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DISORDERS IN AN UNRRA CAMP AT REGGIO EMILIA
JUN. 1946 - JAN. 1947

UNRRA ITALIAN MISSION

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF MISSION

Ref: SA/Camps

20 August 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: MISSION EXECUTIVE OFFICER

FROM: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO CHIEF OF MISSION

SUBJECT: COURT OF ENQUIRY INTO REGGIO EMILIA D.P. CAMP INCIDENTS

1. I am returning to you the attached papers (Report of the court of enquiry into Reggio Emilia D.P. Camp incidents and memo from the Assistant Chief of Bureau of Relief Services, dated August 1st, 1946).
2. With reference to point (3) of your memorandum of 3 August on this subject I agree completely with your recommendation that, since the camp at the time of the incident, was administered by this Mission on behalf of the Military Authorities, we should submit a full report of the incidents to AFHQ for any action they may wish to take. Our contribution to the decision which will be taken in this case should be limited to supplying information with respect to the details of these incidents, but the final decisions on this case, particularly with respect to the jurisdiction of the Italian authorities, should rest with AFHQ.
3. As regards point (4) of your memo, I am inclined to agree with you that a procedure should be established in consultation with the Italian Government and the United Nations Governments in order to define our responsibilities for the camps which we have now taken over from the Military after the signing of the UNRRA/SACMED Agreement of 1 August 1946. It seems to me, however, that there should be no doubt about the direct jurisdiction of the Italian courts over the displaced persons living in camps. Such displaced persons are not entitled to special privileges, immunities and exemptions and are, therefore, subject to the Italian civil and penal law.

As regards the camps themselves, I do not believe that UNRRA can or should claim any extra-territorial rights which would preclude

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As regards the camps themselves, I do not believe that UNRRA can or should claim any extra-territorial rights which would preclude the exercise of the sovereignty of the Italian Government over the UNRRA camps.

APEDINELL:ilm *AP*

cc: C O M

Bur. R.S.

Legal Adviser

Protective Services

Spec. Asst. to C O M

P. Contini

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO

THE CHIEF OF MISSION

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COPY~~CONFIDENTIAL~~U.N.R.R.A. - ITALIAN MISSION

1st August 1946

TO: Executive Assistant
Chief of Mission's Office

FROM: Assistant Chief of Bureau
Relief Services

SUBJECT: Court of Inquiry into Reggio Emilia D.P. Camp Incidents

1. I have just received your memorandum of July 17th, which has been passed on to me by the Deputy Chief of Mission, Relief Services, for comment and action regarding the above subject.
2. While it is certainly necessary that legal action be taken in this instance, the following facts appear to me to be necessary before we can be certain what Government or Military Authority bears responsibility for this action.
3. What nationality was Mr. Kaplan? If of United Nations nationality, it seems to me that UNRRA may have a responsibility to report the facts of his death to his Government for action. It seems questionable to me whether referring this matter to the Italian authorities is sufficient unless Mr. Kaplan is of ex-enemy nationality or stateless.
4. This Report refers to "Jewish nationals". This is an inaccurate classification of nationality. We should know the exact nationality of the persons affronted and those accused of the affront. Are we certain, for example, that the so-called "White Russians" or "Ukrainians" are not U.S.S.R. deserters, and, as such, covered by the Hague Conventions rather than by civilian law authorities? If so, attempting to deal with these individuals through Italian civilian channels would probably be improper.
5. UNRRA bears a different relationship to United Nations nationals than to non-United Nations nationals, inasmuch as the legal relationship between a national and his Government must always be considered.
6. Does UNRRA have a responsibility to request military "screening" of the individuals allegedly involved in the incidents and killing? If persons accused of a killing were determined to be ineligible for UNRRA assistance (which apparently was the case), and if their ineligibility was based on former Military service or suspected collaboration, then would not the Military carry prime responsibility for any legal action taken, and should not our action be limited to providing the Military with any information that we may have regarding the incident?
7. The Bureau of Relief Services agrees with paragraph 4 of the memorandum dated July 11th as prepared by Mr. Bruno, Mr. Duffy and Mr. La Penna, in that legal action should be taken. The questions we have raised pertain rather to the jurisdiction of legal responsibility in this case in view of nationality and civilian and military status. We realise that this matter is one which you

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should discuss with the Legal Adviser rather than with us, but we have submitted our comments in the hope that they will be helpful.

8. An incident like this emphasizes the necessity of careful personnel selection, and, of course, concerns the Bureau of Relief Services. It is realized that attitudes of prejudice towards particular nationality groups, religious or political groups can contribute indirectly, if not directly, to incidents. Therefore, public safety, as well as UNRRA's philosophy, requires the employment only of objective, unprejudiced, experienced, mature personnel.

/s/ Helen Montgomery
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF BUREAU
RELIEF SERVICES

cc: D.P. Division

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UNITED NATIONS

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

ITALIAN MISSION

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File -

Emilia
Reggio Guidotti

JUL 16 1946

R-246

July 11, 1946

TO: Chief of Mission

FROM: Board of Inquiry, composed of:

Mr. G.P. BRUNO, Chairman

Mr. J.W. DUFFY, Member

Mr. I.G. LA PENNA, Member

SUBJECT: Court of Inquiry into Reggio Emilia D.P. Camp incidents.

1. This Court convened on 13 June 1946 and proceeded to Bologna on the same day.
2. All witnesses available at Reggio Emilia were questioned on 14 May. These included D.P. camp staff and the local civil authorities. The Russians and Ukrainians nationals involved were interviewed at Bologna N.2 refugee's camp on 15 June 1946. The remainder of the witnesses, the Jewish nationals, were interrogated at Cinecitta' DP camp on 17 and 18 June.
3. Attached is the report based on this Court's findings and a summary of the evidence furnished by the witnesses.
4. In view of the fact that there are at least three of the Jewish witnesses who stated that they could positively identify the killer of Kaplan, it is suggested that a copy of this report be transmitted to the R.E. Questura in order that the case may be re-opened and legal action instituted against the person whom the Jews identify as the murderer.


 Mr. G.P. BRUNO, Chairman


 Mr. J.W. DUFFY, Member

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J.W. Vane
Mr. J.W. VANE, Member

I.G. La Penna
Mr. I.G. LA PENNA, Member

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UNITED NATIONS

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

ITALIAN MISSION

INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENTS WHICH TOOK

PLACE AT REGGIO EMILIA CAMP

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENTS WHICH TOOK

PLACE AT REGGIO EMILIA CAMP

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C O P Y

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UNITED NATIONS
RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

10th, June 1946

TO: Major G.B. Bruno
Mr. E. La Penna
Mr. J. Duffey

FROM: Chief of Mission

SUBJECT: BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO REGGIO EMILIA D.P. INCIDENT

You are requested to serve on the Board of Inquiry reference above incident to determine the following :

1. Establish facts leading up to the incident.
2. Establish facts of the incident.
3. Ascertain subsequent action taken by civil/or military authorities to determine the guilt of persons involved.
4. Conclusions.

Please submit a full report establishing the facts of this entire incident in chronological order.

It is understood that Mr. Louis Varrichione, Director D.P. Division, has already met with you, placing in your hands all the reports that have been submitted.

The locale of the enquiry is to be Cinecitta' as the assembly point for Jewish D.P. witnesses, following which you will proceed to Bologna to meet with non-Jewish D.P.s as well as to meet with the proper civil and/or military authorities in that area.

The timing and schedule of travel, as well as arrangements for witness assembly have already been arranged by the D.P. Division, according to discussions already held with you.

LV/amr

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LV/amr

Signed: S.M. Keeny
Chief of Mission

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cc: S.M. Keeny
A.A. Sorieri
L. Varrichione

INCIDENT OF 4TH MAY

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(3)

1. When the news of Kaplan's death reached the Jewish nationals, they demanded "justice", wanting the person or persons responsible for the killing arrested immediately.
2. Meanwhile, the camp commandant, in conjunction with Major Lewis, Military Liaison Officer with UNRRA, acting on instructions from Col. Oldfield, had made arrangements to move the Russian group to Modena. Col. Oldfield had been advised by the Camps Administrator to "get the Russian group out of Reggio Emilia as early as possible".
3. The Jewish nationals feared that all chances of apprehending Kaplan's killer would disappear with the removal of the Russians and immediately made strong demands on the camp commandant that an identification parade of the Russian group should be held.
4. At this point, a Mr. Kaganovic, who claimed to be representing the Central Committee of Jewish Refugees in Rome, appeared to have assumed leadership of the Jewish party. It has been established that he happened to be in the Reggio Emilia area when the incident of the 1st May took place and that he happened to hear of the incident and conceived it to be his right to look into the matter on behalf of his organisation.
5. During the incident of 4th May and the immediate events leading up to it, all evidence goes to show that Mr. Kaganovic's arrival on the scene did nothing to ease the situation. It was his strong insistence on an identification parade which caused Major Lewis to at last accede to this demand and it is exceedingly likely that had there been no parade, there would have been no incident. Mr. Kaganovic's threatening and arrogant attitude throughout the discussion with Major Lewis and Lt. Eyston convinced Major Lewis, against his better judgment.
6. Major Lewis held the parade for the purpose of having only the killer identified. The Jewish people who were selected to take part in the identification thought that they were to identify not only the killer but also ring-leaders in the affair of the 1st May. Eighteen people, therefore, were identified. Major Lewis took down their names but knowing that eighteen people could not have directly caused Kaplan's death, considered it best, at this juncture, to hold no one at Reggio Emilia. He, therefore, ordered the Russian group to move off to the embussing area for the move to Modena, where he had originally intended to conduct the investigation.
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7. During the period of the identification parade, many Jewish nationals both in and out of the camp, and perhaps some Italian civilians, watched the proceedings. As the column moved off, the Jewish nationals, intensely dissatisfied at what they considered to be a breaking of the promise made by Major Lewis, became belligerent in their attitude towards the Russian group and the camp authority.
8. To ensure order during the identification, Major Lewis had taken the precaution of requesting the assistance of the Italian Grenadier Company and during the hostile demonstration by the Jewish nationals, the Grenadiers, either to defend themselves or to restore order, opened fire, apparently without command, at first in the air and later towards the ground. Some two to three hundred shots were fired in all.
9. At the same time, Jewish nationals inside the camp were trying to force their way out and a member of the Camp Carabinieri fired from outside into the camp, wounding at least two people, one of whom died later. Several Jewish nationals and one Italian civilian were wounded in the street demonstrations.

COURT OF INQUIRY

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(2)

INTRODUCTION

1. It should be noted that the conclusions of this court are based on unsworn testimony. They are, however, supported by evidence drawn from all available sources concerned in the incidents of the 1st and 4th May.
2. It was obvious during the investigation that discussion after the incident had crystallised the thinking of all parties concerned and that each faction gave its own biased account of the events which had taken place.

FACTS LEADING UP TO INCIDENT OF 1ST MAY

1. On 24th April, a party of approximately 1,000 Jewish nationals were admitted to Reggio Emilia Camp.
2. From date of entry until the time of leaving Reggio Emilia, this party considered itself to have been subjected to adverse discrimination by other camp residents and camp staff.
3. Despite this belief, all are agreed that the incident of 1st May is entirely disassociated from anything which may have happened prior to 1st May.
4. Prior to the 1st May, the Jewish nationals had been given permission to use a meeting place within the camp buildings and therefore concluded that they were authorised to use this meeting place on the 1st May. They had never asked, nor did they deem it necessary to request permission to use the meeting place specifically for political or quasi-political meetings on the 1st May.
5. The meeting place was used on 1st May for a meeting which had a political flavour, or at very least, which to the onlooker would give reason for thinking that it had a political flavour of a leftist nature. All evidence proves the presence of at least a red flag on the wall of the meeting hall on the morning of 1st May.
6. Before the meeting officially opened, a demonstration against the meeting was made by a group of anti-left non-Jewish nationals, the majority of whom spoke Russian, and were therefore regarded by the Jewish nationals as having been Ukrainian or White Russian.

