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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

ACC

10000/143/1281

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LONG RANGE ROCKET
NOV. 1944 - APR. 1945

OK. Please see Nms. 5 and 6: al. 34^A 35^A.
36 A and B, and 37^A for signature please.
Handwritten Wilson W. L. for DPS.

16^{3/4} 45.

OK. 40^A for signature please.
Handwritten Wilson W. L. for DPS.

19^{3/4} 45.
34 36 E.

OK. 42^A for signature please.
Handwritten Wilson W. L. for DPS.

26^{3/4} 45.
34 36 E.

10

OK See (see Gripps)

Please see 43^A. Draft of introduction for proposed Memo to R's on Post-Raid measures. It is suggested that no further use be made of this piece on the subject of Post-Raid measures. In future Public Safety S/E should be concerned with operative civil defense.

26^{3/4} 45.
34 36 E.

Handwritten Wilson W. L. for DPS.

307365.

PA Sec (L. Gripps)

Please see 43^A. Draft of introduction for proposed Memo to R.E.'s on Post-Raid measures. It is suggested that no further use be made of this piece on the subject of Post-Raid measures. Indefinite Public Safety S/C should be concerned with operational civil defence.

20/4/5.
307365.

Handwritten signature: *Handwritten signature*

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To: Acting Executive Commission:
7010 54a for approval.

18 April 1945.

Public Supply

Executive Commission rules - no action

PA Sec.

20/4/5.
307365.

13/1
56 for Signature per.

A.D. Bonham - Carter, Lt. Col.
CSO. CA. Section

A.D. Bonham - Carter - Lt. Col.
24 April.

Handwritten signature: *Handwritten signature*

0286

48 to 68 less 67

19 Copies.

- 49 - to R.C. Abruzzi Marche
- 50 - to R.C. Toscana
- 51 - to SCAO 5 Army

- 52 - Liguria.
- 53 - Piemonte.
- 54 - Emilia.
- 55 - Lombardia.
- 56 - Venezia.
- 57 - Lazio. Umbria.
- 58 - Southern.
- 59 - 8th Army.

5395

MINUTE SHEET

- 1) Long Range Rockets - C. Chapman
- 2) This is a matter for C.D. to consider.

2

PA Section

Please see 5th and 6th. Reply for signature at 8th.

Wm. Wilson W.C.

23¹/₂ 10.

21 365

3

Regal S.E.

Please see Par. 2 of 17th from V.P. et al.

May we have your observations please? ...
Wm. Wilson W.C.
for D.P.S.

8 10.

21 365.

4.

P.S. (for Lt. Col. Wilson).

Conversation between - Wilson. File returned herewith.

At the present moment we know that Italian law does not cover the trustee requirements. This we are working on. If, however, you would like to know exactly what powers are needed for post-raid etc work - we will see how far those powers are already conferred by the law, and what additions are necessary.

Wm. Wilson

4.

PS. (for Lt Col Wilson).

Conversation between - Wilson.

File returned herewith.

At the present moment we know that Italian law does not ⁵³⁹¹ cover the further requirements. This we are working on. If, however, you would like to know exactly what powers are needed for post paid etc work - we will see how far those powers are already conferred by the law, and what additions are necessary.

W. Wilson
D.C.A.

14 Feb 45

5

PA See: Please see 30^A. R.P.S.O's were instructed by Lt Col Wilson. What for D.P.S.

6

22/45.

PA See. Please see Min 5. To avoid delay in action on 32^A 33^A has been sent to R.C.'s for Andora. Florence and the other R.C.'s both 8th Army and Sub-Commissions. The action suggested at 30^A is still necessary for

W. Wilson
for D.P.S.

22/45.

56^A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Tel : 489081 - 365

29 April, 1945.

AG/14529/PS

SUBJECT : Reactivation of C.D. Organization.

TO : C-5 Section A.F.H.Q.

LUA

1. Reference your C-5 384.51 dated 2 April 1945.
2. Attached is a completed "Check List" showing the C.D. organization at Florence.

For the Chief Commissioner :

[Signature]
C.D. UNION, Brig.
VP CA Sec.

[Signature]
30th 46.

5390

4

19th April 1945.

112/1.



- 45A

36B

E. J. BYE

TO	DATE	DAY
DIRECTOR		
DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE		
WASHINGTON		
FROM		
U. S. D. A.		
DEPT. OF		
AGRICULTURE		
WASHINGTON		
TO		
FROM		
U. S. D. A.		

5392

CONFIDENTIAL

CHECK LISTCivil Defence and Fire Service at FLORENCE1. CIVIL DEFENCE

- (a) Is there a Civil Defense Control Center in existence? YES
- (b) Is the Civil Control Center in telephone communication with P.A.D. Control? YES. SAME BUILDING.
- (c) How are language difficulties overcome, and is there a Civil Liaison Officer always available? Personnel have knowledge of Italian and English. No Liaison Officer.
- (d) How many full-time rescue personnel are available and how are they organized? 4 Sectors, 1 NCO and 6 men per sector. Engineering units each provide 1 Heavy Rescue Party. Working parties provided by military. 200 members UNPA available, 1 Squad of 15 men always available for duty.
- (e) What is state of training of full-time rescue personnel? Fairly good. Previously employed as such by Italian Government.
- (f) Has every Party or Squad a vehicle allocated to it in reasonable running order and capable of fulfilling its proper function? Military Squads - Yes, Civilian - No, only 3 box tractors.
- (g) How many First Aid Posts are in existence? 14 What arrangements are there for manning them and what is their casualty capacity? 7 Mobile, 7 Stationary. 10 Hospitals with bed capacity of 2400 staffed by civilians.
- (h) How many ambulances are available? 3 How many of these are on immediate call? 3
- (i) What are the arrangements for Incident Control? Capt. Pegg - Military and Capt. MacDougall, AMG are Incident Officers. Have sufficient civil personnel been trained in Incident Control? No
- (j) Are Civil Defense exercises held? No What was the date of the last exercise? -
- (k) Is reporting system adequate? Doubtful How much time elapses between the occurrence of an incident and the arrival of first Rescue Parties? This depends upon location of incident - average 15 minutes.

2. FIRE SERVICE


- (a) What are the numbers of trained full-time fire fighting personnel? 539*
(1) Officers 5 (2) NCOs and Firemen 150
- (b) What major fire fighting appliances are : (1) Serviceable: 5 Auto pumps, 5

Trucks Rescue, 6 Trailer Pumps and Hose. (2) Unserviceable: -

- (c) In the case of unserviceable appliances, what is required to put them in useable condition? 6 Auto pumps without tyres or wheels, none of which are available.
- (d) What are the arrangements for dealing with petroleum spirit fires, and what stocks of foam compound and/or powder are available? No civilian foam stocks. Dependent on Army supplies.
- (e) Are there sufficient stocks of hose, and is it in good condition? Yes.
- (f) What is the diameter of the standard hose in use? 45 mm

3. EQUIPMENT

- (a) Are there any shortages of fire or rescue equipment in respect of which demands have not been made by the local Civil Affairs Officers concerned? No. Application for additional equipment has been made and is awaited.
- (b) Are there any shortages of equipment in respect of which demands have been made, but have not been met from Allied Commission stocks? See Above.


E. J. BYE
Lt. Colonel,
Chief of Public Safety,
A.M.G. Fifth Army.

DRAFTSECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER

AC/14529/ES

17th April, 1945.

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles :
Post Raid Measures.

TO: See Distribution

1. Although it is considered that there is little likelihood of long range projectiles, V-1 and V-2 (Flying Bomb and Long Range Rocket), being used in this theatre, particularly at this stage, it is desirable that certain aspects of the possibilities be given consideration so that everyone is prepared for any eventuality.

2. Army Commanders have formed plans to modify existing Army P.A.D. measures in order to provide adequate defence against this type of attack.

AMHQ has directed that the Allied Commission will organise Post Raid measures to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

The Civil Defence Organizations have been reactivated in LECHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA which, at the time of writing, are the most likely targets, and are sufficiently self supporting to deal with a medium-scale attack involving all but serious incidents.

3. V-1 and V-2 have been used against military targets in the European Theatre and the following salient features have been noticed :

- a) attack, although usually limited to daylight hours, takes place throughout the 24 hour period. In one port during 24 hours, 57 V-2 rockets fell, and 12 V-1 flying bombs penetrated the defences;
- b) range of rocket and flying bomb has averaged 200 miles;
- c) whereas the flying bomb produces intense blast effect, the rocket produces a deep crater and local damage is generally more severe. The weight of the warhead of both flying bomb and rocket is approximately 1 ton;
- d) where the enemy has been able to get information of the

AFHQ has directed that the Allied Commission will organise Post Raid measures to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

The Civil Defence Organizations have been reactivated in LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA which, at the time of writing, are the most likely targets, and are sufficiently self supporting to deal with a medium-scale attack involving all but serious incidents.

3. V-1 and V-2 have been used against Military targets in the European Theatre and the following salient features have been noticed :

- a) attack, although usually limited to daylight hours, takes place throughout the 24 hour period. In one port during 24 hours, 37 V-2 rockets fell, and 12 V-1 flying bombs penetrated the defences;
- b) range of rocket and flying bomb has averaged 200 miles;
- c) whereas the flying bomb produces intense blast effect, the rocket produces a deep crater and local damage is generally more severe. The weight of the warhead of both flying bomb and rocket is approximately 1 ton;
- d) where the enemy has been able to get information of the point of impact, he has adjusted fire of the V-2 with disquieting accuracy;
- e) although there may be an audible or visible warning of the approach of V-1, attacks by V-2 take place without warning.

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4. The maintenance of morale in ports is a military necessity; migration of labour from the docks and essential public utilities would cause a cessation of work, or require the diversion of very considerable military manpower. It is essential that Post Raid Measures be organised now, in order that they can be put into force immediately an attack occurs.

5. AFHQ have recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defence and that responsibility for Post Raid Measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who alone can co-ordinate all the many services concerned. Fire and Civil Defence Officers in Regions are co-operating closely with Army F.A.D. officers in the re-activation of Civil Defence schemes. Special steps have been taken in LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA and interim reports forwarded to AFHQ.

/ A simplified procedure.....

2.

A simplified procedure has been devised for the procurement of Army items of supply needed for the re-activation of civil defence. A memorandum on this subject will shortly be forwarded to Allied Commission from AFHQ G-5 to serve as a guide in making requisitions for the necessary Army items.

6. Finance. The financing of expenditures for emergency post raid measures will be by the issue of supplementary credits by Provincial Finance Officer to Provincial State Offices, provinces and communes. Where for any reason this procedure cannot be followed, an extraordinary credit should be authorized in favour of the Prefect, who should be instructed to open a Special Account, Prefecture. Disbursements to the various State Offices and enti should be made by him from this account, and the accounts regularized when the emergency period has passed.

7. Emergency Feeding. The Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer in the area will be responsible for the planning and establishment of all feeding facilities for rescue squads and bombed-out persons. Feeding for these persons will be done through communal feeding centres on the basis of two meals per day at the following scale:

Pasta (or Bread	40 grams per meal
Dried vegetables	50 " " "
Dehydrated soup	20 " " "
Olive oil or fats	20 " " "
Salt	5 " " "
	5 " " "

Feeding on this scale will be continued until the period of emergency is deemed to be over.

Sufficient trained personnel to run these communal feeding centres should be provided by the commune, ready to operate them if the emergency arises.

Communal feeding centres will hold on hand stocks sufficient to provide six meals on the scale quoted above for 2% of the population. Additional stocks may be drawn during the emergency period from Allied Commission or Provincial warehouses on the authority of the Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, or officers designated by them.

8. Transport. AC transport will, upon request, be made available to Regional Commissioners. All vehicles in civilian Truck Pools should be called into permanent "stand-by" service if required.

In order that requests for transport may be met with the minimum of delay, Regional Transportation Officers will make direct contact with the officers i/o QM Truck Coys and G.T. Coys operating in their immediate areas.

Should the transport which can be made available be insufficient to meet requirements, the nearest military units should be asked to render assistance.

Pasta	40 grams per meal
(or Bread	50 " " " ")
Dried vegetables	20 " " " "
Dehydrated soup	20 " " " "
Olive oil or fats	5 " " " "
Salt	5 " " " "

Feeding on this scale will be continued until the period of emergency is deemed to be over.

Sufficient trained personnel to run these communal feeding centres should be provided by the commune, ready to operate them if the emergency arises.

Communal feeding centres will hold on hand stocks sufficient to provide six meals on the scale quoted above for 2½% of the population. Additional stocks may be drawn during the emergency period from Allied Commission or Provincial warehouses on the authority of the Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, or officers designated by them.

3. Transport. AC transport will, upon request, be made available to Regional Commissioners. All vehicles in civilian Truck Pools should be called into permanent "stand-by" service if required.

In order that requests for transport may be met with the minimum of delay, Regional Transportation Officers will make direct contact with the officers i/c QM Truck Coys and G.F. Coys operating in their immediate areas.

Should the transport which can be made available be insufficient, they meet requirements, the nearest military units should be asked to render assistance.

9. Medical. PPHO's will, under the direction of the Regional Commissioners, take the following steps:

- a) Immediately inspect all IRC First Aid Posts, ensure that they are adequately stocked with emergency supplies and see that they are in a day and night state of preparedness.
- b) Ensure that all hospitals are ready to deal with the maximum possible number of emergency cases.
- c) Try to obtain emergency lighting systems for hospitals.
- d) earmark alternative accommodation should any hospital or portion of it be destroyed.
- e) Consider the possibility of splitting depots of medical supplies.
- f) Contact the local ADES and discuss co-operation between the Military and ADES, especially in the matter of ambulance transport.
- g) Act as liaison officer between the IRC, the Medical Provincials, the ADES and the Regional Commissioner.

NORMAN E. FISKE, Col.
Acting Executive Commissioner

Distribution:

EC UMBRIA-MARCHE	(10)	(2)
EC TOSCANA	(22)	(2)
EC EMILIA	(20)	(2)
EC LIGURIA	(12)	(2)
EC LOMBARDIA	(22)	(2)
EC PIEMONTE	(18)	(2)
EC VENETIE	(35)	(2)
Executive Commissioner	(3)	(2)
Economic Section	(5)	(2)
Civil Affairs Section	(5)	(2)
Land Forces Sub-Commission		(2)
Navy Sub-Commission		(2)
Air Forces Sub-Commission		(2)
Communications		(2)
HQ IV Corps		(2)
SCAO V Army		(2)
SCAO 8 Army		(2)
G-5 AFHQ		(2)
EAAC		(1)
1 DISTRICT		(2)
2 DISTRICT		(2)
3 DISTRICT		(1)

Tel. 489081
Ext. 317

S-E-C-R-E-T

WML/ac

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION 23 MAR 1945
APO 394

Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission

53a

Reference : 124/PWU

23/ March 1945

Subject : Post-raid measures

To : C.S.O. - C.A. SECTION

- 1) - Reference letter AC/14259/PS dated 17 March 1945 and subsequent meeting held on 21 March 1945 to discuss post-raid measures, the recommendations so far as Public Works and Utilities are concerned ~~is~~ as follows :
all
- 2) - The Ministry of Public Works Field Organization includes the Genio Civile with an Inspector General in charge of each compartment and a Provincial Engineer in each Province. In addition, all larger cities have an Engineering Organization headed by a Communal Engineer. It is proposed that this organization should be used for post-raid measures connected with Public Works and Utilities.
- 3) - It is suggested that the Allied Commission Regional Engineer - in conjunction with compartmental and Provincial Engineer - make the following arrangements :
 - (a) - List of building contractors - The Genio Civile to compile a list of all building contractors. x
 - (b) - Rescue squads - The Genio Civile to arrange for suitable men from the building contractors to be formed into rescue squads for the purpose of rescuing persons trapped in demolished buildings. x
 - (c) - Material for rescue squads - Dumps of material viz : ladders, timber, ropes, picks, shovels, hammers, axes, etc. to be arranged at suitable locations. x
 - (d) - Transport - In case of large amount of road clearance requiring transport beyond that available to the Genio Civile from civilian sources the Regional Engineer will arrange with the Military for assistance. x

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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S-E-C-R-E-T

- 2 -

- (e) - Electricity - The most serious case would be that of damage to the central supply causing complete breakdown of electricity to the whole of a town. The Regional Engineer would contact the Electrical Division of Allied Commission who would make the necessary arrangements for the supply to be restored.
- (f) - Water - Damage to water mains will be handled by the Genio Civile by using civilian contractors. The Regional Engineer may have to give assistance in the case of transport. As most of the townships depend on electricity for water pumping, damage to the electric supply will also affect this service. The Regional Engineer will instruct the Electrical Company to give the highest priority to water supply.
- (g) - Gas - The Genio Civile will make the necessary arrangements by using civilian contractors to repair damage to gas mains and to see that gas supply is cut off in damaged areas. This is not considered to be a service requiring immediate restoration and repairs would be carried out after giving attention to more essential services.

W. M. Lapper

W.M. LAPPER
Lt-Colonel
Chief Elec. Div.

5388

S-E-C-R-E-T

23 MAR 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB COMMISSION
Tel. 478604

22 March 1945

Secret

13232/F

SUBJECT: Post Raid Measures.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. With reference to your AC/14529/PS of 17th instant, it is suggested that the following paragraph be included in the proposed directive on Post Raid Measures:

"Finance. The financing of expenditures for emergency post raid measures will be by the issue of supplementary credits by Provincial Finance Officer to Provincial State Offices, provinces and communes. Where for any reason this procedure cannot be followed, an extraordinary credit should be authorized in favour of the Prefect, who should be instructed to open a Special Account, Prefettura. Disbursements to the various State Offices and enti should be made by him from this account, and the accounts regularised when the emergency period has passed.

DIRECTOR	
DEPT. DIRECTOR	
ASST. DIR.	
SEC. DIR.	
CHIEF CLERK	
CLERK	
STENOGRAPHER	
RECORDS	
MAIL	
TELETYPE	
TELEPHONE	
POSTAL	
OTHER	

for *B. L. Simon*
Joint Director
Finance Sub-Commission.

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2957

24 MAR 1945

JI/ak

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24 MAR 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
Food Sub-Commission

24 March, 1945

Tel: 478807

Ref: 43-1/III /FOOD

SUBJECT: Post-Raid Measures.

TO : The Chief Staff Officer, Civil Affairs Section.
(Through Economic Section)

1. Reference conference of 21 March 1945, herewith proposed instructions re emergency feeding.

2. The Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer in the area will be responsible for the planning and establishment of all feeding facilities for rescue squads and bombed out persons. Feeding for these persons will be done through communal feeding centres on the basis of two meals per day at the following scale:

or	Pasta.....	40	grams per meal	}
	Bread.....	50	" " "	
	Dried vegetables....	20	" " "	
	Dehydrated soup....	20	" " "	
	Olive oil or fats..	5	" " "	
	Salt.....	5	" " "	

(20)

Feeding on this scale will be continued until the period of emergency is deemed to be over.

3. Sufficient communal feeding centres should be prepared to provide for meals for 2½% of the population.

4. Sufficient trained personnel to run these communal feeding centres should be provided by the commune, ready to operate them if the emergency arises.

5. Communal feeding centres will hold on hand stocks sufficient to provide six meals on the scale quoted above for 2½% of the population. Additional stocks may be drawn during the emergency period from A.C. or provincial warehouses on the authority of the Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, or officers designated by them.

For the Chief Commissioner:

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W.J. LEGG

Colonel

Director, Food Sub-Commission

2968

24/3/45

24 MAR 1945

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Tel. 566

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION

GF/rb

Ref: AC/28/18/TN5

22 March 1945

SUBJECT: Disposition of A.C. Transport (Passive Air Defence).

TO : *v.p. Civil Affairs Section*
~~Allied Commission, Chief Civil Affairs Officer~~
Through Economic Section.
(Att. Capt. Atkins)

1. Information has been received to the effect that the enemy may use V 1 and V 2 Rocket Bombs against Northern Italian cities.

2. In order to ensure the efficient distribution of relief and medical supplies, removal of the sick and wounded, and the operation of rescue squads, etc., all AC Transport will upon request be made available to Regional Commissioners. All vehicles in civilian Truck Pools should be called into permanent "stand-by" service if required.

3. In order that requests for transport may be met with the minimum of delay, Regional Transportation Officers will make direct contact with the O i/c's of QM Truck Coys and G.T. Coys operating in their immediate areas.

4. Should the transport which can be made available be insufficient to meet requirements, the nearest military units should be asked to render assistance.

M.B. Thomas
M.B. THOMAS,
Colonel,
Deputy Director.

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2936

22 MAR 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Labor Sub-Commission

22 MAR 1945

49a

TEL : Ext. 204

DCS/rmw

REF : LSC//Y

22 March 1945

SUBJECT: Post Air Raid Measure

TO : Civil Affairs Section
Attention: Col. Cripps

1. Labor Sub-Commission does not desire to make any proposals concerning action to be taken reference above subject.

Helpful
Rae

W. H. Braine

W. H. BRAINE
Director
Labor Sub-Commission

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SECRET. 48a

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394.
Public Health Sub-Commission

22 MAR 1945

AC/3084/PH

22 March 1945.

22 MAR 1945

SUBJECT: - Post Raid Precautions.

TO : - Chief Staff Officer,
Civil Affairs Section.

1. In accordance with decisions taken at meeting of 21 March, herewith instructions for RPHO's of forward regions for incorporation in the General Directive.

2. RPHO's will, under the direction of the Regional Commissioners, take the following steps:

(a) Immediately inspect all IRC First Aid Posts, ensure that they are adequately stocked with emergency supplies and see that they are in a day and night state of preparedness.

(b) Ensure that all hospitals are ready to deal with the maximum possible number of emergency cases.

(c) Try to obtain emergency lighting systems for hospitals.

(d) Earmark alternative accommodation should any hospital or portion of it be destroyed.

(e) Consider the possibility of splitting depots of medical supplies.

(f) Contact the local ADMS and discuss cooperation between the Military and AMG, especially in the matter of ambulance transport.

(g) Act as liaison officer between the IRC, the Medico Provinciale, the ADMS and the Regional Commissioner.

(h) Discuss relief problems with other interested officers eg. Public Works, Welfare, Food, Engineer etc, the latter especially on problems concerning water.

For Brigadier G.S. Parkinson,

G.M. Frizelle
G.M. FRIZELLE,
Lt.Colonel,
Chief, Public Health Branch.

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DRAFT

Present:

see attached list.

COL. CRIFFS apologised for the absence of Brigadier Unjohn.

Col. CRIFFS gave a short description of the general effects of L.R.P.'s and stressed the chaos ^{was} which, caused when people fled from affected areas, and ^{Consequent} the disruption of labour.

Col. CRIFFS stated that the likely targets for enemy L.R.P. action were ANCONA, LAGHORN and FLORENCE; AMHQ considered

GENOA another likely target. Col. CRIFFS reminded the

meeting that L.R.P.'s ^{means} are not wholly the responsibility

of Public Safety, who are only responsible for the immediate

action following a raid; there is much that concerns other

branches as well. We must therefore consider what outside

help is likely to be needed for clearing-up, ^{after raids} stabilising

the morale of the population, Public Works, general public

services and emergency services such as feeding and caring

for the homeless, as well as public health matters.

Col. CRIFFS hoped that those attending the meeting had read

the document which he had had circulated on 17 March,

and that suggestions would be made so that a scheme may be

started in the two ports and in Florence, and an idea formulated

as to what should be done in GENOA and elsewhere.

branches as well. We must therefore consider what outside ^{after raids} help is likely to be needed for clearing-up, stabilising the morale of the population, Public Works, general public services and emergency services such as feeding and caring for the homeless, as well as public health matters.

Col. CRIPPS hoped that those attending the meeting had read the document which he had had circulated on 17 March, and that suggestions would be made so that a scheme may be started in the two ports and in Florence, and an idea formulated as to what should be done in GENOA and elsewhere.

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Lt. Col. WILSON: Experience had shown that SEAFS and other services did not realise the limitations of the responsibilities of Public Safety L.R.P. measures. Places in England had been unready and relied on the police when police services were actually finished in 48 hours, after which difficulties arose in matters concerning feeding, housing, etc., and when these had not been supplied, morale had been affected. However, British morale had stood up to raids amazingly well, but the question arose whether the Italians would behave in the same way. Would port labour in ANCONA, for instance, continue under raid conditions?

AFHQ had stated that Senior CAO's would be responsible for coordinating Post Raid Measures.

Lt. Col. LAPPER:

Asked whether the CAOs would work on the same lines as in England, forming rescue squads, etc.

Lt. Col. WILSON:

Stated that ordinary Italian PAD schemes were in existence and were under AMG control and that there always would be such services; but the number of personnel that could be kept standing by would not be sufficient to cope with 30 or 40 rockets in two or three days. It was essential that centres be prepared to handle feeding, care of homeless people, labour disruption, etc.

Col. CRIEPPS:

Stated that although the CAO would give instructions for what was necessary, he must be given some idea of what instructions to issue. Experience had further shown that various services ~~get~~ in England had got in each others way and hard-feeling had been caused and that an "incident officer" (?) was necessary for coordinating.

Major HALL:

The Ministry of the Interior would be contacted and asked to state whether there was money enough available to handle the scheme. Allied Commission would provide the necessary funds, and no difficulty was foreseen.

Lt. Col. LAPPER: Presumed that the scheme would be on a civilian basis.

Lt. Col. CRIEPPS: Yes - e.g. a port would set up its own gang, as would other units.

Lt. Col. WILSON: Informed the meeting that Army Commanders had been asked to consider the matter so far as it affected ^(the military) themselves.

Lt. Col. LAPPER: Stated that we should rely on the Genio Civili to arrange initial

rescue squads, as well as squads for clearance of buildings, streets, and repair work on water supply and electricity, etc. He suggested

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Lt. Col. CRIFFS : Yes - e.g. a port would set up its own gang, as would other units.

Lt. Col. WILSON : Informed the meeting that Army Commanders had been asked to consider the matter so far as it affected ^(the military) themselves.

Lt. Col. LAPPER : Stated that we should rely on the Genio Civili to arrange initial rescue squads, as well as squads for clearance of buildings, streets, and repair work on water supply and electricity, etc. ⁵³⁸⁴ He suggested that the Regional Engineer would act as Liaison officer.

Lt. Col. WILSON: Stated that it had been found in ~~the~~ England that the amount of damage had been unprecedented and that the "earth-quake" effect was the greatest danger, it caused buildings to crumble up at some distance from the explosion and there were consequently a greater number of trapped people.

Lt. Col. WILSON asked whether, if P.W. & U. undertook the control of these measures, they had any means of disposing of rubble and whether they had transport.

Major KLEIN said that A.F.H.Q. were particularly anxious that there should be made available building equipment, labour equipment, food, clothing etc., for civil defense and post raid measures. The Army would supply if requirements could not be met from civilian sources. G-3 and G-4 must concur as to military necessity and, in such event, supplies would be made available almost immediately from theatre stocks.

Lt. BERIZZI said that soup kitchens should be established to supply those in need, and that any large restaurants, hotels, mills which have their own kitchens, etc., could be used.

Col. CRIFTS pointed out that in the event of families fleeing from affected areas, the workers were very likely to follow and it was important therefore to provide for these families; in this respect soup kitchens would counteract a general exodus.

Lt.Col. LATTER said that special electrical sub-station equipment, which can be put up in 36 hours, had been used in England and is now coming over to Italy for use in the North.

Major HALL spoke of the tendency to reduce fire services and ARP which had already begun in AMG territory.

Lt.Col. WILSON gave an assurance that such services were being reactivated.

Major KLEIN said that existing Italian fire fighting equipment was ineffective because of the lack of tires, tubes, batteries, hoses, etc., and that consequently British fire fighting units, which might otherwise be employed further North, were at present being retained in Southern Italy because the Italians were unable to take over.

Major KLEIN stated that substantial stocks of food were presently available in

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Italians were unable to take over.

Major MARTIN stated that substantial stocks of food were presently available in

539.

AC stock piling warehouses located in ANCONA and LEGHORN and that American Red Cross also was stock piling substantial quantities of clothing for relief purposes in these same warehouses. Both food and clothing could easily be made available when released by the competent authority.

Lt.Col.LAPPER asked whether "V" bombs could be expected to land in TERNI, where the largest electrical plant in Italy was just being completed.

Lt.Col.WILSON said that AMG had concerned themselves only with Leghorn, Anconá and Florence.

