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COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
MAY 1946

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

16 May 1946

#502

SUBJECT : General Situation

TO : A/Director, Public Safety, Sub Commission.

1. The following information has been received within the past few days.

a) The M of I is attempting to recruit 10 people to carry out some unknown Mission and is offering L.500,000 each. On completion they are guaranteed safe passage to Sicily. Further information may be available shortly.

b) The P.S. are attempting to purchase petrol on the "black market". A considerable amount it is said has been bought in Turin and will be delivered in Rome today (Thursday) or tomorrow. It will be stored in the river police depository near Ponte Vittorio (near the island in the Tiber).

c) Sunday last, (12 May) during the morning, NENNI is alleged to have gone with DE CESARE (Vice Capo di Polizia) about 12 Km out of Rome on the main Naples road to meet ROMITTA (Minister of the Interior).

d) On Friday 24 May the Monarchists have advertised a meeting in the Piazza del Popolo at 1700 Hours. It is said that this demonstration, which will be addressed by Gen. BENCIVENGA, is causing some concern to the Left wing parties. NENNI and TOGLIATTI may ask the Council of Ministers to declare this day a national holiday-anniversary of the declaration of war by Italy on Germany.

e) A number of changes in senior police officers has recently taken place.

(i) The Questore of Rome was appointed about two weeks ago - transferred from COMO. (A Socialist).

(ii) The new Vice Questore is a certain DE FLORA transferred from TRIESTE. (Socialist).

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(iii) PANDOLZI the chief of police forces has been relieved of his post on orders of ROMITA (Pandozzi is a Monarchist)

f) It is claimed that a certain ALLOTTI, a Questore employed at M of I is employed to keep NENNI, TOGLIATTI etc. informed on the political leanings of police officials within the Ministry and their contacts.

g) Yesterday evening, Wednesday 15 May, about 7.30 pm a demonstration was held by Monarchists in NAPLES. A fracas occurred in Via Duomo between Communists and Monarchists. Two hand bombs are reported to have been thrown from the balcony of the Communist offices into the crowd below. Over 30 people were injured, 3 seriously. The police made a number of arrests including the persons responsible for throwing the bombs.



A.H. ELLIS,
Captain,
Security Division.

AHE/lm.

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COMMUNIST PARTY.

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The action which the Communist Party is obliged to take during the election period, according to orders received from Moscow, is divided into two phases of operation.

1st. PHASE.

(From today until 2nd. June) the action of the Party during this phase should give the impression of obedience to law and order. But there will be isolated and sporadic incidents of intimidation and threats. Selected groups made up for the best part of dangerous elements brought down from the North, should by day in the outlying parts of the City and in working class districts, carry out threats, intimidations and punishments if people do not vote for the Republic.

Further than this, one should cause isolated sporadic brushes in order to create small incidents. In a word, these incidents should be made to appear that the other parties had provoked such incidents in order that in the eyes of the International World, the Communist Party passed to the offensive first. Several cases of intimidation are already confirmed in certain districts.

2nd. PHASE.

(From 2nd. June onwards). The action during the second phase should be simply a revolt to gain control of the situation by violence with the Powers of the State. To succeed in this object every means will be considered possible. There will be put into force the proscription list which is already completed, of whom they say the first will be Pietro BADOGLIO, and further other personalities and experts well known in the Democratic Parties. There will be an assault on all the strategic points of the City with a view to disrupting the channels of command. Then there will be assaults on the Churches and the religious community including the Vatican.

This offensive action will be carried out whatever the result of the referendum. There will be used the same tactics as were used in 1917 to defeat the Government of KERESKI in Russia and when after the elections, the Allied Anglo-American Forces will take under their control the responsibility for public order, the Communists always in accordance with orders from Moscow will make a move to start the troops of TITO in motion against Italy and provoke a war.

There functions in Rome a well organised branch of Stalin's secret police (GEPBU) commanded by a second-in-command who is RUGGERO Grieco. The commander of the action squad on the other hand is the notorious LONGO, with Col. MOSCATELLI.

TRANSLATION

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R. QUESTURA DI ROMA

Romeo n. 00/509
Rome, 18 May 1946

08464 - Bab. A.4.B.

SUBJECT: Palazzo Viminale - Instructions for the public safety.

For an efficient defence of Palazzo Viminale in case of riots, it is necessary that the defence of the building be organised as follows:

Barricade of the streets leading to Piazza del Viminale.
Defence of the entrances to the Palace.

The area has to be divided into three zones, which will be commanded as follows:

the first zone under the Commissario Capo di P.S. Cav. LACENTRA,
the second zone under the Commissario Cav. De SIMONE and the
third zone under the Commissario DE STEFANO.

They will have at their disposition, besides the Officers attached to each zone, also an P.S. Officer, a trumpeter guard and a messenger guard.

I ZONE

It will be commanded by the Commissario Capo Cav. LACENTRA assisted by the Major Commandant the Nucleo Ministero.

This zone is formed of:

- a) The building of Palazzo Viminale confined within the iron railings of the entrance, and the walls on via Palermo, via Milano, via Panisperna, via Balbo and via Viminale.
- b) The interior part of the iron railings of the principal entrance of the Ministry and the principal entrance of the same Ministry on Piazza Viminale and the secondary ones on via Venezia, via Genova and via Panisperna.

50 Agents of P.S. wearing uniforms ;
20 Agents of P.S. on horseback;
2 light tanks with machine guns will be at disposition of the Commissario Capo Cav. LACENTRA at the court-yard of Palazzo Viminale.

All the Agents have to carry some hand grenades.

The buildings on via Palermo, facing the gardens of Viminale; the wood at the back of the Ministry and the building

of the guardhouse located at the secondary entrance of the Ministry on via Panisperna, have to be particularly watched.

Orders have already been issued for the interior part of the Ministry.

II ZONE

It will be commanded by the Commissario Cav. DE SIMONE, who will be assisted by Capt. of P.S. Cav. CERRA. It will be divided into three parts:

I PART

- A) Piazza Viminale.
- B) The outside of the railings at Piazza Viminale.
- C) The staircases leading to the railings.
- D) The staircases which from Piazza Viminale lead to the square which is located before the Ministry.
- E) Via Agostino De Pretis between via Palermo and via Viminale.

This part will be commanded by the Commissario Dr. PANZINI assisted by a P.S. Officer.

30 CC RR;

80 P.S. Agents wearing uniforms;

50 P.S. Agents attached to the 3^o Group Celere;

20 P.S. Agents on horseback;

2 light tanks; will be at their disposition at Piazza Viminale near the fountain.

Commissario Dr. PANZINI will watch the three railings at the principal entrance and the following barriers will be established:

- 1) Via Agostino De Pretis - by Piazza Viminale, from the corner of via Palermo to the corner of Regina Margherita Gallery. The Gallery has to be included in this zone.
- 2) via De Pretis - by Piazza Viminale, between the building "Supercinema" and the stuff shop located on via Viminale.