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6. Before the meeting officially opened, a demonstration against the meeting was made by a group of anti-left non-Jewish nationals, the majority of whom spoke Russian, and were therefore regarded by the Jewish nationals as having been Ukrainian or White Russian.
7. The camp commandant was advised of the meeting and immediately intervened in order to bring it to a close. Finding himself unable to control the situation as he desired, he left the meeting to obtain military assistance. During the period of his absence, the opposing factions fought with what weapons were available, viz. broken furniture, stones and knives. It is reasonable to assume that the aggressors in this case were non-Jewish. During the fighting, several Jewish nationals were injured by stones and at least two received knife wounds. One of those injured by stones, a man named Israel Kaplan, died on the evening of the 3rd May. The fight on the 1st May was eventually stopped by the efforts of Italian Grenadiers brought in at the request of Lt. Eyston. The six camp Carabinieri on this occasion, proved perfectly useless.
8. From the 1st May until the night of the 3rd May, there were no untoward incidents in the camp and had not Kaplan died, there would have been no incident on the 4th May.
9. During the affair, the camp commandant was attacked by Jewish nationals without any apparent cause.

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10. The Russian group was moved without casualty to the Carabinieri barracks 250-300 yds. away, from which place it was later taken to Modena.
11. On the 4th May, the Russian group obeyed Major Lewis's instruction and took neither defensive nor offensive action and can be said, therefore, to be free from any blame in the incident.
12. During the affray, Melitzanos, Lewis and Eyston were attacked and manhandled by members of the Jewish group.

ACTION OF MILITARY AND/OR CIVIL AUTHORITIES AFTER THE INCIDENTS

1. The civil authorities, with the exception of the Camp Carabinieri who, it should be noted, are in no way connected with the local Carabinieri H.Q., took no action either before or during either incident. They have made preliminary investigations and questioned the injured (see attached statement). Since the scattering of members of the camp, they ceased all investigations and apparently considered the case closed.
2. The Allied Military authorities quite rightly refused to take any action, stating that it was a matter for the Italian civil authorities.
3. The Italian Military authorities assisted the camp commandant at his own request, on both the 1st and the 4th May. With the restoration of order, their interest in the case terminated.
4. Beyond the constitution of this Court, no subsequent positive action has been taken by anyone to apprehend the killer or killers of either victims of the two affrays.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The affair of the 1st May was primarily due to a difference of political outlook between certain members of two camp groups. It would appear, therefore, that whatever the immediate cause for the riot, the putting of a group of people containing a large element of leftist sympathy in a camp where White Russians and anti-leftists were living, was ill-advised. It is strongly recommended that all precautions should be taken to prevent a possible recurrence of such a situation.
2. It is quite apparent that the Jewish nationals felt justified in using the meeting hall as and when they did, whereas obviously,

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3. The Italian Military authorities assisted the camp commandant at his own request, on both the 1st and the 4th May. With the restoration of order, their interest in the case terminated.
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2. It is quite apparent that the Jewish nationals felt justified in using the meeting hall as and when they did, whereas obviously, no meeting should be permitted, the character of which might lead to friction between groups within the camp. Every effort should be made, therefore, for camp rules, regulations, orders, or instructions to be published in such a way and in such places that there can be no doubt as to the intention of the camp commandant with regard to his camp's administration.
3. Had the incident of the 1st May been reported to the Italian civil authorities, with whom jurisdiction rightly rested, positive action by them would have satisfied the Jewish nationals and would have eliminated the responsibility of camp authorities. It is likely also that the incident of the 4th May would not have occurred. It should be made clear, therefore, to all camp staffs that any civil disturbance in or outside UNRRA camps falls under the jurisdiction of Italian civil authorities and must be immediately reported to them for their action.

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4. Without the entry of Mr. Kaganovic into the matter, the identification parade would not have been held, a misunderstanding would have been avoided and the incident of the 4th May again would probably not have occurred. Mr. Kaganovic's interference in the matter was neither authorised nor solicited and was undoubtedly a major factor in bringing about the tragic events of the 4th May. It is suggested, therefore, that all organisations who are interested, or likely to be interested in camp groups, should be requested to advise their members that only specifically authorised representatives should enter into camp affairs. Camp staffs, on the other hand, should be instructed to refuse to permit any but authorised representatives to take part in any important discussions, and then only with approval from UNRRA Headquarters.
5. It would appear that some of the misunderstandings of the entire period were due to imperfections of language interpretations. The use of interpreters should be limited strictly to people who are equally and highly skilled in the knowledge of both languages which they are interpreting back and forth, and who have no bias towards either party for whom they are interpreting.
6. It should not be assumed that any group of people is so far removed from normal that its every whim must be humoured. A good deal of the mischief of 4th May was caused by the fact that Major Lewis thought that way about the Jewish group and therefore gave way to the unwise advice of Kaganovic.

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APPENDIX "A"

1. LIST OF WITNESSES INTERVIEWED

- a) Lt. Eyston & Major Lewis
- b) Maj. Abate, CO CO.HR. & Questore of Civil Police
- c) Russian Nationals:

MAJSKI, Alexander
KARGIŁAWA, Alescia
LOZINSKI, Fedia
MICHAŁOWSKI, Jaroslav
DOSKUSHANSKI, Georg
MYKOLYSEYN, Michael
TITIA, Alexander
STADNIK, Andrea
LINESKIN, Gregor
IVANOV, Pavle
DIRSCH, Mihail
STASIUK, Aloise
KALIFIN, Leonid
HLADKYI, Wolodymir
BOHKA, Mihail
BESEDIN, Valentino
KULPWCZ, Jean
KIJUFAS, Vladimir
SIVCIK, Vasilje
KLANPO, Vladimir
ZEBOWEY
DZURAJEV
BAGRAZION

- d) Jewish Nationals:

LEVENBERG, Mothe
WASSERNAN, Solman
NEMOND, Pessach
BERGER, Amoled
FRIEDMAN, Schleimet
GOLDEBERG, Menachen
HOLTZMAN, Israel
KLEINMAN, Wolf
PENELMUTTER, Baruch
FISCH, Isaac
VITIS, Heim
RYNOIZIM

- e) Mr. Moses Kaganovic

2. STATISTICS OF WITNESSES

KULPILICZ, Jean
KLJUFAS, Vladimir
SIVCIK, Vasilje
KIANTO, Vladimir
ZEBOEFF
DZURAJEV
BAGRAZION

d) Jewish Nationals:

LEVENBERG, Mothe
WASSERMAN, Solman
NIEMOND, Pessach
BERGER, Amoled
FRIEDMAN, Schleimet
GOLDENBERG, Menachen
HOLTZMAN, Israel
KLEINMAN, Wolf
PENELMUTTER, Baruch
FISCH, Isaac
VITES, Heim
RYNOIZIM

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e) Mr. Moses Kaganovic

2. STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES

(a) Lt. EYSTON - Stated emphatically that he had no anti-Jewish bias. He added that he was neither communist nor anti-communist.

With regard to the incident of 1 May he said that the Jewish nationals had not informed him that they would hold a political meeting on 1 May. He stated that when he entered the meeting hall the wall was draped with two Jewish and one red flag on which was a hammer and sickle. Posters and hammers and sickles were displayed in the room. He told the Jews that the holding of political meeting was contrary to camp rules and ordered them to break up the gathering. The Jews refused to comply with his orders and he proceeded to take the red flag down himself. He did not object to the Jewish flags being left hanging on the walls. Eyston claims that at this stage a Jew tried to swing a plank at him from behind but his Rumanian "batman" prevented him from doing so. The excitement in the room increased and he left the scene to obtain the assistance of the military in restoring

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order. At this stage the two groups charged each other and the fight resulted in several persons being injured, one of whom (Kaplan) later died.

After Kaplan's death the Jewish representatives requested that "justice" be done and for this purpose all Russians be lined up outside the camp in order that a committee of Jews could identify the killer. After some opposition on the part of Lewis this proposal was accepted while the Jewish leaders agreed not to cause any trouble.

On the 4 May while the identification parade was going on, the Jews were greatly excited. Lt. Melitzanos (who was not available for direct questioning) saw a Jew in the act of throwing a hand grenade. He caught his arm but was immediately attacked and manhandled by members of the Jewish group. So was Eyston when he rushed to the aid of Melitzanos. Then Lewis went to the aid of both but was also attacked and beaten.

When 18 Russians were identified as killers of Kaplan, Lewis decided that he would march off the whole Russian group to Modena as obviously all of them could not possibly have directly caused Kaplan's death.

As the Russians were being marched off, the Jews grew more excited and began throwing stones, pushing closer to the Russian group and to the few soldiers who were escorting it. The remainder of the Italian soldiers were posted near the camp gates.

Some of the Jews grew bolder and attempted to remove the weapons from the escort. At this stage, the Germaniers opened fire first in the air and then toward the ground. Eyston denied having given orders to fire and stated that he did not hear anybody issue this order. Finally the Russians reached the safety of the CC.RR. barracks and order was restored. On 4th of May the Russians did exactly what they were told.

(b) Major LEWIS was not at Reggio during the incidents of 1 May. Has no anti-Jewish prejudices and, although not a Communist, is not actively anti-communist. Played a leading role in the dealings which preceded the incidents of 4th May. Confirmed almost to the word Eyston's description of the facts which led up to this incident and of the incident itself, the most important additions to his subordinate's statement are the following:

- The Jews had adequate quarters; even had their own special food prepared in the camp and were positively in no way discriminated against.
- After some hesitation, he finally consented to hold the identification parade promising the Jewish leaders that the guilty man would be punished in accordance with justice. Denied ever having promised to hand the criminal over to the Jews (for "justice") as requested by Kaganovic after the identification had been completed.

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order. At this stage the two groups charged each other and the fight resulted in several persons being injured, one of whom (KAPLAN) later died.

After Kaplan's death the Jewish representatives requested that "justice" be done and for this purpose all Russian be lined up outside the camp in order that a committee of Jews could identify the killer. After some opposition on the part of Lewis this proposal was accepted while the Jewish leaders agreed not to cause any trouble.

On the 4 May while the identification parade was going on, the Jews were greatly excited. Lt. Melitzanos (who was not available for direct questioning) saw a Jew in the act of throwing a hand grenade. He caught his arm but was immediately attacked and manhandled by members of the Jewish group. So was Eyston when he rushed to the aid of Melitzanos. Then Lewis went to the aid of both but was also attacked and beaten.

When 18 Russians were identified as killers of Kaplan, Lewis decided that he would march off the whole Russian group to Modena as obviously all of them could not possibly have directly caused Kaplan's death.

As the Russinas were being marched off, the Jews grew more excited and began throwing stones, pushing closer to the Russian group and to the few soldiers who were escorting it. The remainder of the Italian soldiers were posted near the camp gates.

Some of the Jews grew bolder and attempted to remove the weapons from the escort. At this stage, the Gendarmiers opened fire first in the air and then toward the ground. Eyston denied having given orders to fire and stated that he did not hear anybody issue this order. Finally the Russians reached the safety of the CC.RR. barracks and order was restored. On 4th of May the Russians did exactly what they were told.

