

ACC

10000/143/1428

INTERVE  
OCT. 1944

10000/143/1428

INTERVENTION BY AC AT REQUEST OF ITAL GOV'T  
OCT. 1944 - OCT. 1946

Murate Sheet

C.R.S.

5A for signature by C.C. please

John W. Chapman, Ed.  
Public Safety, J.C.P.S.C.  
312-444  
Ext. 686.

D.C.S. Est. C.A.S.

When submitting letters for signature to C.C. such as this will you instruct your staff to record very briefly the way & where of the letter. Further can something of this sort should have been written "The regulation mentioned by the P.M. in his letter in 1 B. could be traced: we are trying to discover from No 3 Dir & A.C. whether it has in fact issued: interim reply R.P.M. submitted"

M.S. (4/5)

- 2 -

C.O.S.  
D.O.P. C.A. section

The regulation referred to in P.M.'s letter is undoubtedly the letter of 1 D on which was written letter 1 C to which no reply has been received to the knowledge of this D/O.  
7 Dec 44.

Chapman  
Ed. D.O.

C.O.S.

When submitting letters for signature to C.S. such as this, will you instruct your staff to record very briefly the way & when for the letter. In this case something of this sort should have been written "The regulation mentioned by the PM in his letter in 1 B cannot be traced: we are trying to recover from No 3 but rather whether it has in fact occurred: interim reply to PM submitted"

MS/4/10

- 28 -

COS.  
L.O.P. C.A. decision  
The regulation referred to in PM's letter is undoubtedly the letter at 1 D on which was written letter 1 C to which no reply has been received to the knowledge of this O/C.  
7 Dec 44.  
Chapman  
and D.D.

COS  
Para 2 of 1 D seems to be a new overriding instruction in the light of which Operation Instruction No 10 and of the Civil Power is to be interpreted, and it is thought that the PM's reference in the first para of 1 B is to this. We have already referred this matter to AFHQ at 1 C and await a reply.  
An interim reply to the PM is at 5A for signature if approved.

COS  
1 DEC 1944

W.H. White  
for AFHQ

Cos.

Since minute 4 was written 6A has been received containing the revised instructions under which the British authorities can call directly on Indian troops - but will not do so except in emergency with consulting the Indian Commander. It is presumed that this deals sufficiently with the points raised by us in 1C, and a specific reply to that letter need not be expected. If so the Indian reply at 5A is no longer appropriate and that a final reply may now be sent. Instructions please.

CAS

10 DEC 1944

COS

Ref minute 5 above.

You referred this morning to employment of Italian troops in aid of the civil power.

Submitted for signature of C.C. is an ack of Bomani's letter of 25 hrs.

6A is latest directive of 3 Dist on the subject which requires careful study. This will be continued on return of file.

12/12

7

At first sight these seem excellent directions if after consultation with CAS the  
is confirmed 1309

(1) Ask AFHQ DATA if all districts can issue similar orders

(2) Ask Royal Forces Sub Com to instruct

W. Army especially on item 1

CAS  
15 DEC 1944

COS

Ref minute 5 above.

You referenced this morning to employment of Italian troops in aid of the civil power.

Submitted for signature of C.C. is an ack of Bonanni's letter of 25 Nov.

6A is latest directive of 3 Dist on the subject which requires careful study. This will be continued on return of file.

12/12

7

At first sight there seem excellent direction. After consultation with CATS the  
is confirmed 1309

(1) Ask ATHQ DATA if all districts can issue similar orders

(2) Ask Rome Forces Sub Com to instruct

W. Army especially on lines of 7.

(3) Inform me of results.

C.A. Sec

8A

Please see COS minute above in reply to four 5.

8

C.A. Sec

Letter to P.M. Bonanni, signed by C.C. now returned for distribution.

X-735.

Shardley  
Officer, Cap. Sec

DEC 13 1944  
CC. 1137

12/12/44

*CA Sec*  
*For Signature please,*  
*16/12/44*  
*10*  
*John W. Chapman*  
*Colonel*  
*D.P.S.*

*Minute 11*  
 TO : Civil Affairs Section (Attn: Col Cripps).

1312

1. Our objection to O I No. 18, 7 December 1944, issued by 3 District is to the inclusion of the requirement that the Italian authorities must consult with and obtain the agreement of the Area/Sub Area Commander concerned. This requirement is not included in AFHQ policy declaration.

2. The requirement is not practical under present conditions. With the general unrest, which exists throughout Italy, it is very probable that serious disturbances will occur at places distant from any Area/Sub Area Headquarters. It should also be borne in mind that the present situation of the Carabinieri and other civil police agencies is such that disturbances, which formerly would have been handled by them, can now get out of hand and into the class of serious disturbances.

3. In many cases the length of time required for Italian authorities to make contact with the area/Sub Area Commander concerned would permit damage and casualties to occur before consultation and agreement could be had.

4. Finally the provision in question relates only to Italian Government Territory where those involved are Italian authorities, Italian people and Italian troops.

5. The AFHQ directive is sufficient without any exceptions.

*John W. Chapman*

JOHN W. CHAPMAN  
 Colonel, J.A.G.D.  
 Director Public Safety  
 Sub-Commission

19 Dec 44

JWC/jwf

PB

1. The new instructions are at 6A. Show you any

comments please.

2. If you have no adverse comment will you please enable letters referring thereto asking AC4R and 15 & 16 similar orders may be issued in 1 & 2 District. DCOS will sign.

3. Will you please also inform a letter for DCOS asking how losses (who how, why, no. 20) if they will inform you while steps are being taken to publish the contents of para 7.

throughout the Indian Army

4. SA. has been signed. It may be that appropriate new instructions are considered satisfactory not to send the instructions reply but to prepare the final reply to 1 B. If the instructions are not satisfactory the instructions will of course be sent.

CAS.

15 DEC 1944

*Handwritten signature*  
for CAS.

1312



20 DEC 1944

DEOS CASE. Please draft letter to AFHQ pointing out discrepancy between AFHQ Admin Order & No 3 Dist Order.

WV (21/22)

14

Civil Affairs Section

Ref. 16 A. and 5 A and 1 B.

Reply to Prime Minister submitted at 19<sup>th</sup> Jan 1945  
John W. Gillingham  
Director of Public Safety

10th Jan 1945

15

Civil Affairs Section  
Proposed Reply to 1 B is at 19 A. For sign. if approd.  
AFHQ letter informing is about the Prime Minister's order  
and objected was to be deleted is at 19 A. 3 Dist action  
is at 19 A.

CAS  
17 JAN 1945

16

So. to cc.

Pl. See above C.A. Sect. minute. Other

Signature Memo 13/11

13/11/45

13/11/45

1

CA See

5 A to attached report is noted.  
It does not, of course, constitute the desired  
action on 1B.

18 Dec 44

Regard.

Please see 1A.

*W. H. Hadden*  
Office of COS

CA Sec.

Ref. minute 15. 19A signed is  
retained for dispatch.

x735  
16 Jan 45

Shorden ext.  
offic, C-15.

Ps

19A for dispatch

18

*[Signature]*  
for VP.

*[Signature]*  
A.K.

CAS  
16 JAN 1945

CAS (Lt Col White)

19

Please see 24A in answer to 23A

2-2-45

J. W. Buchanan Major AC  
for WPS

- 20 -

CA Section,  
76A. for information. Notice date of document  
and of our receipt.  
Chapman  
Col - D.P.D.

*[Signature]*

TO:

1811A

1

Please see Folio 35A-350.

It is understood that the letter at 30 A was prepared in your office and it seems clear that incorrect information was included in the last sub-para on the first page.

The restrictions as to arms and armament of Italian Troops are given in the AFHQ Instruction at 22A in this file, of which you presumably have a copy.

It will be observed from 31A that this wrong information has been circulated to other Italian authorities and to Prefects and it seems strange that the error has not come to light before.

It is presumed that you will take all necessary action to get this matter adjusted.

2

As regards the penultimate para of the letter at 35A I feel there is considerable force in the view expressed. I have always held that there should be 2 sets of rules for the use of Italian Troops in aid of the civil power - one which covers a crowd of demonstrators, in general unarmed, which gathers in a city - the other covering armed rioting, possibly in cities but more generally in country villages or country districts.

I raised this matter when I was a Regional Commissioner but no action was taken. It seems to me obviously wrong that troops dealing with armed rioters in country districts or in cities, who in northern Italy may be fully armed ex-Partisans, should be ordered to move to the scene of the disturbance with weapons unloaded and probably leaving behind in Barracks the equivalent of the armament with which their opponents are armed. This procedure proved most ill-advised during the troubles in Sicily 1943 year. Local Commanders should have discretion in the matter.

3

I suggest for consideration that action should be taken to amend the offending sub-para in the letter at 30A first and that if you agree, the point I have raised in para 2 above should be taken up separately.

4. You may wish to transfer this minute to 35A 1/2 the file in which the original of 30A was drafted and deal with the matter on that file instead of on the AFHQ file. *Brigadier, VP CA Section.*

22.

1314

To: C. A. Section.

29 Aug 45

Ref 21. above and hand grenades.

AFHQ ruled that hand grenades would not be authorized

It will be observed from 31A that this wrong information has been circulated to other Italian authorities and to Prefects and it seems strange that the error has not come to light before.

It is presumed that you will take all necessary action to get this matter adjusted.

2

As regards the penultimate para of the letter at 35A I feel there is considerable force in the view expressed. I have always held that there should be 2 sets of rules for the use of Italian Troops in aid of the civil power - one which covers a crowd of demonstrators, in general unarmed, which gathers in a city - the other covering armed rioting, possibly in cities but more generally in country villages or country districts.

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3

I suggest for consideration that action should be taken to amend the offending sub-para in the letter at 30A first and that if you agree, the point I have raised in para 2 above should be taken up separately.

4. You may wish to transfer this minute to 35A 1/2 the file on which the original of 30A was drafted and deal with the matter on that file instead of on this *McCarr, Brigadier*  
H. CARR,  
Brigadier,  
VP CA Section.

22.

1314

To: C. A. Section.

29 Aug 45

Ref 21. above and hand grenades.

At 440 which that hand grenades would not be authorized for issue from Army stocks to such units as Forest Guards, Public Security Agents, Frontier Guards etc in view of the large small arms and light automatic fire powered by such units and the difficulties caused by use of hand grenades by non-military formations.

Since if hand grenades to all Army formations such as I.S. Div is made to keep them up to date buildings. Some have not been made recently to C.A.R. but you may wish to consider this stock of grenades and recommend accordingly. Other than that on smoke chemicals etc there is no restriction on use of weapons by TROOPS, the last sub-para on the first page of 30A is correct.

*for McCarr's Command*  
*for the file on 30A*

PS.

Your comments on 22 please

C.A. E  
31 AUG 1945

C.A. Section

Min. 22 does not clarify the situation so that we can make a proper reply to letter at 35A. The situation as indicated by our file is:

1. Letter at 22A. ATHQ, 10370.6/005 301-0 of 6 January 1945. Para. 2c states specifically that grenades are prohibited and that automatic weapons will be used only as a last resort. The prohibition against the use of smoke, tear gas and chemicals is contained in para 5d.

2. The last paragraph of the letter at 30A advises the Prime Minister that there is no restriction as to arms and armament other than the prohibition on the use of smoke, tear gas and chemicals.

3. Then by letter at 35B the Ministry of War was advised that distribution of hand grenades could not be authorized.

4. As can be seen in letter at 35A the Italian Government is confused and would like to have the position clarified.

On the basis of the information in the possession of this S/O we cannot reply to the Council of Ministers' letter at 35A unless we deny the statements in the letter at 30A which was prepared for the Chief Commissioner's signature by WIAA.

3 September 1945

15

PS.

Will you please see Col Montecino and see if you can get the matter cleared up.

*Handwritten signature*

4 SEP 1945

JOHN W. CHAFFIN  
COL. - DRS

*Handwritten signature*

proper reply to letter at 25A. The situation as indicated by our file is:

1. Letter at 20A, AFHQ, ACN70.5/205 OCT-0 at 6 January 1945. Para. 90 states specifically that grenades are prohibited and that automatic weapons will be used only as a last resort. The prohibition against the use of smoke, tear gas and chemicals is contained in para 94.

2. The last paragraph of the letter at 20A advises the Prime Minister that there is no restriction as to arms and equipment other than the prohibition on the use of smoke, tear gas and chemicals.

3. Then by letter at 25A the Ministry of War was advised that distribution of hand grenades could not be authorized.

4. As can be seen in letter at 35A the Italian Government is confused and would like to have the position clarified.

On the basis of the information in the possession of this G/O we cannot reply to the Council of Ministers letter at 35A unless we deny the statement in the letter at 30A which was prepared for the Chief Commissioner's signature by MIA.

*Chapman*

JOHN T. CHAPMAN  
Col. - PPS

3 September 1945

25

P.S. Will you please see Col Noakes and see if you can get the matter cleared up.

4 SEP 1945

26

MM/A.

Is there any directive later than that referred to in Minute 24 which changes the instructions in para 9 of that directive? If so, can you give P.S. a copy?  
Chapman  
Col. D.D.

4 Sept. 45.

-27-

P.S.

Reference 26. Letter at 22A A.F.H.Q. AG 370.6/005 GGT-O of 6 Jan was superseded by Appendix 'A' to Op Memo 75 dated 15 Apr 45, a copy of which may be seen in this office.

The last sentence of Min 22 is correct.

The issue of grenades for the purpose in mind is, however, deprecated and should, it is considered, be made only after the publication of orders defining precisely the circumstances under which they may be employed. Their employment is entirely contrary to Allied practice which emphasises the controlled use of "force" in dealing with civil disturbances.

*R.A. CURTIS*

R.A. CURTIS Lt. Col.

A.F.H.Q.

M.M.I.A.

5 Sep 45.

- 28 -

C.A. Section

Reference Min. 27. I examined the document referred to, which does supersede and reading AG 370.6/005 GGT-O. The only prohibition on the use of weapons by troops is on the use of smoke, tear gas and chemicals. This S/C has not been supplied with a copy of G. Memo. 75 or its Appendix A.

Also in July 1944 wrote to AFHQ requesting confirmation of its policy of not issuing hand grenades to such police agencies as Forest Guards, Public Security Agents, and Finance Guards to which AFHQ replied by signal so ruling. This S/C does not have copies of that interchange of communications. We are not interested in furnishing hand grenades to police.

On the basis of the information now at hand the letter at SOA is correct and draft reply to SOA is now submitted for approval and signature of Chief Commissioner.

1313

*John W. Chapman*

JOHN W. CHAPMAN Col.  
A.F.H.Q.

7 September 1945

29.

Exec Com: Sec.

It appears from 28 that hand forces has been corresponding with AFHQ on the arms and equipment of police agencies not only with and consulting Public Safety but also without supplying them with copies of the decisions arrived at.

Hence the false information put up for the CC. Sign: in the final draft. Can representations be made to hand forces to ensure closer cooperation.

Letter at SSA is for sign: if approved.

H. W. H. H. H.

CA 5  
837.1345

-30-

C. A. Section.

The underlined sentence in min. 29 is not correct. The letter referred to (30A), prepared by MMIA, contained the correct information as based on decisions of which this S/C had no knowledge, and was at variance with the information which we did have. Hence the difficulty in attempting to prepare an answer to SSA and some difficulty in obtaining the correct information.

Draft A letter submitted for signature.

11 Sept 43-

L. H. H. H. H.

CC Sign: in the first draft. Our representatives  
 in order to have forces to ensure closer cooperation  
 letter at SSA to be signed if approved.

CA 5  
 8 SEP 1945

-30-

C.D. Section.

The underlined sentence in item 29 is not  
 correct. The letter referred to (30A) prepared by MMMA,  
 contained the correct information as based on decisions  
 of which this S/C had no knowledge, and was at  
 variance with the information which we did have.  
 Hence the difficulty in attempting to prepare an  
 answer to SSA and some difficulty in obtaining  
 the correct information.

Def't A letter submitted for signature

11 Sept 45

Chapman  
 Carl D. P.

31.

EC: A.

35 A. retyped as suggested

1318

11 SEP 1945

21, 29, 30, 31

W. H. H. H.

C86. 21/1/9

22

1. Letter for C.C.'s signature please. In 30 A 11/2 P.M.

was informed that the only restriction as to arms and  
ammunitions of Italian troops employed to quell civil  
disturbances, was that no smoke, tear gas or chemicals  
would be used.

2. The Italian Government, thinking this applied  
to C.C.R.R. also, asked for an issue of handgrenades  
for C.C.R.R.

3. This letter is the result, to clarify the position.

RWR 13/9.

(33)

C.S.O.

I cannot find out from this  
Correspondence what arms & munition  
the forces of the Italian Govt are allowed  
to use. This is what the P.M. asked.  
I think we should tell him

MS 12/7 1/10/7

(34)

Civil Affairs Section

1. Please see minutes 32 and 33.
2. In view of 33, perhaps a tabulated list for the various  
services should be made.
3. It must be remembered that the C.C.R.R. are not an ordinary  
police body but are the first Regiment of the Italian Army

Rustenburg 1/10/7

C.A. Section:

1. Reference minute 34
  2. Para 2. I agree: It's a job for M.H.A. This HK does not  
deal with Italian Army.
  3. Para 3. Right but have been treated like camp followers.
- 18 Sept. 1945.

1/10/7  
S.P.



(Folio 22a)

19 Dec 45

38

W.F.  
Cyt

VP.

39 A for sign: 6 approved. CSO 6 EC was approved  
and concurs that the letter is properly organized by EC  
and should not go down to EC.

His approval was obtained because the letter was  
elaborated as well as seen from main to summary.

2-1-46  
1 SEP 1946

Civil Affairs Sec.

39.

Ref above. Please cancel minute 37. AFHQ's  
ruling of F 222 dated 6 Jan has been superseded by  
AFHQ op News 1675 dated 15 Apr with para 1 of F. 38.  
The undementioned is the answer to Minute ~~33~~ 33  
as requested in your minute 36.

The Italian Army and CCPR (as First Regt of Army)  
may use all arms with which it is at present  
equipped in the maintenance of law and order. The  
only exception is that no rifle, tank gun or carbine of any  
kind may be used. Weapons in use by army include  
25 mm. 17 mm, 40 mm AA, 6 mm, 2" x 3" Mkt, Bren gun, ~~3.5 inch~~  
Italian rifle, etc. and hand grenades (which are maximum 100  
para 3 & 4 of F 38) Presumably Pub Safety Act can with  
supply the answer as to arms of this non-military police bodies.

22 Sep.

At England Field MRA

C.H. See

40

to 35<sup>th</sup>.40<sup>th</sup> for signature please in answer

Minutes 21 to 39 refer.

2 1/2  
3.15 305.W7 signed 41A and includes and will be what.  
your distr. inc.41.

L. F. S. C. (M. M. I. A.).

1. Ref. folio 41A. it is presumed that some new instructions have been received and that your letter at 38A. should now be cancelled or amended.

Can a copy of the new instructions please be inserted in this file?

2. This change of policy is of great interest to the Public Safety Commission in regard to armament of the police bodies.

In all countries which permit the use of tear gas to quell civil disturbance the police are the first elements which use this means, with a view to dispersing crowds with non-lethal weapons before the troops more heavily armed with lethal weapons than the police, are called out?

It seems almost certain therefore that this change in policy may affect the action methods employed by police bodies.

3/19/45

M. J. B. R. J.  
V. P. C. A. S.

42TO: V.P.  
CA SEC

Ref F. 41 A and your Minute No. 41.

Attd for your info are the following Amendments regarding  
"Ground Defense":-"Amendment No. 2 to Operation Memorandum No. 77" — 46<sup>A</sup>  
"Amendment No. 1 to Operation Memorandum No. 78" — 45<sup>A</sup>Thomas C. Jemle III  
Capt.  
NMA

4 Oct 45

43.

V.P. Case

Please see Min 40. 40<sup>A</sup> was not sent.49<sup>A</sup> has been prepared in accordance with your draft at 47<sup>A</sup>.  
For signature pce.

Wang J. L. L. L.

11 10/45.

44.

PS.

We can hardly keep pace but since your letter was prepared  
has there not been still another amendment which says  
smoke "(other than phosphorus)" or something like that  
If so we had better get this inserted - sorry.CAS  
17 OCT 1945

X-606

CAS

45

Wang J. L. L. L.

49<sup>A</sup> amended in accordance with Min 44.

Wang J. L. L. L.

12 14  
10/45.

1321

C.A.S.

46

53<sup>A</sup> is a letter from the Under Sec. of State requesting a reply to his letter of 11 August 1945 (35<sup>A</sup>) regarding armaments of Police Forces.

This was dealt with and reply sent on 12 Oct 45 (49<sup>A</sup>)

55<sup>A</sup> prepared for signature enclosing copy of our letter of 12 Oct 45.

27<sup>th</sup> Oct.  
Sent 31 Oct.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Executive Commission

47

56 A. for information -

TX 686

11 Dec 45

Chapman  
Col. D.P.O.

C.A.S.

48

Thank you. 56 A has been seen by  
Ex C. on our copy.

12/12

18<sup>th</sup> 12/12 with C.A.S.

Chapman  
Col. D.P.O.

C.A. Section:

49

Draft letter for approval and signature.

21 Dec 45

Chapman  
Col. D.P.O.

50

P.S. S/c

Copy of 60 A has been handed to L.F.S.C who agree to preparation of memorandum. Will you please prepare. I do not know whether it will affect your memo but I understand the penultimate para of 49 A is not now correct. I am not in agreement with II of 58 A. I consider tear gas grenades should come under II (a) as well as II (b). M. Canby, D.P.O.A.

51

MMIA.

Re 62<sup>A</sup>

From a Public Safety Point of  
view the Draft appears entirely  
satisfactory.

14.2.46.

E. J. Byr Colonel

52

Public Safety Sub Committee AC.

Noted. I have retained  
the Italian originals.

14.2.46.Seen Op. 16<sup>24</sup>.

M. W. H. H.  
BGS MMIA.

1323

- 53 -

Executive Commissioner.

Please see 43, 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 58, 59 and 60, also Number 51 on MMIA docket G/63.

Authority was given for use of tear gas by Italian Troops, including CCRR, in quelling civil disturbances, but the authority did not extend to Civil Police. ✓

I understand CCRR are now in possession of 1,000 Tear Gas Bombs issued by the Ministry of War.

Dr. Ferrari informs me he gave the information to the Press that a ban by Allied Authorities, on the use of tear gas by Police, was in existence. He states he applied to the Ministry of War about four months ago for a supply of bombs but was informed that none was available and it was not known where any could be obtained.

MMIA do not supply Tear Gas Bombs as they are not war-like stores.

Dr. Ferrari is under the impression that Police may not use these bombs except by Allied Authority. It is suggested that their use is a matter entirely for the Italian Government and if this suggestion is approved I recommend that the Government be notified accordingly.

