

ACC 10000/143/2730 635.01

ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

JULY 1944 - JAN. 1945

ENEMY INTELLIGENCE 63501.

6129/58/4

Part 62

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10000/143/~~2729~~ 2730

THIS FOLDER
CONTAINS PAPER

FROM JULY 44

TO JAN 45

CATALOGUE.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

FILE

MINUTE SHEET

No. of sheet	Date	File no. of Ans'd Ltr.	From whom	Subject
1	16 July			Enemy Intelligence Sources and activities in Italy.
2.	21 Nov.			Information F. O. F.
3	1 Dec.			BOSDARI ORDOM POLIZE
4	17 Jan.			Intelligence reports regarding German occupied Italy.

SECRET

File

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

(4)

REF

SD/635.01

4241

17 January 1945

SUBJECT : Intelligence reports regarding German Occupied Italy

TO : Director Industry Sub Commission,
Commerce Sub Commission,
Public Relations Branch, Information Division.

1. The attached copy intelligence report regarding German occupied Italy received from G-5, AFHQ, is forwarded for information and retention.

00012

St. Harvey May
JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.G.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

S.M./nb

SECRET

SECRET*Security PW*
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4180.
638.01ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS • 155
G-5 SECTION
APO 512

RPM/ahs

15 JAN 45

14 January 1945

G-5: 319.1

SUBJECT: Intelligence reports regarding German-occupied Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

The following secret intelligence regarding German-occupied Italy is forwarded for your information:

"In Italy German organization is very potent contrivance and sucks everything useful from country. In addition to official sucking through forced contracts, requisitions, evacuations and deportations, there is unofficial self enrichment by German and neo-fascists agents who commit unconscionable aggressions coupled with acts of violence, denunciations, bribery, etc. In this respect following summary of circular order 18339 issued end November by Ministry of Corporative Economy is significant if read between lines: "Without first determining whether justified, police establishments often requisition considerable quantities of products destined for popular consumption. When such acts are later proved illegal, restitution must be effected. In most cases, however, goods cannot be found and pecuniary compensation must be given owner. Subordinate offices must henceforth requisition only when illegal possession can be proved."


Military developments beginning November LED "RUK" at Milan and its Turin Branch Office complete preparations return Germany. Moreover December-February food ration cards for civilian workers and civil servants were revoked. However, at last minute Germans changed plans supposedly because of decisions reached at Mussolini-Rahn conference. Thus German offices Italy continue operate fully and food ration cards to March distributed. German engineer said Italian industries will turn out war materials to last possible moment; which end small detachments German infantry assigned protect larger establishments such as at Sesto, Calendo, Husto, Somma, Lombardo, Callarte, where "armaments, control" offices also established. Nevertheless, armaments control office engineers and collaborators (including those at Messerschmidt Branch at Como) live in suitcases and maintain emergency luggage ready for immediate departure. Their chiefs do not expect to be able remain Italy longer than April. Consequently responsible members office staffs no longer work carefully; many prefer occupy selves with liquidation very lucrative private affairs in Italy. Despite Rahn assurance to Mussolini retreating Germans would destroy only electric generating and sub-stations and coal stocks (CF 10th

-1-**SECRET**

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paragraph Legation's airgram 546 December 19), Germans have not discarded plan destroy Italian industry. Thus, after Rahn assurance to Mussolini, Stoll, military administrative counsellor prepares demolition Calendar; significantly, its newest edition was compiled about November 27."

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:


K. P. MANNOCK
J/Comdr.

00010

SECRET

SUBJECT: ORDUM POLIZEI.CONFRef: RIP/38/1(b)/43CONFIDENTIALTO: C.S.I.(b) Main H.Q. Eighth Army.Major HULLEN
SCAF - AG Rear H.Q. Eighth Army.

The following may be of interest to you. Organisation as given below is known to us.

ORDUM POLIZEI

Composed of 2 Bns of about 600 men each with German Officers and N.C.Os. This was formed in Feb or Mar 44 and at that time was composed of about 6 divisions of 1,000 men each. By about the end of Apr the number was already reduced to half owing to numerous desertions.

The ORDUM POLIZEI was employed in "rastrellamento" in PERUGIA area and made its way slowly northwards.