(b) Major LEWIS was not at Reggio during the incidents of 1 May. Has no anti-Jewish prejudices and, although not a Communist, is not actively anti-communist. Played a leading role in the dealings which preceeded the incidents of 4th May. Confirmed almost to the word Eyston's description of the facts which led up to this incident and of the incident itself, the most important additions to his subordinate's statement are the following:

- The Jews had adequate quarters; even had their own special food prepared in the camp and were positively in no way discriminated against.
- After some hesitation, he finally consented to hold the identification parade promising the Jewish leaders that the guilty man would be punished in accordance with justice. Denied ever having promised to hand the criminal over to the Jews (for "justice") as requested by Kaganovic after the identification had been completed.

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498

(c) Major ABATE, CO, Carabinieri detachment of Reggio Emilia.

Did not take any part in the discussion. However, he witnessed the latter part of the affray. Based on what he saw and on reports received from his informants, he asserted that the Grenadiers did fire in the air before and even during the demonstration. In order to prove his assertions he showed to the members of the court many bullet holes high up on the walls of a building opposite the Carabinieri barracks.

(d) QUESTORE of Reggio Emilia - Was informed of the incident of 1 May and had all the injured interrogated. Did not make provision for further disorders because he believed it a matter which was being handled by Allied military authorities. Was not notified that identification parade was going to be held in front of camp gates. Knew nothing at all except what he wrote in his report based on the question-

(8)

3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ning of the injured (see Appendix B).

(e) Russians and Ukrainians - All available witnesses (see para (1), sub-para (c)) were questioned at N.2 Refugee Camp, Bologna, on 15 June. The majority of them denied having taken part in the fight which broke out of the camp and claimed they were either sleeping in their quarters or in some other out-of-the-way place far from the scene of the incident.

Comparing the list of witnesses with that of the Russian ring-leaders identified by the Jews, it will be noted that several of the latter were questioned at Bologna. All protested their innocence and especially one KIAMPO, Vladimir (N.16 on the list) a boy of about 17 years of age, stated emphatically that he had been asleep all the time and had learned of the incident only when all was over.

In general it can be stated that the evidence furnished by the Russian group was the exact reverse of that of the Jews, with the only exception that the former admitted that their Group (Russians & Ukrainians) threw stones back at the Jews during the incidents of 1 May.

(f) Jewish nationals - All available witnesses were questioned at Cinecitta' Refugee Camp, Rome, on 18 and 19 June, in the presence of one of their leaders Mr. LEVENBERG who sat in throughout the whole interrogation. (List of names appears in para (1), sub-para (d)).

(i) Incident 1 May - All claim that quarters at Reggio Emilia D.P. camp were inadequate and food worse than any other camp they had been in up to that time. Furthermore, they were discriminated against by both the camp staff and the other groups of refugees from the moment of their arrival.

Only a relatively small group of Jews (approx. 300) attended the meeting of 1 May. They thought that since permission to use the refectory as meeting place had been granted to them a few days before, they could use it on 1 May. They all admit that the meeting in question had some sort of political flavor, as, in fact, the majority of them, whose views were different did not take part in the May Day celebration at all. All state emphatically that throughout the affray of 1 May no Jew threw stones or used other weapons against the Russians. The latter, on the contrary, used all sorts of weapons including knives. Three of witnesses, namely, LEVENBERG, HOMIE, WASSERMAN Salomon and NIELOND Pessach, asserted that they could identify Kaplan's killer. They all described him as a short and stocky man (about 5'6" tall), blond hair, beard and with small moustache.

As for Lt. Eyston's action, the majority of witnesses agreed that, he only took down the red flag which was hanging on the wall. All denied that he was at any time attacked by anybody. The bulk of them stated that the antagonistic group was composed of Russians, but some, (FENELUTTER, Baurch and FISCH, Isaac) admitted there were also Hungarians and Poles mixed in.

(ii) - Incident of 4 May - LEVENBERG, who, after Kaplan's death parti-

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(ii) - Incident of 4 May - LEVENBERG, who, after Kaplan's death participated in the discussions, stated that he understood that Maj. Lewis had promised that all the Russian ring-leaders who were recognized by the Jewish Committee would be immediately arrested.

In fact, all Jews stated that throughout the identification parade, the members of their group were quiet and orderly until Maj. Lewis decided to march off the Russians without separating those accused. The Jewish onlookers, whose number ranged (according to the various witnesses) from 50 to 400 interpreted this move as an attempt on Lewis's part not to keep his promise.

They immediately grew excited and began booing, hissing and cursing at the Russians. They did not, however, take any action, such as stone throwing, but merely followed the Russian column protesting loudly and shouting. At this stage the Italian troops (whose number ranged, according to the various witnesses from 40 to 500) who escorted the Russian column opened fire. None of the witnesses could explain

CONFIDENTIAL (9) 4.

why the Grenadiers fired and emphatically stated that there was not the slightest provocation on the part of the Jewish group.

KAGANOVIC, a member of the Central Jewish Refugee Committee, admitted, however, that stones might have been thrown by some of the Jews although he did not see this take place.

Some of the witnesses claimed that when the Grenadiers opened fire (all agree that the soldiers did not fire in the air first) the Jewish group was 70/80 metres away from them.

FISCH, Isaac and VITES, Heim, who are two of those who were injured by gun fire, while inside the camp, stated that they were shot at by the camp Carabinieri who were firing at the Jews through the gates. They admitted that they wanted to go out of the camp to join their comrades outside, but stated that they did not take any offensive action against the guards, which could justify the latter's fire. They both claim they could identify the Carabinieri who fired at them through the camp gates.

All witnesses agreed that approximately 200/300 rounds were fired on 4 May.

(g) KAGANOVIC Moses - Member of the Central Jewish Refugee Committee. Happened to be at Reggio Emilia on 2 May and was informed by chance of the disturbances which had taken place at the Reggio Emilia refugee camp on 2 May. He contacted the two Jewish leaders, LEVENBERG and WARZAVICZK, and was told by them that it was not necessary for him to contact Lt. Eyston or Maj. Lewis.

(i) Incidents of 1 May - His account of the disturbance of 1 May was based solely on what LEVENBERG and WARZAVICZK told him according to the latter's story. There was a hammer and sickle on the red flag hanging on the wall. Kaganovic played a major role in the discussion with Eyston and Lewis which took place on the morning of 4 May. Lewis assured him he would have those Russian who were responsible for the 1 May incident arrested at Reggio Emilia.

As the Russians were being marched off after the identification parade and the Jews were growing more excited, Kaganovic told Lewis to at least pretend to arrest the guilty Russians. Lewis told would not listen to him. Kaganovic insisted that, had Lewis kept his promise nothing would have happened.

The killer was identified as such by some of the Jews during the parade.

He and Levenberg and Warzaviczck did their best to keep the quiet before, during and after the incident.

1402

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He and Levenberg and Warzaviczok did their best to keep the ~~quiet~~ quiet before, during and after the incident.

3. LIST OF RUSSIAN WHO WERE IDENTIFIED BY THE JEWISH IDENTIFICATION COMMITTEE ON 4 MAY.

<i>Pole.</i>	MAJSKI, Alexander	R. EMILIA
<i>"</i>	LOWENSKI, Pedja	" "
<i>"</i>	ANDREJEV, Mihail	" "
<i>Pole.</i>	TITLA, Alexander	R. EMILIA
<i>Pole.</i>	MICHAILOVSKI, Jaroslav	R. EMILIA
<i>Pole.</i>	STADITZ, Andrea	R. EMILIA
<i>Pole.</i>	NIKOLAICZIK, Michael	R. EMILIA
	IVANOW, Nikolaj	
	ILIESKIN, Grigori	
	PEDUN, Teodor ?	

COPY

PREFETTURA DI LECCE

PS Division n. 04741

27 JAN 1947
us.

12.12.1946.

20A

SUBJECT : Aliens refugee camps in the province of Lecce.

TO : Ministry of the Interior
PS General Direction.

19A

With reference to my n. 04741 of the 5th inst. and to better illustrate the reported situation, I communicate that, from ascertations made by the local Questura and CC.RR. of the province, it has appeared that lately there have been and are, almost daily, noticeable immigrations of Hebrew refugees into this province, even coming from the faraway concentration camps of Austria, many of these affirm having entered Italy clandestinely so as to escape from the endurances which they were subject to in said camps, and having entered this province being called for by other Jews residing here.

These refugees - who escape from all control and vigilance of the provincial bodies of UNRRA, from which they are sometimes not assisted - practise great commercail activities in the various markets of the province, where they buy and sell or exchange all sorts of goods, making grand profits, but causing the rarefaction of goods and noticeable increase in prices, to the damage of the local population.

Not all of them find lodgings, and as long as one is found, they offer exorbitant prices, thus altering the local market.

The majority are inclined to the receiving of stolen goods and to the contraband of tobacco and foreign exchange, contraband which they practise in Bari, Naples, Rome and Milan, where they go to with great facility and frequency because, as mentioned above, they are not subject to any control.

Recently, in 'Mardo', a criminal association has been discovered, inclined to the theft of tobacco systematically stolen by Jews of the S. Maria al Bagno camp, not yet identified.

It is the possibility of such illicit and very profitable tradings that causes a migratory current of Hebrew elements to the Salentino area, favoured by the presence of refugee camps in this province.

Incalculable damages have been caused by these refugees in the various camps where a number of villas and small rural houses, at one time requisitioned by the Allied Military Command, for the accommodation of those arrived first, have been deteriorated and greatly destroyed.

During the summer, the beaches have been monopolized by Jews to the great damage of the small local tourist industry, which, during said season, gathered lots of holiday-makers from the various communes of the province.

Nevertheless, the concurrent economical restrictions of this population, greatly increases the growing aversion towards Jews, considered by all as smugglers, usurers and speculators; thus it is the desire of everyone that they leave the province. This, as I have already more than once mentioned before, is deemed indispensable and urgent.

This is the ascertained situation which now rouses great anxiety, owing to the reports made by the Provincial Head Group of said camps, who has already asked for assurance on the requested strengthening of the CC.RR. stations with jurisdiction over the four camps existing in this province and the

5021

-2-

constitution of an efficient reserve of CO.RR., asking moreover for the numerical strength respectively suggested.

Attached herewith, for information, is a copy of the letter sent to me by the local UICRA dated 5th inst. which (in spite of the hasteners already received) I take reservations in giving a concrete answer as soon as I hear of the decisions which your Ministry will deem necessary to adopt concerning the request for such re-inforcements in this province.

The Prefect

Translation ac/

502

Chief Commissioner.

This matter relates to some incidents which took place in May this year in a DP Camp at REGGIO EMILIA when it was under UNRRA control.

On 10 June this year the Chief of UNRRA appointed a Board of Inquiry of three members to inquire into these incidents.

On 4 September AFHQ instructed that a copy of the report made by the Board of Inquiry should be passed to the Italian Government.

On 22 October 46 the Italian Government reported that they could not take any action as the camp was under the administration of the Allied authorities. AFHQ were informed and on 15 November wrote that this matter was to be regarded as closed.

The camp was one of those which UNRRA took over and then handed back to Displaced Persons, A.C.

The enclosed letter is submitted for signature in reply to enquiry received at Folio 14A.

27 December 1946.

M. Garr

M. GARR,
Brigadier.
Exec. Comm.

L.P. Win.