Ed. 1.16  
10/10/1946.

*E. J. Pyle*  
E. J. Pyle, Colonel,  
Acting Director.

61.

Chief Commissioner.

Enclosed letter is submitted for signature. Director, Public Safety Subcommittee, has concurred in the letter.

CCRR Section of MMIA ~~was~~ checked with the CCRR yesterday and confirm that 1,000 tear gas bombs were issued to the CCRR prior to the elections.

*After signature I will send a copy  
to G.S. A.F.N.P.*

*M. Carr Bryan*

M. Carr,  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

11 October 1946.

62.

Director, Public Safety S/C.

63A has been signed and copies sent as indicated. Will you please have further copies taken and sent to both Pelads and also send 2 copies to AFHQ, G-5 Section, with a covering letter forwarding for information.

*McAuliffe*

M. CARR,  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

12 Oct 1946.63

*Letter sent to AFHQ and copies to  
Palado. on 14.10.46*

*1510*

*E. J. Byrne*

1325

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
APO 794

AC/14602/5/PS

14 October 1946

SUBJECT : Issue of Tear Gas Bombs  
to Civil Police.

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. The attached (copy) letter sent to the Italian Prime Minister by the Chief Commissioner is forwarded for your information.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,

EJB/ae

E. J. EYE, Colonel  
Acting Director.

1 encl.

1303

63A

Ref: 15/14602/5/1

11 October 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

It appears from published reports in the press that a statement has been made that an Allied order prevented the Italian police from using tear gas.

I must refer to my letter 9/92 of 30 September 1946 to Professor Parí of which I enclose a copy. In that letter the Prime Minister was notified that tear gas or smoke bombs could be used by Italian troops - which includes the CMR - to quell civil disturbances. I understood that the CMR had received an issue of tear gas bombs some time previous to the most regrettable incidents on October 9th, 1946.

In regards other police agencies, I cannot trace that any ban has been issued by the Allies on the use of tear gas. In fact the records of this Commission show that the Public Safety Sub-Commission has been strongly in favour of tear gas or smoke bombs being made available to the agents of public security. The grounds for such an opinion are that a non-lethal weapon of this type should be in the hands of unarmed or lightly armed police who normally deal with the early stages of public disorder rather than in the hands of more heavily armed police or of troops who may be called in as a last resort.

It appears to me, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, that the question of the issue of non-lethal equipment to police agencies has been a matter for decision by your Government especially since the beginning of the year when the handover of territory (except for TRIESTE and VALICAIA GIBIA) to the Italian Government was completed.

Very truly yours,

1307

ELMER E. STONE  
Deputy Chief, USA  
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Indro Montanelli,  
President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
Rome.

Copy to: CC.

CC.

Land Forces /S.

Copies sent to Heads A+B on 14/10/46. *rk*

62A

SUBJECT : Employment of Troops on Duties of Public Order

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.O. (MILIA)

9/92

12 Feb 46

TO : Public Safety Sub Commission A.O.

Recd 1120

13 Feb 46

EL

1. The previous draft on the above subject prepared by the MILIA Ministry of War, dated 26 Nov 45 was discussed by MILIA with you in early Dec 45.

2. As a result of this discussion, suggested re-draft of para II was fwd to the Ministry under our 9/92 of 12 Dec 45 (copy to you).

3. The MILIA Ministry objected to this draft on the grounds that it detailed specifically the arms to be carried by troops

(a) against defenseless disturbers of the peace.

(b) against armed disturbers of the peace.

4. However, it would often not be possible to determine beforehand whether (a) might not develop into (b) they proposed a more general wording of the paragraph which, while accepting the same principles would give more latitude to the local commander.

4. At our request they have now submitted a fresh draft of para II and have also at the same time slightly reworded paras 3 and 12 at our suggestion in order to avoid ambiguity as to responsibilities of the civil and military authorities.

A copy of the new draft in MILIA and a copy of the translation are attached.

5. I should be glad to have your early approval of the new draft in order that publication may proceed.

M. W. Hope.

Brigadier GS

Major General

M K I L

|                 |      |
|-----------------|------|
| TO              | DATE |
| DIRECTOR        | 13/2 |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR | 14/2 |

13 Feb 46  
EK

1. The 2 revised drafts on the above subject prepared by the ITALIAN Ministry of War, dated 26 Nov 45 was discussed by IMIA with you in early Dec 45.

58A

2. As a result of this discussion a suggested re-draft of para II was fwd to the Ministry under our 2/92 of 12 Dec 45 (copy to you).

3. The ITALIAN Ministry objected to this draft on the grounds that it detailed specifically the arms to be carried by troops

(a) against defenseless disturbers of the peace.

(b) against armed disturbers of the peace.

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4. At our request they have now submitted a fresh draft of para II and have also at the same time slightly reworded paras 3 and 12 at our suggestion in order to avoid ambiguity as to responsibilities of the civil and military authorities.

1305

A copy of the new draft in ITALIAN and a copy of the translation are attached.

5. I should be glad to have your early approval of the new draft in order that publication may proceed.

MWH/abc

| NAME            | DATE     |
|-----------------|----------|
| DIRECTOR        | 11/13/46 |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR | 11/13/46 |
| EXEC. OFFICER   | 11/13/46 |
| POLICE          | 11/13/46 |
| LT. & MRG.      | 11/13/46 |
| PROSEC.         | 11/13/46 |
| RECORDS         | 11/13/46 |
| TRAINING        | 11/13/46 |
| CHIEF CLERK     | 11/13/46 |

M. W. Stope, Brigadier GS  
Major General  
X M I A

DRAFT OF CIRCULAR

SUBJECT: Employment of troops in Public Order duties.

This document replaces and cancels circulars Nos. 110950/11 of 30.12.44;  
100500/1 of 9.1.45; 112250/1 of 21.5.45; and 123550/1 of 6.10.45.

1. - In the territories controlled by the National Government, the maintenance of public order and seeing that the law is respected is the responsibility of the Police authorities, in accordance with the directives of the Prefects and the Ministry of the Interior.

When the Police forces are not in a position to reestablish order and the power of the law, or when they have reason to fear disorders on a large scale, the responsible authorities may request the intervention of troops.

2. - The intervention of units of the Army in the service of public order must be limited to cases of exceptional gravity only; request for intervention will be made, therefore, after a calm estimate of the situation has been made, and, in any event, only when the authorities responsible for public order have <sup>1</sup>exhausted all available police and CC.RR. forces. Troops engaged in duties of public order must understand that their intervention is solely for the purpose of safeguarding the citizens from disorder and violence.

3. - In cases of exceptional gravity - referred to in the previous paragraph - requests for Army units will normally have to be made by the Political Authorities to the Military Territorial Commander controlling the area, pointing out the duty to be carried out and giving all useful information on the situation.

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2. - The intervention of units of the Army in the service of public order must be limited to cases of exceptional gravity only; request for intervention will be made, therefore, after a calm estimate of the situation has been made, and, in any event, only when the authorities responsible for public order have <sup>1203</sup> exhausted all available police and CC.RR forces.

Troops engaged in duties of public order must understand that their intervention is solely for the purpose of safeguarding the citizens from disorder and violence.

3. - In cases of exceptional gravity - referred to in the previous paragraph - requests for Army units will normally have to be made by the Political Authorities to the Military Territorial Commander controlling the area, pointing out the duty to be carried out and giving all useful information on the situation. The concession and size of the units is therefore entrusted to the judgement, and is the responsibility, of the said Commander who will always take into consideration the principle of only employing such forces as are strictly necessary.

4. - Troops employed in Public Order duties will remain at all times under the exclusive and direct command of the military H.Q.s, which, in relation to the task entrusted to them by the civilian

authorities, have the widest powers, and consequent responsibilities, in laying down the executive procedure which they consider most suitable to reach the desired end.

The basic principle, also because of its psychological effect on the crowd, is decisive and immediate employment en masse.

Dispersion of the forces in order to be everywhere is an error which will be avoided at all costs.

5. - It may so be that the troops at the disposal of the Military Territorial Command are not sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation; in this case the civilian authority must apply to the nearest Allied Military Territorial Command, requesting the grouping of the Italian troops which may be at the disposal of such H.Q., and specifying, on the approval of the Military Territorial Commander, the force of troops which it considers necessary.

These troops, which will be granted by the Allied H.Q.s, will pass for all effects, immediately and temporarily, to the command of the Military Territorial H.Q. which will employ them in accordance with the standing laws, regulations, and directives of the Italian Army.

1304

6. - The Allied Supreme Command (A.F.H.Q. - Caserta) reserves the right to declare any territories already restored to the Italian Government, "military zone". With this declaration, the exercising of powers of government in the area concerned will be assumed by an Allied Military Government.

Zones in which grave disturbances of public order are met with are likely to be declared "military zones".

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Zones in which grave disturbances of public order are met with are likely to be declared "military zones".

7. - In the event of disturbances of exceptional gravity, the Ministry of the Interior and, on its authority, the Prefects, have the power (see standing P.S. Laws, art. 217 and foll.) to declare a State of War. Consequent to this, the direction of the service of Public Order and the responsibility for its execution, will pass to the Military Authorities.

In this event all the police forces will pass to the command of the Military Authorities.

8. - It may so be that an Allied Command -- on its own initiative if the disorders threaten to affect Allied military interests, or following a request for assistance on the part of the Italian authorities - considers it necessary to employ also Allied troops in order to reestablish order.
- In this event, the direction of the service of law and order and the responsibility for its execution will be assumed by the Allied command, and all Italian troops engaged on Public Order duties - including ITI-ITI, US-ITI and BR-ITI, troops, if any - in addition to all the police forces, will pass to the command of the Allied Military Commander commanding the area, who will thus become the Commander-in-Chief of all Allied and Italian forces, even if the area in which the disorders are taking place has not been declared a "military zone".
9. - When Italian troops are engaged in public order duties under the command of an Allied H.Q., it is for this H.Q. to issue the instructions regarding the procedure of employment and the line of conduct to be adopted in respect of the disturbers of the peace, especially as far as the use of arms is concerned. **1303**
- When the Allied Command omits such instructions, the employment of Italian troops will be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this circular.
10. - In order to guarantee the speediest and most efficient intervention by troops, it is of the utmost importance that very close liaison is maintained at all times between the civilian authorities and Allied and Italian Military Commands.
11. - Troops employed in public order duties will have at their disposal, normally, the arms (individual and unit) with which they

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11. - Troops employed in public order duties will have at their disposal, normally, the arms (individual and unit) with which they are equipped and eventually reinforced; the employment of these weapons - which must always be governed by an officer - will, however, be at all times in relation to the armament and to the armed resistance offered, by the disturbers of the peace.  
Normally, as against unarmed disturbers of the peace, troops will be armed with pistols and rifles only.  
L.M.G.s and other similar weapons may be carried in place of rifles since such weapons can be regulated to fire single shots only.

The automatic weapons, held in reserve, will be employed only when armed resistance is met with.

When it appears that the disturbers of the peace have automatic weapons and hand grenades at their disposal, the troops will be authorized to make use of the same weapons and even weapons of greater power (including the hand grenades), in relation to the principle that they who are called upon to restore order must always possess superior armament to that of those who have disturbed order.

With the exception of the CC.RR., who are authorized to carry their weapons loaded when they consider it necessary, troops, normally, will proceed to the scene of the disorders with their weapons unloaded: weapons will be loaded on the spot only on the order of an officer. Should the troops, however, in order to reach the scene of the disorders, be compelled to make a journey during which some surprise may be expected from elements interested in obstructing the maintenance of order, the unit, following specific orders from the highest ranking or senior officer present, will be authorized to leave with their weapons loaded.

In this case, the unit commander will have the duty of making all the most advisable advance preparations to ensure the avoidance of ambushes; the responsibility for this assurance thus becomes his personally.

12. - The Military Territorial Command, complying with the request to assemble troops and specifying the numbers (as pointed out in para. 3), must clearly indicate to the unit commander, in agreement with the political authorities, the task to be carried out on the basis of the valuation of the situation prevailing. It will then be the duty of the said unit commander to establish the procedure with which he will execute the mission entrusted him.

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- Power is given, however, to the Public Safety official, or in his absence to the CC.RR officer who has been entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining public order in the area, to make, in relation to the altered situation on the spot, alterations to the task previously fixed by the military authorities. These alterations, however, must always limit the task to the possibilities of the unit employed; the commander of the said unit is responsible for the task being adequate with the strength of the unit.
- The said Public Safety official is moreover held responsible for

giving to the unit commander all the necessary information for the carrying out of the task entrusted to him and which may influence the conduct to be borne by the troops in respect of the disturbers of the peace.

13. - The commander of the unit engaged in duties of public order, being acquainted with the task assigned to him and having properly summed up the situation, will decide upon the method with which he intends to carry out the task and, in particular :

- decide whether, in order to reach the desired end, it will be necessary to resort to the use of arms;

- decide which of the arms available to his unit (rifles, L.M.G.s, automatic weapons, hand grenades) will have to be employed;

- order the loading of weapons, the opening of fire, and the cessation of fire.

These responsibilities, which are inseparable from the exercise of command, will be assumed with calmness and without hesitation, bearing in mind that the use of firearms is reserved for extreme cases only, in which there is no other way of preventing the continuation of the disorders or in which the insurgents endanger the troops by they themselves making use of firearms or other means of offense.

Fire will be directed against the most dangerous looking individuals, those who are inciting violence, and, possibly, against the ringleaders of the demonstration.

It is forbidden to fire indiscriminately on the crowd and on women and children.

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Fire will be directed against the most dangerous looking individuals, those who are inciting violence, and, possibly, against the ringleaders of the demonstration.

It is forbidden to fire indiscriminately on the crowd and on women and children.

Troops may not open fire, except in case of legitimate defense, without the order of their commander.

14. - In view of the functions of the commander of the unit engaged in duties of public order, it is necessary that he always be an officer.

15. - The "Regulations for Garrison Duties", which replace the cancelled "Regulations for the Territorial Service", still remain

applicable as far as they concern duties of public order  
(art.202 and following), always provided that they do not  
contradict this circular to which an extract from the said  
instructions have been attached for ease of consultation.

THE MINISTER

B R O S I O

O. Danin Cpl.

1300

RECEIVED AND INFORMATION.

SUBJECT: Equipment; ITALIAN Army: Policy

LAND FORCES SUP COM, A.O. (MILIA).

ED/109.

28 Dec 45.

10: Distn below

1. In view of the forthcoming return of Axis territory in NORTH ITALY to the absolute control of the Italian Government, and of the consequent heavy responsibility for internal security which will now devolve upon the ITALIANS, the problem of intercomm for groups employed in aid of the civil power becomes one of the greatest importance and urgency.

2. It is considered that in event of serious civil disturbance line communications would break down almost immediately.

3. At present Italian Territorial Comds, Internal Security Divn, Independent Regts, and the whole force of the GCR are entirely dependent on line.

4. The only group at present equipped with wireless are the five ITALIAN Inf Divn (ex-Combat Gps) who possess British equipment up to grade.

They are however without rear-links, and could not communicate with Territorial Comd HQ by R/T or W/T in an emergency.

5. It is considered by this HQ that W/T communications should be provided for the HQs and formations listed in para 5 as a matter of high priority.

6. Order of priority in which it is considered they should be provided is as follows:

(a) Territorial Comd HQ  
Inf Div Rear Links.

(b) CC. BR Brigade HQ  
CC. BR Mobile Bns  
CC. BR Legion HQ  
CC. BR Div HQ and all static units

(c) Independent Regts.  
Internal Security Divn.

It has been ascertained that a large quantity of suitable GEM

| DATE            | BY |
|-----------------|----|
| DIRECTOR        |    |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR |    |
| OFFICER         |    |
| ASST. OFFICER   |    |
| SECURITY        |    |
| CHIEF CLERK     |    |

Witten, bell

- In view of the forthcoming return of our territory in NORTH ITALY to the absolute control of the Italian Government, and of the consequent heavy responsibility for internal security which will now devolve upon the ITALIANS, the problem of interest for troops employed in aid of the civil power becomes one of the greatest importance and urgency.

2. It is contemplated that in event of various civil disturbance line communications would be set down and is immediately.

5. As presented in ALLIUM Therapeutic Goals, Incumbent Security Dilemma, Incumbent Rights, and the whole force of the CDS are entirely dependent on line.

4. The only type of argument employed is that which says that the five ITALIAN T-45s (ex-Combat One) who produced this kind of argument up to now.

they are however, without war-talent, and could not communicate with Territorial Command by R/T or W/T in an emergency.

5. It is considered by this HQ that W/T communications should be provided for the HQs and formations listed in para 3 as a matter of high priority.

- [illegible]

|                                                                                                       | DIRECTOR | DEPUTY DIRECTOR | OFFICER | CHIEF CLERK |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------------|---------|-------------|
| (a) Territorial Command HQ<br>Inf Div Recr Bnks.                                                      |          |                 |         |             |
| (b) CS, RR Brigade HQ<br>SC, RR Mobile Bns<br>OC, RR Legion HQ<br>CA, RR Div HQ and all static CO, RR |          |                 |         |             |
| (c) Independent Regtms.<br>The Royal Security Divs.                                                   |          |                 |         |             |

7. It has been ascertained that a large quantity of suitable *CEM* exists.

- It is recommended that policy should be:

- (a) To equip whole of CD, IR, Pothole with with, CMTL.

- (b) To equip Internal Security Div and Independent Regts with surplus British equipment in order that all "Combat Troop" incl Inf Divs, may be on common basis.

12..... 485-

- 2 -

9. Until a policy has been agreed it is requested that all stocks of Captured Enemy Signal Stores be "frozen", and that present reported uncontrolled removal by the ITALIAN Navy and Air Force be suspended until the prior needs of the army have been satisfied.

10. If this policy is accepted, it is requested:

- (a) that immediate overall authority be given to the ITALIAN Army to obtain from the CEM Dumps any required equipment, properly listed and signed for.
- (b) that BRITISH equipment be released as soon as possible for Territorial Comd HQ, Inf Div Rear Bnks, Internal Security Divs and Independent Regts.

11. Herewith estimate of quantity of equipment by types required, (a) CEM for CG.RR and (b) BRITISH for remainder of ITALIAN Army.

ARCS/1.b

*Atch. 1*  
Major General.  
M.M.I.A.

27 Oct  
Sub

TO : C (SD) HQ CEM

INFO : AG - 3 (1 for Public Safety Sub Com)

INTERNAL : SO R Sigs 1241A (to take up through Service channels).

1238

Appendix A to 1914 Letter SD/409  
dated Dec 45.

A. (i) Territorial HQ

Enough Italian Eqs. Available.

(ii) Inf. Div. Rear Lines.

2 sets (cdn) Number  
16

B. CC. HQ

(i) Mobile Eqs.

(a) CC. Eqs. if available.

1 set Eqs. if (a) N.A. Number

Back Sets

18 or 36 sets 144

5 watt transmitters

22 sets 84

10 " "

19 sets 180

30 " "

9 set (cdn) 24

All wave receivers

288 288

German Tank Sets

120 120

(ii) Div. & Bde Hqs.

80 or 100 watt transmitters

9 set (cdn) 12

All wave receivers

12207

(iii) Legion HQ

60 watt transmitter

9 sets (cdn) 21

All wave receivers

21 21

(iv) Group HQ

25, 30 or 40 watt transmitters

22 sets 120

All wave receivers

120 120

(v) Independent Bde.

18 or 36 sets 390

9 sets (Cdn)

16

E. CGAR

(1) Mob Hqs

(a) GEM Hqs if available.

Tech Hqs

5 watt transmitters

10 " "

30 " "

All wave receivers

General Tech Hqs

(11) Div &amp; Rdc Hqs.

80 or 100 watt transmitter

All wave receivers

(111) Legion Hqs

60 watt transmitter

All wave receivers

(iv) Group Hqs

20, 30 or 40 watt transmitter

All wave receivers

O. (1) Independent Hqs.

(11) Internal Security Divs.

(a) GEM Hqs if available.

10 or 30 sets

22 sets

19 sets

9 sets (Cdn)

9 sets (Cdn)

9 sets (Cdn)

22 sets

10 or 30 sets  
22 " "  
19 " "10 or 30 sets  
22 " "  
19 " "

Number

12

84

180

24

288

120

12

12237

21

21

120

120

390

60

20

254

22

18

.....2/

6485

- 2 -

SUMMARY OF REFERENCE Expt.

(a) IF CEM N.A.

(b) IF CEM available.

|               |     |     |
|---------------|-----|-----|
| 13 or 18 actn | 768 | 624 |
| 22 actn       | 165 | 82  |
| 19 actn       | 218 | 38  |
| 9 actn (Cdn)  | 73  | 16  |

1236

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
APO 394

60A

AC/14602/5/PS

Jan 1946  
3 December 1945

SUBJECT : CC.RR. - Issue of Hand Grenades.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission.

1. Reference is made to your letter Q.008 dated 21 December, 1945, and the draft of letter which you propose sending to the Ministry of War.

2. It would seem that your proposed letter will not clarify the problems confronting the War Ministry. One of the principal difficulties, which has occurred throughout all correspondence on the subject, is that the basic documents referred to, both those issued by AFHQ and your Sub-Commission, relate solely to the armament and use of arms by troops on duties of public order and do not purport to deal with the armament and use of arms by police agencies engaged in normal police functions, including their duty to maintain public order to obviate the necessity of calling on troops if possible. The War Ministry, being the source of arms supply for all police agencies, will still remain confused. 1235

3. It occurs to me that the armament of police agencies and their use of arms are matters relating to the operational functioning of such agencies. It is suggested, therefore, that Public Safety Sub-Commission prepare a memorandum on the subject for the Italian Government. Your Sub-Commission can then advise that War Ministry concerning the issuance of arms, if such advice is necessary.

MC

M. CANR, Brigadier  
VP C A Sec.

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION 59A  
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

FILE No.

TO Director, Public Safety S/C

27th Dec. 1945

Will you deal with this matter please in the first instance. I cannot comment on the draft because I have not got the letter referred to.

One comment I have is that the War Ministry letter apparently refers to the issue of hand grenades to CC.RR, Public Safety and Finance Guards. The draft reply is headed "Issue of hand grenades to CC.RR" and does not cover the other Public Agencies.

I think the draft reply should refer only to Italian Government territory.

I do not know whether this would be a suitable opportunity on which to give the Italian Government advice on the subject or for MIA to take action, but I am anxious to see Tear Gas and Smoke Grenades in the hands of the appropriate branches of the forces of law and order. At present for the purpose of dealing with demonstrations and riots they are in the hands of the Italian Army, whereas they should be available for use at the very beginning and should be in the hands of the lightly armed forces of law and order such as the Public Security Agents and CC.RR whose job it is to disperse crowds if possible without resort to fire arms.