As their work was not well carried out and due to desertions they were made to work in conjunction with German S.S. units. The procedure then was that the ORDUM POLIZEI was used to surround the area where PATRIOTS were hidden whilst the S.S. carried out the actual arrests.

Eventually, the ORDUM POLIZEI was employed on guarding roads and bridges in PADOVA and VENEZIA zones:

When informant deserted the ORDUM POLIZEI was on point of being transferred North of TREVISO.

Each Bn is composed of 4 coys commanded by a German Lieut or 2/Lieut. The first Bn was commanded by a German Capt (informant does not know the rank of C.O. of 2nd Bn.)

No 1, 2, and 3 Coys of each Bn were composed of 4 rifle Pls each. A German N.C.O. commanded each Pl some Pls had Italian N.C.Os. The 4 Coy however had 5 Pls of which 2 were rifle; one M.G. and 2 mortar (81 mm.) and one gun 47/32.

ARMAMENTS.

Each man had a "Model 91" rifle, 2 hand grenades "BREDA" and Italian respirators. N.C.Os carried MITRA BROWNING. German officers and N.C.Os had German equipment.

Rifle Platoons had 4 "BREDA 30". M/G Pl 4 "BREDA" 11/Gs. Mortar Pl 4 x 81 mm mortars and 3 guns 47/32.

UNIFORMS.

Italian O.Cs wore the old uniform but with a German badge. On badge they had the following design: Black German Eagle/standing with outstretched wings on a swastika - the whole on a white background.

<u>PAY.</u>	Soldier	Lire	125 per 10 days
	Capt. Major.	Lire	150 " " "

0003

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0009

<u>PAY.</u>	Soldier	Lire 125 per 10 days
	Capp. Magg.	Lire 150 " " "
	Sergente	Lire 175 " " "
	Maresciallo	Lire 225 " " "

In addition, each month was paid into an a/c, in each man's name at Banco
di VERONA or La Cattolica di Venezia, the following: Soldiers: Lire 900. Capp.
Magg. Lire 1000; Maresciallo Lire 1400.

Informant understands that in view of their low morale, the C.O. of 1 Bn
recommended that they should not be employed in the fighting line and that they were
more fitted for use as Pioneers.

(Signed) R.M. Deekingham, Capt.
O.C. VIII Army R.I.P.

SUBJECT: Ordun polizei

Security

CONFIDENTIAL

4716

1 Rear Eighth Army.

CA/75

1 Dec 44.


File

3

HQ Allied Commission
RC AMG Venezia Region.

1. Enclosed as a matter of interest is copy of a R.I.F. report on the "Ordun polizei" who appear to have moved up into the Venezia Area.

4/12
23202
3335



Edman
Major,
SCAFO,
for Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMG Eighth Army.

SJH/nb

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

(2)

REF : SD/232.02

21 November 1944

SUBJECT : Information E.O.T

TO : G-5, A.F.H.Q.

1. Reference your G-5: 311.18 dated
19 Oct. 44 forwarding information regarding E.O.T. prepared
by U.S. Polad.

2. Similar reports have not been received
in this office to date and it will be appreciated if you
will supply them in future, addressing copies of same to
this Division.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.G.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

Tel:- 489081
Ext:- 367

SECRET

Security 3625

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/jjjr

G-5: 311.18

19 November 1944

SUBJECT: Forwarding of Information.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. Attached is copy of memo of Nov 18 prepared by the U.S. POLAD with regard to enemy occupied Italy.



2. Request you state whether you already get similar information from the American Embassy Rome ~~and~~ whether you desire similar such reports to be supplied to you from here.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. Jackman
Lt. Col.

T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel.

Incl:
as above.



003 7

SECRET

C O P Y

SECRET

SECRET

November 12, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-2
G-3
G-5
G-6 Sp. Ops.
British Resident Minister
C.E.W.A.

SUBJECT: Enemy-occupied Italy.

The following information with respect to enemy-occupied Italy emanates from the Italian Minister in Bern:

There are indications that the Fascist Republican Government is preparing to transfer its Foreign Office to Bellagio. An individual by the name of Bonduri has been inspecting private villas at Bellagio with the view to organizing the transfer of offices.