Re 16 para 2. passed to you please for

any action you may deem necessary

F. C. Green
H. C. Green
H. C. Green

30. XII. 46

The enclosed letter is submitted for signature in reply to
enquiry received at Folio 14A.

27 December 1946.

M. G. Cair
M. CAIR,
Brigadier.
Exec. Comm.

D. P. Dim.

Re 16^a para 2. passed to you please for
any action you may deem necessary.

F. C. Cair
M. Cair, P.O. P. Cair
(Signature)

30. XII. 46

502, 1946

Min. 4

To : Ex. Commissioner,

20 Nov. 46.

Please see 13A.

I have also spoken with Dott. Ferrari on this matter.
He fully appreciates the position.

Tel. Ext. 446.

5-

nl
23/11
E. J. Byrne
Colonel
Director P.S. Div.

Free.
~~L.S. to Chief Commissioner~~

I attach draft letter for consideration
and Chief Commissioner's signature, as requested

R. L. Green
L. G. E.
for D. P. D. D.
11/12

17. 211. 46

DEC 17 1946

6-

P. Safety Div.

Please prepare for signature in
accordance with amended draft outline.

L. W. Hand. Smith.
L. Col.

21/12

I

17. XII 46

6.

P. Safety Dir.

Please prepare for signature in accordance with amended draft offsite.
L.W. Woodworth
Lt. Col.
21/12

I

See Commissioner.

~~See~~ Attached letter for signature by Chief
Commissioner please
L. Green 5020
U. C.

23 XII 46

21/12
H. 7/12 for 9/10. P. Dir.

for D. P. Dir.

1408

Ex Comm.

Thru D.P. Lion. Please see 92.

A concentration Police drive has been under way for some time in India due to the deterioration of public order. The District Council of P.S. feels strongly that the inmates of the D.P. Camps in the area are one of the causes of the trouble. Has anything been done to remove the cause for complaints please?

8-11-46.

E. J. Dyer Stone.

2.

Ex Comm.

Please see 10th 13 in reply to 92. If you approve I will inform both Zaman on the lines of 102. under independent cover as per letter at 92 would appear to be semi official.

the cause for complaints please?

EJF Eye Colonel

8.11.46.

2.

Ex Comm.

Please see 10a, B in reply to 9a. If
you approve I will inform both Ferrarini
on the lines of 10c. under confidential
even as he has been as 9a would appear
to be semi official.

EJF Eye Colonel

18.11.46.

2.

Director, Public Safety Division.

5023

11/11

We should certainly inform Dr. Ferrari generally on the action we have taken to deal with the situation outlined in his letter at 9a. There is one comment I have to make on 10b and that is that I cannot see how under para 2 (iv) the Italian authorities can prosecute breaches of curfew regulations. I asked my CSO to discuss this matter with Disper Division and you should contact him before passing on any such information to Dr. Ferrari.

McLambey

M. CAER,
Brigadier,
Exec. Comm.

19 Nov 46.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Division
APO 794

AC/14389/PS

28 January 1947

SUBJECT : Displaced Persons Camps.

TO : UNRRA, Italy Mission.

1. It will be recalled that in the displaced camp of Reggio Emilia there were certain grave disorders during last year.
 2. As a result of these and other disturbances the Italian Government approached this Commission and asked that measures be taken to improve discipline and supervision in displaced persons camps. The Displaced Persons Sub-Commission accordingly drew up a schedule of regulations to be enforced in D.P. camps under the control of the Sub-Commission.
 3. The measures taken were reported to the Italian Government who now ask that the regulations should be made applicable to U.N.R.R.A. camps.
 4. It would be appreciated if you would please consider the matter and if you would kindly address any observations you care to make to this Commission in order that a reply may be sent to the Italian Government.
 5. Attached for your information is a copy of the regulations referred to above.
- FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,

502*

FGG/ae

E. J. BYE, Colonel
Director.1 encl. N. DP/3-2/ADM dated Nov.46.

785016

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

21A

27 JAN 1947
US

2 January 1947

19A 20A

Dear Colonel,

I am confidentially forwarding to you copies of two reports from the Prefect of Lecce on the serious situation determined in that province on account of the continuous afflux of refugees to the camps administered by UNRRA, who, dedicating themselves to the most varied forms of illicit commerce and criminal actions, are a permanent danger to security and public order.


Falling back on our previous conversations on the subject, I wish to once more call your kind attention on the necessity of arranging also for those interned in UNRRA Camps, similar dispositions as those issued to Allied Camps, in order to assure a certain amount of discipline amongst the refugees.

/s/ Ferrari.

Colonel E.J. BYE
Director Public Safety Division.

Translation ac/

5023



Roma, lì 2 Gennaio 1946

Ministero dell'Interno
IL CAPO DELLA POLIZIA

Caro Colonnello,

Le rimetto, in via confidenziale, copia di due rapporti del Prefetto di Lecce circa la grave situazione determinatasi in quella Provincia a causa del continuo affluire nei campi amministrati dall'UNRRA colà esistenti, di profughi stranieri i quali, dedicandosi alle più svariate forme di commerci illeciti e ad azioni delittuose, costituiscono un permanente pericolo per la sicurezza e l'ordine pubblico.

Riportandomi ai precedenti colloqui sulla questione, desidero richiamare ancora la sua cortese attenzione sulla opportunità di fissare anche per gli internati nei Campi UNRRA disposizioni analoghe a quelle concordate per i Campi Alleati, al fine di assicurare una certa disciplina tra i profughi.

Cordialmente

Sig. Colonnello B Y E
Capo della S. Commissione
per la P.S.

ROMA

5022

785016

COPIA

PREFETTURA DI LECCE

Divisione F.S. n. 04741 Prot.

Lecce, li 12.12.1946

OGGETTO: Campi profughi stranieri in provincia di Lecce.

On. MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO
Direzione Generale della F.S.

ROMA

RISERVATA=URGENTISSIMA=RACCOMANDATA

Con riferimento a mia nota n. 04741 del 5.12. andante, e ad illustrare meglio la situazione segnalata, comunico che, da accertamenti praticati dalla locale Questura e dall'Arma della provincia, è risultato che in questi ultimi mesi si sono verificate, e si verificano quasi giornalmente, notevoli immigrazioni in questa provincia di ebrei profughi, provenienti persino dai lontani campi di concentramento dell'Austria, molti dei quali asseriscono di essere entrati clandestinamente in Italia per sfuggire alle sofferenze cui erano assoggettati nei detti campi, e di essere venuti in questa provincia perchè chini nativi da altri ebrei già qui residenti.

Detti profughi - che sfuggono ad ogni controllo e vigilanza degli organi provinciali dell'U.P.R.A., e che da questa non sono talvolta assistiti - svolgono intensa attività commerciale nei vari mercati della provincia, dove comprano e vendono, o barattano, merci di ogni genere, ricavandone sensibili guadagni, ma causando rarefazione di generi e notevole rialzo di prezzi, a danno della popolazione locale.

Non tutti trovano alloggio, e pur di averne uno qualsiasi offrono prezzi esorbitanti, alterando, quindi, il mercato locale.

In massima parte essi sono dediti alla ricettazione ed al contrabbando di tabacco e di valuta estera; contrabbando che esercitano anche nei mercati di Bari, Napoli, Roma e Milano, città verso le quali si spostano facilmente e frequentemente perchè, come sopra detto, non sottoposti ad alcun controllo.

... ..

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E' di recente la scoperta, a Vardò, di una associazione a delinquere di pregiudicati del luogo, dediti ai furti di tabacco che andava sistematicamente ricettato da elementi ebrei del campo di S. Maria al Bagno, non ancora potuti identificare.

E' la possibilità di tali illeciti e molto lucrosi traffici che ⁵⁰¹aveva una corrente migratoria di elementi ebrei nel Salentino, favorita dalla presenza dei campi di profughi in questa provincia.

Danni incalcolabili sono stati causati da detti profughi nei vari campi dove numerose ville e casette rurali, a suo tempo requisiti dal Comando Militare Alleato, per dare alloggio ai primi arrivati, sono state deteriorate ed in buona parte distrutte, nei mobili, negli ingressi e nei muri con vandalismo spietato ed ingiustificato.

Nella stagione estiva le spiagge prossime ai laghi di loro finora sono state monopolizzate dagli ebrei, con un grave nocumento alla piccola industria turistico-alberghiera locale, che vedeva affluire in tale occasione numerosi bagnanti dai vari comuni della provincia, date le istituzioni di mezzi celeri di trasporto.

:/:

Il concomitante disagio economico di queste popolazioni, intanto, acquisisce sempre più la crescente avversione verso gli ebrei, considerati tutti come contrabbandieri, usurai, speculatori a causa prima delle difficoltà di vita locali; ond'è che da tutti si desidera il loro allontanamento da questa provincia.

Allontanamento che anche da parte mia, come ho già più volte segnalato, viene ritenuto indispensabile ed urgente.

Questa la situazione accertata; che desta ora maggiore preoccupazione a seguito delle segnalazioni fatte dal Capo Gruppo Provinciale dei detti campi, il quale ha già sollecitata assiduamente di recente la mia richiesta di rinforzo delle stazioni dell'arma avariata giurisdizione sui quattro campi esistenti in questa provincia e la costituzione di una efficiente riserva di Carabinieri in questo Capoluogo, e mi ha chiesta la forza umana che mi spettivamente propositi.

A questo riguardo al ligo, per opportuna consulenza, un esemplare della lettera a me inviata dall'UNRA locale il 5 aprile, a cui (malgrado i solleciti già avuti) mi riservo di dare risposta concreta, appena mi saranno rese note le determinazioni che codesto Ministero o ruderà opportuno di adottare in merito alla richiesta di tale rinforzi, in questa provincia ed in questo Capoluogo.

IL PREFETTO

f/to.....

OTHER

 $\dots\dots\dots 0.7/T$

5010

COPIA

PREFETTURA DI LECCE

Divisione P.S. n. 04741 Prot.

Lecce, li 5.12.1946

Oggetto: Campi profughi stranieri in provincia di Lecce.

AL MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO

Direzione Generale di P.S.

AL CABINETTO DEL MINISTRO

R O M A

In questa provincia esistono quattro campi di raccolta profughi stranieri, ebrei, gestiti e diretti dall'UNRA, e così indicati: S. Maria di Leuca, con 1150 profughi; Tricase (porto) con 640 profughi; S. Maria al Bagno, con 1800 profughi; S. Sotirava Terme, con 930 profughi.

Tutti campi, pur avendo tale denominazione, non possono considerarsi tali perchè, oltre a non essere recintati, e quindi senza sentinelle e senza alcuna vigilanza, non sono assoggettati ad alcun effettivo controllo da parte delle direzioni, giacchè i profughi vivono alloggiati in case private del centro abitato e nelle ville adiacenti.

Ne consegue che ogni accertamento, sia generico che specifico, che le autorità italiane fanno avuto, talvolta, bisogno di svolgere nei medesimi è sempre rimasto infruttuoso, poichè gli stessi loro dirigenti non hanno potuto fornire notizie esatte nemmeno sulla presenza o meno dei singoli profughi.

La massa di detti ebrei vive quasi esclusivamente di "mercato nero" che viene esercitato tra le popolazioni del luogo, e specula sull'assistenza che prodiga l'UNRA, rivendendo anche indumenti od altro da questa arrivati in distribuzione. Fa la spola, indisturbata, fra questa provincia ed altro territorio della Repubblica costituendo, così, un piccolo permanente sotto tutti i riguardi.

