

ACC

10000/143/1441

10000/143/1441

DISTURBANCE, RAGUSA
JAN. - MAR. 1945

Chief Commissioner.

1. I attach an excellent report on the "rebellion" in the Province of RAGUSA 5-11 January 1945, prepared by Lieut. Colonel Howard of Land Forces Sub-Commission and Major Manley of P.W.E.
2. I do not think it is necessary for you to read the narrative of the operations but I would refer you especially to Pages 11 - 20 giving the background, causes and comments on the attempts to control the situation.
3. I am only sorry that the report did not emanate from the Regional Commissioner for it is exactly the kind of thing that the Regional Commissioner and his staff are supposed to do in an Italian Government Region. I notice, moreover, that at the daily meeting of the Area Commander at SYRACUSE there was no representative of the Regional Commissioner. I frankly do not understand why this is so and am taking it up in strong terms with the Regional Commissioner. You will find from the background and causes that Separatism and Fascism are mentioned as contributory causes but that they are not given high priority. The fundamental causes seem to me to be lack of strong government, that is to say, failure of the local authorities to foresee trouble and enforce the law, and bad staff and field work on the part of the CC.RR.
4. I feel concerned about the CC.RR because it seems to me that here is a matter where the Public Safety Sub-Commission and the Public Safety officers in the Regions should assume the same role as the Land Forces Sub-Commission. I will deal with this in a separate note but I think immediate assistance and the despatch of a first class officer who can help in the training of the CC.RR in Sicily is necessary. We must never forget that we were responsible for the initial work of the CC.RR after the liberation of Sicily.
5. ^{I will read} ~~copy of the report~~ copy of the report ~~to the~~ to the Regional Commissioner and will ask for his comments on the various points raised.

MSL/JG.
25. Jan. 45

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

JAN 25 1945
CC-2443

COS Noted with comment

29/1

JUL

CC

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Chief of Staff.

COS Noted with comment
JWD
CC

29/1

Duos cts.

For action after discussion if necessary

178 (30/1/45)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 489081-365

23 March, 1945

AC/14602/9/PS

SUBJECT : Sicily disturbances

TO : H.E. Director General Public Security
Ministry of Interior

1. With reference to the disorders in Ragusa and surroundings on 5th-11th January, 1945, this Sub-Commission has been asked to supply the following information :-

- a) the names of the instigators and the leaders of the disorders;
- b) the action taken against them;
- c) the cause and the objects of the disorders;
- d) whether any evidence has been disclosed that the disorders were inspired by the enemy or by a subversive organization.

2. It will be appreciated if this information can be sent to this Sub-Commission.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

Copy to:
AFHQ (Ref. AG 370.61/031 GCF-0)
NMIA

AFS/WE.

19 MAR 1945

SUBJECT: SICILY Disturbances

TO
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY
EXEC. OFF.
POLICE
LIC. & REG.
PRISONS
ADM. OFF.
SECURITY
CHIEF

SECRET

20 MAR 1945

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. G/92

19 March 45

TO : CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, A.C.

1. Para 4e of AFHQ letter, file AG 370.61/031 GCT-0, subject SICILY Disturbances - Report on Rebellion in Province of RAGUSA 5 - 11 Jan 45, dated 20 Feb 45 is quoted.

"Information is also required as to the action taken by the Italian Authorities against the ring leaders of the rebellion. The names of these men and the results of their interrogation should therefore be obtained together with the opinion of the investigation officers on the apparent cause of the rebellion and the objects of its leaders. Attention is especially directed toward the importance of any evidence indicating whether the rebellion was inspired by the enemy or by any known subversive organization."

2. It is requested you comply with the above paragraph and send a copy of your answer to this HQ.

S. M. Ingledew
Major General
M. M. I. A.

WS

*AFHQ letter dated 20 Feb 45
to Bureau regarding the
matter to the paragraph.*

27/11

Letter from G5 AFHQ (Lt Col Jackson)
dated 14 July 1945. In quotation
2 copies of daily situation
report. Handled to MNGA.
Report refers to that
submitted by PW.8

hcs
19.5.1945

3133

Rome, 17th January, 1945.

15-044.

Disorders in Catania.

807. Wilcox, R. S., 80/8.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL CHAPMAN	YD	9/1/52
COL YOUNG		
COL WILCOX		
MAJ LUKEMAN	DC	
MAJ DOWSON		
MAJ HARGREY		
MAJ BALICE		

Pages 1 - 4 deal with the causes of the disorders - State of the population - No preparation made for the announcement of the call-up - Method of the call-up - Sicily had been led to believe that the war was over for her - Depressing effect of Eden's declarations - Food situation - Insufficiency of pay and family subsidies, etc.

Page 5. CC.RR Group Commander Antonino DENTI had received information that the 13th Dec., would be the day of demonstrations, however, the 12th and 13th passed as days of undisturbed quiet at Catania. although he kept the largest number of CC.RR possible in the station in readiness for emergencies. The 14th also dawned peacefully, so DENTI no longer kept his CC.RR ready, and himself decided to take a 24 hour leave for which he had previously applied and went off at 8 a.m. in the morning to see his mother who was indisposed. living some distance away.

Pages 6 - 9 describe the disturbances. Capt. LARGATOLLI Livio, who should have been in command in the absence of DENTII was busy about other matters. Only junior officers and N.C.Os remained in charge and general confusion resulted.

Pages 10 - 11 relates how a group of men under the Command of Sergeant Major BARCHETTA were in the courtyard of the Palazzo Beneventano at a short distance from the Municipio while the latter was being fired and devastated. Because he received no orders to move BARCHETTA did not move, although he and his companions heard what was going on quite well. He did telephone to his Company Command and send word to the Questura calling attention to his position and asking for instructions, but he was told to wait where

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Pages 12 - 15 tell of how a Company of CC.RR going to the relief of the Municipio got surrounded by the infuriated crowd, the majority jumped on to a passing lorry and were taken back to barracks, where they just sat. Three got left behind and were promptly disarmed, bitten, scratched and beaten and finally arrived back at the barracks in a deplorable condition, with wounds curable in from 6 to 10 days.

Pages 16 - 20 deplore the results of lack of coordination between political and P.S. authorities. The irrational and disorganised way in which the public force available was used -

either not in the right place or left entirely inactive - chiefly due to the absence of Major Denti. The reluctance on the part of the Prefect to call out the troops, which he only did at 6 p.m. when all the damage was done. (This reluctance was probably due to the wish not to repeat the Palermo incident). Reluctance on the part of the public force to use firearms, for which press campaign is responsible. And, lastly, the fact that no local representative of any political party was sufficiently public-spirited to speak to the crowd which action might have had some effect. In this connection, the Mayor of Catania was actually present at a meeting in the Municipio at the outbreak of the disorders and crept away quietly.

Pages 21 - 22 enlarge upon the incident of the killing of a certain SPAMPINATO who was among the crowd outside the District Military Hqs. Rumour held that a bomb was thrown from one of the windows which killed him. This is said to have been quite impossible and he was probably killed by a shot fired by the entrance guards, who fired a good many. It is quite certain, however, that these entrance guards did their duty (about the only people who did) in defending their Hqs., and that their action saved this building from fire and devastation. Nevertheless, General CESARETTI, intent upon bringing to light the mournful episode of the death of SPAMPINATO, has denounced these guards to the Military Tribunal.

Page 23 summarises individual responsibilities of: -

Major DENTI Antonino di Forlì, Commander of Catania Group.
Capt. LARCAIOLLI Livio, his substitute.

Sergeant Major BARCHETTA Rocca, in command of the 32 men who remained inactive at Palazzo Benvenuto.

Maresciallo BILLI Brocole, in command of 12 CC.RR. who should have gone to the Municipio, but who, surrounded by the mob, turned tail and went back to barracks, where they remained inactive.

The three CC.RR. who allowed themselves to be disarmed and manhandled.

Pages 24 - 25 discuss Major DENTI. He is said to be a very fine officer who always discharges his duties promptly and efficiently but he is blamed for having left his post when he did, even though he had had leave granted to him.

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Page 26 deals with Captain LARGAIOLLI who substituted DENTI and who should have been cognisant of the happenings in the city. He stayed calmly in the barracks the whole morning of the 14th doing routine work and at 2.30 p.m. went to see the Prefect by appointment and stayed with him till midnight. He should have told the Prefect that duty called him elsewhere. (Both Prefect and Questore are being changed). LARGAIOLLI has been punished with serious measures and transferred.

Page 27 deals with Sergeant-Major BARCHITTA and his 32 inactive men. He was not very bright, but he did inform

the Questura and his company command of his position and ask for instructions, though in vain.

Page 28 says that Sergeant BILLI showed professional incapacity and measures of State are proposed for him. The three who ran home to barracks bitten and scratched will be sent before a disciplinary Commission.

Pages 29 and 30 mention the legitimacy of the use of firearms on occasions of this kind and the circular issued on the 29th December by the Commanding General making this clear, and also refer to the aggravation of all situations of this kind caused by the lack of transport facilities for the P.S. Force.

ea.

3125



COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA
DEI CARABINIERI REALI

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE

Roma, li 5 febbraio 1945

Caro Colonnello,

un rapporto circostanziato sui fatti
di Catania fu rimesso alla Commissione Alleata - Sot-
tocommissione per la Pubblica Sicurezza - il 13 gen-
naio u.s. col n° 39/65-15-1944 R.P.

Le invio - in seguito alla Sua richiesta verbale -
copia di tale rapporto.

Con ossequi.

Le Colonnello

Per la Commissione Alleata

N.H. Sig. Colonnello
WILKOS
COMMISSIONE ALLEATA
- Sottocommissione per la P.S. -

R O M A



RISERVATO PERSONALE

COPIA PER IL SIG. COLONNELLO
WILKOS

Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali

UFFICIO SERVIZIO - SITUAZIONE E COLLEGAMENTI

13/63-15-384

N. di prot. R.F.

Roma, li 13 gennaio 1945

Risposta al del n. Allegati n.

OGGETTO: Catania - Disordini.

La situazione dell'ordine e delle opinioni pubbliche nella Sicilia, prima del verificarsi dei gravi disordini conseguenti alla chiamata alle armi, era relativamente buona; tale situazione, però, in conseguenza del quadro tragico della situazione generale del nostro Paese, non può mai parlarsi di normalità.

Le popolazioni dell'isola vivono alla giornata, in una continua condizione di allarme, incertezza, diffidenza verso tutti e tutto, aggravata da una crescente indisciplina determinata non solo dalla propaganda soperata, svolta alla macchina, ma anche, e forse più, dai continui attacchi e dalle facili critiche mosse dalla stampa di alcuni giornali al Governo ed alle autorità centrali e locali, il che contribuisce a spezzare ogni vincolo di disciplina, assolutamente necessario nell'attuale periodo di guerra. In tali condizioni è sufficiente una scintilla, il benché minimo incidente od un sovrano inaspettato

- 2 -

to, perché abbiano a verificarsi gravi disordini e perché una situazione tranquilla abbia improvvisamente a mutarsi in una aperta rivolta.

Il Comando Militare della Sicilia aveva disposto il congedo dei militari in congedo delle classi del 1914 al 1924, se aveva, e senza della stampa, altresì assicurato che i militari stessi sarebbero stati, dopo la presentazione alle commissioni di congedo, posti in regolare posizione di congedo illimitato.

L'improvviso richiamo, e senza cartolina preavviso giunse, pertanto, quanto mai inatteso e anche inopportuno, poiché la data di presentazione del primo congedo era stata fissata nell'occasione delle feste natalizie e di capodanno. Le particolari condizioni di agitazione in cui vivevano le popolazioni siciliane avrebbero dovuto indurre ad adottare qualche cautela, e scegliere una preventiva opera di persuasione e di propaganda al fine di far capire che perché si evitasse agli ordini del giorno ed alle associazioni dei comitati di liberazione e dei dirigenti dei partiti politici militari, i quali nell'isola contano solo, nel complesso, 165 mila iscritti, contro la popolazione della Sicilia di 3 milioni di abitanti.

Per la verità dei fatti occorre mettere in evidenza che i disordini e la violenza verificatisi in dipendenza della chiamata alle armi hanno dimostrato che i comitati di liberazione non vengono nell'isola considerati l'espressione della volontà popolare e che i partiti politici hanno solo limitato seguito.

Hanno determinato, altresì, l'insorgere dei disordini in Catania, le seguenti altre cause, che hanno contribuito a far sì che l'occasione prevista della massa studentesca

per la chiamata alle armi ed estendere ad altri strati della popolazione;

1°)-malcontento generale per le carestie e insostenibili condizioni alimentari, lieve prin di ogni fermento e di ogni agitazione;

2°)-penosa impressione destata nell'ambiente intellettuale, particolarmente universitario, dalle dichiarazioni sull'Italia fatte dal ministro degli esteri britannico;

3°)-dolorosa constatazione che sussidi, paghe e stipendi militari non assolutamente insufficienti ai bisogni di vita della generalità delle famiglie;

4°)-lavoro delle cartoline prestate soltanto a coloro che hanno risposto al censimento militare, i quali sono stati chiamati per aver adempiuto a tale ordine, mentre sono rimasti a casa indisturbati coloro che non si erano presentati alla chiamata di censimento. L'ordine di chiamata alle armi avrebbe dovuto farsi con manifesto verso tutti gli appartenenti alle classi di leva e non mediante cartoline prestate;

5°)-esclusione della Sicilia e della Sardegna dal richiamo, da tempo disposto nella zona continentale liberata, il che aveva indotto a ritenere che per la Sicilia ormai la guerra fosse finita.

* * *

Mentre nei giorni 12 e 13 dicembre in altre province dell'Italia si erano verificate dimostrazioni da parte di studenti e di popolo per l'arretrato richiamo alle armi, a Catania le predette giornate erano trascorse in perfetta calma.

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- 4 -

La sera del 12 detto, il comandante del Gruppo Carabinieri Reali, maggiore DOTTI Antonino, fu informato da quel centro C.S. che manifestazioni del genere si sarebbero avute assai probabilmente il giorno 13 anche in Catania. Datane dal maggiore DOTTI notizia al Prefetto ed al Questore, quest'ultime richiesero la sera stessa che il comando del Gruppo mantenesse pronto in caserma, per eventuale impiego, il maggior numero possibile di carabinieri. Ma, come si è detto, nella giornata del 13, non si verificò alcunché di anormale, e poiché non si prevedevano manifestazioni per il successivo giorno 14, il predetto provvedimento non fu mantenuto.

Solo per il giorno 13, primo giorno di presentazione dei precettati dalle classi 1922, 1923 e 1924 (primo quadriennio), erano attese pubbliche manifestazioni di protesta.

Previdenzialmente di nessun genere venivano, pertanto, prese per far fronte ad eventuali improvvisi perturbamenti dell'ordine pubblico.

Il mattino del 14, alle ore 8, il maggiore DOTTI, considerato che tutto era calmo, partì per Sortore per frairvi un permesso di ore 23, concesso per giorno indeterminato, 1° 19 dicembre, per grave malattia della madre. Rinase, pertanto, al comando interinale del gruppo il capitano Silvio LANCIGLI, comandante la compagnia interna di Catania. Il mattino di detto giorno 14, mentre nessuna provvisione di possibili perturbamenti dell'ordine pubblico veniva segnalata dagli organi informativi della questura e dell'Arma, quest'ultima contava su un complesso, compreso la forza delle stazioni della città, di circa 270 militari, dei quali, non essendo stato ridotto, per la lamentata imprevidenza, alcuno dei servizi normali, risultavano già impiegati 110

circa per esigenze varie del capoluogo (assistenza al tribunale militare alleato e al tribunale militare italiano; traduzione con 12 detenuti civili al tribunale civile; soccorsi ad autogarri del concorso agrario; per esigenze interne di economia; a disposizione dell'ispettorato corporativo; addebi alla squadra di polizia giudiziaria; di custodia a detenuti degenti in luoghi di cura; servizio al parco autonomo di inglesi; al comando militare di stazione; all'ufficio lavoro; di traduzione).

Nella rimanente forma, otto erano satisti, tredici notec-
olisti, dodici scrivani.

Di conseguenza, effettivamente presente nelle varie stazioni della città e di pronto impiego, risultava una forza complessiva di 160 militari tra carabinieri, graduati di truppa e sottufficiali.

L'autorità di P.S. poteva fare inoltre assegnamento su 110 circa agenti e 700 soldati del 45° reggimento fanteria di stanza a Catania, forse quest'ultima che poteva essere portata a 1000 se si fosse fatta affluire dalla vicina Aci-
reale, come infatti più tardi avvenne, una compagnia cells di-
staccata. E' evidente che il complesso di tali forze, ^{21, 24} tan-
to positivamente e razionalmente impiegate, avrebbe certamente
consentito di fronteggiare la situazione cretensi il giorno
14, evitando ed arginando, con la necessaria energia, le vio-
lenze che purtroppo si ebbero invece a lamentare.

Considerando la cronaca della giornata e le disposizioni
non meno adottate dall'autorità responsabile, gli avvenimen-
ti ebbero a svolgersi nel seguente modo:

l'entre, come ai 6 detto, le prime ore del mattino del 15

✓ 9-9

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non davano a dividere alcunché di anormale, verso le ore 10.30 un numeroso gruppo di studenti, circa 200, nella maggior parte universitari, proveniente dall'ateneo, si dirigeva, percorrendo via S. Gaetano alle Grotte e Piazza Carlo Alberto, al Liceo-Ginnasio "Cutelli", in via Giordano Bruno, per ottenere la solidarietà degli studenti di quelle scuole nelle manifestazioni di protesta contro il richiamo alle armi che essi, dopo infuocati discorsi a sfondo antiautoritario tenuti nell'interno dell'ateneo dagli studenti separatisti Isidoro Piazza e Giuseppe Galli, avevano deciso di inseguire.

