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Communications

NOV. 1943 - JUNE 1944

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

FILE

MINUTE SHEET

No. of sheet	Date	File no. of Ans'd ltr.	From whom	Subject
1	6 Nov.		Chief of Communications	- About not handing over whole govt. until communications are re-established
2.	7 Feb.		AFHQ.	Operation of Italian Red's Circuits
3.	11 Feb.		AFHQ.	Communication from AFHQ to London & Wash.
4.	23 Jan.		Communication	- Watch list facilities of communications.
5	27 June			Watch list Facilities.
6	9 Feb.			Civilian Telephone subscriber (ZECCHINA)

SECRET

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

SECRET

ACC/14064/2/PS

27th June, 1944

SUBJECT : Watch List Facilities.

TO : Regional Public Safety Officers.
(thro' Regional Commissioners) I,II,III,IV,V,VI,VII,VIII
Rome Region, AMG 5th and 8th Armies.

1. The following information has been supplied by the Communications Sub-Commission for circulation to Regional and Provincial Public Safety Officers:

- a. POSTAL. There are censorship stations under Allied Control in the following provinces: Rome, Naples, Avellino, Benevento, Foggia, Bari, Taranto, Palermo and Cagliari. Where full postal facilities exist, outgoing mail from the provinces passes through the censorship station. This mail is checked by Allied personnel against a Watch List for which names may be submitted by all interested agencies. Both sender and addressee names are checked. Owing to lack of Allied personnel, it is impossible to cover 100% of the mail in some stations and therefore, when names are submitted, it should always be stated whether the name may be handled by specially vetted Italian personnel. This personnel is used to check the balance of the mail, but names are only put on their list with the consent of the user agency. If this consent is given it will be seen that 100% cover can be provided for suspect mail unless the letter originates in a province not under Allied control.
- All mail to Switzerland, Spain and Portugal is passed through the Watch List and, if desired, names can be forwarded to London and Washington to check other external communications.
- b. TELEGRAMS. There are facilities for censoring telegrams in the same places as above. Post-censorship of telegrams is now in force and therefore it is impossible to prevent a suspect's sending a telegram, but all telegrams are subsequently checked against the list and information passed to user agencies.
- c. TELEPHONES. Monitoring stations are established at Rome, Naples, Bari and Taranto. As Italian monitors are used it is not considered desirable to give them the Watch List, but particular attention is paid to circuits on which Watch List suspects are connected. All reports are subsequently checked against the Watch List and dissemination made of all information contained concerning suspects.

d. It is requested that Public Safety officers submit their requirements to the provincial Allied Censor Control Officers or to the Officer in charge of the monitoring station at a telephone exchange. It would be appreciated if, whenever possible, the length of time for which cover is required, could be stated.

2. The names sent by Public Safety Officers to Allied Censor Control Officers for inclusion on the Watch List should also be forwarded to the Regional Commissioner for his information.

Paul G. Kirk
PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

AFW/hgd

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File

REAR HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394.

LTSJ/blg

H

23 June 1944

CCG/1502/56

Subject: Watch List Facilities.

To : Director, Public Safety Subcommittee,
Attention : Lt. Col. Wilcox.

1. Reference conversation (Lt. Col. Wilcox - Captain Jackson) of 22 June 44, the following are the facilities available for watching communications of suspect individuals. Though local Allied Censor Control Officers perform routine liaison with Public Safety officers, it is felt, as was agreed in the above conversation, that a summary of the facilities, sent out from this Headquarters, would be helpful. It would be appreciated if the following information could be transmitted to your Regional and Provincial officers.

2. Postal: There are censorship stations under Allied Control in the following provinces: Rome, Naples, Avellino, Benevento, Foggia, Bari, Taranto, Palermo and Cagliari. Where full postal facilities exist, outgoing mail from the provinces passes through the censorship station. This mail is checked by Allied personnel against a Watch List for which names may be submitted by all interested agencies. Both sender and addressee names are checked. Owing to lack of Allied personnel, it is impossible to cover 100% of the mail in some stations and therefore, when names are submitted, it should always be stated whether the name may be handled by specially vetted Italian personnel. This personnel is used to check the balance of the mail, but names are only put on their list with the consent of the user agency. If this consent is given it will be seen that 100% cover can be provided for suspect mail unless the letter originates in a province not under Allied control.

All mail to Switzerland, Spain and Portugal is passed through the Watch List and, if desired, names can be forwarded to London and Washington to check other external communications.

3. Telegrams: There are facilities for censoring telegrams in the same places as above. Post-censorship of telegrams is now in force and therefore it is impossible to prevent a suspect's sending a telegram, but all telegrams are subsequently checked against the list and information passed to user agencies.

4. Telephones: Monitoring stations are established at Rome, Naples, Bari and Taranto. As Italian monitors are used it is not considered desirable to give them the Watch List, but particular attention is paid to circuits on which Watch List suspects are connected. All reports are subsequently checked against the Watch List and dissemination made of all information contained concerning suspects.

5. It is requested that Public Safety officers submit their requirements to the provincial Allied Censor Control Officers or to the Officer in charge of the monitoring station at a telephone exchange. It would be appreciated if, whenever possible, the length of time for which cover is required, could be stated.

