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STRENGTH, POLICE AGENCIES
JAN. 1944 – JAN. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Translation/MBe

COPY

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Subject : Compartimental Police Departments - Function and Purposes.

The railway police Service is carried out at the direct orders of the Ministry of the Interior (P.S.General Directorate) that in performing it through the Compartimental Police Departments in connection with the ordinary Police Authorities and with the CC.RR. Force.

The above mentioned Departments were created in 1907 with each of the CompartimentalDirectorate into which the Railway Administration is divided.

Before the present wat there were 15 Police Compartimental Departments, situated at Ancona, Bari, Bologna, Cagliari, Firenze, Genova, Milano, Napoli, Plaermo, Reggio Calabria, Roma, Torino, Trento, Trieste e Venezia.

At present the following eight Departments are functioning and the following personnel are in charge of each of them:

	Officials	Clerks	P.S.Guards
Bari	1	1	26
Cagliari	1	1	20
Napoli	2	2	55
Palermo	2	1	20
Reggio C.	2	1	81
Rome	2	3	50
Ancona	1	1	5
Florence	1	1	21

Their activity is regulated by the "Instructions for P.S.Service on Railways" issued in 1920.

Each of them is superintending all the Police Service on the Railroads of its own Compartment.

As regards this service, the Compartimental P.S. Departments are in direct correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior and keep continuously in close contact with the Railway Administration, especially through a Liaison Officer of the State Railways. They also see that all the regulations issued by the competent Authorities be complied with by the Police Agencies within the jurisdiction of the Compartment, which usually, includes more than one Prefecture.

Their main end is that of preventing and repressing all the offences and crime that have been or may be committed

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in regard to the Railways. Consequently they protect the travellers, as far as their own safety and that of their goods is concerned, and also protect commodities and railway equipment.

For this purpose:

1) they escort the main ordinary trains and all the extraordinary ones;
2) they escort the securities of the Bank of Italy and of other Banks, those of the Railway Administration and of the Post Offices and those of the State Printing Office.
3) They arrange and order vigilance, which in the main Stations is usually carried out by permanent patrols of CC.RR. and Railway Wardens;
4) They carry out directly the investigations on the offences and crimes committed on the Railroad, on the presumable offenders, on the places where the crimes have been perpetrated etc. and effecy unexpected searches in the luggage-van stores, signalman's houses and signal-boxes.
5) They inform and ask for information the Station Police Office the Questura, the CC.RR. Force Hq. the permanent vigilance patrols in regard to the finding out of the offenders.
6) They issue and co-ordinate instructions in regard to judicial police operations, entering into connection with one another and with the Railway Authorities.
7) They draw up biographical reports on the arrested and denounced railway-men and on those who are considered capable to commit theft. In case of transfer they point them out to the competent Compartimental Police Department, to which they also forwarded the a/m reports.

Furthermore, the Compartimental Police Departments carry out a large information service:

a. on the general conduct of the railway personnel;
b. on the persons who claim damages for serious losses suffered in rail accidents or apply for a special railway concessions; on the applicants for the post of railway warder, of whom they investigate the case;
c. on the grantee of the vigilance, bar, restaurant and café services as well as on the firms that have been granted leaves and concessions in the Stations of the Compartment.

The Compartimental Police Departments held their task of directing all the P.S.Service in regard to Railways, even after the Railway Fascist Militia had been created. The Militia in its function of maintaining public order depended directly on the Departments on which all responsibility lay.

2149

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The Police Offices at the main Rail Stations are to be distinguished from the Compartimental Police Departments. The Police Offices consist of one or more officials and of a number of agents which varies according to the requirements. They depend directly on the Questori, although, as far as the Railways service is concerned, they also depend on the Compartimental Police Departments, from which they get instructions and directions.

They carry out the maintenance of public order and the local service of preventive and judicial railway police.

Consequently in each of the above indicated towns there are a Compartimental Police Department directly depending on the Ministry of the Interior and whose jurisdiction includes usually more than one Questura, and one (in some towns more) P.S. Office of the Railway Stations, directly depending on the Questore and with only local jurisdiction.

30th Jan, 1945

2948

COS.

Draft at [illegible] for abroad please

Despatched. 11/1/45. Sec Chl. COS.

CAS
B JUL 1945

Minute 15.

Following visit of Colonel Young and Lt. Col. Wilcox to AFHQ on 23rd January, draft letter is submitted for signature of V.P. which will clear up all points upon which G-5 and G-3 still require information. AFHQ have promised decision on ceiling increase within 14 days.

27th January, 1945.

John W. Chapman

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

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CoS

106 A from AFHQ raised the question of Carabinieri ceiling
119 B from G-3 to G-5 (copy to us) made certain suggestions on 106 A.
123 A ~~xxx~~ is our reply to that portion of 119 B dealing with 5000 Soldiers.
132 A is letter now submitted for CCs signatures dealing with the ceiling portion of 119 B.

E Thorden
Capt

29/11

Chief Commissioner

submitted for sanction - the minute above gone

Hu back history.

29/XI.

cc 102B
30/11/44

133A

C.A. Section
(to Public Safety SC)
Tidia submitted & signed & returned b/as.

Lt Colonel Robertson
W/Adj

C.O.S. Office
30.11.44

2946

C.A.S. 141A for signature please.

A P Luckman Major AC

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123A [illegible]
with 5000 Soldiers.

132A is letter now submitted for CCs signature dealing with the ceiling portion of 1198.

E Thorden
Capt

29/11

11.

Chief Commissioner

submitted for selection - the minute above gives background history.

78/29/11.

133A

C.A. Section
(to Public Safety SC)
Letter submitted & signed & returned h/a.

C.O.S. Office
30.11.44

Lt Colonel Robertson
h/a

12.

2946

C.A.S. 171 for signature please.

12 Dec 44

F.P. Buchanan Major AC
for Public Safety Sec.

To C.O.S. -13-

Ref conversation 123 C.O.S. - D.C.O.S. (A). on Sat herewith letter for signature thereon.

7 Jan 44.

Despatched. 9/1/45 Duncan C.A.S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

4/

CA Sec.

1. Do confirm agreement reached between Brig. Upjohn and DCCAO AAI — 115[A] was sent on 4th Nov 44.

2. Please see 117[A] forwarded for our information from DCCAO. It would appear that the Sending of Italian Military to Ancona is still under discussion by AAI.

3. This whole question is governed by the release date of 21 Dec 44, insisted upon by A.F.H.Q. Suggested we await the communication referred to in 116[A] when a further letter for A.F.H.Q. will be prepared.

Frank Wilson NHS.
for D.P.S.

6/11/44
Unit 365.

(5)

P.S.

V.P. has seen and directs the file to be brought forward with your recommendations as soon the Communication referred to in 116a is received.

C.A.S.
7 Nov. 44
x. 608.

-6-

131[A]

V.P. Forward a draft reply to AFHQ on the subject of CCRR ending

Agreed 22 Nov 44.

7

26 NOV. 1944

29.45

P.S. Reply attached.
Please forward for signature

Major Wilkes

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[illegible], marked upon by A.F.H.Q.
Suggested we await the communication referred to in 116[A] when a further letter for A.F.H.Q. will be prepared.

[illegible] Wilson N.H.J.
for D.P.S.

6 11/44
Sent 365.

(5)

Q.S.

V.P. has seen and directs the file to be brought forward with your recommendations as soon the communication referred to in 116a is received.

R.H. Phipps
Lt Col

C.A.S.
7 Nov. 44
K. 608.

-6-

131[A]

V.P. Request a draft reply to AFHQ on the subject of CCRR

exhg

Algiers 22 Nov 44.

7

25 NOV. 1944

29.15

FS. Draft approved.
Please forward for signature

Major Wilson
[illegible]
for CSO.

C.A.S.
25 NOV. 1944

8

C.A.Sec.
1329 for signature please

Sgt Parker

28/Nov 44

7

P/C

COS
129A for signature by CC if approved
C.A.S.
29 NOV. 1944

[illegible]
for VP.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

MEMO.

Brigadier Dolohn, V.P. C.A. Section.

Following our discussion of the circumstances that have arisen within the last 48 hours regarding the provision of Italian military for Carabinieri purposes, I am submitting to you a draft letter to be forwarded to A.F.H.Q., which I hope will dispose of this matter, at any rate for the time being.

I received a telephone message from Col. Porter Mitchell in the afternoon of the 26th October in which he confirmed what he had previously told me personally, that in fact the date of the 31st December 1944, was merely a provisional one beyond which further application for the retention of the 5,000 soldiers would have to be made. He also advised me regarding the provision of uniforms and said that he had already discussed this with Army Sub-Commission who had told him that there was no clothing available. He expressed the opinion that this was a matter which should be adjusted between Army Sub-Commission and Public Safety and should not be referred to A.F.H.Q. I feel that we ought to accept his advice and personally I am quite prepared for the Chief of Staff to decide this issue regarding clothing since, if, as it now appears, we are to have the use of these soldiers for a substantial period the lack of Carabinieri uniforms does not appear to be a point on which such strong objection can be taken, and of course, it does mean that we shall be deficient of the amount is to be used by the Italian soldiers when we reach our authorised establishment strength.

2944

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[illegible] a draft letter to be forwarded to A.F.H.Q. which I hope will dispose of this matter, at any rate for the time being.

I received a telephone message from Col. Jimmy Mitchell in the afternoon of the 26th October, in which he confirmed what he had previously told me personally, that in fact the date of the 31st December, 1944, was merely a provisional one beyond which further application for the retention of the 2,000 soldiers would have to be made. He also advised me regarding the provision of uniforms and said that he had already discussed this with Army Sub-Commission who had told him that there was no clothing available. We expressed the opinion that this was a matter which should be contested between Army Sub-Commission and Public Safety and should not be referred to A.F.H.Q. I feel that we ought to accept his advice and personally I am quite prepared for the Chief Commissioner or the Chief of Staff to decide this issue accordingly although since, if we do it now anyway, we are to have the use of these soldiers for a substantial period the use of Carabinieri uniforms does not appear to be a point on which such strong objection can be taken, although of course, it does mean that we shall be deficient of [illegible] to be used by the Italian soldiers when we reach the authorised Carabinieri strength.

2044

Alzoug.

A.P. YOUNG Col.
Deputy Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

25th October, 1944.

Approved J.W.C. Chapman Col.

Do CA Sec. Please see 10C^A.

4" Top S Please prepare reply + submit [illegible]

3

John W. Chapman Col.
D.P.S.

Awaiting result of [illegible]

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POLICE STRENGTH

		CCRR	GG.FF.	A.di P.S.	Mun.Gds.	For. Gds.	Ry. Gds.
Region	I	8374	2110	2234	824	171	196
"	II	* 4721	1633	1185	836 ‡	539	-----
"	III	6240	1972	3134	710	287	-----
"	IV	No Provinces Administered.					
"	V	931	241	135	358	27	----
"	VI	4387	1071	274	510	229	----
AMG 8 Army		835	91	44	228	90	----
AMG 5 Army		2107	504	5	6	---	----
		27595	7622	7990	3472	1343	196

* Includes 104 held in reserve for Rome.
‡ Figures not available yet.

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= HQ.-UNITS =	ACTUAL STRENGTH									
	GEN.	COL.	Lt.Col.	MAJ.	CAPT.	1/Lt. 2/Lt.	W.Os. (3 grds)	Brig.	V.Brig.	Non-
HQ., R.G. of FINANZA Liberated Territory	1	-	3	-	3	2	5	3	6	
BARI LEGION	-	2	4	3	10	15	123	115	95	22
CAGLIARI LEGION	-	-	3	4	6	20	80	72	62	9
MESSINA LEGION	-	2	4	7	11	9	187	109	82	37
NAPOLI LEGION	-	1	4	5	14	19	236	197	111	35
PALERMO LEGION	-	1	2	5	6	9	116	82	71	17
SPEC. Bn. " R ".	-	-	-	-	4	14	27	16	42	1
RUTIGLIANO Bn. (O.T.S.)	-	-	1	-	1	2	11	22	19	
T O T A L	1	6	21	24	55	90	785	616	488	123

0 1 4

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	ACTUAL STRENGTH											TOTAL
	GEN.	COL.	Lt.Col.	MAJ.	CAPT.	1/Lt. 2/Lt.	W.Os. (3 grds)	Brig.	V.Brig.	Non-Coms	Fin. E/M.	
ZA									2342			
Y	1	-	3	-	3	2	5	3	3	-	12	35
	-	2	4	3	10	15	123	115	95	220	928	1515
	-	-	3	4	6	20	80	72	62	97	749	1093
	-	2	4	7	11	9	187	109	82	374	949	1734
	-	1	4	5	14	19	236	197	111	352	1165	2104
	-	1	2	5	6	9	116	82	71	170	589	1051
	-	-	-	-	4	14	27	16	42	15	415	533
T.S.)	-	-	1	-	1	2	11	22	19	7	236	299
	1	6	21	24	55	90	785	616	488	1235	5043	8364

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= HQ.- UNITS =	PEACETIME STRENGTH									
	GEN.	COL.	Lt/Col.	MAJOR	CAPT.	1/Lt. 2/Lt.	W.Os (3 grds)	Brig.	V.Brig.	Non-
HQ., R.G. of FINANZA Liberated Territory	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
BARI LEGION	-	1	2	3	14	23	99	103	90	1
CAGLIARI LEGION	-	1	3	-	9	14	80	69	31	
MESSINA LEGION	-	1	6	-	16	23	172	170	101	1
NAPOLI LEGION	-	1	3	3	18	26	187	159	124	1
PALERMO LEGION	-	1	2	2	12	17	118	118	75	1
SPEC. Bn. "R"	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
RAGUSA Bn. (O.T.S.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
T O T A L	-	5	16	8	69	103	656	619	421	6

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PEACETIME STRENGTH											
GEN.	COL.	Lt/Col.	MAJOR	CAPT.	1/Lt. 2/Lt.	W.Os (3 grds)	Brig.	V.Brig.	Non-Coms	Fin. E/M.	TOTAL
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	1	2	3	14	23	99	103	90	123	945	1403
-	1	3	-	9	14	80	69	31	54	422	683
-	1	6	-	16	23	172	170	101	171	1199	1859
-	1	3	3	18	26	187	159	124	161	1463	2145
-	1	2	2	12	17	118	118	75	108	852	1305
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	5	16	8	69	103	656	619	421	617	4881	7395

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1498

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Mel : 41906I - 3C

29 January, 1945.

AG/14601/21/CC

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.RR.

TO : AFHQ G-5.

1. Reference is made to our previous letters on this subject namely :

72A — AGO/014.13, dated 1st Aug. 1944, addressed to AAI
72A — AGO/14622/CC, dated 6th Sept.44, " " "
74B — AGO/014.13, dated 6th Sept.44, " " "
86A — 9/12.B/A.G., dated 23rd Sept.44, addressed to AFHQ, G-3
48A — AGO/14622/CC, dated 28th Oct.44, " " " "
— AGO/14622/CC, dated 9th Nov.44, " " " "
123A — AG/14626/CC, dated 28th Nov.44, " " " "
132A — 3606/GOS, dated 31st Dec.44, addressed to AFHQ, G-3 Sec.
132A — AG/14601/21/CC, dated 7th Jan. 45, addressed to AFHQ, G-5
— AG/14602/21/CC, dated 11th Jan.45, " " " "

2. 148A In these letters the Chief Commissioner has reported that in his view, and on the advice of his technical public safety staff, a strength of 55,000 CC.RR will not be adequate to maintain public order in Italy when the northern provinces have been occupied. In the opinion of this Commission the authorized strength of CC.RR should be raised to a minimum of 65,000 officers and men.

3. The present strength of CC.RR was 55,000. On the 25th July, 1943, Marshal Badoglio, by decree, increased the strength to 65,000, which is still the establishment authorized by the Italian Government.

4. The Royal Carabinieri is the one disciplined and trained force on which reliance can be placed for policing the country.

5. The duties of the Carabinieri may be said to fall into three categories :

i) Public Safety duties (i.e. maintaining law and order among the civil population). 2940

ii) Provost duties (acting as military police within the Italian Army).

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iii) Detached duties (special duties on behalf of other services ; e.g., Navy, Air Force, Ministry of War, Servizio Informazioni Militari, etc., which have no connection with policing the civil population).

Details of the number of CC.RR employed in these categories are set out in Appendix A, but in round figures the strength is divided as follows ;

Public Safety duties	51000
Provost duties	2000
Detached duties	2000
Total	55000

6. Of the 51000 CC.RR allotted to Public Safety duties, some 7000 must be considered "ineffective" from the point of view of not being available for duty. (See details in Appendix "A")

It has now been agreed with AMGOT that in future CC.RR on leave for more than 30 days, or sick for more than 60 days, will no longer be included on the official CC.RR strength returns. This is in accordance with Italian Army regulations.

7. To sum up therefore, of a total strength of 55,000 CC.RR only 44,000 will normally be available for Public Safety duties.

8. These CC.RR are fully engaged in performing all their normal peacetime functions, including ;

i) Patrolling all districts, both town and country. (There are 3,000 CC.RR stations in liberated Italy, and even the remotest inhabited locality is patrolled by CC.RR, who are the guardians of law and order).

ii) Dealing with public meetings, assemblies, disorders and riots. (These have been increasing steadily during the last year, particularly now the military call-up is arousing general opposition).

iii) Investigating crime. (Under present unsettled conditions, considerable numbers of CC.RR are being used to seize arms and ammunition in the possession of illegal political organisations and bands of criminals. Armed hold-ups are also taking place on a scale never experienced in peacetime).

iv) Policing ports, railways, roads and frontiers.

v) Staffing Courts, attending trials, conveying prisoners and performing innumerable other duties connected with the enforcement of the law.

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vi) Protecting Royal personages, Cabinet Ministers, Ambassadors, etc.

9. In addition to the foregoing, CC.RR have been called on to undertake the following duties as a direct result of the occupation of Italy by Allied forces :

i) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at army control lines and other critical points.

ii) Dealing with refugees.

iii) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied nations.

iv) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas, because of sporadic affrays between civilians and troops.

v) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.

vi) Maintaining check posts to prevent black-market activities and to reduce the illegal use of petrol.

vii) Enforcing warrant and assessing regulations.

Again, efforts are being made, at the instance of AFHQ, to procure CC.RR to assist in policing the frontiers of France, Switzerland, Austria and Jugoslavia, when the enemy is driven out of Italy.

It should also be pointed out that in peacetime, when the strength of CC.RR was 55,000, means of communication and transport enabled the police to be sent without delay from one district to another as the need arose. The uncertain communication facilities and the almost complete lack of transport now available mean a serious loss of flexibility in employing police resources and a consequent need arises for maintaining larger local reserves.

10. The present position is that a strength of 55,000 CC.RR is now fully occupied in policing a population of 19 millions in liberated Italy. In Kesselring's Italy, a thickly populated industrial area, a further 21 millions will have to be taken care of. The problem of maintaining law and order in the north will be far more difficult than it has been in southern Italy. To provide for this, at least half the existing CC.RR strength must be withdrawn from the south. Already the authorities in Sicily have been clamouring for more CC.RR (in fact 300 have been sent)

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and all Regions complain that their present allocation is insufficient for their needs.

11. This Commission can give the assurance that the CC.RR are being used to their full advantage, and that it is impossible to rearrange their duties or to redistribute their strength to effect further economies.

12. The recruiting programme now remains in suspense pending a decision as to whether the CC.RR ceiling may be increased to a minimum of 65,000. Until that decision is reached plans for allotting the CC.RR strength throughout Italy by withdrawing men from southern areas cannot be prepared.

For the Chief Commissioner.

G.F. Wilcox, Brig.
V. Ca Dec.
DCCO. AF.

Copy to AFHQ G-3.

AFW/G.

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APPENDIX "A"

STRENGTH OF CC. RR. AS AT 9TH JANUARY, 1945

TOTAL STRENGTH			54,899
Present Duties	1865		
Detached Duties	2396	(4261)	4,261
Total Public Safety Strength			50,638
INEFFECTIVES :-			
Hospital	3396		
A.W.O.L.	104		
Prison	22		
Leave:-			
(1) Agricultural	77		
(2) Sick	2288		
(3) Compassionate	666		
(4) Ordinary	2482		
(5) Awaiting Trial	197	7172	7,172
Total effective CC.RR. Duties			43,466

ITALIAN TROOPS ATTACHED FOR CC. RR. DUTIES.

Pisano Group *	2,893
Montegranaro Bn.	822

* Now ordered to return to Army Duties: Authority AFHQ signal dated 18th January, 1945.

NOTES ON LEAVE.

(1) Agricultural Leave. This is granted according to the seasons on the direction of the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of War. In short, facilities are granted to Carabinieri who have in the past been employed in Agriculture to be given leave to enable them to assist with the harvest or with the sowing. The period of leave is authorised by the Legion Commander, subject to the overriding limitations set by the Ministries. Such leave is not, however, granted

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to regular service men, but only to auxiliaries.

(2) Sick leave. This, of course, is granted for purposed of actual sickness and convalescence, but here the Carabinieri, for purposes of their strength return, are at a disadvantage when compared with the Italian combat units. For example, when an Italian soldier has been sick for more than 60 days, he is automatically struck off the strength and no longer becomes an ineffective because his place, at any rate on paper, can be taken by somebody else. In a police organisation, however, one cannot dispense with the services of a policeman merely because he has been sick for such a period and in consequence the Carabinieri are retained on the official strength beyond that time, until it can be finally established whether they are fit to return to service or whether in fact they must be invalided.

(3) Compassionate leave. A facility which is allowed to Legion Commanders to grant at their own discretion.

(4) Ordinary Leave. In the Carabinieri there is no system of weekly rest days. Each man is eligible for two periods of 15 days' leave each year.

(5) Awaiting trial. . These are CC.RR. who have been suspended from duty pending disciplinary action being taken against them.

N.B. It will be seen from this Appendix that the total strength of the CC.RR., considered apart from the Italian troops attached for auxiliary duties, is within its authorised establishment of 55,000. The total of Italian troops will be reduced to 822, as soon as arrangements can be made for the remainder to return to military duties. So far as the authorised 5% of the total strength on leave is concerned, it will be seen that the addition of those on compassionate and ordinary leave, i.e. 3148, exceeds the authorised 2,750. This is being brought to the attention of the Commanding General CC. RR., and he is being told to reduce this figure accordingly.

1488

M E M O R A N D U M.

SUBJECT : Memorandum from G.O.C., MMIA.

TO : VP CA Sec.

I have read the Memorandum from the General Officer Commanding MMIA, dated 16th January, regarding the effective strength of the Carabinieri. This Memorandum refers to the letter which the Chief Commissioner forwarded to AFHQ on the 11th January, 1945, reference AC/14601/21/PS and in particular to the statement that 16% of the total strength of the Carabinieri is ineffective. The argument against this assertion made by Major General Browning is based entirely on a technical interpretation of the word "ineffective", which in the Chief Commissioner's letter was used solely in its ordinary or dictionary sense.

To quote paragraph 2 of General Browning's Memorandum, he says: "The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the 'posted strength' and the 'fighting strength', i.e. bodies actually doing duty." This, of course, is recognised so far as it applies to a combat unit. Nevertheless, so far as a police organisation is concerned 'effective strength' means the difference between the 'established strength', i.e. the total number serving, and those who are not available for duty. In other words, the effective police strength is the total number of bodies who are available for police duty.

To return to the actual figures which have already been indicated in the Memorandum referred to, they are as follows:-

Total strength	54,714.
Sick	1,187
Leave	4,935
Absent without leave	105
In custody	20
Attached to Army Units:	
i.e. mobilized	1,865
Detached for special duty	2,167
Total	10,279

2:34

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

strength of the Carabinieri. This Memorandum refers to the letter which the Chief Commissioner forwarded to AFHQ on the 11th January, 1945, reference AC/14601/21/PS and in particular to the statement that 16% of the total strength of the Carabinieri is ineffective. The argument against this assertion made by Major General Browning is based entirely on a technical interpretation of the word "ineffective", which in the Chief Commissioner's letter was used solely in its ordinary or dictionary sense.

To quote paragraph 2 of General Browning's Memorandum, he says: "The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the 'posted strength' and the 'fighting strength', i.e. bodies actually doing duty." This, of course, is recognised so far as it applies to a combat unit. Nevertheless, so far as a police organisation is concerned 'effective strength' means the difference between the 'established strength', i.e. the total number serving, and those who are not available for duty. In other words, the effective police strength is the total number of bodies who are available for police duty.

To return to the actual figures which have already been indicated in the Memorandum referred to, they are as follows:-

Total strength	54,714.
Sick	1,187
Leave	4,935
Absent without leave	105
In custody	20
Attached to Army Units:	
i.e. mobilized	1,865
Detached for special duty	2,167
Total	10,279

2134

None of these men are available for police duty and are therefore for this purpose ineffective.

As regards the comments which have been made upon the leave category, I feel some further explanation is necessary. It is rightly pointed out that the number of men authorised to be on leave must not exceed 5% of the whole. This qualification, however, applies only to ordinary and compassionate leave and not to agricultural or sick leave, and here the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Carabinieri are in a somewhat different position from members of Combat units. The four categories of leave which compose the total of 4,935 are as follow:-

1) Agricultural leave. This is granted according to the seasons on the direction of the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of War. In short facilities are granted to Carabinieri who have in the past been employed in Agriculture to be given leave to enable them to assist with the harvest or with the sowing. The period of leave is authorised by the Legion Commander, subject to the overriding limitations set by the Ministry. Such leave is not, however, granted to regular service men, but only to auxiliaries.

2) Sick leave. This, of course, is granted for purposes of actual sickness and convalescence, but here the Carabinieri, for purposes of their strength return, are at a disadvantage when compared with the Italian combat units. For example, when an Italian soldier has been sick for more than 60 days, he is automatically struck off the strength and no longer becomes an ineffective because his place, at any rate on paper, can be taken by somebody else. In a police organisation, however, one cannot dispense with the services of a policeman merely because he has been sick for such a period and in consequence the Carabinieri are retained on the official strength beyond this time, until it can be finally established whether they are fit to return to service or whether in fact they must be invalided.

3) Compassionate leave. A facility which is allowed to Legion Commanders to grant at their own discretion, in special circumstances, which is not at all generally applied.

4) Ordinary leave. In the Carabinieri there is no system of weekly rest days. Each man is eligible for two periods of 15 days' leave each year.

2933

It is solely in respect of the ordinary and compassionate leave that the 5% overall restriction is intended to apply, and although I have not yet been able to receive from the Carabinieri Headquarters the actual breakdown of the leave figure of 4,935 into these four categories, nevertheless,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78 5016

or with the sowing. The period of leave is authorised by the Legion Commander, subject to the overriding limitations set by the Ministry. Such leave is not, however, granted to regular service men, but only to auxiliaries.

2) Sick leave. This, of course, is granted for purposes of actual sickness and convalescence, but here the Carabinieri, for purposes of their strength return, are at a disadvantage when compared with the Italian combat units. For example, when an Italian soldier has been sick for more than 60 days, he is automatically struck off the strength and no longer becomes an ineffective because his place, at any rate on paper, can be taken by somebody else. In a police organisation, however, one cannot dispense with the services of a policeman merely because he has been sick for such a period and in consequence the Carabinieri are retained on the official strength beyond this time, until it can be finally established whether they are fit to return to service or whether in fact they must be invalided.

3) Compassionate leave. A facility which is allowed to Legion Commanders to grant at their own discretion, in special circumstances, which is not at all generally applied.

4) Ordinary leave. In the Carabinieri there is no system of weekly rest days. Each man is eligible for two periods of 15 days' leave each year.

2933

It is solely in respect of the ordinary and compassionate leave that the 5% overall restriction is intended to apply, and although I have not yet been able to receive from the Carabinieri Headquarters the actual breakdown of the leave figure of 4,935 into these four categories, nevertheless, the Commanding General has assured me that the figure relating to compassionate and ordinary leave does not exceed the 5% authorised.

I cannot agree that a fair and proper figure for ineffectives is 7% as General Browning suggests, but emphasise that out of a strength of 54,714, 10,165 are not available to be employed on police duties and that this expressed in terms of percentage is approximately 18.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Because of the particular Italian police system we find that the Carabinieri, who are the principal law enforcement agency in Italy, are members of the Italian Army and for many purposes have to be considered in the light of their military status. Nevertheless, although their status be military, their occupation is beyond any doubt a police and therefore a civil one, and it is from their use as policemen that these figures must be appreciated. In my view, to apply a "fighting strength" to Carabinieri figures is entirely misleading.

A.E. YOUNG, Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

19th January, 1945.

2932

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

A.E. YOUNG, Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

19th January, 1945.

2932

AEY/ea.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

RESTRICTED

1441A

F86262
JAN 201616A

21 JAN 1945

C/8756
JAN 201836A
ROUTINE

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

APHQ SIGNED SAC CITX THCOT

ACTION: AIOOM FOR F SAFETY SC

See 1444
1445A

RESTRICTED.

CMBAT requested in our AG 091.711/033 GCT-O of 11 December last and AG 091.711/033 GCT-O of 9 January now urgently required. Please expedite.

Dist

TO	ACTION	INFO
COL. CH[illegible]N		
COL. YO[illegible]		
LT. COL [illegible]		
MAJ [illegible]		
MAJ W[illegible]		
MAJ H[illegible]		
MAJ BA[illegible]		
CAPT P[illegible]		
CHIEF C[illegible]K		

Action - F Safety
Info - A/Pres
Chief Commissioner
OA See
File (2)
Float

Pls submit fate and brief cause of delay

HEADQUARTERS
21 JAN 1945
A. C.

21 JAN 1945
RESTRICTED

2131

346

SUBJECT: Increase of authorised establishment of CC.RR

C A Sec

17 JAN 1945

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
SD/23
16 Jan 45.

146A

Chief of Staff,
A.C.

144A 17 GEN. 1945

Ref your AG/14601/21/PS of 11 Jan : -

1. I feel I must remark on the sentence in para 2 which says that : "16% of the total strength in any day are ineffective", partly because your letter may affect the Army ceiling with which I as C.O.C., M.M.I.A. am vitally concerned and partly because this may be the subject of query by A.F.H.Q.

2. The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the "posted strength" and the "fighting strength" i.e. bodies actually doing duty.

3. On enquiry from Public Safety Sub Commission, I am informed that the 16% included: -

(a)	Sick	1200 equals	...	2% of 55,000
(b)	Leave	5000 "	...	9% of "
	(Only 5% is authorised by AFHQ)			
(c)	A.W.O.L.	100		
(d)	Attached to Army Units ...	1865 equals	...	3%
(e)	Detached on special duty..	2000 "	...	4%
	TOTAL :	10165 "	...	18%

- of these : -

(d) and (e) do not come within the term "ineffective" as they are actually doing duty.

(b) can only be 5%

(a) and (c) are correctly "ineffective" which means that the ineffectives" really are: -

Sick	1200	equals	2% of 55,000
Leave	2750	equals	5% " "
AWOL	100	-	
TOTAL:	4050	equals	7% " "

2930

5. (a) Army units proper count them "ineffectives" on the above

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

1. I feel I must remark on the sentence in para 2 which says that : "16% of the total strength in any day are ineffective", partly because your letter may affect the Army ceiling with which I as G.O.C., M.M.I.A. am vitally concerned and partly because this may be the subject of query by A.F.H.Q.

2. The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the "posted strength" and the "fighting strength" i.e. bodies actually doing duty.

3. On enquiry from Public Safety Sub Commission, I am informed that the 16% included: -

(a)	Sick	1200 equals	...	2% of 55,000
(b)	Leave	5000 "	...	9% of "
	(Only 5% is authorised by AFHQ)			
(c)	A.W.O.L.	100		
(d)	Attached to Army Units ...	1865 equals	...	3%
(e)	Detached on special duty..	2000 "	...	4%
	TOTAL :	10165 "	...	18%

- of these : -

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(b) can only be 5%

(a) and (c) are correctly "ineffective" which means that the ineffectives" really are: -

Sick	1200	equals	2% of 55,000
Leave	2750	equals	5% " "
AWOL	100	-	
TOTAL:	4050	equals	7% " "

2930

5. (a) Army units proper count them "ineffectives" on the above basis and have, for obvious reasons, a greater difference than CC.RR between "posted strength" and "fighting strength" i.e. a greater % of real "ineffectives."

(b) As a basis of comparison therefore (in connection with bids for ceiling authorisation) the fair and proper figure of "ineffectives" in CC.RR is 7%.

L. Browning

tvs.LB.

Major General.
M.M.I.A.

22/

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

145A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

20 November 1944

Memorandum For the Record Regarding Phasing out of 5,000 Italian Soldiers from CCRR Duty.

1. Conversation between Col. Chapman and Capt. Woodward.

2. Present strength (approx) of CCRR is 45,000. Present training program of recruits will permit at least 2,000 to assume field duty on 1 April. By agreement with L.F. Subcommission P.S. Subcommission expects to get 3,000 bodies from the next-call up for the Italian Army. The training program for the 3,000 will be finished by 31 March or earlier. On 1 April therefore A.C. will have at least 50,000 CCRR on field duty. The 5,000 soldiers can then be released on 1 April.

3. As an alternative plan the soldiers can be released as follows:

1,500	on	15 February
1,500	on	1 March
1,500	on	15 March
2,000	on	1 April

This plan is based on the probability that A.C. will have:

46,000	CCRR	(effective)	on	15 Feb.
46,500	CCRR	(")	on	1 Mar.
46,500-48,000	CCRR	(")	on	15 Mar.
48,000-50,000	CCRR	(")	on	1 Apr.

4. The latter plan represents a phasing out plan which A.C. will be able to put into operation in any event. If the recruiting campaign is able to be accelerated, A.C. will be able to phase out the soldiers earlier.

2529

144A

Ref: AC/14601/21/PS.

11 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Increase of authorised establishment of Carabinieri.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, Attn: G-5 Section.

132A

1. I have received no reply to, nor acknowledgment of, my letter AC/14622/PS dated 28 November 1944 and I am therefore addressing you on the subject de novo.

2. The strength of the CC.RR has now reached, in fact exceeded its approved establishment of 55,000. Our experience is that 16% of the total strength in any day are ineffective. The number is sufficient and only just sufficient to maintain law and order in SARDINIA, SICILY (where the situation is grave) and ITALY up to the RIMINI-PISA Line.

3. We must look forward in the future to occupying N.ITALY and picking up in that territory many thousands of CC.RR. Hitherto these CC.RR found on liberation have been invaluable. Under present regulations we cannot employ them and must immediately disband them unless we have discharged a similar number in Central and Southern ITALY. To reduce this number would be folly.

4. Security in Europe, even in the liberated territories, has deteriorated greatly in the last two months, will become worse until Allied reverses in FRANCE and embarrassments in GREECE are forgotten, and may be almost non-existent in the North after a hard winter, much Allied bombing, and with devastation and unemployment the only hope in the Spring. All our experiences prove that the strength of those whose object is to destroy constitutional government in this and any country is gathering: that there organisation is extensive and well paid. We know that there is dynamite in the North. I cannot ask AMG officers to enter the territory and undertake the responsibility of maintaining order without an adequate, and a more than adequate, police force. I cannot tell you that law and order will be maintained unless I have that force.

5. It is imperative in my mind that we should continue recruitment of CC.RR over and above the ceiling of 55,000 authorised and even now slightly exceeded and I propose to continue to do so up to a ceiling of 65,000 unless I receive contrary orders after you have considered what has been written above and reconsidered my letter of 28th November.

S/ELLERY W. Stone.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief of Staff
Land Forces Section

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

2. : Allied Force Headquarters, Attn: G-5 Section.

1328

1. I have received no reply to, nor acknowledgment of, my letter AC/14622/PS dated 28 November 1944 and I am therefore addressing you on the subject de novo.

2. The strength of the CO.RR has now reached, in fact exceeded its approved establishment of 55,000. Our experience is that 16% of the total strength in any day are ineffective. The number is sufficient and only just sufficient to maintain law and order in SARDINIA, SICILY (where the situation is grave) and ITALY up to the RIMINI- ISA Line.

3. We must look forward in the future to occupying N.ITALY and picking up in that territory many thousands of CO.RR. Hitherto these CO.RR found on liberation have been invaluable. Under present regulations we cannot employ them and must immediately disband them unless we have discharged a similar number in Central and Southern ITALY. To reduce this number would be folly.

4. Security in Europe, even in the liberated territories, has deteriorated greatly in the last two months, will become worse until Allied reverses in FRANCE and embarrassments in GREECE are forgotten, and may be almost non-existent in the North after a hard winter, much Allied bombing, and with devastation and unemployment the only hope in the Spring. All our experiences prove that the strength of those whose object is to destroy constitutional government in this and any country is gathering: that there organisation is extensive and well paid. We know that there is dynamite in the North. I cannot ask AMG officers to enter the territory and undertake the responsibility of maintaining order without an adequate, and a more than adequate, police force. I cannot tell you that law and order will be maintained unless I have that force.

5. It is imperative in my mind that we should continue recruitment of CO.RR over and above the ceiling of 55,000 authorised and even now slightly exceeded and I propose to continue to do so up to a ceiling of 65,000 unless I receive contrary orders after you have considered what has been written above and reconsidered my letter of 28th November.

S/ Emery N. Stone.

EMERY N. STONE
Rear Admiral, USCG
Chief Commissioner

2928

Copy to: Chief of Staff
Land Forces Sub-Com

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

24

DRAFT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

14622?

Tel.

AC/14601/21/PS.

January, 1945.

SUBJECT : Increase of authorised establishment of Carabinieri.

TO : G-5, AFHQ.

524

1. Reference letter of the Chief Commissioner dated 28th November, 1944 (AC/14622/PS) and to previous correspondence.

2. As you are already aware the Carabinieri has reached its authorised establishment of 55,000, and, furthermore, this figure is being steadily exceeded day by day and unless approval is received from your Headquarters to increase the establishment to 65,000, which we have repeatedly requested, some drastic measures must be taken to stop our present recruiting programme and to discharge those who are surplus to the proper establishment.

3. Of this strength of 55,000 there are, in round figures, 8,500 who are ineffective so far as the performance of civil police duties are concerned. Of these 6,000 are either sick or on extended leave and 2,500 are engaged on Italian military provost duties. It will be seen therefore that the effective strength of the Carabinieri, when up to full establishment, is 46,500.

2927

4. In recent months every effort has been made to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SUBJECT : Increase of authorised establishment of Carabinieri.

TO : C-5, AFHQ.

1. Reference letter of the Chief Commissioner dated 26th November, 1944 (IC/14622/PS) and to previous correspondence.

2. As you are already aware the Carabinieri has reached its authorised establishment of 55,000, and, furthermore, this figure is being steadily exceeded day by day and unless approval is received from your Headquarters to increase the establishment to 65,000, which we have repeatedly requested, some drastic measures must be taken to stop our present recruiting programme and to discharge those who are surplus to the proper establishment.

3. Out of this strength of 55,000 there are, in round figures, 6,500 who are ineffective so far as the performance of civil police duties are concerned. Of these 6,000 are either sick or on extended leave and 2,500 are engaged on Italian military provost duties. It will be seen therefore that the effective strength of the Carabinieri, when up to full establishment, is 46,500.

2927

4. In recent months every effort has been made to step up not only the recruiting programme of the Carabinieri but the number of entrants to the service by every possible means. This has resulted in the authorised establishment being reached earlier than was originally anticipated. Factors which have affected this substantial rise in numbers include the return of

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

prisoners of war who have been repatriated to Italy and also the unexpectedly large numbers of Carabinieri who have come through the lines from enemy occupied territory to rejoin the service. For example, during the month of November approximately 2,000 Carabinieri rejoined in this way.

5. As you are no doubt aware it has been the practice as the Allied Armies move northwards to re-enlist CC RR who are found in the locality. It is the opinion of the Commission that it is essential that such re-enlistment should continue for only in this way is it possible to ensure that CC RR who are familiar with the local conditions are employed. Furthermore if such recruiting is to cease it will be necessary to keep in depots a much larger reserve of CC RR and this will involve locking up Carabinieri who can ill be spared and will give rise to grave difficulties of movement and accomodation. Nor can a reduction by demobilisation of the police forces in the South possibly be contempleted, as the recent disturbances in Sicily illustrate only too well.

6. A great effort has been made by all concerned to raise the Carabinieri figures from the comparatively small numbers which existed a few months ago. It will be a disaster if this effort is to be discounted by inability to accomodate them in the service.

7. I consider that from the aspect of law and order in Italy the one 'sine qua non' of paramount importance is the necessity for the increase in the authorised establishment, for which we have already asked, not only be to approved but to be authorised without delay so as to avoid the embarassment which will undoub-

2.26

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5. As you are no doubt aware it has been the practice as the Allied Armies move northwards to re-enlist CC RR who are found in the locality. It is the opinion of the Commission that it is essential that such re-enlistment should continue, for only in this way is it possible to ensure that CC RR who are familiar with the local conditions are employed. Furthermore if such recruting is to cease it will be necessary to keep in depots a much larger reserve of CC RR and this will involve locking up Carabinieri who can ill be spared and will give rise to grave difficulties of movement and accomodation. Nor can a reduction by demobilisation of the police forces in the South possibly be contempleted, as the recent disturbances in Sicily illustrate only too well.

6. A great effort has been made by all concerned to raise the Carabinieri figures from the comparatively small numbers which existed a few months ago. It will be a disaster if this effort is to be discounted by inability to accomodate them in the service.

7. I consider that from the aspect of law and order in Italy the one 'sine qua non' of paramount importance is the necessity for the increase in the authorised establishment, for which we have already asked, not only be to approved but to be authorised without delay so as to avoid the embarassment which will undoubtedly follow unless this approval is speedily given.

For the Chief Commissioner

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

143

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref. AC/14601/21/PS

Tel: 47634.

SUBJECT: Piceno Group - Strength of Carabinieri.

7th January, 1945.

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. With reference to my letter 3606/COS of the 31st December, 1944., and my subsequent letter of the 1st January, 1945, and also to the visit of Colonel Murray Mitchell to this office, I feel that some further explanation is necessary for you to arrive at a proper conclusion in your consideration of the return of the 3,000 troops comprising the Piceno Group from their present duties with the Carabinieri.

2. So far as the strength of the Carabinieri is concerned the latest official figures as of 9th December last show an over-all strength of 54,836. Although no later figures are available there is no doubt that at the present time the strength, which has been increasing rapidly over the past two months, has now exceeded the authorised establishment of 55,000. This figure does, of course, show a considerable increase over the last official return sent to you from this Commission, but the reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the Public Safety Sub-Commission have always followed the Carabinieri practice showing only the effective strength when supplying you with over-all figures. In future a more realistic return will be forwarded.

3. The position at the present time is that of a strength of 55,000, 5,949 are ineffective (i.e. either sick or on leave), in addition to which there are 1,865 being employed on military police duties and 538 employed by Stato Maggiore, none of these are therefore available for civil police work. In short, it will be seen that out of an authorised establishment of 55,000 no less than 8,452 have to be discounted for the reasons mentioned above.

4. At the present time the whole question of Carabinieri strength and its disposition is being examined by the Land Forces and Public Safety Sub-Commissions in conjunction with the Carabinieri, and I hope by the middle of next week to be able to forward you figures which will be accepted by all concerned.

