

785016

ACC

10000/143/1561
(VOL. III)

785016

10000/143/1561
(VOL. III)

REFORMATION OF POLICE FORCES
MAY 1946 - JAN. 1947

0513

785016

61

JAN 17 1947

Chief Commissioner.

Approved
Attached is submitted for your signature
information
7/1/47

Mr. Memorandum
to at/cho 15

127
McAnRye EC

0314

785016

59

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your ~~signature~~ ^{signature}. You approved draft at 18a.

approve

2/1/47. *Man* 442 *EC*

785016

To Executive Comm. 60

22A submitted for your information please

H. C. Green
D. C. Green
for D. P. S. Green

11 January 1947

62

Ex Comm.

see 242

4125

18.1.47

Ex Comm.

62
Ex Comm.
Pac per 24th.
18-1-47.
JW/18/11
4125
E. J. Dye, Col.

63.
Director.
P. S. Div.
Please prepare letter for signature
of E.C. in accordance with his draft
opposite.
21 Jan 47.
A. B. Frost, Lt. Col.
C. S. O. to E.C.

64
Ex Comm.
Letter used for signature per. E. J. Dye, Col.
26-1-47

Chief Commissioner55

As ^{revised} ~~shown~~ is submitted for your sign are you approved draft at
invention 17.

17a

MC

241124

05181

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

54.

16 19 1946

Chief Commissioner

Ref. AFHes Signal at 16A Attached is submitted for your

approval
signature
indication

19/x11

McAnBry
E.C. 4123

Minute 53

Memorandum (15) seen and noted
 for ops 1st Divn
 H. C. Cunningham

12/12/46

56.

Ex Comm.

Please see 203-13+C.

6-1-47

E. J. Dye. Colonel.

56.

Ex Comm.

Please see 202-B+C.

E. J. Dye. Colonel.

6-1-47.

57.

4122

To: Chief Commissioner.

8th January 1947

Enclosed draft is submitted for your approval.

The correspondence referred to in para 2 of the draft is at 20A, 20B and 20C and has come in since we last discussed this matter.

58

M. Carr
M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

E.C.

Approved
9/11/47

JAN 8 1947

Minute 50 (Contd.)

Policy in an Advisory capacity. Unless there is likely to be a change in policy and the scope and powers of the C.C.R.R. Section M.H.P.A. are to be materially increased, I see no reason why the recommendations made in Para 52 of 62 should not be confirmed.

8-11-46.

E. J. Dye, Colonel.
H.L. 8/11

MINUTE No. 51

To: Public Safety Division.

9th November, 1946

I agree with Minute 50 but was hoping you would draft a reply to 12A. A draft reply is at 13A which, if you concur, can be typed for my signature.

M. Carr

M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

MINUTE No. 52

Wm L. A.
K. J. Syc. Colonel.

9th November, 1946

I agree with Minute 50 but was hoping you would draft a reply to 12A. A draft reply is at 13A which, if you concur, can be typed for my signature.

Mcarr

**M. CARR, Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.**

LIBRARY NO. 52

To: Executive Commissioner

12 November 1946

4121

I agree entirely with the draft which has now been typed for signature. It is regretted a draft reply was not prepared but it was thought you wished to know first the views of Public Safety Division.

ext. 1416.

4/20 11/6
E. J. Tamm
Director, P. S. Div.

6th November 1946

MINUTE No. 2

To: Public Safety Division.

It seems to me that before we can answer 12A we should see
ATHQ letter of 14th October 1945.

We can then either suggest some modifications of the functions
to bring them into line with the availability of Public Safety Officers,
which at the moment from local sources stands at two, or we must
agree to the functions as laid down, in which case it seems to me that
the strength will be merely a paper one.

I feel that now that the OCCR have been re-equipped so far as
local resources permit, ~~what~~ the original Public Safety officer
establishment cannot be justified, but this is a matter more for
MIA than this Commission.

McCam Bay.

M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

48.

To MIA.

See sec 47. Can we have a copy of
letter H.G. 014.12 GEG-0 of 14th Oct. per?

12b
8.11.46.

E. J. Byr. Co.

49

P. H. W. Herewith copy of letter received. It was
originally addressed to A.C.

M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

48.

To MMIA.

See sec 47. Can we have a copy of
letter A.G. 014.12 GEG-0 of 14th Oct. per?

8. 11. 46.

E. J. Dye. Col.

49

P. A. Sir Hewitt copy & letter received. It was
originally addressed to A.C.

A. J. Dye. Col.

7. 11. 46.

4128

50

to Comm.

See sec 12. With regard to para 2: As I
understand the present position, MMIA have
supervised the training and administration
of the CARR since the formation of the CARR
Section in MMIA. Operationally the CARR
have been under the control of the MoI since
the handing of training to the Italian
Government and this division has and is acting

45 continued

If we seek for any information from Italian sources, great care must be taken to ensure that our action falls within the present-day functions of the Commission.

2. In connection with this matter we shall have to consider what action is to be recommended in regard to LFSC's report on CERR which I believe you still hold. I suggest we should inform them of the above decision and if the CERR are getting out a report of their own it may be that we should agree to LFSC issuing an abridged report which would confine itself solely to domestic reorganisation within the CERR not affecting other police agencies and which would not come within the scope of your report.

M. Carr
M. CARR,
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

15 October 1946.

46

Ex Comm.
See sec 12. The question of the future strength of the C.C.R.R. Section in M.I.A. was forwarded to A.F.H.Q. in the letter of 6.2. The suggestion to limit the Section to 2 officers was approved by A.F.H.Q. in the letter of 7.2. M.I.A. had previously agreed this suggestion so far as is known there is no objection to be

15 October 1946.

Executive Commissioner.

46

Ex Comm.

See sec 12A. The question of the future strength of the C.I.R.R. Section in W.M.I.A. was forwarded to A.F.H.Q. in the letter of 6/2. The suggestion to limit the Section to 2 Officers was approved by A.F.H.Q. in the letter of 7/2. W.M.I.A. had previously agreed this suggestion so far as is known there is no wish to be any change in policy.

31-10-46.

Ex 4416.

W. J. Dye. Colonel.
41198
11/11/46

0525

42

Chief Commissioner.

6 copies of the Aide Memoire are enclosed for action with the
Prime Minister.

M. Carr

M. CARR,
Brigadier,
A/Executive Commissioner.

29 September 1946.

43

SEP 30 1946

F.C. Del'd to PM today *Jus*

M. Carr 11/10 *cc*

30/11x

44

F.C. PM will be notified of our decision
(to prepare a report without his instruc-
tions) by Bombrdavei. That we want
ade for a conference.

12/11x

Jus
cc

45

30/1x

ms 11/10 cc

44

F.C.

PM will be notified of our decision
(to prepare a report without his notice -
Tito by Bonbrasse) That we won't
adv for a conference.

12/x

ms cc

42

4118

Director, Public Safety S/C.

1. As a result of discussions with both U.K. and U.S. Embassies and the difficulty experienced by the Prime Minister under existing circumstances in agreeing to the suggestion that any information we required should be provided by the Italian Police Officials, or by giving us access to Police records, it has been decided that the report referred to in the Aide Memoire at 10a should be compiled from information already in our possession. Will you therefore, please put in hand the preparation of this report forthwith.

I suggest the report should be on general lines and not be too detailed.

I do not wish to be involved in the details or technicalities in the drafting of this report, but I should like to be advised as to the general framework decided upon and kept informed generally as to progress.

cont....

Minute No.

10th September, 1946

To: Executive Commissioner.

With reference to the discussion held in your office with Major-General Goulburn and others concerned, at 9A is a second draft of an Aide Memoire for consideration by the Chief Commissioner.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission con, I consider, compile the proposed report provided Lt. Colonel Green is assigned to the Sub-Commission as was originally intended. The compilation of the report will, however, probably take two - three months.

T. Carr-Ryad
M. Carr, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

22.

Chief Commissioner.

I submit a draft Aide Memoire for your use in discussion with the Prime Minister on the police forces of Italy. This is a result of a meeting with Brigadier Carr, General Goulburn and others at which we came to the conclusion that the best approach was for the present Public Safety Subcommission to prepare a report making recommendations which can then be passed over to the Italian Government for such action as they desire. We did not think that a further approach on the question of the Allied Police Mission was possible as Dr. Vespri would probably reply on the same lines as Parri did before. The Aide Memoire merely covers the need for possible cultivation later to the thought of an Allied Police Mission.

13 September 1946.

4-0

EL.

Approved

359 17 1946

MSZ

Chief Commissioner.

I submit a draft Aide Memoir for your use in discussion with the Prime Minister on the police forces of Italy. This is a result of a meeting with Brigadier Carr, General Goulburn and others at which we came to the conclusion that the best approach was for the present Public Safety Subcommittee to prepare a report making recommendations which can then be passed over to the Italian Government for such action as they desire. We did not think that a blunter approach on the question of the Allied Police Mission was possible as De Gasperi would probably reply on the same lines as Parri did before. The Aide Memoir merely shows the need for possible cultivation later to the thought of an Allied Police Mission.

13 September 1946.

4-8

EC.

Approved *[Signature]*

17/11

4117

SEP 17 1946

C. S. [Signature]

Herewith 6 copies of the Aide Memoirs

on the Italian Police Agreement. Approved 23/9
WTC

34

Attached ^{approval} submitted for your information ^{signature}

Page 7A.

His aide memoir on para 3 sub para 2 of

EC. ^{A is not in draft & will be submitted to you} By "Alfred Pore Division" - ^{how will you} excluded Russians? ^{26/11/52}

Chief Commissioner

35

Either by definitely stating that it should be
and Anglo American mission or by reversing
what the C.C.s have - ^{appears concerned with}
in the fact a purely British mission on the grounds
that both of significance for India - Army will be
British. I do not like the latter alternative but
expediency might make it necessary.

EC

36

17/11/52

O.R. ✓ GMB

25/100

211

0.12 ✓ g_{cc}

28/32

AUG 27 1946
4116

37. —

23.

9 am having meeting on Thursday
with Big Car & Ben Coulbourn to discuss the
Police Training Hide Memoir. Will you please attend
& raise their point. PS 28/11/11
CAS will submit a report. PS 28/11/11

6/6/2009

75/28/var

54/8/11

AUG 27 1946

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your ~~signature~~ ^{signature}

At Mun 15 you approved the draft at 4A as amended. In the fair copy one slight amendment has been made. Para 5 (c) now asks that the CRR Section M/MIA should retain at least 2 Police Officers. So long as M/MIA are responsible for CRR & personnel resources permit it I think this is reasonable. M Can Big. Act/E.C. 28/7

JUL 29 1946

32

C.A. Sec

Letter signed by CC & copies withdrawn for CC & EC's files. Returned to you for despatch.

14/8/46

29/7.

Thompson
No II
Office of E.C.

Ex. Comm 33
W.V.P. C.A.S. MC2670

7A

32

CA Sec

Letter signed by CC & copies withdrawn
for CC & ECs files. Returned to you for declassification.

WJG 30

Thompson
NO II
Office of E.C.

29/7.

Ex. Comm

33

W.V.P. C.A.S. W2670

Please see 7^A for information
E. J. Dye Colonel

26-8-46.

4115

MISSING ISSUES
NOT AVAILABLE
FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

14

Ref. number 16.

Will you please see draft at 4A as amended
and show to 4A/1A before submitting it
to the C.C. for signature.

Tough Public Works
Capt

CR

22/7

227.358

28.

Do not miss it.
action Col. Pickens.

under the name of
Please see H. A. which has been approved
by the Chief Commr. It would be approved
if the file could be returned to the SPC for
action to be typed and dispatched.

for
✓

E. J. B. P. C. C.

29

P.S. S. Jivri (Cult. Prager)

We agree

the
and delivery of

14th. Seca 12. and you.

