

ACC 10000/143/2339 603

SABOTAGE REPORTS

Dec. 1943 - Apr. 1945

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SECURITY BRANCH.

FILE
MINUTE SHEET

No. of sheet	Date	File no. of Ans'd Ltr.	From whom	Subject
1				Sabotage report for DEC
2				" " " JAN
3				Feb. Report.
4				March "
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7				June "
8				Enemy Sabotage device
9				Sabotage Devices.
10				Monthly Sabotage Report. (24 Nov 44)
11				ALL BUTTERFLY BOMBS
12	11 April			THE BUTTERFLY BOMB
13	30 April			Sabotage equipment
14	30 April			Explosive cord.

No. of sheet	Date	File no. of Ann'd Ltr.	From whom	Subject
1				Sabotage report for DEC
2				" " " " JAN
3				Feb Report.
4				March "
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6				May "
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8				Enemy Sabotage device
9				Sabotage Devices.
10				Monthly Sabotage Report. (CHINA)
11				ALL BUTTERFLY BOMBS
12	11 April			THE BUTTERFLY BOMBS
13	30 April			Sabotage equipment
14	30 April			Explosive coal.

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SAEOTAGE REPORTS 603

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10000 / 143 / 2339

THIS FOLDER CONTAINS PAPERS	
FROM	DEC 43
TO	APR 46
CATALOGUE	

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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GFI-389,502-L

30 April 1945

Security
Division
Sec'd No. 715
Book No. 7195
File No. 603
Action

SUBJECT : Explosive Coal.

TO : See Distribution.

The following note on Explosive Coal as used by enemy saboteurs has been received from L.I.5 Counter-Sabotage Section.

1. General. The object of this note is to describe the different varieties of explosive coal which may be used by enemy agents, and to indicate methods of neutralization and/or disposal. Explosive coals fall into three main classes: -

- a. Solid lumps of explosive disguised as coal.
- b. Plaster or other artificial cases having the external appearance of coal but filled with explosive.
- c. Actual lumps of coal or briquettes which have been hollowed out and explosive inserted.

2. All these varieties are provided with a hole into which is inserted a detonator (blasting cap) crimped to a short length of safety fuse in such a way that the end of the safety fuse is more or less flush with the surface of the coal. Copper tube ignitors (MUD#6), match-head composition or other material to facilitate ignition, may be put on the end of the safety fuse. When the lumps are thrown into a fire, the end of the safety fuse is ignited and the coal explodes within a few seconds. The time interval between throwing the coal into the fire and ignition of the safety fuse depends upon the intensity of the heat and the amount of cement or colloid covering the end of the safety fuse (to keep it dry) but it is usually less than half a minute.

3. It is possible that with coal of the kind described above, there might be mixed a small proportion of lumps, externally the same, but provided with an impact fuse which would cause the coal to explode on being struck with a pick or shovel. There is as yet no evidence that the enemy have used or intend to use coal of this type, which would correctly be described as booby-trapped explosive coal.

4. Solid Explosive Coal. The enemy has used a type of solid explosive coal, the surface of which normally has the black appearance of coal but which, when rubbed, is found to be light grey in colour. If the coal is unarmed (i.e. has not got the detonator and safety fuse inserted), the hole for the insertion of the detonator would be easily seen. If it has been armed, careful inspection of the

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aboteurs has been received from L.I.5 Counter-Sabotage Section.

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- a. Solid lumps of explosive disguised as coal.
- b. Plaster or other artificial cases having the external appearance of coal but filled with explosive.
- c. Actual lumps of coal or briquettes which have been hollowed out and explosive inserted.

2. All these varieties are provided with a hole into which is inserted a detonator (blasting cap) crimped to a short length of safety fuse in such a way that the end of the safety fuse is more or less flush with the surface of the coal. Copper tube ignitors (RED-96), matched composition or other material to facilitate ignition, may be put on the end of the safety fuse. When the lumps are thrown into a fire, the end of the safety fuse is ignited and the coal explodes within a few seconds. The time interval between throwing the coal into the fire and ignition of the safety fuse depends upon the intensity of the heat and the amount of cement or colloid covering the end of the safety fuse (to keep it dry) but it is usually less than half a minute.

3. It is possible that with coal of the kind described above, there might be mixed a small proportion of lumps, externally the same, but provided with an impact fuse which would cause the coal to explode on being struck with a pick or shovel. There is as yet no evidence that the enemy have used or intend to use coal of this type, which would correctly be described as booby-trapped explosive coal.

4. Solid Explosive Coal. The enemy has used a type of solid explosive coal, the surface of which normally has the black appearance of coal but which, when rubbed, is found to be light grey in colour. If the coal is unarmed (i.e. has not got the detonator and safety fuse inserted), the hole for the insertion of the detonator would be easily seen. If it has been armed, careful inspection of the surface will disclose the end of the safety fuse in or slightly below the surface of the coal in the mouth of this hole. The composition of this coal is: -

Pentacrythritol Trinitrate (known as TET)	35%
Nitro-cellulose, ungelatinised	46%
Silica gel	9%
Residual solvent	11%

= Booklet entitled "Enemy Sabotage Equipment (Identification)" issued by the War Office, December 1943, commonly called "RED" because of the red cover. The illustrations in this booklet are identified in this note by the number following the word "RED"; e.g. "RED 96" refers to Figure 96 in the booklet.

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Its density is approximately 1.13. This explosive is as sensitive to impact and friction as dry gun cotton and should therefore be handled with care. In particular it should not be scraped or struck with steel instruments.

5. Cased Explosive Coal. The enemy may use explosive coal of this type either of his own or of Allied manufacture.

A. Allied. The case is of black colored plaster and the filling is usually Plastic Explosive in which is embedded a primer (booster), into which a detonator and safety fuse are inserted through a suitable hole in the case. It is possible that samples may also be found in which the filling is cast Pentolite.

B. German. The case is of black sanded synthetic resin, and the filling is German Plastic Explosive (Plastit), or TTP (RED 50), in which is embedded a FTH/74 primer into which a detonator, sometimes with a very short length of safety fuse attached, can be inserted through a hole in the case.

6. Careful examination of either of these types of explosives will reveal the line of junction of the two halves of the case, and the detonator hole containing the detonator and safety fuse. In the German variety, the hole is usually in the line of junction of the two halves of the case. If the coal has been damaged, the fracture of the case will enable it to be distinguished fairly readily from genuine coal, but suspected samples should not be tested for fracture unless it is quite certain that the coal is not of the variety described under para 4 above.

7. Real Coal or Briquettes. There are pieces of real coal or briquettes (RED 52) which have been drilled, often with a special trepanning tool, to receive a small quantity of explosive into which a detonator and safety fuse are then inserted in the usual way. Careful examination of the surface of this coal will disclose the presence of such holes, which are usually about $3/4$ " in diameter. Alternatively, smaller holes may be drilled and the coal between the holes is knicked out later, forming one big cavity. The high explosive surface is covered with coal dust or some other black substance. The proportion of the explosive contained in coal of this type is clearly not as high as in the other types.

8. Neutralization. A suspected piece of coal should be carefully wiped over with a damp cloth to remove coal dust or other camouflage. (The appearance of the lump will then often make it clear that it is not genuine coal). The surface of the lump should be searched carefully for the detonator hole which is about $3/8$ " in diameter, when this has been found, the cement or paste which usually covers the end of the detonator should be carefully removed, at which time the safety fuse and detonator can be withdrawn. Then the detonator has been withdrawn, the coal is no longer dangerous, provided it is protected from rough handling and from fire, and can be put in a safe place to await disposal by the proper authorities.