*MC*  
M. CARR  
BRIGADIER  
V.P. CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION  
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CCR - Issue of hand grenades FILE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
TO : VP C.A. 27 Dec 1945

I talked to Lt Col Carter about this on Sat  
30th told him you were away. He said that it  
didn't matter not replying until after Xmas.

HA

T. G. [unclear]

123

Subject:- CC,RR - Issue of hand grenades.

22 DIC. 1945

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.  
(M. M. I. A.) ROME.  
Q.008

21 December 1945.

To:- A.C. for Civil Affairs Section.

Reference recent conversation, Lt. Col. CURTIES -  
Brigadier CARR.

The War Ministry have requested information as to whether  
or not the prohibition concerning the issue of hand grenades to CC,RR,  
Public Safety and Finance Guards Units, issued under this H.Q. Q.23  
of 16 July 45 still applies.

Control of all arms and ammunition has now passed to the  
War Ministry, and it is, therefore, proposed to reply in the terms  
of the attached draft.

You are requested to state if you have any comment you  
wish to make before despatch.

*R.A. Curties*

R.A. CURTIES Lt. Col.  
for Major General,  
M. M. I. A.

Copy to:- A.C. for Public Safety Sub Commission,  
"G"

RAC/fem



D R A F T

Subject:- GC.RR - Issue of hand grenades.Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.  
(M. V. I. A.)  
R.M.D.  
Q.008December 1945.To:- War Ministry.224853  
Reference your 213 42/II dated 30 Nov 45.

The restrictions imposed in this H.Q. letter 9/23 dated 16 July 1945 are no longer operative.

The issue of hand grenades is at your discretion, subject to such policy as may be laid down by the Italian Government.

In this connection, your attention is drawn to this H.Q. letter 8/92 of 12 Dec 45, in reply to your 226060/II of 26 Nov 45, and to the letter of 12 Oct 45, addressed to the Secretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers by Civil Affairs Section of the Allied Commission.

Major General,  
M. V. I. A.Copy to:- A.C. for Civil Affairs Section  
Public Safety Sub Commission  
"G"

1291

224853  
Reference your 215 42/II dated 30 Nov 45.

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In this connection, your attention is drawn to this H.Q.

letter G/92 of 12 Dec 45, in reply to your 226060/III of 26 Nov 45,

and to the letter of 12 Oct 45, addressed to the Secretary of the

Presidency of the Council of Ministers by Civil Affairs Section

of the Allied Commission.

Major General,  
M. M. I. A.

1203

Copy to:- A.C. for Civil Affairs Section  
Public Safety Sub Commission  
"G"



*for PUBLIC SAFETY S/C. A.C.*

SUBJECT: Employment of troops on duties of Public Order. *78A*

*see 62A*

LAND FORCES SUB-COMM, 40 (MALIA)

*Woods* 6/92

12 Dec 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref your 226050/II of 26 Nov 45.

I. This HQ, in consultation with Civil Affairs Section and Public Safety Sub-Commission of AC, approve your draft with the exception that it is suggested that you should re-draft para II on the following lines.

II. Troops engaged in public order duties will be armed in relation to the armament available to the disturbers of the peace.

- (a) against defenceless disturbers of the peace
  - (i) troops will be armed only with pistols or rifles
  - (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will only be used to fire in that manner.
  - (iii) the carriage or use of any type of grenade is forbidden.

- (b) against armed disturbers of the peace
  - (i) troops will normally be armed only with pistols or rifles. *1290*
  - (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will normally only be used in that manner.
  - (iii) Automatic weapons will be held in reserve, and will only be used in emergency.
  - (iv) Tear gas or smoke grenades may be used if necessary, except that the use of white phosphorus filled grenades is at all times

I. This HQ, in consultation with Civil Affairs Section and Public Safety Sub-Commission of AC, approve your draft with the exception that it is suggested that you should re-draft para II on the following lines.

II. Troops engaged in public order duties will be armed in relation to the armament available to the disturbers of the peace.

- (a) against defenceless disturbers of the peace
- (i) troops will be armed only with pistols or rifles
  - (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will only be used to fire in that manner.
  - (iii) the carriage or use of any type of grenade is forbidden.

(b) against armed disturbers of the peace

- (i) troops will normally be armed only with pistols or rifles. 1290
- (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will normally only be used in that manner.
- (iii) Automatic weapons will be held in reserve, and will only be used in emergency.
- (iv) Tear gas or smoke grenades may be used if necessary, except that the use of white phosphorus filled grenades is at all times prohibited.
- Tear gas or smoke grenades will neither be issued to nor used by troops except on the orders of an officer of the rank of bn commander or its equivalent.
- These grenades will only be employed when the use of force is considered necessary and when the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire.

## Notes

1. The minimum necessary force will be employed at all times.
  2. Where disturbers of the peace are properly armed, troops are authorised to employ weapons of similar or greater weight.
  3. With the exception of CC RR who will carry loaded weapons as considered necessary, all troops will proceed to the scene of the disturbance with their weapons unloaded and will only load on the orders of an officer.
- Officers are responsible that troops are not surprised en route with unloaded weapons

L. Brossing

Major General,  
Hon. W. I. A.

Copy to : Civil Affairs sec AG  
Public Safety S/C 10A

Internal : GOC  
Dep Comd  
Col GS  
Col A/2  
G SD & Trg  
CC AR

HEROS/eb

| TO              | DATE |
|-----------------|------|
| DIRECTOR        | 1718 |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR | 1712 |
| CHIEF OFFICER   | 1717 |
| ASST. CHIEF     | 1717 |
| SEC. & REG.     |      |
| SONS            |      |
| CHIEF OFFICER   |      |
| SECURITY        |      |
| CHIEF CLERK     |      |

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
LIVORNO ZONE

LIVORNO  
30 NOVEMBER, 1945

File: LIV/PSB-14

SUBJECT: SECURITY PLAN.

To: HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION.  
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION.

1. THIS REPORT IS SEPERATE AND APART FROM THE REGULAR MONTHLY REPORT JUST SUBMITTED COVERING THE ACTIVITIES HERE DURING NOVEMBER, 1945.

2. YOUR PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER FOR LIVORNO ZONE HAS CALLED A JOINT MEETING OF THE TOP HEADS OF ALL CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUPS IN BOTH LIVORNO AND PISA, IN ORDER TO FORMULATE DEFINATE PLANS IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL DISORDER. THIS WAS DONE ON 25 NOVEMBER WHEN IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE PARPI REGIME WOULD FALL IN ROME. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO UNUSUAL REACTION TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS ON THE PART OF THE POPULATION HERE, YOUR OFFICER FELT THAT IT WAS BEST TO PREPARE FOR AN EMERGENCY SHOULD IT ARISE OVER THE GOVERNMENT SHAK-UP.

3. WITHOUT GOING INTO ELABORATE DETAIL: THE PLAN (CONDENSED) IS AS FOLLOWS;

- (A) CARASINIERI, QUESTURA P.S. AGENTI, GUARDIA DI FINANZA AND CORPO VIGILI URBANI WILL OPERATE ON A UNIFIED BASIS AND WORK AS ONE TEAM.
- (B) ALL LEAVES OF PERSONNEL OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE CANCELED.
- (C) ALL OUT-LYING SUB-STATIONS WILL BE CLOSED DURING SUCH AN EMERGENCY AND THE FULL FORCE WILL OPERATE OUT OF A CENTRAL COMMAND POST--ALLIED MILITARY POLICE HEADQUARTERS. I HAVE SELECTED THIS PLACE AS THE POINT OF VANTAGE ON ACCOUNT OF LIAISON AND BETTER COMMUNICATIONS.
- (D) COMMUNICATION POINTS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED. TRANSPORTATION HAS BEEN ARRANGED. ARMS AND AMMUNITION SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN CHECKED AND INSPECTED.
- (E) ITALIAN CIVIL POLICE ARE LITTLE VERSED IN THE WAYS AND MEANS OF HANDLING PUBLIC DISORDER, SO IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO USE THE OLD, BUT EFFECTIVE METHOD OF THREE WEDGE--DIVIDE AND THEN DISPERSE SYSTEM, AND WHERE POSSIBLE THE FLANK AND ISOLATE SYSTEM WHERE THE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT OF A GIVEN AREA WILL PERMIT THIS MOVE.
- (F) ALL POLITICAL LEADERS AND LABOR LEADERS HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND EACH HAS PLEDGED HIMSELF TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER IN THE

12508

To: HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION.  
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION.

14602/s  
P/S

1. THIS REPORT IS SEPERATE AND A PART FROM THE REGULAR MONTHLY REPORT JUST SUBMITTED COVERING THE ACTIVITIES HERE DURING NOVEMBER, 1945.
2. YOUR PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER FOR LIVORNO ZONE HAS CALLED A JOINT MEETING OF THE TOP HEADS OF ALL CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUPS IN BOTH LIVORNO AND PISA, IN ORDER TO FORMULATE DEFINATE PLANS IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL DISORDER. THIS WAS DONE ON 25 NOVEMBER WHEN IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE PARTI REGIME WOULD FALL IN A MINUTE. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO UNUSUAL REACTION TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS ON THE PART OF THE POPULATION HERE, YOUR OFFICER FELT THAT IT WAS BEST TO PREPARE FOR AN EMERGENCY SHOULD IT ARISE OVER THE GOVERNMENT SHAKE-UP.
3. WITHOUT GOING INTO ELABORATE DETAILS THE PLAN (CONDENSED) IS AS FOLLOWS:
  - (A) CAPALINI, QUESTURA P.S. AGENTI, GUARDIA DI FINANZA AND CORPO VIGILI (URBANI) WILL OPERATE ON A UNIFIED BASIS AND WORK AS ONE TEAM.
  - (B) ALL LEAVES OF PERSONNEL OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE CANCELED.
  - (C) ALL OUT-LYING SUB-STATIONS WILL BE CLOSED DURING SUCH AN EMERGENCY AND THE FULL FORCE WILL OPERATE OUT OF A CENTRAL COMMAND POST - ALLIED MILITARY POLICE HEADQUARTERS. I HAVE SELECTED THIS PLACE AS THE POINT OF VANTAGE ON ACCOUNT OF LIAISON AND BETTER COMMUNICATIONS.
  - (D) COMMUNICATION POINTS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED. TRANSPORTATION HAS BEEN ARRANGED. ARMS AND AMMUNITION SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN CHECKED AND INSPECTED.
  - (E) ITALIAN CIVIL POLICE ARE LITTLE VERSSED IN THE WAYS AND MEANS OF HANDLING PUBLIC DISORDER, SO IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO USE THE OLD, BUT EFFECTIVE METHOD OF THREE WEDGE-DIVIDE AND THEN DISPURSE SYSTEM, AND WHERE POSSIBLE THE FLANK AND ISOLATE SYSTEM WHERE THE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT OF A GIVEN AREA WILL PERMIT THIS MOVE.
  - (F) ALL POLITICAL LEADERS AND LABOR LEADERS HAVE BEEN CONTACTED AND EACH HAS PLEDGED HIMSELF TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS TROUBLE SO THAT THEIR INFLUENCE CAN BE UTILIZED TO BREAK UP UNAUTHORIZED GATHERINGS. THEY ARE TO WORK SEPERATE AND APART FROM THE POLICE GROUPS, AND WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOUR OFFICER AT REGULAR INTERVALS.

1208

|              |          |          |
|--------------|----------|----------|
| TO           | INIT     | DATE     |
| A. G. BENTON | 10/11/45 | 10/11/45 |
| A. DEPUY     | 10/11/45 | 10/11/45 |
| 1-NOV-1945   | 10/11/45 | 10/11/45 |

*Stanley Beatty*  
STANLEY BEATTY  
CAPTAIN, SPEC. RES.  
LIVORNO ZONE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER.

COPY

10 DEC 1945

SUBJECT: Aids to Civil Power.

SECRET

HQ 2 DISTRICT, CMF.

2015 G(O)

5 DEC 45.

GHQ CMF.  
MMIA.  
-----

10 DEC 1945

Copy to : Chief Commissioner, AC.  
217 Area.  
-----

Further to my 2015 G(O) of 23 Oct 45, a copy of which is attached for GHQ CMF.

1. Since writing the letter referred to above in which I stressed how greatly handicapped the CORR were, a visit has been paid to BOLOGNA by Col. E.J. EYE, the Deputy Director Public Safety Subcommission, AC. He is making recommendations about the supply of good clothing, petrol and vehs to the CORR and I am writing now because my certainty of the need of these improvements has recently increased.
2. The province of BOLOGNA is both a hot bed of militant Communist and a focal point of British communications. Lawlessness in the form of banditry, gaol storming and murder is rife. I attach a report of a more than usually serious but not untypical incident where fifty armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction.
3. General CERICA, the Italian Territorial Commander at BOLOGNA, is certain that there will eventually be an armed communist uprising centred on BOLOGNA. The Comd of 217 Area is by no means so certain but agrees that it is not impossible. Were it ever to happen you will appreciate that several thousand armed men could hold or destroy the PO bridges and prevent the arrival of either 6 Armd Div or the Combat Group to the north of the PO.
4. The situation is complicated by the fact that both the Prefect and the Sindaco are Communists and untrustworthy, and that communists have been placed in so many public positions of responsibility that it is not safe for ordinary citizens to oppose them. The last man to give reliable information about hidden arms is now dying as the result of reprisals. It is therefore extremely hard to get information on which to make raids for arms, and there are undoubtedly many in the area. In addition, General CERICA is not entirely happy about the reliability of his own staff, and as a result of this infiltration of terrorist influence the Italian Govt is not keeping law and order in this area.

*Copy retained by Office of Area Comm.*



- 2 -

5. Under these circumstances the need of equipment for the CCRR becomes even more marked. They can never move to a scene of disorder for lack of petrol, since their allotment is made by the Prefect who has no wish to make them mobile in case they impede his party's plans.

6. I would therefore again urge that petrol be allocated direct to the CCRR and not through the Prefect, that a drastic comb out of the CCRR be undertaken to eliminate the ex-partisans and that every encouragement, material and moral, be given to this body on whom rests the major responsibility for preventing civil disorder. If an increase in efficiency is not secured the use of combat tps. either Italian or British, to do a police job will be inevitable.

/s/ CA Heydeman  
Commanding 2 District

*must mean Partisans  
as partisans have never gotten  
into the CCRR  
JWB*

| TO              | INIT. | DATE  |
|-----------------|-------|-------|
| DIRECTOR        | WV    | 10/17 |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR | WV    | 17/12 |
| EXEC. OFFICER   |       |       |
| POLICE          | Kds   | 13/12 |
| I.C. & REG.     |       |       |
| PRISONS         |       |       |
| ADM. OFFICER    |       |       |
| SECURITY        |       |       |
| CHIEF CLERK     |       |       |

1236

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 380

AD/14608/3/

November 1945

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter 47306/25784/164 dated 27 October 45 addressed to M.M.I.A. with enclosed copy of your letter H.42458/35784/1-6-4 dated 11 August 1945 regarding the use of weapons in maintaining public order.

A reply to your letter of 11 August 45 was forwarded to you on 12 October 1945. A copy of this reply is enclosed herewith.

Yours very truly,

S.H. WHITE Lt. Col.  
A/YP CA Sec.

The Secretary of  
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

Copy to : Land Forces S/C (MMIA)

12-5

NOV 1945

- 7 NOV. 1945

Subject:- Arming of Units employed in the Maintenance of Public Order.Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.  
(M.M.I.A.) ROME.

Q.008

7 November, 1945.

To:-

A.C. for Civil Affairs Section.

The attached original and translation copy of letter *47506/35784/1.6.4* and *42458/35784/1.6.4* dated 11 Aug 45 received in error is passed to you for necessary action. *of Oct 27*

The control of arms and ammunition passed to the War Ministry with effect from 1 October 1945. Prior to that date releases from Army Depots were made by M.M.I.A.

The issue of hand grenades to CC.RR was not approved. Our Q/23 of 6 Sep 45 to Public Safety Sub Commission refers.

*Action taken as on 55<sup>A</sup>. NMIA informed.*

*27<sup>11</sup> 45*

*RAC/curt.*

R.A. CURTIES Lt. Col.  
for Major General,  
M. M. I. A.

| TO              | INIT     | DATE                     |
|-----------------|----------|--------------------------|
| X DIRECTOR      | <i>W</i> | <i>25/11</i>             |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR |          |                          |
| EXEC. OFFICER   |          |                          |
| X POLICE        | <i>W</i> | <i>24<sup>11</sup> 4</i> |
| SEC. & T.D.     |          |                          |
| POST            |          |                          |
| GEN. OFFICER    |          |                          |
| SECURITY        |          |                          |
| CHIEF CLERK     | <i>W</i> | <i>7/11</i>              |

Copy to:

Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

*B/F on file  
There is previous  
correspondence  
Subject.*

RAC/fem

5606

## TRANSLATION

FROM/ PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
TO A.C. N.M.I.A.

Ref: 47506/35784/1 6 4  
Rome Oct 27/1945


SUBJECT : Arming of units employed in maintenance of  
public order.

We will be grateful to you if you will kindly reply to our  
letter No. 42458/35784/1/1 6 4 dated Aug 11/45? in regard to  
the above:

The reply that we urge is determined by a request of the  
Ministry of War, who in its turn, is urged by the undercommand  
units, who insistently request instructions on the matter.

THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE  
SGD/ ILLEGIBLE

1233





*Presidenza  
del Consiglio dei Ministri  
Gabinetto*

*N. 35784/1-6-4  
Risposta al foglio del  
N. 3*

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA

R O M A

*LAND FORCES 1/2*

Oggetto Armamento di reparti in servizio di ordine pubblico.

Si sarà grati a codesta Commissione se vorrà favorire un cortese riscontro alla lettera n. 42458/35784/1-6-4 dell'11 agosto u.s., relativa all'oggetto sopraindicato.

La risposta che si sollecita è determinata da richiesta del Ministero della guerra che, a sua volta, è pressato dai dipendenti comandi che chiedono insistentemente istruzioni sulla materia.

IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO

*Dipartimento*

TRANSMISSION

16/5

ROMA

Gabinetto

N. 47806/35784/1-6-4

Proposta al Regio del

1910

LAND Forces 5/2

Oggetto Armamento di reparti in servizio di ordine pubblico.

Si sarà grati a codesta Commissione se vorrà favorire un cortese riscontro alla lettera n. 42458/35784/1-6-4 dell'11 agosto u.s., relativa all'oggetto sopraindicato.

La risposta che si sollecita è determinata da richiesta del Ministero della guerra che, a sua volta, è pressato dai dipendenti comandi che chiedono insistentemente istruzioni sulla materia.

IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO

1207

*Dipendenti.*

TRANSMISSION

1615

Uscita 29/10.

1430

20/10

5606

Copy.TRANSMISSION

Ref 42458/35784/1.6.4

From : Presidency of the Council  
of Ministers.

Date : 11 Aug 45.

To : Allied Commission.

Subject: Arming of Units employed in the Maintenance of Public Order.

In letter No. G.92 dated 13 May 45, which refers to the position of the Italian Government with regard to local defence plans, the A.C. pointed out that, wherever Allied or Italian troops might be employed in the subduing of public disturbances, use should not have been made of smoke or tear gas or of chemical substances of any nature whatever. It was added that this was the only limitation imposed concerning the use of arms and armaments by Italian troops employed in the subduing of such disturbances.

In accordance with these instructions, which in effect, cancelled the former prohibition of the use, in cases of the above nature, of automatic weapons and hand grenades, the SMRE has asked the MMIA for the necessary authorisation to issue the hand grenades requested by the various units employed in the maintenance of Public order.

Since the MMIA, in letter Q.23 dated 16 July, copy of which is enclosed, has refused such an authorisation, the Ministry of War has pointed it out as advisable that the A.C. should clarify in a definite manner what arms should be used in cases as above. The necessity should be taken into account, of the Authority restoring public order having an armament at least equal to that of the law-breakers, who as known are possessed of a great amount of automatic weapons, hand grenades and sometimes, even mortars.

We should be grateful, therefore, for your kind reply concerning the matter.

The under-secretary of State.  
(signed) G. Arpesani.

1281



COPIA

RISERVATA

11 agosto 1945

Data ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA

ROMA

Gabinetto

42458/35784/1-6-4

Armaamento di reparti in servizio di ordine pubblico.

Con la lettera 13 maggio u.s. n. 992, relativa alla posizione del Governo Italiano in merito ai piani di difesa locale, codesta Commissione fece presente che ove truppe Alleate o Italiane fossero impiegate per domare sommosse civili, non avrebbe dovuto farsi uso di fumo, né di gas lacrimogeni, né di sostanze chimiche di qualsiasi natura, aggiungendo che questa era la sola limitazione imposta circa l'uso delle armi e dell'armaamento delle truppe italiane impiegate per sedare tali sommosse.

In armonia a queste disposizioni, che in sostanza venivano ad annullare il precedente divieto di far uso, in casi del genere, di armi automatiche e bombe a mano, lo Stato Maggiore del R.Esercito ha chiesto alla M.M.I.A. la necessaria autorizzazione a distribuire le bombe a mano richieste da vari enti per esigenze di ordine pubblico.

Poichè la M.M.I.A. con la lettera 16 luglio u.s. n. 923, unita in copia, ha rifiutato tale autorizzazione, il Ministero della Guerra ha segnalato l'opportunità che codesta Commissione chiarisca in modo definitivo di quali armi sia consentito l'impiego nei casi di trattative facendo presente come sia indispensabile che l'Autorità cui compete il ristabilimento dell'ordine pubblico abbia armaamento almeno uguale a quello dei perturbatori di esso, i quali, com'è noto, dispongono largamente di armi automatiche, bombe a mano, e talora anche di mortai.

Tran-  
lata  
File 2/24/5

SS

Gabinetto

42458/35784/1-b-4

ROMA

Armamento di reparti in servizio di ordine pubblico.

Con la lettera 13 maggio u.s. n. G 22, relativa alla posizione del Governo Italiano in merito ai pieni di difesa locale, codesta Commissione fece presente che ove truppe Alleate o Italiane fossero impiegate per domare sommosse civili, non avrebbe dovuto farsi uso di fumo, né di gas lacrimogeni, né di sostanze chimiche di qualsiasi natura, aggiungendo che questa era la sola limitazione imposta circa l'uso delle armi e dell'armamento delle truppe italiane impiegate per sedare tali sommosse.

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Poichè la M.M.I.A. con la lettera 16 luglio u.s. n. Q 23, unita in copia, ha rifiutato tale autorizzazione, il Ministero della Guerra ha segnalato l'opportunità che codesta Commissione chiarisca in modo definitivo di quali armi sia consentito l'impiego nei casi di 22. Si tratta, xfa facendo presente come sia indispensabile che l'Autorità cui compete il ristabilimento dell'ordine pubblico abbia armamento almeno uguale a quello dei perturbatori di esso, i quali, com'è noto, dispongono largamente di armi automatiche, bombe a mano, e talora anche di mortai.

