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# HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

# AIR INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 108

11 December 1944



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# HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

# WEEKLY AIR INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 108

Distribution: Squadrons

11 Dec. 1944

# I. EVENTS OF THE WEEK IN EUROPE

General, though slow, progress was made along the Western Front during the week which ended with the U.S. 9th Army reaching the outskirts of Julich, the 1st Army capturing Bergstein and the 3rd Army advancing to Saareguimines. The U.S. 7th Army pushed forward parallel to the 3rd Army east of Saarbrucken and met heavy opposition, the enemy giving ground slowly. The German 19th Army appears to be pulling out across the Rhine south of Strasbourg.

On the Southern Front, the Canadians, supported by Desert Air Force, attacked between the Montone and Lamone Rivers and captured Albereto after house-to-house fighting. They then by-passed Russi and swept round to take Ravenna. The threat to Faenza was increased when the British 46th Division established a bridgehead across the Errano and pushed their right flank to within 2 miles of the town. The left flank captured Pideura.

5th Army troops captured Monte Penzola, dominating the Firenzuola-Imola 00011

On the Eastern Front, Russian tank units, after a rapid advance, sealed off the eastern portion of Hungary by capturing the important junction town of Vacs and breaking through to the Danube 13 miles north of Budapest.

The 2nd Ukrainian Army broke through strongly fortified positions northeast of the capital on a sector 75 miles wide and 40 miles deep, reaching the Danube on a broad front. Russian forces south of Budapest pierced the enemy defenses and linked up at Erosi with Soviet troops advancing along the western bank of the Danube.

Very hard fighting is going on near the bastion of Szekesfehervar which protects the southwest approaches to the capital.

When weather permitted, M.A.A.F. aircraft continued the attacks on communications in direct support of the advancing Allied land forces in North Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

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# II. ALLIED AIR OPERATIONS

# Strategic Air Force

During the past week a variety of targets in Eastern Germany, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia have received attention from MAAF Strategic bombers. For at least half the week adverse weather conditions prevailed, seriously limiting sorties. Nevertheless attacks were pressed home whenever possible and in most cases primaries were bombed.

Offensive attacks, complementary to those of 8th U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Bomber Command, were carried out against oil refineries at Blechhammer, Odertal and Vienna. Fresh destruction was caused at Blechhammer North Refinery. Photographic coverage since the attack confirms the visual claims and reveals that there is at present apparently no operational activity at this plant. Cloud cover prevented observation of results on the other missions.

Marshalling yards, supply depots and communications serving Hungarian, Italian and Yugoslavian fronts were also attacked. Here again weather conditions prevented observation of results in practically every instance. However, on 3 December, on the Podgorica Klopot road, the bridge at Bioce was claimed to be hit and a subsequent mission reported it destroyed. On 4 December one span of the Zenica R.R. Bridge was reported down.

Supply Dropping: During the week 231 tons of supplies were dropped successfully by 192 aircraft.

Flak: At Blechhammer and Vienna/Florisdorf the flak is reported to have been moderate to intense accurate heavy, as it was when these targets were attacked two weeks ago.

Enemy Opposition: 76 enemy aircraft were seen by Strategic Air Force during the week. In 5 encounters which took place, 13 ME-109's and 1 HE-111 are claimed destroyed, 4 ME-109's probably destroyed, 3 ME-109's and 1 ME-262 damaged.

Sorties: A normal number of escorts, photo and weather reconnaissances were carried out.

Total sorties amounted to 2667. Of the 495 other aircraft dispatched almost all were unable to carry out their operations owing to adverse weather conditions.

# Coastal Air Force

Anti-shipping activity was on a moderate scale as bad weather interfered with operations to a large extent and sightings were confined to barges except for an occasional "E" Boat or tug. However, patrols were flown and attacks made whenever (Cont'd. on page 4)

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	STRATEGIC AIR FORCE			
ATTACKING	TARGET	TONS	CLAIMS	MISSING
No attacks (	Escorted recons only)			
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		3	)	8 B-24
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		8.5	5	4 B-24, 1 P-51
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	Vienna/Florisdorf Oil Re	f. 186.25	P Scale	
	rarget of Opp.		1-0-1	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Targets of Opp.			
	Vienna S.E. Goods Depot			1 B-17, 1 P-51
	Linz Industrial area	16.75		
	V477			
	VIIIach M/18	21.75		
	Klasenfurt W/V	FEWEL		
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possible and a considerable amount of damage was inflicted on the enemy by R.P. Beaufighters and Spitfires in the Northern Adriatic. Two barges were sunk, six probably sunk and two left burning; five more barges and a tug were severely damaged; and seven barges, two 30 ft. motor launches and a 150 ft. coaster were also damaged. Eight more attacks were made on barges, tugs and "E" boats but no results were observed.

Mine-spotting and air-sea rescue patrols were flown on most days, and Malamocco was bombed as an alternative target by a Wellington which was unable to find any shipping.

Frequent bombing and strafing attacks were carried out by P-39's over the N.W. corner of Italy, direct hits being scored on at least five trains and at least four times on railways. A number of motor trucks and carts were destroyed as well. Spitfires and Mosquitos flew sweeps over Yugoslavia and N.E. Italy in the course of which a locomotive was blown up, some motor vehicles and carts were destroyed, and a large building with radio masts on Sansego Island was attacked, hits and casualties being inflicted.

A JU-188 was damaged in an encounter with a Beaufighter over the South of France.

# Tactical Air Force

Weather conditions again restricted operations during the week. At times there was considerable ground haze, and poor visibility was a frequent obstacle. The total number of sorties flown during the week amounted to 4008.

A considerable portion of the operational activity was devoted to the vital railroad systems in the Po Valley (see page 11). Satisfactory results attended these efforts. 5 R.R. bridges are claimed destroyed and 13 more damaged, while railroads were cut in 146 places. 5 road bridges are also claimed destroyed.

Attacks against road and rail transport were attended with great success. In spite of the adverse conditions close support of the armies was maintained, with good results against gun positions, enemy strong points and troop concentrations.