9. Discovery and Prevention. Discovery of explosive coal once put

5. Cornish. The case is of black varnished synthetic resin, and the filling is German Plastic Explosive (Placit), or TNT (MID 50), in which is embedded a EMU fuse primer into which a detonator, sometimes with a very short length of safety fuse attached, can be inserted through a hole in the case.

6. Careful examination of either of these types of explosives will reveal the line of junction of the two halves of the case, and the detonator hole containing the detonator and safety fuse. In the German variety, the hole is usually in the line of junction of the two halves of the case. If the coal has been damaged, the fracture of the case will enable it to be distinguished fairly readily from genuine coal, but suspected samples should not be tested for fracture unless it is quite certain that the coal is not of the variety described under para 4 above.

7. Coal Coal or Briquettes. There are pieces of real coal or briquettes (MID 52) which have been drilled, often with a special trapping tool, to receive a small quantity of explosive into which a detonator and safety fuse are then inserted in the usual way. Careful examination of the surface of this coal will disclose the presence of such holes, which are usually about $3/4$ " in diameter. Alternatively, smaller holes may be drilled and the coal between the holes is knocked out into, forming one big cavity. The high explosive surface is covered with coal dust or some other black substance. The proportion of the explosive contained in coal of this type is clearly not as high as in the other types.

8. Neutralization. A suspected piece of coal should be carefully wiped over with a damp cloth to remove coal dust or other camouflage (The appearance of the lump will then often make it clear that it is not genuine coal). The surface of the lump should be searched carefully for the detonator hole which is about $5/8$ " in diameter. When this has been found, the cement or paste which usually covers the end of the detonator should be carefully removed, at which time the safety fuse and detonator can be withdrawn. When the detonator has been withdrawn, the coal is no longer dangerous, provided it is protected from rough handling and from fire, and can be put in a safe place to await disposal by the proper authorities.

9. Discovery and Prevention. Discovery of explosive coal once put in the bunker of a locomotive or a ship, or in a coal dump, is virtually impossible without prior knowledge as to the exact place where it has been put. Counter-measures, other than the standard ones of denying access to the places where the target is located, also present great difficulty. It has been suggested that black netting could be placed over locomotive coal bunkers, but objections have been raised to this by transportation specialists. In fact, there are no specialized counter-measures which will satisfactorily prevent this type of attack, and the General ones must be relied on.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. W. Webb

S. S. HILL-MILLER,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBI-339,502-1

30 April 1945

Division	415
Req. No.	7196
File No.	603
Action	

113

SUBJECT: Sabotage Equipment.

TO: See Distribution.

Attached is a sketch of an enemy sabotage device, recently used in ITALY.

It is a metal tyre burster. The equipment consists of two triangular pieces of 1/2" sheet steel. Each portion has a bevelled slot. On assembly, no matter how it is placed on the ground, one point remains in the UP position.

This device will puncture the tyres of aircraft or motor-transport. Saboteurs are likely to lay them on roadways and airfields. Enemy saboteurs are instructed to use them in areas they attack by explosives, so as to delay any repair or firefighting vehicles proceeding to the points attacked.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. S. WILSON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

Encl.

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attached is a sketch of an enemy sabotage device, recently used in IRLM.

It is a metal tyre burster. The equipment consists of two triangular pieces of 1/2" sheet steel. Each portion has a bevelled slot. On assembly, no matter how it is placed on the ground, one point remains in the UP position.

This device will puncture the tyres of aircraft or motor-transport. Saboteurs are likely to lay them on roadways and airfields. Enemy saboteurs are instructed to use them in areas they attack by explosives, so as to delay any repair or firefighting vehicles proceeding to the points attacked.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Col.

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

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 S. S. HILL-DILLON,
 Colonel, G.S.,
 G-2 (CI) Section.

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(Actual Size)

"Metal four pointed tyre burster"

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBI-389.502/A.

SUBJECT : The Buttermoed Bomb.

TO : See Distribution.

Security
11 April 1945.
13/4
66114
603.

Re: our GBI-389.502/A dated 22 March 1945.

The attached photographs of the Buttermoed Bomb are forwarded to you.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

Encls.



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
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBI-389.502/L.

22 March 1945.

SUBJECT: The Butterfly Bomb.
TO: See Distribution.

Herewith description of a modified Butterfly bomb
now being used by German saboteurs for terrorist purposes.

Photographs to follow.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

S. S. Hill-Dillon
S/Cmdr

Encl.

1 S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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SEARCHED
INDEXED 26/3
SERIALIZED 6/63
FILED 603

Dist "2"

3759

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THE BUTTERFLY BOMB

1. German saboteurs are being equipped with modified "Butterfly Bombs" which in future will be referred to as Buttermom Bombs. It may be useful to describe the Butterfly Bomb briefly, as the Buttermom Bomb is essentially the same.

2. The bomb has a cylindrical cast steel body, 3 inches long and 3 inches in diameter, containing about 8 ozs. of TNT. The fuse is fitted centrally into the curved side of the bomb, with an arming spindle projecting. As carried in aircraft, the whole bomb is enveloped in a light sheet steel case made in four parts. A 6 inch steel cable connects this case to the fuse via the arming spindle, which has a two-start thread. When the bomb is released from the aircraft, the case flies open forming a propeller and wings; the rotation of these causes the steel cable to unscrew the arming spindle. When the letter has made a small number of turns, the fuse becomes armed, and a shutter moves across the spindle hole, so that it is impossible to re-insert the arming spindle. A stop on the arming spindle is included to prevent it coming right out, which would allow the wings to separate from the bomb while falling.

3. The bombs may be painted field grey, field grey with 3/4 inch yellow stripes on the body, bright yellow, or dull red, or they may be unpainted.

4. The fuse, which fits into a cavity in the TNT, has marked on it a number inside a circle which indicates which type of fuse it is; five types are known.

(a) The number (41) indicates that the fuse will function on impact, or while the bomb is still falling. It is not suitable for use by saboteurs.

(b) The number (41) B fuse differs from the type (41) only in the method of fastening into the bomb, and in minor constructional details. The remarks under (a) apply.

(c) The number (70) B indicates that the fuse is of the anti-disturbance variety. In this type, the fuse is only partly armed after the arming spindle has been unscrewed during the bomb's passage through the air. On impact with the ground, a trip lever allows a clock mechanism to run for 3-4 seconds, after which the fuse is completely armed and in a highly sensitive condition. Any disturbance or movement of the bomb, its wings, the cable, or the arming spindle, will normally make the fuse function, which in its turn will cause the bomb to explode after a delay of less than one second. As the clock mechanism only runs for 3-4 seconds, the operation of unwinding the arming spindle by hand is evidently a dangerous one, and the (70) B fuse is therefore unsuitable for use by saboteurs.

(d) Number (70) A. This type is known only from documents, but the fuse is stated to be capable of being set to function 4 - 50 hours after impact with the ground, and at the same time to include an anti-disturbance device. Arming is effected by...

which has a two-start thread. When the bomb is released from the aircraft, the cone flies open forming a propeller and wings; the rotation of these causes the steel cable to unscrew the arming spindle. When the letter has made a small number of turns, the fuse becomes armed, and a shutter moves across the spindle hole, so that it is impossible to re-insert the arming spindle. A stop on the arming spindle is locked to prevent it coming right out, which would allow the wings to separate from the bomb while falling.

3. The bombs may be painted field grey, field grey with 3/4 inch yellow stripes on the body, bright yellow, or dull red; or they may be unspined.

4. The fuse, which fits into a cavity in the TNT, has marked on it a number inside a circle which indicates which type of fuse it is; five types are known.

