

ACC

10000/143/1471

10000/143/1471

ITALIAN POLICE
NOV. 1944 - MAR. 1945

Up to 1939 the CC.RR. strength was 55,000. During the war the ceiling was doubled. This was done by the re-engagement of CC.RR who had been on pension and by recruitment from the army.

Most of the army recruits received no police training whatever and as the pensioners were men who are now over 60 years of age, there is an element in the CC.RR. that are of no use for police purposes.

Training schools ceased during the war and it was only last year (1944) that any attempt was made at training. At the present time a school for CC.RR. cadets had been in operation in Rome and last month a school for junior M.C.O.'s has been opened at the former training school at Florence. If there is to be a proper training to equip deficiencies it will be necessary to open more schools, dependent on finance provisions.

A large number of officers are of temporary grade and will disappear with the end of the war or as soon as suitable officers can be found to replace them. There are also officers who are purely military in their outlook and have no police training or background. In other words a place is being found in the CC.RR. for Italian Army Officers who are on the reserve and who should really be retired altogether.

There is a terrible lack of uniform and equipment, especially ~~in the~~ ^{at the} lack of sufficient motor vehicles practically immobilises this force which must of necessity be ready to go to affected spots where disorder breaks out.

The mere initial supply of uniform, sometimes of a second hand nature is not sufficient. Clothing and boots wear out, especially with men in forward areas and sufficient replacements are not to hand. Men have had to go forward without mess kits, knives forks and spoons.

Complaint is made of the lack of support given to the force by the Government. This acts to the detriment of the rehabilitation of CC.RR.

It is admitted that there is a lack of leadership by the Officers.

Nevertheless a start has been made by the new General to put the train on the rails again. The fact that CC.RR. have to meet so many demands for all forms of duty, both in the line and out, that it is a difficulty to get the men together for the necessary police training. The cadet training school will at least give the nucleus of a new force as also the Florence school. If these courses of study and training can be intensified and the CC.RR. given their proper allotment of clothing and arms and equipment, coupled with a gradual elimination of surplus and redundant personnel, there is no reason why the CC.RR. should not regain its former status. This will take time and patience is wanted and not derision especially when the country is not yet wholly occupied.

Minute 20

To : Director of Public Safety:

Before replying to IIA you may wish to have a review of the situation and a few general comments.

History. During the early part of our occupation of Italy the CC.RR were used as they were found and we were too much preoccupied to turn our attention to the reorganisation of the Force as a whole. It had long been recognised that the CC.RR had never attained a standard of efficiency comparable with that of the police in England or America, but it was not until the Carretta incident occurred in September last (in Italian Government territory) that our confidence in the ability of the Italian Police to maintain law and order was seriously shaken.

On 22nd September 1944 Brigadier Upjohn called a meeting of the heads of the Italian Police (the Director General of Public Security, the Commanding Generals of the CC.RR and CC.PP and the Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of the Interior). It was then agreed that everything possible must be done to restore public confidence in the police, to train officers and men to exercise initiative and carry out their duties with energy, to deal vigorously with complaints against the police, and to promote closer personal contact between officers and men. Slow progress has been made in this direction but no spectacular changes have manifested themselves nor indeed were they possible.

In November 1944 The Chief Commissioner wrote to the Prime Minister pointing out the need for reforming the Italian Police system and suggesting a Government Commission to study what reforms were practicable both as a long-term and a short-term policy. It was also stated that the Allied Commission was willing to furnish technical experts to advise the suggested Government Commission. The Prime Minister replied that reformation of the police was under consideration and that the course suggested by the Chief Commissioner might be adopted later. At that time I received the impression that the Ministry of the Interior was not enthusiastically in favour of the proposed Commission and that the reply of the Prime Minister was intended to close the matter. However, from time to time I mentioned the subject to the Director General of Public Security (H.E. Ferrari) but he said he was waiting for his staff to present a report on which they were working. Since the directions on the "New Deal for Italy" have been issued I have not re-opened the matter.