# Other Claims

Type	Destroyed	Demaged
Road and armored vehicles Locomotives Rolling Stock Enemy Aircraft	204 17 321 1	130 58 306

#### Balkan Air Force

In spite of the bad weather conditions prevalent during more than half the

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week, Balkan Air Force maintained attacks against troop concentrations, communications and road traffic.

The number of sorties flown amounted to 766.

A power house at Lussin Piccolo, and 3 gun positions were attacked on 4 Dec., with rocket projectiles, and all of the targets were destroyed.

At Bioce a bridge was damaged and appeared to be holed.

Enemy troop concentrations at Gracac and Bjelovar were also attacked with rocket projectiles. At Gracac more than 200 hits are claimed on buildings believed to be housing enemy troops. Several of the buildings were set on fire. The barracks at Bjelovar received over 100 hits.

Exact figures of M/T and rolling stock destroyed and damaged are not yet available but are believed to be considerable: at least 6 locomotives and much rolling stock were destroyed.

Greece: Offensive patrols were carried out in the Athens-Thebes area. Machine gun nests and snipers were strafed.

Crete: Ammunition and fuel dumps were attacked but no results observed.

# MAAF BOMBING SUMMARY

TOTAL WEIGHT OF BOMBS DROPPED (1 Jan 1 Dec. 1944)	341,456.73	Tons
TOTAL WEIGHT OF BOMBS DROPPED (2 Dec 8 Dec. 1944)	3,459.00	Tons
TOTAL WEIGHT OF BOMBS DROPPED TO DATE (1 Jan 8 Dec. 1944)-	344.915.73	Tons

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# III. ENEMY SITUATION

# 1. <u>AIR</u>

# a. Scale of Effort

Throughout the week enemy air activity has been on a low scale.

On 2/3 December small night ground attack operations were carried out by JU-87's in the central battle zone; 5 JU-87's were intercepted to the north of Bologna by intruding Beaufighters. On the same night 6-8 FW-190's were also active, an ineffective dive bombing and strafing attack being made on DAF Headquarters.

Long range reconnaissance from Italian bases has been negligible and on two days probably no flights were made.

Although enemy fighters were seen on several occasions, few encounters have been reported. Over South Germany on 2 December, 22 fighters were seen, and on the same day about 20 in North Italy. Escorted P.R missions have had encounters with small numbers of ME-109's and ME-262's (the latter in the Munich area). 15th Air Force bombers had the heaviest opposition on the 6th in the area east of Vienna, when about 20 enemy aircraft were encountered.

Air transport over Yugoslavia has been on a moderate scale. Zagreb, Podgorica, and Sarajevo have all been in use for this traffic. There is some evidence that occasional flights are being made to Crete and Rhodes, possibly mainly for the delivery of mail.

# b. Dispositions of the German Air Force on 8 December 1944

<u>Italy</u>		Strength
Ground Attack Long Range Recon TAC/R	FW-190 JU-188/ME-410/JU-88 ME-109	10 20 15
Yugoslavia		
O / (T.E. Fighters	ME-110/JU-88 ME-109	5 10

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Russian Front in Hung	ary (offensive fo	rces not included)	Strength
S.E. Fighters		ME-109	100
South Germany, Austri	a. W. Hungary (S. of 50° N.)		
S.E. Fighters T.E. Fighters		ME-109/FW-190 ME-110/JU-88/ME-262	100 170

N.B. - These figures do not include units engaged in support of the German Army in the West.

#### NOTES:

- In addition to the recon a/c shown in North Italy there are about 30 JU-87's belonging to second line night ground attack units. There have been no operations by the 20 SM-79 torpedo bombers since mid-summer but they must be considered potentially operational.
- In Yugoslavia, there are about 50 a/c of second line units (JU-87's, CR-42's, HS-126's, DO-17's, JU-88's) engaged on ground attack and reconnaissance.
- 3. The Hungarian Air Force includes about 40 ME-109's and about 75 Italian fighters (mainly RE-2001's); also a few T.E. fighters (ME-110's or ME-410's).

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ENEMY SITUATION

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# 2. GROUND

### Western Front

In slow, hard fought battles, troops of the 1st and 9th U.S. Armies have pressed deeper into the Reich. General Simpson's 9th Army, after completing the capture of Linnich, Roersdorf and Flossdorf, has advanced into the western outskirts of Jülich, and brought the Allied line up along the Roer from Linnich down to Jülich. General Hodges' 1st Army men have pushed out from Inden into Lüchem and Lücherberg, and have advanced from Brandenberg to capture Bergstein.

The 3rd U.S. Army is now almost entirely inside Germany. On the left we hold the Western banks of the Saar from Merzig down to Fursten (3 miles from Saarbrucken). At Saarlautern American troops made a rapid advance into the town, which they soon seized, including the valuable bridge which the enemy had omitted to destroy. On the Army right we have gone forward from Sarreumian to Saareguimines, where fighting is, at the moment, still going on.

The 7th U.S. Army has advanced parallel to General Patton's 3rd in the area east of Saarbrucken, and it is here that they report heavy enemy opposition particularly in the Niederbronn sector where the enemy has given ground alowly and only in the face of heavy attacks. North of Strasbourg, the Germans maintain their stiff resistance to our advance. Hagenau still holds out, and there have been several counter-attacks by tanks and infantry against our efforts.

South of Strasbourg the German 19th Army appears to have begun to pull out across the Rhine. An earlier report had stated that the enemy intended to abandon the 19th Army as expendable, but a recently captured document gives the area East of Colmar as the evacuation point. There is even more uncontravertable evidence. Recon planes report a flow of heavy traffic east from Colmar and columns moving across the Rhine at Breisach, where the bridge is protected by a smokescreen during the day. Thus there does not appear to be any reason for doubting that the 19th Army has already begun to cross the Rhine. The success of the move (and so far it has been methodical and successful) will depend on the enemy's ability to maintain a corridor from north of Colmar to north of Mulhouse, through which he can pour his troops across the river, as he gradually contracts his bridgehead west of the Rhine. So far, the enemy has handled the situation well, and although 7th Army troops have cleared Schlettstadt and closed to within 5 miles of Colmar, and 1st French Army troops have come up southwest of the town on a line from Vatin to Thann and Aspach, the enemy still manages to keep his vital corridor open and has launched counterattacks against the American troops north of Colmar, in order to hold us off from the city until the bulk of his troops are through.