The Agents attached to the Group Celere and those on horseback, will be kept as a reserve in case the above said barriers will be attacked and overcome.

In case of intervention of the Celere and of the Agents on horseback, the other agents will withdraw themselves to Regina Margherita Gallery and on via Viminale, between via A. De Pretis and the wall of the Ministry.

II PART

- A) via A. De Pretis - between via Nazionale and via Palermo.
- B) garden located at the back of the staircases on via Palermo.
- C) secondary entrances of via Venezia and via Genova.

This part will be commanded by the P.S. Commissario Dr. ARATO, assisted by Dr. VALNETO and by three P.S. Officers.
 80 P.S. Agents wearing uniforms;
 30 P.S. Agents attached to the Group Celere;
 10 P.S. Agents on horseback, will be at their disposition on via Palermo - corner via Venezia - by the Ministry.

The following barriers will be established:

- 1) via A. De Pretis opening into via Nazionale.
- 2) via Venezia - by Ministry of Interior - opening into via Nazionale.
- 3) via Palermo - by via A. De Pretis opening into via Genova.
- 4) via Genova - by the Ministry of Interior - opening into via Palermo.

The Agents attached to the Group Celere and those on horseback will be kept as a reserve in case the above said barriers will be attacked and overcome.

III PART

- A) via De Pretis - from via Viminale to via Urbana.
- B) via Balbo - right and left side -
- C) via Viminale - from via A. De Pretis to via Firenze -

This part will be under order issued by the P.S. Commissario Dr. PIETRANTONIO, who will be assisted by Dr. IULIA and by a P.S. Officer.

30 CC RR

30 P.S. Agents wearing uniforms
 20 P.S. Agents attached to the Group Celere
 10 P.S. Agents on horseback, will be at their disposition at the corner between the stuff shop and the garden which is located at the back of the left staircase in the square.

The following barriers will be established:

- 1) via De Pretis - by the Ministry of Interior - via Balbo.
- 2) via Viminale - by via De Pretis - via Napoli -

The agents attached to the 3rd Group Celere and those on horseback will be kept as a reserve in case the above said barriers will be attacked and overcome.

III ZONE

Commissario Cav. DI STEFANO will command this zone, assisted by a P.S. Officer.

This zone is formed of:

- A) via Milano - from via Palermo to via Panisperna -
- B) via Panisperna - from via del Boschetto to via Balbo -
- C) the entrance to Viminale from via Panisperna.

30 CC RR

80 P.S. Agents wearing uniforms

30 P.S. Agents attached to the 3^o Group Celere

10 P.S. Agents on horseback, will be at Cav. DI STEFANO's disposition in the Caserma of 1^o Group Celere, which is located on via Panisperna.

The following barriers will be established:

- 1) via Milano - by the Ministry of Interior - opening into via Palermo.
- 2) via Panisperna - by via Milano - opening into via del Boschetto.
- 3) via Cimarra - at the building n.35.
- 4) via Panisperna - by the Ministry of Interior - at the building n.196.

The Agents attached to the III Group Celere and those on horseback will be kept as a reserve in case the above said barriers will be attacked and overcome.

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The Commandants of the three zones have to be in communication with each other.

Their messengers must have bicycles.

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The above said orders have only to be fulfilled in case of a serious disturbance of the public security.

Otherwise, only the orders issued for the I and II zone (I part) will be fulfilled.

In any case the following orders will be issued:

- A) Take full measures for the safety of Palazzo Viminale.
- B) Take partial measures for the safety of Palazzo Viminale.

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The Agents will be always watched by their Officers and all the orders have to be obeyed.

The Officers have to persuade rioters not to cross the barriers. But, if necessary, the Group Celere and the P.S. Agents on horseback have to act with severity in order to disperse the rioters.

Rioters have not to reach the entrance of the Ministry; the instructions concerning this matter will be issued by the Commandant of the II Zone.

Vice-Questore Comm. Dr. LENER will be the Commandant in chief.

IL QUESTORE
(CIRÒ VERDIANI)

(1)

TECHNICAL AND MILITARY PREPARATION FOR THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION1. SYNOPSIS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY AND TECHNICAL-MILITARY ORGANIZATION

- (a) The direction of the political-military work relating to the preparation of the proletariat forces entrusted to the Military General Triumvirate.
- (b) The technical direction of the work is entrusted to a special organization linked to the Military General Triumvirate.
- (c) The preparation of local proletariat is decentralized to the Provincial Military Triumvirates; the "Circondarziali", the "Distrettuali", and to the Citizens.
- (d) The local Military Triumvirate nominates an "Organiser" to whom is entrusted the task of forming the Combat Groups.
- (e) The technical direction relative to the disintegration of the Armed Forces of the State is delegated to the local Military Triumvirates.
- (f) The local Military Triumvirates nominate a Linison Agent who is charged with the preparation of Communist Elements (cells) amongst the ranks of the Army and the Police Force.
- (g) The tasks of these communist elements are:
 - Anti-bourgeois propaganda.
 - Agitation.
 - Distributing pamphlets, newspapers or posters.
 - Sabotaging the orders of Military Commands.
 - Collecting reports regarding the morale of the troops.

Note: See diagram.

2. SYNOPSIS OF THE TECHNICAL-MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION

- (a) The direction of the Technical-Military work of the Communist party is entrusted to the Comitato Rivoluzionario Popolare Militare.
- (b) The strictly military preparations for the revolution are entrusted to the Stato Maggiore (Staff) of the Com. Riv. Pop. Mil.
- (c) Dependant on the Com. Riv. Pop. Mil. and the Staff there are instituted the Provincial Military Revolutionary Committees and the Provincial Military Centres of the party.

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The local military units are charged with the preparation of Communist Bureaux (cells) amongst the ranks of the Army and the Police Force.

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(b) The strictly military preparations for the revolution are entrusted to the Stato Maggiore (Staff) of the Com. Riv. Pop. Mil.

(c) Dependant on the Com. Riv. Pop. Mil. and the Staff there are instituted the Provincial Military Revolutionary Committees and the Provincial Military Centres of the party.

(d) The Provincial Military Centres have a staff consisting of 8 Sections, i.e.

Operations
Intelligence
Armament
Liaison
Communications
Destructions
Supply
Medical

(e) From the pre-existing military organisation follows the constitution of organic units of the armed proletarian forces, e.g. Bns, Regts, Divs.

(f) Particular arrangements have been made for procuring arms, such as, the disarming of Fascists, the capture of dumps, the confiscation of arms, the acquisition of warlike material from abroad, the clandestine manufacture of arms, etc.

