Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC 10000|143|2737 635.05 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE . GENERAL

MAR. 1944 - AUG. 1945

POLICE INTELLIGENCE GENERAL 63505

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

10000/143/~~2756~~ 2737

THIS FOLDER

CONTAINS PAPERS

FROM Mar 44

TO Aug. 45

CAT. [illegible].

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SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

FILE

MINUTE SHEET

No. of sheet	Date	File no. of Ans'd Ltr.	From whom	Subject
5.	15 Aug.		Hq Acd.	Collection of I&C Intelligence
6	25 Aug		AAI	Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY.
7.	extracted 7 May 1946			
8				
9	25 Nov. 44			Counter-INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
10	27 Nov. 44			NOTES ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY.
11	13 Nov. 44			- COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS.
12.	6 Jan.	- -	- -	Counter Intelligence in Italy.
13	29 Dec.	— —	— —	NOTES ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE FOR ITALY
14.	27 Jan 45	- -		808 CS Bn.
15	8 Mar.	- - -	- -	Notes on counter Intelligence in Italy no. 7.
16	31 Aug.	- - -	- - -	Counter Intelligence Corps.

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O. SECURITY DIV

R.A./G

635.05

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

AG 350.09/530 GS-O

31 August 1945

(16)

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps

TO: All Concerned

Letter this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 1[illegible] April 1945, is rescinded.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MCNARNEY:

R. A. STUKEY
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
"X"
5 - ea Corps
5 - ea Division
3 - ea CIC Det
2 - G-1
2 - G-2
2 - G-4
25 - CIC, AFHQ
2 - PMG
2 - AES
2 - SIG
2 - ORD
2 - Fin Dir
2 - AC Records MTO
1 - AC M & D

FPS

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CA

(810 14/1

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Director, Public Safety S/C.

This contains much useful information on events in the front line.

15 3/65 Stencil type proofs 1/a

S J Harvey Maj

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Security

SECRET

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

14ob/20/GSI(b)

8 Mar 45

NOTES ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
IN ITALY NO 7

Security
Division
13/3
Rec'd
Book No 5777
File No 643
Action

15

1. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

February was a comparatively uneventful month in the sphere of counter-espionage, and was characterised by a marked decline in the number of recently infiltrated agents who were captured.

The Jan/Feb and Feb/Mar moon periods do not appear to have been exploited: only one parachute agent is known to have been dropped during the month, and he was captured.

Though there were further indications of the absorption of ABWEHR units into the SD's general management and control, there were no new political espionage cases of outstanding interest or significance.

Little serious sabotage activity was reported, and only one case appeared to be definitely inspired by the enemy.

The progressive reorganisation of the GIS in ITALY, which has been noted in past months, and the possibility of preparations being in hand for wholesale evacuation, may to some extent account for the apparent diminution of the enemy's efforts. Contact must, however, clearly be maintained, for the purpose of supplying the armies with tactical information, so that a complete cessation either of recruitment or despatch is not to be anticipated. There are grounds for believing that agents in training are in excess of the enemy's requirements for "tactical contact", and the problem therefore arises as to their intended employment. On the whole, it appears that continued reference from a variety of sources to post-occupational plans, support the theory that the majority of agents being trained will be given stay-behind missions, and that planning for this work is the enemy's main preoccupation at present, which in turn accounts for the decrease in numbers despatched across the lines. A large proportion of this balance is composed of saboteurs, and it is reasonable to argue that sabotage (and kindred "Insurgiertum" elements) would render a more real service after the total evacuation, in keeping with known long-term projects in other countries, than military espionage agents would at a time when the enemy's interest in Allied troop dispositions in ITALY would tend to diminish. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility of the enemy attempting some infiltration of agents for harassing operations before he withdraws.

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Numbers

The total of captures in ITALY during the month numbered 42. This showed a marked reduction when compared with the figures of 56 and 58 for December and January respectively. Nearly 65% of these were line-crossers. Of the 7 parachutists known to be at large at the beginning of the month, 5 were rounded up, while one additional parachutist was dropped and captured. With the exception of one Fascist, a frco-lance, making for the enemy lines where he intended to hand in such information as he had collected, the remainder were stay-behinds. Only two were women. The most remarkable feature is that only 17 had been actually despatched during the month. Another feature is that no W/T agents were included among those arrested. One parachutist captured had been dropped with a W/T agent who has not yet been traced.

Saboteurs totalled only 9, whilst 4 other KdG 212 trainees were captured who at the last minute had been given general politico-military assignments of the SD variety. Among these 13 were the 4 MONTISI graduates dropped in

...../December

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December, whose apprehension disposes of the 13 of the same group known to have been dropped at that time. Very few cases of sabotage occurred, and in this there is perhaps some justification to be found for the sanguine views expressed in the survey of Rdo 212 included in the last issue of these Notes.

Intentions

The decrease in numbers despatched and captured gives rise to serious speculation as to enemy intentions. The various reasons which suggest themselves may be any of the following, or a combination of all four:- better training and cover, and consequent evasion of capture; the enemy's preoccupation with bigger efforts on "mass production" lines; dislocation due to displacement of HQs, prior to total evacuation of N. ITALY; or concentration on the establishment of post-occupational networks. His known persistence in the face of failure makes it unlikely that the enemy may at least have abandoned large-scale espionage undertakings. On the whole, the planning of stay-behind networks seems the most likely explanation. Such ventures have in the past met with small success, but the indigenous elements on whom he can best rely naturally have hitherto been able to retire with the Germans. Clearly any idea of mass evacuation on former part will not be feasible, and it is probable that the more intransigent Fascist and Republican elements will accept long-term missions on behalf of the OSS.

Much use has been made by the Germans in the past of Neo-Fascist official organisations and ideological groups. Their ramifications, ambitions and loyalties are extremely involved, but deserve study as they may form the basis of stay-behind groups. It is appropriate to begin with the official Neo-Fascist Intelligence Service, the SID (Servizio Informazioni Difesa), though hitherto its active espionage activity has been remarkable for its total absence. A brief account of what is known of this organisation is given later in these Notes. A paper has been prepared by AFHQ on the X MAS, a long-standing source of both Italian and German espionage and sabotage recruits, and this will be issued in the course of the current month.

Means of Entry

The almost total rescue of parachutists despatched has already been noted. Of the 6 captured 5 were dropped in December and January. Two are still at large. SAN SEVERINO CALORE, 14 kms. NE of the Nazi holding unit at AVELLINO - STRAGI of all parachutists in ITALY, has been the subject of careful study in the hope that it would be possible to stage an air attack. Though the results are somewhat disappointing from this point of view much useful information has been obtained on the dropping technique employed and aircraft used. This should go some way towards making up for the shortcomings of night observation.

The use of a new dominating airfield has been reported by that one of the 7 agents dropped on 30 Jan who has been captured. It is located at Ponte S. Pietro, 4 kms West of PESCARA.

Line-crossers were by far the most numerous last month. The general

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Line-crossers were by far the most numerous last month. The proportion of line-crossers to 'stay-behinds' changed from 21:22 in January to 27:9 in February.

Places of capture were fairly evenly distributed across the front in the Army Areas. The figures for line-crossers were:- IV Corps Area - 15; 13 Corps Area - 8; rest of Eighth Army and MLO - 4. Interest in the Adriatic sector distributed the localities where agents were intended to operate more evenly than usual.

Four of the agents captured in the month had previously completed missions. It is difficult to calculate with any pretension to accuracy from so little data what proportion of agents despatched are likely to be still at large.

...../Despatching

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Deportation Agencies

On information already to hand, the 42 cases of the month can be classified as to deportating organisations thus:-

Sp 150	15	
Sp 152	2	
Kdo 212	3	
Kdo 212 - LONGISE	4	
SD	5	(2 - TURIN; 1 - PARMA; 1 - ARTEGO; 1 - unidentified.)
KGB	1	
Fascist free-lance	1	
Alst Paris	1	(left in Vatican on evacuation of ROME.)
Not yet known	6	
Total	42	

GIS Organisation

One of the most interesting pieces of intelligence obtained was the statement of one captured agent to the effect that, if VERONA was occupied by the time of his return, he was to report back to the SD at INNSBRUCK. This suggestion of preparation for withdrawal makes a study of similar intentions or actual movements desirable, and some of the more important movements which have been reported with reasonable accuracy are listed below:-

(a) KdE IN ITALY - AUSBILDUNGS - und ERSATZSTAB 3/HED - moved from CESTO CALENDE (LAGO MAGGIORE) to LEVICO (TRENTO) in Nov 44; its assault-craft training establishments on LAGO MAGGIORE were withdrawn at the same time to GERMANY.

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(b) Kdo 212 HQ, MILAN may have moved to FAI (TRENTO) in Nov 44.

(c) Kdo 212 Sonderstab "HARTUS" (training school) transferred from ERBA (COMO) to MESTO TOMMASEO (TRENTO) in Nov 44.

(d) Kdo 212 new training school established at FAI and CONDINO (TRENTO) in Dec 44.

(e) Kdo 190 - one HILFS training school moved to neighbourhood of COLZANO early in Jan 45. Another moved from MILAN to BRUNICO N. of BOLZANO about the same time. A third either moved from MILAN or opened for the first time at PASSO DEL GRAPPA, NE of VICENZA, in Nov or Dec 44.