(a) The number (41) indicates that the fuse will function on impact, or while the bomb is still falling. It is not suitable for use by saboteurs.

(b) The number (41) fuse differs from the type (41) only in the method of fastening into the bomb, and in minor constructional details. The remarks under (a) apply.

(c) The number (70) B indicates that the fuse is of the anti-disturbance variety. In this type, the fuse is only partly armed after the arming spindle has been unscrewed during the bomb's passage through the air. On impact with the ground, a trip lever allows a clock mechanism to run for 1-4 seconds, after which the fuse is completely armed and in a highly sensitive condition. Any disturbance or movement of the bomb, its wings, the cable, or the arming spindle, will normally make the fuse function, which in its turn will cause the bomb to explode after a delay of less than one second. As the clock mechanism only runs for 3-4 seconds, the operation of unwinding the arming spindle by hand is evidently a dangerous one, and the (70) B fuse is therefore unsuitable for use by saboteurs.

(d) Number (70) A. This type is known only from documents, but the fuse is stated to be capable of being set to function 4 - 50 hours after impact with the ground, and at the same time to include an anti-disturbance device. Arming is effected by unscrewing the arming spindle as in the fuses previously mentioned. The suitability of this type of fuse for saboteurs depends upon whether the anti-disturbance device is armed immediately the arming spindle is unscrewed or after a significant delay. This is not at present known.

(e) The number (67) indicates that the fuse contains no anti-disturbance device, and that unscrewing the spindle initiates a clock mechanism which may run for a period ranging from 5 - 50

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-2-

minutes. When the clock has run off, a striker is released on to a cap and the flame from this initiates a detonator inside a primer. It is the Butterfly Bomb with this type of fuse which, with certain modifications, has been issued to saboteurs.

In the types so far recovered from saboteurs the delay is five minutes (longer delays are known to exist), the number 5 being stamped on the fuse casing, as can be seen in the attached photographs. The light sheet steel case which forms the propeller and wings, and the 5 inch steel cable are removed, leaving the arming spindle protruding from the top of the fuse. A roughly U-shaped safety pin, which can be seen in the photographs, prevents the arming spindle from being accidentally rotated. When the saboteur intends to use the bomb, he pulls out the U-shaped safety pin and rotates the arming spindle until the clockwork delay starts. Five minutes later the bomb will explode.

5. Full details of the Butterfly Bomb, together with diagrams and photographs are supplied to all Bomb Disposal personnel, and if CI staffs require further information either about these bombs or neutralisation, reference should be made to Bomb Disposal officers. It should be noted that Butterfly Bombs will fuse No. 70 3 cannot be neutralised, and the same may well apply to type 70 A.

6. Type 67, which is the only type known to have been given to saboteurs so far, can be neutralised by removing the fuse, which has a bayonet fitting into the main body of the bomb, and unscrewing the primer and detonator, which are contained in a bakelite case which screws into the underside of the fuse. It should also be noted that if the clock is ticking, the maximum time available for neutralisation (with the bombs so far issued to saboteurs) will be somewhat less than five minutes.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GHI-389.502/1/D.

24 Nov 44

SUBJECT : Monthly Sabotage Report.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the months of September - October 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:



V.S. Hill-Dillon
S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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Action

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of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the months of September - October 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

v.l. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GFI-389.502-1-D.

24 Nov 44.

AHQ SABOTAGE SUMMARY FOR SEPT - OCT 1944PART I. SPECIAL CASES.1. Attempted Sabotage on board SS SAMSTRÆ (Br).

a. On 8th October during the unloading of the SS SAMSTRÆ at MARSEILLES a 12-ton M-4 tractor on the establishment of a French Artillery Unit was found to have an American electric blasting cap so attached to the tractor that a serious explosion might have occurred had the horn button of the tractor's siren been pressed.

b. The blasting cap itself had been inserted in the cardboard casing of a 90 mm. round near the fuse. This round with 27 others was situated just over the inlet to the petrol tank. The detonator wires, which were spliced to the siren wiring system at the front of the tractor had been run along the top of the tracks to the box of ammunition concerned.

c. The circumstances are such that the preparations were probably made during loading at NAPLES; the blasting cap could easily have been put in place while the tractor was being secured in the hold of the vessel without arousing suspicion. An unidentified Italian dockworker was moreover known to have picked up a blasting cap which was one of several dropped from a 90 mm. gun while loading and was identical in type with that found later on the tractor.

d. Investigations at NAPLES continue.2. Sabotage attempts at RAVENNA.

a. On 14th October an attempt was made to sabotage the transport vehicles of 685th Army Tank Transporters Workshops with explosive charges.

b. The first charge was discovered at 07.30 hours and another when a search was subsequently made of all vehicles. The firing device which was used on the charges had not been met with before. The attempt appeared to have been made from the sea and the saboteurs were evidently surprised

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 - c. On 22 October a similar attempt was carried out on the vehicles of 323 Indep. Searchlight Bty. In this case the delay devices had had time to detonate but had only broken the charges without exploding them. Three mines with delay devices also exploded in the vicinity of the vehicles.
 - d. It is thought that this may have been the same sabotage party on each occasion, as the selection of target

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and equipment used were similar in both cases.

e. It is to be anticipated that if the line remains relatively stable, similar attempts may be made in the coming weeks, and all concerned have been warned.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

A. NORTH AFRICA.

Nil.

B. ITALY.

1. On 2nd and 9th September there were two cases of interference with the petrol pipe line running along the Adriatic coast. The first involved a civilian, who accidentally detonated a wooden box-mine nearby. The resultant explosion was larger however than would usually be the case, and it seemed possible that a booby trap had been involved. In the second case petrol was found to be leaking from a joint which appeared to have been deliberately loosened. The following day a civilian was seen in the act of loosening the same joint, but was not captured. The motive in each case was thought to be common theft.

2. On 15 September coloured water was found in the storage tank of a 100% Octane petrol store at TORTORELLA.

Laboratory investigation proved this to be coloured sea water. Sea water is used for washing out the pipe line for the purpose of removing debris, and although the presence of the colouring matter cannot be explained, it is not thought that this was a sabotage attempt.

3. On 23 September a fault occurred on a telephone line belonging to 2 Air Formation and was located at AVENALE (S.385187). It had been caused by a piece of wire which had been connected across the civilian telephone wires which constituted the military line. Such a short circuit could only have been caused by a person climbing up the telephone pole to a height of 10 ft. or so, and with some means of knowing which lines to select. The perpetrator was not traced.

4. During the period 7th - 9th October four cases of interference into signal lines in forward areas occurred. Darning needles had been pushed through the signal lines and earthed. In three cases wires had been stranded for tapping the lines.

It is thought that this is more likely to have been the work of forward enemy patrols than of saboteurs.

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Nil.

B. ITALY.

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3. On 25 September a fault occurred on a telephone line belonging to 2 Air Formation and was located at VENALE (S.385187). It had been caused by a piece of wire which had been connected across the civilian telephone wires which constituted the military line. Such a short circuit could only have been caused by a person climbing up the telephone pole to a height of 10 ft. or so, and with some means of knowing which lines to select. The perpetrator was not traced.

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5. On 11 October an explosion occurred at CARDITELLO (Santa Maria - Vetere Comune - NAPLES Province) causing the destruction of salvaged Italian ammunition and explosives. The explosion occurred where technicians were actually working and may have been due to deterioration of the explosives followed by spontaneous combustion or carelessness in handling. The possibility of sabotage cannot however be excluded.