The Swiss Government has now acknowledged the military character of Italian refugee patriots fleeing from Val d'Aosta and Val d'Aoste to Switzerland, of which there are said to be 2500. In accordance with general practice these patriots will be treated as are other military internees and obliged under international practice to remain until the end of the war in Switzerland. Italian Minister comments that this Swiss decision is very favorable from a moral point of view as evidencing the international military status of the Italian armed forces fighting Germans in northern Italy.

It is confirmed from many sources that with the beginning of winter the Germans plan to start aggressive action designed to disperse the principal partisan armed forces in Italy. Follow up actions are still being carried on in the Piedmont in the Aosta Valley and others are being initiated against Italian resistance groups in the Langhe region, especially against the Maurel formation and in the province of Cuneo. According to news received in Switzerland, these operations do not appear to encourage the neofascists units of whom the majority are reported to be losing confidence in the possibility of decisive German resistance in the Po Valley.

For the U.S. Political Adviser: 000, 5

/s/ G. P. REINHARDT

SECRET

TOP SECRET:

Security Branch, HQ A.C.C. (Adv).

You may be interested to read
the attached notes on Enemy
Intelligence Services and Activities in
ITALY. They are forwarded for
your retention.

W. D. Gibson.
H-68

C.S.I.(6) A.A-1.

18 July.

000.0

Security Branch 635.01
Enemy IntelligenceSUBJECT:- Enemy Intelligence Services
and Activities in ITALY

HQ, ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

TOP SECRET

AAI/1403/1/GSI(b)

16 Jul 44

The attached Notes on Enemy Intelligence Services and Activities in ITALY are forwarded for distribution down to HQ Divisions, R.I.Ps, and F.S.Sections/C.I.C. Detachments.

For security reasons the scale of issue only allows for one copy per Division, and Divisional HQ's should make their copy available to their F.S.Section/C.I.C. Detachment.

Please acknowledge receipt on form provided below.

W. J. Gibson. Lt Col
Brigadier,
B.C.S.(I).

JWF

DISTRIBUTION	No. of copies	Copy Nos.
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GSI, Eighth Army	40	21 - 60
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000.4

Subject: Enemy Intelligence Services HQ Allied Armies in Italy
and Activities in Italy

TOP SECRET

AM/1403/1/CSI(1)

15 Jul 44, Copy No.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last three months the enemy intelligence situation in ITALY has undergone some shift and perhaps fundamental changes, partly through the logic of events but also to no small extent as a result of the efforts of our counter-intelligence services. The rapid advance of our Armies and the Allied occupation of ROM, with the fluid conditions necessarily resulting therefrom, created opportunities for the Abwehr and the S.D. which they did their best to exploit, both by sending agents across the lines and by leaving behind espionage networks and sabotage groups in ROM and elsewhere. A lavish distribution of W/T sets was made to the stay-behind agents, and some were equipped with secret ink with a view to the eventual establishment of courier services to the North.

Not only were these plans almost everywhere destined to fail, but their failure (in which the ROM "Y" FORCE operation was an important factor) tore gaping rents in the armour of the German Intelligence Services which our own agencies have not been slow to exploit. Many agents have been arrested, numerous others have given themselves up. Their interrogation has opened trails which should lead to the arrest of many more. The total bag for the three months is well over a hundred, more than half of them having been caught in the month following the ending of our May offensive. It is too early to say that the Abwehr and the S.D. in ITALY have been broken, but they have certainly suffered reverses from which they will find it hard to recover.

2. THE ABWEHR

(a) Organization

The interrogation of recently captured agents has given us a clearer picture of the organization of the Abwehr in ITALY.

