

785016

ACC

10000/143/1559
(1ST)

REF
SEP

785016

0000/143/1559
(ST)

REFORMATION OF POLICE & DECREE ON INCREASE OF CCRR
SEPT. 1944 - OCT. 1945

MANUScript SHEET

35 (cont)

To: Director, P.S. (cont)

As regards the last sub-para of the draft I left this matter rather in the air because I feel it waits dealing with separately. If, as Major General Browning said this morning, the supply of vehicles for the Italian Army and therefore for the Carabinieri is in a desperate state, I do not know where we are going to get transport for these other Police Agencies.

I feel we shall have to determine what is the absolute minimum amount of motor transport required by these two Agencies and then possibly put in to AMHQ on the lines that it must be part of the question of the purchase of war material in this country if such a matter is under consideration.

McCartney
Brigadier,
VP CA Section.

28 Aug 45.

- 36 -

V.P. C.A. Section -

Letter submitted for signature
Chapman
Col. - D.P.A.

30 Aug 45

37.

Executive Committee

I think 25A is the letter you are interested in. Reply at 45A.

6 Sept. 45 -

V.S.K. 6/9.

Chapman
Col. - D.P.A.

V.P. O.H. [unclear]
Letter submitted for signature
Chapman
6-1-68 P.P.

37.

Executive Commission.
I think SSA is the letter you are
interested in. Reply at SSA. Chapman
6 Sept. 68- 6-1-68 P.P.

V.S.h. 6/8.

3916

Minute 30

To : Chief Commissioner, through Civil Affairs Section.

Draft of letter in answer to 35A submitted for approval and signature.

John W. Chapman

JOHN W. CHAPMAN, Col.

6 August 1945.

VP For approval - ? para 2

To Exec.

Draft letter for approval.

wrap up. spec

(M)

list

V.P. See my comments in the draft.

WV 13/8

V.P. CA Section

This 42A draft letter for signature please

Chapman
Col. A.P.D.

24 Aug. 45.

785016

V.P. See my comment in the draft.

HR/13/8

W.P. CA Section
This is a Draft letter for signature please

Chapman
Col. D.P.D.
3015

24 Aug. 63.

- 35 -

TO: Director, Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1. At 42 A is a re-draft of your letter on this subject. I have shown it to the Executive Commissioner and he agrees. You may have some amendments to make, in which case please refer to me. Otherwise, have the letter typed for my signature.
2. As regards para 4 of the draft, we discussed this matter this morning with MIA and you should pursue actively the matter of obtaining equipment and vehicles for the Carabinieri.

As regards para 5, presumably the materials most urgently required for Agents of Public Security and Finance Guards are cloth and leather for boots. It was agreed that you would endeavour to find out where stocks of these commodities were so that, if necessary, we could get AMIQ to release them and if it was not a matter for AMIQ, MA take the matter up with the civilian control bodies in Milan.

25-

C.D. Section:

Letter at 36A submitted for approval and signature by Chief Commissioner. 24 July 1945

W. D. P. A.

Executive Commission

Public Safety

29

You are asking for his file and, by doing so, keep
coals of fire on my head! I don't like this letter
and yet find difficulty in suggesting the right answer.
I agree with para 2 (but would like to state my
point with fewer references!)
But where I am really stuck is whether we ought
to advise using Allied Police Officer for instruction after
the end of August. I entirely agree about Provost Schools

Will you consider that?

Perhaps you are now ready to send a
complete answer. ACHQ para 7 included

28 July

W. D. P. A. 1.601
CAS

deals of part on my
 and yet find difficulty in suggesting the right answer.
 I agree with para 2 (but would like to state my
 point with fewer references.)
 But where I am really stuck is whether we ought
 to advise using Allied Police Officers for instruction after
 the end of August. I entirely agree about Forest schools

Will you consider that?
 Perhaps you are now ready to send a
 complete answer - ACHQ para 7 included
 W.D. Benham
 CAS.

28 July

3514

in a minute suggesting that this
is NOT the time to pass such
a decree even although it is known
to be necessary to increase the
strength.

Time will be soon enough when
CCS have given their decision
The decree after all is prepared.

J.

8

Col. Chapman

Presumably this has already been

dealt with

Howden Lt Col

16 April 1945

-9-

V.P. CAS

We cannot agree to any such decree so long
as the present CCS commitment on rationing ~~is~~ figures
is effect.

16 Apr. 1945

Chapman
Lt Col. R.P.A.

(10)

Land Forces HQ Will you kindly inform the Ministry of War that no such
decree can be passed at this stage H. J. Benham Lt Col CAS. 17 April

Mise Geo

War Minister wants to have a Decree passed authorizing raising of CRR ceiling to 65000 to be reached gradually.

War Minister has asked Mayor Baumann if we agree.

Noone has written a letter, but a copy of the attached (in Italian is said by M. Barloni to have been handed to Col. Chapman). I do not know if any action was taken - files show none.

Baumann has prepared the translation (attached) of preamble and Decree.

For decision

Can the War Minister go forward and put decree to Council of Ministers?

Gen Brunetti may have asked Col Chapman this when he handed over his copy.

ANSWER

Appears to be that the matter should be put to Bug upjohn

(A Section (for Chief Commissioner)
Letter to AFHQ amended as directed submitted
for signature
17 June 1945
Chapman
Col. D.D.O.

25
Ex. Commissioner
Letter now amended and submitted for signature of Chief
Commissioner
18 June
H.D. Bhandarkar Lt. Col.

26
S. 18/45

Chief Commissioner.

1. The letter prepared opposite presents the case to AFHQ for the handling of the administration of the C3.RR, i.e., clothing, equipment, etc., by MIA with particular reference to the granting of a higher priority for this force than has hitherto been provided. The matter is highly contentious and as you see from Minute No. 22 on the page underneath, General Browning takes exception to the letter.
2. I think there is something to be said for his criticism made in para 3 of that minute.
3. The whole matter is highly unsatisfactory and I think there are faults on both sides. If, however, we are to press, as I hope we shall, for the immediate despatch of a special police mission, I am not sure that we should continue the controversy which reflects divergence of views in this Headquarters.
4. On the other hand you may wish to place on record the unsatisfactory attitude of MIA in this connection.

Chief Commissioner.

1. The letter prepared opposite presents the case to MIA for the handling of the administration of the SS.RR, i.e., clothing, equipment, etc., by MIA with particular reference to the granting of a higher priority for this force than has hitherto been provided. The matter is highly contentious and as you see from Minute No.22 on the page underneath, General Browning takes exception to the letter.

2. I think there is something to be said for his criticism made in para 3 of that Minute.

3. The whole matter is highly unsatisfactory and I think there are faults on both sides. If, however, we are to press, as I hope we shall, for the immediate despatch of a special police mission, I am not sure that we should continue the controversy which reflects divergence of views in this Headquarters.

4. On the other hand you may wish to place on record the unsatisfactory attitude of MIA in this connection.

29. June. 45.

MSL 3912

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

JUN 30 11 27 AM '45

27

CA Jue

Letter signed by the Chief Commr is returned to you for despatch
copies have been withdrawn for the Chief Commr & K.C. files.

E. H. Sinden
Major

2/7
for despatch
C.P.S.

21
 Major-General L. Browning,
 GCC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MIA).

1. Please see draft letter opposite which I propose to recommend to the Chief Commissioner should be sent to AFHQ.
2. The proper equipment and maintenance of CC.RR is vital to the tranquillity of the country. It has lagged behind that of the Army. The roles should now be reversed.

11. June. 45.

M.A.
 Brigadier,
 Executive Commissioner.

22
H.Q. A.C. (for Executive Commissioner)

1. Noted. 30A
2. The views of Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA) remain as in our A.O18 of 11 Apr and are in agreement with AFHQ letter G-5 O14.12 of 11 May, which clearly stated the INTENTION of AFHQ in this matter.
3. While I do not wish to argue on the dialectics of words in your proposed letter, I must take exception to your para 5 therein. MIA has been totally unable to obtain correct and up-to-date inventories of CCRR stocks from Public Safety Sub Commission. Such statements as have been produced have been spasmodic and incorrect. Without knowledge of what stocks CC RR had on hand, MIA (as the independent supply agency specifically charged with correct and economical distribution) could not of course blindly meet all requests which might well not be necessary. Nevertheless CCRR have been treated on a footing of absolute equality as regards quality and quantity (subject to remarks as above) with the Italian Army.
4. Lastly, I would mention that in your proposed letter you ignore that I have frequently represented in this and other cases, where you desire to transfer responsibility, that MIA has more than enough on its plate without being saddled with further tasks - an aspect which AFHQ agreed with when turning down your application to transfer P.W. responsibility to MIA.

3011

1. Notes.

2. The views of Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA) remain as in our A.O.16 of 14 Apr and are in agreement with AFHQ letter C-5 014.12 of 11 May, which clearly stated the INTENTION of AFHQ in this matter.

3. While I do not wish to argue on the dialectics of words in your proposed letter, I must take exception to your para 5 therein. MMIA has been totally unable to obtain correct and up-to-date inventories of CRRR stocks from Public Safety Sub Commission. Such statements as have been produced have been spasmodic and incorrect. Without knowledge of what stocks CC RR had on hand, MMIA (as the independent supply agency specifically charged with correct and economical distribution) could not of course blindly meet all requests which might well not be necessary. Nevertheless CRRR have been treated on a footing of absolute equality as regards quality and quantity (subject to remarks as above) with the Italian Army.

4. Lastly, I would mention that in your proposed letter you ignore that I have frequently represented in this and other cases, where you desire to transfer responsibility, that MMIA has more than enough on its plate without being saddled with further tasks - an aspect which AFHQ agreed with when turning down your application to transfer F.W. responsibility to MMIA.

3511

R. Browning

Major-General
MMIA

12 June 45

23

CASec

Ref M19 please submit letter for signature
by CC in accordance with your draft, as
amended.

Office of EC
16/6/45

E. Gordon

Ex Com
TO: G-3-C.

20

Reorganisation of CC.RR

1. Reference to minutes 18 and 19 and draft letter submitted for approval.
2. These minutes refer to misunderstandings which have arisen between Public Safety S/C, Land Forces S/C (MMIA) and G-5 AFHQ over the fixing of responsibility for the administration and control of the CC.RR, which date from the time (7 Apr 45) when the Committee in this HQ, formed to consider the reorganisation of the CC.RR, presented its report.
3. Land Forces Sub-Commission in para 2 (a) of folio 18B says that "MMIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.RR". AFHQ in para 2 of folio 30A says "MMIA responsibility for their (CC.RR) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations".
4. Minute 18 and draft letter in an endeavour to clarify the position develops a line of argument, based on AFHQ directive at 18D, that Land Forces S/C is responsible not only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.RR, but for the supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals and discipline, whilst maintaining that the responsibility of Public Safety S/C is limited to directing the operational use of CC.RR as police.
5. The object of the letter is :
 - (a) to obtain clarification in responsibilities of Land Forces S/C and Public Safety S/C, and
 - (b) assuming that Public Safety's contention is correct, to bring about a much needed improvement in the food and clothing supply situation of the CC.RR.
6. In my opinion AFHQ's directive of 16 Nov contains ambiguities, but I think Public Safety's line of argument should be fruitful and lead to a clear definition of the responsibility once and for all. Everything possible should be done to secure an early examination of the case by AFHQ and a ruling without delay.

*I think CAS letter is excellent
& should be sent*

Office of Executive Commissioner,
8 June 45.

E. 9/6.

E. Sharden.
Major.

(5)

19.

Exec Comm.

Please see the excellent Minute 18 and draft proposed letter to AFHQ. I entirely agree with them and have discussed the matter at length with PS.

I have suggested certain small amendments to the letter which PS agree.

I am sure the only way in which we can improve the standard of clothing and equipment of the CC RR is to make MIA responsible for seeing not merely that a release for a certain quantity of clothing and equipment is given but also

- (a) that the clothing and equipment in respect of which the release is given exists and
- (b) that it is in serviceable condition and
- (c) that it reaches the persons for whom it is intended.

P.S. on their part are already arranging for the R.P.S.O.S. to send a inspector to the depot concerned when drawing clothings.

This letter has not been agreed with MIA.

CA Section
7 June 45

G.R. UFFORD
VP CA Section

(c) that it reaches the persons for whom it is intended.

P.S. on their part are already arranging for the R.P.S.O.S. to send a inspector to the depot concerned when draving clothins.

This letter has not been agreed with MIA.

J. J. [Signature]
S.S. UPJOHN BRIG,
VP CA Section

CA Section
7 June 45

3809

TO: Chief Commissioner (Through C.A. Section)

1. It is now almost three weeks since you wrote letter 3626/EC dated 19 May, 1945 to G-5, AFHQ (folio 31A) recommending revision of the responsibilities of Land Forces S/C (MMIA) and Public Safety S/C in their respective dealings with CC.RR. To this letter no reply has been received and I believe that a further letter should be sent in clarification of our position.

2. It will be recalled that under date of 7 April, 1945, your committee submitted its report on Reorganization of the Carabinieri and other Police Forces in Italy (folio 18C) in which it was recommended "that the respective responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission should correspond exactly with those of the War Ministry and Ministry of the Interior of the Italian Government" Major General Browning, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) in his Memorandum of 11 April, 1945, (folio 18B) took exception to that recommendation stating that "MMIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.RR." In support of his exception the General quotes from para 24 of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November, 1945, (folio 18D) and suggests that an alteration of that paragraph would have to be effected by AFHQ before any alteration in duties could be made. In consideration of the General's exception, the Acting Executive Commissioner under date of 14 April, 1945, wrote to G-5, AFHQ (folio 18A) requesting assurance that the Committee's recommendation would not be inconsistent with any directives issued to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). On 11 May, 1945, G-5 AFHQ replied (folio 30A) that MMIA responsibility for CC.RR. is specifically limited to seeing that they are supplied with rations and that it has no responsibility for their organization or supervision. Then followed your letter already referred to (folio 31A).

3. I have briefly reviewed the correspondence in order to point out the misconceptions, the inconsistencies, and the lack of understanding in regard to the subject of responsibilities in connection with Carabinieri.

Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) in his Memorandum of 11 April, 1945, (folio 18B) took exception to that recommendation stating that "MMIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.RR." In support of his exception the General quotes from para 24 of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November, 1945, (folio 18D) and suggests that an alteration of that paragraph would have to be effected by AFHQ before any alteration in duties could be made. In consideration of the General's exception, the Acting Executive Commissioner under date of 14 April, 1945, wrote to G-5, AFHQ (folio 18A) requesting assurance that the Committee's recommendation would not be inconsistent with any directives issued to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). On 11 May, 1945, G-5 AFHQ replied (folio 30A) that MMIA responsibility for CC.RR. is specifically limited to seeing that they are supplied with rations and that it has no responsibility for their organization or supervision. Then followed your letter already referred to (folio 31A).