LTJCol. CRIFFS and Lt.Col.WILSON agreed that TERNI could be reached by rockets at the present time.

Lt. Col. WILSON said that there had been a meeting in Rome recently which had been attended by every Civil Defence Officer in Italy and they were now speeding up Post Raid Measures and reactivating ARP services of towns.

Col. CRIPPS suggested that each Sub-Commission should prepare a short paper on L.E.P. as it affected them. These papers would be co-ordinated and referred to Executive Commissioner. It would be helpful if papers could be phrased in such a manner that those in places which were not immediate targets and with no Army support, such as Pisa, would be given some indication of the Post Raid Measures necessary.

IT WAS AGREED: a) That Post Raid Measures were the responsibility of the Senior

CAOs.

b) Sub-Commissions would submit to Civil Affairs Section, by 1200 hours Saturday 24 March 1945, a short paper covering

L.E.P. in their own spheres of activity.

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INTER OFFICE MEMO

RHK/er

Ref: #7/395/TW6

28 Feb 45

SUBJECT: Report on Conference - Subject "Reactivation of Civil Defenses" held on 26 Feb 45 by G-5, AFHQ.

TO: Director, Transportation Sub-Commission

FROM: Port & Warehouse Division

1. Minutes of the meeting are being mailed to this HQ by G-5, AFHQ, but two salient points affecting the Allied Commission deserve special attention.

2. G-5, AFHQ desire to know what steps have been taken by AC to comply with para. c and d of letter 29 Jan 45 from AFHQ, Ref. AC 384.5/069 GCT-O, Subject "Long Range Projectiles", letter attached.

3. Further, Lt. Col. Daw, advisor to G-5 on PAD matters, is preparing a list of questions to be submitted to AC thru G-5, AFHQ, inquiring into AC's preparedness on the entire matter of PAD and post-raid measures.

4. The second point of importance is the matter of equipment and supplies for civil defense including post raid measures. The attached list covers the contemplated needs. It was brought out that a new procedure now exists for procurement of standard army type items for essential civilian use. See letter 22 Feb 45 from AFHQ, Ref. AC 400.312/031 GEC-O, this subject, copy attached.

5. The essence of this letter is: where G-3 and G-4, AFHQ concur that the requisition for supplies is of "military necessity" such material will be supplied from existing theatre stocks, if available. If G-3 and G-4, AFHQ do not concur as to "military necessity", decision will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Decision would require

by AC to comply with para. c and d of letter 29 Jan 45 from AFHQ, Ref. AG 364.5/069 SCT-0, Subject "Long Range Projectiles", letter attached.

3. Further, Lt. Col. Daw, advisor to G-5 on PAD matters, is preparing a list of questions to be submitted to AC thru G-5, AFHQ, inquiring into AC's preparedness on the entire matter of PAD and post-raid measures.

4. The second point of importance is the matter of equipment and supplies for civil defense including post raid measures. The attached list covers the contemplated needs. It was brought out that a new procedure now exists for procurement of standard army type items for essential civilian use. See letter 22 Feb 45 from AFHQ, Ref. AG 400.312/031 GEC-0, this subject, copy attached.

5. The essence of this letter is: where G-3 and G-4, AFHQ concur that the requisition for supplies is of "military necessity" such material will be supplied from existing theatre stocks, if available. If G-3 and G-4, AFHQ do not concur as to the "military necessity", decision will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (It is estimated such decision would require perhaps a two month delay, whereas a decision from G-3, G-4, AFHQ could be obtained almost immediately).

6. Since tires, tubes and batteries are needed to make existing Italian fire fighting equipment effective, and since none of these are available from theatre stocks, it was pointed out that AC could only look to stocks of these items already in blanket allocation to AC.

ROBERT E. KILM
Maj. Gen. Adm. C.
Port & Thse. Div.

SECRET

26 February 1948

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE INCLUDING POST WAR MEASURESa. Equipment

- (1) Rescue Parties, also demolition and road clearance

Picks, shovels, debris baskets, rope, lifting tackle, jacks, levers, woodworking tools, flares, oxy-acetylene cutting plants

- (2) Rehousing

Woodworking tools, metalworking tools, tarpaulins, light building materials, glass substitute, cement.

- (3) Repair of Utilities

As advised by Engineers

- (4) Medical Supplies and Hygiene Supplies

As advised by Medical Officers

b. Transportation - Preliminary Note. Any otherwise immobilized vehicles can be put on the road if tires and batteries can be provided. Shortages in local resources will have to be made up with the following types of vehicle:

- (1) Rescue Parties, etc. - 2-1/2 or 3 tonners, with addition of self-tipping vehicles for debris clearance
- (2) Rehousing - 15 cwt, 2-1/2 or 3 tonners
- (3) Food and clothing - no special vehicles required
- (4) Medical - Ambulances or vehicles which can be suitably converted.

c. Clothing - Boots, overalls, heavy gloves - supply to be confined to Rescue Party Personnel, Road and Debris Clearance personnel, and Utility Parties only.

d. Food - "Heavy workers' scale" to be provided for those issued with clothing.

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

APO 512

RHF/awm

AP 32

AG 400.312/031 CMC-0

22 February 1945

SUBJECT: Procedure for Procurement of Standard Army Type Items for Essential Civilian Use, as Authorized by The Combined Chiefs of Staff in CAL 805.

TO : All concerned

1. Civil Affairs requirements fall into four main classes.

a. Non-technical items such as subsistence, soap, and clothing together with bulk items requisitioned for varied uses e.g. newsprint, caustic soda.

b. Medical, veterinary and sanitary supplies.

c. Miscellaneous items not normally held by Army Services e.g. canning materials, agricultural machinery and fertilizers.

d. Items of standard army type equipment common to civilian users and Army Services e.g. telecommunication stores, road maintenance equipment, industrial supplies, mining supplies, electrical power equipment, transport and transportation stores.

2. The procedure for the procurement of items falling within the scope of paragraph 1 a, b, and c above, will not be altered by this directive.

3. AFHQ Supply Services, United States and British, will be responsible for provision of military items as defined in paragraph 1 d above against approved Civil Affairs requirements, either from theater stocks or by new procurement.

4. Procurement will be as follows:

c. Miscellaneous items not normally held by Army services e.g. canning materials, agricultural machinery and fertilizers.

d. Items of standard army type equipment common to civilian users and Army Services e.g. telecommunications stores, road maintenance equipment, industrial supplies, mining supplies, electrical power equipment, transport and transportation stores.

2. The procedure for the procurement of items falling within the scope of paragraph 1 a, b, and c above, will not be altered by this directive.

3. ARHQ Supply Services, United States and British, will be responsible for provision of military items as defined in paragraph 1 d above against approved Civil Affairs requirements, either from theater stocks or by new procurement.

4. Procurement will be as follows:

a. The Allied Commission and various Military Liaison Headquarters will prepare and forward requirements to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, this headquarters, for approval. These requirements will be stated in terms of standard military items wherever practicable.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, this headquarters will refer such requirements to the appropriate United States and British services for comment and recommendations as to:

- (1) Acceptance by Services as falling within scope of paragraph 1 d above
- (2) Validity of the requirements for the stated purposes.
- (3) Possible substitutes of Army type equipment to accomplish the intended purpose.

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APHQ ltr, AG 450,312/031 GSC-O,
 dtd 22 February 1945 (Corrected copy)
 (cont'd)

g. Appropriate United States and British Services will submit their recommendations through normal channels to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, this headquarters, who will, on the basis of those comments, recommend to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, approval or disapproval of the requisition, and advise what division of supply responsibility as between United States and United Kingdom is to be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 will forward to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Combined Civil Affairs Committee examination the approved requirement incorporating this headquarters recommendations.

e. When the Combined Civil Affairs Committee notifies decision as to approval and supply responsibility, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 will direct provision by the appropriate Service which will be responsible for supply from theater stocks or by normal provision action as in the case of other military requirements. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 will adjust supply responsibility between United States and British theater services if necessary.

5. When a service is directed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 to make supply provision, the Service will so notify the Allied Commission and appropriate Military Liaison Headquarters with copy to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, this headquarters, and will advise estimated date and details of delivery. All issue vouchers will be endorsed "for essential civilian supply" and carry G-5 section requisition numbers. Arrangements for release, delivery and/or collection will be made between the Allied Commission and appropriate Military Liaison Headquarters and issuing depots. Conflicts of priority between those requirements and other theater requirements will be referred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 for determination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5. Maximum use will be made of theater stocks in lieu of additional imports.

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6. The requisition as approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee is the basis and authority upon which the Services can initiate new or replacement procurement action.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

S: A.B. KING

Lt. Col., ASD

Asst Adjutant General

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(see next page)

AFHQ ltr AG 400.312/031 CIG-O, dtd
22 February 1945 (corrected copy) (cont'd)

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 2 - Mov & Tn
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 3 - MTR
 3 - SIG AF
 2 - AG Records
 1 - AG M & D

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 489081 - 365

13 April, 1945

AC/14529/TS

SUBJECT : Reactivation of Civil Defence Organization.

TO : S.C.A.O. 5th Army (Attention C.F.S.)

1. ^{36^B} Reference our letter of even number dated 8 March 1945 and your reply ref: 112/1 dated 13 March 1945. ^{33^A}
2. ^{44^A} P.A.D. and Civil Defence Section of A.F.H.Q. has pointed out that in reporting on Florence the Check List forwarded to you was not completed. In consequence a number of questions to which replies are required were not answered.
3. A further copy Check List is forwarded to you herewith. May this be completed in triplicate please.

Edward Wilson N. Col.
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.C.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

FJW/C.

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P SAFETY

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/waw

G-5: 384.51

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Reactivation of Civil Defence Organisation.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your AC/14529/PS dated 17 March 1945.

2. PAD & Civil Defence Section this HQ has pointed out that AMG Fifth Army in reporting on Florence have not made out the Check List submitted to them. In consequence a number of questions to which replies are required are not answered. It would facilitate consideration of the problem as a whole if Florence could be asked to complete the questionnaire originally sent them.

3. The report for Ancona has not yet been received. ^{Now} received

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

TO	INIT	
DIRECTOR		
DEPUTY DIRECTOR		
EXEC. OFFICER		
ADJ. GEN.	W	545
IC. & REG.		
PERSONS		
PROCESSES		
PROPERTY		
COM. & INFO.		

Julius Byles
JULIUS BYLES,
Major, F. A.

4 APR 1945

537-

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/WSW

G-5: 384.51

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Reactivation of Civil Defence Organisation.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your AC/14529/FS dated 17 March 1945.

2. PAD & Civil Defence Section this HQ has pointed out that AMG Fifth Army in reporting on Florence have not made out the Check List submitted to them. In consequence a number of questions to which replies are required are not answered. It would facilitate consideration of the problem as a whole if Florence could be asked to complete the questionnaire originally sent them.

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For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

JB
JULIUS BYLES,
Major, F. A.

SECRET

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PUB. SAFETY 8/L

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/po

12 April 1945

G-5 : 384.51

SUBJECT : Civil Defense - Post Raid Measures.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. Reference our letter G-5:384.51 of 19 February to the Under-Secretary of State, The War Office, London, copy to you.

2. The War Office has replied to the effect that it is impossible at this time to send an Officer of the Ministry of Home Security to Italy to advise you on methods of dealing with long-range projectile attacks.

3. It is desired that you continue your efforts to perfect the civil defense organizations in Florence, Leghorn and Ancona, as directed in this Headquarters letter to you, AG 384.5/069 GCT-O of 29 January and subsequent correspondence from this section direct.

4. Further reports on your progress in this respect are awaited. Reference your AG/14529/PS of 26 March regarding Ancona and our G-5:384.51 of 2 April regarding Florence.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 :

Copy to :

P.A.D. and C.D.
thru G-3.

Julius Byles
JULIUS BYLES
Major F.A.

TO	INIT	DATE
DIRECTOR		
DEPUTY DIRECTOR		
EXEC. OFFICER		
POLICE	<i>[Signature]</i>	154
SEC. & REG.		
INTEL.		
ADJ. GEN.		
SECURITY		
CHIEF CLERK		

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/no

12 April 1945

G-5 : 384.51

SUBJECT : Civil Defense - Post Raid Measures.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

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4. Further reports on your progress in this respect are awaited. Reference your AG/14529/PS of 26 March regarding Ancona and our G-5, 384.51 of 2 April regarding Florence.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 :

JB
JULIUS BYLES
Major P.A.

Copy to :
P.A.D. and C.D.
thru G-3.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Tel : 485031 - 365

26 March, 1945.

AC/44529/PS

SUBJECT : Reactivation of Civil Defence Organization.

TO : AFHQ - G-5.

1. Reference your G-5.384.51 of 4 March 45 and signal F 44241, dated 15 March 45, and our letters of even number dated 16th and 19th March 45.

2. Attached are duplicate copies of an interim report received from Abruzzi-Marche Region, concerning the Civil Defence Organization in Ancona. It is anticipated that further details will be available in the near future, when a further report will be submitted.

For the Chief Commissioner :

G. R. UPJOHN, Brig.
Vice CA Sec.

FJW/G.


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TO : HQ. A.C. Public Safety Sub Commission
FROM : HQ. ANG/AC Abruzzi-Marche Region
SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles
REF : R5/614/6
DATE : 23 March 1945

Ref your AC/14529 dated 8 March 45. Report on reactivation etc. submitted by Maj. Mason Fire and CD Officer Ancona is forwarded for your information as requested.

FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONER :



S. Fickering
S. FICKERING
Lt. Colonel
R.P.S.O.

5386

/ec

CIVIL DEFENCE - ANCONA

PROGRESS REPORT - 20th of MARCH 1945
=====

1. FIRE SERVICE

This has been placed under operational control of A.F.S..
Lists of requirements are being prepared.
Fire Officer requests authority to visit Rome, to arrange
for additional personnel & equipment.
General situation satisfactory.

2. CIVIL DEFENCE

A scheme has been prepared by the Italian P.A. Officer &
is being considered by Provincial Fire & C.D. Officer
and the Area P.A.D. Officer.
The scheme covers the warning system, shelters, first aid
posts, Rescue squads, Hospital accommodation & mortuary ac-
comodation.
The Post Raid Services are being considered by the P.H.O.
& Welfare Officers.
General Situation - Not at all good at present, but will
shortly be improved.

3. Supplies & Equipment

Indents will be submitted as soon as requirements are
known.

[Signature]
Major,

Fire And Civil Defence Officer
for Lt.Col.P.C. Ancona Province

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Civil Defense and Fire Services at ANCONA

1. CIVIL DEFENSE(a) Is there a Civil Defense Control Center in existence? yes

(b) Is the Civil Control Center in telephone communication with P.A.D. Control?

yes

(c) How have language difficulties overcome, and is there a Civil Liaison Officer always available?

Civil P.A. Officer always on duty. Interpreter being provided

(d) How many full-time rescue personnel are available and how are they organized?

Full resources of Fire Brigade. Less fire crews. In squads of 6 or 8 menReserve part time squad being formed(e) What is state of training of full-time rescue personnel? 3364 Fire Brigade personnel - fully trained. Reserve part timers. Training varied.

(f) Has every Party or Squad vehicle allocated to it in reasonable running order and capable of fulfilling its proper function?

One vehicle in good order. 2 others being asked for.(g) How many First Aid Posts are in existence? Nil. What arrangements are there for manning them and what is their normal capacity?Five Posts being established. Personnel Full Time and Part Time.Capacity - will vary according to nature of injury - up to 25 at one time.(h) How many ambulances are available? 3. How many of these are on immediate call?I, Fully efficient.; Two needing tyres etc. both in hand.(i) What are the arrangements for Incident Control? Will probably be entirely military

(e) What is state of training of full-time reserve personnel? Fire Brigade personnel - fully trained. Reserve part timers. Training varied.

(f) Has every party of squad vehicle allocated to it in reasonable running order and capable of fulfilling its proper function?
One vehicle in good order. 2 others being asked for.

(g) How many first aid posts are in existence? Nil. What arrangements are there for mending them and what is their running capacity?

Five posts being established. Personnel full time and part time.
Capacity - will vary according to nature of injury - up to 25 at one time.

(h) How many ambulances are available? 3. How many of these are on immediate call? 1, fully efficient.; 2 needing tyres etc. both in hand.

(i) What are the arrangements for incident control? Will probably be entirely military

Have sufficient civil personnel been trained in incident control? 3 Fire Officers.
Fully trained. Trying to find part time suitable people for training.

(j) Are civil defense exercises held? NO. What was the date of the last exercise? October 1943.

(k) Is reporting system adequate? NO. How much time elapses between the occurrence of an incident and the arrival of first response parties?
Telephones need activating. Scheme in hand.

.....

2. FIRE SERVICE

(a) What are the numbers of trained full-time fire fighting personnel?

(1) Officers 8 (2) NCOs and Firemen 80

(b) What major fire fighting appliances are: (1) Serviceable 9

(2) Unserviceable. 5

(c) In the case of unserviceable appliances, what is required to put them in useable condition? Details to be sent on later chiefly tyres, tubes and wheels

(d) What are the arrangements for dealing with petroleum spirit fires, and what stocks of foam compound and/or powder are available? FIRE SERVICE UNDER MILITARY CONTROL

and all movements ordered by Area Fire Officer

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(e) Are there sufficient stocks of hose, and is it in good condition?

Reasonable stocks on hand condition good (2200 metres 70mm.

(f) What is the diameter of the standard hose in use? 70mm & 45mm.

3. EQUIPMENT

(a) Are there any shortages of fire or rescue equipment in respect of which demands have not been made by the local civil affairs officers concerned?

Details to be sent in later

(b) Are there any shortages of equipment in respect of which demands have been made, but have not been met from Allied Comintern stocks?

Details to be sent in later

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(a) What are the arrangements for dealing with petroleum spirit fires, and what stocks of foam compound and/or powder are available?

Fire Service under Military Control

and all movements ordered by Area Fire Officer

5380

(e) Are there sufficient stocks of hoses, and is it in good condition?

Reasonable stocks on hand condition good (2200 metres 70mm. 800 metres 45mm)

(f) What is the diameter of the standard hose in use? 70mm & 45mm.

3. EQUIPMENT

(a) Are there any shortages of fire or rescue equipment in respect of which demands have not been made by the Local Civil Affairs Officers concerned?

Details to be sent in later

(b) Are there any shortages of equipment in respect of which demands have been made, but have not been met from Allied Commission stocks?

Details to be sent in later

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Tel : 489081 - 365

19 March, 1945.

AC/14529/PS

SUBJECT : Reactivation of Civil Defence Organization.

TO : AFHQ - G-5.

1. Reference your G-5.384.51 of 4 March 45 and signal F 44241, dated 15 March 45, and our letter of even number dated 16th March 45.

2. Attached are duplicate copies of an interim report received from Toscana Region, concerning the Civil Defence Organization in Leghorn. It is anticipated that further details will be available in the near future, when a further report will be submitted.

For the Chief Commissioner :

C. R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Sec.

AFS/G.

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
TOSCANA REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

FILE : R-VIII/PS/10.6

13 March 1945.

SUBJECT : Long-range Projectiles.

SECRET

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission,
Headquarters, A.C. - C.M.F.

1. Reference AE/14529/PS dated 8 March 1945.
2. Submitted herewith are details as indicated in check list pro-forma attached to above, in respect to Livorno.
3. The arrangements so far made result from the conference on 29-30th January 1945, as the directive on the matter only reached this H.Q. on 12 March 1945.
4. Steps had already been taken however by Capt. FORSTER in conjunction with the P.A.D. Officer, P.B.S. Livorno and 60 Sub-Area, also R.P.H.C. Toscana Region. 538₁
5. With regard to 'Exhibit A' attached to above directive, there is much doubt that the heavy rescue equipment indicated in or will become available, other than in an improvised or very simple form.
6. Further enquiry is on hand however to see what further steps can be taken to ameliorate the situation which to say the least is difficult.
7. With regard to the problem of transportation, this is dependent on tyres and batteries. In Florence it is hoped soon to open up a vulcanising plant to repair old and damaged tyres. Italian vehicles are not normally suited to military size tyres unless wheels are specially adapted.
8. With regard to heavy transport, this will have to come from P.B.S. resources and the P.A.D. Officer is again being consulted to that end, as any Scheme organised must co-operate P.B.S., 60 Sub-Area and A.M.C. or A.C. as the case may be.
9. It is hoped that further details will be available in the very near future when a further report will be submitted.

A. W. Rowlerson

A. W. ROWLERSON
Lieut. Colonel, G. L.,
Regional Public Safety Officer.

AWR/dr

SECRET

CHECK LISTCivil defence and Fire Service at LIVORNO1°- CIVIL DEFENCE:(a) Is there a Civil Defence Control Center in Existence?

Yes, and H.Q. of Civil Fire Station is "Secondary" Control.

(b) Is the Civil Control Center in telephone communication with P.A.D. Control?

Yes, by exchange telephone. Fire Station has a direct line to U.S. Fire Station in addition to exchange line.

(c) How are language difficulties overcome, and is there a Civil Liaison Officer always available?

There are two interpreters, one of which report to the Control Center immediately an Alarm is sounded, but once it is established that there are positive indications of V-I and V-2 weapons being used, it is proposed to maintain an interpreter always available at the Control Center (A.F.H.Q. letter AG 384. 5/069 GGT-0 states that there are still no positive indications of V weapons) P.B.S.P.A.D. Officer has at least one fluent Italian speaking EM in his Control.

~~The term Civil Liaison Officer is not understood.~~

(d) How many full-time rescue personnel are available and how are they organised?

U.N.P.A. disbanded. 90 full time Firemen (present leave system 50% are always on duty, but arrangements have already been made to bring all of them into continuous service at 24 hrs maximum notice), but all personnel are obliged to return to their place of duty immediately the Alert is sounded.

There are 4 Fire Engines with 8 Pumps available at two Fire Stations, 3 of which carry light rescue equipment while there are in addition 2 Small Vans and a car equipped for light rescue work, therefore either;

4 Fire Engines and 2 Light Rescue Parties (40 men)
or

3 Light Rescue Parties and 3 Fire Engines (42 men)
can be considered to be always available while the other appliances can be manned at short notice after the Alert has sounded.

39B

-2-

(e) What is the state of training of full-time rescue personnel?

Most of the personnel went through the bombardment of their city as well as those to which they were sent and can therefore be considered adequately experienced.

(f) Has every Party or Squad a vehicle allocated to it in reasonable running order and capable of fulfilling its proper function?

Squads or Parties listed in par (d) above have all serviceable but mostly old vehicles, viz-

- 4 Fire Engines
- 2 Small Vans
- 1 Motor Car

(g) How many First Aid Posts are in existence?

12 First Aid Posts in and around the town, they are all situated in as suitable Chemists Shops as Possible (this latter because of extreme shortage of accommodation and medical supplies).

What arrangements are therefor manning them?

A doctor and one or more nurses report to the post immediately on a Siren sounding in addition to which there is the Chemist himself.

What is their casualty capacity?

Exact capacity unknown at moment.

5359

(h) How many ambulances are available ?

- 3 Motor Ambulances
- 3 Hand Propelled Single Ambulances.

How many on immediate call?

Nil, the shortage of ambulances in the town does not permit any to be left in reserve.

(i) What are the arrangements for Incident Control?

Certain Police Officers to be trained.

Have sufficient Civil Personnel been trained in Incident Control?

No.

(j) Are Civil Defense exercises held?

No.

What was date of the last exercise?

None.

-3-

(k) Is reporting system adequate?

No, only official telephones are in operation; otherwise services depend on messengers.

How much time elapses between the occurrence of an incident and the arrival of first rescue parties?

Not possible to ascertain without exercises.

2°- FIRE SERVICE:(a) What are the numbers of trained full time Fire Fighting Personnel?

I Officer

I3 NCOs

77 Firemen

(b) What Major Fire Fighting Appliances are Serviceable?

2 Tankers with built in pumps, each with a trailer pump and a portable pump.

I Tanker and trailer pump plus portable pump.

I Fire Truck with a trailer pump and a portable pump.

In addition to above appliances there is one spare trailer pump.

What Major Fire Fighting Appliances are Unserviceable?

I Portable Pump which is awaiting delivery of pump parts expected shortly to be in commission and 5352

I Fiat 1100 Van as transport for portable pump.

(c) In the case of unserviceable appliances, what is required to put them in usable condition?

Fiat 1100 Van

5 Tyres and Tubes (16x6)

(d) What are the arrangements for dealing with petroleum spirit fires and what stocks of foam compound and or powder are available?

One Fire Engine Tanker has a modern "built-in" foam apparatus after the fashion of the British multiple jet inductor, but of smaller capacity and there are a minimum of 10 foam branches approximating to English No. 2 Pyrene foam making branches, these are not normally carried on the appliances. Stock of foam compound 900 Kgs.

(e) Are there sufficient stocks of hose and is it in good condition?
Adequate quantities in good condition.

-4-

* (f) What is the diameter of the standard hose in use?

Standard hose is equivalent to English 1 3/4 inch and 2 3/4 inch hose or 45 mm and 70 mm respectively.

3. EQUIPMENT:

(a) Are there any shortages of fire or rescue equipment in respect of which demands have not been made by the local CAC concerned?

Yes, } 6 volt m/c Type Batteries suitable for motor cycle vans
 } 3.50x19 Tyres and Tubes
 10 3.5 Dry-cell batteries (any type) for adaption to standard Italian hand-lamp torch as carried by Italian Firemen.
 1 6 volt Jeep type Battery for FIAT.

(b) Are there any shortages of equipment in respect of which demands have been made, but have not been met from Allied Commission stocks?

Yes, 1 Fiat Van FIAT	5 Tyres	4 Tubes	16x6
3 M/C Vans Tuzzi	5 "	6 "	" "
1 Fiat Van FIAT	5 "	5 "	" "

This latter Van is closed and it is intended to convert this into an ambulance.

REMARKS

535.

1- In addition to the above organization there is a voluntary Society that has been induced to place 12 squads of 12 men each at the disposal of the town on a part time basis, they are all trained in first aid, but are willing to assist in rescue work if so required; They are equipped with stretchers and two hand cart ambulances and would greatly assist the poor ambulance situation.

2- Squads of Municipal Guards have been trained by the Fire Service, for rescue work, these latter are on a part time basis, but unless the equipment as listed in para 3(a and b) is forthcoming, they will be without transport other than handcarts.

3- If the tyres for the motor-cycle vans are supplied, it is proposed to hold them in A.M.C. hands to be made immediately available in case of emergency.

4- It is appreciated that in this organization much depends on the Siren being sounded but plans are being formulated to reduce this to a minimum in case of V-2 attack.

-4-

- (f) What is the diameter of the standard hose in use?

Standard hose is equivalent to English 1 3/4 inch and 2 3/4 inch hose or 45 mm and 70 mm respectively.

3. EQUIPMENT:

- (a) Are there any shortages of fire or rescue equipment in respect of which demands have not been made by the local CAO concerned?

Yes, 3 6 volt m/c Type Batteries suitable for motor cycle vans
 3 3.50x19 Tyres and Tubes
 10 3.5 Dry-cell Batteries (any type) for adaption to standard Italian hand-lamp torch as carried by Italian Firemen.
 1 6 volt Jeep type Battery for IICO Fiat.

- (b) Are there any shortages of equipment in respect of which demands have been made, but have not been met from Allied Commission stocks?

Yes,	1	Fiat Van IICO	5	Tyres	4	Tubes	16x6
	3	M/C Vans Guzzi	6	"	6	"	" "
	1	Fiat Van IICO	5	"	5	"	" "

This latter Van is closed and it is intended to convert this into an ambulance.

REMARKS

535.

1- In addition to the above organisation there is a voluntary Society that has been induced to place 12 squads of 12 men each at the disposal of the town on a part time basis, they are all trained in first aid, but are willing to assist in rescue work if so required; They are equipped with stretchers and two hand cart ambulances and would greatly assist the poor ambulance situation.

2- Squads of Municipal Guards have been trained by the Fire Service, for rescue work, these latter are on a part time basis, but unless the equipment as listed in para 3(a and b) is forthcoming, they will be without transport other than handcarts.

3- If the tyres for the motor-cycle vans are supplied, it is proposed to hold these in A.M.G. hands to be made immediately available in case of emergency.

4- It is appreciated that in this organisation much depends on the Siren being sounded but plans are being formulated to reduce this to a minimum in case of V-2 attack.

SECRETHEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

P.S. H.R. phase

Jil.

38A

with P.S.

cc.

AG/14529/PS

17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Post-Raid Measures.

TO:

Economic Section

Copy No.

"	"	for Finance Sub-Commission	60
"	"	" Food Sub-Commission	61
"	"	" Labour Sub-Commission	62
"	"	" Public Wks. Sub-Commission	63
"	"	" Industry Sub-Commission	64
"	"	" Commerce Sub-Commission	65

Legal Sub-Commission

66

✓ Public Health Sub-Commission

68

✓ Td

1. Following a meeting held on 31 Jan 45 in Public Safety Sub-Commission, at which you were represented, there is attached for your study a copy of A.F.R.Q. letter Reference AG 384.5/069 GOF-O dated 29 Jan 45, together with a copy of Report on P.A.D. and C.D. measures to deal with L.R.P. in the European theatre. 5356

2. Particular attention is drawn to paragraphs 1 (c) and 1 (d) of AG 384.5/069 GOF-O. In order to implement the instructions it is considered necessary to call a further meeting to coordinate in more detail the work of various Sub-Commissions concerned, and to formulate the plans to be adopted with regard to Post-Raid Measures.

3. Will you therefore please arrange to be present at a meeting to be presided over by Vice President, Civil Affairs Section in Room 5B (5th Floor) at 1500 hours on 21 March 45.

RHC/pr

TO	DATE
DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY DIRECTOR	
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	
CHIEF OF STAFF	
CHIEF OF BUREAU	
CHIEF OF SECTION	
CHIEF OF SUB-SECTION	
CHIEF OF BRANCH	
CHIEF OF DIVISION	
CHIEF OF OFFICE	
CHIEF OF UNIT	
CHIEF OF POST	
CHIEF OF STATION	
CHIEF OF TERRITORY	
CHIEF OF ZONE	

R. R. CRIPPS, Col.
CBO CA Section.

511

37^ASECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394.

AC/14529/PS.

March, 1945.

Dis in draft at 33A

SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Regional Commissioners, Liguria, Piemonte, Emilia,
Lombardia, Venezia, Lazio-Umbria, Southern, Regions.
ANG, 8th Army.

1. Reference letter of even number dated 19th January, 1945.

2. Attached herewith is copy of AFHQ letter A.C.384.5/069 GCT-O, dated 29th January, 1945, together with copy of report on Passive Air Defence and Civil Defence measures to deal with long range projectiles in the European theatre. Copies have already been sent to Regional Commissioners, Toscana, Abruzzi-Marche and to ANG 5th Army, who are taking special measures.

3. A meeting was held in Rome on 29th and 30th January, 1945, to discuss P.A.D. organisation in the light of the above report by the P.A.D. and Civil Defence Advisor. This meeting was attended by Fire and Civil Defence officers from Regions. Copy of a Report of this meeting was forwarded to you with letter of even number, dated 20th February, 1945. 5350

4. As a result of the meeting the officers concerned are taking steps to insure that the Civil Defence Organisation is re-activated in Leghorn, Florence and Ancona, and that in target towns it is organised in such a manner as to be immediately available.

5. The Allied Commission has been charged by AFHQ with the responsibility of ensuring that post-raid measures are organised at all levels to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack. Post raid measures are beyond the scope of any one branch. It is recommended

SECRET.

that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defence, and that responsibility for Post-Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who alone can co-ordinate all the many services concerned.

6. Application has been made to the British Ministry of Home Security to send out an advisor on Post-Raid measures to be on short attachment to this Headquarters. The matter is also being considered by the various Sub-Commissions concerned pending the arrival of the advisor.

For the Chief Commissioner:

R.R. Upjohn
G.E. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Sec. AC.

SECRET36th

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 324.

AC/14529/TS.

16 March, 1945.

SUBJECT : Reactivation of Civil Defence Organisation.

TO : AFHQ, G-5.

1. Reference your G-5. 384.51 of 4th March, 1945, and signal P 44241, dated 15th March, 1945.

2. Attached is copy (in duplicate) of report received from AMG, 5th Army, concerning Civil Defense Organisation in Florence.

Again 3. Regional Commissioners concerned have been requested to expedite the submission of reports for Leghorn and Ancona, and the particulars will be forwarded to you as soon as they are received in this Headquarters.

For the Chief Commissioner:

G.R. Upjohn
G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP OA Sec. AC.

535*

Enclosure: Report (in duplicate).

SECRET

TO	
DIRECTOR	
DEPUTY DIRECTOR	
EXEC. OFFICER	
POLICE	Ans 163
LIC. & REG.	
PRISONS	
ADM. OFFICER	
SECURITY	
CHIEF CLERK	

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
AMG FIFTH ARMY
APO 464 U.S. Army

EJB/TJM/ewp

13th March 1945.

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles.

112/1.

TO : H.Q., Allied Commission. (3)
(Attn: Public Safety Sub-Commission)

1. Reference letter on above subject, AC/14529/PS dated 8th March, 1945.

2. The Army P.A.D. Scheme and Civil Defence Organization in Florence works in close collaboration.

3. The Army P.A.D. Scheme is under the control of Capt. Pegg, attached to Florence Command, whilst the Fire and Civil Defence Officer is Capt. A.W. MacDougall.

4. Briefly, the present position in Florence is as follows :-

P.A.D. Scheme. The city is divided into 4 sectors with a Central Control at H.Q., Florence Command (Tel: 1500), manned throughout each 24 hrs.

Sirens. There are 17 sirens situated throughout Florence giving adequate coverage. They are operated from the central control room by remote control on signal from Fighter Command. Sirens are tested daily.

Signal Alert. Warbling tone on siren for one minute.

All Clear. Prolonged blast (steady) for one minute.

Action on Alert. Military personnel who are not in their quarters when the alert sounds, will conform as follows :-

- (i) If in the streets, report to the nearest Military establishment, all of which are signposted.
- (ii) If in Cinema, Hotel or Restaurants, remain until the alert is over.
- (iii) Military personnel will not use civilian shelters.

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SECRET

Communications. Telephones are used as far as possible. Priority given to P.A.D. and Fire. Army Sector Controller arranges for M/C DRs to be available in event of breakdown of phones.

Services available. Light Rescue Squads of 1 N.C.O. and 6 men detailed one per sector. All units exceeding 50 O.Rs provide one light rescue squad.

Heavy Rescue Squads. Engineering units each provide one Heavy Rescue Squad. Called out on orders from Central Control.

Working Parties. Units of over 100 men each provide one working squad of 1 officer and 20 men - allocated to sectors by Central Control.

Action. On alert all squads "stand to" with trucks loaded.

Medical. Stretcher cases to 3 General Hospitals (Military).

First Aid Posts. Two Army First Aid Posts. Civilian First Aid Posts see below.

Ambulances. Three Military Hospitals supply ambulances for wounded.

Reporting Incidents. By phone by Military or Civil Police, Military units or U.N.P.A. to Central Control, or D.R. or runner.

Military Police. All sections "stand to" on alert sounding or bombs falling and report incidents. Organize diversions, etc.

Civil Defence. The Central Control Centre covers both Military P.A.D. and Civil Defence. Capt. Pegg and Capt. MacDougall attend immediately on alert sounding and take charge. Army personnel man the Report Centre, all of whom have a knowledge of Italian. There is no civil liaison officer.

U.N.P.A. At the moment there are 60 members of U.N.P.A. engaged full-time. In addition there are 18 squads - of 8 men each - total 144 (volunteers) who report for duty in the event of a raid. One squad of regular employees (15 men) continuously on duty at U.N.P.A. Hq which is in direct telephone communication with the Control Centre. The majority of the full-time personnel were employed as U.N.P.A. prior to the liberation and therefore have a good working knowledge of their duties.

Equipment. Three Box tractors are available for immediate service with adequate numbers of picks and shovels. No Heavy Rescue equipment is available. Heavy Rescue equipment would be borrowed from the Army authorities.

Medical Arrangements. An Emergency Medical Aid Scheme has been prepared by Col. T. Parr, Medical Officer attached to A.M.G. Fifth Army, briefly as shown

SECRET

hereunder :

A Central Office has been installed at the Misericordia, Florence, (Tel: 22220) manned throughout each 24 hrs. In the event of a raid, the following comes into operation. Ten hospitals mobilized with a bed capacity of 2,400. These hospitals function permanently. Seven First Aid Stations are situated at various points throughout the City to deal with light surgical cases. Five are already working and have fair surgical equipment.

Dressing Stations. There are 3 of these situated in Clinicos with necessary equipment.

Mobile First Aid Stations. Seven Mobile First Aid Stations staffed with 1 Doctor and 2 assistants. Each supplied with 2 first aid boxes and one stretcher. In the event of raids. Col. T. Parr would be in charge assisted by Dr. Danti a civilian doctor. It has been so arranged that the Mobile First Aid Stations will be able to go to any chosen site close to an incident. Ambulances will be parked at the Misericordia in Piazza del Duomo and be despatched to incidents as and when required.

So far, civil defence exercises have not been held.

Fire Service. The civil fire service in Florence consists of :-

Personnel. 5 officers - 150 Firemen, Major Fire Fighting Appliances.

Serviceable. 5 Auto Pumps, 6 Trailer Pumps and 5 Trucks. Suitable for heavy rescue work. Adequate hose of 45 mm. diameter.

Unserviceable equipment. 6 auto pumps without either wheels or tyres. Efforts are still being made to obtain them to enable the units to become operative. 5351

Petrol Fires. There is no foam compound available for the Civil Fire Service. The Army Fire Service is well stocked with foam and these would be utilized in the event of emergency. The equipment generally is in fairly good condition. Additional equipment has been applied for by Capt. MacDougall from H.Q., Allied Commission, and is still awaited.

Civil Police. In the event of a raid either by piloted planes, V.Is or V.IIs, the Civil Police report to their local stations and apart from these patrolling, stand by to assist at incidents. In addition to the normal force of CC.RR. for Florence there is a strong force of CC.RR. at a central school of instruction in Florence. These would be utilized to the fullest extent and there would be no shortage of Police personnel.

GENERAL.

In the event of a concentrated attack on this City by V weapons it may be necessary and advisable to close all places of amusement and ban any

SECRET

large gathering of people to minimise casualties. It may also be necessary to evacuate a portion of the civilian population.

These facts are being borne in mind, but, at present, definite details have not been decided upon. There are 70 Air Raid Shelters capable of accommodating approximately 50,000.

For the Commanding General:



THOMAS J. MEUHIE,
Lt. Colonel, A.C.,
Acting Executive Officer,
A.M.G. Fifth Army.

/ewp

- 4 -

5359

SECRET

1/15 49/12 35^A

REGIONAL COMMISSIONER AND TOSCANA REGION

3653

16 March 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

SUBJECT IS LONG RANGE PROJECTILES PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE OUR ABLE CHARLIE SLANT ONE FOUR FIVE TWO NINE SLANT PETER SUGAR DATED EIGHT MARCH FOUR FIVE PD

PAREN TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER AND TOSCANA REGION FROM ALCON CITE ACPST PAREN

PARA TWO PD ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS HAVE REQUESTED THE REPORTS CALLED FOR BE FORWARDED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY PD PLEASE EXPEDITE SUBMISSION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS PD

5349

DISTRIBUTION (BY ELS)

Abruzzi-Marche Region.

Public Safety Sub-Commission

Ext 502

F.J. WILSON, Lt. Col.

NICHOLAS PIGNONE
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F 44241

Message Centre No: D/5111

Date/Time of Origin: MAR 15 1925A

Date/Time Rec'd: MAR 15 2040A

16 MAR 1945

Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGEG

TO: HQ ALCOM ROME

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~See expedite
at 35^A and 5 AM
report at 36^A

32A

CONFIDENTIAL

Reactivation of civil defense organization is subject. Progress report as requested in letter to you G-5:384.51 of 4 March is desired without further delay.

NEW SUBJECT

Ref G-5:370.6-1 dated 28 February; G-3 this Hq is pressing for lists of public utilities and civilian operated installations vital to the war effort together with lists of reliable personnel at such utilities and installations. Forward lists by installments as they are completed. Only lists received so far are those of advisory committee on electric power.

ACTION

5340

M/C Note.

No record of second quoted reference.

DistAction - CA Sect (2)
PW & UInfo - A/President
Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm
Econ Sec
File (2)
Float

2580

HEADQUARTERS

15 MAR 1945

A. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394.

AC/14529/PS.

Tel. 489081 - 365.

8th March, 1945.

SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Regional Commissioner, Abruzzi-Marche Region.
(Attention S.P.S.O.)
Regional Commissioner, Toscana Region.
(Attention S.P.S.O.)
S.O.A.O. 5 Army.
(Attention C.P.S.)

1. Reference letter of even number, dated 19th January, 1945.

2. Attached herewith is:-

a) a copy of AFHQ letter A.G. 3845/069 OCT-9, dated 29th January, 1945, together with a copy of a report on Passive Air Defence and Civil Defence measures to deal with long range projectiles in the European theatre;

b) Copy of AFHQ letter dated 28th February, 1945 - Minutes of Conference.

c) Check list.

As to a) a progress report on the reactivation already effected in Civil Defence Organisation in Leghorn, Florence and Ancona is desired by AFHQ G-5 as soon as possible, not later than 15th March, 1945. The short notice is regretted but it is asked that special steps be taken to return ~~to~~ duplicate reports to this Sub-Commission as soon as possible.

3. A meeting was held in Rome on 29th and 30th January, 1945, to discuss PAD organisation in the light of the above report by the P.A.D. and Civil Defence organiser. This meeting was attended by Fire and Civil Defence Officers from Regions. Copy of a report of this

SECRET

24^B 25^A
meeting was forwarded to you with letter of even number dated 20th February, 1945.

4. As a result of this meeting, and in accordance with directions contained in Para 1.6 of the attached AFHQ letter, the officers concerned are taking steps to ensure that the Civil Defence organisation is re-activated in Leghorn, Florence and Ancona, and that in target towns it is organised in such a manner as to be immediately available.

5. The Allied Commission has been charged by AFHQ with the responsibility of ensuring that post raid measures are organised at all levels to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after 'V' attack. Post raid measures are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defence, and that responsibility for Post-Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who alone can co-ordinate all the many services involved.

6. Application has been made to the British Ministry of Home Security to send out an advisor on Post-Raid measures, to be on short attachment to this Headquarters. The matter is also being considered by the many Sub-Commissions concerned, pending the arrival of the advisor.

John W. Chapman 53ix

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

PJW/ea.

-2-

SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/lask

4 March 1945.

G-5: 384.51

5 MAR 1945

SUBJECT: Reactivation of Civil Defense Organization.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

PS.

1. In an AFHQ letter dated 29 January 1945, on the subject of "Long Range Projectiles", No. 384.5/069 GCT-O, of which Allied Commission was an addressee, it was stated that "The Allied Commission would insure that Civil Defense organization is reactivated in Leghorn, Florence and Ancona".

2. A progress report on the reactivation already effected is desired as soon as possible, not later than 15 March 1945. A Check List is inclosed to cover the most essential features.

3. Although not specifically mentioned in the above quoted AFHQ letter, it is probable that greater responsibility for providing fire cover for Allied military installations may be placed, in the future, on Italian Fire Services generally. It is thus desirable that the Italian Fire Service should be made as efficient as possible.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

HEADQUARTERS
5 MAR 1945
A.
G.Julius Byler
JULIUS BYLER,
Major, P.A.

5340

Incl:

Check List - Civil Defense
and Fire Service.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CHECK LIST

Civil Defense and Fire Service at _____

1. CIVIL DEFENSE

- a. Is there a Civil Defense Control Center in existence? _____
- b. Is the Civil Control Center in telephone communication with P.A.D. Control? _____
- c. How are language difficulties overcome, and is there a Civil Liaison Officer always available? _____
- d. How many full-time rescue personnel are available and how are they organized? _____
- e. What is state of training of full-time rescue personnel? _____
- f. Has every Party or Squad a vehicle allocated to it in reasonable running order and capable of fulfilling its proper function? _____
- g. How many First Aid Posts are in existence? _____ What arrangements are there for manning them and what is their casualty capacity? _____
- h. How many ambulances are available? _____ How many of these are on immediate call? _____
- i. What are the arrangements for Incident Control? _____ 534
Have sufficient civil personnel been trained in Incident Control? _____
- j. Are Civil Defense exercises held? _____ What was the date of the last exercise? _____
- k. Is reporting system adequate? _____ How much time elapses between the occurrence of an incident and the arrival of first Rescue Parties? _____

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3/3/45

- f. Has every Party or Squad a vehicle allocated to it in reasonable running order and capable of fulfilling its proper function? _____
- g. How many First Aid Posts are in existence? _____ What arrangements are there for manning them and what is their casualty capacity? _____
- h. How many ambulances are available? _____ How many of these are on immediate call? _____
- i. What are the arrangements for Incident Control? _____
 Have sufficient civil personnel been trained in Incident Control? 534
- j. Are Civil Defense exercises held? _____ What was the date of the last exercise? _____
- k. Is reporting system adequate? _____ How much time elapses between the occurrence of an incident and the arrival of first Rescue Parties? _____

2. FIRE SERVICE

- a. What are the numbers of trained full-time fire fighting personnel?
 (1) Officers _____ (2) NCOs and Firemen _____
- b. What major fire fighting appliances are: (1) Serviceable _____
 (2) Unserviceable _____
- c. In the case of unserviceable appliances, what is required to put them in useable condition? _____

CONFIDENTIAL

0 3 5 6

785016

d. What are the arrangements for dealing with petroleum spirit fires, and what stocks of foam compound and/or powder are available?

e. Are there sufficient stocks of hose, and is it in good condition?

f. What is the diameter of the standard hose in use?

3. EQUIPMENT

a. Are there any shortages of fire or rescue equipment in respect of which demands have not been made by the local Civil Affairs officers concerned?

b. Are there any shortages of equipment in respect of which demands have been made, but have not been met from Allied Commission stocks?

5343

0357

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

5343

CONFIDENTIAL

have been made, but have not been met from it.

785016

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

3 MAR 1945

JB/jjr

28 February 1945

-3 MAR 1945

SUBJECT: Minutes of Conference.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Conference was held under Chairmanship of Colonel Mitchell in G-5 Conference Room at 1430 hours on 26 February 1945. The subject considered was the provision of military supplies, equipment and transport by which the civilian defense of Ancona, Leghorn and Florence might be reactivated with particular reference to long-range projectile attack.

2. The following officers were present:

G-3 - Colonel Torrence
Lt.Col. Meals

G-4 - Colonel Lawley
Major Labbitt

G-4(B) - Q(AE) - Major Gaskell
Q(Maint) - Major Bedwell

G-5 - Colonel Mitchell, Chairman.
Major Grady.
Major Byles, Secretary.

P.D & CD - Lt.Col. Daw
Major Burness

ADAFS - Lt.Col. Field

Allied Commission - Major Klein.

3. Lt.Col. Daw outlined the general problem, which is to make available, either in stockpiles on the ground, or on quick call, items of military equipment, transportation, clothing and food. See list attached, marked Exhibit 'A', dated 26 February 1945. He pointed out that considerable trouble and delay had been experienced in SH.EF in making these items available to the civilian defense agencies following upon the V-attacks in that area. It is desired to avoid a delay should these items be required under such conditions in this theatre. AFHQ Operational Memorandum No. 58

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establishes P.D and Civil Defense policy for this theatre and contemplates a reactivated civilian defense.

4. Colonel Torrence stated that Headquarters, Allied Commission, is now under an AFHQ directive to make provision for civilian defense in Ancona, Leghorn and Florence (AG 384.5/069 GGT-0, 29 January 1945) and is CASEC. presumably taking action in the matter.

5. It was pointed out by G-4 and G-5 supply personnel at the meeting that a simplified procedure open to Allied Commission for procurement of Army items for essential civilian use is now available to it and should be used in the present connection (letter AG 400.312/031 GEG-0, 22 February 1945). ECON SEC

6. The Chairman stated that he felt P.D and Civil Defense should submit a Memorandum to G-5 for onward transmission to Allied Commission, which might serve as a guide to the Allied Commission in making requisition for Army items of supply needed for the reactivation of civilian defense in the cities under consideration. Such a requisition should be submitted by Allied Commission to G-5 and, after check by that Section, should be forwarded to G-3 and G-4 (Civil) in turn for appropriate action. The Chairman's proposal was adopted as the sense of the meeting and Lt. Colonel Daw agreed to prepare and submit such a memorandum to G-5.

7. The meeting adjourned at 1530 hours.

Incl:
as above.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - G-3
- 3 - G-4
- 3 - G-5
- 2 - G-4(B) Q(AE)
- 2 - G-4(B) Q(Maint)
- 2 - P.D & CD
- 1 - Asst. Director Army Fire Service (Br).
- 5 - HQ Allied Commission
- 6 - spares.

Julius Byles
JULIUS BYLES,
Major, F.A.,
Secretary.

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CASEC

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P.SAFETY SIC

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SECRETEXHIBIT 'A'

26 February 1945

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE INCLUDING POST RAID MEASURESa. Equipment

- (1) Rescue Parties, also demolition and road clearance

Picks, shovels, debris baskets, rope, lifting tackle, jacks, levers, woodworking tools, flares, oxy-acetylene cutting plants.

- (2) Rehousing

Woodworking tools, metalworking tools, tarpaulins, light building materials, glass substitute, cement,

- (3) Repair of Utilities

As advised by Engineers

- (4) Medical Supplies and Hygiene Supplies

As advised by Medical Officers

b. Transportation - Preliminary Note. Many otherwise immobilized vehicles can be put on the road if tires and batteries can be provided. Shortages in local resources will have to be made up with the following types of vehicle:

- (1) Rescue Parties, etc. - 2-1/2 or 3 tonners, with addition of self-tipping vehicles for debris clearance
- (2) Rehousing - 15 cwt, 2-1/2 or 3 tonners
- (3) Food and clothing - no special vehicles required
- (4) Medical - Ambulances or vehicles which can be suitably converted.

c. Clothing - Boots, overalls, heavy gloves - supply to be confined to Rescue Party Personnel, Road and Debris Clearance personnel, and Utility Parties only.

d. Food - "Heavy workers' scale" to be provided for those issued with clothing.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 489081-365

AC/14529/PS

28 February 1945

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles
TO : V.P., C.A. Section.

1. Please see draft at 29A which, it is suggested, should be forwarded to Regional Commissioners, together with copies of 16A and 16B (These copies have been obtained from AFHQ).
2. Public Safety responsibility is limited to operational Civil Defence. The many services concerned in Post-Raid measures should be co-ordinated by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer who is responsible for Post Raid measures.
3. On 31st Jan, 45, a meeting was held attended by members of the following Sub-Commissions:

Commerce
Finance
Food
Industry
Labour
Legal
Public Health
Public Works

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The meeting was addressed by Lt Col Daw, PAD advisor AFHQ, on the subject of Post Raid measures. It was made clear by experience in the European theatre that the many problems involved

-2-

affected all Sub-Commissions present. It was agreed to forward to each Sub-Commission a copy of 16A and 16B in order that the problems involved could be studied. These copies have now been received, and are available for distribution.

4. Major Klein of Transportation Sub-Commission representing Economic Section, has attended a meeting at AFHQ on 26 Feb, 45, to study the method of provision of vehicles, supplies and equipment at short notice, also the advisability of creating stock piles in target areas. (See 22A).

5. Application has been made by AFHQ G-5, to the War Office for an officer of the Ministry of Home Security to visit Italy to advise AC on post raid measures (See 28A). No reply has yet been received.

6. Pending the arrival of the expert from the Ministry of Home Security it is suggested that :-

Agree
a) copy of 16A and 16B be sent to the Sub-Commissions detailed above for study and preparation of draft schemes;

By JP-BHW
b) an officer be appointed to co-ordinate the planning of post-raid measures by the 8 Sub-Commissions involved and to deal with correspondence from Regions on this subject.

7. Legal Sub-Commission have been consulted on this matter (See Min.4). It has been agreed that when Sub-Commissions decide what Legal powers are necessary to carry out post-raid schemes, any necessary additions will be made to Italian Law. 533

-2-

-3-

19 copies of 16A and B are attached,
11 for Regions and Armies, 8 for Sub-Commissions.

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

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FJW/wg.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394.

AC/14529/TS.

February, 1945.

SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Regional Commissioners, Liguria, Toscana, Piemonte,
Emilia, Lombardia, Abruzzi-Marche, Venezia, Lazio-
Umbria, Southern Regions.
~~AMG 5th Army.~~
AMG 8th Army.

1. Reference letter of even number dated 19th January,
1945.

2. Attached herewith is copy of AFHQ letter A.S.384.5/069
GOT-O, dated 29th January, 1945, together with copy of report
on Passive Air Defence and Civil Defence measures to deal with
long range projectiles in the European theatre. *Report have
already been sent to R.C.S. Toscana and Abruzzi-Marche and
AMG 5th Army who are taking special measures.*

3. A meeting was held in Rome on 29th and 30th January,
1945, to discuss P.A.D. organisation in the light of the
above report by the P.A.D. and Civil Defence Advisor. **5331**
meeting was attended by Fire and Civil Defence officers from
Regions. Copy of a Report of this meeting was forwarded to
you with letter of even number, dated 20th February, 1945. **248**

4. As a result of the meeting the officers concerned are
taking steps to insure that the Civil Defence Organisation is
re-activated in Leghorn, Florence and Ancona, and that in
target towns it is organised in such a manner as to be
immediately available.

5. The Allied Commission has been charged by AFHQ with the responsibility of ensuring that post-raid measures are organised at all levels to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack. Post raid measures are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defence, and that responsibility for Post-Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who alone can co-ordinate all the many services concerned.

6. Application has been made to the British Ministry of Home Security to send out an advisor on Post-Raid measures to be on short attachment to this Headquarters. The matter is also being considered by the various Sub-Commissions concerned pending the arrival of the advisor.

For the Chief Commissioner:

G.R. WELSH, Brig.
VP CA Sec
DVOS, AC.

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FJW/ea.

14529/25

P. SAFETY 5/4

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TRM/TBJ/mls

28

G-5: 384.51

19 February 1945

SUBJECT: Civil Defence - Post Raid Measures.

TO : The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office,
London, S.W.1.

1. Headquarters, Allied Commission have recently had under consideration reports made to them by the PAD & CD Advisor this Headquarters of methods adopted in Belgium and Holland to deal with the effects of long range projectile attacks.

2. It is considered by the Allied Commission that great benefit would be derived if an officer of the Ministry of Home Security could visit Italy to advise the Allied Commission in the matter particularly with regard to post raid measures which have been adopted in other countries. It is understood that such officers have already been provided on loan by the Ministry for other countries.

3. Application is accordingly made for a suitable officer, preferably one who has been a senior member of a Regional Commissioner's Staff, to be sent to Italy for attachment to the Allied Commission for a period of three to four weeks. It is requested that a decision on the matter be sent to this Headquarters by signal as soon as possible.

T.R. Henn

T. R. HENN, Colonel,
Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to:

Headquarters, Allied Commission.
PAD & CD Advisor, AFHQ.

5330

TO	INIT	DATE
MR. CHAPMAN		
MR. YOUNG		
MR. COL. WILSON		
X MAJ. LUCKMAN		
MAJ. WILSON		2/6/45
MAJ. HENDRY		
MAJ. BALLANCE		
CAPT. POWELL		
MAJ. P. W. K.		

27^A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Tel : 489081 - 365

AG/14529/PS

21 February 1945

SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles
TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section

1. Reference your G-5: 385.51 dated 7 Feb, 45.
2. Arrangements have been made for:

Major R.H. KLEIN of Transportation S/C to attend the meeting at your headquarters. He is available on any early date named by you.

For the Chief Commissioner :

G. R. W. P. John
G. R. W. P. JOHN, Brig.
VP CA Sec

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

17 FEB 1945

KPM/JJJr

G-5: 384.51

15 February 1945

SUBJECT: SHAEF Air Defence Review.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

TO	
COL. CHAPMAN	SHAEF Air Defence Review dated 7 Feb. 45, Issue No. 6, forwarded for information.
COL. YOUNG	
LT. COL. WILCOX	
MAJ. DUCKWORTH	
MAJ. WILSON	
MAJ. HANBURY	
MAJ. BALLANCE	
CAPT. POWELL	Incl
CHIEF CLERK	as above.