Si gradiranno, pertanto, cortesi comunicazioni al riguardo.

IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO

F/to: G. Arpesani

6463  
**SECRET**

AP 769

C.A. SEC

10 OCT. 1945

RHF/WP

.....  
 : **SECRET** :  
 :Auth: SAC / MP :  
 :Initials: / MP :  
 :Date: 6 October 45 :  
 .....

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
 APO 512

11 OCT. 1945

AG 370.61 CWS-0

6 October 1945  
 10 OCT. 1945

SUBJECT: Employment of Chemical Agents in Quelling Civil Disturbances

TO: All Concerned.

1. Letter, this headquarters, AG 385.2/047 CWS-0, dated 27 December 1944, subject as above, is rescinded.

2. As authorized by Amendment Number 2 to AFHQ Operation Memorandum Number 77 and Amendment Number 1 to AFHQ Operation Memorandum Number 70, tear gas and/or smoke (other than white phosphorus smoke) may be employed in the quelling of civil disorders upon the authority of an officer.

3. Chemical Warfare Service depots are authorized to issue tear gas and smoke (other than white phosphorus smoke) munitions upon the receipt of approved requisitions from major commands.

4. Major commands will insure that suitable security precautions are maintained at all points where the above mentioned types of munitions are stored to prevent their falling into the possession of unauthorized persons.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

*[Signature]*  
 C. W. CHASENBERRY  
 Colonel, AGC  
 Adjutant General

**DISTRIBUTION:**

"B"  
 2 - CWS  
 2 - G-4  
 2 - G-3

1279

49<sup>A</sup> on AC/1106025/PS refers.12<sup>10</sup> 45/PS.

ACTION: POC SAFETY 7/6/45

INFO: E &amp; Comm

C.A. SEC

EST SEC

4716

**SECRET**

m/c later.  
 no trace of reference of 27 Dec

49A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 394

12 October 1945.

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter No. 42458/35784/1-6-4 dated 11 August 45 on the subject of the use of weapons by police forces in the maintenance of public order.

The information given on this subject in letter dated 11 May 45 from Admiral STONE relates only to the arms and armament of the Italian Army and does not extend to police forces such as Public Security and Finance Guards. In connection with this matter it is to be noted that Admiral STONE's letter of the 11 May 45 was amended by letter No. 9/92 dated 30 September 45 so that the Italian Army can now be equipped with and make use of tear gas, and smoke grenades other than white phosphorus smoke.

The Carabinieri, as a part of the Italian Army could be issued with the same weapons as those authorized for the Army but when employed on police duties, Carabinieri are equipped only with such weapons as are approved for the effective execution of those duties. These weapons, in accordance with current policy, are tanks and armoured cars, machine guns, automatic small arms, muskets and pistols.

If it is considered that the Carabinieri in their role as a police force, should be armed and trained in the use of grenades or tear gas and smoke grenades, the matter is one of policy which should be raised and submitted to all appropriate authorities. It is felt that precise instructions would be necessary as to the conditions under which such weapons should be carried and as to the method of their employment.

- 3 -

Public Security and Finance Guards may be armed with machine guns, automatic small arms, muskets and pistols. As regards hand grenades, it was laid down by AFHQ in a letter dated 23 July 45 that Public Security and Finance Guards should not be permitted to use such weapons.

I hope that this letter gives you all the required information.

Yours very truly,



E. CARR,  
Brigadier,  
VP CA Section.

The Secretary of  
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

Copy to L.F.S.O. (MMIA)

FJF/G

12:7

Q. 071, 1945

2854

Directr. P.S. S/c 14602/5

with reference to the attached  
which we discussed, herewith  
is a draft of a letter on the  
lines of which I feel we  
should write to the Sec.  
to the Council. I want to  
check you as I am not the  
expert in these matters.

7/10.

MD  
H.V.P. C.A.S

D R A R V

C A S e

47<sup>A</sup>

October 1945

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter No. 42450/25791/1-6-4 dated 12 Aug 45 on the subject of the use of weapons by police forces in the maintenance of public order.

The information given on this subject in letter dated 13 May 45 from Admiral Stone relates only to the arms and equipment of the Italian Army and does not extend to police forces such as Public Security and Manned Guards.

In connection with this matter it is to be noted that Admiral Stone's letter of 13 May 45 was amended by letter No. 9/92 dated 30 Sept 45, so that the Italian Army can now be equipped with and make use of machine and tear gas grenades.

The Carabinieri, as a part of the Italian Army could be issued with the same weapons as those authorized for the Army but when employed on police duties, Carabinieri are equipped only with such weapons as are approved for the effective execution of these duties.

12.8

These weapons, in accordance with current policy, are tanks and armoured cars, machine guns, automatic small arms, handsets and pistols.

It is considered that the Carabinieri, in their role as a police force, should be armed with and trained in the use of gas, tear gas and smoke grenades, the latter is as of police which should be raised and submitted to all appropriate authorities. It is felt that precise instructions would be necessary as to the conditions under which such weapons should be carried and

subject of the use of weapons by police forces in the maintenance of public order.

The information given on this subject in letter dated 17 May 45 does not extend to police forces such as Public Security and Finance Guards.

In connection with this matter it is to be noted that Admiral Stare's letter of the 13 May 45 is amended by letter No. 9/92 dated 30 Sept 45. so that the Italian Army can no longer be equipped with and make use of smoke and tear gas grenades.

The Carabinieri, as a part of the Italian Army could be issued with the same weapons as those authorized for the Army but when employed on police duties, Carabinieri are equipped only with such weapons as are approved for the effective execution of these duties.

These weapons, in accordance with current policy, are tanks, and armoured cars, machine guns, automatic small arms, machine and pistols.

If it is considered that the Carabinieri, in their role as a police force, should be armed with and trained in the use of grenades or tear gas and smoke grenades, the matter is one of policy which should be referred and submitted to all appropriate authorities. It is felt that precise instructions would be necessary as to the conditions under which such weapons should be carried and as to the method of their employment.

Public Security and Finance Guards may be armed with machine guns, automatic small arms, rockets and pistols. As regards hand grenades, it was laid down by ANM in a letter dated 23 July 45 that Public Security and Finance Guards should not be permitted to use such weapons.

I hope that the Army will be given information some very early.

The Secretary of the Council of Ministers  
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
(4/10/45)

M. GARRI,  
Director,  
Public Security  
and Finance Section.

12.6

C O P YS E C R E T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AP745

20 September 45

Copy No. 86AMENDMENT NO. 2TOOPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 77Amendment:

1. Delete Para 3 and substitute:

- "3. EMPLOYMENT OF TOXIC GAS FOR POLICE PURPOSES.

The use of toxic gas, other than tear gas and/or smoke, in the quelling of riots and for other police purposes is not authorized. The term "toxic" is intended to cover all chemical agents other than tear gas and/or smoke. Agencies employing smoke for the quelling of civil disorders will insure that no "white phosphorus" smoke is employed for this purpose".

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

W.D. MORGAN  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ G. L. Eberle  
/t/ G. L. EBERLE  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 A

12.5

ws 04 Oct 45

C O P YS E C R E T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AF746

20 September 45

Copy No. 86

AMENDMENT NO. 1TOOPERATION MEMORANDUM NO. 78Amendment:

1. Delete Para 3 g of Appendix "A" and substitute:

"g. In any instance where Allied or Italian Troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, tear gas and/or smoke grenades may be employed subject to the following restrictions:

1. Every security precaution will be employed to insure that stocks of these grenades do not fall into unauthorized hands.
2. All major commands will issue instructions to lower echelons concerning the use of these grenades, subject to the restriction that no grenades will be issued to troops or used by troops except on command of an officer. As a guide to major commands, it is desired that these grenades be employed only when it is considered that use of force is necessary, and that the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire."

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

W.D. MORGAN  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ G. L. Eberle  
/t/ G. L. EBERLE  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

1274

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3 A

WS 04 Oct 45

28 SEP. 1945

COPY

DRAFT

SUBJECT : Troops employed in the Maintenance of Public Order

LAND FORCE SUB-COM. A.C. (MMIA)

G/92

27 Sep. 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref. A.C. letter G/92 dated 13 May 1945 and your letter 122244/I.2 dated 22 Sept 45.

1. If local Civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbance and the Allied Commander grants such assistance only in the form of Italian troops under his Allied Command, the Italian Troops so assigned immediately pass temporarily to the Control of the Italian authorities and the rules set out in paragraph 1 of your cited letter will apply. In other words, Italian troops released from Allied Command for this purpose and under these conditions are temporarily under Italian control and subject to Italian law for all purposes while under Italian control.

2. If local civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbances and the Allied Commander decides that it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian Authorities, all Italian troops engaged (including ITI-ITI, US-ITI and BR-ITI if any) come under command of the Allied District/Base Section Commander, who becomes the Supreme Military Commander regardless of whether or not the territory in question has been made an Allied Military zone. The important point here is that because Allied troops are used in quelling civil disturbances, the Allied Commander is Supreme Military Commander of all troops (Allied and Italian) in the affected area.

3. Should the above not fully answer your questions I will be pleased to discuss the matter further.

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref. A.C. Letter G/92 dated 13 May 1945 and your letter 122244/I.2 dated 22 Sept 45.

1. If local Civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbance and the Allied Commander grants such assistance only in the form of Italian troops under his Allied Command, the Italian Troops so assigned immediately pass temporarily to the Control of the Italian authorities and the rules set out in paragraph 1 of your cited letter will apply. In other words, Italian troops released from Allied Command for this purpose and under these conditions are temporarily under Italian control and subject to Italian law for all purposes while under Italian control.

2. If local civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbances and the Allied Commander decides that it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian Authorities, all Italian troops engaged (including ITI-ITI, US-ITI and BR-ITI if any) come under command of the Allied District/Base Section Commander, who becomes the Supreme Military Commander regardless of whether or not the territory in question has been made an Allied Military zone. The important point here is that because Allied troops are used in quelling civil disturbances, the Allied Commander is Supreme Military Commander of all troops (Allied and Italian) in the affected area.

3. Should the above not fully answer your questions I will be pleased to discuss the matter further.

Major General  
MMIA

Copy to : CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, A.C. (Ref. Conversation)

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| DIRECTOR        |  |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR |  |
| EXEC. OFFICER   |  |
| POLICE          |  |
| SECURITY        |  |
| CHIEF CLERK     |  |

27 Sep. 45

## (TRANSLATION)

From : M of "ar  
Ref : 122244/I/2  
Btd : 22 Sep 45

TO : MMIA

Subject : Troops employed in the Maintenance of Public Order

1. According to Italian law, when the Civil Authorities responsible for the maintenance of Public Order obtain the aid of military units, the following procedure is observed :

a) at places where disturbances occur or are foreseen, the duty of maintaining order is directed by a police official, who is responsible for deciding when it is necessary, under his command, to use troops, and when to discontinue action by them;

b) the police official must inform the unit commander of the objective he must achieve (clearing a square, blocking a street, defending a building etc.);

c) the unit commander, having learned the objective assigned to him, then establishes, on his own initiative the plans of action; in particular, his is the responsibility of deciding if and when to load weapons, and to open and cease fire.

2. I wish to point out that a police official is the person most suitable by reason of his professional experience, and no less, his knowledge of the general situation and the psychology of the crowd, to sum up the gravity of the disturbance, and to judge, with foresight, the advisability of whether or not to use armed force.

3. The above mentioned rules are observed in <sup>the</sup> territory restored to the Italian Government, when troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities are employed. It is not clear whether the said rules may be applied when Civil Authorities obtain the aid of Italian troops under the command of a District or Base Section, or other Allied HQ.'s.

In this case, too, since it has been foreseen (see letter dtd 13 May 45 from Admiral Stone to President Bonomi) that all Italian troops may come under the orders of District or Base Sections, it is not clear whether the above-mentioned rules are valid for the said troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities.

1. According to Italian law, when the Civil Authorities responsible for the maintenance of Public Order obtain the aid of military units, the following procedure is observed :

- a) at places where disturbances occur or are foreseen, the duty of maintaining order is directed by a police official, who is responsible for deciding when it is necessary, under his command, to use troops, and when to discontinue action by them;
  - b) the police official must inform the unit commander of the objective he must achieve (clearing a square, blocking a street, defending a building etc.);
  - c) the unit commander, having learned the objective assigned to him, then establishes, on his own initiative the plans of action; in particular, his is the responsibility of deciding if and when to load weapons, and to open and cease fire.
2. I wish to point out that a police official is the person most suitable by reason of his professional experience, and no less, his knowledge of the general situation and the psychology of the crowd, to sum up the gravity of the disturbance, and to judge, with foresight, the advisability of whether or not to use armed force.

3. The above mentioned rules are observed in territory restored to the Italian Government, when troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities are employed.

It is not clear whether the said rules may be applied when Civil Authorities obtain the aid of Italian troops under the command of a District or Base Section, or other Allied HQ's.

In this case, too, since it has been foreseen (see letter dtd 13 May 45 from Admiral Stone to President Bonomi) that all Italian troops may come under the orders of District or Base Sections, it is not clear whether the above-mentioned rules are valid for the said troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities.

4. I consider it of the greatest importance that the delicate question of relations, at the scenes of disturbances between officials and unit commanders, should be clarified, stipulating the powers of each party, and in particular, on whom should fall the responsibility of directing these duties and consequently the responsibility of assigning to the troops the task which must be carried out - in the case of the Civil Authorities obtaining the aid of Italian troops dependent on Allied HQ's.

I should be grateful for a kind and hasty reply.

The Minister, sgd. Jacini

0254

SUBJECT: Troops employed in the maintenance of Public Order

42A

1000 1945

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMA)

29 SET 1945

G/92

26 Sep 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

14602/5  
RM

Ref A.C. letter G/92 dated 13 May 1945 and your letter 12244/I.2. dated 22 Sep 1945.

1. If local Civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbance and the Allied Commander grants such assistance only in the form of Italian troops under his Allied Command, the Italian Troops so assigned immediately pass temporarily to the control of the Italian authorities and the rules set out in paragraph 1 of your cited letter will apply. In other words, Italian troops released from Allied Command for this purpose and under these conditions are temporarily under Italian control and subject to Italian law for all purposes while under Italian control.
2. If local Civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbance, and the Allied Commander decides that it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian Authorities, all Italian troops engaged (including ITI-ITI, US-ITI and MA-ITI, if any) come under command of the Allied District/Base Section Commander, who becomes the Supreme Military Commander regardless of whether or not the territory in question has been made an Allied Military Zone. The important point here is that because Allied troops are used in quelling civil disturbances, the Allied Commander is Supreme Military Commander of all troops (Allied and Italian) in the affected area.
3. Should the above not fully answer your questions I will be pleased to discuss the matter further.

L. Browning  
Major General  
MMA

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section, A.C.

WB

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| EXEC. OFF.    |  |
| POW           |  |
| SEC. STAFF    |  |
| TRAINING      |  |
| ARMY OFFICERS |  |
| SECURITY      |  |
| CHIEF CLERK   |  |



C/92

30 September 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On 13 May, I wrote your predecessor to clarify the position and responsibilities of the Italian Government in regard to local defense plans.

It is now agreed that the paragraph of my letter which reads as follows:-

"In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. It will be noted from the foregoing that this is the only restriction as to arms and armament of Italian troops employed to quell civil disturbances."

is cancelled and the following is substituted therefor:-

"Where Italian Troops are used to quell civil disturbances, tear gas and/or smoke grenades may be employed. However, every security precaution must be taken to ensure that stocks of these grenades do not fall into unauthorized hands. All echelons must be instructed that these grenades will not be issued to troops or used by troops except on the command of an officer, that they will be employed only when the use of force is considered necessary and that the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire."

Yours very truly,



WILBUR W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

1270

Professor Ferruccio Ferri  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
ROME

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LAND FORCES S/C  
CA SEC

41A

25 OCT 1945

It is now agreed that the paragraph of my letter which reads as follows:-

"In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. It will be noted from the foregoing that this is the only restriction as to arms and equipment of Italian troops employed to quell civil disturbances." is cancelled and the following is substituted therefor:-

"Where Italian Troops are used to quell civil disturbances, tear gas and/or smoke grenades may be employed. However, every security precaution must be taken to ensure that stocks of these grenades do not fall into unauthorized hands. All echelons must be instructed that these grenades will not be issued to troops or used by troops except on the command of an officer, that they will be employed only when the use of force is considered necessary and that the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire."

Yours very truly,

*W. W. Stone*

MILERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

1270

Professor Ferruccio Ferri  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
ROME

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CU  
EXEC COM

WS



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 194

October, 1947

Dear Sir,

The information necessary to clarify the position in regard to the use of weapons in maintaining public order which was raised in your letter N. 42458/35784/1-6-4, dated 11 August 1945, is now available.

I am directed to say that the information given to you on this subject in letter dated 13 May 45 from Admiral Stone relates only to the arms and armament of Italian troops and does not extend to the Police Forces such as Carabinieri, Agents of Public Security and Finance Guards.

In any case where allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances no smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be used. This instruction applies equally to all Italian Police.

The Carabinieri, as the first regiment of the Italian Army may use all arms with which the Army is at present equipped which includes the following: -

Artillery - 25 pounder, 17 pounder, 40 mm. 5 pounder 2 and 3 inch mortars. 1259

Light Arms - Bren guns, British and Italian automatic small arms. British and Italian rifles, muskets. Pistols. Hand grenades (under proper supervision).

- 2 -

Agents of Public Security and Finance  
Guards may use: -

Machine guns, automatic small arms,  
muskets and pistols.

I have to inform you however, that  
Allied Force Headquarters decided on 23 July 1945  
that the use of hand grenades by Agents of Public  
Security and Finance Guards would not be permitted.

Yours very truly.

M. GARR,  
Brigadier,  
VF CA Section.

The Secretary of  
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers

Copy to Chief Commissioner  
Executive Commissioner  
Land Forces Sub Commission

1268

39<sup>A</sup>

AC/14602/5/TS

September 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

I have now received the information necessary to clarify the position in regard to the use of weapons in maintaining public order which was raised in letter N.42453/35754/1-6-4 dated 11 August 1945. *sk*

The information given to you on this subject in my letter dated 13 May 1945 relates only to the arms and armament of Italian troops and does not extend to the ordinary police bodies such as Carabinieri, Public Security Agents, Finance Guards and Forest Guards. *Carabinieri*

The requests made by the Italian Army staff to MMIA were for issuance of hand grenades to such police bodies and MMIA has no authority to grant such requests.

Yours very truly,

WILBY V. STONE  
Rear Admiral USNR  
Chief Commissioner

1267

Professor FERRECCIO PARRI  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome.

Subject : Issue of Hand Grenades Italian Public Security.  
-----

3 SEP. 1945

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,  
(M.M.I.A.)  
R O M E.  
Q/23

6 Sep 45.

To : A.C. for Public Safety Sub Commission,  
-----

1. Reference conversation Col. Chapman - Curties the following extract is quoted from Appx. "A" to A.F.H.Q. Operation Memorandum No. 75 dated 15 Apr 45 :-

"Special Instructions reference preservation of law and order in Italy.

para. 3 "use of troops in aid to civil power

para. 3(g) "in any case where Allied or Italian Troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, no smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. "

2. No other instructions as to the nature of weapons to be employed are contained in the above Op. Memorandum.

3. In reply to this H.Q. letter Q.23 11 Jul 45 the following AFHQ. decision was given in their signal F.27119 Signed SACMED Cite FHGCT dated 23 Jul - "Issues of hand grenades to ~~Forest~~ Forest Guards, Public Security Agents, Finance Guards, etc. will not be made."

4. It is not considered however that the above ruling would apply to special CC.RR units organised on full military lines and employed as units under their own officers.

| TO              | INIT | DATE |
|-----------------|------|------|
| DIRECTOR        |      | 15/9 |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR |      |      |
| EXEC. OFFICER   |      |      |
| POWERS          |      | 11-9 |
| CHIEF OF STAFF  |      | 17-9 |
|                 |      |      |
|                 |      |      |
|                 |      |      |
|                 |      |      |

/agc

*R.A. Curties*

(R.A. CURTIES) Lt.Col.  
for Major General,  
M.M.I.A.

1206

37A

AC/14602/5/PS

September 1945.

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister :

I have now received the information necessary to clarify the position in regard to the use of weapons in maintaining public order which was raised in letter M.42458/39784/4-6-4 dated 11 August 1945.

The information given to you on this subject in my letter dated 13 May 1945 relates only to the arms and armament of Italian troops and does not extend to the ordinary police bodies such as Carabinieri, Public Security Agents, Finance Guards and Forest Guards.

The requests made by the Italian Army staff to MMIA were for issuance of hand grenades to such police bodies and MMIA has no authority to grant such requests.

Yours very truly,

ELMER W. STONE  
Rear Admiral USNR  
Chief Commissioner 1205

Professor FERREUCIO PARRI  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome.

JWC/c

14602/536A

PHILIP TAYLOR

1254

Copy to: Ex Comm.  
Chie, Comm

478427

RICHARD S. PIERCE  
C/O CIA  
Asst. Asst. Dir.

JOHN W. CHAFFIN CO.,

Translation L.S.Reserved35A

PRESIDENCE  
OF THE MINISTRIES COUNCIL  
THE CABINET

Rome 11 th. Aug. 1945

N.42458/35784/1-6-4.

14602/5  
ed

SUBJECT : Armament Units in service for public order.  
TO : The Allied Commission-Subcommission for P.S. Rome

30A

With the letter dated the 13 th. May 1945, n.G.92 relating the position of the Italian Government, concerning the plan of the local defence, <sup>that</sup> this Commission made present that in case, Allied or Italian troops would be employed to subdue civil disturbances, the use of fumes or gas tears or chemical substances of any kind should not be permitted, adding that this was the only limitation imposed about the use of weapons and armaments of the Italian Troops employed to subdue such disturbances.

In accordance with these dispositions, that in short cancelled the preceding prohibition of the use, in such cases, of automatic weapons and of hand grenades, the Italian Army Staff has requested to the M.M.I.A. the authorization to distribute the hand grenades requested by the various commands and offices for the necessity of the public order.

Seeing that the M.M.I.A. with the letter dated the 15 July 1945 n.G. 23 herein enclosed, has refused such authorization, the War Ministry wishes that this Commission would state in a clear and definite way which weapons can be allowed to use in the above mentioned cases of emergency.

12-33

- 2 -

It is very important and necessary that the Authority in charge for the restoring of the public order, could dispose at least the same weapons in the hands of the perturburbers who, as known, dispose of a large quantity of automatic weapons, of hand grenades and even of mortars.