CC.RR Plan of Re-organisation. In October 1944 the Commanding General of the CC.RR (Gen. Orlando) submitted a plan for the re-organisation of the CC.RR to the Ministry of War. Briefly, this plan proposed the formation of 12 motorised detachments under 4 inter-regional commands. The detachments could not function without equipment particularly vehicles and automatic arms - and it was also suggested that they should be provided with radio. In effect, this scheme was not so much a re-organisation of the CC.RR as the imposition of a new service on the old structure to meet exceptional circumstances.

This plan has apparently lain at the Ministry of War for five months without any action being taken. On 16 March 1945 we revived this matter and asked the new Commanding General of the CC.RR (Gen. Brunetti) to retrieve the papers from the Ministry and have the plans scrutinised by General Radini in the light of his long police experience and technical knowledge.

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CO 36
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This plan has apparently lain at the Ministry of War for five months without any action being taken. On 16 March 1945 we revived this matter and asked the new Commanding General of the CC.RR (Gen. Brunetti) to retrieve the papers from the Ministry and have the plans scrutinised by General Taddei in the light of his long police experience and technical knowledge.

It must be said that, as far as converting the CC.RR into a really efficient Police Force is concerned, these plans do not go to the root of the matter.

Comments on CC.RR Failings. It would be a mistake to suppose that the CC.RR can be converted into a highly efficient Police Force merely by copying methods which have proved successful in other countries.

The main criticisms to which the CC.RR have been subjected lie not so much in the organisation itself as in the behaviour of the officers and men. They lack initiative, energy, firmness and the moral courage to carry out their duties without fear or favour. In short, they lack character. This is not a

criticism to be levelled at the police alone; it is a criticism of the Italian nation. A country cannot expect to have a better police than it deserves. The police are dependant on all other branches of public service and on members of the public, and it is futile to expect the standard of police to be improved simply by prescribing schemes of reorganisation.

Nevertheless the principal defects of the CC.RR are fairly obvious. It has been seen again and again that CC.RR officers have not shown the necessary qualities of leadership. In certain cases (for instance, the disorders in Ragusa and more recently in the demonstrations in Ascoli) the first thought of the CC.RR officers has been to find an excuse for absenting themselves before trouble develops. In other cases, CC.RR Officers who were present at the scene of disturbances have failed to take command of the situation and have allowed it to get out of hand. In such circumstances, little can be expected of the men themselves. In Army areas, where groups of CC.RR have been permanently attached to Allied Public Safety Officers they have performed extremely valuable work and have won many commendations from Allied Commanders. This is undoubtedly due to the leadership of the Public Safety Officers who not only know their job but take a personal interest in the CC.RR under their command.

Another defect in the organisation of the CC.RR is the lack of proper supervision by senior officers. This, of course, is common to all Italian organisations. The Italian official considers that he has done as much as can be expected of him when he has issued an order. He does not trouble to ensure that his instructions have been carried out. Our experience has been that the appointment of supervising officers achieves little, as the official regards such an appointment as a sinecure.

Measures for Reforms. The key to the reform of the CC.RR, which will be a very long process, is the training of efficient officers. This must be started at the top. During his term of 6 months as Commanding General of the CC.RR, General Orlando succeeded in improving the efficiency and morale of the Force and also in gaining the respect and affection of his men. His removal is a severe loss. As yet it is too early to estimate the qualities of his successor. It is essential however, that at CC.RR HQs there should be a man of long experience, technical knowledge and sound judgment to carry through such reforms as are practicable. This Sub-Commission has pressed for the appointment of General Taddei as Deputy Commander of the CC.RR and it appears that his appointment is imminent.

The next step is to recruit and train suitable young men as CC.RR officers. So far, very little has been done in this direction. Indeed, pressure has been exerted by the Ministry of War to fill CC.RR posts with Italian Army Officers who will otherwise be unemployed owing to the limitation of Army personnel. It may well be that the reluctance of the Ministry to confirm General Taddei in the rank of Deputy Commander with duties at CC.RR Headquarters may arise from a fear that he will resist efforts to utilise the CC.RR as a refuge for unqualified Army officers. It is not always realised by people outside the police service that a CC.RR officer is not merely an efficient Army officer. He needs specialised training and considerable experience to enable him to deal with Prefects, Questori, Procuratori del Regno, Pretori and many other officials concerned with public administration.