155

should not

28.

Do NY NY 1A.
attn Col Pickens.

Please see 4A which has been approved by the Chief Commr. It would be appreciated if the file could be returned to this SPC for return to be typed and dispatched.

E. J. Byrne, Col.

24.

29

P.S. Section (Col. Payne)

4A. See below.

End note at end of page.

Cont.

any we have a copy when signed.

W. R. 4114
Adm.

24 Jul 46.

30.

at the Commr.

Snaps as at 4A, typed for signature please. The 2 Police Officers shown in penultimate para will allow for one officer to be always available during hours of leave, evening etc. *E. J. Byrne, Colonel*

25.7.46.

20th July, 1946

MINUTE NO. 14

To: Chief Commissioner.

If we amend the draft at 4A in accordance with Polad "B's" Minute No. 12, para 5 (a) will read as amended in pencil.

I would prefer to leave the original wording under which we should have the option of waiting for, or presumably, of seeking or making an opportunity.

If we amend as suggested we commit ourselves to making a recommendation as early as possible. This, if done informally, would be different from an official letter or bringing ~~the~~ pressure. The recommendation might be made in connection with General Browning's letter and Civil Affairs Section's views on the reorganization of the Police and on their redundancy and over-~~armament~~, for which you have called for an aide-memoire.

The question of the composition of the Police Mission might arise. As I know the position the CCS have approved, in principle, an Allied Police Mission staffed by British personnel.

While I would prefer the wording of the original draft as it is more in keeping with the general tone of the letter, I do not think the proposed amendment can do harm.

May I have your decision please.

M. Carr Brigadier

M. CARR, Brigadier.
A/c Executive Commissioner.

Min. No. 15
While I appreciate the difference in implication, I am prepared to accept Polad B's language.

While I would prefer the wording of the original draft as it is more in keeping with the general tone of the letter, I do not think the proposed amendment can do harm.

May I have your decision please.

in Law Brigadier

M. CARR, Brigadier.
A/c Executive Commissioner.

Min. No. 15
While I appreciate the difference in emphasis, I am prepared to accept Palad W's change.

12/11

16

C.A.S.

*Reference preceding minutes/para 411 as amended
draft at 4A prepared for signature
4 CC. in conjunction with P.S. S/C.
Please put through as quickly as possible.*

*M. Carr
A/c Ex. Comm.*

22/11

MINUTE NO. 11

15th July, 1946

To: Polad B.
Polad A.

I have been asked to clear this matter with you.

You may wish to read the principal minutes on the file.

The short points are:-

CCS.

The ~~C.A. Section~~ and AFHQ are still hoping for a Police Mission and are sanctioning ~~the~~ personnel as a basis for it. (1A - 1B).

GOC MIA considered that we should approach the Italian Government officially in the matter and bring pressure to bear if possible, and that the atmosphere for such a policy had improved lately.

The C.A. Section was of the opposite opinion. Draft letters embodying the two views are at 4A and 5A. The Chief Commissioner has decided that 4A shall issue.

Have you any comments on this matter generally, or on the draft letter at 4A?

Please treat as urgent.

M Carr-Saunders

M. CARR, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

12

My only comments on 4A, after speaking with Sir Noel Charles, is that para 5 (a) might usefully be strengthened to read as follows:- "(a) That an opportunity should be found to advise the Italian Government etc."

Printed 20 18 17

The C.A. Section was of the opposite opinion. Draft letters embodying the two views are at 4A and 5A. The Chief Commissioner has decided that 4A shall issue.

Have you any comments on this matter generally, or on the draft letter at 4A?

Please treat as urgent.

Mc Carr Brydges

M. CARR, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

12

My only comments on 4A, after speaking with Sir Noel Charles, is that para 5 (a) might usefully be strengthened to read as follows, - "(c) That an opportunity should be found to advise the Italian Government etc."

~~Plaint~~ Read B. 17/7

13

I approve of the draft at 4A & do not object to Read B's suggestion above.

JW Kelly Jones 4112
Pol. Ad. (Am)

July 19/46

Chief Commissioner.

1. I have for some time been concerned about the thinking in this Commission and elsewhere regarding the question of the Allied Police Mission recommended in your memo of 23rd June 1945. The history roughly is that you recommended an Allied Police Mission. Parri when approached said that he could never get his Government to ask for one. AFHQ concocted the plan of setting up a CC.RR Section in Land Forces S/C which might be the nucleus of a British Police Mission later. CCS agreed (including point about British Mission) and thought (wrongly) that the CC.RR Section of MMIA might eventually extend its functions to other (civilian) police agencies. In the meantime, General Ward, General Browning, British Embassy, and General Morgan were exploring through British and often Foreign Office channels a suitable head for the Mission.
2. In Minute 4 of this file I asked CA Section and Land Forces S/C to consult and submit a communication to AFHQ. Brigadier Carr and General Browning, however, disagree fundamentally in policy and procedure. See Minutes 5 and 7. Each has submitted a draft - 4A and 5A.
3. I agree with Brigadier Carr's approach.
4. The file is illuminating and worth perusal. After which will you give a ruling or discuss?

6. July. 46.

MSL
9
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

EC. I agree with draft 4A with some amendments which I have indicated. Before releasing, you may

and General Browning, however, each has submitted a draft - 4A and 5A. procedure. See Minutes 5 and 7.

3. I agree with Brigadier Carr's approach.

4. The file is illuminating and worth perusal. After which will you give a ruling or discuss?

AK

MSL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

9

6 July 46.

EC. I agree with Draft 4A with some amendments which have indicated. Before releasing, you may wish to have Plado's concurrence

Jus CC

11/11

10

V.P. Cks.

4111

Would you clear with Plado & if they agree then issue for CC's signature.

MSL 12/17

1st July, 1946

To: Executive Commissioner.

1. The Civil Affairs Section and Land Forces Sub-Commission are in complete disagreement as regards the Police role of the CC.MR. It does not seem to me that the Peace Treaty (Paras 1 (b) and (c) of Minute 6) will in any way commit the Italian Government to a permanent CC.MR Police Force. It would be quite wrong if it did. If the CC.MR became purely military, I presume an internal strength adjustment could be made within the ceiling of the Italian Army.

However, this question of the police role of the CC.MR does not, at this stage, affect the main point at issue - i.e. the Police Mission. If it ever comes to such a Mission the terms of reference would presumably be in the hands of very senior British (or Allied) Police experts. I do not think, therefore, that the point need be argued further now.

2. There is, however, one fundamental difference of opinion on which a ruling is required.

G.C.C. Land Forces Sub-Commission (MLA) considers that we should now, or in the near future, approach the Italian Government officially on the matter of a Police Mission and apply pressure, if possible, and bases his draft (3A) on that policy.

In my opinion it would not be appropriate for us, at this juncture, or in the comparatively near future to approach the Italian Government about a Police Mission, a still less to be forceful in the matter of apply pressure. Moreover, I do not agree that the changed political circumstances may have made the possibility of acceptance more likely (paras 2 and 4 of 5A). The very reverse has occurred as evidenced by the Italian attitude to the revised Armistice and to the draft British Civil Affairs Agreement. I, therefore, feel we cannot say more than in my draft at 4A which may not be optimistic, but in my opinion is realistic.

As this fundamental point as to whether we ^{recommended} ~~insist~~ an official approach to the Italian Government, can be decided only by the G.C., can a ruling be given?

W. L. R. Dwyer

M. CARR, Brigadier.
VR. CA. SECTION.

on the matter of a Police Mission and bases his draft (5A) on that policy.

In my opinion it would not be appropriate for us, at this juncture, or in the comparatively near future to approach the Italian Government about a Police Mission, still less to be forceful in the matter of apply pressure. Moreover, I do not agree that the changed political circumstances may have made the possibility of acceptance more likely (paras 2 and 14 of 5A). The very reverse has occurred as evidenced by the Italian attitude to the revised amnesty and to the draft British Civil Affairs Agreement. I, therefore, feel we cannot say more than in my draft at 4A which may not be optimistic, but in my opinion is realistic.

As this fundamental point, as to whether we ~~was~~ ^{recommended} an official approach to the Italian Government, can be decided only by the C.O., can a ruling be given?

1/2 1/4
M. Carr, Brigadier. 18.11.54
VR. CA. SECTION.

4110

Minute No. 6 (Cont'd)

(e) My view is that the ITALIANS would not be likely to swallow (ii), at any rate for the time being. Therefore let us accept the fact that "heat is the enemy of the good" and let us "make it work" and get the CORR right as part of the general Police Organisation. After all, we have equally absurd anomalies in G.I.!

2. As regards your opinion as to how the ITALIAN Government would view a British Police Mission, I am not in agreement. Things have changed lately, since the election. There has been much talk in the papers on unifying and improving the lot of the Police Forces and making the whole more efficient. With a Republic, the monarchists and the Republicans might well feel that it would be a good political move to have an independent and neutral body (British) to advise on reorganisation i.e. it would not be a political move to concentrate power in the hands of the Minister of the Interior, who may be a Socialist or Communist. I feel the ITALIAN Government now might well consider the idea of a Police Mission.

3. A further, if not the major, aspect is "Do the Allies want it as being a good thing both for the Allies and ITALY". The answer to this must be "yes". Anything that conduces to stability in ITALY must be in the Allied interest.

4. Thus, it boils down to this:-

- (a) the Allies surely want a British Police Mission,
- (b) they must, therefore, approach the ITALIAN Government about it, exercising all possible pressure under the circumstances.
- (c) The matter of ITALIAN prestige might be overcome by the arrangements mentioned in para 2 above. The matter of cost might be the stumbling block. The ITALIANS might say "We can't afford it". But, if the Allies think it desirable or necessary, surely the British might offer to foot the bill - which, after all, would not be very great for a Mission of (say) 40 - 50 officers, particularly in view of what we are spending in this connection in other parts of EUROPE.

In any event, the thing is to obtain COS approval of the idea and then discuss possibilities with the ITALIANS. We can't be defeatist and say "The ITALIANS would not agree. So, though we'd like it and feel it necessary, we can do nothing!"

Agreed
mc

3. A further, if not the major, aspect is "Do the Allies want it as being a good thing both for the Allies and ITALY". The answer to this must be "Yes". Anything that conduces to stability in ITALY must be in the Allied interest.

4. Thus, it boils down to this:-

- (a) the Allies surely want a British Police Mission,
- (b) they must, therefore, appraise the ITALIAN Government about it, exercising all possible pressure under the circumstances.
- (c) The matter of ITALIAN prestige might be overcome by the arrangements mentioned in para 2 above. The matter of cost might be the stumbling block. The ITALIANS might say "We can't afford it". But, if the Allies think it desirable or necessary, surely the British might offer to foot the bill - which, after all, would not be very great for a Mission of (say) 40 - 50 officers, particularly in view of what we are spending in this connection in other parts of EUROPE.

In any event, the thing is to obtain COS approval of the idea and then discuss possibilities with the ITALIANS. We can't be defeatist and say "the ITALIANS would not agree". So, though we'd like it and feel it necessary, we can do nothing!

5. In the light of the above, I think that your draft should be redrafted, more optimistically and forcefully - as per attached 2nd draft.

A. Browning

Major General
Land Forces Sub Commission (MFA)

4109

Minute No. 5

24th June, 1946

To: GOC. Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA.)

1. I agree in general with Minute No. 4

2. With reference to your Minute No. 3, it was not my view that the C.M.R. should necessarily be divorced from the Army. They could remain the first regiment of the line and possibly provide the Corps of Military Police, but they should renounce their civil police functions.