News in connection with the above request will be greatly appreciated.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

S/. Arpesano

| TO              |      |      |
|-----------------|------|------|
| DIRECTOR        |      |      |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR |      |      |
| EXPC.           | 2/10 | 16-8 |
| IN CHARGE       |      |      |
|                 |      |      |
|                 |      |      |
|                 |      |      |
| IN CHARGE       |      |      |
| CHIEF CLERK     |      |      |

1263



Riservata

*Presidenza  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Gabinetto

N. 42458/35784/1-6-4

*Responsabilità del*

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA

R O M A

*Public Safety Sec*

Oggetto - Armamento di reperti in servizio di ordine pubblico.

Con la lettera 13 maggio u.s., n.G 92, relativa alla posizione del Governo Italiano in merito ai piani di difesa locale, codesta Commissione fece presente che ove truppe Alleate o Italiane fossero impiegate per domare sommosse civili, non avrebbe dovuto farsi uso di fumo, né di gas lacrimogeni, né di sostanze chimiche di qualsiasi natura, aggiungendo che questa era la sola limitazione imposta circa l'uso delle armi e dell'armamento delle truppe italiane impiegate per sedare tali sommosse.

In armonia a queste disposizioni, che in sostanza venivano ad annullare il precedente divieto di far uso, in casi del genere, di armi automatiche e bombe a mano, lo Stato Maggiore del R.Esercito ha chiesto alla M.M.I.A. la necessaria autorizzazione a distribuire le bombe a mano richieste da vari enti per esigenze di ordine pubblico.

Poiché la M.M.I.A. con la lettera 15 luglio u.s. n.Q 23

*del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Gabinetto

N. 42458/35784/1-6-4

*Proposta al Regio del*

ROMA

*Public Safety Sec*

Oggetto - Armamento di reparti in servizio di ordine pubblico.

Con la lettera 13 maggio u.s., n.G 92, relativa alla posizione del Governo Italiano in merito ai piani di difesa locale, codesta Commissione fece presente che ove truppe Alleate o Italiane fossero impiegate per domare sommosse civili, non avrebbe dovuto farsi uso di fumo, né di gas lacrimogeni, né di sostanze chimiche di qualsiasi natura, aggiungendo che questa era la sola limitazione imposta circa l'uso delle armi e dell'armamento delle truppe italiane impiegate per sedare tali sommosse.

In armonia a queste disposizioni, che in sostanza venivano ad annullare il precedente divieto di far uso, in casi del genere, di armi automatiche e bombe a mano, lo Stato Maggiore del R.Esercito ha chiesto alla M.M.I.A. la necessaria autorizzazione a distribuire le bombe a mano richieste da vari enti per esigenze di ordine pubblico.

Poiché la M.M.I.A. con la lettera 15 luglio u.s. n. 2 23

unita in copia, ha rifiutato tale autorizzazione, il Ministero della Guerra ha segnalato l'opportunità che codesta Commissione chiarisca in modo definitivo di quali armi sia consentito l'impiego nei casi di cui si tratta, facendo presente come sia indispensabile che l'Autorità cui compete il ristabilimento dell'ordine pubblico abbia armamento almeno uguale a quello dei perturbatori di esso, i quali, com'è noto, dispongono largamente di armi automatiche, bombe a mano, e talora anche di mortai.

Si gradiranno, pertanto, cortesi comunicazioni al riguardo.

IL SOTTOSegretario di Stato

*L. Apersant*

Translation I.S.C o p y

36B

L.F.S.C. A.C. M.M.I.A.

Q.23 Roma 15-7-1945.SUBJECT : Alltment of hand grenades.

TO : Ministry of War.

## 1. Reference

S.M.E.E. letter 4-1930-Serv of 5 July 1945

" " " " 4-1745 " " 9 June "

" " " " 4-1617 " " 22 May "

" " " " 4-1667 " " 29 May "

2. Waiting for clearly instructions to carry into execution, this Command cannot authorize the distribution of hand grenades to the Units.

3. You will be informed, as soon as possible, on the final result.

for the Magg. Gen. MMIA

S/. Lt. John j. Ward

## Reference

Q/23/7 file

Q/23/9 "

Q/23/1 "

Q/23/11 "

1200

P.C.C.

The Chief Office I.

s/. Lt.Col.O.Silli

Doc. 14152

25th July, 1945

28 LUG 1943

28 LUG 1943

2. Should this maximum number at any time be demanded adjustment in numbers can of course be made with outside Provinces.

Copy to : The Prefect of BARI.  
V.P., Civil Affairs Section (2) -  
HQ, Allied Commission, C.M.F.

1048

C o l a

L.F.S.C. A.C. M.M.I.A.

Q.23 Roma 15-7-1945.

OGGETTO-

ASSEGNAZIONE DI BOMBE A MANO

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

1- Riferimento

|          |         |              |                |
|----------|---------|--------------|----------------|
| S.M.R.E. | lettera | 4-1930-Serv. | of 5 July 1945 |
| "        | "       | "            | "              |
| "        | "       | 4-1745-Serv. | " 9 June "     |
| "        | "       | "            | "              |
| "        | "       | 4-1617-Serv. | " 22 May "     |
| "        | "       | "            | "              |
| "        | "       | 4-1667-Serv. | " 29 " "       |

2- In attesa di chiarimenti circa le direttive da attuarsi, questo Comando non autorizza la distribuzione di bombe a mano ai Reparti.

3- Vi terremo informati sull'esito finale non appena sarà noto.

per il Magg.Gen. MMIA  
f.to Ten. John J. Ward

1258

Riferimento

Q/23/7 file

Q/23/9 "

Q/23/1 "

Q/23/11 "

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

1- Riferimento

S.M.R.E. lettera 4-1030-Serv. of 5 July 1945  
" " " 4-1745-Serv. " 9 June "  
" " " 4-1617-Serv. " 22 May "  
" " " 4-1667-Serv. " 29 " "

2- In attesa di chiarimenti circa le direttive da attuarsi, questo Comando non autorizza la distribuzione di bombe a mano ai Reparti.

3- Vi terremo informati sull'esito finale non appena sarà noto.

per il Magg.Gen. MMIA  
f.to Ten. John J. Ward

Riferimento  
Q/23/7 file  
Q/23/9 "  
Q/23/1 "  
Q/23/11 "

1238

P.O.C.  
Il Capo Ufficio I  
f.Ten. Col. O. Silli

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Comm. head.  
100 394

334  
Tel : 478427-580

14 June, 1945.

AG/14602/5/PS

SUBJECT : Communications.  
TO : Commanding General  
Royal Carabinieri.

ALL 32A

Intimation has been received from the Military  
Commander No.3 District which comprises most of liberated Italy  
south of the line Umbria Marche, that, in cases of emergency  
members of the CC.MR. will be permitted to make calls over  
Military lines.

Such calls must be in the course of their duty and  
subject to the call being originated in English.

Walter Doherty  
for JOHN W. CHAPMAN  
Colonel, J.A.C.D.  
Director Public Safety  
Sub-Commission.

WD/C.

SUBJECT: Communications.

50 Area  
55 Area  
24 Sub Area  
DISC

24 Area (Area Order 606/45 refers)  
2 (your 1018A 1366 of 10 Jan 45 refers)  
HQ Allied Commission

3 District  
Box 8  
3716  
14/6  
12 Jan 45  
14/6

|                 |     |  |
|-----------------|-----|--|
| DIRECTOR        | hob |  |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR | hob |  |
| EXEC. OFFICER   | hob |  |
| PRISON          |     |  |
| ADM. OFFICER    |     |  |
| SECURITY        |     |  |
| CHIEF CLERK     |     |  |

In view of the official policy of rendering assistance to the Italian civil authorities, you should issue instructions that, in cases of emergency, members of the COME will be permitted to make calls over military lines in the course of their duty, subject to the call being originated in English.

*Watson*  
(J.P. WATSON) Maj.  
for Lt Col. 1258  
GS.

0224

CASect

31A<sup>PS</sup>

30A

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers  
Minister of the Interior

17270

Rome, 16 May 1945

19 MAY 1945

Dear Admiral,

pe

I received your letter of the 13th, M. 8/92,  
and I thank you for your kind interest about the important  
question for the maintenance of public order in the territory  
under the administration of the Italian Government.

I recognized the criticisms expressed in your letter and  
and, on this subject, I have already given the necessary or-  
ders to the Military Ministers, the Chief of the Police and  
the Commander General of the Royal Carabinieri.

The Prefects are also being imparted instructions on  
this important matter.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

B. I. Bonomi

1255

E. C. DIST - 18 MAY 45

Admiral Henry A. Stone  
Chief Commissioner  
Allied Commission  
R o m e

O.C.

| TO              |    |      |
|-----------------|----|------|
| DIRECTOR        | WV | 21/5 |
| CHIEF OF POLICE | WV | 21/5 |
| EXT. OFFICER    | WV | 21/5 |
| POLICE          | WV | 21/5 |
| INT. & EXT.     | WV | 21/5 |
| PERSONS         |    |      |
| ADM. OFFICER    |    |      |
| SECURITY        |    |      |
| CHIEF CLERK     |    |      |

ACTION: LAND FORCE  
CHIEF COMMR  
EX COMMR  
EASect (6123)

c/s

15 May 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In order to clarify the exact position and responsibilities of the Italian Government in regard to local defense plans, the following will serve as your guide:

The Italian Government is responsible for defense against sabotage and the preservation of law and order in all territory in the rear of the Army Areas excepting that under AEM.

As you know, the right is reserved by SACRED to declare specific areas of Italian Government territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such declaration, the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the area in question is assigned by SACRED.

To carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, Italian civil authorities have under their control the Carabinieri. If the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, the local Italian authorities should appeal to the nearest Italian military headquarters. If there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/Zone Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. For this reason it is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied static headquarters and local Italian civil and military authorities.

Should local Italian authorities ask Allied commanders for military assistance in quelling civil disturbances, the local Allied commander has orders to point out that the quelling of civil disturbances is the responsibility of Italian authorities and to refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests. Further, the Italian authorities will be warned that the territory in question will be immediately liable to be made an Allied military zone. If assistance is granted, the first troops to be used will be such Italian troops as may be under command of Allied District/Zone Sections.

Where it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian authorities, all Italian troops then engaged will come under command of Allied District/Zone Section Commanders.

In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, no smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. It will be noted from the foregoing that this is the only restriction as to arms and armament of Italian troops employed to quell civil disturbances.

Yours very truly,

HENRY W. STONE

HENRY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Via Embassy France Boud  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
Rome

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| POUR            | 17/5 |          |
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| ADM. OFFICER    |      |          |
| SECURITY        |      |          |
| CHIEF CLERK     |      |          |

1253

RESTRICTED

DCK/ls

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM )

NUMBER

31 )

7 May 1945

POWERS AND RIGHTS OF ALLIED FORCES IN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY

AFHQ Administrative Memorandum Number 57, 1944, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

1. General

a. It is the policy of the Allied Governments, as military exigencies permit and as the Italian Government is able to take on the responsibility, to hand back to its jurisdiction and administration territory formerly subject to Allied Military Government. In such territory Allied Military Government ceases on the hand-over and the Italian Government assumes jurisdiction and administration.

b. In handing back territory to the Italian Government, certain rights are reserved to the Allied Forces by agreement with the Italian Government. It is necessary that Allied troops in these areas should be aware of the most important of these rights and the manner in which they are to be exercised.

c. For the purposes mentioned herein the territory which may from time to time be included in that handed back to the Italian Government is termed Italian Government Territory. At the present time such territory comprises the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and all provinces on the mainland south of the northern boundaries of the provinces of Viterbo, Rieti and Teramo with the exception of the commune of Naples which is still under Allied Military Government.

2. Requisitioning - The Allied Forces have retained the power to requisition private and public property and services in Italian Government territory but it is emphasized that this must be exercised sparingly and only for reasons of genuine military necessity. This will be exercised through the Italian authorities. The usual formalities of requisitioning will be followed.

3. Process in Italian Courts - No members of the Allied Forces, Allied followers of such forces, or British or US Merchant Seamen will be subject to jurisdiction of Italian Courts.

4. Crimes against Allied Forces

a. In Italian Government territory crimes committed by Italian nationals, will normally be tried under Italian Law and in Italian courts.

b. The Allied Forces however, have reserved to themselves the right to hold Allied Military Courts in Italian Government Territory for the trial of Italian nationals who commit acts seriously hostile to the Allied Forces such as cases of espionage or sabotage and to punish them in accordance with the Italian penal code. The reservation of this right is not intended however to encourage the trial of Italian offenders by Allied Military Courts but is to enable them to deal with the most serious offences against Allied personnel or property which cannot effectively be dealt with by Italian Courts.

-1-

RESTRICTED

1253

## R E S T R I C T E D

## AFHQ Administrative Memo #31 (Cont'd)

c. The procedure to be followed, if it is desired that an offense should be tried by an Allied Military Court, will be for the military authorities to give a full statement of the facts to Headquarters Allied Commission with a request that an Allied Military Government Court be convened to hear the charges. It will be the responsibility of Allied Commission to frame the charges and constitute the Court. It is emphasized that only in the most exceptional circumstances such as mentioned in paragraph 4(b) will any case in Italian Government Territory be referred to Allied Military Courts and then only on order of Allied Commission.

d. There is reserved to the Allied Forces the power to arrest any persons who are believed to have committed offences against Allied personnel or property. High ranking Italian officials and officers of the Italian Armed Forces should, however, only be arrested in collaboration with the appropriate Italian official (e.g. the Prefect or the Commanding Officer of the officer concerned).

e. Apart from cases mentioned in this paragraph and in paragraph 7 the Allied Forces have no power of arrest in Italian Government Territory.

5. Military Zones

a. The right is reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater to declare specific areas of Italian Government Territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such a declaration, the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the Zone in question is assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. Should the situation in any area become such as to convince the District Commander that the establishment of Zones is necessary, he should, after consulting the Headquarters Allied Commission where possible, report accordingly to the headquarters, giving full reasons to justify his view.

b. The right is also reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander to have made available to the Allied Forces such facilities, utilities and installations as may be required by him or his agents for such dispositions, use or operation as may be determined.

6. Use of troops in aid of the Civil Power

In the event that the local Italian authorities ask for the assistance of Allied troops in quelling civil disturbances, the local commander will point out that the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian authorities and he will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests. Furthermore, before rendering such assistance, the local commander will warn the local official requesting his assistance that the territory in question will be liable to be made forthwith an Allied Military Zone. If time permits, the local commander will consult his superior commander before giving assistance. In any event, if the decision is made to grant the assistance required, the first troops to be used will be such Italian troops as may be under command of District/Base Section Commanders. Allied Commanders will inform their superior Commander without delay of any requests made to them and of the action taken thereon.

7. Military and Civilian Internees - The Allied Forces may continue to hold

## R E S T R I C T E D

AFHQ Administrative Memo # 31 (Cont'd)

or require the Italian Government to hold in custody military or civilian internees in Italian Government territory. If the Allied Forces require to arrest any person for security or similar reasons such arrest should be carried out in collaboration with Italian officials unless, in any particular case, it is thought that a request to the Italian police to arrest a suspect would be ineffective. In all such cases Allied Force Headquarters will be notified as soon as possible after the arrest has taken place, and an information copy of such notification will be forwarded to Headquarters, Allied Commission.

8. Allied Commission Liaison Officers - Details of the disposition and functions of Headquarters Allied Commission Liaison Officers stationed in Italian Government Territory together with information for the use of Commanders concerning the Italian civil organization and the Italian officials who should be approached by them in their dealings with the Italians has been issued separately by AFHQ letter file AG 091.1/081 GEC-C, dated 29 March, 1945, subject: "Withdrawal of Allied Commission Personnel from Italian Government Territory".

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

*C. W. Christensen*  
C. W. CHRISTENSEN  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

C

| TO              | INIT              | DATE        |
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| DEPUTY DIRECTOR | <i>[initials]</i> | <i>14/5</i> |
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| PROCES          | <i>[initials]</i> | <i>14/5</i> |
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1251

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- 5 APR 1945

2 DISTRICT DEPARTMENT INS REGION NO 18

DATED 2 FEB 45

COMAND AND ORGANIZATION

ATTACHED NO 3

1. Part 9 INDEXED and SUBMITTED :-

3. CASE AND LOT

(a) The northern city of IOT is the northern bay of the provinces of IOT, RIETI and VITERBO.

(b) All Regions are:-

Name of Region

Location of HQ

Provinces

(i) UMBRIA-MARCHE Region

PERUGIA

ANCONA  
MACERATA  
ASOLI  
BERGAMO  
TRENTO

(ii) TUSCANA Region

FLORENCE

Table of IOT  
LIVORNO  
PISTOIA  
FIRENZE  
AREZZO  
SIENA  
PISA  
LIVORNO  
GROSSETO

(iii) SICILY and SARDINIA are a part of IOT.

1250

*Handwritten signature*

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COMBAT AND OPERATIONS

APPENDIX NO. 3

Area 9 - NORTH and SUBSISTENCE :-

9. AIs and ICI

(a) The northern (id) of ICI in the Northern (id) of the Provinces of TIVOLI, PIETI and VITERBO.

(b) AIs Regions are:-

| Name of Region          | Location of AI | Provinces                                      |
|-------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------|
| (1) UMBRIA-MARCH Region | PERUGIA        | ARONA<br>MANTOVA<br>SCOLI<br>PERUGIA<br>TIVOLI |

|                     |          |                                                                                    |
|---------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (11) TUSCANA Region | FLORENCE | Isle of EIRA<br>LUCCA<br>PISTOIA<br>PIANZE<br>SIENA<br>PISA<br>LIVORNO<br>GROSSETO |
|---------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

1250

(111) SICILY and SARDINIA are a part of ICI.

*for* Lieutenant Colonel,  
General Staff.

MINOLD/err

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plus DALLIES (Copy No 80)  
FOR TIVOLI (Copy No 81)  
the Inspectorate of Army Bnpt (Copy No 82)  
FOUR (4) copies

Ex. COMMISSIONER (2)  
C. C. C.  
C. C. C.  
C. C. C.

3475

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- 8 MAR 1943

8 MAR 1943

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HQ 2 District CMF

2003 G(C)

Page 42

2. DISTRICT OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION NO 19

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

1. Present disturbances have demonstrated the necessity for comds at all levels on the L of C having a clear idea of what action they will take in the event of riots or uprisings breaking out in their zones of responsibility.

OBJECT

2. The object of this instruction is:-

- (a) to define the responsibility of Allied Comds with regard to civil disturbances
- (b) to lay down the principles to be observed when using military forces to quell civil disturbances.

and

DEFINITIONS

3. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY (I.T.T.) FORMERLY KNOWN AS KING'S ITALY

- (a) this term refers to that part of Italy which has been returned to the Italian Government. Within this area the Italian Government is the lawful government, and is the responsible authority for the maintenance of order.

LIBERATED ALLIED GOVERNMENT TERRITORY

- (b) this term refers to that part of liberated Italy still under the control of the Allied Military Government. In this territory proclamations issued by the Allied Military Government have the force of law.

HOPE BETWEEN ALLIED AND I.T.T. TERRITORIES

- (c) All present the following areas are governed as shown:-

by the Italian Government - the whole of liberated ITALY

1249

1 Recent circumstances have demonstrated the necessity for orders at all levels on the part of a body having a clear idea of what action they will take in the event of a crisis of importance arising over its sphere of responsibility.

#### OBJECT

2 The object of this order is:-

(a) to define the responsibilities of Allied Commands with regard to civil Italian areas;

and

(b) to lay down the principles to be observed when using military forces to quell civil disturbances.

#### DEFINITIONS

3 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY (IGT) FORMERLY KNOWN AS KING'S ITALY

(a) This term refers to that part of Italy which has been returned to the Italian Government. Within this area the Italian Government is the lawful government, and is the responsible authority for the maintenance of order.

#### ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT TERRITORY

(b) This term refers to that part of liberated Italy still under the control of the Allied Military Government. In this territory provisions issued by the Allied Military Government have the force of law.

#### FREE ZONE AND A.D. ILL. TERRITORIES

(c) At present the following areas are governed as above:-

By the Italian Government - the whole of liberated ITALY SOUTH of the Lombardy Ridge of the Province of MEDANO, and the whole of the Province of MEDANO, SARDINIA, and the whole of the Province of MEDANO.

By the Allied Military Government - the whole of the Province of MEDANO, and the whole of the Province of MEDANO.

8-11-45

8-11-45

A. G.

2293

1240

PROVISIONS IN LOT

4. Within LOT the Italian civil authorities have under their control the Carabinieri for the purpose of maintaining law and order. If the Italian authorities are unable to quell a disturbance with their own resources, they should call upon the local Italian Military Head quarters for the assistance of Italian troops. If a Italian troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, they should call upon the local Area/Sub-area Command concerned for assistance.

5. Upon receiving such a request the Allied Command will refuse assistance, and will point out to the Italian authorities that the quelling of civil disturbances is a matter for the Italian administration. If, however, he is of the opinion that Allied military interests are or may be involved, assistance will be provided. Before rendering assistance he will warn the local Italian official asking the request, that the area is liable to be made forthwith into an Allied military zone. If time permits, the Area/Sub-area Command will also consult the local AG officer, and seek instructions from the District before the employment of troops is authorized. The Area/Sub-area Command will inform the District as soon as possible of any request made to him or to any subordinate command, and the action taken thereon.

PROVISIONS IN AREA MILITARY

6. (a) Carabinieri under control of AG

Within the areas which are still under AG control, the local AG authority is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under control of AG for this purpose.

(b) Military assistance provided by Area/Sub-Area Commands

If the Carabinieri prove ineffective the local Area/Sub-area Command will provide military assistance at the request of the local AG authority. Italian troops both IRI-IVI type and IV-IV type located in the area, whether under command or not, may be used in this capacity by Area/Sub-area Commands. The priority in which troops are called upon will be at the discretion of the Area/Sub-area Command and will vary with local circumstances but where possible, the priority should be:-

1. IRI-IVI type under command
2. IV-IV type under command
3. IRI-IVI type NOT under command
4. IV-IV type NOT under command
5. Brit troops

POSITION OF TROOPS REGARDING DISTURBANCES

1248

will warn the local station or central command. If time is liable to be made without into an Allied military zone. If time permits, the Area/Sub-Area Comd will also consult the local AG officer, and seek instructions from W 2 District before the employment of tps is authorized. The Area/Sub-Area Comd will inform W 2 District as soon as possible of any request made to him or to any subordinate comd, and the action taken thereon.

#### PROCESSES IN AGG TERRITORY

##### (a) Carabiniers under control of AG

Within the areas which are still under AGG control, the local AGG authority is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabiniers are under control of AGG for this purpose.