5. So far as paragraphs 2(c) and 3(c) of my letter of the 31st December are concerned, it has now been established that, in fact, no Army Guard Btns. will be available for public security duties in Northern Italy, and that the AFHQ letter referred to allocates the Italian Btns. in question for normal garrison and guard duties only. The assumption, therefore, that one of the reasons for returning the Piceno Group to their military duties was the fact that 2,500 additional Italian troops would be available for public safety purposes is now found to be incorrect.

2825

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788014

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. With reference to my letter 3606/008 of the 31st December, 1944, and my subsequent letter of the 1st January, 1945, and also to the visit of Colonel Murray Mitchell to this office, I feel that some further explanation is necessary for you to arrive at a proper conclusion in your consideration of the return of the 3,000 troops comprising the Pisano Group from their present duties with the Carabinieri.

2. So far as the strength of the Carabinieri is concerned the latest official figures as of 9th December last show an over-all strength of 54,836. Although no later figures are available there is no doubt that at the present time the strength, which has been increasing rapidly over the past two months, has now exceeded the authorised establishment of 55,000. This figure does, of course, show a considerable increase over the last official return sent to you from this Commission, but the reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the Public Safety Sub-Commission have always followed the Carabinieri practice showing only the effective strength when supplying you with over-all figures. In future a more realistic return will be forwarded.

3. The position at the present time is that of a strength of 55,000, 5,949 are ineffective (i.e. either sick or on leave), in addition to which there are 1,065 being employed on military police duties and 394 employed by State Aggiore, none of these are therefore available for civil police work. In short, it will be seen that out of an authorised establishment of 55,000 no less than 8,408 have to be discounted for the reasons mentioned above.

4. At the present time the whole question of Carabinieri strength and its disposition is being examined by the Land Forces and Public Safety Sub-Commissions in conjunction with the Carabinieri, and I hope by the middle of next week to be able to forward you figures which will be accepted by all concerned.

5. So far as paragraphs 2(c) and 3(c) of my letter of the 31st December are concerned, it has now been established that, in fact, no Army Guard Btns. will be available for public security duties in Southern Italy, and that the AFHQ letter referred to allocates the Italian Btns. in question for normal garrison and guard duties only. The assumption, therefore, that one of the reasons for returning the Pisano Group to their [illegible] duties was the fact that 2,500 additional Italian troops would be available for public safety purposes is now found to be incorrect.

6. With reference to my letter of the 1st January, it has now been ascertained that an authorised establishment of 1,065 Carabinieri for provost duties with the Italian Army had in fact only been assumed and not specified. As a result of discussions between Public Safety Sub-Commission and MMIA the Minister of War is being informed that his establishment for this purpose will be fixed at 1,065 and in consequence steps will be taken to ensure that the remainder will be returned to civil police duties.

2425

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

7. As a matter of interest, you may like to know that the figure of 55,900 Carabinieri, as quoted in my letter of the 31st December, was arrived at by adding to the official Carabinieri figure of 1st December, 1944, i.e. 54,131, firstly 700 recruits who joined the service between the 1st and 9th December, secondly 400 Carabinieri who have arrived in Taranto, having been returned from the Balkans, and thirdly 500 Italian troops who are being seconded to the Carabinieri in Sardinia.

8. To summarise, therefore, there is no doubt that in fact the Carabinieri have already exceeded their authorised establishment of 55,000, although 2,458 of this total are ineffective for employment on civil police duties, but nevertheless have to be carried on its official strength.

9. Since recruiting for the Carabinieri is continuing not only by recruit intake, but also by the return of personnel from the north of Italy and from prisoner of war camps, the authorised establishment of 55,000 is being steadily exceeded day by day. The matter which is of permanent importance therefore is the decision of your Headquarters in response to our long standing request for an increase in the Carabinieri establishment, see my AC/14622/Pa dated 28th November.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

2924

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

142

MINUTES OF MEETING: MMIA - Col. Kerr
- Lt. Col. Ingledew
P.W. C/C - Col. Young
- Lt. Col. Wilcox.

5th January, 1945.

The following matters were discussed:-

At a meeting presided over by Major General Browning at this Headquarters on Sunday, 31st December, 1944, Col. Kerr informed the meeting that approximately 3,000 Italian troops were at the disposal of the Commander of No. 2 District, M.T. Italy, for public safety duties. To-day, Colonel Young informed Colonel Kerr that he had made enquiries into the matter and found that such was not the case, but that the 3,000 Italian troops at the disposal of the Commander, No. 2 District, were for normal garrison duties and for the guarding of military installations. Colonel Kerr agreed. It is clear therefore that in making provision for public safety services in the north west of Italy we can entirely discount any additional help from Italian troops.

Secondly, Col. Young raised the question of the authorised establishment of CC.RR ~~were~~ employed on Army provost duties and therefore ~~were~~ not available for public safety dispositions. Col. Young pointed out that according to the returns received from General Orlando approximately 3,500 CC.RR were so employed. Col. Kerr had previously indicated that his returns showed a figure of approximately 1,800, which figure ought not to be exceeded by General Orlando because in his, Col. Kerr's, view this was the authorised establishment for this purpose. Col. Young asked that Army S/C would write to the Minister of War informing him that the authorised establishment of CC.RR to be employed on provost duties was 1,800 and that this figure might not be exceeded without further authority. 2023
Col. Young then undertook to take up this matter with General Orlando and to see that those additional to the authorised figure were returned for normal police duties.

Thirdly, Army S/C were asked for an explanation of their

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

The following matters were discussed:-

At a meeting presided over by Major General Browning at this Headquarters on Sunday, 31st December, 1944, Col. Kerr informed the meeting that approximately 3,000 Italian troops were at the disposal of the Commander of No. 2 District, N.W. Italy, for public safety duties. To-day, Colonel Young informed Colonel Kerr that he had made enquiries into the matter and found that such was not the case, but that the 3,000 Italian troops at the disposal of the Commander, No. 2 District, were for normal garrison duties and for the guarding of military installations. Colonel Kerr agreed. It is clear therefore that in making provision for public safety services in the north west of Italy we can entirely discount any additional help from Italian troops.

Secondly, Col. Young raised the question of the authorised establishment of CC.RR ~~were~~ employed on Army provost duties and therefore ~~were~~ not available for public safety dispositions. Col. Young pointed out that according to the returns received from General Orlando approximately 3,500 CC.RR were so employed. Col. Kerr had previously indicated that his returns showed a figure of approximately 1,800, which figure ought not to be exceeded by General Orlando because in his, Col. Kerr's, view this was the authorised establishment for this purpose. Col. Young asked that Army S/C would write to the Minister of War informing him that the authorised establishment of CC.RR to be employed on provost duties was 1,800 and that this figure might not be exceeded without further authority. Col. Young then undertook to take up this matter with General Orlando and to see that those additional to the authorised figure were returned for normal police duties.

2923

Thirdly, Army S/C were asked for an explanation of their figure of 55,900 given in the Chief of Staff's letter of the 31st December, 1944, as being the strength of CC.RR at that time and therefore demonstrating that they were above their authorised ceiling. Col. Kerr explained that this figure of 55,900 was arrived at in the following way:-

a) overall establishment of 54,836 as
~~b~~ return received from General Orlando, 31.12.44, to

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which Army S/C had added the following personnel:-

451 CC.RR. returned from the Balkans, who arrived at Taranto within the last week, and
500 Italian troops who had been loaned to the CC.RR in Sardinia on the same basis as the secondment of the Piceno Group.

These two categories together, in round figures, produce a figure of 55,800.

2922

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

2922

Figure 01 55,000.

ABF/ea.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Note 141

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AC/14622/PS 4 January 1945.

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.RR.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission.

1. The latest strength return of the Carabinieri shows that 121 officers and 3750 NCOS and OR'S of the CC.RR. are mobilised, that is, serving with the Armed Forces and not performing territorial police duties.

2. May this Sub-Commission please be supplied with a copy of the directive limiting the strength of mobilised CC.RR. to a total of 1800. The Commanding General will then be instructed to return to territorial police duties all mobilised CC.RR. above the authorised strength.

3. Do you wish to give any directions as to the allocation of the 1760 mobilised CC.RR?

for JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

AEW/jwf

2921

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

140

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel: 470733

Ref. 3606/005

1st January, 1946.

SUBJECT: 3000 Troops Pisano Group.

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Org.
AFHQ, G-5 Section.

136

1. Reference this Commission's letter 3606/005, dated 31st December, 1945, and in confirmation of telephone conversation 1st January (Brig. Upjohn Cert. Woodward, G-5) it is pointed out that further investigation of the figures show that some 5,500 CC.RR are carrying out provost duties with the Italian army although only 1,800 are authorised for this purpose.

2. It follows that some 3,700 CC.RR are at present carried in the Carabinieri establishment of 55,000 though in fact not engaged in the maintenance of civilian law and order.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Civil Affairs Section.

TO	INI	
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT CO. WILCOX		
MAJ BUCKMAN		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		
CHIEF CLERK		

6803

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Translation HV.

CC.RR. Gen. HQ.

31 December 1944
N. 3/87

Subject : CC.RR. Strength.

To : A.C. Public Safety Sub-Commission - Rome.

With reference to verbal agreements reached between the Sub-Commission and an officer of this Gen. HQ., we communicate that from files existing at this Gen. HQ. the CC.RR. Strength on 9 December results to consists of 54836 members (1121 officers and 53715 n.c.o.s and privates.)

The n.c.o.s and privates on leave at said date appear to be 4006 (not 4112).

In such figure are included, besides the soldiers on ordinary half-yearly leave (aliquot part 5%), those on convalescence leave, those on extraordinary leave for serious family reasons, those on extraordinary leave awaiting trial and those on extendible leave for agriculture reasons.

We point out that those on leave for more then 40 days or on leave for 30 days (extendible), in view of the special organisation of the CC.RR.Arma, have not returned to their bases in accordance with the Army practise but are retained on the strength by the company Command of the Legion to which they belong.

Commanding General
- Taddeo Orlando -

2919

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

10622/25 138

Translation RV.

CC.RR. Gen. HQ.

3 January 1945
N. 3/88

Subject : CC.RR. Strength.

To : A.C. Public Safety Sub-Commission - Rome.

Following letter n. 3/87 dated 31 Dec.1944 and with reference to verbal request, we communicate that the 4006 soldiers on leave are subdivided as follows:

- on leave or extraordinary half-yearly leave	n. 2100
- on convalescence leave	" 1248
- on extraordinary leave	" 658
	4006.

Under the heading "on extraordinary leave" are included those granted for serious family reasons, those extraordinary granted to soldiers awaiting trial and those extendible for agriculture reasons, for which this Gen.Hq. has no details as these data are not necessary to this HQ. If the Sub-Commission needs them, the dependent Legions must be consulted.

By order
Colonel Chief of Staff
- Romano della Chiesa -

Should be 5% and Not 10%.

2918

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622

139

Translation RV.

CC.RR. Cen. HQ.

January 1945
N. 3/89

Subject : CC.RR. Strength
To : A.C. Public Safety Sub-Commission - Rome.

With reference to verbal request we transmit the attached return re the CC.RR. strength on 9 December 1944.

In the effective strength of 54836 are included n. 121 officers and n.3750 n.c.o.s and privates belonging to mobilized units as shown on the return forwarded with letter n. 3/76 Seg. dated 22 December 1944.

It is not possible to give on these sections the particulars given on the attached schedule because these particulars are includedmin the strength returns sent in by the Army units with which the sections referred to are serving.

By order
Colonel Chief of Staff
- Romano dalla Chiesa -

2917

14822

136

384

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

31st December 1944

Ref. 3606/CCG

SUBJECT: 3000 Troops PICKEM GROUP

TO : AFHQ (G-3 Sec.)

Reference your signals re shortage of man power in the Italian Army.

1. At the request of C-C Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MMIA) a meeting was held to discuss the immediate return of the 3000 soldiers lent to the CC.RR from PICKEM Combat Group at a time when the CC.RR were 6000 short of the authorised ceiling of 55,000. The following were present :

COS Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MMIA)
Chief of Staff A.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs
2nd i.c, Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MMIA)
Deputy Director, Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.

2. The representations made for the retention of the 3000 with the CC.RR are as follows :

(a) This 3000 was originally required to partly fill the shortage of 6000 CC.RR and so that an equivalent number of experienced CC.RR could be released for duty when the NORTH of ITALY was liberated.

(b) It remains the considered opinion of this Commission that without an increase in the CC.RR ceiling to 65,000 it will be impossible to maintain law and order in N. ITALY. This opinion is fortified by the recent events in GREECE which may give encouragement to lawlessness in the NORTH.

(c) Though it is understood certain Allied and Italian troops will be allotted for internal security in LIBERATED ITALY, nevertheless the great burden of public security will fall mainly on CC.RR.

(d) The undesirability of altering an AFHQ Order effective until 15th February.

3. The representations made for the return of these 3000 personnel to the Army are as follows :

(a) There is a very urgent need for trained reinforcements for existing combat groups and for volunteers for operational purposes with the Armies.
For a variety of reasons, call-ups have been far short of expectation. Though all possible steps have been taken and are being taken to produce more soldiers for the Italian Army, yet the number of "free" reinforcements has fallen to a very low figure. 2916
The strength return as at 9 Dec shows 12,502 as carried under the "Reinforcements" category, for BR-ITI's. Of these 9000 are already [illegible] of order out to BR-ITI service units. A further 5500

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782016

1. [redacted] at the request of the [redacted] was held to discuss the immediate return of the 3000 soldiers lent to the CC.RR from FICEM Combat Group at a time when the CC.RR were 6000 short of the authorised ceiling of 55,000. The following were present :

SOC Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MELA)
Chief of Staff A.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs
2nd i.c, Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MELA)
Deputy Director, Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.

2. The representations made for the retention of the 3000 with the CC.RR are as follows :

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(b) It remains the considered opinion of this Commission that without an increase in the CC.RR ceiling to 65,000 it will be impossible to maintain law and order [redacted] N. ITALY. This opinion is fortified by the recent events in GREECE which may give encouragement to lawlessness in the NORTH.

(c) Though it is understood certain Allied and Italian troops will be allotted for internal security in NORTHERN ITALY, nevertheless the great burden of public security will fall mainly on CC.RR.

(d) The undesirability of altering an AFHQ Order effective until 15th February.

3. The representations made for the return of these 3000 personnel to the Army are as follows :

(a) There is a very urgent need for trained reinforcements for existing combat groups and for auleteers for operational purposes with the Armies.
For a variety of reasons, call-ups have been far short of expectation. Though all possible steps have been taken and are being taken to produce more soldiers for the Italian Army, yet the number of "free" reinforcements has fallen to a very low figure. 2946
The strength return as at 9 Dec shows 12,502 as carried under the "Reinforcements" category, for BR-ITI's. Of these 5000 are already in process of assignment to BR-ITI service units. A further 5500 have since been sent forward as reinforcements for combat groups or towards the auleteer programme. As a result, the approximate figure of "free" reinforcements actually available at this moment is only 2000.
US-ITI's have no "free" reinforcements except those carried in the service calling.
ITI-YTI's show 5,953 personnel in their reinforcement category but in fact there are no "free" reinforcements as 4550 personnel were in SARDINIA awaiting shipment to the mainland and subsequent assignment to categories while the balance, i.e. 1400 were personnel in transit or contained in small units ordered to be disbanded but not at that time assigned.

/sheet 2...

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Para 3 (cont'd)

(b) The Italian Army is short of its ceiling by some 48,000 whereas the CARABINIERI strength as at 19 Dec was 55,900, not including the MONTECUCCOLI Battalion of 800 transferred to CC.RR for absorption though it is probable that not all of these can be absorbed. The CC.RR is thus over its ceiling of 55,000 and has 3000 FICEN personnel on loan as well.

(c) In addition, it is pointed out that one Regiment MC and three Army Guard Battalions, total 2500 personnel, have been earmarked to assist in the maintenance of public security in NORTHERN ITALY vide AFHQ letter B 1720 of 21 Dec.

4. It would appear that you can only decide whether the immediate operational needs of the Italian Army should take preference over the long term responsibility of ensuring adequate forces to maintain law and order in the NORTH, or vice versa taking into account the strength situation and demands mentioned above.

I am therefore submitting the case to you for decision. As an alternative I would ask that 3000 troops or a portion thereof be taken from service units in the rear areas and posted to the CARABINIERI, thus releasing the trained reinforcements.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

M S Clark

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff

Copy to:- Land Forces Sub Commission (AMIA)
Public Safety Sub Commission
C.A. Section

TO	INIT	DATE
COL CHAPMAN		
COL YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ LUCKMAN		
MAJ WILSON		

2915

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782016

three Army Guard Battalions, total 2500 personnel, have been earmarked to assist in the maintenance of public security in NORTHERN ITALY vide AFHQ letter B 1720 of 21 Dec.

4. It would appear that only you can decide whether the immediate operational needs of the Italian Army should take preference over the long term responsibility of ensuring adequate forces to maintain law and order in the NORTH, or vice versa taking into account the strength situation and demands mentioned above.

I am therefore submitting the case to you for decision. As an alternative I would ask that 3000 troops or a portion thereof be taken from service units in the rear areas and posted to the CARABINIERI, thus releasing the trained reinforcements.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

M. S. Clark

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff

Copy to:- Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA)
Public Safety Sub Commission
C.A. Section

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT. COL. WILCOX		
MAJ. LUCKMAN		
MAJ. WILSON		
MAJ. HENSLEY		
MAJ. BALLANCE		

2915

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED [redacted] COMMISSION

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Picano Gap.

FILE No. 1360

TO : C. S. S. C. 31 Dec. 1944.
(att. Col. Chapman & Col Yang)

(1) Attached draft prepared this morning following the conference called by Major Gen. Browning is forwarded.

(2) It is presumed that C.S.S.C. will call a conference during the afternoon.

Copies to: L.F.
Gov.
V.P. Chasen

R. R. Wrights
Col. 5914

DRAFT.

Secret

136c

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

G.S.

Ref. 31st December, 1944.

SUBJECT:

TO : AFHQ (3 Org.)

Reference your signals re shortage of man power in the Italian army.

1. At the request of GOC MAIA a meeting was held to discuss the return of the 3000 Carabinieri lent from Picena Group Italian army. The following were present:

GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs

Deputy Director Public Safety Sub-Commission.

2. The representations made for the retention with the Carabinieri are as follows:

(a) This 3000 was originally required so that an equivalent number of experienced Carabinieri could be released for duty when the north of Italy was liberated. This has not yet been fulfilled.

(b) From the point of view of law and order it remains the considered opinion of this Commission that without this extra assistance it would be impossible to assume fully this responsibility, and this opinion is fortified by the recent events in Greece which may give encouragement to lawlessness in the north.

(c) The area in N.W. Italy will probably be lightly covered by military

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

AFHQ (3 Cys)

Reference your signals re shortage of man power in the Italian army.

1. At the request of GOC MMIA a meeting was held to discuss the return of the 3000 Carabinieri lent from Picena Group Italian army. The following were present:

GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs

Deputy Director Public Safety Sub-Commission.

2. The representations made for the retention with the Carabinieri are as follows:

(a) This 3000 was originally required so that an equivalent number of experienced Carabinieri could be released for duty when the north of Italy was liberated. This has not yet been fulfilled.

(b) From the point of view of law and order it remains the considered opinion of this Commission that without this extra assistance it would be impossible to assume fully this responsibility, and this opinion is fortified by the recent events in Greece which may give encouragement to lawlessness in the north.

(c) The area in N.W. Italy will probably be lightly covered by military troops which means that a greater burden will fall upon civil police.

(d) The undesirability of altering an AFHQ Order which remains effective until 15th February.

3. The representations made for the return of these 3000 personnel to the army are as follows:

(a) There is an urgent need for trained reinforcements for existing

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

combat groups which are about to go into the line, priority of manpower having been given to the muleteer programme.

(b) The Army is short of its ceiling by 49,000 whereas the Carabinieri is reaching its ceiling, although it is understood that an increase in Carabinieri cieling is under consideration.

(c) While admitting the requirement in para 2(b) above it is pointed out that one Regiment HQ and three Guard Battalions total 2500 personnel have been earmarked for the maintenance of law and order in N.W. Italy vide AFHQ letter

4. The meeting therefore agreed to put forward the case to you for decision and in doing so desired me to ask if it was possible, as an alternative, for 3000 troops or a portion thereof to be taken from service units in the rear areas and posted to the Carabinieri thus releasing the trained reinforcements.

5. To sum up, therefore, it is a matter which can only be decided by AFHQ whether the immediate operational needs of the Italian army should take preference over the long term responsibility of ensuring adequate forces to maintain law and order in the north, or vice versa.

2512

Copy to:

AFHQ, G-5 Section.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782016

(c) While admitting the requirement in para 2(b) above it is pointed out that one Regiment HQ and three Guard Battalions total 2500 personnel have been earmarked for the maintenance of law and order in N.W. Italy vide AFHQ letter

4. The ~~meeting~~ therefore agreed ~~to~~ put forward the case to you for decision and in doing ~~so desired me~~ to ask ~~if it was possible,~~ as an alternative, for 3000 troops or a portion thereof to be taken from service units in the rear areas and posted to the Carabinieri thus releasing the trained reinforcements.

5. To sum up, therefore, it is a matter which can only be decided by AFHQ whether the immediate operational needs of the Italian army should take preference over the long term responsibility of ensuring adequate forces to maintain law and order in the north, or vice versa.

2912

Copy to:

AFHQ, G-5 Section.
Land Forces Sub-Commission (ANCIA).
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

20 November 1944

Memorandum For the Record Regarding Phasing out of 5,000 Italian Soldiers from CCRR Duty.

1. Conversation between Col. Chapman and Capt. Woodward.

2. Present strength (approx) of CCRR is 45,000. Present training program of recruits will permit at least 2,000 to assume field duty on 1 April. By agreement with L.F. Subcommission P.S. Subcommission expects to get 3,000 bodies from the next-call up for the Italian Army. The training program for the 3,000 will be finished by 31 March or earlier. On 1 April therefore A.C. will have at least 50,000 CCRR on field duty. The 5,000 soldiers can then be released on 1 April.

3. As an alternative plan the soldiers can be released as follows:

1,500	on	15 February
1,500	on	1 March
1,500	on	15 March
2,000	on	1 April

This plan is based on the probability that A.C. will have:

46,000	CCRR	(effective)	on 15 Feb.
46,500	CCRR	(")	on 1 Mar.
46,500-48,000	CCRR	(")	on 15 Mar.
48,000-50,000	CCRR	(")	on 1 Apr.

4. The latter plan represents a phasing out plan which A.C. will be able to put into operation in any event. If the recruiting campaign is able to be accelerated, A.C. will be able to phase out the soldiers earlier.

2911

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

132A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394.

AC/14622/PS. 23th November, 1944.

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri.

TO : G-5, AFHQ, APO 512. 119A 119B

1. Reference your G-5, 014.12 of the 4th November, 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, AFHQ HSD/424, dated 2nd November, 1944, and our reply of even number, dated 9th November, 1944.

2. The reply mentioned in para. 1, dealt with the provision of 5,000 soldiers to the Carabinieri. This letter deals with the ceiling of Carabinieri establishment.

3. The ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate. 55,000 was the normal peacetime strength of Carabinieri, but by Decree of Ehrahmal Badoglio dated 25th July, 1943, the strength was fixed at 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorised strength.

4. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri. The strength of these special Police Agencies totalled 16,300.

5. The uncertain state of public order following in the wake of war, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrant a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions. Many additional duties have been placed upon the Carabinieri as a result of the Allied occupation and liberation of Italy. Some of these duties are as follows:

a. Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control lines and at other critical points.

2910

b. Dealing with refugees.

c. Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

by the Allied Nations.

d. Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of possible affrays between civilians and troops.

e. Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.

f. Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities and to reduce illegal use of petrol.

g. Assisting in enforcing harvest regulations, and olive oil control.

6. Beyond the Pisa Rimini line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reale were approximately 23,000. This area is largely industrial, thickly populated, and has been long under German domination. 44,000 Carabinieri are already in service south of the Pisa Rimini line. It is essential therefore that the ceiling of Carabinieri be increased to 65,000 in order to make available for the north a strength comparable to that provided in peace time. This would be the minimum strength necessary to maintain public order.

7. It must be appreciated that if the strength of Carabinieri is below that considered essential, then any failure by the police services to deal with public safety conditions, will necessitate troops being diverted from combat duties to restore the situation.

8. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for the whole of Italy be fixed at 65,000.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR.
Chief Commissioner.

2909

131A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

AC/14622/PS 22 Nov 1944

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri

TO : G-5, AFHQ, APO 512.

1. Reference your G-5, 014.12 of the 4th November 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, AFHQ HSD/424 dated 2nd November 1944, and our reply of even number dated 9th November 1944.

2. The reply mentioned in para 1. dealt with the provision of 5000 soldiers to the CC.RR. This letter deals with the ceiling of Caraoinieri establishment.

3. The ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate. 55,000 was the normal peacetime strength of Carabinieri, but by Decree of Marshal Badoglio dated 25 July 1943, the strength was fixed at 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

4. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the CC.RR. The strength of these special Police Agencies totalled 16,300.

5. The uncertain state of public order following in the wake of war, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrant a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal pe-acetime conditions. Many additional duties have been placed upon the Carabinieri as a result of the allied occupation and liberation of Italy. Some of these duties are as follows:

2908

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

enclosing copy of a letter from G-3. AFHQ HSD/424 dated 2nd November 1944, and our reply of even number dated 9th November 1944.

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3. The ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate. 55,000 was the normal peacetime strength of Carabinieri, but by Decree of Marshal Badoglio dated 25 July 1943, the strength was fixed at 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

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5. The uncertain state of public order following in the wake of war, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrant a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal pe-acetime conditions. Many additional duties have been placed upon the Carabinieri as a result of the allied occupation and liberation of Italy. Some of these duties are as 2308 follows:

a. Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.

b. Dealing with refugees.

c. Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.

d. Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of possible affrays between

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

civilians and troops.

e. Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.

f. Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities and to reduce illegal use of petrol.

g. Assisting in enforcing harvest regulations, and olive oil control.

6. Beyond the Pisa Rimini line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reale were approximately 23,000. This area is largely industrial, thickly populated, and has been long under German domination. 44,000 CC.RR. are already in service south of the Pisa Rimini line. It is essential therefore that the ceiling of Carabinieri be increased to 65,000 in order to make available for the north a strength comparable to that provided in peace time. This would be the minimum strength necessary to maintain public order.

7. It must be appreciated that if the strength of Carabinieri is below that considered essential, then any failure by the police services to deal with public safety conditions, will necessitate troops being diverted from combat duties to restore the situation.

8. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for the whole of Italy be fixed at 65,000.

2307

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622 180

AFHQ INFO MEDIA GE CHIEF CONSIDERATIONS GM CA SECTION

FM ALGOM PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

SECRET

7264

PRIORITY

27/11/44

Public Safety S/C

SECRET FD

PARA ONE FD REFERENCE YOUR FX DASH FIVE SEVEN TWO ONE FOUR DATED TWO FOUR NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR AND OUR SEVEN ZERO FOUR NINE DATED TWO FIVE NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR FD

PARIEN TO AFHQ INFO MEDIA GM CHIEF CONSIDERATIONS GM CA SECTION FROM FM ALGOM PARIN

PARA TWO FD PLEASE SUSPEND TRANSFER OF ITALIAN SOLDIERS LOANED TO AUGMENT CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER AS FAR AS SICILY IS CONCERNED FD

PARA THREE FD DISCUSSIONS TAKING PLACE WITH LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION MEDIA FD

2006

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14672 129

AVFL INFO LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION (MSIA)

RESTRICTED

FROM HQ ALLIED PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

PRIORITY

7049

Public Safety S/C

25/11/44

127

RESTRICTED FD

PARA ONE FD REFERENCE YOUR FX DASH FIVE SEVEN TWO ONE FOUR DATED TWENTY FOURTH

NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR PARA FOUR FD

PARAS FD AFHQ INFO LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION (MSIA) FROM HQ ALLIED FORCES

PARA TWO FD IT IS CONFIRMED THAT MOVEMENT OF FIVE THOUSAND SOLDIERS TO A

DAY IS THE REQUIREMENT FD

Copy to Chief Commissioner
CA Section.

2905

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

128

Majs Wilson

file new with C.A.

Cable AFHQ confirming as para (4). 129

Bring up for re-consideration first week
in January 1945. of position
is then changed we will formerly have
to ask for an extension.

Lt Gen. Orlando Ward.

adj.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

10622

Public Safety
2075-
126A

JME/MMW/as

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 091.711-1 (Italy)

9 November 1944

SUBJECT: Increase in Carabinieri

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
(Attn: Public Safety Sub-Commission),
APO 394.

1. It has come to the attention of this Section that the Montegranero Bn is available for employment and assignment with CC RR.

2. The Montegranero Bn has been withdrawn from the line and is composed of over-age personnel scheduled for discharge when their homes in Northern Italy are liberated.

3. It is requested that you investigate the possibility that this seasoned personnel may be very useful in partially offsetting the deficiency in carabinieri strength and inform this Section if you concur in the transfer of the Bn.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

J. Murray Mitchell
J. MURRAY MITCHELL
Colonel, G.S.C.

Rec'd 14 Nov

In hand with MMIA.
See also 99A. 11/11
Part of Piceno Gap and as such now included in transfer to CCRR.
1/12/44 2904

HEADQUARTERS
10 NOV 1944
A. C. C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

125A

MSG SARUMIA

AFMG O-3(Org)

DD 1765 RESTRICTED

For ADJUGS (*) Please cancel my SUM764 of 10 Nov and substitute following: (*) Special Rn of 900 all ranks org as Hq's for CONR will BE be hand'd over to CONR wide my SUM680 of 27 Oct but will be held intact as Ct personnel org (*) For AMIS (*) Movement you plist shipping normal on List 7 (*) Personnel will be allotted to Unit's in priority FIRST Ver SECOND Labour

Cancels 1764

SECRET

125A

Italian Min of War.
Public Safety Subs
Gen A.F.

2703

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622 125A

2c.

FROM: MMLA

TO : AGW SARDINIA 10 1630 A

Info: AMT, G-3 Org
SD AAI
WAR MINISTRY
PUB. SAFETY SUB-COM. A.G.

SD 1764 RESTRICTED

For SIMMONS (.) Ref AMLA SD 1580 of 27 Oct (.) Special Battalion of 500 all ranks organized as reinforcements for CC RR will not repeat not be turned over to CC RR (.) Hold Battalion intact and ship to Mainland when space available as labour increment for PBS

Cancelled by 125A

PRECEDENCE Routine

AUTHENTICATED

2402

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

124A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Reference No. AC/14622/PS

11 November 1944

SUBJECT : Italian Soldiers to Reinforce Carabinieri

TO : Brigadier General STOFFORD, G-5, A.F.H.Q.

119A

With reference to a letter which I have received from your office (G-5: 014.12) dated 4th November, I am enclosing copy of my reply thereto which I am forwarding to-day.

123A

I do not think you will be surprised when I say that I find this letter most unsatisfactory, since G-3 section seem to have no appreciation of the responsibilities involved.

I cannot be content to leave the matter where it is, but in the meantime I would appreciate your personal interest, not only in influencing G-3, but also in making whatever representations you consider proper to the Chief of Staff.

HILARY W. STONE
Commodore, RNVR.
Chief Commissioner.

AHW/jef

2901

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

123A
Sec127

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Reference No. ACC/14622/PS

9 November, 1944.

SUBJECT : Italian soldiers to reinforce Carabinieri.

TO : G-5, A.F.H.Q., APO 512.

1. Reference your G-5, 014.12 of the 4th November, 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, A.F.H.Q., HED/424. The letter from G-3 referred to deals with two matters, firstly the ceiling of the Carabinieri establishment and secondly the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to reinforce them. In this present letter I will refer only to the provision of the 5,000 Italian soldiers : the matter of the ceiling for the Carabinieri strength will be dealt with in a later communication.

2. The suggestion made by Brigadier Napier in his paragraph 4, to recruit additional Carabinieri and to consider what economies could be effected by way of reorganisation have not only already been examined but are also constantly under review.

3. It is hoped that the present intake, by means of recruiting, of 500 per month will be exceeded in the future, but it should be realised that this matter is by no means so simple as it would appear; particularly in view of the fact that for service with the Carabinieri it is worse than useless to employ men who do not possess the necessary qualifications for this work. So far as the general reorganisation of this service is concerned, this is a subject which is receiving special attention but which also is one which cannot be lightly disposed of or from which any real benefit can be obtained except over a long period.

4. The suggestion that 10,000 Carabinieri should be recruited forthwith is not realistic when one realises that recruitment for this service is voluntary and that it is essential that the type of man accepted is one who will be capable of efficiently performing police duty in the future. Facilities do not exist either to select or to train such an enormous figure. Another point which must be considered when contemplating the recruitment of such large numbers is that of the possibility of finding 12,000 disbanded Carabinieri north of the Pisa-Rimini line, the addition of which to a force already approaching its authorised establishment would raise it far beyond its proper figure. This is another reason in support of the policy to employ soldiers on a temporary basis since they can be returned to their units as the Carabinieri approach their normal strength. 2:00

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5. I am afraid that paragraph 5 of the letter referred to is not of much help to us. The Brigadier should be informed that many very senior Police Officers are already employed in the Public Safety work of this Commission, both at H.Q. and in the Regions.

6. I would remind you that the purpose of requesting the 5,000 Italian soldiers was solely to provide a similar number of trained Carabinieri who would be available for police duty when the north of Italy is in our hands. I have already explained to you the scheme by which these 5,000 soldiers would be used so that they could release an equivalent number of Carabinieri who would be taken from the centre and south of Italy for duty north of the Pisa-Rimini line.

7. Since it has been decided that these soldiers cannot be retained after the 31st December, 1944, they will not serve any useful purpose whatever, since they were required only as an expedient to reinforce police personnel in the north of Italy and for no other purpose.

8. I therefore must ask in the strongest terms for the matter to be reconsidered, since unless the Carabinieri are to have this reinforcement from the Italian Army, I shall have to make it clear to SACMED that I cannot be responsible for Public Safety in the north of Italy with the meagre Police establishment that will be available to me.

9. You will, of course, appreciate that such inability on the part of the Italian Public Safety Services to deal with the situation must inevitably mean that troops will have to be diverted from their combat duties in an attempt to restore the situation.

10. I request therefore, that this matter be reconsidered and that the provision of these 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri be approved for an indefinite period.

2899

ELLERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

AEY/G.

DRAFT

TO: [illegible]

The President, Civil Affairs Section,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Reference :

The copy of Sub Memorandum 1559/4dd of the 2nd November, forwarded by Lt. Col. Jackman, G-5, A.F.H.Q., is a spectacular example of staff muddling on a high level.

Let us have what are the facts.

This Sub-Commission considers its prime duty that of quartering law and order behind the advance of the Allied forces to relieve the Army commanders of the embarrassment of having to maintain the preservation of law and order with troops who would otherwise be employed directly on military operations.

As experts (in spite of the heads in par. grade 5), we consider that the north of Italy, when in Allied hands, will impose a great strain upon the Italian police agencies, who may not be able to handle the situation.

Hence are our reasons :-

a) the Carabinieri in particular, is no less than 22,000 men below that which we consider the minimum adequate strength.

b) Industrial damage in the north ensures unemployment on a tremendous scale and economic conditions will be such that strikes and rioting must be expected.

c) communists, even of the Italian variety, are awaiting such an opportunity to bring about a political coup by means of force which will entail the physical overthrow of the civil police force.

If these reasons are correct, and indeed he would be a bold man who would gainsay them, then the Army Commanders ought to be anxious lest their fighting troops will be needed to reduce lawlessness in the north of Italy.

2508

To provide for this responsibility we have asked for 5,000 Italian troops who would relieve an equivalent number of Carabinieri and free them for the south and centre of Italy.

How should it be forgotten that since the surrender of

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 788016

[illegible] is not possible on a long term basis.

Let us now look at the facts.

This Sub-Commission considers its main duty that of maintaining law and order behind the advance of the Allied troops to relieve the army commanders of the embarrassment of having to maintain the precarious peace of law and order with troops who would otherwise be employed directly on military operations.

In regards (in spite of the remarks in paragraph 5), we consider that the north of Italy, when in Allied hands, will be less a great strain upon the Italian police agencies, who may not be able to handle the situation.

These are our reasons :-

a) The Carabinieri in particular, is no less than 10,000 men below that which we consider the minimum adequate strength,

b) Industrial damage in the north causing unemployment on a tremendous scale and economic conditions will be such that strikes and rioting must be expected,

c) Communists, even of the Italian variety, are awaiting such an opportunity to bring about a political coup by means of force which will entail the physical overthrow of the civil police force.

If these reasons are correct, and indeed he would be a bold man who would gainsay them, then the Army Commanders ought to be anxious lest their fighting troops will be needed to reduce lawlessness in the north of Italy.

To provide for this responsibility we have asked for 5,000 Italian troops who would relieve an equivalent number of trained Carabinieri from the south and centre of Italy. To provide this additional effusion in the south, according to this classic letter from C-S, we are to have their services for a few days only, since they are required to return to their original stations by the end of the year. Such an example of going to such pains to achieve such disproportionate ~~and~~ trouble would indeed be hard to parallel, but if one remembers that we are required to clothe these men in 5,000 Carabinieri uniforms, which we shall probably never see again, the matter is really one for more than serious consideration.

also

-1-

2838

Nowhere is it forgotten that since the preservation of law and order is also of the highest importance a civil [illegible] is not required for [illegible] as would have been the case in the military field.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Your letter to G-5, A.F.H.Q., of the 20th October, which indicated the present situation and gave some estimate of the future, seems to have been entirely overlooked, and I am forced to the conclusion that G-5 Section of A. F.H.Q., has by no means represented either our views or our interests to G-5, for how else can such a letter as that of November 2nd come to be written?

Thus, in your letter ~~under~~ above reference it is laid that the establishment of ~~the C.C.R.~~ cannot be raised above 55,000. We may be right, but let us leave no doubt in his mind as to the ~~views~~ of an inadequate police strength ~~when it does the~~ in lieu of his ~~various~~ responsibilities.

being confused with rearmament

We require directions to be given to the Public Safety Sub-Commission as if he were [illegible] instructions to a kindergarten. Surely he entitle us with more knowledge and more sense in this matter. The habit of recruiting 10,000 men as if this had never been considered and as if it were a subject that could be disposed of as easily as giving instructions for it.

The implication that Italian soldiers are too good to become policemen ought to be translated with the co-operation of the Allied Control Commission on the virtues of the Italian troops.

Perhaps the best word about paragraph 5 the letter, but it is not the limit of sheer importance when it displays a tragic state of ignorance on the part of Senior Officers on the Staff of the Theatre Commander as to the work and constitution and indeed the purpose of this Commission. Again, what has G-5 been doing [illegible] such ignorance possible?

As you will have gathered, I feel strongly on this matter and would be most grateful if you decide to place my views before the Chief Commissioner, informing him that I am prepared, if necessary, to state them to the Commander in Chief himself.

2897

There is an instance where we should advise the Chief Commissioner in his own interests to go direct to the Commander in Chief and tell him quite plainly what has happened and what it may mean in terms of responsibility [illegible] that it is for our heads.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

cc. ER

[illegible] cannot be raised above 55,000. He may be right, but let us leave no doubt in his mind as to the [illegible] of an inadequate police strength [illegible] responsibilities.

big corporate work undertaking

or in face of his enemies

He speaks of directions to be given to the Public Safety Sub-Commission as if he were [illegible] instructions to a kindergarten. Surely he credits us with some knowledge and some sense in this matter. He talks of recruiting 10,000 men as if this had never been considered and as if [illegible] and that he did not [illegible] of as easily as giving instructions for it.

His implication that Italian politics are too [illegible] to be [illegible] with the [illegible] of the Sub-Commission on the virtues of the Italian troops.

Perhaps the best word about paragraph 6 the letter, but if it is not the limit of sheer impertinence then it displays a tragic state of ignorance on the part of Senior Officers on the staff of the Theater Commander as to the work and constitution and indeed the purpose of this Commission. Again, what has G-5 been doing [illegible] such ignorance possible?

do

!

As you will have gathered, I feel strongly on this matter and would be most grateful if you decide to place my views before the Chief Commissioner, informing him that I am prepared, if necessary, to state them to the Commander in Chief Himself.

2597

Here is an instance where we should advise the Chief Commissioner in his own interests to go direct to the Commander in Chief and tell him quite plainly what has happened and what it may mean in terms of responsibility for law and order when the north of Italy is in our hands.

Until this matter has been settled, I have [illegible] AFHQ

to pushed

[illegible] for the movement of Italian troops [illegible] required.

E.E. TOMB, Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

7th November, 1944.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

DRAFT.

War Refugee Board
Office of the Chief Commissioner, APO 204.

SECRET.

Reference No. WRB/Misc/75. 8th November, 1944.

Subject : Italian soldiers to reinforce Dodecanese.

To : Brigadier General Crawford, U.S.A., U.S.M.M.

SPOFFORD

With reference to a letter which I have received from your office (S-5 dtd.12) dated 4th November, I am enclosing copy of my reply thereto which I am forwarding to-day.

I do not think you will be surprised when I say that I find this letter very unsatisfactory, since S-5 section seem to have no appreciation of the responsibilities involved.

I cannot be content to leave the matter where it is, but in the meantime I would appreciate your personal interest, not only in influencing S-5, but also in taking whatever representations you consider proper to the Chief of Staff.

BRENT S. ALLEN
Commodore, USN,
Chief Commissioner.

Approved by C.C.

2496

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SPOFFORD

With reference to a letter which I have received from your office (G-3: 314.(1C) dated 4th November, I am enclosing copy of my reply thereto which I am forwarding to-day.

I do not think you will be surprised when I say that I find this letter most unsatisfactory, since G-3 Section seem to have no appreciation of the responsibilities involved.

I cannot be prudent to leave the matter where it is, but in the meantime I would appreciate your personal interest, not only in safeguarding G-3, but also in making whatever representations you consider proper to the Chief of Staff.

Stuart T. Stone
Commodore, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

7

2896

Approved by C.C.

T.A. Quayle Major

8/XI/44.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

122A
See 123A
See 1A(2nd)

TRATEM.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner,
APO 394.

Reference No. ACC/G(G&Z)/TM. 24th November, 1944.

Subject : Italian soldiers to reinforce Carabinieri.

To : G-3, A.F.H.Q., APO 512.

1. Reference your G-3, 014.12 of the 14th November, 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, A.F.H.Q., HSD/424. The letter from G-3 referred to deals with two matters, firstly the ceiling of the Carabinieri establishment and secondly the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to reinforce them. In this present letter I will refer only to the provision of the 5,000 Italian soldiers, the matter of the ceiling for the Carabinieri strength will be dealt with in a later communication.

2. The suggestion made by Brigadier Napier in his paragraph 4, to recruit additional Carabinieri and to consider what economies could be effected by way of reorganisation have not only already been examined but are also constantly under review.

