

ACC

10000/143/1087

10000/143/1087

PARTISAN ORGANIZATION, TURIN
MAY - JULY 1946

Public Safety Sc

5/

Letter opposite, drafted by Ex. Com, is
returned for dispatch. Copy has been
retained for EC's files.

[Signature]
10/2/26

3884

White sheet

Ex commun. MC
thru V.P. C.A.S.

1A and 1B are submitted for information
Lague with A in 1A. may also file be
passed to M.P. 1A. please furnish information?
The facts have probably already been reported
by the B.O. in Tarnin.

18. 8. 16
 O. J. 16
 E. J. 16

15.6.46;

2:1

Pass to Land Force Sub Com. What is PSS
doing in Turin any case? It seems to me a
waste of man power to employ people whose
existence defects in providing sensation
or exaggerated refats. Please return to me with

Land Farm's comment.

3.
Land Forces S/C -
Passed to you, in accordance with
for comment
by Committee in 2 above. J. W. Hind. Smith
Lt. Col.

SECRET**SECRET**

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512, US Army

GBI-389/DACS/Misc.

5 July 1946

SUBJECT: Partisan Organisation - TURIN.

TO: Headquarters Allied Commission,
Office of the Executive Commissioner,
APO 794, US Army.

Reference your letter AC/14363/PS dated 25 June 1946.

1. It is agreed that the report given in S/16 of 7 June is sensational.
2. It can not however be agreed that OC 315 FS is responsible for the "gross exaggeration" mentioned in your letter. This officer is merely putting on paper the reported statements of the persons interrogated, and he sums up his report by saying that he does NOT consider the partisan organisation is a danger to Allied Military Security, and he stresses the fact that the statements concerning the CREMONA Division are only assertions.
3. It is stated in your letter that this report has been sent "round the country". According to the distribution shown, the report is addressed quite correctly to GSI(b), Northern Detachment, and a copy was given to Chief Liaison Officer, AC, PIMONTE, since instructions have been given by GSI(b) Northern Detachment to all FS sections in their area to keep the local representatives of Allied Commission in the picture concerning any reports which might prove of interest to them. This procedure was asked for by the local AC representatives.
4. The report in question was received by GSI(b) Northern Detachment, was evaluated correctly as exaggerated, and was not sent to this HQ. It was only after receipt of your letter that a copy was requested from GSI(b) Northern Detachment.
5. It is to be regretted that the local AC representatives should have wrongly evaluated the report, and should have forwarded it for the personal attention of the Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission.
6. It is the duty of Field Security Officers to make reports to their superior formations, and the trained intelligence personnel at these formations evaluate such reports.
7. The correct procedure was followed in this case, and no "wrong impressions" were given to the trained intelligence personnel who received the report.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

C. W. M. TIMMIS
Colonel General Staff
D/AC of S, G-2

Copies furnished:

GSI, HQ 5 District, CMF.
GSI, HQ 5 District Northern Detachment, CMF.

SECRET**SECRET**

Ref: AC/44363/RS.25. June 1946.

SUBJECT: Partisan Organisation - TURIN.

TO : ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Attn: C-2 Section.

1. In his report S/16 of 7th June 1946, the CO 315 P.S. Section in TURIN has given a report which in every respect is sensational, both with regard to the 'parkingani' and the liability of insurrection on their part, and with regard to disaffection among Italian soldiers of the Grenada Division. I have had the whole story carefully checked both by the Chief Liaison Officer and the MU in TURIN and I am satisfied from what these responsible officers tell me that the whole report is a gross exaggeration.

2. I think it is most regrettable that officers who term themselves Intelligence Officers should waste time and paper in sending these sensational reports round the country. They give entirely a wrong impression of what is going on in Italy and naturally leads even your Section to a faulty appreciation. For instance, that "there would be widespread disorders in Italy after the elections".