J. L. HENDERSON,
Colonel,
Director, Communications Sub-Commission.

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U.S. SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AFMAG RAS/wp

SECRET
 AUTH: C-in-C, AF
 Initials: [initials]
 7 February 1944

AG 311-20 SIG-AGM

7 February 1944

SUBJECT: Operation of Italian Radio Circuits.

TO : All Concerned.

1. Letter this headquarters, subject and file as above, dated 22 November 1943, is rescinded, and the following substituted therefor, effective upon receipt.

2. The operation of radio equipment by the Italians presents a serious security problem. Strict control over the use of radio by the Italians must be maintained by Allied commands. To accomplish this end, the following policy is set forth and will become effective immediately:

a. The operation of all radio stations, both military and civil, by the Italians will be prohibited except as follows:

- (1) Naval stations authorized and supervised by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- (2) Stations essential to the operations of Italian aircraft, authorized and supervised by the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
- (3) Essential stations authorized and supervised by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force.
- (4) Stations specifically authorized by this headquarters, including Italian broadcast stations which are controlled and supervised by Information and Censorship Section, this headquarters.

b. The plain text of all authorized Italian radio traffic will be turned over to the Allied authority charged with supervision of the individual circuit.

c. All Italian held radio transmitting equipment except that specifically authorized under sub-paragraph a, above, will be immediately turned over to Allied representatives designated by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force; Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean; and Allied Control Commission. To effect this:

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Ltr, Allied Force Headquarters, AG 311-20 SIG-AGM
dtd 7 February 1944 (Continued).

- (1) The Allied Control Commission will order the Italian Government to take necessary action in areas under its control.
- (2) General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force, will take necessary steps to effect action in areas under his control.

d. Italian traffic, except as covered in paragraph a, above, will be handled as follows:

- (1) URGENT high level messages in Allied cipher by Allied facilities when necessary.
- (2) Other communications by landline or cable and by other such means, excluding radio, as may be available.

3. In exercising the authority as indicated in paragraph 2a, above, commanders concerned should assure themselves that the need for Italian radio communication arises in the course of handling military operational messages, and that no authorization is given as a matter of convenience in the handling of administrative communications. In all cases, when adequate wire or messenger service becomes available, the use of radio should be discontinued.

4. All of the authorities listed in paragraph 2a will report to this headquarters without delay, the Italian operated radio communications which they have heretofore authorized, and will report from time to time such additional communications as may be put in operation. This report should cover the following points:

- a. Location of transmitter.
- b. Power of transmitter.
- c. Frequencies used.
- d. Designation of Italian agency authorized to operate the transmitter.
- e. Purpose for which transmitter is authorized to operate, including stations to which it passes traffic.

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Ltr, Allied Force Headquarters, AG 311-20 SIG-AGM,
dtd 7 February 1944 (Continued).

f. Description of cipher used.

g. Arrangements for Allied supervision and monitoring.

By command of General WILSON:

J. L. Tarr
J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - G-2
3 - G-3
10 - MGS
2 - INC
2 - Signals
1 - SGS
25 - ACMT
25 - CINC, Mediterranean
25 - Air CINC, Mediterranean
10 - Allied Control Commission
10 - Chief, Hq, AMG
2 - CG, NATOUSA
10 - Adv Adm Echelon
10 - Allied Garrison Commander, SARDINIA
5 - Allied Garrison Commander, CORSICA
5 - Commander, French Forces, CORSICA
5 - CG, PBS) THRU: CG,
5 - CG, IBS) NATOUSA
5 - GOC, No. 1 District
5 - GOC, No. 2 District
10 - CG, XII Air Force
2 - AG Records, AF

list:

Action: Delcomms P.C. 04

Info - DCC / thru RC & MGS

Nav. S.C.

Land Forces

Air S.C.

Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 512

6 November 1943

SUBJECT: Communications.

TO : Chief of Communications Section.

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS

1. Whereas at the moment the Italian Government only exercises authority in the four provinces of Bari, Iorio, Brindisi and Lecce, it is expected that Regions I and II will be handed over from Allied Military Government to the Italian Government, supervised by the Allied Control Commission, at an early date. Later, Region VI will probably be handed over, followed by other regions when the allied forces have advanced further.

2. No government can exercise authority without communications. Therefore, before any regions can be handed over to the Italian Government, that government must have the use of adequate communications. These include postal services, telephones, telegraphs, wireless and, under present circumstances, the use of air transport.

3. Chief of Communications Section will consider this matter immediately with authorities concerned and report to Acting Chief of Staff. He will consult Captain Stone, USN, in this matter. He will base his report on a phased programme in the order Region I, Region II, Region VI. A subsequent report will be required regarding other regions.

E. Gueterbock

E. GUETERBOCK
Brigadier
Acting Chief of Staff

Copy to:

Economic Director
Administrative Director
Executive Officer Administration
G-2 (Security Intelligence) for
coordination with INC
AFHQ (Military Gov't Sec.)
Allied Military Mission (Brindisi)

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