3. It is hoped that the present intake, by means of recruiting, of 500 per month will be exceeded in the future, but it should be realised that this matter is by no means so simple as it would appear; particularly in view of the fact that for service with the Carabinieri it is worse than useless to employ men who do not possess the necessary qualifications for this work. So far as the general reorganisation of this service is concerned, this is a subject which is receiving careful attention but which also is one which cannot be lightly disposed of or from which any real benefit can be obtained except over a long period.

2895

not realistic

4. The suggestion that 10,000 Carabinieri should

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

To : Q-5, A.F.H.Q., APO 512.

I. Reference your Q-5, 014.12 of the 4th Nov.Dec. 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, A.F.H.Q., HSM/124. The letter from G-3 referred to deals with two matters, firstly the ceiling of the Carabinieri establishment and secondly the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to reinforce them. In this present letter I will refer only to the provision of the 5,000 Italian soldiers. The matter of the ceiling for the Carabinieri strength will be dealt with in a later communication.

2. The suggestion made by Brigadier Napier in his paragraph 4, to recruit additional Carabinieri and to consider what economies could be effected by way of reorganisation have not only already been examined but are also constantly under review.

3. It is hoped that the present intake, by means of recruiting, of 500 per month will be exceeded in the future, but it should be realised that this matter is by no means as simple as it would appear; particularly in view of the fact that for service with the Carabinieri it is more than useless to employ men who do not possess the necessary qualifications for this work. So far as the general reorganisation of this service is concerned, this is a subject which is receiving special attention but which also is one which cannot be lightly disposed of or from which any real benefit can be obtained except over a long period.

4. The suggestion that 5,000 Carabinieri should be recruited forthwith is [illegible] when one realises that recruitment for this service is voluntary and that it is essential that the type of man accepted is one who will be capable of efficiently performing police duty in the future. Facilities do not exist either to select or to train such an enormous number at such a time which must be considered when contemplating the recruitment of such large numbers is that of the possibility of finding 12,000 disbanded Carabinieri north of the Gothic line, the garrison of which is [illegible] some already approaching its authorised establishment

2895

not realistic

-1-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016



is not of much help to us

informed

views

, both ashore and in the Regions.

6. I would remind you that the purpose of requesting the 5,000 Italian soldiers was solely to provide a similar number of trained Carabinieri who would be available for police duty when the ports of Italy are in our hands. I have already explained to you the scheme by which these 5,000 soldiers would be used to free the 5,000 relieved an equivalent number of Carabinieri who would be taken from the centre and south of Italy for employment on the Demarcation line.

7. Since it has been decided that these soldiers cannot be retained after the 31st December, 1943, they will not serve any useful purpose whatever, since they were required only as a specific to reinforce police personnel in the north of Italy and for no other purpose.

8. I therefore ask that in the above event, the matter may be reconsidered, since unless the Carabinieri are to have this reinforcement from the Italian Army, I shall have to make it clear to Gen ED [illegible] that I cannot be responsible for [illegible] in the north of Italy with the meagre police establishment that will be available to me.

2894

9. You will, of course, appreciate the [illegible] difficulty on the part of the Italian public safety Services must inevitably mean that [illegible] troops will have to be diverted from their [illegible] duties in an attempt to restore the situation.

10. I request therefore, that [illegible] be given to this matter and that the question of these 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri be approved for an indefinite period.

be reconsidered

to deal with the situation

Army, Crowe,
Commodore, R.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

RESTRICTED P Safety S/c.

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED COMMISSION
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

12A
Copy to H.Q.

Ref: PS/3.1.1

Copies to 14600/2, 14602/3

Date 6 November 1944

TO	INIT	DATE
BRIG CHAPMAN		
COL YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ GREGORY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

SUBJECT: Strengths of CC.RR. and CC.FF. in Southern Region.

TO : H.Q. NAPLES Zone (for attention of ZPSO)
" SALERNO Zone " " "
" FOGGIA Zone " " "
" BARI Zone " " "
" TARANTO Zone " " "
" CATANZARO Zone" " "

1. Reference this H.Q. letter No. PS/3.1.1 dated 2nd October 1944 requesting effective officer and other ranks strengths of the CC.RR. Province by Province of this Region: The returns received in reply disclose the following establishments:-

Zone	Province	Officer	Other Ranks.
Naples	Naples	48	2270
"	Benevento	5	270
"	Avellino	5	376
Salerno	Salerno	10	728
Foggia	Foggia	6	639
"	Campobasso	6	482
Bari	Bari	24	779
"	Matera	2	228
"	Potenza	5	399
"	Lecce	6	379
"	Brindisi	4	245
Taranto	Taranto	5	312
Catanzaro	Catanzaro	13	753
"	Cosenza	6	533
"	Reggio Calabria	8	640
	Total	153	9027

2893

2. As a result of the dissemination of the information contained in the October 1944 monthly returns received through your office from the various Prefects, the following are the strengths of the CC.FF. in this Region:-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785044

Ref: PS/3.1.1

Date 6 November 1944

TO	INIT	DATE
BRIG CHAPMAN		
COL YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ [illegible]SON		
[illegible]SON		
MAJ [illegible]NBURY		
MAJ [illegible]VEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

SUBJECT: Strengths of CC.RR. and GG.FF. in Southern Region

TO : HQ. NAPLES Zone (for attention of ZPSO)
" SALERNO Zone " " "
" FOGGIA Zone " " "
" BARI Zone " " "
" TARANTO Zone " " "
" CATANZARO Zone" " "

1. Reference this H.Q. letter No. PS/3.1.1 dated 2nd October 1944 requesting effective officer and other ranks strengths of the CC.RR. Province by Province of this Region: The returns received in reply disclose the following establishment:-

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Naples	Naples	48	2270
"	Benevento	5	270
"	Avellino	5	376
Salerno	Salerno	10	722
Foggia	Foggia	6	639
"	Campobasso	6	482
Bari	Bari	24	779
"	Matera	8	228
"	Potenza	5	399
"	Lecce	6	379
"	Brindisi	4	245
Taranto	Taranto	5	312
Catanzaro	Catanzaro	13	753
"	Cosenza	6	533
"	Reggio Calabria	8	640
	Total	153	9027

2893

2. As a result of the dissemination of the information contained in the October 1944 monthly returns received through your office from the various Prefects, the following are the strengths of the GG.FF. in this Region:-

...../2

HEADQUARTERS 8 NOV 1944 A. C. C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Zone	Province	Officer	Other Ranks.
Naples	Naples	(not yet to hand)	
"	Benevento	2	131
"	Avellino	(not yet to hand)	
Salerno	Salerno	7	532
Foggia	Foggia	8	246
"	Campobasso	2	74
Bari	Bari	16	661
"	Matera	1	39
"	Brindisi	(not yet to hand)	
"	Lecce	6	238
"	Potenza	2	54
Taranto	Taranto	3	104
Catanzaro	Catanzaro	5	88
"	Cosenza	2	189
"	Reggio Calabria	4	247
		58	2403

3. The foregoing figures are forwarded for your information; In the comprehensive monthly report of activities of Public Safety Division of this Region to the Director, Public Safety Sub-Commission, H.Q. Allied Commission, it is necessary to set out the effective strengths of these two forces, therefore, if there is any variation in the figures month by month in the Provinces under your jurisdiction, will you please quote the new and correct figures to ensure that our return to H.Q. is up-to-date and accurate.

For the Regional Commissioner:

G. RICHARDSON
Major,
Regional Public
Safety Officer.

GR/tp.

Copy to: Director, Public Safety Sub-Commission
HQ. Allied Commission.

2892

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622

1204

G FIVE AFHQ ACTION INFO AAI LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION MMIA

HQ ALLIED COMMISSION PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

6150

7/11/44

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

Public Safety S/C.

1198

RESTRICTED FD

PARA ONE FD REFERENCE YOUR LETTER G FD FIVE SLANT ZERO ONE FOUR

FD ONE TWO DATED FOURTH NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR FD

PAREN TO G FIVE AFHQ ACTION INFO AAI LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION

MMIA FROM HQ ALLIED COMMISSION PAREN

PARA TWO FD REQUESTED THAT MOVEMENT OF FIVE THOUSAND ITALIAN

MILITARY TRANSFERRED TO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER BE SUSPENDED

PENDING FURTHER DISCUSSION ON RELEASE DATE FD

2891

Internal: A/C.C.
C. of S.
C.A. Section
Public Safety

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Public Safety 3/c
2505

AIRED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/wew

14622 11 9B

G-5: 014.12

4 November 1944
Recd 7/11 1155hrs.

See 123A
124A

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1196

1. Reference telephone conversation Col Chapman - Lt Col Jackman today, herewith as promised is copy of G-3 Memo HSD/424 of 2 Nov.

2. It is requested that a progress report on the matter be submitted to reach this HQ without fail by 15 Nov 44.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

Jackman Lt Col.

T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel

Incl:
as above

BEAD 7 NOV 944 A. C. C.

2890

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G - 3 SECTION

2 Nov 44

1198

FILE NO : HSD/424

SUBJECT : The Increase of Carabinieri

TO : G-5

106 A

1. Reference AG 014.12/137 GCT-O of 27 Oct 44, copy to you.

2. As you are aware, the Carabinieri are at present some 10,000 in number beneath the ceiling figure, and we have recently had to provide 5,000 Army personnel to assist. These Army personnel must be returned without fail by 31 Dec 44.

3. You have requested an increase of 10,000 in the Carabinieri ceiling. Operations will require the use of all Army personnel within the Army ceiling, and it is regretted that it is quite impossible to transfer Army ceiling to Carabinieri.

4. I would like to suggest therefore, that you should inform the Public Safety Sub Commission that they should take immediate steps to carry out the following:-

(a) To recruit 10,000 Carabinieri forthwith, in order that the soldiers can be returned to the Army, and
(b) To carry out an examination of the present Carabinieri organisation to determine whether the numbers allotted cannot be made to go further.

5. If I might suggest it I should recommend that an experienced police officer from ENGLAND, INDIA or PALESTINE might be brought for a period of a few months, to see if he could not make some helpful suggestions.

6. I must add that with present operational needs, it is quite impossible to allow recruiting for the Carabinieri within the Army, as this would entail the removal of the better type of man of which there is already a great shortage.

7. As this is a matter directly affecting the efficiency of the Italian Army I would be grateful if you would inform me by 15 Nov as to the steps that will be taken by the Public Safety Sub Commission to increase the numbers of Carabinieri.

2889

/s/ J L C NAPIER,
/t/ J.L.C. NAPIER,
Brigadier GS.,
G-3 Org Sub Sec.

JLCN/JFN.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

1184

9802

(1) DIRTEMBE FOR ACTION, (2) MAIP AAI (3) AMIA (4) MOVMIT (5) AC (6) MOVKIT
(7) MAAC (8) MOV MEME FOR INFO 04/02

AFHQ SIGNED MACHED

KX 46682 ROUTINE

MOV 011700A CITE: FHCT

SECRET.

1. Order move units shown in appx "A" to MMIA SD/26 of 26 Oct not repeat not to all.

2. Moves to be completed within 3 weeks.

PLAT

INFO-ACTION: In S/C 2
INFO: A/CC
Recon Sec
Army SO
File

2988

SECRET

NOV 022040A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1452/2

Public Safety 2328

SECRET
Civil Affairs Section,
HQ Allied Armies in Italy
TEL: FIELFOT 132

Subject:- Substitution of Soldiers (Italian) for CCRR-Ancona

To:- SD(Ib)(Br)

DCAO/5/2A
3 Nov 44

1. Reference conversation between Maj. Morgan, ASC2, SC(Ib)(Br) and Lt. Col. Perrell on 31 Oct; AFHQ cable FX36508, dated 14 Oct, FX43501 dated 25 Oct; AAI cable CAS/38 and AMG 8th Army cable M666 (copies attached herewith).

2. Your attention is invited to the attached letter from HQ Allied Commission which sets out the reason behind the action requested in the AFHQ cables mentioned above.

3. Should you consider the arrangement inadvisable, please inform this section as to the action you recommend. It is, however, to be hoped that the plan not be altered as from some directions it still seems desirable to have supplemented police available in the ANCONA area if only to assist in enforcing normal public safety restrictions.

4. In support of para 3 above, the cable from AMG 8th Army attached herewith (M666) indicated that AMG 8th Army are going to need their CCRR and it is for these that the soldiers concerned are to be substituted.

R. A. Perrell
R. A. PERRELL,
Lt. Col., Inf.
for DCAO

Copies to:
Public Safety Sub-Comm.
AMG 8th Army

Encls: AAI Cable CAS/38
AMG 8th Army Cable M666
Ltr HQ AC ACO/14622/PS of 29 Oct

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN	2	8
COL [illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		

File with Ch Section

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
CMF
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

ACC/11622/P3 29 Oct 44

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : HQ AAI
(through DCAO)

1 Arrangements are being discussed to transfer 5000 Italian soldiers to the CCRR for duty in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, in order that 5000 fully trained CCRR can be released for duty in the North.

2 It is proposed to employ the military in groups of 500 at the following Legion H. Qs.:-

BARI	CAGLIARI
NAPLES	ROME
CATANZARO	ROME (Lazio)
MESSINA	ORIENT
PALERMO	ANCONA

3 CCRR patrols are worked in pairs. Under the new proposal, each patrol would consist of 1 CCRR, 1 soldier. The 500 CCRR in each Legion thus released would be held in readiness for transport to the North.

4. It is agreed that in ANCONA, no increase of CCRR strength is necessary for the performance of Police duty in that area. 500 soldiers are requested for ANCONA to release 500 CCRR inaccordance with the policy already explained.

5 It may be that at the present stage no additional CCRR are needed in forward areas. However, the progress of operations, which cannot be anticipated, may liberate fresh territory at any time, and CC RR must be readily available.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

2886

P.M.CHILDS
for G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
V.P. CA Section
Dep COS

01194

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

AGNY FORM C136 (Rev 2-50) DOCSAG/5/2A

MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

Call | Sel. No. | Priority | Transmission Instructions

COPY

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

Originator | Date-Time of Origin | Office Date Stamp

FROM (W) CIVIL AGENCY, SECRET, NO NAT

For Action

TO AMB VATT TOKYO ARE FOR (EYES ONLY) AMB

(W) For Information (INFO)

Message Instructions | GR

Originator's No. CAC/55

SECRET (.) DO YOU NOW HAVE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO REVOKE THE POST FORT AID RAVENNA (.) ARE PROOFS AVAILABLE FOR TAKEOVER DO AGREE TO CLOSE LEGAL ITALIA TO HOLDERS GOLD FOR SECRETARY OVERSEAS (.) ACT CLOSELY TO ENSURE SECRECY IF YOU AGREE AID AGENCY SUPERVISION AS TO FORCE AID RAVENNA WE WILL ATTEMPT TO DIVERT ENEMIES MISCHIEF (.) REPLY TELEX BY CABLE LARGENT

This Message May Be Sent AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS { EXCEPT / CAUTIOUSLY

Is liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands; this message must be sent IN CIPHER

SEE A PROBLEM TO GOI

Signed

Originator's Instructions Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE

Time 2385 TOR | Date | Op.

Time Cleared

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET IMMEDIATE
US CIPHER MESSAGE IN

FOLIO NR:76994.
2 NOV 44.
TOO:021830A.
TOR:022330A.

FROM: MAIN AMG 8 ARMY.

TO: ACTION MAIN AAI FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

ORIG NO: M 666

REF YOUR CAS/33 OF 1.
HAVE 150 CCRR FOR RAVENNA 200 FOR FORLI. CONSIDER THIS INSUFFICIENT PARTICULARLY IN VIEW POSSIBLE STATIC OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GREATER NUMBERS THAN USUAL ARE REQUIRED IN ARMY AREA FOR SECURITY CHECK ETC.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION 4 ACTION.

SMC.022330A.
TT.022335A.
JSC.

B. Ku. Pol
2884

MEMORANDUM.

116th

Colonel Thayer.

On the 4th November, 1944, Col. E. Murray Mitchell of C-3, A.F.H.Q., informed me that Reigadier Harter, C-3 A.F.H.Q. had decided that the 5,000 Italian troops destined to assist the Carabinieri must be released, without fail, by the 31st December, 1944. I expressed the opinion that the allotment of troops for such a short period would be useless for police purposes and that this sub-Section for would certainly protest against this decision.

Col. Mitchell said that he would confirm this decision in writing on his return to A.F.H.Q. However his verbal information could be taken as official and if any protest was to be made it would be preferable to make it without delay.

L.T. Wilcox Col. Inf.
Civil Affairs Sub-Commission.

1st November 1944.

Col Wilcox—

Yesterday afternoon (4 Nov) Col. Jackman in telephone conversation told me AFHQ G-5 had a communication definitely refusing to extend the deadline of 31 Dec. The communication is being sent to us on todays courier.

2783

5 Nov. 44

John W. Thayer

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

[illegible] December 1944. I expressed
the opinion that the allotment of troops for such a
short period would be useless for police purposes and
that this consideration would certainly protest against
such decision.

Col. Ellis will send this to world courier this
evening on its return to A.F.H.Q. However,
his verbal information could be taken as official and
if any protest are to be made it would be preferable to
make it without delay.

C.P. Wilcox

C.P. Wilcox Lt. Col.
Civil Affairs Co-ordinator.

4th November, 1944.

Col Wilcox—

Yesterday afternoon (4 Nov) Col. Jackman in Telephone conversation told me AFHQ G-5 had a communication definitely refusing to extend the deadline of 31 Dec. The communication is being sent to us on todays courier.

3 Nov. 44

2483

John W. Chapman
Col—

Major Ulio

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

115A

AFHQ FOR ACTION AAI FOR INFORMATION ARMY S/C FOR INFORMATION

HQ AC PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

5997

4/11/44

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

RESTRICTED FD

PARA ONE FD IT HAS BEEN AGREED WITH DCCAO AAI THAT FIVE ZERO ZERO ITALIAN MILITARY WILL NOT BE POSTED TO ANCONA TO REPLACE CC RR FD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR ACTION AAI FOR INFORMATION ARMY SUB COMMISSION FOR INFORMATION FA HQ ALLIED COMMISSION PAREN

PARA TWO FD WHEN THE MILITARY ARE MOVED THEY WILL PROCEED TO ROME FD

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 1 - CIVIL AFFAIRS

COS

ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

2882

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622

2219
116A

SUBJECT: Italian Soldiers assisting Carabinieri.

Land Forces Sub Commission
(A.C.) M. M. I. A.
R O M E
SD/28
3 November 1944

TO : Hq AC

Copy to: AFHQ
AAI
Public Safety Sub Commission AC.

Reference AFHQ FX38608 and FX43589 and
AAI Signal SD-1334 of 27 October 1944.

1. It has been directed that a battalion of 500 Italian soldiers be organized in Sardinia to reinforce the CC.RR on that Island. This is being accomplished.

2. The official report of the CC.RR officer commanding the CC.RR in Sardinia, dated 11 October 1944, shows:

Assigned strength- 56 officers - 3504 men.

Of the above, On leave- 8 officers - 513 men.

3. It is assumed that the personnel are on leave in Sardinia, as leave outside Sardinia is not authorized.

4. In view of the requirement for the Italian Army battalion to reinforce the CC.RR in Sardinia, it is suggested that the granting of leave to over 14% of the CC.RR be examined.

CLAYTON F. KERR, Colonel
for Major General

CPK/ri

HEADQUARTERS
3 NOV 1944
A. C. C.

A. M. 46 A.	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL. WILCOX	2461	
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

In hand with CCRR 6th

File with case.

113 A

MEMORANDUM.

Notes of a meeting held at 4 p.m. on the 3rd November, 1944.

Present: Col. Kerr (Army Sub-Commission)
Lt. Col. Weekes (Army Sub-Commission)
Lt. Col. Wilson (Public Safety Sub-Commission)
General Orlando, Royal Carabinieri
Mr. Fox Tandbine.

General Orlando said that the Minister of War had received authorisation to issue to the Carabinieri 10,000 uniforms and 10,000 Overcoats. At the last meeting Col. Kerr had said that an additional 10,000 overcoats could be authorised.

Col. Kerr stated that Army Sub-Commission had authorised the Minister of War to issue 10,000 uniforms and 20,000 overcoats.

General Orlando said that there must be some misunderstanding on the part of the Ministry of War, but that he would see the Minister of War and make the necessary arrangements.

General Orlando said that at the last meeting clothing had been issued for the total strength of the Carabinieri which then amounted to 43,000 men. Army Sub-Commission had then stated that as the Carabinieri strength increased additional clothing would be authorised. General Orlando said the strength of the Carabinieri had now been increased to 48,000 and asked for additional clothing for 5,000 men.

Col. Kerr said he would authorise the issue of the following articles :

5,000 sets of uniforms,
5,000 sets of boots,
5,000 pullovers,
5,000 shirts,
5,000 comforters,
5,000 waist-belts,
5,000 pairs of socks,
10,000 pairs of woollen drawers.

2880

Col. Kerr said that this allocation of clothing would be confirmed in writing, copies of the letter being sent to the Commanding General of the C.C.RR, the Minister of War and Public

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

General Orlando said that the Minister of War had received authorization to issue to the Carabinieri 10,000 uniforms and 10,000 Overcoats. At the last meeting Col. Marr had said that an additional 10,000 overcoats would be authorised.

Col. Marr stated that Army Sub-Commission had authorised the Minister of War to issue 10,000 uniforms and 20,000 overcoats.

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Col. Marr said he would authorise the issue of the following articles :

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5,000 sets of boots,
5,000 pullovers,
5,000 shirts,
5,000 comforters,
5,000 waist-belts,
5,000 pairs of socks,
10,000 pairs of woollen drawers.

2880

Col. Marr said that this allocation of clothing would be confirmed in writing, copies of the letter being sent to the Commanding General of the U.S.F., the Minister of War and Public Safety Sub-Commission.

General Orlando said that 500 U.S.F. prisoners of war from North Africa had arrived in Italy. They were men of good physique and high morale. He thought it very desirable that these 500 men should be issued with new clothing. Col. Marr agreed to authorise the Minister of War to issue 500 sets of new clothing, this number being part of the 5,000 uniforms mentioned above.

General Orlando said he understood that the Army Sub-Commission had placed a block on the black dress uniforms stored in U.S.F. Legion depots. General Orlando wished to make use of these

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

dress uniforms which numbered approximately 2,000.

Col. Marr said that no block had been imposed by Army Sub-Commission and that General Orlando should make the fullest use of these uniforms.

General Orlando invited Col. Marr to visit the Carabinieri Headquarters and Col. Marr said that he would be very pleased to pay a visit sometime in the future.

A.E. Wilson, Lt. Col.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

0263

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1 file 112A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
APO 394.

Ref. ACC/14622/PS. 2nd November, 1944.

SUBJECT : Pisano Division.

TO : Army Sub-Commission.

1. Reference is made to your letter AC/15, dated 30th October, 1944, addressed to the Minister for War.

2. In accordance with our agreement any new clothing and equipment supplied for the use of Italian troops, temporarily performing Carabinieri duties, will be allocated to the Carabinieri and will be retained by them when the Italian troops are withdrawn.

3. It is therefore recommended that paragraph 3 (h) of the above-quoted letter be amended to read :

"New items of clothing and equipment issued for the use of personnel will remain the property of the Carabinieri and will not be retained by individuals when they are withdrawn. When new clothing is issued the original Italian Army uniforms worn by the personnel on arrival will be stored by the Carabinieri and re-issued to the troops on their departure."

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

2878

JWC/ea.

1982 Paolucci Lofty

14622

SUBJECT: Piceno Division.

MILITARY MISSION, ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
AQ/15
30 October 1944.

TO : Minister for War.

Reference MMIA letter SD/28 of 28 October.

1. Certain personnel of the Piceno Division, (Serials 1-9 of Appendix A of above letter), plus one Bn. to be organized in SARDINIA, will be used for a limited period as reinforcements for the CC.RR.

2. During the period of duty with the CC.RR this personnel will be in the ITI-ITI category (7).

3. The following plan for clothing this personnel is-

a. Items of Italian Army equipment will be utilized whenever possible and to the fullest extent. Personnel will move with the Italian Army equipment now issued to them. Italian Army blankets only will be used and should be carried by each individual.

b. Outer uniform will be Italian Army uniform. For this purpose the War Ministry will prepare and earmark 6000 repaired Italian Army uniforms and 5000 repaired Italian overcoats.

c. Shirts, underwear, boots, and socks will be supplied from Allied sources only insofar as it is necessary to supplement available items from Italian sources. Such of these items as are supplied from Allied sources will be taken from the Allied items earmarked for the CC.RR.

d. The 185 & 186 Gcz CC.RR will be clothed by the CC.RR from clothing already made available to the CCRR (MMIA letter AQ/15 of 3 October).

e. Clothing as specified in sub-paragraphs b and c above will be issued to the individuals concerned only after arrival of the individuals at the destination as shown in Appendix A of above reference letter.

f. MMIA LO's at Naples, Palermo (for Palermo and Messina), Chieti, Bari and Ancona will inspect these troops upon arrival at the stations named and advise Hq MMIA by signal the items, and quantities of each, needed to clothe and equip this personnel to scale. Officers from Hq MMIA will inspect the units arriving in Rome. An officer of the Public Safety Sub-Commission will inspect the unit arriving in Catanzaro.

2877

g. MMIA LO, Sardinia, will handle the clothing and equiping of the Battalion in Sardinia in accordance with instructions already issued.

h. Items excess to scale will be withdrawn from individuals when new items

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

1. Certain personnel of the Filosno Division, (Serials 1-9 of Appendix A of above letter), plus one Bn. to be organized in SARDINIA, will be used for a limited period as reinforcements for the CC.RR.

2. During the period of duty with the CC.RR this personnel will be in the ITI-ITI category (7).

3. The following plan for clothing this personnel is-

a. Items of Italian Army equipment will be utilised whenever possible and to the fullest extent. Personnel will move with the Italian Army equipment now issued to them. Italian Army blankets only will be used and should be carried by each individual.

b. Outer uniform will be Italian Army uniform. For this purpose the War Ministry will prepare and earmark 5000 repaired Italian Army uniforms and 5000 repaired Italian overcoats.

c. Shirts, underwear, boots, and socks will be supplied from Allied sources only insofar as it is necessary to supplement available items from Italian sources. Such of these items as are supplied from Allied sources will be taken from the Allied items earmarked for the CC.RR.

d. The 155 & 198 Sez CC.RR will be clothed by the CC.RR from clothing already made available to the CCRR (MMIA letter AQ/15 of 3 October).

e. Clothing as specified in sub-paragraphs b and c above will be issued to the individuals concerned only after arrival of the individuals at the destination as shown in Appendix A of above reference letter.

f. MMIA LO's at Naples, Palermo (for Palermo and Messina), Chieti, Bari and Arcona will inspect these troops upon arrival at the stations named and advise Hq MMIA by signal the items, and quantities of each, needed to clothe and equip this personnel to scale. Officers from Hq MMIA will inspect the units arriving in Rome. An officer of the Public Safety Sub-Commission will inspect the unit arriving in Catanzaro.

2877

g. MMIA LO, Sardinia, will handle the clothing and equiping of the Battalion in Sardinia in accordance with instructions already issued.

h. Items excess to scale will be withdrawn from individuals when new items are issued. Items withdrawn will be returned to Italian Army depots.

Sec 112A

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
MMIA.

rmk/ag

Copy to

TO		
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL WILSON		
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANTINE		
CAPT POWELL		

AMMG (2)
AAI (SD)
ACC (2)
MMIA (Old)
G
Spec. Sec.

HEADQUARTERS
1 NOV 1944
A.C.C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SUBJECT: Piceno Division.

MILITARY MISSION, ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
AQ/15
30 October 1944.

TO : Minister for War.

Reference MMIA letter SD/23 of 28 October.

1. Certain personnel of the Piceno Division, (Serials 1-9 of Appendix A of above letter), plus one Bn. to be organized in SARDINIA, will be used for a limited period as reinforcements for the CC.RR.

2. During the period of duty with the CC.RR this personnel will be in the ITI-ITI category (?).

3. The following plan for clothing this personnel is-

a. Items of Italian Army equipment will be utilized whenever possible and to the fullest extent. Personnel will move with the Italian Army equipment now issued to them. Italian Army blankets only will be used and should be carried by each individual.

b. Outer uniform will be Italian Army uniform. For this purpose the War Ministry will prepare and earmark 5000 repaired Italian Army uniforms and 5000 repaired Italian overcoats.

c. Shirts, underwear, boots, and socks will be supplied from Allied sources only insofar as it is necessary to supplement available items from Italian sources. Such of these items as are supplied from Allied sources will be taken from the Allied items earmarked for the CC.RR.

d. The 185 & 198 Sez CC.RR will be clothed by the CC.RR from clothing already made available to the CCRR (MMIA letter AQ/15 of 3 October).

e. Clothing as specified in sub-paragraphs b and c above will be issued to the individuals concerned only after arrival of the individuals at the destination as shown in Appendix A of above reference letter.

f. MMIA LO's at Naples, Palermo (for Palermo and Messina), Chieti, Bari and Ancona will inspect these troops upon arrival at the stations named and advise Hq MMIA by signal the items, and quantities of each, needed to clothe and equip this personnel to scale. Officers from Hq MMIA will inspect the units arriving in Rome. An officer of the Public Safety Sub-Commission will inspect the unit arriving in Catanzaro.

2876

g. MMIA LO, Sardinia, will handle the clothing and equiping of the Battalion in Sardinia in accordance with instructions already issued.

h. Items excess to scale will be withdrawn from individuals when new items

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1. Certain personnel of the Picono Division, (Serials 1-9 of Appendix A of above letter), plus one Bn. to be organized in SARDINIA, will be used for a limited period as reinforcements for the CC.RR.

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3. The following plan for clothing this personnel is-

a. Items of Italian Army equipment will be utilized whenever possible and to the fullest extent. Personnel will move with the Italian Army equipment now issued to them. Italian Army blankets only will be used and should be carried by each individual.

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d. The 155 & 198 Sez CC.RR will be clothed by the CC.RR from clothing already made available to the CCRR (MMIA letter AQ/15 of 3 October).

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2876

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h. Items excess to scale will be withdrawn from individuals when new items are issued. Items withdrawn will be returned to Italian Army depots.

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
MMIA.

mmk/ag

Copy to--
MMIA (2)
AAI (SD)
ACC (2)
MMIA LO's
G
Spec. Sec.

HEADQUARTERS
A. C. C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

2034
Public Safety
14622
110A

SUBJECT: Move of Units of PICENO Division

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
SD/28
30 Oct 44

TO : AFHQ (5)

Copy to: SD AAI (2)
5 Dist
ACC (incl copy for Public Safety Sub-Commission)
Ministry of War

10A

1. Please amend Appx "A" to this H.Q. letter SD/28 of 28 Oct 44 as follows:

(a) Serial 2. Cdo 336 Regt Ftr. Amend strengths of offrs and ORs to read 5 and 149.

(b) Serial 3. Delete "Cdo 152 Regt Art" and relevant detail.

(c) Serial 4. Cdo 235 Regt Ftr. Amend strengths of offrs and ORs to read 11 and 149.

(d) Amend "TOTALS" to read 282 and 5421.

(e) Add "17 offrs 87 ORs" to the personnel to be moved with Serial 11.

2. The above reductions to personnel of serials 2,3 and 4 are made in order to leave behind (for movement with serial 11 of Appx "A") a training nucleus to train Div specialists, and any other Div rfts that may arise from time to time.

HEADQUARTERS
1 NOV 1944
A. C. C.

2875

Major General
M.M.J.A.

Lt-Col

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

Copy to: SD AAI (2)
5 Dist
ADC (incl copy for Public Safety Sub-Commission)
Ministry of War

10 Apl A

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(a) Serial 2. Cdo 336 Regt Ftr. Amend strengths of offrs and ORs to read 5 and 149.

(b) Serial 3. Delete "Cdo 152 Regt Art" and relevant detail.

(c) Serial 4. Cdo 235 Regt Ftr. Amend strengths of offrs and ORs to read 11 and 149.

(d) Amend "TOTALS" to read 282 and 5491.

(e) Add "17 offrs 87 ORs" to the personnel to be moved with serial 11.

2. The above reductions to personnel of serials 2,3 and 4 are made in order to leave behind (for movement with serial 11 of Appx "A") a holding cadre to train Div specialists, and any other Div rfts that may arise from time to time.

HEADQUARTERS
1 NOV 1944
A. C. C.

2875

for Major General
M.M.I.S.

lt-Col

TO	INIT	DATE
COL CHAPMAN		
COL YOUNG		
COL WILCOX		
MAJ MASON		

HEADQUARTERS
1 NOV 1944
A. C. C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

M.M.I.A., ROME
Ref No: SD/28

17622
109A

Minutes of meeting held at MMIA offices 27 Oct to discuss loan of 5000 personnel from Piceno Gp. to CCRR vide AFHQ FX43589 of 25 Oct.

Present

1. Col Kerr, Col Pidsley, Lt Col Noakes, Lt Col Ingledew, Capt Lord Westbury from MMIA.

Col Young, Lt Col Wilcocks from Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.C.

Action

Org

		Personnel		
2. 940	Bari	500	ex units of Piceno Gruppo.	
576	Naples	"	" " " " "	
436	Catanzaro	"	" " " " "	
392	Palermo	"	" " " " "	
582	Messina	"	" " " " "	
500	Cagliari	"	ex Sardinia congedati	
600	Chieti	"	Possibly gd bn of Piceno Gp ex duty with Eighth Army	G action re Spec Sec and Mov.
532	Rome	"	ex units of Piceno Gruppo	
450	Lazio	"	" " " " "	
810	Ancona	"	Montegranero Bn	
5877				

3. It was agreed that units should be approx strength as above and that own offrs etc should accompany. C

Tpt and Equip.

4. It was agreed that units organic are already in possession should accompany together with personal arms and equip of personnel. C

Clothing.

5. M.M.I.A. stated that issue of Italian clothing would count against CC.RR ceiling. Ceiling was at present 55,000 and only 43,000 sets of clothing had been issued to date. Issues will be made to CC.RR Legion HQ for tps on arrival. AQ

Specialists.

6. It was agreed that specialists incl dvrs and muleteers of PICENO should NOT accompany provided nos were maintained. 2874 G

Documentation.

7. It was agreed that personnel should be classed as ITI - ITI [illegible] to CC.RR and that down station should remain AQ

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Col Young, Lt Col Wilcocks from Public Safety Sub Commission
A.C.C.

Org

		Personnel	
2. 940	Bari	500	ex units of Piceno Gruppo.
576	Naples	"	" " " " "
486	Catanzaro	"	" " " " "
392	Palermo	"	" " " " "
582	Messina	"	" " " " "
500 / 600	Cagliari / Chieti	"	ex Sardinia congedati Possibly gd bn of Piceno Gp ex duty with Eighth Army
532	Rome	"	ex units of Piceno Gruppo
450	Lazio	"	" " " " "
810	Ancona	"	Montegranaro Bn
5877			

3. It was agreed that units should be approx strength as above and that own offrs etc should accompany. G

Tpt and Equip.

4. It was agreed that units organic tpt already in possession should accompany together with personal arms and equip of personnel. G

Clothing.

5. M.M.I.A. stated that issue of Italian clothing would count against CC.RR ceiling. Ceiling was at present 55,000 and only 43,000 sets of clothing had been issued to date. Issues will be made to CC.RR Legion HQ for tps on arrival. AQ

Specialists.

6. It was agreed that specialists incl dvrs and muleteers of PICENO should NOT accompany provided nos were maintained. 2874 G

Documentation.

7. It was agreed that personnel should be classed as ITI - ITI while on loan to CC.RR and that documentation should remain as before. AQ

8. It was agreed that reinfts for sick and wounded should NOT be supplied owing to (a) short duration of loan and (b) 56 day rule. AQ

9. It was agreed that personnel should be disciplined through their own offrs. AQ

Detailed Instructions.

10. It was decided that M.M.I.A. should request Italian Min of W to produce draft detailed instructions for issue to all offrs based on M.M.I.A. policy. Spec Sec

Sheet 2/.....

15

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Action.

Visits.

11. Public Safety Sub Comm agreed that G.O.C. PICENO or his staff have right to visit any of his tps providing prior notification was given to senior CC.RR.offr. Spec Sec

Differences.

12. It was decided that any inter-servicepoints for discussion should be referred to M.M.I.A. through Public Safety Sub Comm.

L. McIngledew.

Lt Col
General Staff

27 Oct 44

Distribution:- G - 3 Org, AFHQ.
SD AAI
Public Safety Sub Comm, ACC
Ministry of War
Comd
2 i/c
G
AQ
Spec Sec.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		2.
LT COL WILCOX		28X
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		30X
MAJ [illegible]NSTRY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ GALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

2873

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1088

MINUTE

Meeting held at 4.30 p.m. 28th October 1944 between Lt. Col. Ingleden (Army Sub-Commission) and Lt. Col. Wilcox (Public Safety Sub-Commission).

Subject Italian Troops allocated to CC.RR for temporary duty.

Allocation Lt. Col. Ingleden produced a plan showing the allocation of 5877 Italian Army Officers and men (Piceno Gruppo) to the 10 CC.RR Legion Hq. A copy of the plan would be sent to Public Safety S/C.

Movement This plan would be sent to AFHQ (G.5) who would be responsible for arranging the delivery of the troops to CC.RR Legion Hq.

In the case of Sardinia a movement order had already been issued. In the case of the troops for Ancona no move would take place without confirmation from A.A.I.

Lt. Col. Ingleden advised P.S. to keep in contact with Lt. Col. Cooper of Transportation S/C regarding the movement of the troops.

Clothing & Equipment Uniforms, boots and equipment for the Italian troops would be sent separately to the CC.RR Legion H.Q. These uniforms and equipment were for the use of the troops on CC.RR duties and would be the property of the CC.RR. The clothing and equipment were allotted to the CC.RR and would count against the CC.RR ceiling. When the troops were withdrawn from CC.RR duties the CC.RR would retain the clothing and equipment.

28th Oct 1944

2872

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622
HL.

Public Safety 1820

CONFIDENTIAL 1078

SUBJECT: Move of Units of PICENO Division

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. SD/28
28 Oct 44

Recd 1/5 0945 30/10. HL

TO : AFHQ (2)

Copy to: SD AAI (2)
3 DISTRICT
ACC incl copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
MINISTRY OF WAR

958 — no copy.

Ref AFHQ signal FX 43589 of 25 Oct 44 and AAI SD1334 of 27 Oct.

1. Will you please arrange move of units of PICENO GP vide serials 1 to 9 and 11 of Appx A attached. 1078

2. Adm matters, incl issue of clothing to receiving Legion HQ of CC RR, have been dealt with separately.

3. Attention is drawn to serial 11 of Appx A which requests move of Div HQ itself together with Div Specialists to a more suitable training location in FOGGIA/CEIGNOLA area.

HEADQUARTERS 29 OCT 1944 C.C.

A.M.G. Section

Major General
for C. M. I.

	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPIN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ MASON	2871	
MAJ WILSON	(A)	30
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
C. P. POW		

Copy to: Comd
2 i/c
A/Q
Spec Sec
Mov (2)
Circulator File
File
War Diary

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

110 750 CER
500 Sic. 20-2
600 Sard. 250 / 10 Lorries 5 Tonnes.

CONFIDENTIAL

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

	UNIT	Move Strength Offrs	OR's	animals	Stores in tons	Entraining Station	Detraining Station	R
1	155 & 198 Sezioni CC.RR. III Bty 235 Regt Ftr	4 21	90 371		30 75	MARTINA. F. CRISPIANO	CATANZARO	
2	III Bty 336 Regt Ftr Cdo 336 Regt Ftr	21 ~~10 5~~	371 ~~172 149~~		75 60	MASSATRA FASANO	NAPLES	
3	~~3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art~~ 2 Gruppo 152 Regt Art ~~Cdo 152 Regt Art~~	~~16~~ 20 ~~2~~	~~Rtt~~ 238 ~~37~~	~~nil~~	~~75~~ 75 60	~~NOCI~~ ALBEROBELLO MARTINA. F	~~ROMA~~ ROMA ~~ROMA~~	
4	1 Bty 235 Regt Ftr Cdo 235 Regt Ftr	21 ~~611~~	371 ~~172 149~~		75 60	MARTINA. F. LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA	
5	2 Bty 235 Regt Ftr	21	371	80	75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO	
6	3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Bty Genio and 252 Comp teradio	18 8	226 135		75 75	CEGLIE MESSAPICO MARTINA. F.	ROMA (per LAZIO)	
7	1 Bn 32[illegible] Regt	25	575		30	[illegible]	CHIETI	
8	Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt	15 15	455 455		20 20	BRINDISI BARLETTA	BARI BARI	
9	MONTEGRANERO Bn less one Coy Coy MONTEGRANERO (533 Coy)	30 6	620 166		30 20	VARANO TEST	ANCONA	All older men remain with
10	Bn formed at CONGEDANTI in SARDINIA	25	475		--	-------	------	For CAGLIARI. and 27 Oct AA
	TOTALS	~~295~~ 262	5578 5191					
11	Div H.Q. Tpt and Sup Coy 83 and 91 Fd Hosps 152 Sezione Sanita	28 3 9 7	110 50 78 54	200		MARTINA FRANCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNINO LOCOROTONDO	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are fr
		17	87					

@ - Request serial 9 NOT be moved until called fwd by AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

UO 500 000

750 CER / 25. 20. / Gi. 20-2 / Sard. 250 / 10 Lorries 5 Tonnes.

1078

CONFIDENTIAL

Appx 'A' to HMIA
SD/28 of 28 Oct 44

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

	Move Strength Offrs	OR's	animals	Stores in tons	Entraining Station	Detraining Station	REMARKS
CC.RR.	4	90		30	MARTINA. F.	CATANZARO	
tr	21	371		75	CRISPIANO		
tr	21	371		75	MASSATRA	NAPLES	
	~~10~~ 5	~~142~~ 149		60	FASANO		
~~Art~~	~~16~~	~~214~~	~~att~~	~~75~~	~~TOCI~~	~~ROMA~~	
Art	20	238		75	ALBEROBELLO	ROMA	
	~~7~~	~~37~~		60	~~MARTINA F.~~	~~ROMA~~	
r	21	371		75	MARTINA. F.	MESSINA	
	~~611~~	~~142~~ 149		60	LOCOROTONDO		
r	21	371	80	75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO	
Art	18	226		75	CEGLIE MESSAPICO	ROMA	
and	8	195		75	MARTINA. F.	(per LAZIO)	
	25	575		30	DEPOSIT	CHIETI	
Regt	15	455		20	BRINDISI	BARI	
Regt	15	455		20	BARLETTA	PARC	
ess one Coy	30	620		30	VARANO	ANCONA	All older men. 150 young men remain with "NAPO Combat Group"
533 Coy)	6	166		20	TROT		
EDANTI	25	475		--	-------	------	For CAGLIARI. AMIA Signal SD 1660 and 27 Oct 44 refers.
3	~~295~~ 262	5573 5491					
	28	110	200		MARTINA FRANCA	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are from all units PICENO Division.
	3	50			LOCOROTONDO		
e	9	78			CISTERNINO		
a	7	54			LOCOROTONDO		
	17	87					

NOT be moved until called fwd by AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

PUBLIC SAFETY
RHF/lg
1762
[illegible] Authority of SACMT
Initials
Date 27 October 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

Read 30 Oct. AR

AG 014.12/137 GCT-O

14622 106A

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, APO 390

1. The authorised strength of the Italian Carabinieri has been established at 55,000. Latest reports indicate that the strength of the Carabinieri is approximately 45,000.

