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COMMITTEES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
APR. - OCT. 1945

880

19 OTT. 1945 (Translation C.C.)

COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE PER LA LIGURIA

Presidenza -Affari Politici

Genova 10/10/45

N°2240/GA/ru

SUBJECT: relation

This C.L.N. considers best to report to those Offices the following:

- after the insurrection, in agreement and confirmation with the Allied Military Government, were appointed respectively one Questore and Vice-Questore for the province of Genova, the lawyer Bianchi G.B. and prof. Gelasio Adamoli.
- The avv. Bianchi and Prof. Gelasio have esplicated their duties in the best possible manner inasmuch as the Allies had repeatedly expressed their full satisfaction.

Things stood like that up till a month ago, when to this C.L.N. came the news by accident of the arrival of a new Questore sent by Ministry of Interior.

This C.L.N. requested immediate explanations to Allied Mil. Command of the province and having had a confirmation of the news, provided to present its disappointment for not having been consulted beforehand, and for having provided for the replacement when it was not deemed necessary.

The Provincial Allied Command justified the situation affirming that, having the Questore Bianchi hinted in an interview which he had for other reasons, to leave his Office when to Allied Mil. Command would succeed the "Amministrazione regia" it was found necessary to provide in that sense.

As the C.L.N. interpellated the avv. BIANCHI, same confirmed the non-official and definite character of his declaration adding that he was as ever at the disposal of the C.L.N.

As things stands presently, and having the C.L.N. pointed out to Allied Command that the provision adopted for Bianchi should however not be extended to Vice Questore Bianchi as Command pretended, the matter was subsequently and attentively examined between Provincial Allied Command and the C.L.N., 836

resulting in an agreement which established for the Vice Questore to remain in service until the Region remained under Allied jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding such agreement, a few days ago, the Allied Regional Command communicated to the C.I.N. of the replacement of Questore and Vice Questore.

This C.I.N., by means of its President, pointed out the untimely political provision for being also contrary to agreement mentioned before. But decidedly the Reg. Command took up position in the contrary and confirmed that the decision be taken at once.

The Liguria C.I.N. was then obliged to examine with attention the question, and while confirming own's views regarding the inopportunity of the provision decided however, in order to avoid serious inconveniences, to take a non-resisting attitude voting for the purpose the following resolution.

"" In reference to the communication forwarded by A.M.G. in Liguria regarding the replacement of the Questore and Vice Questore on career appointed by C.I.N., we declare to request that such a provision had been enforced without the opinion of this Committee, in opposition to previous agreement which stated that the replacement should take place on the moment when the passage of the Administration goes back to the Italian Government.

The C.I.N. decides to not create disorders, nor disturb the public opinion, and not to give any publication for the moment of its present position; at same time expresses its thanks to Questore Bianchi and Questore Adamoli for the work carried out under the protection and supervision on the C.I.N. ""

But as provisioned, soon after the publication in the press about the replacement of the Questura I vice Questore, the population re-acted by showing its dissatisfaction.

Only with an intense work of persuasion done by This C.I.N., either directly or by means of its concerns and peripheral C.I.N., it has been possible to avoid public demonstrations and suspension from work in public services and factory workers.

The awkward situation determined in the population and in the same midst of the Questura, which followed the provision, can be better appreciated from the news given by the press, from the demands of resignation presented by old and new officials at the Questura, dismissals from work and numerous orders of the day

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voted by concerns and workers amongst which are those of the Genoa docks; the railwaymen of the Genoa department; tramway-men; workers and employees of the Ansaldo factories; of the shipyards; The Ansaldo carpentery-works; Cesura yards; the joint-stock company of naval engineering works "Sutter"; Bagnara establishments; the Agip-Foltezer factory; Piaggio factory; Gas society; Italian Marconi Company; the population of Ge/ Pontedecimo and Ge/Cornigliano through their C.I.N.; laborers of the St. Giorgio establishment; the population of St. Quirico and workers of the various engineering works in the "Levante cittadino"; Biasoli factory; Mennucci factory.

Nearly all these orders of the day issued by the a/m concerns are in our hands and given to us by commissions of the citizens concerned.