(f) A 150 school at PADUA was believed to be due to move at the end

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(a) HQ Kdo HQ ITALY - AUSBILDUNGS - und EINSATZSTAB (SUED) - moved from SENTO CALENDE (LAGO MAGGIORE) to LEVICO (TRENTO) in Nov 44; its personnel and training establishments on LAGO MAGGIORE were withdrawn at the same time to VERONA.

30057

(b) Kdo 212 HQ MILAN may have moved to TAI (TRENTO) in Nov 44.

(c) Kdo 212 Sonderstab "MARTUS" (training school) transferred from VERONA (COMO) to MEZZO LOMBARDO (TRENTO) in Nov 44.

(d) Kdo 212 new training schools established at TAI and SORDEO (TRENTO) in Dec 44.

(e) Kdo 190 - the MILAN training school moved to neighbourhood of COLZANO early in Jan 45. Another moved from MILAN to BUSNIGO N. of SOLBIATE about the same time. A third either moved from MILAN or opened for the first time at PASSANO DEL GRAPPA, NE of VICENZA, in Nov or Dec 44.

(f) Kp 150 school at PADUA was believed to be due to move at the end of Jan 45 to TRENTO or MERANO.

2. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE TRENDS

Last-minute flaps

Mention was made in the last issue of these Notes of the agent whose task was to obtain a copy of the CI List. The fact that he failed to return from his mission may have caused his employers to give some further thought to the matter, so it is now reported that agents are to be given new aliases and identity documents after leaving the school at which they have been trained. In this way, it will be possible to prevent agents trained at the same school from knowing the aliases under which their fellow students are posing in BDT.

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One means of countering this move would be to pay greater attention to the scrutiny of identity documents, and in particular to question suspects on the towns and addresses shown on their papers. Even this, however, is liable to prove more difficult in the future, as another captured agent has informed us that students at certain CIS schools are now sent on a trip to the town to be shown on their forged identity papers, so that they can familiarise themselves with the location and tenants of their assumed home. One agent was even given 1,000 lire to buy himself an item of clothing bearing a label from a shop in the town in question.

As, however, the news of these two devices comes from agents trained at different CIS establishments, it is probable that they will be encountered separately rather than together.

Method of planting a stay-behind agent

In view of the many indications that the enemy is preparing comprehensive stay-behind networks in Northern Italy, the following description of one of the methods used is of considerable interest: this description was given by a captured line-crosser who attended a W/T course at an ARWER school where a number of other agents were being trained for post-occupational missions.

A month or so before the Allied occupation of a city, several stores or business houses are selected by the CIS for their suitability as contact points and centres for the collection of information. In each case, the store owner receives through the normal channels an order to evacuate. The prospective stay-behind agent then approaches him and arranges to buy the shop, lock, stock and barrel. This is accomplished in an apparently regular manner and the CIS then sets up the store with all the merchandise needed, provides a starting capital of from 300,000 to 1,000,000 lire, and installs the agent and his family in adequate living accommodation. In some cases, rather than leave a large sum of money in cash with the agent and thus arouse suspicion, an equivalent quantity of gold and jewelry is supplied. Where possible, agents are enlisted who have lived in the town for some time and thus have the status of local residents.

Breaking the pattern

Many an agent has been led to confess by constant and minute questioning on the subject of his journey through EOT to the front. This is the part of his story about which he is almost bound to lie, since, for many months, agents have been taken to the front in CIS vehicles.

Now, however, comes news of an agent who had no need to lie about his journey as he made it partly by train and partly by means of fortune, even though accompanied by a CIS official.

It cannot yet be said whether this departure from routine was dictated by circumstances or was a deliberate attempt on the part of the CIS to eliminate what they possibly realise to be a weakness; it does, however, call for increased precaution on the part of CI interrogators.

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It cannot yet be said whether this departure from routine was dictated by circumstances or was a deliberate attempt on the part of the CIS to eliminate what they possibly realise to be a weakness; it does, however, call for increased perception on the part of CI interrogators.

Death of a CIS Official?

During the month, two reports have reached us, from captured agents, of the death of Dr BAUER, the well-known official of Abwehrkommando 190. Both agents stated that he had been killed when his car was machine-gunned by Allied planes, though neither had actual evidence of the fact, having heard it second-hand; it was stated also that Dr [redacted] had lost a leg on the same occasion. An element of doubt was cast on this story when one of the agents stated that he had expressed his regret at the incident to Dr [redacted], only to be asked what he was talking about.

The story may very well be true; on the other hand it may also be a convenient disappearance on the part of BAUER and [redacted], either because they are aware that their identity is known to us or because they are

...../planning;

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planning to "go underground" for a stay-behind mission. This latter possibility cannot be wholly discounted; another agent, in fact, has told us that Lt PLAATEN has definitely planned to be over-run by the Allies. Other considerations apart, such a course might be a convenient way of avoiding the worst when GERMANY's back gets uncomfortably close to the wall.

As a postscript to the above, it is, for the moment, of speculative interest only that a Dr ELZE, who is described as 'speaking through his teeth', (a characteristic long ascribed to Dr BAUER), and closely resembling BAUR in other physical peculiarities, has appeared on the scene as an official of ABWEHRKURS 150 or 152.

Conclusion

The foregoing paragraphs indicate that, far from slackening in their efforts, the CIS are tightening up their methods in the present and have well laid plans for the future - both factors calling for the utmost alertness and improved technique on the part of CI agencies.

3. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE METHODS

Analysis

An analysis of the methods by which the month's 42 agents were captured is given below:-

Controls (incl CC.RR, RIF, forward troops)	21
Arrests by Partisans	3
Search for names on Wanted Lists	8
Information received from other agents	7
Surrendered	3
Total	42

It is particularly noteworthy that under 10% gave themselves up.

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A good arrest

A good example of the type of combination of suspicions leading to arrest has been reported. Two agents first aroused suspicion because they denied all knowledge of enemy and Allied troop movements acquired during a journey in the forward areas. This, coupled with the fact that their identity cards were unusually clean, that they had no luggage, that they were clean-shaven in spite of a 3-day journey, that they several times slipped into German when trying to talk English, and that they were smoking Italian cigarettes which they even offered to British troops, left no doubt as to the nature of their business.

End of a CIS School

A counter-intelligence method of a less orthodox but very effective kind was employed during the month when a CIS school, at which there were reliably reported to be a large number of students in training, was bombed by Desert Air Force at the instance of CSI(b) Eighth Army and 2 SCI Unit. Eleven direct hits were

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Controls (incl CC.MR, MIP, forward troops)	21
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End of a GIS School

A counter-intelligence method of a less orthodox but very effective kind was employed during the month when a GIS school, at which there were reliably reported to be a large number of students in training, was bombed by Desert Air Force at the instance of CSI(b) Eighth Army and 2 SOI Unit. Eleven direct hits were registered on the school buildings, which were completely demolished.

4. SABOTAGE

Railway Engine

On 13 Feb an attempt was made to sabotage a diesel locomotive at CERVETO Railway Station. A fire, immediately preceded by an explosion, was observed near the main cable connecting the motors of the engine. Examination

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disclosed a number of pieces of shrapnel-like metal, a piece of fuse, and the remains of a detonator. Stones in the immediate vicinity of the explosion were blackened and white ash was found on the frame. No damage was done. The igniter has not yet been identified as a known sabotage device, but is a modified type of Kurzzeitzunder of the Time Pencil type of German manufacture. The crimping of the detonator is said to be characteristically German. The shrapnel found suggests that it was a HE/incendiary shell, but there are not enough pieces to make a reconstruction possible or to determine the calibre. Two methods of initiation seem to have been employed, time pencil and time burning fuse, probably both fed into the shell fuse hole with plastic priming and sealing. Investigations have not disclosed the perpetrator of the attempt which on the face of it would appear to have been enemy inspired.

Pipe Line

Interference with the petrol pipe line passing through ROME was reported on 7 Feb and 25 Feb. On the first occasion in broad daylight an American hand grenade was used and a fire caused which was quickly extinguished. The broken section was replaced within two hours and the damage was negligible. The attempt appears too clumsy to have been enemy inspired. No details are known of the second attempt for which credit is claimed by a Fascist subversive group under close surveillance.

Advice to Saboteurs

The following recommendations were made to a class of saboteurs at a SIS school before they left on their missions.

Pupils were advised never to leave traces behind in any place: they must avoid going to hotels, and always ask for shelter with peasants or, in towns and villages, with private families, where they need not register.

They must not make themselves conspicuous in any way and especially not spend too much money. If they were sent to Allied-Occupied Territory they should pass themselves off as refugees who had come over to escape forced labour in GERMANY, and try to find themselves a job. Those who had families in the South should say they had come across to join their relatives.

Pupils were told that many objectives in Allied Occupied Territory, such as petrol and ammunition dumps, were not properly guarded or not guarded at all; the sentries were for not careless.

For the sabotage of trucks the best method was to wait at a cafe or restaurant where a driver might stop for a drink, and seize the opportunity when he left the truck unguarded. Alternatively a saboteur could ask for a lift, and conceal a charge in the vehicle just before leaving it.

For railway sabotage, pupils were advised to look for jobs [illegible] washing so as to [illegible]

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Pupils were told that many objectives in Allied Occupied Territory, such as petrol and ammunition dumps, were not properly guarded or not guarded at all; the sentries were few and careless.

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For railway sabotage, pupils were advised to look for jobs as wagon washers so as to obtain a pass to enable them to enter a station and circulate freely during curfew hours.

