoever.

One case was reported from THORP of an ex-resident of TURIN approaching farm workers with the offer to act as a guide through the lines back to TURIN. He was arrested by F.S.P. and is now in the civil jail awaiting trial.

(ix) The problem of control of movement was rendered more difficult by the number of unofficial and irregular travel permits in circulation. One SAC officer was found to be issuing passes to civilians authorizing journeys into enemy occupied Italy. Instances were also discovered of passes signed by Allied officers or Italian officials who had no authority to do so. Many of these passes were written on old scraps of paper and sorted in the vaguest manner. One Italian soldier was caught by a forward unit while trying to pass through the unit area and was found to be in possession of a pass forged by himself; he was put into THORP jail pending trial. Steps have now been taken to rectify the situation regarding the issue of irregular and unsatisfactory passes.

(ix) In 10 Corps area a German army radio transmitting set was found under suspicious circumstances. Five civilians were detained and investigations are proceeding.

(v) Many instances were reported of units and individuals leaving files for developing of local photographers. A number of such films were found to contain photographs of army and air force equipment. This practice is extremely difficult to check and a scheme for its effective security control has been submitted for the consideration of AFHQ.

(vi) Two instances came to light in the Eighth Army area of U.S. reporting to their Commando legions the locations and identifications of Allied troops in their areas. This matter is being thoroughly and urgently investigated in regards both the extent and investigation thereof.

(vii) Security checks carried out in headquarters showed that the security of documents, maps etc. was in general good, apart from one or two instances of classified material for destruction which had not been properly burnt.

-3-

(b) Security of Material and Installations

(i) Only two cases of wire-cutting were reported for the period under review. In the 6 Corps Area two former Italian soldiers were arrested for cutting telephone wires and removing a section for their own use. Confessions were obtained and both men were sent for trial by Military Court. The results will be reported in a later report. The second instance occurred in the vicinity of Fifth Army Headquarters where two lengths of wire (six feet and eight feet respectively) had been removed. The case is being investigated by CC.RA and U.I.C.

(ii) On the evening of 24 Oct 43 the RAF petrol dump at POGGIO D'ERENIALE (Prov FROSINONE) was destroyed by fire. Investigations by FSP showed no reason to suspect sabotage, but revealed that there had been no guard on the dump. A full report was forwarded to S.I.O., Desert Air Force.

(iii) No other reports of sabotage or suspected sabotage were received during the period under survey and security checks indicated that the position was on the whole satisfactory.

(c) Security of Access to Military Establishments

(i) No violations were reported for the period under review and the position continues to be generally satisfactory.

(ii) The LTC detachment with Fifth Army Headquarters were confronted with a considerable security problem in the shape of seven hundred civilians living in the CACERATA Palace where Army Rear Headquarters is accommodated. It was decided to evacuate all except those persons doing essential work in the palace and these latter were being carefully checked and approved by the palace Carabinieri. By the end of September all persons had been evacuated, with the possibility of 225 more in the near future. The circulation of civilians in the palace grounds, the site of the Army Command Post, was strictly controlled and limited.

(iii) Port Security Sections continued to receive a great deal of their attention to the security of access to the dock area. The following were main points of security interest:

MAAF Port It had been found that the Italian authorities had been issuing passes to the dock area indiscriminately, making little or no attempt to check upon the bona fides of the applicant or to enquire into his reasons for requesting a pass. With effect from 25 Oct 43 no civilian is allowed into the dock area unless he is in possession of a pass.

(c) Security of Access to Military Establishments.

(4) No violations were reported for the period under review and the position continues to be generally satisfactory.

(ii) The CIC Detachment with Fifth Army Headquarters were confronted with a considerable security problem in the shape of seven hundred civilians living in the Uffizi Palace where Army Headquarters is accommodated. It was decided to evacuate all except those persons doing essential work in the palace and these latter were being carefully checked and approved by the Palace Carabinieri. By the end of September 204 persons had been evacuated, with the possibility of 225 more in the near future. The circulation of civilians in the palace grounds, the site of the Army Command Post, was strictly controlled and limited.

(iii) Port Security Sections continued to devote a great deal of their attention to the security of access to the dock area. The following were main points of security interest:

Dock Port It had been found that the Italian authorities had been issuing passes to the dock area indiscriminately, making little or no attempt to check upon the bona fides of the applicant or to inquire into his reasons for requesting a pass. With effect from 25 Oct 43 no civilian is allowed into the dock area unless he is in possession of a pass over-stamped by either Navy House or Port Security. Italian Service personnel in uniform are allowed entry on presenting their normal service identity card.

Italian Merchantmen in port come under the jurisdiction of the Italian Captain of the Port. The latter was instructed through HQR that it is his responsibility to see that shore-leave passes are issued to crews of Italian merchant vessels but that crew-lists must be submitted to Port Security for a further check and for passes to be counter-stamped. This arrangement is working satisfactorily.

Maritime Port The port contains thirteen berths, all at the Western side, the approach to which is well wired. There is one entrance and one exit, both guarded by British military personnel.

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A Permits and Permits officer from English Bay was installed in the port for the issue of all dock passes, in collaboration with Port Security.

Fishing boats and other small craft will be excluded from that part of the port used by Allied ships.

TANANIVO Port This port presents a larger security problem than any of the others on the east coast on account of its size and its large number of installations, such as oil and petrol storage tanks, powder depot, ammunition stores, seaplane base, destroyer filling base etc. Snap checks by the Port Security Sections revealed certain loopholes in the existing security arrangements for the control of entry and stops were taken to remedy these deficiencies.

No comprehensive harbour regulations had been carried by the authorities concerned but stops were taken by Port Security to make the Merchant Harbour a prohibited area for small craft. One of the Port Company were co-operating in frightening away such boats which had previously been allowed to wander close to merchant vessels. The British A.A. Battery stationed on either side of the Merchant Harbour were also helping to keep the harbour clear of gun-boats by threatening to fire on them if they persisted in entering.

The Security Section responsible for TANANIVO (Royal Marine F.S. Section) has a launch in full-time service which is used for visiting ships and carrying out patrols of the harbour area.

NAMIE Port The very considerable security problems presented by NAMIE and satellite ports were vigorously tackled by the Port Security Officer and Fleet Base Security Officer working in the closest co-operation. The degree of security control was gradually improved, but there are still weaknesses to be overcome. Difficulty was experienced in training the guards at the dock entrances properly to perform the duties assigned to them. Detailed regulations existed for the control of fishing craft, and in general these were observed, but measures and resources for their enforcement remained inadequate.

The British S.A. Battery stationed on either side of the Merchant Harbour were also helping to keep the harbour clear of war-boats by threatening to fire on them if they persisted in entering.

The Security Section responsible for TARANTO (Royal Marine F.S. Section) has a launch in full-time service which is used for visiting ships and carrying out patrols of the harbour area.

TARANTO Port The very considerable security problems presented by TARANTO and satellite ports were vigorously tackled by the Port Security Officer and Fleet Base Security Officer working in the closest co-operation. The degree of security control was gradually improved, but there are still weaknesses to be overcome. Difficulty was experienced in training the guards at the dock entrances properly to perform the duties assigned to them. Detailed regulations existed for the control of fishing craft, and in general these were observed, but measures and resources for their enforcement remained inadequate.

(d) Security of Personnel

Nothing to report apart from two cases involving prostitutes. The first concerned a woman in the Fifth Army area, who was following troops under an assumed name and armed with a forged identity card and a pass issued by "Allied Military Mission (AMMOT)" at TARANTO permitting her to travel between TARANTO and BRINDISI. The case was handed over to the Italian authorities.

The second case concerned a report received by Fifth Army to the effect that certain prostitutes were consorting with Allied soldiers in TARANTO. A raid was made in order to get information from them. An investigation was made and the Fifth Army Provost Marshal notified but no evidence of espionage activity was found.

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2. CIVIL SECURITY(a) Individual Suspects, Arrested Persons

(i) The number of arrests by security personnel reported during the period under survey numbered 143. This represents a sharp increase on the number reported for the previous period, and is accounted for by the increase in Eighth Army arrests from 24 to 113. At present, ^{the} ~~the~~ list of security arrests reported by the two armies during the period 16 Oct. - 31 Oct 43, ^{is a sample.}

The majority of these arrests were made in the forward areas, many as a precautionary measure while operations were in progress in that particular area. In the latter case internment was usually recommended for a limited period only, in order to keep doubtful elements out of harm's way until the security situation became more settled.

In the four provinces of the "Kingdom" the normal arrest policy and procedure was followed i.e. that arrests required on security grounds by F.S.P. should wherever possible be carried out by the U.S. or other competent Italian agency.

It will be noted that a number of civilians arrested for internment were placed in the first instance in civil jails. This was only pending Army HQ authorization for internment, on receipt of which such persons were transferred to the civilian compartment of A.P.M. Cago. This latter arrangement is however not entirely satisfactory since P.M. camps have no accommodation for women, they are frequently overcrowded, and also it is on the whole undesirable for civilian internees to be shipped out of Italy to A. FRICK along with ordinary military P.M. The solution of this problem of disposal by the early establishment of internment camps on the Italian mainland under the Italian authorities is not being taken up by A.G. ^{at present.}

(ii) The 143 arrested civilians reported during the period under review were divided as follows:

Administrative Officials

State Officials 11
Magistrates 2
Municipal Police, U.S. 3

Party Officials

Federal Secretaries (F.N.P.) 1
U.S.M. 2

were placed in the first instance in civil jails. This was only pending Army Hq. authorization for internment, on receipt of which such persons were transferred to the civilian compartment of a P.V. Cage. This latter arrangement is however not entirely satisfactory since P.V. cages have no accommodation for women, they are frequently overcrowded, and also it is on the whole undesirable for civilian internees to be shipped out of Italy to N. Africa along with ordinary military P.V. The solution of this problem of disposal by the early establishment of internment camps on the Italian mainland under the Italian authorities is now being taken up by AMC.

(11) The 143 arrested civilians reported during the period under review were divided as follows:

Administrative Officials

State Officials	11
Registrars	2
Municipal Police, CC.NN	3

Party Officials

Federal Secretaries (PNF)	1
SVSM	21
Minor Fascist Officials and Agents	71

Miscellaneous

Italian Armed Forces	4
German Armed Forces	1
Italian Civilians	24
	142

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(12) The following are the names of the more important personalities arrested.