2. Representations have been made to this headquarters that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri, as the total strength of all Italy, is inadequate and that an increase of 10,000 be made to the ceiling.

3. In view of the fact that the Carabinieri are at present under-strength to the same amount as the suggested increase, it is requested that before further consideration is given to increasing the overall ceiling of the Carabinieri, steps be taken to make up the deficiency by recruitment and such other means as may be available.

4. It is desired that the deficiency be made up by 31 December 1944.

By command of General WILSON:

HEADQUARTERS 29 OCT. 1944 A. C. C.

R. H. Frese

R. H. FRESE,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ MALLANDAINE		
CAPT POWELL		

SECRET

2-69

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Hdq 105A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
CMF
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

ACC/14622/PS

29 Oct 44

SUBJECT : Carabinieri.

TO : HQ AAI
(through ECAO)

1 Arrangements are being discussed to transfer 5000 Italian soldiers to the CC. RR for duty in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, in order that 5000 fully trained CC RR can be released for duty in the North.

2 It is proposed to employ the military in groups of 500 at the following Legion H. Qs.:-

BARI	CAGLIARI
NAPLES	ROME
CATANZARO	ROME (Lazio)
MESSINA	CHIETI
PALERMO	ANCONA

3 CC RR patrols are worked in pairs. Under the new proposal, each patrol would consist of 1 CC RR, 1 soldier. The 500 CC RR in each Legion thus released would be held in readiness for transport to the North.

4 It is agreed that in ANCONA, no increase of CC RR strength is necessary for the performance of Police duty in that area. 500 soldiers are requested for ANCONA to release 500 CC RR in accordance with the policy already explained.

5 It may be that at the present stage no additional CC RR are needed in forward areas. However, the progress of operations, which cannot be anticipated, may liberate fresh territory at any time, and CC RR must be readily available.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

G.H. U-JOHN Brig.
A.C.A. CA Section
Dep COS

EJW/ie

P 2868

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 394.

Ref. ACC/14622/PS. 28th October, 1944.

SUBJECT : Carabinieri.

TO : G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. Following your cable FX43589, dated 25th October, 1944, addressed to A.A.I., for action and Army Sub-Commission for information, arrangements are now being made for the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri. This matter was the subject of discussion between the Army Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission of this Headquarters on the 27th October, 1944. However, the Army Sub-Commission have emphatically declared that these soldiers must be returned to the Italian Army for combat duties by the 31st December, 1944, and that there is no prospect whatever of retaining their services beyond this date.

2. When, during the preliminary stages, this matter was being discussed between representatives of your Headquarters and Public Safety Sub-Commission, it was appreciated that the secondment of Italian Military personnel for auxiliary police purposes was an arrangement intended only to augment the Carabinieri until their numbers had grown sufficiently to enable them to deal with their police responsibilities following the liberation of the north of Italy. Therefore, in this sense, the provision was of a temporary character only. On the other hand however, it was never envisaged that the significance of the 31st December, 1944 (first indicated by your Headquarters in a cable addressed to A.A.I. No. FX38608, dated 14th October, 1944) was to be anything more than a date beyond which new approval would be required from your Headquarters for the further retention of the services of these men. This view was, I understand, confirmed by Lt. Col. Murray Mitchell in his telephone conversation with Col. Young of Public Safety Sub-Commission on the 27th October, 1944.

3. You will appreciate that if the assertion of the Army Sub-Commission had been correct no useful purpose would have been served in expending so much time and trouble to incorporate

2867

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1. Following your cable FX43589, dated 25th October, 1944, addressed to A.A.I., for action and Army Sub-Commission for information, arrangements are now being made for the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri. This matter was the subject of discussion between the Army Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission of this Headquarters on the 27th October, 1944. However, the Army Sub-Commission have emphatically declared that these soldiers must be returned to the Italian Army for combat duties by the 31st December, 1944, and that there is no prospect whatever of retaining their services beyond this date.

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3. You will appreciate that if the assertion of the Army Sub-Commission had been correct no useful purpose would have been served in expending so much time and trouble to incorporate these men into the ranks of the Carabinieri for so short a time. I would be glad, therefore, to have your assurance that my interpretation is the correct one and that the date on which these 5,000 Italian soldiers are to return to their normal military duties is one subject to your decision following representations from this Commission.

4. I quite understand that you will require to have some

2867

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Subject: Piceno Division

Land Forces Sub Commission
A.G.-(MMIA)
R O M E
AQ/15

7 Nov 44

To : Minister for War

1. Par 3h of AQ/15 of 30 Oct is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

New items of clothing and equipment issued for the use of personnel will remain the property of the Carabinieri and will not be retained by individuals when they are withdrawn. When new clothing is issued the original Italian Army uniform worn by the personnel on arrival will be stored by the Carabinieri and re-issued to the troops on their departure.

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel,
for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

CPK/wk

Copy to:

AFHQ (2)
AAI (SD)
AC (2)
MMIA LO's
G
Spec. Soc.
A.C. Public Safety Sub- Comm.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL [illegible]		
MAJ [illegible]		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ [illegible]		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

2366

indication of the time for which these men will be required and I can assure you that my own desire is to give you some definite appreciation of future public safety requirements. However, this matter presents some difficulty since the facts which will influence this need are subject very considerably to Military operations and to future developments which at the present time can only be estimated. I therefore give you a recapitulation of the circumstances effecting these arrangements.

5. At present, having regard to the position of the Army line and the amount of Italian territory liberated, the numbers of Carabinieri available are no more than sufficient to discharge their existing police responsibilities. Beyond any question, as the Military advance progresses and particularly having regard to the industrial and economic situations which are bound to influence the condition of Public Safety in the north of Italy, the present numbers will be entirely inadequate, to the extent that one should seriously doubt the effectiveness of the Carabinieri to deal with such situations as can be logically anticipated. There are, however, two main sources of augumentation of the Carabinieri strength, one which is being vigorously exploited at the present time and the other which will be just as zealously pursued when the opportunity arises. I refer firstly to the recruiting intake into the Carabinieri and secondly to the re-enlistment of men who have been disbanded or temporarily out of the Police service by reason of the fact that the districts in which they have been living have been under enemy control. Figures now available indicate that by means of recruiting the Carabinieri strength is being increased at the rate of approximately 500 per month, and there is every reason to suppose that this figure will be more than maintained in the future. I do not, however, think that in the present circumstances a substantial increase of this figure should be anticipated.

6. As regards the second factor, it is, of course, quite impossible to say how many Carabinieri are likely to be re-enlisted into the service by means of the Replacement Centres which have been set up to deal with this procedure, but a fairly accurate estimate can be given a comparatively short time after any substantial Military advance has been made.

7. From the aspect of Public Safety, I have [illegible] that the most serious of our problems are to be encountered in the [illegible] 2865

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

recapitulation of the circumstances affecting these arrangements.

5. At present, having regard to the position of the Army line and the amount of Italian territory liberated, the numbers of Carabinieri available are no more than sufficient to discharge their existing police responsibilities. Beyond any question, as the Military advance progresses and particularly having regard to the industrial and economic situations which are bound to influence the condition of Public Safety in the north of Italy, the present numbers will be entirely inadequate, to the extent that one should seriously doubt the effectiveness of the Carabinieri to deal with such situations as can be logically anticipated. There are, however, two main sources of augumentation of the Carabinieri strength, one which is being vigorously exploited at the present time and the other which will be just as zealously pursued when the opportunity arises. I refer firstly to the recruiting intake into the Carabinieri and secondly to the re-enlistment of men who have been disbanded or temporarily out of the Police service by reason of the fact that the districts in which they have been living have been under enemy control. Figures now available indicate that by means of recruiting the Carabinieri strength is being increased at the rate of approximately 500 per month, and there is every reason to suppose that this figure will be more than maintained in the future. I do not, however, think that in the present circumstances a substantial increase of this figure should be anticipated.

6. As regards the second factor, it is, of course, quite impossible to say how many Carabinieri are likely to be re-enlisted into the service by means of the Replacement Centres which have been set up to deal with this procedure, but a fairly accurate estimate can be given a comparatively short time after any substantial Military advance has been made.

7. From the aspect of Public Safety, I have pointed out that the most serious of our problems are to be encountered in the north, and accordingly, as you know, the 5,000 soldiers will be utilized to replace an equivalent number of trained Carabinieri from central and southern Italy, including Sicily, so that this dilution of police strength in these areas will enable an equivalent concentration to be made available in the north. If I may refer to figures I would remind you that the present authorised establishment of the Carabinieri is 55,000 men. This Commission is strongly of the opinion that this figure

2865

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789016

is inadequate and indeed, your Headquarters is already considering an application for the increase of this establishment by an addition of ten to fifteen thousand men. At the present time, however, the strength of available Carabinieri is only 43,000, which is little more than two-thirds of the minimum strength which this Commission recommends for the maintenance of law and order in Italy.

8. Having regard to these facts I ask for your authority firstly, that, in principle, the 5,000 Italian soldiers may be retained for police purposes until the strength of the Carabinieri reaches 55,000, after which they be progressively released as the Carabinieri establishment exceeds this figure. Secondly that specific agreement be given for the retention of these men until the 31st March, 1945, by which time the future conditions affecting this matter will have been much more clearly defined.

9. I regret that I am not able to place before you a more specific plan for the eventual release of these men, but under the circumstances I do not feel that it is possible for me to give you a more definite appreciation than I have done in this letter. I take the opportunity to emphasise that the maintenance of law and order in the north of Italy is a matter which is receiving very serious consideration and that the Chief Commissioner feels that unless these 5,000 men will be available for the period which I have in mind, he will not be able to accept, with any proper confidence, the responsibility for the preservation of law and order with a strength of Carabinieri so inadequate to meet their onerous duties in the north.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

Brigadier,
V.P. C.A. Section,
Dep. C.O.S.

2864

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

Brigadier,
V.P. C.A. Section,
Dep. C.O.S.

2864

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

704X

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 394

Ref:ACC/14628/PS

27 October 1944

SUBJECT: CARABINIERI

TO: G-5 Section. A.F. H.Q.

1. Following your cable FX43559 dated 25 October 44 addressed to ASI for action, MMIA for information, preliminary arrangements have been made for the provision of 5000 Italian soldiers to assist Carabinieri. The matter was discussed between Army SubCommission and Public Safety Sub Commission on 27 Oct 44.

2. It was stated by Army Sub Commission that the 5000 soldiers could not be provided by 31 October 44, as requested by A.F. H.Q. No fixed date could be given, but the transfer would be made as quickly as possible. It was stated to be essential that the soldiers be returned to the Italian Army by the 31 December 44.

3. The effect of the time limit will mean that the soldiers will be attached to the CC.RR for less than eight weeks. This would be of little value for the needs of the present situation, and it is urged that the time limit be extended.

4. The present strength of CC.RR is 43,000. The agreed ceiling is 55,000 (although it is hoped to increase to 65,000 if possible). The 5,000 soldiers are required to help adjust the difference of 12,000 CC.RR necessary for the Public Safety of Italy. For that purpose they will need to remain in CC.RR service until such time as the strength reaches the required level.

5. The strength of CC.RR is being increased by the recovery of men from liberated territory and recruiting.

6. The rate at which men will return to the CC.RR from liberated territory cannot be assessed, as it depends entrely on the rate at which operations progress. If the line moves forward rapidly, substantial numbers of CC.RR may become available, but, if winter conditions prevent the liberation of territory and the line remains almost static, then few, if any, CC.RR will be recovered.

7. The uncertainty of the increase of CC.RR strength makes it difficult to propose any date for the return of the soldiers to the Italian Army. The ideal to be aimed at would be to retain them until the CC.RR ceiling reaches 55,000.

2865

8. Recruiting is being carried on by the CC.RR and training barracks have been established at BARI, ROME, CAGLIARI and

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1. Following your cable FX43589 dated 25 October 44 addressed to AAI for action, MMIA for information, preliminary arrangements have been made for the provision of 5000 Italian soldiers to assist Carabinieri. The matter was discussed between Army SubCommission and Public Safety Sub Commission on 27 Oct 44.

2. It was stated by Army Sub Commission that the 5000 soldiers could not be provided by 31 October 44, as requested by A.F. H.Q. No fixed date could be given, but the transfer would be made as quickly as possible. It was stated to be essential that the soldiers be returned to the Italian Army by the 31 December 44.

3. The effect of the time limit will mean that the soldiers will be attached to the CC.RR for less than eight weeks. This would be of little value for the needs of the present situation, and it is urged that the time limit be extended.

4. The present strength of CC.RR is 43,000. The agreed ceiling is 55,000 (although it is hoped to increase to 65,000 if possible). The 5,000 soldiers are required to help adjust the difference of 12,000 CC.RR necessary for the Public Safety of Italy. For that purpose they will need to remain in CC.RR service until such time as the strength reaches the required level.

5. The strength of CC.RR is being increased by the recovery of men from liberated territory and recruiting.

6. The rate at which men will return to the CC.RR from liberated territory cannot be assessed, as it depends entrely on the rate at which operations progress. If the line moves forward rapidly, substantial numbers of CC.RR may become available, but, if winter conditions prevent the liberation of territory and the line remains almost static, then few, if any, CC.RR will be recovered.

7. The uncertainty of the increase of CC.RR strength makes it difficult to propose any date for the return of the soldiers to the Italian Army. The ideal to be aimed at would be to retain them until the CC.RR ceiling reaches 55,000.

2865

8. Recruiting is being carried on by the CC.RR and training barracks have been established at BARI, ROME, CAGLIARI and PALERMO. The training period is 6 months for regular CC.RR, but this has been reduced to 4 months for men enlisted for war service.

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9. 500 CC.RR from BARI School will be trained and enter the Service on 1 February 44. This School will then close.

10. A total of 1,100 CC.RR at ROME, CAGLIARI and PALERMO will be available on 1st April. These are all regular CC.RR.

11. A further 500 CC.RR in ROME will complete a war service course on 1st March.

12. With the exception of BARI all these schools will commence training when the present CC.RR are in service. The effect of this programme is that

500 CC.RR available	1 February 44
500 CC.RR available	1 March 44
1100 CC.RR available	1 April 44
Total 2,100	

Subsequently the men will be trained at the rate of about 400 each month. There is a training school at TURIN which will be operated as soon as the area is liberated.

13. If the 5000 soldiers transferred to CC.RR were returned to the Army before the CC.RR strength was substantially increased above its present level, Public Safety in the South of Italy would be seriously endangered. The spearhead strength of 5,650 CC.RR for the Northern Provinces was obtained by withdrawing this number of men from the South. It has been agreed that the strength remaining is the absolute minimum essential for ensuring public order. Regional Commissioners have been promised that no more transfers will take place. When the 5000 soldiers are attached to CC.RR, an equal number of CC.RR will be going to the North. The strength will thus remain the same. If, however, within a few months, the soldiers are withdrawn, the South of Italy will then be 5000 below its agreed minimum strength. The Chief Commissioner could not be responsible for Public Order under these circumstances.

14. It is strongly urged that the 5000 soldiers remain attached to the CC.RR until by recruiting and recovery in the North, the ceiling of 55000 is reached. The soldiers could then be released.

2862

Brigadier
VP CA Sec
Dep COS

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12. With the exception of BARI all these schools will commence training when the present CC.RR are in service. The effect of this programme is that

500	CC.RR available	1 February 44
500	CC.RR available	1 March 44
1100	CC.RR available	1 April 44
Total 2,100		

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14. It is strongly urged that the 5000 soldiers remain attached to the CC.RR until by recruiting and recovery in the North, the ceiling of 55000 is reached. The soldiers could then be released.

Brigadier 2862
VP CA Sec
Dep COS

FJW/acf

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Col. YOUNG. 14623/K. 103A

Col. Mitchel A.F.H.Q. phoned at 3.40pm (day ref) and said that G/3 takes the position:-

a. That they expect the next step to be made by A.C.C. as to what happens after 31 Dec. 44

b. as to the clothing, uniforms etc. they have been on to M.M.I.A. and there is no clothing available.

They feel that the matter is something which should be adjusted on the M.M.I.A./ A.C.C. level and not taken to A.F.H.Q.

If he may tender advise to you, he suggests that it would be better not to raise the clothing issue in the letter which you have prepared. G.3. do not take very kindly to it. It might precipitate a domestic quarrel and achieve nothing.

S.K. Harper
Maj.
27.10.44

Sec
AG.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622. /jpl 102A

MEMORANDUM

25 Oct. 44

TO : CA Sec

1. Ref 3 District instruction "Aid to the civil power" of 17 Oct & memo Public Safety to C.A.S and CAS to Legal, both of 24 Oct. 44.

2. MMLA are satisfied that paras 2 & 3 set out accurately the existing relationship between the Allied and the Italian military authorities.

3. It is suggested that 3 District be asked to issue a short supplement to their letter of 17 Oct, informing addressees of the coming attachment of the 5,000 soldiers to the AR CC and stating that during the attachment they will be treated, for the purposes now under consideration, as police.

4. If this is done, any difficulty or misunderstanding arising out of the use of these soldiers will be avoided and all existing directives or agreements as to cooperation between the Allied Military authorities and the Italian Military and civil authorities will remain unaffected.

W.E. [illegible]
Colonel
Deputy Chief Legal Adviser.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT. COL. WILCOX		
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ H. NBURY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

[illegible] have taken on file and prepare for ACOS signature a letter to 3 Dist. informing them of the forthcoming attachment of 5,000 to the AR CC/AR and asking them to make it plain to addressees of 69/Ltr of 17 Oct that para 2 will not apply to Allied soldiers

102A

EAS.
27 OCT. 1944

2824

2860

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

AGO, A.C. Sec. 1014

In case of the 5000 soldiers
to be attached to the Carabinieri
for normal public safety duties,
paragraph 3 of basic communication
should be clarified.

Chapman
Colonel

24 Oct. 44

Legal

Have you any views on the limitation
on Italian powers in Italian Govt Territory which
is implied by para 3 of the attached.

[illegible]

C.A.C.
2nd OCT. 1944

2859

0233

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

C A Sect 878

SECRET

10VA

3 District
Ext 9
69/G

17 Oct 44

SUBJECT:- Aid to the Civil Power.

52 Area (2)
54 Area (2)
56 Area
70 Sub Area
94 Sub Area
64 Garrison
67 Garrison

19OCT1944

19OCT1944

Copy to:- EC & MG Section HQ ACC
Southern Region ACC
LAZIO Region ACC
ABRUZZI/MARCHE Region ACC
SICILY REGION ACC
MMIA
A Pro
MMIA LO

Under authority of AAI Adm Instr No 48 dated 8 Aug 44, (which has been subsequently endorsed by AFHQ letter AG 370.6/107 GCT-O dated 2[illegible] Sep 44), this HQ issued Operation Instruction No 10, "Aid to the Civil Power" (Copies attached for LAZIO and ABRUZZI/MARCHE Regions ACC).

1. Area/Sub Area/Grn commanders will ensure that their liaison with ACC Zone Commissioners (Regional HQ in SICILY) is such that they receive early information of any civil disturbances, should they arise.

2. While the quelling of civil disturbances, which do NOT directly affect Allied interests, is a matter for Italian administrative authorities, it will be borne in mind that the latter will normally only dispose of police and CC RR for the purpose. Area defence schemes will be drawn up in the light of this.

3. Where as in SICILY and CALABRIA the Italian authorities do dispose of troops, such will NOT, except in grave emergency, be employed without prior reference through ACC to the Area Commander, who will be kept fully informed of all incidents and actions taken.

4. Areas will forward full reports of all civil disturbances to this HQ, although Allied action may NOT have been called for.

2858

EPW/NH

Lt col
G S
(EP WARNER)

2824

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Civil Affairs Sect

14622

SUBJECT: Montegranaro Bn

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. SD/RB
24 Oct 44

26 OCT 1944

TO : AFHQ (R)

Copy to: SD AAI
ACC

1. Montegranaro Bn has come out of the line for re-org with C.I.L. where it recently took part in active operations under Eighth Army.

2. A nucleus of this Bn has been used to form the third Alpine Bn (to be known as either ARNUSCI or SALUCHA Bn) in the Legnano Gruppo di Combattimento.

3. The Montegranaro Bn, less the nucleus mentioned in para 2 above, is composed of over-age personnel who are due for demobilization when their homes in Northern Italy have been liberated.

4. As these men are not able to fight in the Italian Army, and as the unit is surplus to Italian Army requirements, I should like to recommend that the Montegranaro Bn be employed under CC RR and carried within CC RR Ceiling. In the CC RR, I feel that this unit, composed of steady men with Basic Military Training, would be a valuable asset.

5. Will you please let me know if you agree, when the necessary instructions could be issued from this HQ.

R. B.
Major [illegible]
M. M. [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS
26 OCT 1944
A. C. C.

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANCE		
CAPT POWELL		

3125

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Ref:ACC/14622/FS

28 October 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri

TO: H.Q. A.A.I.
(through C.C.A.C.)

1. Arrangements are being discussed to transfer 5000 Italian soldiers to the CC.RR for duty in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, in order that 5000 fully trained CC.RR can be released for duty in the North.

2. It is proposed to employ the military in groups of 500 at the following Legion H.Qs.:

BARI	CAGLIARI
NAPLES	ROME
CATANZARO	ROME (Lazio)
MESSINA	CHIETI
PALERMO	ANCONA

3. CC.RR patrols are worked in pairs. Under the new proposal, each patrol would consist of 1 CC.RR, 1 soldier. The 500 CC.RR in each Legion thus released would be held in readiness for transport to the North.

4. It is agreed that in ANCONA, no increase of CC.RR strength is necessary for the performance of police duty in that area. 500 soldiers are requested for ANCONA to release 500 CC.RR in accordance with the policy already explained.

5. It may be that at the present stage no additional CC.RR are needed in forward areas. However, the progress of operations, which cannot be anticipated, may liberate fresh territory at any time, and CC.RR must be readily available.

2856

Brigadier
VP CA Sec
Dep COS

FJW/acf

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Rub Supply
9327
94A

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

RESTRICTED

INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: ACTION: ACC SARDINIA INFO: AFHQ G-3Org, SD AAI, ACC

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 7627

FROM: MMIA CLASSIFICATION:

REFERENCE No: SD 1680 PRECEDENCE: IMPORTANT

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: OCT 27/1530 OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

INFO - ACTION

RESTRICTED. For SLESSIS. Form from personnel destined for mainland one bn inf on approx following WE. HQ 15 all ranks under Lt Col. Five Coys under Capt each of three pls of 30 all ranks and Coy HQ 10 all ranks. On completion report to C.C. Region CAGLIARI for temp duty with CCRG until 31 Dec. Personal arms and equip to accompany. Documentation through mil channels as before. On completion of duty unit will be placed on Shipping List 7. These are ITI-ITI. Adds to authorized strength of garrison. Remain in Italian outer uniform. Advise quantity and items of Italian and Allied clothing necessary to equip to scale. All available Italian items will be utilized

Dist
Inf-Act: R. Supply Off.
Inf: A/CC
G.O.S.
P. Pers Sect.
2855
File

HEADQUARTERS 28 OCT 1944

Rec'd 1159 28/10

RESTRICTED

DATE and Time of RECEIPT OCTOBER 27/1824

Distribution:

96A

MEMORANDUM.

Note of a meeting held on the 27th October to discuss the provision of 5,000 Italian troops to replace U.S.ZR.

Present.

Public Safety Sub-Commission

Col. Young
Lt. Col. Wilcox

Army Sub-Commission.

Col. Kerr
Col. Sidney
Lt. Col. Ingleby
Lt. Col. Noakes
Capt. Westbury

Col. Kerr stated that Army Sub-Commission had received orders through A.A.I. to supply 5,000 Italian troops. He asked where these troops should be sent. It was agreed that the troops should be sent by Army Sub-Commission to each of the following U.S. Legion Hqs:-

Bari,
Naples,
Catanzaro,
Messina,
Palermo,
Cagliari,
Rome,
Rome (Lazio)
Chieti
Ancona.

Col. Kerr said that General Alexander had ordered that these troops should remain as Army formations and that they would be accompanied by their own officers who would be responsible for their administration. This was agreed on the understanding that for operational purposes they would come under the direct control of the U.S.ZR.

2854

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Public Safety Sub-Commission

Col. Young
Lt. Col. Wilcox

Army Sub-Commission.

Col. Kerr
Col. Ridsley
Lt. Col. Ingleby
Lt. Col. Noakes
Capt. Westbury

Col. Kerr stated that Army Sub-Commission had received orders through A.A.I. to supply 5,000 Italian troops. He asked where these troops should be sent. It was agreed that the troops should be sent by Army Sub-Commission to each of the following C.C.Rs Legion Hqs:-

Bari,
Naples,
Catanzaro,
Messina,
Palermo
Cagliari.
Rome,
Rome (Tuscio)
Chieti
Ancona

Col. Kerr said that General Alexander had ordered that these troops should remain as Army formations and that they would be accompanied by their own officers who would be responsible for their administration. This was agreed on the understanding that for operational purposes they would come under the direct control of the C.C.Rs.

It was agreed that the Italian troops would report to the C.C.Rs Legion Hqs in formed groups each of an approximate strength of 500.

Administration.

For the purposes of documentation and discipline the Italian troops would be under their own regimental command. Their superior officers would have the right to inspect them. The Minister of War would be asked by Army Sub-Commission to provide

2854

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

the necessary administrative instructions. These would be agreed with Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Equipment.

The Italian troops would be accompanied by their own equipment - blankets - cooking utensils - mess-kits etc., and a certain amount of motor transport. (rifles - not side-arms).

Clothing.

The troops would be supplied with uniforms, boots and underclothing. This clothing would count against the allocation of uniforms to CC.RR. When at the end of December the troops were withdrawn they would be required to hand in their uniform to the CC.RR. It was certain that very little underclothing could be handed in and it was unlikely that 5,000 uniforms and 5,000 pairs of boots would be returned to CC.RR sources. The loss would be suffered by the CC.RR.

Transfer of troops to CC.RR Legions.

Army Sub-Commission stated that they would be responsible for ordering 5,000 troops to report to CC.RR. Legion HQs, but that they could not guarantee how many would arrive. Col. Pilcley expressed the view that of the 1,000 ordered to Sicily not more than half were likely to arrive. Italian troops did not wish to be stationed in Sicily and would desert. Since the men would not be posted as deserters until 30 days had expired, there would be no time to obtain replacements.

2853

Dates of transfer.

Army Sub-Commission said that their orders were to make the troops available on the 31st October. This could not be done. They were unable to state any fixed date but would make the transfer as quickly as possible.

Col. Kerr said that his orders from General Alexander were

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Clothing.

The troops would be supplied with uniforms, boots and underclothing. This clothing would count against the allocation of uniforms to CC.RR. When at the end of December the troops were withdrawn they would be required to hand in their uniform to the CC.RR. It was certain that very little underclothing could be handed in and it was unlikely that 5,000 uniforms and 5,000 pairs of boots would be returned to CC.RR. sources. The loss would be suffered by the CC.RR.

Transfer of troops to CC.RR Zones.

Army Sub-Commission stated that they would be responsible for ordering 5,000 troops to report to CC.RR. Region HQs. but that they would not guarantee how many would arrive. Col. Tidsley expressed the view that of the 1,000 ordered to Sicily not more than half were likely to arrive. Italian troops did not wish to be stationed in Sicily and would desert. Since the men would not be posted as fit for home until 30 days had expired, there would be no time to obtain replacements.

Dates of transfer.

Army Sub-Commission said that their orders were to make the troops available on the 31st October. This could not be done. They were unable to state any fixed date but could make the transfer as quickly as possible.

Col. Kerr said that his orders from General Alexander were that the troops must be returned to the Italian Army by the 31st December as they would be needed for combat duties. He saw no possibility of an extension of time being granted.

Col. Young stated that he could not accept the loss of clothing which would be occasioned by the proposed arrangement and he reserved the right to appeal to higher HQs on the question of the date of the return of the Italian troops.

2853

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

96B

MEMORANDUM

List of Headquarters AM.HR where Italian troops are to be supplied.

AMERICAN SITE A.		AMERICAN SITE B	
Bari	500	Palermo	700
Foglia	500	Messina	1 00
Ortanzaro	500	Cagliari	700
Messina	500	Chieti	700
Palermo	500	Rome	800
Cagliari	500	Rome (Lazio)	700
Rome	500	Ancona	700
Rome (Lazio)	500		
Chieti	500		
Ancona	500		
	5000		5000

2852

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

(UTION AAI, IMPO: KMIA, AGC

APH3 SIGNED SAG
FI 43589

DOC 2513524

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

PRIORITY

CITE PIORE

SECRET. 1. Provision of 3000 Italian soldiers to assist Carabinieri is subject.

2. Request you arrange provision of personnel as in our FI 12608 of 14 Oct by 31 Oct. Personnel will be provided from PIORE Div. No drivers will be used for these duties.

3. This answers your AR 1169 of 15 Oct letter follows.

HEADQUARTERS
26 OCT 19
C. C.

Dist
Info-Action - M.A.A.A. (2)
Info - A/CO
C.A. Sec
Pub Safety #3
File (2)
Plant

TO	INIT	DATE
DPS		
ODPS		
EX OFFICER		
POLICE		
2		
FIRE & C. D.		
PRISONS		
LIC & REG		
ADM OFFICER		

2851

SECRET

OCE 252127A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

94A

94

C.A. See

Ref 93A it is understood that following a meeting at AFHQ there are likely to be further developments. The C.S. would appreciate it if you would continue to Reep him informed on this particular situation.

E. Thresher
Capt
Dpty Dep

21 Oct 44

TO	INIT	DATE
COL. CHAPMAN		
COL. YOUNG		
LT COL WILCOX		
MAJ MASON		
MAJ WILSON		
MAJ HANBURY		
MAJ HARVEY		
MAJ BALLANTINE		
CAPT POWELL		

2850

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub Commission
A.P.O 394

Ref: ACC/14622/2S 18 October 1944

SUBJECT: CC.RR.

TO: D. P. S.

1. During the past few months correspondence has passed between this HQ and HQ.AAI, on the subject of increasing the strength of CC.RR by the transfer of Italian military from the Army to CC.RR. The position at the moment is that by a letter dated 23 Sept 44, Ref. 9/12.B/A.S. the acting Chief Commissioner laid the position before G-5 Section, AF. HQ. It was asked that 5000 soldiers be released immediately for duty with CC.RR in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy in order that 5000 highly trained CC.RR. be released for duty in the North.

2. By cable No.FX30600 dated 14 Oct 44 AF.HQ. requested AAI. to provide immediately 5000 soldiers to assist CC.RR. until 31 Dec 44. By cable SD II69 dated 15 Oct 44 AAI. produced arguments against the supply of the 5000 soldiers. Copies of these two cables are attached (I.B and I C.).

3. From the wording of cable AAI. to AF.HQ. it would appear that the scheme for the employment of Italian military is not properly understood. It is proposed to employ the 5000 soldiers in groups of approximately 700 at each of 7 Legion HQ. This would release an equal number of CC.RR. for duty in the North. It should be explained that CC.RR. patrols are worked in pairs, and the proposition, agreed by Commanding General CC.RR., is to use one CC.RR., one Italian soldier, on patrol instead of two CC.RR.

2849

4. Dealing with the 7 points of AAI.cable they are shown below, together with comments.

First. No comment. C.-in-C. is anxious that the training of soldiers should not be interrupted

Second. The employment of 5000 soldiers will set back seriously their training and final date of readiness for post-Kigma. This is not acceptable to C.in.C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

Ref: AGC/14622/2S 10 October 1944

SUBJECT: CC.RR.

TO: D. P. S.

1. During the past few months correspondence has passed between this HQ and HQ.AAI. on the subject of increasing the strength of CC.RR by the transfer of Italian military from the Army to CC.RR. The position at the moment is that by a letter dated 23 Sept 44, Ref. 9/12.B/A.S. the actin. Chief Commissioner laid the position before G-5 Section, AF. HQ. It was asked that 5000 soldiers be released immediately for duty with CC.RR in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy in order that 5000 highly trained CC.RR. be released for duty in the North.

2. By cable No.FX38608 dated 14 Oct 44 AF.HQ. requested AAI. to provide immediately 5000 soldiers to assist CC.RR. until 31 Dec 44. By cable SD 1159 dated 15 Oct 44 AAI. produced arguments against the supply of the 5000 soldiers. Copies of these two cables are attached (I.B and I C.).

3. From the wording of cable AAI. to AF.HQ. it would appear that the scheme for the employment of Italian military is not properly understood. It is proposed to employ the 5000 soldiers in groups of approximately 700 at each of 7 Legion HQ. This would release an equal number of CC.RR. for duty in the North. It should be explained that CC.RR. patrols are worked in pairs, and the proposition, agreed by Commanding General CC.RR., is to use one CC.RR., one Italian soldier, on patrol instead of two CC.RR.

2849

4. Dealing with the 7 points of AAI. cable they are shown below, together with comments.

First. No comment. C.-in-C. is anxious that the training of soldiers should not be interrupted

Second. The employment of 5000 soldiers will set back seriously their training and final date of readiness for operations. This is not acceptable to C.-in-C.

Comment. (a) The maintenance of law and order throughout Italy is the primary duty of ACC. The withdrawal of CC.RR. from the South, in order to police the North, has caused great anxiety for some months. If further men have to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782016

be withdrawn from Southern areas for the North the position will become most serious, and ACC cannot be expected to accept responsibility. Accordingly, ~~or~~ the allotment of 5000 troops has been requested. They will not increase the strength in the South but will merely make that number available for the North, and keep sufficient personnel in the South of Italy to maintain law and order.

(b) While it may be necessary to continue further training with these soldiers from an operational point of view, it must be realised that events in the South may make their transfer to that area imperative to preserve law and order. It is thought, therefore, that these men should be transferred now rather than wait until disorder occurs.

Third. Security in Ancona is the responsibility of AAI. who have no knowledge of additional troops needed there.

Comments. (a) This point is apparently made by AAI. as the cable from A.F.H.Q. requests 700 soldiers to be allotted to the Legion HQ. at Ancona.

(b) It is not suggested that additional troops are required in Ancona, but rather that these men will release an equal number of CC.RR. for the North. The strength of the Legion in Ancona will thus remain the same.

Fourth. Employment of troops on civilian police duties, for which they are not trained or suited, will be detrimental to Italian Army morale, which AAI. is trying to raise. Suggest instead that Civil Police Force and CC.RR be increased.

Comment. (a) It is appreciated that troops, as such, are not trained for police duties. It is for this very reason that the scheme governing the transfer of 4000 troops has been evolved. The troops will not be permitted to perform duties as policemen alone. As previously explained they will always patrol with a fully trained CC.RR.

(b) The increase of strength of Civil Police Forces and CC.RR. will not meet the urgent requirements of CC.RR. for the North.

2348

Fifth. No comment. Deals with manner in which 4000 men could be made available.

Sixth. No comment. C.-in-C. desires C.C.of S. to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 780016

accept responsibility. Accordingly, [illegible] 9000 troops has been requested. They will not increase the strength in the South but will merely make that number available for the North, and keep sufficient personnel in the South of Italy to maintain law and order.

(b) While it may be necessary to continue further training with these soldiers from an operational point of view, it must be realized that events in the South may make their transfer to that area imperative to preserve law and order. It is thought, therefore, that these men should be transferred now rather than wait until disorder occurs.

Third. Security in Ancona is the responsibility of AAI. who have no knowledge of additional troops needed there.

Comments. (a) This point is apparently made by AAI. as the cable from A.F.H.Q. requests 700 soldiers to be allotted to the Legion R. at Ancona.

(b) It is not suggested that additional troops are required in Ancona; but rather that these men will release an equal number of CC.RR. for the North. The strength of the Legion in Ancona will thus remain the same.

Fourth. Employment of troops on civilian police duties, for which they are not trained or suited, will be detrimental to Italian Army morale, which AAI. is trying to raise. Suggest instead that Civil Police Force and CC.RR be increased.

Comment. (a) It is appreciated that troops, as such, are not trained for police duties. It is for this very reason that the scheme governing the transfer of 3000 troops has been evolved The troops will not be permitted to perform duties as policemen alone. As previously explained they will always patrol with a fully trained CC.RR.

(b) The increase of strength of Civil Police Forces and CC.RR. will not meet the urgent requirements of C .RR. for the North.

2148

Fifth. No comment. Deals with manner in which 4000 men could be made available.

Sixth. No comment. C.-in-C. desires C.C.of S. to increase Italian Army ceiling.

Seventh. Last known strength of CC.RR. was 46,000, ceiling 55,000. If CC.RR. recruits cannot be obtained AAI. recommend balance of 9000 ceiling be transferred to Italian

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Army and employed under military, not police, command.

Comment. Law and Order throughout Italy must be maintained through the police services. The CC.RR. form the principal force. It would be quite impossible for any force of Italian soldiers to deal with the many problems of public safety in the North. It is essential that the present system of control by Police forces continues.

Frank D Wilson MAJOR

Frank D. Wilson
Police Division

FDW/acf

1 Forwarded to A.F.H.Q. for argument
- by Col Young and Col Mitchell.
18th

2847

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

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A2*

HOME AREA ALLIED COMMAND
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM MAIN AAI

REF NO: SD 1169

DATE TIME RECEIVED 160500

DATE TIME GROUP 152115A

TO: AFHQ

INFO MMIA

See 95A

SECRET

Ref FX38608 of 14th Oct. FIRST. C in C is particularly anxious that completion reorg personnel of groups should proceed as planned IE third and fourth mid Oct fifth and sixth early Nov. Issue complete equipment will be deferred ?as? groups will have trg scale. Essential groups have maximum time trg. See my 1910/90/G(SD1) of 12th Oct. SECOND. Employment 8000(5000)? personnel 5th and 6th groups in lieu of carabinieri until end Dec will set back seriously trg and final date readiness for ops this is NOT rpt NOT acceptable to C in C. THIRD. Security in ANCONA is responsibility this HQ. Have no knowledge any requirement additional troops there. FOURTH. Employment troops on Civil Police duties for which they are not trained or suited will be detrimental to Italian arms morale which we are trying hard to raise. Suggest instead Civil Police Forces and GGFF be increased. If demand for troops you require must be met following plan will make ?four? thousand available. FIFTH. Phase II plan for redistribution GD duties troops in my 1605/30/G(SD1) of 24th Sep covered requirements in ITALY when armies operate beyond the PO. We are prepared to release three Italian bns earmarked for employment in 3 District beyond PO and two bns earmarked for eighth army until end Dec provided (A) six Italian smoke (smoke) coys are released to AAI now in addition to two in 1 District now (B) guarantee given that when armies advance beyond PO or Northwest Italy is in Allied hands the five bns are released without question. SIXTH . AAI has repeatdly represented necessity for raising Italian Army ceiling. In view of necessity for making fullest operational use of Italian Army during winter C in C considers that urgent representations should be made to Combined Chiefs of Staff to increase the ceiling to cover ?any? additional demands. SEVENTH. Last known strength carabinieri was 46000 against ceiling 55000. If carabinieri recruits cannot be obtained recommend balance 9000 ceiling be transferred to Italian Army. These tps to be employed under military and NOT rpt NOT Police Comd.

2846

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I

See 95A

To: P.S. / HyACC 91 AT 7997

IMPORTANT

SECRET US CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

FOLIO NO 65795
14 OCTOBER 44
TOO 1230A
TOR 1542A

See 114A

FROM AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG
TO AAI
INFO MMIA ACC
NO FX 38608

IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY 5000 ITALIAN SOLDIERS TO ASSIST THE CARABINIERI UNTIL 31 DEC 1944. IN VIEW URGENCY REQUEST YOU ARRANGE PROVISIONAS UNDER BY 25 OCTOBER TO FOLLOWING CARABINIERI. REGION HQ PALERMO 700 MESSINA 700 CAGLIARI 700 CHIETI CHIETI ? 700 ROME 800 ROME (LAZIO) 700 ANCONA 700 IN VIEW FACT THAT 5 AND 6 GRUPPIS CANNOT BE EQUIPPED BEFORE FEBRUARY 1945 THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE FOUND FROM THEIR SOURCE. HSD/46 OF 30 SEP REFERS.

HEADQUARTERS
17 OCT 1944
A.C. Cen. 14

G(SD) 6 ACTION
A 1
G4 3
DCCAO 1

TP 1630A 14 GX.

2944

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Translation ABC 10/10/44

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
No 555/01890
Subject: Battalions "Italian Police"
To A.C.C. P.S. SUBCOMMISSION

Following verbal request I ~~join herewith~~ attach copy of report concerning above subject.

The Chief of the Police

2845

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Trans ABC

28-8-44 90b

C O P Y

CC.RR General Head Quarters.
No 38/1 Prot Segreto
Subject: Battalions "Italian Police"

To the Ministry of the Interior
To the Ministry of War
To the Undersecretary of State at the Interior
To the Army Staff
and for knowledge
To the Presidence of the Consiglio dei Ministri

One Company and a half of the first Battalion "Italian Police" formed of 2 companies of 220 men, including 9 officers, has just arrived at Livorno from Naples.

This corps- it seems- is formed by a regiment with 3 battalions. The soldiers come from the 113th infantry regiment. It has been formed by allied military authorities, and its members - physically, morally and intellectually selected - have attended a special course of about 40 days at the Police school near Naples, under american instructors. This corps depends, for its employement, from allied Military Police Authorities.

General duties : Guard service at depots, at works of art, at camps; Escort service to transport lorries; Road signaling service.

At present in Livorno they are employed in controlling the entry and exit of civilians and troops, from the so called "black zone".

Administration: autonomic; by Allied Authorities they are dressed, fed and lodged.

Uniforms: american kaki linnen with helmet bearing on front M.G (Military Garde).

The General of Corpo d'Armata
sgd Taddeo Orlando.

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RISERVATISSIMA

Mod 840

Ministero dell'Interno

DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA PUBBLICA SICUREZZA

---==oOo==---

N. 555/0890

Roma, 10 ottobre 1944 -

On. Commissione Alleata di Controllo
Sottocommissione per la P.S.
Via Veneto

ROMA

OGGETTO: Battaglioni "Polizia Italiana".

- - - -

Giusta richiesta verbale invio, qui unita, copia della comunicazione riguardante quanto in oggetto.-

IL CAPO DELLA POLIZIA

2842

C O P I A

COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CARABINIERI REALI
Ufficio Situazione
- - -

N.38/1 di prot.Segreto Roma,28 agosto 1944 -

OGGETTO: Battaglioni " Polizia Italiana ".

AL MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO - ROMA
AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA - ROMA
A S.E.IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO ALL'INTERNO - ROMA
ALLO STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO - ROMA
e per conoscenza
ALLA PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI - ROMA

- - - -

Proveniente da Napoli, é testé giunto a Livorno una compagnia e mezzo del 1° battaglione della "POLIZIA ITALIANA" Formato su due compagnie, della forza complessiva di 220 uomini, compresi nove ufficiali.