To throw a piece of explosive charcoal in a railway tender, pupils were instructed to pretend to be normal passengers and to be throwing back a piece of coal that had fallen out of the tender. (They practised at MILAN Central Station.)

5. ENEMY SUBVERSIVE METHODS

A considerable number of enemy propaganda pamphlets in an ingenious form were recently dropped by aircraft over 2 NZ Div lines. The pamphlet took the form of a booklet of matches bearing the "V for Victory" sign on the outside. Inside, in place of matches, was folded a long, closely-printed strip of paper bearing the titles "Come back home alive" and setting forth methods for inducing artificially the symptoms of a large number of ailments and diseases. This manoeuvre does not appear to have increased the work of NZ MOs.

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6. VETTING

In large towns, and particularly in the major ports and supply bases, the problem of security vetting of civilian labour, and of screening applicants for travel permits, ration cards, dock passes etc has always presented the CIC/FS officer with one of his major worries. If he does not tackle it early and with a clear-cut workable plan he is liable to find his slender manpower resources sucked under within a very short time. In view of the new and formidable commitments awaiting us in the North of ITALY (MILAN, GENOA, TRIESTE etc), it appears appropriate at this juncture to examine vetting procedure evolved from past experience in handling problems of equal scope.

The vetting problem in LEGHORN is probably no great as in any other Italian centre which we have so far occupied. The Port Security Section at present operating in that port, however, has had considerable previous experience in the ports of ALGIERS and NAPLES and is consequently not unacquainted with the problem of vetting on a large scale. A study of the vetting organisation established in LEGHORN at the beginning of the year under the name of the "Allied Identification Centre" should therefore prove of general interest. In examining this scheme it is intended to present it not as a blue print for all future occasions, but rather as a scheme which has been found to work effectively in one particular port and which may provide CIC/FS with useful data for setting up a similar system of their own should they feel that circumstances warrant it.

In LEGHORN, as is the case with most large ports, two separate security agencies were covering the town and the port area respectively. In the first place, therefore, an agreement was reached that whatever screening organisation was to be set up should serve both town and port in order to eliminate overlapping and wastage of manpower, to centralise records and to standardise procedure throughout the area. It was further agreed that FSS and CIC in the area should pool resources for the purpose, and that the services of CC.RR and Questura agents should also be utilised wherever practicable. It should also be mentioned that the Naval Staff Officer (Security) based in LEGHORN has been an active and invaluable collaborator throughout.

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It was decided that, in principle, screening was to be in the form of a check against security records combined with a personal interview, and that all possible security and police records should be available for ready reference in one place. Accordingly, a suitable building in the centre of the town was taken over and in due course the "Allied Identification Centre" opened to receive its first customers. This centre was designed to deal with the following:-

(a) All applicants for work with the Allies. (This covers Port passes.)

(b) All applicants for identity cards.

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(a) All applicants for work with the Allies. (This covers Port passes.)

(b) All applicants for identity cards.

(c) All strangers applying for bread tickets or lodging permits.

(d) Cases of applications for travel permits of possible security interest (as requested by A/M. Public Safety Officer).

(e) Special cases referred to the Centre by Military Police etc.

The above scheme was based on the estimated ability of the Centre to deal with a maximum of three hundred persons a day, bearing in mind the local security requirements peculiar to the town and port of LEGHORN. In other towns modifications might be required to meet different circumstances. Obviously the various ingredients fed into the sausage machine are capable of variation, depending on the limitations of manpower and the demands of the local security situation. Thus, those individuals not granted the favour of a personal interview (for example applicants for travel permits not included in (c) above, names gleaned from hotel registers etc) could instead be listed

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and checked against the Centre's card indices.

By arrangement with AMG, Questura, Civil Labour Office etc all persons in categories (a) to (e) above are passed automatically to the Centre for screening. This process is carried out in a series of stages, the victim passing from room to room. If he is an applicant for work with the Allies he brings with him an "Iscrizione al Lavoro" card given him by the Civil Labour Office. On entering the Centre he is directed to a civilian clerk who enters his personal details on a special printed card (Scheda Personale). His name is also checked against the card index of previous applicants to ensure that he has not been through before. He then proceeds with his card to the next room, where a Questura agent examines his identity card, noting the details of the latter on the Scheda Personale. He next passes to another table in the same room where he is checked by CIC/FSS against the CI List and CI Bulletin photographs, (the former being also cross-indexed under physical peculiarities). The number of his identity card is also checked against a list of those of suspect identity cards. The applicant then passes to a third table presided over by a Questura agent, and his name is checked against a very comprehensive card index of Fascists, suspects etc (excluding agents); this index has been compiled from the very complete Fascist records available in LEGHORN, from local police records and from various other such sources; it is distinct from the CI list of suspected agents. The results of this check are noted on the subject's Scheda Personale, and the latter is handed to a Carabiniere who escorts him to an interrogation booth in the next room. (If possible a waiting room should be provided at this point to accommodate persons awaiting interrogation.) Here he is questioned either by CIC/FSS or by an Italian CS agent for the purpose of forming a general impression of the man and of probing any doubtful parts of his story as set forth on his Scheda Personale. Though of necessity brief, this questioning has proved remarkably successful, not only for the numerous breaches of AMG proclamations, line-crossers etc which it has brought to light, but also for the healthy psychological effect which it is having indirectly on the local population as a whole. If as a result of this preliminary interview there is reason to believe that further, more detailed investigation is indicated, the man is passed to one of the "full interrogation" rooms for interrogation at length and in detail by CIC/FSS. Cells are also available for the temporary custody of security suspects.

Once the ordeal has been completed, the Scheda Personale is filed in the card index at the entrance to the Centre (mentioned above). Applicants for employment with Allied units either have their Iscrizione al Lavoro cards approved and stamped, or are blacklisted as the case may be. In other cases, the appropriate authority (AMG, Questura etc) is informed of the results.

Although a vetting organisation on the above scale is obviously justifiable only in a major port or large centre, miniature versions may well be workable elsewhere. In a town like CERIGNOLA or TRIESTE, six would not be an unreasonable number of CIC/FS personnel to devote to the operation of what is in any case a security control of vital importance [illegible]

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Although a vetting organisation on the above scale is obviously justifiable only in a major port or large centre, miniature versions may well be workable elsewhere. In a town like GENOA or TRIESTE, six would not be an unreasonable number of CIC/FS personnel to devote to the operation of what is in any case a security control of vital importance, and a scheme on the above lines has a number of points in its favour from the point of view of both speed and thoroughness. One distinct advantage is that such a system reduces the period required for "clearing" an individual, from a week or two to a matter of a few hours.

7. THE ITALIAN SID (SERVIZIO INFORMAZIONI DIFESA)

(a) Introduction

In the first edition of these Notes we gave a short description of the Italian SID. Additional information on this organisation has become available during the intervening six months and the following account, compiled by AFHQ, brings our knowledge of the SID up to date.

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(b) General

The SID was formed on 1 Oct 43 by the Italian Republican Fascist Government, and comes under the control of the Minister of National Defence.

Basically it replaces and incorporates SIM and the associated organizations of RIE (formerly SIE), SIS and SLA. But internally the emphasis appears to have shifted from Offensive Intelligence to Counter-Espionage and the detection of subversive elements.

From the outset it appears to have worked in close collaboration with the Germans, and in Nov 43 a German Liaison officer, Major Von GRIESHEIM, was appointed to it. The Head of it was formerly Vittorio FOSCHINI, a lawyer and journalist, who was reputedly head of the USI, described as a "super OVRA" which policed and superintended the OVRA itself and its agents. He was replaced in Jan 44 by Lt-Col DE LEO, GC.RR, a former SIM Counter-Espionage officer of some competence.

The more important officers appear to have been drawn mainly from the ranks of SIM, SIS, and SLA. Many of them, it can be safely asserted, are serving in it principally because they happened to be in the wrong place geographically when ITALY was invaded, and are unlikely to be pursuing their work with any great enthusiasm. But there appears also to be a considerable proportion of officers of the MVSN (who were rare in SIM) and it is probably from these that SID derives such driving force as it possesses.

(c) Organisation

(1) From reports received the organisation of SID appears to be as follows: The HQ is believed to be still located at VOLTA MANTOVANA (F 3743) to which it moved from ROME early in 1944.

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HQ: General Secretariat (Personnel Section - General Section).
"Secret" Secretariat (handling all Secret documents).
Deputy Head's Office (from which Offensive Intelligence was directed).

SECTIONS:

"Alpha" Section	Offensive Intelligence	(Servizio E - Army (" A - Air Force (" M - Navy
"Beta" Section	Cryptographic Section.	
"Delta" Section	Counter-espionage.	
"Omega" Section	Foreign Postal Censorship.	
"Sigma" Section	Political (Police)	
"I" Section	Wireless Interception.	

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LH by Lt-Col DE LSO. CC.MR, a former SIM Counter-Espionage Officer of some competence.

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"Beta" Section	Cryptographic Section.
"Delta" Section	Counter-espionage.
"Omega" Section	Foreign Postal Censorship.
"Sigma" Section	Political (Police)
"J" Section	Wireless Interception.
"K" (Kappa ?) Section	Communications Section (Internal).
"T" (Tau?) Section	Laboratory Section.
Admin. Section	
Transport Section	

(ii) It is of particular interest that:

Offensive Intelligence comes under the Deputy Head and not under the Head, which is a clear indication of the internal balance of the organisation.