CAVALLI, Francesco	Director of Prison for political internees (TRIMITE ISLANDS)
ROUSSEL, Michele	Vice warden (CALPOBASSO)

Messore (CARPAGNO) // 100 p. 2

MANVELLA, Francesco

M. BRIND, Arturo

MANGUCCI, Giuseppe

MAGONICO, Secondino

MAURIL, Paolo

MAGGIORI, Salvatore

MAGGIO, Alfredo

MAGGIORIEL, Carlo

MAGGIORIEL, Renato

Major, Italian Army

Colonel, Italian Army

Local founder of Fascist Republican Party in CALIGNOLA

Director General of National Insurance Coy.

Segretario Federale of CARPAGNO 1941-1943

Vice Director of Bank of Rome (VINO VALENTI)

Wealthy exporter, of NAPLES. Associated closely with Germans after Armistice

Wealthy NAPLES business man. Received special dispensations and privileges from Germans. Consoorted with German Officers.

(iv) The activities of LUINO Achille, newspaper and shipping magnate of NAPLES were also investigated. It was established that he received much assistance from Count OLINO, entertained Field Marshal COMING's wife at his villa for a month and a half, entertained the German Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP for several days and received the order of the German Eagle. Further investigations were being made.

(v) On the recommendation of the Allied security authorities COMTE Alfredo, chief of the political police of the Gestapo of NAPLES, was transferred to another department. His successor however, was reported to be generally disliked and his activities were placed under close surveillance.

(b) Subversive Movements and Organizations

(1) Political activity in Allied occupied Italy continued to be on a minor scale and was of no great security interest. The Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale which includes seven anti-Fascist groups continued to supply Fifth Army with useful information, but largely of a political character. The CARTEA group of Anti-Fascists, representing the Partito di Sinistra, the

(iv) The activities of LAURO Achille, newspaper and shipping magnate of Naples were also investigated. It was established that he received such assistance from Count UMANO, entertained Field Marshal COHENCO's wife at his villa for a month and a half, entertained the German Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP for several days and received the order of the German Eagle. Further investigations were being made.

(v) On the recommendation of the Allied security authorities COMTE Alfresco, chief of the political police of the Austro-Hungarian, was transferred to another Department. His successor however, was reported to be generally disliked and his activities were placed under close surveillance.

(b) Subversive Movements and Organizations

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(ii) There was little evidence of support for the Republican Fascist Party. Reports from CASALE stated that considerable support for this movement had existed in the town but that it had been suppressed by the arrests made by F.B.I.

1820

(iii) Posters appeared in the town in Bari Province urging the Italian population to sabotage the Allied war effort. It was believed possible to trace two of the men responsible for putting up these posters and immediate steps were taken to locate and arrest these men for interrogation, but their discovery has not yet been reported.

3. (a) Relations Between Troops and Civilians

(i) Relations between troops and civilians were generally satisfactory and incidents reported were on the whole few in number. In MORTALA (near TARANTO), however, relations were reported to be bad, and clashes between troops and civilians were frequent. As a remedial measure it was arranged for an officer and seven C.I.'s (British) to patrol the town each evening and a resident picket of six, drawn from NEW ZEALAND troops, to be quartered with the C.I.'s. Further incidents were reported from BRUCE involving British and American troops from TARANTO, BRINDISI and Sirfields in the district who visit BRUCE in the afternoons and evenings. The matter was referred to the DPM BRINDISI who has taken appropriate action.

(ii) Fifth Army troops complained of the exorbitant prices charged by local tradesmen, but in general such complaints are less common than against the French in N. AFRICA.

(iii) In TARANTO a good impression was created by BASTOLAND troops on account of their frequent visits to church. This has done much to counteract the initial reaction on the part of the civilian population of fear and distrust generally encountered by coloured troops on their arrival in a European country.

(vi) It was reported by Eighth Army that in certain forward areas the friendly attitude of British troops was being interpreted as a sign of weakness and compared unfavourably with the brutal aloofness of the Germans.

(b) Civilian morale and reactions

(i) The general attitude of the Italian population towards the Allied occupation continued to be satisfactory, but was conditioned in many by the degree of thoroughness with which the Allied authorities were carrying out their task of purging the Italian administration of known Fascist elements. Wherever the Allies had taken a strong line civilian morale assumed a healthier tone. Two P.I. Sections in the "Heads" of Italy (which is part of the "Kingdom") and therefore outside the jurisdiction of AGO spoke of the considerable disgust felt by the people that many Fascist were still in their old positions. The present regime was referred to as "a Fascist overcoat turned inside out".

(ii) Economic conditions also had a bearing on the condition of civilian morale. Lack of employment in certain areas was reported as a source of discontent, particularly in view of the rise in prices. The

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(iii) That ITALY is a defeated nation counts for nothing with the average Italian who has switched from the status of "enemy" to co-belligerent with consummate ease. The war against GERMANY is supported, but with no general display of enthusiasm.

(c) Remarks

(i) Among Troops

That Brazilian troops are on the way to take over the occupation of SICILY and ITALY. (13 Corps Hq.)

That 1 Can Div is (+) returning to England

(b) preparing for an assault on JUGOSLAVIA
(13 Corps Hq.)

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That Churchill has given GERMANY 14 days to surrender or suffer raids of 3,000 bombers per day. (L.I.C. RAIL)

That General MONTGOMERY is going back to U.K., and is to be replaced by General FRANK. (Source unknown)

(ii) Among Civilians

That MOSE has fallen to the Allies (Eighth Army)

That GRAZIANI has turned against the Germans (Eighth Army)

That GRAZIANI has committed suicide (BONIFAZ Prov. CASPOBASSO)

That HUNGARY and RUMANIA have sued for a separate peace
(Area CUCULONESI, 29 Oct.)

That 2,000 British parachutists were recently dropped on the Brenner (TRENOLI, late Oct.)

That Bavarian and Austrian troops are deserting in N. ITALY.
(Area LUCERA, 27 Oct.)

That Americans in the United States were starving on account of the high prices and difficulties in obtaining food. (Fifth Army Area)

That HITLER had recently broadcast an ultimatum to the Allies to the effect that they must leave ITALY within 72 hours or be annihilated. (Fifth Army Area)

That HITLER had admitted in a broadcast that the war was no 90% even 95%, lost and that he hoped he would be forgiven for what he planned to do during the last ten days. (Fifth Army Area)

(d) Other Matters of General Security Interest

(1) A plan for the canalization and screening of refugees in the forward area of 5 Corps, was put into operation and was working satisfactorily. Forward troops were instructed to round up all refugees passing through the Allied lines and pass them back through P.T. Channels to the Army zone where arrangements were made for a fuller interrogation than would have been possible in the forward areas. An officer and two N.C.O's were especially allotted for this task. It is proposed that a comprehensive scheme on Italian lines for the control of refugees will be put into force in S. ITALY

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(2) Other Matters of General Security Interest

(a) A plan for the examination and screening of refugees in the forward area of 5 Corps, was put into operation and was working satisfactorily. Forward troops were instructed to round up all refugees passing through the Allied lines and pass them back through P.V. Channels to the Army base where arrangements were made for a fuller interrogation than would have been possible in the forward areas. An officer and two N.C.O.'s were especially allotted for this task. It is proposed that a comprehensive scheme on similar lines for the control of refugees will be put into force in G. ITALY as a whole.

(ii) A report received from LXXXI stated that the Civil Court had sentenced a man to eight years' penal servitude for obstructing the Fascist title of a document and substituting the word "liberty." The case was also reported to have released a man charged by a pro-filied Italian with saying that the Germans would soon free ITALY from the Fascist. It was further stated that an order had been issued to the police to fire on any pro-filied demonstrators. The Allied Political Liaison Officer is now investigating these allegations.

(iii) In XXXII the Gestapo was instructed to continue the registration of enemy aliens and to begin the registration of nationals of enemy-occupied countries and persons of enemy origin who have acquired another nationality as a counter-measure against possible German-inspired subversive activity.

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behind the Allied lines it was recommended that all individuals included in the above categories should be interned as likely to prove harmful to the Allied war effort, with certain exceptions such as the very young and the very old, members of holy orders and those of proven anti-Nazi convictions who might be helpful.

(iv) At the request of AMG who wished to re-open courts of justice as quickly as possible, a check of the officials of the NAPLES courts was made by security personnel. It was found that the courts had built up no small reputation for resistance to Fascist domination. The only exception was the First President of the Court of Appeals who had been appointed to that post for the purpose of forcing the other judges to accept the arbitrary decrees of the regime.

(v) A report was received that the NAPLES Branch of the Italian Red Cross had been trafficking in automobile permits. The Red Cross was alleged to be submitting for AMG's approval a list of permits in excess of its own requirements. The extra ones were then being sold for 5000 lire to civilians who were not entitled to them. A report on the matter was passed to AMG.

(vi) On the whole the Italians continued to cooperate satisfactorily. Cases of non-cooperation on the part of Italian personnel were however reported by the RAF at GALATINA airfield and also by British units working in BARLETTA docks, and further enquiries were being made. RM of 5 Corps reported that Italian units in the Corps area were giving satisfactory assistance but made the comment that civilians engaged on road labour worked better than Italian troops.

(e) Distribution of F.S. and C.I.C. Sections as on 31 Oct. 45.

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SUBJECT: Security Notes No. 4

SG, 15 Army Group
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20 Nov 43

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1. Herewith Security Notes No. 4 concerning field security work with an infantry division in SICILY.

Shannon Capt.
E., RUSCOE., Capt.

for Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

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B-389.514/10.

14 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Security Notes No. 6.