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(g) Details regarding the putting into force of the technical phase of the revolution are:-

- (i) Making use of the largest possible number of armed men.
- (ii) Systematically boycotting the activities of the State organization.
- (iii) The material destruction of the enemy's installations.
- (iv) The creation of disorder and public revolts.
- (v) The employment of the Partisan formations in the operative picture of the proletarian armed forces.

(h) Detailed directives on the development of the plan for armed revolt:

- (i) Tactical action by each centre of revolt and general action by the proletariat masses.
- (ii) Organisation of the eventual defence and consequent action to be taken by the Reg and units.

3. SYNOPSIS OF THE PROGRESS OF THE VARIOUS OPERATIONS AND THE TIMING OF THE TWO PHASES OF THE REVOLT

Political and Technical-Military Preparations

The Communist Party, having theoretically won over the support of the proletariat masses, proceeds to the development of the plans relating to the armed revolution:

- (a) Nominates a Military General Triumvirate
- (b) Institutes Provincial Committees of the Party and local Military Triumvirates.
- (c) Begins the material mobilisation of the proletariat forces.
- (d) Nominates a Popular Military Revolutionary Committee.
- (e) Institutes the Provincial Military Centres of the Party.
- (f) Gives out the first directives on the action to be carried out regarding carrying the plan of revolt into effect.
- (g) Nominates a Staff for the strictly Military direction of the armed action.
- (h) Perfects the Military territorial organisation by the creation of other provincial military organisations, dependant on the

proletariat masses, persons to be sent to the armed revolution:

- (a) Elects a Military General Triumvirate
- (b) Institutes Provincial Committees of the Party and local Military Triumvirates.
- (c) Begins the material mobilisation of the proletariat forces.
- (d) Nominates a Regular Military Revolutionary Committee.
- (e) Institutes the Provincial Military Centres of the Party.
- (f) Gives out the first directives on the action to be carried out regarding carrying the plan of revolt into effect.
- (g) Nominates a Staff for the strictly Military direction of the armed action.
- (h) Perfects the Military territorial organisation of the creation of other provincial Military organisations, dependant on the Provincial Military Centres.
- (i) Issues directives regarding the provisioning, and on their clandestine manufacture.
- (j) Arranges the intensive employment of all members of the party who are capable of carrying arms.
- (k) Arranges single or collective allocation of weapons.
- (l) The local Triumvirates responsible for the organising work of the armed forces, nominate elements capable of constructing the first Combat Groups in the industrial and agricultural areas.
- (m) Re-groups the revolutionary masses and organizes them on a military basis.
- (n) Pre-arranges the apparatus of insurrectional and post-insurrectional command.
- (o) Issues combined directives to all the forces of the Party throughout the Country.
- (p) Constitutes the organic units of the proletariat forces and efficiently briefs the persons detained to command the same.

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- (1) Determines the composition of the various Regts.
- (2) Considers the desirability of the employment of other partisan forces during the armed action.
- (3) Creates an infiltrating organisation for the moral and material backing up of the Armed Forces of the State (Liaison agents and communist elements in the Army and the Police).
- (4) Considerably increases propaganda and agitation and determines the measures to suppress persons dangerous to the cause of the revolution.
- (5) Gives out orders in detail regarding the commencement of the revolt and arranges the political organisation in the captured areas, and the action to be taken by HQs and units in the offensive and defensive phases.

Technical and Military preparation for the Communist Revolution

General:

The preparations for the commencement of the Communist Revolution must on account of their importance be divided into two phases, the first of a political nature and the other as regards technical preparation.

For the success of the first phase it is necessary that the Communist Party draws attention to the general political activity of the Party itself. It is during this period that proceeding with the political manipulation of wide sectors of the population, the Party must ably gain the adhesion and sympathy of the masses.

The second phase, i.e. that of technical preparation, begins at the moment when the Party, having obtained the adhesion of the working masses, judges - of necessity by practical means - the time to be ripe for organising and technically preparing the forces thus gained for the political fight for gaining power. The majority having been won over, the general characteristics towards the development of the technical preparation of the revolution are:-

Grave economic crises.
Internal ferment of the working masses on account of straightened economic and financial conditions.
Indecision and weakness on the part of the Government and Armed Government Forces.

The principle measures to be taken by the Party at this stage are:-

To organise, arm and prepare the revolutionary forces;
Simultaneously to ferment the demoralisation of the masses;
Strengthen the opposition;
Neutralise the Government.

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- 3. Indecision and weakness on the part of the Government and Armed Government Forces.

The principle measures to be taken by the Party at this stage are:-

- 1. To organise, arm and prepare the revolutionary forces;
- 2. Simultaneously to ferment the demoralisation of the masses;
- 3. Strengthen the opposition;
- 4. Neutralise the forces of opposing parties;
- 5. Disorganise the armed apparatus of the Government.

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At the same time the Party must proceed to select and organise nuclei of the most important organs who will be destined to administer the Country once the power has been gained.

The Military activity of the Communist Party during the phase of political preparation consists generally in propaganda; agitation; organisation; and intentional preparation of confusion and disorganisation amongst the adversary's forces, at the same time, intensifying and looking after the organisation of the Party's own forces, so that during the period of technical preparation it will be possible in the shortest possible time to develop our forces to the full and disorganise those of the enemy.

All our energies must therefore principally be devoted to the work of demolishing the adversary.

The essential effort of the Party during this phase must be directed towards the development of a vast agitation in order to achieve power.

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The Party must pass from clandestine activity to open fight in the streets, without caring about the loss of human lives; creating an atmosphere of conspiracy and armed revolt necessary and indispensable for seizing power. All this, which is the consequence or continuation of the first phase, can be summed up as follows:-

- (a) To ensure for the revolt the necessary armed forces, adequately organised and prepared.
- (b) To get ready all the material means useful for the struggle.
- (c) To act unflinchingly against the enemy.

ORGANISATION OF THE APPARATUS OF WAR

A. Phase of Political Preparation of the Revolution

- (i) For the direction and exploitation of all military orders the Party nominates a special branch to which is entrusted the responsibility of organising the technical military work.
- (ii) This special branch is designated "the General Military Triumvirate". It is composed of 3 trustworthy members who have authority in the Party and are military prepared. Delegated by the Central Committee, they are responsible for the technical and military organisation of the party.
- (iii) One of the three members of the Triumvirate is a member of the Central Committee of the Party and has the function of Secretary of the Military organisation.
- (iv) The other two members of the Triumvirate, besides having to possess the requisites attributed, must be noted by the Central Committee as persons only who enjoy the trust of the masses.
- (v) The Military organisation is divided between the three members of the Triumvirate in the following manner:-

First, is responsible for defining the work of destruction;

The second, for preparing the forces, and

The third, presides and co-ordinates all the work of the Triumvirate and is directly responsible to the Central Committee of the Party for the political-military activity which that particular branch is carrying out.