Abwehr I, as represented by Kommando 150 and 190 - the latter the intelligence organization of Luftflotte 2 - has been by far the most active department of the Abwehr in ITALY. The main HQ of Kommando 150, headed by ROSSETTI moved to FLORENCE at the time of the ANZIO landing, leaving a forward headquarters with Harpurn BERGER and Rittmeister LANG at the Pensione FLAVIA in ROMA. ZERNER continued to be the chief recruiter of agents, who were usually sent for training in the espionage schools at FLORENCE. Meanwhile the ROM office of Kommando 190, under Dr DAUER, whose real name is now known to be Hans Georg DUCHOLTZ, was mainly occupied with the organization of post-occupational networks in ROM; and in this it had

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By contrast, there is not much new light on Abwehr II. The 10th MAS Plotilla, which includes personnel of the San Marco Regt, remains the main recruiting ground of saboteurs, and LESOLO the main training school whence they are despatched to Kommando 212, and thence to forward troops. The head of Kommando 212, Major Count EDUARD VON ROETTER was in ROE in May, but was mainly concerned with counter-espionage work, and was also acting as senior master officer in ROE with consequent Staff Duties which he seemed by all accounts to take very lightly. A curious report has been received that he is preparing to desert.

...../(b) The ROE Networks.

- 2 -

(b) The ROME NETWORKS

Over a dozen Abwehr stay-behind agents have been arrested or given themselves up in ROME. One of them presented himself in the first days of our occupation complete with his Abwehr lecture notes. From the interrogation of these agents it appears that there were originally two eight groups to be left behind, each with its own W/T operator and in some cases also with secret ink specialists. One group had actually started operating before they were caught. The majority of these groups, but not quite all, have now been rounded up.

The primary mission of these agents was the collection of military intelligence, though one or two were also required to report on political and economic conditions in Allied-occupied ROME. Moreover, though nearly all had received some instruction in aircraft recognition, this appears to have been secondary to the main task which was to gather information about the ground forces, with special emphasis on the movement and identity of troops, arms and equipment and the location of HQ's. These at least were the subjects of such general assignment, and the impression is gained that it was the Abwehr's objective here that, provided enough people were left in ROME reporting everything and anything without regard to quality, something good would turn up. A feature of special interest in their plans is the first serious attempt to organize communication by means of secret ink.

There are clear indications that the Abwehr departed from ROME in haste and disorder. Thus at their school in the Via Severino Merendante, valuable documents were found and the Kommando Headquarters itself left its name board behind and the names of all its officers and NCO's on the doors of its offices. That the Abwehr are fully conscious of their weakness is equally manifest, and it is known that most of the officers left in a mood of deep depression and defeatism.

(c) Operations outside ROME

The rapid advance of the Allied armies no doubt necessitated a hasty revision of the Abwehr's plans for the penetration of South Italy, but it offered certain compensating advantages in that it created a state of fluidity and temporary confusion favourable to espionage operations. These at any rate were the conditions which the Abwehr expected to prevail, and Kommando 150 in particular attempted to profit by them, during the month of June. Prior to our May offensive in Italy it was estimated that this Kommando alone was preparing to send between fifteen and twenty agents into Allied occupied Italy. Some of these may still be in the capital waiting to make their way south at the first opportunity.

Kommando 150 lost a number of W/T parties south of ROME to be over-run by our advance. They were to make their way to widely scattered points in S. ITALY and SICILY. Two of these have been captured, one by Eighth Army at the end of May; the other gave himself up in NAPLES early in June. Both were equipped with W/T. What may prove to be a third agent of this group has been arrested in the NAPLES area, but further details are not yet available.

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Three other stay-behind agents gave themselves up in the Polish Corps area in the first half of June. They were not themselves equipped with W/T, but were instructed to contact, through intermediaries, a W/T operator already established in the area and pass their information to him.

Parachute operations have been a feature of the period, approximately a dozen parachutists having been dropped during the past three months. Several of these were despatched from BELGRADE by the BALCAN Abwehr and most were equipped with W/T sets. The majority gave themselves up without attempting to

...../carry out

- 3 -

carry out their missions. In one case, the parachutist was sent to contact an agent already in Allied-occupied territory and act as the latter's W/T operator. His colleague had been arrested before he arrived. Another parachutist was despatched by Kommando 150 and dropped in SALERNO Province with instructions to make his way North gathering information as he went and among other things, looking for any signs of preparations for an amphibious landing. The latest parachute operations were directed against SARDINIA, and it appears that these were the result of a joint effort of the Abwehr and Fascist Republican authorities.