I cannot see how a police force can be effective when there is divided control and administration, nor how it can gain and hold the confidence of the public when the major part of the force is part of the Armed Forces and is heavily armed. In this connection it is to be noted that the first, I think, term of reference for the British Police Mission to Greece was that no part of the Police Force should belong to the Army. However, this is somewhat academic as it would appear that there is no prospect of the Italian Government asking for a Police Mission with comprehensive terms of reference and that the present set up of the Police will remain.

3. As this file came to me first I enclose at 4d. draft of a letter to ARHQ as a basis for discussion. This draft represents the views of this Section but I am not sure whether the figures quoted as regards strengths are correct.

Major Byader
M. Byader, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

Minute No. 6

27 Jun 46

TO : V.P. CA Sec

Ref your Minute No 5 above:-

1. (a) The OCMR are the major and best part of the ITALIAN Police Forces. If you remove their Police functions, you:-

comprehensive terms of reference will remain.

3. As this file came to me first I enclose at 4A draft of a letter to AMVQ as a basis for discussion. This draft represents the views of this Section but I am not sure whether the figures quoted as regards strengths are correct.

M. Car Byader

M. Car, Brigadier,
VF. CA. Section.

27 Jun 46

Minute No. 6

TO : V.P. CA Sec

Ref your Minute No 5 above:-

1. (a) The CCR are the major and best part of the INDIAN Police Forces. If you remove their Police functions, you:-
 - (i) merely turn them into soldiers of the line,
 - (ii) cut out an age-old and valued tradition, close to the INDIAN heart,
 - (iii) have nothing to take their place and therefore greatly reduce the efficiency of the Police Forces.
- (a) Moreover, the Peace Treaty is likely to specify a certain figure for CCR apart from the Army on the understanding that the CCR are Police.

A new force would be recruited. not

Not agreed. The Army could be kept within 1/2 ceiling. not

- (a) To my mind, therefore, it is out of the question to divorce CCR from their Police duties.
- (d) The real point at issue is whether the CCR shall:-
 - (i) remain as they are under divided control, for traditional reasons or
 - (ii) whether they should be divorced from the Army and come completely under the Ministry of the Interior.

over

COO, Land Forces S/C (MIA).
 W. Civil Affairs Section.

4.

1. There is in my mind a good deal of confusion as to the policy and procedure regarding the original proposal of the Allied Commission made in June 1945 to set up an Allied Police Mission in Italy. The matter, in my opinion, has gone out of channels as the attached record which I have obtained from the British Embassy will show.

2. Moreover, I agree with paras 1(c) and (e) of Minute 3 above that the CC.MR section of the Land Forces S/C cannot extend its influence to the Italian Police Forces as a whole.

3. I feel the time has come when we must make a comprehensive recommendation to AFHQ and get the matter straightened out for there is no doubt that there is confusion in the minds of the CGS and to a certain extent AFHQ in the scope of the duties of the CC.MR Section now established and of the police organization in Italy as a whole.

4. I would here suggest that we maintain the correct channels and do not become involved in direct correspondence with the Embassy without at any rate sending copies to AFHQ.

5. The first point to decide is whether the CC.MR section should continue in the successor to the Land Forces S/C. I have the impression that it is considered that the work of this section is nearly complete and in any case I would suggest that it could be very much reduced. The release of police officers will automatically reduce it in any case. Can we, however, and should we, recommend a reduction in the CGS? The second point we must make is to explain quite clearly that the scope of this section is limited to the organization of the CC.MR and cannot extend their influence to the Italian Police Forces as a whole. The third point is to consider what recommendations we should make with regard to the Police Mission. We were responsible for the original idea and before the Commission closed I think we should state clearly that our present recommendation bearing in mind, as Brigadier Carr has frequently pointed out, that it will be extremely difficult to persuade the Italian Government to ask for a Police Mission and that we cannot force it upon them.

6. There is no doubt that it would be of immense advantage to the Italian Government if there was an Allied Police Mission to advise them on a democratic form of police force. The present police system in this country is unsatisfactory, out of date, and a section of the point of view, it is quite

the impression that it is nearly complete and in any case I would suggest that it could be very much reduced. The release of police officers will automatically reduce it in any case. Can we, however, and should we, recommend a reduction in the CC? The second point we must make is to explain quite clearly that the scope of this section is limited to the organization of the CC, RR and cannot extend their influence to the Italian Police Force as a whole. The third point is to consider what recommendations we should make with regard to the Police Mission. We were responsible for the original idea and before the Commission closes I think we should state clearly that we are not present recommendations bearing in mind, as Brigadier Carr has frequently pointed out, that it will be extremely difficult to persuade the Italian Government to ask for a Police Mission and that we cannot force it upon them.

6. There is no doubt that it would be of immense advantage to the Italian Government if there was an Allied Police Mission to advise them on a democratic form of police force. The present police system in this country is unsatisfactory, out of date, and a section of the police are liable to be used as a political instrument. Whatever may be the tradition of the CC, RR, from the police point of view, it is quite anomalous to have a part of the Army dealing with civil police matters. The whole system requires complete reorganization.

7. It is clear that the establishment of a Police Mission will not form part of the peace treaty and therefore it can only come as a request from the Italian Government after pressure from the Embassies, for the revised armistice terms do not give SACMAD in my opinion the **4407** to insist upon it.

8. If you agree with the above analysis, would you, in consultation with each other and, if necessary, both Polads, draft a telegram or despatch to AMHQ clearing up the situation.

21. June. 46.

Will
 Migration,
 Executive Commission

Executive Commissioner.

- 3 -

Ref m 2.

1. (a) The British Police Officers forming the "CC.RR. SEC." in my Sub-Commission fulfil their functions by virtue of the fact that we deal with the Italian Army and the CC.RR. are part of that Army.
- (b) The remainder of the Italian Police Forces come under Public Safety Sub-Commission A.C. and the Minister of the Interior (as also the CC.RR. in respect of their Police functions).
- (c) I therefore do not see how the CC.RR. SEC. can "extend its influence to the Italian Police Forces as a whole".
- (d) The situation will, of course, be further complicated if Public Safety Sub-Commission fades out.
- (e) Moreover, the vast task of coordinating and reorganising all the Police Forces in ITALY would be quite beyond the power of a small "CC.RR. SEC.", tackling the problem as a sort of side-issue of Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) activities.
2. (a) If such coordination and reorganisation is required by the Allies, the answer is a special British Police Mission on the lines of GERMANY, AUSTRIA or GREECE, but by no means necessarily anything like so large. This presumably would have to be approved of and requested by the Italian Government, who might be loath to do so on grounds of prestige and cost, though there is no doubt that such a mission would be most advantageous.
- (b) The question as to how the Italian Government should be approached on this, or when, is outside my purview.
3. I feel I must comment on Brig. CARR's para 4 - minute 1 -. I do not agree with divorcing the CC.RR. from the Army, even though they have Police functions. Nor would the Italians. The CC.RR. have a long and honoured tradition; are the most efficient part of the Italian Police Forces; and are an effective check against excessive party control of the Police Forces as a whole, the QUESTURA being completely under the Minister of the Interior.

(d) The situation will, of course, be further complicated by the fact that the Safety Sub-Commission fades out.

(e) Moreover, the vast task of coordinating and reorganising all the Police Forces in Italy would be quite beyond the power of a small "CC.RR. SEC.", tackling the problem as a sort of side-issue of Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) activities.

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(b) The question as to how the Italian Government should be approached on this, or when, is outside my purview.

3. I feel I must comment on Brig. GARR's para 4 - minute 1 -. I do not agree with divorcing the CC.RR. from the Army, even though they have Police functions. Nor would the Italians. The CC.RR. have a long and honoured tradition; are the most efficient part of the Italian Police Forces; and are an effective check against excessive party control of the Police Forces as a whole, the QUESTURA being completely under the Minister of the Interior.

LE/am

6 June 1946.

L. Browning

Major General, 4106
Land Forces Sub-Commission,
(M. M. I. A.)

4106
4106

2.
Land Jones SP (MMIA)

Will you please let the Ex. Comm have
your comments on folios 1A + 1B and minute 1
from V.P. C.A.S.

N.S. 116

N. W. HIND-SMITH

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER

05551

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

4105

Executive Summary

1. AF 1A-1B appears to be the original of the AFHQ letter forwarding to the 1st. Div. its copy of a FAN telegram - FAN 661 which has been passed to Public Safety, but there is no indication as to whether it is for info or action.
2. I understand the effect of FAN 661 is that seventeen British Police Officers are authorized for M.M.A. to supervise C.C.R.R. Affairs. I thought at the time that this confusion stemmed over the strength of British Police Officer requested for M.M.A. that it was pointed out to AFHQ - possibly only verbally from your office - that ten Police and two other Officers - a total of 12 - were all that were required.
3. In my opinion the C.C.S.'s hope has no substance and there is no prospect of the Italian G.N. giving an invitation for Officers attached to M.M.A. to function as a Police Mission.
4. Moreover a Police Mission without appropriate terms of reference would do little good. One of these terms should be that the Police in Italy should be divorced from the Army. In any case I consider it would be most undesirable for a Police Mission to be kept in M.M.A. without terms of reference.

There is no prospect of the Italian Govt. giving an invitation for officers attached to M.M.I.A. to function as a Police Mission.

4. Moreover a Police Mission without appropriate terms of reference would do little good. One of these terms should be that the Police in Italy should be divorced from the Army. In any case I consider it would be most undesirable for a Police Mission to be part of M.M.I.A. whatever Mission succeeds it or to evolve out of it and that it is inadvisable that Police Officers with M.M.I.A. should extend their influence to the Italian Police Force as a whole.

Memorandum (cont.)

5. It seems to me most regrettable that the C.C.S. should be dealing with personnel matters based on faulty information and so perhaps on a Police Mission which have no chance of success or for the evolution of a Mission based on faulty premises.

I feel we should inform A.F.H.Q. of our requirements in personnel and give them as above on officers with M.M.I.A. extending their influence to the Italian Police as a whole and on the prospects of and inadvisability of a Police Mission being part of a evolving out of M.M.I.A.

20/5/46

Major Bagader
V.R.C.S.

20/5/46

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
APO 794

26

Ref. : 3626/379/70

14634

31 January 1947

SUBJECT: Police Report.

TO : APO,
G-5 Section.

1. Reference is made to your G-5:940.00 dated 15 Jan. 47.
2. I am enclosing two copies of the Report on the Italian Police Forces together with copies of the Aide Memoire under which it was handed to the Prime Minister to-day. Copies have been seen by Polads who reviewed the Report before its release.

24A

26A

WILLIAM W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copies to: Polad A (with 3 copies of Report)
Polad B (" " " ")
M.M.I.A. (with 1 copy of Report)
P.Safety Div. (less Report)

4103

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 794

AIDE MEMOIRE

REPORT ON ITALIAN POLICE FORCES

With reference to my Aide Memoire handed to you on 30th September 1946, herewith are six copies of a Report on the Italian Police Forces which has been compiled by the officers of the Public Safety Division of this Commission and is based on information acquired and experience gained during their tour of duty in this country.

It is hoped that this Report may be of value to the Italian Government in any study which may be made of the Italian police system.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

4102

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: AG/14634/PS

22 January, 1947

SUBJECT: Police Mission.

TO : ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
Attention: G-5 Section.

1. Reference is made to your G-5: 940.00 of the 15th January, 1947.

2. The first draft of the report will be ready on the 28th January, 1947. Allowing two days for review of the draft it should be possible to determine by January 30th, on which date your Headquarters will be informed of the position, whether a completed report will be ready for submission on the 15th February, 1947.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

M. CAIR, Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to E.C.

4101

DRAFT.