"Sigma" Section as far as is known consists entirely of MVSN officers.

(N.B.) There have been differing reports on this organisation, and it has been impossible fully to reconcile them. The

...../above.

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above is based on the interrogation of Lt.Col Renato SALARIS I.A.F., Head of the "R" (Signals) Section until Jan 44 who has given the most comprehensive, comprehensible and self-consistent account of the many that have been received. It should not however be taken as final and more information is required to give an accurate picture.

(iii) In most Italian organisations of this kind theory and practice are widely divorced, and it would be surprising if the organisation above set out functioned as it is intended to do on paper. The following is an attempt to summarise what is known about it present activities:

"Alpha" Section. This issues Intelligence Summaries. It is reported to have taken over from S.I.A. three secret Wireless Stations on Spanish Territory, at MADRID, ALGECIRAS, and in SPANISH MOROCCO. No information is available as to the scope of its activities outside Italy beyond this. No agents identifiable as having been despatched by S.I.D. have been captured in A.O.T. It has recently been reported however that an office has been established in a Villa near VICENZA for the purpose of despatching such agents.

"Beta" Section. Was reported in Jan 44 to be handicapped in its work by lack of equipment. This may have been remedied since, but even so it has decoded tactical messages from the Italian Front, and at one time appears to have been concentrating on messages from the ANZIO bridgehead.

"Delta" Section. Was reported in April 44 to have Counter-Espionage Centres at the following places: (Note: Places since overrun have been omitted.)

TURIN	- Via Cambursano 8 Detachments at: ASTI, ALESSANDRIA, VERCELLI, AOSTA, CUNEO.
MILAN	- Nr. Central Rly. Station.
GENOA	- 1st floor of highest skyscraper. Detachments at: ALBENGA, LA SPEZIA, SAN REMO,
BRESCIA	- Detachments at: VARESE, SONDRIO, NOVARA, BARDONECCHIA, PAVIA, CREMONA, MANTUA, VERONA.
PADUA	-
BERGAMO	- Via Giuseppe Verdi 8.

The above list is believed to be incomplete, but evidently represents the main centres.

"Sigma" Section. If this is not the most active section in reality, which it may well be, it is certainly the most publicised for its activities against the Partisans. Unfortunately however very little can be said with precision

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GENOA	- 1st floor of highest skyscraper. Detachments at: ALBENGA, LA SPEZIA, SAN REMO.
BRESCIA	- Detachments at: VARESE, SONDRIO, NOVARA, BARDONECCHIA, PAVIA, CREMONA, MANTUA, VERONA.
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The above list is believed to be incomplete, but evidently represents the main centres.

"Sigma" Section. If this is not the most active section in reality, which it may well be, it is certainly the most publicised for its activities against the Partisans. Unfortunately however very little can be said with precision about it. It is reputed to have centres in every important city and its officers appear to be mainly ardent Fascists. Under FOSCHINI it was said to be the Section to which he attached the greatest importance, and in view of his own past history and the fact that it was his own creation, it is to be presumed that he modelled it on OVRA and USI, except that it is independent of the Ministry of the Interior.

"Omega" Section. Nothing is known of this. It is alleged to have confined its attention to correspondence to foreign countries.

...../"J"

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"J" Section. This Section was reported to be in possession of only two Wireless sets in Jan 44. Its activity was consequently limited to the monitoring of REUTER reports. At that time it was living in hopes of acquiring a further twenty sets, but it is not known to what extent these hopes have been fulfilled.

"I" Section. This Section concerned itself with the provision of such internal communications as the organisation required, including wireless links.

"C" Section. This Section was expert in such matters as Secret inks, forgeries, etc. It never seems to have developed its activities very far, and according to one report has been dissolved.

(d) Conclusion.

While the offensive activity of S.I.D. appears to be negligible, the defensive side of its work is clearly a good deal more developed, and it is known to have been of considerable value to the Germans, with whom it cooperates closely, in the penetration and detection of resistance groups.

The danger to Allied security from S.I.D. in the post-occupational period is problematical. It is known that a number of the more convinced Fascists are determined to continue the fight after the withdrawal of the Germans, and it is possible that members of the "Sigma" Section, for instance, may turn over to the offensive role when that stage is reached. On the other hand, they will be well-known to their colleagues in the other Sections, who are in their turn, as ex-members of SIM, known to their former colleagues who are at present collaborating with the Allies. It is probable therefore that the capture of one or two leading officials will quickly lead to the effective elimination of the remainder. Such as are left will not be likely to survive long once their direction has gone. For this reason, only the more important members of S.I.D. are listed in Appendix "A": it is against them that Allied C.I. work should be directed. Appendix "B" shows the locations of the central and regional offices of the S.I.D.

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W. D. Gibson Lt-Col

for Brigadier,
AC of S, G-2.

JWF

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dissolved.

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AC of S, G-2.

JWF

DISTRIBUTION:- G-2 Fifth Army
GSI Eighth Army
427 TS Section
16 TS Section
G-2 (CI) AFHQ
SC(SI) c/o NCIC LEGHORN
CIC NATAF
Public Safety SC, Allied Commission
1 SCI Unit
SCI Unit 2
2 SCI Unit
3 SCI Unit
CI Section, CSDIC, CMF
AFHQ LO, ZAI, ROME
Tac HQ "A" Force
G-3 (Special Ops)

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APPENDIX "A"

List of More Prominent Personalities Known to be Serving with S.I.D.

ANSALDO	Seniore MVSN. Head of Secretariat, Aug 44.
ARGENZIANO Biagio	Major CC.RR. Head of C.E. Centre VERONA, Nov 43. Formerly head of SIM(CS) Centre there. Reported proven pro-Allied in sympathy.
BAGATTA, Colonel	Head of "Omega" Section in Jan 44. Previously for a considerable time in charge of SIM Censorship Section.
CAMILLETTI Lt. Col.	Head of Air Force sub-section of "Alpha" Section until replaced by CECCOTTI (q.v.)
CECCOTTI Colonel	Head of Air Force sub-section of "Alpha" Section in Jan 44.
COSMACINI Colonel Giuseppe.	Head of "Beta" Section in Sep 44. Former head of SIM Cryptographic Service. Alleged pro-German and opportunist.
DE LEO, Candoloro	Colonel CC.RR. Head of SID since Jan 44. Formerly in SIM(CS) where he obtained a reputation for his work in SICILY earlier in the war.
DEL MONTE	Capitano di Vascello. Head of the Naval sub-section (Section 3) of "Alpha" Section of SID in Sep 44. Formerly in SIS.
DE PEDIS	Capo Manipolo. Head of the Secretariat of SID in Jan 44.
DOMINI	Capitano di Frigata. Head of "J" Section of SID in Jan 44. Former Head of the Naval Cryptographic Section. Stated to have pro-British sympathies and a wife of British extraction.
DRAGONE Giuseppe	Major CC.RR. O.C. C.E. Centre MILAN in Apr 44. Formerly Head of SIM(CS) Centre MILAN.
FOSCHINI Vittorio	Lawyer-Journalist from ROME. Allegedly former Head of UNIONE SEGRETA INFORMAZIONI. Aged 45. Head of SID Oct 43 - Jan 44.
DE GERMANIS Salvatore	Capitano di Corvetta. Head of the General Secretariat of SID in Sep 44.
GRIESHEIM Major, Von	German Liaison Officer with SID. Well-known Abwehr

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[illegible] Col.	Head of Air Force sub-section of "Alpha" Section until replaced by CECCOTTI (q.v.)
CECCOTTI Colonel	Head of Air Force sub-section of "Alpha" Section in Jan 44.
CASSACCINI Colonel Giuseppe.	Head of "Beta" Section in Sep 44. Former head of SIM Cryptographic Service. Allegedly pro-German and opportunist.
DE LEO, Candeloro	Colonel CC.RR. Head of SID since Jan 44. Formerly in SIM(CS) where he obtained a reputation for his work in SICILY earlier in the war.
DEL MONTE	Capiteno di Vascello. Head of the Naval sub-section (Section 5) of "Alpha" Section of SID in Sep 44. Formerly in SIS.
DE PEDIS	Capo Manipolo. Head of the Secretariat of SID in Jan 44.
DONDINI	Capitano di Frigata. Head of "J" Section of SID in Jan 44. Former Head of the Naval Cryptographic Section. Stated to have pro-British sympathies and a wife of British extraction.
DRAGONE Giuseppe	Major CC.RR. C.C. C.E. Centre MILAN in Apr 44. Formerly Head of SIM(CS) Centre MILAN.
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DE GERMANIS Salvatore	Capitano di Corvetta. Head of the General Secretariat of SID in Sep 44.
GRIESHEIM Major, Von	German Liaison Officer with SID. Well-known Abwehr Officer.
HONORATI Nicola	Lt.Col. Head of C.E. Centre PERUGIA in Nov 43.
JORI Francesco	Major. C.C. C.E. Centre ANCONA in Nov 43.
MADERNI Col. Andrea.	Deputy Head of SID. In charge of Offensive Intelligence. Regular SIM Officer; formerly in ALBANIA.
MALVINI Col.	Head of Army sub-section of "Alpha" Section in Sep 44.
MARCHI	Capt. MVSN. In "Sigma" Section of SID in Jan 44.