The seriousness of the situation which followed the provision is such that this C.I.N. finds it necessary from this moment to inform that Authority, and at same time points out its deepest regret for the fact that such a situation has arisen, besides that for the fact itself, its nevertheless a demonstration, be it occasional but equally sad, of the contrast between the C.I.N. and the Allied Mil. Command.

National Liberation Committee

The President

/s/ Secondo Pazzi

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1 DIRECTOR	MM	9/3/10
2 DEPUTY DIRECTOR		
EXEC. OFF.	MM	23-10
✓ POLICE	MM	24/10
✓ LIC. A. T.O.		
PRISON		
ADM. OFFICER		
SECURITY		
CHIEF CLERK		

have feathers

PUBLIC SAFETY 3/6

COMITATO LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE PER LA LIGURIA

PRESIDENZA - AFFARI POLITICI E MILITARI

PROT. N. 2246/3A/ru

Genova, 10/10/45
Albergo BristolOGGETTO: segnalazione.

al COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE ALTA ITALIA

Milano

al MINISTERO DEGLI INTERNI

Roma

e per conoscenza:

alla COMMISSIONE CENTRALE ALLEATA

Roma

Questo C.L.N. ritiene opportuno portare a immediata notizia di questi Uffici quanto segue:

dopo l'insurrezione, di pieno accordo col Governo Militare Alleato, il quale appunto li conferò, vennero nominati rispettivamente a Questore e Vice Questore per la provincia di Genova l'avv. Bianchi G.B. e il prof. Gaspario Adamoli.

Sia l'avv. Bianchi che il prof. Adamoli esplicarono nel miglior modo il loro compito tanto che anche gli stessi Alleati dichiararono più volte la loro piena soddisfazione.

Così stavano le cose circa un mese e mezzo fa, quando a questo C.L.N. giunse per via indiretta notizia dell'arrivo a Genova di un nuovo Questore inviato dal Ministero degli Interni.

Questo C.L.N. provvedeva subito a chiedere delucidazioni al Comando Militare Provinciale Alleato e avuta dallo stesso conferma della notizia provvedeva a far presente il suo disappunto perché, senza averlo previamente consultato e sapere che le circostanze lo richiedessero si era voluto provvedere in tal senso.

Il Comando Provinciale Alleato giustificava la situazione affermando che, avendo il Questore avv. Bianchi accennato, in un colloquio intervenuto per altri motivi, che egli non intendeva rimanere in funzione quando, alla partenza del Comando Militare Alleato, fosse subentrata la Amministrazione regia, si è trovato nella necessità di provvedere in tale senso.

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Pr. vvedutosi da parte del C.L.N. ad interpellare l'avv. Bianchi questi confermava il carattere non ufficiale e definitivo della dichiarazione da lui emessa e dichiarava che, al riguardo, egli si rimetteva come sempre alla decisione del C.L.N.

Così stando le cose e avendo fatto questo C.L.N. presente al Comando Alleato che in ogni caso, il provvedimento di sostituzione non poteva essere preso nei confronti del Vice Questore Adamoli, al quale invece il Comando pretendeva di estendere il provvedimento, venne attentamente esaminata e discussa la situazione e, fra il Comando Provinciale Alleato e questo C.L.N. intervenne una intesa in base alla quale rimase stabilito che questore e Vice Questore sarebbero rimasti in funzione sino al passaggio della regione al Governo Alleato al Governo Italiano.

Nonostante e contro gli interventi di tale accordo, invece, improvvisamente, nei giorni scorsi venne comunicato a questo C.L.N. che il Comando Regionale Alleato aveva deciso di provvedere alla sostituzione del Questore e del Vice Questore.

Questo C.L.N. a mezzo del suo Presidente, richiamava l'attenzione di tale Comando sulla inopportunità politica del provvedimento; il quale inoltre era contrario agli accordi già intervenuti. Ma il Comando Regionale prendeva decisamente posizione in contrario e confermava che senz'altro la sostituzione doveva aver luogo immediatamente.