3. If the services of these officers are really necessary, I would suggest that they be instructed to contact the responsible officers who are really in touch with the Italians, e.g., CIO's and MU's, before passing exaggerated reports to their Headquarters.

For the Chief Commissioner:

W. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

WHL/JG.

3880

Copy to: HQ 3 District.

SECRET

ALLIED COMMISSION
LIAISON GROUP
PIEMONTE REGION

Ref : PR/CLO/051.6 10 June, 1946
Subject : Partisan Organisation - Turin.
To : HQ Allied Commission (Public Safety Sub-Commission)

Forwarded herewith copy of report received from O.C. 315 F.S. Section re: partisan Organisations, said to be existing in Turin and in other districts.

With regards to these documents, information received at this office would certainly indicate that there has been a considerable alert in old partigiani circles and the leaders of various partigiani formations have been reported to have been back in their old areas. There seems little doubt that action was afoot to frustrate any "coup d'etat" which might be attempted by monarchist or neo-fascist elements. As regards this partisan formation in Turin, however, it will be noted that the persons concerned are chiefly youths who, perhaps, having served in the partigiani movement, now find life a little dull and sigh for the old exciting times. It is, therefore, probable that this report is highly exaggerated and not deserving of too much serious attention.

The Cremona Division were themselves working on this case and I have not referred any information supplied by the F.S.S. to the Cremona Division as, presumably, they already know the state of their own division.

I endeavoured to discuss this matter with an Officer from the CC.RR. and could not help noticing the obvious reluctance to speak; which I put to the fact that they have received orders to avoid causing any political recrimination at the present time.

Apart from this attitude, this particular officer considered that this small band at Turin was a band of youthful adventurers.

L. L.

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 To : HQ Allied Commission (Public Safety Sub-Commission)

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F.G. Green

F.G. GREEN
 Lt; Colonel - GL
 Chief Liaison Officer -
 PIEMONTE

FGG/hl

SECRET

To: GSI (b), HQ, 3 District,
Northern Detachment.

1/15

From: CC, 315 P.S. Section,
Intelligence Corps.

Subject: Partisan Organization - TURIN.

1. On Monday 3 June 1946 CC, RR of the CREMONA Division raised a Freattoria at No. 10, Via Milano, TURIN, on information received that deserters from the Cremona Division were using this restaurant. Several deserters were arrested, also 9 civilians and 1 German soldier, who deserted to the Partisans last year and has since lived in TURIN.
2. On one of this civilians, a man named CHIRARLI Luigi, alias GINO, a number of documents were found in connection with a partisan organization. These documents, copies of which are attached, are of recent date.
3. On interrogation, the German MOHLMEYERCKX alleged that he had been approached by "GINO" with a view to his enlistment in a partisan formation which would take action should the referendum be in favour of the monarchy. MOHLMEYERCKX stated that he had been told that the partisans had a total force of 60,000 men and that they had adequate arms and mechanical transport at their disposal.
4. On the strength of these allegations MOHLMEYERCKX and "GINO" were interrogated by this section. MOHLMEYERCKX reaffirmed his previous statements, but said that he was unable to state whether or not the partisans actually had the arms as stated. 388
5. "GINO" was interrogated at length with special reference to the partisan formation. He stated that

Subject: Partisan Organization - TUNIS.

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2. On one of this civilians, a man named ^{COLO}OMARINI Luigi, alias GINO, a number of documents were found in connection with a partisan organization. These documents, copies of which are attached, are of recent date.
3. On interrogation, the German MOHLERBROCK alleged that he had been approached by "GINO" with a view to his enlistment in a partisan formation which would take action should the referendum be in favour of the monarchy. MOHLERBROCK stated that he had been told that the partisans had a total force of 60,000 men and that they had adequate arms and mechanical transport at their disposal.
4. On the strength of these allegations MOHLERBROCK and "GINO" were interrogated by this Section. MOHLERBROCK reaffirmed his previous statements, but said that he was unable to state whether or not the partisans actually had the arms as stated. 388
5. "GINO" was interrogated at length with special reference to the partisan formation. He stated that the organization was in contact with partisans in Plesouste, Liguria, Lombardy and Veneto Giulia, and that the military organization was the same as the regional partisan divisions of the time of the insurrection.
6. "GINO" denied any connection with the Communist Party and stated that the movement was directed against any possible attempt by monarchists and neo-fascists to seize power by force despite the result of the elections. He further denied having in his possession any arms and despite a severe interrogation would not admit anything in this connection.