6. On 13 October a pilot dressed in American officer's uniform took off in a P.38 aircraft from FOGLIANO airfield and has not been seen since. This man may be a deserter, but

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in view of the fact that a German agent was recently briefed to bring back a P.38 aircraft on completing his mission, the possibility that the pilot concerned may in fact also have been an agent cannot be ignored.

7. Nine cases were reported during the period under review by 12 Engr. Sqd. Wkps, HEME of apparently deliberate sabotage. They varied from placing cotton waste in petrol tanks to pieces of chain in a motorcycle engine. The possibility of introducing a reliable civilian informer is being considered.

C. SARDINIA.

III.

PART III.

1. Wire-cutting still persists generally, but in decreasing volume.

2. No further examples of the "SCOTISH HAIR PENCIL" mentioned in A.P.H.Q. Sabotage Report for August have come to light.

3. Information has been obtained from captured saboteurs that the enemy is using a type of explosive which can be made up to look like luggage or articles of wearing apparel. It only requires to be in contact with an ordinary type detonator and no special attachment is needed. It is reported as only 80% as effective as plastic. No example has so far come to notice in this theatre but the information has been obtained from several independent sources.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBI-389.502/A.

11 Nov 44.

⑨

SUBJECT : Sabotage Devices.

TO : Distribution below.

Among enemy sabotage equipment there may be found ordinary detonators to which exceedingly short lengths of safety fuse are crimped. The safety fuse may only protrude half a centimetre. This item of equipment is part of the German coal bomb, which operates in exactly the same way as the British one; the heat of the fire first ignites the safety fuse, which in turn initiates the detonator. A black incendiary paste is placed over the end of the safety fuse which is furthest from the detonator and therefore nearest to the surface of the coal, so that the safety fuse cannot be seen from the outside.

Dist5 Army AMG-
8 " AMG.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

W. Hill - Dillon
W. HILL - DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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SUBJECT: Enemy Sabotage Device.

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23 AUG 44

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RAAC, etc.

1. Information has been received from the War Office that the Germans are using a tyre burster sabotage device, camouflaged as a piece of stone, rock, mud or horse dung. The device explodes on pressure and will blow a hole about three inches in diameter in a tyre.
2. The device is stated to be unstable and great care should be exercised in dealing with it. The method of disposal is by detonation and this should be carried out only by engineers or bomb disposal personnel.
3. It is thought that this type of device is more likely to be encountered in newly occupied areas, but the above is forwarded for your information.
4. Armies have been informed by signal.

/s/ E. RUSCOE, Maj,
Lieut. General,
Chief of General Staff.

1st Ind.

HYD/wrv

AG 471

3 September 1944

FROM: RAAC, AFO No. 794 U. S. Army

TO: See Distribution.

Per information and dissemination to all concerned,
By command of Brigadier General BROWN:

H.K. DODGEN
Lt. Col. CSO

File No. 421
Action

1. Information has been received from the War Office that the Germans are using a tyre burster sabotage device, camouflaged as a piece of stone, rock, mud or horse dung. The device explodes on pressure and will blow a hole about three inches in diameter in a tyre.
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/s/ E. RUSCOE, Maj,
for Lieut. General,
Chief of General Staff.

1st Ind.

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3 September 1944

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For information and dissemination to all concerned.

By command of Brigadier General BROWN:

H.K. DODGEN
Lt Col., GSC
AG of S, G-3

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for Suite 1944

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Chief of Central Staff.

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for a/c E. J. ...
Chief of General Staff.

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B-289.502/1-D.

5 AUG. 44.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for June 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of June 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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5 Aug. 44.

SABOTAGE SUMMARY FOR JUNE 1944.PART I.SPECIAL CASES.

As was expected, the GERMANS left behind their retreating forces, mostly in the ROEY area, a network of saboteurs. This appears to have been hastily organized but numerically strong and a number of its members had taken a sabotage course at a German school near WELFRADT. Supplies of sabotage equipment were issued liberally, to be hidden by saboteurs pending the receipt of instructions. Evidence of the hastiness of the preparations is in the fact that it was not made clear how these instructions were to be conveyed to them. Some surrendered upon the arrival of the Allies and, as a result of information obtained, many others have been arrested, and a number of dumps of sabotage materials, including a very large one at the GERMAN Embassy ROEY, have fallen into our hands.

An interesting feature of this post-evacuation sabotage network is that it was organized by the Sicherheitsdienst and not, as hitherto, the Abwehr. By the end of June, fifteen saboteurs and four suspected saboteurs had either surrendered or been arrested. Among them were three women.

PART II.CASES REPORTED.

A. NORTH AFRICA.

MI.

B. ITALY.

1. The engine of a F40 aircraft was found to have been fouled by foreign matter. CIC is investigating.

2. The failure of generating machinery belonging to 3rd Photo Group AIF, was traced to foreign matter, believed to be cement, in one cylinder. CIC is investigating.

3. The fire which broke out in a B17 bomber during an operational flight on 28 May 44 (see Ray currency) was found, upon investigation when the plane returned to base, not to have been due to sabotage. It was decided that what the pilot mistook for an incendiary device was, in fact, the fire caused by the action of a jet of escaping oxygen on a hot oil ring.

C. SARDINIA.

MI.

D. SICILY.

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C. SARDINIA.

Nil.

D. SICILY.

Nil.

E. CORSICA.

In an area (not specified in report) newly occupied by an AMERICAN air force Service Group in Corsica a number of delayed charges were found. A bridge about 30 ft. from Group HQ had a heavy charge of HE, with a 21-day delay device. CIC is investigating.

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PART III. NOTES FOR CIC and MSP.

Wire-cutting throughout the theatre during the month was on a reduced scale, the motives apparently in all cases being theft or mischief. There were again instances of signals' wires being severed by snail arms' fire, presumably by troops.

by ... and ... info, presumably by ...

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

16 June, 1944.

B-389, 502/1-D

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for May 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of May 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

G. Evans Newell, 16 (7) (1)
S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.
G-2(OT) Section.

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For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

G. S. Newell
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"M" (G-2) Military Mission, c/o A.C. of S., G-2, Hq., Northern Base Section, PO. 306, U.S. Army.	1
Spares	7
Copy to D.S.M.	

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15 June, 1944.

SECRETSABOTAGE SUMMARY FOR PER. 1244.PART I. SPECIAL CASE.

On 31 May lubricating pressure failed in the turbo fans of one of H.M. destroyers off the coast of N.A. Cotton waste and metal bolts, etc, had been inserted in the suction mechanism, and it is considered that this must have taken place in ALGIERS during overhaul, on which some native labour was employed. Investigations are proceeding.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

A. NORTH AFRICA.

1. A fighter plane undergoing repair at an ALGIERS workshop was found to have punctures, deliberately made, in the cylinders containing hydraulic fluid. The report upon the CIG investigation has not yet been received.
2. At BLIDA aerodrome, aeroplane tyres were twice found slashed. It is thought that this was done by disgruntled workers, but a report of the investigation has not yet been received.
3. On 10 May 44 the U.S. merchantmen "IRVING BROWNELL", docking at CASABLANCA, reported sabotage to the main circulatory pump. Steel waste had been inserted under the shaft housing and had caused deep scoring of the brass shaft. It was considered that the act of sabotage could not possibly have been committed during the voyage, and must have taken place in the American port from which the ship sailed. The ship has returned there, and an investigation will be conducted in the U.S.A.
4. The number of cases of wire-cutting reported is gratifyingly low. It is evident that the energetic measures taken to counteract this nuisance are proving successful.