Il C.L.N. Liguria si vedeva allora costretto ad esaminare attentamente la questione e, pur confermandosi nella propria convinzione circa l'assoluta inopportunità del provvedimento dec. deva tuttavia, al fine di evitare più gravi inconvenienti, di assumere un atteggiamento di non resistenza votando, al riguardo, il seguente ordine del giorno:

"" In riferimento alla comunicazione data dall'A.M.G. in Liguria in merito alla sostituzione, per il 5 ottobre p.v. del Questore e del Vice Questore nominati dal C.L.N. con Questore e Vice Questore di carriera il C.L.N. si dichiara dolente che il provvedimento sia avvenuto senza il suo parere, anzi contro un accordo precedente, secondo il quale si stabiliva che la sostituzione sarebbe avvenuta al momento del passaggio dell'amministrazione della regione al Governo Italiano.

Il C.L.N. decide al fine di non suscitare disordini turbamanti nell'opinione pubblica, di non dare nessuna pubblicazione, per il momento, a questa sua posizione; nel medesimo tempo ringrazia il Questore Bianchi e il Vice Questore Adamoli per la loro opera svolta sotto l'egida del C.L.N. e orientata secondo le direttive del C.L.N. ""

Come previsto, però, non appena resa pubblica a mezzo della stampa la notizia della sostituzione del Questore e Vice

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

AFC 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

2/20.1/CA

21 April 45

SUBJECT : Committee of National Liberation.

TO : All Officers, Emilia, Liguria, Lombardia,
Piemonte and Venetia Regions.
SCAG's 5 and 6 Army.
HQ IV Corps

1 This directive lays down the policy which will govern the actions of all Officers of Allied Military Government in their relations with the Committees of National Liberation (CLN - "Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale") in Northern Italy.

2 CLNs have been organized on a communal, provincial and regional basis throughout German occupied territory. Their activities are co-ordinated by an over-all CLN for the whole of the area, known as the CLNAI - ("Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale dell'Alta Italia").

Intelligence reports from the North show that the various Committees of National Liberation have learned a good deal about the art of government in the year-long struggle against the Fascist, and the German. In many districts, "shadow" Governments have been set up, and the various portfolios have been distributed amongst the leaders of the different parties. On the whole it seems that for the time being there is a remarkable degree of unity of purpose in the Committees, and party differences have been sunk in the common desire to crush the Germans from Italy and to punish their Fascist collaborators. These Committees have been assisted in their military operations by the Allied authorities and the giving of such assistance necessarily implies a degree of recognition of their position.

3 Relations with AMG. - The Supreme Allied Commander has made the best military arrangements with the CLNAI. He has not given political recognition to the CLNs, but under these military arrangements, the CLNAI will endeavor to maintain law and order and continue to safeguard economic resources until the CLN is established. Thereupon CLNAI has agreed that the CLNs will recognize AMG and hand over to it all authority previously assumed.

Like-wise all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (VFL) will come under the direct command of the C-in-C, 45th Army Group, and will obey any order issued by him (or by AMG on his behalf) including orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so. Upon the establishment of AMG the SCAG first, and later the HQ, is supreme and possesses all powers of government, and the CLN has no official standing in the conduct of affairs.

berations (Relazioni) dell'Alta Italia".

Intelligence reports from the North show that the various Committees of National Liberation have learned a good deal about the art of government in the "shadow" Governments against the Fascist, and the Germans. In many districts, distributed amongst the leaders of the different parties, on the whole it seems that for the time being there is a remarkable degree of unity of purpose in the Committees, and party differences have been sunk in the common desire to chase the Germans from Italy and to punish their fascist collaborators. These Committees have been assisted in their military operations by the Allied authorities and the giving of such assistance necessarily implies a degree of recognition of their position.

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Relations with AMI. -- The Supreme Allied Commander has made his own military arrangements with the CLNAI. He has not given political recognition to the CLNAI, but under those military arrangements, the CLNAI will undertake to maintain law and order and continue to safeguard economic resources until AMI is established. Thereupon CLNAI has agreed that the CLNAI will recognize AMI and hand over to it all authority previously assumed.

Likewise all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Italy (GVLI) will come under the direct command of the C-in-C, 15th Army Group, and will obey any order issued by him (or by AMI on his behalf) including orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so. Upon the establishment of AMI the SOAG first, and later the TC, is supreme and possesses all powers of government, and the CLNAI has no official standing in the conduct of affairs.

