

ACC 10000/143/2540 140/ULU LUCA UGO
OCT. 1944

Colonel A. E. Young, Security Branch

You may care to see this immensely long report on Colonel LUCA.

From what is written it seems that the Colonel may be inclined to exaggerate his own importance a bit, but presumably that is not a failing which need concern the A.C.C. too closely!

Political Section,
26.10.44

H.A.C. Security

Division

Rec'd 26/10

Book No 2587

File No 140 Luca

Action

SECRET

JUL/905/196

23rd October, 1944.

To: Mr. CACCIA, A.C.C. (without enclosure (1))
Col. HILL-DILLON, A.C. of S., G-2 Sec., A.P.H.Q.

From: No. 1 S.C.I. Unit.

Subject: Colonel Ugo LUCA.

R.O. letter K/32792/70 of 8.9.44. reform.

Enclosures:

- (1) Photostat copy of Col. LUCA's own report.
- (2) Photograph of Col. LUCA in hiding.

C.F.H. Capt
for oc 1 Ser Unit.

p.

Subject: Colonel Ugo LUCA.

H.O. letter E/12799/70 of 5.5.44. refers.

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- (2) Photograph of Col. LUCA in hiding.

*Col. Luca Capt.
for cc & set out.*

↑

Subject: COL. (O.C.R.R.) UGO LUGA.

A. History up to the present war.

1. Subject was born in May 1893.
2. He entered the Army in 1910 and was immediately assigned to serve with the C.O.R.R.
3. Subject took part in the Great War in a C.O.R.R. fighting group on the Italo-Austrian front.
4. Later he commanded an Assault group and received two Silver Medals and one bronze medal, awarded for valor, on the field of battle.
5. Subject ended the War with the rank of Lieutenant.
6. In 1919 Subject was sent to Asia Minor in the Inter-Allied expeditionary corps which was commanded by General ALLIERY and had its H.Q. at Tatabul.
7. Besides his police functions, Subject acted as the representative of the Italian Foreign Minister SFOZZA in the Italian zone of influence. It was during this period (see attached photograph report) that Subject became very friendly with SAKAGUCHI KUNIKIDA, the future Turkish Prime Minister.
8. After a period of service on the island of Rhodes (from 1922 - 1923) Subject was repatriated to Italy where he commanded the C.O.R.R. Teneza of Roveretta near Trento until 1926.
9. Subject returned to Rhodes in October 1926 and commanded a C.O.R.R. Company (with the rank of Captain) there until 1932.
10. During this period Subject became involved in a quarrel with the local Fascist party secretary, who accused him of being an Anti-Fascist and eventually succeeded in obtaining his transfer back to Italy.
11. Apart from gaining a very intimate knowledge of the island, Subject claims to have won the friendship of the Greek population, with whom he was always on the very best terms.
12. On his return from Rhodes in 1932 Subject was sent to PAFOS, where he was attached to the Air Ministry as a C.O.R.R. officer.

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 sergeant with the 90. RR.

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 group on the Italo-Austrian front.

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 Medals and one bronze medal, awarded for valor, on the field of
 battle.

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6. In 1919 Subject was sent to Asia Minor in the Inter-Allied
 expeditionary corps which was commanded by General Allenby and
 had its H.Q. at Istanbul.

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 representative of the Italian foreign Minister Sforza in the
 Italian zone of influence. It was during this period (see
 attached photostat report) that Subject became very friendly with
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 1921 - 1923) Subject was repatriated to Italy where he commanded
 the CC. RR. Trench of Roveretta near Trento until 1926.

9. Subject returned to Rhodes in October 1925 and commanded a
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 Subject claims to have won the friendship of the Greek population,
 with whom he was always on the very best terms.

12. On his return from Rhodes in 1932 Subject was sent to
 PADOVA, where he was attached to the Air Ministry as a CC. RR.
 officer.

13. He made a journey to Tripoli in 1931 - 1934, having been
 attached to BALBO's staff because of his knowledge of Arabic.

14. He was repatriated to Italy in 1934 after a quarrel with
 BALBO and was assigned command of the CC. RR. in the Province of
 TRIESTE, with the rank of Major.