Herewith attached are two copies of extract from SHAEF Air Defence Review dated 7 Feb. 45, Issue No. 6, forwarded for information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

16 FEB 1945

K. P. MANNOCK

Jr. Comdr.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

KPM/jjjr

G-5: 384.51

15 February 1945

SUBJECT: SHAEF Air Defence Review.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

Herewith attached are two copies of extract from
SHAEF Air Defence Review dated 7 Feb. 45, Issue No. 6, for-
warded for information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

K. P. Mannock
K. P. MANNOCK
Jr. Comdr.

533~

Incl:
as above.

SECRET

1121

13 February 1945

EXTRACT FROM SHARP AIR DEFENSE REVIEW dated 7 FEBRUARY 1945- ISSUE NO. 6

E A I T " Q "

SECTION VII: PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CIVIL DEFENSE AND FIVE DEFENSEA. POST-RAID ORGANIZATION - BELGIUM

1. In issue No. 5 of Air Defense Review, some notes appeared on the necessity for organization of Civil Defense in BELGIUM at Government level to meet the problem of Post-Raid Organization. The size of the Post-Raid problems has also called for reconsideration from the military angle, since, in addition to passive Air Defense, so many branches of Civil Affairs are involved in one way or another in Post-Raid Organization that it has been found impracticable to coordinate at the level of the local Civil Affairs (Civil Defense) Officer. Consideration is therefore being given by 21 Army Group to placing the responsibility for this coordination on the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, and to obtaining certain experts from the Ministry of Home Security who can advise at Headquarters Army Group level.

2. Although considerable progress has been made by the Belgian authorities, the main obstacle to efficient organization of Post-Raid Services is still in the lack of vigor displayed by local executives in carrying out the instructions of the Government. Meanwhile, morale remains high - particularly in ANTWERP where there appears to be a genuine feeling of satisfaction at the way the Allied Forces have played their part in alleviating the effects of attacks. An instruction has now been issued by the Belgian Government which makes it possible for the Military Commander at ANTWERP to give directions to the Burgomaster and this should prove a great help.

C. RAID OPERATIONS

1.

2. Considerable improvement has been made by local Civil Defense organizations. They have been strengthened and new depots have been opened where required. Expert advice has been given to local Police forces in traffic control, coordinating of incidents, and in the exclusion of unauthorized persons from sites of damage. Existing rescue equipment has been supplemented by the provision of a number of three-ton lorries and 15-cwt trucks, and a supply of heavy rescue equipment. The organization of post-raid services has been receiving constant

2. Although considerable progress has been made by the Belgian authorities, the main obstacle to efficient organization of Post-Raid Services is still in the lack of vigor displayed by local executives in carrying out the instructions of the Government. Meanwhile, morale remains high - particularly in ANTWERP where there appears to be a genuine feeling of satisfaction at the way the Allied Forces have played their part in alleviating the effects of attacks. An instruction has now been issued by the Belgian Government which makes it possible for the Military Commander at ANTWERP to give directions to the Burgomaster and this should prove a great help.

C. PAID OPERATIONS

1.

533
c. Considerable improvement has been made by local Civil Defence organizations. They have been strengthened and new depots have been opened where required. Expert advice has been given to local Police forces in traffic control, coordinating of incidents, and in the exclusion of unauthorized persons from sites of damage. Existing rescue equipment has been supplemented by the provision of a number of three-ton lorries and 15-cwt trucks, and a supply of heavy rescue equipment. The organization of post-raid services has been receiving constant attention. Guidance and advice is being given, and mattresses and blankets have been obtained for use in local rest centres.

d. In the early stages of liberation, no organization for the clearance of debris existed and rubble caused by Allied bombings remained uncleared. Personnel and vehicles are now employed regularly on this and the clearance of glass. A start has been made on an organization for first aid "roofing repair" of damaged buildings and some twenty tons of bituminizedessian have been supplied from Army stocks.

1127

13 February 1945

EXTRACT FROM SHARP AIR DEFENSE REVIEW dated 7 FEBRUARY 1945- ISSUE NO. 6

E A R T " C "

SECTION VII: PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CIVIL DEFENSE AND FIRE DEFENSEA. POST-RAID ORGANIZATION - BELGIUM

1. In issue No. 5 of Air Defense Review, some notes appeared on the necessity for organization of Civil Defense in BELGIUM at Government level to meet the problem of Post-Raid Organization. The size of the Post-Raid problems has also called for reconsideration from the military angle, since, in addition to passive Air Defense, so many branches of civil affairs are involved in one way or another in Post-Raid Organization that it has been found impracticable to coordinate at the level of the local civil affairs (Civil Defense) officer. Consideration is therefore being given by 21 Army Group to placing the responsibility for this coordination on the Senior Civil Affairs officer, and to obtaining certain experts from the Ministry of Home Security who can advise at Headquarters Army Group level.

2. Although considerable progress has been made by the Belgian authorities, the main obstacle to efficient organization of Post-Raid Services is still in the lack of vigor displayed by local executives in carrying out the instructions of the Government. Meanwhile, morale remains high - particularly in ANTWERP where there appears to be a genuine feeling of satisfaction at the way the Allied Forces have played their part in alleviating the effects of attacks. An instruction has now been issued by the Belgian Government which makes it possible for the Military Commander at ANTWERP to give directions to the Burgomaster and this should prove a great help.

C. PAD OPERATIONS

1.

2. Considerable improvement has been made by local Civil Defense organizations. They have been strengthened and new depots have been opened where required. Expert advice has been given to local police forces in traffic control, coordinating of incidents, and in the exclusion of unauthorized persons from sites of damage. Existing rescue equipment has been supplemented by the provision of a number of three-ton lorries and 15-cwt trucks, and a supply of heavy rescue

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level.

2. Although considerable progress has been made by the Belgian authorities, the main obstacle to efficient organization of Post-Raid Services is still in the lack of vigor displayed by local executives in carrying out the instructions of the Government. Meanwhile, morale remains high - particularly in ANTWERP where there appears to be a genuine feeling of satisfaction at the way the Allied Forces have played their part in alleviating the effects of attacks. An instruction has now been issued by the Belgian Government which makes it possible for the Military Commander at ANTWERP to give directions to the Burgomaster and this should prove a great help.

C. RAID OPERATIONS

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1.

c. Considerable improvement has been made by local Civil Defense organizations. They have been strengthened and new depots have been opened where required. Expert advice has been given to local police forces in traffic control, coordinating of incidents, and in the exclusion of unauthorized persons from sites of damage. Existing rescue equipment has been supplemented by the provision of a number of three-ton lorries and 15-cwt trucks, and a supply of heavy rescue equipment. The organization of post-raid services has been receiving constant attention. Guidance and advice is being given, and mattresses and blankets have been obtained for use in local rest centres.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

25A
24A

Tel : 489081 - 365

20 February 1945

AC/14529/PS

SUBJECT : PAD and CD Long Range projectile

TO : Regional Commissionere:
Liguria Region (Attn: R.P.S.O.)
Piemonte " "
Lombardia " "
Venezia " "
Toscana " "
Emilia " "
Abruzzi-Marche " "
Lazio-Umbria " "
Southern "

1. A meeting of PAD and Civil Defence and Fire Officers A.C. was held in Rome on 29th and 30 Jan, 1945.

2. Attached hereto is a copy of a Report on the conference, for the distribution to the following officers:

5323

Lt Col. Montague
Major Brannigan
" Mason
Capt. Beckman
" Brown
" Foster
" Mc Dougall
" Noble

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

KPM/mls

9 February 1945.

G-5: 384.51

SUBJECT: PAD and CD Long range projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

Reference is made to your AC/14529/PS dated 24 January 1945.

Attached hereto are 9 copies of Report on PAD & CD Conference for distribution to the officers named in the above quoted letter.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

9 Incl:

as above.

K. P. MANNOCK,
Jr. Comdr.

CONFIDENTIAL

P SAFETY SK

21 9941

8A 3025A

cc.

HEADQUARTERS
10 FEBRUARY 1945

5328

K. P. Mannock

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
P.A.D. & Civ. Def. Section
A.P.O. 512

SEHD/lrp

6 February 1945

REPORT ON P.A.D. & CIV. DEF. CONFERENCE

A meeting of P.A.D. officers, British and American, was held at P.A.D. Control in Rome on 29 and 30 January 1945 to discuss P.A.D. organization in the light of a report by the P.A.D. & Civ. Def. Advisor on conditions in northwestern Europe. Civil Defense and Fire officers of Public Safety Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, also attended. A list of officers who were present is attached at Appendix 'A'.

FIRST DAY

P.A.D. & Civ. Def. Advisor gave a general description of his visit to the European Theater and covered all points set out in report to G-3 and G-5, dated 10 January 1945, No. 1243. He stressed importance of difficulties which had arisen owing to general lack of training, and the many problems arising from Incident Control. It was made clear that there were no positive indications of long range projectiles being used in this theater and that in no circumstances should the subject be exaggerated. The purpose was to make up leeway in training and effect necessary modifications in organization.

The implications of the ATHQ directive on the subject were then considered and the memorandum which had already been circulated to P.A.D. officers was discussed in detail. Additional notes to amplify this memorandum including comments by SHAER P.A.D. officers were issued to all present. Copy of memorandum and notes are attached at Appendix 'B'.

Major Bolland, training officer (Br.), P.A.D. & Civ. Def. Section, ATHQ, gave an account of his experiences in running P.A.D. training classes over a period of seven months at various static headquarters in Italy. In two cases the Area Commander concerned had given instructions for a talk for unit commanders to be included. This had proved most helpful.

The last session of the first day was devoted to projection of films of V-1 attack and Rescue operations.

P.A.D. responsibility for anti-gas measures in British static units was discussed. Lt. Col. R. Kerr Muir, Deputy Chief Chemical Section, who was present at this period, indicated that P.A.D. responsibilities should include measures for reporting the presence and dealing with the effects of gas, also insuring that adequate resources of men and material would be available for the purpose.

Chairman, Chief of Public Safety Sub-

The implications of the ATHQ directive on the subject were then considered and the memorandum which had already been circulated to P.A.D. officers was discussed in detail. Additional notes to amplify this memorandum including comments by Staff P.A.D. officers were issued to all present. Copy of memorandum and notes are attached at Appendix 'B'.

Major Holland, training officer (Br.), P.A.D. & Civ. Def. Section, ATHQ, gave an account of his experiences in running P.A.D. training classes over a period of seven months at various static headquarters in Italy. In two cases the Area Commander concerned had given instructions for a talk for unit commanders to be included. This had proved most helpful.

The last session of the first day was devoted to projection of films of V-1 attack and rescue operations.

P.A.D. responsibility for anti-gas measures in British static units was discussed. Lt. Col. R. Kerr Muir, Deputy Chief Chemical Section, who was present at this period, indicated that P.A.D. responsibilities should include measures for reporting the presence and dealing with the effects of gas, also insuring that adequate resources of men and material would be available for the purpose.

Major E. W. Hanbury, representing Col. Chapman, Chief of Public Safety Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, was present during the afternoon of the first day.

SECOND DAY

The second day of the conference was chiefly devoted to the problems of Incident Control. Major Burness, P.A.D. & Civ. Def. Section, ATHQ, gave a lecture on the subject following the headings of an Incident Control "Check List" issued to all present. Copy of this Check List is attached at Appendix 'C'.

Major Burness and Major Brolin, P.A.D. Officer, Rome Allied Area Command, gave a demonstration of Incident Control using a tactical table for the purpose. This tactical table consisted of a model of a town in which a number of military installations were situated.

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Later an exercise was carried out by the officers present, who performed the various roles connected with the subject of Incident Control.

A final discussion took place on the matters arising out of the conference; among the points which arose were difficulties and delays in obtaining equipment for Civil Defense. It was explained that this had been appreciated and a G-4 and G-5 discussion was being held to examine this situation.

On the question of anti-gas protection, the Public Safety Sub-Commission officers present stated that both the Italian Civil Defense organization and the Italian population were unprepared and unprotected as far as gas warfare is concerned.

With few exceptions the transport situation was unsatisfactory. The arrangement whereby officers of AMHQ Staff & Services Pool (Br.) should be supplied from a pool of vehicles in the area to which they were attached had not worked satisfactorily. P.A.D. officers are definitely hampered in their duties of supervising P.A.D. training and organization.

The security aspect as regards "V" attack was mentioned, it being pointed out that the enemy would desire accurate information as to time and place of fall of "V" weapons, therefore arrangements for the very necessary liaison between Italian Civil Defense organization and military P.A.D. must be approved by G-2/CSI branch of the headquarters concerned.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

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APPENDIX 'A'

P.A.D. CONFERENCE

NAME

Lt. Col. S. E. H. Day
Major J. F. Bolland
Major J. W. A. Burness
Capt. T. F. Novikowski

Major G. S. Lang

Lt. C. S. Rohrer
Capt. J. D. Patterson
Major R. R. Canaway
Major E. R. Brolin

Major F. W. V. Tannock
Major R. H. K. Wickham
Major B. T. McDermid
Major C. T. F. Tapster
Capt. D. J. Webster
Capt. A. B. Pegg

Lt. Col. Montague
Major Mason
Capt. Backman
Capt. J. B. Forester
Capt. A. W. MacDougall

Major F. Brannigan
Capt. Brown
Capt. C. Noble

HQ

PAD & Civ Def Advisor, AFHQ
PAD & Civ Def Sec., AFHQ
PAD & Civ Def Sec., AFHQ
PAD & Civ Def Sec., AFHQ

Allied Air Force Area Command

PAD Officer, P.E.S.
" " " (South)

SO PAD, No. 2 District
Rome Allied Area Command
PAD Officer

SO PAD, 54 Area
" " " 55
" " " 56
" " " No. 3 Beach Group
" " " 60 Sub-area
" " " Florence Command

ALG
" " " "

AC
" " "

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S. G. M. A. - 44 - (100 - 55) 1000

Capt. J. B. Forrester
Capt. A. W. MacDougall

Major F. Brannigan
Capt. Brown
Capt. C. Noble

"
AC
"
"

CONFIDENTIAL

LONG RANGE PROJECTILES

10/12/44

NOTES ON MODIFICATION TO EXISTING P.A.D. MEASURES

1. P.A.D. CONTROL

Whereas the present organization of P.A.D. in this Theatre is mainly based on the probability of night attack alone; a condition of permanent alert will have to be maintained in a port or similar target area which is subject to frequent attack at irregular intervals by long range projectiles. A much higher degree of P.A.D. readiness would therefore be required. It is considered that a Duty P.A.D. Officer will be necessary at all times, together with sufficient clerks and telephonists. It is suggested that in addition to the P.A.D. Staff Officer, who is responsible for organization, inspection, and training, that three complete shifts are planned each comprising an officer with telephonists and clerks.

2. P.A.D. SERVICES

P.A.D. Services must be organized in such a manner as to be immediately available. It is suggested that a predetermined number of duty ambulances should be available on call from P.A.D. Control. At least one light and one Heavy Reserve Party should be standing by or performing duties from which they could be called at a few minutes notice. On deployment of one or both of these parties, another two parties would have to be called to a state of immediate readiness.

The problem of striking a balance between immediate availability and tie-up of manpower is not easy of solution. Much will depend upon local conditions. To provide further parties to assist those called out on immediate action, it would be necessary for certain units to receive orders to have these available at short notice. Work Parties should be provided in a similar manner.

3. REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

Although the methods of a normal P.A.D. organization for reporting incidents should suffice, it is suggested that observer posts on high buildings or other suitable points should be established with telephone facilities. To ensure rapid reporting of incidents, additional communications might be necessary from Military Police posts. All units should be instructed to report incidents at once even if no additional help is needed. This will prevent unnecessary movement of Rescue Parties as a result of inaccurate information forwarded outside the unit.

4. WARNING

It is not considered that any general siren warning will be possible. Immediate approach of Flying Bombs might be signaled in ports or other targets

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parties, another two parties
readiness.

The problem of striking a balance between immediate availability and tie-up of manpower is not easy of solution. Much will depend upon local conditions, it is suggested that observer posts on high buildings or other suitable points should be established with telephone facilities. To ensure rapid reporting of incidents, additional communications might be necessary at Military Police posts. All units should be instructed to report incidents at once even if no additional help is needed. This will prevent unnecessary movement of Rescue Parties as a result of inaccurate information forwarded outside the unit.

3. REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

Although the methods of a normal P.D. organization for reporting incidents should suffice, it is suggested that observer posts on high buildings or other suitable points should be established with telephone facilities. To ensure rapid reporting of incidents, additional communications might be necessary at Military Police posts. All units should be instructed to report incidents at once even if no additional help is needed. This will prevent unnecessary movement of Rescue Parties as a result of inaccurate information forwarded outside the unit.

4. WARNING

It is not considered that any general siren warning will be possible. Immediate approach of Flying Bombs might be signaled in ports or other targets which may be the object of frequent attacks. This would provide a short warning period of one or two minutes, to enable dock and other workers to rush to shelter. Warning of launching of long range rockets is unlikely and in any case would involve an extensive communication system.

5. SHELTERS

Although the construction of shelters on a large scale would probably not be necessary, shelter arrangements would be required on the docks and other places where it is essential that work goes on throughout the entire 24 hour period. Such shelters should be of simplest possible design, providing protection against blast and splinters. Protection from falling masonry, etc. is desirable but this additional protection must be weighed against quicker cover than immediate access to the shelter. An open slit trench provides quicker cover than a covered trench with a limited number of entrances. Shelters, whether slit trenches or built-up, would take up space on or near quays, but the confidence which they would give if combined with a warning period however short, would result in greater working efficiency over a period.

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More First Aid Posts would be necessary than are usually available in a normal P.A.D. scheme. These Posts would also need protection against splinters and especially against blast. Arrangements would be necessary for availability of duty doctors and if possible surgical teams should be available at short notice to proceed to the scene of serious incidents.

7. INCIDENT CONTROL

Reports already received from 21st Army Group (Br.) indicate that the importance of the Incident Officer is greater than ever. Similar importance is attached in 12th Army Group (U.S.). The following is an extract from P.A.D. Orders of an area within the 12th Army Group:

"Incident Officer. During alerts, units and detachments of over 50 men will have available an Incident Officer, who in case of incidents in the unit area, will proceed to the scene of damage. The Incident Officer will be completely in charge of the incident. He will coordinate the work of all the activities and will be supplied with all the information relative to the incident. The Incident Officer will be the representative of the Commanding General at the scene of damage. No officers will be allowed to interfere, unless such officers are prepared to take over complete responsibility and charge of the incident. The Incident Officer, when on duty at the scene of damage will be identified in daylight by letters I.O., chalked on his helmet. At night his post will be identified by two lanterns."

8. TRAINING

The possibility of attack by long range projectiles makes it necessary for P.A.D. training to be much increased beyond the present scale. The greatest need is for a high percentage of officers to be trained in Incident Control, and for NCO's to be trained as Leaders of rescue parties. Your attention is drawn to P.A.D. Technical Bulletins Nos. 1 and 2, dated 20 January and 15 May 1944 respectively, issued by this section. All troops will need further training in simple precautions enabling them to know where to seek some protection if no shelters as such are available in their vicinity.

9. GENERAL

Although applicable to all P.A.D. schemes, it is desirable that the following points receive special emphasis:

a. Post Raid Measures. It is essential that P.A.D. Control provide earliest possible information to Engineers of damage resulting in blocked roads or damaged bridges. Reports of location of all incidents to Signals will be necessary, in case trunk telephone routes are affected. It is desirable that arrangements be made to ensure that necessary information is passed on without prior notice,

8. TRAINING

The possibility of attack by long range projectiles makes it necessary for P.A.D. training to be much increased beyond the present scale. The greatest need is for a high percentage of officers to be trained in Incident Control, and for WCO's to be trained as Leaders of rescue parties. Your attention is drawn to P.A.D. Technical Bulletins Nos. 1 and 2, dated 20 January and 15 May 1944 respectively, issued by this section. All troops will need further training in simple precautions enabling them to know where to seek some protection if no shelters as such are available in their vicinity.

9. GENERAL

Although applicable to all P.A.D. schemes, it is desirable that the following points receive special emphasis:

a. Post Raid Measures. It is essential that P.A.D. Control provide earliest possible information to Engineers of damage resulting in blocked roads or damaged bridges. Reports of location of all incidents to Signals will be necessary, in case trunk telephone routes are affected. It is desirable that arrangements be made for units to feed and possibly accommodate, without prior notice, survivors of another unit.

b. Army Fire Service. Where it is not already the case, the Army Fire Service Control should be established in close proximity but not in the same building as P.A.D. Control. It is essential that both Controls are so organized that if one suffers a direct hit control could be temporarily maintained from the other.

c. Civil Defense. To ensure that military resources are not diverted to deal with civil casualties or trapped persons, it is important that the Civil Defense organization in all target towns is overhauled and made efficient under arrangements made by Allied Commission, with the technical advice of the P.A.D. Staff Officer. Although military reinforcement of the Civil organization may be necessary in severe incidents, it is most important that the Civil organization be self-supporting as far as possible.

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22 January 1945

COMMENTS MADE BY S.H.A.E.F. PAD OFFICERS ON NOTES ISSUED TO THIS
THEATER 10 DECEMBER 1944.

1. P.A.D. CONTROL

Only comment was to the fact that in heavily attacked areas a second P.A.D. officer was essential. This in addition to the Control Room team.

2. P.A.D. SERVICES

At Antwerp, one ambulance, one medical officer, and one dispatch rider are always held available. Medical officer on arrival at incident decides how many ambulances are required. Dispatch rider is sent back to Control with message as ambulances are only called by P.A.D. for the incidents. After departure of ambulances, M.O. and D.R., another "party" moves to readiness.

In Antwerp there are 20 heavy rescue parties standing by to the exclusion of all other duties. It is hoped however to change this to "performing duties from which they can be called at a few moments notice".

A particular feature of the organization which has been developed in Belgium is that any unit with strength of 50 upwards is required to provide, without notice, an Incident Officer and one or more light rescue parties.

3. REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

Units need much more instruction in reporting of incidents. The tendency has been to report only if they are themselves involved. For the purpose of assessing scale and zones of "V" attack, it is essential that every incident is reported.

4. WARNING

A 4 or 5 minute siren warning is usual in the case of V-1 attack. No warning system has been organized for V-2 attack.

5. SHELTERS

The necessity for dispersal has been demonstrated on a number of occasions. As many siren warnings are given for V-1 attack which do not materialize, the tendency has been to ignore the siren when engaged on essential work until V-1 is heard or seen.

6. AIRSTAID POSTS

No comments.

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Units need much more instruction in reporting of incidents. The tendency has been to report only if they are themselves involved. For the purpose of assessing scale and zones of "w" attack, it is essential that every incident is reported.

A 4 or 5 minute siren warning is usual in the case of V-1 attack. No warning system has been organized for V-2 attack.

The necessity for dispersal has been demonstrated on a number of occasions. As many siren warnings are given for V-1 attack which do not materialize, the tendency has been to ignore the siren when engaged on essential work until it is heard or seen.

No comments.

Incident Control has been the biggest headache encountered. Strenuous efforts are being made to increase training in this respect. The only satisfactory solution is for all officers to be trained.

In addition to training of Incident Officers, see para 7 above, all troops need more general P.A.D. training. Not only has the training of officers and NCOs in rescue technique been sadly inadequate but the troops themselves have not had sufficient training in taking the simplest precautions.

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[illegible]

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9. GENERAL

a. Post Raid Measures. The post raid measures referred to in this memo are operational measures on the part of P.A.D. Control and are not to be confused with post raid measures as regards Civil Defense organization.

b. Army Fire Service. No comment.

c. Civil Defense. The only comment was that Civil Defense was at first hopelessly inadequate to deal with "V" incidents and for a long time much military effort was diverted.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNN No.

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APPENDIX 'C'

24/1/45

INCIDENT CONTROL CHECK LIST

1. ARRIVAL.
2. ESTABLISH POST AND INFORM P.A.D. CONTROL.
3. APPOINT ASSISTANT.
4. ORGANIZE SEARCH PARTIES FOR AREA SURROUNDING INCIDENT.
5. CHECK REPORTS ALREADY SENT IN BEFORE ARRIVAL.
6. INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED
 - a. Main seats of damage
 - b. Number and Position of Casualties
 - c. Craters and Mains damaged
 - d. U.X.B.'s
 - e. Gas escapes or flooding
 - f. Poison Gas
 - g. Wind direction
 - h. Dangerous buildings
 - i. Water supply (hydrants and dams)
 - j. Site for temporary mortuary
7. ORGANIZATION
 - a. NCOs at each seat of damage
 - b. Immediate assistance to casualties
 - c. Arrangements with M.P.'s (diversion of traffic, evacuation, cordoning, etc.)
 - d. Loading of Casualties
 - e. Parking of Vehicles
 - f. Guides
 - g. Calling forward of Services
8. INSTRUCTIONS TO SERVICES
 - a. Where to operate
 - b. When to operate
 - c. Where to park vehicles
 - d. Priority of Operations
 - e. Information
 - (1) Casualties and damage
 - (2) Loading Points
 - (3) Fires, U.X.B.s, dangerous structures, etc.
9. COORDINATION

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- g. Wind direction
- h. Dangerous buildings
- i. Water supply (hydrants and dams)
- j. Site for temporary mortuary

7. ORGANIZATION

- a. NCOs at each seat of damage
- b. Immediate assistance to casualties
- c. Arrangements with M.P.'s (diversion of traffic, evacuation, cordoning, etc.)
- d. Loading of Casualties
- e. Parking of Vehicles
- f. Guides
- g. Calling forward of Services

8. INSTRUCTIONS TO SERVICES

- a. Where to operate
- b. When to operate
- c. Where to park vehicles
- d. Priority of Operations
- e. Information

- (1) Casualties and damage
- (2) Loading Points
- (3) Fires, U.X.B.s, dangerous structures, etc.

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9. COORDINATION

- a. Police - Military and civil
- b. Fire Services - Military and civil
- c. Officers in charge of Services
- d. Civil authority.

10. PROGRESS

- a. Progress Reports
- b. Reinforcements or relief of parties or equipment
- c. Canteen
- d. Release of Services - traffic restrictions
- e. Final Report.

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24/11/45

INCIDENT OFFICER'S REPORT FORM

POSITION OF INCIDENT AND NO.

FIRE (Spreading or under control)

UNEXPLODED BOMBS

CASUALTIES - Military

Cleared
To be cleared

Dead	Serious	Slight	Missing	Total

CASUALTIES - Civil

Cleared
To be cleared

Dead	Serious	Slight	Missing	Total

DAMAGE TO MAINS

ROADS BLOCKED

REMARKS:

DATE

TIME

(Sgd)

Incident Officer

SKETCH OF INCIDENT

RESTRICTED

COPY

COPY

Extract from Report on Civil Defence ANSWERS, dated January 1945.
21 A Gp/16134/1/2/CA

Repair

Of the 9,600 damaged properties which are repairable 220 demands have been received and 25 houses are at present under repair by the city services. 150 men are at present engaged on repair work. Arrangements have been completed for contractors to undertake this work. This is of course only touching the fringe of the problem. It is hoped that the appointment of a civil engineer from the Belgian Army will result in the repair work being pushed ahead more rapidly. Material for the work and provision of skilled labour are the main bottlenecks. A second officer of the Belgian Army is likely to be seconded to organize a system of recovery from irreparable damaged buildings. This will go some way towards meeting the need but it should be remembered that the employment of material recovered this way considerably slows down the speed at which the work can be undertaken. The following is a list of what is required for this work if the present rate of bombardment continues:-

- Sheets of pressed cardboard
- Concrete sheets
- Tiles: Pottelberg
- Boom
- Ridge-tiles
- Timber
- Eternit sheets
- Cement
- Plaster
- Slatos
- Sanded Asphalt
- Glass
- Vitrex
- Putty
- Nails of all kinds

- 25,000 per month.
- 10,000 "
- 10,000 "
- 10,000 "
- 1,000 "
- 200 m3
- 5,000 m3
- 20 tons "
- 1 ton "
- 500 m2
- 10,000 m2
- 500 m2
- 500 m2
- 1,000 kg
- 2,000 kg

Debris Clearance

This is being undertaken under the supervision of M. Van WIERDEN, City Engineer, ANSWERS. It is in this aspect of the post-raid organization that heavy equipment can be most usefully employed and K. Van WIERDEN is at present compiling a list of material owned by contractors in the ANSWERS area. This list will be their present use and employment and based on this it will be possible to requisition some of the items which are not being employed directly by the military.