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But there are other considerations which should be borne in mind in placing the policy indicated in the above arrangements. It is in the interest of the Allies that there should be a stable Government in Italy, in the way possible. The Italian Government the legitimate Italian Government in every of the CLNAI in the North and, at best, their influence there may be subject to fluctuation. This may be based on several factors. There is the fact that the North has suffered far more heavily for Italy. There is the fact that the South, and has suffered far more heavily for Italy. There is the fact that the progress made by the Italian Government in the reconstruction of the country, and above all in the pressing economic problems of food supply and fuel, is well aware of this antipathy and has an agreement which goes further than that of the Supreme Allied Commander in recognizing the CLNAI as its representative in the struggle in the North. The Government has succeeded in creating a certain measure of reconciliation from the CLNAI in the North, but the possibility cannot be overlooked that they, or their component political parties, may not abide by this agreement if circumstances seem favorable for a political upheaval. It is hoped that after liberation the Rome Government will be able to absorb additional members from the North and thereby become more representative.

5 Relations with the Italian Government. The recognition of the CIMEs as the representatives of the Government in the struggle against the enemy does not affect the Allies, who are not parties to the arrangement. Moreover, the Italian Government has no authority of any kind in Military Government Territory. Its arrangements with the CIMEs are not operative in Military Government Territory and do not affect the relations between AMG and the CIME.

6 The problem facing AMG, therefore, is to reconcile the military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the aspirations of the political leaders of the CIMEs to self-government, at the same time supporting the authority of the Italian Government in Rome in order that it may be able to administer the Northern Territories once AMG is withdrawn. The solution of this problem may well be found to lie in the concentration at a very early date of CIME nominees into the civil administration. If Allied Officers arrive in the North and bluntly inform the CIMEs that their task is accomplished and that they may now disperse and if, after that, Sindaco and other administrative officers are appointed without the views of CIMEs being considered, the antagonism will be great and may well be disastrous. The danger of setting up local administrations composed of Italians who are not acceptable to the Patriot organizations cannot be over emphasized. AMG officers are not bound to accept the first suggestions of the CIME, who can always be instructed to submit alternative names. If, however, this principle is followed out, many of the problems of maintaining law and order will never arise. It will be easier to exploit the local resources of the country in the work of reconstruction and in the work of feeding the population. It will be easier to bring together the former Patriot organizations and the Italian Government, and it will be easier to prepare the ground against the time when the Government in Rome can take over the administration.

7 While the foregoing paragraph lays down a principle which is calculated to reconcile the Military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the aspirations of the CIMEs, there are special considerations in regard to the office of Prefect and Questore. Prefects, as the official representatives of the Government, are normally appointed by the Government from career officials. Even in the present situation this practice has generally been followed. Similarly the Questori have normally been appointed from Public Safety personnel by the Central Government. Other appointments, such as the Sindaco, etc., are normally local choice. For obvious reasons the Italian Government wishes to continue the customary practice in regard to Prefects and Questors, and have raised it again very recently. It is the policy of the Allied Commission to support the Government and it would be unwise to depart, entirely, from the normal practice. The Italian Government has, therefore, been advised that any specific nominees whom they put forward for appointment to the post of Prefect or Questore by AMG will receive consideration. At the same time it has been pointed out that it would be quite useless to try and put any nominee who is not acceptable in the locality. Since AMG will not, by this arrangement, lose any of the powers delegated to it, and since the policy of this Commission is to support the Government in Rome, it is calculated that the policy of this Commission,

7 While the foregoing paragraph lays down a principle which is calculated to rectify the military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the administration of the GINs, there are special considerations in regard to the office of Prefect and Questore.

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SAOs and IGOs will not, by this arrangement, lose any of the powers delegated to them. It is their duty, however, in implementing the policy of this Commission, to use their best efforts to obtain local acceptance for the Government nominee, endeavouring to reconcile the views of the GIN with those of the Italian Government. This must be the principle although the practice will always depend finally on the judgement of the SOA or RO.