Conditions have been less favorable for short-range agents, partly because the forward HQ's of both the Abwehr and Io, which specialized in this type, have had to move back in a hurry, and also because it would have been extremely difficult for such agents to return across the lines, in view of the speed with which the latter have receded. Nevertheless, several agents of this type have been captured; two, who had been recruited by Kommando 150 in ROME, were arrested in the Polish Corps area after having been sent from BRITTOLI on short range missions without W/T.

In general, the forward HQ's, or rather the places where they were located, have yielded little of interest. An exception is APPINO, where an excellent piece of investigation by 412 P. Section has given us a complete picture of the functioning of Abwehrtrupp 132, known locally as "DIENSTSTELLE HAS". From this it emerges that Lt. Von WEISS, noted at FURGI and other places during the winter and hitherto assumed to be a Io officer, is in fact an officer of this Abwehrtrupp. His recruiting organization in ROME was run by Lt. Colonel DAVID, its official name being Gruppo Segreto Attentatori Fascisti Repubblicani, otherwise Gruppo S.A. Col. DAVID is believed to have placed several groups at the disposal of the Abwehr and in general his organization serves mainly to provide, often among misguided Italian youth, short-range liaison-crossers for the Abwehr's forward HQ's. Two of Lt. Colonel DAVID's agents were recently brought to trial and convicted.

Judging by its known achievements, Abwehr II, as represented by Kommando 212, has conspicuously failed to carry out its sabotage programme in this period. Five members of the 10th MAS Flotilla have been caught on the Polish Sector. Their task was to wait for the arrival of the Allied troops and then select good vehicle targets for sabotage. A further two saboteurs, left by the enemy at PONTECORVO, are now in our hands. They were to await the arrival of the Allied Forces and then to sabotage any suitable targets as opportunity offered. It is not thought that any of the above intended to carry out their mission, and it is believed that it is a not uncommon practice of saboteurs to dispose of their explosives and return with an entirely fictitious account of their achievements.

On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that further dumps of explosives may be hidden within territory already overrun and in that soon to be occupied, and we must be prepared for attempts to make use of these.

With instructions to find and report on any signs of preparations for an amphibious landing. The latest parachute operations were directed against SARDINIA, and it appears that these were the result of a joint effort of the Abwehr and Fascist Republican authorities.

Conditions have been less favorable for short-range agents, partly because the forward HQ's of both the Abwehr and IC, which specialized in this type, have had to move back in a hurry, and also because it would have been extremely difficult for such agents to return across the lines, in view of the speed with which the latter have receded. Nevertheless, several agents of this type have been captured; two, who had been recruited by Kommando 150 in ROME, were arrested in the Polish Corps area after having been sent from BRUNNEN on short range missions without W/T.

In general, the forward HQ's, or rather the places where they were located, have yielded little of interest. An exception is ARPING, where an excellent piece of investigation by 412 F. Section has given us a complete picture of the functioning of Abwehrtrupp 124, known locally as "DIEMSTELLE HAS". From this it emerges that Lt. Von WEISS, noted at FIUGGI and other places during the winter and hitherto assumed to be a 1st officer, is in fact an officer of this Abwehrtrupp. His recruiting organization in ROME was run by Lt. Colonel DAVID, its official name being Gruppo Segreto Attentatori Fascisti Repubblicani, otherwise Gruppo S.A. Col. DAVID is believed to have placed several groups at the disposal of the Abwehr and in general his organization serves mainly to provide, from among misguided Italian youth, short-range line-crossers for the Abwehr's forward HQ's. Two of Lt. Colonel DAVID's agents were recently brought to trial and convicted.

Judging by its known achievements, Abwehr II, as represented by Kommando 212, has conspicuously failed to carry out its sabotage programs in this period. Five members of the 10th HAS Flotilla have been caught on the Polish Sector. Their task was to wait for the arrival of the Allied troops and then select good vehicle targets for sabotage. A further two saboteurs, left by the enemy at PONTECORVO, are now in our hands. They were to await the arrival of the Allied forces and then to sabotage any suitable targets as opportunity offered. It is not thought that any of the above intended to carry out their mission, and it is believed that it is a not uncommon practice of saboteurs to dispose of their explosives and return with an entirely fictitious account of their achievements.

On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that further dumps of explosives may be hidden within territory already overrun and in that soon to be occupied, and we must be prepared for attempts to make use of those.