##### (b) Military assistance provided by Area/Sub-Area Comds

If the Carabiniers prove ineffective the local Area/Sub-Area Comd will provide military assistance at the request of the local AGG authority. In line tps both ITI-ITI tps and PR-ITI tps located in the area, whether under comd or not, may be used in this capacity by Area/Sub-Area Comds. The priority in which tps are called upon will be at the discretion of the Area/Sub-Area Comd and will vary with local circumstances but where possible, the priority should be:-

1. ITI-ITI tps under comd
2. PR-ITI tps under comd
3. ITI-ITI tps NOT under comd
4. PR-ITI tps NOT under comd
5. Rest tps

#### POSITION W 2-000 REGARDING DISTURBANCES

7 If there is a possibility of tps becoming involved in a purely civil disturbance, all tps in the vicinity of the disturbance will be confined to barracks.

8 The above responsibilities apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with accordingly.

...../3

1248

EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS

2 In cases where Allied or Italian troops are used to quell disturbances the following instructions will apply:-

- (a) All possible measures will be taken to quell the disturbance without recourse to firing.
- (b) Troops will be ordered to use some of the disturbance with arms unloaded.
- (c) Weapons will be loaded only on the order of an officer.
- (d) Only small arms will be borne by troops. Automatic weapons and grenades are specifically prohibited.
- (e) No troops will open fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.
- (f) An officer giving the order to fire will:-
  - (i) Point out clearly who is to fire
  - (ii) State the target, which will, if possible, be the ring-leaders of the disturbance
  - (iii) State the no of rounds to be fired
  - (iv) Order the firing to cease as soon as it becomes effective.

Troops must bear in mind that they are only justified in using the minimum force necessary to quell the disturbance.

(g) The following will NOT be permitted:-

- (i) Firing over the heads of a crowd
- (ii) The use of "blank" arms
- (iii) Firing on women and children
- (iv) The use of smoke, tear gas or chemicals of any kind.

10 In territories where 2 District is NOT the controlling agency British troops will NOT be used to quell a civil disturbance unless:-

(a) The British Command has been requested by the appropriate Allied HQ to take specific action

or

(b) British interests are affected.

In the case of sub para (b) above the matter will always, if time permits, be referred to the appropriate Allied HQ before any irreversible orders are issued.

LAISON

11 In the event of

1247

1247

- (c) weapons will be issued only on the command of an officer.
- (d) Only small arms will be borne by GPs. Automatic weapons and grenades are specifically prohibited.
- (e) No GP will open fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.
- (f) An officer giving the order to fire shall:-
- (i) Identify clearly who is to fire
  - (ii) State the target, which shall, if possible, be the ring-leader of the disturbance
  - (iii) State he has no other rounds to fire
  - (iv) Order the firing to cease as soon as it becomes effective.

GP's must bear in mind that they are only authorized in using the minimum force necessary to quell the disturbance.

(g) The following will NOT be permitted:-

- (i) Firing over the heads of a crowd
- (ii) The use of blank amm.
- (iii) Firing on women and children
- (iv) The use of smoke, tear gas or chemicals of any kind.

10. In territory where 2 Districts is not the controlling agency British troops will not be used to quell a civil disturbance unless:-

- (a) The British Comd has been requested by the appropriate allied HQ to take specific action
- or
- (b) British interests are affected.

In the case of sub para (b) above the matter will always, if time permits, be referred to the appropriate allied HQ before any irreparable orders are issued.

#### LIASON

11. In the event of -

- (a) A purely civil disturbance
- or
- (b) A disturbance in which both civil and military personnel are involved

it is essential that close liaison exists between the area/Sub area Comd and the local AC/adjt officer.

....

- 4 -

REPORTS

12 In all cases of riots or civil disturbance whether or no Allied or Italian troops have been employed, Comds are responsible that the circumstances are reported as soon as possible to HQ 2 District.

13 ACK

MMG/ED/ES

*Ind. W. H. J. May*  
for Lieutenant Colonel,  
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION

|                               | <u>Copy No</u> |            | <u>Copy No</u> |
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| 57 Area                       | 1              | PA for GOC | 27             |
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1246

Letter Wilson

This would require batons with leather thong or cord for the wrist. A musket, pistol and baton in a man's equipment would be ludicrous. It must be some or batons and Italy at present would not permit of disarming police, especially C.C.R.R.

Do you know if the C.C.R.R. have any "riot" drill?

10/3/45

W.S.

NB

This was discussed by

Col. Chapman

Col. Doherty

C.G. C.C.R.R. on 14th March 1945

1245  
B. Wilson 1  
H.W.C.

|                 |             |
|-----------------|-------------|
| TO              | 14002/5 26A |
| DIRECTOR        |             |
| DEPUTY DIRECTOR |             |
| EXECUTIVE       |             |
| PERSONNEL       |             |
| TRAINING        |             |
| INTELLIGENCE    |             |
| RECORDS         |             |
| SECURITY        |             |
| CHIEF           |             |

# ALLIED COMMISSION

SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS

APO. 394

(PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION)

FILE NO: RPS/612/JBL

DATE 30th January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Police Action in the event of Disturbances.

TO: Brigadier M. GARR, G.B.E. M.C.  
Regional Commissioner, Sicily Region.

1. During the course of demonstrations and disorders which have occurred in Sicily in recent months, frequent complaints have been heard of the lack of energetic action on the part of police in restoring order. It is appreciated that conditions are quite different here from those existing, for example, in England, and that by reason of the nature and conduct of civilians and their well-known characteristic preference for the use of firearms and other lethal weapons, very strong measures, including the use of firearms, etc., are absolutely necessary on the part of the police in maintaining law and order. This was demonstrated very clearly in the recent Ragusa riots when by reason of the opposition of very large numbers of armed civilians the counter-action was taken on military lines, normal policing measures being quite inadequate.

2. The object of the submission of this report is to call attention to the apparent absence of definite instructions to Police as regards their procedure in dealing with demonstrations and the lack of suitable means with which to handle a situation in its early stages and so prevent what might be merely a demonstration from deteriorating into violent disorder. In the case of the small strikes and demonstrations in Palermo which culminated in the major incident of 19th October and further, in more recent petty strikes and students' demonstrations, it was apparent that the Police had no real idea of how to control a procession, but merely trailed behind it. The Carabinieri Reali seem inclined to adopt the attitude that they are a military force which cannot take any action until a crowd becomes really violent or attacks them when they then feel justified in resorting to the use of firearms. It is undoubtedly the case that many major disorders are the product of smaller minor incidents in which students or rowdy youths roam the streets at will being joined later by more violent or criminal elements prepared to exploit the prevailing situation. If early and energetic action was taken as regards these minor incidents it would often be possible to gain the respect and confidence of the public and prevent a state of chaos and disorder developing.

3. In the first place, therefore, it seems most desirable that definite and clear cut rules of procedure should be laid down governing the action of Police in the event of meetings, strikes, processions, demonstrations and disorders. The second point of importance is the means and method by which police intervene in the prevention of disorder or the breaking-up of a crowd. At present they have only rifles and / or pistols and as the butt-end of the former is too

SUBJECT: Police Action in the event of Disturbances.

TO:

Brigadier M. CARR, C.B.E. M.C.  
Regional Commissioner, Sicily Region.

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- 2 -

a long staff or baton with which to disperse persons intent on creating disorder.

4. Advice on the lines of this report has already been given to local police officials but such subjects as rules of procedure and equipment must be considered centrally and the necessary action taken throughout the various police services.

5. Summarised, the recommendations contained in this report are:-

- (a) That rules of procedure governing the action of police at demonstrations and disorders should be clearly defined. These should cover the use of truncheons, (if this suggestion is agreed upon) of firearms, hand bombs, etc., of mounted men, also the co-operation of Fire Brigades in suitable circumstances.
- (b) That truncheons or batons should be supplied to all police as extra equipment, not in substitution of firearms.
- (c) That additional instruction should be given to police in handling violent persons.
- (d) That horses should be trained to assist in controlling crowds and mounted men provided with staves.

6. A further matter which might receive serious consideration by the Italian Government is the imposition of more severe punishments for the unlawful possession of firearms and explosives, the penalties being prescribed according to the deadly nature of the weapons or explosives possessed.

*J. T. Manuel*  
J. T. MANUEL,  
Major,  
Public Safety Officer.

1st Ind.

ALLIED COMMISSION, SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS, APO 394. - 1234345.

TO - Headquarters, Allied Commission.

For the attention of,  
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Submitted for information and consideration, please.

*H. H. H. H. H.*  
H. H. H. H. H.

for M. GARR,  
Privatier.

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*J. T. Manuel*  
J. T. MANUEL,  
Major,  
Public Safety Officer.

Let End.

ALLIED COMMISSION, SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS, APO 394. - 123-2-45

TO - Headquarters, Allied Commission.

For the attention of,  
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Submitted for information and consideration, please.

*H. Highhall Major*  
for  
M. CARR,  
Brigadier,  
Regional Commissioner.

時常已往國庫

3 March 1949.

One

Long  
Line

See 10

17.40

1792

### Major Events

4

Copy to: Executive Commissioner,  
Civil Affairs Section,  
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

24A

## AIDON SICILY REGION

113

21 January 1945

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE DISTURSE OPERATION INSTRUCTION ONE EIGHT PD

PARA TWO AIDON SICILY REGION FROM HQ AIDON PAREN PD

PARA TWO PD AMENDMENT TWO DATE FIVE JANUARY ORDERS DELETION FROM PARA THREE

SENTENCE QUOTE EXCEPT IN GREAT EMERGENCY ITALIAN TROOPS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE

USED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT OF AREA SUB AREA COMMANDER CONCERNED PD

1241

PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

Ext 606

JOHN W. CHAPMAN, COLONEL

NICHOLAS FICCHINO  
CSO, USA  
ASST ADJUTANT

**ALLIED COMMISSION**  
**SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS**  
**APQ 394**

OFFICE: REGIONAL COMMISSIONER  
PHONE: 15555 EXT 1

FILE: RC/000.5

SUBJECT: Aid to the civil power

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission  
R O M E

17 Jan 1945

5761 02 NOV

PS  
19 Dec

1. With reference to your cable No. 8375 of 18 DEC 44 (copy enclosed for easy reference), no decision has yet been received in respect to this matter.

2. It seems quite clear that, under para 6 of AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 57 of 11 DEC 44, in the case of use of Italian troops in aid of the civil power application to the Allied Military authorities is not necessary. The orders still stand, however, that such application must be made in No. 3 District territory "except in great emergency".

In this connection it has come to light that at CATANIA on 14 DEC between the hours of 1530 and 1700, when the main damage was done to public buildings, a letter was typed at the Prefettura asking for permission to call out the troops. This request was received at Provincial Headquarters Allied Commission at 1610 hours. The matter was immediately taken up with the Area Commander who instructed the Italian Army authorities that the troops could be used. Under such a procedure extremely valuable time was lost.

When this matter is discussed with the local military authorities they point out that action could have been taken under the "except in great emergency" provision. But I consider that this procedure places, for instance, a Prefect in a most difficult position. He is aware that his action may be criticised not only by his own Government but also by the Allied authorities, who have a voice in his appointment. He has to serve two masters and is naturally led to seek covering approval before making a decision.

3. During the more recent disturbances in RAGUSA Province the procedure broke down completely and I advised the High Commissioner at the beginning of these developments that normally prior approval need not be obtained but that the Allied Military should be kept informed of all

~~SECRET~~

23A

C. Asse

23 JAN 1945

426

SECRET

troop moves.

In view of the AFHQ orders on the subject, I am at a loss to understand why No. 3 District have introduced this procedure especially in SICILY where, in my opinion, it is quite impracticable.

*McLan Brydies*

M. CATH  
Brigadier  
Regional Commissioner

1 Encl- copy of R.C.A.C. cable No. 8375 of 18 DEC 44.

*12/20/44  
This document was delivered to Lt.  
LPC by a civilian employee of CA Section  
not enclosed in any cover  
J.W.C.*

1239

RECLASSIFIED  
20 JAN 1985

A.

END/END

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
AF0 512

## SEQUEST

49 593

AS 370.6/005 GGP1-0

SUBMISSION: Local Defense Plans.

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group,  
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District  
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District  
General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District  
Commander, Balkan Air Force  
Commander, Land Forces, Adriatic  
Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army

FOR: Army Sub-Commission,  
Deputy President, Allied Commission  
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 702.  
Commanding General, Zone Area Allied Command, APO 794.

1. Letters, this headquarters, file AG 370.6/106 GCT-O, dated 24 September 1944, AG 370.6/107 GCT-O, dated 27 November 1944, and AG 370.6/107 GCT-O, dated 6 December 1944, all subject as above, are resubmitted and the following substituted therefor:

2. Your attention is directed to recent local uprisings and disorders which indicate the possible inability of local police to cope with such situations.

3. The present policy with respect to military zones and the employment of Allied troops to quell civil disturbances is laid down in paragraphs 5 and 6 of AFHQ Administrative Memorandum Number 57, 1944, subject: "Powers and Rights of Allied Forces in Italian Government Territory". The following instructions are in amplification of those included in Administrative Memorandum Number 57.

4. There are two types of areas in that part of Italy in rear of the army boundaries where civil riots or disturbances may occur: first, those areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, including islands of Sicily and Sardinia, and second, those areas still under Allied Military Government control.

5. Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To accomplish this, the Italian local civil authorities have under their control the local carabinieri. If, in the opinion of the local Italian authorities, the carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should appeal to the nearest Italian military headquarters for the assistance of such Italian troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the local District (base section) area or sub-area commander for

6 January 1945

## SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans.

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group.  
 General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District  
 General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District  
 General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District  
 Commander, Italian Air Force  
 Commander, Land Forces, Adriatic  
 Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army  
 FOR: Army Sub-Commission.  
 Deputy President, Allied Commission  
 Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 762.  
 Commanding General, Rome Area Allied Command, APO 794.

1. Letters, this headquarters, file AS 370.6/106 GCI-O, dated 24 September 1944, AS 370.6/107 GCI-O, dated 27 November 1944, and AS 370.6/107 GCI-O, dated 8 December 1944, all subject as above, are reenclosed and the following substituted therefor:

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SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AF 370.6/605 GCI-0,  
dtd 6 January 1945 (cont'd)

section) area and sub-area headquarters with the local Italian civil and military authorities.

6. Within areas which are still under Allied Military Government control, the local Allied Military Government authority is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of Allied Military Government for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local Allied Military Government authority will appeal to the local district (base section) area or sub-area commander. It is essential that close liaison exist between the local Allied Military Government commander and the local district (base section) area and sub-area commander.

7. The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

8. Immediate reports will be made through normal channels in all cases of riots or civil disturbance, whether or not it has been necessary to employ Allied troops.

9. In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, the following instructions will apply:

- a. Troops will be moved to the scene of the disturbance with weapons unloaded.
- b. Weapons will be loaded only on command of an officer.
- c. Only small arms will normally be borne by troops. Commanders are advised that the carrying of automatic weapons by troops in a civil disturbance is most undesirable and will only be allowed in the army areas where they will be kept to a minimum and used only as a last resort. Grenades are specifically prohibited.
- d. No smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.
- e. No troops will open fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.
10. Within the army areas, the Commanding General, 15th Army Group will issue such instructions as are considered necessary to implement the general principles outlined above.

11. Commanders concerned are responsible for the preparation of local defense schemes for the protection of Allied government property and to insure the security and efficiency of the lines of communication. Addressees who have not already forwarded copies of their local defense plans will do so without delay. Changes or amendments will be submitted immediately on publication.

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SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 370.6/005 GCT-0  
 dtd 6 January 1945 (cont'd)

12. All addressees will acknowledge receipt of this order.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

/s/ C.W. CHRISTENBERRY  
 C.W. CHRISTENBERRY  
 Colonel, AGD,  
 Acting Adjutant General

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 Commission. 12 Jan 45 2606/COS

| TO             | INIT | DATE |
|----------------|------|------|
| COL CH PM N    |      | 1/11 |
| COL YOUNG      |      | 1/11 |
| LT COL W. G. X |      | 1/11 |
| MAJ WILSON     |      | 1/11 |
| MAJ HANBURY    |      | 1/11 |
| MAJ BALANCE    |      | 1/11 |
| CAPT POWEL     |      | 1/11 |
| CHIEF CLERK    |      | 1/11 |

1237

**SECRET****SECRET**

5 JAN 1945

AF 544

RHF/awm

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512: **SECRET** :

: Auth: SAC MT :

: Initials: :

: 3 January 1945 :

: : :

3 January 1945

AG 370.6/005 GCT-O

SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans.

TO : General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District.

1. Reference is made to "3 District Operation Instruction Number 18" dated 7 December 1944. In paragraph 3 thereof appears the sentence: "Except in great emergency Italian troops will NOT be used without prior consultation and agreement of Area/Sub Area commander concerned."

2. Letter, this headquarters, file AG 370.6/107 GCT-O, subject as above, dated 27 November 1944, does not so limit local Italian authorities. This is based on the general policy that the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order within areas which have been turned back to them, and is not prohibited in any way from using all the resources under its control in the accomplishment of this function. It is only when, having failed successfully to cope with a situation, a request is made for assistance from the local District (Base Section) Area or Sub Area commander that the latter is empowered to limit or control the use of troops.

3. It is therefore desired that you amend your Operation Instruction Number 18 in accordance with the above stated policy. It is suggested that this might best be done by deleting the sentence referred to in paragraph 1 above.

4. Nothing in the foregoing is intended to limit District (Base Section) Area or Sub Area commanders from effecting the close liaison with local Italian authorities already provided for in our letter referred to in paragraph 2 above.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

**DISTRIBUTION:**

- 2 - Addressee
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- 1 - S G/S
- 2 - G-3
- 2 - G-5
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M&D

| TO              | INIT | DATE |
|-----------------|------|------|
| COL. CHAPMAN    |      |      |
| COL. YOUNG      |      |      |
| LT. COL. WILCOX |      |      |
| MAJ. LUCKMAN    |      |      |
| MAJ. WILSON     |      |      |
| MAJ. HANBURY    |      |      |
| MAJ. BALLANCE   |      |      |
| CAPT. POWELL    |      |      |
| CHIEF CLERK     |      |      |

*Jack Carter* 1236  
 JACK CARTER,  
 Captain, AGD,  
 Asst Adjutant General.

**SECRET**

14602/5.

2017

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Troops employed to quell civil disturbances

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.  
(M.M.I.A.)  
File No. S/O/33  
5 Jan 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Your ref.: 110159/I dated 30 Dec 44.  
129-1-7

1. The authorization to order the opening of fire is extended to all officers commanding troops on public order duty. In the event of no officers being present, the senior NCO will accept the responsibility. However, it is pointed out that troops should only in very exceptional instances be despatched to quell a disturbance without an officer in charge.

*S.M. Tingle*  
Major General  
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: Public Safety Sub Com, AC.

Internal: SD/50

1235

|             |      |   |
|-------------|------|---|
| TO          |      |   |
| TO DIRECTOR | 15/1 |   |
| TO VICE     |      |   |
| TO W. S.    | 14   |   |
| TO W. S.    | 15/2 | 5 |
| TO W. S.    | 15/1 |   |
| MAJ BALANCE |      |   |
| CAPT FOWEL  |      |   |
| CHIEF CLERK |      |   |

AC/14502/1/20

16 January 1945

My dear Mr Prime Minister

With further reference to your letter 19905/14008/1.6.4 of 25 November 1944 on the employment of Italian troops in aid of the civil power, the position has now been clarified by Allied Force Headquarters.

It has been agreed that, since the maintenance of law and order in Italian Government territory is the responsibility of the Italian authorities, Italian troops may be called out to assist the civil power without prior reference to Allied Military Commanders. The instructions referred to in your letter have now been modified accordingly.

Though this has been arranged it does not abolish the necessity for close liaison between the appropriate Local Italian civil and military authorities and the local Allied District, Base Section Area etc commander so that both sides may be fully aware of the situation and of the resources available to meet it.

Yours very truly,

1234  
HARRY W. DUFFIN  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Chief Commissioner

Via Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
R O M E

Hq AC

C. A. Sec  
7334  
18ASECRETCopy No. .... 23  
5 Jan 75.Amendment No. 2  
3 DISTRICT OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 18

See 6A

Aid to the Civil PowerPara 3.DELETE sentence:-

"Except in great emergency Italian troops will NOT be used without prior consultation and agreement of Area/Sub Area commander concerned."

RBS/DD.

MR. L. A.  
Lt-Col,  
CS.  
(C.F. PARES).

1233

DISTRIBUTION  
(As for Operation Instr No. 18)

HOAC

3139

17A.

SECRET

Copy No. 23...

Dec 44.

AMENDMENT No.1 to  
3 DISTRICT OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.18

Aid to the Civil Power

see b1

Para 2(b) - DELETE "3 District"  
and SUBSTITUTE "L of C Area".

ACK.

*W. Parks*  
Lt-Col,  
GS.  
(C.F. PARKS).

DISTRIBUTION:- As for Operation Instruction No.18.

1232

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

FJS/iase

G-5: 370.6-1

31 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Employment of troops in Aid of the Civil Power.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, A.F.O. 394

1. Reference is made to your AC/14602/5/PS of 23 December 1944.
2. H.Q. No.3 District is being requested to amend their instructions so as to conform with the instructions of this headquarters.
3. Your instructions to be conveyed to the Italian Government should be based on the directive issued by this H.Q.

For Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

*F. J. G. Smith*  
F. J. G. SMITH,  
Captain, A.G.D.

| IC             | V        | OK        |
|----------------|----------|-----------|
| COL. CHAPMAN   |          |           |
| COL. YOUNG     |          |           |
| LT. COL. WILCH | <i>W</i> | <i>12</i> |
| MAJ. LUCKMAN   |          |           |
| MAJ. WILSON    |          |           |
| MAJ. HANBURY   |          |           |
| MAJ. BALLANCE  |          |           |
| CAPT. POWEL    |          |           |
| CHIEF CLERK    |          |           |

*Please prepare instructions  
as it para 3 file*  
6/1/45

1231

*seen by SP3*  
SECRET *15A*  
*PS*SUBJECT: Aid to the Civil Power.  
-----Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.  
(M.M.I.A.)*18* S/G/33  
Dec 44 *th*TO : Civil Affairs Section., A.C.  
----- *9A* *14/002/5*

1. In reply to your AC/14602/PS of 16 Dec 44, your attention is directed to our letter S/G/33 of 3 Dec 44 to the Ministry of War, copy to you.
- 15B*

*Major*  
Major General  
M.M.I.A.

1230

(6244)

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Troops employed to quell Civil disturbances

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.  
(M.M.I.A.)  
File No. TG/3/10  
17 Dec 44

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. Paragraph 2(c) letter 9/6/44 this HQ, subject as above, dated 3 Dec 44, is amended to read as follows:-

"C. Only small arms will normally be borne by Troops. Commanders are advised that the carrying of automatic weapons by troops in a civil disturbance is most undesirable and will only be allowed in the operational zone where they will be kept to a minimum, and used only as a last resort. Grenades are specifically prohibited."

*Capt. Pinkley*  
Major General  
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: AFHQ (your AG 370.6/107 GCT-0 of 27 Nov 44 refers)  
Public Safety Sub-Com., A.C.  
Civil Affairs Sec., A.C.