On the enemy side of the battle, SHAEF estimates that the Autumn offensive has cost the enemy the equivalent of 17 divisions. The figure is based on a total of 7 divisions destroyed and 22 which have suffered severe losses.

#### Southern Front

The Canadian attack, which has given us Ravenna and cleared all the ground east

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of the Lamone, opened with a morning assault, supported by D.A.F. planes, launched against the enemy positions between the Montone and the Lamone. The German 356 Infantry Division took most of the weight of the attack, and, after a short period of surprise, it recovered enough to make us fight house by house for Albereto. Profiting from the fall of Albereto, Canadian armor and infantry advanced rapidly, bypassed Russi and turned right towards Ravenna, which was held by the 114 Jaeger Division, a formation that has very painful memories of Anzio. The Jaeger troops managed to get out of the area, but not before they had lost some 130 men to Canadian armored cars which secured Ravenna and then went on north of the town to report that all the ground east of the Lamone was free of the enemy.

South of Faenza, the threat to the town grew more serious when the British 46th Division put in an attack across the Lamone and established a bridgehead near Errano. In a series of hard fought battles with the German 305 Infantry Division, we extended our hold on the left bank of the river and pushed our right flank to within 2 miles of Faenza, with the center going forward to Celle, 2 miles due west of the town, and the left coming round to take Pideura.

Polish troops, who hold the left of the 8th Army, completed the capture of Brisighella, and then went forward to a line from Monte Rontana due north to Monte Rinaldo.

On the 5th Army front, the 13th British Corps, which holds the Army right, passed an active week. Monte Penzola, which dominates the Firenzuola-Imola road fell to one of the Guards battalions. Mahrattas and Punjabis, following close upon the 715 Infantry Division, have occupied Casola Valsenio and Frugno.

The position of the 76th Panzer Corps, which is opposing the 8th Army attacks, is not a particularly happy one, as it has had to fight the battle since Cesena, without any reliefs, and has therefore been forced to follow a policy of relieving tired divisions with othere less tired. It is now faced with the threat of the Canadians who are up all along the line of the Lamone, and by the British drive southwest of Faenza. The course of the battle through November shows that 76 Panzer Corps has been left to fight the battle on its own resources, and will not receive any reinforcements which are all needed for the Bologna area, where the enemy apparently appreciates that his greatest danger lies. At the moment, the 90th Panzer Grenadier and 362 Infantry Divisions, are resting in the Bologna area and of them the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division is more fitted to return to the line. If the position of 76 Panzer Corps grows worse, we may yet see this formation coming across to reinforce it.

Two more enemy formations, 44th and 71st Infantry Divisions, have left Italy for the Eastern front, and so the total of enemy divisions in the country drops from 28 to 26. The 44th Infantry Division, pompously styled "Reichsgrenadierdivision Hoch und Deutschmeister", came out of the line south of Bologna and was last identified in the Udine area. It has now been confirmed in action near Mohacs in Hungary. The 71st Infantry Division, after the battle south of Rome, moved north to garrison the Gorizia-Udine area. It, too, is reported on its way to the Eastern front. On the Franco-Italian frontier troops of the 5th Mountain Division have been identified

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ENEMY SITUATION

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in the Mont Genis Pass area, a sector previously held by the 157 Mountain Division. This would appear to confirm a report that the 157 Mountain Division is leaving the frontier, and since the Gorizia-Udine area has been left bare by the departure of the other two formations we will probably see the 157th turning up there. The Gorizia-Udine area has required a German garrison in the past because of the active threat of the Partisans there.

# Eastern Front

Most active section of the long Eastern front this week was the battlefield of Hungary. Red Army troops who had last week crossed the Danube in South Hungary to capture Pecs pressed on to Lake Balaton where, by weeks end, they have cleared the entire south shore of enemy forces. A second large-scale crossing was effected just south of Budapest, after all of Csepel Island, on which are located the Manfred Weiss Works, Hungary's largest industrial undertaking, and the Tokol airdrome and aircraft factory, had been taken. The two bridgeheads joined forces, and the Russians are now closing on Szekesfehervar from the south and east. Meanwhile, other troops of the 4th Ukrainian Army moved west from Pecs, through Kaposvar, as far as Nagybajom, and are now advancing toward Nagykanizsa on a general line from the southwest corner of Lake Balaton to a point just west of Barcs, on the river Drava.

Northeast of Budapest, in the Hatvan area, a major breakthrough was effected and quickly exploited, and Russian troops reached the Danube in the Vac vicinity north of the capital city. Budapest is thus in communication with the west, whence reinforcements must come, only along the direct routes which leave the city at Obuda and Budaörs, as the roads to Szekesfehervar have been cut west of Csepel.

It is significant that, whereas previous breaches in the enemy line in Hungary have usually been made on sectors held by Hungarian forces, the advance in the Hatvan area was pushed through German divisions. The defense of Budapest itself is almost exclusively a German undertaking, although there are two Hungarian Infantry divisions in the area, and elements of the Spanish "Blue" Division have been identified.

In Yugoslavia, further advances have been made between the rivers Danube and Sava, in the region northwest of Belgrade.

An important aspect of the operations southwest of Budapest is their effect on the enemy air operations there. Szekesfehervar and Seregelyes, now immediately ahead of the Russian ground forces, have been the principal operating bases for ground attack planes in this area, and around 30 ME-109's were based at Pecs and

At Budapest itself, Erd, Csepel, and Tokol airdrames have been occupied, the Vesces fields are battlegrounds, and Budaors and Matyasfold are immediately ahead of the Red Army.

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# 3. ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY ROUTES



The shadow of MAAF fighter bombers fell on enemy lines of communications fairly frequently again this week, although operations were limited in scope due to uncertain weather conditions.

#### Northern Italy

Of the 11 rail bridges across the Po between Turin and the sea, 8 are known to be cut and the status of 3 bridges is doubtful: Torreberetti is probably open while Pontelagoscuro and Casale Monferrato are probably cut.

All 16 road bridges appear to be unserviceable with the possible exception of Carnale bridge, north of Voghera. Although not covered recently by photo reconnaissance, this bridge is reported by a ground source to be serviceable.