15. Subject however quarreled with FOCCIL, the Fascist Prefect
 of TRIESTE, who, Subject stated, resented the fact that he was
 not a member of the Fascist Party. This resulted in Subject's
 being recalled to ROMA in 1936.

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16. After an interview with General ROCCA (commanding the CC.RR. at the time) in Rome, Subject was sent to Spain in 1937. He was assigned police functions within the Italian Volunteer Corps whose poor conduct and morale had been for some time a source of serious concern to the Commander, General ROCCA.

17. Subject reported to ROCCA's H.Q. as a Staff Officer of the ARMED Division and was subsequently sent to MALAGA, where he organized police work after being promoted to rank of Lt. Colonel.

18. In Spain Subject won his two bronze and one silver medal for his "brilliant work" amongst the numerous Italian deserters in the Volunteer Corps.

19. Subject was repatriated to Italy in 1938 after his reports to his own H.Q. in Rome on the degeneracy, corruption and cowardice of the Italian troops in Spain had been intercepted by ROCCA's General Staff.

20. In 1939 Subject was appointed C.O. of the CC.RR. cadet school in Rome and in September 1940 he was made head of all CC.RR. Formations attached to the Air Ministry.

B. From the Outbreak of War up to the Armistice.

21. In December 1940 Marshall BASTICO was appointed Governor of Rhodes. Subject was made personally responsible for the security measures for BASTICO's journey by Air from Rome, since the Italian Air Ministry had received information that our I.S. had made plans to intercept or shoot down BASTICO's plane.

22. Subject claims that the elaborate security precautions taken by himself thwarted our designs. (Abortive attempts were however made by the R.A.F. to bomb OLYMPIA Air field at the time when it was thought that BASTICO's plane was due to take off. The Grand Hotel in Rhodes, where BASTICO was reported to be staying on his arrival, was also bombed).

23. Subject returned to Italy a few days later, after renewing some of his old contacts in Rhodes, in particular with the Turkish Consul.

24. Subject claims that BASTICO was impressed by the welcome accorded to Subject on his return to Rhodes and his excellent contacts amongst all communities. It was BASTICO who suggested to Rome that Subject's Turkish connections should be exploited in order to obtain supplies from Turkey to remedy the desperate food situation of the island.

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24. Subject claims that BASTICO was impressed by the welcome accorded to Subject on his return to Rhodes and his excellent contacts amongst all communities. It was BASTICO who suggested to Rome that Subject's Turkish connections should be exploited in order to obtain supplies from Turkey to remedy the desperate food situation of the civil population of Rhodes and other Italian islands in the Dodecanese.

25. Shortly after his return to Rome therefore, Subject was called to the War Ministry and informed that he would be sent on a special mission to Turkey to contact SAKALJOUU personally (Note: Subject claims that he had maintained very close friendly relations with SAKALJOUU ever since 1919).

26. Subject's brief was twofold: His first task was to obtain food supplies from Turkey for the civil population on the Italian islands in the Aegean. He was also expected through his personal contacts, with SAKALJOUU to attempt to improve relations between

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Italy and Turkey, which had declined as a result of strong divergences of opinion between the "Super Fascist" Italian Ambassador in Tokyo and SARAJOLU. (Subject claims that these divergences of opinion had arisen as a result of Turkey's hostile attitude towards Russia, whereas in 1930 was, somewhat illogically perhaps, considered pro-Russian).

27. Before Subject's departure for Turkey, he was interviewed by MUSSOLINI. The latter informed him that he did NOT place much hope in the success of Subject's mission, since he himself had little faith in "personal contacts".

28. MUSSOLINI was however anxious to know the exact state of Turkey's relations with the Axis.

29. He instructed Subject to inform SARAJOLU on his behalf that Italy harboured NO hostile intentions towards Turkey and that she had refused the loan requested by the Turkish Government in 1932, simply because she had NOT been in a position to make one.

30. MUSSOLINI added that Turkey's territorial aspirations in the Balkans would receive full consideration, especially in the case of the island of CASTEL ROSSA.