Once the right type of officers permeates the Force and improvement in the CC.RR and men will quickly follow. Properly trained senior officers can be

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Once the right type of officers permeate the Force and improvement in the MGs and men will quickly follow. Properly trained senior officers can be used for supervising the junior officers.

Method of Effecting Reform. It is clearly laid down in TAN 187 'New Deal for Italy' that the Allied Commission will not concern itself with the organization of the police, and therefore the reform of the Italian Police must come from the Italian authorities.

It is true that we have responsibility in AMG Regions, but there it is not possible for Public Safety Officers to devote time to training or supervising the CC.RR as Public Safety Officers in Army areas have been able to do with the small groups under their command.

During the static period in Army area Public Safety Officers initiated classes of training in Florence and Viareggio. This training had the most

- 2 -

beneficial effect, particularly in teaching EOCs and men to deal with Proclamation Offences and give evidence in AMG Courts. While this kind of work is possible during a lull in Army areas it cannot be undertaken by the solitary Provincial Public Safety Officer who has to cope with five distinct police forces, Prisons, Fire Services, Allied Military Police and Security Agencies, the control of civilian movement, prosecutions in AMG courts and numerous other duties. Reforms must therefore be left to the CC.RR command.

It is therefore recommended that this Commission contents itself with insisting on the appointment of General Taddai at CC.RR Headquarters and that both he and the Commanding General be impressed with the urgent necessity of training young CC.RR officers in practical police duties and that military training as such should be a minor consideration. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the absorption of Army officers to fill responsible CC.RR posts can only contribute to the lowering of CC.RR efficiency and morale. You may consider that before replying to the V.P.'s letter it would be as well to discuss with General Taddai the plans for reorganising the CC.RR which he has been studying.

There is one last point which perhaps I should mention though it is not a matter on which action can be taken now. To my mind the CC.RR will never be a satisfactory Police Force according to our standards while it remains under the Ministry of War. This is certainly not the view of the C.RR themselves, nor as far as I am aware is there any substantial body of Italian opinion in favour of transferring the CC.RR to the Ministry of the Interior, though that seems a most desirable change. Such a reform in any event could not be considered until after the war is over.

6004



A.F. WICKS Lt. Col.

25-3-45
AW/G.

The C.C.R.R. depend on the Ministry of War for all that concerns enlistment, organization, administration, management of promotion lists, equipment, armament and all requirements for military service.

6003

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

30 March 1945

Ref: 3626/18/XC

Memorandum:

1. A committee is appointed consisting of the following officers, to meet at the call of the Chairman thereof, for the purpose of examining the question of reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces.

Colonel Charles Icletti - Chairman
Colonel John W. Chapman
Colonel W. G. Fidsley

2. The committee, in reporting its recommendations, will consider the following:

a. Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?

b. If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about.

c. If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Subcommittee or the Public Safety Subcommittee.

d. What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri.

3. The committee will consider this matter as highly confidential and urgent. A report by 5 April is desired.

By command of Rear Admiral STONE:

Norman E. Fiske

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel

Acting Executive Commissioner

SECRET

2067

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

490 074

Office of the Executive Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

- Colonel Charles Poletti, LAZIO-UMBRIA Region.
- " John W. Chapman, Public Safety Sub-Commission.
- " W.G. Pidsley, Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMIA)
- Civil Affairs Section.
- Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1. The Committee is composed of representatives of the various Allied Governments and the United Nations, and is charged with the task of investigating and reporting on the situation in the occupied territories.

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[Signature]

JOHN W. CHAPMAN

Colonel

Public Safety Sub-Commission

SECRET

PS. Sep 6

MEMORANDUM.

M.S. Bonomi's report, dated 26th March, 1945.

It was thought, on receipt of this report, that it was one involving the reorganization of the Italian Police Services; instead of which it is actually pointing out the differentiation in treatment between the G.A.M. and the other Police Agencies.