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4. ORGANISATION OF THE APPARATUS OF WAR

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(vi) Alongside the Central Military Triumvirate another branch is created for the technical direction of the work. The Comrades proposed for this task must be trustworthy persons and particularly qualified for the work in question. They are nominated by the Central Committee of the Party.

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(vii) Local Military Triumvirates are subject to the Central Committee.

Military Triumvirates can be local, provincial, "circondariali", district or citizens.

(viii) Military Triumvirates are nominated in accordance with the aforementioned principles and carry out their activity in co-operation with the local Committees of the Party.

(ix) The organization scheme of the Provincial Committees is similar to that of the Central Committee.

(x) The Secretary of the Provincial Military Triumvirate is responsible for the activity of the branch entrusted to him, whether it is with the provincial Committee of the Party, from which he receives instructions regarding the province, or with the Central Military Triumvirate, from which he receives instructions of a general nature.

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- (xi) The Provincial Committee of the Party supplies the necessary orders to the Provincial Military Triumvirate and to collaborators for the immediate execution of work.
- (xii) Of these collaborators supplied by the provincial Committee, one part receive definite orders from a single member of the Triumvirate and do not therefore get to know the complete military organisation; the remainder, however, receive directives on the military organisation of the forces, meet the members of the Triumvirate and remain at their orders.
- (xiii) From the start conferences must be avoided, because they are dangerous for the maintenance of secrecy regarding the military revolt. However, in case of necessity, it is permitted to call together collaborators in order to give out instructions, on condition that the place where each on works is kept secret from the others.

B. Phase of the Technical Preparation of the Revolution

- (i) The Party mobilises for the revolt. For this end it is necessary to introduce into the organisation itself the greatest possible number of workers and to prepare them actively for the struggle for conquest of power.
The competent branches must diffuse amongst the masses the sense of necessity for armed revolt, at the same time getting ready the organisation for successive fighting and elaborating the programme of government to be introduced in the provinces after their capture.
- (ii) The direction of the political and military work of the Party must be concentrated in the hands of a single branch which must have full powers and enjoy the trust of the Party itself.
This branch (Comitato Rivoluzionario Popolare Militare) must include, in co-operation with the territorial organisation of the Party, an active apparatus (Staff) for the strictly military preparation of the revolt at the centre as well as in the other provinces.
- (iii) In order to lighten the preparatory work and carry out the co-ordinated programme better, Provincial Military Centres of the Party are formed, indirectly subject to the Central Committee.
In creating these Provincial Centres, the strategic and military reasons must above all be borne in mind, as well as the political factors.
- (iv) The rights, tasks and competences of every branch of the Revolutionary Committee must be well laid down, from which results:-
 - (a) Unity of action as regards the carrying out of the general plan for the revolt.

(ii) The direction of the political and military work of the Party must be concentrated in the hands of a single branch which must have full powers and enjoy the trust of the Party itself.

This branch (Comitato Rivoluzionario Popolare Militare) must include, in co-operation with the territorial organisation of the Party, an active apparatus (Staff) for the strictly military preparation of the revolt at the centre as well as in the other provinces.

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(iv) The rights, tasks and competences of every branch of the Revolutionary Committee must be well laid down, from which results:-

(a) Unity of action as regards the carrying out of the general plan for the revolt.

(b) Sufficient independence which is necessary for the achievement of the combined effort in case of lack of communications during the initial stages of the revolt.

(v) The Military Revolutionary Committee are generally collective branches formed from representatives of the principle organisations taking part in the revolt.

For this reason the Communist Party must pursue a directive role and influence the majority.

(vi) In the strictly Military direction of the armed revolt, Special branches (Staffs) are instituted who look after the technical preparation and the putting into effect of the revolutionary programme.

(vii) Military Centres are created dependant on the Central Revolutionary Committee; these consist of several sections and are engaged on military organisation and work arising therefrom. The command of each centre is by order allotted to a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

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(viii) The Military Centre can be composed, whenever the situation of the Province so demands, of more persons, who form a collective branch, which can also avail itself of the assistance of representatives of Military and Political organisations, even though not completely proletarian, so long as they are ready to support the revolt.

In every case however it is the person who acts as president of the collective branch who must advise as to the action to be taken.

(ix) The direction of the Military Centre is entrusted only to one person, who receives directives from the Central Revolutionary Committee. The co-ordination of the work between the Centre and the Sections is carried out by means of conferences of the Chiefs of Sections concerned under the guidance of the Military Director of the Revolutionary Committee.

(x) The Military Centre depends directly, through the Comrade who heads it, on the Central Revolutionary Committee. This Comrade is in all cases a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee and is chosen from the most energetic comrades of the party and from the most popular individuals.

(xi) The Military Centre of the Party normally consists of the following Sections:-

- | | | |
|-----|----------------|---------|
| (a) | Operations | Section |
| (b) | Information | " |
| (c) | Armament | " |
| (d) | Signal | " |
| (e) | Communications | " |
| (f) | Destructions | " |
| (g) | Supply | " |
| (h) | Medical | " |

In case of necessity, more sections can be grouped under the command of one comrade.

This procedure can be adopted particularly in the small provinces.

The heads of the Sections are nominated by the Chief of the Military Centre and confirmed by the Military Revolutionary Committee.

(xii) Heads of Sections are responsible for the work of their Sections and are subordinated in all matters to the Military Chief. They must however have a certain independence in promoting the means, and the initiative to reach the final goal.

(xiii) The development of the Sections of the Military Centre is gradually completed from the moment of the revolt. The responsible leaders, however, together with their direct collabor-

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- (xiii) The development of the Sections of the Military Centre is gradually completed from the moment of the revolt. The responsible leaders, however, together with their direct collaborators, are obliged to start work from the first moment. Technical collaborators on the other hand are normally employed at the opportune moment. The development of these branches must be foreseen and prepared in such a manner as to be able - at the moment of the revolt - to assume the whole weight of action, but before that to avoid disclosing themselves before it is considered necessary.

- (xiv) The above arrangements can be varied to suit local conditions, so long as the principles are strictly preserved.

- (xv) In electing the Heads of Sections of the Military Centre, account must be taken of their readiness, their trades and their position in the Party. It is necessary for the person elected to possess all the moral and professional qualities which make him suitable to hold a post of responsibility in the Red Army. For this reason, the maximum prudence in the selection of leaders is recommended.

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(xvi) Military Provincial Branches are formed by the Provincial Military Revolutionary Committees in accordance with the method already employed for the Military Centres and with particular regard to the territorial sub-division laid down by the Party.

(xvii) The Military Provincial Branches are the executors of the orders of the Military Centres in the various Sectors. The less important the Branch, the more direct work it will have with the masses. The standard of articulation depends on local circumstances. In limiting the functions of each subordinate branch, it is as well to remember that too much liberty or initiative may bring discords in the work, whilst too much limitation may suffocate the independence of local branches in the event of a break-down in Communications.