3. THE SICHERHEITSDIENST.

(a) Organization

The occupation of ROME has been particularly fruitful in the light which it has thrown on the S.D., hitherto something of an unknown quantity. The HQ of the S.D. in Italy is at VERONA and its head is Obergruppenführer WOLFF. In each main city is an "Einsatzkommando des Sicherheitsdienstes", under whom are the officers running the different sections.

...../IN ROME

In RME, Obersturmbannführer KAPFER was the head of the S.D. station though his main interest was in Art. VI, the section concerned with espionage and sabotage; the nominal chief of this section was Hauptsturmführer HASS.

(b) The S.D. Network

KAPFER's stay-behind plan for RME envisaged a vast espionage network, divided into several groups each with its own W/T operator. These groups were to collect not only political and military intelligence for transmission to Germany, but also information to be passed to groups of saboteurs. The saboteurs had their own dumps of explosives established throughout RME, one of the largest being in the German Embassy to the Quirinal, left under the protection of Swiss flags and seals. Additional groups of saboteurs were to move into South Italy while a squad was to be dropped by parachute in SICILY.

A curious feature of the espionage network was that its members were told that they would be controlled by a German "Colonel FALCO", who was said to speak all Italian dialects perfectly and who would make himself known to them when the time came. It is thought that the mysterious FALCO, if he exists at all, may be Obersturmbannführer ELLING, a high official of the S.D. with diplomatic cover; on the other hand, he may be merely a bogey man invented for the benefit of impressionable Italian agents.

The S.D. appears to have made a belated effort at security by preventing as far as possible, the members of the group from knowing each other and by allotting them symbols. Nevertheless, during the first week of our occupation more than half of its members were in custody and more arrests have been made since then. It is considered that the back of the organization has been broken, and that the survivors, even if they are not apprehended, will not attempt to operate. It is possible, however, that there may be individual W/T agents at large, unconnected with the main network.

Of the sabotage group, more than a dozen are now under arrest. One of these was to have been the leader of a sabotage squad to be dropped in the CATANIA plain.

It is of some interest to record that one agent who was to have operated outside RME was so overcome with panic when he read our airborne leaflets announcing the shooting of spies caught earlier in the year that he smashed his W/T set.

One of the difficulties of dealing with the S.D. is the use which it makes of diplomatic cover. Only the knowledge that explosives were hidden in the German Embassy enabled a search of the entire premises to be made. This was most revealing. Valuable documents concerning agents were discovered and sufficient other details to show that the S.D. directed its activities to a certain extent from behind Embassy walls. Likewise, there is evidence that various Axis and neutral missions, both to the Holy See and to the Quirinal, at one time or another afforded a certain amount of cover for the S.D. and even for the Abwehr, if the report is true that the latter organization originally planned to leave behind an officer of enemy

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4. CONCLUSION

There can be little doubt that the enemy must be feeling seriously disappointed with the meagre results being obtained from his elaborate plans for post-occupational espionage and sabotage in RCIE, and we can feel confident that the considerable threat which these plans presented to our security has been largely neutralised.

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At the same time it cannot yet be claimed that all the agents which the enemy left in ROME have been discovered. There are undoubtedly some at large, for whom we are still seeking, and although several of these may well have gone to ground and given up all idea of performing their mission, it is more than probable that a few are still active.

In the Army areas, our rapid advance increased the difficulty of "aloeing up" each town as it was captured, and it must be presumed that anyway a few agents have so far escaped detection in these areas.

The enemy has continued to show a keen interest in the rear areas, as far South as TARANTO and even SICILY, and there is no reason to suppose that such interest will slacken, since he must always be anxious to discover the identity of formations and units entering and leaving the country through Base Ports.

As regards sabotage, Abwehr II will assuredly redouble its efforts, since its officers must realize that they will be wholly discredited (and possibly sent to the Russian front), if they cannot point to some solid successes in the near future.

5. POSTSCRIPT

The following statistics may be of general interest:

The number of enemy agents who have fallen into our hands in ITALY since the beginning of December 1943 is now approximately two hundred.

Over forty have been brought to trial, of whom thirty-five have been convicted. Sixteen have been executed.

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