31. He complained that ISMET INONU had NOT answered any of his personal letters and finally instructed Subject to do all in his power to try and improve Italo-Turkish relations and also to obtain the food supplies requested.

32. The interview lasted in all five minutes.

33. On arrival in ANKARA Subject was immediately received by SARAJOLU to whom he communicated MUSSOLINI's message.

34. SARAJOLU replied that he regarded MUSSOLINI as a lunatic and expressed his surprise that Subject should have given weight to anything he said. He added that MUSSOLINI's expansionist aspirations against Asia Minor (which MUSSOLINI had made clear in 1925) had driven Turkey into an alliance with England. Turkey was no longer interested in CASTELROSSO or any other island. To accede to Subject's request and supply food to the Italian Islands in the Aegean, would only endanger the good relations between England and Turkey.

35. After further discussion with Subject, SARAJOLU eventually agreed, as a personal favour to the latter, to arrange for a consignment of food to be sent through the Turkish Red Cross to

much hope in the success of the "perpetual contacts".

28. MUSCULINI was however anxious to know the exact state of Turkey's relations with the Axis.

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30. MUSCULINI added that Turkey's territorial aspirations in the Dodecanese would receive full consideration, especially in the case of the island of GAGARIS BOGHA.

31. He complained that INSTANT IMPERIAL had not answered any of his personal letters and finally instructed Subject to do all in his power to try and improve Italo-Turkish relations and also to obtain the food supplies requested.

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35. After further discussion with Subject, SARAJOVIC eventually agreed, as a personal favour to the latter, to arrange for a consignment of food to be sent through the Turkish Red Cross to the Moslem Communities on the Islands. The whole transaction would be carried out through the Turkish Consul in Rhodes. Subject, on his return to Italy was to inform MUSCULINI that this was the most the Turkish Government could do.

36. Subject claims that while in ANKARA he was in contact with the S.I.M. personnel attached to the Italian Embassy and passed them any information of interest he obtained from his conversations with SARAJOVIC and other Turkish Personalities.

37. He described the Italian M.A. Col. SAVATARI as an opportunist, the Air Attache, Lt. Col. TRINCOLI as a convinced Fascist, but was of the opinion that Major LUTESI of S.I.M. had always been an Anti-Fascist.

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38. He claimed to have had NO contact at all with the Germans during this period and stated that VON PAPPEN regarded him with the utmost suspicion and attempted to keep him under observation.
39. A good local source with whom Subject was in contact was a Greek Banker in ISTANBUL, called PELLER, whom Subject had known in ANATOLIA during the 1919 - 1922 period. PELLER, who claimed to be working for our I.S., provided Subject with information on local Greek activities, which Subject passed on to SAVARINI.
40. Subject returned to Italy in February 1941 and referred him SAVARINI's messages to MUSSOLINI. SAVARINI had one one occasion described Turkey's position as that of someone looking from a window and seeing two people fighting in the street below. To go into the street and become involved in the conflict would be foolishness, he had added.
41. Subject also told MUSSOLINI that SAVARINI had said that Germany could never win the war and that Italy would pay for her alliance. He added that SAVARINI had also made it quite clear that Turkey was NOT afraid of the Italian Army.
42. MUSSOLINI expressed his disappointment at the results of Subject's mission and said that SAVARINI was making a serious mistake and must be convinced of his error.
43. He added that he would send Subject back to Turkey at a later date, to which Subject replied that his task would be an extremely difficult one as Col. GIBSON and Major O'LEARY of the British I.S. knew all about him and the British Ambassador was aware of the conversations he had had with SAVARINI. Notwithstanding, Subject was sent back to Turkey in May 42, this time with the Diplomatic Cover of Commercial Attache attached to the Italian Embassy in ANKARA.
44. Before leaving Italy the Italian General Staff impressed upon Subject the necessity of obtaining at all costs further supplies of food for the Dedagones. Subject was told to inform the Turks that the Italian Government would supply raw materials and credits in exchange.
45. Subject had a further interview with MUSSOLINI, who instructed him to intervene with SAVARINI in order to obtain a passage through the Bardenelles for the Italian patrol ships which at the time were being held up by the Turks.
46. On arrival in ANKARA Subject found SAVARINI reluctant to carry out any further commercial transactions with Italy.