1. Attached are Security Notes No. 6 giving an account of field security work with an Infantry Division in Sicily.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S.S. Hill-Dillon

S.S. HILL-DILLON,
 Colonel, G. S.,
 G-2 (CI) Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

STANDARD FORMS)

NO. 6)

14 November 1943.

FIELD SECURITY WORK WITH A DIVISIONAL STAFF

1. Preliminary Training and Study.

c. When it became known in February 1943 that the Division was to train for combined operations, Field Security N.C.O.'s were sent to combined operations and mountain warfare courses with the Brigades to which they were attached. This gave them an idea of how combined operations were planned and executed and at the same time enabled them to carry out an intensive security campaign within their Brigades at a time when a high standard of military security was all important.

d. During March and April, while the theatre of operations was still unknown, training was carried out as follows:-

- (1) Badges of rank and arms of service of both the German and Italian armies were studied for recognition purposes.
- (2) Specimen enemy documents were studied and their classifications memorized, again for recognition purposes.
- (3) A course was held in the discerning of mines and booby traps. This it was hoped would prove useful in the searching of enemy premises.

e. At the end of April the Field Security Officer and four N.C.O.'s were informed of the target of the forthcoming operation. The N.C.O.'s were attached to the Divisional planning staff to ensure the security of the buildings, and at the same time they started on a detailed study of the Italian Police system and general political organization with particular reference to SICILY. At that time the Field Security Section had only one Italian speaking N.C.O. and application was made for others; these joined the Section at a later date, which was convenient, coming from a security point of view as the personnel were well known throughout the Division and such changes would have attracted attention.

f. At the end of May all N.C.O.'s were told that the operation was impending against territory occupied by Italian troops and that they should therefore study the language and the situation of the area.

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d. At the end of May all N.C.O.'s were told that an operation was impending against territory occupied by Italian troops and that they should therefore study the language and the system of Italian government. The Section as a whole was not briefed as to the actual destination until after the force had sailed for SICILY.

2. Attachment to a Division.

It was generally accepted before the Brigade was in that Division and Brigade Headquarters would move through open country, while Field Security work would mainly be found in towns and populated areas. It was therefore planned that the Section should work within the Division area but detached from the Division itself, although the idea of a Section Headquarters near to Division Headquarters and of detachments of N.C.O.'s near Brigade Headquarters was preserved for the sake of ease of obtaining releases, ROL and working maintenance as well as of keeping in touch with the military situation. The system on the Sicily work was well. N.C.O.'s with Brigades worked under the general direction of the Brigadier, who kept them informed of moves and put them in readiness to enter towns at the moment of capture. The Field Security Officer kept in close touch with the staff of Division Headquarters where he received copies of all operation and administrative orders and was able to make his plans.

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3. Priority of Landing and Transport Loads.

5. The question of landing Brigade detachments with their bridgades was considered but finally rejected for the following reasons:-

- (1) The difficulty of obtaining priority for their L/Cs to be landed early enough for them to keep up with their bridgades.
- (2) The fact that they would have been of no immediate value in the beach area and might have suffered needless casualties.

This Section therefore landed complete with main Division Headquarters on D Day, except for one V.C.O. who was left in charge of the second vehicle due to be landed on D + 14, and Brigade detachments were sent forward as soon as L/Cs came ashore.

6. The following scale of transport was included in the landing tables:-

1 Lt. Recon Car.
1 L5 - art. C.O.
1 L4/Cs.

The Lt. Recon Car was found to be of little value and was transferred to the Division Recon Regiment. On the other hand the L5 - art C.O. scale was not found to be adequate to carry (1998 stores, extra water on the scale of one gallon per man and extra petrol on the scale of one gallon per one hundred miles per vehicle, and the time to be used for the carriage of supplies, political prisoners, captured documents and such like. The more serious scale of transport was authorized for operations to be into combat should solve such difficulties in future. On this occasion the deficit was made up by commandeering civilian vehicles. Due to unforeseeable alterations in unloading, the L/Cs did not arrive as planned and personnel were not able to proceed to their first security objective, the town of St. Omer, as soon as intended. It may be added that this difficulty does not arise in a shore-to-shore landing, as in the landing in Italy, when personnel, L/Cs and vehicles are all embarked on the same craft.

4. Action on First Landing Party.

a. From experience in 1944 it was found possible to establish a drill for action on entering a town, which even if the stay was to be short, would create the maximum impression and act in relation to properties which other

one was not found to be adequate to be used for one hundred miles per man and extra petrol on the scale of one gallon per man and extra petrol on the scale of one hundred miles per vehicle, and at the same time to be used for the carriage of suspects, political prisoners, captured documents and such like. The more generous scale of transport now authorized for Sections to be into combat should solve such difficulties in future. On this occasion the deficit was made up by commandeering a civilian vehicle. Due to unforeseeable alterations in unloading, the I/Cs did not arrive as planned and personnel were not able to proceed to their first security objective, the town of Bittah, as soon as intended. It may be added that this difficulty does not arise in a shore-to-shore landing, as in the landing in Ibbi, when personnel, I/Cs and vehicles are all embarked on the same craft.

4. Action on First Landing at Ibbi.

a. From experience in Ibbi it was found possible to establish a drill for action on entering a town, which even if the stay at it is to be short, would create the maximum impression and set in motion a programme which other Sections could take up on arrival. Similar drill might profitably be worked out in advance for other objectives. It was as follows:-

(1) A meeting to be arranged between the Field Security Officer, the Civil Affairs Officer and local officials, in particular the senior representatives of the Garibini, at which the following business should be transacted:-

- (a) Field Security officer assigned, in some building as agreed if possible, as a wing posted in the town to indicate location.
- (b) Date for holding in of arms decided, precautions being posted by Garibini.
- (c) Arrangements made for checking of documents of Garibini, issuing of permits to them to travel to town, and instructing them to make and wear armbands marked 'Civil Police'.
- (d) List of persons in town, detail of sentences and register of persons permitted to bear arms requested from local officials.
- (e) Lists of mosques, anti-liquorists and others requested.
- (f) Locations of any unknown enemy positions to be disclosed.
- (g) Garibini instructed to place guards on security objectives and outside Field Security office.

(2) During this meeting or even before, all available M.C.O.s

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to search enemy headquarters; Fascist, Carabinieri and police buildings; post offices etc.; all valuable documents being sent to Division Headquarters.
(3) By the time the meeting and the search had been completed, a basis for investigative work was established.

(b) No attempt was made in the above drill to conceal the identity or contain reports of the work of R.A.P. It was found in the circumstances to be the best way of ensuring cooperation and of encouraging informers to come forward; it was also advisable to have a separate office for the latter to come to and so avoid making themselves conspicuous.

5. Billets and Rations.

a. There was never any difficulty in the towns in finding accommodation suitable for a billet. A billet reported from the office was found most satisfactory.

b. Rations and cooking presented a problem owing to distances served by the R.A.P. and the Headquarters to which they were attached. Rations were drawn either from the Division or through the Division Group Commandant, which was more convenient, and were cooked under various arrangements:-

- (1) Cooked by a local c/o and eaten on the premises.
- (2) A local woman cook was employed to cook at the billet.
- (3) Permission was obtained to carry a suitably equipped kitchenette with the Section. This arrangement was found to be much the most satisfactory.

6. Cooperation with R.A.P.

a. The extent to which the work of R.A.P. and the R.A.P. was inter-related had not been fully appreciated prior to the capture of the R.A.P. up to the time of the static period before the capture of the R.A.P., neither parties had much knowledge of the plans and movements of the other. Moreover, however, satisfactory cooperation developed. Supplies of foodstuffs were provided and passed up by both R.A.P. and R.A.P. and whilst R.A.P. issued circulation permits to the Carabinieri and to persons captured in special security duties, R.A.P. was responsible for the rest.

b. The later arrangements in Italy, by which R.A.P. had liaison officers with Division Headquarters, responsible for the placing of R.A.P. officers in towns as they were captured, and cooperation very much easier for the R.A.P.

7. Cooperation with the Carabinieri.

Despite a certain tendency to partiality even to local connections and local informants, the Carabinieri were found to be very much more

saturnary.
b. Portions and cooking presented a problem owing to distances separating N.C.O.s and the Headquarters to which they were attached. Portions were drawn either from the Division Camp Commissariat, which was more convenient, and were cooked under various ration tickets:-

- (1) Cooked by a local cafe and eaten on the premises.
- (2) Local women cooks employed to cook at the billet.
- (3) Portion was obtained to carry a ration ticket with the Section. This arrangement was found to be much the most satisfactory.

6. Cooperation with M.G.O.

2. The extent to which the work of M.G.O. and the P.D. was inter-related had not been fully appreciated prior to the capture. Hence up to the time of the capture the period before the capture in C. Hill, most of parties had much knowledge of the plans and movements of the other. Thereafter, however, satisfactory cooperation developed. Supplies of foodstuffs were carried and posted up by both P.D. and M.G.O., and whilst M.G.O. issued circulation permits to the Carabinieri and to persons employed in special security duties, M.G.O. was responsible for the rest.

b. The later circumstances in Italy, by which M.G.O. had liaison officers with Division Headquarters, responsible for the finding of M.G.O. officers in towns as they were captured, was a cooperation very much easier for the P.D. in those circumstances, the senior officer being held responsible for any laxity.

7. Cooperation with the Carabinieri.

Despite a certain tendency to partiality with to local connections and local interests, the Carabinieri were held in high esteem and cooperated efficiently with P.D. in various orders regarding handling in of arms, currency, etc. were explained to them, and they were then directed with enforcement of those regulations, the senior officer being held responsible for any laxity.

8. Informers.

The informer service built itself up very rapidly. First, there were members of the political groups which had been suppressed by Fascism, who were anxious enough in their desire to help the Allies. As a result, there were "problematic" informers who accepted money for useful information concerning persons under the suspicion of P.D. Thirdly, and lastly, there was the usual body of persons with a grudge to work off or simply wishing to in extirpate themselves with the Allies. On one or two occasions complete anti-Fascist committees presented themselves requesting the installation of their leaders in place of the present holders. Cash payments were freely requested and freely made; odd items of furniture were sometimes given to informers and this well satisfied them.

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9. Additional Requirement.

The following list of additional items of equipment, many of which were carried by this Field Security Section may be found useful to other Sections engaged in similar roles:-

- a. Nails - for nailing up broken doors and windows of offices and for dismantling mines and booby traps.
- b. Signs marked F.S.S. and the equivalent in the appropriate language.
- c. Twenty yards of rope, for booby traps, captured equipment etc.
- d. Paint and stencils.
- e. Two pairs of hand-cuffs.
- f. Single door and safe breaking equipment.
- g. Gunbelts and tie-on loops for documents, internees' possessions etc.
- h. Military permit forms to be used as authorizations to local police forces.
- i. Arrest Report forms and Receipts for Prisoners.
- j. Vehicle tool-kits and two repair outfits.