3. I have briefly reviewed the correspondence in order to point out the misconceptions, the inconsistencies, and the lack of understanding in regard to the subject of responsibilities in connection with Carabinieri.

4. The basic directive on the subject is indisputably AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 dated 16 November, 1944 and entitled "Command and Administration of Italian Army". (folio 18D).

5. The first point, which, from the correspondence, seems to be a little hazy in the minds of some, is whether the CC.RR. are units of the Italian Army or not. For example, in the letter from G-5 AFHQ of 11 May, 1945, (folio 30A) it is stated, "While historically the CC.RR. are Army personnel," thus implying that actually they are not, but that they are in a sort of twilight zone. Even the AFHQ directive itself contains unfortunate, inconsistent and confusing language on this point which was used by General Browning as the basis for his position. In para 24 it is stated, "The Carabinieri, except those units within Army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police organization." However, para 24 is only one paragraph under Section IV of the directive, which section is entitled "Italian Army Units Maintained Internationally". The first paragraph of the section, para 23 of the directive, is entitled "Organization" and states that

Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) in his Memorandum of 11 April, 1945, (folio 18B) took exception to that recommendation stating that "MMIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.RR." In support of his exception the General quotes from para 24 of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November, 1945, (folio 18D) and suggests that an alteration of that paragraph would have to be effected by AFHQ before any alteration in duties could be made. In consideration of the General's exception, the Acting Executive Commissioner under date of 14 April, 1945, wrote to G-5, AFHQ (folio 18A) requesting assurance that the Committee's recommendation would not be inconsistent with any directives issued to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). On 11 May, 1945, G-5 AFHQ replied (folio 30A) that MMIA responsibility for CC.RR. is specifically limited to seeing that they are supplied with rations and that it has no responsibility for their organization or supervision. Then followed your letter already referred to (folio 31A).

3. I have briefly reviewed the correspondence in order to point out the misconceptions, the inconsistencies, and the lack of understanding in regard to the subject of responsibilities in connection with Carabinieri.

4. The basic directive on the subject is indisputably AG 091.711/169 GCT-O dated 16 November, 1944 and entitled "Command and Administration of Italian Army". (folio 18D).

5. The first point, which, from the correspondence, seems to be a little hazy in the minds of some, is whether the CC.RR. are units of the Italian Army or not. For example, in the letter from G-5 AFHQ of 11 May, 1945, (folio 30A) it is stated, "While historically the CC.RR. are Army personnel," thus implying that actually they are not, but that they are in a sort of twilight zone. Even the AFHQ directive itself contains unfortunate, inconsistent and confusing language on this point which was used by General Browning as the basis for his position. In para 24 it is stated, "The Carabinieri, except those units within Army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police organization." However, para 24 is only one paragraph under Section IV of the directive, which section is entitled "Italian Army Units Maintained Internationally". The first paragraph of the section, para 23 of the directive, is entitled "Organization" and states that

"These units," (that is, Italian Army units) "are divided into three categories." The third category is listed as "Para - Military personnel. i.e. Carabinieri the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration". Therefore, regardless of the statement that the CC.RR. "are a civil police organization," the directive designates them as Italian Army units and as such they are subject to all of the General provisions of the directive relating to Allied Control and General Organization and Administration to the same degree as other Italian Army units. Also Carabinieri are definitely recognized as Italian Army units by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their fixing the ceiling of the Italian Army.

6. Para 3 of the directive provides that control of the Italian Army (including all units listed) is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission. This begins the fixing of responsibility. In para 4, MMIA is specifically made responsible for supervision of administration and supply. Again in para 8a it is provided that in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MMIA for the Administration of all categories except as otherwise specified in the directive and there is no exception relating to CC.RR. Then in para 8d, it is further provided that the general administration of the Italian Army (all units presumably) is vested in the Ministry for War. Finally in para 24 it is provided that the CC.RR. are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, who is a general of the army and who is responsible to the Ministry of War. This chain of command, administration, supervision and control is all the responsibility of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). Public Safety Sub-Commission comes into the picture only by virtue of one sentence in para 24 of the AFHQ letter which states that "The Carabinieri---- are a civil police organization---- directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission." Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of Carabinieri as police, which is substantially the same responsibility as is vested in the Ministry of Interior.

7. From this analysis it would seem that no revision of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 DATED 16 November, 1944, is necessary to accomplish the recommendation of your committee in its report of 7 April 1945. It would appear that the respective responsibilities already exist within the structure of the directive although not expressed in terms of comparison with the respective Ministries. A clear recognition

is no exception relating to CC.RR. Then in para 8d, it is further provided that the general administration of the Italian Army (all units presumably) is vested in the Ministry for War. Finally in para 24 it is provided that the CC.RR. are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, who is a general of the army and who is responsible to the Ministry of War. This chain of command, administration, supervision and control is all the responsibility of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). Public Safety Sub-Commission comes into the picture only by virtue of one sentence in para 24 of the AFHQ letter which states that "The Carabinieri---- are a civil police organization---- directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission." Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of Carabinieri as police, which is substantially the same responsibility as is vested in the Ministry of Interior.

7. From this analysis it would seem that no revision of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GGT-0 DATED 16 November, 1944, is necessary to accomplish the recommendation of your committee in its report of 7 April 1945. It would appear that the respective responsibilities already exist within the structure of the directive although not expressed in terms of comparison with the respective Ministries. A clear recognition of this situation would be sufficient to justify opening discussions with the Prime Minister on the subject of reorganization of the police forces of Italy.

8. I am submitting for your approval and signature a letter to G-5 AFHQ embodying the foregoing idea and pressing for a considered reply.

John W. Chapman
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
D.P.S.

Tel Ext 686
Room 8, 5th Floor
PS S/C

5 June 1945

15

CASec

as arranged letter referred to in your 14 is returned unsigned for modification in view of signal from AFHQ - FX 69806 of 3/5/45.

Shorden may

Office of EC
4 May 45

16

Ex. Commission

letter submitted for Chief Commission. As you know, the long delays are due to the situation changing so rapidly that drafts were out of date before signed

A. Bombardier 1.6.45
CAS

6 May

Executive

17

CA Section

Letter signed by CC as requested & returned herewith for despatch. Copies have been withdrawn for CC & EC files

10/5/45

Shorden may

Letters submitted for Chief Commissioners. As you know, the long delays are due to the situation changing so rapidly that drafts were out of date before signed
6 May
A. D. Bonham
CAS

Executive

17

CA Section

Letter signed by CC as requested & returned herewith for despatch. Copies have been withdrawn for CC & EC files

10/5/45

A. D. Bonham

• 3506

MINUTE SHEET I

①

To: C.O.S.

See 7a)

Present to you for information & return please.
S.P. Chapman

6. OCT. 44.

CH.

②

Thank you. I do not quite understand the

implication of 11 last sentence.

W.C.

To: P.S.

③

See minute 2 above

Will you explain this please.

8. OCT. 44.

S.P. Chapman

To: C.A. Section.

(4)

As a result of the Caretta and Regina Coeli incidents, the question of the efficiency of Italian Police has been raised. Reorganization is a matter for the Italian Government. Commanding Generals CC.RR. CG.FF and the Director General of Public Security, Ministry of the Interior have all agreed that morale is low, and that energetic measures must be taken to improve matters. Proposals for re-organization will be made by them and the result reported.

John W. Chapman
John W. Chapman.

9 Oct. 44.

⑤

To: P.S.

To: P.S.

(3)

Re: minute 2 above

Will you explain this please.

J.P. Chapman

8 Oct. 44.

To: C.A. Section.

(4)

As a result of the Carretta and Regina Coeli incidents, the question of the efficiency of Italian Police has been raised. Reorganization is a matter for the Italian Government. Commanding Generals CC.RR, CG.FF and the Director General of Public Security, Ministry of the Interior have all agreed that morale is low, and that energetic measures must be taken to improve matters. Proposals for re-organization will be made by them and the result reported.

John W. Chapman
John W. Chapman.

9 Oct. 44.

(5)

To: P.S.

4 above re: 11 Oct. 44

I do not propose to send the book until you report is submitted. Thank you.

31.05

J.P. Chapman

9 Oct. 44

(6)

C.A. Section:

90.10^a forwarded for information.

J.P. Chapman

16/10/44

Noted thank you

CRS.

MINUTE 47.CC.BR. Reorganization.

Reference is made to Memorandum N. 3626/42/3C, dated 19th March, 1945, by the Executive Commissioner.

Public Safety Sub-Commission will be pleased to nominate a member to the Sub-Committee to consider the reorganization of the Italian Police referred to as CC.BR in the memorandum.

The terms of reference suggested are:-

1. Whether or not to unify all police agencies.
2. To determine the control, management and equipment of the police as a whole.
3. Review of officers at present in office, their screening, future selection, recruitment and training.
4. Recruitment and training of all police agencies.

Attention is directed to :-

1. EAM 487 "New Deal for Italy", Schedule C, para. 1; wherein it is laid down that the Allied Commission will not concern itself with the organization of the Italian Police. This Commission will therefore be in direct contravention of the directive.

2. The representations made by the Chief Commissioner at the instigation of the Public Safety Sub-Commission on 26th November, 1944 and again on the 11st December, 1944, suggesting such a Committee; the reply by H.E. Bond on the 28th December, 1944, of which the following are excerpts:-

"the frame of the police taken as a whole is still

- of the police as a whole.
3. Review of officers at present in office, their screening, future selection, recruitment and training.
 4. Recruitment and training of all police agencies.

Attention is directed to :-

1. PAN 487 "New Deal for Italy", Schedule C, para. 1: wherein it is laid down that the Allied Commission will not concern itself with the organisation of the Italian Police. This Committee will therefore be in direct contravention of the directive.

2. The representations made by the Chief Commissioner at the invitation of the Public Safety Sub-Commission on 26th November, 1944 and again on the 31st December, 1944, suggesting such a Committee; the reply by H.B. Bonomi on the 28th December, 1944, of which the following are excerpts:-

"the frame of the police taken as ^{whole} ~~is~~ still sound".

"if there are faults they must be ascribed to the general state of disorder in which the whole country finds itself - these faults will therefore disappear at the end of this crisis."

"The competent officers are making the necessary studies and as soon as these studies have reached a concrete phase I will gladly follow your suggestion and entrust a commission with the task of examining them thoroughly in detail. I shall be most glad if technical members of the Allied Commission will participate in it".

This latter excerpt is of a date before PAN 487 and it will require careful decision if such technical advice can

be forced upon or given without reference to the draftsman of the New Deal. Failure to do this would involve the Commission in a responsibility which may have serious repercussions. If we force our formulas on the Italian Government, we must expect to have a certain degree of responsibility if things go wrong.

It is of note that any serious disturbances have occurred in liberated Italy since it was handed over; specific cases being:-

1. Catania
2. Ragusa
3. Rome Caretta incident
4. Rome Roatta incident.

Item 4 at the Viminale was one in which Metropolitan Police and not CC.RR were concerned.

It is conceded that all is not well in the Police set up in Italy, and may worsen.

The impregnation of officers in the CC.RR with a wholly military background is bad. A Police trained CC.RR officer must be exclusively appointed to that branch of the service and here it is pointed out that the attempt to place MIA in control of the CC.RR will be a retrograde step. They have no conception of police duty as such and all the military training in the world will not make policemen.

The CC.RR do not operate as an army in battle formation but as isolated units.

To train them for such work is what is required and if some form of training could be devised that will meet the approval of the Italian Government and not cross the conditions of the New Deal it would be the first step to a satisfactory public safety organisation.

The strength of the combined Italian Police Force is

It is conceded that all is not well in the Police set up in Italy, and may worsen.

The impregnation of officers in the CC.RR with a wholly military background is bad. A Police trained CC.RR officer must be exclusively appointed to that branch of the service and here it is pointed out that the attempt to place MIA in control of the CC.RR will be a retrograde step. They have no conception of police duty as such and all the military training in the world will not make policemen.

The CC.RR do not operate as an army in battle formation but as isolated units.

To train them for such work is what is required and if some form of training could be devised that will meet the approval of the Italian Government and not cross the conditions of the New Deal it would be the first step to a satisfactory public safety organization.

The strength of the combined Italian ~~Police~~ ^{Police} Forces is approximately double that of Britain in relation to its population and by careful recruitment, training and improved conditions in the Italian Force it would be possible to eliminate the rotten core that permeated the Italian Government during the Fascist Régime and bring about a Force which would be democratic in its outlook and make for a well ordered Italy.

The trained Allied police personnel at present in the country is much too occupied to devote itself to the training of the Italian police at present unless the members selected were released from all other duties.

Otherwise it would mean calling for a Police Expert from the U.S. or Britain, whichever code the Italian Government decided to adopt.

Such a newcomer would be initially at a disadvantage until he got the background of the working of the Italian Police and the country.

W.A.

W. DOHERTY, Lt. Col.
Deputy Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

28th March, 1945.

3502

Public Safety Sub-Commission.

MEMORANDUM.

TO : Col. DOHERTY.

The chief criticism of the Carabinieri has arisen out of the following four incidents:

The Caretto incident, during the trial of Caruso, in Rome,

Catania disturbances,

Ragusa disorders,

Demonstration in Rome after Roatta's escape.

Before committing ourselves to the re-organisation of the Carabinieri, the following considerations should be borne in mind:

1. The preservation of Public Order is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, the Prefects, the Questori and the Mayors of Communes. Carabinieri merely function as Agents of Public Security at their disposal on these occasions. Methods of dealing with Public Disorders cannot be settled by considering the Carabinieri alone. All other police Agencies are involved.

2. It is laid down that the organisation of the Italian Police is not a matter for the Allied Commission (FAN 487).

This Commission has already suggested to the Italian Government a police re-organisation Committee and has offered Allied experts as collaborators. After three months this suggestion has not been adopted by the Italian Government.

If we thrust a scheme of reorganisation on the Italians then we must expect to get the blame when things go wrong - as they certainly will. The policy of the new deal for Italy, as I understand it, is to let the Italians have the responsibility for a state of affairs which we have neither the power nor the means to avert.

3. This is not the moment to effect major changes in the Italian police system. However inefficient it may be it works and it is understood by the Italians.

Our plans for occupying Northern Italy, where we intend to send spear-heads of Carabinieri and make use of existing

Agents of Public Security, Finance Guards and Forest Guards, are based on the present system and total reorganisation at this stage of the war would result in chaos.

The greatest asset of the Carabinieri is their sense of tradition. This is not the moment to strike at its roots.