40. Subject returned to Italy in February 1941 and referred AMB SARAJOVIC's messages to MUSCOLINI. SARAJOVIC had one one occasion described Turkey's position as that of someone looking from a window and seeing two people fighting in the street below. To go into the street and become involved in the conflict would be foolishness, he had added.

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46. On arrival in ANKARA Subject found SARAJOVIC reluctant to carry out any further commercial transactions with Italy.

47. Subject however succeeded in enlisting the influential backing of EDIB Bey, whom he promised to make Representative for all raw material despatched to Turkey from Italy, in return for his support in negotiating the transaction with the Turkish Government.

48. EDIB Bey, close friend of VON PAPPEN and well paid by the latter, was very well informed on the intentions of the Turkish Government and was also exploited by Subject as a useful source of information.

49. Subject stated that his activities during this period increased the German's initial distrust of him and aroused the jealousy of the German Commercial Attache in ANKARA, Herr HENDEL.

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50. Between July - August 41 Subject was sent by the Italian Ambassador in Turkey to ERURISTAN to meet the Italian diplomats who were being repatriated from Russia.

51. He was at the same time instructed by SAVITARI to obtain as much military information as possible about the Russian Army and to report on the possibilities of winning over the Russian Moscow Border Communities.

52. Subject recruited several armed agents (whose names he cannot remember) and stated that he could have obtained excellent information, if he had been provided with funds. As it was the reports he received all tended to impress him with the power and efficiency of the Russians.

53. Subject returned to Rome in October and reported both to the General Staff and to CIAMO, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter instructed him to spare no details, when submitting his report to MUSCOLINI (Note: Subject gained the impression at the time that CIAMO was very anti-Mussolini). Subject was then instructed to remain in Rome at CIAMO's disposal.

54. He was informed that he would have to return again to Turkey and this time was to be supplied with a credit of 500,000,000 lire on the Banca Commerciale Italiana in ANKARA in order to obtain the necessary food supplies for the Dodecanese Islands.

55. Subject again saw MUSCOLINI in February 42, just prior to his departure, and discussed general relations with Turkey. He also informed MUSCOLINI of the reports he had received on the Russian Army while in ERURISTAN - MUSCOLINI appeared impressed and instructed Subject to find out through the intermediary of BARAJOLE under what condition Russia could be persuaded to withdraw from the conflict.

56. On his return to ANKARA Subject approached BARAJOLE as instructed. He was informed by the latter that despite the reverse the morale of the Russian Army was considered very high.

57. BARAJOLE subsequently informed Subject that the Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW had reported that the only hope for the Axis of making peace with Russia was to withdraw all Axis troops from Poland, the occupied Balkans, and Carabia.

58. Subject returned to Rome in April 42 and informed MUSCOLINI of what BARAJOLE had said about Russia. MUSCOLINI told Subject he would discuss the matter with HITLER. CIAMO was present during the interview.

52. Subject recruited several Armenian agents (whose names he cannot remember) and stated that he could have obtained excellent information, if he had been provided with funds. As it was the reports he received all tended to impress him with the power and efficiency of the Russians.
53. Subject returned to Rome in October and reported both to the General Staff and to CLANC, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter instructed him to spare no details, when submitting his report to MUSESSINI (Note: Subject gained the impression at the time that CLANC was very anti-Musessini). Subject was then instructed to remain in Rome at CLANC's disposal.
54. He was informed that he would have to return again to Turkey and this time was to be supplied with a credit of 500,000,000 lire on the Banca Commerciale Italiana in ANKARA in order to obtain the necessary food supplies for the Dodecanese Islands.
55. Subject again saw MUSESSINI in February 43, just prior to his departure, and discussed general relations with Turkey. He also informed MUSESSINI of the reports he had received on the Russian Army while in KUMULISTAN - MUSESSINI appeared impressed and instructed Subject to find out through the intermediary of SARATOVSKI under what condition Russia could be persuaded to withdraw from the conflict.
56. On his return to ANKARA Subject approached SARATOVSKI as instructed. He was informed by the latter that despite its reverses the morale of the Russian Army was considered very high.
57. SARATOVSKI subsequently informed Subject that the Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW had reported that the only hope for the Axis of making peace with Russia was to withdraw all Axis troops from Poland, the occupied Balkans, and Carrelia.
58. Subject returned to Rome in April 43 and informed MUSESSINI of what SARATOVSKI had said about Russia. MUSESSINI told Subject he would discuss the matter with HITLER. CLANC was present during the interview.
59. Eight days later CLANC informed Subject that HITLER had told MUSESSINI that they would win even if Russia maintained her hostile attitude.
60. Subject quoted CLANC's words after he had delivered this message: "I see the War already lost, but that obstinate fellow ('Testone': meaning of course MUSESSINI) does not want to understand".
61. Shortly after this Subject was sent to Libya and attached to General BASTICO's staff as officer in charge of the C.I.R.