Vigevano bridge over the Ticino river remains serviceable. Through traffic from Milan to Turin north of the Po passes via Mortara, Vercelli and the recently repaired bridge at Chivasso. Assuming that one or both of the bridges at Torreberetti and Casale Monferrato are serviceable the route to Turin south of the Po is now clear.

The main Verona-Milan line is cut at 3 and possibly 4 points. In addition there are 4 line cuts between Brescia and Verona. The parallel route to the Milan-Verona line following the north bank of the Po is impassable at 2 points.

The main Genoa-Turin line is passable throughout. The Genoa-Asti-Milan line is passable, subject to the status of the two Fo river bridges mentioned above. The Voghera-Turin line is probably passable at Tortona rail diversion. The Voghera-Piacenza line is impassable at one point.

# Frontier Routes

The Brenner route was cut by P-47's on December 2nd at 3 localities, one north of Trento, two south. Photo recon on the 4th of December showed an additional cut north of Rovereto. Photo reconnaissance could not give a complete picture of the

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status of the Brenner route during the past month when operations were limited by periods of bad weather. Cover of the route between 6-18 November showed interdiction to be continuous at one or more points. From 19-27 November there was no photo cover of the line. On 28 November, coverage from Ambroggio, north of Trento to Egna, south of Ora, showed the line to be serviceable. Fighter bombers attacked the section south of Trento, possibly following the recon on the same day, claiming numerous cuts. Two days later, on 30 November, the line was passable from Verona to Bolzano. Attack was not again resumed until 2 December.

In the absence of photo reconnaissance during the latter part of November, there is information from a reliable ground report stating that the line was not service—able until 27 November, in which case complete interdictions of the Brenner route would have been in effect from 6-27 November. If the recon of the 28 November preceded the attacks of that day, interdiction of the line may have been in effect at some time between the 28 November and the following recon of 30 November. The alternative line to the Brenner route leading southeast from Trento remains impassable at one, possibly two points. Interdiction of this line appears to have been continuous from 6 November to the present date.

The Tarvisio, Postumia and intermediate routes are open to through traffic south, via Casarsa rail diversion, to Verona.

# Germany and the Balkans

15th Air Force heavy bombers attacked marshalling yard targets in south Germany, Austria and communications targets in Yugoslavia.

#### Yugoslavia

Enemy troops retreating from Southeast Yugoslavia now appear to be north of Sjenica situated on the Novi Pazar-Prijepolje road. Sjenica is now occupied by Bulgarian troops. Possible escape routes from Dobrun lead west through Sarajevo and north from a point east of Sarajevo at Sokolac. Principle outlets north from Sarajevo are the road and rail routes to Brod via Doboj with possible employment of the lateral routes running west via Jajce and Banjaluka. These latter routes pass through Partisan territory and must first be cleared. Further use of the route east from Dobrun via Uzice, then north along the Drina river appears to be denied the enemy in view of present Partisan control of that area backed by an approaching Russian line from the east. At present, enemy troops still in Zvornik and Prijepolje are fighting to break through Partisan forces astride the road to Tuzla. troops in the Podgorica area have now begun to move in force northeastward towards Andrejevica, withdrawal attempts to the northwest via Niksic having been abandoned. e Partisan opposition has been cleared from the road at Bioce and Klapot, but remains persistent throughout this area and at the enemy's rear south of Podgorica. The enemy is by-passing the main route to Andrejevica by following what is reported to I have a difficult road leading through the Maraca valley which regains the main road at Matesevo. In an effort to break the Partisan hold on the Andrejevica-Plevelje road and clear the retreat route north, strong German forces have moved down from Prijepolje to Bjelopolje and west to attack Plevelje.

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# 4. ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES

# a. Enemy Air Losses in Air Combat Since 1 January 1944

Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
3,671	880	1,238
15	5	5
3,686	885	1,243
Old West as		follows:
	010,00	wassace 1/16
JU-87 Type not r	eported	1 JU-87 4 Type not reported
	3,671 15 3,686 ictories du robably Des	3,671 880 15 5 3,686 885 ictories during the week is as robably Destroyed

# b. No Enemy Aircraft Losses on the Ground for Week 25 Nov. - 1 Dec. 1944

# c. Enemy Aircraft Losses on the Ground (1 January to 1 December 1944)

	Destroyed	Damaged
Transport Aircraft	84	38
Bomber Aircraft	212	85
Fighter Aircraft	322	134
Type not reported	1,216	883
	1,834	1,140

# d. Total Enemy Aircraft Losses in the Air and on the Ground

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
Total Enemy Air Losses through 8 December, 1944	3,686	885	1,243
Total Enemy Aircraft Losses on Ground through 1 December 1944	1,834		1,140
TOTALS:	5,520	885	2,383
	-		-

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
# IV. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

# GERMAN TRANSPORT DESIGN: BV-144

The Blohm and Voss BV-144 is a twin-engined high-wing monoplane transport, designed specifically for these duties and capable of carrying about 25 passengers and a crew of four. The French Breguet concern, best known for their flying boats, have been engaged on the detail design of this aircraft, according to a recent report from A.I.2(g), Air Ministry.

The plane is faintly reminiscent of the Douglas DC-5 except for its twin fin and rudders. From a design standpoint, its outstanding feature is a variable incidence wing. The variation is obtained by the use of a tapered steel tube for the main spar, about which the whole wing turns under hydraulic power through an angle of 9° to increase the angle of incidence for take off. The tubular spar is in three sections, the center-section of which passes through the fuselage, supports the engines, and is used as a fuel tank. Fowler type flaps run the length of the wing center-section, and the ailerons, with a trimming tab at the inboard end of each, run the length of the outboard wing sections. The empennage is distinctive, the twin fins extending forward of the tailplane, which is set well ahead of the fuselage ending.

The plane is fitted with a tricycle landing gear, the two main wheels retracting inwards toward the fuselage. The nose wheel does not completely retract into the rather stingily-dimensioned nose section. Two BLW-801 engines are specified for the prototypes. Span is 88 ft. 2½ in., length 71 ft. 5 in.