A new police system cannot be built up in a matter of months. It is a long and tedious process. All we can expect to do now is to effect improvements in the existing Police Force. The time for reorganising the Italian Police as a whole will be one or two years after the conclusion of the war.

As far as immediate measures for improving the CC.RR. are concerned, it is recommended that the subject be discussed with General Taddei along the following lines:-

- 1) Training of CC.RR. Officers,
- 2) Recruiting and training of NCOs and CC.RR.,
- 3) System of promotion,
- 4) Distribution of CC.RR. Strength,
- 5) Plans for dealing with civil disturbances - Mobile columns, transport, automatic arms, use of truncheons, fire-hose etc.
- 6) Means of communication,
- 7) Clothing and equipment,
- 8) Pay,
- 9) Supervision by Senior Officers,
- 10) Demobilisation of auxiliaries and recalled personnel,
- 11) Revision of regulations re marriage and local residence,
- 12) Disciplinary measures and methods of dealing with complaints by members of the Public,
- 13) Press Bureau for improving relations with the Public.

When definite plans have been prepared by technical experts it may be an advantage to form a Committee to decide what facilities can be given for putting them into operation.

28th March, 1945.

A.F. Wilcox
A.F. WILCOX,
Lt. Col.
Public Safety S/C.

3980

MEMORANDUM.

H.E. Boromi's report, dated 26th March, 1945.

It was thought, on receipt of this report, that it was one involving the reorganization of the Italian Police Services, instead of which it is actually pointing out the differentiation in treatment between the CC.PP and the other Police Agencies.

It is alleged that trouble and dissatisfaction are caused by the CC.PP receiving an improved scale of rations and free medical treatment which the other Police Agencies do not get.

Accommodation.

A large central barracks is required in Rome to house the Police, the capacity of which should be 2,000 together with 2,000 camp beds. The present system of Police living in private houses is condemned in that the men cannot be trained properly or assembled to take action in the event of an emergency.

Return of Property.

Three main places are mentioned which are occupied by the Allies, the return of which is urgently required:-

- 1- the barracks near the Viminale, Rome, occupied by the Allies.
- 2- the Police training school at Caserta, occupied by the Royal Navy.
- 3- the motor pool for service and repair of vehicles at Via Tommaso Campanella, Rome, occupied by the Allies.

A large central barracks is required in Rome to house the Police, the capacity of which should be 2,000 together with 2,000 camp beds. The present system of Police living in private houses is condemned in that the men cannot be trained properly or assembled to take action in the event of an emergency.

Return of Property.

Three main places are mentioned which are occupied by the Allies, the return of which is urgently required:-

- 1- the barracks near the Viminale, Rome, occupied by the Allies.
- 2- the Police training school at Caserta, occupied by the Royal Navy.
- 3- the motor pool for service and repair of vehicles at Via Tommaso Campanella, Rome, occupied by the Allies.

The report details a large deficiency ^{of} ~~in~~ ^{ammunition} ~~of~~ ^{ammunition} as also clothing and equipment, bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, fuel and lubricants

Preliminary observations on the report indicate that there is a serious shortage in essential material to enable the Police Agencies to function satisfactorily and if the assistance of Economics and Supply Division can be enlisted to give priority to these Police Agencies it would go a long way towards helping the Police to function more efficiently. It is, nevertheless, thought that some pruning of the needs could be effected and priority given to certain articles.

His Excellency rightly points out that in the Islands of Sicily and Sardinia, as well as in Calabria, without sufficient means of locomotion, the police are at a disadvantage in dealing with outbreaks of disorder.

It is felt that great stress is being laid on the Forces other than CC.RR, whereas in the reports of disorders received from certain places in liberated Italy it has invariably been the CC.RR who have taken action. On the total number of disorders reported in only about 3% can it be said that the CC.RR have failed to meet requirements. On the credit side it must be recorded that from AMB and Army territory good reports are continually received as to the excellent work done by the CC.RR.

The general observation on this report - a preliminary one - is that H.E. Bonomi is only touching one angle of the reorganisation of the Police in Italy.

29th March, 1945.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

785016

3598

3597

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

gld
HOA

Ref: AG/14694/RS

29 Oct 45.

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces.

TO: AFHR, G-5 Section.

With reference to your AG: 014.12 GEG-0 of 14 Oct 45.

- 1 1 Nov 45 has been agreed upon as the date of transfer of responsibilities, in matters connected with the Carabinieri, except their operational functions, from the Public Safety Sub-Commission to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MILA).

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

M Carr Brigadier

M. CARR, Brigadier,
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
MILA,
Establishment Section.

	TO	INIT	DATE
1	DIRECTOR	<i>[initials]</i>	31/10
2	DEPUTY DIRECTOR	<i>[initials]</i>	31/10
	EXEC. OFFICER	<i>[initials]</i>	30-10
	POLICE	<i>[initials]</i>	31/10
	HC. & AD.		31/10
	PRISONS		
	ADM. OFFICER		
	SECURITY		
	CHIEF CLERK		

1 NOV 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

E.O. 983-11

1 - NOV 1945

Ref: 3636/191/20.

21 October 1945.

SUBJECT: Transfer of responsibility for G.P.R.R. to M.I.A.

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

DPS

DPS

1. In your telegram 750363 of 25 Oct 45 you refer to your letter G-5. 104.12 of 7 Oct 45 to which I have not yet replied. I read your letter under reference in conjunction with your telegram FX 47521 of 6 Oct 45 on which I commented in my telegram 6884 of 10 Oct 45. I was studying the whole question of the transfer to M.I.A. of the responsibility for the G.P.R.R. in conjunction with your letter of 7 Oct 45 when your instructions of 14 Oct 45 arrived (your letter AG 014.12 GSC-0).

2. I have received a letter from GOC, Land Forces S/C (M.I.A.) in which he states that he had previously informed you that in order to carry out his new duties he would require no less than 20 officers.

3. This matter is under discussion with GOC, Land Forces S/C (M.I.A.) and you will appreciate that in view of the divergence between the number quoted in your letter of 7 Oct 45 and the demands of GOC Land Forces S/C (M.I.A.) together with the grave shortage of personnel, a rapid decision is not possible.

4. My first impressions are that the numbers quoted in your letter and requested by GOC Land Forces S/C (M.I.A.) are extravagant but until Land Forces S/C (M.I.A.) and Public Safety S/C have worked out a modus operandi it would be premature of me to express a firm agreement. This will be forwarded in due course.

5. In this connection I forward you copy of a communication received from the US ambassador in which you will note he has been instructed to communicate the State Department's instructions to the Prime Minister on the question of the despatch of an Allied Police Mission to this country.

6. I still hold that it would be better to prosecute the question of an Allied Police Mission as a whole rather than to adopt a plan which deals with only part of the question. I should therefore be glad if this point of view, together with a copy of the ambassador's letter, could be submitted to SACMED in support of my views which you note in para 3 of your telegram 750363 of 25 Oct.

3896

WALTER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (M.I.A.)
CA Section.

5134

Final Draft Dispatched

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

35A
43A

Tel : 473427

AO/14634/PS

31 August 45

SUBJECT : Reorganization of Carabinieri
and other Police Forces in Italy.

TO : G-5, AFHQ.

1. Reference is made to your G-5:014.12 of 20 July 1945.

2. In view of the gravity of the present internal security situation in general and the state of Italian police forces in particular, your offer of assistance is appreciated.

3. As regards para 2 of your letter under reference, it is considered that in existing circumstances the Italian Government would not agree to the attachment of Allied Police Officers to Italian Police Units to train and reorganise them. This aspect of the matter depends upon the results of discussions which are currently taking place with your Headquarters on the subject of an Allied Police Mission to Italy.

4. As regards the Carabinieri it is understood that as the result of Land Forces Sub-Commission (LFSC) letter A/052 of 28 July 45, your Headquarters has agreed that Carabinieri are in present circumstances to have priority over the remainder of the Italian Army in such matters as clothing, boots, equipment, and transport.

The implementation of this *35A* should go a long way towards eliminating the difficulties which have so far been experienced in the re-equipment of the Carabinieri and in the raising of their standard of efficiency. The method of implementation is under discussion with the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

- 2 -

5. Agents of Public Security and the Finance Guards, not being considered as units of the Italian Army are not in a position to claim assistance from Army sources though their needs are as great as those of the Carabinieri. Investigations are being conducted with a view to locating stocks of material from which these organisations might be supplied. Many stocks of materials have been blocked by one authority or another and if your assistance is required in obtaining the release of any stocks a further communication will be addressed to you.

The question of the provision of transport for these two organisations is under urgent consideration. Demands submitted to this Headquarters by these two organisations are being screened.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

M Carr

N. CARR,
Brigadier,
VP CA Section.

3894

785016

44A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

10 SET. 1945

Tel :

August 45

AG/1463A/PS

*Four of
Draft list sent*

SUBJECT : Reorganization of Carabinieri and
other Police Forces in Italy.

TO : G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

35A

1. Reference is made to your G-5:014.12 of
25 July 1945.

2. In view of the gravity of the present
internal security situation in general and the state
of Italian police forces in particular, your offer of
assistance is gratefully received and much appreciated.

3. You are aware of the fact that under the
provisions of FAR 487 we are not in position to thrust
upon the Italian Government any plan for reorganization
and retraining of the police forces and also of the
fact that the matter of an Allied Police Mission to
Italy is currently under discussion at your Headquarters.
In consideration of these facts and the further fact that
personnel is not available it is our considered opinion
that Allied officers ought not be assigned to Italian
police units nor Italian officials assigned to Allied
Provost Schools. The problem of retraining must of
necessity await the concluding of a policy agreement
with the Italian Government.

4. The Italian police system as now constituted,
regardless of its defects, must be accepted as the organ-
ization responsible for the maintenance of internal
security because there is not sufficient time ³⁸⁹³
the hand-over to the Italian Government in which to
organize a new or alternative system. Therefore, it
is considered that the police forces can be best
strengthened by granting to them all possible material
assistance in the way of clothing, equipment and
transport.

- 2 -

5. Following receipt of your letter each of the three principal agencies, i.e., Carabinieri, Agents of Public Security and Finance Guards, were requested to submit to Public Safety Sub-Commission lists of their requirements as regards clothing, equipment and transport. In characteristic fashion the lists were complete as to items and in such quantities as to contemplate re-outfitting every man. As result Public Safety Sub-Commission is endeavoring to determine not only the essential needs and quantities but also the possible availability. For this reason we are still unable to give you details of requirements based on actual needs.

6. It is observed from the letter of Land Forces Sub-Commission (A.M.I.S.) A/092 of 28 July 1945 addressed to AFHQ (3) that a new and changed approach for the needs of carabinieri has been strongly recommended in that it is now considered that they should have priority over the rest of the Italian Army as regards such matters as clothing, boots, equipment and transport. It is urged that this recommendation be approved and quickly implemented.

7. Agents of Public Security and Finance Guards, not being considered as units of the Italian Army, are not in position to claim assistance from army channels and their needs are as great as those of the Carabinieri. Investigations are being conducted in an effort to locate stocks from which they might be supplied. Most stocks have been blocked by one authority or another and your assistance may be required in unblocking. As soon as definite information is available you will be advised.

For the Chief Commissioner :

3892
Brigadier,
VF CA Section.

JWC/G

DRAFT

Final Draft - Not Sent

*36 A
42A*

HEADING

Ref: AC/14694/FS

Tel: 473427

Aug 45.

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of Carabinieri and other Police Forces in Italy.

TO: G-5, AFHQ,

- 1 Reference is made to your G-5:014.12 of 20 July 1945.
- 2 In view of the gravity of the present internal security situation in general and the state of Italian police forces in particular, your offer of assistance is appreciated.
- 3 As regards para 5 of your letter under reference, it is considered that in existing circumstances the Italian Government would not agree to the attachment of Allied Police Officers to Italian Police Units to train and reorganise them. This aspect of the matter depends upon the results of discussions which are currently taking place with your Headquarters on the subject of an Allied Police Mission to Italy.
- 4 As regards the Carabinieri it is understood that as the result of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MILA) letter A/052 of 28 July 45, your Headquarters has agreed that Carabinieri are in present circumstances to have **3891** ~~third~~ priority over the remainder of the Italian Army in such matters as

offer of assistance is appreciated.

3 As regards para 5 of your letter under reference, it is considered that in existing circumstances the Italian Government would not agree to the attachment of Allied Police Officers to Italian Police Units to train and reorganise them. This aspect of the matter depends upon the results of discussions which are currently taking place with your Headquarters on the subject of an Allied Police Mission to Italy.

4 As regards the Carabinieri it is understood that as the result of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MLDA) letter A/052 of 28 July 45, your Headquarters has agreed that Carabinieri are in present circumstances to have ³⁸⁹¹ ~~first~~ priority over the remainder of the Italian Army in such matters as clothing, boots, equipment and transport.

The implementation of this policy should go a long way towards eliminating the difficulties which have so far been experienced in the re-equipment of the Carabinieri and in the raising of their standard of efficiency. *The needs of implementation in land divisions with the Carabinieri Sub-Commission*

5 Agents of Public Security and the Finance Guards, not being considered as units of the Italian Army are not in a position to claim assistance from Army sources though their needs are as great as those of the Carabinieri. Investigations are being conducted with a view to locating stocks of material from which these organisations might be supplied. Many stocks of materials have been blocked by one authority or another and if your assistance is required in obtaining the release of any stocks a further

communication will be addressed to you.

The question of the provision of transport for these two organisations is under urgent consideration. Demands submitted to this Headquarters by these two organisations are being screened.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

M. CARR,
Brigadier,
VP CA Section.

Second Draft - Not Sent. 25A

DRAFT.

Subject: Reorganisation of Carabinieri and other police forces in Italy.

To: G.5 A.F.H.Q. A.P.O. 512.

1. Reference is made to your G.5: O.M.12 of 20 July, 1945.
2. This Headquarters is very grateful for your offer of assistance to the Public Safety Sub Commission in its efforts to reestablish Italian Police bodies. The Sub Commission has analysed the position of the several police organisations, including requirements, and reports as hereinafter.
3. It will be recalled that C.C.S. has been requested to authorize an Allied Police Commission for Italy under
 Much of the long term planning for the police obviously should be held in obeyance pending the decision on this point.
4. Your suggestion to allot vacancies to Italian Police Officials for courses at Allied Provost Schools is appreciated. If this Headquarters can be advised of the number of such vacancies, Italian Police Bodies will be requested to assign police officials to attend these schools.

The suggestion to attach allied police officers to Italian police units to train and reorganise them is not quite clear as to availability of such officers. If it is thought that such officers could be drawn from Public Safety Sub Commission, then the suggestion would not be practicable due to the shortage of personnel in that sub-commission. If, however, the officer ~~being~~ be supplied from Allied Force Headquarters, the suggestion would be very acceptable.