Of the 1,200 premises where debris clearance will have to be undertaken between 20 and 30 are in course of clearance at the present time. 700 men are also employed; the rate of clearance has to be related to the amount of material.

5,000 m2
 20 tons
 1 ton
 500 m2
 10,000 m2
 500 m2
 500 m2
 1,000 Kg
 2,000 Kg
 eternit sheets
 Cement
 Plaster
 Slates
 Sanded Asphalt
 Glass
 Vitrex
 Putty
 Nails of all kinds

Debris Clearance

This is being undertaken under the supervision of M. Van WINGHE, City Engineer, ANTWERP. It is in this aspect of the post-raid organization that heavy equipment can be most usefully employed and M. Van WINGHE is at present compiling a list of material owned by contractors in the ANTWERP area. This list will be their present use and employment and based on this it will be possible to requisition some of the items which are not being employed directly by the military.

Of the 1,200 premises where debris clearance will have to be undertaken between 20 and 30 are in course of clearance at the present time. 700 men are also employed; the rate of clearance has to be related to the amount of transport available for carrying debris away. The present debris is being dumped in the Commune of Berchem some distance outside the town. Efforts are being made to obtain the consent the Belgian Ministry of National Defence to the use of the old fortifications of the city of ANTWERP as a dumping ground. If this consent is secured it will considerably reduce the length of haul, thus providing more rapid clearance.

One peculiar difficulty does arise over the requisitioning of equipment. Under Belgian law no payment may be made from Government funds to a collaborator or suspected collaborator; on the other hand nothing may be requisitioned by the Government unless payment is made for it. This brings about the ridiculous situation whereby material belonging to a collaborator cannot be requisitioned.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

KPM/JJJr

G-5: 384.51

12 February 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Civil Defence, ANTWERP.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

Herewith attached are three copies of Report on Civil Defence, ANTWERP, forwarded for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

Incl: re above dated 22 Jan. 45

K. P. MANNOCK
Jr. Comdr.

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Initial reverse side please.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

KPM/JJJr

12 February 1945

G-5: 584.51

SUBJECT: Report on Civil Defence, ANTWERP.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

Herewith attached are three copies of Report on
Civil Defence, ANTWERP, forwarded for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

K. F. MANNOCK
Jr. Comdr.

Incl: re above dated 22 Jan. 45

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COPY

COPY

Extract from Report on Civil Defence ANTWERP, dated 22 January 1945,
21 A Gp/16134/1/2/CA

Repair

Of the 9,800 damaged properties which are repairable 220 demands have been received and 25 houses are at present under repair by the city services. 150 men are at present engaged on repair work. Arrangements have been completed for contractors to undertake this work. This is of course only touching the fringe of the problem. It is hoped that the appointment of a civil engineer from the Belgian Army will result in the repair work being pushed ahead more rapidly. Material for the work and provision of skilled labour are the main bottlenecks. A second officer of the Belgian Army is likely to be seconded to organize a system of recovery from irreparable damaged buildings. This will go some way towards meeting the need but it should be remembered that the employment of material recovered in this way considerably slows down the speed at which the work can be undertaken. The following is a list of what is required for this work if the present rate of bombardment continues:-

Sheets of pressed cardboard	25,000 per month
Concrete sheets	10,000 "
Tiles: Pottelberg Room	10,000 "
Bridge-tiles	10,000 "
Timber	1,000 "
Sternit sheets	200 m3
Cement	5,000 m3
Plaster	20 tons
Slates	1 ton
Sanded Asphalt	500 m2
Glass	10,000 m2
Vitrex	500 m2
Putty	500 m2
Nails of all kinds	1,000 kg
	2,000 kg

Debris Clearance

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This is being undertaken under the supervision of M. Van WINGHEM, City Engineer, ANTWERP. It is in this aspect of the post-raid organization that heavy equipment can be most usefully employed and M. Van WINGHEM is at present compiling a list of material owned by contractors in the ANTWERP area. This list will show their present use and employment and based on this it will be possible to requisition some of the items which are not being employed directly by the military.

Of the 1,200 premises where debris clearance will have to be undertaken between 20 and 30 are in course of clearance at the present time. 700 men are also employed; the rate of clearance has to be related to the amount of transport available.

Boom	10,000 "
Ridge-tiles	1,000 "
Timber	200 m3
Externit sheets	5,000 m3
Cement	20 tons
Plaster	1 ton
Slates	500 m2
Sanded Asphalt	10,000 m2
Glass	500 m2
Vitrex	500 m2
Putty	1,000 KG
Nails of all kinds	2,000 KG

Debris Clearance

This is being undertaken under the supervision of M. Van WICHEM, City Engineer, ANTWERP. It is in this aspect of the post-raid organization that heavy equipment can be most usefully employed and M. Van WICHEM is at present compiling a list of material owned by contractors in the ANTWERP area. This list will show their present use and employment and based on this it will be possible to requisition some of the items which are not being employed directly by the military.

Of the 1,200 premises where debris clearance will have to be undertaken between 20 and 30 are in course of clearance at the present time. 700 men are also employed; the rate of clearance has to be related to the amount of transport available for carrying debris away. The present debris is being dumped in the town of Berchem some distance outside the town. Efforts are being made to obtain the consent of the Belgian Ministry of National Defence to the use of the old fortifications of the city of ANTWERP as a dumping ground. If this consent is secured it will considerably reduce the length of haul, thus providing more rapid clearance.

One peculiar difficulty does arise over the requisitioning of equipment. Under Belgian law no payment may be made from Government funds to a collaborator or suspected collaborator; on the other hand nothing may be requisitioned by the Government unless payment is made for it. This brings about the ridiculous situation whereby material belonging to a collaborator cannot be requisitioned.

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COPY

Excerpt from Report on Civil Defence Situation, dated 22 January 1945.
21 A Gb/1614/1/2/CA

Repair

Of the 9,800 damaged properties which are repairable 220 demands have been received and 25 houses are at present under repair by the city services. 150 men are at present engaged on repair work. Arrangements have been completed for contractors to undertake this work. This is of course only touching the fringe of the problem. It is hoped that the appointment of a civil engineer from the Belgian Army will result in the repair work being pushed ahead more rapidly. Material for the work and provision of skilled labour are the main bottlenecks. A second officer of the Belgian Army is likely to be succeeded to organize a system of recovery from irreparable damaged buildings. This will go some way towards meeting the need but it should be remembered that the employment of material recovered in this way considerably slows down the speed at which the work can be undertaken. The following is a list of what is required for this work at the present rate of bombardment continues:-

Sheets of pressed cardboard	25,000 per month
Concrete sheets	10,000 "
Tiles: Pottelberg	10,000 "
Boon	10,000 "
Ridge-tiles	1,000 "
Tiebar	200 m3
Sternit sheets	5,000 m3
Cement	20 tons
Plaster	1 ton
Slates	500 m2
Sanded Asphalt	10,000 m2
Glass	500 m2
Vitrex	500 m2
Putty	1,000 kg
Nails of all kinds	2,000 kg

Debris Clearance

This is being undertaken under the supervision of M. Van Duppel, City Engineer, ANTWERP. It is in this aspect of the post-war organization that heavy equipment can be most usefully employed and M. Van Duppel is at present compiling a list of material owned by contractors in the ANTWERP area. This list will show their present use and employment and based on this it will be possible to requisition some of the items which are not being employed directly by the military.

Of the 2,200 premises where debris clearance will have to be undertaken between 20 and 30 are in course of clearance at the present time. 700 men are already employed; the rate of clearance has to be related to the amount of transport available for carrying debris away. The present debris is being dumped in the Gansme

Cement
Plaster
Slaton
Sanded Asphalt
Glass
Vitrex
Ratty
Nails of all kinds

Debris Clearance

This is being undertaken under the supervision of M. Van WIDEN, City Engineer, AXTON. It is in this aspect of the post-war organization that heavy equipment can be most usefully employed and M. Van WIDEN is at present compiling a list of material owned by contractors in the AXTON area. This list will show their present use and employment and based on this it will be possible to requisition some of the items which are not being employed directly by the military.

Of the 1,200 houses where debris clearance will have to be undertaken between 20 and 30 are in course of clearance at the present time. 700 men are already employed; the rate of clearance has to be related to the amount of transport available for carrying debris away. The present debris is being dumped in the Home of Berghem some distance outside the town. Efforts are being made to obtain the consent of the Belgian Ministry of National Defence to the use of the old fortifications of the city of AXTON as a dumping ground. If this consent is secured it will considerably reduce the length of haul, thus providing more rapid clearance.

One peculiar difficulty does arise over the requisitioning of equipment. Under Belgian law no payment may be made from Government funds to a collaborator or suspected collaborator; on the other hand nothing may be requisitioned by the Government unless payment is made for it. This brings about the ridiculous situation whereby material belonging to a collaborator cannot be requisitioned.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512TBJ/jjjr
PS
22#

G-5: 384.51

7 February 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. As a corollary to the action to be taken under AG memo 384.5/069 GCT-0 of 29 January addressed inter alia to HQ. Allied Commission, the Chief of Staff this HQ has directed certain action to be taken here. This includes the following "G-4 and G-5 to study provision or earmarking of supplies, equipment and transport for specified towns now in Allied hands and for anticipated future requirements".

2. It is proposed to hold a meeting at this HQ with interested staff sections to implement the above - the purpose of the meeting would be to discuss a method of provision of vehicles, supplies and equipment at short notice and also the advisability of creating stock piles in the possible target areas namely Leghorn, Florence and Ancona.

3. It is considered desirable that a representative from HQ Allied Commission should attend the meeting who could speak as to the desires of Allied Commission in the matter.

4. It is requested that you will confirm that you will be represented and give the name of the officer who will attend together with the earliest date he could attend here for that purpose.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. Jackman
Lt. Col.
T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel

Copy to: PAD & CD - your IRS of 4 Feb. refers.

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SECRET

T. Safety 262

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/mls

G-5: 384.51

14 February 1945

SUBJECT: Civil Defence - Post Raid Measures.

TO : PAD & CD Advisor, AFHQ.

1. Reference is made to your L262 of 5 February and to G-5 384.51 of 7 February addressed to HQ Allied Commission (copy to you).

2. Attached is copy of HQ Allied Commission AC/14529/PS of 12 February.

3. Will you put forward please the necessary application to the Ministry of Home Security and notify this section as to the result.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

Incl:

as above.

Copy to:

HQ Allied Commission ✓

Jackman
2nd col.
T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel.

THIS IS COPY FOR AC

5310

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

20A
101A
Tel: 478008

Ref: AC/14529/PS

12 Feb 45. ac.

SUBJECT: Civil Defence - Post Raid Measures -
Long Range Projectiles.

TO: AMHQ, G-5 Section.

Reference your letter G-5: 384.51 dated 7 Feb 45.

- 1 This Commission would like assistance by way of advice in connection with the matter of Civil Defence operations and in particular post-raid measures.
- 2 It is considered that a visit from an officer of the British Ministry of Home Security would be preferable to sending an officer to the U.K. for instruction.
- 3 Will you, therefore, make the necessary arrangements for the visit of this officer and advise this Headquarters in due course of the likely date of his arrival.

For the Chief Commissioner,

R.R. CRIPPS, Col.,
CSO CA Section.

AA/eg

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*In your decision
Pl has been sent for a comment
9 Feb 45*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

7 FEB 1945 TBJ/ceb

G-5: 384.51

7 February 1945

SUBJECT: Civil Defense - Post Raid Measures -
Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394.

1. The P.A.D. & Civil Defense Advisor this Headquarters, (Lt.Col. Daw) has reported to this Section on the meeting held at your Headquarters on 31 January to discuss the post raid aspect of long range projectile attack when it was decided to study the question in the light of AG letter 384.5/069 OCT-0 of 29 January.

2. Colonel Daw states that while he was able to make certain suggestions on the subject of post raid measures, the subject in all its details is outside the scope of Civil Defense operations. He further states he is of the opinion that the only person competent to advise adequately on the subject would be an officer of the British Ministry of Home Security, and he feels that should you desire such advice arrangements could be made for the Ministry of Home Security to send out a competent officer on short attachment. Alternatively he suggests that arrangements might be made for one of your officers to receive instruction in the U.K.

3. It is requested that you will indicate your wishes in the matter.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

X
T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel

Copy to:

PAD & CD Advisor.

Your memo of 5 Feb., refers.

AL Capps

If P.S. agree let us get a man out 5314

Home. 9/2/45

JH

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
 LAZIO-UMBRIA REGION.
 (C.D. & FIRE)

18^A
 8/2/45.

TO;- Lt Col Wilson,
 Public Safety Sub-Commission.
 Headquarters. A.C.

I have seen in one of the A.C. files the copy of a letter sent to A.F.H.Q. in which it was stated that certain fire officers including myself had received no training in F.A.D./A.R.P.

I have never troubled to correct this error but in view of the attached letter feel that perhaps A.F.H.Q. should be informed that in addition to being a Member of the Institution of Fire Engineers (by examination) I also hold the Home Office Certificate as an Instructor in A.R.P.

Verification of the above can be obtained by reference to Major Ollis, Chief Instructor, Home Office, A.R.P. School, Falfeld, Nr Gloucester, or through Wing Commander Hodsoll of the Home Office or to the Singapore Municipal Agents;- Messrs Pierce & Williams, Civil Engineers, No 1, Victoria Street, London.

A. J. Brown
 A. J. Brown,
 Fire & C.D. Officer,

5310

Col Cripps.

17^A

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2. Legal should advise on the relevant provisions of Italian law. See letter to OFA para 5 c & d if it is insufficient draft an appropriate General Order.

2 Feb 45.

John 531.

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2 Feb 45.

John 531~

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER

AC/14529/PS

17th April, 1945.

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles :
Post Raid Measures.

TO: See Distribution

1. Although it is considered that there is little likelihood of long range projectiles, V-1 and V-2 (Flying Bomb and Long Range Rocket), being used in this theatre, particularly at this stage, it is desirable that certain aspects of the possibility be given consideration so that everyone is prepared for any eventuality.

all concerned are

2. Army Commanders have formed plans to modify existing Army P.A.D. measures in order to provide adequate defence against this type of attack.

AFHQ has directed that the Allied Commission will organise Post Raid measures to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

Italian
The Civil Defence Organizations have been reactivated in ~~LEGHORN~~, FLORENCE and ANCONA which, at the time of writing, are the most likely targets, and are sufficiently self supporting to deal with a medium-scale attack involving all but serious incidents.

3. V-1 and V-2 have been used against Military targets in the European Theatre and the following salient features have been noticed :

- a) attack, although usually limited to daylight hours, takes place throughout the 24 hour period. In one port during 24 hours, 37 V-2 rockets fell, and 12 V-1 flying bombs penetrated the defences;
- b) range of rocket and flying bomb has averaged 200 miles;
- c) whereas the flying bomb produces intense blast effect, the rocket produces a deep crater and local damage is generally more severe. The weight of the warhead of both flying bomb and rocket is approximately 1 ton;
- d) where the enemy has been able to get information of the

measures to ensure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

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- b) range of rocket and flying bomb has averaged 200 miles;
- c) whereas the flying bomb produces intense blast effect, the rocket produces a deep crater and local damage is generally more severe. The weight of the warhead of both flying bomb and rocket is approximately 1 ton;
- d) where the enemy has been able to get information of the point of impact, he has adjusted fire of the V-2 with disquieting accuracy;
- e) although there may be an audible or visible warning ^{at 311} the approach of V-1, attacks by V-2 take place without warning.

4. The maintenance of morale in ports is a military necessity; migration of labour from the docks and essential public utilities would cause a cessation of work, or require the diversion of very considerable military manpower. It is essential that Post Raid Measures be organised now, in order that they can be put into force immediately an attack occurs.

5. ^{while the} AFHQ have recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defence and that responsibility for Post Raid Measures be assumed by the ~~Senior Civil Affairs Officer~~ ^{Senior Civil Affairs Officer}, who alone can co-ordinate all the many services concerned. Fire and Civil Defence Officers in Regions are co-operating closely with Army P.A.D. officers in the re-activation of Civil Defence schemes. Special steps have been taken in LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA and interim reports forwarded to AFHQ.

to reactivate Italian Civil Defence organizations

/ A simplified procedure.....

*Ref SC in
Ref Com 2*

2.

A simplified procedure has been devised for the procurement of Army items of supply needed for the re-activation of civil defence. A memorandum on this subject will shortly be forwarded to Allied Commission from AFHQ G-5 to serve as a guide in making requisitions for the necessary Army items.

6. Finance. The financing of expenditures for emergency post raid measures will be by the issue of supplementary credits by Provincial Finance Officer to Provincial State Offices, provinces and communes. Where for any reason this procedure cannot be followed, an extraordinary credit should be authorized in favour of the Prefect, who should be instructed to open a Special Account, Prefecture. Disbursements to the various State Offices and enti should be made by him from this account, and the accounts regularised when the emergency period has passed.

7. Emergency Feeding. *Regional* The Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer in the area will be responsible for the planning and establishment of all feeding facilities for rescue squads and bombed-out persons. Feeding for these persons will be done through communal feeding centres on the basis of two meals per day at the following scale:

	40	grams	per	meal
Pasta	50	"	"	"
(or Bread	20	"	"	"
Dried vegetables	20	"	"	"
Dehydrated soup	5	"	"	"
Olive oil or fats	5	"	"	"
Salt	5	"	"	"

Feeding on this scale will be continued until the period of emergency is deemed to be over.

Sufficient trained personnel to run these communal feeding centres should be provided by the commune, ready to operate them if the emergency arises.

Communal feeding centres will hold on hand stocks sufficient to provide six meals on the scale quoted above for 2½% of the population. Additional stocks may be drawn during the emergency period from Allied Commission or Provincial warehouses on the authority of the Provincial Commissioner or the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, or officers designated by them.

8. Transport. AC transport will, upon request, be made available to Regional Commissioners. All vehicles in civilian Truck Pools should be called into permanent "stand-by" service if required.

In order that requests for transport may be met with the minimum of delay, Regional Transportation Officers will make direct contact with the officers i/o QM Truck Coys and G.T. Coys operating in their immediate areas.

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Should the transport which can be made available be insufficient to meet requirements, the nearest military units should be asked to render assistance.

9. Medical. RPHO's will, under the direction of the Regional Commissioners, take the following steps: 534

- a) Immediately inspect all IRC First Aid Posts, ensure that they are adequately stocked with emergency supplies and see that they are in a day and night state of preparedness.
- b) Ensure that all hospitals are ready to deal with the maximum possible number of emergency cases.
- c) Try to obtain emergency lighting systems for hospitals.
- d) Earmark alternative accommodation should any hospital or portion of it be destroyed.
- e) Consider the possibility of splitting depots of medical supplies.
- f) Contact the local ADMS and discuss co-operation between the Military and AMG, especially in the matter of ambulance transport.
- g) Act as liaison officer between the IRC, the Medico Provincials, the ADMS and the Regional Commissioner.

NORMAN E. FISKE, Col.
Acting Executive Commissioner

3.

Distribution:

RC UMBRIA-MARCHE	(10)	
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AP 788

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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9 FFB.1945

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RHF/at 9205
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: S E C R E T :
:Auth: SAC MT :
:Initials: Risk :
:29 January 1945 :
:.....

AG 384.5/069 GGT-0

29 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
(THRU: commanding general, MTCUSA, APO 512)
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District, CMF
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District, CMF
President, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. With reference to letter, this headquarters, file AG 384.5/233 OCT-0, dated 8 December 1944, subject as above, there are still no positive indications of use of V-1 or V-2 weapons against targets in this theater. However, in view of a report on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense reorganization and modifications in the European Theater, the following Passive Air Defense measures will be put into force forthwith:

a. Passive Air Defense training in units will be intensified. Details of training of instructors at an AERQ school will be issued shortly.

b. On the assumption that LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA are the most likely targets, commanders of static headquarters concerned will consider what measures will be necessary for the dispersal of personnel and stores if "V" attacks start or definite information of their imminence is received. Orders for putting these plans into effect will be prepared so that they can be issued without delay. The orders should include the closing of places of entertainment, limitation of numbers of military personnel, so far as may be practicable, to a maximum of fifty (50) in any one building, and the staggering of mess hours. It may be assumed that instructions will be issued from this headquarters to stop the use of these towns as leave centers.

c. The Allied Commission will insure that the Civil Defense Organization is reactivated in LEGHORN, FLORENCE and ANCONA. The Civil Defense Organization in these places should be sufficiently self-supporting to deal with a medium scale attack involving all but serious incidents.

d. The Allied Commission will insure that post-raid measures are organized at all levels to insure that the normal life of the community is restored after "V" attack.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 384.5/069 GCT-O,
 dtd 29 Jan 45 (cont'd) 16B

2. Copy of report on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense measures to deal with long range projectiles in the European Theater, referred to above, is attached for your information.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenberry
 C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
 Colonel, AGD,
 Adjutant General.

1 Incl
 Report on PAD&CD in ETOUSA

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
P.A.D. & C.D. Section
A.P.O. 512

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10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles - Visit to European Theater
of P.A.D. & C.D. Advisor

TO : A. C. of S. G-3, AFHQ
A. C. of S. G-5, AFHQ

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the visit was to observe the effects of long range projectiles and to study the modifications rendered necessary to P.A.D. and C.D. organization in the places involved. The following places were visited:

BRUSSELS
GHENT
EINDHOVEN

LIEGE
ANTWERP

2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

a. Effect of Attacks on Military Operations. So far the "V" attack on Antwerp has not appreciably reduced the operation of the port, although military effort has been diverted to provide manpower to deal with incidents. A number of Heavy Rescue Parties have to stand by to the exclusion of any other duties and at one time in Antwerp there were 575 military personnel (U.S. and British) actually deployed at the scene of military and civil incidents. To reduce this call on skilled military personnel a Civil Defense Regional Column of 12 rescue parties has been sent to Antwerp from V.V. Also strenuous efforts are being made by Civil Affairs to reorganize the various local Civil Defense Services. To prevent a similar dissipation of military effort in cities in Holland yet to be liberated, Dutch Civil Defense Columns are being formed and trained to move in as required.

b. Scale of Attack and Main Targets. The V-2 attack has been chiefly directed against Antwerp and approximately 20 V-2 fall in and around that city in 24 hours. V-1 attack is divided between Antwerp, Liege, and to a lesser extent Brussels. During conditions of bad visibility in a similar period up to 50 V-1 may be expected to fall in or near Antwerp and Liege respectively. The V-2 appears to be a more accurate weapon than the V-1 and a number of V-2 have fallen within a short distance of each other in Antwerp. Although both V-1 and V-2 have fallen at Ghent it is considered unlikely that this city and port will become a main target until the port is operated on a large scale.

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c. Casualties and Damage. The total casualties up to 31 December 1944 from "V" weapons were:

ANTWERP	Military	538 killed	632 seriously wounded
	Civil	1631 "	3242 "
ELSEWHERE	Military	73 killed	434 seriously wounded
	Civil	317 "	1366 "

The average number of casualties per projectile is low but in one incident involving a cinema at Antwerp the casualties were 500 killed, 450 wounded. 500 of these casualties were military.

As far as is known no ship has been hit although several boats have been damaged. There have been hits on the electric power station at Antwerp and on a military telephone exchange. At Liege a petrol and oil dump was set on fire by a V-1 and 200,000 gallons of fuel were destroyed. Military damage has been caused at railway yards and vehicle parks.

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d. Reporting of incidents. In order to obtain a complete picture of the joints at which V-1 and V-2 fell, it was essential that all military units reported incidents whether they had suffered damage or not. Civil Affairs Detachments made arrangements for collection of information in less populated areas for direct transmission to Army Group. In large cities much assistance was provided by use of observation posts manned by Civil Defense personnel.

As a result of lack of P.I.D. organization before the attack started, it was necessary in one town to improvise a reporting system by using a continuous patrol of 4 radio jeeps.

At HQ. 21st Army Group, a special information room has been established under P.I.D. arrangements. The density of attack and choice of targets are shown on maps. Charts give details of damage and casualties. Daily Sitreps (V-2X P.Ds) are issued.

e. Warning Arrangements. At Brussels a siren warning is given when a V-1 is known to be approaching. After 5 minutes an "All Clear" is sounded. At Liege the "All Clear" is omitted, it being understood that if nothing has happened in 5 minutes that the danger has passed. No warning is available in the case of V-2 attack. At Antwerp no warning is given except for attack by aircraft.

f. Medical Arrangements. The use of Medical Inspection Rooms (MIRs) to provide additional first aid posts proved satisfactory. Evaluation of casualties was smooth and efficient and was adequate for the largest incident. The practice introduced at Antwerp of sending a Medical Officer with the ambulance called to each new incident was effective. Apart from taking charge of medical arrangements on the spot he was able to assess the amount of any further medical assistance required.

It has been found necessary to widen the scope of rescue training to cover first aid.

g. Effect on Civil Population. The maintenance of morale in ports is a military necessity otherwise migration of labor from the docks and essential public utilities would cause a cessation of work or require the diversion of very considerable military manpower. Morale has been good particularly in Antwerp where some 15,000 Polish dock workers have shown such determination. The weakness of the local Civil Defense organization and the total absence of Post Raid Measures caused a serious situation for a time. These subjects will be covered in paragraph 5 below.

h. Tactical use of V-1. Although primarily intended as a long range weapon, considerable numbers of V-1 were launched from a range of 30 to 40 miles on forward areas prior to the German attack on 16 December 1944. The targets

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4. Tactical use of V-1. Although primarily intended as a long range weapon, considerable numbers of V-1 were launched from a range of 30 to 40 miles on forward areas prior to the German attack on 16 December 1944. The targets appeared to be forward dumps and billeting areas.

5. Army Fire Service. To date few fires have been caused by "V" weapons. With the exception of the petrol dump at Liege they have not been serious. To reduce the strain on manpower of the U.S. Engineer Fire Service, a National Fire Service Column from U.K. has been asked for to cover a number of Rear areas fire risks.

The communication and reporting organization of the Army Fire Service provides an additional reporting agency for "V" incidents.

3. MODIFICATIONS TO NORMAL P.A.D. OPERATIONS

A. Permanent State of Alert. Owing to the fact that V-1 and V-2 attack may take place at any time during the 24 hours, the P.A.D. organization has to be maintained in a permanent state of alert. This involves continuous naming of the Control Centers in target areas. A Control Room staff consists of 3 officers and

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6 C.A.S./E.M. divided into 3 shifts. There is in addition one NCO for day duty only. All units with a strength of 50 and over are required to provide at a few minutes notice an Incident Officer and a Light Rescue Party (NCO and 6 ORs). Larger units have to have further parties to a state of readiness to replace those sent out. Specified technical units have Heavy Rescue Parties standing by to the exclusion of other duties. Equipment is kept ready loaded on vehicles. Work Parties to assist in rescue work and to cordon incidents are available from specified units on short call. Specially manned Control Centers and standby operations are in operation at Antwerp City, Antwerp Port, Brussels and Liege. Similar arrangements are being made for Ghent City and Ghent Port.

B. Additional Officers. Much difficulty has been experienced in providing trained officers as the 21st Army Group SO P.D. Pool had been kept as small as possible. When the attack developed many formations who hitherto had remained somewhat aloof as regards P. D., demanded officers at very short notice. It was necessary to increase the War Establishment of the 21st Army Group P.D. Staff Officers Pool. At Antwerp an additional SO P.D. became necessary and full-time Staff Officers have been attached to two of the Corps in 2nd Army as well as at HQ, 2nd Army. U. S. Army Headquarters already had full-time P.D. Officers. To run Control Centers, officers have been drawn from training or similar depots and hurriedly instructed. A War Establishment for these Centers is under discussion. In Communication Zone (U.S. Army) the additional officers are provided from Replacement Depots and placed on Temporary Duty.

C. Intensification of Training. P.D. training had been maintained in both 12th and 21st Army Groups and fullest use had been made of facilities provided by the Ministry of Home Security in U.K. The new form of continuous attack has shown however that not only has training been insufficient but not nearly enough officers and NCOs have been trained. This has been particularly noticeable as regards training of officers in Incident Control and NCOs in rescue technique. Training in reporting of incidents had also proved inadequate.