Il nuovo corpo - a quanto si dice - ha per ora l'organico di un reggimento su tre battaglioni. I militari che ne fanno parte provengono dal 113° reggimento fanteria. Esso é stato costituito dalle autorità militari alleate, e i componenti - che sono stati selezionati fisicamente, moralmente ed intellettualmente - hanno frequentato un corso speciale di circa 40 giorni presso il campo scuola della polizia, nelle vicinanze di Napoli, alle dipendenze di istruttori americani. Per l'impiego, il corpo stesso dipende dalle Autorità di Polizia Militare Alleata.

Compiti generali: servizio di guardia in genere ai depositi, alle opere d'arte, agli accantonamenti; servizio di scorta agli automezzi da carico; servizio di segnalazione stradale. Attualmente in Livorno, sono impiegati nel controllo dell'entrata e l'uscita dei civili e militari nella cosidetta "zona nera".

Amministrazione: autonoma; dalle Autorità Alleate ricevono

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OGGETTO: Battaglioni " Polizia Italiana ".

AL MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO - ROMA
AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA - ROMA
A S.E.IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO ALL'INTERNO - ROMA
ALLO STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO - ROMA
e per conoscenza
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Amministrazione: autonoma; dalle Autorità Alleate ricevono vitto, alloggio e vestiario.

2841

Uniforme: americana di tela kaki con elmetto recante nella parte frontale la sigla M.G. (Military Garde).

IL GENERALE DI CORPO D'ARMATA
F.to Taddeo Orlando

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Colonel Sharman.

On the 14th October, Lt. Col. Mitchel, U.S., A.F.H.Q., telephoned to say :

a) that the transfer of 5,000 troops to the CC.RR. had been approved,

b) that the 5,000 troops would be attached to CC.RR until 31st December, 1944.

c) that A.A.I. had been asked to give the troops available by the 25th October,

d) that the troops would be allotted to the seven CC.RR legions as set out in our report of the 6th October (27A of this file).

e) that a copy of a message giving this information had been sent to HQ., A.C.C.

Lt. Col. Mitchel said that he assumed that A.A.I. would now liaise with A.C.C. regarding the details of the transfer. Nothing has been specifically stated about the CC.RR. Command selecting suitable troops.

14th October 1944.

Lt. Col. A.F. Wilcox.

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T. T.C.E.O.S

1,622 88A

For info & return.

These reports disclose, I think, a reasonable attitude on the part of A.F. Hqr & I am of opinion that we should leave them alone for a few days before renewing the attack

Thank you. I will tell A/Cre

W/Cdr.

To Particular Safety V

2/39

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

6th October 1944

Tel. 489081
Ext. 489

7 OCT 1944

SUBJECT: Strength of Carabinieri.

TO: Director of Public Safety.

1. On 4th October 1944 I visited AFHQ and discussed with Lieut.Col. J. Murray Mitchell, G.5, the following matters:

a) the immediate provision of 5000 Italian troops to release 5000 trained Carabinieri for policing the north of Italy;

b) the raising of the Carabinieri strength from 55000 to a minimum of 65000 (or 70000 if circumstances warrant).

It was decided to deal with the two questions separately.

2. After discussing the objections to providing any troops whatever for this purpose (as set out in MMIA letter SD/28 dated 22nd September 1944) a meeting was attended by the following:

Brigadier J.L.C.Napier,	G.3, AFHQ
Colonel C.E.Lewin-Harris,	G.5, AFHQ
Lieut.Col.J.M.Mitchell,	G.5, AFHQ
Lieut.Col.A.F.Wilcox,	HQ, A.C.C. (Public Safety)

3. It was agreed:

a) that 5000 Italian troops should be provided for CC.RR duties;

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b) that the transfer should be on a temporary basis (no time limit was specified)

c) that the date of transfer should be on or about 20th October 1944

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d) that, in order to obviate extensive troop movements, it would be preferable to transfer troops direct to the undermentioned CC.RR Legion Headquarters from Italian units in the vicinity:

CC.RR Legion HQ.	Troops required.	
Palemmo	700	
Messina	700	
Cagliari	700	
Chieti	700	
Rome	800	
Rome (Lazio)	700	
Ancona	700	5000

e) that the most suitable troops should be selected in conjunction with representatives from CC.RR HQ.

4. The decision of the meeting was embodied in a memorandum from Brig.General Spofford, G.5, to Lieut.Gen. Sir J.A.H.Gammell, Chief of Staff, AFHQ. The Chief of Staff will read the recommendations on 9th October 1944, and it is probable that HQ A.A.I. will be consulted before a final decision is reached.

5. On 6th October 1944 the second question - i.e. raising the ceiling of the Carabinieri - was discussed. A memorandum from Brig.General Spofford, G.5, to the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, was prepared recommending that the authorised strength of the Carabinieri be increased to 65000 with authority to increase to 70000 if circumstances warrant.

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6. The officers named in paragraph 2 of this report again met on 6th October 1944. Brigadier Napier expressed himself as being sympathetic towards the recommended increase in strength, but stated that before the memorandum could be

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laid before the Chief of Staff it would be necessary for G.3 to set out in detail the effect on the Italian Army. Brigadier Napier proposed to consult A.A.I. Col.Lewin-Harris suggested that a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission should be present at any consultations with A.A.I., and Brigadier Napier agreed.

7. There is now nothing more that can be done by HQ.A.C.C. or G.5, AFHQ. It is a matter of awaiting notification from AFHQ:

i) That the transfer of 5000 troops to the CC.RR has been finally approved

ii) That a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission is required to consult with A.A.I. regarding any objections they may raise to increasing the CC.RR ceiling.

8. Lieut.Col.Mitchell asked me to point out to HQ.A.C.C. that while the strongest possible recommendation for the transfer of 5000 troops has been made to the Chief of Staff it must not be assumed that the Chief of Staff's final approval will be automatic.

A. F. WILCOX.
Lieut.Col. G.I.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

2836

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Ref: 9/12.B/A.S. 23 September 1944. ae.

SUBJECT:- CARABINIERI

TO : G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. The primary duty of this Commission is to maintain, or to ensure that the Italian Government maintains, law and order throughout the territory. The Carabinieri (CC.RR) form the principal force for the maintenance of law and order. Hitherto, with one notable exception in Rome, they have been moderately successful in achieving this object. The future, however, has filled me with great anxiety for some months. There are not sufficient Carabinieri in the country to ensure the maintenance of law and order in Italy after the occupation of the Northern Regions. In these Regions particularly we shall be faced with a situation in which security problems will be more difficult than any we have hitherto met.

2. Foreseeing this, I have for some time been in communication with AAI in an attempt to secure sufficient men for the Carabinieri in order that I may fulfil the responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order which are properly mine.

3. I enclose copies of correspondence which has passed between my HQ and HQ AAI. I would summarise the position as follows:-

a) In my opinion 65,000 is the absolute minimum strength of Carabinieri necessary for the maintenance of law and order for the whole of Italy. My reasons are set forth in my letter A/CC 014.13 of 1. Aug(Marked 'A'), addressed to HQ AAI.

b) HQ AAI has so far refused permission for this ceiling which accordingly remains at 55,000. This is insufficient. Of these 55,000 it has been found possible to recruit only 43,000. It seems unlikely that I shall be able to reach the ceiling of 55,000 by drawing upon the Carabinieri in the normal way, i.e. by finding them in liberated areas as the Armies progress northwards. The reasons for this are set out in my A/CC 2835 /CC/14622/S of 6 September addressed to HQ AAI, para 3 (marked 'B'). It is hoped that the reports of scarcity of Carabinieri in the Northern Regions may be exaggerated; it is possible that we may be able to find as many as 10,000 - 15,000; but although I cannot possibly count on finding a single man North of the Rimini-Pisa line, I am prepared to run a certain risk by anticipating picking up between 10,000 - 15,000.

c) This still leaves me with the necessity of finding at once [illegible] Carabinieri to police the area [illegible] of the Rimini-

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a) In my opinion 65,000 is the absolute minimum strength of Carabinieri necessary for the maintenance of law and order for the whole of Italy. My reasons are set forth in my letter A/CC 011.13 of 1. Aug (marked "A"), addressed to HQ AAI.

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c) This still leaves me with the necessity of finding at once 8,000 - 13,000 carabinieri to police the area north of the Rimini-Pisa Line. This is an absolute minimum. I am prepared to plan on a basis of 11,000.

d) In the letter of 6th Sept referred to above (marked "B"), I accordingly suggested that 11,000 soldiers should be attached from the Regular Army by AAI to the Carabinieri as a temporary measure. CCC Army Sub-Commission has told my Public Safety Sub-Commission that clothed and equipped soldiers are not available but no reply has been received from AAI.

4. In view of this refusal I have had to strip the rest of

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Italy, particularly Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy to a dangerously low limit. I have already sent 4,000 Carabinieri to Florence where a holding centre for the North will be formed and am planning to send a further 2,000 making a total of 6,000 Carabinieri against 11,000 needed.

5. I must therefore repeat my request for an allocation of troops from Regular Army by MMLA and I now formally ask that 5,000 soldiers should be released immediately for duty with the Carabinieri in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy (an experiment which has worked very well as a temporary measure in connection with grain collection in Sicily) in order that I can release a further 5,000 highly trained Carabinieri from these areas for duty in the North. Such an arrangement would give me the minimum of 11,000 required as an initial nucleus to go forward to the Northern areas.

6. I would add that it is essential that such soldiers should be fully equipped and clothed.

7. I attach comments of the CCO, Army Sub-Commission on this request and I would ask that an immediate decision be made in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the primary necessity for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organisation of the MMLA now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North without the necessary forces to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganisation of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in those areas.

8. Without the Carabinieri I shall be compelled to ask for more Allied troops in newly liberated areas.

9. With a view to saving time I have shown a draft of the above letter to C.C.C., MMLA and his comments are attached (marked "C"). I do not want to comment in detail on his letter but would point out

a) valuable though his suggestions are for a reorganisation of the CC.RR they will take time. It takes far longer to train a good policeman than a good soldier.

b) we are already proposing to skim a further 2,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy (see para 4 above).

c) It is the view of this HQ that the use of patriots who are completely untrained in police work would be extremely hazardous 2834

d) we must accept the fact that the best men must be taken for the Carabinieri. This has been the custom in the past, with good reason. Having in view the future of the Italian Army consequent on the demilitarisation of Italy which presumably must take place when hostilities have ceased it is now even more necessary that the Carabinieri should take the cream.

It is precisely because of the above difficulties and because my problem

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6. I would add that it is essential that such soldiers should be fully equipped and clothed.

7. I attach comments of the C.C. Army Sub-Commission on this request and I would ask that an immediate decision be made in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the primary necessity for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organisation of the AMGLA now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North without the necessary force to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganisation of the regular army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in those are as.

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It is precisely because of the above difficulties and because my problem is immediate (especially in view of the reported fall of Rimini) that I have asked for the allocation as a temporary measure of 5,000 soldiery so as to enable me to send 5,000 fully trained Carabinieri for duty in the North. I need hardly say that the suggestions made by C.C.C. AMGLA are being examined immediately in detail with a view to reorganisation of the Carabinieri.

KILBEY W. STONE
Captain, RENR
Acting Chief Commissioner.

TWB.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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5. I must therefore repeat my request for an allocation of troops from Regular Army by MMIA and I now formally ask that 5,000 soldiers should be released immediately for duty with the Carabinieri in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy (an experiment which has worked very well as a temporary measure in connection with grain collection in Sicily) in order that I can release a further 5,000 highly trained Carabinieri from these areas for duty in the North. Such an arrangement would give me the minimum of 11,000 required as an initial nucleus to go forward to the Northern areas.

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7. I attach comments of the CCC, Army Sub-Commission on this request and I would ask that an immediate decision be made in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the primary necessity for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organisation of the MMIA now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North without the necessary forces to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganisation of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in those areas.

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2434

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5,000 required as an initial nucleus to go forward to the Northern areas.

6. I would add that it is essential that such soldiers should be fully equipped and clothed.

7. I attach comments of the G.O.C. Army Sub-Commission on this request and I would ask that an immediate decision be made in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the primary necessity for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organisation of the AMGOT now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North without the necessary forces to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganisation of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in those areas.

8. Without the Carabinieri I shall be compelled to ask for more Allied troops in newly liberated areas.

9. With a view to saving time I have shown a draft of the above letter to G.O.C., MTA and his comments are attached (marked "C"). I do not want to comment in detail on his letter but would point out

a) valuable though his suggestions are for a reorganisation of the CC.RR they will take time. It takes far longer to train a good policeman than a good soldier.

b) we are already proposing to skim a further 2,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy (see para 4 above).

c) It is the view of this HQ that the use of patriots who are completely untrained in police work would be extremely hazardous 2834

d) we must accept the fact that the best men must be taken for the Carabinieri. This has been the custom in the past, with good reason. Having in view the future of the Italian Army consequent on the demilitarisation of Italy which presumably must take place when hostilities have ceased it is now even more necessary that the Carabinieri should take the cream.

It is precisely because of the above difficulties and because my problem is immediate (especially in view of the reported fall of Rimini) that I have asked for the allocation as a temporary measure of 5,000 soldiers so as to enable me to send 5,000 fully trained Carabinieri for duty in the North. I need hardly say that the suggestions made by G.O.C. MTA are being examined immediately in detail with a view to reorganisation of the Carabinieri.

KILBEY S. STOCK
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner.

TAB.

SKY 5/10/44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622/2/10. 85A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/dfe

A/CC 014.13

30 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner
Brigadier Upjohn, Admin. Section
Colonel Chapman

See 794

I had a telephone call this morning from Lt. Col. Mitchell of G-5 AFHQ with reference to my recent letter on Carabinieri. He stated that AFHQ had decided to press to secure us additional bodies on a temporary basis for the next three or four months--leaving to be handled as a separate issue the question of permanent increase in the Carabinieri strength or ceiling.

He further stated that G-5 felt that notwithstanding the possibility of our securing additional temporary personnel, ACC should put into effect urgently such recommendations made by General Browning on a long term basis for reorganizing and improving the efficiency of the CC.HR. as we approve.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USN
Acting Chief Commissioner

56 467

Hq A C C Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 1 - OCT 1944
Via 2nd Sec. Wing
Initials CM

2833

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Plan on CCRR Strength

84A

MEMORANDUM.

SUBJECT : Removal of CC.RR from Southern Italy.

While visiting Col. Wilcox on the morning of the 19th September, 1944, His Excellency Dott. Ferrari, Director of Public Security, Ministry of the Interior, stated that he was seriously exercised in his mind with regard to the maintenance of Public Order in Sicily and Southern Italy.

He understood that the Allied Forces would be withdrawn from Sicily on the 5th October, and already, with the Occupying Forces still there, the police force was insufficient and the situation bad. Now it was proposed to withdraw 1,000 Carabinieri from Sicily to police the newly occupied northern districts, and he shuddered to contemplate what would happen in the South.

He was much relieved to hear that 5,000 soldiers were being detailed for the South to replace the Carabinieri.

He mentioned that the Ministry of War apparently had no soldier reserves in Rome, for, when during the disturbances at the Palace of Justice, in connection with the killing of Caretta, on 18th September, he called upon them for Military reserves, he was able to obtain just 20 soldiers!

2832

19th September, 1944.

RWW

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

83 A

To Adm. Sec.

25A from NMIA asks for a check on Strength
25X from P.S. to NMIA is an acknowledgment
28A from NMIA gives instructions on form of return.

The important letter – not mentioned by NMIA on 82B is 26A.

This is a reply from P.S. to NMIA re 25A giving Strength returns as requested.

22 9/44. Enc. 365.

Thos. D. Wilson Maj.

To. P.S.

V.P. by Sea and Mail.

No further action.

22 Sep. 44

R. A. Capper Col.

2831

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

824

To P.S.

823

① May I please be furnished with the file containing the letters referred to in attached letter.

② Also a photo of the action taken on them.

18 Sept. 42.

R. H. Klein Lt.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Subject: Ration Return for 3CMR.

Military Mission to
Italian Army,
R O M E.
AQ/3/1
17 Sep 44.

To: Administrative Section.

Reference your ACC/14601/0/PS of 11 Sep.

The references of the letters to which you refer are :

From	To	Reference No.	Date
MMIA	Public Safety Sub Comm.	AQ/3/1	28 May 44
Public Safety Sub Comm.	M.M.I.A.	ACC/146/PS 22	6 June 44
MMIA	Public Safety Sub Comm.	G/11/1	29 June 44

FJN/lh.

CLAYTON P. NEAL Colonel.
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

2830

1497

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Acefile Acc/14601/53/PS. 80A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 489081
Ext : 365

Acc/14601/53/PS 8 September, 1944.

SUBJECT : CC.RR. Strength.

TO : Director, Army Sub-Commission.

1. It is understood from reliable sources that during August 1944 14,000 CC.RR were interned in Germany from Lombardia. It is thought that the same measures may be taken in other Regions under German control. Accordingly a shortage of CC.RR must be anticipated as areas are liberated.

2. The strength of CC.RR is well below the present ceiling of 55,000, and difficulty is being experienced in finding the necessary men for Regions, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

3. It is asked by Gen. Orlando, Commanding General CC.RR, that 5,000 fully equipped and armed Italian soldiers be temporarily transferred to the CC.RR. This would release 5,000 CC.RR for duty in forward areas. The soldiers would be released when the CC.RR strength reached 55,000.

4. It is understood that Army personnel are not available in the vicinity of all Legion Headquarters. Accordingly, if this scheme meets with approval, it is suggested that 5,000 soldiers be allotted between the following Legion Headquarters -

PALERMO
MESSINA
CAGLIARI
CHIETI
ROME
ROME (LAZIO)
ANCONA.

1 Refused by MMIA on Acc/14601/53/PS 14 9.

PJW/C.

F. Wilson MAT.
A. E. YOUNG, Col.,
Acting Director
Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

2829

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

EWS/hjp

6 September 1944

A/CC 014.13

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference your 1605/50/44 (SDI) dated 13 Aug 44.

2. In compliance with para 4 of the above letter, I submit as Appendix "A" hereto a brief outline showing the organization, strength and location of the Carabinieri.

3. With respect to the suggestions made in para 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". With respect there cannot be two such classes anymore than you could have part of the Italian Army maintained by the Allies and part by the Italian Government.

The reason briefly is that the Carabinieri are an integral part of the Italian Army and the senior corps in the Army; this fact coupled with the importance of their duties (especially in connection with the black market) make it essential for them to continue to receive Army rations, Army petrol and Army clothing as at present; there is no other source from which these essential supplies can come.

4. As already pointed out in para 2 above, for all administrative purposes the Carabinieri are under the control of the Italian Government. It is true that in Military Government Territory, ACC Public Safety Officers supervise the duties of the Carabinieri, but the functions and organization remains unchanged. In fact, territory can be handed over to the Italian Government without the necessity of making any changes whatever in Carabinieri organization and administration. Rations, petrol, clothing and supplies are unaffected by the assumption of control by the Italian Government.

Again this proposal will not have the effect of reducing the Carabinieri strength.

5. It appears that the purpose of the proposed change is to limit the amount of food and equipment to be supplied from Allied sources. In this connection it is our view that fundamental changes in the organization of the Italian police ought not to be made merely

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

because of a temporary shortage of supplies. The organization of the Italian Police Forces is complex, affecting numerous Government Departments and civilian agencies. This Commission is not charged with the task of making constitutional changes in Italian national institutions, which is a matter for the Italian Government.

6. The following observations are offered regarding the specific suggestions made in para 3 of your letter:

a. Formation of separate corps of Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia.

Separate Carabinieri Brigades exist in Sicily and Sardinia. If it is proposed that these Brigades should be treated differently from other Brigades in the matter of rations and supplies this Commission advises most strongly against any such discrimination, which would be fatal to the "esprit de corps" of the Carabinieri.

From the political standpoint any proposal to divorce Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia from Carabinieri on the mainland would almost certainly be taken as a sign of encouragement by the "separatist" parties.

It is pointed out that this proposal will do nothing to reduce the Carabinieri ceiling.

b. Transfer of Carabinieri to Finance Guards.

It will be appreciated that the functions of the Carabinieri are entirely different from those of the Finance Guards, who, under the control of the Ministry of Finance, are mainly engaged in enforcing revenue laws.

This is specialised work for which the Carabinieri are not trained. Carabinieri duties, on the other hand, are quite outside the experience of the Finance Guards. Further, the method and standards of selection and recruitment are different; lastly, such a transfer would be fatal to the esprit de corps of the CCRR.

7. In general it must be emphasized that the Carabinieri is part of the Italian Army with proud traditions and high morale. Any attempt to break up the Carabinieri at this stage would be disastrous to a body which has already done much to aid the Allied cause and whose services are still essential to the war effort in Italy.

Hq A.C.C. Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 6 Sept 1830
Initials

2827

1 Incl:
Appendix "A"

KELSEY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Draft submitted by:
Brig. Upjohn, Admin Sec

1124

0275

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

796

APPENDIX "A"

6 September 1944

CARABINIERI REALI

1. Present Organization

a. The present organization of the Carabinieri consists of a General Headquarters at Rome; two divisions (2nd and 3rd) with HQs at Rome and Naples, respectively. Each division normally consists of two brigades. Thus far three brigades have been activated: Rome, Naples and Palermo. A fourth brigade will soon be activated at Florence. Eventually the first Division will be reactivated with Hqs at Milan.

b. The brigades are sub-divided into Legions, the strength of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the moment, there are nine Legions namely: Abruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the Legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organized.

c. Each Legion is sub-divided into progressively small units: Groups, Companies, Lieutenancies, Sections and Stations. The jurisdiction of Group corresponds to that of Province.

2. The present strength is indicated as follows as of 1 August:

General HQ	129	Replacement Centre, Bari	383
Abruzzi Legion	2502	Replacement Centre, Rome	3013
Bari Legion	4564	Nucleus for the Activation of Florence Legion	300
Cagliari Legion	4053	Nucleus for the Activation of Leghorn Legion	100
Catanzaro Legion	2797	HQ's Bn Bari	231
Lazio Legion	4446	Cadet Bn Andria	728
Messina Legion	3546	Cadet Bn Barletta	514
Napoli Legion	5726	Cadet Bn Gallipoli	409
Rome Region	4602	Cadet Bn Cagliari	515
Palermo Legion	4764	Cadet Bn Palermo	379
Replacement Centre, Naples	255		43934

Strength of the Leghorn nucleus is not available at this time.

The total strength shown of 41,892 includes all Carabinieri serving with troops.

Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 3,011.

3. Future Organization.

It is planned that the future organization on the basis of an authorized strength of 65,000 will be approximately as indicated below. Allowance of course must be made for developments which might warrant

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

an increase in strength in a particular area.

Strength of CC.NN for all of Italy
based on a ceiling of 65,000

Torino	4211	Napoli	3220
Alessandria	2544	Bari	2640
Genova	4793	Catanzaro	2037
Livorno	2543	Palermo	2370
Milano	5289	Messina	2104
Verona	2244	Comando Generale	84
Bolzano	2715	Inspectorates of Brigades	30
Padova	2698	Central School	158
Trieste	3256	Cadet Legion	3960
Bologna	3285	Rome Battalion	1200
Firenze	3001	Palermo Bn	900
Abruzzi	2094	Squadron Groups	360
Cagliari	2134	Band	80
Roma	2487	King's Guards	90
Lazio	2432		65000

2826

11ak

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

A/CC 014.13
ACC/14622/FS

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Mobili

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference 1605/50/44/0 (SDI), dated 13 Aug 44.

2. A communication, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under separate cover.

3. However, since my letter to you of 1 August, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the PISA - RIMINI line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this Commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.

4. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43,954 men. A ceiling of 55,000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian army is short at least 11,000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the MMIA be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11,000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Mobili. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the CCRM to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.

5. Furthermore if no CCRM are found in the North it may be necessary to go further and ask that in order to make up the balance of 23,000, which in my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the North (see my A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug paras 5 and 6), part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCRM to work with them on police duties. Such an attachment has been arranged in Sicily in connection with the grain system and is working well.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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6. This Commission is still of the view that a Carabinieri strength of 65,000 is necessary. The need therefore was set forth in my letter of 1 August. But since the prospect of reaching the present authorized ceiling is made virtually impossible by the action of the Germans, it is urgently requested that favorable consideration be given to the proposal made above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered.

ELLIOT R. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Army Sub-Commission

Draft submitted by:
Brig. Upjohn, Admin Section

Public Safety Sub-Commission

	Date	for action/information
D.P.S.		
D.D.P.S.		
Legal Officer		
Civil Affairs Officer	8/9	
Communications		
Fin. & C.D.		
Plans & Licensing		
Adm. Officer		

REMARKS

2524

SD 105

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 6 Sept 1946
Via HQ
Initials DER

-2-

SECRET

1102

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

77A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

6 Sept. 1944

ACC/14622/PS

SUBJECT : AMG 5 Army Conference with P.S. Representative.

TO : Vice President, Administrative Section.

74A

1. On 3rd Sept. 1944 signal marked "A" was received from AMG Fifth Army asking for a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission to visit HQ to discuss expected developments. On 3rd Sept.44 signal marked "B" was sent in reply. 75A

On 4th and 5th Sept. 1944 conferences were held with CCRR and detailed plans were made for policing territory not yet liberated.

On 6th Sept. 1944 these plans were discussed with Brigadier Lush and Lieut Col. Shipp, RC & MG Section. Brigadier Lush directed that a representative from Public Safety Sub-Commission should not contact AMG Fifth Army but should explain the plans to Regional Commissioners X, XI and XII who would make the necessary arrangements with AMG Armies.

2. According signal, C " was sent on 6th Sept. 1944 explaining that no Public Safety representative would attend HQ AMG Fifth Army. 76A

for A. E. YOUNG, Col.
Acting Director
Public Safety
Sub-Commission

AFW/hgd

2823

0 2 8 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

10622 76A

77A
See 75A

AMG 5TH ARMY

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY
PUBLIC SAFETY S/S

RR AGC PUBLIC SAFETY S/S
2829

6/3/44

74A

REFERENCE YOUR EIGHT TWO SEVEN ZERO OF THREE SEPTEMBER FB
FABEN TO AGO FIFTH ARMY FROM RR AGO RESTRICTED STATE PAPER
EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER DIRECTS ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE BY THIS
HQ WITH REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORY FOR FORWARD
AREAS HQ REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS WILL CONTACT YOU RE THE
FB ACCORDINGLY HQ REPRESENTATIVES WILL
MOVEMENT AND DISPOSITION
BE SENT FROM AGO PUBLIC SAFETY TO FIFTH ARMY

2822

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Tele 75A

76A
77A refer

AMG FIFTH ARMY

HQ ACC PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

2713

3/9/44

RESTRICTED.

PRIORITY.

Public Safety S/C.

74A

REFERENCE YOUR EIGHT TWO SEVEN ZERO OF THREE SEPTEMBER PD PAREN TO AMG FIFTH ARMY FROM HQ ACC PAREN CONFERENCE ON CORR STRENGTH BEING HELD TOMORROW PD YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHEN REPRESENTATIVE OF PUBLIC SAFETY CAN ATTEND MEETING AT FIFTH ARMY HQ.

2821

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

744

HEADQUARTERS
13 SEP 1944

TO: HQ ACC FOR PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION (ACTION) HQ ACC FOR RC AND MG SECTION (INFO)

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 42/03

FROM: AMG 5 ARMY SIGNED HUME — CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE No: 8270 — PRECEDENCE: NONE

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEP 0311458 — OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE: 288

CONFIRMING PHONE CONVERSATION 1 SEPTEMBER CONSIDER VERY DESIRABLE REPRESENTATIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION CONFER WITH THIS HQ SOON AS POSSIBLE ON PLANS TO MEET EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE. CAN YOU ARRANGE REPRESENTATIVE VISIT THIS HQ. ACKNOWLEDGE.

ACC DIST

ACTION:	PUB SAFETY SC	2
INFO:	A/CC	
	CA BR	
	FILE	2
	FLOAT	

2820

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

TO: HQ ACC FOR PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION (ACTION) HQ ACC FOR RC AND MG SECTION (INFO)

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 42/03

FROM: AMG 5 ARMY SIGNED HUME

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE No: 8270

PRECEDENCE: NONE

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEP 031145B

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE: 288

CONFIRMING PHONE CONVERSATION 1 SEPTEMBER CONSIDER VERY DESIRABLE REPRESENTATIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION CONFER WITH THIS HQ SOON AS POSSIBLE ON PLANS TO MEET EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE. CAN YOU ARRANGE REPRESENTATIVE VISIT THIS HQ. ACKNOWLEDGE.

ACC DIST

ACTION: PUB SAFETY SC 2
INFO: A/CC
CA BR
FILE 2
FLOAT

2820

DATE and Time of RECEIPT SEP 031405B

Distribution:

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 789016

0284

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

73A

See 70A - 72A

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner

.... September 44

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Commanding General, Allied Armies in Italy.

66c

Reference your 1605/30/14/G (201) dated 13 Aug 44.

1 In compliance with para 4 of the above letter, I submit as Appx: "A" hereto a brief outline showing the organisation, strength and location of the Carabinieri.

2 With respect to the suggestions made in para 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". With respect there cannot be two such classes anymore than you could have part of the Italian Army maintained by the Allies and part by the Italian Government.

The reason briefly is that the Carbinieri are an integral part of the Italian Army and the senior corps in the Army; this fact coupled with the importance of their duties (especially in connection with the black market) make it essential for them to continue to receive Army rations, Army petrol and Army clothing as at present; there is no other source from which these essential supplies can come.

3 As already pointed out in para 2 above, for all administrative purposes the Carabinieri are under the control of the Italian Government. It is true that in Military Government Territory, ACC Public Safety Officers supervise the duties of the Carabinieri, but the functions and organisation remains unchanged. In fact, territory can be handed over to the Italian Government without the necessity of making any changes whatever in Carabinieri organisation and administration. Rations, petrol, clothing and supplies are unaffected by the assumption of control by the Italian Government.

Again this proposal will not have the effect of reducing the Carabinieri strength.

4 It appears that the purpose of the proposed changes is to limit the amount of food and equipment to be supplied from Allied sources. In this connection it is our view that fundamental changes in the organisation of the Italian police ought not to be made merely because of a temporary shortage of supplies. The organisation of the Italian Police Forces is complex, affecting numerous Government Departments and civilian agencies. This Commission is not charged with the task of making constitutional changes in Italian national Institutions, which is a matter for the Italian Government.

2819

5 The following observations are offered regarding the specific suggestions made in para 3 of your letter.

i. Formation of separate corps of Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia.

Reference your 1705/50/H1/e (SDE) dated 13 Aug 44.

1 In compliance with para 4 of the above letter, I submit as Appx: "A" hereto a brief outline showing the organisation, strength and location of the Carabinieri.

2 With respect to the suggestions made in para 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". With respect there cannot be two such classes anymore than you could have part of the Italian Army maintained by the Allies and part by the Italian Government.

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2819

5 The following observations are offered regarding the specific suggestions made in para 3 of your letter.

i Formation of separate corps of Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia.

Separate Carabinieri Brigades exist in Sicily and Sardinia. If it is proposed that these Brigades should be treated differently from other Brigades in the matter of rations and supplies this Commission advises most strongly against any such discrimination, which would be fatal to the "esprit de corps" of the Carabinieri.

From the political standpoint any proposal to divorce Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia from Carabinieri on the mainland would almost certainly be taken as a sign of encouragement by the "Separatist" parties.

It is pointed out that this proposal will do nothing to reduce the Carabinieri ceiling.

ii Transfer of Carabinieri to Finance Guards.

It will be appreciated that the functions of the Carabinieri are entirely different from those of the Finance Guards who, under the control of the Ministry of Finance, are solely engaged in enforcing revenue laws.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

This is specialised work for which the Carabinieri are not trained. Carabinieri duties, on the other hand, are quite outside the experience of the Finance Guards. Further, the method and standards of selection and recruitment are different, lastly, such a transfer would be fatal to the esprit de corps of the CCRR.

6 In general it must be emphasised that the Carabinieri is part of the Italian Army with proud traditions and high morale. Any attempt to break up the Carabinieri at this stage would be disastrous to a body which has already done much to aid the Allied cause and whose services are still essential to the war effort in Italy.

HARRY W. DIXON,
Captain, AUSA,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Carabinieri Reali

1 Present Organisation

a The present organisation of the Carabinieri consists of a General Headquarters at Rome. Two Divisions (1st and 3rd) with HQs at Rome and Naples, respectively. Each division normally consists of two brigades. Thus far 3 brigades have been activated :- Rome, Naples and Palermo. A fourth brigade will soon be activated at Florence. Eventually the First Division will be reactivated with HQs at Milan.

b The brigades are are sub-divided into legions, the strength of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the moment, there are nine legions namely: Abruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organised.

c Each legion is sub-divided into progressively small units: Groups, Companies, Lieutenancies, Sections and Stations. The subdivision of Group corresponds to that of Province.

2 The present strength is indicated as follows as of 1st August:

Gen HQ	123
Abruzzi Legion	2502
Bari Legion	4598
Cagliari Legion	4053
Catanzaro Legion	7797
Lazio Legion	4446
Messina Legion	3546
Napoli Legion	5726
Roma Legion	4622
Palermo Legion	4764
Replacement Centre, Naples	255
Replacement Centre, Bari	381
Replacement Centre, Rome	3043
Nucleus for the Activation of Florence Legion	300
Nucleus for the Activation of Leghorn Legion	100
ECO's Bn Bari	921
Cadet Bn Arbatax	708
Cadet Bn Barletta	514
Cadet Bn Castrovilli	499
Cadet Bn Cagliari	515
Cadet Bn Palermo	379
	47994

2817

Strength of the Leghorn nucleus is not available at this time.
The total strength, above of 47,994 includes 471 Carabinieri serving with troops.
Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 3041.

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b The brigades are further subdivided into Legions, the number of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the present, there are nine Legions namely: Abruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the Legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organized.

c Each Legion is sub-divided into progressively small units: Groups, Companies, Detachments, Sections and Stations. The subdivision of Group corresponds to that of Province.

2 The present strength is indicated as follows as of 1st August:

Gen HQ	128
Abruzzi Legion	2502
Bari Legion	4564
Cagliari Legion	4053
Catanzaro Legion	2797
Lazio Legion	4445
Messina Legion	3546
Napoli Legion	5726
Rome Legion	4622
Palermo Legion	4764
Replacement Centre, Naples	255
Replacement Centre, Bari	301
Replacement Centre, Rome	3013
Nucleus for the Activation of Florence Legion	300
Nucleus for the Activation of Leghorn Legion	100
Scuola Di Bari	201
Cadet Di Aosta	728
Cadet Di Benedetto	514
Cadet Di Caltanissetta	499
Cadet Di Cagliari	515
Cadet Di Palermo	372
	47951

Strength of the Leghorn nucleus is not available at this time.
The total strength shown of 41,893 includes all Carabinieri serving with troops.
Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 3461.

3 Future Organization.

It is planned that the future organization on the basis of an authorized strength of 65,000 will be approximately as indicated below. Allowance of course must be made for developments which might warrant an increase in strength in a particular area.

Strength of CC.RR for all of Italy
based on a ceiling of 65,000

Torino	4211
Alessandria	2924
Genova	4795
Livorno	2563
Milano	5212
Verona	2814

/Bolzano

2817

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782046

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Bolzano	2715
Belluno	2618
Trieste	3986
Bologna	3885
[illegible]	3004
Abruzzi	2094
[illegible]	2134
Pavia	2487
Lucca	2432
[illegible]	3[illegible]
Bari	262[illegible]
Catanzaro	2057
Palermo	2670
Messina	2105
Comando Generale	84
Inspectorate of Brigades	30
Central School	158
Cadet Legion	3960
Demo Battalion	1300
Palermo Bn	500
Squadron Groups	300
Band	80
King's Guards	90
	65000

2816

02901

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

See 26A Ltr 1460/53/K.

72A

SECRET

Draft

See 70A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

AAI/14672/28

4 Sep 44

STUDENT : Carabinieri Recall.

TO : Commanding General, A.A.I. 1660

Reference 1660/50/14/5 (AMI), dated 13 Aug 44

1. A memorandum, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under separate cover.

2. However, since my letter to you of August 1, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the GUSTAV - GOTHIC line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.

3. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43954 men. A ceiling of 59000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian army is short at least 11000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the A.A.I. be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Recall. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the CCRR to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.

4. Furthermore if no CCRR are found in the North it may be necessary to go further and ask that in order to make up the balance of 23000 which in my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the North (See my A/CC 04643 of 4 Aug paras 5,6), part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCRR to work with them on police duties. Such an attachment has been arranged for Sicily in connection with the grain system and is working well.

2315

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

3. This commission is still of the view that a Constabulary strength of 65000 is necessary. The most immediate need set forth in my letter of August 1. But since the prospect of reaching the Japanese authorized ceiling is made impossible by the action of the Congress, it is urgently requested that favorable consideration be given to the personnel ceiling above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered.

For the Commander in Chief:

HARRY T. SCOTT
Capt. USN
Acting Chief of Staff
United Central Commission

Copy to ATIS Declassification

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

Draft

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

31 August 1944

ACC/14622/FS

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Commanding General, A.A.I.

Reference 1605/50/44/G(AMI). dated 13 Aug 44

1. A communication, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under seperate cover.

2. However, since my letter to you of August 1, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it is reliably reported that 14000 of the Carabinieri north of the PISA - RIMINI line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.

3. Briefly, the story of the employment of the Carabinieri may be divided into three phases in connection with the Italian campaign:-

2313

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

a) In the early stages of the occupation of Italy, Carabinieri had generally been permitted by the Germans to remain on duty and thus were available for service under AMG control.

b) In the spring of 1944, when the Allied advance was held up at Cassino, the Germans disbanded all Carabinieri to the north. It thereupon became necessary, with the resumption of the advance, to establish replacement pools to which the disbanded Carabinieri reported, and where they were screened and reequipped, insofar as Italian military stores permitted, and returned to duty in areas liberated.

c) The third phase is the present one, when Carabinieri not only have been disbanded, but, we are informed, removed to Germany.

~~3. As pointed out in para 5 of A/CC 014.13 dated 1 Dec 43 it is suggested therefore that CCRR are needed North of the Rome - Pisa line - It is suggested therefore~~

~~3. At this moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri~~ is 43954 men. A ceiling of 55000 is authorized. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian army is short at least ~~12 000 men. It is accordingly proposed~~ that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the M.M.I.A. be authorised to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Reali. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class.

This would fill up the CCRR & its are presently authorised is 23412 + would form a nucleus for -2- policing the hinth.

and for the above reasons it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5. This commission is still of the view that a Carabinieri strength of 65000 is necessary. The need therefor was set forth in my letter of August 1. But since the prospect of reaching the present authorized ceiling is made impossible by the action of the Germans, it is urgently requested that favorable consideration be given to the proposal made above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered.

HILBERY W. STONE
Capt. U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission.

4 Furthermore if no CCRR are found in the hotel it may be necessary to go further afield that in ordered to make up the balance of 23000 which in this my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the hotels (see my AFC 014.13 of 4 Aug para 5, 6) part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCRR to work with them on police duties. ~~This has now is working well in Sicily~~ 2311 Such an attachment has been arranged in Sicily in connection with the grain system & is working well.

Copy to AFHQ Italian Sec

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622
7.A

Population of United Kingdom 44,500,000
Number of Police 68,719

1 Policeman per 660 population.

Population of London 8,000,000
Number of Police 21,729

1 Policeman per 368 population.

Population of Italy 43,606,000
Number of Carabinieri 55,000

1 Carabinieri per 792 population.

(Liberated Italy - 43,954 Carabinieri).

Population of Rome 1,200,000
Number of Carabinieri 4,437

1 Carabinieri per 270 population.

This ignores Finance and Forestry Guards, etc.

The Italian figures are not reliable as the population of liberated Italy is not known.

C.

SECRET

SECRET

40 A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

31 August 1944

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Commanding General, Allied Armies in Italy.

Reference your 1605/50/44/3(SDI) 66c

1. In compliance with paragraph 4 of the above letter, the following information is submitted:-

A)i. Present Organization.

The present organization of the Carabinieri consists of a General Headquarters at Rome; two divisions (2nd and 3rd) with Hqs. at Rome and Naples, respectively. Each division normally consists of two brigades. Thus far 3 brigades have been activated:- Rome, Naples and Palermo. A fourth brigade will soon be activated at Florence. Eventually the 1st Division will be reactivated with Hqs at Milan.

ii. The brigades are sub-divided into Legions, the strength of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the moment, there are nine Legions namely: Abbruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the Legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organized.

iii. Each Legion is sub-divided into progressively smaller units: Groups, Companies, Lieutenencies, Sections and Stations. The jurisdiction of Group corresponds to that of Province.

B)i. The present strength is indicated as follows:
as of 1st August

Gen. Hq.	129
Abbruzzi Legion	2502
Bari Legion	4564
Cagliari Legion	4053
Catanzaro Legion	2797

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Reference your 1605/50/44/G(SDI)

1. In compliance with paragraph 4 of the above letter, the following information is submitted:-

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ii. The brigades are sub-divided into legions, the strength of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the moment, there are nine legions namely: Abbruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the Legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organized.

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as of 1st August

Gen. Hq.	129
Abbruzzi Legion	2502
Bari Legion	4564
Cagliari Legion	4053
Catanzaro Legion	2797
Lazio Legion	4446
Messina Legion	3546
Napoli Legion	5726
Rome Legion	4602
Palermo Legion	4064
Replacement Centre Naples	255
Replacement Centre Bari	381
Replacement Centre Rome	3013

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Nucleus for the activation of Florence Legion	300
Nucleus for the activation of Livorno Legion	100
NCO's Bn.Bari	231
Cadet Bn.Andria	728
Cadet Bn.Barletta	514
" " Gallipoli	409
" " Cagliari	515
" " Palermo	379
	43954

Strength of the Livorno nucleus is not available at this time.
The total strength shown of 41,892 includes all carabinieri serving with troops.
Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 2011.

ii. Locations of units are shown on attached map.

c)1. Future Organization

It is planned that the future organization on the basis of an authorized strength of 55,000 will be approximately as indicated below. Allowance of course must be made for developments which might warrant an increase in strength in a particular area.

Strength of CC.RR for all of Italy based on a Ceiling of 55,000.

Torino	2211
Alleasandria	2044
Genova	2793
Livorno	2043
Milano	3289
Verona	1744
[illegible]	[illegible]
Padova	2198
Trieste	2756
Bologna	2785
Firenze	2501
Abruzzi	2094
Cagliari	2134
Roma	2487
Lazio	2432
[illegible]	[illegible]

2908

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Strength of the Livorno nucleus is not available at this time.
The total strength shown of 41,892 includes all carabinieri serving with troops.
Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 3011.

ii. Locations of units are shown on attached map.

C)t. Future Organization

It is planned that the future organization on the basis of an authorized strength of 55,000 will be approximately as indicated below. Allowance of course must be made for developments which might warrant an increase in strength in a particular area.

Strength of 53,32 for all of Italy Based on a Ceiling of 55,000.