SUBJECT: Police Mission.

TO: Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention G-5 Section.

January 1947

1. Reference is made to your G-5: 940.00 of the 15th

January 1947.

2. The first draft of the Report will be ready on the 26th January 1947. ^{4 Jan 30 47} ^{with reference to the position,} ^{should} be possible to determine whether a completed report will be ready for submission on the 15th February 1947. ^{by January 30th} when your Headquarters will be informed of the position.

EC

4943.

p. 24

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 940.00

17 JAN 1947
14634
WS

15 January 1947

SUBJECT: Police Missions

TO : Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 794

21A

1. Reference is made to your letter AG/14634/PS dated 10 January in which you raise the question of whether or not the report on the Police Forces in Italy should be completed.

2. If you can assure this Headquarters that the report will be completed in all its details and ready for submission by the 15th February 1947 you should continue the work, if however you are unable to give this assurance the work will cease forthwith.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MORGAN:

A. L. HAMBLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Draft will be ready by 1200 hrs 28/1/47

4099

File
23^aSECRET

18 January, 1947

Ref: 2/10/46

On 27th November 1946, Mr. Ward handed me a memorandum on the subject of the Police Mission and the Report which is being drawn up by this Commission on the Italian Police Forces.

As regards the last sentence of the memorandum, I informed Mr. Ward I had authority to communicate the Report when completed to the Italian Government.

I am now forwarding a copy of a further letter dated 6th January from AFM, which confirms that a copy of the Report may be made available to the Italian Government if they so desire.

The present position is that a final draft of the Report should be ready about the end of January. In this connection I addressed a letter to AFM (AC/14634/45 of 10th January 1947 copy to Polad (B)) asking whether compilation of the Report should continue and expressing my own opinion that the report should be completed.

14/14634/45

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Sir Noel Charles, Bt., K.C.M.G., M.C.,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy to Polad (A)

4098

785016

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
C-5 Section
APO 512

22A

P. H. 730

G-5: 940.00

January 1947.

SUBJECT: Police Missions.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

9 - JAN 1947
14-634
W

14A

1. Reference is made to your letter AC/14634/PS dated 20 December.
2. It is not proposed to make any request for the acceptance by the Italian Government of any Police Missions. Recent correspondence between this Headquarters and CHQ on this subject was forwarded to you under cover of this Headquarters letter, G-5: 940.72 of 31 December.
3. If you consider that the report (referred to in para 3 of your letter) will be of use to the Italian Government and it contains nothing which it is undesirable to communicate, you may, should they so desire, and an occasion occur, offer to make a copy of the report available to the Italian Government.

20A

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MORGAN:


A.L. HAMBLIN,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

D/P [unclear] [unclear]

4097

21A

of: 1447/1

10 January 1962

SUBJECT: Office Mission

TO : Chief, State Department, Wash. D.C.

Attention: Mr. Malone

17A

1. I refer to this office's letter of 1447/1 of the 20 December 1961. In view of the desire to reduce as far as possible the functions of this mission, your directions are requested as to whether the completion of the report on the office mission is truly should be expedited.

2. In addition to regarding the report remains as stated in the letter under reference, that is that a draft of the report should be ready about the end of this month. It is difficult to estimate what may be required for the editing of the draft and when the final report will be ready.

20A

3. In connection with this matter, reference is made to your letter of 1447/1 of 8 December 1961 addressed to me on the subject of the efficiency of the mission office and it would appear that the preparation of the report now being expedited may be the only way in which your assistance and advice might be given to the foreign government in this matter.

As the only agency within the country through which this mission is presently composed of only three officers so that the matter of a possible reduction in personnel really arises.

4. I recommend that the completion of the report on the office mission be expedited and that the report be ready about the end of this month.

Very truly,
 your friend,
 John F. Kennedy

Copy to: CC

EC

Pols

Sol

4096

0568

785016

21B

DRAFT.

Ref: AC/14634/PS.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Police Mission.

TO: A.F.H.Q.

Attention: G-5 Section.

January 1947.

17A

1. I refer to this Commission's letter AC/14634/PS of the 20th December 1946. In view of the desire to reduce as far as possible the functions of this Commission, your directions are requested as to whether the compilation of the report on the Police Forces in Italy should be completed.

The situation as regards the report remains as stated in the letter under reference, that is that a draft of the report should be ready about the end of this month. It is difficult to estimate what time may be required for the editing of the draft and when the final report will be ready.

20A

2. In connection with this matter, reference is made to your G-5:940/72 of 31st December 1946 addressed to GHQ on the subject of the efficiency of the Italian Police and it would appear that the presentation of the report now being compiled may be the only way in which some assistance and advice might be given to the Italian Government in this matter.

(Including the Security Branch)
The Public Safety Division of this Commission is

4095

10567

785016

The situation as regards the report is stated in the letter under reference, that is that a draft of the report should be ready about the end of this month. It is difficult to estimate what time may be required for the editing of the draft and when the final report will be ready.

2. In connection with this matter, reference is made to your G-5:940/72 of 31st December 1946 addressed to GHQ on the subject of the efficiency of the Italian Police and it would appear that the presentation of the report now being compiled may be the only way in which some assistance and advice might be given to the

Italian Government in this matter. *(including the Security Branch)*
The Public Safety Division of this Commission is

4095

presently composed of only three officers so that the matter of possible reduction in personnel hardly arises.

3. I recommend that the compilation of the report on the Police Forces in Italy should continue.

ELDERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral USNR
Chief Commissioner

Fav. *WJ* as to Polaris DFB
CC OK
EC OK
Polaris (Wm)
P.L.H. (D) 8

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 5126 - JAN 1947
14674 AC.

31 December 1946

G-5: 940.72

SUBJECT : Security Police Organisation

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission
APO 794

1. Herewith copy of GHQ letter 5887/G of 8 December and AFHQ
G-5: 940.72 of 28 December in reply thereto. — 206
2. Copies of the above mentioned letters are being sent to Brit
Polad and US Polad for forwarding to their respective Embassies.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MORGAN:


A. L. HARBELEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

4094

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Public Security Organization

G(Cps), GHI CMF

5387/G

AFHQ (for G-5) (2 copies)

8 Dec 46

Tele. No.....

1. It appears as a matter of great regret that when the Allied Forces leave ITALY in the near future the ITALIAN organizations for maintaining law and order will be left unsupported in their present state, which is sadly lacking in efficiency and in homogeneity.
2. Some of the fundamental weaknesses which have come to light in NW ITALY, and more particularly in the VENICE - TRIESTE area, have been reported to you on previous occasions. In brief:
 - a. In the province of VENEZIA there are five separate bodies concerned with Public Safety. These are the Carabinieri, the Agents of Public Safety, the Tax and Customs Guards, the Railway Police, and the City Police. This diversity of organization does not make for efficiency.
 - b. Conditions of service in all these forces are appalling. Equipment and accommodation is poor and rations are bad. Moreover rates of pay are extremely low, being barely enough to provide for existence.
 - c. The result of the conditions in (a) and (b) above is that morale is very low, and idleness and corruption are rife.
3. This weakness of the Police Forces encourages law breaking and incidents of all kinds. Such a state of affairs provides ideal scope for influences of a seditious nature, and the Communists in particular have not been slow to exploit this situation.
4. As far as the immediate requirement affecting Allied interests is concerned, it is true that some reinforcements have been moved to this area, and that there is, at present, no serious cause for complaint. However it is necessary to think ahead to the probable state of affairs which will obtain after our departure. In this connection the effect of uncontrolled unrest in the provinces of VENEZIA and UDINE, with their strong Communist elements, is not likely to assist the development of the TRIESTE FREE STATE TERRITORY.
5. In conclusion, it is strongly recommended that in the time remaining until ratification of the Peace Treaty, every means of persuasion and pressure should be employed to convince the ITALIAN Government of the necessity to reorganize and improve the various forces on which the maintenance of law and order will devolve unaided after the departure of the Allied Forces. The backing of the Allied authority and forces can now afford to such measures presents an opportunity which is quickly passing.

/s/ B.M. Archibald
Brigadier
Lt. Gen. GOC in C

SECRET

SECRET

20

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 940.72

31 December 1946.

SUBJECT: Security Police - Organization.

TO : GHQ CMF,
Padua.

1. Reference your letter above subject file G (Ops), 5887/G, dated 8 December 1946. The matter which you raise has been under consideration for an extended period. Various efforts have been made to bolster up the Italian Public Security Agencies. There has been in the Allied Commission for some time a group of Allied officers to assist the COMR. The question of Police missions has been raised with the CCS and with the Italian Government, so that all concerned are fully aware of the desirability of improving the police agencies. The present position is that the Allies will not furnish such missions unless requested by the Italian Government, and the political situation is such that the Italian Government will not make such a request.

2. In view of the above and the further consideration that run down of military personnel in this theater does not make it possible to take on any additional commitments, it is not contemplated that any further action will be taken except to bring your views to the attention of U.S. and British Embassies in Rome.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MORGAN:

A.L. HAMBLEN,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

SECRET

4092

19A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Division
APO 794

28 December 1946

AC/14634/PS

SUBJECT : Police Mission.

TO : A.F.H.C., G-5.

14A

1. I refer to letter from this Commission Ref. AC/14634/PS dated 20th December.
2. The number of signal referred to in para 1 of the letter should read F 73820 not F 73828.
3. Will you please amend.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,

E. J. Byrne
E. J. BYR, Colonel
Director.

FGG/ae

Copy to Ex.Comm.

4091

18A

RE ALICE SIGNED ABOVE

ENC 201145 B

AMM FOR G-5 SECTION

5063

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR FOR SEVEN THREE EIGHT TWO ZERO OF ONE EIGHT DECEMBER RECENTLY POLICE
MISSION BEING SENT BY LONDON TOWN

4090

URGENT

Office of the Chief Commissioner.

JOHN R. HAYES,
Major, AMB.
Adjutant.

Secret

3. The report referred to above is now being compiled, but the matter has been delayed by the illness of the Director of Public Safety Division who is still in hospital. It is anticipated that a draft of the report may be available about the end of January 1947.

4. Since the above developments, I have received a copy of a note from the Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy stating that the British Foreign Office have expressed the view that it would be politically a mistake if the Allied Commission or any other agent of the Supreme Allied Commander were to raise with the Italian Government the question of a Police Mission. The note further states that the Foreign Office believe that this might imply that the Mission was intended to be a kind of carry over from the Allied Commission and would very likely render the Italian Government strongly opposed to the whole idea of Allied assistance in this field.

I have informed the Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy that I shall be glad to send it both the British and American Embassies before forwarding the report on the Civil Police of Italy to the Prime Minister. Since the report itself will not raise the question of a Police Mission, it is not believed that its submission would have any political significance.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

Major General, MC
Rear Admiral, RCNVR
Chief Commissioner

Encls: as above.

Copy to: CC.

EC.

Polad (A)

Polad (B)

Secret

17A

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: P73820
Date/Time of Origin: DEC

Message Centre No.: H/8630

Date Time Rec'd: DEC 191000

Precedence: IMPORTANT

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACHED CITE FHCEC
TO: ALCOM ROME FOR ADMIRAL STONE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL:

See letter subject police mission file G-5940 point 00 dated 25 August.
Have you taken action directed query. If so what was reaction query reply
urgently. Your AC/14634/PS of 29 July also refers.

AC DIST

ACTION - P SAFETY

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COMR

FILE

SKELSTON

ACTION

0576

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL:

4A

See letter subject police mission file G-5940 point 00 dated 25 August.
Have you taken action directed query. If so what was reaction query reply
urgently. Your AC/14634/PS of 29 July also refers.