He stated that the only man who might know of the existence of any arms deposits was the Commandante for TURIN, a man known as MARI. "GIRON" stated that he did not know the real name of MARI, but he was able to identify him through a telephone number as Giorgio RINALDI, living at Corso Massimo d'Azeglio 37, TURIN.

7. We were able to trace RINALDI and questioned him about this partisan organization and in particular the possibility of tracing arms deposits. RINALDI stated that he did not know of the existence of any arms deposits and that although most of the partisans had in their possession some weapons either a pistol or in some cases Stens, he did not believe that they were in a position to find any large quantity of weapons.

8. RINALDI went on to make a serious admission: he stated that he was in close contact with disaffected Italian soldiers of the CROCEIRA Division, who had agreed to desert to the partisans in the event of any insurrection. He alleged that 90% of the CROCEIRA Division, excluding the officers were willing "to join the partisans with their weapons and transports".

9. RINALDI denied that the Partisans had any intention of making the first move and their plans had been made in view of the preoccupation with possible and even probable monarchist and neo-fascist aggressions. Questioned with reference to the actual organization of his men, he stated that it was the old partisan organization which had been carried on. RINALDI, who is only 15 years old, is extremely intelligent and the fact that he volunteered as a paratrooper at the age of 15 and took part in dangerous operations confirms my impression that he has considerable personal courage.

10. RINALDI stated that he was only too willing to give information to the Allies about this organization and denied categorically that there was any intention to upset public order. His own opinion on the present political situation seems to be mainly concerned with the possibility of a civil war starting from an attempt by monarchists and neo-fascists to seize power by force.

3. RINALDI went on to make a serious admission: he stated that he was in close contact with disaffected Italian soldiers of the GRAMONA Division, who had agreed to desert to the partisans in the event of any insurrection. He alleged that 90% of the GRAMONA Division, excluding the officers were willing "to join the partisans with their weapons and transport".

9. RINALDI denied that the Partisans had any intention of making the first move and their plans had been made in view of the preoccupation with possible and even probable monarchist and neo-fascist aggressions. Questioned with reference to the actual organization of his men, he stated that it was the old partisan organization which had been carried on. RINALDI, who is only 18 years old, is extremely intelligent and the fact that he volunteered as a paratrooper at the age of 15 and took part in dangerous operations confirms my impression that he has considerable personal courage.

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11. Questioned about the present organization of the partisan groups RINALDI stated that the Commander for the all Regions including Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, is a man named MANETTI, of Via Mazzini 43, TURIN. MANETTI is known as "the General". RINALDI asserted that MANETTI was the only man who had complete knowledge of arms and ammunition available for use by the partisan formations but that he considered that the area from the GRAMONA Division were a much more important factor in the plans for any eventual action.

12.

Information has reached this Section from other sources regarding the activities of MANETTI. Capt. BONAZZI, O.S., TURIN, informs us that MANETTI, who is a communist, has been warned about these activities and as a result MINELLI states that MANETTI wishes to withdraw from the organization. In fact he has left TURIN on private business and is supposed to be at GENOA.

Action Taken.

1. As a result of the interrogations no one has been detained with the exception of the German MOHLKNECK. It is not considered that this partisan organization is a danger to Allied Military Security. A separate letter is being forwarded to you asking for disposal instruction in the case of MOHLKNECK.
2. The most interesting point in this case would appear to be the assertions by MINELLI that the Italian soldiers of the "Grisone" Division are disaffected and could not be relied upon in the event of a left-wing uprising.
3. Efforts are being made to trace MINELLI, who will be questioned with regard to his activities in organizing a partisan "army" and his alleged knowledge of arms deposits.