It is alleged that trouble and dissatisfaction are causing the G.A.M. receiving an inferior scale of rations and free medical treatment which the other Police Agencies do not get.

Accommodation.

A large central barracks is required in Rome to house the Police ^{force} the capacity of which should be 2,000 together with 2,000 camp beds. The present system of Police living in private houses is condemned in that the men cannot be trained properly or assembled to take action in the event of an emergency.

Return of Property.

103

Three main places are mentioned which are occupied by the Allies, the return of which is urgently required:-

- 1- the barracks near the Vittoriano, Rome occupied by the Allies.
- 2- the Police training school at Casserta, occupied by the Royal Navy.
- 3- the motor pool for service and repair of vehicles at Via Francesco Saverio, Rome, occupied by the Allies.

The report details a large deficiency in arms and ammunition as also clothing and equipment, bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, fuel and lubricants

Preliminary observations on the report indicate that there is a serious shortage of resources.

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1051

Return of Property.

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- 1- the barracks near the Vittoriano Rome occupied by the Allies.
- 2- the Police training school at Caserta occupied by the Royal Navy.
- 3- the motor pool for service and repair of vehicles at Via Venezia Casanelli. Rome, occupied by the Allies.

The report details a large deficiency in arms and ammunition as also clothing and equipment, bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, fuel and lubricants

Preliminary observations on the report indicate that there is a serious shortage in essential material to enable the Police Agencies to function satisfactorily and is the assistance of Economics and Supply Division can be enlisted to give priority to these Police Agencies it would go a long way towards helping the Police to function more efficiently. It is, nevertheless, thought that some pruning of the needs could be effected and priority given to certain articles.

His Excellency rightly points out that in the Islands of Sicily and Sardinia as well as in Calabria, without an efficient means of locomotion, the police are at a disadvantage in dealing with outbreaks of disorder.

2070

It is felt that great stress is being laid on the forces other than CC.RR. whereas in the reports of disorders received from certain places in liberated Italy it has invariably been the CC.RR. who have taken action. On the total number of disorders reported in only about 3% can it be said that the CC.RR. have failed to meet requirements. On the credit side it must be recorded that from AMG and Army territory good reports are continually received as to the excellent work done by the CC.RR.

The general observation on this report - a preliminary one - is that M. R. Bonoli is only touching one angle of the reorganization of the Police in Italy.

29th March, 1945.

JOHN W. CRAMER,
Colonel, R.A.C.D.,
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

6037

MINUTE 47.

CC. RR. Reorganisation.

Reference is made to Memorandum No. 1676/40/55, dated 1944 March, 1945, by the Executive Commissioner.

Public Safety Sub-Commission will be pleased to nominate a member to the Sub-Committee to consider the reorganisation of the Italian Police referred to as CC. RR in the memorandum.

The terms of reference suggested are:-

1. Whether or not to unify all police agencies.
2. To determine the control, management and equipment of the police as a whole.
3. Review of officers at present in office, their screening, future selection, recruitment and training.

4. Recruitment and training of all police agencies.

Attention is directed to :-

1. PAX 427 "New Act for Italy", Schedule C, para. 1; wherein it is laid down that the Allied Commission will not concern itself with the organisation of the Italian Police. This Committee will therefore be in direct contravention of the directive.

2. The representations made by the Chief Commissioner at the investigation of the Public Safety Sub-Commission on 26th November, 1944 and again on the 21st December, 1944, suggesting such a Committee; the reply by H.E. Dowd on the 18th December, 1944, of which the following are excerpts:-

"the frame of the police taken as a whole is still sound".

"if there are faults they must be ascribed to the general state of disorder in which the whole country finds itself - these faults will therefore disappear at the end of this crisis."

6053

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2. The representations made by the Chief Commissioner at the instigation of the Public Safety Sub-Commission on 26th November, 1944 and again on the 21st December, 1944, suggesting such a Committee; the reply by H.L. Bennett on the 28th December, 1944, of which the following are excerpts:-

"the frame of the police taken as a whole is still sound".

"if there are faults they must be ascribed to the general state of disorder in which the whole country finds itself - these faults will therefore disappear at the end of this crisis."