6A

ACTION

AC DIST

ACTION - P SAFETY

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COMM

FILE

SKELETON

15A 4088

DEC 19 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY.SECRET

15

93.

The Foreign Office have welcomed the action taken by the Chief Commissioner in his letter of 7th October (AC/146341/PS) to Signor de Gasperi regarding the Italian Police Force.

At the same time the Foreign Office have expressed the view that it would be politically a mistake if the Allied Commission, or any agent of the Supreme Allied Commander, were to raise with the Italian Government the question of a Police Mission. The Foreign Office believe that this would imply that the Mission was intended to be a kind of carry over from the Allied Commission and would very likely render the Italian Government strongly opposed to the whole idea of Allied assistance in this field.

The Foreign Office think that the report on the present state of the Police which they understand the Chief Commissioner is preparing may come in very useful at the appropriate moment. They agree with the Chief Commissioner's view that the report should be based solely on Allied sources. They feel that the question when and how it is communicated to the Italian Government is a delicate one, which will require careful consideration. Mr. Ward understands that the Chief Commissioner does not intend to communicate the report to the Italian Government without the Supreme Allied Commander's authority, and he assumes that at that stage the United States and United Kingdom Embassies would be consulted.

27th November 1946.

(Told Mr. W. I have authority - but will be glad to consult Embassies before forwarding report. EWS.)

4087

Spoke CC No action at this stage
ME 4/12

15

Telephone
Rome 489064 Ext 218

LAND FORCES SUB COM 40 (MILIA) COMF

SD/101

18 Nov 46

18 NOV 1946
14-934
US

CHQ C(ED3) 7
CHQ C(ED2) 1
CHQ C(ED4) 1

Subject:

Review of WE POLICE INCREMENT TO
MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN
ARMY (CM/1279/1)

I. THE PROPOSAL

- (a) Review of WE POLICE INCREMENT TO MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY (CM/1279/1).
- (b) NO alteration to existing WE.
- (c) N/A.

II. EFFECT OF THE PROPOSAL

NO CHANGE in existing WE.

III. REASONS FOR THE PROPOSAL

- (a) Review ~~unrelated~~ recommendation requested by not received.
CHQ signal SD 296 dated 12 Nov 46.
- (b) Chief Commissioner Allied Commission has recommended to JHQ that pending a policy decision on reorganization of all Italian Police Forces, the POLICE INCREMENT TO MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY should continue to supervise the Carabinieri, and in default of officers to fill WE being available in this theatre should be allowed to waste to a minimum of two officers.

- ## II. SYNOPSIS OF THE PROPOSAL

NO OXIDATION IN EXHAUSTIVE TEST.

III. REASONS FOR THE PROPOSED

- (a) Review endorsed recommendation requested by HQ signal SOO 296 dated 12 Nov 45.
- (b) Chief Commissioner Allied Commission has recommended to HQ that pending a policy decision on reorganisation of all Italian Police Forces, the POLICE INCUMBENT TO MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY should continue to supervise the Carabinieri, and in default of officers to fill on being available in this theatre should be allowed to transfer to a minimum of two officers HQ agreed to this proposal.
- Its policy decision on the reorganisation of all the Italian Police Forces has yet been taken.
- The functions of the POLICE INCUMBENT TO MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY remain unchanged.
- The full force at present is necessary if these functions are to be properly discharged.
- Only two officers are actually at present available in this theatre.
- It is therefore recommended that the views of ALLIED COMMISSION be accepted i.e., that the HQ remains unchanged, but implemented only to the extent of the two officers actually available.

LTD/STT

Copy to :-

1740 (63)

ADDENDUM 00004783300

Abstract

2007

for - Major-General,
GOC, MONT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

AC/14634/PS

14 November, 1946

SUBJECT: Police Increment to MHA.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission.
(M.H.I.A.)

1. With reference to your G/11 of the 29th October 1946, this Commission is not in a position to give a definition as requested in para 3 of the letter. — 12A
2. AFHQ letter of the 14th October 1945 lays down that L.F.S.C. is responsible for the training and administration of the CC.RR., while Public Safety Division remains responsible for advice on instruction in Civil Police duties and on operational functions. — 12B
3. This Commission cannot change a basic policy set out in an AFHQ letter. It would appear to be for your Sub-Commission to decide what staff is necessary to implement that part of the AFHQ policy which concerns your Sub-Commission, having regard to re-organization and re-equipment which has already been effected, and to basic policies and instructions which have been imparted and instilled as regards training. If it is desired to change the policy laid down by AFHQ, you will presumably take up the matter in consultation with this Commission.
4. This Commission can see no reason for departing from the recommendation made in para 5(G) of AC/14634/PS of 29th July 1946 which was concurred by L.F.S.C. especially having regard to the availability of Public Safety personnel. — 6A

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

MLC
M. CAIR, Brigadier. 4085
Executive Commissioner.

136

DRAFT.TO: ~~WATERS.~~

M.M.A.

November, 1946

1. With reference to your G/11 of the 29th October 1946, this Commission is not in a position to give a definition as requested in para 3 of the letter.

2. AFHQ letter of 14th October 1945 lays down that L.F.S.C. is responsible for the training and administration of the CC.RR, while the Public Safety Division remains responsible for advice on instruction in Civil Police duties and ^{on} operational functions.

This Commission ^{cannot} ~~is not in a position to~~ ^{advise a basic} change ⁱⁿ the policy set out in ~~the~~ AFHQ ~~letter~~. It would appear to be for

Your Sub-Commission to decide what staff is necessary to implement the AFHQ policy, having regard to re-organization and re-equipment which has already ^{been effected} ~~been effected~~, and to ~~the~~ basic policies and instructions which have been imparted as regards training. ~~That~~ ^{and instilled}

If it is decided to change the policy laid down by AFHQ you will presumably take up the matter in consultation with R.S. ~~the Commission~~

SUBJECT : Police Increment to MIA
WE ON/1279/1

146340 LAND FORCES SUB COM AC (MIA)

(489081 Ext 218) G/11

29 Oct 46

TO : ALLIED COMMISSION

1. GHQ (G(SD)) have called on this HQ for proposals for the review of the above WE.

This review has been postponed since 12 Aug 46 owing to lack of info on the future role of this section.

2. No notification of any change in the functions of the Police Increment to MIA has been received by MIA since these were laid down in AFHQ letter AG.014.12 GEG-O of 14 Oct 45 although your AG/14634/PS dated 29 Jul 46 addressed to AFHQ (G - 5) para 5 and AFHQ G-5.940.00 dated 25 Aug 46 both refer.

It is not possible for this HQ to recommend to GHQ any alteration to this WE unless any changed future functions of the Police Increment to MIA are previously clearly defined.

3. It is requested therefore that you will supply this HQ with such a definition of the future functions of the Police Increment to MIA in order that a reply may be sent to GHQ.

ARCS/ell

Copy to : AFHQ -- GHQ, CMF

Major-General,
M. M. I. A.

4083

5037

Recd 31/10

P. Safety

12b

6A

W. L. C. C.

12-
This review has been postponed since 12 Aug 46 owing to lack of info on the future role of this section.

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It is not possible for this HQ to recommend to GHQ any alteration to this ~~WE~~ unless any changed future functions of the Police Increment to MIA are previously clearly defined.

3. It is requested therefore that you will supply this HQ with such a definition of the future functions of the Police Increment to MIA in order that a reply may be sent to GHQ.

ARCS/c11
Copy to : AFHQ -- GHQ, CMB
Internal Distribution

'A'
CC.PP
SD/101

for Major-General,
M. M. I. A.

4083

COPY

RESTRICTEDALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

RHF/avm

A.G. 014.12. GEG-0

14 October 45.

SUBJECT:- Transfer of Responsibility for the Carabinieri to MMIA

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO594.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
FOR : MMIA.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 24 of letter, this headquarters, AG 091.711/169 GGT-0 dated 16 November 1944, subject, "Command and Administration of Italian Army" and to letter, this headquarters, G-5 014.12, dated 20 July 1945, subject, "Reorganisation of Carabinieri and Other Police Forces of Italy".

2. It is believed that the time has now come when the supervisory functions of MMIA should parallel the executive functions of the Italian Ministry of War. It is therefore desired that you cause all matters connected with the training and administration of the Carabinieri which have heretofore been handled by the Public Safety Sub-Commission to be transferred to the Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA). This will result in all matters connected with the Carabinieri except their operational functions, which should remain at present, being placed under the supervision of MMIA.

3. The date of transfer of responsibilities will be mutually agreed between Public Safety Sub-Commission and MMIA and will be reported by you to this headquarters. In any event this date will not be later than 1 November 1945.

4. In matters affecting the instruction of the Carabinieri in purely civil police duties, as distinct from normal military training, MMIA will consult the Public Safety Sub-Commission which will afford such advice and assistance as may be required.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER.

(Sgd) C.W. CHRISTENSEN.
Col, AGD
Adjutant General.Distribution.

5. - Each addressee.	1 - C(3D)	1 - CH
2 - - No.2. District.	2 - CL(MTOUSA)	1 - REE
2. - No.3. District	1 - Q(AE)	1 - S & T
2. - FES.	1 - Q(Maint)	3 - C-L(MMIA)
2 - CC MTOUSA	1 - G-5	1 - Dep Mil Sec
2 - Rome Area MTOUSA	1 - Fin Adviser Er	1 - DPIC
2 - "A"	1 - Vis Director MTOUSA	1 - CAO
2 - G1 (MTOUSA)	2 - JA	2 - AG Records
2 - G-2	1 - Dir of Labour	10 Spares (to G-5)
1 - G-3(AMHQ)	1 - D Prov M Sec	
1 - G-5 (MTOUSA)	1 - Led Br.	

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HA

Chief Commissioner delivered the Aide Memoire to the Prime Minister on 30 September. CC discussed the matter with A/Executive Commissioner on 1 October. It was understood that the PM's intention was not to raise the subject matter of the Aide Memoire with all members of the Council of Ministers.

PM stated that when he was in the Parri Cabinet he supported the idea of an Allied Police Mission but he believes that Ferrari opposed it (I could not confirm with CC whether at that time Ferrari was Chief of Police).

Mr. Bevin had also spoken to the PM in Paris about an Allied Police Mission and the PM had to point out to him that this was a very delicate internal political matter.

PM agreed that the situation was serious and that reorganisation and a thorough overhaul was desirable. He instanced the case of 300 Partisans who after completion of their training had left the school at Anzio and gone straight back to their district and paid their respects to the Left Wing authorities.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

10A

AIDE MEMOIREREORGANIZATION - ITALIAN POLICE FORCES

1. Officers of the Allied Commission have for the past three years worked in very close touch with the Italian Police Agencies, and it has been very evident to them that allowing for disorganization as the result of the war, the state of efficiency of the Italian Police Forces leaves much to be desired.

2. It is generally agreed that for a Police Force to be effective and efficient certain basic principles are necessary.

For example:

- (a) All Police Forces in a country should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.
- (b) They must be adequately clothed, equipped and housed, efficient schools of Instruction with a standard code of training should exist.
- (c) There should be reasonable pay and conditions of service.
- (d) The arming of Police should be kept at a minimum compatible with security.
- (e) Police forces should be divorced from the Armed (Defence) Forces of the country and they should, as far as possible be without any political bias.

3. At the present time there are in Italy three major Police Forces i.e. Carabinieri, Corps of Public Safety Agents and Finance Guards, together with other smaller forces, all of which work more or less independently of each other.

It is obvious that this must lead to overlapping, inefficiency and a waste of man power, furthermore the above mentioned basic principles are in general not applied.