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...../ NISSRI

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NISTRI	Capt. in "Sigma" Section of SID. Described as a Federale and Squadrista of the worst sort.
CENIS Major Anacleto	CC.RR. Head of C.E. Centre MILAN in Nov 43. Head of C.E. Centre BERGAMO in Apr 44. Regular SIM(CS) Officer and formerly in LJUBLJANA.
PAJOTTI	Capt. MVSN. In "Sigma" Section of SID in Jan 44.
PACILILLO	Colonel, Head of Administration in SID. Formerly Administrative Officer in SIM.
PAVIA	Capitano di Fregata. Head of "C" Section SID in Jan 44.
PENNOTTA Capt. Luigi	C.C. C.E. Centre in BRESCIA in Apr 44.
RICCIARDI	Capt. CC.RR. C.C. C.E. Centre in GENOA in Apr 44.
SARACCO Ettore	Major CC.RR. Head of C.E. Centre TURIN in Nov 43 and Apr 44.
SATTA ROERO	Major (Militia). Head of Administrative Section in Sep 44.
SCHIANO Lt.Col. Emilio	CC.RR. Head of C.E. Centre PADUA in Apr 44. Formerly in charge of SIM(CS) for NW Jugoslavia at TRIESTE.
SCOGNAMILLO Col.	(Militia). Head of Personnel Section of General Secretariat in Sep 44.
SFERRA Lt.Col.	Head of "Alpha" Section (Agents).
SUSILL Capt.	CC.RR. Employed in the Secret Secretariat of SID in Jan 44.
STENDARDI	1° Seniore MVSN. Head of "Sigma" Section SID in Jan 44.
VOLPI Aurelio	Major. C.C. C.E. Centre BOLOGNA in Nov 43.

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SECRET

APPENDIX B

Location of Central and Regional Offices of the SID.

1. Central Offices

VOLTA MANTOVANA F 3745
SID Hq - Villa delle Rimes
Secretariat - Villa Werner
Deputy Head of SID - Villa Rosselli
Army Sub-section
Navy Sub-section
Air Force Sub-section
Administration Sub-section
J Section (wireless interception)
K Section (communications) - Villa Rosselli
T Section (laboratory)

GOITO F 3854
"Omega" Section (Foreign Postal Censorship) - Villa Bonomi.

MANTOVA
"Sigma" Section (Political)

BRESCIA
"Delta" Section (Counter Espionage)

CASTIGLIONE DELLE STIVIERE F 8581
"Beta" Section (Cryptographic)

2. C E Centres

BRESCIA - Corso S. Alberto 6
BERGAMO - Via G. Verdi 8
MILANO - near Central Station
TURIN - Via Carburenze 8
PADOVA
BOLOGNA
VENICE
TRIESTE
GENOA

The above centres all report direct to SID Hq at VOLTA MANTOVANA.

3. C E Detachments

(a) Under CE Centre TURIN
CUNEO
[illegible]
ACQUI
VERCELLI F 8493
ALESSANDRIA
ASTI

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COMO F 3634
"Lago" Section (Foreign Postal Censorship) - Villa Bonomi.

MANTOVA
"Sigma" Section (Political)

BRESCIA
"Delta" Section (Counter Espionage)

CASTIGLIONE DELLE STIVIERE F 2551
"Beta" Section (Cryptographic)

2. C E Centres

BRESCIA - Corso C. Alberto 8
BERGAMO - Via G. Verdi 8
MILAN - near Central Station
TURIN - Via Cumburcene 8
PADOVA
BOLOGNA
VENICE
TRIESTE
GENOA

The above centres all report direct to SID HQ at VOLTA MANTOVANA.

3. C E Detachments

(a) Under CE Centre TURIN
CUNEO
R. EDOARDO H 4435
LODI
VERCELLI F 6453
ALESSANDRIA
ASTI

(b) Under CE Centre CUNEO
SAN REMO
ALIENTA G 3619
L. SPEZIA

(c) Under CE Centre BRESCIA
SONDRIO E 8219
VICENZA
MANTOVA
CREMONA
NOVARA
VARESE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBI-389.701-F-1.

27 January 1945.

Security Division
Recd. 29/Jan
Book No. 4573.
File No. 643.
Action.....

SUBJECT : 808 CS Bn.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Reference is made to 15 Army Group letter 15 AG/1402/8(b)/GI(b) of 15 Nov 43, and to Land Forces Sub-Commission, (L.F.S.I.A.) letter No. TS/SD/31 of 26 Dec 44. In consequence of the reversion to command of A.C.H.Q. of a large part of liberated Italy, the reorganisation of the Italian Army Intelligence and Security Police Units described in L.F.S.I.A. letter quoted, and the changed conditions of counter-intelligence work in Italy, the position and functions of SIM(CS), (now 808 CS Bn.) have been reviewed.

2. a. Organisation.

808 C.S. Bn., which has developed from the original "Bonsignore" staff section of the Italian Intelligence organisation, and has till recently been known as SIM(CS), now has a T.E. of 69 Offrs. and 931 O.Rs. It forms part of the Italian Army, and as such is responsible to the Italian General Staff for administration and discipline, but to this Headquarters for overall C.I. policy and operations. It has a central controlling staff, and a number of subsidiary outstations. The organisation as it now stands is set out in diagrammatic form at Appendix "A".

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b. Communications.

808 C.S. Bn. now have their own W/T communications between their outstations and the centre.

c. Functions.

The functions of 808 C.S. Bn. as a Counter-Intelligence organisation operating in collaboration with Allied C.I. agencies, are as follows: -

1. Counter-espionage and counter-sabotage.

This remains the principal function to which all others must be subordinated.

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i. Counter-espionage and counter-sabotage.

This remains the principal function to which all others must be subordinated.

ii. Morale of Italian troops.

Subversion or disaffection within units and formations and the motives behind it will be brought to the attention of the appropriate authority by 808 C.S. Bn.

iii. Civil Security.

Action against the formation of Fascist movements and any subversive political activity designed to impede the Allied war effort, whether such activity is enemy-inspired, or organised by indigenous elements on their own initiative.

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iv. General counter-intelligence work carried out at the request of the Allied Military Authorities within the zone of operations.

It is emphasized that although (i) above continues to be the most important function, the remainder should not be neglected. There have been recently, for example, a number of incidents which indicate a recrudescence of pro-Fascist activity, or at least of civil subversion and unrest, about which it is essential that the Allied Authorities be kept informed. In this connection, Italian C.S. personnel can be of great assistance.

d. Operation.

As more of Italy has been liberated the work of C.S. personnel has represented a steadily growing contribution to the efficiency of the Allied C.I. organisation. It is important however that 808 C.S. Bn. personnel should work in all cases in the closest collaboration with local Allied C.I. Headquarters and agencies, and vice versa, if there is not to be much duplication and waste of effort. In particular, it is essential that wherever practicable no arrests of suspected enemy agents should be carried out without prior consultation between C.S. personnel and the local Allied C.I. I(b) authority. If considerations of urgency arise, which make such prior consultation impossible, C.S. will inform their nearest Allied C.I. representative with the minimum delay.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

S. S. HILL - DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

GSI(b), HQ., 15th Army Group.	5.
G.S.I., HQ., No. 1 District.	1.
G.S.I., HQ., No. 2 District.	1.
G.S.I., HQ., No. 3 District.	1.
Security Branch, A.C.	1.

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S. S. HILL - DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

DISTRIBUTION:


GSI(b), HQ., 15th Army Group.	3.
G.S.I., HQ., No. 1 District.	1.
G.S.I., HQ., No. 2 District.	1.
G.S.I., HQ., No. 3 District.	1.
Security Branch, A.C.	1.
A.C. of S., G-2, HQ., Southern District, P.B.S.	2.
A.C. of S., G-2, HQ., P.B.S.	2.
A.C. of S., G-2, R.A.C.	1.
No. 1 S.C.I. Unit.	3.
S.C.I., Naples.	1.
No. 3 S.C.I. Unit, c/o 54 Area.	1.
S.I.L.O., c/o HQ., 54 Area, for Forward Counter Intelligence.	1.
M.M.I.A.	1.
Stato Maggiore Generale Italiana	2.
Liaison Officer, HQ., A.A.I.	1.

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
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APPENDIX "A"



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ORGANIZATION OF 808 C.S. Bn.

JANUARY 1943

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Security Br. 6916

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Security Division 2 Jan 3903 643

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AFHQ/TOAGSI(b)

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NOTES ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY

1. PARACHUTISTS

It has been officially announced that the enemy has dropped behind the American lines on the Western Front a considerable number of parachutists dressed in Allied uniform. They speak English, including Gl idiom, are provided with Allied weapons and identity documents, and have been instructed to procure Allied transport. Their task in general is to cause confusion, and in particular to assassinate higher commanders, to ambush staff-cars, IRuctn, and to commit acts of sabotage. Unlike the notorious Skorzeny-trained agents whom we have usually encountered in ITALY, these parachutists are clearly of a younger calibre, since they are for the most part Germans who know well that they will be shot if captured alive. To round off the picture in the West, we have received a copy of a signal from an Allied HQ in FRANCE referring to an unconfirmed report of parachutists dressed as nuns.

It has been known for several years that the enemy was capable of launching airborne operations of this nature, as the Fallschirmjaeger STURMDIVISION s.b.v., which later developed into the BRANDENBURG division, was originally formed and has been trained for this purpose. The personnel are recruited mainly from German returning Auslandsdeutsche with a knowledge of foreign languages and countries. It is probably from this organisation or a similar successor that the recent shower of parachutists in FRANCE was formed.