"The competent officers are making the necessary studies and as soon as these studies have reached a concrete phase I will gladly follow your suggestion and entrust a commission with the task of examining them thoroughly in detail. I shall be most glad if technical members of the Allied Commission will participate in it".

This latter excerpt is of a date before PAM 457 and it will require careful decision if such technical advice can

be forced upon or given without reference to the dragutsmen of the New Deal. Failure to do this would involve the Commission in a responsibility which may have serious repercussions. If we force our formulas on the Italian Government, we must expect to have a certain degree of responsibility if things go wrong.

It is of note that any serious disturbances have occurred in liberated Italy since it was handed over. Specific cases being:-

1. Un'aria
2. Regnan
3. Rome Garotta incident
4. Rome Roatta incident.

Item 4 at the Mininale was one in which Metropolitan Police and not CC.MR were concerned.

It is conceded that all is not well in the Police set up in Italy, and may worsen.

6033

The impregnation of officers in the CC.MR with a wholly military background is bad. A Police trained CC.MR officer must be exclusively appointed to that branch of the service and here it is pointed out that the attempt to place MIA in control of the CC.MR will be a retrograde step. They have no conception of Police duty as such and all the military training in the world will not make policemen.

The CC.MR do not operate as an army in battle formation but as isolated units.

To train them for such work is what is required and if some form of training could be devised that will meet the approval of the Italian Government and not cross the conditions of the New Deal it would be the first step to a satisfactory public safety organization.

The strength of the combined Italian Police forces is approximately double that of Britain in relation to its population and by careful recruitment, training and improved conditions in the Italian force it would be possible to eliminate the rotten core that permeated the Italian Government during the Fascist regime and bring about a

specific cases being:-

1. Catania
2. Reggio
3. Rome Gasetto incident
4. Rome Montte incident.

Item 4 of the timetable was one in which Metropolitan Police and not CC.M. were concerned.

It is conceded that all is not well in the Police set up in Italy, and may worsen.

6033

The impregnation of officers in the CC.M. with a really military background is bad. A Police trained CC.M. Officer must be exclusively appointed to that branch of the service and here it is pointed out that the attempt to place MM.A in control of the CC.M. will be a retrograde step. They have no conception of police duty as such and all the military training in the world will not make policemen.

The CC.M. do not operate as an army in battle formation but as isolated units.

To train them for such work is what is required and if some form of training could be devised that will meet the approval of the Italian Government and not cross the conditions of the New Deal it would be the first step to a satisfactory public safety organization.

The strength of the combined Italian Police Forces is approximately double that of Britain in relation to its population and by careful recruitment, training and improved conditions in the Italian Force it would be possible to eliminate the rotten core that permeated the Italian Government during the Fascist Regime and bring about a Force which would be democratic in its outlook and make for a well ordered Italy.

The trained Allied police personnel at present in the country is much too occupied to devote itself to the training of the Italian police at present unless the members selected were released from all other duties.

Otherwise it would mean calling for a Police Expert from the U.S. or Britain, whichever code the Italian Government decided to adopt.

Such a newcomer would be initially at a disadvantage until he got the background of the working of the Italian Police and the country.

Walter Doherty

W. DOHERTY, Lt. Col.
Deputy Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

28th March, 1945.

6037

-21-

VP C.A.S.

Please see minutes re the
statement requested in folder 11 A.

26 Mar. 45-

Chapman
bol - D.P.S.

To. P.S.

File returned after today's interview with C.A.
An agreed time of reference has been come to.

C.A.S.

29. Nov. 45.

x 608.

A. D. Phillips

6036

19.C.S.O. to Ex:Com:

C.C. approves draft letter (opposite) but
 no action should be taken before Monday 26th — by
 which time C.C. is assumed by Sarani that General
 Tadda's appointment will be promulgated.

J.A.B.
24.13.

803b

PHOTO SHEET 14
-16-

Will you please, if the matter is not already in hand, look a fairly early opportunity of conveying relevant information in the "study" reference in the last para and one of SA

[Handwritten signature]

✓

CA B
27 JUN 1945

To A ExC 17

The attached draft at 10a is self explanatory & ~~inferred~~ ^{approved} is provided for signature J.C.C.