Even allowing for the consequences of the war, housing and office conditions are to large degree inadequate.

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Conditions of clothing and equipment, although improving are very poor.

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- 2 -

Classes of instructions are in operation but there is little co-ordination between the Forces.

The pay and conditions of service are unsatisfactory.

Although it is appreciated that conditions at present are abnormal, the Police Forces are undoubtedly being overarmed and a wrong mentality is thereby being fostered amongst both the Police and the Public.

Beyond doubt large sections of certain police bodies identify themselves with certain Political Parties.

4. The Allied Commission will be closing down in the near future, but before it does so, I propose that my Public Safety Officers submit a comprehensive report on the general efficiency of the Police Forces of Italy, together with their recommendations for improvement. To enable them to compile a detailed report, it will be necessary for them to seek information from Italian Police Officials and records. I am sure, that you will be only too pleased to give instructions for such information to be made available.

On completion, I shall submit the report to you. If you are in general agreement with the recommendations contained therein, you may then care to consider:

(a) whether the Italian Police Forces are able to implement the recommendations unaided or,

(b) whether you would wish to ask the service of an Anglo-American Police Mission to assist in their implementation.

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DRAFT.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

6 copies on C.C.'s paper
Reorganizing action - Italian Police Forces.

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2. It is generally agreed that for a Police Force to be effective and efficient certain basic principles are necessary.

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- (b) They must be adequately clothed, equipped and housed; efficient schools of instruction with a standard code of training should exist.
- (c) There should be reasonable pay and conditions of service.
- (d) The arming of Police should be kept at a minimum compatible with security.
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3. At the present time there are in Italy three major Police

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See Min 36.

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On completion, I shall submit the report to you. If ⁴⁰⁷⁷ are in general agreement with the recommendations contained therein, you may then care to consider:

- (a) whether the Italian Police Forces are able to implement the recommendations unaided or,
- (b) whether you would wish to ask the services of an Anglo-American Police Mission to assist in their implementation.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 794

Spore

9B

7 October 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Recently it has come to the notice of the Allied Authorities that the Agents of Public Safety are being organized and armed on military lines, parallel with the CC.NN.

It is understood that this Police Body is to be a thoroughly Military Corps comprising Mobile Battalions, Groups and Companies and that it is to be subject to Military Code and Discipline.

As regards the arming of the Force, a report submitted by the Ministry of Interior to the Allied Commission on 10th May last, revealed that as applications for automatic arms by the Ministry of War had not been met, the Ministry of Interior had procured, apparently without Allied authority, 4000 mitra, which, after repair had been issued to the Civil Police.

The report also disclosed that the Force possessed 5 Tanks, 21 Armoured Cars and 14 Armoured tractors. Furthermore, in a letter from the Ministry of Interior to the Allied Commission dated 10th July 1946, it was stated that the Ansaldo Society of Genova, had, on request of the Ministry, forwarded to Rome, two new armoured cars of the undermentioned types:-

- a. "Vinci" type (3 tons).
- b. "Sps AB/42" type (7 tons).

The firm Ansaldo were prepared within a short time, to supply 50 of each type fully equipped to the Ministry and authority of the Allied Commission to proceed with the purchase was requested.

It is appreciated that the responsibility **4076x** law and order in Italian Territory rests with the Italian Government and that the proposals to change the character of the Corps of Public Safety Agents were initiated before the elections and the institutional changes when outbreaks of disorder may have been considered by some as a possibility.

Further it is realized that many sections of the population are still in unlawful possession of Arms.

Should the changes mentioned continue to be implemented, it will be necessary to give serious consideration to the question as to whether this re-organisation and armament brings the Corps of Public Safety Agents within the category of the Armed (Defence) Forces, on a par with the S.C.M. for whom ceilings have been set under the Armistice (Long or Revised) and by the Draft Peace Treaty, as it stands at present.

In view of all the circumstances, I would appreciate, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, if full details of the scheme for the re-organisation and re-equipping of the Corps of Public Safety Agents could be furnished to this Commission as early as possible. Meanwhile, pending the examination of the scheme, the Supreme Allied Commander is unable to give authority for the proposed manufacture of armoured cars for the Police.

Yours very truly

HILARY E. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

Polad A
Polad B
Land Forces S/C.

4075

4073

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Italian
Police Forces.
TO : Executive Commissioner.

FILE No. 3626/BC

3 September 1946

It is confirmed that the meeting to discuss the reorganization of the Italian Police Forces will be held on Thursday, September 5th at 1500 hours in the Executive Commissioner's office.

Copy of a draft aid-memoire is enclosed.

The draft is only a basis for discussion.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

Distribution:
H.M.I.A.
Public Safety.

Trophella Capt
M. CARR, Brigadier,
VP CA Section.

4074

ATTN MEMORANDUMREORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN POLICE FORCES.

1. It is believed that the Italian Government agree with the Allied opinion that the Italian Police Forces require considerable reorganization. The extent and type of reorganization required is, however, debatable and may present difficult and delicate problems.

2. If considered from an American or British angle, the primary object in the construction and operation of an efficient police force would be :

(a) Prevention of crime.

(b) Arrest and detection of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all efforts of the police would be directed. The absence of crime, the safety of life and property and the state of public tranquility would alone prove whether the efforts of the police have been successful and the object in view attained.

3. In considering how to prevent crime, not only must supervision, patrolling, concentrations and transport be efficient, but what is still more important, the Police must have the co-operation of the law-abiding sections of the community.

To ensure this they must have the confidence and

police force would be : -

(a) Prevention of crime.

(b) Arrest and detention of offenders if crime is committed.

To these ends all efforts of the police would be directed. The absence of crime, the safety of life and property and the state of public tranquillity would alone prove whether the efforts of the police have been successful and the object in view attained.

3. In considering how to prevent crime, not only must supervision, patrolling, communications and transport be efficient, but what is still more important, the Police must have the co-operation of the law-abiding sections of the community.

To ensure this they must have the confidence and respect of the public. This can only be attained by acting at all times with scrupulous fairness, impartiality and without political bias. When the public fully realise that the police have these attributes, then the public on their part will give their full support.

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-2-

The Police, in actual fact, should be the servants and friends and not the masters and enemies of the people.

4. For a Police Service to be thoroughly effective and efficient it is necessary for the following main principles to be applied.

- (a) All the Police Forces, although they may be known by different names should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.
- (b) They should be adequately clothed, equipped and housed.
- (c) Adequate schools of instruction with a standard code should exist.
- (d) Pay and conditions of service should be such as to ensure the forces being contented and honest.
- (e) Although armed when and where necessary, the Force should not, in general, be equipped, militarised and used in such a way as to constitute a continual threat to the community.
- (f) It must be divorced from the Armed (Defence) Forces of the Country.

5. From the information in possession of the Allied Commission, the situation and state of efficiency of the Italian Police at present appears to be as follows: -

- (a) There are three major Police Forces, i.e. Carabinieri (75,000)

should exist.

- (d) Pay and conditions of service should be such as to ensure the Force being contented and honest.
- (e) Although armed when and where necessary, the Force should not, in general, be equipped, militarised and used in such a way as to constitute a continual threat to the community.
- (f) It must be divorced from the Armed (Defence) Forces of the Country.

5. From the information in possession of the Allied Commission, the situation and state of efficiency of the Italian Police at present appears to be as follows: -

- (a) There are three major Police Forces, i.e. Carabinieri (75,000) Corps of Public Safety Agents (47,000) and Finance Guards (30,000) each working more or less independently of the other.

The Finance Guards are in the nature of Revenue Agents and may require special consideration as regards inclusion in the Police Forces as such. In addition there are independent smaller Forces - i.e. Vigili Urbani (Municipal not known) and Forest Guards (5,000) also under separate authorities.

-2-

In this connection it is understood that steps are now being taken to remove the Metropolitan which is a section of the Civil Police operating in Rome, Milan, Naples and Palermo from the control of the Director of Public Safety to that of the Garmine. However efficient all these forces may be in themselves, overlapping and a waste of effort, manpower and money must inevitably occur when Police, under different organizations are covering the same areas and performing parallel duties. Each force becomes jealous of the other and co-operation is lacking.

- (b) As a result of the war and due to unavoidable causes, clothing, equipment and accommodation fell into a deplorable state. Many improvements have been effected but there is much still to be done.
- (c) Classes of instruction are in operation but there is little or no co-ordination between the Forces.
- (d) The pay of the Police, which is one of the most important essentials in police administration is inadequate and is such that corruption must inevitably creep in.
- (e) Originally the Civil Police Forces were normally armed with a submachine gun and pistol, mainly for defensive purposes.

are covering the same areas and performing parallel duties. Each Force becomes jealous of the other and co-operation is lacking.

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(d) The pay of the police, which is one of the most important essentials in police administration is inadequate and is such that corruption must inevitably creep in.

(e) Originally the Civil Police Forces were normally armed with a handgun and pistol, mainly for defensive purposes.

Immediately following the cessation of hostilities in successive areas in Italy, Lawlessness became acute due to the aftermath of war. In some areas armed banditry was rife with the police, on account of lack of transport and equipment, in no position to combat the situation effectively. Somewhat similar conditions still prevail in many centres. Continued widespread unemployment is now causing dissatisfaction in many places.

The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, with the assistance of Allied Police Officers concentrated on the re-clothing, re-equipment and re-training of the Carabinieri with the result that to-day this force has become remarkably efficient as a combatant force. They are now equipped with armored cars and automatic weapons. The Carabinieri are military in character and are armed as such although performing civil police duties.

The Corps of Public Safety Agents has, for a long time, been pressing for automatic arms on the grounds that such are necessary to combat criminals and a considerable percentage of the population who are similarly armed. Large numbers of automatic weapons have come into the possession of the Public Safety Agents. In addition they have a number of armored cars and the authority of the Allied Commission has not been sought to purchase a considerable number of additional armored cars.

It would seem that the Ministry of Interior are anxious to arm the Corps of Public Safety Agents on a scale equal to that of the Carabinieri.

Furthermore, in a directive issued by the Ministry of Interior to Prefects and Commanders of Police it is laid down that the Corps of Public Safety Guards is a thoroughly military Corps. It is being reorganized on military lines i.e. in Divisions, Groups, Companies etc, with Mobile Battalions.

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the population who are similarly armed. Large numbers of automatic weapons have come into the possession of the Public Safety Agents. In addition they have a number of unsecured arms and the authority of the Allied Commission has not been sought to purchase a considerable number of additional unsecured arms.

It would seem that the Ministry of Interior are anxious to arm the Corps of Public Safety Agents on a scale equal to that of the Carabinieri.

Furthermore, in a directive issued by the Ministry of Interior to Prefects and Commanders of Police it is laid down that the Corps of Public Safety Guards is a thoroughly military Corps.

It is being reorganised on military lines i.e. in Divisions, Groups, Companies etc, with Mobile Battalions.

In any comprehensive reorganisation many technical and detailed matters would require study. Some of the main problems to be solved, together with recommendations for consideration are given in the following paragraphs: -

(a) The merging of the main police forces under one central authority together with co-ordinated and uniform training in modern police methods and the elimination of over armament and of the publication of effort may be an extremely difficult and delicate problem. The Carabinieri are an essentially military body, they are naturally very

-5-

jealous of their traditions and might not view with favor
their complete absorption into the Corps of Public Safety
Agents.

On the other hand it would be equally inadvisable for the
Public Safety Agents to be absorbed into the Carabinieri
and for the whole Corps to become completely military in
character. An efficient police force can never emerge
from a force which is organized wholly on military lines and
in which the human touch, so essential in successful police
work, is completely lacking.