B. ITALY.

1. On 25 May 44, a B17 bomber which had set out from FOGGIA on an operational flight, burst into flames over four hours after taking off, at a height of 21000 ft. The fire, which was caused by an incendiary bomb inserted under the top gun turret table, burned so fiercely that the pilot ordered four of his crew to be cut. He finally ejected himself, however, and made a successful

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

On 31 May lubricating pressure failed in the turbo fans of one of U.S. destroyers off the coast of N.A. Cotton waste and metal bolts, etc, had been inserted in the suction mechanism, and it is considered that this must have taken place in ALGIERS during overhaul, on which some native labour was employed. Investigations are proceeding.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

A. NORTH AMERICA.

1. A fighter plane undergoing repair at an ALGIERS workshop was found to have punctures, deliberately made, in the cylinders containing hydraulic fluid. The report upon the CIO investigation has not yet been received.
2. At BILTM aerodrome, aeroplane tyres were twice found slashed. It is thought that this was done by disgruntled workers, but a report of the investigation has not yet been received.
3. On 10 May 44 the U.S. merchantman "IRVING BROWELL", docking at CASABLANCA, reported sabotage to the main circulatory pump. Steel waste had been inserted under the shaft housing and had caused deep scoring of the brass shaft. It was considered that the act of sabotage could not possibly have been committed during the voyage, and must have taken place in the American port from which the ship sailed. The ship has returned there, and an investigation will be conducted in the U.S.A.

4. The number of cases of wire-cutting reported is gratifyingly low. It is evident that the energetic measures taken to counteract this nuisance are proving successful.

B. ITALY.

1. On 26 May 44, a B17 bomber which had set out from FOGGIA on an operational flight, burst into flames over four hours after taking off, at a height of 21000 ft. The fire, which was caused by an incendiary bomb inserted under the top gun turret turntable, burned so fiercely that the pilot ordered four of his crew to bale out. He finally quelled it, however, and made a successful emergency landing in CORSIKA. It is considered probable that the incendiary bomb employed incorporated a normal delay device rather than one activated by atmospheric pressure. A report on investigations made upon the plane's return to FOGGIA is awaited.
2. Between 2 May and 5 May 44, four vehicles of a city

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Bridge Coy. were discovered to have had metal objects put into the carburettor, water pump, dynamo and gearbox. Sabotage at Base Workshops appeared probable, and SIME were asked to investigate.

3. On 29 April 44, a CANT seaplane exploded in the air and fell into the sea about 10 miles from HAWAII. It is not yet known whether investigation of the possibility of sabotage was practicable.

4. On 1 June 1944, a Paratroop NCO was killed through the breaking of his parachute strap. Examination detected acid on the harness, and the result of the investigation is awaited.

5. Three more cases of booby-traps attached to damaged telephone wires are reported from FOLDSH Corps area.

C. SABOTAGE.

A few cases of wire-cutting occurred.

D. STORM.

1. On 30 April 1944, the United Nations' Propaganda Kiosk in PALMBO was completely destroyed by fire. Sabotage is indicated. The perpetrator has not been traced, but final findings are awaited.

2. On 5 May 44, an attempt to fire the PAB Propaganda Shop in PALMBO by means of a home-made delayed-action incendiary device failed. The device, an improvised one, was placed behind a hung picture, but was discovered when it went off, and little damage was done. The substance was not discovered, but a further investigation was requested, a report on the result of which is awaited.

3. A few cases of wire-cutting occurred.

E. COMBATS.

1. During the early part of the month, improvised incendiary devices of the "Molotov Cocktail" variety were found in a barracks just evacuated by FOLDSH troops and near a petrol point. No damage was done, and no culprit was traced.

2. Several cases of wire-cutting occurred on the island.

PART III. NOTES FOR C.I.C. and F.S.P.

1. A recent case indicates that the GERMANS have not abandoned the thought of sabotage in NORTH AFRICA, and FRENCH sources report that members of the "MILICE" in FRANCE are being trained for sabotage work in NORTH AFRICA and CONSIDER.

2. ITALIAN Army saboteurs being trained in Northern ITALY

breaking of his parachute strap. Examination detected acid on the harness, and the result of the investigation is awaited.

5. Three more cases of booby-traps attached to damaged telephone wires are reported from POLISH Corps area.

C. SAFETY.

A few cases of wire-cutting occurred.

D. SECURITY.

1. On 30 April 1944, the United Nations' Propaganda Minsk in BELARUS was completely destroyed by fire. Sabotage is indicated. The perpetrator has not been traced, but final findings are awaited.

2. On 5 May 44, an attempt to fire the RWB Propaganda Shop in BELARUS by means of a home-made delayed-action incendiary device failed. The device, an ingenious one, was placed behind a hung picture, but was discovered when it went off, and little damage was done. The saboteur was not discovered, but a further investigation was requested, a report on the result of which is awaited.

3. A few cases of wire-cutting occurred.

E. CORRUPTION.

1. During the early part of the month, improvised incendiary devices of the "Molotov Cocktail" variety were found in a barracks just evacuated by ITALIAN troops and near a petrol point. No damage was done, and no culprit was traced.

2. Several cases of wire-cutting occurred on the island.

PART III. NOTES FOR C.I.C. and F.S.P.

1. A recent case indicates that the GERMANS have not abandoned the thought of sabotage in NORTH AFRICA, and FRENCH sources report that members of the "MILICE" in FRANCE are being trained for sabotage work in NORTH AFRICA and CONGO.

2. ITALIAN Army saboteurs being trained in Northern ITALY are urged to sabotage rolling-stock of all kinds, trucks and cars, ration and equipment dumps, bridges, pipelines, oil tanks and electricity installations. They are advised to attach magnetic Clams, (L.M.P.) Publications "MAGNETIC DEVICES", p. 3.5, to stationary vehicles, and to leave "Canned Goods" or "Oil Can" bombs (LEADEN DEVICES, p. 13.) on vehicles in which they are given a lift. To introduce these bombs to dumps and stores, they are taught to change the tin for another article in the dump, or land it in a being found on the road.

1 Security *[Handwritten Signature]*
53105

Subject: Monthly Sabotage Report
for April 1944.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN THE WEST

SECRET.

AAI/1424/3/GSI(6)

28 May 44

(6)

To: Distribution below.

The enclosed AAIHQ Sabotage Report(s) for the month of April 1944 are forwarded for your information.

*f.k. case to
from Lt-General,
Chief of General Staff*

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2 XMS/44

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P. K. ...
for Lt-Comdr.
Chief of General Staff

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By Auth. C-in-C, AF.
19 May, 1944.
Initials: *[Handwritten mark]*

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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

19 May, 1944.

D-38,502/1-I.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for April, 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of April 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

[Handwritten signature: S.S. Hill-Dillon]

S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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As per Monthly Sabotage Report for March 1944.

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

19 May, 1944.

R-389,592/1-I.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for April, 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of April 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

DISTRIBUTION:-

As per Monthly Sabotage Report for March 1944,

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MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR APRIL 1944.PART I.SPECIAL CASES.

NIL.

PART II.CASES REFERRED.A. NORTH AFRICA.

1. Early in the month 27 airscrew plug assemblies, important repair supplies, were found to have been put in a sewer near a MAISON BLANCHE airport, ALGIERS, workshop. G.I.C. and FRENCH police investigations have so far not discovered the culprit.

2. At the same airport an accident was caused to an aircraft through the steel plating of the runway being cut and bent upwards. No details have yet been received.

3. A railway truck upon which a dismantled aeroplane was loaded caught fire at LUMPSKAY 29, Mar. 44. Only slight damage resulted. Sabotage was suspected because of the presence of petrol fumes, but it proved impossible to discover the cause of the fire.

4. An 44 balloon was lost from ALGIERS harbour 23 Apr. 44, due to its mooring gear having been interfered with. The perpetrator was not discovered.