Ai dimostranti si univano infatti molti altri studenti del "Cutelli" che erano da poco usciti dal primo turno di lezioni. Si formava così un corteo di circa 500 giovani, ai quali, cammin facendo, man mano si aggiungeva una massa varia di giovani non appartenenti al ceto studentesco. Dette corteo si portava in Piazza Stesicoro, ove innalzava due cartelloni improvvisati portanti la scritta: "NON SI PARTE" ed ove tale GALLO Concetto, esponente del separatismo catanese, salite sul monumento a Vincenzo Balini, invitava i presenti ad unirsi alla manifestazione studentesca.

All'altezza del vicino palazzo Romenoventano veniva colto dalla folla un individuo, non ancora identificato, che, scagliandosi contro il Re, esortava i giovani pretestati a non presentarsi alle armi. Alla vicina chiesa di S. Gaetano, il già nominato GALLO Concetto presentava alla folla altre individui, che dopo essersi qualificato per operaio ed aver dichiarato che parlava a nome dei giovani e delle madri, concludeva con l'affermare che non si sarebbe dovuto più indovinare il grigio-verde.

In Piazza Carlo Alberto, il giorno sempre gravita di po-

- 7 -

polino e di rivenditori di ogni genere, altre giovane invitava i presenti ad unirsi alla manifestazione di protesta, aggiungendo che non vi sarebbe stato nulla da temere in quanto «alludendo evidentemente alla forza pubblica» nulla questa avrebbe potuto fare contro di loro.

Il corteo, composto da elementi sempre più eccitati, alle ore 11.45 si avviava verso il distretto militare. In Piazza Bessicero lo studente separatista Fabrizio PROVVISORIA gridava alla folla schiamacciante e piangente: "Il Governo non è che l'espressione del popolo e noi che siamo popolo non partiremo".

In prossimità della piazzetta antistante all'edificio del distretto militare, dove i manifestanti giungevano verso le ore 11.30, un folto gruppo di corteo, con in testa i portatori di cartelloni, si portava di corsa al portone di ingresso dello stabile, che era stato chiuso al giungere della folla, tentando di forzarlo ad emettendo alte grida, che davano chiaramente a divedere l'intenzione di invadere o dare alle fiamme il distretto. Nel contempo della folla partivano contro il portone vari colpi di rivoltella, ai quali rispondevano con sei o sette colpi di fucile, sparati dallo interno contro il portone stesso, i fanti GABRIELI Giovanni e SAVIEL Nello, posti a guardia dell'ingresso. Improvvisamente si udì uno scoppio fragoroso ed uno dei dimostranti, tale SPAMPINATO Antonino di Tomaso e di Di Stefano Vincenzo, nato a Buenos Ayres, di anni 21, celibe, cinto, separatista, veniva colpito da un proiettile all'occipite e decedeva immediatamente. Mentre il cadavere del caduto veniva ritirato nell'interno del distretto, la folla si disperdeva suddividendosi in forti nuclei, propagando a gran voce in città che una bomba a mano, lanciata dall'interno dell'edifi-

cio del distretto militare, aveva ucciso un loro compagno e ferito gravemente altro. Per la via, intanto, avvenivano qua e là coperti episodi di violenza contro militari in transito, alcuni dei quali venivano disarmati, mentre qualche automezzo militare veniva assalito, rovesciato ed incendiato. Così il caporal maggiore MARINI Decimo, della compagnia 1.4. del 43° reggimento fanteria, che transitava in motocicletta nei pressi del "Central Cerena", veniva costretto a fermarsi e ad abbandonare il mezzo, che veniva seriamente danneggiato dai dinamitardi.

Subito dopo un automezzo militare che transitava per la stessa località con a bordo alcuni soldati veniva fatto fermare e fatto allo stesso modo, dopo che erano stati fatti scendere i militari. Altro automezzo italiano veniva pure incendiato in Piazza Stesicoro.

Poco dopo le 11.30, giunta finalmente in Questura la notizia dei gravi incidenti fino ad allora occorsi, ne veniva telefonicamente informato il comandante la compagnia interna, capitano LARGILLI, che a quell'ora si trovava in ufficio. Questi, anche per specifica richiesta del capo gabinetto del questore, disponeva l'immediato invio in Piazza Stesicoro, punto nevralgico della città, di tutti i militari che aveva alla mano e precisamente: 19 carabinieri del nucleo rinforzi e subito dopo altri 10 militari della stazione principale con il maresciallo maggiore MARITTA Rocco ed il maresciallo capo NELLI Francesco; in totale 29 militari che furono successivamente dislocati nell'atrio del vicino palazzo Benvenuto, distante metri 10, per toglierli dall'immediato contatto col pubblico.

Nel contempo faceva affluire al distretto militare, ass-

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pre per richiesta della questura, 15 carabinieri delle stazioni di Catania Tribunali e Duomo, agli ordini dei rispettivi comandanti, marescialli maggiori LUTIA Filippo e CARLUCCA Colegere, e alla P. Prefettura il comandante la stazione di Gibli, maresciallo maggiore LA TORRE Domenico, con 5 dipendenti.

Era tutta forza in parte occasionalmente pronta nelle diverse capoluoghi ed in parte fatta affluire man mano dalle varie stazioni, in relazione alle successive richieste della questura.

Il commissario TOCCARD, che avrebbe dovuto assumere la direzione del servizio nella località, avendo a sua disposizione il reparto suddetto, non si era ancora fatto vedere, mentre vi era rimasto il maresciallo di P.S. ARRUO. Si annoverano pure in luogo altri due militari dell'Arma e precisamente il maresciallo maggiore RABBITO Antonio, comandante la stazione P. Marco, meno anziani del già nominato maresciallo maggiore RABBITO, con dipendente, che portava così a 33 il numero totale dei militari dell'Arma di quel reparto, che, peraltro, come si vedrà in seguito, rimaneva incorporato nella località per l'assenza del funzionario addetto, mentre il suo intervento avrebbe potuto aver favorito il grave incendio del municipio, situato non molto lontano dal palazzo Denoventano.

Il capitano LUCIALI, disposto l'invio dei predetti carvini e dopo avere informato il comandante la stazione di Catania principale di quanto stava accadendo, ordinandogli di predisporre a difesa la sacca capoluogo, si recava al distretto militare, dove trovava ancora un gruppo di dimostranti che imprimeva contro il comandante del distretto,

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colonnello mutilato NILAZZO Salvatore. Si portava quindi in questura dove, avendo appreso che il questore si era pure recato al distretto, vi tornava trovando colà pure il comandante del presidio, Generale di brigata CERRITI Antonio; con questi e col questore esprimeva una sommaria inchiesta sul tragico fatto poco prima accaduto. In quel mentre, erano circa le 13, il colonnello NILAZZO comunicava allarmato di avere appreso che un nucleo di dimostranti si era diretto verso la sua abitazione, sita in via Umberto, con l'intento di vendicare sui suoi familiari la morte delle SPANFISATO. Il capitano LARGAIONI disponeva, allora, su richiesta del questore, presente, l'invio in luogo di 15 carabinieri al comando del vicebrigadiere GULLI' Dedato, prelevando la forza stessa dalla stazione principale e si dirigeva poi, con la sua macchina, all'abitazione del colonnello NILAZZO.

Giunto in via Stena si imbatteva in una colonna di circa un migliaio di dimostranti, costituita in maggioranza da giovani della apparenza di operai e da persone di basso ceto, che gli imponevano di fermarsi. Sceso dalla macchina, il capitano LARGAIONI esortava tutti alla calma, quasi contemporaneamente un autocarro militare, proveniente da Piazza Duomo, veniva pure fermato dai dimostranti ed il conducente ed i tre soldati del 45° reggimento fanteria che si trovavano a bordo dell'autocarro, venivano fatti scendere e disarmati, mentre all'autocarro veniva applicato il fuoco. Il capitano LARGAIONI riusciva poi, oltre a farsi consegnare le armi tolte dai dimostranti ai soldati (due fucili con relativi caricatori e due giberne) che poneva sulla sua macchina e, approfittando poi della voce che si era sparsa, secondo la quale sull'auto-

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carro incendiato si trovavano alcuni bidoni di benzina, ciò che rappresentava un pericolo imminente per gli abitanti, riusciva a far allontanare la folla e con l'aiuto di volontari ad estinguere il fuoco, del quale l'automezzo stava già diventando preda.

L'autocarro, pilotato da altro volontario, poteva così far rientro alla caserma del 45° reggimento fanteria. Il capitano proseguiva indi a piedi per via Stena giungendo verso le ore 13,30 all'abitazione del colonnello MILANO, dove peraltro constatava che moriva la presenza in luogo dei militari da lui inviati, di alcuni agenti di P.S. e del commissario DE CARO, nulla era accaduto. Successi in colloquio telefonico con la questura, riceveva richiesta da quel capo gabinetto di disporre l'invio con l'autocarro della questura di parte della forza colà presente, con a capo il commissario DE CARO, verso la sede del "Corriere di Sicilia" ove stavano dirigenziosi forti nuclei di dimostranti. Proseguiva quindi a piedi verso la caserma del gruppo dove giungeva verso le ore 14, in tempo per ricevere altra richiesta da parte della questura per l'invio, al palazzo del comune, di 10 carabinieri. Tale richiesta veniva esaudita con l'invio di 12 carabinieri al comando del maresciallo capo BILLI Brocchi.

A quell'ora, pertanto, riepilogando, l'Arma si trovava dislocata in servizio d'ordine pubblico come segue: 32 uomini nell'atrio del palazzo Beneventano al comando del maresciallo maggiore MARCHESE, 13 militari al comando del maresciallo maggiore CASTELLANO al distretto militare, 5 militari al comando del maresciallo maggiore FUSI Giovanni alla R. Prefettura, parte del nucleo di 13 militari già a disposizione del commissario DE CARO all'abitazione del ca-

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tenente MILAZZO, mentre altra parte del nucleo stesso col vicebrigadiere GOMMI e col predetto commissario diretti alla sede del "Corriere di Sicilia", 12 carabinieri al comando del maresciallo BILDI diretti verso il Municipio - totale 84 militari.

Il comandante interinale del gruppo e comandante la compagnia interna, capitano LACCHICCI, il comandante interinale la compagnia esterna, tenente DI STEFANO e il sottotenente VINCIGLI, comandante la tenenza di Catania, rientrato alle ore 12.30 dal servizio prestato quella mattina all'ufficio leva, si trovavano a quell'ora tutti in caserma, ove stavano Intanto affluendo i rimanenti militari ancora rimasti disponibili dalle varie stazioni della città.

Alle ore 14.30 il capitano LACCHICCI veniva rilevato nella caserma stessa dal questore che lo conduceva con sé in prefettura, dove, per richiesta dello stesso prefetto, rimaneva fino alle ore 24 circa.

Intanto il drappello di 12 carabinieri, che al comando del maresciallo capo BILDI era stato inviato alle ore 14.30 al municipio, giunto in Piazza Stesicoro veniva affrontato da una folla di circa 2000 persone, fatto segno ad alcune sassate senza conseguenze e a gran voce esortato a non far uso delle armi.

Il maresciallo BILDI rispondeva che, per il momento, i carabinieri non avrebbero fatto fuoco, intendendo affermare con ciò, a suo dire, che i militari ai suoi ordini avrebbero fatto uso delle armi solo in caso di necessità. A tale uscita i più vicini al sottufficiale lo afferravano, lo alzavano in trionfo, gridando "Viva i Carabinieri, viva il maresciallo". Contemporaneamente, altra folla, giunta improvvisamente dalle vie adiacenti, stringeva sempre più da

presso i militari dell'Arma, che, visti in preda di essere suddivisi e singolarmente sopraffatti, riuscivano a liberarsi dalla stretta facendo uso del calcio dei moschetti e disperdendosi. Infatti il maresciallo BILI rientrava in caserma con qualche militare alle ore 17, mentre gli altri vi si restituivano alla spicciolata più tardi.

Alle ore 18 era stato incendiato il municipio che i militari stessi avrebbero dovuto proteggere.

Dopo aver comunicato l'avvenute suo ritorno al comandante la stazione, maresciallo maggiore VIRZI^o Antonino, il maresciallo BILI rimaneva in caserma, perché colpito da forte accesso febbrile, mentre gli altri militari venivano impiegati in altri servizi.

Mentre accadeva quanto sopra, il vicebrigadiere GULLI^o, che con 15 carabinieri era stato inviato dal capitano LILLO SICILIA all'abitazione del colonnello MILAZZO, minacciata dai dimostranti, riceveva ordini, come è stato detto, di trasferirsi con alcuni agenti di P.S. e con 5 dipendenti (appuntato BORDALLO Giuseppe, carabinieri MARRASINO Pietro, SICILIA Francesco, CACCHI Renzo e SIBILA Agilio) tutti a disposizione del commissario di P.S. DE CARO, alla sede del "Corriere di Sicilia". Salite nei predetti su un autocarro della questura, si avviò verso la zona indicata. Giunto l'autocarro all'incrocio di via Umberto con via Etnea, veniva avvistata un'autocarro militare guidata da un borghese e carica di dimostranti. Il commissario DE CARO disponeva l'inceguimento dell'automezzo, che veniva raggiunto in Piazza Stesicoro. Al sopraggiungere dell'autocarro della forza pubblica, i dimostranti che si trovavano sull'autocarro scendevano da questa e si davano alla fuga, confondendosi con la moltitudine che gravava la piazza.

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Gli agenti di P.S. riuscivano però a fermare uno di costoro, che veniva fatto salire sull'autocarro. Il commissario DE CARO disponeva quindi che parte dei militari dell'Arma ed un agente, capace di guidare, salissero sull'autocarro, proseguendo su di esso al seguito dell'autocarro. In la folla, insospetiti per l'avvenuto fermo di un secondo disordinato, circondava silenziosamente l'autocarro, pretendendo la restituzione e facendo luogo a lancio di sassi contro i militari che si accingevano a salire sopra. Al fine di intimidire i più violenti, agenti e carabinieri operavano alcuni colpi di pistola e di moschetto in aria, riuscendo solo in parte nell'intento, in quanto, pur cessando per il momento diretta la folla e allontanata la pressione di questo, continuava il lancio dei sassi, uno dei quali colpiva alla testa uno degli agenti che si trovavano sull'autocarro.

Alla vista del ferito, il commissario DE CARO ordinava di proseguire e così l'autocarro si dirigeva verso Piazza Duomo, lasciando però a terra l'appuntato BORGATO, i carabinieri BORGATO e BORTOLLO e due agenti. Intanto, il vicebrigadiere GALLI richiama l'attenzione del commissario DE CARO, battendo anche col calcio del moschetto contro la cabina di guida dell'autocarro, entro la quale il funzionario si trovava, onde avvertirlo che non tutti i militari ed agenti avevano fatto in tempo a salire sull'autocarro: questa proseguiva la sua corsa, raggiungendo la questura, senza curarsi dei militari abbandonati tra la folla, che, inferocita, li circondava subito.

Si trovava di servizio nella piazza il commissario di P.S. RABIZZI con qualche agente, il quale, a detta dei militari, dopo avere imposto a costoro di non far fuoco sulla fol-

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la, si confondeva fra di essi con i suoi agenti per assolvere, a quanto pare, l'incarico di seguirne le mosse, mentre lo appuntato e i due carabinieri venivano assaliti, malmenati, morsicati alle mani, onde indurli a lasciare le armi e in breve disarmati dei tre moschetti e di una pistola. Qualche volontario riusciva a sottrarli alla folla, che appariva male intenzionata, e a farli allontanare per vie traverse, da dove raggiungevano la caserma capoluogo. Nella colluttazione avuta, l'appuntato BORGALLO riportava contusioni varie giudicate guaribili in giorni 5; il carabiniere BELLISIMO un morso alla mano destra ed una ferita lacero-contusa alla testa giudicata guaribile in giorni 10 e/o. e il carabiniere BIRIBILI contusioni al ginocchio destro e contusioni alla regione ipotanca destra guaribili in giorni 10 e/o.

Dalle armi loro asportate, due moschetti e la pistola venivano consegnati il giorno successivo alla guardia di alcuni studenti che erano riusciti, a tal fine, ad ottenerli con stratagemma da coloro che se ne erano impossessati con la violenza.

Mentre si svolgevano gli episodi sopra descritti, parte dei dimostranti, divenuti ormai padroni della situazione - erano le ore 14.30 circa - assalivano l'ufficio loro provinciale e comunale, dove, sotto la direzione del segretario LA SPIA Giuseppe, dava fuoco al carteggio e gettava dalle finestre parte del mobilio. Successivamente - ore 15 - altra forte colonna di dimostranti, composta di elementi dei bassi fondi della città, assaliva il palazzo del municipio. Il portone di ingresso di questo, che era stato precedentemente chiuso, veniva forzato col lancio di una bomba a mano e con un grosso palo di legno che serviva da leva, manovrato dallo studente GIAMPAOLO Gioacchino, del 1° anno della facoltà di scienze naturali.

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Ceduto il portone, la folla irrompeva nell'interno dell'edificio e dopo avere disarmato alcune guardie che avevano lo specifico incarico di difendere il comune e che non opponevano alcuna resistenza, invadeva il locale del palazzo, devastando, saccheggiando e, infine, incendiando.

L'automobile privata del sindaco ed un camioncino di proprietà del comune venivano portati in Piazza Duomo e distratti col fuoco.

Intanto i 32 militari dell'Arma al comando del maresciallo maggiore BARCHETTA, nella vana attesa del commissario DE CASO, del quale erano stati messi a disposizione, rimanevano inattivi nell'atrio del non lontano palazzo Benaventano, distante circa 500 metri dal municipio.

Della presenza di detti 32 militari nell'atrio del palazzo Benaventano erano stati informati verso le ore 14.30 sia il capitano LARGIOLLI, sia il questore GIUFFRÈ, a mezzo telefono, dallo stesso maresciallo BARCHETTA. Non si comprende perché non sia stato dato ordine al sottufficiale, al delinearci della minaccia, di portarsi al municipio.