It is suggested for consideration that in order to keep their
identity as far as possible the Carabinieri might remain
dependent on the Ministry of War for food, clothing and
equipment, but for all other purposes control should be vested
in the Director General of Public Safety Ministry of Interior.
It would be essential, however, that political bias should be
completely eliminated from both Corps.

(b) Heavily armed police may be required to meet serious
emergencies as and when they arise in certain areas, but they
are unnecessary for employment on normal police duties. It is
agreed that a situation, such as exists in Italy to-day, where
large sections of the population are in possession of modern arms

as a result of the passage of war is not in itself a normal condition.
The situation, however, in many areas, including some of the large

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(b) Heavily armed Police may be required to meet serious emergencies as and when they arise in certain areas, but they are unnecessary for employment on normal police duties. It is agreed that a situation, such as exists in Italy to-day, where large sections of the population are in possession of modern arms as a result of the passage of war is not in itself a normal condition. The situation, however, in many areas, including areas of this type cities tends to be tranquil and normal. It is felt that every endeavour should be made to reduce steadily the number of armed police employed as such.

-6-

(c) As regards the pay of the Police Forces, it is appreciated that this is a matter which is affected by the wage scales of central and para-central employees in general. In principle, however, it is essential that the Police Forces receive a scale of pay which should remove temptations of bribery and corruption.

7. In the past the question of an Allied Police Mission to advise on and assist in the re-organization of the Italian Police Forces has been discussed with various members of the Italian Government in power at the time.

It is suggested that re-consideration might be given at this stage to an invitation being extended to the Allied authorities for such a mission.

Among other advantages which might accrue from such a step is the prospect that the re-organization of the Police Forces would be considered in an atmosphere free from political bias and it is hoped might lead to the setting up of an impartial and efficient police organization.

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Among other advantages which might accrue from such a step in the prospect that the re-organisation of the Police Forces would be considered in an atmosphere free from political bias and it is hoped might lead to the setting up of an impartial and efficient police organisation.

4068

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 940.00

SUBJECT: Police Mission.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

Your letter AC/14634/PS of 29 July has received careful consideration and the proposals contained in the fifth paragraph thereof are approved.

Will you please take action accordingly and in due course inform this Hq of the reaction of the Italian Government to your advice.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:



A.L. HAMBLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

A. Enfroncia to be considered. Just before
forwarding report. See Folio 15.

MC

4067

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

A P O 794

SECRET

10/11/53/10

29 July 1946

Subject: Police Division.

Re: (S) Action, Allied Forces Headquarters.

1. I feel that the time has come when the whole question of an Allied or British Police Division to the Italian Government should be re-viewed, as there appears to be considerable confusion both as regards the prospect of such a Division being set up in this country and as regards the proposed requirements for a Police Division.

2. From the Allied point of view, it seems to be agreed in principle with a view to the re-organization of the Italian police forces and their training in modern police methods and procedure that in accordance with the original proposal of this Commission made in June 1945, a Police Division to the Italian Government would be highly desirable.

There are certain, however, no prospect of imposing such a Division on the Italian Government under the revised unification terms or under the Peace Treaty under discussion so far as I am informed of its terms.

There appears, however, to be no immediate prospect of the Italian Government extending an invitation to the Allies to provide a Police Division. With regard to the present international political situation and the changes pending in the Italian Constitution, regarded as a sovereign power, in my opinion, precludes the possibility of the Italian Government asking for an Allied, still less an all-British Police Division for which, incidentally, the Italian Government would presumably be mainly financially responsible. Any further observations are made in para. 4 below should, consequently, the Italian Government extend an invitation.

3. From the purely Allied angle, the present position is as follows:-

Within the framework of the various sub-commissions Allied Commission (A.C.C.) there is a C.I. Section with a S.I. of 10 Police Officers (plus two military staff officers). The Police strength of this section is now reduced to 6 Officers and under normal release procedures will gradually reduce away.

4066

- (b) That no endeavor should be made by the OLIN Section, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, (M.M.I.A.) to extend its influence over the Police Forces as a whole.
- (c) That there should be no increase in the strength of the OLIN Section, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, (M.M.I.A.); that so long as there are sufficient officers to perform, the Section should continue with officers normally available or those who defer voluntarily, but that otherwise it should be permitted to waste to a minimum of 2 officers.

6. Will you please say if you concur.

10/11/50

HARRY S. STEIN
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

cc. Chief Commissioner.
Executive Commissioner.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, (M.M.I.A.)
Civil Affairs Section.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Folded (A)
Folded (B) *[initials]*

SECRETEND TRAFF

TO : AMHQ 2-2

1. I feel that the time has come when the whole question of an Allied or British Police Mission to the ITALIAN Government should be reviewed, as there appears to be considerable confusion both as regards the potentialities of the existing "COMR Sec I.P.S.C. (MIA)" and what is required to put the whole of the ITALIAN Police Forces on their feet.

2. From the Allied point of view, it seems to be agreed in principle that, with a view to the reorganization of the ITALIAN police forces and their training in modern police methods and procedure, in accordance with the original proposal of this Commission made in June 1945, a Police Mission to the ITALIAN Government would be highly desirable and advantageous to the Western Allies.

It is not now desirable to impose such a mission on the ITALIAN Government. On the other hand, it might well be that, under the changed circumstances since the elections, the new ITALIAN Government would now consider the idea of a British Police Mission with some approval. There has been much discussion in the Press recently on the necessity of unifying, improving the lot and raising the efficiency of the ITALIAN Police Forces as a whole. An independent mission would avoid the jealousy and suspicions of party politics. In any event, we can but ask the ITALIAN view, expressing our views in the matter.

their training in modern police methods and procedure, in accordance with the original proposal of this Commission made in June 1945, a Police Mission to the ITALIAN Government would be highly desirable and advantageous to the Western Alliance.

It is not now possible to impose such a mission on the ITALIAN Government. On the other hand, it might well be that, under the changed circumstances since the Elections, the new ITALIAN Government would now consider the idea of a British Police Mission with some approval. There has been much discussion in the Press recently on the necessity of unifying, improving the lot and raising the efficiency of the ITALIAN Police Forces as a whole. An independent mission would avoid the jealousies and suspicions of party politics. In any event, we can but ask the ITALIAN view, stressing our views in the matter.

4063

3. From the purely Allied angle, the present position is as follows: within the framework of I.P.A.C. A.C. (MIA) there is a COMSEC with a ME of 10 Police Officers (plus two military staff officers). This SEC has never been up to strength and has at present only 7 Police Officers and under normal release pressed to will gradually waste away.

Apart from the matter of a Police Mission, this COMSEC section has, in general, led its "immediate objective" of re-equipping and rehabilitating the units of the COMSEC, and the section will, there, be allowed to make.

- PAT 661 of 11 May 1946, however, has the following effect:
- (a) A review of the increase in the COMSEC section (MIA) from the 10 Police Officers (plus two Staff Officers), to 15 Police Officers (plus two Staff Officers).

-2-

(b) Constitutes the CORP Section (MIA) as a foundation for a Police Mission which Section, in the meantime, is to endeavour to "extend its influence" over the ITALIAN Police Forces as a whole.

As regards (a) above, there are no sources in this theatre from which personnel can be obtained to increase the strength of the CORP Section (MIA). With regard to maintaining its existing strength, it would not, as things stand, be equitable to defer these Police officers as operationally vital.

As regards (b) above, I do not consider it possible for a CORP Section in L.F.S.C., A.C. (MIA) to extend its influence undisturbedly over the Police Forces as a whole. L.F.S.C. A.C. (MIA) only deals with the CORP in their capacity as an advisory body to the ITALIAN Army, of which CORP form part.

1. To Sun 5/1

- (a) The point at issue is whether the Allies wish to have an efficient ITALIAN Police Force or not.
- (b) If they do, the only answer is a British Police Mission, to extend the work already performed by CORP Sec L.F.S.C. A.C. (MIA).
- (c) We cannot impose such a Police Mission. Therefore, we must ask the ITALIANS to accept it, exerting such pressure as may be possible.
- (d) It seems that the changed political circumstances may

unobtrusively over the Police Forces as a whole. L.P.S.C. A.C. (MMA) only deals with the OCHE in their capacity as an advisory body to the ITALIAN Army, of which OCHE form part.

4. To SUE II

- (a) The point at issue is whether the Allies wish to have an efficient ITALIAN Police Force or not.
- (b) If they do, the only answer is a British Police Mission, to extend the work already performed by OMR Sec L.P.S.C. A.C.

(MMA).

- (c) We cannot impose such a Police Mission. Therefore, we

must ask the ITALIANS to accept it, exerting such pressure as may be possible.

4062

- (d) It seems that the dimmed political circumstances may have made the possibility of such a move more likely. At any rate, we can try; and unless we do, there is stalemate and possibility of retrogression in the efficiency of the ITALIAN Police Forces.

(e) The matter of ITALIAN opposition from the prestige aspect

might be overcome by the arguments in para 2 above. As regards possible opposition from the financial aspect, if the ITALIANS cannot afford to pay for a Mission, the question arises as to whether it would not be worth our while to pay for a small mission (of say 40 - 50 officers) which would have such a

salutary and far reaching influence in the Allied and international interest.

NOTE: Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (LMIA) letters CORR/G/12 of 1 June and 17 June 1946, together with the reports attached thereto, should be read in conjunction with the above.

W.
 (SEAR ADMIRAL) MILITARY STONE
 U.S.M.R.
 CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
 ALLIED COMMISSION.

cc: L.F.S.C. (LMIA)
 C.A. Section
 Public Safety Sub Commission
 Polad A
 Polad D

SECRETSECRET

TO: AHHQ G-5

1. I feel that the time has come when the whole question of an Allied or British Police Mission to the Italian Government should be reviewed, as there appears to be considerable confusion both as regards the prospect of such a mission being set up in this country and as regards the personnel resources for a Police Mission.

2. From the Allied point of view, it seems to be agreed in principle with a view to the re-organization of the Italian police forces and their training in modern police methods and procedures ^{Ref} in accordance with the original proposal of this Commission made in June 1945, a Police Mission to the Italian Government would be highly desirable.

There now exists, however, no prospect of imposing such a

Mission on the Italian Government under the Peace Treaty under discussion *as far as I am informed of its terms.*

immediate under the 'revised Armistice terms', there appears, moreover, to be no prospect of the Italian

Government extending an invitation to the Allies to provide a Police Mission. Quite apart from the present political situation and the changes ^{international} pending in the Constitution, prestige as a sovereign power, in my opinion, precludes the possibility of the Italian Government asking for an Allied, *Italian Government* still less an all-British Police Mission for which, incidentally, *4060* would presumably be mainly financially responsible. Some further

with a view to the re-organization of the Italian police forces and their training in modern police methods and procedure, in accordance with the original proposal of this Commission made in June 1945, a Police Mission to the Italian Government would be highly desirable.

There now exists, however, no prospect of imposing such a Mission on the Italian Government under the Peace Treaty under discussion. *As far as we are informed of its Terms, under the revised Armistice terms, imposed on the Italian Government, to no prospect of the Italian*

There appears, moreover, to be no prospect of the Italian Government extending an invitation to the Allies to provide a Police Mission. Quite apart from the present political situation and the changes pending in the Constitution, prestige as a sovereign power, in my opinion, precludes the possibility of the Italian Government asking for an Allied, *Italian Government, still less an all-British Police Mission for which, incidentally, 4060* would presumably be mainly financially responsible. Some further observations are made in para 4 below should, unexpectedly, the Italian Government extend an invitation.