10. Procedure for Arrests.

a. Procedure for arrest of civilians was not at first clearly laid down, but a simple drill was soon worked out as follows:-

- (1) A N.C.O., accompanied by a Sergeant, went to the house of the individual and placed him under arrest. If the permitted he was allowed to pack a bag and leave money for his family. Wherever he was not allowed to converse with anyone.
- (2) A search took place at the Section office, documents of security interest being retained for submission to Army with the arrest report; other documents and money were placed in sealed envelopes marked with the owner's name, and the amount of money was entered on the Receipt for Prisoner to be signed at the base. The Receipt, when signed, was kept with the file copy of the Arrest Report.
- (3) The individual's house and business premises, if any, were then searched. Documents were examined for information of local interest and then forwarded to Army.

b. In view of transport problems, evacuation of V.I.'s and deserters presented difficulties. As a rule they were disposed of through the nearest unit, though this often meant delaying evacuation for one or two days.

c. During the two months spent in SLOPPY this Section dealt with

a. Procedure for arrest of civilians was not at first closely laid down, but a simple drill was soon worked out as follows:-

- (1) A H.C.O., accompanied by a Carabinieri, went to the house of the individual and placed him under arrest. If the permitted he was allowed to pack a bag and leave money for his family. Thereafter he was not allowed to converse with anyone.
- (2) A search took place at the Section office, documents of security interest being retained for submission to Army with the arrest report; other documents and money were placed in sealed envelopes marked with the owner's name, and the amount of money was entered on the Receipt for Prisoner to be signed at the Gage. The Receipt, when signed, was kept with the file copy of the arrest report.
- (3) The individual's house and business premises, if any, were then searched. Documents were examined for information of local interest and then forwarded to Army.
- b. In view of transport problems, evacuation of U.I.'s and deserters presented difficulties. As a rule they were disposed of through the nearest unit, though this often meant delaying evacuation for one or two days.
- c. During the two months spent in Sierra this Section dealt with some eighty arrests and some 500 P.I.s and deserters.

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Subject: Security Notes No. 5.

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Hq. quarters,
AME, 5th Army.
AMC, 8th Army.

Hq., AME,
15 Army Group,
C. I. P.

AMC/4.10/3
9. Nov. 43.

One copy of Security Notes No. 5 is forwarded.

MP1/JC.

M. P. LOTHIAN
M. P. LOTHIAN,
Major,
Public Safety Division.

PS

Banc

E 7 NOV 1943

SUBJECT: Security Notes No. 5

H.Q. 15 ARMY GROUP
C.I.F.BE CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL 15 NOV 194315AG/1424/9/3(1b)

7 Nov 43

Attached hereto are Security Notes No. 5. These notes take the form of a description by an Officer in the American Army in charge of a O.I.C. Post Detachment.

Ruthledge-Wright.

Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

/SME

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

B-389.514/10. 2 November, 1943.

SUBJECT: Security Notes No. 5.

1. Security Notes No. 5 take the form of a description by an officer of the American Army in charge of a C.I.C. Port Detachment.

2. This untouched story is published as it describes candidly and vividly the security picture as it appears to such an officer in actual operations and it is considered that presented in this form it may be of use in training. It must not be taken for granted that all the views expressed or suggestions made are agreed with at A.F.H.Q.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S.S. Hill-Dillon

S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

2 November, 1943.

SECURITY NOTES)

NO. 5)

TWO DAYS IN THE LIFE OF A PORT SECURITY OFFICER

by

....., CAPTAIN, Military Intelligence Service (CIC)
PORT SECTION "A"

AUTHOR'S PREFACE:

It is difficult to break down the activities of a Port Security Section into a stereotyped pattern of security work. For one thing, a Port Security Officer must possess the attributes of a commando, the humor of a master of ceremonies, the patience of a diplomat and the heart of a critic. He becomes a father confessor to every person who enters his office. He is confronted by officers whose sole conception of security is the faded recollection of undisplayed posters LOOSE LIPS SINK SHIPS. He is forever surrounded by military personnel of higher rank who accept his security recommendations with the same hurt feeling a playwright manifests upon criticism of his first play. He is blamed for all that goes wrong and is not entered on the credit side of the ledger when everything operates smoothly. He spends his working hours keeping someone from blowing up the port and when he sleeps his dreams are punctured by wild scenes of the port being blasted into the sea by saboteurs. A day in the life of a Port Security Officer is equal to a week in the life of any other officer. To illustrate this contention, I present herewith a typical day in the life of a port security officer. I have selected the first day of an invasion as an excellent example of confusion. The second day has been added in order that some comparison might be made between a tactical situation and a more stabilized period. If exaggeration appears to creep into this account it is only because truth is stranger than fiction.

FIRST DAY.

The enemy has abandoned the town and port. Our troops move in. You, Actually your

into a stereotyped pattern of security. The humor of a master of ceremonies must possess the attributes of a comedian, the humor of a father confessor, the patience of a diplomat and the heart of a critic. He becomes a father confessor to every person who enters his office. He is confronted by officers whose sole conception of security is the faded recollection of undisplayed posters LOOSE LIPS SINK SHIPS. He is forever surrounded by military personnel of higher rank who accept his security recommendations with the same hurt feeling a playwright manifests upon criticism of his first play. He is blamed for all that goes wrong and is not entered on the credit side of the ledger when everything operates smoothly. He spends his working hours keeping someone from blowing up the port and when he sleeps his dreams are punctuated by wild scenes of the port being blasted into the sea by saboteurs. A day in the life of a Port Security Officer is equal to a week in the life of any other officer. To illustrate this contention, I present herewith a typical day in the life of a port security officer. I have selected the first day of an invasion as an excellent example of confusion. The second day has been added in order that some comparison might be made between a tactical situation and a more stabilized period. If exaggeration appears to creep into this account it is only because truth is stranger than fiction.

FIRST DAY.

The enemy has abandoned the town and port. Our troops move in. You, as Port Security Officer, lead your section in with the invaders. Actually your strength is fifty percent, as half of your section must handle security work in the town adjacent to the port. The missions of the section operating in town have already been assigned and the men have moved out.

As you move your group into the port fires are still burning, mines have been set by the enemy, and a few enemy planes appear to drop a few bombs and strafe the port area just to hinder its early recovery. In the port you find an engineer battalion which had captured the port. You immediately seek out the Commanding Officer and identify yourself. The conversation usually goes something like this:

"Good morning, sir, I'm Lt. Doe, CIC Port Section X."

The C.O. of the engineers, normally a major, frowns and states, "CIC. Now let's see, what does that stand for? Oh, yes, CIC."

You then spend ten minutes explaining the CIC, its functions and the part it plays in the port. When finished, the major says, "Fine, bring your surveys in tomorrow." You then go on to explain that at the very moment CIC Agents are going through the port making a spot check survey and that as soon as they return you will give the Major their recommendations. This will facilitate placing guards on only those objectives of vital importance, pending a stabilization of the situation, etc. The Major frowns upon you as though you were out

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of your head. "Oh, yes, I'm glad you have enough men for guards. I've been wondering where I was going to get men." You then explain that the CIC doesn't furnish guards but is a specialized corps that makes security surveys and recommendations. The Major smiles tolerantly and announces, "I haven't enough men to guard this port. Anyway, I don't know how long I'll be here. Maybe an hour, maybe a day." You try another approach. You point out the danger to port if the place is left unguarded, mines, sabotage, in fact, all the gruesome details you can recall from the last war to the present conflict. He finally dismisses you with a promise to do the best he can and for you to send over your preliminary survey.

You take one man and enter the Customs Office. Four soldiers are scattering files everywhere in their search for conveniences. You choose them out. You go to another building and repeat the procedure. You notice that civilians are beginning to enter the port. The Major comes out of his office and you point out that the gates are unguarded; that there is ammunition scattered everywhere; that no enemy civilians are to be permitted entrance to the port area. The Major agrees and puts a guard on the gate.

Next (Saturday)

The engineers start to work. Your agents begin returning from their survey of the port. You find office space in one of the abandoned buildings. Two agents are sent to search the enemy gun positions within the port. Another agent brings in a civilian he found hiding on a small yacht. He is identified as a pilot. As OMI has not arrived, you tell him to wait. A Colonel stamps in, demands your exact job, nods as you inform him and then announces, "You'll have to move. I'm taking this office." One of the agents you sent to search enemy gun positions rushes in with a man who knows the exact location of all mines in the port. The Colonel interrupts and states you must move immediately, not tomorrow. You have your clerk move the sectional command and you take the man who knows the location of the mines to the commanding officer of the engineers. When you return you find the guards are gone from the gates. A mob of mechanics and waterfront sailors are pouring in, crowding around you, practically holding a cigarette out of your mouth. You try to make them leave and they erupt closer. You point your tommy-gun at them and they grin and shrug. A Captain rushes up, "Where's the nth engineers?" You answer truthfully, "I don't know." He then orders, "Get a detail of men and unload a truck of dynamite." You say you're CIC. He rushes off, yelling, "Never mind that, get the detail." You follow him and manage to stop him just as he starts to rush into one of the port buildings. You point out a land mine just inside the door of the building. He grins and you manage to explain who and what you are. He rushes off again with a "OK, forget it." Two of your agents struggle up, loaded down with maps, letters and orders taken from gun emplacements. "Blind and dark then" you direct.

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- 3 -

Another agent rushes up and states a fire has been started near a carload of ammunition. You rush toward the engineer CP and find the captain. You tell him about the fire and he takes care of that. Your jeep returns with the documents. The CP of the Division has moved. No one knows exactly where. The documents are unloaded. Your interpreter comes back with a colonel who announces, "I'm taking this man to help locate a billet and regimental CP in town". Politely but firmly you advise the colonel the man is an agent of the CIC. He is the only man who speaks Italian in your section and that you have urgent security matters to handle immediately. You're sorry but you cannot spare him. The colonel gets red in the face and demands your name. You answer and he stomps off.

You send an agent out to contact each guard and explain to them what they can do to help secure the port, namely keeping people out. The commander of the engineers rushes in, "must use your interpreter to talk to the pilot reference the land mines. You let him go. You have found three port maps, and you are working them with the present guard system and gates when in comes a Naval Captain. "Where are the documents?" He is followed by at least four junior officers. You show him on the map. "This building was occupied by the Captain of the Port. His offices were destroyed. All papers are buried in the debris. The lighthouse is standing and everything is intact." When you finish the Naval Captain grunts and says to one of his officers. "Find me several offices, I'll pick out one." Then to you, "Let your men pick up all these documents and hold them here until I can have them brought over to my office."