Quasi contemporaneamente veniva assalita la sede del "Corriere di Sicilia" rimasta indifesa, perché il commissario DE CASO, con la forza a sua disposizione, aveva ritenuto opportuno portarsi come si è detto in questura, anziché raggiungere il posto assegnatogli.

La folla, danneggiata la porta d'ingresso, dava alle fiamme 4000 copie del giornale, già pronte per la spedizione, e poscia si portava alla sede dell'"Unione Giovanile Italiana", dove venivano danneggiati mobili e distrutto carteggio.

Poco più tardi - fra le 16 e le 17 - venivano assaliti i locali dell'ufficio distrettuale delle imposte in via Ventimiglia. L'opera devastatrice della folla si rivolgeva pure

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contro la vicina sede dell'esercito e della imposta diretta, sia nei locali a piano terreno del centro di Sicilia, dove le marciandole, i locali venivano devastati ed incendiati. Agente morto trovava al palazzo di giustizia del quale la folla devastava in parte alcuni locali degli uffici della procura del Regno, della procura generale e della Corte di appello.

Non appena aveva notizia dell'altro grave fatto, il questore disponeva l'invio in luogo di 30 carabinieri al comando del sottotenente VEDUGLI, forza che si trovava riunite nella caserma capoluogo. Tale forza, costituita da agenti, giungeva però solo in tempo a disperdere la folla ed a limitare, con l'intervento dei pompieri, i danni provocati dagli incendiari.

Alla stessa ora erano stati le 18-30 un richiamo del questore veniva fatto rinforzare con altri 10 carabinieri al comando di un sottufficiale, il servizio di protezione già disposto al palazzo della prefettura, mentre altri 14 carabinieri ed un sottufficiale venivano inviati a sorvegliare a presidio il carcere giudiziario.

L'autorità militare del centro era, in persona del Generale Antonio CASAROLI, comandante il presidio militare di Catania, aveva di sua iniziativa fra le ore 18-45 un drappello di 19 fanti ed un ufficiale alla centrale telefonica per assicurare i collegamenti, e, successivamente, sempre di iniziativa, in quanto l'autorità politica non aveva fino ad allora inteso di fare intervenire la truppa, provvedeva a far presidiare il telegrafo, la centrale elettrica, la cabina di trasformazione principale ed a rinforzare con due plotoni mitragliatori la difesa delle carceri civili, nonché a rinforzare le guardie al cascinio viventi e al cascinio agrario.

rio. Provvedeva ancora, d'accordo questa volta con l'autori-
tà politica, a far presidiare la zona d'Italia, il Regno di
Sicilia, il Tribunale civile, l'intendenza di Finanza, la ma-
nifattura tabacchi.

Alle ore 18 il prefetto richiese al comando del
presidio militare di Catania - dopo averne la prescritta
autorizzazione - di mettere a disposizione del comando
procedura del comando militare alleato. L'elenco di reparti
di truppe e personale di una compagnia di motorie e di
spazio di un funzionario di P.S. in forza della forza
e di due plotoni motocarrozzi a disposizione di altri fun-
zionari per perlustrare la città, secondo itinerari da dis-
porre dal funzionario stesso.

Dopo la dislocazione di tali truppe, ed anche per il co-
mpimento delle altre, la sera si andò a dormire in condi-
zioni.

Il successivo giorno 15 altre manifestazioni avevano loca-
go, in questa volta l'autorità politica, ottenute anche l'as-
silio delle forze del presidio militare, aveva adottato tut-
te le misure che erano state il giorno precedente e la
forza pubblica aveva così affrontato energicamente i dis-
ordini disperdendoli e facendo loro perdere ogni valore.

Per rientrare in sede il comandante del Gruppo carabinieri
colonnello, dopo averne parlato, si era recato a casa, e
aveva concesso l'uscita.

Infatti, in corso di alcune centinaia di persone, che si
era formato in Piazza Duomo e si erano varie piante ste-
sicche, non avendo obbedito alle ripetute intimazioni di
sottomettersi, fatte da funzionari di P.S. colli di carvino,
veniva affrontato dalla forza pubblica che faceva uso delle
armi. Intendeva una marcia per mettere in fuga i dimostranti,
dei quali molti rimasero feriti.

Il bilancio dello scorso anno si chiudeva, pertanto, con i seguenti risultati:

Giorno 14 - Le devastazioni sopra descritte fra le quali la più grave a danno del manufatto, un morto fra i diseredati; nei feriti, fra cui un funzionario di P.S. e 14 persone, fra cui un funzionario di P.S., 6 agenti e 1 militare dell'arma (appuntato MURILLO e carabinieri MURILLO e MURILLO). Questi ultimi dimessi dalle folle.

Giorno 15 - molti feriti a causa di fuoco fra i diseredati.

Non sono ancora in viaggio quei dirigenti, capi-giornali dei diseredati e autori materiali delle violenze, la cui azione è stata limitata da misure di ordine pubblico, mentre altre si sono state consumate a pieno titolo.

La questione è stata sopra esposta con evidenza, come le gravi devastazioni verificatesi nella città di Catania il 14 dicembre abbiano potuto effettuarsi per le seguenti cause:

a)-mancata azione da parte dell'autorità politica e di P.S., per aver dato i mezzi, si intende sia per la tutela dell'ordine pubblico, la cui situazione lo esigeva, che per la protezione dei diseredati.

b)-impiego irrazionale ed a disagio della forza pubblica, in dipendenza di un completo disorientamento della situazione da parte di dette autorità, nonché la forza stessa o non fu impiegata in base necessaria, con la dovuta risoluzione ed unità, o fu semplicemente impiegata, o rimase

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del tutto inopportuno;

c)-riluttanza da parte del prefetto di fare intervenire la truppa, cosa alla quale si decise solo verso le ore 18, quando ormai i fatti più gravi erano già accaduti. Tale riluttanza trova come dubbio la sua causa nel timore che potessero ripetersi i noti fatti di Palermo;

d)-riluttanza o indecisione da parte della forza pubblica a fare uso delle armi, il che tale uso doveva ritenersi legittimo, per i gravi rischi al pericolo pubblico di cui la folla si rendeva colpevole. Tale riluttanza è una diretta conseguenza della campagna condotta da taluni giornali, non di ordine politico, ma di ordine morale, contro la forza pubblica, in qualche caso addirittura di ordine religioso, per l'uso delle armi. Tale campagna ha generato non solo negli agenti, ma anche nei funzionari dirigenti, l'erroneo convincimento che non si deve sparare mai;

e)-nessun esponente locale del partito o del comitato provinciale di liberazione è intervenuto per calmare i dimostranti, per arringarli, con sage parole, contro il spintone generale che su qualcuno dei funzionari locali aveva avuto tale buona volontà, molti ancora si sarebbero potuti formare e contenere. A tal proposito si ricorda vivamente il contegno del sindaco di Catania, avv. Mario Armiato, e dei componenti della giunta municipale, i quali, trovandosi riuniti nel palazzo comunale proprio mentre vi si recavano i dimostranti, si astennero opportunamente dall'intervenire alla richiesta.

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Per quanto ha tratto alle evidenti responsabilità che fanno capo al prefetto ed al questore è già intervenuto il

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provvedimento da parte del Ministero dell'Interno del collocamento a disposizione di entrambi i predetti. L'attuale profetto di carriera V. M. M. gr. aff. Lion Lugaresi, incaricato, in seguito ad ordine dell'Alto Comando d'Interno del Comando, di condurre circostanziata inchiesta intorno a stabilire le singole responsabilità, ha già riferito in senso generale sulle deficienze già sopra illustrate, prospettando al Governo la opportunità che l'inchiesta predetta, specie per quanto ha tratto agli organi della guardia, sia condotta, sotto il punto di vista tecnico, da un ispettore generale.

Prima di riferire sugli addebiti che si fanno all'Arma, si precisa l'esito degli accertamenti eseguiti in ordine al luttuoso incidente occorso innanzi all'edificio del distretto militare.

Nonché in un primo tempo era rimasta diffusa nell'opinione locale la convinzione che una bomba fosse stata lanciata nelle circostanze già sopra descritte, ma che, per la mancanza dell'edificio del distretto militare, probabilmente invece prevaleva il convincimento che l'ordigno, se pure si era potuto portare, non poteva che provenire dalla folla.

Infatti la bomba non avrebbe potuto essere lanciata dal piano terreno dell'edificio del distretto, in quanto le finestre di tale piano sono munite di inferriate e di grata rete metallica, ed dalle aperture del portone d'ingresso perché troppo stretto, ed ancora da una delle finestre del piano superiore, perché queste sono tutte di uffici occupati dal colonnello comandante e dal personale militare (ufficiali) e civili impiegati presso il distretto stesso, nei riguardi dei quali è da escludersi, come dagli accertamenti eseguiti dal Generale M. M. M., il sospetto che abbiano potuto compiere atto del genere.

D'altra parte nessuno dei testimoni vicini e lontani al-

l'incidente ha potuto finora affermare d'aver visto persona affacciarsi alle finestre predette prima, durante e dopo lo sparo.

Lo SPARATORE era stato colpito all'occipite, cioè alle spalle e non di fronte, ciò che starebbe a dimostrare sempre che egli non aveva in quel momento rivolta la spalle al distretto - che il colpo era partito dalla folla e non dall'edificio. Il fatto però che non veniva trovata in luogo la minima traccia della bomba esplosa, la quale, d'altra parte, data la densità della folla di fronte all'edificio del distretto, non avrebbe potuto fare una sola vittima, ma avrebbe dovuto colpire altri con le numerose schegge che produceva, confermerebbe l'esito della perizia necroscopica eseguita sul cadavere, della quale si è avuta qualche notizia in via confidenziale, secondo cui la ferita che ha causato la morte dello SPARATORE sarebbe dovuta non all'esplosione di una bomba, ma a un proiettile d'arma da fuoco, che, per fortuna non riuscì a verificarsi, avrebbe provocato lo scoppio della bomba svedese. In tal caso dovrebbero arguire che il caduto sia stato colpito o da uno dei colpi di rivoltella partiti dalla folla dei dimostranti contro il portone d'ingresso della caserma, o da uno dei sette colpi di fucile sparati dall'interno dell'atrio d'ingresso del distretto contro il portone in parola dai due soldati posti a guardia di esso, e precisamente da qualche colpo di fucile esplosivo attraverso lo spioncino del portone d'ingresso.

Alle state dei fatti non si può dire il risultato definitivo dell'esame necroscopico, del cui esito è stato possibile avere solo in parte notizia.

È risaputo, comunque, accertato che i soldati messi a guardia del portone d'ingresso del distretto hanno compiuto il loro dovere nel difendere la loro caserma, salvando così il

distinto dalla maggioranza e dall'insulto. Il Generale
non tentava, nell'intento di far fare loro completa
e luttuosa epistola della morte solo... ha pro-
posto espressamente la denuncia dei militari stessi all'au-
torità giudiziaria.

- Facciamo ora a trattare delle singole responsabilità del-
l'area, dovendo prendere in considerazione il comportamento
del comandante del gruppo carabinieri Luigi di Antonio, cap-
itano Antonio RINALDI di 30111;
del comandante in compagnia intorno di Antonio, capitano Lino
Antonio Lino, che il giorno 14 notturno il comandante del
gruppo, in persona;
del capitano... saggio... comandante il ma-
glio di 32 militari rimasti durante i notturni del 14
te inoperanti sotto l'ala del palazzo...
del maresciallo capo RINALDI... comandante del distretto
di 72 carabinieri che avrebbe dovuto raggiungere il mi-
nistero e che invece, affrontato dalla folla dei dimostranti,
ritornò nei suoi posti rimasti in caserma dove rimase ul-
teriormente inattivo;
dell'agente RINALDI e dei carabinieri...
e RINALDI Pietro che circondati dalla folla dei dimostran-
ti si lasciarono uccidere, picchiare e disarmare.

3117

Prima parte di trattare i singoli argomenti, si ritiene op-
portuno precisare che il Generale RINALDI, comandante la VI
brigata CC. di Palermo, dall'inchiesta eseguita ha rapre-
sato il convincimento che tutte le violenze carabiniere sono
avviate da i'antichi politici, aveva notizia dei primi di-

.../...

ordini e valutata la nostra forza a disposizione, aveva
abbinate i mezzi della truppa, secondo preside-
re, da questa, come era inevitabile iniziativa in parte ave-
va disposte il Generale GONZALEZ, comandante del presidio
di Catania, gli edifici pubblici. Tale provvedimento aveva
avuto come risultato la messa in sicurezza degli edifici ed aveva
dato la disponibilità di una considerevole massa di uomini, co-
stituita da oltre 200 agenti e carabinieri per gli inter-
venti in forma come la volta.

Il profetto ed il quartiere hanno evidentemente risentito
dell'ingiusta campagna di stampa svolta dai giornali di
alcuni partiti di sinistra contro l'Esercito, con riferi-
mento ai lutti di episcopio di Palermo, e non hanno saputo a
tempo debito vincere l'ingenuità delle relazioni e schie-
dere l'intervento della truppa, provvedimento a cui, per lo
aggravarsi della situazione, avevano pure aderito vorac-
iamente con le loro deviazioni complete.

Le deficienze rilevate a carico dei militari della zona,
e che si accingono a cominciare, sono una conseguenza neces-
saria di tali ingenuità degli agenti dirigenti, per cui i
militari della zona impiegati in piccoli nuclei contro una
folta massa più accesa e numerosa non hanno saputo o po-
tuto intervenire a tempo debito ed in modo proficuo ed ef-
ficace.

(*)- Il maggiore DALLI è un valoroso ufficiale superiore
molto distinto, onesto, capace, molto stimato nell'ambiente
di Catania, e che nelle situazioni della provincia ha sapu-
to sempre dare tempestive e precise informazioni.

Agli inizi del 1968, ricevuta notizia che si è detto
dal centro C.S. di quella sede che regnava un certo ter-
rore.

[illegible]

As a private professional, I do not have a net worth.

Il 12-11-1944, giorno in cui si verificò l'attacco, l'U.S. Navy, che aveva il compito di sorvegliare la costa, non fu in grado di intervenire a causa della nebbia. L'attacco fu effettuato da una nave tedesca, la U-101, che si era avvicinata alla costa. La nave tedesca fu vista a circa 10 miglia dalla costa, e si diresse verso la costa. La nave tedesca fu vista a circa 10 miglia dalla costa, e si diresse verso la costa. La nave tedesca fu vista a circa 10 miglia dalla costa, e si diresse verso la costa.

3. nel evidente, per quanto riguarda la sua presenza in
qualche modo, che se egli aveva fatto presente al prefetto
qualche cosa in quel caso i suoi speciali interessi, questi non
lo avrebbe lo stesso; e d'altra parte è possibile che la
presenza nel ministero era dovuta in parte a dispendio
affari e se vicini a particolari, che, se non lo era
un lavoro che potesse in qualche modo, che era non solo.
certamente l'ho potuto che prevedere, e prevedere e l'ho
trasferito sopra.

[illegible]

編者 謝世榮



RISERVATO PERSONALE

Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali

UFFICIO SERVIZIO - SITUAZIONE E COLLEGAMENTI

N.

di prot.

Roma, li

Risposta al

del

n.

Allegati n.

OGGETTO:

Atto di Addebiatamento dell'Arma - Uno solo.

In questi ultimi tempi si sono verificati atti di violenza e di
 odio verso l'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali, che ha sempre
 mantenuto una alta moralità e disciplina, e che ha sempre
 dato una buona immagine dell'Arma e del Reame.
 Si è verificato che in questi mesi, l'Arma ha subito
 una serie di atti di violenza e di odio, che hanno
 causato una serie di danni e di perdite.
 Si è verificato che in questi mesi, l'Arma ha subito
 una serie di atti di violenza e di odio, che hanno
 causato una serie di danni e di perdite.

3103

Il secondo dei due punti è quello che riguarda la possibilità di un'azione di tipo "preventivo" da parte delle autorità competenti. In questo caso, si tratta di un'azione che si basa su una valutazione di tipo "probabilistico" e non su una valutazione di tipo "certificativo".

Page 6
12-26-2010
12-26-2010

3107

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394.

AC/24602/9/PS.

Tel. 489081 - 580.

13th February, 1945.

SUBJECT : Sicily Disturbances.

TO : ATHQ., G-5.

1. Reference is made to your G-5,005, dated 31st January, 1945.

2. As a result of an investigation by the Commanding General of Carabinieri into the ineffective action taken by the Group in Sicily, the following action has been taken:-

- a) The Group Commander, who was temporarily absent, will be subject to disciplinary measures.
- b) CC.RR Captain has been punished and transferred.
- c) 1 Sergeant and 3 CC.RR are being dealt with by a disciplinary commission.

3. The Prefect and Questore have been replaced and transferred to other posts.

For the Chief Commissioner:

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Sec.
DCOS, AC.

3106

AD/24602/9/18.

Vol. 432001 - 530.

13th February, 1945.

SUBJECT: Sicily Disturbances.

TO: AFHQ, 3-5.

1. Reference is made to your 2-5-05, dated 11st January, 1945.

2. As a result of an investigation by the Commanding General of Carabinieri into the ineffective action taken by the Group in Sicily, the following action has been taken:-

- a) The Group Commander, who was temporarily absent, will be subject to disciplinary measures,
- b) CC.RR Captain has been punished and transferred,
- c) 1 Sergeant and 3 CC.RR are being dealt with by a disciplinary commission.

3. The Prefect and Questore have been replaced and transferred to other posts.

For the Chief Commissioner:

[Signature]

G.R. VERONA, Brig.
VF CA Sec.
DOCS, AG.

Copy to Chief of Staff.