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If this venture in the West is deemed successful, it is possible that the enemy may employ similar methods in the Italian Theatre. On the whole it seems unlikely that he will disperse his limited resources or suitable personnel, and we may expect him to concentrate his whole effort in support of the major operations in the West, rather than to divert even a small proportion to the Italian front. Moreover we have received no reports of any specialist party of this nature arriving in N. Italy from GERMANY, nor of any plans for such operations being prepared. It is by no means improbable, however, that, in the event of the enemy developing a strong counter-offensive on this front, it might well be accompanied and supported by parachutists in Allied uniform; it is on such occasions that they have the most scope and opportunity and the best chance of achieving effective and valuable results. It is possible but unlikely that they might be used to slow down a dangerous Allied breakthrough. It is virtually certain that they would NOT be used during a quiet period.

It would be as well for formation/unit HQ's and security/ CI agencies to consider in advance what steps should be taken within their HQ or area to meet this form of special attack should it ever materialise in ITALY. Such consideration should not be confined to the counter-measures necessary to deal with the direct and obvious dangers of assassination, ambush and sabotage: special security precautions would certainly be required in this direction, but if the [illegible] that the enemy aim of operation, which would

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meet this form of special attack should it ever materialise in Italy. Such
consideration should not be confined to the counter-measures necessary to deal
with the direct and obvious dangers of sabotage, ambush and espionage :
special security measures would probably be required in this direction, but
it is also essential to ensure that the general air of confusion, which would
inevitably be present at such a time, should not give rise to counter-measures
of such an extreme or elaborate nature as to unduly to the conduct of the battle
by clogging or slowing down our own military machine.

There is one insidious danger inherent in this type of enemy activity,
and it is one which may well have more serious consequences than the actions
of the parachutists themselves. Exaggeration, rumours and false reports,
these seem almost invariably to follow in the train of parachute operations
of this nature : and if there is one story which will inevitably crop up, it
is a tale of the parachutists are dressed as Nuns. Nuns indeed, however,
have played a minor part in the spread of acute and universal suspicion : nuns
may (and should) stay in their nunnery, but the complex machinery of our
military operations must continue to function. Supplies must go forward,

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dispatches must be delivered, staff visits must be made, telephones must be used : these facts must be accepted and our security measures fitted into their framework, so that the maximum safeguards and protection are achieved while causing the minimum interference and delays.

Road controls, strict guarding of HQs, identification checks, speedy reports on suspicious individuals, general alertness - these and other such measures may well require improvement or extension to neutralise the activities of German parachutists known to be in the area in Allied uniform. But if the dual danger is to be averted, i.e. both violence and delay, such measures must be applied not only with alertness, but with restraint and flexibility. On such occasions it is the responsibility of all ranks to ensure that the party of parachutists is treated with just that degree of respect and caution that is due to a party of parachutists, and NOT with that due to an Airborne Division, a Panzer penetration - or even a crocodile of nuns.

2. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

The onslaught of line-crossing agents with espionage and sabotage missions in our forward area has continued. Over forty agents were captured during the past month in this command.

Although this number is rather less than the total for the previous period, there is every reason to believe that this is due to the fact that fewer agents were operating in the course of this month than during November, and there are reliable indications that the proportion of agents arrested in relation to those despatched has been appreciably increased. The fact that more than ninety agents have been captured in the operational zone in the past two months must be causing the GIS considerable concern, and it is probable that they are giving urgent thought to ways and means of improving their methods and results. One development, already noticeable this month, is the more frequent use of parachutes as a means of introducing agents behind our lines.

It has been noted that the enemy is tending to train and employ agents of better quality than heretofore. The majority appear more determined to carry out their missions, and this applies to W/T agents and parachutists as well as to line-crossers. At preliminary interrogations, for instance, immediate confessions are more seldom obtained : cover stories are almost invariably related, which in themselves imply serious intentions. Voluntary surrenders have become rare, and several of those apprehended had displayed considerable pertinacity in seeking to perform their assigned tasks.

All the line-crossers apprehended had attempted to pass or had passed the lines on the Fifth Army front, and thus for the third consecutive month we find the enemy concentrating on this sector. It is known that he is deliberately directing the majority of line-crossing agents through this [illegible] In the latter area, however,

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One case of particular interest and importance outside the operational zone was that of two agents arrested in ROME in mid-December. They were Germans and actually members of the Wehrmacht, who had been installed in ROME by the Abwehr in February, and had been left behind when the enemy withdrew from the city in June. They worked as a pair, equipped with W/T, and they had transmitted a considerable number of messages between June and December. By early December they had been almost located by our RSF organisation, which had narrowed down its search to a particular block, when their arrest was precipitated by the arrival of a courier with funds.

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Espionage

Abwehr Kommando 150. (I-I)

Early signs of this Kommando's activities in the post-occupational sphere during the past few months have developed with the arrest of several stay-behind agents who had been "planted" in towns on the ADRIATIC Sector many weeks previously. They had been given espionage assignments and were equipped with W/T. Approximately fifteen line-crossers of the Kommando were arrested during the month : they had been despatched by Truppe 150 and 152. The majority of these were long-god or short range missions which consisted of obtaining information about troops and installations in the forward areas. Two, however, had a special mission to penetrate as far as TERNI for the purpose of locating a particular formation.

Abwehr Kommando 190 (I-S)

Approximately five agents of this Kommando were arrested during the period. This figure represents a substantial reduction compared with previous months, possibly as a result of the failure of so many of its agents during the past few weeks. One agent of this Kommando was parachuted into the PERUGIA area and was arrested on route to enemy territory. His particular mission consisted of securing air intelligence on the identity of units using certain airfields in the vicinity of PERUGIA and FOLIGNO. Incidentally, this agent was on his second mission, his first being of the same type and apparently a successful one. The other 190 agents, one of whom was a woman, all crossed the lines and mostly had general espionage missions in the forward areas, though one was to go to RIMINI and ANCONA on a 15-day mission : at the latter city he was to pay particular attention to signs of amphibious operations being mounted as well as to obtain general military and shipping information.

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Abwehr Marine Kommando (I-M)

No agents of this unit were arrested during the period, though as in the past it appears that Kdo 190 is prepared to cover incidentally certain matters of Naval interest.

The Sicherheitsdienst

Approximately ten SD espionage agents were apprehended during the month. One agent remained behind in the forward areas and, when overrun by Allied troops, proceeded south to ROME, NAPLES, SALERNO and SICILY where he remained for several weeks : on his return journey to HQ he was arrested near the front line. Another agent was parachuted in the CASERTA area and made his way north to FLORENCE where he surrendered : this agent was despatched via the Abwehr air service unit known as the Dienstelle CARMEN, BERGAMO, which illustrates the coordination of GIS activities and branches. The balance of [illegible] crossed the lines and were to go to FLORENCE, ROME and SIENA.

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Their missions were primarily directed towards the collection of economic and political intelligence, though two agents were also to gather military information. One of the spies destined for FLORENCE was to ascertain what type of documents were necessary for circulation in that city as well as to reconnoitre a suitable place in the mountains for the landing of explosives by parachute.

Sabotage

Seven ABWEHR II saboteurs, all believed to have been despatched by Truppe of Kommando 212, were arrested during this period. Five of these had crossed the lines and two arrived by parachute.

The missions of the former were directed against various targets in the forward areas, and they were to work from bases that had been prepared before the German withdrawal. The other two were to move to the vicinity of CASSINO, where they were to obtain explosives from a dump that had been previously prepared by the enemy, and with these they were to sabotage a gasoline pipe line.

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The introduction of sabotage agents by parachute is new in this theatre, but there is good reason to believe that this method will be employed more in the future.

Organisation

A report in the form of a general outline of the CIS, its Order of Battle in Tripolitania, a location statement and information on its officials are being prepared for dissemination at an early date.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE METHODS

As noted above, the majority of enemy agents despatched overland have for some months entered our territory through the western half of the front, due largely to the nature of the country and the consequent dispositions of our own forces; as a result, Fifth Army has had a good opportunity to carry out what might almost be termed "Mass Observation" of enemy agents of all kinds and of the pattern of their behaviour, equipment, instructions etc. The following notes are based on a survey made recently by CIC Fifth Army.

Routes and methods of travel

Generally speaking, agents do not seem to have been warned of road blocks, travel regulations and security checks, although some were told that, when first entering AOT, they should avoid main arteries, stay away from all towns and move on country by-roads; once well into our territory, they could travel freely in whatever way they judged most likely to elude capture. More recently, agents have been told to move along river beds as snow makes cross-country travel almost impossible and leaves main roads as the only other alternative. A few agents were warned that hotel registers were subject to checks, while to others this point was not mentioned. Little consideration seems to have been given to the question of how agents were to travel once they got into AOT and the idea of travelling on military vehicles had neither been counselled nor discouraged. To sum up, the general impression given to agents is that there is little or no control of movement in AOT.