C. Organisation of the Combat Groups of the Militia and of the Units in the Political preparatory phase of the Revolution (Preparation of the Military Forces of the Proletariat).

- (i) One of the basic functions of the Central Military Triumvirate and of the local Triumvirates is the preparation of the armed masses of the Proletariat, so that at the moment of the Revolution the Party can count on a well-prepared, powerful and homogeneous formation of fighters.
- (ii) One must principally make use of all members of the Communist Party who are capable of carrying arms and also other workers, who though not inscribed in the Party, show sympathy for the cause of the Revolution.
- (iii) To the Members of the Military Triumvirate is entrusted the preparations of the Military organisation of the proletariat forces.
- (iv) One member of the Central Military Triumvirate, particularly versed in administrative ability, and assisted by a branch under his orders, gives necessary instructions and supervises the work of the local Triumvirates.
- (v) The members of the local Triumvirates to whom is entrusted the organisation work of our armed forces, make use of the collaboration of other members of the party especially at their disposal in order to nominate an organiser who is chosen from amongst the most trustworthy comrades and who has sure and proved experience of military services.
- (vi) The principal task of the organiser is essentially that of forming one or more Combat Groups with the members of the Party.
- (vii) In order better to control the performance of the Combat Groups, members of each Group must not exceed ten men.

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- (vi) The principal task of the organizer is essentially that of forming one or more Combat Groups with the members of the Party.
- (vii) In order better to control the performance of the Combat Groups, members of each Group must not exceed ten men.
- (viii) The Commander will be chosen from comrades most devoted to the cause of the revolution. He will be responsible for the Military preparation of the Groups entrusted to him.
- (xi) Every member of a Combat Group must be sufficiently instructed in the handling of arms, in their tactical use, in the particular method of how to conduct an armed revolt, and in signal and traffic services.
- (x) From the political and military point of view the Combat Groups must be convinced of the necessity for an armed revolt, as being the only decisive means of fighting for the creation of a proletarian dictatorship and to transform subsequent war into a civil war.
- (xi) The fundamental principle of instruction to be imparted to the Combat Groups must be that of dealing with armed fighting in streets and squares.

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(xii) A rational teaching is recommended in order that to inculcate useful knowledge to the troops and eliminate the superfluous. Particular attention must be taken in the teaching of how to conduct night attacks and surprise actions.

(xiii) Not more than ten persons at a time must be employed in exercises.

(xiv) For training, all possible means recognised by the law must be made use of, e.g. sporting organisations, clubs, gymnastic associations, volunteers unions, etc.

D. Military Organisation in the Phase of the Technical Preparation for the Revolution

(i) The armed organisation of the proletariat in this period is intended to be as follows:-

(a) The absorption and re-grouping of the revolutionary masses of workers and agricultural labourers (contadini) and forming them into a solid organisation.

(b) Pre-arranging a system of Command which will have as its programme not only the conquest of power, but which will extend its action even further, in the event of the struggle having to be continued beyond this point.

(ii) The organisation of the armed forces must be prepared in good time and based on the constitution and example of the Army of the Country. Besides this the organisation must have the following characteristics:-

(a) Be simple and flexible.

(b) Be in a position to establish a rapid formation of new units according to the intake.

(c) Be able to transform small Combat Units into bigger ones.

(d) Be united in purpose throughout the whole country, whether it be in industrial areas or in agricultural zones, with the sole difference that in the latter the units must be smaller than in the former.

(iii) The small military units will be formed in factories for industrial zones and in villages for agricultural zones.

(iv) During this phase, in the larger industrial centres, the Combat forces will fraternise with the masses of the proletariat, thus forming small groups of forces which answer to the following principles:-

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- (iv) During this phase, in the larger industrial centres, the Combat forces will fraternise with the masses of the proletariat, thus forming small groups of forces which answer to the following principles:-
 - (a) Creation of organisers capable of working in large groups and capable of co-ordinating military operations at the time of the struggle and afterwards.
 - (b) Give the possibility of nominating in good time the persons destined to command the more important units besides preparing them for practical employment of the units which will be entrusted to them.
The expressions Battalion, Regiment, Division, however, must not in actual fact indicate a numerical strength nor a relative argument; so long as they represent a generic statement of units organised from the revolutionary masses who are preparing themselves for the armed revolt.
- (v) It must be arranged that the units - up to the formation of Regiments - are composed of men from the same establishments and firms. Done in this way a better cohesion of the units is obtained.

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- (vi) The units are formed with the aid of the cadres which were already arranged for during the political preparatory phase. The components of each single unit must be sufficiently in the picture as regards the scheme of the unit they belong to. They must also know the composition of the Battalion and the Regiment.
- (vii) The simplicity of the scheme is a necessary factor for success. The unit must be homogeneous. In this way the preparation for the struggle is simplified. The fundamental principle is that no unit of the proletarian forces must be of a strength less than three or more than six sub-units directly under command.
- (viii) Increase in numbers within the units is ensured by the recruiting of labourers and farm hands. Recruitment is obligatory for all members of the military organisation. Registration of recruits and their assignment to fighting units is the responsibility of the command designated from the cadres. No co-ordination of the work, being delegated for the purpose by the local or provincial military command.
- (ix) Recruits must know the name of their own units' superior officers, before the operations begin.
- (x) The cadres of the military organisation are normally subordinate to the branches of the local military organisation up to the moment when the units are mobilised. These are then re-grouped under the authority of the local territorial military branches in the zone of action where they work in agreement with and according to plan of the revolt.
- (xi) For the formation of new battle groups during the action - in the case of lack of cadres for further expansion - the possibility of employing independent formations of units of other parties must be considered with great prudence. The partisans must be used in necessary measure, and must be kept under permanent control throughout the development of the action. It is therefore considered essential to collect our commissars close to the heads of these formations. They can be supplied and provisioned only in the eventuality of their being placed under our command, and later on one must not lose sight of their organisation which can subsequently be exploited by means of absorbing efficient personnel and the more efficient weapons and eliminating superfluous or weak elements.
- (xii) The destination of the commanders of fighting units normally depends on the military command subject to confirmation of the relative Revolutionary Military Committee. By Order, Company and Battalion commanders are nominated by heads of zones, while Regional Commanders are nominated by Provincial Chiefs.

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- (xiii) Apart from the simple nomination, no promotion is given to commanders.
The nominee must be carefully selected and the chosen person must be suitable for command.
Subordinates have the right of not accepting the nomination of a Commander who is unsuitable.

B. Arrangements regarding Armament

- (1) Every Communist must be well prepared and must show not by word but by deed that he is an active member of the Party.
He must procure himself arms for the part he is to play in the civil war.