*Delivered
by
13 FEB 1945*

3106

SECRET

LAND FORCES SUB-COMFAC (MMA)

8/5/53

9 Feb 45

AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE ON
SICILY DISTURBANCES TO BE
HELD AT HQ MMA ON 8 FEB 45

OBJECT

1. The object of the conference is to discuss, from A.C. point of view, the problems confronting the authorities in the maintenance of law and order in SICILY and to recommend such measures as may be considered necessary. The report made by Lt-Col H.A.C. HOWARD, MMA, will be studied.

AGENDA

2. Is it considered that there are now sufficient troops and sufficient OC RR in the island?

	Personnel	Vehs	ADs	Trucks
WE Strength)	5000		47	88
SARAU DA Div)	49 CORR att			
WE Strength)	5000		47	88
AGSIA Div)	49 CORR att			
Strength OC RR)	151 offrs	144		108
Incl. MONTE-)	8816 ORs			
CHAMERO Bn)				

Above includes two MOB OC RR units each of 12 lt tks and 12 vehs. Firms are up to WE in personnel and tpt.

ACTION

Different troops

Check on strength

also light.

18 effective vehicles. Light and return same

1305

15. This not up to strength

SUBJECT

1. The object of the conference is to discuss, from A.C. point of view, the problems confronting the authorities in the maintenance of law and order in SICILY and to recommend such measures as may be considered necessary. The report made by Lt-Col H.A.C. HOWARD, MIA, will be studied.

AGENDA

ACTION

2. Is it considered that there are now sufficient tps and sufficient CC RR in the island?

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehs</u>	<u>MPs</u>	<u>Trucks</u>
WE Strength)	5000	47	88	
SABAUDA Div)	49 CORR att			
WE Strength)	5000	47	88	
ACSTA Div)	49 CORR att			
Strength CC RR)	151 offrs	144	108	
Incl. MONTE-)	8815 ORs			
GRANERO Bn)				

Above includes two Mob CC RR units each of 12 lt tks and 12 vehs. Funds are up to WE in personnel and tpt.

3. Is it considered that ORG and equipment of an Internal Security Div are adequate?

Sufficient Power
CCRR - insufficient strength

2103

Ins light.

18 effective vehicles. better and return some

15. In not up to strength in drive

- 2 -

4. Is it considered that present distribution of tps is satisfactory?

5. Is it considered that officers of Internal Security Divs are efficient?

6. Is it considered that tng of tps is desirable and if so is it possible and what form should be recommended?

7. Is it considered that comms within the Island are satisfactory?

Comms are at present:-

(a) 30 short range WT sets

(b) Civil telephone

(c) 1X

8. Is it considered that the Italian Corps Comd and Allied Sub Area Comd understand the differences between their respective functions and is there any overlapping?

9. Is it considered that present org of CO RR is satisfactory, bearing in mind:-

(a) present standard of offr

ACTION

16 Mt High Submarine Landing

Learn opponents replaced
Steps taken considered
available.

Manufacturing. Specify
drawing to J. King.

8 H.F. 4. etc required

Range too short

Letter Newman 3.10.4
to be taken into

Low

Is it considered that the Internal Security Divs are efficient?

6. Is it considered that the of tps is desirable and if so is it possible and what form should be recommended?

7. Is it considered that comms within the Island are satisfactory?

Comms are at present:-

(a) 30 short range WT sets

(b) Civil telephone

(c) MC

8. Is it considered that the Italian Corps Comd and Allied Sub Area Comd understand the differences between their respective functions and is there any overlapping?

9. Is it considered that present org of CC RR is satisfactory, bearing in mind:-

(a) present standard of offr

(b) fact that many CC RR have families in SICILY

(c) present system is to have many "stazioni" and "tenenzie". Gen MARIONI's recommendation is to come into "sezioni" and "tenenzie".

Step taken considered suitable.

Unsatisfactory for present training & security.

8 H.F.H. auto required

Range too short

Rel. common 3404
is not linked

Low

Individual removed

Station of no

- 3 -

ACTION

10. What is the best method of employment of MONTEGRANERO personnel? There is a recommendation that these should be formed into an Alpine Legion CC RR. Extract of M.L.A. LC's report on this subject is att. at appx "A".

11. Are the present regulations for the carrying of weapons and amm. into action satisfactory?

12. Is efficient use being made of Mob CC RR units?

13. Is propaganda being spread in an efficient manner for SICILY Call-up phase III (due to start 1 Mar)? In this connection it is interesting to note that 967 personnel have presented themselves at RAGUSA, and that 664 have been accepted, which is a very high average in comparison with other towns.

14. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SICILY Call-up phase III and can action be taken now to anticipate same?

15. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SARDINIA Call-ups Feb/

Learn from

Recommendations: Weapons to be kept around (and under orders of our officers)

In training

No propaganda

3103

Older classes, Yordakish in some numbers

See summary report on Sardinia Call up

11. Are the present regulations for the carrying of weapons and arm into action satisfactory?

12. Is efficient use being made of Mob CC RA units?

13. Is propaganda being spread in an efficient manner for SICILY Call-up phase III (was to start 1 Mar)? In this connection it is interesting to note that 367 personnel have presented themselves at RAGUSA and that 664 have been accepted, which is a very high average in comparison with other towns.

14. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SICILY Call-up phase III and can action be taken now to anticipate same?

15. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SARDINIA Call-ups Feb/Mar and can action be taken now to anticipate same?

16. Have offenders been dealt with.

Recommended:
Weapons to be kept around Y-axis
under order of our officers

In training

No propaganda

3103

Older class. Handing in some cases

Great numbers expected in trouble. Call up is under way.

Low enough. Chief offenders in the hills.

SECRET

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

10/gda

20 January 1945

FILE : RC/000.5

SUBJECT: Report on Disorders in Sicily

TO : HEADQUARTERS - Allied Commission - APO 394

1. I am enclosing herewith copy of a report on the recent disorders made by my Public Safety Division.

2. I concur in this report and in order to avoid delay am forwarding it in original.

3. I would draw particular attention to the matter of troops and police being disarmed by the civil population owing to their weapons being unloaded. I have referred this matter to your Headquarters in a separate letter, my RC/000.5 of 19 January 1945.

[Signature]
For M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Incls: PS Rept No. 3 - 18 January 1945

Copies for: Public Safety Sub-Commission
Land Forces Sub-Commission

HEADQUARTERS
24 JAN 1945

3103

SECRET

SECRET

Report No 3.

S/124/JTM

18th January, 1945.

Disorders in Sicily - January, 1945.

Brigadier M. Carr, C.B.E., M.C.
Regional Commissioner, Sicily Region.
Headquarters, Allied Commission,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

General.

1. At the end of December it was foreseen that further disorders were likely to occur in Sicily and as already reported by signal, a number of serious disturbances have taken place in the early part of the present month.

The following is a brief outline of these disorders so far as it can be illustrated with the aid of somewhat disjointed and contradictory information received from various sources, including the Carabinieri Reali, Questori, High Commissioner, Prefects, Military Commander, F.S.S., F.W.B. etc. In the first instance it should be pointed out that the disturbances mainly occurred in an area in the South-east corner of the Island, far removed from the Headquarters, and that owing to the lack of communications caused by interrupted railway services, broken telephone lines and heavy snowfall it has been extremely difficult to obtain accurate and up-to-date news of events as they occurred. In addition the operations quickly assumed a military rather than a civil character, enquiries are still in hand and the various Authorities are reluctant to submit written reports of occurrences until the results are made known of investigations now pending. In these circumstances it is requested that the information contained in this report should be treated with reserve. As and when more detailed and authentic reports become available, these will be forwarded for information.

Table of Disturbances.

2. The table below shows the dates and places of demonstrations or disorders, with brief particulars of each. Where the reported facts are in conflict, those which appear the more reliable have been reproduced:-

Disorders in Sicily - January, 1949.

Brigadier M. Carr, O.B.E., M.C.
Regional Commissioner, Sicily Region.
Headquarters, Allied Commission.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

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The following is a brief outline of these disorders so far as it can be illustrated with the aid of somewhat disjointed and contradictory information received from various sources, including the Carabinieri Reali, Questori, High Commissioner, Prefects, Military Commander, F.S.S., P.W.B. etc. In the first instance it should be pointed out that the disturbances mainly occurred in an area in the South-east corner of the Island, far removed from the Headquarters, and that owing to the lack of communications caused by interrupted railway services, broken telephone lines and heavy snowfall it has been extremely difficult to obtain accurate and up-to-date news of events as they occurred. In addition the operations quickly assumed a military rather than a civil character, enquiries are still in hand and the various Authorities are reluctant to submit written reports of occurrences until the results are made known of investigations now pending. In these circumstances it is requested that the information contained in this report should be treated with reserve. As and when more detailed and authentic reports become available, these will be forwarded for information.

Table of Disturbances.

2. The table below shows the dates and places of demonstrations or disorders, with brief particulars of each. Where the reported facts are in conflict, those which appear the more reliable have been reproduced:-

28/12/44	= Rosolino (Catania). 200 persons demonstrated after 3 persons arrested for failing to answer call-up. Shooting occurred for the purpose of intimidating the CC.RR. and securing release of arrested persons. The CC.RR., after a shooting-duel, released prisoners and demonstration immediately ceased.
29/12/44	= S. Cono (Catania). Population assaulted trucks carrying grain, wounding one

driver and seizing grain. Hand-bombs thrown and guns fired by the demonstrators who ransacked local "Granai del popolo".

30/12/44 =

S. Michele di Ganzaria (Catania). Three Carabinieri fired at by unknown persons, one being killed and one seriously wounded.

1/ 1/45 =

Sciacca (Agrigento). During the night 31 Dec/1 Jan. 45 fascist wall posters appeared in Sciacca. The following day 2,000 people demonstrated against the call-up. No damage or casualties.

3/ 1/45 =

Ragusa. Demonstrators assaulted Italian soldiers and Police, throwing hand-grenades, following arrest of 9 persons for failing to report. One civilian killed and one wounded. One Carabinieri wounded and 6 persons arrested. Serious riots took place following disturbance referred to above. Mass demonstrations crowds soon became excited and hostile. Local Police were overwhelmed and disarmed. 100 Italian troops coming from Galtanissetta were also disarmed. 200 additional troops sent to Ragusa and after ~~fighting~~ restoring public order. Casualties: Military. 1 Officer killed; 3 soldiers, one Carabinieri, one Finance Guard killed; 15 soldiers seriously wounded. Civilians: 5 killed, 8 wounded. Approximately 200 persons arrested. The Military Authorities did not succeed in persuading rioters to hand in their arms.

4/ 1/45

to 8/ 1/45

3/ 1/45
to 10/ 1/45 =

Vittoria (Ragusa). Following the arrest of 9 persons for failing to answer call-up and of 20 persons for curfew infringements, rioters damaged Railway Lines, telephone communications, etc. Demonstrators also made repeated attempts to force an entrance into the Ammunition Dump, but were repelled by the Depot Guard. Italian Troops, coming from Agrigento eventually restored order in town of Vittoria, but rioters then took to open countryside pillaging private houses and land properties. Order completely restored when other troops forced their way into the town. Casualties: 3 soldiers wounded, 3 civilians killed and 20 wounded.

5/ 1/45 =
to 11/ 1/45.

Comiso (Ragusa). 1000 armed rioters took possession of town digging trenches, erecting barbed wire, mining bridges and blocking roads. The barracks of the CC.RR., Finance Guards and Questura were attacked and the Police disarmed. Italian Troops, made several attempts to enter town. Many of these soldiers were disarmed and others taken prisoners by rebels. Railway Miners and others

3/ 1/45 =

Casualties.

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to 8/ 1/45

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1000 armed rioters took possession of town digging trenches, erecting barbed wire, mining bridges and blocking roads. The barracks of the CC.RR., Finance Guards and Questura were attacked and the Police disarmed. Italian Troops, made several attempts to enter town. Many of these soldiers were disarmed and others taken prisoners by rebels. Railway lines and telephone communications damaged. Troops under the command of Generals BRISOTTO and ROMEO entered Comiso and order restored at 1200 hrs, 11th January. Only one rebel arrested. Order to hand in arms was not obeyed.

7/ 1/45 =

Canicattì (Agrigento).

Demonstrators suddenly appeared on the streets protesting against the call-up. Communist elements broke into the Traders Club and demanded exclusion of all Fascists.

7/1/45 = Solarino (Siracusa).
Rioters attacked grain warehouse and olive-oil Depot, causing damage.

7/1/45 = Cassibile = Avola (Siracusa).
to 8/1/45. Railway bridge blown up between these two places. Hand-grenades thrown at labourers repairing lines. Train attacked by rioters.

9/1/45 = Sicily (Ragusa).
Demonstrators threw hand-grenades = no casualties.

11/1/45 = Canicatti (Agrigento).
Demonstration took place. No damages or casualties reported.

11/1/45 = Campobello di Licata, (Agrigento).
Demonstration took place. No damages or casualties reported.

11/1/45 = Naro (Agrigento).
to 13/1/45. 300 rioters took possession of the town, ransacking and setting on fire the CC.RR. Barracks. CC.RR. reinforcements entered the town on the morning of the 13th and restored order. Casualties: 2nd Lieut. DI DIHO killed; 4 CC.RR. wounded; 5 civilians killed; 12 civilians wounded; 15 persons arrested.

14/1/45 = Melia (Caltanissetta).
Sudden and violent manifestation took place when 1000 persons, incited by 15 armed men, plundered grain warehouses, clothing Depots, causing damage amounting to 3 million lire. The CC.RR. Barracks, Customs Office and other buildings were also attacked. Reinforcements of CC.RR. and Italian soldiers entered the town and restored order early following morning. 1800 quintals of grain stolen, operations for the recovery of this grain in progress. 3100

14/1/45 = Sommatino (Caltanissetta).
Demonstrators sacked grain-warehouses and other food stores.

In addition to the above various incidents involving damage to railways and telephone lines occurred at certain points. casualties: The total casualties as published in the Giornale di Sicilia dated 17th January, 1945, are shown below: Province of Ragusa: killed 12 carabinieri, 1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer, 2 troops; wounded: 15 soldiers. Rioters: killed 13, wounded 50. Province of Agrigento: killed 1 Officer of CC.RR. wounded 4 carabinieri; rioters: killed 5, wounded 12, 300 captured. If the above are complete, the figures are very small having regard to the scale of the operations.

Demonstration took place. No damages or casualties reported.

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Causes of Disturbances.

3. The principal cause of these disturbances has undoubtedly been the enforcement of the call-up; to this must be added the general discontent of the public over shortage of food and high cost of living, the weakness and inefficiency of the Administration also what appears to be incitement by Separatist and Fascist elements and the acts of criminals and hoodlums always anxious to exploit such a situation. It should also be observed that the affected area is, politically speaking, more Communist than any other part of the Island. In Ragusa Province it appears that many persons were particularly incensed by being called upon to hand in

- 4 -

a further 25 kg. of grain, that Province having already amassed a higher percentage of the prescribed quota than any other in the Island, viz. 90%.

Action taken in Disturbances.

4. Criticism has again been levelled against the Carabinieri Reali for their failure to cope with the situation in its early stages. At Ragusa, for example, it has been reported that only 1 officer and 9 men would turn out in response to the Prefect's call for assistance, the others declining to leave their stations. The CORR. have been given precise instructions as to their action in the event of disorders, including the use of arms, and General Sannino is paying particular attention to these complaints in the enquiry which he is now having conducted. Whether such criticism is warranted cannot be assessed until the full facts of individual disturbances are known. It is sufficient to say at the moment that as already indicated the operations quickly achieved a military character owing to the large number of armed rioters involved and the policing agencies could hardly be expected to deal with the resulting situation. It appears that military assistance was made available as quickly as reasonably possible but it does seem that in present circumstances a fairly large force should be kept available in all provincial capitals and so avoid long journeys from places so far distant as Palermo and Agrigento as was necessary in this instance.

The following have been promised as aid:-

2 cruisers
12 light tanks
24 Armoured vehicles
24 trucks
2 Battus troops

but so far as can at present be ascertained only

6 armoured vehicles
6 trucks

have arrived.

Every effort is being made to requisition, through the Italian Authorities, 24 serviceable trucks to replace those being sent but it is very doubtful whether this number will be obtained.

Searching operations are now being conducted to gather in arms and arrest responsible persons, including those whose political activities are suspect and justify their internment by the Italian Authorities, also to concentrate and guard isolated and scattered ammunition dumps. Military patrols are being maintained in affected areas and a display of force thus demonstrated. It is understood that some 200 persons have been arrested, mostly in Ragusa City, but it is possible that some of these may be proved quite innocent after enquiries are made.

3039

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There have been two or three minor incidents of antagonism towards Allied personnel but nothing of a definite or serious character.

The Regional Commissioner has made a personal tour of the district affected.

Future considerations.

5. For the past three days conditions throughout the Island have been reported as tranquil. The future, however, is most un-

3093

certain and there is no question but that widespread unrest exists among a resentful population which may lead to further demonstrations or disorders at any time. Even now this is being manifested in the shape of small demonstrations and strikes by communal and public utility undertaking employees, who complain of the non-payment of Christmas gratuities and of the difficult economic conditions. One of the most serious aspects of the recent disorders is that many armed rioters, estimated at Comiso alone as 1000, have not been disarmed and are not only in possession of the weapons originally held but also those taken from police and troops. An Order has been issued by the Prefect for all arms to be surrendered by 18th January but the latest information is that the order is not being complied with. Finding the arms will be a difficult problem and in the meantime some of these armed persons who have taken to the open country may form themselves into armed bands and endeavour to terrorise local inhabitants and travellers and take over control by such tactics. A band of 30 armed men recently held up a bus on the Licata-Agrigento road.