Torino	2211
Alleasandria	2044
Genova	2793
Livorno	2043
Milano	3289
Verona	1744
Padova	2193
Trieste	2756
Bologna	2783
Firenze	2591
Abbruzzi	2094
Cagliari	2134
Roma	2487
Lazio	2432
Napoli	3220
Bari	2540
Catanzaro	2037
Palermo	2870
Messina	2106

: 2808

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Comando Generale	
Inspectorates of Brigades	30
Central School	158
Cadet Legion	3960
Rome Battalion	1200
Palermo Battalion	500
Squadron Groups	300
Band	80
King's Guard	90
Total	55000

2. With respect to the suggestions made in paragraph 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". The only maintenance provided to the Carabinieri by the Allies are rations, some petrol, and some occasional items of clothing. Each of these will be dealt with briefly insofar as they bear upon the question of maintenance:-

Rations.

The Carabinieri draw rations on the Italian Army scale through the Italian Army. These rations are in part supplied by the Allies. All civilians in Italy are supplied with rations from Allies sources on varying scales according to the work they are performing. Presumably it is not disputed that the Carabinieri are entitled to rations on the Italian Army scale both by reason of their duties and of the fact that they are the senior element of the Italian Army. It should not be overlooked that police in this country are continually exposed to the temptation of corruption, and it would be imprudent to give inadequate rations to men expected to enforce black market regulations, amongst others.

Since the Allies are committed to supply supplementary rations to the Carabinieri there seems to be little point in dislocating the existing machinery of supplying them through the Italian Army.

Petrol.

Petrol for any purpose can only be obtained from the Allies as an ultimate source. "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" will still draw their petrol from the Allies.

Clothing and Equipment.

Clothing received from Allies sources from the time of

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Total 39630

2. With respect to the suggestions made in paragraph 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". The only maintenance provided to the Carabinieri by the Allies are rations, some petrol, and some occasional items of clothing. Each of these will be dealt with briefly insofar as they bear upon the question of maintenance:-

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Since the Allies are committed to supply supplementary rations to the Carabinieri there seems to be little point in dislocating the existing machinery of supplying them through the Italian Army.

Petrol.

Petrol for any purpose can only be obtained from the Allies as an ultimate source. "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" will still draw their petrol from the Allies.

Clothing and Equipment.

Clothing received from Allied sources from the time of our occupation to the 10th of July 1944 amounts to:

11708	pairs of partly worn boots
608	pairs of trousers (battle dress)
508	blouses (battle dress)
168	belts
2196	cotton shirts
3042	pairs of cotton socks.

The vast majority of clothing, and all other equipment, for Carabinieri come from Italian Army sources.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

It will be seen, therefore, that the distinction between "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" means little in substance.

3. The following observations are offered regarding the specific suggestions made in paragraph 3 of your letter.

D)i. Formation of separate corps of Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia.

Separate Carabinieri Brigades exist in Sicily and Sardinia. If it proposed that these Brigades should be treated differently from other Brigades in the matter of rations and supplies this Commission advises most strongly against any such discrimination, which would be fatal to the "esprit de corps" of the Carabinieri.

From the political standpoint any proposal to divorce Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia from Carabinieri on the mainland would almost certainly be taken as a sign of encouragement by the "Separatist" parties.

It is pointed out that this proposal will do nothing to reduce the Carabinieri ceiling.

ii. Transfer of Carabinieri to Finance Guards.

It will be appreciated that the functions of the Carabinieri are entirely different from those of the Finance Guards who, under the control of the Ministry of Finance, are mainly engaged in enforcing revenue laws. This is specialised work for which the Carabinieri are not trained. Carabinieri duties, on the other hand, are quite outside the experience of the Finance Guards. Further the method and standards of selection and recruitment are different.

iii. Handing back of Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

As already pointed out in paragraph 2 above, for all administrative purposes the Carabinieri are under the control of the Italian Government. It is true that in Military Government territory, A.C.C. Public Safety Officers supervise the duties of the Carabinieri, but the functions and organisation remain unchanged. In fact, territory can be handed back to the Italian Government without the necessity of making any changes whatever in Carabinieri organisation and administration. Rations, petrol, clothing and supplies are unaffected by the assumption of control by the Italian Government.

2506

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782016

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Again this proposal will not have the effect of reducing the Carabinieri strength.

4. It appears that the purpose of the proposed changes is to limit the amount of food and equipment to be supplied from Allied sources. In this connection it is our view that fundamental changes in the organization of the Italian police ought not to be made merely because of a temporary shortage of supplies. The organization of the Italian Police forces is complex, affecting numerous Government Departments and civilian agencies. This Commission is not charged with the task of making constitutional changes in Italian national Institutions, which is a matter for the Italian Government.

2806

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 798016

In general it must be emphasized that the Carabinieri is part of the Italian Army with proud traditions and high morale. Any attempt to break up the Carabinieri at this stage would be disastrous to a body which has already done much to aid the Allied Cause and whose services are still essential to the War effort in Italy.

5. Enclosed is a map showing the territorial divisions of the Royal Carabinieri and also a brief booklet entitled "News About the Royal Carabinieri" which may prove of general interest.

KLIBERT P. STONE,
Capt. U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission.

F 2805

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14622

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INTER OFFICE MEMO

EWS/dfe

69 PS.

From: Acting Chief Commissioner

26 AUG 1944

SUBJECT: Strength of Carabinieri

FILE No. 15

TO: Acting Head, Administrative Section

26 August 1944

I think it is of the greatest importance, both in the administration of Italy and as tactics to secure upward revision of the authorized strength of the Carabinieri to 65,000 as the Public Safety Sub-Commission recommends, to recruit to fill immediately the vacancies between the present actual strength of 42,000 and the present authorized strength of 55,000.

Kindly let me have your report on this at the Vice Presidents' Meeting on August 28th.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

2804
838.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

B/F on 1462/ Pt 6&7

15 Aug 1977

To: Public Safety

6&C

Please prepare suitable draft for signature of Actg Chief Commissioner for Para 3 GAI letter, ACTING HEAD and return to [redacted] Admin Sec as soon as possible.

DAT Town Clk
for Actg Head Admin Sec

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INTER OFFICE MEMO

EWS/dfe

From: Acting Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Italian Carabinieri

FILE No. A/CC 014.13

TO: Acting Head, Administrative Section 15 August 1944

1. Reference is AAI's letter 1605/50/44/G(SD1) of 13 August attached hereto.

2. Forwarded for action.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl.
AAI ltr (see para 1 above)

2802

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

SUBJECT:- Italian Carabinieri

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.
1605/50/44/G(SD1)

13 Aug 44

ACC

Ref your A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug 44.

1. It will be appreciated that the manpower ceiling for the Italian Army, of which the Carabinieri form part, has been reduced and that it is essential, therefore, that the reduced number pay the best dividend in the interest of the war effort as a whole.

2. It is regretted that approval to hold personnel in excess of 55,000 and to pay such personnel a ration allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, petrol etc all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of:-

(a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.

(b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

4. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing :-

(a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri

(b) present strengths and location of all units and detachments

(c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of Italy.

This information will serve as a basis for further examination of the problem.

/s/

for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

Copy to:- MMIA, MA to CGS, MA to CAO, DCAO
G(Ops), A, Q

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
A.C.C.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
REGION VI.

PS/1515 3 August 1944.

SUBJECT: CC.RR. Strength in Sardinia.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission.

Reference your Cable NR 1129 of July 29/1730B.

1. Further to my Cable NR 590 of August 01/1000B, the following information is submitted.

2. The proposed further reduction of CC.RR. strength in Sardinia has been discussed with the CC.RR. Commanding Officer for Sardinia and Allied Garrison Headquarters. The above concur with my recommendation that any reduction in CC.RR. strength would not be advisable due to the prevalence of crimes of violence in the rural districts of the island and lack of adequate transport facilities for Police Agencies.

3. Present strength and allocation of the Carabinieri follows:

Assigned as railway guards in substitution of the dissolved Railway Militia	75
Assigned to Ispettorato Industria e Lavoro	11
Traffic and Road Block control	140
Assigned to Allied Commands for special duties .	203
Total Carabinieri performing special duties	429
Total Strength	3112
Available for regular Police functions	2683

4. The ratio of Carabinieri to inhabitants is one to 500 or one Carabiniere per 10 square kilometers of territory.

5. 1350 Carabinieri have already been transferred to the mainland and the CC.RR. Command has informed me that instructions have been received to hold an additional 250 men in readiness for shipment.

(H) M Carr Ryder.
Regional Commissioner
A.C.C. Region 6.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Sent number ref UU23 file 11012/3 -19

	REGIONS	PROVINCES	ORGANIC STRENGTH				PRESENT S		
			Off.	N.C.O.	Privates	TOTAL	Off.	N.C.O.	
I	Sicilia	Caltanisetta - Catania - Enna - Messina - Ragusa - Siracusa - Trapani - Agrigento - Palermo	66	621	1894	2581	41	523	
II	Puglie - Lucania (exc.prov.of Foggia)	Bari - Brindisi - Ionio(Taranto) - Lecce - Matera - Potenza	37	270	891	1198	23	354	
III	Campania	Benevento - Napoli - Salerno - Avellino	50	436	1555	2041	59	542	
IV	Lazio - Umbria	Frosinone - Littoria - Rieti - Roma - Viterbo - Perugia - Terni	123	588	2745	3456			
1) V	Abruzzi - Molise Marche (inc.prov. of Foggia)	L'Aquila degli Abruzzi - Campobasso - Chieti Pescara - Teramo - Ancona - Ascoli Piceno - Macerata - Pesaro & Urbino - Foggia	41	285	792	1118	6	44	
VI	Sardegna	Cagliari - Nuoro - Sassari	26	180	476	682	26	176	
VII	Calabria	Catanzaro - Cosenza - Reggio di Calabria	14	139	436	583	14	134	
VIII	Toscana	Arezzo - Firenze - Grosseto - Livorno - Lucca Apuania(Massa & Carrara) - Pisa - Pistoia - Siena	39	278	862	1179			
IX	Emilia	Bologna - Ferrara - Forli - Modena - Parma - Piacenza - Ravenna - Reggio nell'Emilia.	25	160	556	741			
X	Liguria & Piemonte	Genova - Imperia - La Spezia - Savona - Alessandria - Aosta - Asti - Cuneo - Novara - Torino - Vercelli.	96	891	2762	3749			
XI	Lombardia	Bergamo - Brescia - Como - Cremona - Mantova - Milano - Pavia - Sondrio - Varese.	88	724	2519	3331			
XII	Venezia Tridentina - Veneto & Venezia Giulia.	Bolzano - Trento - Belluno - Friuli (Udine) - Padova - Rovigo - Treviso - Venezia - Verona Vicenza - Carnaro (Fiume - Gorizia - Istria (Pola) - Trieste.	171	1591	6074	7836			
		TOTAL	776	6157	21562	28495			

Rome, 25 July, 1944.

COMMANDING GENERAL
O.Morisco.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Allied Commission Ref. AWX2 file AV012/3 -18A 14622.

6AA

PROVINCES	ORGANIC STRENGTH				PRESENT STRENGTH 1)				REMARKS
	Off.	N.C.O.	Privates	TOTAL	Off.	N.C.O.	Pvts.	TOTAL	
...isetta - Catania - Enna - Messina - ... - Siracusa - Trapani - Agrigento - ...no	66	621	1894	2581	43	523	1626	2190	1) The present strength includes only Sicily, Sardinia and peninsula up to Castiglione since we do not have the necessary data for the rest of liberated territory. The total strength for the regions indicated above : Officers.... 179 N.C.O's..... 1773 Privates.... 5633 Total 7585
... Brindisi - Ionio(Taranto) - Lecce- ... - Potenza	37	270	891	1198	25	354	1112	1499	
...nto - Napoli - Salerno - Avellino	50	436	1555	2041	59	542	1769	2364	
...one - Littoria - Rieti - Roma - Viterbo - Perugia - Terni	123	588	2745	3456					
...ia degli Abruzzi - Campobasso - Chieti ... - Teramo - Ancona - Ascoli Piceno - ...ba - Pesaro & Urbino - Foggia	41	285	792	1118	6	44	211	261	
...ri - Nuoro - Sassari	26	180	476	682	26	176	378	580	
...aro - Cosenza - Reggio di Calabria	14	139	436	583	14	134	543	691	
... - Firenze - Grosseto - Livorno - Lucca ...ia(Massa & Carrara) - Pisa - Pistoia -	39	278	862	1179					2) For reasons indicated above, the strength returns for Reg.V include only the Province of Foggia.
... - Ferrara - Forli - Modena - Parma - ...za - Ravenna - Reggio nell'Emilia.	25	160	556	741					
... - Imperia - La Spezia - Savona - Ales- ... - Aosta - Asti - Cuneo - Novara - ... - Vercelli.	96	891	2762	3749					3) The present strength in the city of Rome up to July 23.1944 is as follows : Officers..... 179 N.C.O's ..... 680 Privates..... 2656 Total 3515
...o - Brescia - Como - Cremona - Mantova - ... - Pavia - Sondrio - Varese.	88	724	2519	3331					
...o - Tronto - Belluno - Friuli (Udine) - ... - Rovigo - Treviso - Venezia - Verona ... - Carnaro (Fiume - Gorizia - Istria ... - Trieste.	171	1591	6074	7836					includes "R" Bn.i.e. 3 officers - 6 NCOs and 134 Pvts. stationed at "Lido di Roma", who are however, included in the 3515 total strength.
TOTAL	776	6157	21562	28495					

Rome, 25 July, 1944. COMMANDING GENERAL
O.Moricca.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

Administrative Section

EIB/dfo 14/22

1 August 1944

A/CC 014.13

Subject: Strength of Carabinieri Reali

To: Hq, AAI

ZA-6A refer.

1. By signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July, the following information was received:

> "MENTIONED (.) spoke [illegible] Reales (.) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 Jun and recommended subsequently to APWA total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed fifty-five thousand (.) 1605/90/3/8 (SDI) of 19 Jun refers."

The office of origin was Main AAI: the addressee was MMIA.

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, nor within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CCAS nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of ACC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ASC organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

a. The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.

b. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 65,000, exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

c. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,300.

d. In addition to the foregoing, the following additional [illegible] incident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the

2798

SECRET

6 3 1 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali:

(1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.

(2) Dealing with refugees.

(3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.

(4) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilians and troops.

(5) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.

(6) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.

(7) Enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

e. The uncertain state of public discipline, following in the wake of war and the overthrow of the Fascist government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrants a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions.

f. Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

4. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jun is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is admitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

a. that the ration ceiling be lifted, or if that is impossible,

b. that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5. In the opinion of the Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of ration, but in view of the actual requirements of the situation as it exists, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 61,892, making maximum use of

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA-RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is widely populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6. If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA-RIMINI line, i.e., the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 5 of this letter, this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

7. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

ELIOT B. ROSS
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5, AFHQ
Admin. Sec. ✓
Files A-B

Hq A.C.C. Secty Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date - Time 3 Aug 1020
Via AG / M/C
Initials [illegible]

2796

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

TO

ACTION

HEADQUARTERS
2 AUG 1944
A. C. C.

ACC MAIN

41/01

ACC REGION 6

SECRET
PRIORITY
CITE ACC 035

AUG 011641B

REFERENCE YOUR CABLE 1129 DATED 29 JULY. YOUR 749 OF 20 JULY CANNOT BE TRACED. DUE TO PREVALENCE CRIMES OF VIOLENCE IN RURAL DISTRICTS DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY FURTHER REDUCTION CC RR STRENGTH HERE. 1220 CC RR HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED.

DIST

ACTION - P Safety 2
INFO - A/CC
FILE 2
FLOAT

2795

SECRET

AUG 0121368

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

61A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

ACC/14622/PS. 1 Aug 44.

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri Reali.

To : Acting Chief Commissioner.

61B

Attached for your consideration is a revised draft of a proposed letter to HQ AAI, on the above mentioned subject.

C-in-C

G.R. UPJOHN Col,
A/HQ Admin Sec.

2794

618

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
OFFICE OF ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER
APO 394

SECRET

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri Reali — Jul 44.

TO : Headquarters, AAI.

1 By signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 Jul, the following information was received :-

"RESTRICTED (.) spoke HAMPDEN WOQUEEN (.) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 JUN and recommended subsequently to AFHQ total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed FIFTY FIVE thousand (.) 1605/50/3/G (SDI) of 19 JUN refers"

The office of origin was Main AAI; the addressee was MAIB.

2 The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CCRR nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of AFHQ at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ACC organisation.

3 The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited :-

(1) The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.
(2) The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshall Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorised strength.
(3) Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,300.
(4) In addition to the foregoing, the following duties, coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali :-

a) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.
b) Dealing with refugees.
c) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by Allied Nations.
d) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilian and troops.
e) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
f) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce

2793

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

1 By signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 Jul, the following information was received :-

"REGTHICPED (.) spoke HAMPDEN MCQUEEN (.) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 JUN and recommended subsequently to AFHQ total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed FIFTY FIVE thousand (.) 1605/50/3/G (SDI) of 19 JUN refers"

The office of origin was Main AAI; the addressee was MMLA.

2 The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CCRM nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of ACC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ACC organisation.

3 The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited :-

(1) The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.
(2) The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshall Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 65,300 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorised strength.
(3) Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,300.
(4) In addition to the foregoing, the following duties, coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali :-

a) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control lines and at other critical points.
b) Dealing with refugees.
c) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by Allied Nations.
d) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilian and troops.
e) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
f) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
g) Enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

(5) The uncertain state of public discipline, naturally following in the wake of War and the overthrow of the government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, certainly warrants a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peace time conditions.
(6) Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a most probable prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

2793

..... s/-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

4 Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jun is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is submitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure absolutely imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling then it is suggested -

a) that the ration ceiling be lifted, or, if that is impossible,
b) that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorised a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5 In the opinion of the Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situation as it really is, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabiniari Reali, namely 41,892, making maximum use of the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA - RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabiniari Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organisation of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6 If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA -RIMINI line i.e. the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 3 of this letter this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

7 It is the considered judgement of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

HILDEY W. STONE,
Captain USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

2792

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783016

03206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

60A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
AFO 394

Tel.489081
Ext.489

31 July, 1944

Memo to: Acting V.P.Admin.Section.
(Col. Upjohn).

See 58A

1. It is perfectly agreeable to me that paragraph 5 be omitted from the letter. It is, as I stated, not addressed to the merits of the case. At our conference Capt. Stone seemed to attach considerable importance to these collateral matters, and for that reason alone was reference made to them.

2. As to the authority for the statement made in the last paragraph, I do not now have access to the original source material bearing the imprimatur of the C.C.S. I know it to be a fact, however, and in support thereof cite the AMGOT Bible, viz:-

a) page 84, par.1. "The governments of the United States and Great Britain have agreed upon basic policies to be adopted by Allied Forces, including AMGOT, in the treatment of the civil population, Fascist institutions and other political matters. The agreements have been communicated to the C in C of the Allied Forces through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the form of agreed directives. The following instructions are based upon these directives. They are for your general guidance. Your attitude toward the officials and toward the civil population will be governed thereby. Any action not specifically provided for and which may have to be taken on the spot will be within the framework of these principles. In matters of doubt and all important questions, you should consult with your unit commander and with the S.C.A.O., if he is available.

2791

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b) page 6, para (22):-"The civil police will be organized on the basis to the Carabinieri, augmented by such other police organizations as may be considered reliable."

c) page 94, par 1 (1):- "CAPO's must not rely on the possibility of obtaining detachments of Occupational Police Battalions to aid them in carrying out their duties of maintaining law and order as such detachments will not be available."

d) page 95, par 6:-"Policy regarding use of local police organizations. As stated in the plan, it is planned to make use of the Carabinieri as a basis for the civil police forces in the initial period"

3. It is considered that the foregoing constitutes sufficient authority to sustain the statement made.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

PGK/hcd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

594

10. P.S.

Re: attached.

See report of A.V.P.

at foot of GP paper

ACC/14622/RS. dtd 28 JUL 44

Jams early remarks &

suggested plan

R.M. Hayes

CL

30 JUL 44.

0323

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

58A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

HQ ACC, APO 394
28 Sec'y Gen.
Rec'd 29 July 1944
By DPR.

ACC/14622/PS

28 July 1944

SUBJECT: Strength of Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

57A

1. Attached for your consideration is a draft of a proposed letter to HQ. AAI., on the above mentioned subject.

2. I discussed the draft with Col. Spofford who took a copy with him for his own information and it was his view that the letter should be sent in the first place to HQ. AAI, and if and when our recommendation is turned down we can approach AFHQ direct.

G.R. Upjohn
G.R. UPJOHN,
Colonel,
A/Head Admin Sec.

To P.S. (for CA Kirke)

1. I have attached discussed attd draft with Capt Stone.
2. He thinks it is too long & rather repetitious & has suggested the amendments which I have made below.
3. Please let me have your comments on revised draft.

2789

Upjohn

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

57A

D R A F T

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
OFFICE OF ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER
APO 394

SECRET

29 July 1944

~~ACC/14622/-S~~

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Headquarters, AAI.

1. By signal dated 22 July 1944, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July the following information was received:-

"RESTRICTED (.) spoke HAMPDEN McQUEEN (.) as decided at meeting of 1430 hrs 17 JUN and recommended subsequently to AFHQ total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed FIFTY FIVE thousand (.) 1605/50/3/G(SII) of 19 JUN refers"

The office of origin was Main AAI; the addressee was MMIA.

2. The agreement referred to on 17 June at AAI Hq. was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this HQ. are charged with responsibility for the CCRR nor by any one on its behalf. The only representation of ACC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ACC organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength for all of Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:-

(1) The normal peace-time strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.
(2) The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by decree dated 25 July 1943 was 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.
(3) Since the occupation of Italy by the AlliedArmies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,300.
(4) In addition to the foregoing, the following duties, coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali:-

a) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.
b) Dealing with refugees.
c) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.
d) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilian and troops.

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e) Apprehending prostitutes in the effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
f) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
g) Enforcing harvesting regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

(5) The uncertain state of public discipline, naturally following in the wake of war and the overthrow of the government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, certainly warrents a substential increase over the strength provided for normal peace-time conditions.
(6) Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

4. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 June is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peace-time figure, then it is submitted the change of circumstances recited in paragraph 3 above make an upward revision of the figure absolutely imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling then it is suggested -

a) that the ration ceiling be lifted, or, if that is impossible,
b) that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorised a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5. By way of background, it may be worth mentioning that on April 3 1944 an estimate of the number of rations from Allied sources required for Carabinieri Reali and Guardia di Finanza up to the PISA - RIMINI line was 60,000. This estimate was given to AAI. It was certainly not offered as, nor received as, an estimate of the aggregate strength of the two organizations for all of Italy, nor for their strength south of the PISA - RIMINI line since some elements of the two organizations, because of their locations, received cash allowances in lieu of military rations.

The figure 60,000, based upon many variable, almost incalculable factors, was submitted as the estimated number of rations desired from Allied sources up to the line named. AFHQ reduced this estimate, and the ration ceiling to the PISA - RIMINI line was fixed at 55,000. This ration ceiling has now for both organisations, been reached. If it had remained at 60,000 it would almost have been reached, just as the PISA - RIMINI line has almost been reached. It is submitted that the long-range estimate, made for ration purposes only, was substantially correct.

However, it has now been arranged that the Guardia di Finanza, not being a part of the Italian Army, will as of 31 July 1944 cease to draw army rations. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali as of 1 July 1944 is 41,892 which brings it well ~~within the ceiling now fixed~~.

6. In the opinion of the Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situation as it really is, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 41,892 making maximum use of the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA - RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali

/were

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has long been under German domination. The existing police forces will have to be purged or perhaps disbanded. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

7. If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA - RIMINI line i.e. the normal peace-time strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in paragraph 3 this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

8. Finally, it is reiterated, that whatever factors may enter into a revision of the strength of the Italian Army as a whole the incontrovertible fact is that the Carabinieri Reali, as an integral part of that army, has a definite mission of continuing and growing importance. That mission, the maintenance of public order, was prescribed for it by the Combined Chiefs of Staff ⊙, who stated that occupational military Police Battalions would not be available for the purpose. That mission cannot be performed unless adequate personnel and means are made available. It is the considered judgement of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

⊙ Please cite your authority for this statement.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain U.S.N.R.
Acting Chief Commissioner

0327

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

55A

(2)

40A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Milizia Stradale (A3)	1600
Milizia portuale	3300
Milizia Ferroviaria	12000

MMIA state these are the latest figures available - 1943 - They are accurate within 20 or 30 men. It is not thought that they were increased to any extent after 1943

A.F.Wilcox, Lt.Col.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

To: Public Safety Sub/Com
Fm: CA Sub Ctr

Attached copies forwarded
for your information

0330

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

L

14622 52A

TO: HQ, ACC.

FROM: HQ, Region 5, AMG.

SUBJECT: CC.RR.

REF: R5/514/8

DATE: 27 JULY 44

40A

1. Reference your signal 749 Secret dated 20 Jul, we suggest the following disposition of CC.RR. in Region 5:-

Campobasso: - To revert to peacetime strength forthwith.

Chieti — Peacetime strength plus 10% until further notice. There are still a considerable number of cases of possession of W.D. property and it is suggested that the above strength is maintained until these cases show a considerable decrease.

Pescara - Peacetime strength plus 10% for another month and then return to peacetime strength. W.D. property is the difficulty here.

Teramo, Ascoli - Same as for Pescara. There is still an amount of rounding up of army from Patriots to be done here. W.D. property does not come into the picture in these two Provinces.

Macerata, Ancona, Pesaro - These three Provinces are at present under A.M.G. Eighth Army, but it is thought that they should be peacetime strength plus 10% for two months after being handed over to Region 5, could then revert to peacetime strength.

2. It is regretted that this report is late but the delay has been caused by the change of Regional HQ.

For the Regional Commissioner.

2783

S. PICKERING,
Lt. Colonel,
Regional Public Safety Officer.

SP/prl

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5/A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
ROME REGION
APO 394

OUTGOING MESSAGE

REF NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DATE: 27 JULY 1944

TIME DATE: _____ PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

ORIGINATING SECTION: Hqs Rome Region APPROVED: _____

TO: ACC HQ FROM ROME REGION FOR POLETTI

Same as 48A

draft

REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE TWO ZERO JULY PD PEACETIME STRENGTH CC.RR. ROME SIX FIVE ZERO ZERO PD PAREN TO ABLE CHARLIE CHARLIE HEADQUARTERS FROM ABLE MINE GEORGE ROME REGION FOR POLETTI PAREN PRESENT STRENGTH FOUR ZERO ZERO ZERO PD MINIMUM REQUIRED NOW FOUR FIVE ZERO ZERO PD NONE CAN BE SPARED

0332

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CMG/day

50A

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
Allied Control Commission
A P O 394

TO : HQ. A.C.C., (R.C. & M.G. Section) 27 July 1944

SUBJECT: Strength of C.C.R.R.

FILE No: R4/230.145

40A

1. Reference your signal 20 July 1944.

2. The considered opinion of the Public Safety Division of Region IV is that the ceiling now set for Carabinieri is too low and should be raised to enable normal establishments to be maintained. It is suggested that an additional ten per-cent over normal establishment should be made to cover extra duties which formerly came under the jurisdiction of other police bodies which now are no longer in existence.

3. Many Carabinieri are reporting in to Lazio Region headquarters from hiding in the hills. The rapid screening and equiping of these men would aid materially in solving the problem of personnel.

Carl H. Lewis
Lt. Col.
for Regional Commissioner

Copy for Public Safety Sub Comm

2781

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

P - Safety
0-1708
14632/25
6v764PA

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
ROME REGION
APO 394

27 July 1944

E/4003

SUBJECT: CC.RR for the North.

TO : Regional Control and Military Government Section
Headquarters
Allied Control Commission.

Reference your message dated 20 July 1944 and this Headquarters message dated 27 July 1944.

1. The strength of CC.RR in Rome prior to the war was 6,500. Prior to our occupation of Rome on 5 June 1944 the CC.RR had been disbanded by the Germans, and we brought in from the South 1,985 CC.RR officers and men. Since 5 June 1944 we have recruited and brought into service 2,032 CC.RR officers and men in addition to those mentioned above. This makes a total strength of just over 4,000 on active duty in Rome Region.

2. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that a minimum of 4,500 officers and men is necessary.

3. Of the 4,000 CC.RR mentioned above as on duty in Rome 600 are awaiting uniforms.

4. It is understood that at the present time in the neighbourhood of 1,500 CC.RR are at the training school at Via Legnano. Attached is a report by Lt Col. Perinetti in command of the CC.RR in Rome.

For The Regional Commissioner:

JOHN D. AMES
Lt Colonel G.S.C.
Executive Officer.

SECRET

LEGIONE TERRITORIALE DEI CARABINIERI REALI DI ROMA
UFFICIO COMANDO

498

MEMORANDUM

Rome, July 23rd, 1944

Informations asked by LT. COLONEL POLLOCK, Chief of Public Safety.

1) Carabinieri in Rome before the war ... about 6500
(Legione Territoriale dei CC.RR. di Roma)

2) Carabinieri that came from Naples ..... 29 officers
1956 n.c.officers and carabinieri

3) Carabinieri recruited in Rome for the Rome Legion 24 officers
2008 n.c.officers and carabinieri

4) Necessary for the duties in the Capital (excluding the duties at the Ministries and special duties at various istitutions -war,navy,aeronautica,SIM,etc. ... 4500

5) Militaries of the Rome Legion without uniform ... 665

6) Carabinieri missing ... about 500

7) How many can be appointed north :
a) From the Legion ... none
b) From the replacement centre at the training school, via Legnano ... 178 officers
1299 n.c.Officers and troop of whic only 91 have uniform and weap

This return refers to todays date 12 o'clock.

Il T.Colonello Comandante
(Carlo Perinetti)

2779

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

P. SAFETY 1788 48A 0-1910 14622

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
ROME REGION
APO 394

ACTION

HEADQUARTERS
28 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

REF NO.: _____ CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DATE: 27 JULY 1944

TIME DATE: _____ PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

ORIGINATING SECTION: Hqs Rome Region APPROVED: Gen

TO: ACC HQ FROM ROME REGION FOR POLETTI

40A

REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE TWO ZERO JULY PD PEACETIME STRENGTH CCRR ROME SIX FIVE ZERO ZERO PD /PAREN TO ABLE CHARLIE CHARLIE HEADQUARTERS FROM ABLE MIKE GEORGE ROME REGION FOR POLETTI PAREN/ PRESENT STRENGTH FOUR ZERO ZERO ZERO PD MINIMUM REQUIRED NOW FOUR FIVE ZERO ZERO PD NONE CAN BE SPARED

DIST

(ACC) R. Safety 1
(INF) ACC 1
Supply 1
2718 2
FLOAT 1

L-90450

0336

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

3336

619
4TA

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
REGION II

22 July 1944

REF : PS/38

SUBJECT: Strength of CC.RR.

TO : Executive Commissioner, R.C. & M.G. Section, APO 394.

See 40A

42A

Confirming telegram of this date, the enormous demands for vigilance in connection with collection, transportation, and distribution of grain, and other farm products, as well as maintenance of civil law and order in the Region which is now bursting with Allied Military Personnel and civilian personnel, making any reduction in Carabinieri in the Region - a dangerous procedure.

JOHN T. ZELLARS.
Col. Inf.
Regional Commissioner.

LEK/ar

Copy to Chief, Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1K622/PS

Partington

6192

46A

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. ARMY

In connection with this
letter see 164/174 of
14601/26

PS/3.1

24 July 1944

Sec 67A

SUBJECT: Strength of Royal Carabinieri.

TO : Adv. HQ., ACC., Public Safety Sub-Commission. ✓ 40A

1. Reference is made to your message Ref. No ACC.749 of 21st July, 1944, and my reply by cable on 22nd July 1944, on the subject of strength of the Royal Carabinieri. 41A

2. It seems incomprehensible that the present difficult juncture should be chosen to fix a ceiling and reduce the strength of Carabinieri. In my opinion this is a most unwise step and as far as I can see there seems no reason for it. It is considered that Regions might have been consulted before such a drastic course was taken.

3. For many reasons, some of which are given hereunder, and particularly having regard to the fact that the Legion has recently suffered a considerable reduction in providing Carabini-ri for forward areas, it is not possible to further reduce the existing strength without affecting efficiency.

4. The following figures of the Naples Legion (Naples, Avellino, Benevento, Salerno) may prove of interest and serve as a guide to fixing a new establishment :-

(a) Pre-war Establishment.

Officers		59
N.C.Os	863	
Corporals	406	
Carabinieri	1815	3084

(b) Present Strength (on paper)

Officers		139
N.C.Os	1713	
Corporals	621	
Carabinieri	6079	8413

2776

...../2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

(c) Actual numbers present for duty.

Officers		77
N.C.Os	923	
Corporals	453	
Carabinieri	3104	4480

The difference between (b) and (c) is accounted for by 62 officers and 3933 other ranks being absent on leave, without leave, sick and in hospital, on duty outside the Legion, etc.

(d) At the Central Replacement Pool.

Officers		13
N.C.Os	15	
CC.RR.	205	220

(e) Specially employed with the Allied Forces.

	Officers	N.C.Os	CC.RR.
Service at the Port of Naples	3	9	165
Railway Police Service	1	19	175
Control posts		2	28
Various (guarding Allied Food Warehouses, mixed patrols, service with C.I.C., refugees, etc.)	1	22	300
Total	5	52	668

Copy Authenticated

5. It will be seen, therefore, that the position now is :-

	Officers	Other Ranks
Employed on Ordinary duty	72	3760
Specially employed	5	720
Total	77	4480

6. I do not feel that the prewar Establishment, as at (a) of 4, can have any real bearing on the present requirements as conditions now are so fundamentally different. Neither do I think that much regard can be had to (b) as there are so many "dead" men included in the figures.

2775

7. The only figures on which a strength calculation can be made are those in (c) of numbers actually on duty (ordinary and special) to which of course would ~~shew~~ have to be added a percentage increase (of say one - third),

...../3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

to provide for ordinary and special leave, sickness and so forth, viz.

	Officers	N.C.Os	Corporals	CC.RR.
	77	923	453	3104
1/3rd increase	26	308	151	1035
	103	1231	604	4139

which I suggest should be the Establishment for the time being.

8. It has been found from experience that we are at present working on an absolute minimum and some of the reasons which can be advanced against any further reduction are :-

(a) Naples remains a Military Zone. This is due to its great importance in the common war effort.

(b) A large number of Carabinieri are being employed on special duty for the Allies.

(c) Notwithstanding orders to the contrary considerable numbers of vehicles are coming from Rome to collect food, and refugees from the South are coming back into the Region. CC.RR. have to be used to cope with these problems.

(d) A considerable number of CC.RR. have been taken from this Region for replacements for Rome and forward areas.

(e) The population of Naples increases rather than decreases.

(f) The Region abounds with troops and stores necessitating patrols in conjunction with Military Police to prevent larcenies, black market offences and so on.

(g) A number of CC.RR. are still employed with or by other Units of the Italian Army and notwithstanding many representations to Army Sub-Commission it has been found impossible to get them released.

(h) Constant demands are still received both from our own organisation and other Military, Naval and Air Force Services for temporary employment of CC.RR. on vital and urgent duty.

9. It might be mentioned that the Naples Legion consists of 60 Officers' Headquarters and 376 Stations.

2774

C.T. FRANCIS
Lieut. Colonel, C.L.,
Regional Public Safety Officer.

CTF/tp.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

14627 45A

RCs REGIO II,III,IV,V,VI,VIII AND SCACS F E AND EIGHT ARMIES

ACC HQ ADMIN SEC

SECRET

850

PRIORITY

23

ADMIN SEC.

RECENT PRESS STATEMENTS INDICATING DISSOLUTION OF ITALIAN POLICE FORCES CAN BE OFFICIALLY DENIED CMA SUBJECT IS NOT BEING ACCURATELY REPORTED FD FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FOR YOU ONLY FD PAREN TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS REGIONS TWO CMA THREE CMA FOUR CMA FIVE CMA SIX CMA EIGHT CMA NINE CMA AND SCAOS FIVE AND EIGHT ARMIES CIN COPY TO REGIONS ONE AND SEVEN CMA RCMG AND PUBLIC SAFETY FROM HQ ACC ADMIN SEC PAREN SOME REORGANISATION OF PRESENT POLICE AGENCIES IS UNDER CONSIDERATION MAIN PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO ELIMINATE UNDESIRABLES WHO ENTERED THE FORCES UNDER FASCISMO FD YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF ANY MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS FD IMMEDIATE PROMULGATION OF A DECREE NOT CONTEMPLATED.

DISTRIBUTION : RC REGION I (ACTION)
RC REGION VII(CTION)
PUBLIC SAFETY(ACTION)
RCMG (INFO)
ADMIN

2773

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

COPY

MESSAGE FORM

From - MAIN AAI
To - MMTA
Info - ACC

Date - Time 222015

Orig. No. SD 1562

RESTRICTED (.) spoke HAMPDEN McQUEEN (.) as decided at meeting of 1430 hrs 17 JUN and recommended subsequently to AMHQ total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed FIFTY FIVE thousand (.) 1605/50/3/G(SD1) of 19 JUN refers — no copy held.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PUB SAFETY SC 1492

VSA

EXECUTIVE COMM RC AND MC RSC /SC AIW

See 47A 52/53

RC REGION II HQ
52/45

NONE
NONE

JUL 231258B

REF 749 SECRET. SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF CC NO. 50 CC NO CAN BE STAMED FIELD REGION II, WITHOUT SERIOUSLY AFFECTING MISSION OF EVACUATION AND DISTRIBUTION O/T TF GRAIE

HEADQUARTERS
23 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

ACS EDIT

ACTION: C.A. Br 2
INFO : A/CC
Pub.Saf.Sec 2
File 2
Float

2771

JUL 23

0343

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PUB SAFETY

42 1471

N66/22

LRVZ V ECO NR 117
FROM HQ REGION 5 AMG 221530
TO ACC MAIN
QQY GR -- BT

ACTION

373
REDUCTION CCRR AGREED REGION 5
BT
SENT SRL 117 FNC 1915B AR
RECD SRL 117 AAA 1915 B AAA AR

A.C.C. DIST
ACTION : PUB. SAFETY (1)
INFO : ACC
ARMY S.C
FILE (1)
FLOAT

HEADQUARTERS
27 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

2770

0344

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET Pub Safety 1437

41A

ROME AREA COMMAND FOR ACC ADV

ACCREDICT THREE FOR CHAPMAN

NOVE

JULY 22/1713

17/23 See 46A

SECRET

PRIORITY

CITE: NOVE

40 Arefers

STRENGTH CCHR. ACC 3/21. NOT POSSIBLE AT PRESENT TO FURTHER REDUCE STRENGTH OF CCHR IN THIS REGION. REASONS, WITH EXISTING ESTABLISHMENT AND STRENGTH, AND DUTIES ON WHICH SPECIAL ENGAGED AT DISPOSAL OF ALLIED FORCES FOLLOWS BY LETTER

ACTION

Acc Dist
Action - Pub Safety (2)
Info - A/cc
File (2)
Floor

HEADQUARTERS
23 JUL 1944
A. C. C.
2769

SECRET

JULY 23/0840

0345

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1 (

REEX SECRET

146222

749 JK HOA

DISTWO PENBASE CAMPOBASSO FABLE FIVE ARMY EIGHT ARMY

ACC HQ

SECRET
PRIORITY
Civil Affairs Branch

20 July 1944

STRENGTH CCRR IS SUBJECT PD PAREN TO DISTWO FOR ACC REGION TWO CMA PENBASE FOR ACC REGION THREE CMA CAMPOBASSO FOR ACC REGION FIVE CMA FABLE FOR ACC REGION SIX CMA FIVE ARMY FOR AMG CMA EIGHT ARMY FOR AMG FROM ACC HQ PAREN PD PRESENT CEILING INTENDED TO SUFFICE WHOLE ITALY PD RESULT COLON IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO REDUCE STRENGTH OF CCRR IN ALL REGION IN ORDER TO MEET NEEDS IN NEWLY CAPTURED TERRITORY PD WHOLE MATTER NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION PLEASE STATE BY CABLE YOU VIEWS ON REDUCTION IN YOUR REGION AND CONFIRM IN MORE DETAIL BY LETTER

2768

2767

DISTRIBUTION:
Region I — Rome Region
Region IV — Executive Commissioner
Region VII — Public Safety Sub-Comm.
Region VIII — Admin. Section
Region IX — Italian Refu ees Branch(for comment also)

L.T. MONTANT JR.
1st Lt. AGD
Adjutant

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

394

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

17th July, 1944

ASC/14622/PS

SUBJECT : Disposition of CC.RR.

TO : V.F. Admin. Section.

396

1. Herewith proposed scheme for distribution of CC.RR. throughout Italy for information of RC & TO Section.

2. It will be noted that Plan A is predicated upon an authorized strength of 65,000 men, whereas plan B is based upon an authorized strength of 55,000 men. The strength which should be authorized is now a subject of discussion with the Army Sub-Commission.

3. There are so many factors which have a bearing upon the effectiveness of the CC.RR. irrespective of its numerical strength, that a separate special report is in process of preparation and will be submitted shortly.