8 The action is, therefore, as follows: On arrival in a Province it seems almost certain that a Prefect and Questore appointed by GIN will be found in office. This will be fully in accord with the agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and GINAI. These appointments should not be confirmed forthwith but the individuals should be normally allowed to remain in office as acting Prefect and acting Questore respectively solely for the purpose of carrying on routine business pending the final appointment by AAR. Nominations should then be invited from the GIN, to whom it will be explained that AAR alone have the right to make the final appointment from names approved by the Italian Government, GIN and other sources. Nominations may also be sought from other sources, e.g. the local Archdiocese. The names of Government candidates for these two posts will be furnished by this Headquarters as soon as they are available, and local opinion should then be sought as to the possible acceptance of the Government's nominees. The appointment should not be hurried and it is much better to allow a reasonable period, say 10-14 days, to elapse so that full consideration can be given to the matter before final decision is made. In appointing a Questore that importance is attached to the professional qualifications of the

nominees. Purely political appointments to this important office should be avoided. The responsible SCAC or RC will inform this HQ of the following details directly they are available:

- a) Name of Prefect and Quastore found in office.
- b) Name of Prefect and Quastore finally appointed.

One word is stressed that these special circumstances apply only to the two offices of Prefect and Quastore. The Italian Government fully associates that other officials are normally local choices and AMG officers will appoint them with no regard to CIN advice.

The CINs must be treated with the courtesy due to their political position and their past labours. They should be received regularly by the RC and given the opportunity of expressing their views. They are at liberty to make representations to the RC or the Prefect, both of whom should seek the advice and views of the CIN whenever they think it opportune. It is however entirely a matter for the RC to consider whether, in any particular case, the advice of the CIN is to be followed or rejected. It would of course be in keeping with this directive to accept such advice except where it is in conflict with the Policy of AMG.

It should be added that, when a member of a CIN is appointed to an administrative position, it is better that he should resign from the CIN. There may be objections to this in individual cases and it is left to the discretion of the RC concerned. It is most desirable, however, that holders of administrative positions should be entirely divorced from the politics of the CIN.

It must be made plain to the Prefect and to other officials that they are the servants of AMG and can take no orders from the CIN. On the other hand, the RC must give him full support to the Prefect and the official administrators. If he no longer has confidence in his officials, the RC should take steps to remove them. The CIN must not exercise executive functions or usurp the authority of the Prefect, e.g. by making official appointments or setting up commissions of enquiry. If, after they have been duly warned and ordered to desist, the CINs persist in attempting to be executive or otherwise violate the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander as Military Governor, then, and as a last resort, the RC may ignore them completely. Such an attitude is to be adopted only in case of absolute necessity, when all efforts at conciliation have failed and administration is at a deadlock.

There is some evidence that in parts of German Occupied Territory, where the AMG's control is slight, the CINs have set up governing bodies in each commune, elected on an informal system of universal suffrage. Such popularly elected bodies can also be met at other levels. These bodies will not be given official recognition by the AMG. Local authorities prescribed by former directives will be established as soon as possible. But every effort will be made to absorb into membership of the official authorities the nominees of such an elected body at the same level. If in very special circumstances in forward areas, the unofficial body is allowed to continue for a short time, it must be understood that it derives its authority from AMG and not from any popular mandate.

11 It must be made plain to the Prefect and to other officials that they are the servants of the PC and can take no orders from the CM. On the other hand, the PC must give him full support to the Prefect and the official administrators. If he no longer has confidence in his officials, the PC should take steps to remove them. The CM must not exercise executive functions or usurp the authority of the Prefect, C.S. by making official appointments or setting up commissions of inquiry. If, after they have been duly named and ordered to assist, the CM's persist in attempting to be executive or otherwise violate the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander is Military Governor, then, and as a last resort, the PC may ignore them completely. Such an attitude is to be adopted only in case of absolute necessity, when all efforts at consultation have failed and administration is at a deadlock.

12 There is some evidence that in parts of German Occupied Territory, where the CM's control is slight, the CM's have set up governing bodies in each commune, elected on an informal system of universal suffrage. Such popularly elected bodies are also to be set up at other levels. These bodies will not be given official recognition by the official local authorities prescribed by former directives will be established as soon as possible. But every effort will be made to absorb into membership of the official authorities the nominees of such an elected body at the same level. If in very special circumstances in forward areas, the unofficial body is allowed to continue for a short time, it must be understood that it derives its authority from the PC and not from any popular mandate.

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