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# GERMAN LONG RANGE ROCKET A-4

Best known as V-2 from the German propaganda attempts to picture it as a decisive weapon, the long range rocket has actually been in use since 8 September, 1944, when it was first fired against London. From that date through 21 November, over 200 rocket incidents had occurred in England, over 500 in Belgium, and over 50 in Northern France, Holland, and Luxembourg. The R.A.E. has examined fragments of these rockets, and from their reconstruction, A.I.2(g) has compiled an almost complete picture of the structure and performance of the rocket.

Performance: As reported in a previous issue, the speeds and altitudes attained by these missiles are phenomenal. The take-off weight is 12.2 tons, including 82 tons of fuel. The rocket attains a maximum speed of about 5,000 ft. per second (c. 3400 miles per hour), and after the power has been cut off, it follows a parabolic path, rising to an ultimate height of 60 to 70 miles.

For launching, the rocket stands in a vertical position, the four stabilizing fins at the rear being orientated to conform with the desired azimuth bearing of the target. When the propulsion system is ignited, the rocket rises with increasing speed; after two seconds a cylindrical drum with a number of electrical contacts, rotating to alter in steps the resistance of a circuit, continually changes the axis of the pitch gyroscope. Thus, for the first 51 seconds of the rocket's flight, the projectile curves over on a predetermined trajectory towards the target, the course following approximately a segment of a circle. During flight, the rocket is held on course, i.e. controlled in azimuth, by the azimuth gyro. Range is controlled by shutting off the fuel to the propulsion unit at a predetermined point in the trajectory, i.e. when the rocket has assumed a predetermined angle and is travelling at a predetermined velocity. In early rockets the velocity appears to have been measured by radio, by means of the transmitter/receiver; it is not clear whether its altitude could be determined on the ground. The fuel was then cut off by remote radio control from the ground.

In the latest rockets, it is believed that radio control is rendered superfluous by the fitting of an integrating accelerometer, which not only cuts off the fuel when the correct velocity is attained, but also makes any necessary allowance, if the trajectory up to the cut-off point has been too steep or too flat, by decreasing or increasing the time during which the propulsion unit is allowed to operate. Theoretically, this means that greater accuracy can be achieved than was the case with radio control; it also makes any radio interference with the rocket's flight impossible. At present it is not yet clear whether all rockets are now being fitted with the accelerometer only or whether this instrument is being used experimentally either alone or in conjunction with radio.

Rockets fired against England to date have shown an average range of about 190

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miles, the maximum so far being 220 miles. The trajectories of several of these rockets have been plotted and it has been found that generally the velocity at the fuel cut-off point has been about 5,100 ft. per sec.; the angle of inclination to the horizontal at this point was between 33 and 39 deg. It is theoretically possible for the rocket to attain a velocity of 6,800 ft. per sec.(4,635 miles an hour); using an optimum angle of 41 degrees to the horizontal at the cut-off point a theoretical range of 340 miles would be obtained. It is not known how far the Germans have been able to proceed towards the maximum figure of 340 miles, but there is no evidence to date to suggest that such a range has ever been approached in practice.

During the rocket's descent through the atmosphere, it is slowed down considerably, to about 2,500 ft. per sec.(1,700 miles an hour), and in the process becomes heated to an extent which appears to have given the Germans a considerable amount of trouble. In nearly a quarter of the rocket incidents so far reported, the rocket breaks up in the air; the various components fall separately to the ground, where the warhead explodes in the normal manner. It has so far not been possible to explain definitely why this happens, but it is probably due in part to overheating, which may cause either structural failure of the rocket shell or perhaps of the fuel tanks. In a few incidents it has been possible to confirm that the warhead has actually exploded in the air, again almost certainly as a result of overheating. It may be that overheating of parts of the rocket casing is one reason why it is not possible to approach nearer to the theoretical range of 340 miles.

Damage caused by the rocket has been generally consistent with a warhead of 2,150 lb. weight. It is possible that some of the variations in damage which have been reported may be due to the use of alternative warhead fillings, as was the case with the flying bomb. The fuze employed must give efficient instantaneous detonation, since the rocket approaches the ground with a speed of about 2,500 ft. per second and the average crater depth is 10 to 12 ft.

Calculations by the Ministry of Home Security, based on incidents in England to date, show that the vulnerable area for the rocket, i.e. the area from the point of impact over which casualties are caused, is about 80% larger than the corresponding vulnerable area for the flying bomb in each casualty category. Since there is little difference in the area of damage caused by the two weapons, it must be that the lack of warning of the rockets' approach is the main contributory factor.

It is possible that in the future the range of the rocket could be increased by reducing the warhead size, or alternatively, a heavier warhead could be used where shorter ranges would be sufficient. There is to date, however, no evidence that more than one size of warhead has been used operationally.

Structure: The A-4 is a streamlined projectile, 45 ft. 10 in. long, of 52 ft. maximum diameter, with a sharply pointed nose, and fitted with four external fins at right angles to each other at the tail. Its general shape is suitable to its supersonic speeds. The outer shell is constructed in much the same form as an air-

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craft fuselage, with an outer skin spot-welded and riveted to circumferential formers and longitudinal stringers. In this shell, from front to rear, are a conical warhead, a controls compartment, two main fuel tanks, and an auxiliary gas generator, operating a turbine to drive two separate centrifugal pumps supplying the main fuels through a series of jets to the combustion chamber and venturi. The control vanes are eight in number, four fitted internally to operate in the jet stream within the rear end of the venturi, and four fitted externally on the rear outer edges of each of the four fins. Two reinforced joint rings allow the rocket to be built up in sections and also serve to take the main weights within the shell.


Warhead: Knowledge of the warhead is as yet incomplete, although a damaged unexploded specimen has now been recovered in the 1st U.S. Army area and will be reported as soon as the examination by R.A.E. has been completed. The overall warhead length is 5 ft. 82 in., and the weight, as set forth above is 2150 lb.