This is a very good suggestion & a getting from them. Can we not borrow a little? No

4. Your suggestion to allot vacancies to Italian Police Officials for courses at Allied Provost Schools is appreciated. If this Headquarters can be advised of the number of such vacancies, Italian Police Bodies will be requested to assign police officials to attend these schools.

The suggestion to attach allied police officers to Italian Police units to train and reorganise them is not quite clear as to availability of such officers. If it is thought that such officers could be drawn from Public Safety Sub Commission, then the suggestion would not be practicable due to the shortage of personnel in that sub-commission. If, however, the officer ~~being~~ be supplied from Allied Force Headquarters, the suggestion would be very acceptable.

5. The analysis of the position of each of the Italian police bodies, Carabinieri, Finance Guards, ^{and} Agents of Public Security, will be dealt with separately. In your consideration of the requirements which are submitted, it should be borne in mind that none of these services ^{has} have received an initial issue of clothing, equipment, arms or transport for upwards of two years. Consideration should also be given to the fact that in normal times each of these services received stocks of uniforms from supplies controlled by the Ministry of War.

./.

There is a very close connection between AFHQ and the Italian Government - L.H.C.
N.C.

785016

Further, it must be realized that after allied occupation, all stocks of uniforms and other military type clothing, arms, military type equipment and transport were blocked and held at the absolute disposition of allied military authorities (M.M.I.A.), for issue only to units of the Italian army, thus depriving Finance Guards and Agents of Public Security from access to such stocks.

6. We will consider first the C.C.R.R. The carabinieri being a unit of the Italian army should have been entitled to parity treatment with other units of the army. However during the continuance of hostilities all other units of the Italian army received priority to the substantial exclusion of the carabinieri.

It is observed from the letter of Land Forces Sub Commission(M.M.I.A) A/052 of 28 July, 1945 addressed to A.F.H.Q. (3),^{that} a new and changed approach for the needs of carabinieri has been strongly recommended and that this body should have priority over the rest of the Italian army as regards such matters as clothing, boots, equipment, transport etc.

(a) As a result of recent conversations with Land Forces Sub Commission 10,000 British dyed battle dress are being issued and there is a prospect that additional battle dress will be available to the remaining 55,000 of the corps. Also, tentative arrangements have been made for the issuance of boots.

(b) The state of arms and equipment is deplorable and entirely inadequate. Not only are additional arms required, but also supplies for the repair, cleaning and maintenance of such weapons as are now in possession of the force. Discussions are under way with M.M.I.A.

*M.H.A.
Asst. Col. J. ...
P.S. Sub Com. ...
M.M.I.A.
Asst. Col. J. ...*

It is strongly urged that this recommendation be implemented as soon as possible

*5000 battle dress
M.M.I.A.*

It is strongly
urged that this
recommendation
be implemented
as soon as
possible

CCO's both
are to be
done

It is observed from the letter
4/052 of 28 July, 1945 addressed to A.F.H.Q. (3),^{that} a new and changed
approach for the needs of carabinieri has been strongly recommended
and that this body should have priority over the rest of the Italian
army as regards such matters as clothing, boots, equipment, transport
etc.

(a) As a result of recent conversations with Land Forces Sub Commission
10,000 British dyed battle dress are being issued and there is a
prospect that additional battle dress will be available to the
remaining 55,000 of the corps. Also, tentative arrangements have
been made for the issuance of boots.

(b) The state of arms and equipment is deplorable and entirely
inadequate. Not only are additional arms required, but also supplies
for the repair, cleaning and maintenance of such weapons as are now
in possession of the force. Discussions are under way with M.M.I.A.
concerning the availability of captured enemy material for issue to
the police forces.

(c) The most crying need for carabinieri as well as other police
forces is transport. Many of the vehicles in possession of the
carabinieri are on the dead line due to the lack of ample repair
material and tyres. Given the facilities, the CC.RR. would be
able to maintain vehicles and other equipment and otherwise act
as a self contained unit.

./.

-3-

(d) The supply of POL is highly necessary. The position at present is that Carabinieri must be supplied from civilian sources. Only a very meagre allotment is made by A.G.I.P. which is entirely inadequate to maintain the necessary police patrols and the present allotment of armoured vehicles are immobilised for the lack of sufficient fuel. This matter is one of prior importance and must receive priority attention.

(e) The requirements of carabinieri are attached hereto as Appendix "A".

7. The condition of Agents of Public Security is much worse than that of carabinieri inasmuch as they are a civil police body and are not in position to claim assistance from the allied army authorities who control the release of clothing and equipment, arms and transport.

They have been compelled to depend upon the ~~good graces of~~ Commerce Sub Commission of A.C. to release for their use such items of civilian supply as have been available. In the main this has been negligible for the reason that the items under control of Commerce Sub Commission and the related Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labour were not adaptable to police use -

(a) Agents of Public Security are a uniform police and thus have the same requirements for clothing as carabinieri. In normal times cloth for uniforms for this force was made available through Italian government channels. However, as has been stated above,

authorities who control the release of clothing and equipment, arms and transport.

They have been compelled to depend upon the ~~good graces of~~ Commerce Sub Commission of A.C. to release for their use such items of civilian supply as have been available. In the main this has been negligible for the reason that the items under control of Commerce Sub Commission and the related Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labour were not adaptable to police use -

(a) Agents of Public Security are a uniform police and thus have the same requirements for clothing as carabinieri. In normal times cloth for uniforms for this force was made available through Italian government channels. However, as has been stated above, upon the occupation of the country by allied forces ^{SSM} items of military or semi-military nature, including all cloth designed for uniforms was "blocked" and held under the control of allied authorities for the use of the Italian Army. This has deprived the Agents of Public Security of access to supplies from which uniforms might be made. The deplorable shortage of cloth of other types is responsible for the shortage of other clothing such as under garments and the like.

It is strongly recommended that part of such cloth be released to the Ministry of Interior for the use of Public Security agents. /.

-4-

(b) These Agents require the same type of arms and equipment as are used by carabinieri and which are obtainable only from military stocks under the control of M.M.I.A. and the related Ministries of War. In the past these stocks have been held for the use of, primarily, the service and combat units of the Italian Army with second priority to the carabinieri.

As a result of this situation a large number of this force are inadequately armed and equipped to the detriment of their performance of duty.

(c) That has heretofore been said in regard to transportation for carabinieri is equally applicable to this force.

(d) The requirements of the Agents of Public Security are attached hereto as Appendix "C".

8. The situation of the Royal Finance Guards (Guardia d'Finanza) concerning clothing, boots, arms, equipment and transport is on all fours with the Agents of Public Security. However, it should be borne in mind that up to the spring of 1944, the Finance Guards were recognized under Italian law as being an integral part of the Italian Army and as such were entitled to be clothed armed, equipped and rationed from Italian Army sources.

In 1944 by order of the Higher Allied Command, the Royal Finance Guards were arbitrarily deprived of its ~~army~~ army status. It is for this reason that the Finance Guards find themselves in a similar situation to the Agents of Public Security. ^{They} ~~It should be referred to the Ministry of Finance.~~ *Edth*

The requirements of the Guardia d'Finanza are attached hereto as Appendix "B".

8. The situation of the Royal Finance Guards (Guardia d'Finanza) concerning clothing, boots, arms, equipment and transport is on all fours with the Agents of Public Security. However, it should be borne in mind that up to the spring of 1944, the Finance Guards were recognised under Italian law as being an integral part of the Italian Army and as such were entitled to be clothed armed, equipped and rationed from Italian Army sources.

In 1944 by order of the Higher Allied Command, the Royal Finance Guards were arbitrarily deprived of its ~~privileges~~ army status. It is for this reason that the Finance Guards find themselves in a similar situation to the Agents of Public Security. *Both should be referred to the Minister of Finance.* *Edh*
 The requirements of the Guardia d'Finanza ~~are~~ attached hereto as Appendix "B".

9. The Italian police system as now constituted must be the accepted bodies responsible for the maintenance of law and order and internal security for the present due to the lack of time in which to organise a new or alternative system. In view of this it is of paramount importance that all material assistance possible is given to the bodies which now constitute the system.

./.

-5-

It is believed that given the necessary supplies the morale of these forces will be sufficiently increased to enable them to perform their duties with reasonable effectiveness despite the fact that there are other factors which tend to affect the morale such as over-age personnel, and the political situation.

Realising the impending ~~of~~ withdrawal of Allied Forces from the country and the assumption of ^{full} responsibility by the Italian Government coupled with the fact that a government ought not to be compelled to ~~rely~~ ^{rely}, in the first instance, on military force to maintain law and order, it is ~~vital~~ imperative that the police forces be armed and equipped ~~with~~ at the earliest possible moment.

Until the police forces in Italy are placed on a satisfactory basis in regard to clothing, arms, transport, equipment and the necessary supplies of P.O.I. they cannot be considered capable of assuming the full responsibility of maintaining law and order. This should be given serious consideration in any plans of turning over the control of the country to the Italian Government.

Elmer W. Star
Chief Commissioner
3885

at the earliest possible

Until the police forces in Italy are placed on a satisfactory basis in regard to clothing, arms, transport, equipment and the necessary supplies of P.O.L. they cannot be considered capable of assuming the full responsibility of maintaining law and order. This should be given serious consideration in any plans of turning over the control of the country to the Italian Government.

Elmer W. Star
Chief Commissioner
3485

I do not think the Appendix has
here & can
change. Can we not sample use
But quite a number of items. They all go
predicament issue sum acceptable & no stocks
in default. What refusal both these parties
HWC 14/6

Draft - Not Sent

Tel : 470427

AG/14634/PS

August 45.

SUBJECT : Reorganization of Carabinieri and other Police Forces of Italy.

TO : G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

1. Reference is made to your G-5:014.12 of 20 July, 1945.
2. It is indeed gratifying to learn, even at this late date, that your Headquarters is anxious to give all possible assistance to the Public Safety Sub-Commission in their efforts to re-establish satisfactory police control. For almost a year that Sub-Commission, not having any control over, or even access to, stocks of clothing or equipment, has been pleading and begging for assistance for the police forces and without any material success.
3. The Sub-Commission has analyzed the situation and reports the requirements of the Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza and Agents of Public Security as to clothing, equipment, arms and transport as shown in Appendices A, B and C attached hereto.
4. As a result of discussions with Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFA) it is known that the present stocks of clothing are insufficient for the needs of other units of the Italian Army and therefore no allotment can be made to Carabinieri. However the increased strength of 10,000 is being clothed from British sources in dyed battledress. Stocks have also been issued. Considerable stocks of British battledress dyed grey ³⁸⁸⁴ are available to MFA and issue could be made to the 10,000 Carabinieri. The question of the variation from the traditional dress has been raised with the Commanding General Carabinieri. It was appreciated that cloth for

- 2 -

the manufacture of uniforms would not be available until next year and accordingly it was agreed that dyed battle dress would be suitable and acceptable. In view of the importance of this matter the agreement of the President of the Council of Ministers was also obtained. Repaired boots can be issued to Carabinieri and no difficulty is anticipated.

5. One of the serious handicaps of the police bodies is the lack of transport. MIA have insufficient transport for the needs of the other units of the Italian Army and are thus unable to supply vehicles to the Carabinieri. Applications have been made for vehicles from Allied sources but in your AFHQ/31:8/5/Q(AZ) dated 14 May 1945 it was stated that no vehicles were available for issue. Not only are vehicles necessary but also tires and spare parts for repairs are urgently required.

6. The Guardia di Finanza was formerly considered as part of the Italian Army and was clothed and equipped from Army stocks. Now the status is changed and the channel of supply is from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor to the Ministry of Finance. Stocks of cloth found in the North have not yet been made available to the Italian Ministry and accordingly no clothing has been supplied. Similar difficulties exist regarding arms, equipment and transport.

7. Agents of Public Security are also dependent on the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor and consequently are in the same situation as the Guardia di Finanza. This also applies in regard to arms, equipment and transport.

8. Italian government resources are wholly inadequate to meet the requirements of the police bodies. It is hoped that through the good offices of your Headquarters resources can be made available for the immediate assistance required by the Italian police agencies. The need is urgent and the **3883** is short.

Incls
APP. A, B and C.

WILSON W. STONE
Rear Admiral USNR
Chief Commissioner

Appendix "A"

GENERAL COMMAND OF ROYAL CARABINIERI
Direzione di Amministrazione

N.3/1350/8-1

30 July 1945

SUBJECT : Clothing, Equipment, Ammunition and Transportation
Requirements for the Royal Carabinieri.TO : Allied Commission
Sub-Commission P.S.ROMA

In accordance with a telephone request, we forward the following lists:

- a-) Clothing Requirements
- b-) Transportation Requirements
- c-) Ammunition

The above mentioned lists reiterate the material requirements of the Royal Carabinieri which have been requested from time to time.

The clothing lists shows the requirements for the entire Royal Carabinieri Force. As regards the request made in the past for 30.000 complete outfits, this headquarters informs you that it hasn't as yet received any so that practically speaking we have not apparently had any assignments.

Therefore, should an assignment be made to us in the meantime, on the basis of our first request, it is understood that it should be deducted from the clothing lists as presented to-day.