Clothing

A recent letter from this HQ mentioned that agents are now being supplied by the CIS with certain items of clothing; photographs of several typical garments were also enclosed. Several agents questioned in this connection gave a number of pointers on the differences between German and Italian clothing. A German jacket is light-fitting and has shorter lapels than an Italian model. In other words, the lapels descend lower on the Italian jacket, which is almost always a two-button style while the German jacket in most cases has three buttons. Italian jackets generally have a cigarette pocket in the inside lining, low on the left, whereas the German type has a pocket for the same purpose inside the lining of the lower left outside pocket. German jackets have two upper outside pockets as opposed to Italian ones which have a single one only, on the left. German jackets have two upper inside pockets, usually slanted, while the Italian type has only one, on the right and usually straight.

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Equipment and accessories

It has been observed that certain saboteurs have been issued with a large, handsome jack-knife made by J.A. SCHMIDT & SOHNE, SOLINGEN. This knife has a single stainless steel blade about four inches in length which closes into a wooden handle of a dark brown colour about five inches long. Another type given to saboteurs is probably of the same make and design, but has the additional feature of a catch on the side to allow the blade to close into the handle.

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Each of the same group of saboteurs was also given twenty small paper envelopes each containing twenty grains of saccharine, and bearing in blue printing a list of the contents in English, French, Russian and German. This was in no sense an emergency ration, but was to be used to trade with civilians for food or lodgings.

In addition to items given to them by the Germans, it has been noticed that quite a few agents use their own initiative and provide themselves with articles of equipment to assist them on their journey through the lines, such as compasses, concentrated foods, first aid material and other items which the genuine refugee would hardly be expected to have in his possession.

Identity papers

The procedure followed by almost all installations of the CIS for issuing agents with identity papers is now well known to us; either at the time of his recruitment or shortly before his despatch, the agent is instructed to produce a number of photographs of himself, and is later issued with an identity card in a false name.

It is interesting to note that an attempt is made to give the agent a card from his home town if it is in EOT, or at least from a town nearby, since he would be expected under interrogation to be familiar with his place of residence. This consideration, however, is normally overridden in the case of agents from towns in AOT, who are also given cards from towns in EOT which, of course, are not readily subject to a check by Allied Security agencies.

* * * * * * * *

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AMG - Gotyan Version

What is certainly the boldest attempt at forgery that we have so far encountered on the part of the CIS came to notice during the month in a pass carried by an SD agent. It was in the form of a card, printed at the top "ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT, Caserta Headquarters" ("Caserta" had been entered in manuscript over "EBOLI" which had been crossed out). The pass bore the official AMG stamp and was signed "Major R.L. LAILAR". The following was written in English: ".....has been questioned by CIC and AMG. They can see no reason why he cannot be O.K. He comes from SICILY and is trying to find his father in ROME. From a Security angle" (!)

That the author of this document was not too sure of his ground is shown by the fact that the agent was told to do his best to obtain a specimen of an authentic AMG pass while in AOI.

Recruiting methods

MORRI Mario, who for some time has been well known to us as an Abwehr

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agents with identity papers is now well known to us; either at the time of his recruitment or shortly before his despatch, the agent is instructed to produce a number of photographs of himself, and is later issued with an identity card in a false name.

It is interesting to note that an attempt is made to give the agent a card from his home town if it is in ZOT, or at least from a town nearby, since he would be expected under interrogation to be familiar with his place of residence. This consideration, however, is normally overridden in the case of agents from towns in AOT, who are also given cards from towns in ZOT which, of course, are not readily subject to a check by Allied Security agencies.

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00046

AMG - German Version

What is certainly the boldest attempt at forgery that we have so far encountered on the part of the CIS came to notice during the month in a pass carried by an SD agent. It was in the form of a card, printed at the top "ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT, Caserta Headquarters" ("Caserta" had been entered in manuscript over "ZEOLI" which had been crossed out). The pass bore the official AMG stamp and was signed "Major R.L. LAILER". The following was written in English: ".....has been questioned by CIC and AMG. They can see no reason why he cannot be O.K. He comes from SICILY and is trying to find his father in ROME. From a Security angle" (!)

That the author of this document was not too sure of his ground is shown by the fact that the agent was told to do his best to obtain a specimen of an authentic AMG pass while in AOT.

Recruiting methods

MONTI Mario, who for some time has been well known to us as an Abwehr recruiter, gave some interesting sidelights on his work to an agent who was subsequently captured during the month. He stated that he found PADUA a happy hunting ground and that Major BOTTAZZI, the head of the U.P.I. in PADUA, provided him with large numbers of recruits. MONTI, however, said that he had found that his practice of recruiting agents 7 or 8 at a time was causing confusion at the School and that in future he would limit himself to two recruits at a time. MONTI usually instructs his recruits to tell outsiders that they are working for the Todt organisation.

77218

Tell-tale money

For some little time it has been noticeable that the CIS is aware of the suspicion that rests on "refugees" carrying large sums of money. Various methods of concealing money have been mentioned in these Notes, but these have evidently not been adequate, as there have been several indications from interrogations carried out recently that short-range agents in particular are now paid only working expenses on despatch, the rate being 3,000 or 4,000 lire every ten days. This practice has the additional advantage of encouraging the agent to return across the lines to claim the tempting lump sum.

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Clothes-line cover:

An article in itself is usually innocent enough- but it may lead down to an agent's W/T set. One would hardly suspect a clothes-line of the ordinary, particularly if it was apparently of good sport rope. The SIS took advantage of this when they equipped one of their W/T agents, who was captured during the month, with what was ostensibly a genuine clothes line, except that the core was good copper aerial wire.

Choice in the menu

A high-class agent captured during the month admitted to being on his second mission. On his first, for which he had been dropped by parachute in Southern [redacted], he had journeyed up northwards by various means, collecting information on the way and finally being arrested and interrogated by SD.SR. To this he told the story that he was endeavouring to join his family in S. [redacted], and he was released. Possibly being short of money, he obtained employment in a British Officers' mess where he worked as a waiter for a week and then received his salary. He then obtained his release by saying that he was suffering from malaria and proceeded on his way to rejoin the Germans.

Morse Pocket Wireless

This subject was mentioned in the last issue of these Notes and it is now safe also to say that it forms a regular part of the training programme of sabotage agents. One such agent captured recently found the following in the kit allotted him: Changing combination labels on a filofy magazine; cutting pneumatic brake tubes; unlocking Yale locks and vacuum type bottle tops.

Pocket Kit

An agent captured a few days ago stated that other agents of Abwehrtrupp 150, when passing through the forward dump taking point at [redacted] near [redacted] on the way to the front, be supplied with footwear of Italian manufacture. Four agents have now been captured similarly equipped. A sketch is given below.

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information on the way and finally being arrested and [illegible]
To [illegible] the story that he was endeavouring to join his family in S.
Mikkeli, and he was released. Possibly being short of money, he got [illegible]
employment in a private office! Soon after he started as a waiter for a week
and was received [illegible]. He then obtained his release by saying that
he was suffering from malaria and proceeded on his way to rejoin his [illegible].

More Infantry without explosives

This subject was mentioned in the last issue of these Notes and it is now quite clear that it forms a regular part of the training programme of sabotage agents. One such agent captured recently stated the following in the last published last month: Complete combination locks on railway wagons; cutting pneumatic brake tubes; switching warning-lamps and vacuum type brake tubes

Footwear

An agent captured a few days ago stated that other agents of Abwehrtrupp 150, when passing through the forward camp taking point at [illegible] near Rovaniemi on the way to the front, are supplied with footwear of Russian manufacture. Four agents have now been captured similarly equipped. A sketch is given below.



The leather is of approximately the same tone of brown as the U.S. Government army issue. The construction is poor and the stitching sharp. The toe is plain and there are seven eyelets rimmed with black metal.

4. [illegible]

Interrogation of [illegible]

..t one o'clock in the morning of 19th November a full rating, one of three "[illegible]" stationed in the small lighthouse on the end of the northern breakwater of the port of [illegible], walked along the mole and threw into the water [illegible] anti-limpet charge. ..s he did so he noticed a dark

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shape alongside the mole and heard a slight cough. He returned to his post, collected his mates and the party of three advanced on this form, one firing a shot as they did so. Three men emerged from the water and surrendered. They were wearing green felt skull caps of the "Balaclava helmet" type, with dark camouflage netting attached, and their faces were blackened. When they were later examined to better advantage their clothing was found to consist of dark blue overalls, over which was fitted a submarine breathing apparatus, rubber skin suits set in rubber shoes with large GAMA flippers attached, and next to the skin, thick woollen under-garments. In addition each carried a money belt containing nearly 50,000 lire in newly printed and consecutively numbered Banca d'Italia notes, knife, wrist compass and two metal clamps hanging from a weighted belt. The leader of the party had the rank-badge of an Italian Sottotenente on his overalls and each of his assistants wore on their lapels two Republican Fascist badges in white metal depicting a wreath and Roman broadsword, the latter with the word "ITALIA" on its hilt. Each wore a service identity disc around his neck, and when the question arose of treating them not as members of the armed forces but as saboteurs out of uniform, it was to this disc rather than to their badges that they referred in order to establish their military status.