Però, intanto, si è presentato al locale questore il Capo Gruppo provinciale dei predetti campi, il quale, nell'informare che questi quattro prima saranno gradualmente sciolti e i profughi che ne fanno parte inviati in altri campi della provincia, prima, e poi in quelli esistenti in diverse regioni d'Italia, ha fatto presente che, a quanto li risulta, ridiene prima una sommossa di detti profughi, ma perchè ciò farebbe parte del movimento ebraico contro l'Inghilterra, sia perchè la notizia della chiusura

COPIA

PREFETTURA DI LECCE

Divisione P.S. n. 04741 Prot.

Lecco, li 5.12.1946

OCCORRENZA: Campi profughi stranieri in provincia di Lecce.

AL MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO
Direzione Generale di P.S.
AL CABINETTO DEL MINISTRO

R O M A

In questa provincia esistono quattro campi di raccolta profughi stranieri, ebrei, gentili e diretti dall'UNRRA, così ubicati: S. Maria di Leuca, con 1150 profughi; Tricase (porto) con 640 profughi; S. Maria al Bagno, con 1800 profughi; S. Sossano Terme, con 930 profughi.

Detti campi, pur avendo tale denominazione, non possono considerarsi tali in realtà, oltre a non essere recintati, e quindi senza sentinelle e senza alcuna vigilanza, non sono assoggettati ad alcun effettivo controllo da parte delle direzioni, giacché i profughi vivono e alloggiavano in case private del centro abitato e nelle ville adiacenti.

Ne consegue che ogni accertamento, sia generico che specifico, che le Autorità Italiane hanno avuto, talvolta, bisogno di svolgere nei suddetti è sempre rimasto infruttuoso, poiché gli stessi loro dirigenti non hanno potuto fornire notizie esatte nemmeno sulla presenza o meno dei singoli profughi.

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Ne consegue che ogni accertamento, sia generico che specifico, che le autorità italiane siano state, talvolta, bisogne di svolgere nei confronti è sempre rimasto infruttuoso, poiché gli stessi loro dirigenti non hanno potuto fornire notizie esatte nemmeno sulla presenza o meno dei singoli profughi.

La massa di detti ebrei vive quasi esclusivamente di "mercato nero", che viene esercitato tra le popolazioni del luogo, e spaccia sull'assistenza che prodiga l'UNRRA, rivendendo anche indumenti ed altro da questa arrivati in distribuzione. Fa la spola, indisturbata, fra questa provincia ed altro territorio della Repubblica; costui, un piccolo permanente sotto tutti i riguardi.

Ieri, intento, si è presentato al locale Questore il Capo Gruppo provinciale dei predetti campi, il quale, nell'informare che questi quattro prima saranno gradualmente sciolti e i profughi che ne fanno parte inviati in altri campi della provincia, prima, e poi in quelli esistenti in diverse regioni d'Italia, ha fatto presente che, a quanto gli risulta, ritiene prima una sommosa di detti profughi, ma perché ciò farebbe parte del movimento ebraico contro l'Inghilterra, sia perché la notizia della chiusura dei campi, ~~assolutamente~~ non sarà certamente bene appresa dagli interessati.

A dimostrare la fondatezza delle sue previsioni detto Capo Gruppo ha fatto noto che un segno premonitore si è avuto già il 1° andata, alle ore 10, quando come alla stessa ora è avvenuto in molti altri campi del genere è stata issata da ignoti, sulla palazzina delle singole direzioni dei predetti campi, la bandiera dell'organizzazione terroristica ebraica in lotta per la Palestina.

Detto Capo Gruppo, pertanto, ha chiesto che, in previsione di quanto potrà accadere da un momento all'altro, siano subito efficientemente rinforzati le stazioni dei Carabinieri aventi giurisdizione sulle località ove sono siti i sopradetti campi, e sia, altresì, costituita con ogni urgenza in Lecce una congrua, efficiente riserva, pronta ad accorrere là dove tale imminente sommosa si dovesse prima effettuare.

11/11

- 2 -

Analoga richiesta sarà fatta a codesto Ministero direttamente dalla Sede Centrale del 1° UMRRA.

Quanto sopra comunicato a codesto Ministero per opportuna notizia, con preghiera di voler esaminare se - come sembra opportuno a questo Ufficio - si debba aderire alla richiesta.

E' bene, intanto, tener presente che, come ripetute volte è stato riferito a codesto Ministero, tutti i comandi di Stato in questa provincia hanno un organico insufficiente anche per i ~~minimi~~ ^{normali} servizi d'istituto, e, d'altra parte, per vari motivi, quali il fenomeno della disoccupazione, il disagio economico, l'intolleranza esistente fra gli appartenenti ai vari partiti, non è possibile distogliere alcun elemento per rinforzare le stazioni interessate, nè, tanto meno, costituire un nucleo di riserva a Lecce, giacchè non si avrebbe alcuna disponibilità di personale da impiegarvi.

Nel caso, quindi, si dovesse aderire alla richiesta, si prega impartire le necessarie disposizioni a chi di competenza, perchè, con la massima sollecitudine e senza distogliere le normali esigenze forse di polizia già in servizio in questa provincia, siano rinforzate efficientemente le stazioni dei Carabinieri di Galliano del Capo, Tricase, Mardò e Poggiardo e sia fatto affluire a Lecce un nucleo di almeno cento carabinieri, da tenere come riserva, in caso di bisogno, sino a che tutte le operazioni di sgombero dei predetti campi siano state portate a termine.

IL PREFETTO

P/ro

5014

1422

785016

18A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Division
APD 794

AC/14602/7/PS

30 December 1946

SUBJECT : 'U' P.W. Camp at Eboli, Salerno.

TO : G-5, A.F.H.Q.

1. A letter has been received at this Division from the Ministry of Interior which raises, inter alia, a question regarding the U. (Overseas) PW Camp at Eboli, Salerno.

2. The Ministry ask to be informed under what conditions the internees are finally released from the camp. They state that the number of occupants of the camp has greatly diminished during the last few months and the Italian Authorities are worried that Jugo-Slavs are being allowed to leave the camp and to remain elsewhere in Italy without the consent of the Italian Government being obtained, in the same manner as is obligatory for members of the Allied Forces who wish to stay in Italy.

3. May I be informed please of the procedure adopted in order to reply to the Ministry.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,

FSG/ao

E. J. BYN, Colonel
Director.

5013

COPY: AC/14389/PS

Rg.

REPUBBLICA ITALIANA

Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri

UFFICIO SERVIZIO E SITUAZIONE

N. 1056/2 di prot.

Roma, li 23 dicembre 1946

Risposta al

del

Allegati n.

OGGETTO: Eboli (Salerno) - Ferimento grave di un sottufficiale dell'Arma ad opera di jugoslavi.

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA
Sottocommissione per la P.S.

R O M A

In Eboli (Salerno), verso le ore 20 del 26 corrente, quattro militari jugoslavi tutti manifestamente ubbriachi, appartenenti al locale campo di concentramento, recatisi davanti la locale Caserma dei Carabinieri, spararono in aria quattro colpi di pistola.

Invitati ad allontanarsi da un carabiniere, si appostarono in vicino angolo della strada insieme con altri quattro connazionali armati, sopraggiunti nel frattempo.

Il brigadiere PASSARIELLO Raffaele, comandante la stazione e altri 6 militari dipendenti, in provinto di avvicinarsi al gruppo, per indurre gli jugoslavi a desistere dal loro atteggiamento minaccioso, furono fatti segno a numerosi colpi di arma da fuoco.

I militari dell'Arma reagirono, onde un conflitto a fuoco durato alcuni minuti.

Rimase gravemente ferito il brigadiere PASSARIELLO che fu subito ricoverato all'ospedale di Salerno. Degli jugoslavi uno gravemente e due probabilmente feriti.

La polizia militare inglese, intervenuta poco dopo, arrestò il principale responsabile

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Rimase gravemente ferito il brigadiere PASSARIELLO che fu subito ricoverato all'ospedale di Salerno.- Degli jugoslavi uno gravemente e due probabilmente feriti.-

La polizia militare inglese, intervenuta poco dopo, arrestò il principale responsabile nella persona di DUSAN Vidio - divisione Drin Shi Fuk -.-

La popolazione locale, appreso il fatto, improvvisò una pubblica dimostrazione di protesta contro gli jugoslavi.-

IL COMANDANTE GENERALE

- Brunetto Brunetti -

501-

785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 794
DISPLACED PERSONS DIVISION

DPR/3-2/ADM

Tel. 489081 Ext 414


6 January 1947

SUBJECT : Discipline - DP's.

TO : Distribution.

1. Further to this H.Q. letter DPR/3-2/ADM dated 15 November 1946, forwarded herewith is copy of letter even number and date, for information and action as deemed necessary.

For the Director:



B. WOODCOCK
Major
O. i/c ADM.

Maj.

DISTRIBUTION:

List "B", less 2 copies to
B.Q. Central Italy D.P. Group.

Copies to : Executive Commissioner, A.C.
Public Safety Division (3).

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17B

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 794
DISPLACED PERSONS DIVISION

DPR/3-2/ADM

Tel. 439031 Ext 414

6 January 1947

SUBJECT : Discipline - DP's.

TO : H.Q. Central Italy Group, D.P. Division.

1. Reference our DPR/3-2/ADM of 15 November 1946 para 2 (i). It has been pointed out by the Ministry of Interior that the curfew should commence prior to 2000 hrs in view of the fact that it is now dark long before that hour.

2. Therefore please make the following amendment : -

Para 2 (i) First sentence to read "A curfew will be imposed on all Camp inmates from dusk till 0700 hrs daily according to the season. Camp Commandants will arrange and adjust this hour of commencement in conjunction with the local Questura".

See 10⁶

For the Director:

B. Woodcock

B. WOODCOCK
Major
O. i/c ADM.

Maj

Copies to : Executive Commissioner,
A.C.
Public Safety Division (3).

501²

785016

16^AMINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
Head of Police

17 DEC 1946

14389

11 December 1946.

Dear Colonel,

13^A — in thanking you for the kind communication of your letter AC/14389/PS dated 19/11/1946, I wish to again call your particular attention on the question concerning the Camp of Reggio Emilia, so that you may bear in mind, at the first most suitable occasion, the possibility of the transfer to another region.

11^A — I have taken note of the dispositions issued by the Allied Authorities to practise a greater discipline over the internees at the camp, but I wish to submit to you the necessity that these dispositions be extended, according to what I had the opportunity of prospecting to you in letter n. 443/67785 of the 9.11.1946, on the well known incidents which took place at Fermo, and in other camps, having you moreover notice that the hour for the commencement of the 'curfew' does not offer, owing to the season, the desired security, as cases of crime committed already before 20.00 hrs are not infrequent.

I therefore kindly ask you to inform me under what criterions the internees of the Camp of S. Giovanni di Eboli are dismissed, the number of which, apparently, has greatly decreased during these last few months. The Italian Authorities are in fact worried over the possibility that the Yugoslavs are being dismissed from the camp, thus remaining in Italy, without prior interpellation to the Italian Government - as is done for those of the Anglo-American Armed Forces.

In thanking you for your courteous authoritative interest in the matter,

I am yours sincerely

/s/ Luigi Ferrari.

Translation ac/

500

Copy on 14602/7

MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO
IL CAPO DELLA POLIZIA

Roma, li 11 dicembre 1946

Caro Colonnello,

mentre La ringrazio della cortese comunicazione, di cui alla lettera del 19.11. scorso n. AC/14339/P.S., desidero richiamare nuovamente la Sua particolare attenzione sulla questione relativa al Campo di Reggio Emilia, perchè Ella voglia tener presente alla prima favorevole occasione la possibilità del trasferimento in altra regione.