By order of the Director
Giovanni Mottola

882

List of clothing and Equipment needed to clothe the Carabinieri
force band on a strength of 65,000 men,

=0=0=0=0=

29 July 1945

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Towels.....	130,000
Suspenders.....	65,000
Linen traveling kit (brown or grey green).....	65,000
Canteen.....	65,000
Cotton caps overseas (grey).....	65,000
Overseas caps	65,000
Cotton Shirts.....	130,000
Flannel Shirts.....	130,000
Cotton socks.....	195,000
Wool socks.....	40,000
Belts.....	65,000
Wool ties.....	65,000
Black Sateentiss.....	65,000
B.V.D'S (Sateen).....	5,000
Overcoats.....	65,000
Crash Helmets for motorcycle riders.....	13,000
Rain proof overcoats...." "	13,000
For trimmed overcoats.....	1,100
Camp Blankets.....	130,000
Handkerchief.....	195,000
Stomach protectors (wool).....	130,000
Wool leggings (bandage type).....	65,000
Leather puttees various sizes for cavalry.....	3,000
Leather puttees for motorcycle riders.....	13,000
Wool jacket (blouse).....	65,000
Mess kits.....	65,000
Cotton jackets (blouse).....	65,000
Leather jackets for motorcycle riders.....	13,000
Rain capes.....	600
Wool drawers.....	50,000
Cotton drawers (shorts).....	130,000
Goggles for motorcycle riders.....	13,000
Trousers, cotton, windproof for motorcycle riders..	13,000
Trousers, wool.....	65,000
Riding Pants (cavalry) various sizes.....	3,500
Cotton trousers.....	65,000
Mountain hat with Bear muffs.....	10,000
Tents pegs.....	100,000

Tents poles.....	110.000
Low boots for the infantry rubber.....	65.000
Alpine haver sacks.....	20.000
Mess kit cups.....	65.000
Large tent canvass.....	40.000
Clotherhangers.....	65.000
Bicycles complete with accessories and spare parts.....	300
Liquid containers - shoulder type aluminium, capacity 5 to 6 liters.....	115
Wooden barrels - capacity 25 liters.....	50
" " " 100 "	45
Can openers.....	8.000
Kitchen knives.....	8.000

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

Type Vehicle	Amount required	Amount on hand	Short of required amount
Automobiles	1026	438	588
Light Trucks	1310	114	1196
Heavy Trucks	288	15	273
Water Trucks	27	0	27
Light truck, covered top	48	19	29
Light Truck runabout	156	20	136
Motorcycle with tandem	13664	836	12828
Motortricycles	120	15	105
Motorcycles	932	0	932
Small trucks	12	0	12

3879

ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND ACCOUNTREMENT REQUIREMENTS

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AMOUNT REQUIREMENTS</u>
Carbines "Moschetto" model 38 caliber 6-5	10.200
Automatic pistols model 34 caliber 9	18.293
Clips for pistol model 34	36.769
Holsters for pistol model 34	22.000
Pistol Belts for model 34	22.550
Belts, waist	10.000
Cuff links	10.000
Bandolier (gery green) cavalry type	17.416
Cartridges for moschetto type caliber 6-5	633.744
Sub-machine gun cartridges for moschetto caliber 6-5	156.194
Pistol ammo. caliber 9	399.360
Security chains	30.550
Locks for above	33.660
Hand cuffs	3.360
Short prisoner chains	336
Long prisoner chains	672
Automatic carbines type Berretta cal.9	13.000
Cartridges for above caliber 9	2.600.000
Hand grenades	107.080

3878

30 July 1945

Appendix "B"

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

General Command
of
GG. FFSecretary Office
N.765 R.O.SUBJECT : Request for Clothing, Arms and Ammunition,
Equipment, Transportation, and Tires made
by GG.FF (Finance Guards)TO : Allied Commission
Sub-Commission P.S.R O M AURGENT

In accordance with a telephone conversation between Public Safety Sub-Commission Allied Commission and this Office, we are forwarding the attached lists in triplicate showing our requirements for clothing, Arms and ammunition, equipment, transportation, and tires.

We wish to call to your attention the fact that both the uniforms and socks requirements should be made from new stock. We stress this because just recently, this command was forced to return the uniforms and socks allocated for the 1200 guards who were alerted for duty north due to the fact that they were not new.

We thank you for anything which may be done for the GG.FF.

IL GENERALE DI DIVISIONE
GENERAL COMMANDANT
/s/ (G.B. Oxilia)

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
GENERAL COMMAND OF GG.FF

CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS FOR GG.FF

Cotton overseas caps.....	20.000
Woollen jackets (blouses).....	20.000
Woollen trousers.....	20.000
Cotton shirts.....	40.000
Woollen undershirts.....	40.000
Cotton drawers.....	40.000
Woollen drawers.....	10.000
Woollen Stomach protectors.....	40.000
Cotton Socks.....	pr.40.000
Shoes.....	pr.20.000
Cotton Sheets.....	40.000

Colonel
Chief of Secretary Office
/s/ (Quirino Giombini)

3876

GENERAL COMMAND OF G3.PP
Ufficio del Generale addetto
Sezione Motorizzazione

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

Automobiles	(Civilian type.....	130
	(Military "	170
Medium trucks.....		38
Light trucks.....		525
Tandem Motorcycles.....		2000

It is understood that the above vehicles come fully equipped with tires plus spare tires and parts. is needed
An assignment of a proportionate amount of spare parts is needed to keep up maintenance.

Rome, 30 July 1945

Colonel
Chief of Secretary Officer
/s/ (Quirino Giombini)

33875

GENERAL COMMAND OF G.I.F.F.
 Ufficio del Generale addetto
 Servizio Motorizzazione

TIRE REQUIREMENTS

Heavy trucks	{	10.50 x 20.....40
		7.50 x 20.....40
		42 x 930
Light trucks	{	600 x 18.....200
		32 x 6 40
		210 x 20..... 60
Automobiles	{	4.25 x 17.....500
		5.00 x 15.....200
		5.50 x 15..... 30
		5.50 x 17..... 40
		4.00 x 15..... 20
Motorcycles		3.50 x 19.....400

Rome, 30 July 1945

Colonel
 Chief of Secretary Office
 /s/ (Quirino G. Gabini)

ARMS AND AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GG.FF1. WEAPONSa) Carbines "Moschetti" model 1891 T.S. caliber 6-5

Genoa detachment.....	600	}	5300 Total
Turin "	600		
Milan "	2000		
Venezia "	1000		
Trento "	600		
Udine "	500		

b) Automatic carbines type "Berretta" model 38 caliber 9.....2000
(to be distributed throughout the entire force)c) Sub-machine guns "Breda" model 1930

Genoa detachment	150	}	700 Total
Turin "	80		
Milan "	150		
Venezia "	130		
Trento "	90		
Udine "	100		

d) Automatic pistol "Berretta" model 34 caliber 9

Genoa detachment	1100	}	7000 Total
Turin "	800		
Milan "	1500		
Venezia "	1200		
Trento "	800		
Udine "	900		
Central Italy	700		

e) Machine guns "Breda" model 36-600
(to be distributed throughout the entire force)f) Bayonets for "moschetti" type 1891 model T.S.....5300

3873

- 2 -

AMMUNITION

- a.) Cartridges for weapon model 1891 caliber 6-5.....382.000
(based upon 72 cartridges per each weapon)
- b.) Cartridges for automatic carbine type "Berretta".....300.000
(based upon 150 rounds per weapon requested)
- c.) Cartridges for sub-machine gun caliber 6-5 "Breda" type
model 30.....1,050.000
(based upon 1500 rounds per each weapon)
- d.) Cartridges for automatic pistol "Berretta" type model
1934 caliber 9.....147.000
(based upon 21 rounds per weapon)
- e.) Cartridges for machine gun type "Breda" model 1936....1,800.000
(based upon 3000 rounds per weapon)
- f.) Hand Grenades.....10.000
(to be divided among the entire corps)

ACCOUTREMENTS

Completly equipment for carbine "moschetto" (Straps with large
and small fasteners)
model 1891 for T.S.....6000

Cartridges belts complete, model 1891 with straps and necessary
books.....5000

Bandoliers.....1000

Accoutrements for bayonet complete,
(scabbard, leather, pouch, belt).....387.....1300

Holsters, leather for pistol model 1934 type "Berretta" caliber
9.....7000

Blings for Sub-machine guns.....600

- 3 -

Ammunition Boxes and machine guns spare parts in proportion to weapons requested.

3871

Appendix "C"

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
General Direction of P.S.

Div. G.C.F. Sez/III^a
N. 999.9608
14735

Rome, 29 July 1945

SUBJECT: Clothing Equipment Weapons and Transportation
Requirements for Public Security.

TO : Allied Commission
Sub-Commission P.S.

R O M E

As per our agreement with you, we forward four lists of various materials needed by the Public Security Police Force. These four lists deal with clothing, equipment, weapons, and transportation.

May we call your attention to the fact that these requirements are based upon the strength of 32000 agents, of which 22000 are in operation, and 10000 are in the process of being recruited; and that this total strength is an allocation, only, for the 49 provinces which come under Italian administration as of the present date.

We should also like to point out that to quite an extent, the bicycle requirements together with the parts requirements for them, include the needs of the Royal Carabinieri.

THE CHIEF OF POLICE
Ferrari

3870

CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS
for the Public Security Corp of Police

Khaki coloured cotton material for Summer Uniforms	200,000 metres or 30,000 uniforms
Wool material for uniforms (khaki or grey green)	100,000 metres or 30,000 uniforms
Shoes (military type)	pr. 80,000
Shirts (khaki or grey green)	ea. 70,000 or the equivalent in material for same.
Fatigue Uniforms for mechanics and motorcycle riders	ea. 5000
Raincoats	15000
Leather jackets for motorcycle riders and drivers	3000
+ Stomach Protector	30000
Cotton drawers	30000
Belts	20000
Handkerchiefs	30000

+ There is no equivalent for this in the American Army - it is a woollen band which laces up the back. It's primary use is to keep the stomach warm.

**EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
For Public Security Corps of
Police**

Leather belts with ammo. pouch	30.000
Foot Lockers	15.000
Security chains with lock	25.000
Canteens	10.000
Ration Pouches	12.000
Flash lights (complete)	5.000
Batteries for Flashlights	5.000
Wool Blankets	10.000
Shoe Brushes	15.000

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS
for Public Security Corps of Police

Carbine type "moschetto da Cavalleria" model 91 caliber 6-5	15.000	
Automatic pistols type "Berretta" caliber 9	15.000	
Automatic Carbine type "Berretta" model 37 caliber 9	5.000	
Machine Gun type "Breda" model 37 caliber 8	150	
Sub-machine Gun type "Breda" model 30 caliber 6-5	200	
Hand grenades	15.000	
Sub-machine gun cartridges for type moschetto model 91 caliber 6-5	200.000	
Carbine cartridges for type moschetto model 91 caliber 6-5	500.000	=====
+ Cartridges "frangibile" to be used with carbine type "moschetto 91" caliber 6-5	250.000	=====
Ammunition for pistol type "Berretta" caliber 9	500.000	
Cartridges for automatic carbine type "Berretta" caliber 9	400.000	
Machine Gun ammunition Cal.8	200.000	
Sub-machine gun ammunition caliber 6-5	250.000	=====

+ "Frangibile" cartridges are less resistant than the normal type. It bursts, shatters, and flattens out as it strikes the ground.

It is used only in closed areas. It has less range than the normal type. Its casing is made of nichel and ~~6.8~~ and lighter weight than the normal round.

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS
for the Public Security Corps of Police

Automobiles (fully equipped with tires)	400
Heavy trucks " " " "	100
Motorcycles " " " "	400
Tanks	50
Scout Cars	60
Bicycles	5000
Motorboats	20

TIRES

For police work limited to the City of Rome only:

<u>Size</u>	<u>Vehicle type</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Corresponding tubes</u>
5.50 x 15	Fiat 1500	30	30
5.50 x 15	" 1100	100	100
6.00 x 18	" 524	30	30
6.50 x 18	Alfa Romeo	20	20
4.00 x 15	Fiat 500	30	30
3.50 x 19	Motorcycle	250	250
15 x 45	Lancia Astura	30	30
16 x 45	Dilanda	20	20
1.40 x 40	Aprilia	30	30
14 x 45	Artens	20	20
4.00 x 17	Fiat 508	60	60
5.50 x 18	Alfa Romeo	12	12
1.65 x 400	Fiat 1100 (long)	25	25
32 x 6	Spa 25 C.10	10	10
30 x 5	Fiat 621	10	10
6.00 x 16	Fiat 508 1100	200	200
	1500 and Aprilia		

For police work throughout the realm

800	size	4.00 x 17
1000	"	5.00 x 15
800	"	5.50 x 15

3867
200

1000	size	32 x 6	} For motorcycles
200	"	350 x 19	
200	"	325 x 19	

Bicycle requirements

4000 tires

4000 tubes



3866

10 SET. 1945

Tel : 478427 - 686

July 1945.

AG/14634/PO

SUBJECT : Reorganization of Carabinieri and
Other Police Forces of Italy.

TO : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512.

1. Reference is made to your G-5:014.12
of 20 July 1945. 30A

2. Concerning para.3 of your letter, I
am compelled to register a strong protest against
the confirmation of the ruling contained in your
G-5: 014.12 of 11 May 1945. The ruling is contrary
to the responsibility admitted by MIA and violates
the specific provision of para. 4b of AFHQ letter
AG 091.711/159 GGT-O of 16 November 1944.

3. 18D Concerning your para.5 the acute short-
age of Allied Police officers in this theater will
not permit assignment to Italian police units and
language difficulties would militate against sending
Italian officers to Allied Provost schools.

4. Public Safety Sub-Commission is assembling
the data required under your para.7 and this will be
submitted to you at the earliest possible time.

3865 STONE
Rear Admiral USNR
Chief Commissioner

JWC/g

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

6246
Pub. Safety 5/6
37A 38A

G-5: 014.12

14634
et.

20 July 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of Carabinieri and Other Police
Forces of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your AC/14634/PS of 30 June 45.
2. The reasons advanced in your letter in favor of extending the responsibilities of MMIA to include the administration and training of the Carabinieri are appreciated.
3. It is regretted, however, that it is not possible to modify the ruling conveyed in our G-5: 014.12 of 11 May 45.
4. It is realized that a strong and efficient police force in Italy is vitally necessary and that the Carabinieri are much below this standard. This Headquarters is therefore anxious to give all possible assistance to the Public Safety Sub-Commission in their efforts to re-establish satisfactory police control.
5. This assistance can take several forms, such as the temporary attachment of Allied police officers to Italian police units to train and reorganize them or the allotment of vacancies to Italian police officials for courses at Allied Provost Schools.
6. It will not, however, be possible to offer constructive proposals as to the precise form such assistance should take until the full extent of the problem is known.
7. The Public Safety Sub-Commission should therefore fully analyse the position and furnish this Headquarters with their requirements. All possible steps will then be taken to provide such help as may be practicable.

TO	INITIALS	DATE
DIRECTOR	Wol	22/7
DEPUTY DIR.	Wol	22/7
EXEC. OFF.		
POLICE		
IC. & M.		
PERSONNEL		
ADM. OFF.		
SECURITY		
CHIEF CLERK		

Copy to: G-3.

A. L. Hamblen
A. L. HAMBLLEN,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

31
344
Tel: 478427

AG/14634/PS

30 June 1945

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the CC.RR. and other Police Forces.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters, AFG 512,
(Attention : G-5 Section.)