In these circumstances it is absolutely essential that strong Italian military forces should remain in the island in support of the policing agencies. It is further necessary that the armoured cars and trucks promised should be supplied. The transport now in possession of policing agencies is in poor condition and the greatest need at the moment, in this connection, is tyres and tubes. Provided the food and economic situation does not worsen and energetic action is taken to (a) search for leaders of recent riots, including political elements, (b) to collect arms and (c) to display a sufficiently strong patrolling force to convince the public that the authorities intend to maintain law and order and are in a position to do so; the present precarious situation may be prevented from deteriorating, but in the meantime conditions are most uncertain. It has been reported that the call-up figures in Catania have much improved, viz: of the 2910 men in the 1922-24 classes who were liable to report, 2284 have done so. This would seem to indicate that the reaction to the call-up will not continue as the chief cause of discontent and that if the food and economic situation can be ameliorated, then a return to more normal conditions in Sicily can be expected.

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J. T. Manuel
J. T. MANUEL,
Major,
Public Safety Officer.

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Withdraw copy of
report on rebellion

"CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF SAC"

~~TOP SECRET~~ 1 FEB 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TRH/TBJ/mls

G-5: 000.5

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: Sicily Disturbances.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to the very full joint report dated 18 January prepared by MMIA and PWB on the "Rebellion in the Province of Ragusa 5/11 January" copies of which were forwarded to this Headquarters and to Headquarters Allied Commission under MMIA reference C/33 of 26 January.

2. Particular reference is made to paragraph 7b of the above report recommending specific action so far as concerns the Carabinieri involved in the disturbances.

3. It is requested that this Headquarters be informed of the action which is being or has been taken by the Italian Government so far as the Carabinieri are concerned.

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S. B. Lockhart
for T. R. HENN, Colonel,
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

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REPORT ON THE REBELLION IN THE PROVINCE OF

RAGUSA 5/11 JANUARY 1945.

1. OBJECT OF REPORT:-

The object of this report is to give the facts, in so far as they are known, about the rebellion in the Province of RAGUSA which lasted from the 5th to the 11th of January 1945, and to comment on the action taken by the Italian Civil and Military Authorities to restore order.

The report has been compiled jointly by Lt-Col. the Hon. E. A. C. Howard, Coldstream Guards (MMIA) and by Major. I. Manley, Intelligence Corps (PMB).

This is a confidential report no parts of which will be reproduced in other reports for information without prior reference to the Land Forces Sub Commission AC (MMIA), nor will it be shown to any person not directly concerned.

A sketch map attached as Appendix 'A' shows the area covered by the rebellion and the main roads and towns affected.

The distribution list is attached as

Appendix 'I'.

2. DIARY OF EVENTS:-

Wed. 3 Jan.:- Demonstrations and riots reported from larger towns in Province of RAGUSA and part of Province of SYRACUSE. Those participating claimed that pretext for demonstrations was the call up.

RAGUSA - Demonstration. Trouble began when COBR arrested 28 persons in street after curfew and 9 men for ignoring call up.

1 Bn. (250 all ranks) from 139 Inf. Regt PALERMO arrived of which 70 were sent to MODICA.

AVOLA - During night 3/4 Jan. small length of rail on railway line was destroyed by explosives 1 Km. south of railway station.

MODICA - Demonstration. 70 troops from 139 Inf. Regt. at RAGUSA arrived.

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MODICA - Demonstration. 70 troops from 139 Inf. Regt. at RAGUSA arrived.

COMISO - Demonstration.

VITTORIA - Demonstration.

Thur. 4 Jan.:- Demonstrations continue; situation in area tense.

RAGUSA:- Demonstrations. Shots exchanged between troops and rebels. One Italian Officer seized by crowd, but later liberated by Italian troops. Casualties, killed one civilian, wounded one CORR, one commissario di Pubblica Sicurezza and one civilian. Another report states that the casualties were -

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Killed one CCRR and one Finance Guard and wounded one civilian.

AVOLA - Railway line repaired and train service resumed.

MODICA - Demonstrations continue.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations continue.

Situation in area unchanged.

Fri. 5 Jan:-

RAGUSA:- Situation more serious. Prefect ordered the Major Commanding the RAGUSA garrison to get his troops out. These troops were fired on by well armed rebels in the area near the railway station of RAGUSA ISLEA on the outskirts of the town. Troops remained in this area for the night. Prefect asked for reinforcements of troops to be sent to his area to deal with situation. Prefect sent written report to O.O. Troops, SYRACUSE. Between RAGUSA and VITTORIA CCRR vehicle carrying rations held up and rifled by rebels armed with machine guns, rifles and hand grenades.

MODICA - Demonstrations continue no casualties or damage.

COMISO - Heated demonstration. 200 to 300 armed rebels dispersed on escarpment above town by CCRR and troops sent from RAGUSA. Shots exchanged one CCRR wounded.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations continue no casualties or damage.

Sat. 6 Jan:-

Situation in area takes a more serious and violent turn.

RAGUSA - In morning troops belonging to RAGUSA Garrison returned to town.

12:30 hrs 100 troops belonging to the 16th Arty. Regt. of the SABAUDA Division which had been sent from CALTANISSETTA as reinforcements were ambushed and after short action disarmed by rebels at road junction on outskirts of RAGUSA. Troops in accordance with orders did not have their weapons loaded. Rebels kept arms, troops proceeded to RAGUSA in disarmed condition. One officer and two other ranks killed during action.

In afternoon 70 CCRR arrived as reinforcements from PALERMO. Skirmishes between troops and rebels in town. 1 p.m. 15 O.R.'s disarmed Military Dist. H.Q.'s plus 5 CCRR. 16:00 hrs Demonstration outside prefecture. Prefect telephoned to SYRACUSE for reinforcements.

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SYRACUSE - 21:15 hrs 225 troops under the Command of Lt.-Col. TRAPANI left by road for RAGUSA of which 125 were from 145 Regt. SYRACUSE and 100 from 45 Regt. CATTANIA.

GIARRATANA - Troops on their way to RAGUSA from SYRACUSE fired on by rebels while passing through town at night, slight injuries. Column then remained in area until later during 7 Jan., mopping up.

MODICA - Situation still tense.

SOLOLI - Situation tense.

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COMISO - Demonstrations continue.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations and rebel activity, some shooting. OORR barracks attacked and a few OORR disarmed. Civil prison attacked and a few prisoners set free.

Sur. 7 Jan: - Situation in area unchanged. Telephone lines in area interrupted. Railway line RAGUSA to MODICA under rebel control.

RAGUSA - Shooting and skirmishes between troops and rebels in town. Prefect telephoned several times during day to SYRACUSE for reinforcements. Prefect and troops besieged (assediato, in his own words) by rebels in Prefettura. Several shots which were fired at the Prefettura entered the prefect's office.

During the day Prefect ordered Lt-Col. MANDANICI O.C. OORR of RAGUSA to send sufficient men to the Prefettura to help disperse the rebels. A 2nd Lt. and about 60 men were despatched but on reaching the bridge at RAGUSA IBLEA they were fired upon by machine guns and rifle fire. The majority returned to their barracks and only the 2nd Lt. and 9 men arrived at the Prefettura. The Prefect again telephoned to Lt-Col. MANDANICI for reinforcements but the latter was unable and probably unwilling to lend his men in aid of the Prefect.

16:00 hrs Column, under Command of Lt-Col. TRAPANI, from SYRACUSE which had been held up in GIARRATANA area arrived.

17:00 hrs (approx) Col. LEONARDI Commanding Officer 16th Art. Regt., arrived from CALTANISSETTA with 25 men and one armoured car on tow.

17:30 hrs Gen. RONCO arrived with troops. Set up his H.Q. at the Prefettura and de facto took over from the Prefect.

19:00 hrs. Telephone line between RAGUSA and SYRACUSE interrupted.

During the night the situation quietened down as the majority of the rebels either left the town or went into hiding.

SYRACUSE - 12:30 hrs Gen. RONCO with 30 men (40 OORR from CATANIA, 10 OORR from SABAUDA Div. at MESSINA and 30 troops from 46th. Inf. Regt. at MESSINA) left for RAGUSA by road.

17:15 hrs. Lt-Col. HOWARD and Major. MANLEY arrived. Contacted Major. GRAY, O.C. Troops, and Capt. HUGHES A.C. Public safety in order to ascertain latest situation.

CASABILE - Early in day small railway bridge on SYRACUSE-RAGUSA line destroyed by explosives. Workmen who were sent to repair the bridge were prevented from doing so by rebels who attacked them.

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17:15 hrs. Lt-Col. HOWARD and Major. MANLEY arrived. Contacted Major. GRAY, O.C. Troops, and Capt. HUGHES A.C. Public Safety in order to ascertain latest situation.

CALTAIBATE - Early in day small railway bridge on SYRACUSE-RAGUSA line destroyed by explosives. Workmen who were sent to repair the bridge were prevented from doing so by rebels who attacked them with hand grenades.

SOLARINO - In the evening rebels destroyed doors of grain and olive oil stores belonging to the Comune with hand grenades. Private house next to grain store damaged and one girl injured.

GIARRATANA - CORR dispatch rider on motor/cycle on way from SYRACUSE to RAGUSA forced to turn back by hostile attitude of crowd.

COMISIO - CORR disarmed at their barracks by rebels. Rebels use CORR barracks as P.W. cage for CORR and captured Italian Officer and other ranks. Comitato Provvisorio del popolo established.

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VITTORIA - Rebel activity and sporadic shooting occurred.

Mon. 3 Jan:-

Situation still tense and serious in area. Telephone communication between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA still interrupted. Call up temporarily suspended. Lt-Col. HOWARD, Major. MANLEY and Sgt. JACOB, P.S.C., left SYRACUSE at 09:20 hrs returning 17:35 hrs. During the day SOLARINO, PALAZZOLO, GIARRATANA, RAGUSA, MODICA, ISFICA, MOTO, AVOLA and CASSIBILE visited. C.C. Troops, SYRACUSE informed early in morning that:-
(a) Railway line between AVOLA and RAGUSA had been cut.
(b) Damage had been done to grain and olive oil store at SOLARINO by rebels.
(c) A bridge near CASSIBILE had been destroyed.

SOLARINO - Outwardly calm. In main square sulkier and hostile looking inhabitants were standing about in small groups. Damage to store slight. CCRA guarding it.

PALAZZOLO - Looked outwardly calm in morning. Traffic normal on road SYRACUSE - PALAZZOLO.

GIARRATANA - At about 11:30 hrs. Very hostile looking crowd of men standing around cross roads in centre of town, no arms seen. Took road leading down valley to RAGUSA, passed several small groups of peasants coming from the direction of RAGUSA.

RAGUSA - Troops in control, situation improved, mopping operations in progress. Rebels in hiding or had left town.

On outskirts passed RAGUSA IBLEA railway station all shut up and deserted.

Shops and houses closed and streets deserted. Population peered from behind doors and windows. About 15 Italian troops encountered standing in large archway in main square of RAGUSA IBLEA. Troops had taken up positions with no cover. Troops appeared nervous. One of them acted as guide to main town of RAGUSA where the Prefettura is situated.

Courtyard of Prefettura full of troops and cumbersome and dilapidated Italian Army M.T. Called immediately on Prefect DOTT. NAITANA he appeared nervous. Prefect outlined events of previous days and considered that though order had been restored the situation was tense and that there was possibility of further trouble breaking out from one moment to another. He stressed the necessity for the systematic disarming of the civil population.

Gen. RONCO who was present concurred with the Prefect's statements and added that the rebels had now either gone into hiding or left the town, and that they were controlling the RAGUSA - MODICA road by means of a road block. Gen. asked Lt-Col. HOWARD to obtain further information on arms, ammunition and supplies on

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gone into hiding or left the town, and that they were controlling the RAGUSA-MODICA road by means of a road

block. Gen. asked Lt-Col. HOWARD to obtain further reinforcements, arms, ammunition and supplies on

returning SYRACUSE.

Both Prefect and Questore GIUFFRÈ considered that trouble in Province caused chiefly by Fascist elements

aided by separatist who had used the call up as the pretext for creating the disturbances.

Interrogated 4 men who had been arrested as rebels only 2 of whom were liable for call up.

One said he had been given his weapon by Catanese Lt. while another said he had been given his weapon from

a truck.

127 total of rebels and suspects arrested up to 15:00 hrs.

During time spent in town there were spasmodic bursts of firing and explosions of hand grenades caused by the mopping up operations.

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Elements among the troops appeared to be nervous. Prefect had had manifesto prepared to put up in town prohibiting meetings and assembling of crowds (for translation see Appendix 'B').

14:45 hrs. Left RAGUSA for SYRACUSE via MODICA and NOTO.

No sign of rebels on road blocks between RAGUSA and MODICA. Road deserted and all houses cleared.

MODICA - 15:15 hrs. Outwardly calm. Small groups of men in main street. Several slogans against call up on walls. CORR patrols in streets.

ISPIGA - 15:45 hrs. Outwardly calm apart from hostile looking groups of men in main square. Several fresh anti-call up and pro Fascist slogans on walls. No CORR visible.

ROSSOLINI - By passed town. Separatist slogans on station building.

NOTO - 16:45 hrs. Appeared normal. Two CORR patrols in main street.

AVOLA - During the day rebels armed with M.Gs. (?) threw six hand grenades against train carrying 200 conscripts from NOTO to SYRACUSE forcing it to stop. None of the conscripts used this as an opportunity for deserting. Troops sent from NOTO restored situation after an exchange of shots with rebels. Troops remained occupying positions near railway station and patrolling main street.

17:15 hrs. Passed through town, troops near railway station in open positions with no cover in street, outwardly calm, unfriendly looking groups of men in main square.

CASSIBILE - 17:30 hrs. Quiet.

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COMISO - Concentration of rebels in occupation of town. Town under control of Comitato Provvisorio del Popolo with Commissario del Popolo at its head. During the morning Commissario del Popolo telephoned to RAGUSA to inquire about the situation there and to ascertain if the Prefect was still in office.

VITTORIA - Situation tense, partial lull in rebel activity. Commissario Prefettizio in control. Local Committee of Liberation supported by all parties formed armed squads to help maintain public order and protect the town hall. The Communist leader is reported to have been the principle organizer. Signor CULTRONE, brother-in-law of Salvatore ALDISIO the High Commissioner for Sicily, was a member of one of the squads.

SCIACI - situation tense and unsettled, rebels reported

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SCICLI - Situation tense and unsettled, rebels reported in area. Unconfirmed report stated that hand grenades were thrown in town.

Tues. 9 Jan: - Situation calmer and less tense. More traffic on road SYRACUSE to RAGUSA via NOTO and MODICA. Telephone line between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA still interrupted. Lt-Col. Howard, Major Manley and Sgt. Jacobs left SYRACUSE at 09:15 hrs, passing through CASIBILE, AVOLA, NOTO, ISPICA, MODICA twice during day, visiting RAGUSA and undertook reconnaissance to within 2 kms. of COMISO. The same route was taken both ways on account of the reported mining of other road between SOLARINO and PALAZZOLO.

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RAGUSA - Controlled by troops, situation calm, fresh slogans against the call up written on walls in centro of town.

Meeting with Prefect and Gen. RONCO. They had received no news from either COMISO or VITTORIA and considered that the towns were in the hands of the rebels. They were of the opinion that Gen. BRISOTTO's column from AGRIGENTO had already arrived in the area and that order would soon be restored. The Prefect then sent for a telegram which he had received the day before from salvatore ALPISIO the High Commissioner for Sicily regarding Gen. BRISOTTO's column. On reading it again carefully he learned from it that the column was expected to arrive at VITTORIA at 12:00 hrs; this information had not been given by him to Gen. RONCO. Discussed the possibility of sending agents to COMISO and VITTORIA to ascertain what the situation was. This was an idea which they had not thought of before. They both stated that among the CORR and Questura Agents there was no one that they could trust and that if they sent one of these men it was possible that he would betray them to the rebels. Gen. RONCO said that none of the CORR in RAGUSA were like his own Div. H.Q. CORR, 10 of which he had with him. Gen. RONCO said that he was going to place one of his platoons about 1 Km. outside RAGUSA astride the road leading to COMISO - None of his troops had been as far as this point till then. Gen. RONCO asked for additional medical personnel to be sent to RAGUSA.

Visited prison to interrogate woman who had been acting as a nurse to the rebels and who was accused of having fired on the troops. Interrogation produced no results. Questura plain clothes agent who acted as a guide to the prison was frightened to return to Prefettura on foot as he claimed that he was a marked man; he had to be escorted back in the jeep as a consequence. 14:30 hrs proceeded along road to COMISO - no traffic. Passed through the remains of several rudimentary stone road blocks erected by rebels outside RAGUSA. Countryside deserted and all houses closed up. Continued on winding road leading down escarpment above COMISO to within about 2 kms. of town. Excellent view of COMISO, VITTORIA and surrounding countryside from this point. Observed from 15:00 hrs to 15:30 hrs.

COMISO - Town in rebel hands. Two manifestos put up in town by Comitato Provvisorio del Popolo (for translation see Appendix C). From observation point saw road block consisting of two rows of stones in position across the road entering the town from RAGUSA. From the town a few rifle shots were heard and two flares fired from a very pistol. People and carts were using the other roads leading to the town.

VITTORIA - Situation fairly quiet in morning, action

Continued from Prefettura telephones

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VITTORIA - Situation fairly quiet in morning; action squads on duty. Commissario Prefettizio telephones ALBISO and reports situation in hand but reinforcements required.

13:30 hrs - Strong force of rebels containing elements principally from COMISO attack town with intention of capturing arms and ammunition depot. Few shots exchanged with action squads who dispersed on arrival of rebels.

Rebels took up position in houses on outskirts of town from where they could obtain a field of fire on positions of the depot.

Rebels captured ten soldiers in town belonging to the depot garrison who were collecting ration tins. The arms and ammunition depot garrison consisted of 40 troops under the command of a Mariscallo, ten of

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whom had already been taken prisoner by the rebels. Lt. Teresio MARIANI of the Direzione di Ariglietia Palermo who had been sent to VITTORIA on 5 Jan to salvage arms and ammunition from the area was in the depot when the attack was made and immediately took over command of the garrison, gave orders for its defense, and personally placed the troops in strategic positions inside the depot.