1229

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 390  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: AC/14602/5/PS

23 Dec 44.

SUBJECT: Employment of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power.

TO: AFHQ, C-5.

- 1 If para 3 of 3 Dist Op Instr No 13 of 7 Dec 44 is compared with para 3 of AG 370.6/107 OCT-9 of 27 Nov 44 it will be seen that the two are practically identical except for the addition of the last two sentences in the 3 Dist Instr. The first of which reads:

"Except in great emergency Italian troops will NOT be used without prior consultation and agreement of Area/Sub Area Commander concerned."

- 2 The AFHQ Instruction contained no such limitation and its effect is to limit the powers of the Italian Government to use Italian Troops in Italian Government Territory in which it is primarily responsible for maintaining order.

- 3 It is submitted  
(a) that it is outside the province of 3 District to limit the general powers of the Italian Government; that if any such limitation is necessary the order should emanate from AFHQ or AC.  
(b) that the obtaining of prior agreement is not practical where a disturbance is remote from an Area, etc., Headquarters and that delay in an attempt to obtain agreement may lead to a greatly worsened situation.

- 4 In view of the situation in Sicily an early decision is requested as to whether the Instructions to be conveyed to the Italian Government and its troops may be based solely on the AFHQ Instruction or whether different limitations and conditions may have to be observed in different districts.

For the Chief Commissioner.

1228  
G.R. Upton, Brig.,  
VP CA Section,  
DOCS AC.

RESTRICTED

DCK/ar

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM )

NUMBER

57 )

POWERS AND RIGHTS OF ALLIED FORCES IN ITALIAN  
GOVERNMENT TERRITORY

| TO                |  |
|-------------------|--|
| COL. CHAPMAN      |  |
| DR. YOUNG         |  |
| 11 December, 1974 |  |
| LUCKMAN           |  |
| WILSON            |  |
| WAL BALANCE       |  |
| CAPT POWEL        |  |
| CHIEF CLERK       |  |

1. General

a. It is the policy of the Allied Governments, as military exigencies permit and as the Italian Government is able to take on the responsibility, to hand back to its jurisdiction and administration territory formerly subject to Allied Military Government. In such territory Allied Military Government ceases on the hand-over and the Italian Government assumes the jurisdiction and administration subject to the paramount guidance and control of the Allied Commission.

b. In handing back territory to the Italian Government, certain rights are reserved to the Allied Forces by agreement with the Italian Government. It is necessary that Allied troops in these areas should be aware of the most important of these rights and the manner in which they are to be exercised.

c. For the purposes mentioned herein the territory which may from time to time be included in that handed back to the Italian Government is termed Italian Government Territory. At the present time such territory comprises the Islands of Sicily and Sardinia and all provinces on the mainland south of the northern boundaries of the provinces of Viterbo, Rieti and Terni with the exception of the commune of Naples which is still under Allied Military Government.

d. It is to be particularly noted that officers of the Allied Commission stationed in Italian Government territory are there to advise and control the Italian Government and one of their most important functions is liaison between Allied Military Formations in their areas and the local Italian administrative officials.

e. It is further particularly to be noted that all but the most routine dealings with the Italian administration must be conducted through the local Allied Commission representative.

2. Requisitioning - The Allied Forces have retained the power to requisition private and public property and services in Italian Government territory but it is emphasized that this must be exercised sparingly and only for reasons of genuine military necessity. This will be exercised through the Italian authorities. If for example it is necessary to requisition a building it should be done through the Sindaco of the town where the building is situated with the assistance of the nearest provincial officer of the Allied Commission. The usual formalities of requisitioning will be followed.

- 1 -

RESTRICTED

## RESTRICTED

AFHQ Admin Memo #57 (cont'd)

3. Process in Italian Courts - No members of the Allied Forces, Allied followers of such forces, or British or U. S. Merchant Seamen will be subject to jurisdiction of Italian Courts.

4. Crimes against Allied Forces

a. In Italian Government territory crimes committed by Italian nationals, will normally be tried under Italian Law and in Italian Courts.

b. The Allied Forces however have reserved to themselves the right to hold Allied Military Courts in Italian Government Territory for the trial of Italian nationals who commit acts seriously hostile to the Allied Forces and to punish them in accordance with the Italian penal code. The reservation of this right is not intended however to encourage the trial of Italian offenders by Allied Military Courts but is to enable them to deal with the most serious offences against Allied personnel or property which cannot effectively be dealt with by the Italian Courts.

c. The procedure to be followed, if it is desired that an offence should be tried by an Allied Military Court, will be for the military authorities to give a full statement of the facts to the local representative of the Allied Commission with a request that an Allied Military Government Court be convened to hear the charges. It will be the responsibility of Allied Commission to frame the charges and constitute the Court. It is emphasized that only in the most exceptional circumstances will any case in Italian Government Territory be referred to Allied Military Courts and then only on order of Allied Commission.

d. Consequent on reservation of the power to try such offenders there is reserved to the Allied Forces the power to arrest persons who are believed to have committed such offences. High ranking Italian officials and officers of the Italian Armed Forces should, however, only be arrested in collaboration with the appropriate Italian official (e.g. the Prefect or the Commanding Officer of the officer concerned). In all cases of arrest the agreement of the local Allied Commission officer will be obtained beforehand, except in an emergency when he will be informed immediately after the arrest.

5. Military Zones - The present policy with respect to military zones and the employment of Allied troops to quell civil disturbances is as follows:

The right is reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater to declare specific areas of Italian Government Territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such a declaration, the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the Zone in question is assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. Should the situation in any area become such as to convince the District Commander that the establishment of Zones is necessary, he should, after consulting the Allied Commission Regional Commissioner, report accordingly to this Headquarters, giving full reasons to justify his view. The Allied Forces may also re-occupy any part of Italian territory, but the right to constitute a Military Zone will render it unnecessary to exercise this right in respect of any local disorders.

RESTRICTED

AFHQ Adm Memo #57 (cont'd)

6. Use of troops in aid of the Civil Power

a. In the event that the local Italian authorities ask for the assistance of Allied troops in quelling civil disturbances, the local commander will point out that the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian authorities and he will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests. Furthermore, before rendering such assistance, the local commander will warn the local official requesting his assistance that the territory in question will be liable to be made forthwith an Allied Military Zone. If time permits, the local commander will consult the local Allied Commission officer and seek instructions from his superior commander before giving assistance; in any event, he will inform his superior commander of any request made to him and the action taken thereon without delay.

b. District and Base Section Commanders in disposing of their forces should have regard for contingencies in which it might be necessary to send troops to quell civil disturbances. They should consult the local Allied Commission officer where appropriate in this matter particularly in regard to contemplated troop movements which might prejudice the security of any locality within their area of responsibility.

7. Military and Civilian Internees - The Allied Forces may continue to hold or require the Italian Government to hold in custody military or civilian internees in Italian Government territory. If the Allied Forces require to arrest any person for security or other reasons such arrest should be carried out in collaboration with Italian officials unless, in any particular case, it is thought that a request to the Italian police to arrest a suspect would be ineffective. In all such cases the Local Allied Commission officer must, except in emergency, be informed of the intention to make the arrest, whether it is to be effected by the Allied or Italian authorities. If he is not in agreement the matter will be referred to higher authority. Such persons will be detained in 371 PW Camp, or such other place of internment as there may from time to time be designated for that purpose.

8. Emergency Action - All action required from the Italian Administration should invariably be sought through the medium of the Allied Commission Regional or Provincial Commissioner, except where an emergency may arise which requires immediate action by the Allied Forces for their protection and security. Where by reason of the emergency immediate action is taken without previous reference to Allied Commission, the appropriate Allied Commission officer will be informed as soon as possible.

1226

By command of General WILSON:

*C. V. Christenberry*  
C. V. CHRISTENBERRY, *(Signature)*  
Colonel, AGD,  
Acting Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

"C"

- 3 -

RESTRICTED

785016

### ANCON SIGILLATA REGIONE

6575

18 100 44

TETRAHYDRO-2H-1,2,4-TRIAZINE-3,4-DIOL

QUESTIONS PD

SUBJECT IS AID TO CIVIL POWER PD IN REPLY TO YOUR EEO BUREAU SEE TOP OF  
ONE SEVEN DECEMBER PD

~~WANTED TO AVOID SINGULAR TENSION FOR GIVE FROM AND ALONG FROM LUSH MOUTH~~

WE HAVE ISSUED INFORMATION DATED TWO SEVEN TWENTY SEVEN NUMBER AS  
THREE. SEVEN ZERO THREE SIX SEVEN ONE ZERO SEVEN GOT BLANK ZERO ON THIS SUBJECT PD  
THIS INFORMATION STATED THAT ITALIAN AUTHORITIES IF THEY CONSIDER CANNIBAL  
WOUND TO DEAL WITH SITUATION SHOULD APPEAL TO RESIDENT ITALIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS  
FOR ASSISTANCE OF ITALIAN TROOPS PD NO INFO IN REFERENCE TO LOCAL BRITISH COMMANDER  
IS INDICATED IN THE MEMORANDUM BUT CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN ARAB MILITARY AND  
ITALIAN CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IS STRESSED PD

HEADQUARTERS NORTH CAROLINA DISTRICT OF SEVEN DECEMBER 1940 (CLASSIFICATION  
NUMBER 10) (NOTE: ADDING THAT INITIAL TRACKS WOULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT  
PRIOR CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT OF LOCAL ARMED COMMANDERS WOULD BE IN GREAT  
EMERGENCY UNLESS YOU HAVE FIRST NOT RECEIVED ANY OF EITHER DEPARTMENT OF  
OFFICERS YOU SHOULD HAVE YOUR OFFICERS ON AND TELEPHONE TO  
1225

MAZAR NOW UNDER DISCUSSION WITH MEMBER FROM DISTRICT

Copies to: Civil Affairs Section  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
Legal Sub-Commission

300.

## Index of Staff

H. W. DR. GUNF,  
ELPHR AGO,  
ADVERTISE

RESTRICTED

11A

CITE: REG 361  
DEC 17/1150A

DEC 1944

DEC 1.  
URGENT

FROM: ALCOM SICILIA REGION (CAHH)

TO: HQ ALCOM

18 DEC 1944

RESTRICTED.

1. Subject is aid to civil power. Request urgent decision on my HC/ 000.5 of 24 October.

DIST

ACTION : CoS (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
CA SEC  
FILE (2)  
FLCAT

1224

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS

19 DEC 1944

6209

SECRET

10A

CO 960  
DEC 16/0800

C/128  
DEC 16/1910  
PRIORITY

ROME AREA FROM 03 BUREAU

IN AC INFO: 201 SUB AREA, AND LAZIO AREA (A REVISION)

16 DEC. 1944

SECRET.

Ref DISTRICT 01 No 16 of 1 December para 3 on aid to civil power and assistance by Italian military. Policy outlined precludes use Italian military except in great emergency authorized by area/sub area commr. Inform this re whether Italian authorities so informed and that action as laid down para 3 in above 01 will be taken in conjunction 201 Sub Area and IN AC

DIST

ACTION : CA SEC (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
LAZIO SEC  
FILE (2)  
FLOW

1233

SECRET

6/26

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 394

QA  
15A

AC/14602/RS/5

16 December 1944

SUBJECT : Aid to the Civil Power.

TO : Land Forces, Sub-Commission

6A

1. Reference is made to 3 District Operation Instruction No. 18 dated 1 December, subject as above.
2. Will you please inform Civil Affairs Section this Headquarters what steps have been taken to publish the contents of para 7 of the above O.I. to the Italian army?

C.S. PARKING, Brig.  
A/17 CA Sec.  
A/1200, AG

JHC/jwf

1222

# INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: GO 966  
 Date/Time of Origin: DEC 16/0800

Message Centre No: 0/4318  
 Date Time Rec'd: DEC 16/1610  
 Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: ROME AREA FROM G3 BRITISHTO: ALAC INFO: 201 SUB AREA, AND LATIO LEBANTIA REGION**SECRET**

16 DEC 1944

SECRET.

Ref DEPTREE O I No 18 of 1 December para 3 on Aid to civil power and assistance by Italian Military. Policy outlined precludes use Italian military except in great emergency authorized by area/sub area commr. Inform this HQ whether Italian authorities so informed and that action as laid down para 3 in above O I will be taken in conjunction 201 Sub Area and ALAC

**ACTION**DIST

ACTION : OA SEC (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
 LATIO REG  
 FILE (2)  
 FLIGHT



1221

**SECRET**

11602/5

SUBJECT: Italian Troops employed to  
quell civil disturbances.

~~SECRET~~ *Wor/S* *7A*

*Wor/S* *Ca* *Sec*

Land Force Sub-Gen. A.C.  
(S.M.T.A.)

5/6/33

Dec 44

TO: Ministry of War.

1. The extract of chap XVIII of "Regulations for Frontier Services" forwarded under your 304443/Ca of 14 Nov 44 has been read with interest and it is thought that most points are well covered. However, there are a few changes which must be made.

2. I am directed to inform you that in any case, where Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, the following instructions will apply:-

- a. Troops will be moved to the scene of the disturbance with weapons unloaded.
- b. Weapons will be loaded only on command of an officer.
- c. Only small arms will be borne by troops. Automatic weapons and grenades are specifically prohibited.
- d. No smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.
- e. No troops will open fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.

3. You will please therefore change your existing regulations where they are at variance with the above instructions and in due course send this HQ a copy of your necessary order.

1220

Copy to:-

AFHQ (your AG 370.6/107)

GUT-O of 27 Nov 44 refers)

Public Safety Sub-Gen. A.C.

Civil Affairs Sec A.C.

*Wor/S*  
Major General  
M.M.I.A.

SECRET

3 DISTRICT OPERATION INSTRUCTION No 18

COPY No. ....

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

7 Dec 44

- 9 DEC 1944

GENERAL

1. Disturbances of civil disturbances have indicated that fresh instructions are necessary to define responsibilities and to specify certain precautions in the employment of armed forces to quell civil disturbances.

This instruction will cancel Operation Instruction No 10 of 16 AUG 44 and letter 69/C of 17 Oct 44 (NOT to all).

2. Disturbances may occur in the following two types of areas and procedure varies accordingly:-

(a) Italian Government Territory (IGT) - those areas including SICILY and SARDINIA which have been turned back to the Italian Government.

(b) AMG Territory - territory still under AMG control. At present, within 3 District, only COMUNE OF NAPLES is under AMG control.

## RESPONSIBILITIES

3. Italian Government Territory. Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To accomplish this, the Italian local civil authorities have under their control the local Carabinieri. If in the opinion of the local Italian authorities the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should apply to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters for the assistance of such Italian troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the local Area or Sub Area commander for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between Area and Sub Area headquarters with the local Italian civil authorities and with the local Italian military authorities. Except in great emergency Italian troops will NOT be used without prior consultation and agreement of Area/Sub Area commander concerned. Assistance of Allied troops will NOT be given unless Area/Sub Area commander is of the opinion that it is necessary for protection of Allied interests.

1219

4. If a request is made to the local Area or Sub Area commander for the assistance of Allied troops (as mentioned in para 3) the local commander will point out that the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian administration and he will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests. Should the situation in any area become such as to convince the Area Commander that a specific area in Italian Government Territory should be made a Military Zone he will report to the District Commander.

5. AMG Territory. Within areas which are still under AMG control, the local AMG authority is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of AMG for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local AMG authority will appeal to the local Area or Sub Area commander.

6. The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. If there is a possibility of troops becoming involved in a purely civil disturbance troops will

2. Disturbances may occur in the following areas and varies accordingly:-

- (a) Italian Government Territory (IGT) - those areas including SICILY and SARDINIA which have been turned back to the Italian Government.
- (b) AMG Territory - territory still under AMG control. At present, within 5-District, only Comune of NAPLES is under AMG control.

#### RESPONSIBILITIES

3. Italian Government Territory. Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To accomplish this, the Italian local civil authorities have under their control the local Carabinieri. If in the opinion of the local Italian authorities the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should apply to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters for the assistance of such Italian troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the local Area or Sub Area commander for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between Area and Sub Area headquarters with the local Italian civil authorities and with the local Italian military authorities. Except in great emergency Italian troops will NOT be used without prior consultation and agreement of Area/Sub Area commander concerned. Assistance of Allied troops will NOT be given unless Area/Sub Area commander is of the opinion that it is necessary for protection of Allied interests.
4. If a request is made to the local Area or Sub Area commander for the assistance of Allied troops (as mentioned in para 3) the local commander will point out that the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian administration and he will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests. Should the situation in any area become such as to convince the Area Commander that a specific area in Italian Government Territory should be made a Military Zone he will report to the District Commander.
5. AMG Territory. Within areas which are still under AMG control, the local AMG authority is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of AMG for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local AMG authority will appeal to the local Area or Sub Area commander.
6. The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. If there is a possibility of troops becoming involved in a purely civil disturbance troops will be recalled and confined to barracks for such time as will ensure that incidents will be avoided. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

#### PRECAUTIONS IN USE OF ARMED FORCES

7. In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, the following instructions will apply:-

ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO QUELL THE DISTURBANCE WITHOUT RECOURSE TO FIRING WILL BE TAKEN

- 2 -

- (a) troops will be moved to the scene of the disturbance **with weapons unloaded.**
- (b) Weapons will be loaded only on command of an officer.
- (c) Only small arms will be borne by troops. Specifically prohibited are automatic weapons and grenades.
- (d) No smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.
- (e) No troops will open fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.
- (f) Shots will not be fired over the heads of the crowd and blank rounds will not be used.
- (g) If it is considered necessary for troops to fire, the minimum number of soldiers will be used and they will concentrate their aim on ringleaders or apparent ringleaders. No indiscriminate fire will take place. All fire will be strictly controlled by an officer. The number of rounds will be limited and firing will cease immediately it becomes effective.
- (h) Women and children will NOT be fired upon

## REPORTS

8. Immediate reports will be made to this HQ by teletype through normal channels in all cases of riots or civil disturbances, whether or not it has been necessary to employ Allied troops. These immediate reports will be followed by a detailed report at the earliest opportunity.

## LIAISON

9. It is essential that closest possible liaison be maintained with Allied Commission officers on all questions affecting relations with Italian Civil Authorities.

ACK

TOS 071202 A hrs

*W. Parks*  
Lt col  
GS  
(OF PARKS)

Distribution att

DISTRIBUTION

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\* Rome Area please pass one copy  
to 201 Sub Area for action

(5a)

A-14602/5/79

10 Dec 44

My dear Mr Prime Minister,

With reference to your letter 19905/14008/1.5.4 of 25 Nov on the employment of Italian troops in aid of the civil power I am discussing the possible modification of the instructions to which you refer with Allied Force Headquarters. I will inform you of the result of the discussion as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,

ELMER F. STONE  
Commanding General, USAR  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe BONOMI  
The President of the Council of Ministers  
Italian Government  
E. F. S.

1217

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
330 391  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref. 1/35.2/5A

SUBJECT:

Intervention by the Allied Commission  
at the request of the Italian Government,  
TO : Chief of Staff.

2nd December, 1944.

SECRET

1. Reference was made on 28th November, 1944, to a statement should be made of the principles and problems involved in the declaration of military zones.

This paper is only concerned with the question of a declaration of a military zone where it has become necessary or desirable by reason of some civil disorder involving the rendering of military aid, and not with the declaration of a military zone for purely operational reasons.

2. Where a civil disorder has led the local authorities to ask for Allied military assistance to quell the disorder three distinct problems have to be faced:

- (a) It is for the local Allied Military Commander to decide whether to call out the military forces in aid of the civil power.
- (b) It is then a matter for the local Allied Military Commander to decide whether to decide whether to constitute a military zone.
- (c) It is then a matter for the local Allied Military Commander to decide whether to constitute a military zone.

3. It is then a matter for the local Allied Military Commander to decide whether to constitute a military zone. It is possible to formulate with great precision the principles on which the local Allied Military Commander should be guided in giving assistance. Each set of circumstances must be judged as it arises and the decision must be at the discretion of the Military Commander. It has been laid down by AWM in a recent directive dated 24th September, 1944 (see 2606/208 Folio 23 para 2(b)) that assistance should only be given in the local Commander is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests, and that whether this is a comprehensive guide as a few examples will show.

For instance, if there is a riot, even a serious one, in Catanzaro there would be no real threat to our military interests, but it might be desirable to render assistance in aid of the civil power to prevent widespread loss of life and breakdown of the local civilian administration, or a possible spread of the trouble. Contrasted with this is a very minor riot in the port of Catanzaro. Under it, assistance should be given to the civil power to prevent a possible spread of the trouble.

Public Safety 4A

1. I have your letter of 28th November, 1944. I think a restatement should be made of the principles and problems involved in the declaration of military zones.

This paper is only concerned with the question of a declaration of a military zone where it has become necessary or desirable by reason of some civil disorder involving the rendering of military aid, and not with the declaration of a military zone for purely operational reasons.

2. There is a civil disorder has led the local authorities to ask for Allied military assistance to quell the disorder. Three distinct problems have to be faced:

- (a) It is for the local Allied Military Commander to decide whether to call out the military forces in aid of the civil power.
- (b) It is then a matter for the local, or the persons duly authorised by him to decide whether to constitute a military zone.
- (c) It is then a matter for decision as to what form of military control should be instituted in the military zone.

3. As to para 2(a), the problem is a difficult one and I do not believe it is possible to formulate with great precision the principles on which the local Military Commander should be guided in giving assistance. Each set of circumstances must be judged as it arises and the decision must be at the discretion of the Military Commander. It has been laid down by AWM in a recent directive dated 24th September, 1944 (see 268/000 Policy 2) para 2(b) that assistance should only be given if the local Commander is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests; but I doubt whether this is a comprehensive guide as a few examples will show.

For instance, if there is a riot, even a serious one, in Catanzaro there would be no real threat to our military interests, but it might be desirable (assuming Allied forces in sufficient numbers to be available in Catanzaro) to render assistance in aid of the civil power to prevent widespread loss of life and breakdown of the local civilian administration, or a possible spread of the trouble. Contrast this with a very minor riot in the port of Bari which render it necessary for the local Commander to render assistance in order to secure an uninterrupted flow of military supplies to Britain in the north.

I think it is easy to over-estimate the importance of disorder in Rome which is of little significance in the purely military sense. In Rome, it appears that the governing factor must be the desirability of leaving the Italian Government to deal with its own problems to the maximum possible extent, but it may be necessary to render military assistance to avert serious loss of civilian life or destruction on a widespread scale. For instance if a large Communist meeting on the Palatine Hill leads to such grave disturbances as to give rise to a serious probability that there will be grave loss of civilian life and destruction of property, immediate intervention by the military might be essential.

even though there was no real apprehension as to the safety of the Allied troops. In the other hand a riot of a few hundred prisoners in the Regina Coeli Prison constitutes no threat to military security (from that security standpoint have been requested) and probably we should not interfere with such a riot until the Italian Government have shown themselves so incapable of dealing with it as to lead to disorders in other parts of the city.