The real position is I believe the B053 certain parties in the G.M. are trying to block Tadder's appointment for political reasons.

Tadder is a first class man & undoubtedly Orlando or Brunetti he is a regular C.R.R. Mr with great knowledge & experience of their particular problems.

Rb.7

22 hours.

I have deleted

2 lines and added the sentence in the penultimate para. L.C. letter of 31 Dec is p 13 in attached file to 3626/EC

22 p 13.

To A Ec II

The attached draft at 10a is self explanatory & ~~if approved~~ ^{approved} is forwarded for signature

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Taddes is a first class man & undoubtedly Orlando or Brunetti there is a regular CERE for with great knowledge & experience of this particular problem.

22 hours. Reby

I have deleted 2 lines and added one sentence in the penultimate para. See letter of 31 Dec in p 13 in attached file no 3626/EC

23p.

18

So to CC / Would you ask CC if he approves draft letter (opposite) to PM. See minute 17 above. 24/3

cc 772

MAR 24 1962

Chief Commissioner.

1. At the last Chief of Staff's meeting the ineptitude of the police in CATANIA was brought to notice and directions were given that Public Safety Sub-Commission should take the matter up with the Italian Government.

2. This is being done. Civil Affairs Section, in addition, has recommended that you should represent the matter to the Prime Minister. Draft letter to the Prime Minister is submitted.

28. Dec. 44.

DEC 28 1944

21/12/44 GMS

12

CA Sec

Draft letter to which minute is referred is approved by C.C. above & returned to you for final typing.

29 Dec 44

pg 1

pg.

20 DEC 1944

To. Cpt.

(14)

Draft letter has been typed in accordance with your instructions at minute 12, and is now at 5a. Copy for signature and home in file.

MSL

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

003

Whorden
Cpt
Office of C.S.

11/12/44

Don by 20 Dec 44.

Minister. Draft letter to the Prime Minister is submitted.

MSL

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

28. Dec. 44.

cc 1266
DEC 28 1944

21/12/44 OKI GMS

12

CA Sec

Draft letter to which minute is referred is approved by C.C. above & returned to you for final typing.

Shorden
Officer of CS

29 Dec 44

ps *Shorden*

ps

reminiscent

Shorden

Don by 10 Dec 44.

CA Sec
30 DEC. 1944

To: C.C.

(14)

Draft of 4a has been typed in accordance with your instructions at minute 12, and is now at 5a.

Copies for signature are now in file.

C.C.

31 Dec. 44

X. G.O.P.

C.A. See

Ref minute 4 draft letter is now approved by minute 6. Returned to you for ~~return~~ preparation in final form for signature.

24/11/44

Pharden Cpt
Office of Cos.

25/11/44

COS

Letter to SA for signature please to CO.

H.M.B. 174

174

2084

MEMORANDUM

TO: Public Safety Sub-Commission

15 Nov 44

I have read Col. Young's memorandum with much interest. It seems to me that we should ask the Chief Commissioner to see Benoni, in his capacity of Prime Minister, and ask him to set up a Ministerial Committee presided over

You may have other views as to the best action policy to pursue, and if so will require to set up small extent working sub-committee. I will ask the Chief Commissioner to please discuss the matter with me; otherwise I will ask the Chief Commissioner to see the Prime Minister and suggest to him the formation of a Committee on the above lines.

G.P. Hargrave

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

30th March 1945

SUBJECT : Improvements in the Police Force
TO: Public Safety Sub-Commission

The attached memo reference CC.3615 dated 29 March is

Let Ben to PS section

29 MAR 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

JAC/hjp 13B

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

29 MAR 1945

CC 3615

29 March 1945

MEMO TO: Civil Affairs Section, Hq A.C.
(Attention: Col. Gripps)

12A PS 28/3.