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

PGK/mjd

2767

COMANDO ARMA CARABINIERI REALI DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

S P E C C H I O della forza dell'Arma dei CC.RR. calcolata su di un organico complessivo di: 55.000 e di 65.000 uomini.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

0348

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

REGIONI	PROVINCIE COMPRESE NEL TERRITORIO DI CIASCUNA REGIONE	LEGIONI CC.RR. TA CUI DIPEN= DONO LE PROV. COMPRESE NEL TERR. DELLE REG.	FORZA PASE 55, CC Uff.
REGIONE I^	Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta, Messina Catania-Enna-Siracusa e Ragusa	Palermo e Messina	94
REGIONE II^	Bari-Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto-Matera-Potenza e Foggia	Bari e Catanzaro	49
REG. III^	Napoli-Avellino-Benevento-Salerno e Caserta	Napoli	68
REG. IV^	Frosinone-Viterbo-Terni-Rieti-Littoria e Perugia	Lazio e Firenze	59
REG. V^	Campobasso-Chieti-Pescara-Teramo-Ascoli Piceno Pesaro-Macerata-l'Aquila e Ancona	Abruzzi e Ancona	71
REG. VI^	Cagliari-Nuoro e Sassari	Cagliari	41
REG. VII^	Catanzaro - Reggio Calabria e Cosenza	Catanzaro	41
REG. VIII^	Livorno-Pisa-Lucca-Massa-Grosseto-Firenze- Pistoia-Siena-Arezzo	Livorno e Firenze	101
REG. IX^	Bologna-Ferrara-Modena-Ravenna-Reggio Emilia-Forlì - Parma e Piacenza	Bologna e Genova	66
REG. X^	Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti-Torino-Aosta-Novara-Vercelli-Genova- La Spezia-Savona- Imperia.	Alessandria Torino e Genova	117
REG. XI^	Milano-Bergamo-Brescia-Como-Sondrio-Varese-Pavia Mantova e Cremona	Milano Genova e Verona	78
REG. XII^	Bolzano-Trento-Belluno-Verona-Vicenza-Padova-Rovigo-Venezia-Treviso-Udine-Trieste-Pola-Gorizia Fiume e Zara	Bolzano-Verona Padova-Trieste Ancona	137
REGIONE ROMA	Roma città	Roma	192
		totali	1114

2766

ANNOTAZIONI:

- Nell'organico della legione di Roma è compresa la forza della legione allievi carabinieri, indispensabile per poter rimpiazzare il personale che si congeda o non è più idoneo al servizio militare: inoltre vi è compreso il personale del Comando Generale e degli altri Comandi CC.RR. dell'Urbe.
- La forza in atto presente nelle provincie liberate, compresi i richiamati è di 42.000 uomini; la differenza di 23.000 militari per raggiungere la cifra di 65.000 indicata nello specchio potrà ripianarsi come segue:
  - nuovi arruolamenti ..... 3000 uomini
  - provenienti dalla prigionia 1000 "
  - ricuperabili dai terr. liberati 19.000"

- E' da prevedere effettivi e di i comandi dell ricuperare la

0349

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PLAN

PLAN

...RITORIO DI CIASCUNA	LEGIONI CC.RR. DA CUI DIPEN= DONO LE PROV. COMPRESE NEL TERR. DELLE REG.	FORZA COMPLESSIVA SULLA BASE DI UN ORGANICO DI 55,000 UOMINI			FORZA COMPLESSIVA SULLA BASE DI UN ORGANICO DI 65,000 UOMINI		
		Uff.	Sottuff. e truppa	Totale	Uff.	Sottuff. e truppa	Totale
...Caltanissetta, Messina ...ausa	Palermo e Messina	94	5855	5949	124	5855	6979
...o-Matera-Potenza e	Bari e Catanzaro	49	2770	2819	79	3270	3349
...Salerno e Caserta	Napoli	68	3310	3378	98	3810	3908
...eti-Littoria e Perugia	Lecio e Firenze	59	2645	2704	59	3145	3204
...Teramo-Ascoli Piceno ...e Ancona	Abruzzi e Ancona	71	2987	3058	71	3287	3358
	Cagliari	41	2300	2341	71	2800	2871
...ia e Cosenza	Catanzaro	41	1778	1819	41	2328	2369
...Grossato-Firenze- Pisto	Livorno e Firenze	101	3583	3684	131	4433	4564
...venna-Reggio Emilia-For	Bologna e Genova	66	3550	3616	96	4200	4296
...rino-Aosta-Novara-Ver- ...avona- Imperia.	Alessandria Torino e Genova	117	5250	5367	177	6634	7011
...mo-Sondrio-Varese-Pavia	Milano Genova e Verona	78	3943	4021	108	4635	4743
...erona-Vicenza-Padova-Ro ...le-Trieste-Pola-Gorizia	Bolzano-Verona Padova-Trieste Ancona	137	7371	7508	167	8965	9132
	Roma	192	8544	8736	222	8994	9216
totali		1114	53886	55000	1444	63556	65000

2766

...compresa la forza della ...abile per poter rimpiaz ...on è più idoneo al ser- ...il personale del Coman- ...RR. dell'Urbe.

...nelle liberate, compresi ...fferenza di 23.000 mi- ...000 indicata nello

...uomini
...
...00"

- E' da prevedersi che su di una forza di circa 25.000 uomini effettivi e di circa 25.000 richiamati che si prevede abbiano i comandi dell'Italia tuttora occupata dai tedeschi si possa ricuperare la predetta cifra di 19000 uomini effettivi.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PLAN "B"

REGIONS	PROVINCES INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORY OF EACH REGION	PROV. INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORY OF EACH REGION UNDER CONTOL OF CC.RR. LEGION	TOTAL STRENGTH BASED UPON A UNIT OF 55.000 MEN			TOTAL STRENGTH BASED UPON A UNIT OF 50.000 MEN
			OFFICERS	N/C and pvts.	Total	OFF.
REGION I	Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissatta Messina-Catania-Ragusa-Siracusa and Ragusa	Palermo and Messina	94	5855	5949	
REGION II	Bari-Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto-Matera-Potenza and Foggia	Bari and Catanzaro	49	2770	2819	
REGION III	Napoli-Avellino-Benevento-Salerno-Caserta	Napoli	68	3310	3378	
REGION IV	Frosinone-Viterbo-Terni-Rieti-Littoria and Perugia	Lazio and Firenze	59	2645	2704	
REGION V	Campobasso-Chieti-Pescara-Teramo-Ascoli Piceno-Pesaro-Macerata-l'Aquila-Ancona	Abruzzi and Ancona	71	2987	3058	
REGION VI	Cagliari-Nuoro and Sassari	Cagliari	41	2300	2341	
REGION VII	Catanzaro-Reggio Calabria-Cosenza	Catanzaro	41	1778	1819	
REGION VIII	Livorno-Pisa-Lucca-Massa-Grosseto Firenze-Pistoia-Siena-Arezzo	Livorno and Firenze	101	3583	3684	
REGION IX	Bologna-Ferrara-Modena-Ravenna-Reggio Emilia-Forli-Parma-Piacenza	Bologna and Genova	66	3550	3616	
REGION X	Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti-Torino-Aosta-Novara Vercelli-Genova-La Spezia-Savona-Imperia	Torino Alessandria Genova	117	5250	5367	
REGION XI	Milano-Bergamo-Brescia-Como-Sondrio-Varese Pavia-Mantova-Cremona	Milano Genova and Verona	78	3943	4021	
REGION XII	Bolzano-Trento-Belluno-Verona-Vicenza-Padova-Rovigo-Venezia-Treviso-Udine-Trieste-Pola-Gorizia-Fiume-Zara	Bolzano-Verona Padova-Trieste Ancona	197	7371	7568	
ROME REGION	Rome City	Rome	192	8544	8736	
		Totals	1114	53886	55000	

REMARKS:

1) - The legion of Rome comprises Carabinieri training-legions which are used to replace personnel who are discharged or unfit for military service - also instruc[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

		PLAN "B"			PLAN "A"		
INCL DED IN THE TERRITO[RY] OF REGION	PROV. INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORY OF EACH REGION UNDER CONTROL OF CC.RR. LEGION	TOTAL STRENGTH BASED UPON A UNIT OF 55.000 MEN			TOTAL STRENGTH BASED UPON A UNIT OF 65.000 MEN		
		OFFICERS	M/C and pvts.	Total	Officers	M/C and pvts.	Total
[T]rapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta [C]atania-Enna-Siracusa and Ragusa	Palermo and Messina	94	5855	5949	124	6855	6979
[B]rindisi-Taranto-Matera-Potenza	Bari and Catanzaro	49	2770	2819	79	3270	3349
[A]vellino-Benevento-Salerno-Caserta	Napoli	68	3310	3378	98	3810	3908
[V]iterbo-Terni-Rieti-Littoria	Lazio and Firenze	59	2645	2704	59	3145	3204
[P]escara-Chieti-Pescara-Teramo-Ascoli [P]iceno-Macerata-l'Aquila-Ancona	Abruzzi and Ancona	71	2987	3058	71	3287	3358
[N]uoro and Sassari	Cagliari	41	2300	2341	71	2800	2871
[R]eggio Calabria-Cosenza	Catanzaro	41	1778	1819	41	2328	2369
[M]assa-Lucca-Massa-Grosseto [P]istoia-Siena-Arezzo	Livorno and Firenze	101	3583	3684	131	4433	4564
[F]errara-Modena-Ravenna-Reggio [E]milia-Parma-Piacenza	Bologna and Genova	66	3550	3616	96	4200	4296
[A]lessandria-Asti-Torino-Aosta-Novara [G]enova-La Spezia-Savona-Imperia	Torino Alessandria Genova	117	5250	5367	177	6834	7011
[C]remona-Brescia-Como-Sondrio-Varese [N]ovara-Cremona	Milano Genova and Verona	78	3943	4021	108	4635	4743
[T]rento-Belluno-Verona-Vicenza- [P]adova-Venezia-Treviso-Udine- [G]orizia-Fiume-Zara	Bolzano-Verona Padova-Trieste Ancona	137	7371	7508	167	8965	9132
	Roma	192	8544	8736	222	8994	9216
	Totals	1114	53886	55000	1444	69556	65000

[C]arabinieri training-
[t]o replace personnel who are discharged

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REGION VI	Cagliari-Nuoro and Sassari	Cagliari	43	2300	2343
REGION VII	Catanzaro-Reggio Calabria-Cosenza	Catanzaro	41	1778	1819
REGION VIII	Livorno-Pisa-Lucca-Massa-Grosseto Firenze-Pistoia-Siena-Arezzo	Livorno and Firenze	101	3483	3584
REGION IX	Bologna-Ferrara-Modena-Ravenna-Reggio Emilia-Forli-Parma-Piacenza	Bologna and Genova	66	3550	3616
REGION X	Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti-Torino-Aosta-Novara Vercelli-Genova-La Spezia-Savona-Imperia	Torino Alessandria Genova	117	5250	5367
REGION XI	Milano-Bergamo-Brescia-Como-Sondrio-Varese Pavia-Mantova-Cremona	Milano Genova and Verona	78	3943	4021
REGION XII	Bolzano-Trento-Belluno-Verona-Vicenza-Padova-Rovigo-Venezia-Treviso-Udine-Trieste-Pola-Gorizia-Fiume-Zara	Bolzano-Verona Padova-Trieste Ancona	137	7371	7508
ROME REGION	Rome City	Rome	192	8544	8736
		Totals	1114	53886	55000

REMARKS:

- The legion of Rome comprises Carabinieri training-legions which are used to replace personnel who are discharged or unfit for military service - also includes personnel of Gen.Hqs. and other Commands in Rome.
- The present strength in liberated provinces, including personnel who have been recalled totals 42,000. The difference of 23,000 men so as to reach the strength of 65,000 men as shown in the chart, can be replaced as follows:
- Recruiting . . . . . 3000 men
- Coming from prisons . . . . . 1000 men
- Recoverable from Liberated territory 19,000
- It is to be noted that based upon the strength of about 25,000 men on permanent service and of about 25,000 men recalled to duty which are supposed to be under the Italian Command in territory occupied by Germany, 19,000 men on permanent duty can be recovered.

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Nuoro and Sassari	Cagliari	41	2300	2341	71	2800	2871
Reggio Calabria-Cosenza	Catanzaro	41	1778	1819	41	2328	2369
isa-Lucca-Massa-Grosseto istoia-Siena-Arezzo	Livorno and Firenze	101	3583	3684	232	4439	4564
errara-Modena-Ravenna-Reggio li-Parma-Piacenza	Bologna and Genova	66	3550	3616	96	4200	4296
essandria-Asti-Torino-Aosta-Novara enova-La Spezia-Savona-Imperia	Torino Alessandria Genova	117	5250	5367	177	6834	7011
ano-Brescia-Como-Sondrio-Varese ova-Cremona	Milano Genova and Verona	78	3843	4021	108	4635	4743
nto-Belluno-Verona-Vicenza- igo-Venezia-Treviso-Udine- la-Gorizia-Fiume-Zara	Bolzano-Verona Padova-Trieste Ancona	137	7371	7508	167	8965	9132
	Roma	192	8544	8736	272	8994	9216
	Totals	1114	53806	55000	1444	69556	65000

prises Carabinieri training-
to replace personnel who are discharged
service - also includes personnel of
eeds in Rome.
liberated provinces, including
lled totals 82,000. The difference
reach the strength of 65,000 men
can be replaced as follows:
. . . . 3000 men
. . . . 1000 men
ted territory 19,000
based upon the strength
permanent service and
alled to duty which are
Italian Command in
erman, 19,000 men on
covered.

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MEMORANDUM TO COL. KIRK, CHIEF PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION.

Ida in data ordine 13.7.1944.

39(X)

Strength of CC.RR.

1. Arma of the CC.RR., created in 1814 as the first arm of the army and to maintain public order, is an integral part of the army and is under the control of the Ministry of War except when performing police duties, it depends upon the Ministry of Interior.

2. The strength of Arma was subject to various changes according to the internal conditions of the country because it is obvious that the strength of a police agency must be proportionate to the needs of the situation and it is not possible to create an adequate situation to a pre-determined strength.

3. Before the present war the CC.RR. strength was about 55.000 without counting those of the colonies. Due to the present conditions of the country, I believe that strength should increase and not diminish.

I) For the continued requests of the Allies who make extensive use of the CC.RR., more then that prescribed by authorized strength.

II) For the presence of the mobilized CC.RR. (not included in the authorized strength) who take part in the maintenance of the public order.

III) For the abolition of "special police" (Army, Rd. roads, ports) who also contributed in maintaining order.

IV) For the dissolution of FF.AA. who were employed in case of emergency to restore public order.

V) For the inefficiency of P.S. Corps.

4. I believe that the strength should at the time of the total liberation of Italy, reach about 70,000 men but never below 60,000.

In this number, the GG.FF. should not be included,

I) because they are not part of the army and only armed Forces of State.

2764

II) because they have tasks of fiscal police, well defined, and depend upon and are paid by the Ministry of Finance. Only the Allies have employed the GG.FF. as auxiliary police forces, a task not developed by the Corps.

Gen. G. Pièche.

M/G.

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Ranch Kid flow Acc

R/6785/94622

4860

FM [redacted]

TO ACC ADV

[redacted] SR 14

S304 C.O. OUR ADV 355 OF 10 JULY C.O.

AGREED K I R K S[redacted]

GENERAL S R O W A I N G IN R O M E

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S304 ADV 1/7/ADV355 10

KING ERSKINE

ROME 121130 E

SECP [redacted]

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IMPORTANT

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P. Safety

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FLOAT 2

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A. C. C.

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DIST
(Hcs) P. Safety 1
(UNA) PILOT 1
FLOAT

37A

P. Safety
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Original
to Judy 4th Floor
Mail

ACTION

LRKD V LROF P 628
FROM MJCS Ø811ØB
TO LRKD
BT
REF NR THREE ZERO SEVEN ONE (CLASSIFY RESTRICTED) FOLLOWING CABLE
RECEIVED ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO HOURS EIGHT JULY AT REA R HQ
PUBLIC SAFETY FROM HMIA FROM BOWNING CLN QUOTE WILL SEE YOU IN
LEQUILE PD/TO ACC ADV FOR KIRK PUBLIC SAFETY FROM ACC REAR FROM
PUBLIC SAFETY SIGNED STONE/PD SIGNAL YOUR ETA PD REFER SEVEN ONE
SEVEN FOUR OF SIX JULY UNQUOTE PD PLEASE TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION
BT
SENT 628 Ø9Ø75Ø REB B1
RECD 628 Ø9Ø75Ø ':://JC

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Out Going

P1136A

ARMY SUB COMMISSION MEDITERRANEAN

HQ ADVANCE ACC

RESTRICTED

356

ROUTINE

10 JULY 44

PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMM

FOLLOWING TALK WITH FIDSLEY CMA IF GENERAL BROWNING LEAVING FOR ROME THIS WEEK PREFERABLE KIRK PUBLIC SAFETY AWAIT ARRIVAL FOR CONFERENCE PD PAREN TO ARMY SUBCOMMISSION FROM ACC ADVANCE PARTY REVER SEVEN ONE SEVEN FOUR OF SIX JULY PD PLEASE ADVISE IF ACCEPTABLE

Col Provost (SVT) (2nd)

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U. S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTED

OUTGOING

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

ADC REAR

ADC ADV

JUL 1944
G-1 HQ. A.C.C.

3071

JULY 6 1944

FOLLOWING CABLE RECEIVED ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO HOURS EIGHT JULY AT REAR HQ PUBLIC SAFETY FROM MAIA FROM BROWNING CLAR QUOTE WILL SEND YOU IN LECUILE RD TO ADC ADV FOR KIRK. PUBLIC SAFETY FROM ADC REAR FROM PUBLIC SAFETY SIGNED STONE RD SIGNAL YOUR EEA PD REFER SEVEN ONE SEVEN FOUR OF SIX JULY UNQUOTE PD PLEASE TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION

AUTHENTICATED:

E. J. CHIOCCA
G-1 USA
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1 File
1 Plcmt
1 ACC
1 P Safety
1 Adj Main

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U. S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTED

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14627 3AA

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 391

11th July, 1944

SUBJECT : Notes on the strength of CC.RR and GS.FF.

TO : Acting Vice President, Admin. Section.

1. The following notes have been prepared for your information:

STRENGTH FIGURES

	CC.RR	GS.FF	TOTAL
Peace time strength	35,000	32,348	67,348
July 1943 strength	+ 65,000	32,348	97,348

+ (By decree of 25th July 1943 Gen. Badoglio authorised an increase to 65,000)

Present strength (30th June, 1943)	33,909	8,371	42,280
Public order duties	30,836		
Italian Army "	3,073		
	33,909		

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OUTLINE.

Letter 1 from Army Sub-Commission (quoting AFHQ) states:

i) CC.RR and GC.FF are part of the Italian Armed Forces.

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ii) Strength of CC.RR and GG.FF has been fixed at 55,000 men.

The reasons for limiting the strength to 55,000 men are stated to be:

i) The Italian Government cannot be allowed to maintain a large private Army.

ii) The maintenance of a large private Army would drain Allied resources (food).

Signal 2 from HQ MMIA states that the strength of the CC.RR should be reduced as it is feared that feeding arrangements may break down.

Letter 1. from Public Safety Sub-Commission states that a total strength of 55,000 CC.RR and GG.FF will be inefficient for the duties they will be called upon to perform. It suggests that if the ceiling must be limited to 55,000 because of ration shortage, one solution would be to exclude GG.FF from the Italian Army strength.

NECESSITY FOR INCREASING CC.RR STRENGTH.

Number of CC.RR at present (30th June) employed on public order duties	20,836
Hence the strength of CC.RR for the same territory	2758
Present excess	2,836

-/...

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even with this excess the present number is still inadequate to meet the demands being made.

Among numerous other reasons for requiring a larger number of CC.RR than in peace time are the following:

i) The Rebranding of Fascist Militias - Port, Railway and Railway Militias. (In Naples alone, 352 CC.RR are employed in the docks. The Allied Port authorities have asked for more).

ii) Checking civilian movement, especially at Army control lines.

iii) Dealing with refugees.

iv) Protecting Allied installations and communications against sabotage, damage, etc.

v) Guarding and escorting Allied supplies.

vi) Joint patrols with Allied Military Police owing to interference with civilians by Allied troops.

vii) Campaign against prostitution and venereal disease.

viii) Road check posts to prevent black market, illegal use of petrol, etc.

ix) Enforcement of harvesting regulations.

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RETENTION OF LIFTING THE CEILING TO 55,000

It is understood by Public Safety Sub-Commission that the ceiling of 55,000 is prior to Italian territory up to the Pisa-Rimini line.

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42,280 CC.AR and 63.77 are now fully occupied in policing the territory already liberated. A further 12,720 men will not be sufficient to police territory up to the Pisa - Rimini line.

Moreover, preparations have to be made now for policing Italy north of the Pisa-Rimini line - i.e. 15 provinces comprising most of the large industrial cities in Italy where CC.AR have been disbanded by the enemy.

It is necessary to recruit and train CC.AR in readiness for moving into North Italy, with the advancing Armies.

Conclusion

A ceiling of 55,000 CC.AR and CC.WE is insufficient to police Italy up to the Pisa-Rimini line.

An additional allocation must be made for CC.AR and CC.WE to be held in reserve for policing Italy north of the Pisa-Rimini line.

AFW/fgd

FAU.S, CMP,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

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CCRR | Hq in Liberated Italy.

14622
~~14622~~ 330

P.M. 135, 30 June 1944

Prot. No. 3/19

Subject: Strength of CCRR.

To P.S. Sub-Commission

In forwarding you a list concerning CCRR strength on June 1, we are pointing out:

1. The list does not include, as it was requested last month, the men who are paid in cash in lieu of food.
These men are 79.

2. In the report of last month, the personnel (men and privates) belonging to the Legions of Lazio, Roma Territoriale, Abruzzo was included in the strength mobilized in the liberated territory (column 8, letter a of the report). 2755

3. The men who have not been supplied by the Legions because absent (on medical furlough, agricultural leave, sent to hospitals etc.) are 2864. Said personnel is included in the strength of the Legions.

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The total strength of the Arma (m/c and privates) - column 10 of the report - is greater than 3616 as shown in last month's report. The increase is due to: (a) 1147 soldiers who have received rations in lieu of cash (privates who in the past month received cash in lieu of rations total 1326 less 79 who shall receive it during this month making a total of 1147. The 79 privates are not included in the report, as it is shown in No. 1 above); (b) privates flowing from territory recently occupied and (c) newly enrolled.

The data for the Region of Cagliari have been furnished by Boards existing at this Hq as the requested report has not yet arrived. We shall inform you about the differences, if any.

For The Commanding General

The Colonel Chief of Staff

Romano Dalla Chiesa.

DATE

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MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.







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Legioni o Comandi	Generali	Colonnelli	Ten.Colonnelli	Maggiori	Capitani	Tenenti e S.Tenenti	TOTALE UFFICIALI Total officers	W.O's MARESC.		Sott.-Ufficiali BRIGAD.		Sott.-Ufficiali V.BRIGAD.		Caporali APPUNTATI		CARABINIERI		(S
								1		2		3		4		5		
							In servizio territoriale	Mobilitati	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	
Com.Arma	I(1)	2	2	3	3	3	I4			7		I3	I	I2		3	8	44	
Leg.Bari	I(2)	2	4	7 4	2I 7	I9 I4	54	25	I59	2II	44	I73	2I8	I62	56	3I9	843	I7I2	I
" Cagliari		I	5	5	20 2	2I I3	52	I5	I4I	I90	3I	90	I23	84	II7	337	832	I6I9	
" Catanzaro		I	5	4	20	I4 I	44	I	I58	20I	52	87	I70	4I	44	I82	55I	II03	
" Messina		I	2	8	I6 2	20 I	47	3	I22	II0	25	99	I42	87	8I	288	I004	I595	I
" Napoli	2(3)	3	5	I6 6	20 I0	30 9	76	25	I47	428	86	I67	240	238	26	485	I000	2953	I
" Palermo	I(4)	I	4	I0	I3 I	29 2	58	3	86	I86	32	I57	I98	247	67	384	836	25I0	I
" Roma Tam.			2	I I	II	I6	30	I	II	2I	22	83	I20	I4I	3	9	65I	I239	
" Roma Lazio			I	5	6	7	I9		6	7	I2	8	I5	7	II	6	I80	253	
" Abruzzi		I		3	4	5	I3		46	47	7	23	42	22	I3	64	23I	593	
Rep.compl. e Ric.-Napoli		I(5)	I		I	I	4		2	I2	3	7	I6	5	6	7	I83	I60	
id.-Bari						I	I		3	I	7	3	2	8	3	-	75	48	
Btg.Allievi Sott.-Bari		I(6)		I	I	5	8			I		3		I2		33	4	I76	
Btg.Allievi C/mi Andria			I		2	3	6			5	2	5	5	I3		I		434	

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BRIGAD.	V.BRIGAD.	APPUNTATI	CARABINIERI	TOTALE (Sottuff.e Truppa)	FORZA ORGA= NICA	MOBILITATI (Sottuff.e Truppa)			TOTALE GENE= RALE	Totale del personale presente nel territorio libenato compresi i militari mobilitati nel territorio stesso. (Col. 6/a e 6/b - e 8/a (Sottuff.e Truppa)
						In territorio liberato	Di cui non si conosce la sede	TOTALE	Sottufficiali e Truppa	
2	3	4	5	6	7	8				
Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b	Richiamati a	Effettivi b			
	I3	I	I2	3	8	44	9	79					88	88
44	I73	2I8	I62	56	3I9	843	I7I2	I320	2577	2660	I3I9	I835	3I54	705I	52I6
3I	90	I23	84	II7	337	832	I6I9	I244	2320	2234	992	5I6	I508	5072	4556
52	87	I70	4I	44	I82	55I	II03	975	I6I4	I984	26I	I447	I708	4297	2850
25	99	I42	87	8I	288	I004	I595	I374	2I79	2033	26	656	682	4235	3579
86	I67	240	238	26	485	I000	2953	I499	427I	3II6	266	2244	25I0	8280	2753
32	I57	I98	247	67	384	836	25I0	I2I9	3484	3429	209	I074	I283	5986	49I2
22	83	I20	I4I	3	9	65I	I239	807	I493	4077	-	-	-	2300	2300
I2	8	I5	7	II	6	I80	253	224	28I	2I46	-	-	-	505	505
7	23	42	22	I3	64	23I	593	339	749	I476	-	-	-	I088	I088
3	7	I6	5	6	7	I83	I60	2I0	I9I	-	-	-	-	40I	40I
7	3	2	8	3	-	75	48	90	60	-	-	-	-	I50	I50
	3		I2		33	4	I76	4	225	-	-	-	-	229	229
2	5	5	I3		I		434	7	458	-	-	-	-	465	465

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" Palermo	I(4)	I	4	IO	I3 I	29 2	58	3	86	I86	32	I57	I98	247	67	384	836	25IO
" Roma Tarr.			2	I I	II	I6	30	I	II	2I	22	83	I20	I4I	3	9	65I	I239
" Roma Iezio			I	5	6	7	I9		6	7	I2	8	I5	7	II	6	I80	253
" Abruzzi		I		3	4	5	I3		46	47	7	23	42	22	I3	64	23I	593
Rep.compl.e Ric.-Napoli		I(5)	I		I	I	4		2	I2	3	7	I6	5	6	7	I83	I60
id.-Bari						I	I		3	I	7	3	2	8	3	-	75	48
Btg.Allievi Sott.-Bari		I(6)		I	I	5	8			I		3		I2		33	4	I76
Btg.Allievi C/ri-Andria			I		2	3	6			5	2	5	5	I3		I		434
" Barletta			I		2	2	5		I	2	2	4	2	I9				484
" Gallipoli				I	2	I	4				2	I0	5	I7				538
" Cagliari				I	2	I	4		I		2	2	2	2				I63
" Palermo				I	I	7	9		I			5	I	8				26I
Totali...	5	I4	33	77	I67	225	448	73	884	I429	329	939	I302	II25	427	2II8	6398	I5885	9

(1)Generale di divisione comandante dell'Arma CC.RR.dell'Italia Liberata; General of Division, Co
(2)Generale di divisione a disposizione del Ministero della Guerra; General of Division at the Min
(3)Due generali di brigata di cui uno comandante la 5^ brigata - Napoli-e l'altro ff.di comandante
(4)Generale di brigata comandante la 6^ brigata - Palermo-; General of Brigade commanding the 6 Brigade
(5)Colonnello Ispettore dei CC.RR.dislocati nelle retrovie; Colonel Inspector of CC.RR. Distributed
(6)Colonnello Ispettore Scuole e Battaglioni Allievi CC.RR. Colonel Inspector of Schools and Battalions
N.B.Le cifre in nero,della forza "UFFICIALI",indicano quelli del servizio territoriale;quelle in
Remarks: Figures concerning Officers, when written in black refer to personnel "on regular service"

0 3 3 9

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32	I57	I98	247	67	384	836	25I0	I2I9	3484	3429	209	I074	I283	5986	49I2
22	83	I20	I4I	3	9	65I	I239	807	I493	4077	-	-	-	2300	2300
I2	8	I5	7	II	6	I80	253	224	28I	2I46	-	-	-	505	505
7	23	42	22	I3	64	23I	593	339	749	I476	-	-	-	I088	I088
3	7	I6	5	6	7	I83	I60	2I0	I9I	-	-	-	-	40I	40I
7	3	2	8	3	-	75	48	90	60	-	-	-	-	I50	I50
	3		I2		33	4	I76	4	225	-	-	-	-	229	229
							434	7	458	-	-	-	-	465	465
2	5	5	I3		I										
2	4	2	I9				484	5	509	-	-	-	-	5I4	5I4
2	I0	5	I7				538	7	565	-	-	-	-	572	572
2	2	2	2				I63	5	I67	-	-	-	-	I72	I72
	5	I	8				26I	2	274	-	-	-	-	276	276
9	329	939	I302	II25	427	2II8	6398	I5885	9340	2I496	23I55	3073	7772	I0845	4I68I	33909

RR.dell'Italia Liberata; General of Division, Commandant of CCRR Troops in Liberated Italy.
tero della Guerra; General of Division at the disposal of the War Ministry.
la 5^ brigata - Napoli-e l'altro ff.di comandante la 3^ Divisione-Napoli; Two generals of brigade of reform
- Palermo-; General of brigade commanding the 6 brigade at Palermo. one commanding the 5 brigade, Naples, and the other deputy
retrovie; Colonel Inspector of CCRR Relocated on the Rear. chief of the 3 division - Naples
evi CC.RR. Colonel Inspector of Schools and battalions for the training of CCRR.
icano quelli del servizio territoriale; quelle in rosso gli ufficiali mobilitati.
in black refer to personnel "on regular service", when written in red refer to reservists personnel.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

Translate please.

COMANDO ARMA CARABINIERI REALI DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO

N. 3/19 di prot. SEGRETO P. M. 135,11 30 giugno 1944

Risposta al del n. Allegati n.

OGGETTO: Specchio della forza dell'Arma dei CC.RR.

Al LA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO PER LA P.S.
SALERNO

Nel trasmettere lo specchio della forza dei CC.RR. al 1° c.m. si rappresenta:

1)-Non vi sono stati compresi i militari che percepiscono il vitto in contanti, in analogia a quanto fu richiesto nel decorso mese. Il numero di tali militari ascende complessivamente a 79.

2)-Il personale (sottufficiali e truppa) delle legioni Lazio, Roma Territoriale ed Abruzzi nello specchio del decorso mese era compreso fra i militari mobilitati nel territorio liberato (colonna 8 - lettera a - dello specchio). 2752

3)-I militari che non sono stati vittovagliati dalle legioni perchè assenti (licenza di convalescenza, licenza agricola, ricoverati in luoghi di cura ecc.ecc.) sono 2864. Tale personale è compreso nella forza delle legioni.

La forza complessiva dell'Arma (sottufficiali e truppa) - colonna 10 dello specchio - è superiore di 2616 unità a quella segnalata nel decorso mese. L'aumento è dato da 1147 militari che hanno percepito vitto in natura anzichè in contanti (militari che nel decorso me

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

COMANDO ARMA CARABINIERI REALI DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO

N. 3/I9 di prot. SEGRETO P. M. I35,li 30 giugno 1944

Risposta al del n. Allegati n.

OGGETTO: Specchio della forza dell'Arma dei CC.RR.

AlLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO PER IA P.S.
S A L E R N O

Nel trasmettere lo specchio della forza dei CC.RR. al 1° c.m. si rappresenta:

I)-Non vi sono stati compresi i militari che percepiscono il vitto in contanti, in analogia a quanto fu richiesto nel decorso mese. Il numero di tali militari ascende complessivamente a 79.

2)-Il personale (sottufficiali e truppa) delle legioni Lazio, Roma Territoriale ed Abruzzi nello specchio del decorso mese era compreso fra i militari mobilitati nel territorio liberato (colonna 8 - lettera a - dello specchio).

2752

3)-I militari che non sono stati vittovagliati dalle legioni perchè assenti (licenza di convalescenza, licenza agricola, ricoverati in luoghi di cura ecc.ecc.) sono 2864. Tale personale è compreso nella forza delle legioni.

La forza complessiva dell'Arma (sottufficiali e truppa) - colonna IO dello specchio - è superiore di 2616 unità a quella segnalata nel decorso mese. L'aumento è dato da II47 militari che hanno percepito vitto in natura anzichè in contanti (militari che nel decorso mese percepivano viveri in contanti I226 meno 79 che lo

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

percepiscono nel corrente mese = II47 : i 7 militari non sono compresi nello specchio, come è detto al n.I della presente) ; da militari affluiti dai territori di recente occupazione e da nuovi arruolamenti.

I dati per la legione di Cagliari sono stati desunti dalla situazione esistente presso questo Comando non essendo giunto fino ad ora il periodico richiesto. Nel caso che vi fossero varianti saranno comunicate a codesta Sottocommissione.

---

p.IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
- Giuseppe Pièche -
IL COLONNELLO CAPO DI S. M.
-Romano dalla Chiesa-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

File 3aA

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

ACC/14522/PS

5th July, 1944

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.RR and CC.PP.

TO : Army Sub-Commission AGO. (Major General Browning)

3aA/31A refer

Reference your 8/6/1 of 27 June, 1944

1. In connection with the letter above referred to, wherein it was recommended that the total strength of the Carabinieri Reali and Guardia di Finanza should not, in the aggregate, exceed 55,000, it is requested that I be invited to confer with you in order that the relationship of the two bodies to one another and to the Italian Army may be clarified before any final decision is reached.

2. Pending such a conference, I wish to invite your attention to the following observations:

a) The Carabinieri Reali is an integral component of the Italian Army and is the senior element thereof. Its primary mission is the maintenance of public order. Its normal peace-time strength is 55,000 officers and men. By decree of July 25, 1943 Marshal Badoglio authorized the strength of the CC.RR to be increased to 65,000. The Combined Chiefs of Staff designated the Carabinieri Reali as the police agency upon which reliance would primarily be placed to preserve public order, it having been specifically determined that military police battalions would not be available for this purpose. With the disbandment or dissolution of numerous other special police bodies, the duties hitherto performed by them have devolved upon the CC.RR. This, together with the general state of disorganization in the wake of war and the lack of or defective means of communication, has taxed the strength of the CC.RR to the utmost. There is every reason to believe that the conditions which have hitherto pertained will not only continue, but will be considerably aggravated as

2751

0375

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

the advance to the north, with its numerous industrial centres, continues. That in the face of such conditions the strength of the CC.RR should be reduced below its peace time level in a decision which is fraught with peril and to which this sub-commission registers most emphatic dissent. Rather it is the view of this sub-commission that the strength of the CC.RR because of its manifold increased duties and because of the uncertain state of public discipline, should be augmented above, rather than cut below, its normal peace-time level. The present strength of the CC.RR is 33,909. Of this number 30,836 are engaged in public order duties; the remainder work under the direction of the Italian General Staff with the Italian Army. It is likewise believed that, save for the units of the Italian Army actually committed to combat, first priority as to armament, uniforms, and equipment, especially motor transport, should be accorded to the Carabinieri Reali. Whatever factors may enter into revision of the effective strength of the Italian Army as a whole, the incontrovertible fact is that the Carabinieri has a continuing and growing responsibility.

b) The Guardia di Finanza is not an integral part of the Italian Army. It depends as you are aware, from the Minister of Finance. It is construed however, to be one of the armed forces of the Crown and for disciplinary purposes is under the command of a general officer detailed by the Italian General Staff. Because of its quasi-military character, it was, upon the invasion of Italy by the Allied Armies, diverted from its normal duties of enforcing revenue laws etc., and required to assist in the maintenance of public order. It was for this reason that it was included, with the assent of AAI, amongst the elements which were entitled to draw rations from Army sources. The GG.FF continue in many cases, especially in the forward areas, to be used for general law enforcement purposes, although as soon as possible they are permitted to revert to their normal duties.

2750

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

the [illegible] strength of the GG.FF is, as reported to us, 8,271. The normal peace-time establishment is 12,346.

a) If the underlying reason for the proposed reduction in strength of both the GG.AA and GG.FF is to keep the Italian Army within a predetermined ration ceiling, then it is most respectfully submitted that a different approach be used to solve the problem. Under no circumstances, in our view, should the strength of the GG.AA be reduced. Rather, an increase should be expected and provided for. Similarly, the strength of the GG.FF should not be reduced. The solution which is now offered, if the decision reached as to ceiling is inflexible, is that the GG.FF be dropped from the army ration and be authorized to draw the special ration for public safety personnel from civilian sources (schedule C special ration scale); and that the GG.AA continue to draw rations from army sources up to at least its normal peace time strength. Before this suggestion, if acceptable, is adopted and made effective an opportunity should be afforded this sub-commission to make the requisite arrangements with the Food Sub-Commission to implement it as to the GG.FF. If, pending this adjustment, an overdraft of rations is made, it will later be compensated for because the GG.AA will not have reached its authorized strength even according to your figures.

3. Finally, it is urged upon you most strongly that a reduction in the strength of the GG.AA would invite consequences which are not at all pleasant to contemplate and for which this sub-commission cannot share responsibility.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, [illegible] 2749
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

Copies to:
Acting Chief Commissioner
Adm. Vice-President.
Food Sub-Commission.

PGK/hcd

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U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING

KIRC/mar

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

ACC REAR

ACC MAIN

JULY

RESTRICTED
MEAN HQ. A.C.

REFERENCE MESSAGE HAMBIEN TO BROOKING STEETOTH GG RR NOT OUT OF PROPORTION PD TO ACC MAIN FOR ADM SUBMISSION L D FOR BROOKING FROM ACC REAR FROM KIRC SIGNED STONE PD REDUCTION CANNOT BE MADE PD LETTER FOLLOWS WITH PROPOSAL PD CONFIRMING YES YOU DESIRED

AUTHENTICATED:

E. J. CHIOCCA
AUS USA
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1 File
1 Plots
1 ADC
1 P Safety

2748

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

0378

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ACTION COPY

PUBLIC SAFETY SC

N63/4 5-6241 30

14622 SR

HEADQUARTERS
5 JUL 1944
A.C.

HJDT V LRAR NR 1700

OVR 2

FROM HQ AAI 12003 J//// 03/1200Z

TO MMIA ACC MAIN

G-4 346

CONFIDENTIAL X YOU HAVE SEEN MY 345 TO PBS X IT IS CLEAR THAT MORE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES NOW FORWARD THAN CAN BE MAINTAINED UNTIL ITALIAN SET UP MACHINERY FOR SUPPLYING X THE 10,000 CEILING TOO HIGH AT PRESENT X EZZZZZZ BELIEVE STRENGTH CORR ALL OUT PROPORTION AND SHOULD BE REDUCED AT ONCE X STRENGTH NOW EQUAL AUTHORIZATION FOR ALL ITALY X UNITS UNDER COMMAND BEING CARED FOR BUT OTHERS MOST UNTIDY X FEAR COMPLETE BREAK DOWN FEEDING IF ARRANGEMENTS NOT MADE SOONEST X PERSONAL HAMBLEN TO BROWNING

THI 1005

CKG

SENT NR 1700 04/1320Z VCAA AR K

RECD NR 1700 041320Z JFF

Acc Main Hist

INFO - ACTION.... Public Safety SC
INFO.... CSO
Def CC
[illegible] Sec
BR
Army Lo
Navy SC(Adv)
MM Forces SC
File
Floot

2747

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET Public Safety SC

14622 Sec 5-6066

FOR ACTION AMLA INFO SC CASERTA FOR CINCCMS, ACC MAIN FOR OPERATIONS

356/02

MAIN AAI

141

JULY 012012

SECRET
ROUTINE
CITE 2D 1020

1. INFORM ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF THAT INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE-TICES CEILING WILL NOT EXCEED 53300 IRRESPECTIVE OF DECISION ON REDUCTION OF ITALIAN ARMY TOTAL CEILING STILL AWAITED.

2. POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER LIST FOR 11000 REMOVED FROM CASERTA ABOUT 7 JULY MAINS IT ESSENTIAL THAT UNITS FOR SERIALS 161 165 180 202 250 304 ON LIST 7 BE NOMINATED AND ALERTED IMMEDIATELY. PERSONNEL FOR DEMOBILIZATION WILL NOT BE SHIPPED UNTIL SPECIFIC ORDERS ISSUED.

3. SERIALS AT PARA 2 WILL BE FILLED BY EXISTING FRONT UNITS LESS PERSONNEL FOR DEMOBILIZATION.

HEADQUARTERS
2 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

ACC MAIN DTGTH 2746

Info...Army Lo.....1
Sec Gen
Dep C G
Public Safety SC
Adv Army S C (Rear Hq)
File
Plans.....2

SECRET

JULY 012042

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

11056/6

28/4

SUBJECT: Strength Returns.

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ (BARI)
LECCE (LECCE)
G/1.1/1
June 44.

Naval Sub Commission.
Air Force Sub Commission.
Public Safety Sub Commission. ✓
F.O.T.A.L.I.
S.M.A.F.
Min of War.

16/c

1. The attached letter and appendix addressed to the Italian Army General Staff is forwarded to you for having returns rendered by your services in order that all returns will be in the same general form.

2. Please instruct your services to comply as otherwise the S.M.A.F. cannot properly demand or issue rations.

Major General
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

tvs.OPK.

SUBJECT: Italian Army Strength and Ration State.

288

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ (BRITA)
[illegible] (USSR)
G/11/1
Rome 44.

S.E.R.E.

1. A new method of rendering the strength state of the Italian Army has become necessary and with effect from 25 July it will be rendered in revised form.

2. A new proforma, specimen at Appendix "A" will be used which will incorporate both the strength state and the ration state.

3. The state will be forwarded to this HQ on the 5th, 15th, 25th of each month showing the position as at the preceding 25th, 5th, 15th.

4. The following points are noted for emphasis and clarification:

(a) Every Italian officer and man of the Italian Army must be assigned to a formed unit.

(b) Personnel in process of being assigned to a formed unit will be carried under the heading "Unassigned attached" in the depot or transit camp in which they are situated. Strengths of Depot and Camp staffs must not include those "unassigned attached" which will be shown on a separate line immediately below the entry showing the strength of the Depot or transit camp.

(c) The columns for vehicles and animals shown on the old state, are no longer required.

(d) The order of units and the subdivision into 5 parts, will be the same as in the old state.

(e) The total of the Italian Army is obtained from Columns 1 and 2.

(f) The total of Columns 3 to 14 inclusive will equal the total of columns 1 and 2.

(g) Personnel sick in hospital will not be included in the strength of the hospital staff but shown on a separate line, headed "Patients" immediately below the entry showing the strength of the hospital staff and entered only in Columns 13 and 14. The total should agree with Column 2744 (Refer to our AG/2 of 23 June.)

(h) Personnel temporarily in Transit camps and authorised rations will not be included in the strength of the Transit camp staff or in the strength of the "unassigned attached" since they are already accounted for under the unit to which they are assigned. These personnel will be shown on a separate line, headed "Attached for rations" below the entry "unassigned attached" and only in columns 13 and 14. Personnel on leave are not entitled to rations until they rejoin their assigned unit and will therefore only appear in the state under the heading of their own unit. They will not be included in any Transit camp figures.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

perate with the strength state and the ration state.

3. The state will be forwarded to this HQ on the 5th, 15th, 25th of each month showing the position as at the preceding 25th, 5th, 15th.

4. The following points are noted for emphasis and clarification:

(a) Every Italian officer and man of the Italian Army must be assigned to a formed unit.

(b) Personnel in process of being assigned to a formed unit will be carried under the heading "Unassigned attached" in the Depot or transit camp in which they are situated. Strengths of Depot and Camp staffs must not include these "unassigned attached" which will be shown on a separate line immediately below the entry showing the strength of the Depot or transit camp.

(c) The columns for vehicles and animals shown on the old state, are no longer required.

(d) The order of units and the subdivision into 5 parts, will be the same as in the old state.