To meet the sudden demand for training, three instructors have been sent out by the Ministry of Home Security. Schools have been established at Brussels, Antwerp and Eindhoven. At each of these schools approximately 50 officers per week are trained in Incident Control (one day course) and 40 NCOs are trained as Rescue Party Leaders (five day course). The 2nd Army school at Eindhoven has been made available to U.S. officers and NCOs from 1st and 9th Armies. Venues are allotted to all types of units and it is intended to proceed with training at this rate until a very high percentage of officers of all arms have been trained in Incident Control. Lack of this training has considerably added to the difficulties in clearing up serious incidents. ²³⁰⁰ In rescue technique will also be continued and the Ministry of Home Security experts retained until sufficient military instructors are competent to relieve them.

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The training at the above schools is supplemental to and not in place of unit training.

4. MODIFICATION OF P.A.D. POLICY

a. Reduction of numbers in individual buildings. As a result of the disaster at the Cinema in Antwerp, attendance has been drastically curtailed at Cinemas, Theaters, Churches, and, in fact, all places where large numbers of civilians or troops normally congregate. This policy cuts across welfare organization and dispersal of entertainment presents such difficulty. Nevertheless, in places subject to "v" attack, it has been considered preferable to avoid a "casualty risk". A direct hit on an P.A.D. mass led to a decision to stagger the hours of meals in officers and other messes. Every endeavor is made to limit the casualty potential to 50 in any one building. Headquarters and billets are therefore dispersed.

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The policy has been accepted to apply the lessons of Antwerp to Ghent when that port is opened in order that the same lessons do not have to be learned at great cost.

b. Reduction of number of troops in target areas. Large cities such as Antwerp, Liege, and Ghent offer considerable facilities for entertainment, and it has been necessary to discontinue the use of Antwerp and Liege as leave centers, and the exclusion of Ghent is also under consideration. The removal of a large Canadian reinforcement depot from the immediate vicinity of Ghent is also contemplated. The unheralded nature of "W" attack makes it undesirable for large numbers of persons to be exposed unless some definite military purpose is served. A V-2 which fell at a main crossroad in the center of Antwerp destroyed 5 trains and some hundred passers-by were killed and wounded.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS' RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Local Civil Defense Organization. Both in Belgium and Holland very considerable leeway has had to be made up in getting Civil Defense reorganized. Absence of air attack from Normandy onward had diminished the importance of Civil Defense in the list of other Civil Affairs' responsibilities, and the specialist Civil Defense officers labored under certain difficulties. When "W" attack commenced the Belgian and Dutch Civil Defense Services were quite unable to cope with the situation and unnecessary strain was placed on military resources to deal with Civil incidents.

The work of the Civil Affairs Officers concerned has been beyond praise and they received full cooperation from the local authorities. It was not possible however to effect in a few weeks a reorganization that normally requires months. Lack of training in Incident Control and rescue technique was even more serious in the civil organization than in P.D. Much delay in restoring the local Civil Defense Services was caused by the slowness of the administrative machinery to provide such items as vehicles, tires and batteries, and other essential equipment. This also applied to the provision of clothing and extra rations to enable Civil Defense rescue personnel to carry on with the heavy task of rescue work at high pressure.

b. Post Raid Organization. By far the most difficult problems in dealing with air or similar attack on civilians are those generally known as "Post Raid". These include:

- (1) Tending, clothing, and housing the survivors immediately after an incident, also housing those who homes have become permanently or temporarily untenable.

specialist Civil Defense Officers labored under great strain during the attack. Officers and Dutch Civil Defense Services were quite unable to cope with the situation and unnecessary strain was placed on military resources to deal with Civil incidents.

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b. Post Raid Organization. By far the most difficult problems in dealing with air or similar attack on civilians are those generally known as "Post Raid". These include:

- (1) Feeding, clothing, and housing the survivors immediately after an incident, also housing those who homes have become permanently or temporarily untenable.
- (2) Arrangements for "First Aid" repairs to less severely damaged premises. This includes freezing and control of building material and labor.
- (3) Provision of Information Centers.
- (4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and effects from wrecked houses.
- (5) Organization of a system for provision of funds to those requiring temporary relief.
- (6) Replacement of civil documentation, a serious matter in European countries and involving normally much screening procedure.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356 SECTION 3.3/NND NO. 785016

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All these and other Post Raid matters are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defense and that responsibility for Post Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer who alone can coordinate all the many services concerned. In important places the appointment of an expert deputy is contemplated or arrangements made for the training of an existing deputy.

It will be recalled that in U.K. failure to appreciate the great importance of Post Raid problems caused the only weakness in morale during the early stages of the air attacks. As a result a highly efficient coordinated organization was built up. One of the leading experts in Post Raid measures from the Ministry of Home Security has been attached to NATO Mission to Belgium to assist in this matter. The necessary measures at Belgian Government level having been effected, this officer is now being attached to Civil Affairs 21st Army Group.

C. Lack of Emergency Legislation. Great difficulty was met by Civil Affairs Officers in Belgium and Holland owing to lack of emergency legislation. For example, it was not possible for the local authority to remove timber from a wrecked house to effect temporary repairs or emergency strutting to neighboring houses. Such timber and also the debris belonged to the estate of the dead buried in the ruins. No legislation existed to prevent migration of labor from Civil Defense rescue parties to more lucrative work. Building materials could not be frozen and used as directed by the local authority and a black market in roof tiles, tarpaulins and window screening material had already started. This, as well as the fear of looting, lowered morale and tended to make the dockers or railwaymen stay in his damaged home or move to a less troubled town. Coordination of voluntary and mutually jealous welfare bodies provided a highly complex matter until local authorities were provided with emergency powers and could be persuaded to use them.

6. CONCLUSION

P.A.D. and C.D. measures as developed and modified to meet the new form of attack have proved sound and were effected in a very short period. This was due to the high degree of training and experience of the P.A.D. and C.D. officers concerned and the existence of plans to meet special emergencies.

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Ref: 1243

TO	1/1/44
COL. CHAPMAN	
COL. YOUNG	
LT. COL. WILCOX	
MAJ. LUCAS	
MAJ. WILSON	
MAJ. HANBURY	
MAJ. BAKER	

S. E. H. DAW
Lt. Colonel
PAD & C.D. Advisor

See Album: 8/4/45.
See F. Brangin. map.

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Ref: 1243

TO	10/2/45
COL. CHAPMAN	
COL. YOUNG	
L.T. COL. WILSON	
MAJ. HUSKISSON	
MAJ. WILSON	
MAJ. HANBURY	
MAJ. GALLAGHER	

See Album: 8/2/45.
See F. Brannigan: Ref.

J. E. D. D.
S. L. H. DAW
Lt. Colonel
P.A.D. & C.D. Advisor

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AC/14529/PS

30 January 1945

SUBJECT : Long Range Projectiles.. P.A.D.

TO : Director, Commerce Sub-Commission
Director, Finance Sub-Commission
Director, Food, Sub-Commission
Director, Industry Sub-Commission
Director, Labour Sub-Commission
Director, Legal Sub-Commission
Director, Public Health Sub-Commission

1. Reference our letter of even number dated 28 January 1945.
2. Will you please note that the meeting arranged will now take place at 3.30 P.M. (not 2.30 P.M.) Wednesday 31st January 1945 in the office of the Director, Public Safety.

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.C.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

FJA/jwf

Copy to:

Lt. Col. Daw. (A.F.H.Q.).

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17AHEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
50394

40/14529/40

28 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles, P.A.C.

- TO :
- Director, Commerce Sub-Commission
 - Director, Finance Sub-Commission
 - Director, Food Sub-Commission
 - Director, Industry Sub-Commission
 - Director, Labour Sub-Commission
 - Director, Legal Sub-Commission
 - Director, Public Health Sub-Commission

53 para 5

1. Attached is an extract entitled "Post War Organization" taken from an AHC directive dated 18 January 1945 on the subject of long range projectiles.
2. P.A.C. and C.P. arrangements in this theatre are being revised as a result of experience gained in the European theatre recently.
3. "Post War" organization will affect in some degree, each of the sub-commissions listed above in addition to Public Safety sub-commission.
4. Lt Col. Law, P.A.C. and C.P. adviser to AHC, who has recently visited the European theatre, has requested a meeting of representatives of the sub-commissions named at 2.30 P.M. Wednesday 21st January, 1945 to discuss problems arising from the use of V-1 and V-2.
5. Will you please arrange for a representative to attend.

Howard Wilson M.C.
 Major General
 Colonel L. J.A.C.C.
 Director Public Safety
 sub-commission

735/308

all s/c have been notified to add that
 the meeting will be held in Col. Chapman's office.

s/sy. Law & P.A.C.
 5376/45

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ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

18A

SUBJECT: Billeting.

FILE No. HQC/7

TO : Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

25 January 1945

Reference your AC/14829/PS, dated 23 January 1945, arrangements are in hand to billet the officer personnel mentioned in your letter for the period of their stay at this Headquarters.

H. H. Robertson Colonel
H. H. ROBERTSON
Hq. Commandant.

5304

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PUBLIC SAFETY

HEADQUARTERS
FRENCH REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SECRET 8689

BVIII/2/12/238

23 Jan 45.

SUBJECT : Meeting of HQ officers.

TO : HQAO, AGO, Fifth Army
IG, SIGMA.
R.P.S.G.

1. Under TIM No. 339 dated 23 Jan 45, HQ AG direct that the u/m officers be ordered to proceed to Rome for the purpose of attending a conference to study HQ problems.

Major G.H.L. MASON - SIGMA Province
Capt. A.W. MADDOUGALL - AGO Fifth Army
Capt. J.B. FORSTER - Reg. HQ.

2. The conference is to take place at No. 45, via BEN (?) CORNICCHI, ROME on Monday and Tuesday, 29 and 30 Jan 45. Please issue instructions accordingly. Necessary Travel Orders and a copy of this letter are being sent to the officers concerned.

For the Regional Commissioner:

A. H. Pindley
Adj. Comd. A.T.S.
J. HOWARD HALPER,
Major R.A.,
Adjutant.

CM/AG

Copies to: HQ, AG - [unclear] TIM No. 339 dated 23 Jan 45, refers.

HQ
Maj. MASON
Capt. MADDOUGALL
Capt. FORSTER

Travel Orders are attached.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT. COL. WILCOX		
MAJ. LOCKMAN		
MAJ. WILSON		
MAJ. HANBURY		
MAJ. BALLANCE		
CAPT. POWEL		
CHIEF CLERK		

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11A

ALL TOSCANA REGION CMA EMILIA REGION CMA PLEASE FOR ALCOM
SOUTHERN REGION

339

23 January 1945

ROUTINE

SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS LONG RANGE PROJECTILES PD

PARIN TO ALL TOSCANA REGION CMA AMG EMILIA REGION CMA PLEASE FOR ALCOM SOUTHERN REGION
FROM H. ALCOM PARIN PD

PARA ONE PD CONFERENCE OF PETER ABLE DOG OFFICERS TO STUDY PROBLEMS ARISING FROM LONG
RANGE PROJECTILES IS BEING CONVENED IN ROME ON MONDAY AND TUESDAY TWO NINE AND THREE ZERO
JANUARY PETER ABLE DOG AND CHARLIE DOG ADVISOR ABLE FOX HOW QUEST WILL BE PRESENT PD

PARA TWO PD CONFERENCE IS TO BE HELD AT ONE FIVE VIA BON COMPAGNI CMA ROME CMA AND
WILL OPEN AT ZERO NINE ZERO ZERO HOURS TWO NINE JANUARY FOUR FIVE PD

PARA THREE PD PLEASE ARRANGE FOR THE FOLLOWING OFFICERS TO ATTEND PD LT COL MONTAGUE
MAJOR EASON BARNIGAN CAPTAIN LACKEN BROWN FOSTER MCDUGALL AND NOBLE PD

PARA FOUR PD ACCOMMODATION WILL BE BOOKED FOR THE NIGHTS OF TWO EIGHT AND TWO NINE AND
THREE ZERO JANUARY PD

5302

DISTRIBUTION:

Lazio Region (Action) (ELS)
Piemonte Region (Action) (ELS)

Public Safety S/C

Ext 365

F.J. JILSON, Lt Col

NICHOLAS PIONIERO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

Flora
10A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 489001 Ext 365

23 January, 1945

AG/11529/Po

SUBJECT : Billeting

TO : HQ Commandant (Attn: Billeting Officer)

1. The following Public Safety Officers will visit Rome on 28 Jan. and remain for about 3 or 4 days: -

Lt. Col.	Montague
Major	Mason
Major	Brannegen
Capt.	Backman
"	Brown
"	Foster
"	Mc Dougal
"	Noble.

2. Can billeting arrangements be made for these officers please.

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.C.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

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FJH/wg.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
P.A.D. & C.D. Section
A.P.O. 512

12 January 1945

Extract from SHAEP Air Defense Review No. 5, dated 22 December 1944.

P A R T " C "

SECTION VII : PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CIVIL DEFENSE AND
AIR DEFENSE

A. CIVIL DEFENSE IN BELGIUM

1. Organization at Government Level

a. An interesting development has been the temporary appointment of an advisor to the SHAEP Mission to BELGIUM on "Post-Paid Services". This advisor was selected by the Ministry of Home Security for his wealth of experience of administration and post-raid organization after heavy attacks on large centers in ENGLAND.

b. It soon became apparent that the civil defense organization in BELGIUM must follow the same sequence as it did in the U.K. This sequence is:-

(1) Building up "A.R.P. Services" and coordinating them under centralized control. This has already commenced as reported in issue No. 4 of the Air Defense Review.

(2) Setting up an operational control on a national basis by which re-enforcements can be sent from one part of the country to another. The mobile columns being formed in BELGIUM are evidence that this lesson has already been appreciated.

(3) Coordination at government level of all services which will be required after a heavy raid has taken place until the normal life of the community is restored.

c. In the U.K. this development took the form of the organization of Regions under Regional Commissioners. In BELGIUM this aspect of the problem is being tackled today by the BELGIAN Government, advised by the post-raid expert attached to the SHAEP Mission.

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d. One of the first problems facing the Belgian Government is that of accommodation. After a series of attacks numbers of houses become uninhabitable and accommodation has to be found for those who have lost their homes. This problem is increased by the number of displaced persons from forward areas who require to be billeted. Unless, therefore, there is a government control scheme for the rapid repair and restoration of damaged property, slightly damaged houses deteriorate until they are uninhabitable, and the number of houses available decreases until it becomes impossible to provide essential accommodation.

e. The agencies responsible for effecting these repairs, for providing building material and temporary accommodation, for deciding on priorities, and for insuring that bombed out persons are housed, fed, and clothed, must therefore be coordinated with the local Civil Defense Services who make the first immediate contact at the scene of damage. At the time of writing this need is being put to the Belgian Government in the light of experience gained in the U.K., and the Belgian authorities are said to be "not unsympathetic".

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f. If attacks develop over large areas in rear of an army the military P.A.D., which in the fighting line is sufficient in itself, must be reinforced progressively in areas further and further back. Initially this is done by local Civil Defense Services, then by the repair and reconstruction and public assistance organizations of local authorities, and ultimately the government itself must coordinate the whole under central control, and release the military authorities from all Civil Defense problems. Thus the understanding of Civil Defense problems in the widest sense becomes an essential part of all military operations in which the rear areas are open to widespread attack by the enemy upon the civil population.

2. Civil Defense Organization at ANTWERP

a. In issue No. 4 of the Air Defense Review it was explained how the Belgian Government formed a committee to coordinate and improve their P.A.D. Services and their Voluntary Aid Services. As the date for opening the port of ANTWERP drew nearer the interest of the military authorities in the Belgian Civil Defense organization became more and more keen. This interest was focused mainly upon the danger that the morale of the 15,000 stevedores required for the docks would be impaired by "V" attacks on themselves and their homes.

b. A comprehensive survey was undertaken and arrangements were made to tie up even more closely the control of the Belgian Civil Defense Services with those of the military P.A.D. organization. Further essential equipment and transport required by the Civil Defense was made available to them through military resources and technical advice was provided for protection of vital parts of essential services. Assistance in training was also arranged.

c. The military P.A.D. organization for the dock area itself is to be re-enforced by a Civil Defense Regional Column consisting of 147 men and 30 vehicles, loaned to 21 Army Group by the Ministry of Home Security. It is expected that this column will be ready to leave the U.K. by December 24th.

3. Civil Defense Organization at LIEGE

Initially there had not been close coordination of Civil Defense with military P.A.D., as there were very few military units in the area. The sharp and severe V-1 attack to which LIEGE was subjected from 20 November onwards made a rapid improvement of the Civil Defense Services in LIEGE essential and this called for urgent action on the part of the military authorities through their P.A.D. and Civil Affairs staffs. This action is now in progress. The position is made easier by the fact that the Belgian Central Government has already been made aware of the needs in ANTWERP and BRUSSELS, and is therefore better prepared to deal with problems arising in LIEGE.

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B. OPERATIONAL REPORTS OF CIVIL DEFENSE AT NIJMEGEN

1. NIJMEGEN has provided an example of the importance of the initial coordination of local Civil Defense and P.A.D. The weak state of the Dutch Civil Defense Services was soon apparent; the military commander, however, through his P.A.D. and Civil Defense staffs, took energetic measures to revitalize the Dutch Civil Defense services in NIJMEGEN and to coordinate them under the P.A.D. Control. An illustration of the change brought about by these efforts is provided in the following examples extracted from reports received:-

2. On October 1st two HE bombs fell on a kapok factory and 92 persons were trapped, including both living and dead. No message reporting the incident or calling for assistance could be traced and no organized parties arrived until the following day. There was then ample labor available, but there was no organized control. Men stopped work whenever a shell fell in the town area and labor dispute were frequent. Nobody knew where the bodies were likely to be found. There was no equipment other than picks and shovels for the removal of tons of concrete,

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iron netting, collapsed machinery and bales of kapok. After 12 days a trained incident officer was put in charge, and the Civil Defense Services which had by then been organized were put into operation. The incident was cleared up on October 26th.

3. The second example occurred on October 29th. The report states:-

"October 29th was a particularly bad day when both shelling and bombing taxed the Civil Defense Services to the full. Shelling had been practically continuous from 0830 hours to 1655 hours. During both the morning and afternoon, attacks were made from the air with HE bombs and rockets. Incidents affected both military and civilian areas. . . . The total casualties as a result of the day's bombing and shelling was civil killed 34, injured 46; military killed 17, injured 51. In all instances both killed and wounded civilians were removed from the damaged sites within 30 minutes of the bombs or shell falling. The new reporting system and the dispatch and work of services were all taxed to the utmost and the results reflected great credit. . . . From the point of view of Civil Defense working, equally satisfactory results have been experienced in similar attacks since. It is considered. . . that Civil Defense in NUTEGEN can continue to be entirely responsible for civil incidents and this will include a safety margin to allow for an increase of approximately 50% on present occurrences. Above that it may be necessary to seek military assistance."

4. It seems likely that the next step in such towns as NUTEGEN will be coordination of these reactivated Civil Defense services with the repair, the restoration, and public assistance organizations under central control.

C. LONG-RANGE ROCKETS

Some provisional Civil Defense lessons learned in dealing with long range rocket incidents in the UNITED KINGDOM have now been received from Ministry of Home Security and other sources. The following is a summary of these lessons and conclusions:-

1. Lack of Warning

Normally, nothing is heard of the approach of the rocket and the first intimation of its arrival is a flash followed by an explosion. If the rocket in its flight passes over the observer, the shell save from the rocket may also be heard as a distinct report. This will not generally be heard by observers who are beyond the point of fall. The secondary noise of falling masonry will be audible. The explosion can often be heard from a long distance; the sound is therefore deceptive and makes it difficult to locate the incident. No attempt to give public or other warnings of rockets in flight is made. In country areas, this absence of warning leads to delay in the dispatch of assistance as the

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2. Organization at the incident

a. The rocket is more liable than the flying bomb to cause damage to water, gas, and electricity mains. In consequence, the considerable number of services and utilities specialists required in built-up areas throws additional strain on incident officers and creates a complicated parking problem. There is a need for more than one incident officer at large incidents, with one senior officer to coordinate. Also required are incident control vans and field telephones, especially where the approach to the incident has been split by the crater.

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b. At large incidents occurring at a time when many people may be about, a considerable number of ambulances may be required at the outset and there is a need for a light rescue squad with transport to go round the area in the early stages of an incident to deal with light casualties.

c. The small number of fires enables the fire services to give general assistance at incidents. Risk of fires being caused is increased in winter due to increased number of domestic heating appliances in use.

3. Casualties

The proportion of seriously injured to killed is greater than is produced by bombs from aircraft, glass being a considerable cause of casualties. Burns from chemicals used in the propulsion unit of the rocket have also been experienced. The identification of casualties, especially in daytime, continues to prove a major difficulty. This difficulty is naturally increased by lack of warning because more people may be in streets and buildings with which they are not normally identified.

4. Equipment

Cranes are valuable and sometimes essential but must not be regarded as a substitute for skilled rescue work. There is a need for lighting of incidents at night and use has been made of indirect lighting from searchlights. Tipper lorries have also been found of value for clearing roads around the perimeter of incidents. They must not, however, be allowed to interfere with the work of rescue parties.

MAJ HADLEY	MAJ BALLANCE	CAPT POWELL	CHIEF CLERK
MAJ WILSON	MAJ HADLEY	MAJ BALLANCE	CAPT POWELL
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See Annex 8/4/5

a substitute for skilled rescue work. There is a need for lighting of incidents at night and use has been made of indirect lighting from searchlights. Tipper lorries have also been found of value for clearing roads around the perimeter of incidents. They must not, however, be allowed to interfere with the work of rescue parties.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475	476	477	478	479	480	481	482	483	484	485	486	487	488	489	490	491	492	493	494	495	496	497	498	499	500	501	502	503	504	505	506	507	508	509	510	511	512	513	514	515	516	517	518	519	520	521	522	523	524	525	526	527	528	529	530	531	532	533	534	535	536	537	538	539	540	541	542	543	544	545	546	547	548	549	550	551	552	553	554	555	556	557	558	559	560	561	562	563	564	565	566	567	568	569	570	571	572	573	574	575	576	577	578	579	580	581	582	583	584	585	586	587	588	589	590	591	592	593	594	595	596	597	598	599	600	601	602	603	604	605	606	607	608	609	610	611	612	613	614	615	616	617	618	619	620	621	622	623	624	625	626	627	628	629	630	631	632	633	634	635	636	637	638	639	640	641	642	643	644	645	646	647	648	649	650	651	652	653	654	655	656	657	658	659	660	661	662	663	664	665	666	667	668	669	670	671	672	673	674	675	676	677	678	679	680	681	682	683	684	685	686	687	688	689	690	691	692	693	694	695	696	697	698	699	700	701	702	703	704	705	706	707	708	709	710	711	712	713	714	715	716	717	718	719	720	721	722	723	724	725	726	727	728	729	730	731	732	733	734	735	736	737	738	739	740	741	742	743	744	745	746	747	748	749	750	751	752	753	754	755	756	757	758	759	760	761	762	763	764	765	766	767	768	769	770	771	772	773	774	775	776	777	778	779	780	781	782	783	784	785	786	787	788	789	790	791	792	793	794	795	796	797	798	799	800	801	802	803	804	805	806	807	808	809	810	811	812	813	814	815	816	817	818	819	820	821	822	823	824	825	826	827	828	829	830	831	832	833	834	835	836	837	838	839	840	841	842	843	844	845	846	847	848	849	850	851	852	853	854	855	856	857	858	859	860	861	862	863	864	865	866	867	868	869	870	871	872	873	874	875	876	877	878	879	880	881	882	883	884	885	886	887	888	889	890	891	892	893	894	895	896	897	898	899	900	901	902	903	904	905	906	907	908	909	910	911	912	913	914	915	916	917	918	919	920	921	922	923	924	925	926	927	928	929	930	931	932	933	934	935	936	937	938	939	940	941	942	943	944	945	946	947	948	949	950	951	952	953	954	955	956	957	958	959	960	961	962	963	964	965	966	967	968	969	970	971	972	973	974	975	976	977	978	979	980	981	982	983	984	985	986	987	988	989	990	991	992	993	994	995	996	997	998	999	1000
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Seen W. Brown 8/2/51
Seen F. Brumigan.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Tel 489081 Ext 365
24 January 1945

NO/14527/PS

SUBJECT: PAD and CD. Long Range Projectiles.

TO : AFRL, C-5 section.

1. Reference your C-5, 364.51 dated 14 January and 16 January 1945.

2. Arrangements have been made for the attendance of the following officers in Rome on Monday and Tuesday 29 and 30 January 1945.

Lt Col.	Montague
Major	Brannigan
Major	Haron
Capt	Backman
Capt	Brown
Capt	Porter
Capt	McDougal
Capt	Noble

3. In view of the conference to be held at 15 Via Bon Compagni Rome at which ~~AC~~ technical experts will be present, it is assumed that no separate discussion will be necessary with Public Safety Sub-Commission on 27th or 31st January.

For the Chief Commissioner:

C.R. UPJOIN Brig.

VP CA Sec

ECOS AC

5290

File 7A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AC/14529/PS

19 January, 1945.

SUBJECT : Civil Defence of Target Towns. Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Regional Commissioners : Sicilia, Sardegna, Southern Lazio,
Abruzzi-Marche, Toscana, Emilia, Pic-
monte, Liguria, Lombardia and Venezia
Regions (Attn: R.F.S.O.).

AMG 5th Army
(Attn: C.F.S.).

AMG 8 Army
(Attn: S.C.A.F.O.).

1. The attached Notes on modifications to existing P.A.D. Measures is forwarded for information and necessary action.
2. Although there is little likelihood of the V1 and V2 weapons being used against open towns in Italy it is considered desirable that certain precautions be taken.
3. The Civil Defence organizations of areas situated within 200 miles of the battle front containing important military objectives, road and rail centres and shipping ports should be overhauled and made efficient.
4. The modifications contained in the attached Notes should be made to serve as a model and guide in re-organising civil defence to meet the Flying Bomb and Rocket Bomb type of attack.
5. It is important that the civil organisations be maintained in such state of efficiency that military resources will not have to be diverted to deal with civil casualties and trapped persons.
6. The closest liaison between the Army P.A.D. and Civil Defence authorities should be maintained and technical advice of the P.A.D. Staff Officer obtained in any case of difficulty.

AM/G.

5235-AM
J. H. GARMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

7B

TO	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN	
COL. YOUNG	
LT. COL. WILSON	
MAJ. GILSON	
MAJ. HENNESSY	
MAJ. BARRON	

LONG RANGE ARTILLERY

NOTES ON MODIFICATION OF P.A.D. CONTROL

OP 1945

1. P.A.D. CONTROL

There is the present organization of the P.A.D. in this theatre is mainly based on the probability of night attack of a certain condition of permanent alert will have to be maintained in a port or similar target area which is subject to frequent attack at irregular intervals by long range projectiles. A much higher degree of P.A.D. readiness would therefore be required. It is considered that a Duty P.A.D. Officer will be necessary at all times, together with sufficient clerks and telephonists. It is suggested that in addition to the P.A.D. Staff Officer, who is responsible for organization, inspection, and training, that three complete shifts are planned each comprising an officer with telephonists and clerks.

2. P.A.D. STATION

P.A.D. Services must be organized in such a manner as to be immediately available. It is suggested that a predetermined number of duty ambulances should be available on call from P.A.D. Control. At least one Light and one Heavy Rescue party should be standing by or performing duties from which they could be called at a few minutes notice. On deployment of one or both of these parties, another two parties would have to be called to a state of immediate readiness.

The problem of striking a balance between immediate availability and tie-up of manpower is not easy of solution. Much will depend upon local conditions. To provide further parties to assist those called out on immediate action, it would be necessary for certain units to receive orders to have these available at short notice. Such parties should be provided in a similar manner.

REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

Although the method of a normal P.A.D. organization for reporting incidents should suffice, it is suggested that observer posts on high buildings or other suitable points should be established with telephone facilities. To ensure rapid reporting of incidents, additional communications might be necessary from Military Police posts. All units should be instructed to report incidents at once even if no additional help is needed. This will prevent unnecessary movement of Rescue Parties as a result of inaccurate information forwarded outside the unit.

4. TARGETS

It is considered that any general alarm warning will be possible. It is suggested that any general alarm warning will be possible. It is suggested that any general alarm warning will be possible.

every Rescue Party should be standing by or performing duties from which they could be called at a few minutes notice. On deployment of one or both of these parties, another two parties would have to be called to a state of immediate readiness.