You patiently explain that it would take a crew of nine men three days to haul by truck the massive port ledgers, etc. you've found in the various port offices. Would it not be better to let him and his men go over the documents taking what he considers of value, freezing the others until disposition can be determined. Another grunt and the Naval Captain rushes out of the office. You still have no idea what they want to do with the documents.

The Captain of the engineers rushes in. "Have to pull my men off the gates as we are moving out. You'll have to get people somewhere else." He's gone before you can even reply. Seven Italians rush in behind your interpreter. "They want back wages." Your interpreter announces.

Another Italian pushes his way through the group and starts screaming. "He's the owner of the lumberyard. He wants to know if the Americans are going to pay for the lumber that was destroyed and that which is being taken by the soldiers now." A sailor comes in and interrupts you. "Say bud, know where's there's any Italian rifles?"

The Italians start in again, all talking at once. Your clerk and two agents come in with an armful of papers, all taken from a gun position, the other agents are out. They dump them on the floor and the Italians have started a fight among themselves. With a curse you clear the office and slam the door.

my office."

You patiently explain that it would take a crew of nine men three days to haul by truck the massive port ledgers, etc. you've found in the various port offices. Would it not be better to let his OMI go over the documents taking what he considers of value, freeing the others until disposition can be determined. Another grunt and the Naval Captain rushes out of the office. You still have no idea what they want to do with the documents.

You still have no idea what else will happen.

The Captain of the engineers rushes in.
"We've got to pull my men off
the gates as we are leaving out. You'll have to get them somewhere else."

Seven Italians rush in behind your interpreter announces.
"They want back wages."

Your interpreter announces.
"They want back wages."

and starts screaming.

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the door.

at this point you take inventory, of the port offices, all but three have been searched by your agents. The enemy gun emplacements within the port have been searched all documents picked up. Although the map shows five port entrances there are actually are nine as aerial bombs created four large breaks in the wall. The enemy has arrived. There are three buildings just outside the port that were occupied as barracks by the enemy. Your work map shows that these are part of your mission. You start a list of missions to be handled by the five agents now entering cold C notations. It reads like this:

MISSIONS:

a. Jones and Smith search X barracks at corners of M and G streets: (see map for location, barracks circled in red)

b. Brown locate the new engineer unit, see the officer in charge of the guards and go over the boundary security of the port with him.

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2. Lawrence, contact OM officer and take him around to port buildings where we found documents of interest to Navy.

3. Menin in office, Fox, make six overlays of attached map showing the five main gates and the four breaks in the wall also show KZ yards leading into south end of port area.

You then hand the rough list to the Agent in charge and announce you have to go into town and check on the group operating there. You will be back as soon as possible. You grab a can of O ration biscuits and walk toward the center of town.

You arrive in the main piazza and find your agents have set up an office in the Fascist party headquarters. The place is surrounded by a large mob of civilians. Inside you find two of your agents talking to three civilians. They are using a civilian interpreter. The main subject of the conversation is the location of food. You listen for a while longer and learn that the bakeries have been looted and there is no flour. "People are dying in the streets of starvation," your fat interpreter announces. By this time you have pushed yourself into the center of the group and manage to get the matter straightened out. You learn that MGMT has not arrived. You advise the civilians to go to the city hall and wait the arrival of the American civil affairs officers. They reply they were there and sent to you. Your CIC agent announces that the Regimental Commander sent the civilians to the CIC with verbal order to handle the matter. You clear the room and try to determine what has been accomplished in regards to the missions you assigned to the group. Your list reads something like this:

Police station.....not checked.
 Post Office and Telegraph.....not checked.
 Fascist Party Bldg.....in hands of CIC.
 Enemy billets.....not checked.
 City Hall.....occupied by American troops.
 Telephone Bldg.....demolished by bombs.
 Hospital.....checked.
 Banks.....closed but guarded.
 RR Station.....being checked.
 Prison.....not checked.
 Militia Offices now being searched.
 Gun positions on outskirts of town.....checked as
 they entered. Documents marked and tied.

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Police station.....not checked.
Post Office and Telegraph.....not checked.
Nazi Party Bldg.....in hands of CIC.
Evangelical Bldg.....not checked.
City Hall.....occupied by American troops.
Telephone Bldg.....demolished by bombs.
Hospital.....checked.
Banks.....closed but guarded.
RA Station.....being checked.
Prison.....not checked.
Militia Offices now being searched.
Gun positions on outskirts of town.....checked as they entered. Documents marked and tied.

You check over the city map making proper notations as to the vital installations checked. You then take an agent over to the regimental commander and point out the importance of placing guards on the vital installations you have marked on the map. He turns you over to the officer of the guard and you go over the city map carefully. When finished you send an Agent with him to the guard to locate the objectives to be guarded. When you return to the CIC office you find the remaining agents there.

For the next hour your notes read something like this:

1320 - Leaving stopped at Post Office, Carabinieri Headquarters and
City Hall.
1330 - Division CP located and documents delivered to C-2.
1345 - Billots of Italian officers searched. Two suitcases of letters and documents confiscated.
1400 - Three fascist party employees found and interrogated as to location of party secretaries.
1410 - Agent has no interpreters and has to borrow your only Italian speaking Agent.
1415 - Italian deserter dressed as civilian picked up. He alleges to know location of four mine fields on outskirts of town. Taken to Division CP.

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English
CONFIDENTIAL
(Equals British CONFIDENTIAL)

- 5 -

- 1420 - Another deserter found who states he knows location of three
arsenals. Sent Agent with him.
1425 - Five boxes of documents arrived from G-2 Division including
those you delivered to G-2 an hour ago.
1430 - Returned to port.

By the time night falls you find that out of the confusion and
lashing back and forth between the port and the center of town much has been
accomplished. For one thing, all the entrances to the port are guarded.
There is a moving patrol within the port. LCI's are already using the small
piers and troops and supplies are starting to roll in. Documents in the port
offices have all been collected, bound, marked and tied. You and the ONI
have agreed on what is necessary to security. The engineers now know who
and what the CIC is. Anti-aircraft defense is being set up. A semblance
of order seems to be coming out of what was a few hours before a chaotic
scene.

In town your crew also has accomplished considerable. Guards are
on all the vital installations and the officer of the guard accepts your
recommendations without question. AMCOFF has set up and a semblance of civil
government has replaced the confused scene of seven hours ago. You feel that
it is time to feed your men and bed them down for the night. It's been
thirty-six hours since anyone slept. You manage to heat C rations and spread
bedding rolls in the office.

As you go to bed you feel the first day has been well accounted for.
Sleep paralyzes everyone. At eleven thirty German bombers drop a few eggs
and they all seem to have been intended for your office. As the planes roar
away you settle back to sleep again when a pounding at your door gets everyone
up. It's the sergeant of the guard. He announces the guard unit is moving
out in twenty minutes. A new outfit is coming in to take over. No, they
won't be able to show the new unit the posts as the old guard unit will be
gone before the new one arrives. You thank him and send two men over to
wait and to contact the new guard unit and show them the installations you
have recommended to be guarded. Another air-raid in the early morning, plus
street shooting throughout the night leaves you wide awake at six o'clock.
A new day starts and you continue to iron out the confusion.

2nd DAY (A WEEK LATER)

The security of the town has been taken over by another unit. You
are now concerned only with the port. The day starts as all days start, with
a gang of Italians being let out to the CIC office, irrespective of their
desires. You keep a line of the problems that have added a few more grey
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2ND DAY (A WEEK LATER)

The security of the town has been taken over by another unit. You are now concerned only with the port. The day starts as all days start, with a gang of Italians being detained to the CIC office, irrespective of their desires. You keep a list of the problems that have added a few more grey hairs to your head.

1. Sentries are letting in Italians, fruit peddlers, wine salesmen. They are crawling over the docks like lice.

2. Every engineer unit and outfit within a radius of five miles are leaning against civilians to enter the port. These are merely slips of paper which usually state "ALLOW THE BEARER TO ENTER THE PORT ON BUSINESS". Signatures range from Lieutenants to Colonels.

3. Sailors are going through every building in the port looking for rifles. Sailors go into Army (M) supply stores in the port which are being operated by Italian civilian employees and taking pipe, lumber, tools, etc. The army wants the CIC to prevent this.

4. Army officers and enlisted men from units bivouaced near the port are going through the port area looking for anything they can carry away.

5. No one seems to have interpreters and you find the Army and Navy rushing into your office throughout the day borrowing your Italian speaker to settle all problems from hiring of dishwashers for the navy mess to the buying of wine.

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U.S. Navy

CONFIDENTIAL
(Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification)

6. The ONI is constantly submitting countless problems to you, including requests for investigation of Navy employees.
7. No one seems to want to bother with the documents you found in the various port buildings and turned over to the ONI. Although this is not a worry of the CIC everyone comes in and want to know whether you intend to remove them. You send the inquirers to the ONI and an hour later they are back again with the same question.
8. Italian laborers keep coming in demanding back wages from the former Italian employers. They also charge their foremen with being former fascist leaders and claim they won't work under them.
9. The navy and army hire men and an hour later they all have disappeared and don't return. You find out the reason is that they heard a plane go over the port and fled from their jobs. You are asked to stop this.

On the accomplishment side of the ledger you find out that in the week's time you have managed to achieve a great deal:

- a. A centralized pass system has been worked out and passes are being issued to every employee. The Port S-2, however, knows nothing about the issuance of the pass and as he also is the Provost Marshall, he has too many jobs to handle the matter. He has requested that if the centralized system is to be carried out, will the CIC do it. As the Provost Marshall has no men, he uses guard details from other units, and as a centralized pass system is important to port security, you initiate the issuance of passes.
- b. You have had signs painted both in English and Italian and placed in conspicuous places at all entrances.
- c. A port survey has been completed.
- d. Informants have been established among the laborers.
- e. Investigation of alleged fascist foremen and employees is underway.
- f. You have broken up a labor "racket" among civilian dock workers.
- g. Daily liaison is maintained with all Army units operating in the port.
- h. You have located for the navy former pilots and sailors who

system is to be carried out, and as a centralized pass system no men, he uses guard details from other units, and as a centralized pass system is important to port security, you initiate the issuance of passes.