7 June 1946

Refuted

Capt.
CG. 313 P.S. Section,
Intelligence Corps.

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Action Taken.

1. As a result of the interrogations no one has been detained with the exception of the German POW, MOHRENBROCK. It is not considered that this partisan organization is a danger to Allied Military Security. A separate letter is being forwarded to you asking for disposal instruction in the case of MOHRENBROCK.
2. The most interesting point in this case would appear to be the assertions by NERARDI that the Italian soldiers of the "German" Division are disaffected and could not be relied upon in the event of a left-wing uprising.
3. Efforts are being made to trace MURRAY, who will be questioned with regard to his activities in organizing a partisan "Army" and his alleged knowledge of arms deposits.

7 June 1945

Re: MURRAY
 Capt.,
 OO. 213 P.S. Section,
 Intelligence Corps.

3870

Enclosures

3 copies of documents found on Luigi GUERARDI,
 alias GINO.

Copies (2): Chief Liaison Officer,
 AC Platoon.

Torino, 29 maggio 1946

Ordine del Giorno del Comando Supremo.

COMANDANTE IN CAPO "Generale Perotti" Ordine:

1. Tutti gli appartenenti delle suddette Colonne a-
vendo a carico famiglia appartengono ad una paga suf-
ficiente per il suo mantenimento.
2. I suddetti avranno dopo un mese di servizio un
impiego migliore sul lavoro, per i militari saranno
impiegati nei posti migliori e congedati, secondo le
leggi del governo repubblicano.
3. Il bottino di guerra fatto in azioni sarà distri-
uito immediatamente a tutti gli appartenenti delle
Colonne, secondo le regole.
4. In più il Comando raccomanda a tutti gli indipen-
denti delle Colonne di mantenersi sulle regole pra-
corritte e di non trasgredire gli ordini.

In fede di Cinesento alla Repubblica
Italiana.

IL COMANDANTE DI COLONNA
(Gino di Bruto)

3870

Torino 30/5/1946

Ordine del giorno del capo colonna.

- 1° Il capo colonna ordina ai capi squadra di mantenere la massima disciplina e il massimo ordine verso i suoi uomini dipendenti.
- 2° I capi squadra devono mantenere secondo gli ordini il loro compito nelle azioni che eventualmente si svolgeranno.
- 3° Ordine del Comando Supremo. I capi squadra secondo gli ordini del capo colonna dovranno agire.
- 4° I capi squadra possono agire sempre sulle regole come vogliono e con qualsiasi mezzo necessario al buon andamento dell'azione.
- 5° I capi squadra sono tenuti a conoscenza che se qualche errore viene commesso senza motivi e senza ordini dal comandante del capo colonna saranno responsabili assoluti e giudicati per mezzo delle leggi Repubblicane.
- 6° I capi squadra devono pensare per l'organizzazione e il raggruppamento delle armi in possesso degli uomini stessi entro il termine stabilito dal comandante.
- 7° I capi squadra quando danno ordini ai loro uomini, costoro devono assolutamente ubbidire senza minime discussioni.

8 Colonna di Azione.

Il Comandante della colonna
(ottimista di ordine)

387

III° RAGGRUPPAMENTO BRIGATE MOBILI

COMANDO

N. 2/Com. di prot.

Sede Com., li 31/5/46

Oggetto: Disposizioni di carattere generale.

A TUTTI I COMANDI DI REPARTO DIPENDENTI

M. 88.

Questo Comando non ripete i concetti generali già diretti perché ciò non potrebbe portare che ad un'inutile perdita di tempo ed a una confusione mentale.