The problem of striking a balance between immediate availability and tie-up of manpower is not easy of solution. Much will depend upon local conditions. To provide further parties to assist those called out on immediate action, it would be necessary for certain units to receive orders to have these available at short notice. Work parties should be provided in a similar manner.

4. REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

Although the method of a formal F.A.D. organization for reporting incidents should suffice, it is suggested that observer posts on high buildings or other suitable points should be established with telephone facilities. To ensure rapid reporting of incidents, additional communications might be necessary from Military Police posts. All units should be instructed to report incidents at once even if no additional help is needed. This will prevent unnecessary movement of Rescue Parties as a result of inaccurate information forwarded outside the unit.

4. WARNERS

It is not considered that any general siren warning will be possible. Immediate approach of flying bombs might be signalled in ports or other targets which may be the object of frequent attacks. This would provide a short warning period of one or two minutes, to enable lock and other workers to rush to shelter. Warning of launching of long range rockets is unlikely and in any case would involve an extensive communication system.

5. SHELTERS

Although the construction of shelters on a large scale would probably not be necessary, shelter arrangements would be required on the docks and other places where it is essential that work goes on throughout the entire 24 hour period. Such shelters should be of simplest possible design, providing protection against blast and cylinders. Protection from falling masonry, etc. is desirable but this additional protection must be weighed against need of immediate access to the shelter. An open slit trench provides quicker cover than a covered trench with a limited number of entrances. Shelters, whether slit trenches or slit-up, would take up space on or near quays, but the confidence which they would give if extended with a warning period however short, would

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CONFIDENTIAL

result in greater working efficiency over a period.

6. FIRST AID POSTS

More First Aid Posts would be necessary than are usually available in a normal F.A.D. scheme. These posts would also need protection against splinters and especially against blast. Arrangements would be necessary for availability of duty doctors and if possible surgical teams should be available at short notice to proceed to the scene of serious incidents.

7. INCIDENT CONTROL

Reports already received from 21st Army Group (Br.) indicate that the importance of the Incident Officer is greater than ever. Similar importance is attached in 12th Army Group (U.S.). The following is an extract from F.A.D. Orders of an area within the 12th Army Group:

"Incident Officer. During alerts, units and detachments of over 50 men will have available an Incident Officer, who in cases of incidents in the unit area, will proceed to the scene of damage. The Incident Officer will be completely in charge of the incident. He will co-ordinate the work of all the activities and will be supplied with all the information relative to the incident. The Incident Officer will be the representative of the Commanding General at the scene of damage. No officers will be allowed to interfere, unless such officers are prepared to take over complete responsibility and change of the incident. The Incident Officer, when on duty at the scene of damage will be identified in daylight by letters I.O., chained on his helmet. At night his post will be identified by two lanterns."

8. TRAINING

The possibility of attack by long range projectiles makes it necessary for F.A.D. training to be much increased beyond the present scale. The greatest need is for a high percentage of officers to be trained in Incident Control, and for NCO's to be trained as leaders of rescue parties. Your attention is drawn to F.A.D. Technical Bulletin Nos. 1 and 2, dated 20 January and 15 May 1944 respectively, issued by this section. All troops will need further training in simple precautions enabling them to know where to seek further training in shelters as such, are available in their vicinity.

9. GENERAL

Although applicable to all F.A.D.

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relative to the incident. The Incident Officer, a representative of the Commanding General at the scene of damage. No officers will be allowed to interfere, unless such officers are prepared to take over complete responsibility and charge of the incident. The Incident Officer, when on duty at the scene of damage will be identified in daylight by letters I.O., chalked on his helmet. At night his post will be identified by two lanterns.

CONTENTS

The possibility of attack by long range projectiles makes it necessary for P.A.D. training to be much increased beyond the present scale. The greatest need is for a high percentage of officers to be trained in Incident Control, and for WFO's to be trained as Leaders of reserve parties. Your attention is drawn to P.A.D. Technical Bulletins Nos. 1 and 2, dated 20 January and 15 May 1944 respectively, issued by this section. All troops will need further training in simple precautions enabling them to know where to seek some protection if no shelters are such, are available in their vicinity).

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7. General

Although applicable to all F.M.D. schemes, it is desirable that the following points receive special emphasis:

4. Post Raid Measures. It is essential that R.A.D. Commander receive possible information to Engineer of damage resulting in blocked roads or damaged bridges. Reports of location of all incidents to Signals will be necessary, in case trunk telephone routes are affected. It is desirable that arrangements be made for water to feed and possibly accommodate, without prior notice, survivors of another unit.

b. Army Fire Service. Where it is not already the case, the Army Fire Service Control should be established in close proximity but not in the same building as P.A.D. Control. It is essential that both Controls are so organized that if one suffers a direct hit control could be temporarily maintained from the other.

2. Civil Defence. To ensure that military resources are not diverted to deal with civil casualties or trapped persons, it is important that the Civil Defence organization in all target towns is overhauled and made efficient under the guidance made by Allied Commission, with the technical advice of the P.M.D. Staff Officer. Although military reinforcement of the Civil organization necessary in severe incidents, it is most important that the Civil organization be self-supporting as far as possible.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

6A

G-5: 384.51

16 January 1945

SUBJECT: PAD & CD - Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394. ✓

1. Reference paragraph 2 of G-5 384.51 of 14 January the PAD & CD Advisor has now informed this section that with the approval of G-3 here a conference of PAD Officers to study problems arising from Long Range Projectiles is being convened in Rome on Monday and Tuesday, 29 and 30 January.

2. He has requested that arrangements should be made for the following civil affairs officers who, so far as he is aware, are still responsible for Fire and Civil Defence, to attend:

Major Mason
Major Brannigan Rome
Capt. Noble Naples
Capt. Brown Rome
Capt. Backman Reg. A.
Capt. McDougall B

Albert G. Montague
Capt. Foster

Remain

3. The conference is to be held at 15 Via Ben Compagni, Rome, and will open at 0900 hours 29 January.

4. Will you please confirm here that arrangements will be made accordingly. Officers attending will have to make their own billeting arrangements.

See

For Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

Copy to:
PAD & CD Advisor,
with copy of G-5 384.51 of
14 January for reference.

T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel

5290

TO	NO.
COL. CHAPMAN	
COL. YOUNG	
LT. COL. WILCOX	
MAJ. JACKMAN	
MAJ. BROWN	
MAJ. BALANCE	
CAPT. BOWEL	
CHIEF CLERK	

SECRET

SECRET*P-Sept 7965
5A*ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
AFO 512

TBJ/mls

14529

G-5: 384.51

14 January 1945

SUBJECT: PAD&CD - Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, AFO 394.

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1. Attached is a copy of a Memo of 10 January prepared by the PAD&CD Advisor AFH on the above subject as the result of his recent visit to the European Theatre.

2. The PAD&CD Advisor will be in Rome for meetings which are being arranged for 29 and 30 January and would be glad to discuss with you either on 27 or 31 January the implications arising out of the above report so far as Italy is concerned.

3. It is requested that you will confirm which date would be the more convenient for him to see officials of the Sub-Commission concerned.

For the Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:


T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel.Incl:
as above.

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TO	INITIALS	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN	<i>W</i>	<i>15</i>
COL. YOUNG		
Lt. COL. WILCOX		
MAJ. JACKMAN	<i>W</i>	<i>15</i>
MAJ. WILSON		
MAJ. HANBURY		
MAJ. BALLANCE		
CAPT. POWEL		
CHIEF CLERK		

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
P.A.D. & C.D. Section
A.P.G. 512

SEHD/1P

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles - Visit to European Theater
of P.A.D. & C.D. Advisor

TO : A. C. of S. G-3, AFHQ
A. C. of S. G-5, AFHQ

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of the visit was to observe the effects of long range projectiles and to study the modifications rendered necessary to P.A.D. and C.D. organization in the places involved. The following places were visited:

BRUSSELS
GHENT
EINDHOVEN

LIEGE
ANTWERP

2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

a. Effect of Attacks on Military Operations. So far the "V" attack on Antwerp has not appreciably reduced the operation of the port, although military effort has been diverted to provide manpower to deal with incidents. A number of Heavy Rescue Parties have to stand by to the exclusion of any other duties and at one time in Antwerp there were 575 military personnel (U.S. and British) actually deployed at the scene of military and civil incidents. To reduce this call on skilled military personnel a Civil Defense Regional Column of 12 rescue parties has been sent to Antwerp from U.K. Also strenuous efforts are being made by Civil Affairs to reorganize the various local Civil Defense Services. To prevent a similar dissipation of military effort in cities in Holland yet to be liberated, Dutch Civil Defense Columns are being formed and trained to move in as required.

b. Scale of Attack and Main Targets. The V-2 attack has been chiefly directed against Antwerp and approximately 20 V-2 fall in and around that city in 24 hours. V-1 attack is divided between Antwerp, Liege, and to a lesser extent Brussels. During conditions of bad visibility in a similar period up to 50 V-1 may be expected to fall in or near Antwerp and Liege respectively. The V-2 appears to be a more accurate weapon than the V-1 and a number of V-2 have fallen within a short distance of each other in Antwerp. Although both V-1 and V-2 have fallen at Ghent it is considered unlikely that this city and port will become a main target until the port is operated on a large scale.

BRUSSELS
GHENT
BRIDHOVEN

LIEGE
ANTWERP

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c. Casualties and Damage. The total casualties up to 31 December 1944 from "V" weapons were:

ANTWERP	Military	538 killed	632 seriously wounded
	Civil	1631 "	3242 "
ELSEWHERE	Military	79 killed	434 seriously wounded
	Civil	317 "	1366 "

The average number of casualties per projectile is low but in one incident involving a cinema at Antwerp the casualties were 500 killed, 450 wounded, 500 of these casualties were military.

As far as is known no ship has been hit although several berths have been damaged. There have been hits on the electric power station at Antwerp and on a military telephone exchange. At Liege a petrol and oil dump was set on fire by a V-1 and 200,000 gallons of fuel were destroyed. Military damage has been caused at railway yards and vehicle parks.

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d. Reporting of incidents. In order to obtain a complete picture of the points at which V-1 and V-2 fell, it was essential that all military units reported incidents whether they had suffered damage or not. Civil Affairs Detachments made arrangements for collection of information in less populated areas for direct transmission to Army Group. In large cities much assistance was provided by use of observation posts manned by Civil Defense personnel.

As a result of lack of P.A.D. organization before the attack started, it was necessary in one town to improvise a reporting system by using a continuous patrol of 4 radio jeeps.

At HQ. 21st Army Group, a special information room has been established under P.A.D. arrangements. The density of attack and choice of targets are shown on maps. Charts give details of damage and casualties. Daily Sitreps (VEE P.Ds) are issued.

e. Warning Arrangements. At Brussels a siren warning is given when a V-1 is known to be approaching. After 5 minutes an "All Clear" is sounded. At Liege the "All Clear" is omitted, it being understood that if nothing has happened in 5 minutes that the danger has passed. No warning is available in the case of V-2 attack. At Antwerp no warning is given except for attack by aircraft.

f. Medical Arrangements. The use of Medical Inspection Rooms (Dispensaries) to provide additional first aid posts proved satisfactory. Evacuation of casualties was smooth and efficient and was adequate for the largest incident. The practice introduced at Antwerp of sending a Medical Officer with the ambulance called to each new incident was effective. Apart from taking charge of medical arrangements on the spot he was able to assess the amount of any further medical assistance required.

It has been found necessary to widen the scope of rescue training to cover First Aid.

g. Effect on Civil population. The maintenance of morale in ports is a military necessity otherwise migration of labor from the docks and essential public utilities would cause a cessation of work or require the diversion of very considerable military manpower. Morale has been good particularly in Antwerp where some 15,000 Polish dock workers have shown much determination. The weakness of the local Civil Defense organization and the total absence of Post Raid Measures caused a serious situation for a time. These subjects will be covered in paragraph 5 below.

h. Tactical use of V-1. Although primarily intended as a long range weapon, considerable numbers of V-1 were launched from a range of 30 to 40 miles on Forward areas prior to the German attack on 16 December 1944. The targets appeared to be Forward dumps and billeting areas.

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i. Army Fire Service. To date few fires have been caused by "V" weapons. With the exception of the petrol dump at Liege they have not been serious. To reduce the strain on manpower of the U.S. Engineer Fire Service, a National Fire Service Column from U.K. has been asked for to cover a number of Rear areas fire risks.

The communication and reporting organization of the Army Fire Service provides an additional reporting agency for "V" incidents.

3. MODIFICATIONS TO NORMAL P.M.D. OPERATIONS

a. Permanent State of Alert. Owing to the fact that V-1 and V-2 attack may take place at any time during the 24 hours, the P.M.D. organization has to be maintained in a permanent state of alert. This involves continuous naming of the Control Centers in target areas. A Control Room staff consists of 3 officers and

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6 O.Bs/E.M. divided into 3 shifts. There is in addition one NCO for day duty only. All units with a strength of 50 and over are required to provide at a few minutes notice an Incident Officer and a Light Rescue Party (NCO and 6 ORs). Larger units have to move further parties to a state of readiness to replace those sent out. Specified technical units have Heavy Rescue Parties standing by to the exclusion of other duties. Equipment is kept ready loaded on vehicles. Work Parties to assist in rescue work and to cordon incidents are available from specified units on short call. Permanently manned Control Centers and standby conditions are in operation at Antwerp City, Antwerp Port, Brussels and Liège. Similar arrangements are being made for Ghent City and Ghent Port.

b. Additional Officers. Much difficulty has been experienced in providing trained officers as the 21st Army Group SO P.D Pool had been kept as small as possible. When the attack developed many formations who hitherto had remained somewhat aloof as regards P. D., demanded officers at very short notice. It was necessary to increase the War Establishment of the 21st Army Group P.A.D. Staff Officers Pool. At Antwerp an additional SO P.D became necessary and full-time Staff Officers have been attached to two of the Corps in 2nd Army as well as at HQ. 2nd Army. U. S. Army Headquarters already had full-time P.A.D. Officers. To man Control Centers, officers have been drawn from Training or similar depots and hurriedly instructed. A War Establishment for these Centers is under discussion. In Communication Zone (U.S. Army) the additional officers are provided from Replacement Depots and placed on Temporary Duty.

c. Intensification of Training. P.A.D. training had been maintained in both 12th and 21st Army Groups and fullest use had been made of facilities provided by the Ministry of Home Security in U.K. The new form of continuous attack has shown however that no only has training been insufficient but not nearly enough officers and NCOs have been trained. This has been particularly noticeable as regards training of officers in Incident Control and NCOs in rescue technique. Training in reporting of incidents had also proved inadequate.

To meet the sudden demand for training, three instructors have been sent out by the Ministry of Home Security. Schools have been established at Brussels, Antwerp and Eindhoven. At each of these schools approximately 60 officers per week are trained in Incident Control (one day course) and 40 NCOs are trained as Rescue Party Leaders (five day course). The 2nd Army school at Eindhoven has been made available to U.S. officers and NCOs from 1st and 9th Armies. Vacancies are allotted to all types of units and it is intended to proceed with training at this rate until a very high percentage of officers of all arms have been trained in Incident Control. Lack of this training has considerably added to the difficulties in clearing up serious incidents. Training in rescue technique will also be continued and the Ministry of Home Security experts retained until sufficient military instructors are competent to relieve them.

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The training at the above schools is supplemental to and not in place of unit training.

4. MODIFICATION OF P.A.D. POLICY

a. Reduction of numbers in individual buildings. is a result of the disaster at the Cinema in Antwerp, attendance has been drastically curtailed at Cinemas, Theaters, Churches, and, in fact, all places where large numbers of civilians or troops normally congregate. This policy cuts across Welfare organization and dispersal of entertainment presents much difficulty. Nevertheless, in places subject to "v" attack, it has been considered preferable to avoid a "calamity risk". A direct hit on an R.A.F. base led to a decision to stagger the hours of meals in officers and other messes. Every endeavor is made to limit the casualty potential to 50 in any one building. Headquarters and billets are therefore dispersed.

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The policy has been accepted to apply the lessons of Antwerp to Ghent when that port is opened in order that the same lessons do not have to be learned at great cost.

b. Reduction of number of troops in target areas. Large cities such as Antwerp, Liege, and Ghent offer considerable facilities for entertainment, and it has been necessary to discontinue the use of Antwerp and Liege as leave centers, and the exclusion of Ghent is also under consideration. The removal of a large Canadian reinforcement depot from the immediate vicinity of Ghent is also contemplated. The unheralded nature of "W" attack makes it undesirable for large numbers of persons to be exposed unless some definite military purpose is served. A V-2 which fell at a main crossroad in the center of Antwerp destroyed 5 tanks and several hundred passers-by were killed and wounded.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS' RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Local Civil Defense Organization. Both in Belgium and Holland very considerable leeway has had to be made up in getting Civil Defense reorganized. Absence of air attack from Normandy onward had diminished the importance of Civil Defense in the list of other Civil Affairs' responsibilities, and the specialist Civil Defense officers labored under certain difficulties. When "W" attack commenced the Belgian and Dutch Civil Defense Services were quite unable to cope with the situation and unnecessary strain was placed on military resources to deal with Civil incidents.

The work of the Civil Affairs Officers concerned has been beyond praise and they received full cooperation from the local authorities. It was not possible however to effect in a few weeks a reorganization that normally requires months. Lack of training in Incident Control and rescue technique was even more serious in the civil organization than in F.D. Much delay in restoring the local Civil Defense Services was caused by the slowness of the administrative machinery to provide such items as vehicles, tires and batteries, and other essential equipment. This also applied to the provision of clothing and extra rations to enable Civil Defense rescue personnel to carry on with the heavy task of rescue work at high pressure.

b. Post Raid Organization. By far the most difficult problems in dealing with air or similar attack on civilians are those generally known as "Post Raid". These include:

- (1) Feeding, clothing, and housing the survivors immediately after an incident, also housing those who have become permanently or temporarily untenable.
- (2) Arrangements for "first aid" repairs to less severely damaged buildings, this includes freezing and control of building

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- (2) Arrangements for "first aid" repairs to less severely damaged premises. This includes freezing and control of building material and labor.
- (3) Provision of Information Centers.
- (4) Salvage and safe custody of furniture and effects from wrecked houses.
- (5) Organization of a system for provision of funds to those requiring temporary relief.
- (6) Replacement of civil documentation, a serious matter in European countries and involving normally much screening procedure.

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All these and other Post Raid matters are beyond the scope of any one branch. It has been recommended that Public Safety responsibility be limited to operational Civil Defense and that responsibility for Post Raid measures be assumed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer who alone can coordinate all the many services concerned. In important places the appointment of an expert deputy is contemplated or arrangements made for the training of an existing deputy.

It will be recalled that in U.K. failure to appreciate the great importance of Post Raid problems caused the only weakness in morale during the early stages of the air attacks. As a result a highly efficient coordinated organization was built up. One of the leading experts in Post Raid measures from the Ministry of Home Security has been attached to SHAEF Mission to Belgium to assist in this matter. The necessary measures at Belgian Government level having been effected, this officer is now being attached to Civil Affairs 21st Army Group.

c. Lack of Emergency Legislation. Great difficulty was met by Civil Affairs Officers in Belgium and Holland owing to lack of emergency legislation. For example, it was not possible for the local authority to remove timber from a wrecked house to effect temporary repairs or emergency strutting to neighboring houses. Such timber and also the debris belonged to the estate of the dead buried in the ruins. No legislation existed to prevent migration of labor from Civil Defense rescue parties to more lucrative work. Building materials could not be frozen and used as directed by the local authority and a black market in roof tiles, tarpaulins and window screening material had already started. This, as well as the fear of looting lowered morale and tended to make the docker or railwayman stay in his damaged home or move to a less troubled town. Coordination of voluntary and mutually jealous welfare bodies proved a highly complex matter until local authorities were provided with emergency powers and could be persuaded to use them.

6. CONCLUSION

P.A.D. and C.D. measures as developed and modified to meet the new form of attack have proved sound and were effected in a very short period. This was due to the high degree of training and experience of the P.A.D. and C.D. officers concerned and the existence of plans to meet special emergencies.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLICATION TO THIS THEATER

a. Preparatory measures

- (1) Plans to be made to provide Control Room teams at short notice.
- (2) Decision on policy as regards use of possible target towns as leave centers, also issue of a directive concerning limitations of numbers of military personnel in any one building in target areas.

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6. CONCLUSION

F.A.D. and C.D. measures as developed and modified to meet the new form of attack have proved sound and were effected in a very short period. This was due to the high degree of training and experience of the F.A.D. and C.D. officers concerned and the existence of plans to meet special emergencies.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLICATION TO THIS THEATER

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a. Preparatory measures

- (1) Plans to be made to provide Central Room teams at short notice.
- (2) Decision on policy as regards use of possible target towns as leave centers, also issue of a directive concerning limitations of numbers of military personnel in any one building in target areas.
- (3) Organization of Post Raid measures which can be put into operation without delay.
- (4) Plans to accelerate the provision of vehicles and equipment for Civil Defense services; also clothing and extra rations for Civil Defense personnel engaged on heavy duty.

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b. For Immediate Action

- (1) Increase of P.I.D. training above present scale and inclusion of P.I.D. training for officers and other ranks (enlisted personnel) in training depots and in Replacement Depots.
- (2) Training in rescue technique at R.S. Training Depots and at the U.S. Engineer School Detachments. If this is not practicable a special Rescue school would be required.
- (3) Publication of a G.R.O. requesting names of officers and NCOs who have attended a Ministry of Home Security Rescue Training School in the U.K. during the last two years.
- (4) Reactivation of Civil Defense organization in certain Italian towns to be specified.
- (5) AFHQ Operation Memorandum No. 58 to be widened in scope and modified in the light of recent experience.

Ref: 1243

S. E. H. DAW
Lt. Colonel
R&D & CD Advisor



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S. E. H. DAW
Lt. Colonel
PAD & CD Advisor



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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 SECTION
APO 512

FJS/ahs

14 December 1944

G-5: 384.51

SUBJECT: Long-range projectiles.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

The attached letter, file AG 384.5/233 GCT-O, dated 8 December, 1944, is forwarded for your information and such action as you deem necessary.

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:



[Signature]
F. J. SLAUGHTER,
Captain, AGD.

1 Incl:
Incl #1 - Ltr as above.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT. COL. WILCOX		
MAJ. LUCKMAN		
MAJ. WILSON		
MAJ. HANCOCK		
MAJ. BALLANCE		
MAJ. P. WEL		
<i>Capt Brown</i>		

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ABK/rh

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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: S E C R E T :
:Auth: SACIT :
:Initials: *AB 3/1* :
:Date: 8 Dec 1944 :
:.....:

AG 384.5/233 GCT-O

8 December 1944

SUBJECT: Long Range Projectiles.

TO : Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
Commanding General, Rome Area Allied Command, MTOUSA, APO 794
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District, CMF
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District, CMF
General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District, CMF

1. Although it is considered that there is little likelihood of long range projectiles, V-1 and V-2 (Flying Bomb and Long Range Rocket), being used in this theater, it is considered desirable that certain precautions should be taken. To guard against surprise, Commanders will ensure that provisional plans are made to modify existing PAD measures in order to provide adequate defense against this type of attack. Such modification to become effective either on attack or on further instructions from this headquarters.

2. These weapons have been used against military targets in the European Theater. Some salient features are:

a. Attack, although usually limited to daylight hours, take place through 24 hour period. In one port during a 24 hour period, 37-V-2 rockets fell, and 12-V-1 flying bombs penetrated the defenses.

b. Range of rocket and flying bomb has averaged 200 miles.

c. Whereas flying bomb produces intense blast effect, the rocket produces a deep crater and local damage is generally more severe. The weight of the warhead of both flying bomb and rocket is approximately 1 ton.

d. Where the enemy has been able to get information of the point of impact, he has adjusted fire of the V-2 with disquieting accuracy.

e. Although there may be an audible or visible warning of the approach of V-1, attacks by V-2 take place without warning. Possibilities of providing even two to three minutes' warning are small and are dependent on extensive communications.

3. Experience indicates that Passive Air Defense measures must provide immediate remedial action without previous warning throughout the 24 hours in order to minimize the effects of this form of attack. Technical details

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Ltr AFHQ, AC 384.5/233 GCT-O, dtd 8 Dec 44.
subj: "Long Range Projectiles." (Cont'd.)

of modifications to PAD organization which have been found effective in the European Theater will be forwarded to PAD Officers by the PAD and CD, Section of this headquarters.

By command of General WILSON:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGC,
Acting Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 2 - C-in-C, Hq, AAI
- 1 - C-in-C Med
- 1 - CG, MAAP
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- 1 - AG MED

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LONG RANGE PROJECTILES

10/12/44

NOTES ON MODIFICATION TO EXISTING P.A.D. MEASURES

1. P.A.D. CONTROL

Whereas the present organization of P.A.D. in this Theatre is mainly based on the probability of night attack alone; a condition of permanent alert will have to be maintained in a port or similar target area which is subject to frequent attack at irregular intervals by long range projectiles. A much higher degree of P.A.D. readiness would therefore be required. It is considered that a Duty P.A.D. Officer will be necessary at all times, together with sufficient clerks and telephonists. It is suggested that in addition to the P.A.D. Staff Officer, who is responsible for organization, inspection, and training, that three complete shifts are planned each comprising an officer with telephonists and clerks.

2. P.A.D. SERVICES

P.A.D. Services must be organized in such a manner as to be immediately available. It is suggested that a predetermined number of duty ambulances should be available on call from P.A.D. Control. At least one Light and one Heavy Rescue Party should be standing by or performing duties from which they could be called at a few minutes notice. On deployment of one or both of these parties, another two parties would have to be called to a state of immediate readiness.

The problem of striking a balance between immediate availability and tie-up of manpower is not easy of solution. Much will depend upon local conditions. To provide further parties to assist these called out on immediate action, it would be necessary for certain units to receive orders to have these available at short notice. Work Parties should be provided in a similar manner.

3. REPORTING OF INCIDENTS

Although the methods of a normal P.A.D. organization for reporting incidents should suffice, it is suggested that observer posts on high buildings or other suitable points should be established with telephone facilities. To ensure rapid reporting of incidents, additional communications might be necessary from Military Police posts. All units should be instructed to report incidents at once even if no additional help is needed. This will prevent unnecessary movement of Rescue Parties as a result of inaccurate information forwarded outside the unit.

4. WARNING

It is not considered that any general siren warning will be possible.

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4. WARNING

It is not considered that any general siren warning will be possible. Immediate approach of Flying Bombs might be signaled in ports or other targets which may be the object of frequent attacks. This would provide a short warning period of one or two minutes, to enable dock and other workers to rush to shelter. Warning of launching of long range rockets is unlikely and in any case would involve an extensive communication system.

5. SHELTERS

Although the construction of shelters on a large scale would probably not be necessary, shelter arrangements would be required on the docks and other places where it is essential that work goes on throughout the entire 24 hour period. Such shelters should be of simplest possible design, providing protection against blast and splinters. Protection from falling masonry, etc. is desirable but this additional protection must be weighed against need of immediate access to the shelter. An open slit trench provides quicker cover than a covered trench with a limited number of entrances. Shelters, whether slit trenches or built-up, would take up space on or near quays, but the confidence which they would give if combined with a warning period however short, would result in greater working efficiency over a period.

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6. FIRST AID POSTS

More First Aid Posts would be necessary than are usually available in a normal P.A.D. scheme. These Posts would also need protection against splinters and especially against blast. Arrangements would be necessary for availability of duty doctors and if possible surgical teams should be available at short notice to proceed to the scene of serious incidents.

7. INCIDENT CONTROL

Reports already received from 21st Army Group (Br.) indicate that the importance of the Incident Officer is greater than ever. Similar importance is attached in 12th Army Group (U.S.). The following is an extract from P.A.D. Orders of an area within the 12th Army Group:

"Incident Officer. During alerts, units and detachments of over 50 men will have available an Incident Officer, who in case of incidents in the unit area, will proceed to the scene of damage. The Incident Officer will be completely in charge of the incident. He will co-ordinate the work of all the activities and will be supplied with all the information relative to the incident. The Incident Officer will be the representative of the Commanding General at the scene of damage. No officers will be allowed to interfere, unless such officers are prepared to take over complete responsibility and charge of the incident. The Incident Officer, when on duty at the scene of damage will be identified in daylight by letters I.O., chalked on his helmet. At night his post will be identified by two lanterns."