5. Fascist P's.T. employed at MMDQVI E.S.S.D. are suspected of slashing portecor bridge supports stored there early in the month.

6. At DVERADA coalmine shaft on 16 Apr. 44, the cable carrying the cage was found to have a slow fuse intertwined with it. The fuse reached to the roof of the cage, on which cartridges were spread. The FRENCH have not reported tracing the would-be saboteur.

7. Several cases of damage to signals' wires occurred. In some, theft of wire was the motive. Energetic counter-measures resulted in arrests being made, and a number of Arabs are held for trial. In an effort to suppress wanton damage to communications by troops using small arms, convoy were followed, and as a result two U.S. soldiers were traced as culprits.

B. ITALY.

On 30 Apr. 44, (in the II POLISH Corps area), a grenade was found connected to a signals' line by a trip wire, in such a manner as to be exploded when the line was checked. In the same area five days later a line was found severed in two places and booby-trapped, a percussion cap detonated by an electric battery being employed. Preventive measures have been increased. The saboteurs have not yet been caught.

C. SARDINIA.

repair supplies, were found to have been put in a sewer near E. MATHON BLANCHES airport, ALGIERS, workshop. C.I.C. and FRENCH police investigations have so far not discovered the culprit.

2. At the same airport an accident was caused to an aircraft through the wheel landing of the runway being cut and bent upwards. No details have yet been received.

3. A railway truck upon which a dismantled aeroplane was loaded caught fire at ERREZALIX 29, Mar. 44. Only slight damage resulted. Sabotage was suspected because of the presence of petrol fumes, but it proved impossible to discover the cause of the fire.

4. An AA balloon was lost from ALGIERS harbour 23 Apr. 44, due to its mooring gear having been interfered with. The perpetrator was not discovered.

5. Fascist F's.N. employed at MONDOVI E.S.S.D. are suspected of slashing painted bridge supports stored there early in the month.

6. At DJERADA coalmine shaft on 16 Apr. 44, the cable carrying the cage was found to have a slow fuse intertwined with it. The fuse reached to the roof of the cage, on which cartridges were spread. The FRENCH have not reported tracing the would-be saboteur.

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On 30 Apr. 44, (in the II POLISH Corps area), a grenade was found connected to a signals' line by a trip wire, in such a manner as to be exploded when the line was checked. In the same area five days later a line was found covered in two places and booby-trapped, a percussion cap detonated by an electric battery being employed. Preventive measures have been increased. The saboteurs have not yet been caught.

C. SARDINIA.

A number of cases of wire-cutting were reported, some evidently for theft, others apparently malicious. No culprits are reported to have been traced.

D. SICILY.

Several cases of wire-cutting were reported; in most the motive would appear to be theft.

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E. CCPSICA.

1. A lump of sugar was found in the petrol tank of two planes at CALVI airfield on 9 Apr. 44. The result of investigations is not yet known.
2. A recrudescence of wire-cutting, stated to be by experts, during the latter half of the month, is considered by Northern Base Section to be sabotage. No details have yet been reported.

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to be set ago. No details have yet been reported.

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S-1817
~~Security~~
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SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for
March 1944

TO: ALLIED ARMY IN ITALY

SUBJECT

ASI/AL24/7/G(I6)

ASAC 114

(4)

To: Distribution below.

The enclosed Army Sabotage Report(s) for the month of March 1944 are forwarded for your information.

E. R. ...

1st Lt. General,
Chief of General Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS
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The enclosed ABC Saboteur reports (4) for the month of March 1944 are forwarded for your information.

E. Kinnear, Jr.
Lieutenant General,
Chief of General Staff.

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16 April, 1944.
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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

16 April, 1944.

B-589.502/1-D.

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for March, 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of March 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

C.S. Hill-Dillon

S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.
G-2(CI) Section.

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SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for March, 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of March 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

L.P. Hill-Dillon

S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, U.S.
G-2(OI)Section.

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MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR MARCH 1944

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

The interrogation of the enemy agent referred to in Part I of February summary has been completed and a full report published.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

A. NORTH AFRICA.

1. At BONE on 14 March 1944, the nose fuse of a 500 lb. aerial bomb was found with its detonator upon a railway line, in the docks, over which a train was shortly due to pass. The passage of a train would not necessarily have caused damage, as a trained saboteur would know. It is considered that the device was placed with malicious or mischievous intent, possibly by an Arab. The culprit was not traced.
2. On 8 March 1944, at ALGIERS, AA telephone wires which had been checked at 1900 hours were found to be unserviceable during the enemy aerial activity of the same evening. The cutting immobilised three AA batteries which might have been required to fire. Sabotage is indicated, since operational wires were selected for damaging from among others, by a person who used some kind of tool. Investigation has so far failed to trace the culprit.
3. Other instances of damage to signals wires reported are:
 - (i) 16 March 1944, near SOUK AHRAS, eastern ALGERIA, telegraph wires were shot down. Spent Tommy-Gun ammunition was found nearby.
 - (ii) 27 March 1944 near KROUS, ALGERIA, 30 yards of cable were cut out of line running by the railway.
 - (iii) Night 23/24 March 1944, 4000 feet of cable were cut and stolen from Air Corps inter-radio station circuit near ALGIERS.
 - (iv) 29 March 1944 FRENCH DSI reported AA battery telephone cable BONE area cut and burned.

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 - (iv) 29 March 1944 FRENCH DSM reported AA battery telephone cable BONE area cut and burned.

B. ITALY.

1. Investigation of the plane crashes at FOGGIA reported in last month's summary proved that the loss of two of the three planes concerned was due to causes other than sabotage. Findings relative to the third plane have not yet been reported, but it is understood that suspicion of sabotage has been disproved.
2. The inquiry into the railway accident in which, on 3 March 1944, nearly 500 lives were lost through asphyxiation when a train stopped in a tunnel near POTENZA, reveals that the cause

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was not sabotage. No allied personnel were involved.

3. On 4 March 1944, near TELLO, a cut piece of rail was found on the railway, wedged between track rail and guard rail in such a way as possibly to derail a train. The perpetrator was not traced.
4. On 17 March 1944, at AVERSA, a half-pound block of TNT was found on a railway line, so placed that a wagon loaded with ammunition would have run over it. Full details have not been reported.
5. Several cases of wire-cutting and petrol pipe-line breakings are reported. The pipe-line most affected, MARLES to TORO, is being guarded by an increased force of Carabinieri.

C. SARDEGNA.

A number of incidents of wire-cutting are reported.

D. SICILY.

Cases of wire-cutting are reported. On one occasion 600 yards, and on another, 470 yards, of cable were stolen.

PAGE III. NOTES FOR CIB and DES.

1. Members of the LETTIGLIANT BRIGADE formerly stationed in SARDEGNA, were trained to approach shipping in motorboats in fishing boats, dressed as civilians, under pretence of offering goods for sale. The fishing boat dragged a submerged torpedo or mine which was attached surreptitiously to the ship whilst alongside.
2. Another ruse reported is that of the lone amateur who spends a lot of time on a beach, becoming popular and well-known by giving swimming and water-polo lessons, and carrying his kit in a case. On occasion the case contained a mine for clamping to ships, a special respirator and compact inflatable raft.
3. Both these subterfuges may be encountered again, as they are said to form part of the training in the BRANDENBURG regiment.

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C. SARDINIA.

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3. Both these subterfuges may be encountered again, as they are said to form part of the training in the BRANDEBURG regiment.