To sum up, it merits consideration as to whether the local military commandant ought to accede to a request to lend military assistance if in the circumstances of any particular case:

- (a) Allied military interests will be directly affected, or
- (b) there is no necessity to prevent widespread loss of civilian life and damage to property with the possibility of a serious breakdown of civilian administration in any area.

(a) In the para 2 (b) above, SACCHI has under various agreements with the Italian Government ample power to declare military zones whenever he deems it desirable to do so, and down to the present the attitude has always been taken that the rendering of military assistance in aid of the civil power will always be followed by the declaration of a military zone (see 2566/100 folio 2 para 7, folio 15 para 7, folio 23 para 2(b)), but I think that this proposition requires reconsideration.

There is no legal or other principle which requires the giving of military assistance to be followed by the declaration of a military zone and though it may be a useful threat to hang over the head of the Government that the one will follow the other, it may not always be desirable to do so. For instance if troops are called out to quell a riot in Catanzaro, where I am assuming we have no military interests, there may well be no need as a matter of military necessity to establish a military zone.

Even where we have a direct military interest as in the port of Bari, there may be no need as a matter of military necessity to declare a military zone unless it is believed that a withdrawal of military aid will give rise to an immediate recurrence of the trouble or unless it is necessary for the reorganisation of the area in the interests of our military installations.

To sum up, from a purely military angle it does not appear to be possible to lay down any principles upon which the declaration of a military zone should follow the giving of military aid, and each case as it arises must be judged on its own merits by those responsible.

(b) The above sub-paragraph can now take into consideration the political standpoint, but has dealt with the problem solely as a matter of military necessity.

As I have pointed out above we have always threatened that the giving of military aid would be followed by the declaration of a military zone, but if purely military considerations do not demand such a declaration there seems no compelling reason why political considerations should do so. It is our policy to support the Italian Government and the declaration of a military

(2) there is no necessity to prevent widespread loss of civilian life and damage to property with the possibility of a serious breakdown of civilian administration in any area.

4. (a) As to para 2 (b) above, I think that the Italian Government might be able to declare military zones wherever he deems it desirable to do so, and down to the present the attitude has always been taken that the surrendering of military assistance in aid of the civil power will always be followed by the declaration of a military zone (see 1966/68 Folio 2 para 7, reconsideration).

There is no legal or other principle which requires the giving of military assistance to be followed by the declaration of a military zone and though it may be a useful threat to hang over the head of the Government that the zone will follow the other, it may not always be desirable to do so. For instance if troops are called out to quell a riot in Palermo, where I am assuming we have no military interest, there may well be no need as a matter of military necessity to establish a military zone.

Even where we have a direct military interest as in the port of Bari, there may be no need as a matter of military necessity to declare a military zone unless it is believed that a withdrawal of military aid will give rise to reconsideration of the area in the interests of our military installations.

To sum up, from a purely military angle it does not appear to be possible to lay down any principles upon which the declaration of a military zone should follow the giving of military aid, and each case as it arises must be judged on its own merits by those responsible.

(b) The above submissions do not take into consideration the political standpoint, but are dealt with the problem solely as a matter of military necessity.

As I have pointed out above we have always threatened that the giving of military aid would be followed by the declaration of a military zone, but no compelling reasons why political considerations should do so. It is our policy to support the Italian Government and the declaration of a military zone in Rome might have very serious repercussions on that Government. On the other hand the declaration of a military zone in Palermo is not necessary for military reasons would not, I suggest, affect the prestige of the Government in any way, and there would seem to be no good reason for declaring such a zone.

To sum up, it seems to me that the question as to whether or not the giving of military assistance should be followed by the declaration of a military zone can only be decided on the merits of each particular case.

5. As to para 2 (c) above, if it is decided to declare any area to be a military zone then the Allied authorities can impose any form of military control from the assumption of mere police duties up to complete A.B.C. It is my view that where a military zone is created A.B.C. should temporarily be

fully imposed and it can be partially reduced as may seem desirable after quite a short period, even as short as 24 hours. The Legal Sub-Commission has prepared a draft form of Proclamation which seems to me to be appropriate to meet any likely circumstances, and a copy is attached.

With regard to the area to be declared such a zone, I have carefully considered your suggestion that a particular building such as the Regina Coeli Prison should be declared a military zone. The suggestion is, if I may respectfully say so, ingenious, but I doubt if it is sound. If trouble occurs in one building only it would seem more appropriate to give military assistance and then to withdraw without declaring a military zone rather than take over a particular building. If the Government are incapable of running one establishment they must be so weak that it would appear desirable to take over a much larger area of their administration. Furthermore, there would be a real danger that the Government would fail in the first place to take adequate steps to deal with the problem if they realized that we were willing to take over small trouble spots and relieve them of their responsibilities in respect thereof, and it must be borne in mind that the taking over of a prison, even in Rome, would not, I think, diminish the prestige of the Government unduly.

To sum up, I think that for administrative reasons it would be unwise to take over anything less than an administrative sub-division of the country, e.g. a province or, as in Naples, a commune. Col. Chapman informs me from personal experience that he thinks we should soon get into difficulties if we adopt anything less than an administrative sub-division of the country.

6. In my opinion the whole problem requires review and I trust that this paper - which has the concurrence of the Directors of the Legal and Public Safety Sub-Commissions - may point out in greater detail than has hitherto been done the problems and difficulties that arise. My own view is that it is impossible to lay down beforehand any clear cut principles, except in the rather general way which I have done above. Each case as it arises must be judged in the light of all the circumstances, i.e. military interests, the locality, strength and character of the disorder, and finally the position, attitude and actions of the Government in the matter.

Encl. Draft Proclamation.

Copy to: Political Section.  
Legal Sub-Commission.  
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

J. R. B. *[Signature]*  
J. R. B. *[Signature]*, Major, F. C. I. B.  
Legal Section.  
1000.

PROCLAMATION

Whereas it is necessary to establish and maintain law and order in the area of

Now, therefore, I HERBERT R. L. B. ALLEN, Major General, U.S. Army, Field Marshal, hereby proclaim as follows:

ART. 1

The said area is hereby established as a Military Zone and is hereinafter called "The Military Zone".

ART. 2

All powers of Government and jurisdiction and final administrative responsibility in the Military Zone are vested in me as Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and Governor of the Military Zone, and shall be exercised under the direction of such Deputy Governor as I may appoint.

ART. 3

All state, provincial or other public officials or employees shall continue in their present duties as officials or employees under the order of the Deputy Governor unless dismissed by him.

ART. 4

Any person who:

- 1) Violates or has violated any provision of Italian law.
- 2) Violates any rule order or regulation governing the administration of the Military Zone or any inhabitants thereof.
- 3) Disobeys any order given under the authority of the Allied Forces or the Deputy Governor.
- 4) Takes part in any demonstration or assembly not authorized by the Deputy Governor.
- 5) Does any act to the prejudice of good order of the Military Zone.

Now, therefore, I HEREBY S.L.G. ALTKANTER, C.S.P., C.S.I., U.S.A.,  
M.C., Field Marshal, hereby proclaim as follows:-

ART. 1.

The said area is hereby established as a Military Zone and is  
hereinafter called "The Military Zone".

ART. 2.

All powers of Government and jurisdiction and final administrative  
responsibility in the Military Zone are vested in me as Supreme Allied  
Commander Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and Governor of the Military  
Zone, and shall be exercised under the direction of such Deputy Governor  
as I may appoint.

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All state, provincial or other public officials or employees shall  
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of the Deputy Governor unless dismissed by him.

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- 2) Violates any rule order or regulation governing the  
administration of the Military Zone or any inhabitants  
thereof.
- 3) Disobeys any order given under the authority of the  
Allied Forces or the Deputy Governor.
- 4) Takes part in any demonstration or assembly not authorized  
by the Deputy Governor.
- 5) Does any act to the prejudice of good order of the  
Military Zone.
- 6) Does any act to the prejudice of the safety or security  
of the Allied Forces or any member thereof.
- 7) Conspires or attempts to commit, or assists or procures  
the commission of any act hereby constituted an offence.

Shall be guilty of an offence and shall upon conviction by a  
Military Court be liable to punishment by death or by imprisonment or fine

5349

or both as the Court may determine and in respect of any offence under sub para 1 above the punishment which may be imposed shall not be limited to such punishment as may be prescribed for such offence by Italian law.

#### ART. 5.

Military Courts, which shall be General Superior or Summary Military Courts, are hereby established and shall have such jurisdiction as shall be conferred upon them respectively.

#### ART. 6

- a) Any person convicted by a Military Court may within 15 days of conviction present to the office of the Deputy Governor a Petition for Review of conviction or sentence.
- b) No sentence of death shall be executed unless or until confirmed in writing by me or by an officer expressly authorised in that behalf by me in writing.

#### ART. 7

This Proclamation shall come into effect throughout the Military Zone upon its first publication therein.

HAROLD R. L. G. ALEXANDER  
Field Marshal

SEVERAL ALIEN COMRADES MEDICALMAN ZHANG  
OF OPERATION

1211

DATED:

14602 3A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 324  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

*File  
Jub.*

Ref. 4/35.3/CA

30th November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Intervention by the Allied Commission  
at the request of the Italian Government.

TO : Legal Sub-Commission.  
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

*rough*

1. <sup>26</sup> Herewith copy letter from the COS, Ref. 2606/COS dated 28th  
November, and draft proposed reply for your comments. <sup>2A</sup>

I would like to discuss the matter with the Directors of Legal  
and Public Safety Sub-Commissions at 18.00 hours this evening.

*J. R. P. [Signature]*  
C.R. UNION, Brig.  
VP CA Section.  
IXOS.

Encls.

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0334

COPY

2A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref. 2606/COS

26th November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Intervention by the Allied Commission at the request of the Italian Government.

TO : DCOS, Est. Sec.  
DCOS, CA Sec.  
DCOS, Econ Sec.  
VF, Pol Sec.

I refer to para 6 of the Minutes of the Chief of Staff's Meeting of 24th November. The points which were discussed at that meeting, and on which I should like your views in writing, are as follows:-

- (a) If a proper request from the Italian Government for the intervention of the Allied Commission is received, should we accede to this request?
- (b) If it were agreed to accede to the request, what measures should be adopted?

(Sgd.) M.S. Lush  
Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

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DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
AJO 324  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref. 4/35/100

30th November, 1944.

SUBJECT: Intervention by the Allied Commission at the request of the Italian Government.

TO : Chief of Staff.

128

1. Reference your 2606/COS, dated 24th November, 1944, I think it is desirable before attempting to answer the questions propounded by you to state the principles which, as I see it, should govern our attitude in this matter.

2. Where territory has once been restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government its return to a Military Government is justified only on one of two grounds: (a) where a zone is required by the Military for some operational purpose, or (b) where the civil administration has broken down to such an extent as to cause a serious threat to military operations.

3. As to (a), it is unnecessary to deal with this further. If the military authorities should desire to utilise the port of Bari, for instance, for a new operation it might be desirable to create a military zone as is the case with the port of Naples, but no such military necessity is, so far as I know, likely to arise.

1208

4. As to (b), the problem is a difficult one. It seems to me impossible to formulate with any greater precision than I have done above the principles upon which we should be guided, for each set of circumstances must be judged as they arise.

For instance if there is a riot, even a serious one, in Ostia there would be

TO : Chief of Staff.

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1208

4. As to (b), the problem is a difficult one. It seems to me impossible to formulate with any greater precision than I have done above the principles upon which we should be guided, for each set of circumstances must be judged as they arise.

For instance if there is a riot, even a serious one, in Catanzaro there would be no real threat to our military operations in the north and it would be unnecessary and indeed undesirable to create a military zone. On the other hand a comparatively minor riot in the port of <sup>Rome</sup> ~~Naples~~ might render it necessary for the Military Commander to create a military zone in order to secure the continued flow of military supplies to the armies in the north.

It seems to me extremely undesirable to over estimate the importance of disturbances in Rome which is, as I understand it, of little significance in the

5172-

purely military sense, i.e. it is not on any vital lines of communication. In Rome it seems to me that the governing factors must be the desirability of leaving the Italian Government to deal with its own problems to the maximum possible extent, coupled with interference by Allied troops only if a serious breakdown of civilian administration is threatened.

For instance if a large Communist meeting on the Palatine Hill leads to such grave disturbances as to give rise to a serious apprehension that the safety of Allied troops in the vicinity may be in danger, and that the civil administration of Rome may break down, immediate interference by the military would be essential. On the other hand a riot by a few hundred prisoners in the Regina Coeli Prison cannot be said to constitute, in my view, any such threat, and now that all Allied security prisoners have been removed from the jail we have no direct military interest therein. It is my opinion that we should not now interfere with a riot in the Regina Coeli Prison until the Italian Government have shown themselves so incapable of dealing with it as to lead to disorders in other parts of the city, though I appreciate that the military authorities will consider this a dangerous policy but, I believe, the right one.

5. If it becomes necessary to declare any area a military zone then the Allied authorities can impose any form of military control from the assumption of mere police duties up to complete A.M.G. It is my view that where<sup>207</sup> military zone is created A.M.G. should temporarily be fully imposed and it can be relaxed as may seem desirable after quite a short period, even as short as 24 hours. The Legal Sub-Commission have prepared a draft form of proclamation (see accompanying file No. 40/4049/1/1) which seems to me to be appropriate to meet any likely circumstances, the area being altered as may be necessary.

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5. If it becomes necessary to declare any area a military zone then the Allied authorities can impose any form of military control from the assumption of more police duties up to complete A.M.G. It is my view that where<sup>201</sup> a military zone is created A.M.G. should temporarily be fully imposed and it can be relaxed as may seem desirable after quite a short period, even as short as 24 hours. The Legal Sub-Commission have prepared a draft form of proclamation (see accompanying file No. AC/4049/1/1) which seems to me to be appropriate to meet any likely circumstance, the area being altered as may be necessary. Returning again to the particular case of the Regina Coeli Prison, your suggestion that the prison area be declared a military zone is, if I may respectively say so, ingenious but I doubt if it is sound. If we adopt the policy of putting specific buildings under military control we at once point out to the Italian Government that we are going to undertake their responsibilities in respect of small riots as they will think for the purpose of saving their faces, and in my view if A.M.G. is to be imposed in any place it should

- 3 -

be imposed over a substantial area though it is impossible to define in general what such area should be

6. Specifically to answer your questions:

(a) In my opinion the request should only be granted if the local Military Commander is satisfied that the conditions set out in para 1 (b) exist; and

(b) In my opinion a full A.L.G. should be imposed with a proclamation on the lines of that already prepared by the Legal Sub-Commission.

7. The Directors of the Legal and Public Safety Sub-Commissions concur in this letter.

G. R. WELCH, Brig.  
VT CA Section.  
DOCS.

1206

para 1 (b) exist; and

(b) In my opinion a full A.M.G. should be imposed with a proclamation on the lines of that already prepared by the Legal Sub-Commission.

7. The Directors of the Legal and Public Safety Sub-Commissions concur in this letter.

G.R. WOODMAN, Esq.  
VT CA Section.  
DOCS.

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## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ext: 300

21 NOV. 1944

27 November 1944

Ref: 2606/43/COS

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops in aid of Civil Power.  
 TO : DCOS Civil Affairs Section.

1. I forward to you original and translation of a letter from the Prime Minister to the Chief Commissioner, reference 19005/14008/1.6.4 dated 25 November 1944, on the subject of employment of Italian troops in aid of the civil power.

2. Would you please prepare a reply for the signature of the Chief Commissioner.

*W. J. Phipps*  
 for  
 Brigadier,  
 Chief of Staff.

Encls: 2.

Copy to: SO to CC.

| TO            | INIT      | DATE         |
|---------------|-----------|--------------|
| COL. CHAPMAN  | <i>WJ</i> | <i>27/11</i> |
| COL. YOUNG    |           |              |
| LT. COL.      | <i>WJ</i> | <i>27/11</i> |
| MAJ. BROWN    |           |              |
| MAJ. WILSON   |           |              |
| MAJ. HANBU Y. |           |              |
| MAJ. BALLANCE |           |              |
| CAPT. POWEL   |           |              |
| CHIEF CLERK   |           |              |

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Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers  
19905/14008/1.6.4

Rome 25 November 1944

Dear Commodore,

I have just heard about a regulation recently issued by the Allied Authorities about the employment of Italian troops for services of public order.

According to these regulations, the Italian administrative authorities which should have to make use of the troops besides the police forces and the carabinieri, should obtain through A.C. the previous approval of the competent Area Command.

For instance, this would mean that if the Italian authorities of Sicily needed an immediate intervention, they would first have to inform the Regional Commissioner of Palermo of their intentions; the Regional Commissioner would inform the Command of the Sub-Area in Catania, which would have to inform Palermo of its agreement according to the requirements of the situation. This exchange of communications which should have to take place through a net of liaison would not always correspond to the needs.

It seems that this wouldn't correspond to the timely execution of measures for which rapidity is an essential condition of success.

Besides pointing out the deficiencies of this system from the practical point of view, I also want to stress the fact that it would deprive the Italian authorities - now fully responsible for the maintenance of public order since the powers were given back to them - of one of the most important instruments they have at their disposal to cope with their responsibility,

I shall be most grateful, my dear Commodore, if you will re-examine this regulation, taking my observations in consideration.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Commodore Ellery W. Stone  
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission  
R o m e

trans. E.C.

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NOV 26 1944

Rome, 11 25 NOV. 1944

*Al Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Caro Comandante,

ricevo notizia di una disposizione recentemente emanata dalle Autorità Alleate circa l'impiego delle truppe italiane in servizi di ordine pubblico.

Secondo tale disposizione, le Autorità amministrative italiane, che si trovassero a dover far ricorso alle truppe, oltre che alle forze di polizia e ai carabinieri, dovrebbero ottenere, tramite A.C., il preventivo benestare del competente Area Command, a tale misura.

Ciò significherebbe - ad esempio - che le autorità italiane della Sicilia, trovandosi di fronte alla necessità di un immediato intervento, dovrebbero anzitutto far presenti le loro intenzioni al Commissario Regionale di Palermo, il quale a sua volta dovrebbe informare il Comando della Subarea in Catania; e questo dovrebbe infine far giungere a Palermo il proprio assenso in merito ai provvedimenti richiesti dalla situazione. Scambio di comunicazioni, questo, che dovrebbe naturalmente svolgersi attraverso una rete di collegamenti non sempre rispondente alle necessità.

Non sembra che tale procedura si presti alla tempestiva esecuzione di misure, per le quali la rapidità

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Al Comandante ALLERY W. STONE  
Commissario Capo della Commissione Alleata

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Secondo tale disposizione, le autorità amministrative italiane, che si trovassero a dover far ricorso alle truppe, oltre che alle forze di polizia e ai carabinieri, dovrebbero ottenere, tramite A.O., il preventivo benestare del competente Area Command, a tale misura.

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Non sembra che tale procedura si presti alla tempestiva esecuzione di misure, per le quali la rapidità

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Al Comandante MILLEY W. STONE  
Commissario Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

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1998



*Al Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

è condizione essenziale di riuscita.

Ma, a parte questo lato di pratica deficienza del sistema, desidero anche rilevare, caro Comandante, che, attuandosi, esso verrebbe in un certo senso a esautorare le autorità italiane - responsabili in pieno, dopo il passaggio dei poteri, della tutela dell'ordine pubblico - di uno degli strumenti più importanti, che esse abbiano a disposizione per far fronte a tale loro responsabilità.

Le sarò grato, caro Comandante, se vorrà riprendere in esame il provvedimento sulla base di tali osservazioni.

Molto cordialmente

*Foran* 2202

C O P Y

S E C R E T

EWS/ejp

Ref 2606/39/COS

1 November 1944

SUBJECT: Powers and Rights in Italian Government Territory

TO : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

1. From the Regional Commissioner, Sicily Region, I have received the attached copy of letter dated 17 October 44, sent to him by 3 District Commander. I would draw your attention to Paras 2 and 3 of this letter, in which it is laid down that in quelling civil disturbances not directly affecting Allied interests Italian troops will not, except in grave emergency, be employed without prior reference through the Allied Commission to the Allied Area Commander.

2. In AAI Administrative Instructions No. 42, para 7, it is stated that "the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian Administration and he (the local Allied Commander) will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests."

3. The possibility of the employment of Italian troops is not specifically mentioned in Administrative Instructions No. 42, and it would appear that a procedure for this contingency should be established.

4. However, the channel for permission to use them, as laid down by 3 District, would, I suggest, in some instances delay their employment to a considerable extent. For example, a demand for Italian troops from a Province in the interior of Sicily administered from Palermo would have to pass to the latter and from there to Catania, HQ of the Sub Area Commander, and of course, follow the same route back. Having regard to the length and slowness of communications, a considerable period would elapse before consent could be obtained, by which time damage and casualties might have occurred.

5. It is suggested that where Italian troops are disposed in Italian Government Territory, the Italian authorities should have liberty of action in the event of a civil disturbance, provided that Allied interests are not directly involved.

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6. It is for consideration however if it would not be advisable to prescribe rules and limit the armament of troops so employed.

7. The foregoing does not arise out of the recent incident in Sicily, as you will see by the date of the letter from 3 District, but that occasion does give point to the foregoing proposal. Will you kindly raise the matter and let me know your conclusions.

ELLERY W. STONE  
Commodore, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl.  
As in para 1 above.

C O P Y

COPY

ID

SUBJECT : Aid to the Civil PowerSECRET3 District  
Ext 9  
69/G

17 Oct 44

Under authority of AAI Adm Instr No 48 dated 8 Aug 44, (which has been subsequently endorsed by AFHQ letter AG 370.6/107 GGT-C dated 24 Sep 44), this HQ issued Operation Instruction No 10, "Aid to the Civil Power" (Copies attached for LAZIO and ABRUZZI-MARCHE Regions AGC).

1. Area/ Sub Area/ Gm commanders will ensure that their liaison with AGC Zone Commissioners (Regional HQ in SICILY) is such that they receive early information of any civil disturbances, should they arise.

2. While the quelling of Civil disturbances, which do NOT directly affect Allied interests, is a matter for Italian

administrative authorities, it will be borne in mind that the latter will normally only dispose of police and cc. rr. for the purpose. Area defence schemes will be drawn up in the light of this.

3. Where as in SICILY and CALABRIA the Italian authorities do dispose of troops, such will NOT, except in grave emergency, be employed without prior reference through AGC to the Area Commander, who will be kept fully informed of all incidents and actions taken.

4. Areas will forward full reports of all civil disturbances to this HQ, although Allied action may NOT have been called for.

1200

EPW/WH

/s/ R.P. WARNER  
/t/ Lt Col  
G.S.  
(RP WARNER)

0 3 4 8