Lt. MARIANI estimated the rebels to be about 500 strong and to be well armed. He stated that the rebels had four M.G.s. and that what appeared to be their leaders were armed with Mitra Beretta automatic rifles.

During the afternoon the rebels made six attacks on the depot. During one attack a rebel car passing by the entrance to the depot was destroyed and set on fire by hand grenades thrown by the troops, its occupants escaped though wounded. In another attack rebel elements tried to enter by the main gate, this attempt was repulsed by the troops with M.G. fire and hand grenades; one rebel, however, managed to get inside the perimeter defenses before he was wounded and captured, later he escaped from the civil hospital.

During the afternoon Lt. MARIANI ordered two 47 mm. German ATK guns in the depot to be used against the rebels, six rounds were fired.

The attack continued until dark when the rebels retired in the direction of COMISO, threatening to return early the next day.

About 6 soldiers were wounded, 4 rebels killed and an unascertained number wounded during the action.

The able and courageous defense of the arms and ammunition dump by Lt. MARIANI undoubtedly prevented its capture by the rebels and saved a dangerous situation in the Province from becoming critical.

Part of this attack was witnessed between 15:00 hrs and 15:30 hrs from the observation point above COMISO. At the time it was thought that it was Gen. BRISOTTO's column that was engaged.

04:00 hrs - Gen. BRISOTTO left AGRIGENTO by train with 100 troops from 10th Art. Regt. from CALTANISSETTA, 100 troops from 139 Regt. Ft. Sec. from PALERMO and 100 troops from 22nd Art. Regt. AGRIGENTO.

About 12:00 hrs train carrying troops arrived GELA. Here joined by troops and 4 guns that had come by road from CALTANISSETTA.

15:00 hrs - Train left GELA for VITTORIA. *Train left by road*

19:00 hrs - Train arrived VITTORIA.

Quiet night at VITTORIA.

CHIRAMONTE - Small groups of rebels reported in hills above town.

SCICLI - Small groups of rebels reported in district.

SOLARINO - PALAZZOLO road - 09:00 hrs - F63 SYRACUSE

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SOLARINO - PALAZZOLO road - 09:00 hrs- F63 SYRACUSE received report that road mined at one point. Investigation later in the day showed that about one third of road had been inexpertly demolished during the night by explosives. Damage repaired during day, traffic only held up temporarily.

Wed. 10 Jan: - Situation improved in all areas except COMISO which remained in rebel hands. Mopping up operations at VITTORIA. Appearance all towns passed through outwardly calm. Telephone communication SYRACUSE-RAGUSA restored in morning.

Lt-Col. Howard, Major Manley and Sgt. Jacobs left SYRACUSE 09:25 hrs, returning 20:15 hrs. Passing through twice during the day CASIBILE, AVOLA, ISFICA, MODICA and visiting RAGUSA and VITTORIA.

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RAGUSA - Town rapidly returning normal life. Troops had not moved further than outskirts of the town. 160 rebels and suspects arrested to date. Called on Gen. ROMCO, Prefect and Questore, Avv. Giovanni LUPIS RAGUSA socialist leader at Prefettura. Gen. ROMCO received congratulations on operations and orders for the co-ordinated attack on COMISO for 12:00 hrs on thur 11 Jan. from Gen. MARICCHI. Gen. ROMCO had previous to this order planned to attack at dawn on Thu. 11 Jan.

Prefect now in control and calm. Questore had sent no agents out to rural areas to observe rebels. 12:00 hrs - Left RAGUSA for VITTORIA via observation point above COMISO. In afternoon Lt. Sabatini and other prisoners held by rebels at COMISO liberated and returned RAGUSA.

COMISO - No attempt to attack VITTORIA. Early in the morning the parish priest of COMISO together with another priest went to RAGUSA as an intermediary of the rebels. At RAGUSA he told Gen. ROMCO that the rebels were prepared to cease fighting if the call up was abolished and that they would return the prisoners they held. Gen. ROMCO replied that his terms were :-

(a) Immediate return of the prisoners held by the rebels.

(b) All arms and ammunition in the hands of the rebels to be handed immediately to the Commissario Prefettizio in COMISO.

Priest then returned to COMISO. In afternoon rebels released SABATINI and other Italian army prisoners. It appears as if the rebels began to loose heart in evening and to disperse. At 12:15 hrs observed COMISO from road leading down escarpment. Town still in rebel hands but outwardly calm, no firing, road blocks in position on road entering town from RAGUSA. Civilian traffic on other roads leading from town. 12:30 hrs - Returned to top of escarpment and took secondary road to VITTORIA thereby avoiding passage through COMISO.

VITTORIA - Order restored, troops in control, mopping up in progress. Few arrests made. Population calm and hostile looking, most of them standing in their doorways.

13:15 hrs - Arrived at entrance to arms and ammunition depot. Heard story of previous days attack from Lt. MARIANI and then proceeded to centre of town to visit Gen. BRICOTTO. The General was found lunching with his A.D.C. and the Commissario Prefettizio for VITTORIA former vice-sindaco of CATANIA at hotel. At

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In town a number of pro-Fascist, anti-call up and anti-allied slogans had been written on the walls. One anti-allied slogan "A morte agli invasori", "Who death with the invaders". Called at arms and ammunition depot and were shown around by Lt. MARIANI. It has a very large perimeter and is a difficult place to defend without previously

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prepared defenses. Inspected German ATK guns that had been used for defense. Left at 14:30 hrs returned to RAGUSA uneventful. Encountered people from COMISO but unable to extract any information.

CHIARAMONTE - Small groups of rebels reported in area.

SCICOLI - Small groups of rebels reported in area.

ROSOLINI - A short distance after by passing town at about 18:30 hrs heard rifle shot near road.

CATANIA - In the evening supply column of vehicles on train left for RAGUSA with escort of 100 troops from 45th Regt.

Thur. 11 Jan: - Situation outwardly calm to normal in all areas except COMISO which was occupied by troops without incident. Appearance of towns passed through normal. Lt-Col. Howard, Major. Manley, Capt. Baker, Sgt. Harrison and Mr. Weston, U.S. Consul General Palermo left SYRACUSE 08:15 hrs returning at 17:30 hrs; passing through twice during the day the same towns as on the 10 Jan. except VITTORIA and in addition visiting COMISO.

RAGUSA - Situation calm, P.S. continue arresting suspects. In early morning supply column and escort arrived by road from CATANIA, having detained at MODICA. Party arrived 11:00 hrs. called on Prefect and Gen. ZONCO, latter having lunch with his officers, several telephone calls delayed Gen. from eating and it was not until 11:40 hrs that he left the Prefecture with a small column of troops to join his troops who were then deploying on escarpment above COMISO. Party followed in rear of column.

COMISO - Situation outwardly calm. No sign of rebels. Town occupied by Gen. BRISOTTO's troops without incident. No reaction of any sort to entry of troops by population. Troops commence mopping up and post standing patrols at entrances to town. 12:15 hrs - Gen. ZONCO's column followed by Allied party motored into town finding it already occupied by Gen. BRISOTTO's troops. 14:00 hrs - Party interviewed Parish Priest who acted as intermediary for rebels. Owing to his evasion of certain points that were raised failed to obtain satisfactory answers to all pertinent questions. 14:30 hrs - Party visited CORR barracks to interrogate only rebel arrested up to this time. He was a Venetian who stated that he had crossed enemy lines 12 days before and had come to COMISO with his wife

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Up to time party left COMISO no arms had been found by troops.

14:45 hrs - Party left COMISO returning directly to SYRACUSE.

NOTE - 307 kms. south of town on return journey found two unexploded shells minus their fuzes standing up in road.

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NOTES:-

(A) On returning to SYRACUSE each evening a meeting was held at which Lt-Col. Howard and Major Manley informed all present what they had seen during the day and what their impressions had been. Those attending the meeting each evening were as follows:-

- Major GRAY, O.C. Troops, SYRACUSE.
- Capt. BAKER, 21 FSB (on 10 Jan. only).
- Mr. NESTOR, U.S. Consul General, PALERMO. (on 10 Jan. only).
- General DE LORENZIS, G.O.C. II Bde. "SABAUDA" Div.
- Col. SALERNO, 145 Inf. Regt. (on 10 Jan. only).
- Lt. Col. ROSSITTO, 145 Inf. Regt.
- Major RE. O.C., CORR, SYRACUSE.
- Capt. AZZOLINI, Liaison Officer to G.O. Troops, SYRACUSE.
- Dr. COCUZZA, Prefect of SYRACUSE Province.
- Fto. COHEN, Took the minutes of the meeting.

(B) The only telephone line between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA is an A.A.F. meteorological one which continues to AGRIGENTO. This line was put at the disposal of the Prefect of RAGUSA during the period of the rebellion by O.C. Troops, SYRACUSE. This line was interrupted for two days during the rebellion.

(C) For translation of anti-call up leaflet circulated in RAGUSA in the month of Dec 44 see Appendix 'E'.

(D) Reference Lt. MARIANI's estimate that the rebels were about 500 strong on page 7, it is probable that many spectators were included and that the number of rebels were at least halved.

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~~TOP SECRET.~~3. BACKGROUND AND CAUSES:-(a) Background:-

Though Sicilians belong to the Italian race they differ in many respects from the Italians on the mainland; this can be largely accounted for by the influences left behind by the various races which have occupied the island in historical times, each of which has left its mark on the customs, language and character of the people.

Sicilians are very individualistic and selfish people who have little team or public spirit outside their own family, to which they are very closely tied, or Mafia circles, they are only loosely linked together and distrust for one another is common. They have, however, a deep individual pride in being Sicilian.

Their personal character is declared to be derived from relatives and intimate associates. Sicilian "omertà" is an impenetrable barrier to the outsider except upon their terms or to the better of them.

Corruption and deceit are rife among all classes, particularly so among the rich and urban population. The Contadini have the same weaknesses though they are generally hard working and industrious people.

A large proportion of the people are illiterate. From the end of the Great War until the advent of Fascism the few who were politically mature had rightist tendencies, because they felt that right politics gave protection to their vested interest. In the towns there were small groups of Socialists, principally among professional classes, and a few Communists. The most popular party was the church party known as the "Partito Popolare" under the leadership of Dr. Luigi Sturzo. Cooperation as an organized movement was then unheard of. Fascism had some of its early cells in Sicily, made headway out of the prevailing unsettled conditions, the town of RAGUSA being notable for its activity.

The majority of the people remained politically immature or apolitical.

Public demonstrations and disorders were infrequent, bribery and corruption was generally practiced. Organized brigandage and Mafia activities were common, especially in certain areas.

The Fascist Government, on the whole, neglected the welfare of the island, but in certain instances, efficiency was improved, notably with the railways. The Government managed to enforce its laws through its public administration, which later became corrupt and inefficient. The CORA were respected until recent years when they succumbed to corruption and began to lose the people's respect. An energetic campaign was carried on against the Mafia and brigandage, and crime reduced, and public safety largely restored.

The majority of the people were either apathetic, disinterested or against the Fascist wars of conquest and feared Italy's entry into the war against the Allies in 1940.

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Though conditions to begin with remained fairly normal, apart from certain restrictions, in the island, the people rapidly became war weary. Allied air attacks, the arrival of German troops and finally the Axis defeats in Africa, all added to this.

A reaction to Fascism began to set in and small individual Anti-Fascist groups began to form clandestinely.

The Allied landings in Sicily though Italy was still at war with the Allies were welcomed by the majority of the people even though they heralded the defeat of Italy. They saw in them what they imagined to be a speedy solution to their sufferings and problems, especially as Allied propaganda had led them to expect an improvement in their political and economic conditions.

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With the Allies came political freedom and the abolition of Fascism. Political parties formed and public meetings were held. The separatist party came to light as soon as PALERMO was occupied under the title of the Committee for the Independence of Sicily. Measures were taken to combat Fascism and remove prominent Fascist from official positions. Quantities of Italian, German and some Allied war material was left everywhere after the speedy campaign and some time passed before its collection into dumps began. During this period certain elements, with an eye to the future, collected and hid arms and ammunition, the possession of which even in peace time is a source of pride to the Sicilian.

A.M.G. administration raised the peoples hopes to expect a new era of honest and efficient administration. They were soon dismayed to find that many former Italian officials were still in office and could not understand, firstly, why they had been retained and secondly, why many officials were still open to bribery and corruption.

The rise in the cost of living which followed and the scarcity of food encouraged both crime and black market activity. The police forces and public authorities were unable to stop its growth. The people began to become disillusioned.

During the winter 1943/44 crime and armed banditry were on the increase and there was a considerable lack of public safety in many areas.

In Feb. 44, A.M.G. relinquished its administration, Sicily being returned to the control of the Italian Government with A.C.G. in an advisory capacity. MISOITO was appointed by the Government as first High Commissioner for Sicily.

The public administration without A.M.G. behind it began to lose the respect and confidence of the people and was the target for much criticism much of which was incorrect or unfair.

The separatist claimed at different times to have the support of either Great Britain or the U.S.A. and began a new intensive political campaign together with criticism of the Italian Government. Stormy scenes took place at separatist meetings.

The consignment of grain to the Granai del Popolo met with a poor response on account of the low price of 1000 lire per quintal for hard grain being fixed when it could be sold illicitly to the black market for more money. This resistance was encouraged by the separatist who had support of the large "latifundist". Another factor which may have contributed to the failure to reach the quota for each province was that the latter may have been fixed too high. At the end of Dec 44, 43% of the total quota fixed had been consigned to the Granai del Popolo, SICUSA province, however consigned 95% of its total quota during this period.

Crime and brigandage continued. Robbery was encouraged by the rising prices and economic distress.

On the 19 Oct 44 in PALERMO, while a large crowd was demonstrating against economic conditions a hand grenade was thrown and Italian troops opened fire, thereby wounding a number of the civilians. This incident brought forth a storm

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On the 19 Oct 44 in RALEMC, while a large crowd was demonstrating against economic conditions a hand grenade was thrown and Italian troops opened fire, thereby wounding a number of the civilians. This incident brought forth a storm of protest and the feeling was very bitter against the troops who had taken part in the firing. Criticism against the Italian army was general, which, it was claimed, should be at the front and not firing on its own people. The separatist used this incident as a further pretext to attack the Italian Government and claimed that it had no authority as it had not been elected by the free will of the people.

The separatist continued with their opposition to the Italian Government and its representatives in Sicily, and encouraged the people though not openly to adopt a form of civil disobedience.

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An Official British Government statement was made denying support of the Separatist, though officially disclaimed the Separatist leaders still tried to demonstrate to their less well informed followers that they were being supported by the Allies by means of associating whenever possible with Allied officers in public places and by inviting them to their homes.

Early in Dec-44 the first phase of the call up of the 1922/1923 and first quarter of the 1924 classes was begun.

This brought a storm of protest and an outburst of public demonstration. In PALERMO, CATANIA and CANICATTI they lasted for several days, while at PALMA DI MONTECHIARO in AGRIGENTO province armed demonstrators who objected against the call up held the town for 24 hrs before the CCR and troops were able to regain control.

The Separatist together with a large weight of public opinion encouraged the men called up, especially students, not to present themselves, but to demonstrate instead. Further opposition to the call up was created by a rumour prevailing everywhere at the time that those called up were being sent to units which would go to BURMA, CHINA or JAPAN.

During Dec 44 the German counter offensive in Belgium and their small offensive in Italy gave impetus to the revival of Fascism, more of its exponents coming out into the open. Pro-Nazi elements also became active with the fabrication of rumours. These elements together with the Separatist began using the pretext of the call up to create further unrest. Furthermore it is not unlikely that some Nazi subversive agents have been at work stirring up trouble, but there is no evidence to confirm this. Enemy agents recently dropped in Sicily and who were captured had quite different missions to accomplish.

The second phase of the call up began on 8 Jan 45 with the calling up of the 1918 to 1921 classes. This had already been postponed a few days at the request of ALDISIO who feared that further demonstrations would take place.

Demonstrations began against the call up in the main towns of RAGUSA and parts of SYRACUSE provinces on 3 Jan 45. In the remainder of the island the call up proceeded according to plan.

The series of events during the last few years ¹⁹⁴⁰⁻¹⁹⁴⁴ with the Sicilian character have both contributed towards the present situation and the attitude of the population.

The people have lost confidence in themselves and in their government and are disillusioned. Furthermore they have had for some time now a completely post war outlook which makes it difficult for them to bear with the continued war conditions and to make the contributions now demanded of them to prosecute the war against the Nazis.

A growing lack of sympathy for the Allies has further added to this complex outlook.

(b) Causes:-

I. The Call Up of certain classes for military service. Reasons and pretexts were:-

(a) General war weariness little or no desire to continue fighting in a war which Italy has lost, especially now that the war has moved away from Sicily.

(b) Population has reached a post war state of thinking.

(c) Low rates of pay and family allowances in the Italian army.

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- (b) Population has reached a post war state of thinking.
- (c) Low rates of pay and family allowances in the Italian army.
- (d) Unwilling to serve while many of their brothers and relatives are prisoners in Allied hands.
- (e) The dislike for Italians by Sicilians makes them unwilling to serve in the Italian army under Italian officers.
- (f) Fear because they do not know what they are being called upon for and how they will be treated.
- (g) Fear that they will be sent to BURMA, JAPAN or CHINA.
- (h) Fear of leaving those whom they support by their earnings when economic conditions are bad and the cost of living high.
- (i) Desire to be given good uniforms and boots, and to be given food and pay equal to Allied military standards.

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- (j) Short notice for call up.
- (k) Desire to obtain Allied status before they fight alongside Allies.
- (l) Desire to know the armistice terms

II. Political:-

- (a) Italian Government has little authority.
- (b) Opposition to and distrust of local Government authorities.
- (c) Desire to overthrow local authorities.
- (d) Separatist agitation.
- (e) Recent revival of Fascism and Fascist agitation.
- (f) Pro-Nazi agitation.
- (g) Anti-Allied feelings.
- (h) Desire to embarrass the Allies.
- (i) Possible activity of enemy agents.