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e. Investigation of alleged fascist foremen and employees is underway.

f. You have broken up a labor "racket" among civilian dock workers.

g. Daily liaison is maintained with all Army units operating in the port.

h. You have located for the navy former pilots and sailors who are familiar with the harbor and know where the Germans placed their mines.

During a lull you jot into your notebook recommendations for future operations and egotistically hope that someday higher authorities will ask you for your ideas. These notes read like this:

1. The biggest problem is obtaining guards to carry out the security measures. Utilization of line outfits as semi-military police in a port is unsatisfactory. The constant switching of guard units, sometimes as high as three times in a day, does not tend to produce the desired security of a port and its installations. A unit should be designated as being charged with physically carrying out the guarding of a port, based on CIC surveys and recommendations. An ideal state would be the assigning to each Division or Corps CIC section one company to carry out CIC security recommendations under the direct supervision and control of the CIC. This company would have no other duties.

2. Directives should be issued before a campaign prohibiting the issuance of any pass to civilians by any Army Officer except the Provost Marshall of a port. All passes should be standardized.

C O N F I D E N T I A L
(Equals British CONFIDENTIAL.)

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(Equals British CONFIDENTIAL)

- 7 -

3. If CIC security officers are to be held responsible for port security (land side) then their recommendations should be accepted as final word in security matters. Under present conditions his power is limited to the extent of his salesmanship.

4. After a port has been in operation for several weeks a full contingent of CIC (eleven men) are not needed. This may not apply to more hostile territories.

5. CIC port section can handle port and town security in towns less than a hundred thousand. In cities the size of Palermo, the initial security phase requires the port section to interest itself solely with the port. After a stabilization the section can handle both town and port.

6. Directives should be issued prohibiting entrance to a port by all military personnel save those actually assigned to port duty. The continuous flow of unauthorized personnel into a port ties up traffic and causes considerable confusion. A port should be placed off limits just as town is. Strict enforcement would quickly educate military personnel.

7. A section should be given as many agents as possible who can speak the language of the country they are operating in.

You stop your list. There are many difficulties, accomplishments and recommendations you could list, but as you read over the various entries in your notebook it becomes apparent that you've only scratched the surface. Only one thing is evident, you have managed to accomplish your mission. Suddenly your thoughts are shattered by a loud blast. You know someone has sabotaged the port! You rush out to investigate and find a fruit peddler with three bottles of wine hidden under the grapes in his basket being held by a sentry. You hear that the fruit peddler found a hand grenade somewhere inside the port and tossed it into a berbed building just to see what would happen. At this moment the officer of the guard drives up and announces he is pulling all his guns off the gates immediately as his unit is moving out. No, he doesn't have any idea who is coming in to replace his unit. You stand there watching the guards leaving the port entrances unprotected. The fruit peddler at your side reaches into his basket and pulls out a bottle of wine. "Cento lives" he grins. A communist car screeches to a stop and a colonel bawls hell out of you for buying wine while on duty. Thus ends another day.

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bawls hell out of you for buying wine while on duty. Thus ends another day.

181v

CONFIDENTIAL.
(Equals British CONFIDENTIAL.)

Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Security Guard

Hq, 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

OR SECRET EQUALS US SECRET

15AG/1104/LAC(Ib)

3 Nov 43

A.C. of S., G-2
AFHAttached herewith is Security Summary for the period
1 - 15 Oct 43.

W.D. Gibson. Lt-Col

W.D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.
Brigadier,
BGS(I).COPY TO: OSI, No. 2 District
AEC, Hq, 15 Army Group.All after 10:00
5/11

15/11/43

P.His.

W.D. Gibson. Lt-Col

What is in the report regarding the

list of persons taken over?

N.H. required but lists of the persons are
extracted and kept in a special file.

10/11/43

5/11

18

32

PS

2A

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY SUMMARY FOR SOUTHERN ITALY

Period Covered: 1 Oct - 15 Oct 43

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

In general the security situation in Southern Italy during the period under review continued satisfactory. No serious difficulties were encountered apart from the refugee question which continued to cause security personnel a certain amount of trouble. This type of problem should disappear shortly when the special scheme for the canalization, "vetting" and dispersal of refugees is put into operation.

No adverse reports were received on the cooperation afforded to Allied Forces by Italian civil officials. Certain cases, however, came to light of non-cooperation, and even hostility, on the part of senior Italian officers. Such cases were passed to the Italian High Command for Court Martial or other disciplinary action. In general our relations with the Italian civil and military authorities have been satisfactory, though in view of the conciliatory attitude taken by the Allies towards the Italian the possibility that the latter will attempt to exploit this situation once they have found their feet cannot as yet be excluded.

A number of explosions occurred in the Naples area, causing several deaths, but all were due to delayed action bombs or booby traps left by the Germans before their evacuation. Cases of fire cutting and otherwise tampering with Allied communications were also reported, though not on a large scale. In certain of these cases no wire was recovered, thus admitting the possibility of deliberate sabotage.

Arrests of civilian security suspects continued, though still on a diminished scale. Aliens residing in and around Naples were ordered to register with the questura between 10 Oct and 15 Oct 43.

During the period under survey there were three reports of small-scale Fascist propaganda activity by pamphlet and rumour in the Naples area, directed in each case against the British.

PART II

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During the period under survey there were three reports of small-scale Fascist propaganda activity by pamphlet and rumour in the Eighth Army area, directed in each case against the British.

PART II

I. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

Only one serious breach of security was reported during the period under review.

This was the loss of a package of 100ST SECRET War Force documents sent by officer courier from Naples addressed to CHICAGO. Available evidence indicates that it was lost in the vicinity of the SAN VINCENZO area, SICILY, whilst in the custody of two RAF officers, since the inner and outer envelopes were later found in that area. A thorough search of the neighbourhood by trace was initiated and the local F.S.I. section have been making exhaustive enquiries but to date no trace has been found of the documents themselves. This matter is the subject of a special report to AFHQ dated 25 Oct 43 under reference IS-0/1009/5(Ib)

The following were the main points of interest:

(i) RAP 24, the Fifth Army area continued to devote special attention to the unauthorized use of civilian photography of films from troops for developing and printing. Notices were posted in all photographers' shops in the Army area restricting the work done for troops to the taking of portrait photographs only.

(ii) An instance was reported by Eighth Army RAP of directions, including the designation in code of the formation concerned, being chalked on loaded railway trucks in sidings. Steps were taken to ensure that the usual code system was used in future.

(iii) Three cases of suspected illicit wireless transmitters were reported in the Fifth Army area. All were carefully investigated, with negative results.

(b) Security of Material

(i) Before their departure from the RAP 24 area the Germans planted a considerable number of delayed action bombs in the town and port. During the period under survey there were violent explosions each day, including one in the Port Office which killed more than twenty five persons, including many Allied soldiers. Subsequent investigation showed that prior to the German evacuation the area concerned had been mined off and buried to civilians. A number of other explosions are also reported. Fifth Army engineers inspected all buildings used for military purposes where bombs were suspected and public officials were warned that concealed bombs of the type which had been mined had been found could be treated as sabotage.

(ii) On 24 Sep 43 the water supply at GROSSE was cut off and conveyance through were held up for lack of water. The main water pipe was found to be damaged at a point where a mine had been left open. An Italian working party reported that ten minutes before the supply failed they were asked by three Italian soldiers where the main water pipe to GROSSE was located. The working party gave them the information requested. Sabotage is suspected and investigations are proceeding, but details of identification of the three Italian soldiers are scanty. The possibility is not excluded that they may have been Germans in Italian uniforms.

(iii) Reports of live cutting were on the increase but were not on a very large scale. GROSSE airfield, although not the RAP area, were mentioned in particular. In some cases, no fire had been removed, indicating possible sabotage. In the Fifth Army area Military Order No. 1 calling attention to the death penalty for tampering with Allied communications.

including many Allied soldiers. Subsequently, the German evacuation the area's concerned had been moved off and buried to civilians. A number of minor explosions are also reported. Fifth Army engineers inspected all buildings used for military purposes and found that bombs were suspected and public officials were warned that they could be attacked by anyone of the area ledge that a building had been found could be attacked as sabotage.

(iii) On 23 Sep 43 the water supply at GORTON was cut off and convoys passing through were held up for lack of water. The main water pipe was found to be washed at a point where a sabotage had been left open. An Italian working party reported that ten minutes before the supply failed they were caused by three Italian soldiers where the main water supply to GORTON was located. The working party gave them the information requested. Sabotage is suspected and investigations are proceeding, but details of identification of the three Italian soldiers are scanty. The possibility is not excluded that they may have been German in Italian uniforms.

(iii) Reports of fire hitting were on the incidence but were not on a very large scale. GORTON and GORTON, ALFORD and the GORTON area were mentioned in particular. In some cases no fire has been removed, indicating possible sabotage. In the Fifth Army area Military Order No. 1 calling attention to the death penalty for sabotage and the Italian civil authorities by hand in and also in the Naples newspaper "L'ESPRESSO". A report of 2000 lire has also been offered for information leading to the nature of this type of sabotage.

1807

(c) Security of Access to Military Installations

There has been nothing of special security interest to report on this subject for the period under review.

The normal security controls were working in general satisfactorily in the ports used by the Allies, including security checks on the crews of merchantmen. In Bari port the usual 24 and 60-hour guards are reinforced by an infantry guard which is on duty 24 hours a day.

-3-

The large influx of refugees from ALBANIA and JUGOSLAVIA continued to present a security problem in the east coast ports, since Port Security Sections have neither the men nor the transport to cope adequately with the situation without assistance.

It was reported from Bari that security of access to the dock area was complicated by the large number of passes issued independently by various authorities, including the Italians. An arrestment has been made whereby all passes valid for the dock area must bear the stamp of either the Port Security Section or Navy House.

(c) Security of Personnel

There were no cases reported of any attempts to tamper the morale of Allied troops.

One case was reported by a British unit of unarming by two Italian soldiers in uniform in the PIZZAR-WOLLO DI MARITTIMA area. The two men concerned are now in a 24 hour waiting trial. In the same area at an earlier date a civilian was discovered by the same British unit, armed with a rifle and crouching behind some bushes. There was no evidence of actual sniping but the man will be tried by MG for the illegal possession of a rifle.

Several incidents between Allied and Italian Service personnel were reported from the TARANTO area.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Important Individual Subjects and Arrested Persons.