- (ii) In order to acquire arms all means must be utilised, e.g.

- (a) Disarming the fascists or capturing dumps of arms.
- (b) Getting ready the means for confiscating ammunition in barracks, depots, dumps etc.

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- (c) Buying them from abroad.
 - (d) Pre-arranging a plan for the rapid transport of weapons, ammunitions, etc, from abroad to already established issuing points.
- (iii) In accordance with the general plan, the disarming of the Police or the Regular troops or attacking them in their depots is not recommended during the political preparatory period.
- (iv) With the object of utilising explosives from the industries and mines in a convenient and efficient way, it is as well to lay down the following general rules:-
- (a) Arrange for types of hand-grenades, rifles, mortars, explosive contrivances and munitions based on toxic gases. These can be prepared in small workshops or at home, making use of the explosives and material used in industries and mines.
 - (b) Prepare the necessary plant in workshops so that at the opportune time, production on a large scale can be commenced. The workshops must have suitable tools for producing the new types envisaged.
 - (c) Prepare cadres of instructors who are to direct and guide the work in the workshops and arrange instruction in the technical and tactical use of the contrivances manufactured therein.
 - (v) Generally speaking it is during the phase of political preparation for the revolution that the use of these explosives is foreseen. These are the means which the workers will succeed in obtaining easily by means of the accelerated development on a big scale capable of supplying the required individual armament necessary for each labourer.
 - (vi) The distribution of arms for the use of the military organisations is arranged thus:-
 - (a) Collective and individual distribution of armament to the Combat Groups.
 - (b) Individual distribution of arms to all Communists capable of carrying and using them.
 - (c) The hiding of the remaining weapons in small depots, possible near to large factories and especially where the revolutionary spirit of the workmen is apparent. It would be as well if the quantity of arms to be hidden in each small dump amounted to about a dozen rifles and one or two machine guns. Care must be taken that the arms are well kept and that there is also a sufficient supply of ammunition in each dump.

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(vii) The distribution of arms is of the greatest strategic importance and of obvious political value.

A larger distribution of arms will be made to the more important areas.

8. The destruction of Society and of the Armed Forces of the State (Army and Police).

(i) The work of destroying Society and the Government armed apparatus (Army and Police) is the most important task during this phase.

It is necessary that every member of the Party takes part in this dismemberment in the most extensive sense of the word.

(ii) The Party by itself cannot achieve concrete results in this field of action without the valid contribution of its adherents.

(iii) The general direction of this work is entrusted to the Central Military Directorate and particularly to the member charged with this task.

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(iv) The relative mandate for the disintegration of the armed forces of the State (Army and Police) is entrusted to the local Triumvirate, and by it to the member charged with this work. This member entrusts to an agent the task of establishing a link with the armed units of the State and with the Police detachments existing in the area.

It will be ascertained whether there are Communists in these forces or persons who by their behaviour show sympathy for the Communist Party, and if this is so, the agent will form one or more Communist "cells" thereby initiating through these comrades or sympathisers, the work of disintegration. If however there are no such desirable elements in the units, it is the task of the member of the Triumvirate to introduce proletarian elements capable of starting the work of disintegration into the military and police circles.

(v) The comrades chosen for this task receive instructions and directives from the Military Triumvirate through the member proposed for this task.

(vi) The communist agent who has been introduced into the ranks of the Armed Forces receives from the member of the Triumvirate propaganda material which he diffuses throughout the unit to the best of his ability.

(vii) The same agent collects information regarding the moral and material condition of the troops and communicates it to the member of the Triumvirate.

(viii) In this field of action women belonging to the Party can also be made use of, as they can generally make contact with the troops easily.

(ix) The Military Triumvirate must particularly develop a specially organised activity at the time of the call-up, particularly at the places where recruits report. By doing this it is possible to establish an immediate collaboration between the Party and the soldiers.

(x) In the first place the Triumvirate must arrange a particularly sharp control on persons inscribed to the Party and on the Communist Youth who are charged with the activity in the places where recruits report.

To this end use will be made of the local branches, to whom is entrusted the control of members of the Communist Party, and they will report to the Military Tribunal on the matter.

(xi) The member of the Military Triumvirate responsible for the disorganisation of the State Military apparatus will establish communication with those members of the Party and the Communist Youth who have been called to arms, by means of agents and elements of the Party existing in all institutions and firms.

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- (xii) Those inscribed to the Communist Party must have particular preparation as regards the task assigned to them. Deleterious propaganda must begin from the first moment and continue incessantly throughout the journey the recruit has to make to join the HQ of his Regiment.
- (xiii) Even before the call-up, it is obligatory for those who are inscribed in the Communist Party and who are called-up, to establish contact with other call-ups and single out those who have sympathy for the Communist Party. Having established this they must hasten to found a communist "Cell" as soon as they reach their Corps.
- (xiv) The task of the Communist "Cells" in the Regiment is to make daily systematic propaganda and agitation, with the argument that the inevitable political transformation in favour of the proletariat and contadini elements must lead to the undoing and disbandment of the Army.
- (xv) The work of agitation and propaganda by the "Cells" has as its

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primary task the strengthening of the ideas of the proletariat and convincing soldiers and to make them clearly understand the necessity for the armed revolt of the proletariat and the transformation of the fighting to come into a civil war.

(xvi) Those belonging to the Communist Party are obliged to follow attentively the daily life of the Regiment, avoid creating incidents, but however to underline any brutal treatment or wrongs committed by the Staff to the detriment of the soldiers, in consideration of the fact that the command embraces in itself all the Government system, and as such is the expression of bourgeois domination.

(xvii) In the event of order emanating from the HQ of the Regiment regarding the quelling of strikes or agitations on the part of the contadini, those belonging to the Communist Party must adopt on their own responsibility all measures which tend to impede the execution of orders given by the HQ, organise sabotage and remind themselves of the bourgeois character of the military organization and of whoever gave the orders.

They must consequently provoke a general refusal to obey on the part of the soldiers, avoiding however single demonstrations by comrades, which would not have any practical value.

(xviii) The members of the Communist "Cells" must in the shortest space of time acquire popularity and authority, making use of all means. The soldiers in their turn must see in the members of these nuclei their real spiritual leaders and the defenders of their rights. The comrades must acquire such authority and have such ascendancy over the soldiers that the latter should refer to these exponents of our Party at all times when they need advice or explanation regarding the safeguarding of their interests and those of their families.

(xix) In the event of the declaration of war, the nucleus has the duty of strengthening provocations against the bourgeoisie and turning the struggle at once into a civil war.

(xx) To the members of the nucleus falls the task of spreading manifestations, proclamations, newspapers etc., published by the Central and local Triumvirates and dealing with anti-bourgeois propaganda and the disorganisation of the State organism.

(xxi) They are obliged to inform the members of the Triumvirate on the moral and material conditions of their respective units.