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62. He remained in Libya until April 43 when he was sent back to Turkey. His task on this occasion was to arrange for the Turkish Ambassador in Rome to be transferred elsewhere, since the latter was regarded by the Italian Government as very anti-Italian.

63. On arrival in Ankara however, Subject was informed by the Italian Ambassador GUARIGLIA that his instructions had been cancelled for the time being.

64. In June however GUARIGLIA stated that MESSORI still insisted on the change of the Turkish Ambassador and that failure to bring this about might result in a rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Italy. GUARIGLIA added that this would suit VON PAPEN's game.

65. Subject accordingly contacted SARAJOLU requesting a change on the grounds that the present Turkish Ambassador in Rome had been greatly impressed by the Allied bombing of Italy and had allowed his judgement to suffer in consequence.

66. SARAJOLU replied that whilst he retained confidence in the Ambassador, he would examine the case and if necessary refer it to the President.

67. A few days later the Turkish Ambassador in Rome was substituted by the Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary in BUDAPEST.

68. Towards the beginning of July 43 SARAJOLU warned Subject that he had positive information of an Italian collapse in the very near future.

69. Subject referred SARAJOLU's message to GUARIGLIA, who though somewhat sceptical, gave Subject permission to return to Italy.

70. Subject went to PADUA and then to VICENZA, but continued to keep in touch with his Turkish contacts. In this way he was kept informed of what was happening.

71. In August 43 GUARIGLIA was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Subject himself was attached to the Air Ministry in his capacity as Chief of all the CC.RR. under the Italian Air Force.

72. Subject claimed that at the same time he also acted, in an unofficial capacity, as GUARIGLIA's chief Intelligence Officer and kept him informed of what was happening inside Italy. (Comment: It is perhaps strange that as Foreign Minister, GUARIGLIA should have employed Subject in this manner).

73. Subject was asked to GUARIGLIA on the activities and

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70. Subject went to MADON and then to VIGNOLA, but continued to keep in touch with his Turkish contacts. In this way he was kept informed of what was happening.

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73. Subject reported to GUARIGLIA on the activities and movements of German troops in Italy and on all current rumors and reactions amongst the population. Subject's reports were passed by GUARIGLIA to MADON.

74. Subject stated his reports to GUARIGLIA were found by MADON after the Armistice and resulted in his being actively sought after by both the Germans and the Fascist Republicans.

75. Subject claimed that he warned the Italian Gov. of the German plan to rescue MUSSOLINI from the "Campo di Maggio". He stated that he suggested that MUSSOLINI be sent to Sicily and handed over to the Allies as an act of "aged faith". MADONIS replied that subject's proposal was sound, but a little premature.

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C. From the Time of the Arrests

76. After the departure of the Italian Air Minister BARBERIS to BASI, Subject was instructed to stay at the Air Ministry in Rome under the orders of GABRI the "Capo Gabinetto" (Deputy to the Air Minister).