Controls: The control compartment is divided into four equal sections divided by plywood partitions. The exact arrangement of the various controls in these four sections has not been determined. One of the sections contains three pressure bottles, thought to be filled with nitrogen and used to pressurize the alcohol fuel tank. The other sections contain the control equipment proper, which has varied considerably in the specimens examined to date and is apparently in the process of being simplified. Essential control equipment found in all A-4 rockets consists of an azimuth gyroscope, a pitch gyroscope, a group of instruments forming the amplifying link between the gyroscopes and the servo-motors operating the rear control-vanes, and some means of controlling range by cutting off fuel supply. The latter equipment has varied most notably. In the earliest rockets, three receivers, a transmitter, and a modulator and tone generator unit were fitted. Later, only a transmitter-receiver for measuring velocity and a control receiver for shutting off fuel supply were retained. Most recent examples appear to be without any form of radio control. An integrating accellerometer performs the joint operation of cutting off the fuel and measuring velocity, also taking into account the altitude of the rocket. In addition, some rockets have contained what appears to be a master control, the purpose of which appears to be to initiate a series of operations - just what operations isn't clear. There are apparently two sources of electric power.

Main fuel tanks: The two main tanks are in a bay 20 ft. 2 in. long, and are so arranged that the center of gravity of the rocket is hardly affected whether they are empty or full. The forward tank contains 7,610 lb. of alcohol; the rear holds a total weight of 10,930 lb. of liquid oxygen. To prevent the alcohol from freezing, a double walled pipe with an insulating layer of glass wool between the walls is used, and there are probably other layers at the ends of the oxygen tank. When the propulsion unit is in operation, liquid is drawn from both tanks at a very rapid rate, so that it is necessary to arrange for the tanks to be pressurized. In the case of the alcohol tank, this is done by what is believed to be nitrogen from bottles contained in the control compartment; in the case of the liquid oxygen tank a small part of the oxygen delivered by the pump is by-passed through a heat exchanger unit and returned in the form of gas.

The two main tanks are filled with the rocket standing in the vertical position

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at the launching point, and filling connections are provided at the bottom of each tank. It is believed that the liquid oxygen tank is always filled to capacity when preparing the rocket for launching.

Turbine and Pump Assembly: In order to transfer the two main fuels at a high rate from the tanks to the combustion chamber, two separate centrifugal pumps, driven by a turbine, are employed. The turbine itself is operated by a power unit making use of hydrogen peroxide and calcium permanganate solution along the lines previously developed by the Germans for the propulsion unit of the HS-293 glider bomb, and the assisted take-off unit for bombers. The turbine and pump assembly, together with the gas generator, are mounted in a braced tubular steel frame attached, by means of ball joints, to the forward end of the venturi.

Combustion Chamber and Venturi: The actual propulsion unit comprises a large steel nozzle, double-walled for liquid-cooling over the greater part of its length, and closed at the forward end by 18 burner cups. Round the outside of the nozzle are four small annuli. A large annulus forms the main alcohol inlet into the space between the venturi walls. Each of the small annuli is connected through double walls to the interior of the venturi by a circle of radial holes through which alcohol passes to produce supplementary film cooling of the wall. The extreme rear of the venturi is not of double-walled construction, but is lagged externally with glass wool to minimize heat transfer to the adjacent servo-control motors.

The 18 burner cups are each constructed in the same manner; in the forward closed end of each is a sprayer rose, and to each rose one of the 18 oxygen distributing pipes is connected, so that oxygen passes through these roses directly to the interior of the burner cup as soon as the main oxygen distributing valve opens. In the walls of each burner cup are three rows of jets and two rows of plain holes, through which alcohol enters, mixes thoroughly with the oxygen, and burns.

The propulsion unit is estimated to produce a maximum of 68,500 lb. thrust acting for 65 seconds. With a by-pass system in operation, the thrust is reduced to 30,000 lb.

Control Vanes Assembly: The rocket is controlled directionally by movement of the two sets of vanes

Two of the four external control vanes are coupled, through radial shafts, chains and sprocket segments, to the corresponding electro-hydraulic servo-motors which drive two of the internal vanes, so that, in the plane of rotation of the turbine rotor, external control vanes on two stabilizing fins operate at the same time as internal control vanes in the jet stream. The other two external control vanes are each independently driven from a small electric motor with a very high reduction gear, again through radial shafts chains and sprocket segments. They can be turned only at a relatively slow rate (about 3° per second) whereas all four internal vanes and the other two external vanes can be operated very rapidly by the servo-motors.

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# V. INFORMATION FROM INTERROGATION AND DOCUMENTS

(THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS OF WAR AND THEIR DOCUMENTS. IT SHOULD BE TREATED WITH RESERVE UNTIL CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES).

# THE G.A.F. FIGHTS ON THE GROUND

Very large numbers of G.A.F. personnel who have been fighting as infantry in the front line have been captured since the end of August. In examining the types of men encountered and their antecedents, three periods can be distinguished, each having marked characteristics of its own and in which prisoners were largely of certain types. The three periods may be summarized as follows:-

- (a) From late August to early September: This was the period of the Allies' rapid advance through France and Belgium, when the German Army, retreating precipitately from those countries, collected all the odd bodies they could lay their hands on in an attempt to stem the rout.
- (b) From mid-September until early October: This period is characterized by the airborne landings in Holland, and was for the Germans a time of great confusion, when every type of man appears to have been converted to the infantry at high speed and immediately thrown into the front line.
- (c) From the latter part of October onwards: At this time the confusion of the preceding period began to settle down into something more resembling order and normality; the G.A.F. infantry battle groups, which were by then gradually taking shape as genuine G.A.F. infantry formations, bore a large part of the brunt of the Allied pushes towards the banks of the Maas.

First Period: Of the considerable number of G.A.F. prisoners captured during the first three weeks of September, a large proportion was the remains of the trained Fallschirmjäger (paratroop) formations, such as had gone through the campaigns of Holland in 1940 and Crete in 1941, and of the Luftwaffe Felddivisionen.

The remainder of the G.A.F. infantry prisoners were nearly all from elements of retreating units such as the staffs of airfields and Eadar stations. Upon receiving orders to withdraw on the approach of the Allied Armies, they had in most cases been ordered to go to Lille for assembly, but the majority had either failed to arrive there or had been routed straight on towards the German frontier. Some of these men were thrust hurriedly into the line to fight as units under their own officers; others who had become scattered were swept up in ones and twos as they passed through the streets of towns such as Tournai and Ghent, and were pushed into the ranks of G.A.F. infantry units or into purely ad hoc battle groups made up of stragglers and usually designated by the name of the officer in charge. As an example, eighteen members of the staff of the Radar station "Skorpion" near Abbeville were captured between September 7-9th fighting under their own commanding officer near Ghent; at about the same time a large number of ground staff of Beauvais/Tille airfield turned

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up in an Army cage, having been en route from Beauvais to Germany for some weeks and having had to turn and fight in Belgium.