(xxii) They must report to members of the Triumvirate the names of the enemies of the Proletariat belonging to the HQs of their respective units, as well as the names of those who on the other hand sympathise with the Communist Party.

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(xxiii) The Military nucleus should not know, for the work which it carries out, and other outside intermediary other than the agent with whom it is in contact.

The nucleus should not know the Military organisation in particular, nor the composition of the Military Triumvirate.

(xxiv) In the Organisation of the Party the Communist nucleus is in communication with the local responsible committee and is subordinate to it; in no case is it allowed to re-group isolated units according to military organisation, e.g. divisions, corps, etc., during the phase of political preparation.

(xxv) The agent to whom is entrusted the task of disorganisation transmits the particulars concerning the HQ of the Corps in which he is operating to the member of the Military Triumvirate from whom he has received his task.

(xxvi) The member of the Military Triumvirate also attempts to make contact with Senior HQs belonging to Military HQs, and particularly with those HQs coming from the working classes and from the con-

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G. Carrying into effect of the Technical Phase of the Revolution

- (1) At the beginning of the Revolt the technical and organising superiority will be with the enemy. It is necessary therefore, if success is to be achieved, to take all necessary measures to strike at and demolish the adversary's tactics, especially from the morale point of view. The general situation during this phase determines the following considerations:-

Maximum faith in our cause.

A consequent indecision on the part of the State organs and a foreseeable analogous attitude on the part of the medium or lesser subordinates.

From all this springs the positive result of our labours, whose object can be summed up thus:-

- (a) To bring over to our side as many soldiers as possible, in order to neutralise the remainder.
 - (b) To destroy the activity of the Governmental and Military Organisations.
 - (c) To provoke material damage which will tend to weaken the resistance of the enemy.
- (ii) These orders must be realised by the adoption of our moral and material resources, not only as regards single persons but also against vast organisations, whether they be private or state ones; in this way the adversary will be deprived of those means which, vice versa, he might be able to use against us.
- (iii) The demoralisation must be conducted with all means possible, by word of mouth and by incitement; with leaflets and with manifestations. Women can be very useful in this work. The places in which our propaganda must be introduced are many, e.g. clubs, etc.

- (iv) The means by which the agitation is completed vary according to circumstances. They stretch from propaganda to open intimidation, and also to limited personal action against the adversary. Small disturbances inside barracks and institutions, which may have started for unimportant motives, can have excellent results if by altering the causes one can succeed in turning them into a public revolt. The Communist units in the Army and the Police Force must at the moment of the revolt make a common cause with the rebels, or else if it is advisable for reasons of tactical order, remain neutral.

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- (v) Effective material measures against the enemy are:-

Combined action by terrorist and partisan groups.
Partial operations by the Combat Militia.

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- (vi) The object of this type of action is to eliminate persons who are antagonistic to the Revolution; to sequester arms and material necessary for the revolt and to destroy and annihilate the enemy's organisation.

- (vii) The active chief of the Partisans of the area is obliged to put himself in contact with the Military Command through the local Chief in charge of Disorganisation, in order to receive instructions referring to the activities of his men. In localities where there is no recognised chief, the military command gives orders direct to the partisans; if however this does go according to local plan, the sanction of higher authority is necessary.

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- (viii) In the fulfilment of such missions it will be necessary to observe whether the useful material or moral results derived fall in with the plan of the competent authorities and also that any harm which might result is not too great.
- (ix) Against non-proletariat organisations (Fascists) and such-like enemies of the Proletariat, any kind of act of terrorism is permitted.
- (x) The actions of the partisans must be supervised carefully, so that they do not degenerate into illicit personal gain. Hostile or undesirable elements must be inflexibly eliminated from the organisations, and if necessary, liquidated. This also applies to provocateurs, who must also be eliminated to avoid their doing harm to the organisation.
- (xi) The partisans and other institutions on the spot must be added to the local organisation, as they on account of their character, represent and include the aspirations of the proletariat masses.
- (xii) In this phase the action of the masses must be directed against the police and armed forces (demonstrations in the streets, meetings etc.,) These actions can have an undoubted value in the development of our programme and will gain us sympathy amongst neutral elements.
- (xiii) Special determined partial operations, which will take place at the commencement of the revolt, will be made as demonstrations with the object of drawing the attention of the enemy away from the main blow.

II. Plan for the Armed Revolt

- (i) It is not possible to foresee the course the armed action will take. However, one absolutely must not lose faith in the spiritual influence of the organisation and the collaborators of the revolt.
- (ii) The armed revolt must develop rapidly according to the pre-arranged plans, and making use at the same time of the greatest possible number of armed forces.
- (iii) The plan for the revolt must be able to count on the launching of the principal offensive of the proletariat army from the very first moment.
- (iv) The plan for revolt is strategically represented by the tactical action of each centre of revolt and of every important locality from the general or partial point of view.
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- (v) All the works relative to the plan for revolt are carried out by the actions of the Military branches on information from the competent Information Section.
- (vi) The Military Command superintends the elaboration of the plan of work, while the co-ordination of single plans devolves on the Military Director.
It is the duty of this Director to establish at the opportune moment the attributes of the military branches who are subordinate to him as regards the fulfilment of tasks and any particular directives which may result from the general strategic plan.
- (vii) The plan must conform to the following essentials:-
 - (a) It must be clear and precise in such a way that cannot give rise to false interpretation when it is carried out.
 - (b) It must be elastic so as to allow, in the event of unforeseen changes, action to be taken just the same, without detriment to the principal idea of the operation.
 - (c) It must apply totally and completely to the actual situation

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- (d) Individual orders which arise from the plan must be able to be acted upon, not only as regards the time factor, but also as regards the personal element. It is recommended that in the elaboration of individual local plans, where the time factor is sometimes calculated to the exact minute, not more than one specific task is given to any one unit.

(viii) The elasticity of the plan consists in leaving to the subordinate branches (who receive the orders affecting the general plan) that certain independence in the selection of the manner of execution. Subordinate branches must be completely "au fait" with the plan, so that in the event of a breakdown in communications, they can act on their own.

- (ix) The independent units which act in accordance with the plan of the revolt must be informed, within the necessary limits, of the tasks allotted to the larger units of which they form part and also of the tasks allotted to units working in nearby areas.

(x) In the execution of the plans it is necessary to pay attention to the numerical strength of units. The smaller the unit, the more detailed must be the plan of action, because in such a case it has a more limited independence. It is obvious that the detailed plan must refer only to the operations reflecting the initial phase. Successive operations must be illustrated only in a general sense.

- (xi) In the elaboration of the plans of operation it is logical to bear in mind that the possibility of movements of troops from one zone to another according to the requirements and course of the action.