Ho preso conoscenza delle disposizioni impartite dalle Autorità Alleate per una maggiore disciplina degli internati nel campo, ma desidero sottoporle la opportunità che le disposizioni stesse vengano estese, in conformità di quanto ebbi occasione di prospettare con nota n. 443/67785 del 9.11.u.s. a proposito dei noti incidenti verificatisi a Fermo, a tutti gli altri campi, facendole inoltre rilevare che l'ora per l'inizio del "coprifuoco" non offre, data la stagione, le garanzie che si desidera ottenere non essendo infrequenti i casi di reati compiuti già prima delle 20.

Con l'occasione La prego di volermi cortesemente comunicare con quali criteri vengono dimessi gli internati del Campo di S. Giovanni di Eboli, il cui numero, a quanto risulta, è diminuito sensibilmente in questi ultimi mesi. Le Autorità Italiane sono infatti preoccupate per la possibilità che gli jugoslavi vengano dimessi dal campo

senza che il Governo italiano sia stato

1429

Campo di Reggio Emilia, perchè Ella voglia tener presente alla prima favorevole occasione la possibilità del trasferimento in altra regione.

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./.

Sig. Colonnello E.J. BYE
Capo della S. Commissione per la P.S.

R O M A

5003

preventivamente interpellato - come viene fatto per gli stessi appartenenti alle F.A. Anglo-Americane.

Nel ringraziarla per il Suo cortese autorevole interessamento a queste questioni Le porgo i miei cordiali saluti

grazie

Disiderio

785016

AG/4589/PS

18 December 1946.

My dear Mr. Lustig,

I refer to your letter ref. 0648 dated 6th December 1946 regarding incidents in Reggio Emilia Camp and have to inform you as follows.

The findings of the Court of Inquiry were forwarded by U.N.R.R.A. to Allied Force Headquarters for consideration and instructions. A copy of the Proceedings was sent to the Italian Government - Ministry of the Interior on the 23rd September and a reply was received from the Ministry dated 22 October to the effect that no action could now be taken by them as the camp is under the administration of Allied authorities.

This decision of the Ministry was communicated by this Commission to Allied Force Headquarters who informed U.N.R.R.A. on 15 November 1946 that the matter should be regarded as closed. This Commission has no authority in this matter since the incident occurred in a Camp not at the time under its jurisdiction.

Very sincerely yours,

1st Deputy W. Stone

HILARY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Mr. E. Lustig,
Deputy Chairman,
Comitato Centrale Organizzazione
dei Profughi in Italia,
Rome.

5007

785016

D R A F T

AC/11389/PS

17 December 1946

My dear Mr. Lustig,

1. I refer to your letter Ref. 0618 dated 6th December 1946 regarding incidents in Reggio Emilia Camp and have to inform you as follows.
2. The findings of the Court of Inquiry were forwarded by U.M.R.R.A. to Allied Force Headquarters for consideration and instructions. A copy of the Proceedings was sent to the Italian Government - Ministry of the Interior on the 23rd September and a reply was received from the Ministry dated 22 October to the effect that no action could now be taken by them as the camp is under the administration of Allied authorities.
3. This decision of the Ministry was communicated by this Commission to Allied Force Headquarters who consider that the matter can now be regarded as closed. This Commission has no authority in this matter since the incident occurred in a Camp not at the time under its jurisdiction.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Mr. E. Lustig,
Deputy Chairman,
Comitato Centrale Organizzazione
dei Profughi Ebrei in Italia,
Rome.

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785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 794

DRAFT

AC/14389/PS

Re - draft

December 1946

My dear Mr. Luffig,

1. I refer to your letter Ref. 0518 dated 6th December 1946 regarding incidents in Reggio Emilia Camp and have to inform you as follows.

2. The findings of the Court of Inquiry were forwarded by U.N.R.R.A. to Allied Force Headquarters for consideration and instructions. ✓

~~3. As a result Allied Force Headquarters communicated with this Commission ordering that a copy of the report should be passed to the Italian Government for such action as they deemed appropriate. I would point out that this ^{was} entirely an Italian Government matter as Reggio Emilia ^{was} at the time of the disturbances entirely under Italian Government control.~~

*If so
Why did
UNRRA
hold it?*

500~

Proceeding

A copy of the ~~report~~ was ~~sent~~ ^{sent}

sent to the Italian Government - Ministry of the Interior

on the 23rd September and a reply was received from the Ministry dated 22 October to the effect that no action could ^{now} be taken by them as the camp is under the administration of Allied authorities.

3. 8.

This decision of the Ministry was communicated to Allied Force Headquarters ~~from~~ by

this Commission, ↓ who consider that

the matter can now be regarded as closed.

The Commission has no authority in the matter.

Very Sincerely Yours
 Since the incident occurred in a Camp ~~not~~
 at the time under its jurisdiction

ELLERY W. STONE
 Rear Admiral USNR
 Chief Commissioner.

785016

10 December 1946

My dear Mr. Lustig:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of 6 December concerning the Reggio Emilia camp incident. As soon as details are available on the status of this case I shall forward them to you without delay.

Very sincerely yours,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Mr. E. Lustig,
Deputy Chairman,
Comitato Centrale Organizzazione
dei Profughi Ebrei in Italia,
Rome.

5003

785016

ORGANIZZAZIONE
DEI PROFUGHI EBREI IN ITALIA
COMITATO CENTRALE



מנהל
הפליטים באיטליה
המרכז

Roma, December 6, 1946

NED

Ref. 0618

To : Mr. ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

From : Organization of Jewish
Refugees in Italy
Central Committee.
R o m e .

Subject : Reggio Emilia Camp Incident.

Dear Sir,

We wish to draw your kind attention to the regrettable bloody incidents in Reggio Emilia.

We have been advised by AJDC Director, Mr. Trobe, that all findings of the Court of Inquiry were handed over for action to you as an authority competent to deal with it.

We shall be pleased to receive from you soon further details on the status of this case.

Truly yours

ORGANIZATION OF JEWISH
REFUGEES IN ITALY
Central Committee.

/ E. Lustig /
Deputy Chairman

5002

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Division
APO 794

13a

AC/11339/RS

19 November 1946.

SUBJECT : Displaced Persons Camps.
TO : Ministry of the Interior
Director General of P.S.

Reference is made to your letter of the 4th November in which you raise the question of the possibility of transferring the Displaced Persons Camp in Reggio Emilia to another locality on account of the unsettled conditions of public order in that area.

The matter has been taken up with the Displaced Persons Division, Allied Commission, but for administrative and accommodation reasons it is not possible to move the camp. However with a view to assisting the Italian Authorities in the maintenance of public order the following action is being taken forthwith.

a. A curfew is being imposed on all camp inmates from 20.00 hrs to 07.00 hrs daily. Where it is possible for anyone to be out of camp during curfew hours passes will be issued by the Camp Commandant and disciplinary action will be taken against persons who violate this order.

b. Action will be taken to ascertain whether any of the inmates are concerned in Black Market dealings and if evidence is obtained the persons concerned will be handed over to the Italian Authorities if desired by them.

c. Periodical searches for arms will be carried out and if necessary with the assistance of the Italian Authorities.

d. Notices will be displayed warning all inmates that anyone contravening the Italian Penal Code will be handed over to the Italian Authorities for prosecution and deportation from Italy as undesirable Aliens.

e. Camp Commandants are being instructed to render all possible assistance to the local Questura for the apprehension of persons within the Camps reasonably suspected of committing offences.

Camp Commandants will, at all times, co-operate as closely as possible with the Italian Authorities, and it is hoped that by the enforcement of the foregoing, the situation will be materially improved.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EJB/ac

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E.J. HYE Colonel
Director.

13548

P. SAFETY

12A

G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 254

14389
15 NOV 1946

15 November 1946.

SUBJECT: Disturbances in DP Camp - REGGIO EMILIA
TO : UNRRA - Italy Mission
(Attn: Chief of Mission)

Reference your letter dated 28 August 46, subject as above.

1. A copy of the report of the Court of Enquiry into the disturbances which took place in the DP Camp - REGGIO EMILIA - was sent to the Italian Government.

2. A reply has now been received in which it is stated that the Italian authorities do not propose to take any action as the Camp is under the administration of the Allied authorities.

3. The matter can, therefore, be regarded as closed.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE:

James Notestein
JAMES NOTESTEIN

Colonel, G. S. C.

For: A. L. HAMBLIN

Colonel, G. S. C.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Copy to: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission,
(Attn: Public Safety Division).

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785016

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
PS Direction General

18 NOV 1946
14389
US

9 November 1946

N. 123/67785

SUBJECT: Incidents at Fermo between Aliens and Italian civilians.

TO : Public Safety S/C A.C.
Displaced Persons S/C U.N.R.R.A. - Rome.

Owing to the frequent repeating of incidents caused by Croatian subjects interned in the Fermo Gathering Centre, the Prefect of Ancoli Piceno and the Camp Comdt have agreed on a few provisions which this Ministry considers apt to put a certain amount of discipline and to somehow assure order and security in that area.

The dispositions issued on agreement with the Allied and Italian authorities can therefore be recapitulated as follows:


1. Croatian refugees may only leave the camp between 7 and 17 hrs each day and will not go beyond 4 kms of the camp, being prohibited to enter the inhabited part of Fermo.
2. To go beyond the determined limit or to go into Fermo, the Croatian refugees must have a written permit signed by the Camp Comdt. who will issue it when really utterly necessary and to those elements who can really be relied upon with regards to behaviour.
3. Those Croatian refugees who are found outside the camp when they should not be or beyond the 4 km limit or in Fermo, without the written permit of the English Camp Comdt. will be stopped and accompanied to the camp for the Comdt's decisions.
4. All the Croatians who do not appear to belong to the a/m camp and those which the comdt refuses to gather in the camp, will have to be accompanied to the PS Commissariato of Fermo for competent action.
5. Upon agreements to be made with the Camp Comdt. the OC.PS. will provide in collaboration with said commandant, in effecting a thorough search over the camp.

This Ministry calls the attention of the Allied Command and UNRRA on the a/m directives and kindly asks you to examine the possibility of issuing similar dispositions to the Commandants of other camps in Italian territory because it thinks that provisions of a general order which clearly and equally discipline the behaviour of the Aliens deported to Italy, could usefully effect order and security, putting the Italian authorities in conditions to assure a more efficacious control over the not always licit activity which they carry out in our country.

We thank you, wishing to be informed of the decisions which you may deem necessary to adopt on the matter.

For the Minister
/s/ Ferrari

499



Le

Ministero dell'Interno

DIREZIONE GENERALE
DELLA PUBBLICA SICUREZZADivisione A.G.R. Sez. III^a
Prot. N. 2443/57785, Allegato

Roma, 9 Novembre 1946

rec. - 16/11/46

LA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA.
Sottocommissione per la P.S.

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA

S. Commissione Profughi e Rimpatri

tri - U.N.R.P.A. -

ROMA

Risposta al teleg. del

Gen.

OGGETTO Incidenti a Perno tra stranieri e civili italiani.

A seguito del frequente ripetersi di incidenti provocati dai sud-diti croati internati nel campo di raccolta di Perno, il Prefetto di Ascoli Piceno ed il Comandante del Campo hanno concordato alcuni provvedimenti che questo Ministero ritiene siano atti a porre una certa disciplina ed ad assicurare in qualche modo l'ordine e la sicurezza in quella zona.