As might be expected, prisoners were of all ages. One peculiar collection is worth mentioning; on September 16th, the Army cage provided six men aged 27 - 30 with the rank of Fahnrich, all of whom were time expired regulars whose twelve years' service had come to an end in about 1941/42. They had then become Beamten (uniformed civil servants) and had been posted as accountants at various airfields in Germany. In the spring of 1944 these men had all been re-incorporated into the Luftwaffe and had become aspirant officers; at the end of August they were sent off without notice to Cologne, where they were outfitted, and joined up with about 60 others, and on September 2nd they were loaded into motor trucks and sent to the front in Belgium.

None of them knew to which units they were to be posted or even where they were going, although it was believed that the drivers had had the destination imparted to them; in any event they never discovered their destination because they had barely crossed the Belgian border when they were met by Allied tanks and captured.

Second Period: Towards the end of September G.A.F. prisoners came into the cages from the Nijmegen and Arnhem fronts at an average rate of about 200 a day and this intake lasted for upwards of a fortnight.

There was an obvious change in the type of prisoner encountered; while there was still a small nucleus of genuine Fallschirmjäger, the vast majority were personnel of every sort and kind from all over Europe. In the course of the preceding three weeks they had been hurriedly posted to the Haupt-Untersuchungs Stelle der Fallschirmtruppe (Paratroop Receiving Center) at Gardelegen and had been formed into "battle groups" designated by place names or by the name of the commanding officer, e.g. Kampfgruppe Halberstadt, Kampfgruppe Koch, etc. In addition, quite a number of prisoners belonged to Festungsbataillonen (Fortress battalions), which had similarly been thrown together with men of the higher age groups.

The first impression made by these prisoners was that quality had gone down with a bump; one day produced about 20 members of a Luftwaffe construction bataillon, one of whom pleaded piteously with the interrogating officer not to leave them in the open all night "since some of us are grandfathers". There was, however, a sprinkling of N.C.O.'s of some standing and experience who no doubt gave stiffening to the motley crowd.

At this time there was a noticeably large number of signal personnel among G.A.F. infantry, who included men from Radar stations, airfield signal units, telephone exchanges and linesmen. On one day, cut of a batch of about 100 prisoners there were some 15 signal personnel, all of whom had been drafted into the infantry within the preceding three weeks and who had come from a variety of stations in Crete, Poland, Italy, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Germany and Denmark.

The great majority interrogated during this period were from the G.A.F. schools, particularly the signal schools, most of which appeared to have been closed or

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drastically cut down towards the end of August; in addition there were considerable numbers from the flying training schools and a few from gunnery schools.

Operational aircrew fighting as infantry consisted almost entirely of aerial gunners and all these were from IVth Gruppen (R.T.W's), to which they had been posted back for one reason or another after having flown in one of the operational Gruppen. There were also some members of IVth Gruppen newly posted from the schools and who had not yet flown operationally. No prisoners have so far been encountered who had been transferred direct from operational units to the infantry with the exception of a couple of members of transport units which had been disbanded.

Third Period: Since the middle of October a further change has taken place; the ages have become more extreme, the largest age groups being 19 year olds, while there are considerable numbers aged well over 30. The quality of the men, particularly of the junior members, appears to be far lower than in the two preceding periods and at the same time the number of deserters has increased markedly, and must now be at least 5% or, if the stragglers who are all but deserters are included, at least 10%.

Nearly all the prisoners are still from the paratroop battle groups set up at Gardelegen in August and September, some of these groups having been reformed again and again. There is still, surprisingly, a fair proportion of genuine Fallschirm-jäger.

As a whole, the collection of men is much more mixed; there are considerable numbers from flying training schools and a few from signal schools, although in both cases in a much smaller proportion than in the second period.

Those from the pilots' schools had all been pulled out of the A-(primary)
Schools (E.F.T.S.) in the earlier stages of training and none were encountered who
had passed through the complete A-School course. It is curious that few prisoners
have been encountered from gunnery schools in any of the three periods.

The largest group in this third period was airfield and unit ground personnel, comprising roughly 40% of aircraft and aero-engine servicing and repair staffs, about 40% of general duty ground staff, mostly from kitchen and guard duties, and about 20% from orderly rooms, motor pools, supply rooms, etc. (A.D.I.(K) Report No. 640).

# INTERROGATION OF A JU-87 PILOT IN ITALY

Shortly after 1600 hours on 28th November, two JU-87's took off from an airfield in the Bovolone area to attack suitable targets in the Polish-British sector of the Italian front. The pilot ended the sortie a prisoner of war, and his gunner was killed.

At the briefing, according to the pilot, they had been told to choose their own

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targets from artillery positions, troop and transport concentrations and bridges, and his aircraft carried 4 x 50 kg incendiary bombs and 1 x 500 kg fragmentation bomb. The prisoner was instructed to follow the leading aircraft, the pilot of which set course southeast for Forli, climbing to 3000 m. which height, with occasional variations due to cloud, they maintained for the greater part of the flight. Shortly before they reached Forli course was changed to southwest. They were flying just above a cloud bank at about 250 kph when the gunner warned the pilot that he had seen a night-fighter come out of the clouds behind. Before the latter could take evasive action the night-fighter's guns came into play, and the pilot thinks the rudder was hit as the JU-87 became unmanageable. He gave the order to bale out and suited the action to the word, but failed to see the gunner do likewise.

The prisoner landed near where his aircraft crashed with its bombs still attached, about 5 miles SW of Forli, and was promptly captured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

This man is an experienced pilot and has 311 war-flights to his credit, 236 in Russia (in the Northern sector) and 75 in Italy. He was shortly due for the clasp to his gold FFS. He also has the Deutscheskreuz in gold. He transferred from the Russian front, where he claims to have flown HE-46's, in December, 1943. The gunner joined the unit on 26 February this year, but was not paired up with the prisoner until May or June. The pilot has so far refused to pinpoint his place of start which, however, he admits to be in the vicinity of Bovolone, but not one of the recognized airfields. Only the first Staffel of his unit was there.