(e) The total of the Italian Army is obtained from Columns 1 and 2.

(f) The total of Columns 3 to 14 inclusive will equal the total of columns 1 and 2.

(g) Personnel sick in hospital will not be included in the strength of the hospital staff but shown on a separate line, headed "Patients" immediately under the entry showing the strength of the hospital staff and entered only in Columns 15 and 16. The total should agree with Columns 2744 (Refer to our A4/2 of 23 June.)

(h) Personnel temporarily in Transit camps and authorised rations will not be included in the strength of the Transit camp staff or in the strength of the "unassigned attached" since they are already accounted for under the unit to which they are assigned. These personnel will be shown on a separate line, headed "attached for rations" below the entry "unassigned attached" and only in columns 15 and 16. Personnel on leave are not entitled to rations until they rejoin their assigned unit and will therefore only appear in the state under the heading of their own unit. They will not be included in any Transit camp figures.

(i) Personnel absent without leave for more than 30 days are struck off the strength of the Army. They will not be shown as entitled to rations during such absence.

(j) Personnel in military prisons, either awaiting a sentence, or awaiting trial for more than 30 days, are struck off the strength and will NOT appear in any column. Such personnel will be transferred to civil prisons and draw civil rations (Refer our A4/8 of 23 May and 27 May)

(k) Personnel in military prisons less than 30 days will not be included in the strength of the prison staff but shown on a separate line under heading, "prisoners" immediately below the entry showing the strength of the prison staff and only entered in Columns 15 and 16.

Sheet 2/..

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

(l) Part 5 of the State will only contain units which are available to the Allies for the Allied programme, including those formed and awaiting movement, and those in course of formation including those units in RAMSDEN alerted for shipment to the Main end.

(m) Columns 13 and 15 and 14 and 16 will contain the same figures, except in the case of patients in hospital, prisoners and "attached for rations" in transit camps and where personnel are granted a money allowance in lieu of rations, as in the case with the CC.NR and CC.FF and others.

3. If any further points in the new proforma require clarification, it is requested that the State Registers bring them to the notice of this HQ at the earliest moment.

tw.CPL.

Major General.
Army Pay Corps, A.C.E.

Copy to:- Ministry of War

2743

9324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

STRENGTH STATE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY IN ITALY, SARDINIA, CORSICA AND SICILY 27 42

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH																		
			ABSENT																	
		Total Assigned	Sick in Hospitals		On Leave		AWOL		In Military Prisons		Other Prisoners		Present with Unit		Present Assigned		To be Turned Over		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16			

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ANNEX "A"

STRENGTH STATE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY IN ITALY, SARDINIA, CORSICA AND SICILY 27 [illegible] 43

Total Engaged	STRENGTHS ARMY: Sick in Hospital	On Leave	AWOL	In Military Prisons	Other Prisoners	Present with Unit	To be Issued: Allied Army	To be Issued: Italian	REMARKS
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	

SUBJECT: Strength of CC.RR and GG.FF.

14622

18.

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ (M TA)
LEQUILE (LECCE)
G/6/1
27 June 44.

27A

To: Public Safety Sub Commission, ACC ✓

copy to: HQ ACC
HQ AAI (2)
Minister for War
Chief of Staff, SMRE.

Reference: - your ACC/14622/PS of 20 June 1944.

1. Attention is invited to letter 1605/50/3 (SDI) HQ AAI dated 19 June 1944, addressed to AFHQ. This letter recommends that the ceiling of the CC.RR and the GC.FF shall be 55,000 in case the total ceiling for the Italian Armed Forces is maintained at 44,300.

2. Paragraph 5 of above letter is quoted for your information:

"Personnel in excess of ceiling. 5. The question as to whether part of the administrative establishments, sick, reinforcements and personnel in transit could be carried in excess of the ceiling was considered. In view of the difficulties of implementation and the lack of clothing and other stores it was not found practicable for such personnel to exist on the strength of the Italian Army and be a charge against the Italian Government Administration."

3. The CC.RR and GC.FF are a part of the Italian Armed Forces, and the total strength of these units cannot, in accordance with this letter, exceed 55,000.

4. The strength return submitted by you indicates that as of 1 May the total strength of the CC.RR and GC.FF, including the personnel assigned to military formations was 47,282. It is understood that another seven or eight thousand will be picked up in Rome. The ration strength is, of course, somewhat under this figure inasmuch as some men are given an allowance of money in lieu of rations. However, it is believed that the total figure should be held within 55,000, regardless of the ration strength, for the following reasons:

(a) The Italian Government cannot be allowed to maintain a private Army of any size which is not carried on the strength returns submitted to the Allies.

(b) The maintenance of a private Army would further drain Italian resources which should be used to assist in maintaining the authorised army and decrease the amount of food imported by the Allies. This applies whether or not the personnel is issued army rations or civilian rations.

5. Instructions are in the course of preparation covering the reports to be submitted by the Minister for War on the strength of the Italian Armed Forces. These instructions will provide that all members of the Italian Armed Forces be reported on the strength returns, and that proper deduction be made on the ration demands for personnel not issued rations for any reason.

27A-1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Chief of Staff, SHAEF.

Reference: - your ACC/14622/PS of 20 June 1944.

1. Attention is invited to letter 1605/50/3 (SDI) HQ AAI dated 19 June 1944, addressed to AFHQ. This letter recommends that the ceiling of the CC.RR and the GC.FF shall be 55,000 in case the total ceiling for the Italian Armed Forces is maintained at 444,000.

2. Paragraph 5 of above letter is quoted for your information:

"Personnel in excess of ceiling. 5. The question as to whether part of the administrative establishments, sick, reinforcements and personnel in transit could be carried in excess of the ceiling was considered. In view of the difficulties of implementation and the lack of clothing and other stores it was not found practicable for such personnel to exist on the strength of the Italian Army and be a charge against the Italian Government Administration."

3. The CC.RR and GC.FF are a part of the Italian Armed Forces, and the total strength of these units cannot, in accordance with this letter, exceed 55,000.

4. The strength return submitted by you indicates that as of 1 May the total strength of the GC.RR and GC.FF, including the personnel assigned to military formations was 47,282. It is understood that another seven or eight thousand will be picked up in Rome. The ration strength is, of course, somewhat under this figure inasmuch as some men are given an allowance of money in lieu of rations. However, it is believed that the total figure should be held within 55,000, regardless of the ration strength, for the following reasons:

(a) The Italian Government cannot be allowed to maintain a private Army of any size which is not carried on the strength returns submitted to the Allies.

(b) The maintenance of a private Army would further drain Italian resources which should be used to assist in maintaining the authorised army and decrease the amount of food imported by the Allies. This applies whether or not the personnel is issued army rations or civilian rations.

5. Instructions are in the course of preparation covering the reports to be submitted by the Minister for War on the strength of the Italian Armed Forces. These instructions will provide that all members of the Italian Armed Forces be reported on the strength returns, and that proper deduction be made on the ration demands for personnel not issued rations for any reason.

2791

6. In order to stabilise the strength of the Italian Armed Forces as quickly as possible, it is requested that you issue necessary instructions to the CC.RR and GC.FF that the total combined strength of the two units does not exceed 55,000 and that hereafter the returns submitted to the Minister for War will show:

(a) Total strength of the Forces, regardless of how rationed, in two parts as follows:

(i) Assigned to and operating under command of Army formations, and Headquarters.

(ii) Operating under command of CC.RR and GC.FF

(b) Number of personnel of (ii) above to be issued Army rations.

A. Browning
Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

tvs.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

26A

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

20 June, 1944

see 14601/21 (15B)
see 14601/3 (9B)

ACC/14622/PS

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.AA and GG.FF.

TO : Army Sub-Commission ACC Main HQ (MMIA) LEGHTIE.

125

1. Reference is made to your letter AG/S/1 of 28th May, 1944.

2. The strength of the CC.AA and GG.FF, as certified by their Commanding Generals, are shown in enclosures "A" and "B". No enc

3. It will be noted that they differ considerably from those shown in your letter. The Commanding Generals have been shown your strength returns and can only suppose that your figures are based on the number of rations supplied, whereas their own figures include men who are given an allowance in lieu of rations.

PAUL G. KIRK
Colonel, Inf.
Calif. Public Safety
Sub-Commission

Copy to: File ACC/14601/21/PS
ACC/14601/3/PS

2740

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

25X

NEAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

ACC/14622/23 6 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Strength of CCRA and CGRF.

TO : Army Sub-Commission ACC, Main HQ (MEDLA), Caserta (Rear)

224

With reference to your AG/3/1 dated 28 May 1944, this matter has been taken up with the CCRA and the CGRF and you will be informed of the true strengths of these forces as soon as possible.

A. E. YOUNG, Colonel,
for Deputy Chief, Public
Safety Sub-Commission.

BRE/t

2739

03910

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Place on 1462 - 25A

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.RR

Army Sub-Commission ACC
Main HQ (MMIA)
LECCILE (LECCE)
AG/3/1
28 May 44.

Public Safety Sub-Commission.
ACC.

Reference your letters ACC/14012/PS dated 25 Mar 44 and ACC/14601/8/PS dated 28 Apr. 44.

1. This HQ is advised by the SHAE that the present total strength of the CC.RR in military formations is 20 officers and 1527 other ranks.

2. For your information, the strength returns as of 25 May, show the strength of CC.RR and GG.FF in all Italy, including those with military formations, as

NOT IN MILITARY FORMATIONS		CC.RR		GG.FF
Mainland	271	14,414	99	4,046
Sardinia	53	3,821	28	928
Sicily	121	9,320	23	1,005
For Rome	21	662	19	462
Total.	466	28,217	169	6,441

IN MILITARY FORMATIONS, including
Mainland and Islands — 20 officers, 1527 OR's

3. Since these figures do not closely agree with reports quoted in your letters, it is suggested that action be taken to ascertain the true of the CC.RR and this HQ be advised.

(Sgd) L.Browning,

Major General,
Army Sub-Comm. ACC.

2738

0397

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Ffame 11627 Pgs

MONTHLY RETURN OF STRENGTH - OFF. (April 1944)

HQ-UNITS.	Gen.	Col.	L/Col	Maj.	Capt.	Lieut.	W.O.	Brig	V.Brig	App.	Finanziari.	TOTAL.	Authorised. Estab't.
												12	16
H. Q.	1		4		4	3							
BARI LEGION		2	5	4	8	18	138	121	101	119	899	1416	1412
CAGLIARI "			3	3	6	15	69	71	61	88	630	946	682
MESSINA "		2	4	6	11	8	189	105	83	359	959	1726	1859
NAPOLI "		1	6	6	17	18	242	161	128	332	1243	2154	2145
PALERMO "		1	1	5	6	9	115	81	73	170	586	1046	1305
EPG. "R"					4	17		73			535	646	520
Under Training " RUFIGLIANO"			1		1	1	11	20	21	5	208	268	
TOTAL	1	6	24	24	57	89	764	632	467	1073	5267	8215	7939

2737

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

11622

Translation

HEADQUARTER OF CC.RR. ROMA IN LIBERATED ITALY

8 June 1944 (93 A)

N; 6/3

SUBJECT : Situation of the strength

TO : ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION - Public Safety Sub-Commission

SALERNO

The data given by the Legions to S.M.R.E cannot be the same as those provided by this HQ as the first represent the soldiers really present and eating, while the report forwarded by this office represent the personnel strength of the Legion, absentees included.

The legions, on the 1.st of May, which date the report refers, (see note hereunder quoted) had in force, but not present, 1549 military personnel (on medical furlough, emergency furlough, rest camps etc.)

Moreover in the data concerning the force given by S.M.R.E was not included the military personnel getting the food for cash (far, unconfortable stations, etc.)

In any case, adding to the 28.217 men to be supplied, the 1549 mobilised (included in the report of this HQ in the rank of" mobilised in liberated territory") the 1549 absent from the detachment (in license, rest camps etc.) we have a force of 31293 units, a little lower than the stated one.

The difference, of course, has to be inscribed to that military personnel getting the food for cash.

The Commander, General

Giuseppe Pièche

2736

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET 25532

SUBJECT: Mobile Carabinieri.

AMG Rear Eighth Army. 23A

Executive Commissioner's Branch,
HQ Allied Control Commission.

Copy to Administrative Section, HQ ACC.
DC AMG Region V, Campobasso (For info.RESO)

1. Further to your ACC/14622/PS of 22 May 44 the 150 CCRR dispatched from the BARI Depot duly arrived. 20A

2. Their expeditious dispatch is appreciated.

3. The general appearance, clothing and equipment of the men, considering the circumstances, is good.

4. They are already on duty with formations in the forward area, where their presence has been warmly welcomed by the civilians.

5. In the control of refugees they are of great value.

6. As regards the strength of Mobile Carabinieri with Eighth Army and 5 Corps, this is 223

7. In response to an urgent request from Fifth Army AMG the 38 Carabinieri from NAPLES Depot have been diverted in agreement with this HQ for duty with Fifth Army.

8. The 223 men, so far as can be seen will satisfy the Mobile CCRR needs of Eighth Army and Five Corps AFF.

P.C. Butler Jones

Lt.Col.RA,
for Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMG Eighth Army.

2736

HEADQUARTERS
1 - JUN 944
A.C.C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5.3244

SECRET.

Public Safety 3 A

SUBJECT :- Mobile Carabinieri.

HQ AMG
Rear EIGHTH ARMY.

OA/8/6

26 May 44.

Executive Commissioners Branch
HQ Allied Control Commission.

Copy filed on 14601/38.

Copy to:- Administrative Section,
HQ Allied Control Commission.

20A

1. Reference your ACC/14622/PS of 22 May 44 the strength of Mobile CCRR under Eighth Army is 73.

2. Of this number 64 were handed over by Fifth Army AMG when certain territory was taken over by Eighth Army.

3. Request has been made for reinforcements of 200. (14601/38/PS)

4. If this request is met 273 Mobile CCRR will perform duty with 5 Corps and Eighth Army.

5. There is ample scope of duty for this number of men in the wide area covered by 5 Corps and Eighth Army.

E. L. Lucas.
Major,
S.C.A.P.O.,
for Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMG EIGHTH ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS
A. C. C.
27 MAY 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

f.

20A

REAR HEAD QUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AGC/14623/PS May 22, 1944

SUBJECT : CC.RR. Mobile Group.

TO : SCAPO 8th Army (thru' SCAO)

Will you please inform this HQ the strength of the CC.RR Mobile group attached to AGC 8th Army, and also if in your opinion, the number allotted is sufficient for your requirements.

A. Z. YOUNG, Colonel
Deputy Chief, Public
Safety Sub-Commission.

0386

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

Public Safety Divn.
Rear Echelon

17th May, 1944

Subject: Strength Report of CC.RR and G/F.

To : Chief, Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.C.

1. Comparative strength of Rome Contingent of Carabinieri and Finance Guards.

Carabinieri

Foot	Officers	32	Men	2111
Mounted	"	3	"	71

Finance Guards

	Officers	17	Men520

---

2. Finance Guards assigned "Black Market" Unit:
Men 99

3. Finance Guards proposed to collect Sardinia.
Men 200/300

J.R. POLLOCK
Lt. Col.,
Chief, Public Safety

Copy placed on 1140/2/1
1140/2/3

2732

further report, more details, to follow.

KWF/bca

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
Allied Military Gover ent
APO 394

TO : Rear Headquarters, A.C.C., Public Safety Sub-Commission.

FROM : Regional Public Safety Officer, AMG, Region IV.

SUBJECT : Strength - Police Agencies.

REF : R4/PS/6/12/14.

DATE : 11 May, 1944.

RECEIVED ADJ. SEC
14 MAY 1944
R HQ. A.C.C.

1. Reference your letter of 27 April, 1944 (No. ACC/14601/1 PS) requesting pre-armistice strength of Italian Police Agencies.

2. From best sources available, the following information has been assembled:

CCRR

Rome City (Including Command)	4077
Rome Prov.(Including Lazio Legion Command)	735
Littoria Province	425
Frosinone Province	350
Viterbo Province	368
Rieti	250
Terni	228
Perugia	430
Total	6863

TERRITORIAL LEGION OF THE R. GUARD OF FINANCE OF ROME

		Offrs.	Troops
QUADRO	(Command of the Legion & Co. Command	8	110
SINOTTICO	(Rome Nucleus under direct Command of Commanding General	4	64
	(Company of Rome - 1 Non Com. Offr. (Lieut. of Rome 1 Non Com.		
CIRCOLO	(Lieutenancy of Ripagrande 1 Non Com.		
	(Section of Velletri	3	217

2731

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

REF : R4/PS/6/12/14.

DATE : 11 May, 1944.

R HQ. A.C.

1. Reference your letter of 27 April, 1944 (No. ACC/14601/1 PS) requesting pre-armistice strength of Italian Police Agencies.

2. From best sources available, the following information has been assembled:

CCRR

Rome City (Including Command)	4077
Rome Prov.(Including Lazio Legion Command)	735
Littoria Province	425
Frosinone Province	350
Viterbo Province	368
Rieti	250
Terni	228
Perugia	430
Total	6863

TERRITORIAL LEGION OF THE R. GUARD OF FINANCE OF ROME

		Offrs.	Troops
QUADRO	(Command of the Legion & Co. Command	8	110
SINOTTICO	(Rome Nucleus under direct Command of Commanding General	4	64
	(Company of Rome - 1 Non Com. Offr. (Lieut. of Rome 1 Non Com.		
CIRCOLO	(Lieutenancy of Ripagrande 1 Non Com.		
	(Section of Velletri	3	217
DI	(Company of Littoria - (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Littoria 1 Non Com.	
ROMA	(	Lieutenancy of Formia 1 Non Com.	
	(	(Section of Ponza) 3	110
	(Company of Civitavecchia (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Civitavecchia 1 Non Com	
	(	(Section of S. Marinella 2	116
	(Company of Frosinone (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Frosinone 1 Subaltern	
	(	(Section of Pontecorvo 2	55

14601/1 15A 2731

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

			Offrs.	Troops
CIRCOLO DI PERUGIA	(Company of Viterbo (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Viterbo 1 Subaltern (Section of Tarquinia	2	54
	(Company of Terni (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Terni 1 Subaltern	2	41
	(Company of Rieti (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Rieti 1 Subaltern	2	35
	(Company of Grossoto (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Grosseto 1 Subaltern Section of Orbetello	2	95
	(Company of Perugia (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Perugia 1 Subaltern Section of Spoleto	2	50
CIRCOLO DI CHIETI	(Company of Chieti (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Chieti 1 Subaltern Section of Lanciano	2	71
	(Company of Pescara (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Pescara 1 Subaltern	2	50
	(Company of Aquila (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Aquila 1 Subaltern	2	37
	(Company of Ascoli Piceno (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Ascoli Piceno - 1 Subaltern Section Port of S. George	2	69
		Grand Total	40	1174

Agenti di P.S.

Agenti - Plain Clothes

2730 .

Umbria :	Perugia	30
	Terni	25
Lazio :	Frosinone	50
	Littoria	80
	Rieti	25

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PERUGIA	(Company of Grosseto (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Grosseto 1 Subaltern Section of Orbetello	2	95
	(Company of Perugia (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Perugia 1 Subaltern Section of Spoleto	2	50
CIRCOLO DI CHIETI	(Company of Chieti (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Chieti 1 Subaltern Section of Lanciano	2	71
	(Company of Pescara (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Pescara 1 Subaltern	2	50
	(Company of Aquila (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Aquila 1 Subaltern	2	37
	(Company of Ascoli Piceno (and nucleus P.T.I. (1 Non Com.	Lieutenancy of Ascoli Piceno - 1 Subaltern Section Port of S. George	2	69
		Grand Total	40	1174

Agenti di P.S.

Agenti - Plain Clothes

2730

Umbria :	Perugia	30
	Terni	25
Lazio :	Frosinone	50
	Littoria	80
	Rieti	25
	Rome City	2000
	Viterbo	30

Agenti - Uniformed

Rome City 4000 (of Whom 1000 are mobile).

In Rome, the City Police functions are performed by the Agenti di P. S. as at Naples.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785046

In the other communes of the above named provinces, besides the Royal Carabinieri, the City Firemen also serve as guards, by local authority, and their approximate force may be calculated as 1 man for every 1000 inhabitants.

Municipal Guards

Port Police

Approximate Force - Lazio

Troop Command - Situated in Sabaudia-Frosinone-Viterbo-Rieti
Approximately - 12 Officers
Approximately - 120 Soldiers

Approximate Force - Umbria
Officers - N.N.
Troops - N.N.

Approximate Force - Abbruzzo
Officers - N.N.
Troops - N.N.

Highway Police

Approximate Force - Lazio
Approximately - 16 Officers
Approximately - 240 Soldiers

Approximate Force - Umbria
Approximately - 5 Officers
Approximately - 30 Soldiers

Approximate Force - Abruzzo
Approximately - 4 Officers
Approximately - 24 Soldiers

Forestry Guards

Central Command - Ministry of Agriculture - Rome
Territorial Legion - Via Nazionale

2729

R.T. MILLHOUSE
Lt. Colonel
Regional Public Safety Officer, AMG,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Approximate Force - Lazio

Troop Command - Situated in Sabaudia-Frosinone-Viterbo-Rieti
Approximately - 12 Officers
Approximately - 120 Soldiers

Approximate Force - Umbria
Officers - N.N.
Troops - N.N.

Approximate Force - Abbruzzo
Officers - N.N.
Troops - N.N.

Highway Police

Approximate Force - Lazio
Approximately - 16 Officers
Approximately - 240 Soldiers

Approximate Force - Umbria
Approximately - 5 Officers
Approximately - 30 Soldiers

Approximate Force - Abruzzo
Approximately - 4 Officers
Approximately - 24 Soldiers

Forestry Guards

Central Command - Ministry of Agriculture - Rome
Territorial Legion - Via Nazionale

2729

R.T. MILLHOUSE
Lt. Colonel
Regional Public Safety Officer, AMG,
Region IV.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

0403

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

27 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Strength - police Agencies.

TO : RPSC Region IV.

ACC/14622/PS

Further to this office letter ACC/14601/1/PS dated 13 March 1944, and your reply thereto RH/PS/6 dated 17 March 1944, would you please furnish pre-armistice strengths of CCRR, GCFF, Agenti di P.S. and estimated pre-armistice strengths of Forest Guards and Municipal Guards.

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

2728

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785916

14627

14A

LEGIONE TERRITORIALE DEI CARABINIERI REALI DI NAPOLI

GRUPPO DI CASERTA

T R A N S L A T I O N

15th April 1941.

SUBJECT: Strength Report of the Group.

TO : Lt. Colonel DOHERTY,
Caserta.

Present Strength of Group.....	482
Military strength in the fixed service of the Allies.....	141
Military strength employed for service at the Stations (station commanders and barrack guards).....	112
Strength employed for the Railroads.....	64
Strength for disposal from the three companies of the group (Caserta - S. Maria C.V. - Capua).....	165

VEHICLES CONSIGNED TO GROUP

Group Commandante's automobile - (requisitioned by the General comandante La Brigat e CC.RR for his own use.)
Company Comandante's automobile, Caserta - inefficient.
Automobile of the Comandante of the Tenenza of Caserta.
Company comandante's automobile, S. Maria C.V.
Company comandante's automobile, Capua - inefficient.

In conclusion, the Group, consisting of seven "Comandi di Ufficiali" has in reality only two efficient cars at its disposal.

The Group have the use of two motorcycles which are need to cover the vast territorial expension that extends from S.Maria a Vico a Mignano and from Annibale Bridge (Onlora) by the sea.

We have no telephone at our disposal; neither has the comandante of the Group.

2727.

040 51

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

In order to render the Group efficient and in order that they can ashere to the multiple requests made by the Allies, to whom we have given our fullest collaboration, both intelligent and active, it will be necessary to:

1. Have vehicles assigned to the official commands.
2. Assign to the aforesaid commands at least one motorcycle.
3. Assign an automobile to the Group commander for urgent transport of personnel.
4. Assign to the Group commander, a nucleous of at least 60 men to be used as a personnel reserve for the various stations therefore being able to always keep a stabilized strength at all stations at all times.
5. To have a telephone connection from the Group Commanders office to the Central Allied Telephone Service.

The above necessities are the minimum indispensabilities of the Group in order that it may meet the impellant and urgent needs of the war.

The difference revealed between the report compilated on 21st March N° 900/12-1944 and the present situation is as follows:

1. Releaved of duty..... 10
2. Transferred out of the Group..... 13
3. Temporarily out of the Group..... 35
4. Military sent to Naples to attend an English Language school..... 5

IL MAGGIORE COMANDANTE

=DOMENICO FORNICA=

/S/ DOMENICO FORNICA

/mdp

2726

0406

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

TO : Rear HQ.ACC.FS. Sub-Comm.APO 394

FROM : HQ.Region 5 A.M.G.

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies

REF : R5/514/8

DATE : 15 April 44

Reference your letter ACC/14601/1 dated 13 March 44, it is regretted this return has been delayed. The following are the various strengths of the police agencies in Foggia Province.

CC RR	931
GG RR	241
Agents of P.S.	135
Municipal Guards	358
Forest guards	27

For Regional Commissioner

G. G. Jackson.

G. G. JACKSON
Major
A/R.P.S.O.

GGJ/LL

2725

0807

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Allied Control Commission Military Government
Region 2. Headquarters

Your ref A.C.C/14601/1 — 6H

OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL POLICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER

My ref P S. 19.

Subject Police Agencies Report. 6th April 1944

SECRET

TO : Chief, Public Safety Subcommission, A.C.C. APO394.

The attached GRID showing strength of Police Agencies in Region 2 is submitted as directed.

Roxhead
Captain.
Regional Police Officer.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

REGION 2 - STRENGTH - POLICE AGENCIES

PROVINCE	Carabinieri Officers	Carabinieri O-R-S	Agents. P.S. Officers	Agents. P.S. O-R-S	Guardia Finanza Officers	Guardia Finanza O-R-S	Forest Guards Officers	Forest Guards O-R-S	Municip Officer
MATERA	4	277	1	35	1	31	2	38	1
POTENZA	6	595	8	43	1	54	5	104	1
BARI	9	903	12	298	7	491	2	42	17
BRINDISI	4	225	9	139	2	116	-	2	17
LECCE	18	274	16	80	4	27	1	12	
TARANTO	6	406	16	199	4	185	1	15	2
COSENZA	7	360	5	68	2	170	9	142	1
CATANZARO	9	(x) 879	1	32	4	242	1	94	
REGGIO	8	627	7	196	3	289	4	65	1
T O T A L S	71	4546	75	1110	28	1605	25	514	

(x) 104 in reserve for "R" in addition to numbers shown.

(+) Not yet available.

27.3.194

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

12B

REGION 2 - STRENGTH - POLICE AGENCIES

Carabinieri Officers	O-R-S	Agents. P.S. Officers	O-R-S	Guardia Finanza Officers	O-R-S	Forest Guards Officers	O-R-S	Municipal Guards Officers	O-R-S	Communes
277		1	35	1	31	2	38	1	14	38
595		8	43	1	54	5	104	1	149	91
903		12	298	7	491	2	42	17	110	46
295		9	139	2	116	-	2	17	136	20
274		16	80	4	27	1	12		(+)	94
406		16	199	4	185	1	15	2	193	26
360		5	68	2	170	9	142	1	54	135
(x) 879		1	52	4	242	1	94		(+)	154
627		7	196	3	289	4	65	1	140	89
4546		75	1110	28	1605	25	514			687

(x) Reserve for "R" in addition to numbers shown.

(+) Not available.

Capt.
Regional Police Officer
Region 2.

27.3.1944

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394.

12A

FILE : RPS 014.1. R1/565/17/CPS/BJH.
1/4/44.

SUBJECT : Strength of Police Agencies :

TO : Chief, Public Safety Sub-Commission, — 14601/1
Rear Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(THRU Channels). 6A

Reference memorandum ACC/14601/1 dated 13th March, 1944, and letter from this Headquarters, numbered as above, dated 28th March, 1944 :— 11A

1. Following are the figures by province for the municipal police :

Palermo	-
Catania	259
Messina	200
Trapani	134
Caltanissetta	37
Agrigento	30
Siracusa	36
Ragusa	31
Enna	97
	824.

2722

For the Regional Commissioner :

B. J. Hefford PH 9/4

B. J. HEFFORD,
Major,
Deputy Public Safety Officer.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

FILE : RPS 014.1. R1/565/17/CPS/BJH.

1/4/44.

SUBJECT : Strength of Police Agencies :

TO : Chief, Public Safety Sub-Commission,
Rear Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(THRU Channels).

Reference memorandum ACC/14601/1 dated 13th March, 1944, and letter from this Headquarters, numbered as above, dated 28th March, 1944 :—

1. Following are the figures by province for the municipal police :

Palermo	-
Catania	459
Messina	200
Trapani	134
Caltanissetta	37
Agrigento	30
Siracusa	36
Ragusa	31
Enna	97
	824.

2722

For the Regional Commissioner :

B. J. HEFFORD,
Major,
Asst/Regional Public Safety Officer.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394.

FILE : RPS 014.1. R1/565/17/CPS/BJH.
28/3/44.

SUBJECT : Strength of Police Agencies.

TO : Chief, Public Safety Sub-Commission,
Rear Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(THRU Channels).

Reference memorandum ACC/14601/1 dated 13th March, 1944.

1. I have to submit attached particulars of the strength, by Provinces, of the various Police Agencies in the Island of Sicily.

For the Regional Commissioner :

B. J. HEFFORD,
Major,
A/Regional Public Safety Officer.

2721

Enclosure : List of Police Agencies showing present strengths.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

IIB

Total Strength of Police and Public Security Agents in Sicily.

By Province.

PROVINCE	CC.RR.	FINANCE GUARDS.	Agents OF P.S.	FOREST GUARDS	RAILWAY GUARDS	MUNICIPAL POLICE.	TOTALS.
PALERMO	2756	521	975	52	116		4420
TRAPANI	659	296	113	7	-		1075
AGRIGENTO	725	147	88	7	-		967
CALTANISETTA	318	50	84	8	-		460
ENNA	345	34	25	7	-		411
MESSINA	1549	466	349	58	-		2422
CATANIA	1051	351	431	25	-		1858
SIRACUSA	458	165	115	5	-		743
RAGUSA	263	80	54	2	-		399
RECRUITS IN TRAINING	250	-	-	-	80		330
TOTALS.	8374	2110	2234	171	196	To follow	13085

2720

Figures not to hand, will be sent as soon as possible.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Total Strength of Police and Public Security Agents in Sicily.

By Province.

PROVINCE	CC.RR.	FINANCE GUARDS.	Agents of P.S.	FOREST GUARDS	RAILWAY GUARDS	MUNICIPAL POLICE.	TOTALS.
PALERMO	2756	521	975	52	116		4420
TRAPANI	699	296	113	7	-		1075
AGRIGENTO	725	147	86	7	-		967
CALTANISSETTA	318	50	84	8	-		460
ENNA	345	34	25	7	-		411
MESSINA	1549	466	349	58	-		2422
CATANIA	1052	351	431	25	-		1858
SIRACUSA	458	165	115	5	-		743
RAGUSA	263	80	54	2	-		399
RECRUITS IN TRAINING	250	-	-	-	80		330
TOTALS	8374	2110	2234	171	196	To follow	13085

figures not to hand, will be sent on soon as possible.

27.6.43

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies U-2726 Public Safety

AMG Rear Eighth Army

f: OA/91

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission
Rear HQ, Allied Control Commission
APO 394

30 March 1944

SR.1077

1. Reference your ACC/14601/1 of 13 Mar 44 herewith is return as at 13 Mar 44.

	CAMPOBASSO Province	Occupied part of CHIETI Province
Carabinieri	636	199
Guardia di Finanza	71	20
Agents of Public Security	44	None serving as such (Questura still in Occupied territory)
Forest Guards	70	20
Municipal Guards	190	38

E. Sheen Major
/s/ Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMG Eighth Army.

2718

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Headquarters, Region 6.
APO 397

14601/1

29 MAR 1944

Cagliari, 22 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies.

TO : Rear HQ's, A.C.C., Public Safety Sub-Commission, APO 394.

FROM : Regional Public Safety Officer, A.C.C., Reg. 6, APO 397.

1. In reference to your letter, ACC/14601/1 dated 13 March 1944, we submit the following information concerning the strength by province of each Police agency. These listings include officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

2. a. Carabinieri (Territorial).

Cagliari Province	1,283
Sassari Province	680
Nuoro Province	693
Total,	2,656

Carabinieri (Mobile). Assigned to Army Units and not provincial: 1,731

Carabinieri, Grand Total, 4,387.

b. Guardie di Finanza.

Cagliari Province	596
Sassari Province	359
Nuoro Province	116
Total,	1,071

c. Agents of Public Security.

Cagliari Province	127
Sassari Province	99
Nuoro Province	48
Total,	274

d. Forest Guards.

Cagliari Province	94
Sassari Province	66
Nuoro Province	69
Total,	229

2717

e. Municipal Guards.

Cagliari Province 224

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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d. Forest Guards.

Cagliari Province	94
Sassari Province	66
Nuoro Province	69
Total,	229

2717

e. Municipal Guards.

Cagliari Province	224
Sassari Province	176
Nuoro Province	110
Total,	510

3. 15 non-commissioned officers and 117 men of the Guardie Finanza, included in the above strength report, have received orders to proceed to the mainland.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783019

JEH/wld.

J. E. HUGHES, Capt.,
Regional Public Safety Officer,
ACC, Region 6, Cagliari.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

2716

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
AMG FIFTH ARMY (FIELD)
APO 454 U.S. ARMY

26 March 1944.
203/2

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies.

TO : Public Safety Division,
Rear Headquarters A.C.C.

1. Reference Memo ACC/14601/1 dated 13 March 1944.

2. The following are the available particulars of the police agencies in this Army area:

Province	CCRR	Guardia di Finanza	Agents of Pub. Sec.	Forest Guards	Municipal Guards
Campobasso					
Venafro	46	-	-	-	1
Frosinone					
San Vittore	-	-	-	-	1
Cervaro	-	-	-	-	4
Littoria (Beach)	8	4	5	-	-
5 Army (Field) Mobile	153	-	-	-	-
5 Army (CAS)	1900	500	-	-	-

3. In compiling these figures no return has been made for the forward districts in Naples Province which have been accounted for by Region 3, A.C.C.

4. The policing of the forward Corps Areas is done from the pool of 5 Army (Field) Mobile CCRR while that in Littoria Province is done by the 5 Army (CAS) detachment in addition to [illegible] CCRR who were static in the area on arrival.

2715

E.B. MAYNE,
Lt. Colonel, UDF.,
for C of S.,
AMG 5 Army.

/hdp

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
AMG FIFTH ARMY (FIELD)
APO 464 U.S. ARMY

26 March 1944.
203/2

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies.

TO : Public Safety Division,
Area Headquarters A.C.C.

1. Reference Memo ACC/14601/1 dated 13 March 1944.

2. The following are the available particulars of the police agencies in this Army area:

Province	CCRA	Guardia di Finanza	Agents of Pub. Sec.	Forest Guards	Municipal Guards
Caserta					
Venafro	46	-	-	-	1
Frosinone					
San Vittore	-	-	-	-	1
Cervaro	-	-	-	-	4
Littoria (Beach)	8	4	5	-	-
5 Army (Field) Mobile	153	-	-	-	-
5 Army (CAS)	1900	560	-	-	-

3. In compiling these figures no return has been made for the forward districts in Naples Province which have been accounted for by Region 3, A.C.C.

4. The policing of the forward Corps Areas is done from the pool of 5 Army (Field) Mobile CCRA while that in Littoria Province is done by the 5 Army (CAS) detachment in addition to the 8 CCRA who were static in the area on arrival.

2714

E.B. MAYNE,
Lt. Colonel, UDF.,
for C of S.,
AMG 5 Army.

/hdp

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

FA/mrd

HEADQUARTERS R[illegible]ION 4
Allied Military Government
APO 394

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission

FROM : R.P.S.O. Region 4

SUBJECT : Strength of Police Agencies

REF : R4/P.S./[illegible]

DATE : 17 March 1944

1. In reply to your ACC/14601/1 dated 19 March 1944 it is pointed out that no provinces are at present administered by this Region. Consequently existing personnel Strengths are unknown.

2. Pre-armistice strengths of CC RR, GG FF, and Agenti di P.S. are available.

3. Estimated pre-armistice strengths of Forest Guards and Municipal Guards can be prepared.

R.T. MILLHOUSE
Lt. Col.
Regional Public Safety Officer

2713

0423

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

NEAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

ACC/14601/1

13 March 1944

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies.

TO : RTSC, Regions, I,II,III,IV,V,VI.

It will be appreciated if you will furnish information showing the existing personnel strength-by provinces- of each of the Police Agencies named below;

Carabinieri
Guardia di Finanza
Agents of Public Security
Forest Guards
Municipal Guards

PAUL G. KERN
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

2712

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

	CARABINIERI		GUARDIA FINANZA	
	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.
MAINLAND	194	10,846	111	4,363
SARDINIA	51	3,105	31	1,049
SICILY	118	9,046	19	1,040
	363	22,999	161	6,472
Increase or decrease on last figures published	+6	-303	+ 10	-204

Public Safety

The above extract from State of Italian Army No 14 as at 15 Mar, is forwarded for your information.

Capt for Lt Col
Army Sub-Commission

20 Mar 44

2711

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. ARMY
REGIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICE

PS/3

17 March 1944

17 MAR 1944
A.C.C.

SUBJECT: Strengths - Police Agencies.

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission, Rear HQ. ACC.

1. In reply to your letter ACC/14601/1 dated 13 March 1944, information required is as follows:

	Naples Prov.	Avellino Prov.	Benevento Prov.	Salerno Prov.
Carabinieri	3860	610	570	1200
Guardia di Finanza	1353	57	160	402
P.S. Agents	3500	85	99	229
Forest Guards	66	64	53	104
Municipal Guards	—	204	214	292

C.T. FRANCIS
Lieut. Colonel, G.S.,
Regional Public Safety Officer.

jb/tp.

2710

{Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

V-1616

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. ARMY
REGIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICE

HEAD
17 MAR 194
A. C. C.

PS/3

17 March 1944

SUBJECT: Strengths - Police Agencies.

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission, Rear HQ. ACC.

1. In reply to your letter ACC/14601/1 dated 13 March 1944, information required is as follows:

	Naples Prov.	Avellino Prov.	Benevento Prov.	Salerno Prov.
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Forest Guards	66	64	53	104
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C.F. FRANCIS
Lieut. Colonel, G.S.,
Regional Public Safety Officer.

jb/tp.

2769

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

0428

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

NEAR EADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

13 March 1944

ACC/11601/1

SUBJECT: Strength of Police Agencies

TO : SCAPO 5th Army - 84
SCAPO 8th Army - 350

It will be appreciated if you will furnish such information as may be in your possession relating to the existing strength by provinces if possible within your Jurisdictions - of each of the Police Agencies named below:

Carabinieri
Guardia di Finanza
Agents of Public Security
Forest Guards
Municipal Guards.

for PAUL O. FIEL
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

BP/kgd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

QS74

9 March 1944

TO: Administrative Section.

Ag 1440/1 GE M.

The attached extract from the State of the Italian Army as at 20 Feb 44 is passed to you for information of Public Safety.

	CARABINIERI		GUARDIA FINANZA	
	OFFR'S	O. Rs.	OFFR'S	O. Rs.
MAINLAND	168	11,053	101	4,579
SARDINIA	51	3,103	31	1,057
SICILY	118	9,046	19	1,040
	357	23,202	151	6,676

Lt. Col.

(G. W. QUINSMITH)
Army Sub-Commission

Copy each 5 14001/2

14012/

2708

See Min file Strength Police agencies

0430

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Admin Sec

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION QS/mms

APO 394

In reply refer to: QS 10 17 February 1944

SUBJECT: Increase in strength of the Carabinieri.

TO : Administrative Section, Main Headquarters, ACC, Naples.

Your draft AMG/014.12/AD refers. Present strength of Carabinieri on 20 January 1944, was 18,712. I have not accurate figures for Sardinia and Sicily but will endeavor to obtain same shortly. As the Carabinieri is an integral part of the Italian Army (not Guardia Finanza), their strength must, of course, be correlated to total strength allowed to the Italian Army under the ration policy recently enunciated by A.F.H.Q.

For your information, this office informed A.C.M.F. on January 29 that it was considered that Carabinieri up to a total of 34,000 (exclusive Sardinia) would be necessary when territory up to the line PISA-RIMINI had been occupied. Gradual recruiting up to this strength with the advance of the Armies should present no particular difficulty in provision of supplies, providing that strengths are regularly reported through normal channels to the Italian General Staff (Stato Maggiore) so that they will be brought under computation for rations by this Sub-Commission.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

G. W. Quinsmith Lt. Col.

(G. W. QUINSMITH)
Army Sub-Commission)

Copy to: MMIA

2707

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Admin Sec

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION QS/mms

APO 394

17 February 1944

In reply refer to: QS 10

SUBJECT: Increase in strength of the Carabinieri.

TO : Administrative Section, Main Headquarters, ACC, Naples.

Your draft AMG/014.12/AD refers. Present strength of Carabinieri on 20 January 1944, was 18,712. I have not accurate figures for Sardinia and Sicily but will endeavor to obtain same shortly. As the Carabinieri is an integral part of the Italian Army (not Guardia Finanza), their strength must, of course, be correlated to total strength allowed to the Italian Army under the ration policy recently enunciated by A.F.H.Q.

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For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

Lt. Col.

(G. W. QUINSMITH)
Army Sub-Commission)

2707

Copy to: MMIA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1B 24

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
(Salerno Detachment).
APO 394

Administrative Half Section.

AHQ/C1A.12/AD 28 January 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Recruiting.

TO: D.C.C.A.O., HQ., A.M.G., A.P.O. 394.

1. Recommend the attached draft be executed in final form, signed and despatched.

2. It will confirm program planned by Generals Alexander, McSherry and Colonel Spofford, which is actually in effect at the present time.

H.R. GRITTS,
Lt.Colonel,
for the Vice Pres. Administrative Half Section.

Encl: Draft Administrative Order.

2706

0433

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Strength of C.C.R.R. —

ID

Sicily - 9000

Sardinia 2200 11200.

Strength of Guardia di Finanza

Italy 1641

Sardinia 1355

Reg. II 5295

Reg. III 2341

Lazio - Umbria, Marche
Abruzzi e Molise 3547

14179

2705

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

4. His bank is not in this city.
5. This beautiful young (lady) is my wife.
6. The son is very strong.
7. The weather is better now, but it is cold.
8. The friends are in the station.

II

1. We are three students and one soldier.
2. She is the daughter of Mr. Jones.
3. Do you want to go to a movie, Miss?
4. They want to work in the bank.
5. Doesn't he understand Italian well?
6. Where is your friend from?
7. She has married her cousin.
8. What is your sister's name?

III

1. The friends of John are strong.
2. The ladies and the gentlemen work here.
3. The sons and the daughters work in (the) city.
4. We work and we study.
5. He is called Peter and she is called Mary.
6. What are the names of your brother and sister?
7. What work do you do, Joseph?
8. The friends of my wife are Mary and Louise.

0435