- 308
1. Reference is made to your G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, and to my 3626/EC of 19 May, 1945.
 2. Since writing my letter of 19 May, I have had occasion to make further study of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November 1944, and I am now firmly convinced that under the provisions of that letter the responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (NSIA) in regard to the CC.RR do parallel the responsibilities of the Italian Ministry of War insofar as control, supervision, administration and supply are concerned. I, therefore, request that a critical study be made in order to clarify the situation which has developed over the past several months in regard to responsibility for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the CC.RR.
 3. In your letter G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, it stated that "NSIA responsibility for their (the CC.RR.) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army." In this connection I invite your attention, first, to the fact that NSIA admit their responsibility for the feeding, clothing and equipping of the CC.RR., (letter A.018 of 11 April, 1945, copy sent to you as enclosure to our letter 3626/EC of 14 April, 1945), and, second, to para. 4b of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November, 1944, wherein it is stated that NSIA will be responsible for supervision of administration.

and supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.NR. being Italian Army units, inasmuch as they were specifically included under the CCS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 11 May, 1949, it is stated that "MIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.NR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ letter AG 091, 711/169 OCT-0 of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on MIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War. Para. 5a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 5b provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.NR.) are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri.". The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri are a civil police organization directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission.". Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of the Carabinieri as police.

5. The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of MIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in an unsatisfactory

3862

level of supply of all kinds of equipment as compared with line troops of the Italian Army. Also this has caused the development of a fallacious opinion that, because Carabinieri are used as police, Public Safety Sub-Commission, which controls nothing in the way of supplies and equipment, is responsible for everything relating to Carabinieri. This situation has contributed materially to the ineffectiveness of the Carabinieri and the reports I am now receiving from my Public Safety officers in the north all testify to the very poor impression created in minds of the public in all parts of the territory recently liberated by reason of the poor turn out of the Carabinieri sent North.

6. The internal security situation in Italy is far from satisfactory and threatens to become worse due in part to taking Carabinieri from the south to assist in the policing of the north. Now that combat operations have ceased, I feel that every aid and assistance possible should be given to strengthen, not only the Carabinieri, but also other Italian Police agencies. I see no reason why Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMA) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the AFHQ letter herein referred to.

7. For the reasons herein expressed and as a matter of urgency, I request that serious and prompt consideration be given to this matter.

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to :
Land Forces S/C (MMA)

3861

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

30A
DRP
AA

AC/14634/PS

Tel: 478427

June 1945

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the CC.RR. and other Police Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512,
(Attention : G-5 Section.)

30A

1. Reference is made to your G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, and to my 3626/EC of 19 May, 1945.

2. Since writing my letter of 19 May, I have had occasion to make further study of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November, 1944, and I am now firmly convinced that under the provisions of that letter the responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) in regard to the CC.RR. do parallel the responsibilities of the Italian Ministry of War insofar as control, supervision, administration and supply are concerned. I, therefore, request that a critical study be made in order to clarify the situation which has developed over the past several months in regard to responsibility for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the CC.RR.

18D

3. In your letter G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, it stated that "MMIA responsibility for their (the CC.RR.) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army." In this connection I invite your attention, first, to the fact that MMIA Admit their responsibility for the feeding, clothing and equipping of the CC.RR., (letter A.018 of 11 April, 1945, copy sent to you as enclosure to our letter 3626/EC of 14 April, 1945), and, second, to para. 4b of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November, 1944, wherein it is stated that MMIA will be responsible for supervision of administration and

30A

18B

18D

supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.RR. being Italian Army units, insomuch as they were specifically included under the CCS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 11 May, 1945, it is stated that "MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.RR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ letter AG 091. 711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on MMIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War. Para 8a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MMIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 8d provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.RR.) ---- are ---- under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri." The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri ---- are a civil police organization ---- directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission." Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of the Carabinieri as police.

5. The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of MMIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in an unsatisfactory level of supply of all kinds of equipment as compared with line troops of the Italian Army. Also this has caused the development of

3859

supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.RR. being Italian Army units, insomuch as they were specifically included under the CCS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 11 May, 1945, it is stated that "MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.RR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ letter AG 091. 711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on MMIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War. Para 8a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MMIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 8d provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.RR.) ---- are ---- under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri." The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri ---- are a civil police organization ---- directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission." Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of the Carabinieri as police.

5. The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of MMIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in the Carabinieri being practically and substantially ignored in the distribution of clothing and equipment, all of which is controlled by MMIA. Also this has caused the development of

On the Carabinieri being put on a lower plane & receiving insufficient quantities & a poorer quality than the line troops of the Italian Army

a fallacious opinion that, because Carabinieri are used as police, Public Safety Sub-Commission, which controls nothing in the way of supplies and equipment, is responsible for everything relating to Carabinieri. This situation has contributed materially to the ineffectiveness of the Carabinieri.

6. The internal security situation in Italy is far from satisfactory and threatens to become worse due in part to taking Carabinieri from the south to assist in the policing of the north. Now that combat operations have ceased, I feel that every aid and assistance possible should be given to strengthen, not only the Carabinieri, but also other Italian Police agencies. I see no reason why Land Forces Sub-Commission (MEMIA) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the AFHQ letter herein referred to.

7. For the reasons herein expressed and as a matter of urgency, I request that serious and prompt consideration be given to this matter.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

Land Forces Sub-Commission (MEMIA)

- 3 -

I and the reports I am now receiving from public safety offices in the north all testify to the very poor impression created in the minds of the public in all parts of the territory recently liberated by reason of the poor turn out of the Carabinieri sent north.

3857

785016

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

CASE
29A
78
33A

G-5: 014-12

14634

14 June 1945
Recd 18/6
18 GIU. 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of the CC.RH and other
Police Forces of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394.

PS 31/5

1. Reference is made to your 3626/EB of 19 May.
2. G-3 this Headquarters state that it is necessary that the full attention of MMCA should continue to be devoted for the time being to the military effectiveness of the Italian Army. G-3 further state however, that it is possible that this requirement may be reduced in importance in a few months time, when consideration might be given to modification of the present policy.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

TO		
DIRECTOR	<i>146</i>	<i>19/6</i>
DEPUTY DIR	<i>146</i>	<i>19/6</i>
EXECUTIVE	<i>146</i>	<i>19/6</i>
PERSONNEL	<i>146</i>	<i>19/6</i>
LOGISTICS		
ADJUTANT		
SECURITY		
CHIEF		

/s/ T. B. JACKMAN.

T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel.

3856

E.C. DISTRIBUTION - 18 June 45

Land Forces S/C (MMCA)
G.A. Section

File with CAS.

8129

785016

CASEC
WSA/hjp

3FA
29A

21 MAY 1945

Ref: 3626/ED

21 MAG. 1945

19 May 1945

14634

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the CC.RR and other Police Forces of Italy

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
(Attention: G-5 Section)

30A

1. Reference is made to your G-5 OIA.12 of 11 May 1945.
2. The point which you raise in your para 2 is noted--namely that MIA responsibility for the administration of the CC.RR is specifically limited to the supply of rations.

14634
FR.
18A

It is essential, however, to bear in mind that the CC.RR are Italian Army personnel more than historically; they are actually an integral part of the Italian Army, depending from the Ministry of War for their organization, supply, training, and discipline.

It was with the knowledge of this fact and with understanding of the Italian organization that the Committee which set to consider the reorganization of the CC.RR made their report.

3. This Headquarters' letter 3626/ED of 14 April sought assurance that "placing corresponding responsibilities (i.e., corresponding to those of the Italian Ministry of War whose counterpart in this Commission MIA is) on the Public Safety Sub-Commission and Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) would not be inconsistent with any directives that have been issued to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) and, in particular, AFHQ letter AG OOI.711/169 OCT-0 of 16 November 1944."

4. It is now my recommendation, should these proposed new responsibilities not be covered by existing directives to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) or be in conflict with them, that it be considered whether these directives should not be changed.

3855

cc: Exec Com'r, AC
Land Forces S/C (MIA), AC
Civil Affairs Sec, AC

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

(6289)

Please initial reverse side

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
AFG 512

TBJ/irf

17A
30A

G-5: OLA.12

pe

11 May 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Carabinieri and other Police Forces of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
AFG 394

1. Reference is made to your 3626/EC of 14 April.

2. While historically the CCRR are Army personnel, they are used as Civil Police and MMIA responsibility for their administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army. MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their organization, supervision or use and no extension of MMIA responsibility in this connection is contemplated.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel

TO		
X DIRECTOR	Handwritten initials	34/5
X DEPT. CHIEF	Handwritten initials	3/5
X STAFF	Handwritten initials	24/5
EX. & INT.		
PERSONS		
ADM. DIST.		
SECURITY		
CHIEF CLERK		

3854

29A.
36A

AO/14634/RS

9 May, 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

- 22A

I have received your letter dated 23 April 1945 in which you enclose copy of a letter from your Minister of War to Land Forces Sub-Commission (SMIA) requesting that an additional 10,000 Carabinieri be authorized, and asking approval for a decree to accommodate this increase. I am happy to inform you that instructions have now been received from AFHQ that there is no objection to your Government adopting a decree to increase the strength of Carabinieri to 69,000.

This letter should be read in conjunction with my reply of this date in answer to your letter of 29 April 1945.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USMC
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

3853
gil

Copy to: C. Commission.
Ex. Commission.

28A
23A

Ref: AG/14634/PS

9. May 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have now received your letter dated 25 April 1945 in which you enclose copy of a letter from your Minister of War to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFA) requesting that an additional 10,000 Carabinieri be authorized, and asking approval for a decree to accommodate this increase. I am entirely in sympathy with your demand and the strongest possible representations have been made to higher authority in support of your request, without whose permission, as you know, the ceiling of the Carabinieri cannot be increased.

26c
With your letter of 25 April 1945 you enclosed a memorandum from the Minister of War the first two paragraphs of which deal with the same subject, and I much regret that so far I am unable to give you an answer other than that above.

Constant touch is being maintained with AFM and you may depend upon it that I will let you know directly we have an answer.

I will reply to you later on the other points raised in the memorandum with your letter of 25 April.

Yours very truly,

1st Elmy W. Stone

ELMERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief, Configuration

8352

Handwritten signature and initials

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

cc: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFA)

785016

float
SECRET

24A
27X

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: AC/11601/21/45

30 Apr 45.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Strength.

TO: AFHQ, G-5 Section.

24A

Reference our signal 6404 dated 23 Apr 45.

26C 26D

- 1 The Chief Commissioner directs that a copy of a further letter from the President of the Council of Ministers be forwarded to you.
- 2 This Commission is studying the letter in detail but your attention is drawn particularly to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the War Department letter. The very strongest possible support to the requested increase is again urged.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

D. R. Hampton
/s/ G. R. HUTTON, Brig.
VP of Section.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission.

8551

704 245

23A
~~25A~~

V.P. CAS

AFHR — 6404

Chief Commissioner has affirmed
issue of telegram as amended.

Copy to P.S.
M.M.A.
E.C.
P.M. Sec

DW/29/84

Memorandum

Entry to show

3850

A.F.H.Q. C-5

6404

28 April 1945

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

PARA ONE PD URGENT REQUEST RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO PASS A DECREE INCREASING STRENGTH OF CARABINIERE TO FORMER CEILING OF SIX FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO PD PARMI TO AREA C-5 FROM AIGON CITE AGSOC PAREM PD

PARA TWO PD IN HIS VIEW WITHDRAWAL NOW IN PROGRESS OF TWO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO FROM PRESENTLY LIBERATED ITALY TO NEW BATTLE ZONE MAKES FORCE REMAINING IN SOUTH WHOLLY INADEQUATE TO COPE WITH LAW AND ORDER PD THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED IN HIS LETTER TO THE DANGER OF A RECURRENCE OF RECENT INCIDENT IN ROME AT TIME OF ESCAPE OF ROATTA WHEN MOBILAGE INVADED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND TO OTHER INCIDENTS IN PROVINCES AND STATED IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO INCREASE POLICE FORCES TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER AND FOR THE APPREHENSION OF OFFENDERS PD

PARA THREE PD ADDITIONAL NUMBERS REQUIRED WILL FORM TWELVE MOBILE BATTALIONS AND FOUR GROUP HEADQUARTERS PD

PARA FOUR PD THIS COMMISSION VERY SERIOUSLY SUPPORTS REQUEST AND CONSIDERS IT MOST UNWISE TO DENY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT RIGHT TO INCREASE THIS FORCE SO ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVATION OF LAW AND ORDER WHICH IS VITAL AT THIS PERIOD PD

Chief Commissioners

ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE, Rear Admiral

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO

CWO USA

Asst Adjutant

3849

Ellery

PAGE 2
Cable No. 6404

PARA FIVE PD UNDER PAR FOUR EIGHT SEVEN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER IN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY AND THEY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DISCHARGE THIS LIABILITY IF THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCES FOR THIS PURPOSE PD

PARA SIX PD MOREOVER UNDER TERMS OF PARAGRAPH TWO CHARLIE OF PAR FOUR EIGHT SEVEN ALLIED COMMISSION HAS ABANDONED THE PRACTICE OF APPROVING DECREES ISSUED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD

DISTRIBUTION

Public Safety
NMIA
Executive Commissioner
C A Section

3848

785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

28 APR 1945

35A
21A

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/78/EC.

27 April 1945.

28 APR 1945

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army and Carabinieri.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Attached hereto is translation of letter from Prime Minister No.347 dated 25 April 1945, together with its enclosure from the Minister of War, and copy of the acknowledgement.
2. Will you please prepare a reply to paragraphs 1 and 2 for signature by the Chief Commissioner.
3. It is suggested that with this reply should be combined also the reply to the Prime Minister's letter dated 23 April on the same subject.

E. Sharden
Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl: as above

* of the enclosure

TO	INIT	DATE
DIRECTOR	<i>[initials]</i>	30/4/5
DEPUTY DIRECTOR		
EXEC. OFFICER		
CLERK		
LC. & REG.	<i>[initials]</i>	28/4/5
PERSONS		
OFFICE		
TELETYPE		
RECORDS		

3847

4531

~~2673~~
218

Ref/3606/EO.

April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 347 dated 25 April 1945 on the subject of the strength of the Carabinieri and kindred matters.

The points raised in the War Minister's letter which you enclosed call for examination by more than one Sub-Commission. Consideration is now being given to these matters and I will write to you again as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Comm. (MCA)
Civil Affairs Section .

3870
218

1531

Translation

26
210

The President of the Council of Ministers

347

Rome, 25 April 1945

My dear Admiral,

the maintenance of public order represents one of the most important problems for the interior safety of the State.

I therefore take the liberty of drawing your attention on the enclosed memorandum of the Minister of War and especially on paras 1 and 2 of the said memorandum.

The urgency to increase the numeric number of the Carabinieri is quite obvious. North Italy having to be garrisoned with about 10 thousand carabinieri, it is natural that the 6 Corps should have to be increased of identical forces.

This, request n. 2 is particularly important. We haven't enough safety troops, in Rome especially. Here, there is one battalion only, which, employed in guard service, can dispose of a few score of men only.

I trust that you, an old and trusted friend of Italy, will speak in favour of our request to the Allied Commission in which you have such an important situation.