3. From the purely Allied angle, the present position is as follows:-

R.C. (M. M. 1947)
Within the framework of L.P.S.C., there is a CC.P.R. Section with *7th Police Squadron* a W.E. of 10 Police Officers (plus two military staff officers) *These* *IS now reduced to* *section* *has never been up to strength and has at present only 11* Officers and under normal release procedure will gradually waste away.

- 2 -

Apart from the latter of a Police Mission, this CC.RR Section has, in general completed ^{the immediate objective} of re-equipping and rehabilitating the morale of the CC.RR and the Section could, therefore, be allowed to waste.

PAN.661 of the 11th May 1946, however, has the following effect:

- (a) Approves an increase in the CC.RR Section (MIA) from 10 Police Officers (plus two staff Officers) to 15 Police Officers (plus two staff Officers).
- (b) Constitutes the CC.RR Section (MIA) as a foundation for a Police Mission which Section, in the meantime, is to endeavour to extend its influence over the Italian Police Forces as a whole.

As regards (a) above, there are no sources in this Theatre from which personnel can be obtained to increase the strength of the CC.RR. Section (MIA). With regard to maintaining its existing strength, it would not be equitable to defer ^{known} as operationally vital Police Officers unless there are fair prospects of the Italian Government requesting a Police Mission in the very near future, nor would it appear to be justified when there is such a shortage of Police Officers in U.K. and in Central Europe. In this connection ^{it has become} necessary to defer officers as operationally vital at ~~some future date~~ in order to maintain the Venezia Giulia Police Force.

As regards (b) above, I do not consider it practical for a CC.RR

its influence over the Italian Police Forces as a ^{known} known.

As regards (a) above, there are no sources in this theatre from which personnel can be obtained to increase the strength of the CC.RR. Section (MIA). With regard to maintaining its existing strength, it would not be equitable to defer ^{as operationally vital} Police Officers unless there are fair prospects of the Italian Government requesting a Police Mission in the very near future, nor would it appear to be justified when there is such a shortage of Police Officers in U.K. and in Central Europe. In this connection ^{it has become} necessary to defer officers as operationally vital ~~at some stage~~ in order to maintain the Venezia Giulia Police Force.

As regards (b) above, I do not consider it practical for a CC.RR. Section in ^{LFSC AC} to extend its influence unobtrusively over the ⁴⁰⁵⁹ forces as a whole. ^{LFSC AC (MIA) only deal with the CC.RR. in the} Section in ^{LFSC AC (MIA) only deal with the CC.RR. in the} forces as a whole. ^{LFSC AC (MIA) only deal with the CC.RR. in the} capacity to do so ^{LFSC AC (MIA) only deal with the CC.RR. in the} should, unexpectedly, the Italian Government extend an invitation to the Allies for a Police Mission, and agreement be reached on terms of reference and financial responsibility, we ^{LFSC AC (MIA) only deal with the CC.RR. in the} should, in my opinion, deal at that stage with the question of personnel.

more appropriately

- 3 -

Police officers who have had experience in this country would still be serving as Police Officers in U.K. U.S., or in Central Europe and doubtless arrangements could be made for some of them to be included in the Police Mission.

5. In the light of the foregoing, if it is ^{accepted} that the prospects of the Italian Government requesting a Police Mission are very faint or non-existent, my recommendations are as follows:

(a) That an opportunity should be found
~~That an opportunity should be found~~ ^{to advise the}
 Italian Government that its Police Forces require re-organization and to recommend an Allied Police Mission.

(b) That no endeavour should be made by the CC.BR Section (MELA) to extend its influence over the Police Forces as a whole.

(c) That there should be no increase in the strength of the CC.BR Section L F S C R C (MELA); ^{that} so long as there are sufficient duties to perform, the Section should continue with officers normally available or those who defer voluntarily, but that otherwise it should be permitted to ^{maintain} a minimum of 2 officers.

added: 6 held your plans say for now.

and to recommend an Allied Police Mission.

L.F.S.C.A.C.

(b) That no endeavour should be made by the C.C.H.R. Section (MIA) to extend its influence over the Police Forces as a whole.

(c) That there should be no increase in the strength of the C.C.H.R. Section (MIA); That so long as there are sufficient duties to perform, the Section should continue with officers normally available or those who, defer voluntarily, but that otherwise it should be permitted to waste a minimum of 2 officers.

added/ 6 will you please say if you agree.

W
DEAR ADMIRAL MILITARY STAFF.
J.S.H.R.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, 4058
Allied Commission.

Cc. C.C.
L.F.C.
L.F.S.C.A.C. (MIA)
C.A. Section.
Public Safety S/O.
Police A.
Police B.

3A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 473427

24 June 1946

SUBJECT : Proposed Police Mission.

TO : VP. CA. Section.

✓ 1. I have read and agree with the draft letter but I think the last sentence in para 3 might be extended and the following added: "unless the number of officers is materially increased and the section's powers and scope are considerably widened".

2. I suggest the words "or with the CC.RR. Section MIA" in para 4 might be omitted as to some it may give the impression that Officers with CC.RR. Section have not had general Police experience in this Country. On the contrary they have all had a wide experience out here.

3. I have no other observations to offer.

EJB/ae

E. J. ME
E. J. ME, Colonel
Acting Director.

4057

Police Mission

2A

- (1) Dec. 14 Telegram from Foreign Office
Consider can't success with the Italian Government is more likely if we proceed to ask for a small police mission to be attached to existing military mission.
- (2) Jan. 12 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to Savinham above. Possible to recruit good candidate for Head of police mission and to recruit officers from those now in Italy, Germany etc. They must wear uniform - this should be discussed with General Morgan.
- (3) Jan. 18 From General Browning (MIA)
Memorandum for discussion with COS on police officers for the GCR.
- (4) Jan. 19 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 2 above. Matter to be discussed on January 21st with COS to SACRED. Gen-Browning rules that ARVN has already provisionally appointed 14 former Public Safety Officers of Allied Commission for training of GCR.
- (5) Jan. 20 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 2 above. Requests early reply.
- (6) Jan. 22 From Major Paget-Orake, GRC, CTF
Copy of telegram to War Office reporting views of MIL and Ambassador that police officers should wear military uniform and suggesting how they should be organised.
- (7) Jan. 24 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 5 above. Draws attention to 6 above. Psychological advantages of wearing police uniform are offset by disadvantages of publicity drawing attention to fact that police mission has been sent.
- (8) Jan. 25 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 7 above. Suggestion that O'Rourke be appointed as head of police mission and that it be an Allied mission.
- (9) Feb. 1 AC telegram to Enclosing memo. from Brigadier Hope

appointed to former United States
Officers of Allied Commission for
Training of GMR.

- (5) Jan. 20 Telegram from Foreign Office Refers to 2 above. Requests early reply.
- (6) Jan. 22 From Major Pavet-Gocke, GMR, OT Copy of telegram to War Office reporting views of WMA and Ambassador that police officers should wear military uniform and suggesting how they should be organized.
- (7) Jan. 24 Telegram to Foreign Office Refers to 5 above. Draws attention to 6 above. Psychological advantages of wearing police uniform are offset by disadvantages of publicity drawing attention to fact that police mission has been sent.
- (8) Jan. 25 Telegram to Foreign Office Refers to 7 above. Suggestion that O'Rourke be appointed as head of police mission and that it be an Allied mission.
- (9) Feb. 1 AC telegram to AFHQ No. 818 Enclosing memo. from Brigadier Hope regarding information held at AFHQ about Italian Coastal, Frontier and AA defences.
- (10) Feb. 11 Telegram from Foreign Office Refers to 2 above. All members of Mission should wear military uniform; strength reduced. In favour of all-British Mission.
- (11) Feb. 20 Telegram to Foreign Office Refers to 10 above. General Browning (WMA) has pointed out that U.S. interest will be secured by presence of his deputy, a U.S. Colonel with whom he works in closest cooperation.
- (12) Feb. 19 Telegram from Washington Refers to 10 above. State Dept. Now confirm that they have no objection to police mission being exclusively British.
- (13) Feb. 26 Telegram from Caserta Refers to 12 above. Formal endorsement of CCS view required. Should make it clear that it is not a Police mission but increase in staff of military mission to Italian army.

4056

785016

- 2 -

- (14) Feb. 25 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 11 above. Foreign Office spoke to Admiral Stone, before his departure from London, on lines of 10 above. He will support our proposals. Mission must be treated as military affair.
- (15) Mar. 14 Telegram from Washington
Refers to 12 above. COS suggest reply to Sacmed on lines of 13 above.
- (16) Mar. 27 Telegram from Washington
Refers to 15 above. Instructions requested as to wording of reply, should that in 13 above be used?
- (17) Mar. 29 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 16 and 13 above. Administrative hitch prevents despatch of immediate instructions to JSM.
- (18) May 9 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 12 above. Have been unable to secure Colonel O'Rourke or substitute. Arrival of full Colonel in Italy would attract much attention. Comments required. Does Sacmed want 3 subordinate police officers?
- (19) May 13 Savingram from Caserta
Refers to 16 above. COS Telegram FAN 661 to SAC informs him that proposals in MAF 1086 are approved. Gives extract of Tel. FAN 661. British Police officers should be attached to MMIA to supervise Carabinieri affairs but they should not be regarded as Police Mission.
- (20) May 18 From General Browning (MMIA)
Letter enclosing list of Police officer staff of "CCRR" giving demob. dates. Discusses recruitment of CCRR in time for the elections.
- (21) May 17, PL from Foreign Office
Encloses copy Tel. JSM Washington to London No. 224 and copy of FAN 661. British Police officers should be attached to MMIA to supervise Carabinieri - they should be regarded as part of MMIA.
- (22) May 22 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 18 above. Agreed generally that officer of Colonel O'Rourke's calibre should be found instead of Lieut. Colonel Mighall. Existing officers are anxious to be relieved soon.

to secure detail of Colonel O'Rourke's of assistance.
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required. Does SAC need want 3 subordinate
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Caserta
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- Letter enclosing list of Police officer
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Discusses recruitment of CCRR in time
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- (21) May 17, PL from Foreign
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- Refers to 18 above. Agreed generally
that officer of Colonel O'Rourke's calibre
should be found instead of Lieut. Colonel
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to be relieved soon.

4055

Q
SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512PSafety
~~H31~~

7393

1A

G-5: 940.09

20 May 1946

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Increment to MMIA.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394.- 1 B
The attached copy of Combined Chiefs of Staff signal
FAN 661 is forwarded to you for information and guidance.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

A. L. HAMBLEN
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5Incl:
as above.Copy to:
MMIA.

ADPS -

Police 2 -

4054

SECRET

COPY

PRIORITY

SECRET

H/3167

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS

TO : AFHQ FOR MORGAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH

REF NO THIS MESSAGE : W-87638

11 May 1946

This is FAN-661.

Proposals in NAF-1086 are approved.

British Police Officers should be attached to the Military Mission, Italian Army (MMIA) to supervise Carabinieri Affairs.

Although primarily concerned with Carabinieri it is hoped that these Officers will be able to extend their influence to Italian Police Forces as a whole and will in due course be invited by Italian Government to function openly as a Police Mission.

Meanwhile, in view of Italian Government susceptibilities it is most important that these Officers should be regarded strictly as part of MMIA and NOT referred to as a Police Mission.

NOTE : HAS BEEN RELAYED TO CINC MED FOR INFORMATION.
NAF 1086 IS FX-51855 MC OUT 331 5/11/45 C(SD)

ACTION : G(SD)

INFORMATION : SACS CAO US POLAD BRIT POLAD RAF
USN G-2 G-3(AFHQ) NLO G-4 G-5

MC IN 1364 11 May 46 SECRET 0910B Ref No W-87639 dc/P

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