(i) Arrests reported during the period under survey and effected by Allied security agencies totalled forty four, divided as follows.

<u>State Officials</u>	Police Officials	3
	Other Officials	1

<u>Party Officials</u>	Vice-Administrative	
	Federal Secretary	1
	Political Secretary	7
	Minor Fascists (including Communist etc.)	11

sonnel were reported from the TERNIO area.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Important Individual Contacts and Arrested Personnel:

(i) Arrests reported during the period under survey and effected by Allied security agencies totaled forty four, classified as follows:

<u>State Officials</u>	Police Officials 3
	Other Officials 1
<u>Party Officials</u>	Pro-administrative 1
	Federal Secretary 1
	Political Secretaries 2
	10th
	Minor Fascists (including Communist etc.) 12
<u>Miscellaneous</u>	Italian Military 1
	Personnel 1
	German Military 1
	Personnel 1
	Italian Civilians 15
	German Civilians 1
	44
	1800

(ii) At Appendix "A" is a consolidated list of all arrests reported during the period 5 Sep to 15 Oct 43.

(iii) The following are names of the more interesting personalities arrested.

General MILITATO: Former commander of Italian 19th Corps. Arrested by C.I.G. in Naples when in hiding in civilian clothes after having turned M.L.E. over to the Germans about 11-1. Sep 43. The Allied Military Mission has been asked to advise as to his disposal.

Handwritten: 1800

-4-

DIOMUL-FRASA : Vice Federal Secretary, BARI

Cesare

NICKEL, Emil : Self-confessed German agent. Will be the subject of a separate report.

(iv) In addition the following cases were referred to the Italian military authorities for disciplinary action.

Col. NAPOLLEONI : O.C. UNSTRECHER airfield. Failed to declare to Allies a CAPRONI aircraft, a car and a substantial ammunition dump. Assisted German withdrawal. Made anti-ally statements. Fights hearing of his men after arrival of Allies.

Major LUCIANI : Second in Command to Col. NAPOLLEONI.

(v) Admiral FIORAVANTI, Comando Militare Marittimo, TARANTO, who issued an order to his command authorizing the shooting of Allied troops in certain circumstances, and had manifested strong anti-ally tendencies, has been the subject of a report to C in C who has been requested to take action against him.

(vi) The case of Console CAVALLIO of AVULI, senior Italian Air officer TARANTO, is under investigation on account of this officer's evident non-cooperative attitude and strong anti-ally feelings.

(vii) The Japanese Consul at NAPLES, an Italian serving in an honorary capacity, was placed under house arrest. This man had a record as an active Fascist. The only remaining German Consular employee in NAPLES was similarly confined. The latter held only a minor job in the consulate and has been in NAPLES for 12 years.

(viii) Several of the wealthiest and more prominent men in NAPLES have been made the subject of investigation by the Fifth Army security agencies among them Renato GUGLIEMINI, Achille LAURO and Baron AVANZATA (former Italian Ambassador to FRANCE). These three are described by Fifth Army as active Fascists and formerly in close contact with the Germans.

(ix) All enemy aliens and nationals of enemy occupied countries resident in the NAPLES area were notified by newspapers and handbills to report to the Gestapo. During the period under review this order produced nearly 100 registrations, mostly German, but also a few Hungarians, Bulgarians and one Japanese. At a later date it is planned to arrange for the registration of all nationals of enemy or enemy-occupied countries who

(vi) The officer TARANTO, is under investigation on charges of non-cooperative attitude and strong anti-Allied feelings.

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(b) subversive movements and organizations

(1) Two reports were received of subversive pamphlets being published in FOGGIA province. The first example was found in ONTARIO (Prov FOGGIA). It consisted of an appeal to the Italians not to allow themselves to be swayed by English propaganda and cursed those who welcomed these "English forces, murderers of your brothers".

The second pamphlet was found in SANFRANCESCO (Prov FOGGIA) and was addressed also to the Italians. It appealed to them to disobey the order to return to their units, saying that they were to be used to further English interests.

In neither case has the source been established though there are possible indications that the second pamphlet was dropped by German aircraft.

-5-

It was further reported from a source of unknown reliability that Fascist propaganda in CAROVIGNO (Prov. MESSINA) was attempting to show that certain surplus Italian stocks of grain collected from the reduction in the ration allowed were to be used to supply the British. (According to the CC.BP. this grain is in reality intended for the Italian Army).

(ii) Investigations and enquiries into Fascist, OVA etc personalities continued along normal lines.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Relations between Allied Forces and Civilians

Relations between troops and civilians continued on the whole friendly but were liable to be impaired locally both by several cases of disorderly conduct on the part of our troops, and several cases of Italians alleged to have "beaten up" Allied soldiers -- the latter in the TARANTO area.

(b) Civilian Morale

Active interest in political affairs has not as yet little attraction for the average Italian. Neither is he particularly interested in the side wine the war. The only thing that matters to him now is that it should end quickly. He has a healthy respect for Allied material resources and there is general expectation among the Italians that Allied occupation will mean a marked improvement in their economic conditions.

In CASERTA, VI. AREA and CAPUA the population has reported as being still largely sympathetic towards Fascism and apathetic towards British troops stationed there. As a result these towns were well covered by security personnel for subversive or disaffected elements.

(c) Rumours

Rumour was reported as particularly rife in the Fifth Army area, due mainly to the lack of newspapers and of power to work civilian radio sets. As a result the belief was at one period widespread in that area that ROSE was in Allied hands, and many civilians actually set out from NAPLES on their way to the Italian capital. Two rumours were definitely traced to merchant seamen, one to the effect that SPAIN had declared war on GERMANY and the other that UMBRIA had copied the American coast-guard and was using it with success against Allied shipping convoys.

(b) Civilian Morale

active interest in political affairs has had as yet little stimulation for the average Italian. Neither is he particularly interested which side wins the war. The only thing that matters to him now is that it should end quickly. He has a healthy respect for Allied material resources and there is general expectation among the Italians that Allied occupation will mean a marked improvement in their economic conditions.

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Rumor was reported as particularly rife in the Fifth Army area, due mainly to the lack of newspapers and of power to work civilian radio sets. As a result the belief was at one period widespread in that area that ROME was in Allied hands, and many civilians actually set out from Naples on their way to the Italian capital. Two rumors were definitely traced to merchant seamen, one to the effect that SPAIN had declared war on GERMANY and the other that GERMANY had copied the American boat-sight and was using it with success against Allied shipping convoys.

The following rumors were reported as prevalent among the civil population.

"ROME has been occupied by Italian troops under GRACIANI" (TORRESACCIOPPE, PROV FOGGIA) 100-

"GERMANY has made an Armistice with ENGLAND" (BOVINO, PROV FOGGIA)

"The war with GERMANY will end in November and the Armistice will be followed by a war with the USSR" (BOVINO, PROV FOGGIA).

"MUSOLINI is dead and his rescue was manufactured by German propaganda" (VIESTE DI POTENZA)

4. OTHER MATTERS OF GENERAL SECURITY INTEREST

(a) During this period the large coastal towns and the former army areas were adequately covered by FS/CIC sections. The inland areas in the South were only covered very sparsely, if at all, but this did not cause undue anxiety as the military and security importance of such areas was slight.

(b) Limited contact and cooperation between the Ardes and the S.I.I. counter-espionage organization was established with useful results, and there is no doubt that this liaison will develop and prove of very great value.

(c) Cooperation between No. 3 S.I.I. (b) Unit and Fifth Army was fully and closely maintained, but No. 2 S.I.I. (c) Unit had not yet arrived in the Eighth Army area. Gen/Lor JONCKHEM, however, was able temporarily to fill this gap.

(d) Enquiries were made into the question of control of fishing: the position was found to be unsatisfactory, as the enforcement of the former Italian control regulations had largely lapsed on the Allied invasion, and a proper control had not been reestablished. This matter was taken up at the end of the period under review, and progress has now been made: details will be forwarded shortly.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1803

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will be forwarded shortly.

SUBJECT: Security Summary.

15 Army Group

C.S.I.

26 OCT 1943

SECRET SIGNALS U.S. SECRET

15AG/14044/GI(5)

25 Oct 43.

A.C. of S., G-2 (C.I.)
A.F.H.Q.

Attached herewith is security summary for the period 15 - 30 Sep 43.

The delay is very much regretted, and steps have been taken to try to ensure their more punctual submission in future.

All officers
Summary
27/10
att.

W.D. Gibson. Lt. Col.

W.D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
for Brigadier,
B.C.S.(I),
15 Army Group.

WG/GND

Copy To:-

No. 2 District
A.C. of S., 15 Army Group.

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TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECURITY SUMMARY FOR SOUTHERN ITALY

Period Covered: 16 Jan 43 - 30 Jun 43

1516/1100/4/C(1b)

25 Oct 43

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GENERAL SUMMARY

The period covered was characterized by swift political development and uncertainty in Italy. The Armistice, following soon after the fall of the Fascist Party after twenty years of dictatorship, left the average Italian bewildered and subservient. For the time being, at any rate, he was willing to accept the inevitable and even to welcome the occupation of his country by the Allies. Thus in the initial phase of the Italian campaign, cases of non-cooperation and active obstruction were few. The situation needed, however, to be watched carefully, and it was clear on accurate assessment of Italian sympathies and intentions would be possible only when the paralyzing effects of military disaster wore off.

The special policy laid down with regard to the four provinces forming the "Kingdom" has called for the exercise of a great deal of tact in the enforcement of security measures in that area. During this period, no special difficulties were encountered. Elsewhere armies worked in close co-operation with A.S.G. and the enforcement of security restrictions (movement, curfew etc.,) were on the whole satisfactory.

A big problem, particularly in the forward areas, was the screening and disposal of refugees of all nationalities who poured through the Allied lines. These had to fend for themselves usually dispersed in the towns in the rear areas, often with no security check whatsoever. Lack of stocks of food, clothing and accommodation combined to make the situation still more difficult. This problem is now being tackled.

All reports agree that the U.S.M. have done, and are still doing excellent work. Contact has been made with the officers of the CIVILIO CONTROL BRIGADE (C.C.B.) which promises to be of equal value to us in the counter-

he was willing to accept the inevitable and even to accept the possibility of his country by the allies. Thus in the initial phase of the Italian campaign, cases of non-cooperation and active obstruction were few. The situation changed, however, to be watched carefully, and it was clear that security assessment of Italian sympathies and intentions would be possible only when the security effects of military disaster were off.