Yours very truly,

S. I. Bonomi

Admiral Henry H. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EC DISTRIBUTION - 27 Apr 45
Action : C A Section
Info : Chief Comar
Exec Comar
Staff Forces S/C

S.O.

Handwritten signature/initials

1474

785016

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
Liaison Office

267
EID

Rome, 23 April 1945

TO : His M. the President of the Council of Ministers

P. O. M. S.

SUBJECT : Military questions requiring urgent solution.

I expound to your Excellency, to have them forwarded to the allies, some of the main questions of a military character which require an urgent solution:

1) - IMPOSEL OF 10,000 CARABINIERE.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.P.H.A. is of 55,000 men (of whom 1,800 are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the Kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 groups) it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 65 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabiniere scattered all over the Kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the interregional mobile ones.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabiniere, ³³⁰⁰ troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions ^{for} safety (Calabria, Aosta, Sabauda; Divisions 5, 15, 25)

1) - INCREASE OF 10,000 CARABINIERES.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.F.H.A. is of 20,000 men (of whom 1,800 are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the Kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 Groupments) it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 60 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the interregional mobile units.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, ~~800~~ troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions of interior safety (Calabria, Aosta, Sabauda) Divisions - 15 thousand men) are stationed in Sicily and Sardinia (only 500 men in Calabria to watch the plants).

It would be necessary to dispose of safety troops on the continent also, and particularly in the capital. To obtain this, the contingent which, for this category, is at present fixed to 15 thousand men, would have to be adequately increased by A.F.H.A., and above all, the formation of a safety division in ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~area~~ would have to be authorized.

4210

3) - GREATER COMPLETION OF THE TERRITORIAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The organs of the territorial, district and depot military commands fixed by A.F.H.A. are inadequate for the numerous, delicate and urgent functions which the said organs have to fulfill.

For instance, the districts can have an average of five men, only; the organization is completed with civilian personnel exclusively; in such conditions, all these organs cannot function well.

It must be remembered that many districts are also centres of mobilization for the units and are therefore burdened with the work which

1851

- 2 -

such a function implies.

A.F.H.Q. would have to increase adequately the number of the personnel of the central and periphtric administration which is at present fixed to 27 thousand men (1st category).

4) - MILITARY RATIONS

The allied control organs allot foodstuff rations according to the authorized force and won't admit derogations for any motive whatever.

There are however, special situations which would require derogations, for instance:

- in favour of repatriated prisoners or interned soldiers, or soldiers who come back from other States, as long as they haven't been discharged;
- in favour of sick or wounded soldiers who stay over 60 days in hospital (from the 61st day on, they get civilian rations);
- in favour of travelling soldiers (those who start on a journey according to allied orders are only allowed to take two days rations, while the journey - because of the means of communications - often lasts several days);

and soldiers called under arms
 in favour of draftees, ~~for the day on which they present themselves to the districts (away rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);~~

- etc.

- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the Allies and treated as such. The system must be revised; the motives are obvious and come from humanitarian considerations and from an understanding of reality: they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE BILLETTS

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftees adequately would have a good moral effect on the Country and for the Government.

It would also make it possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary - the draftees from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called ~~under arms~~ during the first period of their training.

- in favour of travelling soldiers (those who start on a journey according to allied orders are only allowed to take two days rations, while the journey - because of the means of communications - often lasts several days);
- and soldiers called under arms themselves to the districts (army rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);

- etc.

- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the Allies and treated as such. The system must be revised; the motives are obvious and come from humanitarian considerations and from an understanding of reality; they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE FACILITIES.

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftees adequately would have a good moral effect on the Country and for the Government.

It would also make it possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary - the draftees from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called up during the first period of their training.

Only the allied side can solve this problem and leave at our disposal the necessary minimum of military buildings.

6) - REPARATION ELEMENTS 'CUNEO' & 'REGINA' AIRBORNE DIVISIONS EMPLOYED IN EGYPT AS AUXILIARIES.

The troops of these two divisions, stationed in the Suez Canal at the time of the armistice, did not fight against the Germans ever since September 9th, 1943, at the side of the Allies for the defence of these islands (the 'Cuneo' alone had about 400 dead and wounded in these actions). Overrun by the enemy, instead of surrendering, in agreement with the allied authorities, they reached Egypt through Turkey and Palestine; they were not allowed to carry on their fight against the Germans in other sectors and are being employed as auxiliary units in the dependence of the local English commands.

But, after having been at first considered as 'collaborators', the soldiers of the 'Cuneo' and of the 'Regina' (about 6500) were then to all effects placed by the British commands in the category of 'co-operating prisoners', though there had been nothing to cause such action to be taken.

- 3 -

It is necessary to :

- revoke this regulation, placing again these troops in the 'rebelligent' category.
- repatriate them without delay.

I have expounded all these facts, for I know of your Excellency's wish to reconstruct the army, and I am sure you will intervene in favour of the solution of the above mentioned questions which are all of a fundamental and moral interest.

THE MINISTER

R. Casati

785016

Translation

C.A. SEC

The President of the Council of Ministers
336

25 APR 1945

Rome, 23 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

I send you a copy of the letter addressed by Minister Casati to L.F.S.C. - A.S. (M.M.L.A.) to obtain the Carabinieri Corps to be increased of ten thousand units.

From this letter you will learn the reasons which make it advisable to increase our police forces. With the occupation of the North, 9 thousand Carabinieri at least will have to be taken away from liberated Italy, while the conditions of Sicily prevent to diminish the forces which are scattered there.

I have already pointed out to you after the invasion of the Vindale - the very great need to increase the armed forces in the Capital. The Government cannot run the risk of being its offices invaded again, nor can it remain inactive any longer in front of the incidents which take place in the provinces and which have to remain unpunished because of the lack of police forces.

Will you kindly see that the request of my Minister of War is granted so that the decree may soon be issued.

I hope your answer will be favourable and I remain,

Yours sincerely,

s. I. Bonomi

EC Dist - 243448 45

Action: CA SEC (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMR

EX COMMR RSL

HAND FORWDS SC

(WITHOUT ENCLOSURES)

Admiral Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

4313

Translation

War Department
Ufficio coordinamento

n. 402677/coord

Rome,

SUBJECT : Interior safety forces

TO : L.F.S.C. - A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROME

As it is well known, the Italian military forces for interior safety are composed of the divisions of Interior Safety and the RR.CC. Corps.

The Interior Safety divisions are located in Sicily and Sardinia, where they are mostly used for guard duties; there are no safety units on the mainland (only 800 men in Calabria).

Up to now, the RR.CC. Corps was rather numerous, in liberated Italy, but is getting greatly reduced because of the numerous groups which are being organized for the requirements of the part of Italy which is being liberated (9,000 carabinieri at least are ready; another 10,000 are getting prepared).

When Italy will be entirely liberated, and especially during the critical period of the liberation and immediately afterwards, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will prove to be very scarce for the requirements of local safety (units for territorial service) and will prove insufficient for the requirements of interregional safety (mobile units).

Foreseeing these requirements, the general command of the RR.CC. has been pointing out to the competent organ of A.C. the necessity of raising the force of the Corps from 55,000 to 69,000 men; in this way, 12 battalions (4 groupments) would be constituted; they would be mobile and might be transported from one region to another according to particular safety requirements.

I think this increase of force, and the ensuing constitution of mobile battalions are essential elements for the interior safety of the country, at the side of the Allied operating units.

As this is no longer a matter of plain military police, I forward a copy of the draft of the decree for the re-organization of the Corps, which, after obtaining the consent of the Allies, I mean to propose to the Council of Ministers, and I ask for the kind interest of the Mission, which shall deal promptly with all fundamental problems.

THE MINISTER

E. A. Casati

785016

205
~~208~~
~~209~~

Translation

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

SUBJECT: Draft of a Regency Decree relative to the Organic Force and Regulations of the Royal Carabinieri.

The present regulations, sanctioned by laws issued on this subject and still officially in force, though they have in fact been modified for essential requirements, foresee that the R.C. Corps must have the various requirements with a force of 22,000 men (excluding the officers and the soldiers being services in the colonies, or at the various Ministries and dependent organizations) at its disposal.

This force, according to the above mentioned regulations, should be divided between :

- a) - 1 General Command
- b) - Three Division Commands
- c) - Six Brigade Commands
- d) - 1 Central School
- e) - Twenty Territorial Legions
- f) - 1 Legion of Cadets
- g) - 1 Band of the Corps
- h) - Four Battalions
- i) - 1 Cavalry Group
- l) - 1 Squadron of Carabinieri Guards of the King.

Experience has proved that to face the requirements, which are sometimes urgent, imposed by reasons of public order, the various commands, through lack of manpower, had to get the required personnel from the stations, not excluding the rural ones.

As the stations themselves, especially those of the periphery, have a personnel strictly limited to the requirements, the result was that they were sometimes reduced to the state of sheer reference points, which could, what is more, easily be submerged in case of trouble on a large scale, or in case of trouble brewing up simultaneously in various parts of the Kingdom.

Before fascism, the corps could rely on eight militia battalions, thanks to which - if only in part - it was able to face the various requirements without troubling the normal functioning of the rural stations, but the past regime thought among other things, that it could also reduce this corps. Finally, in fact, in

- 1) - 1 Legion of Cadets
- 2) - 1 Band of the Corps
- 3) - 4 Cavalry Battalions
- 4) - 1 Cavalry Group
- 5) - 1 Squadron of Carabiniers Guards of the King.

Experience has proved that to face the requirements, which are sometimes urgent, imposed by reasons of public order, the various commands, through lack of manpower, had to get the required personnel from the stations, not excluding the rural ones.

As the stations themselves, especially those of the periphery, have a personnel strictly limited to the requirements, the result was that they were sometimes reduced to the state of sheer reference points, which could, what is more, easily be submerged in case of trouble on a large scale, or in case of trouble brewing up simultaneously in various parts of the Kingdom.

Before fascism, the Corps could rely on eight mobile battalions, thanks to which - if only in part - it was able to face the various requirements without troubling the normal functioning of the rural stations, but the past regime thought among other things, that it could also reduce this Corps, **3439** in fact, in determined periods, the said stations lived an ephemeral **3439** during difficulties of all sorts, caused by the lack of personnel, and by the requirements of the service which had to be met in the interest of the population.

To solve the problem in a satisfactory, practical and definitive way, and in the belief that the organization of the Territorial Corps - which is, as we have already said, strictly proportioned to the requirements - ought to remain practically unchanged, I emphasize the need:

- a) of increasing the organic force of the Royal Carabiniers Corps, bringing it to 65,000 men (officers included);
- b) of making use of the men who will not be needed for strictly territorial requirements to form 12 mobile battalions and 4 battalions Groupements Commanda, the latter entirely autonomous and quite independent from the legions.

I therefore prepared the enclosed draft to a Regency Decree which shows the particulars of the above mentioned modifications, and the new organic characteristic which would in this case be assumed by the Carabiniers Corps, and I submit it to your approval.

ALL INFORMATION

CHIEF

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA
 PRINCE OF PIEMONTE, Lieutenant General of the
 Kingdom

By the Authority invested in us:

Considered the R.D.L. of February 1920, n. 128 and successive modifications;
 Considered the R.D. of December 1923, n. 2386 and successive modifications;
 Considered the R.D. of April 1925, n. 381 and successive modifications;
 Considered the R.D.L. of May 1929, n. 833 and successive modifications;
 Considered the R.D. of July 1929, n. 1430 and successive modifications;
 Considered the R.D.L. of October 1939, n. 2092 and successive modifications;
 Considered Law of May 1940, n. 368 and successive modifications;
 Considered the R.L.D. of October 1943, n. 4/B;
 Considered the Decree of June 1944, n. 151;

On the proposal of the Minister of War in agreement with the Ministers of the Interior and of Treasury,

We have sanctioned and promulgated what follows.

Art. 1

The organic force of the Carabinieri Corps will be of 69,000 men, including the officers.

Art. 2

In this force are not to be included the soldiers who might have to do service in the colonies or at the various Ministries and dependent organs.

Art. 3

The Royal Carabinieri Corps includes:

- 1 General Command
- 3 Division Commands;
- 6 Brigade Commands;
- 21 Territorial Legion Commands;
- 1 Central School;
- 1 Carabinieri Juvenile Legion
- 4 Groupments/Commands of mobile Battalions;
- 12 mobile Battalions

Depending from the R.R.06. Legion of Rome Territorial, it also includes

- 1 R.R.07. Squadron;
- 1 Squadron of Alpi's Guards

ART. 2

In this force are not to be included the soldiers who might have to do services in the colonies or at the various ministries and dependent organs.

ART. 3

The Royal Carabinieri Corps includes:

- 1 General Command
- Three Division Commands;
- Six Brigade Commands;
- 21 Territorial Legion Commands;
- 1 Central School;
- 1 Carabinieri Pupils Legion
- 4 Groupment Commands of mobile battalions;
- 12 Mobile Battalions

Depending from the AR.CC. Legion of some territorial, it also includes

3838

- 1 AR.CC. Squadron;
- 1 Squadron of King's Guards
- 1 Band of the AR.CC. Corps.

ART. 4

The groupment commands of mobile battalions mentioned in the former article will have their seat in the towns of: Milan, Florence, Rome, Naples, and will have in their dependence the mobile battalions of:

MILAN: Milan - Turin - Genoa - Trieste;

FLORENCE: Florence, - Bologna - Ancona;

ROME: Rome - Cagliari;

NAPLES: Naples - Bari - Palermo.

ART. 5

The organic formation of the units mentioned in art. 3 are fixed by the enclosed gradual and numerical tables.

- 2 -

Art. 6

The groupment commands of mobile battalions will depend on the brigade commands in which case they will happen to find themselves.

Art. 7

The stations are commanded by non-commissioned officers of various ranks and by first class privates empowered to do so.

Art. 8

The present Decree will be in force on the day of its publication in the Gazette officielle of the Kingdom.

We order that it may concern to respect the present Decree and see that it is respected as State law.

Done,1945



Roma, li 23 aprile 1945

APR 23 RECD

20D

*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*
336

Caro Ammiraglio,

Le mando copia della lettera che il Ministro Casati ha indirizzata alla L.F.S.C.-A.C. (M.M.I.A.) per ottenere un aumento di diecimila unità nell'Arma dei Carabinieri.

Dalla lettera Ella apprenderà le ragioni che consigliano l'aumento delle nostre forze di polizia. Con l'occupazione del Nord ben 9 mila Carabinieri dovranno essere tolti dall'Italia già liberata mentre le condizioni della Sicilia impediscono di diminuire le forze colà dislocate.