(xii) It must be understood that even a plan worked out in the most complete manner is always liable to variation whilst the operations are developing. The possibility that we shall not always be able to maintain the initiative has not been excluded; at times it may be opportune to conform to the moves of the enemy. It is however necessary always to remain active.

- (xiii) The most ingenious of plans can fail if the revolt does not have a simultaneous and synchronized beginning in all zones. It may happen that hostile provoking agents may force certain zones to get into action before the fixed time. This must be avoided at all costs. The following documents complete the plan of the operations:-

- (a) Map showing the advanced zones with particular regard to inhabited areas shown in relation to their revolutionary

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The following documents complete the plan of the operations:-

(a) Map showing the advanced zones with particular regard to inhabited areas shown in relation to their revolutionary activity and reference regarding the location from which the signal for the initial attack will be given.

(b) Notes of a military-topographical character on the direction of our offensive; special notes re cross-roads and means of communication; notes regarding the use to be made of the mountain system in the general plan of revolt.

(c) Locations of units of the Regular Army and the Police, Arms Depots and eventually, of Fascist Squads. This is of capital importance. For this reason an efficient information service is organised, which is in a position to signal urgently the location, identification and movement of enemy forces.

(d) The principal objectives of the I.R. which directs the operations; the occupation and defence of centres of revolt; action against enemy attempts at re-grouping; widening of the territory occupied; pursuit of enemy forces; preparations against a possible intervention from abroad.

- (xiv) In pre-arranging the strategic plan, the areas which are particularly important for us and on which maximum attention must be concentrated are laid down:-
In particular it is necessary:-
- (a) To distribute and according to the political, military and strategic importance of the area.
 - (b) To concentrate the organised forces on identical principles in all the zones.
 - (c) To know road communications, road junctions etc., and in the event of its being necessary in the strategic plan, to provide for their systematic destruction.
That is in the interest of the development of our operations.
Determination of strategic points in relation to the organisation and execution of the armed revolt and to the possibility of having the maximum of our combat forces at our disposal at the important strategic points.
- (xv) The Government Armed Forces (Army and Police) are numerically strong, well equipped and supplied with the most modern technical means of armament.
They have an excellent technical training and possess a command capable of conducting the fight with prospects of success.
- (xvi) The units of the bourgeois class are not however homogeneous because the soldiers for the main part come from the working classes and the contadini.
The commanders however are composed of representatives of the upper classes and the nobility.
- (xvii) For this reason the units of the Army and the Police, not feeling themselves foreign to the general revolution will certainly at the time of the revolt find themselves undecided and thereby will weaken their fighting strength.
- (xviii) For this reason the Army and the Police will not conduct the fight against the Proletariat Forces in the inhabited zones, but will prefer to give battle in open country where they can better make use of their armament and where they will find it easier to maintain order in the units.
- (xix) The proletariat not being in possession of abundant weapons, cannot arm all the working classes.
For this reason, at the moment of the revolt, the proletariat class cannot count on an effective majority of armed men in respect to the Government Forces.
- (xx) It is also a fact that from the point of view of equipment,

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- (xix) The proletariat not being in possession of abundant weapons, cannot arm all the working classes. For this reason, at the moment of the revolt, the proletariat class cannot count on an effective majority of armed men in respect to the Government Forces.
- (xx) It is also a fact that from the point of view of equipment, organization, technical and tactical training, and command; the proletariat forces are inferior to those of the bourgeois class.
- (xxi) The proletariat forces however possess precious qualities which put them ahead of the Army and Police Forces; these are their conviction of the good of the cause, enthusiasm and the spirit of sacrifice.
- (xxii) In all cases where it is possible, we must act against the enemy by surprise.
- (xxiii) Every partial victory must be exploited to the full, with the outlook of a greater victory. As many weapons as possible must be captured in order to supply those units of ours who still lack arms.
- (xxiv) The forces of the enemy must be liquidated on the spot, by killing them, disarming them and weakening them in such a manner that they will no longer have the possibility of re-organising them. The means to be employed are:-

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- (a) Surprise attacks in strength against barracks and areas occupied by the enemy.
This method if properly employed can achieve decisive results in the shortest space of time.
- (b) If the attack does not succeed completely; blockade the barracks and the areas occupied by the enemy with barricades and entrenchments; interrupt their communications (signals and transport); disconnect their water pipeline supply and electric light; and carry out small surprise attacks with squads of a few determined men.
- (c) In case our attack is not crowned with success, the partisan formations must be used against the enemy with the task of molesting their forces and preventing them from re-organising in other zones.
It must therefore be pre-arranged that there are, in the cities and elsewhere, combat squads, each composed of five men with the task of bringing destruction to railway and road communications and to other means of transport useful to the enemy.
- (xiv) The operations of the rebels must be conducted against the enemy with extreme decision and courage.
The enemy must not be given any rest.
This is the task of the small "contadino" squads.
Just by doing this success cannot fail to favour our fighting forces.
- (xv) The start of the revolt must be simultaneous throughout all the Country.
All the rebel forces must be used in the fight.
- (xvi) So that the disorganisation of the enemy forces may be arrived at rapidly, terrorism must be brought to bear against the enemy commanders until they are completely liquidated.
The revolt having started it must be conducted to the end.
- (xvii) The general strategic plan having been definitely elaborated, this has value, for the whole Country and must conform to the following principles:..
 - (a) Which are the principal areas of the Country where the revolt will have certain success.
 - (b) Consistent dictatorship by the Proletariat in the conquered areas.
 - (c) Which are the regions considered the most important.

Just by doing this success cannot fail to follow.
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The revolt having started it must be conducted to the end.

(xix) The general strategic plan having been definitely elaborated, this has value for the whole Country and must conform to the following principles:-

(a) Which are the principal areas of the Country where the revolt will have certain success.

(b) Consequent dictatorship by the Proletariat in the conquered areas.

(c) Which are the regions considered the most important.

(d) From whence could a counter-revolutionary action organised abroad be launched against the proletarian revolt.


(e) What political and military assistance for the success of the revolt can come from the proletariat of other countries.

(f) Which are the specific tasks entrusted to the leaders of the revolt and against which strong forces of the enemy must first act (Army, Navy, Railway nodal points, overline bridges, dumps and factories of arms and ammunition, political centres etc).

(g) The date of the armed revolt.

(h) The liquidation of Government anti-revolutionary personalities and the leaders of other parties.

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
Appendix 'A'TECNICO-MILITAREORGANIZZAZIONE




STATO MAGGIORE	
SEZIONE OPERATIVE	SEZ INFORMATIVA
SEZ ARMAMENTO	SEZ COLLEGAMENTO
SEZ COMUNICAZIONI	SEZ DISTRUTTIVA
SEZ SENSISTENZA	SEZ SANITA

47.

Appendix 'B'

ORGANIZZAZIONEPOLITICO-MILITARE

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