I comandanti dei reparti dipendenti debbono attenersi strettamente alle disposizioni precedentemente emanate ed alle seguenti:

a)- Tutti i comandanti di colonne e di distacco debbono preoccuparsi di inculcare nei dipendenti un alto senso di disciplina necessario al buon esito dell'azione.

b)- I reparti dipendenti debbono perfezionare la rete dei collegamenti che dovrà permettere la tempestiva riunione di tutte le formazioni. Si ribadisce che tutti i reparti dovranno trovarsi pronti per la partenza in un limite massimo di 96 ore. I comandanti saranno considerati disertori a tutti gli effetti e nei loro confronti saranno prese severissime misure e, nei casi più gravi sarà per essi fatta eseguire la sentenza capitale. La responsabilità di ciò ricade in parte sui comandanti le formazioni.

c)- Le dipendenti colonne dovranno sopraggiungere nel prefisso luogo di adunata con la massima dotazione di automi ed armi e portando con loro tutto ciò che ai Comandanti le formazioni riterrà utile al proprio equipaggiamento. Per le requisizioni degli automi, i comandanti dipendenti dovranno uniformarsi a quei concetti di civismo che sono basilari per ottenere la considerazione della cittadinanza.

d)- I comandanti dipendenti dovranno inoltre tener presente che in quei giorni tutta l'Italia si guarderà e si giudicherà.

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c)- Le dipendenti colonne dovranno sorvegliare nel prefisso luogo di adunata con la massima dotazione di automi ed armi e portando con loro tutto ciò che ai comandanti le formazioni riterrà utile al proprio equipaggiamento. Per le requisizioni degli automi, i comandi dipendenti dovranno uniformarsi a quei concetti di civismo che sono basilari per ottenere la considerazione della cittadinanza.

d)- I comandi dipendenti dovranno inoltre tener presente che in quei giorni tutta l'Italia ci guarderà e ci giudicherà. Qualsiasi atto abusivo sarebbe quindi deleterio per la nostra causa. A questo riguardo ordino nella maniera più tassativa che chiunque arbitrariamente e sotto qualsiasi pretesto rubi, violi la neutralità dei pacifici cittadini, uccida per odio personale o compia qualsiasi atto si da spargere inutile terrore sia giudicato per direttissima dal Tribunale degli Angeli e passato immediatamente per le armi.

e)- Si pregano infine i comandi dipendenti di segnalare a questo comando gli eventuali depositi di viveri, di carburanti e di qualsiasi altro materiale necessario alla nostra formazione affinché questo comando possa emanare in merito ordine di requisizione.

Il comandante militare 2°/to NERI

(4)

C.S.O. Ex Comm.

1. I was in TURIN on 3-5 June and received full details of these reports at the time. I was also able to discuss the attitude of the troops and in particular those of CREMONA Div very freely with the Territorial Commander and the Commander of CREMONA Div, and also to form my own opinion through visits to units.
2. The informer, in addition to giving the information reported in this file, stated that there would be a big Partisan demonstration in TURIN on the evening of 4 June. In fact there was no such demonstration or any sign of one and this may serve as a guide to the reliability of the information in general.
3. As regards the statement in para 8 of 1B I am satisfied that this is a very gross exaggeration.
The 3rd Battalion of both Infantry Regts of this Div are not up to the standard of the rest of the Div and undoubtedly contain some disaffected elements. I am confident however that the remainder of these two Regts are very reliable.
144 Engineer Battalion of this Div is also known to have poor discipline and to contain a high proportion of unreliable men. For this reason, during the Election Period it was moved to CHIERI where it was quartered with the 7 Artillery Regt. This Regt is known to be very loyal and reliable and was considered fully capable of suppressing any troubles in the 144 Engineer Battalion should they arise. The War Ministry are at the moment considering changes in Senior Officers and certain personnel in 144 Engineer Battalion in order to improve its discipline and morale.

*m 2 refs.*21 June 46

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*M. W. Hope*B.G.S.
M.M.I.A.*JP 21/6**125*