77. Subject remained at his post until the 7th October and then went to hiding in order to avoid arrest.

78. He joined Col. BERTONE's "Gruppo clandestino" (see our telegram addressed LONDON 775 repeated NAPLES 131 of 1.9.44.) disguising himself as a woman (see attached photograph). He did not have any contact with any members of the official Italian Resistance Movement (the Comitato Nazionale di Liberazione), as BERTONE's organization worked independently.

79. During the period of German occupation of Rome Subject learnt that both the S.D. and the Fascist Republican Police were searching for him. He was also informed that VON PETER had sent two of his agents from Turkey to find him and bring him back to ANKARA, possibly with a view of enlisting his services on behalf of the G.I.S. in Turkey.

80. In the very early days of June Subject reported to an officer of this Unit and was instructed to write a report on his activities, a photostat copy of which is now attached to this report.

D. Comments and Conclusions

81. There is nothing in Subject's story to support the rumours and unsubstantiated allegations that he collaborated with any German or Fascist organization after the Arrests. Colonel BERTONE's group has after full examination by the Italian authorities now been officially recognized for the part it played during the period of the German occupation of Rome. Subject's own activities within this group are confirmed both by BERTONE and from other sources.

82. It is our opinion that Subject has given a truthful and accurate account of the very important Political and Economic Missions which he carried out in Turkey on behalf of the Italian Foreign Office, the General Staff and MUSCOLINI himself. It is also our opinion that these missions were entrusted to him solely

75. He joined Col. BERTONE's "Gruppo Glaucolettino" (see our telegram addressed LONBOS 775 repeated MAPLES 131 of 1.9.44.) disguising himself as a woman (see attached photograph). He did NOT have any contact with any members of the official Italian Resistance movements (the Comit. to National Liberation), as BERTONE's organization worked independently.

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82. It is our opinion that Subject has given a truthful and accurate account of the very important political and economic missions which he carried out in Turkey on behalf of the Italian Foreign Office, the General Staff and EUSAQUINI himself. He claims that these missions were entrusted to him solely because of his wide experience of Turkey and the very close, but purely accidental friendship which had grown up between him and SARAJOGU.

83. Subject claims that he has never been a Fascist and that he only joined the Party in 1942 under pressure. The specific messages he conveyed to SARAJOGU from MUSSOLINI merely formed part of his general mission, which, as a soldier, he could NOT refuse to carry out.

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84. Subject states that he has never at any time been a member of any recognized Italian Intelligence Service. He admits however, that he was able to exploit his Turkish connections for the benefit of S.I.M., and that he worked in close contact both with General AHS in GHHS and Colonel SAVATURI in ANZARI.

85. Subject gives the impression of being both intelligent and competent and enjoys the respect and friendship of the older anti-Left wing S.I.M. elements of the DE GAZCO type.

86. As already stated in our telegram No. 158 of 26.6.44, the Italian Air Ministry proposed that Subject should be allowed to resume his former post as head of all the CC.MR. attached to the Air Ministry. The proposal was turned down by the Allied Control Commission on the recommendation of this Unit, as Subject's activities at the time had not yet been fully investigated.

87. Subject states that he has now been designated to command the CC.MR. Regiment in VIMAKA and it is considered that there is now no security reason to prevent him eventually taking up this appointment.

88. Subject's ability, intelligence and background may still make him a candidate for special post war employment by the Italian Government, particularly in Farney. From the long-term standpoint his activities in this connection should be carefully watched.

65. Subject lives in the impression of being born in Italy and competes and enjoys the respect and friendship of the older anti-left wing S.I.M. elements of the SS Radio type.

66. As already stated in our telegram No. 128 of 25.6.44, the Italian Air Ministry proposed that Subject should be allowed to resume his former post as head of all the SS.M. attached to the Air Ministry. The proposal was turned down by the Allied Control Commission on the recommendation of this Unit, as Subjects activities at the time had NOT yet been fully investigated.

67. Subject states that he has now been designated to command the SS.M. Regiment in VARESE and it is considered that there is now NO security reason to prevent him eventually taking up this appointment.

68. Subject's ability, intelligence and background may still make him a candidate for special post war employment by the Italian Government, particularly in Turkey. From the long-term standpoint his activities in this connection should be carefully watched.