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As reports grew that the G.C. had been done, who are still doing excellent work. Contact has been made with the officers of the Italian G.C. (104/5513 (U.S.)) which appears to be of a real value to us on the Counter-Intelligence side.

Greatly on security grounds were on a small scale. In the forward areas security intervention is frequently reported to in respect of persons whose sympathies were doubtful.

There were no reports of sabotage, nor of wire cutting, nor from a minor incident involving the children.

1. INTERNAL SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

No specific cases of leakage of information were reported during the period under survey, but there is no indication that the high level of security-consciousness existing among Allied troops was slackened.

movement of civilians, especially in the forward areas, is a potential source of leakage, and is a problem which FM/CIC, with their limited resources of manpower, cannot cope with alone. Travel restrictions similar to those for civilians have been imposed by U.S. in Allied occupied Italy exclusive of the four provinces of the Kingdom. On paper these restrictions are entirely adequate but the extent to which they are enforced depends, especially in the rear areas where FM/CIC are thin on the ground, largely on the efficiency and energy displayed by the Italian police, and on the extent of their supervision which can be undertaken by U.S. Officers. In the Kingdom's case there has been taken to reinstate the pre-occupational travel regulations whereby civilian movement outside the provincial boundary is prohibited except by valid pass. In the forward areas control of movement is restricted as an ever-present problem, the more so since here the civilian police services were generally not disorganized during the initial stages of the occupation.

Large areas in the Eighth Army zone of travel permits being issued by local U.S. officials to Italian civilians and civilians for destination in enemy occupied Italy. These were being taken by U.S. Army, Eighth Army to prevent the issue of such passes in future.

The use by Allied troops of an authorized civilian biographical for the development and printing of personal biographies has also presented a security problem. Certain such biographical data were being taken from Allied troops for processing were closed by U.S. Army. In the Eighth Army area and the films announced. There was no indication, however, that any such film provided contained any information of value to the enemy.

Fifth Army reports that the Allied invasion of the Sicily sector had been expected by the civilian population since June, but that there was no evidence to show that the exact date or date were known.

(c) Security of Material

No cases of sabotage were reported for the period under review nor any instances of wire-cutting apart from one case in which the children were concerned. It could not, however, be assumed at this stage that this type of security problem would not arise in any considerable proportion in the future. Fifth Army took the precaution of giving wide publicity to a Military Order covering interference with Allied communications to be punishable by death.

Considerable attention was devoted by FM/CIC to the question of passes for civilians, installations etc., and as a result of their recommendations considerable improvements were made. In the Fifth Army and U.S. Army were busy correcting faults in encourage discipline.

security problem. Certain such photographs' short-circuiting films from allied troops for processing were closed by P.C.C. in the Eighth Army area and the films impounded. There was no indication, however, that any such film impounded contained any information of value to the enemy.

Fifth Army reports that the allied invasion of the Rhine sector has been unopposed by the civilian population since June, but that there was no evidence to show that the same place or date were shown.

(b) Security of Material

No acts of sabotage were reported for the period under review nor any instances of wire-cutting apart from one case in which two children were concerned. It could not, however, be assumed at this stage that this type of security problem would not arise in any considerable proportions in the future. Fifth Army took the precaution of giving wide publicity to a Military Order showing interference with allied communications to be an offense punishable by death.

Considerable attention was devoted by P.C.C. to the question of guards for dumps, installations etc., and as a result of their recommendations appreciable improvements were made. In the Fifth Army area U.I.C. were busy correcting faults in camouflage disposal.

All forces covered by the Allies - I.S.W.D., M.G.D., M.G.D., M.G.D., M.G.D., M.G.D. - were covered by P.C.C. Sections, which somewhat thinly covered the last coast during the period under review. (At the time of writing the security coverage of these ports has greatly improved). 180

In general the measures taken to safeguard our material and installations against sabotage by the situation in the Italian civil authorities, in particular the C.C.M., co-operated satisfactorily. As far as shortage of personnel for guard duties was the difficulty, but one which should diminish as more and more Italian troops became available for that purpose.

(c) Security of Access to Military Establishments

In general the security of access to military establishments was well maintained and no serious breaches were reported.

The normal security precautions were taken in the ports visited, by the Allies and in general the port security situation was satisfactory.

The dock areas in the ports of Bari and Brindisi were also off. The port of Brindisi presented a bigger problem on account of its size, but it is hoped to have the docks of that port also cleared. These actions were in force for the dock workers and there is no longer a threat to merchant vessels before they come ashore. Both Carabiniere and Military Police are employed in the checking of passes.

(d) Security of Personnel

Security of personnel was generally good and there were no reports of attempts being made to damage the morale of Allied forces, other than through the medium of enemy air-sea propaganda. This latter had, as usual, no apparent effect.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(1) Important Individual Subjects

Arrests of civilian suspects effected by EC/CIIC were on a much reduced scale compared with the number made in 1942. For instance arrests in the Highways area for the whole of October amounted to 73 only. The following are names of the more important persons arrested during that period.

CIVILIAN SUBJECTS	Subject of 1942
MONTELLI Pietro	Prefect of Province of Caltanissetta, a Federal Secretary of PSLDI
MARINELLI Francesco	Colonel, Garrison Commander at Caltanissetta
BRIGANTI Luigi di Arcangelo	Commander, 1st Legion N.Y.M.A.
GIFFONE Domenico di Francesco	Federal Inspector, S.M.F. Police Unit
BRIGANTI Felice di	Federal Inspector, S.M.F. Police Unit

(c) Important Individual Suspects

Arrests of civilian suspects effected by FAR/GIC were on a much reduced scale compared with the number made in 1944. For instance arrests in the Eighth Army area for the whole of September amounted to 73 only. The following are names of the more important persons arrested during that period.

CHIAMANTO Oreste	Master of ASBEO
MONSIEUR Pietro	Prefect of Province of Calabria, as Federal Secretary of ASBEO
MASSIMO Francesco	Colonel, German Commander at C. 114200
BRIGANTI Luigi of Arcangelo	Commander, 155 Legion I.V. 1141
GIRODI Domenico of Francisco	Federal Inspector, S.M.F. 1011-1141
MASSIMO Zello of Francisco	Federal Inspector, S.M.F. 1011-1141

(d) Subversive Movements and Organizations

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With the collapse of Fascism in Italy and the arrival of the Allied armies, numerous anti-Fascist organizations came out of hiding. The most important of these were the "Liberazione Italiana" and the "Fronte di Liberazione". Other political groups which have come to light are the "Comunisti", "Socialisti", "Christian Democrats" (Catholic political party), "Fronte di Liberazione", "Liberazione" and the "Liberal Reconstruction Party". Almost all claimed to have been engaged in one way or another in anti-Fascist activities prior to our arrival. Security personnel were generally able to use the names of such movements as sources of security information.

The influence of the "Fronte di Liberazione" Fascist Republican Party in the South appeared negligible. MASSIMO was seldom mentioned. There was no evidence of any subversive movement at work in Allied occupied Italy against the Allied cause.

3. DISCUSSION(4) Relations between Allied Forces and Civilians

Our troops were well received by the local population which showed general relief at being liberated from German control. On the whole relations between Allied troops and civilians were good, though there were naturally a number of incidents which had a local adverse effect on these relations. A number of reports bear testimony to the favourable impression made on the Italians by the behaviour of our troops in general, in contrast to the brutality and ruthlessness displayed by the Germans.

(5) Civilian Morale

All reports agreed that civilian morale was at a low ebb. Living conditions were in general bad, particularly in the Fifth Army area where food was often scarce and sanitary arrangements primitive. The SALVOGLIO Government was accepted but with no great enthusiasm. On the other hand little evidence was apparent of resentment or broken pride. In general the Italian masses were tired of the war and looked forward only to its end and an eventual improvement of their economic conditions.

(c) Remarks

The publication of newspapers under R.S.S. arrangements in SALVOGLIO and BARI did much to substitute fact for conjecture. In the Fifth Army area the number of rumours reported current among civilians was small and this was attributed in a large measure to the good work done by the "SALVOGLIO Times". The following is a sample of the more prevalent rumours:

(1) Among Troops

"The South of FRANCE is to be invaded by French troops from NORTH AFRICA" (86 Area).

"Hitler is about to use gas" (5 Div Area)

(11) Among Civilians

"GRANLANTI has gone over to the Germans with some Fascist troops. Reason: Jealousy of SALVOGLIO". (TARENTO District)

"The Germans and Russians have agreed upon a line to which the Russians will advance and then together they will fight the Allies".

(c) Rumour

The publication of newspapers under P.L.S. arrangements in VALENNO and BARI did much to substitute fact for conjecture. In the Fifth Army area the number of rumours reported current among civilians was small and this was attributed in a large measure to the good work done by the "AFFRIMO" Plan. The following is a sample of the more prevalent rumours:

(1) Among Troops

"The South of FRANCE is to be invaded by French troops from NORTH AFRICA" (56 Area).

"Hitler is about to use Kees" (5 Div Area)

(ii) Among Civilians

"GRILLANI has gone over to the Germans with some Fascist troops. Reason: Jealousy of BELINELLO". (TARENTO District)

"The Germans and Russians have agreed upon a line to which the Russians will advance and then together they will fight the Allies". (CATANZARO, NICASTRO and TALA CONCELLIUA).

"All male children between the ages of 13 and 19 in NAPLES were shot by the Germans. The Germans in the CALABRO area advanced behind a screen of Italian women and children". (Fifth Army area).

"Marshall BADOLLO and the Italian Royal Family are now in the United States". (Fifth Army area)

(c) Other Matters of General Security Interest

(1) There were a few reports of German soldiers in hiding behind the Allied lines but investigations proved fruitless. Fifth Army offered rewards for information leading to the capture of Germans not yet rounded up.

(14) The SHILLING SPIONAGE OF the C.C. general showed itself perfectly willing to co-operate with the Allied Security authorities in counter-espionage work. As a counter-espionage agency it has proved itself to be highly efficient in the past, when its energies were directed against our own Intelligence Service, and there is every indication that it will do equally good work against the DEATH. Its value as an aid in dealing with purely Italian organisations or individuals is more problematical.

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