1. A letter from Sig. Bonomi to the Chief Commissioner, No. 258 (Presidency of the Council of Ministers) of 26 March 1945, on the subject of improvements in the Police Force, was passed for action to Civil Affairs Section on the 27th of March.
2. This letter begins "In accordance with your kind request," and it should be explained that these words refer to a personal conversation between the Prime Minister and Admiral Stone.
3. The Chief Commissioner suggests that if the Poletti Committee on CO.RR. has been appointed then Bonomi's letter and its attachment might be included for consideration by the Committee under its terms of reference.

J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

6049

3204

Translation

28 MAR 1945

The President of the Council of Ministers
3/8

Rome, 26 March 1945

Dear Admiral,

TranslationSANITARY SUPPLIES AND POLICE

The fact of treating differently the RR. CC. Corps and the P.S. Guardia Corps (and the Royal Guardia di Finanza) is a cause of trouble and dissatisfaction which is prejudicial to the collaboration between the Police Forces.

In fact, because of the regulation putting these last forces on civilian r

tion to what was formerly done) in military nursing homes nor are they entitled to the medicines supplied by the Military authorities, which means that they have got to go to civilian hospitals which do not always have free beds, and which, as it is well known, dispose of very few means; civilian patients can make up for these deficiencies with what they get from their families, but the Guardia, especially the unmarried ones, find themselves in a state of inferiority. As for the medicines, they have to buy them on the market, where they are expensive.

It is clear that all that this difference of treatment has an influence on the moral of the Guardia

Cartridges for Beretta pistol cal. 9	n.	250,000 -
Cartridges for Prada automatic gun n. 37, cal. 8		100,000 -
" " " " n. 30, cal. 6,50		200,000 -

Also

CLOTHING

To dress in uniform ten thousand Guardia only, the clothing requirement would be the following:

Clota uniforms (material, lining, sewing material, buttons) n.	12,000 -
Coats (with material, etc)	8,000 -
Water	

before long
To avoid all police activity coming to an end/ outside small inhabited centres and even inside large inhabited centres, it is therefore necessary for three trucks for troop transport, and a car for functionaries to be allotted to every questura of small importance. As for the more important questura, like those of Catania, Palermo, Messina, Reggio Calabria, Naples, Bari, Rome, Cagliari, Ancona, Florence, the allotment should be much greater, in accordance with the relative populations.

In Rome, it is also necessary that the Allied authorities should hand over the Via

MAR 26 RECD



*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Roma, 26 marzo 1945

N° 258

- 2 -

È stato necessario ricorrere a mezzi straordinari per impedire il deterioramento e la perdita.

C A S E R M E

È indispensabile per la disciplina e per l'impiego dei reparti di P.S., che questi siano accasermati. Non solo in Roma, ma in tutte le sedi si verifica che le Guard

- 3 -

A R M I

Le Guardie di P.S. attualmente non hanno un completo armamento. Per una forza di circa 24.000 uomini fra gli attuali effettivi e quelli che dovranno essere arruolati per la istituenda polizia ferroviaria, allo scopo di ottenere un armamento che consente l'impiego di tutti gli effettivi in modo che siano contemporaneamente tutti armati occorrerebbe quanto segue:

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
278

Rome, 26 March 1945

Dear Admiral,

In accordance with your kind request, I enclose a note showing the action and means required to reinforce without delay the Police

TranslationSANITARY SUPPLIES AND RELIEF

The fact of treating differently the RR. CC. Corps and the P.S. Guardia Corps (and the Royal Guardia di Finanza) is a cause of trouble and dissatisfaction which is prejudicial to the collaboration between the Police Forces.

In fact, because of the regulation putting these last forces on civilian r

where long
To avoid all police activity coming to an end/outside small inhabited centres and even inside large inhabited centres, it is therefore necessary for three trucks for troop transport, and a car for functionaries to be allotted to every quarter of small importance. As for the more important quarters, like those of Catania, Palermo, Messina, Reggio Calabria, Naples, Bari, Rome, Cagliari, Ancona, Florence, the allotment should be much greater, in accordance with the relative populations.

In Rome, it is also necessary that the Allied authorities should hand over the Via Tommaso Campanella pool, which is the only organization

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394.

AC/14607/2/P3.

Tel. 489081 - 365.

16th March, 1945.

SUBJECT