Le disposizioni impartite d'intesa con le Autorità Alleate ed italiane, possono così riassumersi:

- 1°- I profughi croati potranno uscire dal campo soltanto dalla ore 7 alle 17 di ogni giorno e non dovranno allontanarsi oltre 4 Km. di raggio dal campo stesso, con divieto di recarsi nell'abitato di Perno;
- 2°- per oltrepassare il limite stabilito e per recarsi nell'abitato di Perno, i profughi croati dovranno essere muniti di permesso scritto firmato dal Comandante del campo che lo rilascerà nei casi veramente necessari ed a elementi che siano pienamente affidamento di ben comportarsi;
- 3°- i profughi croati che venissero trovati fuori del campo nelle ore non consentite, oppure fuori del limite di 4 Km. o nell'abitato di Perno, senza permesso scritto dal Comandante inglese del campo, saranno fermati ed accompagnati al campo stesso per le decisioni di quel Comandante;
- 4°- tutti i croati che non risultano appartenere al suddetto campo

785016

4. seguito del frequente ripetersi di incidenti di natura
di cui i croati internati nel campo di raccolta di Termo, il Prefetto di
Ascoli Piceno ed il Comandante del Campo hanno concordato alcuni provvedimenti
velocemente che questo Ministero ritiene siano atti a porre una certa
disciplina ed ad assicurare in qualche modo l'ordine e la sicurezza
in quella zona.

Le disposizioni impartite d'intesa con le Autorità Alleate ed italiane,
possono così riassumersi:

1°- I profughi creati potranno uscire dal campo soltanto dalle ore
7 alle 17 di ogni giorno e non dovranno allontanarsi oltre 4 Km. di
raggio del campo stesso, con divieto di recarsi nell'abitato di Termo;
2°- per attraversare il limite stabilito o per recarsi nell'abitato
di Termo, i profughi creati dovranno essere muniti di permesso scritto
firmato dal Comandante del campo che lo rilascerà nei casi veramente
necessari ed a elementi che diano pieno affidamento ai ben comportarsi;

3°- i profughi creati che venissero trovati fuori del campo nelle
ore non consentite, oppure fuori del limite di 4 Km. o nell'abitato di
Termo, senza permesso scritto dal Comandante inglese del campo, saranno
fermati ed accompagnati al campo stesso per le decisioni di quel Comandante;

4°- tutti i creati che non risultano appartenere al suddetto campo
e quelli che il Comandante si rifiuta di ricoverare nel campo, dovranno
essere accompagnati al Commissariato di P.S. di Termo, per le disposizioni di sua competenza.


5°- previ accordi da prendersi col comando del campo, l'Allegato provvederà, in collaborazione con detto comando, ad eseguire una totalitaria
perquisizione del campo.

Questo Ministero richiama l'attenzione del Comando Alleato e della
U.N.R.R.A. sulle predette direttive e prega di esaminare la possibilità
di impartire disposizioni analoghe ai Comandanti degli altri campi
./.

esistenti in territorio italiano perchè ritiene che provvedimenti di ordine generale che disciplinino in maniera chiara ed uniforme il comportamento degli stranieri deportati in Italia, potrebbero procurare utili effetti nei riguardi dell'ordine e della sicurezza, ponendo le Autorità italiane in condizioni di assicurare un più efficace controllo sull'attività non sempre lecita che essi svolgono nel nostro paese.

Si ringrazia, in attesa di conoscere le determinazioni che, al riguardo, si crederà adottare.

PER MINISTRO



DF/3-2/ADM

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFC 794
DISPLACED PERSONS DIVISION

BW/ECM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION (Through
Public Safety Division, A.C.)

SUBJECT : Discipline - DPs

Reference Minute 1 and folio 9A of File AC/14389/FS.

1. Forwarded herewith three copies of this H.Q. letter of even number and date addressed to H.Q. Central Italy Group, D.P. Div, on the subject of disorders in EMILIA Region.

2. It is requested that Ministry of Interior be notified of the steps taken to combat these disorders and assured of all cooperation and assistance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR :

15 November, 1946.

B. Woodcock
B. WOODCOCK,
Major,
O. i/c Adm.

4994

See Mem 2

SECRET

BW/EGH

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
ALC 794
DISLACED PRISONERS DIVISION

Tel: 489031 Ext 414 / November, 1946.

DP/3-2/ADM

SUBJECT : Discipline - DP's
TO : H.Q. Central Italy Group, D.P. Division (3)

1. Following continued reports of disorders in the EMILIA Region alleged to be caused or fomented by unruly D.P. elements from REGGIO D.E. Centres, urgent representations have been made by the Italian Police Authorities for the removal of D.Ps from this area.

2. For administrative and accommodation reasons it is quite impossible to move the camps concerned, but with a view to assisting the Italian Authorities to cope with this situation the following steps will be taken and put into effect forthwith :-

(i) A Curfew will be imposed on all camp inmates from 2000 hours to 0700 hours daily.

Anyone requiring to be out of camp during curfew hours, on duty or for other special reasons, will be issued with a pass signed by the Camp Commandant.

Camp police will check passes and record the names of any DPs without passes returning to camp within curfew hours. Camp Commandants will take suitable disciplinary action against offenders.

(ii) Where reliable and suitable personnel are available, an intelligent system will be formed within camps to ascertain who are spending money freely and to identify those suspected of Black Market and other malpractices. Where sufficient evidence is found the Italian Police Authorities should be informed and the culprits handed over if demanded.

(iii) Spot searches for arms will be carried out at irregular intervals, if necessary with the assistance of the Italian Police Authorities.

Arms and explosives will be exhibited on Camp

1 4 4 3

(i) A Curfew will be imposed on all camps 2000 hours to 0700 hours daily.

Anyone requiring to be out of camp during curfew hours, on duty or for other special reasons, will be issued with a pass signed by the Camp Commandant.

Camp police will check passes and record the names of any DPs without passes returning to camp within curfew hours. Camp Commandants will take suitable disciplinary action against offenders.

(ii) Where reliable and suitable personnel are available, an intelligent system will be formed within camps to ascertain who are spending money freely and to identify those suspected of Black Market and other malpractices. Where sufficient evidence is found the Italian Police Authorities should be informed and the culprits handed over if demanded.

(iii) Spot searches for arms will be carried out at irregular intervals, if necessary with the assistance of the Italian Police Authorities.

(iv) Prominent notices will be exhibited on Camp Information Boards warning that anyone contravening the Italian Penal Code, or failing to observe curfew hours will be handed over to the Italian Authorities for prosecution and eventual deportation from ITALY as an undesirable alien.

(v) Camp Commandants will grant the necessary facilities and render all possible assistance to the local Quarters for the apprehension within camps of persons suspected of committing the above-mentioned offences.

3. Request you report progress earliest.

FOR THE DIRECTOR :

Copies to: Executive Commissioner, A.C.
Public Safety Division (3).

B. WOODCOCK,
Major, O.I/c Adm.

CONFIDENTIAL9^A.

Ministry of the Interior
 Head of the Police

1438⁹

4 November 1946.

Dear Colonel,

Strictly confidentially I wish to call your attention, on the particular situation of the province of Emilia and on the necessity that - for the urgent exigencies of public order which are connected with it - the Allied Authorities agree to the moving of the Refugees Camp of Reggio - administered by them - to some other more suitable locality.

I have more than once approached you on the question of the Refugee Camps, but the complicated problem, for various difficulties, which I cannot but understand, is still far from an entire and satisfactory solution.

Thus, while I am reserving to eventually come back on the subject, meanwhile I wish to point out to you some particular situations which, similar to those of Reggio Emilia, I consider must be separately examined without waiting, for their definition, that the whole problem of refugees be faced and solved.

You will certainly have heard of the conditions of public order in Emilia, for which you will easily understand how the presence, in that region, of a noticeable number of aliens, the majority from Balkan lands, inclined to all trades, easy to any allurements and dealings, is a remarkable element for disorders and disturbances, in those areas.

I think that the Allied Authorities have no particular reason for keeping the camp efficient in those areas and that they, therefore, have nothing on the contrary in transferring, to other camps, the aliens there at present.

But, should such solution not be possible at the moment - for reasons not known to me - I could, in agreement with you, examine another way out which might consist in eliminating, from Emilia, that nest of criminals, which is the cause of many and serious incidents and which the very Allied Authorities have been obliged to worry about.

I have considered it necessary to inform you confidentially of this situation which, in my opinion, is of great importance, with a view to an improvement in the general situation of those provinces and I kindly ask you to let me know your point of view.

I heartily thank you with the best of wishes

/s/ Ferrari. Luigi

499⁹

Le



MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO
IL CAPO DELLA POLIZIA

Confino

Roma, li 4 Novembre 1946

Care Colonnello,

in via del tutto confidenziale desidero richiamare la Sua cortese attenzione sulla particolare situazione delle province dell'Emilia e sulla opportunità che - per le urgenti esigenze di ordine pubblico che vi sono connesse - le Autorità Alleate consentano allo spostamento del Campo profughi di Reggio, da esse amministrato, in altra località più adatta.

Sulla questione dei Campi profughi io ho avuto più volte ad interressarla, ma il complesso problema per difficoltà di ordine vario, delle quali non posso non rendermi conto, è ancora lontano da una integrale e soddisfacente soluzione.

Mentre perciò mi riservo di ritornare sull'argomento a tempo opportuno, desidero per ora farle presente alcune situazioni particolari che, come quelle di Reggio Emilia, ritengo debbano essere separatamente valutate senza attendere, per la loro definizione, che tutto il problema dei profughi possa essere affrontato e risolto.

Le saranno certamente note le condizioni dell'ordine pubblico nell'Emilia per cui la sarà facile rendersi conto del come la presenza in quelle regioni di una massa così notevole di stranieri, appartenenti per la quasi totalità ai paesi balcanici, dediti a tutti i traffici, facili ad ogni allettamento e ad ogni

to del Campo profughi di Reggio, da esse amministrato, in altra località più adatte.-

Sulla questione dei Campi profughi io ho avuto più volte ad interressarla, ma il complesso problema per difficoltà di ordine vario, delle quali non posso non rendermi conto, è ancora lontano da una integrale e soddisfacente soluzione.-

Mentre perciò mi riservo di ritornare sull'argomento a tempo opportuno, desidero per ora farle presente alcune situazioni particolari che, come quelle di Reggio Emilia, ritengo debbano essere separatamente vagliate senza attendere, per la loro definizione, che tutto il problema dei profughi possa essere affrontato e risolto.

Le saranno certamente note le condizioni dell'ordine pubblico nell'Emilia per cui le sarà facile rendersi conto del come la presenza in quelle regioni di una massa così notevole di stranieri, appartenenti per la quasi totalità ai paesi balcanici, dediti a tutti i traffici facili ad ogni allettamento e ad ogni impresa, costituisca, in questa zona, un elemento notevole di disordine e di turbamento.-

Sig. Colonnello E.J. BYE
Capo della S.C. Allesta per la P.S.

R O M A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Division
APO 794

AC/14389/PS

31 October 1946


SUBJECT : Disturbances in D.P. Camp
Reggio Emilia.

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. Reference is made to your letter G-5.254 of 4th Sept. and report of UNRRA which dealt with disturbances in above camp on 1st and 4th May 1946.
2. A copy of the report was sent to the Italian Government as directed. A reply has now been received in which it is stated the Italian Authorities do not propose to take any action as the camp is under the administration of the Allied authorities.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,

EJB/ae


E. J. BYRNE, Colonel
Director.

4993

785016

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

N. 143/67835

22 October 46

SUBJECT : Disorders in the UNRRA Refugees Camp. of
Reggio Emilia.