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BY Auth, O-in-C, AF,
21 March, 1944
Initials: *SH*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

21 March, 1944

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for February, 1944

TO : Distribution below

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of February 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

P. S. Hill-Hill
P. S. HILL-HILL
Colonel, G-2,
G-2(OT) Section

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Thru S.O.S.
-M.F.O.S.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this headquarters during the month of February 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:


 S. S. HILL
 Colonel, G. S.
 G-2(CI) Section

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- Hq. Field Security, North Africa.
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SECRET.MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1944.PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

An enemy agent captured during the month is a trained saboteur who has been through the lines on a mission which did not include active sabotage, but consisted of reconnaissance of ammunition, petrol etc., dumps, and aerodromes, in preparation for future sabotage. His interrogation is yielding useful information.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.A. NORTH AFRICA.

1. During the first half of February two suspected sabotage attempts were discovered in the railway yard at FERRUGUJ, Algeria. In one case crushed stone had been packed in the journal housing of a goods truck, and in the other TNT had been placed in rolling stock. Investigation was undertaken by the French authorities.
2. On 2 February 1944, 30 yards of the CONSTANTINE - 6 S. O. D. cable, running through KROUD churchyard, were cut away, apparently with pliers. The CAP SIGLI-TINER, Algeria, airfield signal line has repeatedly been interfered with, and local FRENCH authorities are co-operating to prevent repetition. No other wire-cutting has been reported.

B. ITALY.

1. Two Wellington bombers returning from operations to FOGGIA aerodrome were lost during the night 16/17 February 1944. Both these planes were experiencing no difficulty a few minutes before they crashed; one suddenly caught fire and dived into the ground, and the other passed the aerodrome and crashed some distance away. The following night a Wellington bomber crashed in planes when taking off. There is at present no indication that sabotage was involved, although the circumstances are not inconsistent with the explosion of a delay-action bomb. Security measures at the aerodrome are being increased. The result of investigation is not yet known.
2. Near POTENZA, two disabled military vehicles were left unattended. When personnel returned to effect repairs, it was found that the vehicles had been wrecked. The perpetrators have not been traced.
3. Only four cases of wire-cutting during the month have so far been reported, one arrest having been made. The publicising of two recent convictions, one entailing a sentence of 8 years imprisonment and the other 6 years, plus 4000 Lire fine each, is evidently having a salutary effect.

C. SARDEGNA.

Six cases of wire-cutting were reported.

D. SICILY.

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C. SARDINIA.

Six cases of wire-cutting were reported.

D. SICILY.

Nothing to report.

PART III. NOTES FOR G.I.C./F.S.P.

1. Enemy agents recently taken into custody suggest an increase in GERMAN interest in aerodromes as sabotage targets. Special attention should be paid to security of aircraft and air force installations.
2. Clifford GOODWIN, merchant seaman, was charged at LIVERPOOL with sabotage to the s.s. COULING in October 1943 at DONE, Algeria. Proceedings resulted from a deposition taken at the time, and GOODWIN was sentenced in the U.K. to two months' hard labour. (Vide AMIG Monthly Sabotage Report for November 1943, Part II., para 2.)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

D-389.502/1-D.

17 February, 1944

SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for January 1944.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of January 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

J. S. Hill-Dillco

S. S. HILL-DILLCO,
Colonel, G.S.
G-2(CI)Section.

DISTRIBUTION:-

As per Monthly Sabotage Report for December 1943,
plus:- G.S. (Int), G.H.Q., RAFORCE. 1 copy.

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MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR JANUARY 1944.

PART I. SPECIAL CASE.

Three enemy agents surrendered on 22 January 1944 in the forward Eighth Army area. They were ITALIANS who had been specially trained by the Sicherheitsdienst for sabotage work, and their mission was to destroy a petrol dump at USERO AL VOLTURO (sheet 5H, 0939). They abandoned their equipment before surrendering, and it has not been recovered, but from descriptions they have given all the devices they carried have been identified as among those illustrated in the A.F.H.Q. publication "SABOTAGE DEVICES".

Interrogation is continuing, and valuable information is being obtained.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

1. NORTH AFRICA.

1. The theft of secret R.D.R. apparatus from an AMERICAN B-26, 'plane from a TRINCH Air Force training school at GADIR, FRENCH MOROCCO, was first noticed 10 January 1944. Immediate investigation by the Police Mobile proving fruitless, the S.S.I. and D.S.I. were called in. Part of the apparatus was found hidden among drums in a petrol pump, and the theft was traced to a TRINCH sailor employed at the school. The motive was not sabotage, and it is thought that the secrecy of the apparatus was not compromised. A significant feature of the case is that the 'plane, according to the commandant of the school, was delivered without an inventory, and attention was not drawn to the secret nature of the apparatus in question.

2. GAZES Airport sabotage, (see report for December 1943):- It has not been possible to discover the perpetrators.

3. The number of cases of wire-cutting reported is small. One instance occurred, at MINSIRA, in the COMBATTANT-ALGIERES sector, of overhead signal wires being tied together.

2. ITALY.

1. Between 3 and 4 January 1944, during unloading at NAPLES, a piece of wire was removed from bow gun of s.s. JOHN BARNARD, rendering electrical firing impossible. It was believed that a saboteur from the docks had succeeded in avoiding the armed guard. No suspect was traced.

2. On 17 December 1943 at GROTTACELLE airport, ITALY, a Diesel rock-crusher was ruined by sand put in the oil sump, and a Diesel locomotive was also tampered with. On 2 January 1944, three cranes at BRINDISI docks were found to have sand or water in their fuel tanks. In neither case were the culprits traced.

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A. NORTH AFRICA.

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2. GAZES Airport sabotage, (see report for December 1943):- It has not been possible to discover the perpetrators.

3. The number of cases of wire-cutting reported is small. One instance occurred, at ALGERIA, in the COASTAL-ALGERS sector, of overhead signal wires being tied together.

B. ITALY.

1. Between 3 and 4 January 1944, during unloading at NAPLES, a piece of wire was removed from bow gun of S.S. JOHN BARBER, rendering electrical firing impossible. It was believed that a saboteur from the docks had succeeded in avoiding the armed guard. No suspect was traced.

2. On 17 December 1943 at GROTTOLIE airport, ITALY, a Diesel rock-crusher was ruined by sand put in the oil sump, and a Diesel locomotive was also tampered with. On 2 January 1944, three cranes at ARBESCI docks were found to have sand or water in their fuel tanks. In neither case were the culprits traced.

3. During night 14/15 January 1944, an engine was derailed and damaged, one railway car destroyed, and another damaged, at MARGLIASE, ITALY. The accident was caused by interference with the track switches, and discontented civilian workers at nearby M. dump are considered probable perpetrators.

4. During the night 15/16 January 1944, nuts, washers and V-links were removed from a test box of an underground railway cable at PISTELLA, putting all circuits out of operation. The perpetrators were not found.

5. On 22 January 1944, during shunting at TORRE ANUNZIATA docks, three empty railway cars were derailed by a piece of steel placed across the track. It is considered that the steel could not have been moved by one man only. No report has so far been received of the culprits being traced.

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6. On 21 January, the crew of an engine at SAIERNO Dock area stopped it, fearing that it had been derailed. Upon investigation they found several 2 lb. blocks of TNT on the track between the guard rails, with clips of bullets, presumably intended as detonator. C.I.C. were called in to investigate.
7. On 29 January 1944 an ITALIAN railway section-foreman found catenary poles across a railway track in the RENEVENTO area. C.I.C. were called in to investigate.
8. On 29 January 1944, in RENEVENTO area, a BRITISH soldier discovered a mortar base on a railway track, connected to a detonator placed on the rail, so as to be exploded by a passing train. An investigation was immediately initiated, but the results have not so far been received.
9. On 25 January 1944, following repeated thefts of Military Railway Service cables near S. GIOVANNI BARI station, a signal trap was set at the station. Later in the day the signal indicated that the cable had been cut. Investigators rushed to the spot indicated by the signal were able to follow the track made by the dragging of the cable to the house of the culprit, PATIZIHO Francesco fu GABRIANO, who was arrested and awaits prosecution. Theft and not sabotage is the probable explanation.