Io ho avuto occasione - dopo l'invasione del Viminale - di segnalarle la estrema necessità di aumentare le forze armate nella Capitale. Il Governo non può restare esposto ai pericoli di una nuova invasione dei suoi uffici, come non può restare inoperoso di fronte a fatti che avvengono in provincia e che per mancanza di forze di polizia occorre lasciare impuniti.

Al Sig. Ammiraglio
Ellery W. Stone
Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

./.

336



*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*


- 2 -

Pertanto la prego vivamente di voler far accogliere la richiesta del mio Ministro della Guerra in modo da poter presto adottare il provvedimento legislativo.

In attesa di una risposta che spero favorevole, le invio i miei cordiali saluti.

Luigi Barco

URGENTE



20 E
Ministero della Guerra

GRABINETTO

Ufficio Coordinamento

Prot. n. 402677 / coord.

OGGETTO: Forze di sicurezza interna.

ROMA,

ALLA L. P. S. C. - A. C. (R. M. I. A.)

R O M A

Come è noto, le forze militari di sicurezza interna italiana sono costituite dalle divisioni di sicurezza interna e dall'Arma dei CC. RR.

Le divisioni di sicurezza interna sono dislocate in Sicilia ed in Sardegna ed in prevalenza assorbite da compiti di guardia; non esistono unità di sicurezza nel continente (solo 200 uo. in Calabria).

L'Arma dei CC. RR. ha avuto, sino ad ora, una discreta consistenza nell'Italia liberata, ma questa efficienza si sta notevolmente riducendo per i molti nuclei in approntamento per le esigenze dell'Italia in corso di liberazione (in complesso ben 9.000 carabinieri già pronti; altri 10.000 di previsto approntamento).

Quando l'Italia sarà completamente liberata - e particolarmente nel periodo di crisi della liberazione e immediatamente successivo - i carabinieri disseminati in tutto il Regno risulteranno molto scarsi per le esigenze di sicurezza locali (unità per servizio territoriale) e saranno insufficienti per le esigenze di sicurezza interregionali (unità mobili).

In previsione di queste esigenze il comando generale del CC. RR. sta prospettando da tempo al competente organo ~~di~~ ^{del} A. C. la necessità di portare la forza dell'Arma da 55.000 a 65.000 uo.;

Come è noto, le forze militari di sicurezza interna italiana sono costituite dalle divisioni di sicurezza interna e dell'Arma del CC. RR.

Le divisioni di sicurezza interna sono dislocate in Sicilia ed in Sardegna ed in prevalenza assorbono compiti di guardia; non esistono unità di sicurezza nel continente (solo 100 uo. in Calabria).

L'Arma del CC. RR. in aiuto, sino ad ora, una discreta consistenza nell'Italia liberata, ma questa efficienza si sta notevolmente riducendo per i molti nuclei in approntamento per le esigenze dell'Italia in corso di liberazione (in complesso ben 5.000 carabinieri già pronti; altri 10.000 di preciso approntamento).

Quando l'Italia sarà completamente liberata -- e particolarmente nel periodo di crisi della liberazione e immediatamente successivo -- i carabinieri disseminati in tutto il Regno risulteranno molto scarsi per le esigenze di sicurezza locali (unità per serotino territoriale) e saranno insufficienti per le esigenze di sicurezza interregionali (unità mobili).

In previsione di queste esigenze il comando generale del CC. RR. sta prospettando da tempo al competente organo ^{Bia} A. C. la necessità di portare la forza dell'Arma da 55.000 a 65.000 uo.; col che, tra l'altro, verrebbero costituiti 12 battaglioni (4 ruq gruppi) mobili, spostabili da una ad altra regione a seconda delle particolari esigenze di sicurezza.

Attenso che questo aumento di forza, e la conseguente costituzione dei battaglioni mobili, sono elementi essenziali per la sicurezza interna del Paese a lato ed a tergo delle unità Al-

./.

237

leute operanti.

Poichè ciò trascende l'aspetto ristretto di pura polizia-
- militare, mentre trasmetto copia dello schema di decreto per il
riordnamento dell'Arma che, previo consenso all'alto, mi propon-
go di presentare al Consiglio dei Ministri, mi permetto di richia-
mare sulla questione l'interessamento di codesta Missione, sempre
tanto sollecita di ogni problema fondamentale.

IL MINISTRO



20F

RELAZIONE AL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

—o—

OGGETTO: Schema di Decreto Luogotenenziale relativo alla Forza Organica ed ordinamento dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali.

—o—

Gli attuali ordinamenti, sanciti dalle leggi emanate al riguardo e tuttora ufficialmente in vigore, anche se in pratica modificati ed in parte superati per necessità d'ordine contingente, prevedono che l'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali debba far fronte alle varie necessità avvalendosi di una forza di 50.000 uomini (esclusi gli ufficiali ed i militari impiegati in servizio nelle Colonie o presso i vari Ministeri ed organi dipendenti).

Tale forza, sempre secondo gli ordinamenti di cui sopra dovrebbe essere ripartita fra:

- a) - UN COMANDO GENERALE
- b) - TRE COMANDI DI DIVISIONE
- c) - SEI COMANDI DI BRIGATA
- d) - UNA SCUOLA CENTRALE
- e) - VENTI LEGIONI TERRITORIALI
- f) - UNA LEGIONE ALLIEVI
- g) - UNA BANDA DELL'ARMA
- h) - QUATTRO BATTAGLIONI
- i) - UN GRUPPO SQUADRONI

e tuttora ufficialmente in vigore, anche se in pratica modificati ed in parte superati per necessità d'ordine contingente, prevedono che l'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali debba far fronte alle varie necessità avvalendosi di una forza di 50.000 uomini (esclusi gli ufficiali ed i militari impiegati in servizio nelle Colonie o presso i vari Ministeri ed organi dipendenti).

Tale forza, sempre secondo gli ordinamenti di cui sopra dovrebbe essere ripartita fra:

- a) - UN COMANDO GENERALE
- b) - TRE COMANDI DI DIVISIONE
- c) - SEI COMANDI DI BRIGATA
- d) - UNA SCUOLA CENTRALE
- e) - VENTI LEGIONI TERRITORIALI
- f) - UNA LEGIONE ALLIEVI
- g) - UNA BANDELLA DELL'ARMA
- h) - QUATTRO BATTAGLIONI
- i) - UN GRUPPO SQUADRONI
- l) - UNO SQUADRONE CARABINIERI GUARDIE DEL RE.

333

Alla luce dell'esperienza si è constatato che per far fronte alle insorgenti necessità, talvolta imperiose, imposte da ragioni d'ordine pubblico, per mancanza di masse di manovra i vari comandi hanno dovuto attingere il personale occorrente presso le stazioni, non escluse quelle rurali.

- 2 -

E poiché le stazioni stesse - specie quelle periferiche - hanno un organico strettamente commisurato ai bisogni, ne è derivato che, in taluni periodi, queste hanno finito per costituire dei semplici punti di riferimento e facili per giunta ad essere sommersi nella circostanza di perturbamenti di vasta portata od affiorati contemporaneamente in varie zone del territorio del Regno.

Prima dell'avvento del fascismo l'Arma poteva contare su otto battaglioni mobili, mediante i quali - se pur solo in parte - era in grado di fronteggiare le varie esigenze senza turbare il normale funzionamento delle stazioni rurali, ma il passato regime, fra l'altro, ritenne di poter ridurre anche questi per cui, in pratica, in determinati periodi le stazioni anzidette sono vissute di vita effimera e fra difficoltà di ogni genere originate, da un lato dalla mancanza di personale e dall'altro dalle necessità del servizio cui - nell'interesse delle popolazioni - non era possibile sottrarsi.

Per risolvere in modo soddisfacente, pratico e definitivo il problema e poiché ritengo che l'ordinamento dell'Arma territoriale - come già detto strettamente commisurato ai bisogni - debba rimanere pressoché invariato, ravviso la necessità:

a) - di aumentare la forza organica dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali portandola a 65.000 unità (ufficiali compresi);

b) - di utilizzare l'aliquota eccedente le necessità strettamente territoriali, nella costituzione di 12 battaglioni e 4 Comandi di Raggruppamento di Battaglioni mobili questi ³ ~~12~~ ³ ~~12~~ comple-

in varie zone del territorio del Regno.

Prima dell'avvento del fascismo l'Arma poteva contare su otto battaglioni mobili, mediante i quali - se pur solo in parte - era in grado di fronteggiare le varie esigenze senza turbare il normale funzionamento delle stazioni rurali, ma il passato regime, fra l'altro, riteneva di poter ricorrere anche questi per cui, in pratica, in determinati periodi le stazioni anzidette sono vissute di vita effimera e fra difficoltà di ogni genere originate, da un lato dalla mancanza di personale e dall'altro dalle necessità del servizio cui - nell'interesse delle popolazioni - non era possibile sottrarsi.

Per risolvere in modo soddisfacente, pratico e definitivo il problema e poiché ritengo che l'ordinamento dell'Arma territoriale - come già detto strettamente commisurato ai bisogni - debba rimanere pressoché invariato, ravviso la necessità:

- a)- di aumentare la forza organica dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali portandola a 65.000 unità (ufficiali compresi);
- b)- di utilizzare l'aliquota eccedente le necessità strettamente territoriali, nella costituzione di 12 battaglioni e 4 Comandi di Raggruppamento di Battaglioni mobili questi ³ ~~12~~ ³ ~~12~~ completamente autonomi e del tutto indipendenti delle legioni.

He predisposto pertanto l'unito schema di Decreto luogotenenziale dal quale risultano in dettaglio le modifiche sopra accennate e la nuova caratteristica organica che in conseguenza l'Arma dei Carabinieri

- 3 -

mi verrebbe ad assumere e con la presente lo sottopongo alla vostra
approvazione. =

I L M I N I S T R O

3831

206

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA
PRINCIPE DI PIEMONTE, LUOGOTENENTE GENERALE DEL REGNO

^--^^^

In virtù dell'Autorità a Noi delegata:

- Visto il R.D.L. 1° febbraio 1920, n°128 e successive modificazioni;
- Visto il R.D. 30 dicembre 1923 n°2986 e successive modificazioni;
- Visto il R.D. 2 aprile 1925 n.381 e successive modificazioni;
- Visto il R.D.L. 16 maggio 1926 n°855 e successive modificazioni;
- Visto il R.D. 26 luglio 1929 n°1430 e successive modificazioni;
- Visto il R.D.L. 26 ottobre 1939 n°2002 e successive modificazioni;
- Vista la legge 9 maggio 1940 n°368 e successive modificazioni;
- Visto il R.D.L. 30 ottobre 1943 n°2/B ;
- Visto il R.D.L. 29 maggio 1944 n°141 ;
- Visto il R.D.L. Luogotenenziale 25 giugno 1944 n°151 ;
- Visto la deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri;
- Sulla proposta del Ministro della Guerra d'intesa con i Ministri per l'Interno e per il Tesoro

Visto il R.D. n. 301 e successive modificazio-

- ni;
- Visto il R.D.L. 16 maggio 1926 n°355 e successive modificazioni;
 - Visto il R.D. 26 luglio 1929 n°1430 e successive modificazioni;
 - Visto il R.D.L. 25 ottobre 1939 n°2002 e successive modificazioni;
 - Vista la legge 9 maggio 1940 n°368 e successive modificazioni;
 - Visto il R.D.L. 30 ottobre 1943 n°2/B ;
 - Visto il R.D.L. 29 maggio 1944 n°141 ;
 - Visto il R.D.L. Luogotenenziale 25 giugno 1944 n°151 ;
 - Visto la deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri;
 - Sulla proposta del Ministro della Guerra d'intesa con i Ministri per l'Interno e per il Tesoro

abbiamo sanzionato e promulghiamo quanto segue:

Art. 1

La forza organica dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali è fis-

./.

sate in 65.000 unità, compresi gli ufficiali.

Art. 2

In tale forza non sono da comprendersi i militari che eventualmente dovessero prestare servizio nelle colonie o presso i vari Ministeri ed organi dipendenti.

Art. 3

L'Arma dei Carabinieri inclui comprises:

- un Comando Generale;
- tre Comandi di Divisione;
- sei Comandi di Brigata;
- 21 Comandi di Legioni Territoriali;
- 1 Scuola Centrale;
- 1 Legione Allievi Carabinieri;
- 4 Comandi di Raggruppamento di Battaglioni Mobili;
- 12 Battaglioni Mobili.

Comprende inoltre alle dipendenze della Legione del CC.RR. di Roma Territoriale:

- 1 Gruppo Squadroni CC.RR.;
- 1 Squadrone Inerte del Re;
- 1 Banda dell'Arma del CC.RR.

Art. 3

L'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali comprende:

- un Comando Generale;
- tre Comandi di Divisione;
- sei Comandi di Brigata;
- 21 Comandi di Legioni Territoriali;
- 1 Scuola Centrale;
- 1 Legione Allievi Carabinieri;
- 4 Comandi di Raggruppamento di battaglioni mobili;
- 12 Battaglioni mobili

Comprende inoltre alle dipendenze della Legione dei
CC.RR. di Roma Territoriale:

- 1 Gruppo Squadroni CC.RR.;
- 1 Squadrone Guardia del Re;
- 1 Banda dell'Arma dei CC.RR.

329

Art. 4

I comandi di raggruppamento di battaglioni mobili di cui all'articolo precedente avranno sede nelle città di : Milano - Firenze - Roma e Napoli ed avranno rispettivamente alle loro dipendenze 1 battaglioni mobili di :

./.

- 3 -

- MILANO : Milano - Torino - Genova - Trieste
- FIRENZE: Firenze - Bologna - Ancona
- ROMA : Roma - Cagliari
- NAPOLI : Napoli - Bari - Palermo.

Art. 5

Le formazioni organiche dei reparti di cui all'articolo 3 sono stabilite dalle tabelle generali e numeriche allagate.

Art. 6

I comandi di raggruppamento di battaglioni mobili dipen-
deranno dai comandi di Brigata della sede in cui verranno a
trovarsi.

Art. 7

Le stazioni sono comandate da sottufficiali di vari gra-
di e da appuntati all'uopo abilitati.

Art. 8

Il presente Decreto entra in vigore il giorno della sua
pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno.

Il presente Decreto è pubblicato per assicurare il presente

Art. 6

I comandi di raggruppamento di battaglioni mobili dipen-
deranno dai comandi di Brigata della sede in cui verranno a
trovarsi.

Art. 7

Le stazioni sono comandate da sottufficiali di vari gra-
di e da appuntati all'uopo abilitati.

Art. 8

Il presente Decreto entra in vigore il ~~giorno~~²⁸ della sua
pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno.

Ordiniamo a chiunque spetti di osservare il presente
Decreto e di farlo osservare come Legge dello Stato.

A Roma, li.....1945