TO : Public Safety S/C A.C.

With reference to your letter AC/14389/PS
of the 23/9/46.

We inform you that this Ministry cannot
take any action following the disorders which took
place in the Refugees Camp of Reggio Emilia on the
1st and 4th May last, as said camp is under the
administration of the Allied Authorities.

For the Minister
/s/ Ferrari.

Translation ac/

30/10

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H



Mod 872

Roma 22 Ottobre 1946

Ministero dell'Interno
DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA PUBBLICA SICUREZZA

AL LA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA
Sottocommissione per la P.S.
ROMA

Divisione A.G.R. Sez. 3^a
Prot. N. 443/67835 Allegato

Risposta al f. del 23/9/1946
Da M.AC/14389-P.S.

OGGETTO Disordini nel campo profughi dell'UNRRA
di Reggio Emilia.

Con riferimento alla lettera suindicata, si
comunica che questo Ministero non può adottare
misure in seguito ai disordini avvenuti nel campo
profughi di Reggio Emilia il 1° ed il 4 maggio
scorso, in quanto che detto campo è amministrato
dalle Autorità Alleate.

PEL MINISTRO

4991

Rec. 29/10

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APC 794

6A

AC/14389/PS

23 September 46.

SUBJECT : Disorders in UNRRA
Displaced Persons Camp - Reggio Emilia.

TO : Ministry of Interior
Director General of P.S.

1. The attached report of the findings of a Court of Enquiry into disorders at the Displaced Persons Camp - Reggio Emilia on the 1st and 4th May 1946 which resulted in the death of one person, is forwarded to you for information and appropriate action.

2. It would be appreciated if this Headquarters could be informed of the action taken in due course.

For the Chief Commissioner

E.J. BYE Colonel
Acting Director.

4990

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 794

Tel : 416

14057
SUBJECT : UNRRA Report of Court
of Enquiry.

23 September 1946

TO : Displaced Persons S/C.

1. Reference attached.
2. The ~~list~~ showing the locations of the Russians concerned includes 10 names only whereas the number mentioned in the report is 18.
3. Can the location of the remaining 8 be given please?

Encl.

E.J. BYE, Colonel,
Acting Director.

1454

785016

SR

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

14057

G-5: 254

4 September 1946

SUBJECT: UNRRA Report Court of Inquiry, DP Camp Reggio Emilia.

TO : Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
(Attn: Displaced Persons Section)

1. After perusal of the enclosed report of an UNRRA Court of Inquiry with regard to a disorder in a DP Camp at Reggio Emilia last May, as a result of which one Kaplan later died of the injuries he then received, you will pass a copy to the Italian Government for such action as they may deem appropriate.

2.- Should the Italian Government ask for an identification parade of the Russians you will allow them to hold the same. You will no doubt instruct the Camp Commandant to see that any such parade is conducted in a proper and fair manner and in particular that there is no opportunity for collusion between the witnesses.

3. To complete the file in this office, please relay action or inaction in the premises by Italian authorities.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

A. L. HAMBLIN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to: Mr. S.M. Keeny
Chief of Mission
UNRRA - Rome

1 Encl : As above

4988

The Russians accused are at present located as follows:

MAJSKI, Alexander	-	REGGIO EMILIA	(Pole)
LOWENSKI, Fedja	-	REGGIO EMILIA	(Pole)
ANDREJEV, Mihail	-	RIMINI SEP CENTRE	(Russian)
TITLA, Alexander	-	REGGIO EMILIA	(Pole)
MICHAILOVSKI, Jaroslav	-	REGGIO EMILIA	(Pole)
STADITZ, Andrea	-	REGGIO EMILIA	(Pole)
MIKOLAICZIK, Michael	-	REGGIO EMILIA	(Pole)
IWANOW, Nikola j	-	RIMINI SEP CENTRE	(Russian)
LETESKIN, Grigori	-	RIMINI SEP CENTRE	(Russian)
PEDUN, Teodor	-	not known	
KARCIAWA, Alosawa	-	" "	
KSEMLONOW, Vasilij	-	RIMINI SEP CENTRE	
IVANOV, Pavle	-	RIMINI SEP CENTRE	
KARCHMAN, Alexander	-	not known	
KIAMPO, Vladimir	-	RIMINI SEP CENTRE	
DOSKUCHANSKI, Georg	-	REGGIO EMILIA D.P.	
WALCUE, Meron		not known	

HEADQUARTERS ARMYING COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 794

4A.

AC/14189/TS

23 September 46.

SUBJECT : Disorders in UNRRA
Displaced Persons Camp - Reggio Emilia.

TO : Ministry of Interior
Director General of P.S.


/E. alt.

1. The attached report of the findings of a Court of Enquiry into disorders at the Displaced Persons Camp - Reggio Emilia on the 1st and 4th May 1946 which resulted in the death of one person, is forwarded to you for information and appropriate action.

2. It would be appreciated if this Headquarters could be informed of the action taken in due course.

For the Chief Commissioner

4980


S.J. GYS Colonel
Acting Director.

3A

23 September 1946

TC : Displaced Persons S/C.

1. Reference attached.
2. The list showing the locations of the Russians concerned includes 10 names only whereas the number mentioned in the report is 18.
3. Can the location of the remaining 8 be given please?

E. J. BYE, Colonel,
Acting Director.

1 Gulap

23 SEP 1946

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Capt Ellis - 2A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFO 794
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPATRIATION SUB-COMMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

DPR/13/G-II (DP)

11 September 1946

M. G. Reed

SUBJECT : UNRRA Report Court of Inquiry, DP Camp REGGIO EMILIA.

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1. This would appear to be more of your concern. Will you pass it to the Italian Authorities concerned.

The Russians accused are at present located as per attached list. They are not under any special restraint.

For the Director:



E. PURDY
Lieut. Colonel,
Asst. Deputy Director.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 254

4 September 1946

SUBJECT: UNRRA Report Court of Inquiry, DP Camp Reggio Emilia.

TO : Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
(Attn: Displaced Persons Section) *1B*

1. After perusal of the enclosed report of an UNRRA Court of Inquiry with regard to a disorder in a DP Camp at Reggio Emilia last May, as a result of which one Kaplan later died of the injuries he then received, you will pass a copy to the Italian Government for such action as they may deem appropriate.

2. Should the Italian Government ask for an identification parade of the Russians you will allow them to hold the same. You will no doubt instruct the Camp Commandant to see that any such parade is conducted in a proper and fair manner and in particular that there is no opportunity for collusion between the witnesses.

3. To complete the file in this office, please relay action or inaction in the premises by Italian authorities.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN

James H. Morgan
Colonel, G.S.C.
A. L. HAMBLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to: Mr. S.M. Keeny
Chief of Mission
UNRRA - Rome

1 Encl : As above

785016

1.28

1B

28 August, 1946.

TO : ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
FROM : Chief of Mission
SUBJECT : Court of Inquiry into Reggio Emilia
D.F. Camp Incidents

1. Attached hereto, for your information, is report of the Court of Inquiry which was held by this Mission into certain incidents which took place in the Reggio Emilia Displaced Persons' Camp.

2. It is considered that, as the camp was administered by this Mission on behalf of the Military Authorities, our action in this matter should be limited to supplying you with information in respect to the details of the incident, and any final decision on the case, particularly with respect to the jurisdiction of the Italian authorities, should be a matter to be settled by a competent military command.

3. Should you require any further information in this matter, we will be pleased to supply it upon request.

S. M. KEENEY

S. M. Keeny
CHIEF OF MISSION

AJREYNOLDS/eta

cc - COM

Spa

4982

COPY

PREFETTURA DI LECCE
PS Division n. 04741

5.12.1946.

27 JAN 1947
w.

19A

SUBJECT : Refugee camps in the province of Lecce.

TO : Ministry of the Interior
PS General Direction
Cabinet of the Minister - Rome.

In this province there are four concentration camps for alien refugees, Jews, administered by UNRRA, S. Maria di Leuca with 1150 refugees; Tricase and port with 640 refugees; S. Maria al Bagno with 1800 refugees; S. Cesarea Terme with 930 refugees.

These camps, though bearing such figures, cannot be considered as such because, besides not being enclosed and therefore without any sort of guard, are not subject to any effective control by the direction, since the refugees live in private houses of the inhabited centres and adjacent villas.

Consequently whatever enquiries, either generic or specific, the Italian authorities have sometimes been obliged to make, they have always been useless, as the very directors have never been able to give exact news, not even on the presence or not of each refugee.

The mass of these Jews lives almost exclusively by black market activities practised on the population, speculating on the assistance given to them by UNRRA. They go backwards and forwards from this province to another, thus also constituting a permanent danger under all points of view.

Meanwhile, yesterday, the Provincial Chief Group of the a/m camps, went to the local Questura and, while informing the Questore that said camps would soon be dissolved and the refugees sent first to other camps of the province, and then to those existing in the different regions of Italy, pointed out that from what it appears to him, these refugees might determine a riot, because this would be part of the Hebrew movement against England, and then because the news of the closing of the camps would certainly not be welcomed by those interested.

The Chief Group, to prove the reliability of his expectations, pointed out that already on the 1st inst. at 10.00 hrs a forewarning signal was given, as in many other camps, the flag of the Hebrew terroristic organisation fighting for Palestine, was hoisted by unknown persons.

Thus this head group has asked that, foreseeing what may happen at any moment, the CC.RR. stations with jurisdiction over the localities where said camps are situated, be immediately and efficiently strengthened and a large and efficient reserve be held in Lecce in case of emergency.

A similar request will be made direct to your Ministry by the Central Hdqs of UNRRA.

The above is sent to you for information, begging you to examine, as is deemed necessary by this office, if said request has to be complied with.

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-2-

Thus it is well to bear in mind that, as it has been repeatedly referred to your Ministry, all Station Commands in this province have an insufficient organic strength even for the normal services of institute, and, on the other hand, for various reasons, such as the phenomenon of unemployment the economical uneasiness, the intollerance existing among those belonging to the various parties, it is not possible to divert any element to re-inforce the stations interested, nor, so much the less, form a nucleus of reserve in Lecce, as there would be no personnel available.

Therefore, in case, the request should be adhered to, please issue the necessary dispositions to the competent bodies, to efficiently re-inforce the CC.RR. stations of Gagliano del Capo, Tricase, Mardo' and Poggiardo, as soon as possible and without diverting the normal slight police forces already on duty in this province, and to have sent to Lecce a nucleus of at least 100 CC.RR. to be kept as reserve, in case of necessity, until all the a/m camps are completely cleared.

The Prefect

Translation ac/

5019

CONFIDENTIAL

(10)

(cont. list of Russian who were identified by the Jewish
identification committee on 4 May)

5.

KARCIANA, Alosawa
KSENI ZONOW, Vasilij
KRELASOW, Vasilij RIMINI SED CENTRE.
IVANOV, Pavle " " "
KARCHOLAN, Alexander
KIAPPO, Vladimir RIMINI SED CENTRE.
DOSKUCHANSKI, Georg REGG. EMICIA. B.
WALCUK, Meron

JFANCA/ig

1464

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KRELSOV, Vasilij (GMM)
IVANOV, Pavle
KARCHOLAN, Alexander
KIAMPO, Vladimir (GMM) SED CEMRE
DOSKUCHANSKI, Georg REGG. EMICIA. DR.
WALCUC, Meron

JIANCA/ig

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