C. SARDEGNA.

1. The discovery of an alleged plot to destroy the radio station at OSLIO, SARDEGNA, resulted in sixteen arrests. Full details are not yet available.
2. Two civilians have been imprisoned for loosening a connection in the CAGLIARI-BERGAMO pipeline, causing the loss of a large quantity of petrol.
3. A number of cases of wire-cutting occurred, and patrols were supplemented. A decrease in this activity resulted.

D. SICILY.

No sabotage occurred during the month. No further report has been received concerning the discovery at B.S.D. CANTINI of wired enemy mines, referred to in Monthly Sabotage Report for November 1943.

PART III. NOTES FOR C. I. C. / T. S. P.

1. The arrest during the month of three enemy agents, ITALIANS, sent on a sabotage mission by the Sicherheitsdienst, indicated that the enemy had not abandoned his intention. The increase in sabotage attempts against railways indicates a tendency to pay more attention to self-destroying targets, neglect of which has hitherto been marked. The attempts recorded are somewhat crude and, on the information available, it seems doubtful that they are enemy-initiated, but more expert ones may well follow. Vigilance against sabotage must therefore be unrelaxed.

8. On 29 January 1944, in BENEVENTO area, a BRITISH soldier discovered a mortar bomb on a railway track, connected to a detonator placed on the rail, so as to be exploded by a passing train. An investigation was immediately initiated, but the results have not so far been received.

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2. Oa.C. C.I.G. Detachments and F.S. Sections should now be in possession of a copy of the publication "SUBOTAGE DEVICES", distributed during the month. The notes in this are designed to serve as an aide-memoire to personnel investigating suspected sabotage. The illustrated descriptions of sabotage devices known to be used by the enemy will assist in ascertaining the method employed in individual cases.

"SUBOTAGE DEVICES" will be used as the medium for keeping the "man on the spot" up-to-date on the latest devices employed, or likely to be employed, by enemy saboteurs.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

D-389.502/1-D.

25 January, 1944.

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SUBJECT: Monthly Sabotage Report for December 1943.

TO : Distribution below.

Attached for your information is a summary of cases of sabotage reported to this Headquarters during the month of December 1943.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:-

4 copies to Hill-Dillon
S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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TO : Distribution below.

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*Sp 32
H. G. Hill-Dillon*
S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G. S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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MONTHLY SABOTAGE REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1943.

PART I. SPECIAL CASES.

From 26 December 1943 to 6 January 1944, a series of incidents occurred at the CAZES Air Base, CASABLANCA, of which two are considered by a C.I.C. investigator to be the result of intentional sabotage.

On 31 December 1943 it was found that the trailing edge of the aileron cut-off of a B-26 plane had been bent upwards with a blunt instrument, interfering with the air flow and almost causing the craft to crash on the take-off. Enquiry showed that in the interim between the last inspection on 29 December and the flight on 31 December, a crew guard was not posted. It was deemed virtually impossible to detect the damage unless it were specifically looked for, which indicated that the culprit had a working knowledge of aero-dynamics.

On 6 January it was discovered that a cable to the cross-fed brake of a G-47 plane, last inspected on 4 January, had been crushed by a blunt instrument resulting in the rupture of two strands of the cable.

No suspects have been apprehended in either case. On or about 9 January, however the FRENCH Bureau S.II, with whom the Air Force then had no effective liaison, apprehended in the vicinity of the CAZES Air Base two Arab Saboteurs trained at a Sabotage School in BERLIN, who had been instructed to concentrate on the aircraft and Air installations in AFRICA. It is not yet established whether they were responsible, but a fuller report on the case will be given next month.

PART II. CASES REPORTED.

This month has seen a decline in sabotage cases reported, and that follows mainly refers to wire-cutting. It has not been thought worth while to give these in detail.

A. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

With the exception of the above, and the possible exception of TUNISIE, (see below) no cases of sabotage have been reported. Wire-cutting has figured prominently. In the latter half of December, an increase in the cutting of telephone lines, both civilian and military, was reported in the ALGIERS area. The only culprits so far apprehended have been small boys, apparently not impelled by politics.

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On 12 December 1943, Seaman Einar G. FJELDE of RAITMOE, MA., was removed from the S.S. "MAYO BROS." at BIZERTE for complicity in suspected sabotage. A collision between the S.S. "MAYO BROS." and another ship in the convoy was nearly produced by the closing, during FJELDE's watch, of the valves in the engine room controlling exhaust from the steering engine. The suspect, a Norwegian living in the U.S. since 1937, is being repatriated to U.S.A. for full investigation of his background, but it is not considered that the case was enemy-inspired.

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B. SICILY.

Reports from I.B.S. indicate that continued cases of wire-cutting are still motivated by theft. Proclamations imposing heavy penalties have, however, again reduced the incidence of such cases. Wire-cutting in CALTAI. Province was made easier by the irregularity of C.C.M. patrols, and shortage of personnel. However, the re-laying of wire away from the main roads has effected some improvement.

A case of apparently deliberate go-slow sabotage occurred in SICILY in December 1943. Arturo CAPACCIO, employed as a co-ordinator of railway traffic by I.B.S., a known Fascist and Squadrista, and alleged to be an agent of the OVRA, was apprehended on December 8 by the C.I.S. near the town of MARCELLONA, for having indirectly delayed for some 7 hours on December 6 the urgent loading of boats at PALERMO, bound for ITALY. CAPACCIO was en route to MESSINA from which point he was to embark on a long-planned return to ITALY. Although twice instructed within three hours to move twenty cars of ammunition on 6 December from BRAMICCIOLI to PALERMO, he failed to have those instructions executed. CAPACCIO's efficiency had also been questionable at TRAPANI where he was employed after the killed occupation. It has been recommended that he be turned over to AMG for trial.

C. ITALY.

Sabotage of communication lines has increased in ITALY. In 15 May Group area, wire-cutting increased in the period 16 November - 30 November, the latest survey period. At FOGGIA, in November, Giampetro S. VITO, a civilian, was arrested in the act of cutting a telephone wire, and was subsequently sentenced by AMG Military Court to twelve months imprisonment. G.S.T. (b) has requested stiffer sentences from AMG as a deterrent. In the period 24 November - 14 December 1943, there was a marked increase in the cutting and removal of operational telephone wires in the LESCE area, implying the possibility of organized sabotage. Many cables were cut with pliers and wire-cutters. Units were instructed to organize armed patrols on such lines at night. GARDINI, too, reported in late December some recurrence of flagrant cases of wire-cutting.

Few other cases have been reported. In late November, a steel wedge driven between the tracks connected to a switch nearby caused the derailment of a train at VENTIMIGLIARE. Enquiries proved inconclusive. On November 9, the petrol pipe line from M. MARCONI to an aerodrome near FOGGIA was punctured as a result of the impact of a sharp object. Enquiries again proved inconclusive.

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PART III. NOTES FOR C.I.C./F.S.F.

The decline in sabotage cases reported may be attributable partly to improved control as the area in rear of the front becomes more stabilized. On the other hand, it is still considered probable that the enemy has not yet given up his sabotage plans for ITALY in general, and no precautions should be relaxed.

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