8. TRAINING

The possibility of attack by long range projectiles makes it necessary for P.A.D. training to be much increased beyond the present scale. The greatest need is for a high percentage of officers to be trained in Incident Control, and for WCO's to be trained as Leaders of rescue parties. Your attention is drawn to P.A.D. Technical Bulletins Nos. 1 and 2, dated 20 January and 15 May 1944 respectively, issued by this section. All troops will need further training in simple precautions enabling them to know where to seek some protection if no shelters as such are available in their vicinity.

9. GENERAL

Although applicable to all P.A.D. schemes, it is desirable that the following points receive special emphasis:

A. Post Raid Measures. It is essential that P.A.D. Control provide earliest possible information to Engineers of damage resulting in blocked roads or

No officers will be allowed to interfere, unless such officers are prepared to take over complete responsibility and charge of the incident. The Incident Officer, when on duty at the scene of damage will be identified in daylight by letters I.O., chalked on his helmet. At night his post will be identified by two lanterns."

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Although applicable to all P.A.D. schemes, it is desirable that the following points receive special emphasis:

a. Post Raid Measures. It is essential that P.A.D. Control provide earliest possible information to Engineers of damage resulting in blocked roads or damaged bridges. Reports of location of all incidents to Signals will be necessary, in case trunk telephone routes are affected. It is desirable that arrangements be made for units to feed and possibly accommodate, without prior notice, survivors of another unit.

b. Army Fire Service. Where it is not already the case, the Army Fire Service Control should be established in close proximity but not in the same building as P.A.D. Control. It is essential that both Controls are so organized that if one suffers a direct hit control could be temporarily maintained from the other.

c. Civil Defense. To ensure that military resources are not diverted to deal with civil casualties or trapped persons, it is important that the Civil Defense organization in all target towns is overhauled and made efficient under arrangements made by Allied Comissin, with the technical advice of the P.A.D. Staff Officer. Although military reinforcement of the Civil organization may be necessary in severe incidents, it is most important that the Civil organization be self-supporting as far as possible.

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14 DEC 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

14 DEC 1944

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13 December 1944

G-5: 384.51

SUBJECT: Civil Defence Measures.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. There are inclosed herewith for your information two copies of Part "C" Section VI: Passive Air Defence, Civil Defence, Fire Defence, and extract from SHAEF Air Defence Review No. 4.

2. Please acknowledge receipt on attached form.

For the Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

C. C. BUSH, JR,
Major, Infantry.

Incls - 2
as above.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT. COL. WILCOX	EW	16 Dec
COL. UCKMAN		
COL. WILSON	EW	18 Dec
W. J. HANCOCK		
AN. BALLANCE		
CAPT. POWELL		
CHIEF CLERK		
Capt. Brown.		

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EXTRACT FROM SHAER AIR DEFENCE REVIEW, NO. 4, DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1944.

PART "C"

SECTION VI : PASSIVE AIR DEFENCE, CIVIL DEFENCE, FIRE DEFENCE

A. CIVIL DEFENCE IN BELGIUM

1. The Belgian Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive organisation has carried on with the accent on "Passive" for four years, and indeed has had little cause for action during that period. It suffers from lack of coordination at all levels; it lacks transport and petrol, and its strength has been depleted. In spite of all this, it is showing a remarkable power of recuperation under allied guidance and pressure, though much still remains to be done.

2. A Belgian Government Committee has been set up with the objects of linking all Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive organisations at Government level and their reorganisation on a regional basis, as in the UNITED KINGDOM. The Committee has undertaken to make an immediate survey of all resources and to submit to the Allied Forces a list of essential needs. Committee meetings will be held twice weekly and may be attended by representatives of the Armed Forces. Mobile columns are to be formed to meet emergencies; to be augmented, if necessary, by three Battalions of Engineers. All voluntary First Aid Services are to be pooled.

3. It is not possible to say at this stage how quickly effect will be given to these decisions. There is no doubt that the Chief of Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive and his staff are fully alive to the urgency of the situation, and already a great deal has been done towards the coordination of protection Anti-Aerienne Passive at lower levels. Standard of rescue work is rapidly improving as a result of experience.

B. OPERATIONS

Reports of the following Passive Air Defence, Civil Defence and Fire Defence operations of special interest have been received by the Air Defence Division up to 31 October 1944.

1. At NIEBEGEN (21 Army Group)

a. General.

NIEBEGEN being in the forward area, PAD is organised on normal unit lines. A PAD Control Centre has been established and instructions issued to all units.

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B. OPERATIONS

Reports of the following Passive Air Defence, Civil Defence and Fire Defence operations of special interest have been received by the Air Defence Division up to 31 October 1944.

1. At NIJMEGEN (21 Army Group)

a. General.

NIJMEGEN being in the forward area, P.D. is organised on normal unit lines. A PAD Control Centre has been established and instructions issued to all units.

NIJMEGEN covers approximately nine square miles and has an estimated present population of 60,000 - 70,000. It is estimated that half the total accommodation is useless. Destruction continues from daily shelling.

b. Dutch Civil Defence arrangements on 12 Oct 44.

(1) Organisation.

At this date, the town was divided into two principal sectors, controlling fourteen sub-sectors. Each sub-sector was divided into six or eight "bloks" with part-time "blokleiters". Only the CD Controller and four assistants were paid. Each "blok" originally had two paid firewatchers and from 12/50 part-time wardens, but it was not their habit to turn out during raids. The relationship between police and CD was not good.

(2) CD Services.

Services consisted of four light rescue parties (minus equipment and transport), one ambulance, and one sitting-case car (no petrol). Two Hospitals and two First Aid Posts could still be used. Heavy rescue and demolition

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work was left to individual contractors. Labour was found from temporarily unemployed persons from bombed factories. Warning system was not in operation. Incidents were controlled entirely by Police, who had no special training.

As a result of the fighting, one-third of the civil population moved out, leaving CD services heavily depleted. The removal of collaborators added to these losses. No efforts were made by Dutch authorities to replace personnel or destroyed sector posts, and there was no system of patrolling blocks or reporting damage.

(3) Shelters

The shelter position was most unsatisfactory. Homeless persons were living in small badly ventilated shelters.

C. Method employed to restore Civil Defence since 12 October 1944:

(1) Daily Meeting.

A daily meeting is held attended by C.I. and P.I.D. Officers, representatives from Netherlands Military Administration, and the Civil Defence Controller. These meetings enable immediate action to be taken on matters which normally clog the machinery of re-organisation, and allow such items as provision of bicycles, petrol, clothing and passes, and receiving reports of damage for the past twenty-four hours to be dealt with quickly.

(2) Rescue Equipment.

A thorough search of the town was made for rescue equipment. Large quantities were found - more than sufficient for present needs. There are now twelve light rescue parties fully equipped, except for transport. Civil Affairs have asked for two further ambulances.

(3) Labour.

Difficulties arose in the early stages in getting men to work during gun-fire and on Sundays. These were overcome by a direct appeal from the M.C. Officer.

(4) Warning System.

It was found impossible to obtain more than two minutes warnings during the hours of darkness and none at all during daylight. It was decided, therefore, not to bring the civil sirens into use unless a minimum period of five minutes warning was obtainable.

(5) Reporting.

400 paid CD wardens are being recruited, and, together with

(2) Rescue Equipment.

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(5) Reporting.

400 paid CD wardens are being recruited, and, together with the paid fire watchers who remain, will form teams of 4 or 5 per blok, to report damage, patrol for black-out offences, and aid anti-looting measures. The full-time personnel are issued with special passes allowing them to appear on the streets by night.

(6) Training.

Courses for blok-leaders and others were started on 15 October. Subjects covered include reporting, incident control, UXB reconnaissance, and incendiary bombs. A number of Police will also be trained in CD and Incident Control.

d. Netherlands Military Administration

A valuable contribution to the work of restoration of CD has been made by a Lieutenant and a team of four Sergeants of MMA. The officer had been

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trained in all branches of CD in EMELD. The Sergeants were trained in Rescue, First Aid, Incident Control and Bomb Reconnaissance. Their experience in MIJMEET should make them invaluable to the Dutch Government for the reestablishment of CD in other parts of HOLLAND later.

c. Bomb Disposal

Over a period of 18 days a B.D. Platoon RE have covered a varied assortment of work in connection with UXBs, prepared charges, abandoned ammunition, etc. Some 66 reports were passed to them for action by Garrison HQ alone during this period.

f. Incidents

There is no complete record of Incidents yet, and spasmodic enemy shelling is continuing day and night. It is estimated that approximately 300 shells hit built-up areas up to 20 October. Casualties were principally civilian. Bombing had lessened during the previous five nights.

Each blok maintains a Log and Shelling record of its area. Local RE resources from a Mechanical Equipment section were called in to assist with clearance and wreckage where bodies were known to be covered. The largest incident of this nature was a collapsed factory and warehouse where 167 persons were reported trapped. Work on this incident proceeded using RE and Civil labour, with a Netherlands Military Administration Sergeant acting as Incident Officer.

g. Fire

The local Fire Services was in a state of complete collapse at the beginning of October owing to incessant raid conditions. A British Army Fire Service Company has since arrived and a greatly improved Fire Service is now in operation. Observation posts are set up in each Sector and manned by newly recruited Fire Personnel.

2. At ANTERP (21 Army Group)

a. Incidents at ANTERP are providing an interesting example of what may be expected from indigenous Civil Defence organisations in the early stages of reactivation after a considerable period of inaction.

b. Inspections of ANTERP Civil Defence organisations prior to the initial GERMAN attack presented a picture of comparative efficiency. A lack of transport was evident, but all personnel were said to be trained in rescue, fire, first aid and anti-gas measures. Two shifts of 400 men each were permanently available. An organisation was reported to exist for use of the utility services and building trades in heavy rescue and clearance roles. Certain experience had been gained in a heavy BRITISH raid on factories in the outskirts of the town in 1943.

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c. Early in the GERMAN attacks a serious incident was caused by a projectile which fell in the middle of the town causing severe casualties and damage at this, and a subsequent incident shortly following, a number of weaknesses in Protection Anti-Aérienne Passive organisation were shown to exist. The attached extracts from a report on one of these incidents illustrate this -

"It was about 1430 hours when I arrived at the incident. I was immediately struck by the complete lack of organisation and control. There were lots of civilians wandering about over the debris and others standing by the side of the workmen, watching and generally getting in the way.

Being the only Military Officer present, I gave instructions for everyone not immediately concerned with rescue and searching in the debris to be cleared away outside the barriers. This was done, and the workmen and RTs were then able to operate their mobile crane and bulldozer without being obstructed.

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The main points which were obvious at once were:-

(1) Nobody doing "Incident Control" with the result that there was no firm control.

(2) The various working parties were not co-ordinated and were working wherever their leader decided. Some of these men were more concerned with recovering exposed furnishings, etc., for civilians who were standing by than the movement of debris. This was a definite waste of labour when something like 16 people were still missing under the debris.

(3) The number of police was quite inadequate to deal with the spectators.

(4) Necessity to cordon off the area.

(5) An enquiry post should be set up nearby to deal with relatives of missing and dead.

(6) Local working parties were stopping work as follows:

19/20 Oct 44	-	0100 hours
20	"	- 1730 "
21	"	- 1700 "
22	"	- Day off.

Casualties.

16 dead, 70 injured, 16 missing."

d. About a week later another serious civil incident occurred, extracts from a report on which are given below:-

"In the afternoon I visited an incident which had occurred in a closely built area of the town at about 0500 hours the same day. Approximately ten houses had been completely demolished and 40 seriously damaged. The area of complete demolition covered approximately 50 yards x 70 yards. Casualties so far estimated; 7 dead, 25 seriously hurt and 10 missing. The incident was caused by a missile which had penetrated the roof and three floors of a house and exploded leaving a crater below ground level. The buildings were old fashioned and of brick construction - collapse of the 10 houses was complete.

The incident was entirely in the hands of the Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive, except for an Army mobile crane. A cordon was operating efficiently. The rescue work was being carried out on an organised pattern and parties were well controlled. An Incident Control Post was in operation and a First Aid Post had been set up. There were about 25 Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive and an equal number of utility service personnel on the job. In all, a very different picture to that presented by the reports on earlier incidents."

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e. These two reports demonstrate the very considerable improvement that can be effected in a short time by Military and Civil organisations working in close liaison.

3. At BRUSSELS (21 Army Group)

a. Military P.D

Military P.D is organised with a central control which is manned 24 hours a day. Close liaison is maintained with the BELGIAN Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive organisation.

b. Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive

BRUSSELS is divided into six sectors under control of a main control centre. A meeting was called with the Chiefs of BRUSSELS Protection

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Anti-Aerienne Passive at Headquarters BRUSSELS Garrison as soon as the weaknesses in AIRWERP Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive became known, to discover if any of these were latent in the BRUSSELS organisation. The Chief of BRUSSELS Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive assured the meeting that incident control would function properly, but it appeared that the control of Utilities, Police and First Aid Services provided by Communes was far from good. It was accordingly agreed that the Chief of BELGIAN Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive should address the 19 Burgomasters on the necessity for co-operation. This was done in the presence of military representatives from Headquarters BRUSSELS Garrison a few days later.

At the request of Headquarters BRUSSELS Garrison a permanent Protection Anti-Aerienne Passive liaison officer has been allotted to them. This should prove a valuable asset.

4. At LIEGE (12 US Army Group)

a. LIEGE, during the GERMAN occupation, was subjected to numerous heavy Allied air bombings. The Civil Defence and Fire Organisations, while not organised nor operated to our standards, apparently were able to cope with the situation satisfactorily.

b. The present situation has deteriorated from the above due to the decentralization of control of the services to twenty different communes and to the normal civilian shortages of transport, petrol and tyres. Rectification of this situation is being tackled by the Public Safety Officer of the Civil Affairs detachment.

c. There is no close co-ordination of Civil Defence with Military PAD, as there are very few military units in the area. Greater cooperation will be required in the near future and this is being arranged.

5. At NANCY (12 US Army Group)

a. NANCY is situated on a road net vital to the operations of a US Army and contains a considerable number of Army units. Also it is within range of GERMAN railway artillery.

b. The Civil Defence and Fire Defence organisations of NANCY appear adequate to cope with any normal incident. Also they are more than willing to assist the Military in any way and have made preparations to do so.

c. The Military, in turn, have their normal PAD scheme and do not intend to rely upon civilian assistance to any extent, although they are prepared to assist the civilians when requested and the Military situation permits.

d. A direct line from MAJOR provides the Civil Defence Control Centre with information on hostile aircraft. They may then sound the sirens or not as they see fit. The Military rely on MAJOR fire or bombs or flares dropping for warning.

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c. The Military, in turn, have their normal PAD scheme and do not intend to rely upon civilian assistance to any extent, although they are prepared to assist the civilians when requested and the Military situation permits.

d. A direct line from AOR provides the Civil Defence Control Centre with information on hostile aircraft. They may then sound the sirens or not as they see fit. The Military rely on AA fire or bombs or flares dropping for warning. This is considered adequate since precautions against immediate air attack are maintained at all times.

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COMANDO 14827

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Risposta a nota

Allegati N.

OGGETTO

Seen thru you.
Antony Brown
6/10/74
J.W.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Circulation Slip ::

Date 30 Nov. 44

Interior _____

Public Safety ✓

Public Health _____

Legal _____

Education _____

MFA & A _____

Patriot Branch _____

Displaced Persons
and Repatriation _____

Comments :

In informationR. G. Verpp

u.

TO	DATE	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN	<u>6/10</u>	<u>6/10</u>
COL. YOUNG	<u>6/12</u>	<u>6/12</u>
LT. COL. WELCH	<u>7/11</u>	<u>7/11</u>
MAJ. LUCK	<u>3/11</u>	<u>3/11</u>
MAJ. WILSON	<u>7/11</u>	<u>7/11</u>
MAJ. HANBU Y		
MAJ. BALLANCE		
CAPT. POWEL	<u>7/11</u>	<u>7/11</u>
CHIEF CLERK		

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SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512~~4283~~
CA Section
FJS/JJR DA

29 NOV. 1944

27 November 1944

G-5: 384.51

SUBJECT: PHD, CD and FD, SHAEF.

29 NOV 1944

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

The attached report from Shaef is forwarded for
your information.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

Incl: Extract on PAD, CD & Fire
Defence from SHAEF Air
Defence Review dtd 15 Oct. 44.F. J. SLAUGHTER
Captain, A.G.D.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

FJS/jjr

27 November 1944

G-5: 384.31

SUBJECT: PHD, CD and PD, SHAEF.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

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your information.

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Incl: Extract on PAD, CD & Fire
Defence from SHAEF Air
Defence Review dtd 15 Oct. 44.

F. J. SLAUGHTER
Captain, A.G.D.

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EXTRACT from AIR DEFENCE REVIEW dated 15 October 1944, SLANT.

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PART "C"

SECTION VIII : PASSIVE AIR DEFENCE, CIVIL DEFENCE, FIRE DEFENCE

A. FOREWORD

1. The rapid forward movement of the Allied armies in FRANCE and BELGIUM between July and September have naturally involved organisation and reorganisation of Passive Air Defence, Civil Defence and Fire Defence arrangements as battle conditions changed. This has left little time for the preparation by Passive Air Defence officers of reports. Frequent movements of headquarters, echelon by echelon, have introduced further delays in the preparation, passage and collation of reports. It has, therefore, only been possible during the period under review to collect certain isolated facts and to form general impressions. These facts and impressions are recorded in the following notes. A more adequate picture of Passive Air Defence, Civil Defence and Fire Defence history in this Theater of Operations should be possible in subsequent issues of the Review.

2. In addition to this lack of information, there has also been a lack of enemy air activity during the period under review. Consequently, in British Zones, Passive Air Defence Officers have set up their Passive Air Defence organisations and arranged coordination with Civil Defence and Fire Defence services and have then turned their hands to other urgent tasks connected with Passive Air Defence - notably the recognition, handling and neutralisation of enemy bombs and booby traps. In the US Zone, the Passive Air Defence organisation in rear areas has frequently been added to the duties of the Defence Officers of formations.

3. There may, however, be more to report in the future on Passive Air Defence, Civil Defence and Fire Defence - organisation and operation, owing firstly, to the possible use by the enemy of fly bombs and other similar devices against the rear areas, and secondly, to the increased enemy air activity reported by the Second Army, who report that "the period of reorganisation seems to have ended and the German Air Force to be in a position to mount raids of the order of between twenty and thirty aircraft" (GHQ, AA Troops Weekly Intelligence Summary, 22 September 1944).

B. ORGANISATION IN 21ST ARMY GROUP

1. A pool of Staff Officers (PAD) has been formed under the control of Headquarters, 21st Army Group. Appointments of Staff Officers (PAD) from this pool to headquarters of formations are made by 21st Army Group as required to meet conditions as they arise.

2. Where no Staff Officer (PAD) is appointed, PAD staff duties are

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2. Where no Staff Officer (PAD) is appointed, PAD staff duties ^{are} 5277 carried out by the General Staff Officers of the formation.

3. Operational PAD control of an area is normally carried out by the duty officer at headquarters of the formation, or by officers of units, stationed in the area, working to a roster. In the latter case, these officers are under the general supervision of a General Staff Officer of the formation.

4. Coordination of PAD, Civil Defence and Fire Defence is regarded as a primary duty of the Staff Officer (PAD).

5. In BRUSSELS and ANTWERP in particular, the Belgian Civil Defence Services are coordinated with the PAD control organisation, and are counted upon to provide considerable assistance if and when required.

6. Instructions was given to PAD officers at courses held in CAMB and BAYNIX in recognition, handling and neutralisation of enemy bombs and booby traps. This instruction was put to good use when cleaning up in NORMANDY, and again later in NIMETZ where "services of Bomb Disposal were required in the town" and "no civilian organisation for removal of either bombs or ammunition" existed.

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G. PAD OPERATIONS IN 21ST ARMY GROUP

1. A Colonel commanding a Beach Sub-Area in an appreciation on "the merits of a PAD officer and staff" wrote (21st August): - "The PAD Officer must be prepared and trained to take on any task directly or indirectly connected with PAD".

An example of this versatility is contained in a General report by the Staff Officer, PAD, Headquarters 11 L of C Area, dated the 20th of September.

This Officer was posted to HQ 11 L of C Area three weeks before D-day. Within the sphere of his responsibilities was the vitally important FOL Port of PORT-EM-MENSIN. Although the DADPS was primarily responsible for the fire cover of these highly inflammable installations, the Staff Officer PAD was also concerned and arrangements were made for each of these Officers to take over the function of the other should either become a casualty.

On arrival at KING beach on D plus 3 (3 June 1944), the first duties of the Staff Officer PAD were to deal with unexploded missiles on the beaches, in the Headquarters building, in billets, and in ammunition dumps awaiting disposal.

2. The narrative then continued: -

"The Beach Sub Areas were too busy in the early days to worry about PAD and incidents were accepted as risks of war. The commander of the Beach Sub-Area had his Command Post on the beach and took charge. They had many casualties through shelling from hidden guns across the canal"

"Air raids did not eventuate on the scale anticipated but regular nightly raids were carried out by small numbers of enemy aircraft. Casualties were light and there was no major incidents The fall of flak constituted a danger to personnel in slit trenches and under canvas and of course, no general protection could be given against this"

"Air raids tended to become less and less frequent as time went on and when the general retreat started, ceased altogether."

3. "PAD - NORMANDY - Clearing Up"

After the PAD house had been put in order, the main attention of PAD officers was directed towards the reconnaissance of unexploded bombs and abandoned enemy ammunition etc. Liaison was established with Bomb Disposal Sigs for reconnaissance, removal and destruction of unexploded bombs

Valuable practical experience was also gained through attending the various courses at GAIN and BATESUX which gave instruction in recognition, handling

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Valuable practical experience was also gained through attending the various courses at CAEN and BAYeux which gave instruction in recognition, handling and neutralising enemy bombs and booby traps. The knowledge thus gained was put to good use in subsequent movements and enabled reconnaissance of billets and offices to be undertaken and effective disposal of the various anti-personnel devices the enemy bequeathed to the advancing troops.

4. "PAD Test of SEINE RIVER - Initial Arrangements"

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By the time that HQ 11 L of C Area moved to AMING, the possibility of enemy air attack was almost non-existent and it was found that the Civilian Defence Services in the town were so well organised that they were considered capable of dealing with any incidents that might arise. PAD orders for the HQ were however made out

5. "PAD Test of SEINE RIVER - Clearing Up"

As in NORMANDY, the chief PAD occupation was the reconnoitring of unexploded bombs, bomb and ammunition dumps etc. The enemy had left large quantities of unexploded bombs, ammunition of all kinds, grenades, gas training equipment, field guns, etc. behind him. The reconnaissance of all this material and arrangements for its disposal were all attended to by the PAD officer owing to shortage of Bomb disposal personnel. The French had already instituted their own Bomb Disposal Sigs (Desobusages) and they rendered valuable assistance".

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D. 12TH ARMY GROUP

No specific reports of PAD activities in 12th Army Group area have come to hand. It is hoped to complete a survey of these activities in the near future.

E. COMMUNICATION ZONE

1. In the Communication Zone, conditions between areas have varied appreciably. In Beach Areas PAD has been included in the duties of the Defence Officer together with Perimeter guards, Mine Clearance, Camouflage, etc. In certain towns PAD Operational Control has been activated only in sectors containing military installations or billets. In CHERBOURG, complete PAD and Civil Defence operational control was established.

2. During September, no reports have reached this Headquarters or Incidents in the Communication Zone requiring PAD Services.

F. FIRE DEFENCE

1. No reports have been received of any instance where military fire fighting units have been seriously pressed to cope with a fire situation.

2. Consideration is being given to a reduction in the scale of personnel and equipment being held by the National Fire Service as reinforcements to Army Fire Services overseas.

G. PARIS CIVIL DEFENCE

1. The following extract from the report by the PARIS Civil Affairs Detachment dated 5 September 1944, gives detailed information which alters the impression given in Issue No. 2 of the Air Defence Review.

2. "The organisation of the Civil Defence services is on the same basis as in LONDON. Its main weakness is on the bomb reconnaissance side since the French were not permitted by the Germans to touch any objects dropped from the air. Despite a long period of comparative inactivity, the services work fairly efficiently and it is obvious that the morale and discipline of the personnel is excellent. The organisation and operation of the personnel as a whole was given a severe test on the night of 26/27 August and acquitted itself well.

3. On this occasion, PARIS was attacked by over 100 planes with a small number of HE bombs and a large number of incendiary bombs of the 1 kilogram and also of the explosive nose type, together with some 50 kilogram phosphorus bombs. The damage was considerable. 213 persons were killed, 914 injured, and 3,000 were rendered homeless. 56 buildings were totally destroyed, 262 seriously damaged and 282 slightly damaged. There were 500 large fires and in addition 432 demands for appliances for smaller fires. The raid occurred at

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H. TRAINING OF FRENCH PERSONNEL IN MINERFIELD CLEARANCE

Schools are being established by 21 Army Group and Communications to train French personnel in minerfield clearance. Some equipment is being provided from BR/US sources and the French hope to be able to manufacture additional equipment quickly so that the agricultural areas can be speedily cleared of remaining mines.

I. RAD INTELLIGENCE

1. Protection of Motor Vehicles against Air Attacks:

A battalion order of 12 SS Panzer Engineer Battalion, dated 4 August 1944, carries instructions to drivers of motor vehicles in regard to passive defence against pursuit bombers and fighters. After the first attack the driver is ordered to throw a smoke grenade, of which two are carried, as near to the vehicle as fire precautions allow. It is hoped to cause the pilot of the attacking aircraft to believe that he has scored a direct hit, thereby warding off any repetition of the attack.

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2. Enemy Air Raid Warning System: (Source: Periodical Notes for Signal Security Officers No. 9 - Aug 44).

The enemy intercept service has become the principal passive means of defence for the German ground forces against the devastating effects of Allied air attack. A complete air raid warning system has been built up on the basis of intercepting Allied calls for air support and distributing flash warnings of imminent air attack to the German front line units concerned. Interrogation of a large number of prisoners of war has established that the system will frequently provide as much as an hour's notice of our intention to attack.

As a result of this warning system the enemy is saved a large number of casualties and the effectiveness of our air attack is minimised. This is particularly true of attacks on established enemy positions. When the battle becomes fluid, the enemy's prospects of taking effective evasive action, even if the warning system continues to function efficiently, are much less. That the intercept service is efficient enough to provide warning of our intentions is a useful aid to enemy morale, and a further disadvantage to us.

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HEADQUARTERS A.A.I.
C.M.F.

JWAB/lp

11 November 1944

TO: Public Safety Sub-Commission, Headquarters Allied Commission, A.P.G. 394,
U. S. Army
Attention: Fire & Civil Defense Officer

I have received from the P.A.D. & C.D. Section, AMHQ, some details of the long range rocket which is now being employed by the enemy in N.W. Europe. This information has been collected by the P.A.D. Staff Officer at Headquarters, 21 Army Group. It is reported that a number of incidents have already occurred involving Belgian and Dutch civilian interests and that a considerable measure of Civil Defense activity has had to be introduced to meet the situation.

Whilst there is no evidence that attacks of this nature are likely in this Theater in the immediate future, it is pointed out that no very extensive works are necessary to create firing platforms for this type of missile so that there would be little delay in the use of rockets against Italian targets if the enemy thought fit to do so.

An important feature of attacks so far made has been their employment during daylight hours and without warning. Thus, the need for measures to report damage and casualties and for general remedial action to be speedily available throughout the 24 hours is stressed.

The rocket warhead is filled with high explosive and weighs approximately 2,000 lbs. Penetration being deeper than in the case of the flying bomb, the general destructive effect is greater although blast effect is less. The range of the weapon is given as up to 220 miles. It is also said that accuracy is better with the rocket than with the V-1.

P.A.D. officers generally are being kept posted with the latest developments of these weapons. It is not thought that any special measures are necessary at the present juncture. It would, however, in my opinion, be unwise to relax further such precautionary measures as are still available in the northern half of Italy.

Copy to:

G-Ops, AAI
PAD & CD Sec., AMHQ

TO	INIT	DATE
COL CHAPMAN		
COL YOUNG		
LT COL WILSON		
MAJ LUCKHART		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ CAPT BROWN		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

J. W. A. HUNESS

Major

P.A.D. Liaison Officer AAI

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