III. Failure of local authorities:-

- (a) Failure of local authorities to enforce the law and general inefficiency.
- (b) Failure of local authorities to foresee trouble, make plans accordingly, and take effective measures to nip trouble in the bud.
- (c) Quacatura and P.S. agents inefficient and fear to take strong action.
- (d) OCRR have lost much of their former prestige, were inefficient and were not prepared to put up a fight when attacked.
- (e) OCRR who have their wives and families in Sicily fear reprisals on them if they forcefully enforce the law.

IV. Economic Conditions:-

- Economically the area affected by the rebellion is not nearly as badly off as other parts of Sicily. The majority of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihood and have not felt inflation and food shortage the same as those who live in the large towns. Rations of bread and pasta have been distributed regularly, however, if larger quantities were available at reasonable prices, it would do much to content the population. Unemployment is slight apart from 800 asphalt miners who are out of work.
- Though economic conditions were not a direct cause of the rebellion, the population complain that:-
 - (a) They fear that much of the grain they produce is exported to the mainland.
 - (b) After RAGUSA province had already consigned 90% of its grain quota to the granal, Aldisio's recent demand for a further 25 kgs of grain from the landowners and contadini's personal reserve created discontent.

V. Various:-

- (d) Separatist agitation.
- (e) Recent revival of Fascism and Fascist agitation.
- (f) Pro-Nazi agitation.
- (g) Anti-Allied feelings.
- (h) Desire to embarrass the Allies.
- (i) Possible activity of enemy agents.

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V. Various:-

- (a) Availability of arms and ammunition in Sicily.

4. FAILURE OF CORR TO CONTROL THE SITUATION:-

- (a) One of the main reasons why the disorders in the Province of RAGUSA took such a dangerous turn was that in many instances the CORR failed to carry out their duties and in certain others were considered by the Italian Military Authorities to be guilty of cowardice. The following are examples of the above:-

- (1) At RAGUSA on the morning of 7 Jan 45 the Prefect asked for reinforcements from the CORR barracks at RAGUSA ISLEA as

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he was then assigned in the Profettura. Lt-Col. MANDAMICI, C.O., CORR, sent out a 2nd Lt. in charge of some 60 men. After a short skirmish at the bridge, most of them turned back and only the 2nd Lt. and 9 men reached the Profettura.

The Prefect again telephoned to Lt-Col. MANDAMICI for more reinforcements but the latter remained in barracks at the head of his men. His first appearance at the Profettura was at 21:00 hrs after General RONCO had arrived and some time after relative order had been restored by the troops. Both the Prefect and General RONCO said plainly that they no longer considered the CORR garrisoned in towns in the area affected to be trustworthy.

(ii) At COMISO on 7 Jan 45 some dozen CORR commanded by a maresciallo handed their arms over to the rebels without firing a shot.

(iii) At VITTORIA a certain number of CORR were disarmed without firing a shot on 6 Jan 45.

(iv) At RAGUSA BLEA 5 CORR were disarmed without firing a shot on 6 Jan 45.

(v) The previous behaviour of the CORR in the CATANIA riots of 15 Dec 44 (not referred to in this report) coupled with the general opinion about their conduct in the RAGUSA Province affair lead one to the following generic conclusion about the CORR in SICILY:-

(i) They have been incapable of showing the necessary determination to quell civil disorder in its initial stages and before it became dangerous.

(ii) They have lost their own self respect and the esteem of the people.

(iii) The officers are often very indifferent. The recent troubles at CATANIA and RAGUSA proved the two senior officers concerned to be at any rate inefficient and probably timid.

(iv) Both officers and men more often than not are married and have families in the towns where they are garrisoned. Since a considerable proportion of them are Sicilian this is a guarantee that they will not shoot, even in self defence because they fear reprisals.

(v) The rank and file seem to be very old or very young. At COMISO the average age of the garrison appeared to be 40.

(vi) They are inadequately armed to deal with (a) street riots, (b) armed rebellion, and are probably bewildered by the recent regulations issued after the PALERMO riots governing their use of arms in the case of civil disorder.

5. COMMENTS ON ACTION TAKEN BY ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE ORDER.

(a) Command:-

(i) Military action against the rebels was directed as far as possible by General MARIOTTI, C.O.C. Comando Territoriale della Sicilia from his H.Q. at PALERMO.

This was a mistake firstly because his communications by telephone with General BRISOTTO at AGRICENTO/CELA/ by telephone with General BOVIO at RAGUSA were slow

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- This was a mistake firstly because his communications by telephone with General BRIGOTTO at AGRIGENTO/GELA/VITTORIA and with General RONCO at RAGUSA were slow, uncertain and controlled by civilian exchanges, and secondly because even had his communications been good he had not the necessary knowledge of local conditions to make his control effective at such a distance.
- It is surprising that a man of General MARIOTTI's experience should have failed to appreciate the necessity for complete control by the man on the spot (General RONCO) and that he should have been guilty of issuing the operation order which is attached to this report as Appendix 'D' without comment.
- (ii) Efficient leadership amongst Italian Army Officers and N.O.C. is hard to find, and when found their standards differ so widely from Allied standards that its value is hard to assess.

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Without any doubt however the energy and determination of General ROMCO ensured the restoration of order in RAGUSA whilst that of Lt. MARIANI saved the arms and ammunition dump at VITTORIA from being captured by the rebels.

Generally speaking most of the operations carried out by Italian Army Units large and small violated all the known principles of war.

Organisation was slow and clumsy, elementary battle drill such as ambushing, debussing, field formations, street patrols, the taking up of five positions etc., were carried out inefficiently.

No reconnaissance of any kind was made by either General or any of their officers prior to the occupation of COMISO.

The failure of General BRISOTTO to keep in touch, by means of reconnaissance patrols, with the rebels retiring to COMISO, after his arrival at VITTORIA at 19:00 hrs on 9 Jan., and his inertia that night and the following day ensured the effective dispersal of the rebels and the hiding of their arms.

General ROMCO and more especially General BRISOTTO appeared to have little idea of handling the particular guerilla type of operation which they were required to perform. Though General ROMCO, who is an able Commander, no doubt had his style cramped by General MARIOTTI's interference. He had in fact planned to surround and attack COMISO at dawn on 11 Jan. That this inability to adapt themselves to the circumstances was true of all ranks is shown by the fact that on 6 Jan., the reinforcement column of 100 men from CALTAJUSETTA was ambushed by the rebels, 1 officer and 2 O.R.'s killed and the remainder not having their rifles loaded surrendered and were disarmed after a short action in which the rebels suffered no casualties.

(b) Staff:-

It was quite impossible to guess on visiting the H.Q.'s. of both the Generals concerned if there was any attempt being made to allocate staff duties even in accordance with normal Italian procedure. There was no sign of any kind whatsoever, and in the case of General ROMCO "Q" appeared to be his own personal responsibility. General BRISOTTO apparently considered an ADC sufficient for all needs. Punctuality was noticeably absent from all operations. Reinforcement and supply columns never once arrived on time during the whole course of the operations.

(c) Transport:-

The striking power of the troops employed was crippled from lack of transport. Whether there is a real lack M.T. throughout the Island or whether that there is is uneconomically employed is not known, but there was a very definite shortage in the vital area.

General DE LAURENZIS at SYRACUSE had no vehicles with which to send General ROMCO urgently needed ammunition.

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General DE LAURENZIS at SYRACUSE had no vehicles with which to send General ROMCO urgently needed ammunition supplies on 9 Jan.

A vital M.T. supply column destined to leave CATANIA for SYRACUSE at 10:35 hrs on 10 Jan., by rail and to arrive at 14:47 hrs on the same day actually left by rail on the evening of the 10th arrived at MODICA, where it detained, late at night and finally reached RAGUSA by road early on the morning of the 11th.

The tendency to send M.T. columns by rail was a notable feature of all operations, and the excuse given was a shortage of fuel and the necessity for conserving tyres. The limitations imposed by time in carrying out this procedure and the risks run in adopting it are obvious.

(d) Communications:-

(i) All urgent communications between Italian H.Q.'s. were

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RAGUSA via

carried out by telephone. No R/T is available to the Italian Army I.S. Divisions and D.R.'s. were not able to use funds safely.

(ii) All telephone communications were served by civilian exchanges.

(iii) The line GELA/AGRIGENTO/PALERMO appeared to work fairly well for General BRISOTTO but General RONCO had to rely on the faulty R.A.F. line between RAGUSA and SYRACUSE - which was cut once - in order to keep in touch with his superior. All his messages had to be relayed on to PALERMO from SYRACUSE as there is no through communication.

(iv) General RONCO was working from the touring map of Italy 1/1,000,000 as issued by the R.A.O. d'Italia. No other maps were available to him or to his staff until supplies from Allied sources.

(a) Organisation and Order of Battle:-

(i) The organisation of an Internal Security Division is shown in Appendix 'E'.

The Italian Army Order of Battle for SICILY as at 5 Jan 45 is shown in Appendix 'F'.

Given the present poor road and rail communications of the Island, the lack of military transport with which sudden operational moves can be made (civilian transport is unsatisfactory in the case of civil disturbances) there would seem to be an unequal distribution of the armed forces throughout SICILY with too heavy a concentration of troops at PALERMO.

(ii) As is usual in the Italian Army when units were required to produce bodies in a hurry they were found to be very much under strength. The battalion of the 139 Regiment which arrived at RAGUSA from PALERMO on 3 Jan was 250 strong.

(iii) The fact that most of the troops employed were Sardinians from the SABAUDA Division made certain that there would be no disaffection on the part of the soldiers. The feelings between the Sicilian populace and the Sardinian troops of the SABAUDA and AOSTA Divisions have remained bitter throughout the Island since the PALERMO incidents of 19 Oct 44.

6. CONCLUSIONS:-

- (a) It is difficult to draw up a balance sheet showing the relative importance of the rebellion in the Province of RAGUSA. The people, however, who bore arms during the period 5/11 Jan 45 in the Province have been accorded the name of "rebels" and the disorders called "rebellion" for the following reasons:-
- (i) A definite attempt was made to besiege, attack and take over the Prefettura at RAGUSA.
 - (ii) At RAGUSA, COMISO and VITTORIA some of the GCR and troops were disarmed and in the case of COMISO imprisoned.
 - (iii) At COMISO a provisional committee of the people was set up which drew up its own laws, called upon all citizens to obey them, and prepared to defend the town against Government forces. It referred in a public manifesto (Appendix 'G')

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- (ii) At RAGUSA, COMISO and VITTORIA some of the GCR and troops were disarmed and in the case of COMISO imprisoned.
- (iii) At COMISO a provisional committee of the people was set up which drew up its own laws, called upon all citizens to obey them, and prepared to defend the town against Government forces. It referred in a public manifesto (Appendix 'G') to the Government forces as "the enemy" and apparently directed all activities in the area which were carried out against them.
- (iv) The attack against the arms and ammunition dump at VITTORIA was a calculated attack by armed forces against Italian Army troops and organised with the object of placing at the disposal of the COMISO committee large stocks of weapons and munitions.
- In short the sum total of the disorders during the period mentioned were co-ordinated, if badly so, in such a way as to attempt to overthrow the representatives of the legal Italian Government at the Provincial Capital and to control a large part of the Province.

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It was not a case of spontaneous "disorders" or "riots", provoked by the call up, but of rebellion, planned to force the Government to abandon it. On the credit side for the rebels the Government was forced to employ seven days and approximately 1600 troops and CCRB in order to quell the rebellion, and of this total, 1240 had to be dispatched from other centres thus weakening the internal security at CATANIA, SYRACUSE and AGRIGENTO at an inopportune moment. Furthermore in addition to many minor acts of sabotage some 150 soldiers or CCRB were disarmed and their weapons taken off them, 1 officer and 6 other ranks were killed and about 26 wounded, and the Government was forced to suspend the call up for the Province of RAGUSA.

- (b) The three danger periods during the rebellion were as follows:-
- (i) 6/7 Jan when RAGUSA town might have been taken had the rebel action been more determined and skilful. The taking over of the Prefettura at RAGUSA by the rebels would undoubtedly have spurred and prolonged the rebellion.
 - (ii) 9 Jan when had it not been for the able and courageous defence of the arms and ammunition depot at VITTORIA the rebellion might have been given a dangerous impetus by the capture of large stocks of war material including at least three serviceable artillery pieces.
 - (iii) During the whole period 5/9 Jan the area GIARATANA, CHIARAMONTE, COMISO, and VITTORIA was sufficiently under control of the rebels to enable enemy aircraft to land at the airfields at COMISO and VITTORIA or to drop supplies or agents unhindered and unreported anywhere in the area. The rebels at COMISO were reported by the CCRB to have stated that they expected a drop by the Germans at DONNAPUGATA.

- (c) The reason for the moderate success enjoyed by the rebels may be summarised as:-
- (i) The good breeding ground the Province of RAGUSA offered for discontent which was fostered by the unpopularity of the call up, by separatism and Fascism, by the circulation of a great number of arms and by the high cost of living.
 - (ii) The failure of the Civilian Authorities to foresee what form of violence the growing discontent would be likely to take and to suppress the rebellion in its initial stages.
 - (iii) The disgraceful and in some cases cowardly conduct of the CCRB.
 - (iv) The inefficiency of the Italian Army units employed.
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- (iii) The disgraceful and in some cases cowardly conduct of the OCRR.
- (iv) The inefficiency of the Italian Army units employed.
- (v) The difficulties of transport and communications facing the Italian Army Authorities.
- (d) The Italian Army succeeded in its task of restoring law and order in the Province. It failed in its task of capturing the rebels their arms and ammunition. It is a safe assumption that the great majority of those who took part in the rebellion will not now be found. Whilst it is difficult to assess the numbers of rebels engaged there are probably still at large throughout the Province not less than 300 and not more than 800 well armed men who have at their disposal a few machine guns; a good number of light machine guns and sub-machine guns and considerable quantities of Italian rifles and hand grenades.

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There is no apparent lack of ammunition. Only very few of these hidden arms are likely to be recovered by either the Military or Civil Authorities. The majority of these men are now "hunted". They will go to ground either in the towns or the hills or try to join one of the brigand bands operating in SICILY. They will form a reserve of easy recruits for future disturbances should they occur. At the moment they are not organized and led, their danger is therefore only potential.

- (c) Discontent, existing at present mainly from the call up, Separatist agitation, latent Fascism, and in some cases economic distress, combined with brigandage will contribute to the continuation of isolated acts of violence throughout the Island. Such a semi permanent state disorder is unlikely to crystallize into rebellion unless the pretext is a strong one, the moment favorable and suitable leaders emerge. The two most likely pretexts in the near future may be the call up and shortage of food, but unless grave weakness is shown by the Civil and Military Authorities disorders are likely to remain localised.

- (f) Although most of the proceedings connected with the rebellion were carried out in an atmosphere of comic opera, and although the casualties on both sides were slight (see Appendix 'G') the danger which it constituted to the Allied war effort was that firstly a large tract of territory, including two airfields, was controlled by a movement hostile to the present Italian Government and possibly in a lesser degree to the Allies, and secondly that with a little more organization and impetus a state of affairs would have arisen necessitating Allied intervention. Since the Allies are continually seeking opportunities to drop agents North of the line and to exploit just such circumstances as happened in RAGUSA Province it is not unreasonable to suppose that where the Germans could retaliate economically they might well try to do so.

7. LESSONS BROUGHT OUT BY REBELLION:-

- (a) In order to discourage activities on a similar scale breaking out elsewhere in the Island a stern example must be made of men convicted of bearing arms and of killing or wounding any members of the armed forces. SICILY which is a troublesome area to administer should have first class prefects and questors. Inefficient or weak administrators should be weeded out now, if they exist.
- (b) A complete report on the CORR in SICILY should be made with a view to punishing officers and men who have failed in their duty during the recent disorders at CATANIA, RAGUSA and elsewhere, and to reorganising and strengthening the

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- (e) A complete report on the OCRR in Sicily should be made with a view to punishing officers and men who have failed in their duty during the recent disorders at CATANIA, RAGUSA and elsewhere, and to reorganising and strengthening the Legion in order to cover some of the defects mentioned in para 4 sub para (b).
- (e) The following points regarding the military organisation in the Island should be studied:-
- (1) In a grave emergency the need for a delegation of full powers to the military commander on the spot by the High Commissioner for Sicily and the Commando Territoriale della Sicilia, i.e. he must not be tied by advice from PALERMO military or civil or by regulations as to when he can open fire or upon what conditions he is allowed to use hand grenades etc.

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- (ii) The policy of strengthening garrisons by drawing off small numbers of men from units in other provinces is uneconomical.
A small mobile striking force should therefore be formed to be held as a reserve for immediate employment in cases of emergency.
- (iii) Provincial Capitals must be adequately garrisoned, if necessary at the expense of other trouble centres. So long as the authority of the Prefect in his Prefettura is maintained disorders elsewhere are likely to remain localised.
- (iv) The transport situation of the Comando Territoriale della Sicilia should be improved.
- (v) Wireless communication should be restored to the Italian Army in SICILY for essential headquarters in order to overcome the existing difficulties of communication.
- (vi) A report should be made on the organisation, equipment and efficiency of the AOSTA and SABAUDA Divisions with recommendations as to how their value for an internal security role could be increased.
- (vii) An energetic press and radio campaign by the Italian Authorities preparing the people for the call up is essential. This was not in fact carried out in some of the Sicilian Provinces. In the Province of MESSINA where both the Civil and Military Authorities took great pains by means of posters, articles in the press, conferences, etc., to prepare the ground for the call up, well over the 1000 men expected, from the 1922/1923 and first quarter 1924 classes, were accepted for service with the colours.

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
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


LEGEND


- Standard gauge roads
- First class roads used during operations
- Other roads used during operations
- Unfield

PROVINCE OF RAGUSA

1/500,000



APPENDIX A



PROVINCE OF RAGUSA

1/500,000

MILES 10 50 100

Major roads
Other roads

APPENDI "B"

MANIFESTO ISSUED BY Dottore NAITANA, PREFECT
of RAGUSA, on 8 Jan. 1945.