His aircraft was armed with twin rearward-firing 7.9 mm. MG 81's and one 20 mm. MG 151 in each wing. From an examination of the wreckage it is believed that only the FuGe 7 was carried in the way of radio equipment. The aircraft possessed no rearward-scanning night-fighter detector.

Navigation was by dead reckoning, aided by radio and visual beacons.

This prisoner was somewhat security-conscious, and his morale is quite high. (CSDIC Air Report A.499).

# CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENT

The following is a translation by the Interrogation Unit, Headquarters 9th Air Force (Adv.), of an undated notice to all troops which gives suggestions for be-havior in the face of ground attack aircraft:-

# "Notice: To All Troops

# The chief enemy in the West is the fighter-bomber,

On the way up to the front behave as though you were already there! Fighter-

-23 - 00000 b

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bombers attack at all points. Therefore, always have all air defense weapons manned and ready for action, even during the hours of darkness.

Never put troops in the cer immediately behind the engine. Ammunition wagons at the end of the train. Fuel well away from ammunition.

During an air raid alert or in case of the train stopping, alight only when ordered to do so. Panicky movement often provokes new attacks.

Camouflage: Use all available cover, trees, shadows, fox-holes. Each vehicle must have air observers with a clear view in all directions. The more the better. Observation from a closed vehicle is not sufficient.

March discipline: Arms always with the man. Pistol belt fastened. Distance between men at least 100 metres. Keep distances when halted. Stop only when cover is available. Road must remain clear.

When column halts have traffic control established at once in front and behind column. Tactical commanders must get traffic moving again after jams, at once and regardless of all else.

Columns may be passed only by single staff cars. Right of way to be given to vehicles going to the front.

Send reconnaissance ahead when you come to narrow passages, bridges, bombed-out cities. Rush vehicles through; do not jam up. Appoint traffic officers.

Fire at fighter-bombers. Even armored cars may be attacked with rocket bombs. Stop at place offering best cover if fighter attack is heavy. Proceed in short spurts at opportune moments. Cut out engine. Listen. By the time you see the enemy aircraft it is too late. Avoid wide roads. Second class roads get you to your destination more rapidly.

### Drive without lights at night.

If road is lighted up by chandelier flares, stop under cover. Be on your guard when short light signals are used. Bombs will be dropped immediately after.

# Any movement made in the light is clearly obvious.

A lighted cigarette can be seen up to 1,000 metres altitude at night. Therefore be careful. Smoking while driving is prohibited.

Remember: Each soldier, each vehicle is irreplaceable and may decide the fate of the war.

Thoughtlessness, carclessness, "showing off", lead to avoidable losses, and will therefore be prosecuted by court martial.

General of the Armored Forces, West."

P 6 ...

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7850/5


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# - KNOW YOUR CLOUDS -



CUMULONIMBUS
ELEMENTS TO KNOW AND REMEMBER


The elements that are potentially dangerous are:


ELEMENT	OCCURRENCE	REGION	REMARKS
Turbulence	Always	Throughout storm	Severe in updrafts, moderate to mild in other regions.
lce accretion	Always	Above 3 <sup>0</sup> C level	Can become severe at low temperatures or in rain area where temperature is below freezing.
Hail	Rare	At sides and front	Usually occurs in clear air at sides and front of central cloud mass. Hail encountered within the cloud is usually soft and small.
Squall winds	Frequent	Along front of storm	This element hazardous only if flight is con- ducted at low levels or landing or take-off is made at time of occurrence.
Lightning	Frequent	Throughout storm	Injury to aircraft will be limited to small structural burns or fusings, but from the operational standpoint the hazard is real since radio and electrical equipment will probably be knocked out just when they may be most needed. How-
Att Com			ever, the chance of a discharge striking an air- plane in flight is remote.


(Ninth of a series on cloud recognition produced by the 12th Weather Squadron, AAF)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7850/5

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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL THUNDERSTORM SHOWING 3 STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT, AND STREAMLINES OF ASCENDING AND DESCENDING AIR

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# MAAF AIR INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARIES

# for period

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assified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7850 U. .. HAVAL DECAMENT MARIE CELIAN File No. A8-2 Serial: 02 COMPTDENTIAL Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Detachment, Naples Italy. From: To : All Intelligence Units, Naples Area. Subject: U.S. Naval Intelligence activities, Naples area. (a). Confidential COMMANNAW letter serial no. 0474, dated 5 References: October 1943, subject: U.S. Naval Intelligence activities, U.S. Naval Forces Morthwest African Waters. (b). Confidential COMNAVNAW Administrative order number 25, dated 5 October 1943, subject: U.S. Naval Intelligence Unit, establishment of. All U.S. Naval Intelligence officers and intelligence activities operating in the Naples area will hereafter be coordinated under the Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Detachment, Naples Italy, who is Senior Officer U.S. Navy ashore for the port of Narles. In order to centralize direction and operations and to adequately provide sufficient office space, rooms 20, 21, and 22 in the Bank of Naples building have been placed at the disposal of this Command as headquarters for Intelligence operations. The majority of Allied Intelligence agencies are presently occupying space in the Bank of Naples building and established lisison with these units operating from a central location will provide closer cooperation in the performance of intelligence activities. Officers who are assigned special intelligence duty as Liaison with other units or Allied commands will maintain dual offices: first, at Intelligence Headquarters at the Bank of Haples; second, at the headquarters of the unit or the command to which they report for special intelligence operations. The Commanding Officer, Mayal Detachment, Maples, will be kept informed of all matters which should be brought to his attention, primarily through the Senior Intelligence Officer, or in his absence, or in an emergency, or special circumstances, directly by any Intelligence officer who may have a material report to present. Official mail will be addressed to Naval Intelligence Unit (Advanced Section), FPO 728. The office telephone number of headquarters of the Bank of Maples is 15622 (emergency calls at night, telephone number 16176). Titellen W. E. HILBERT Captain U.S. Navy

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U.S. NAVAL DETACHMENT NAPLES ITALY

13 April 1944

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