The Prefect of the Province of RAGUSA.

GIVEN the particular and exceptional needs of the moment necessary to maintain normal public order at all costs throughout the Province;

GIVEN the ordinance 16.12.1944 of the High Commissioner for SICILY;

IN VIEW OF the necessity for prohibiting, until further orders can be issued, all assemblies or public meetings in public or private places;

GIVEN the ordinance 3 Jan. No. 019 Gab. di P.S.;

GIVEN the existing texts of the laws of P.S. (public order);

GIVEN article 19 of the existing urban and Provincial byo-laws;

D I R E C T S

- 1) - From to-day and until rescinded participation in 3034 assemblies or meetings inside or outside of houses is prohibited throughout all Provincial communes.
- 2) - Whoever is found spoiling or destroying this manifesto will be liable to severe punishment.
- 3) - The agents of Public law and order are entrusted with the rigorous application of the present order.

RAGUSA, 8 Jan. 1945.

The Prefect NAITANA.

The Prefect of the Province of RAGUSA.

GIVEN the particular and exceptional needs of the moment necessary to maintain normal public order at all costs throughout the Province;

GIVEN the ordinance 15.12.1944 of the High Commissioner for SICILY;

IN VIEW OF the necessity for prohibiting, until further orders can be issued, all assemblies or public meetings in public or private places;

GIVEN the ordinance 3 Jan. No. 019 Gab. Gi P.S.;

GIVEN the existing texts of the laws of P.S. (public order);

GIVEN article 19 of the existing urban and Provincial bye-laws;

D I R E C T S

- 1) - From to-day and until rescinded participation in 3034 assemblies or meetings inside or outside of houses is prohibited throughout all Provincial communes.
- 2) - Whoever is found spoiling or destroying this manifesto will be liable to severe punishment.
- 3) - The agents of Public law and order are entrusted with the rigorous application of the present order.

RAGUSA, 8 Jan. 1945.

The Prefect MAITANA.

(A) Notice and (B) Manifesto printed in COMISO,
issued by the Provisional Committee of the
People, 9 Jan. 1945 and posted all over the
town.

(A)

NOTICE

All citizens are warned that whoever is found in the act of robbery or of any kind of violation to rights of private property will be immediately punished by sentence of death by means of shooting in the back.

THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE.

(B)

PEOPLE CITIZENS !

In order that the uncertainty of the times should be felt as little as possible and in order that public life should rapidly return to normal you are invited to remain calm, to return to your normal occupation and to collaborate with the Provisional Committee of the People.

With reference to the above the following is established :--

- 1) All legislative decrees, decree-laws, laws, instructions, bye-laws and municipal instructions which are not at variance with the new decrees issued by the Committee will be neither cancelled or altered.
- 2) Any citizen who has complaints or suggestions etc. to make may visit the Palazzo Comunale at any time where he will be heard and helped within the limits of the present conditions.
- 3) All public offices will resume their normal functions as from today.
- 4) Curfew is re-imposed from 2000 hrs. to 0500 hrs.
- 5) The roads entering the town are blocked and therefore those who have to leave it for essential reasons (work, sickness, etc.) are requested to obtain a pass which will be issued by the Comune.

All citizens are warned that whoever is found of robbery or of any kind of violation to rights of private property will be immediately punished by sentence of death by means of shooting in the back.

THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE.

(B) PEOPLE CITIZENS !

In order that the uncertainty of the times should be felt as little as possible and in order that public life should rapidly return to normal you are invited to remain calm, to return to your normal occupation and to collaborate with the Provisional Committee of the People.

With reference to the above the following is established :-

1) All legislative decrees, decree-laws, laws, instructions, bye-laws and municipal instructions which are not at variance with the new decrees issued by the Committee will be neither cancelled or altered. 3003

2) Any citizen who has complaints or suggestions etc. to make may visit the Palazzo Comunale at any time where he will be heard and helped within the limits of the present conditions.

3) All public offices will resume their normal functions as from today.

4) Curfew is re-imposed from 2000 hrs. to 0500 hrs.

5) The roads entering the town are blocked and therefore those who have to leave it for essential reasons (work, sickness, etc.) are requested to obtain a pass which will be issued by the Comune.

6) The service of public order and of night watches is assigned to special patrols which will have the task of preventing any violation of person or property.

7) Anyone found circulating after curfew will be held when called upon to do so, will produce identity papers and justify his actions.

8) Violation of domicile, abuse of arms, robberies, treason, contact with the enemy at the present time and until further instructions are issued cancelling the present ones, will be punished by shooting: the execution to take place in the public square.

./...

- 9) Rations will be distributed normally.
- 10) In the case of enemy forces attacking the town the signal for "state of alarm" will be given by ringing the bells in peals of three.

CCN130, 9 January 1945.

THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE.

TOP SECRET.

APPENDIX "D"

OPERATION ORDER from General MARIOTTI

to General RONCO and ERIOTTO

10 Jan 1945 1630 hrs.

From Comando Territoriale
To General RONCO Ercolo
To General ERIOTTO Silvio
PALERMO
RAGUSA
VITTORIA.

No. 282/C1 di prot. I congratulate General RONCO and the troops under his command for their determined action during the last few days which resulted in the restoration of order at RAGUSA and I inform him that a supply column is on the way in accordance with his request escorted by 100 men of the 45 Inf Regt.

I also congratulate General ERIOTTO on the occupation of VITTORIA and I wish him too to express my warmest congratulations to the personnel of the arms and munitions depot for their determined and courageous action during the rebel attack on the depot itself.

COMISO, still under control of the rebels, now remains to be liberated with the object of capturing the rebels themselves and bringing in their arms and munitions.

To this end:

General ERIOTTO will move from VITTORIA at about 0900 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan in such a way as to be able to attack the town of COMISO at about 1200 hrs.

General RONCO will arrange to block the road RAGUSA COMISO at 1200 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan with such troops as he has available, who will not push further west than the line VILLA ARZIZIO - CASCIANA - FRASCIA (reference map 1/100,000).

Signed General MARIOTTI

No. 282/01 di prot. I congratulate General RONCO and the troops under his command for their determined action during the last few days which resulted in the restoration of order at RAGUSA and I inform him that a supply column is on the way in accordance with his request escorted by 100 men of the 45 Inf Regt.

I also congratulate General BRISOTTO on the occupation of VITTORIA and I wish him too to express my warmest congratulations to the personnel of the arms and munitions depot for their determined and courageous action during the rebel attack on the depot itself.

CCMISO, still under control of the rebels, now remains to be liberated with the object of capturing the rebels themselves and bringing in their arms and munitions.

To this end:

General BRISOTTO will move from VITTORIA at about 0900 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan in such a way as to be able to attack the town of CCMISO at about 1200 hrs.

General RONCO will arrange to block the road RAGUSA CCMISO at 1200 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan with such troops as he has available, who will not push further west than the line VILLA ARIZZO - CASCIEN - TRASCIA (reference map 1/100,000).

Signed General MARIOTTI

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET.

APPENDIX

W. E. Internal Security Division

Div HQ
22 offrs 78 ORs

1 Bde	1 Engr Bn 12 offrs 311 ORs	1 Med Sec 7 offrs 68 ORs	1 Sup Sec 3 offrs 22 ORs	1 MT Sec 3 offrs 72 ORs	1 Sec CQPR 15 ORs
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Regt 57 offrs 1031 ORs

Regt

1 Bn	Supt Coy 6 MC 6 81 mm Mortars	2 Bn 12 MC 16 LMC
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Rifle Coy

Supt Coy 6 MC 6 81 mm Mortars

Rifle Coy 3 MC 8 LMC 12 Sub MC

HQ pl

MC pl
3 MCRifle pl
4 LMC

Rif

(A) includes Bde HQ

APPENDIX "E"

W.E. Internal Security Division

Div HQ
22 offrs 78 ORs

Bn 1 Med Sec 1 Sup Sec 1 MT Sec 1 Sec CCR 2 Hie
311 ORs 7 offrs 68 ORs 3 offrs 22 ORs 3 offrs 72 ORs 15 ORs 118 offrs 2083 ORs
(A)

s Rest

1 Coy 2 Bn
6 MC 12 MC
6 81 mm Mortars 16 LMC

Rifle Coy Supt Coy Rifle Coy
6 MC 3 MC
6 81 mm Mortars 8 LMC
12 Sub MC

HQ pl MC pl Rifle pl Rifle pl
3 MC 4 LMC

~~TOP SECRET.~~

~~TOP SECRET.~~

APPENDIX "B"

Order of Battle Italian Army in SICILY as

at 5 Jan 44.

PALERMO

Territorial HQ SICILY

HQ 105th Div

3 Bde HQ (A)

5 Inf Regt (A)

6 Inf Regt (A)

139 Inf Regt (A) less one Bn

28 Bn Engr (A)

MONTESANTO Alpine Bn less two Coys

3 Bde (5 Inf Regt
6 Inf Regt

MESSINA

HQ 5th Div

46 Inf Regt (S)

CATANIA

1 Bde HQ (S)

45 Inf Regt (S)

1 Coy Alpini

1 Bde (45 Inf Regt
46 Inf Regt

SYRACUSA

2 Bde HQ (S)

145 Inf Regt (S)

2 Bde (145 Inf Regt
16 Arty Regt

RAGUSA

1 Bn 139 Inf Regt (A)

2 Coys 145 Inf Regt (S)

CALTAGIRONE

1 Gp 16 Arty Regt (S)

CATANIA

16 Arty Regt less one GP (S)

ENNA

139 Bn Engr (S)

AGRIGENTO

4 Bde HQ (A)

4 Bde (22 Arty Regt
139 Inf Regt

MARTINI

22 Arty Regt (A)

Note A.

It is probable that owing to guard duties, sickness, leave, absence without leave etc. not more than 1/3 of the above units were available for special duty during the emergency.

Note B.

The following reinforcements were sent to the places indicated (early Dec figures refer to garrison troops).

RAGUSA VITTORIA MODICA From

Army CC.RR. Army

Early December

110 60 30

145 Regt SYRACUS.

MESSINA	6 Inf Regt (A) 139 Inf Regt (A) less one Bn 26 Bn Engr (A) MONTESANO ALPINE Bn less two Coys
CATANIA	HQ SAR.UD. Div 46 Inf Regt (S) 1 Bde HQ (S) 45 Inf Regt (S) 1 Coy Alpini
SIRACUSA	2 Bde HQ (S) 145 Inf Regt (S)
RAGUSA	1 Bn 139 Inf Regt (A) 2 Coys 145 Inf Regt (S)
CALTAGIRONE	1 Cp 16 Arty Regt (S)
CALTANISSETTA	16 Arty Regt less one GP (S)
ENNA	139 Bn Engr (S)
AGRIGENTO	4 Bde HQ (A)
TRAPANI	22 Arty Regt (A)
	4 Bde (22 Arty Regt 139 Inf Regt

Note A. It is probable that owing to guard duties, sickness, leave, absence without leave etc. not more than 1/3 of the above units were available for special duty during the emergency.

Note B. The following reinforcements were sent to the places indicated (early Dec figures refer to garrison troops).

	RAGUSA	VITTORIA	MODICA	FROM
	Army	CC.RR.	Army	Army
Early December	110	60	30	145 Regt SIRACUSA
End of December	90			" " "
3 January	180	70		139 Regt PALERMO
6 "				(125: 145 Regt SIRACUSA)
7 "	225			(100: 45 Regt CATANIA)
7 "	30			46 Regt LESSINA
7 "	25	50		16 Regt CALTANISSETTA
7 "	-----x	150		(CC.RR. : LESSINA and CATANIA)
Totals	660	180	330	70

* This total does not include 100 men of the 16 Arty Regt sent from CALTANISSETTA and 100 men of the 45 Inf Regt sent from CATANIA as escort to a supply column on 10 Jan. ~~TOP SECRET~~

COLASUALTIES.

	Italian Armed Forces		Rebels	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Reported during Rebellion:-	1.	6.	15 to 26.	5 to 13.
Italian Government Official Figures announced 16 Jan 45:-	2 (A)	16.	24.	19.
				65.

(4) Includes CORR Lieutenant killed at MARO Province of AGRIGENTO on 13 Jan 45.

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Robles and suspects arrested:-

(1) The Italian Government has announced that 30 rebels have been arrested among whom are some of the leaders of the rebellion.

(14) The Quosstore of RAGUSA stated that 264 rebels and suspects had been arrested of which 22 had been released in RAGUSA up to 17 Jan 45.

MINIATURED LEAFLET CIRCULATED IN PAGUSA

DEC. 1944.

An answer to "Italy at War" of

In the gazette of the 24th of this month a criminal madman writes "Italy at War" inciting all of us the youth (of Sicily) to take up arms once again in order to expel from our martyred land the loathed Nazi-fascists. To this man, a person certainly of great we answer WE WILL NOT GO, we will not go because our hearts tell us not to, because this is our sacred will, because our feelings in absolute opposition to any kind of militarism, can only register disgust and nausea for those who, after gambling at will with the unhappy fate of an Italy miserably and shamefully capitulated, try to gamble with the life so precious and so dear to us the youth (of Sicily), the life which is the dream and hope of our beloved ones. Shame! and above all contempt for those who discarding our history, forgetting how much we have suffered and our mothers wept, urge us to take up arms, to don our uniform caked with mud, and to fight under a flag not saturated with the pure blood of those who gave their lives on the battle field crying

" Land of my birth
the life which you gave me I hereby return to you"
but saturated with the shame of a dynastic house whose continued existence is unjustified and hateful. To the mad criminal of "Italy at War" we must affirm that our land, today as never, is pregnant with resurrected Garibaldian heroes who fought and suffered and died for the liberation of the soil of Italy, and of heroes of the Risorgimento who to their thoughts and actions added the sacrifice for the independence and union of Italy. Like these and like worthy sons we are ready to give all, even our lives. We, the youth (of Sicily) who have already suffered too much from the frightful violence of this war are unable to consider sane he who defines it as our "sacred duty" to respond to the call to arms, we cannot but declare him criminal who exhibiting the most gross political ignorance thinks that such a contribution to the war will give Italians the possibility of preparing the future of the country and of accelerating along the road to re-birth the fortunes of democratic and proletarian Italy. Such men are either deaf or pretend not to hear. A few days ago Anthony Eden publicly declared that Italy is a conquered country and as such has no right to

this man, a person certainly of great we answer
 WE WILL NOT GO, we will not go because our hearts tell us
 not to, because this is our sacred will, because our feelings
 in absolute opposition to any kind of militarism, can only
 register disgust and nausea for those who, after gambling at
 will with the unhappy fate of an Italy miserably and shameful-
 ly capitulated, try to gamble with the life so precious and
 so dear to us the youth (of Sicily), the life which is the
 dream and hope of our beloved ones. Shame! and above all
 contempt for those who discarding our history, forgetting
 how much we have suffered and our mothers wept, urge us to
 take up arms, to don our uniform caked with mud, and to fight
 under a flag not saturated with the pure blood of those who
 gave their lives on the battle field crying

30.

" Land of my birth

the life which you gave me I hereby return to you"
 but saturated with the shame of a dynastic house whose continued-
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 "Italy at War" we must affirm that our land, today as never,
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 and suffered and died for the liberation of the soil of Italy,
 and of heroes of the Risorgimento who to their thoughts and
 actions added the sacrifice for the independence and union of
 Italy. Like these and like worthy sons we are ready to give
 all, even our lives. We, the youth (of Sicily) who have
 already suffered too much from the frightful violence of this
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 duty" to respond to the call to arms, we cannot but declare him
 criminal who exhibiting the most gross political ignorance
 thinks that such a contribution to the war will give Italians
 the possibility of preparing the future of the country and of
 accelerating along the road to re-birth the fortunes of democratic
 and proletarian Italy. Such men are either deaf or pretend
 not to hear. A few days ago Anthony Eden publicly declared
 that Italy is a conquered country and as such has no right to
 expect any concessions at the peace table. We think that
 he could not have spoken more clearly.

For whom must we fight? For whom must we say goodbye
 to our dearly loved ones? For whom are we to shed our blood?
 Our questions can be epitomised in a single reply for those
 who have conquered us with shame and with betrayal, who have
 affirmed their imperialistic theories in every age, conquering
 a vast empire at the cost of the blood and sacrifice of others,
 and also for these opportunists who in order to maintain
 themselves in the saddle try the most desperate remedies.

We do not wish to go and we must not go.

The unknown author of "Italy at War" had also better realise that the future and guarantee for the liberty of our people will not be a gift of others which we do not want or aspire to, but the fruit of our titanic sufferings, of our assiduous labours and of our thirst for peace which burns within us.

YOUTH (OF SICILY) MEN AND WOMEN WHOM AN ODIOUS TYRANT IS ATTEMPTING TO BLIND, MOTHERS WHO HAVE CONSUMED THE BEST DAYS OF YOUR LIFE IN PAIN AND TEARS, WIDOWS WHO HAVE BEEN SNATCHED FROM THE AFFECTIONS OF YOUR BELOVED HUSBANDS BY THE BLOTS OF A DEVILISH WAR, WAR WOUNDED TORN AND MUTILATED IN FLESH AND BODY, UNITE WITH US, AND SWEAR WITH US, HATE, ETERNAL HATE, IMPELABLE HATE AGAINST ANYONE WHO TRIES TO GAMBLE ONCE AGAIN WITH OUR TOO OFT TORTURED LIVES.

Appendix 'I'.

1. Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MIA).....	20 Copies.
2. Mr. O.R. Radford, Chief of Intelligence F.W.B.....	2 "
3. Lt. Col. H.A.C. Howard, MIA.....	1 Copy.
4. Major. I. Manley, F.W.B.....	1 "
5. MIA, LO, SICILY.....	1 "