Immediately after capture they were segregated, searched and questioned individually. It was found that they had entered the water some three hours earlier from a 10 M.S Flotilla craft which had brought them from their starting point at S.ELENO up the coast to a point some two or three kilometres north-west of the northern entrance to LEGHORN harbour. The Naval authorities took immediate steps to alert the port, the illumination being further increased, 3045 charge-dropping intensified, and keel searches of all ships in the vicinity undertaken, whilst a P.T. boat put to sea in the hope of making contact with the parent craft of the limpeteers. As the events of the night were more fully revealed by subsequent interrogation of the captives, however, it became clear that no damage would result from the attack which was barely under way when its would-be authors surrendered. But they had all "shown willing" for each had swum with two bilge-keel bombs of a new type on his belt and had assisted with the tow of a large rubber sack containing four sets of civilian clothing and various personal effects for shore use, including false identity cards, three BERETTA pistols and ammunition, and a quantity of concentrated food. The swim was more exhausting than they had anticipated, as the leader explained to his captors, for the unexpected brightness of the port lighting prohibited a nearer approach by their craft. They were also unprepared for the frequency and strength of the anti-limpeteer charges used in the harbour, and in general their briefing was inadequate to the task before them. The three were therefore in rather poor shape as they rested at the mole (one was suffering from convulsions resulting from a torn suit) and when the sentry opened fire they promptly abandoned both their equipment and their mission.

The limpeteers, Tenente MELACHINE, Sotto Capo BERTONCIN and Meringio SORGETTI of the 10 MAS Flotilla were first brought together in the VALDAGNO Office of Lieut WOLK, Commanding Officer of the GAMMA Group early in November. Previously they had undergone extensive swimming training, two on the island of SAN GIORGIO, near VENICE, and the third at VALDAGNO. For the planning of their attack there was available a set of air photos taken over LEGHORN about 20 Oct and this appears to have been the most concrete piece of information

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Thus while [redacted] and his crew underwent a six day interrogation, [redacted] was waiting at La [redacted] for his follow-up mission. The weather remained unfavourable, and it was decided to postpone the attempt until the December dark period. [redacted] spent the interval in a journey to MILAN and GENOA, where he commandeered VE, and in getting him gear in order at [redacted]. By the evening of 10 December he was ready to start off, declining the substitute whom WOLK had provided in view of his medical condition. WOLK had informed [redacted] that the [redacted] trio had successfully established themselves, having cleared their equipment using the burned-out oil tanks in the port. Engine trouble postponed the venture till 11 Dec, when at approximately 2130 hrs [redacted] was put into the water a mile off LEGHORN, together with his ten packs and some subsidiary objects. Once more the necessary effort proved greater and more prolonged than had been expected, and it was a very exhausted swimmer who got ashore nearly nine hours later, close to the breakwater MARZOCCO oil basin at the north end of the main harbour. Naturally, no [redacted] was there to receive him, and he abandoned the packs on the beach together with his flippers and oxygen apparatus, donning over his blue overalls a light brown water-proof which had been carried separately. It is not clear whether he was setting off to find his associates or whether, as he asserts, he was beginning a long trek to [redacted], his former home, when at 0630 hrs, he was arrested by the U.S. Military Guard on the West mole of the PISA Canal. The sentry had noticed the tell-tale rubber shoes with large eyelets, peeked to the rubber trousers. [redacted]'s party was forthwith reunited under Allied auspices.

From their various interrogations valuable information has been obtained concerning other possible operations of a similar nature on LEGHORN for which counter-reception measures have been made. Fresh light too has been thrown on the training methods and technical developments in limpet-mine warfare as conceived by WOLK, and on the relations between his German and Italian trainees. It appears that the Italians have been starved of essential equipment since their stores at La [redacted] were destroyed, and consequently they must beg, borrow or steal from the Germans the explosives, oxygen, rubber suits etc, without which a limpeteer remains grounded. WOLK even had to buy petrol on the Black market in order to keep his trucks on the road.

In conclusion the following aspects of this case are perhaps worth special mention : firstly, the sentries' prompt segregation of their prisoners which made it impossible for the latter to arrange a concerted cover story; then the production during their interrogation of several homely details on life in the 10th M.S culled from the Security files (for instance, how SOLETTI's pal had recently had a [redacted] test), which gave the desired impression that the interrogators "knew it all anyway"; thirdly, the alertness of the US guard who captured Sotto Tenente [redacted] after being told to keep a watch out for individuals in rubber limpeteer footwear; and finally, of course, the confession of [redacted] the latter of [redacted] that far too little concrete information had been given on the sea and security defences of LEGHORN when the operation was launched.

Sabotage of [redacted]

Previous editions of these Notes have included reports of two sabotage attempts in the [redacted] area directed against [redacted]. A third occurred during the night 16/17 Dec 44 when four [redacted] on the [redacted] airfield (61 7707) were

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[illegible] to the rubber trousers. [illegible] united under Allied banners.

From their various interrogations valuable information has been obtained concerning other possible operations of a similar nature on LEMNOS for which adequate reception measures have been made. Fresh light too has been thrown on the training methods and technical developments in Limpetcer warfare as conceived by SCIA, and on the relations between his German and Italian trainees. It appears that the Italians have been starved of essential equipment since their stores at L. SPEZIA were destroyed, and consequently they must beg, borrow or steal from the Germans the explosives, oxygen, rubber suits etc, without which a limpeteer remains grounded. SCIA even had to buy petrol on the black market in order to keep his trucks on the road.

In conclusion the following aspects of this case are perhaps worth special mention : Firstly, the surprise prompt segregation of their prisoners which made it impossible for the latter to arrange a concerted cover story; then the production during their interrogation of several homely details on life in the 10th MAS culled from the Security files (for instance, how SCIARRI's gut had recently had a MASSIGLI test), which gave the desired impression that the interrogator "knew it all anyway"; thirdly, the alertness of the US guard who captured Sotto Tenente FAVONE after being told to keep a watch out for individuals wearing limpeteer footwear; and finally, of course, the confession of [illegible] and later of FAVONE that for the little accurate information had been given on the set and security defences of LEMNOS when the operation was launched.

Sabotage of HT

Previous editions of these Notes have included reports of two sabotage attempts in the RHODES area directed against HT. A third occurred during the night 18/19 Dec 44 when four RAF trucks on the [illegible] airfield (K 7707) were almost completely demolished by the explosion of charges placed under the bonnets: all four charges exploded simultaneously. The trucks were parked beside the coast road about 30 yards from the water's edge.

At the same time as the explosions occurred an import at multiple signal line was found to be cut and the ends of wires were [illegible] indicating that they might have been tapped.

Eleven days later a party of four members of the SAN MARCO Port (1 Offr, and 3 Ors) was captured, not far from the scene of the incident. These men, who were all dressed in uniform with insignia of the Italian expeditionary Army, admitted to the sabotage of the four lorries and stated that they had landed by rubber dinghy during the night 18/19 Dec. They further stated that another party of four had landed the same night in a second dinghy, having lost their explosives en route. This party has also been rounded up, and yet a third group has since been landed, of which three out of five have so far been caught.

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The results of the interrogations are not yet available but it would appear likely that the wire-cutting incident was also the work of one or other of the first two parties.

5. SOME LEFTIST POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

The following notes on certain lesser known Leftist movements extracted from G-2 R.A.F. Security Summary covering November should provide useful background information for FSS/CIC when assessing the security implications of various political groups or activity in their area.

Movimento Partigiano

"The Movimento Partigiano is directed by a Direzione Centrale of 14 to 20 members with an inner executive committee of 7 members. At present the Direzione Centrale consists of the founders of the Movimento, principally the .ERRONI family and friends. It is, however, proposed to hold at some future date and thereafter yearly a national congress at which the Direzione Centrale will be elected or reelected. In each province there is a Direzione Provinciale of 3 to 5 members elected by the Assemblea Provinciale which is made up of delegates from each group or section. The groups or sections are constituted in each commune, a group consisting of 3 to 20 members and a section of 20 or more.

The following is the official programme of the Movimento Partigiano taken by a reliable contact from official circulars.

(i) The defence of the true frontiers of ITALY which the Fascist Monarchy compromised by entering an anti-national, anti-democratic, anti-European war.

(ii) The defence of democratic ideas which now reveal themselves incompatible with the institution of the Monarchy.

(iii) The defence of a social system founded on popular liberty and assuring for manual and intellectual workers the full fruit of their labours.

(iv) The universal brotherhood of all Partisans, disregarding national frontiers. The Partisans represent the popular, idealistic, revolutionary element in the present war. Far more than national or mercenary armies, the Partisans throughout the world are moved by an ideal of brotherhood on which can be built a true confederation of nations and international justice for all.

Para (i) of this programme may well contain the seeds of future agitation while in para (iv) the basic idea of international brotherhood provides the main point of contact between this movement and the more orthodox form of international Communism.

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Para (i) of this programme may well contain the seeds of future agitation while in para (iv) the basic idea of international brotherhood provides the main point of contact between this movement and the more orthodox form of international Communism.

During a recent conversation, Carlo ANDREONI is reported to have openly declared his adherence to the classic revolutionary doctrine that the Movimento and other leftist parties must make their own headway by the old tactics of stirring up popular discontent through playing on grievances and doing everything possible by propaganda to create a revolutionary atmosphere in ITALY.

ROCCHI Claudio, one of the chief assistants of ANDREONI, is reported to have declared that the political aims of the Movimento Partigiano are republican, and that it desires to absorb into the movement all those who are disillusioned with the six official parties, as well as ex-Partisans, ex-soldiers and repatriated prisoners. Like the Movimento Communista, the Partito Communista and to some extent the Socialist Party, it appears to be trading on, and even encouraging the growing forces of disillusionment and discontent in the country. A leading article, entitled "Il diritto di Insurrezione" which recently appeared in "Il Partigiano", the organ of the Movimento Partigiano, propounded the theory of the legitimacy of popular risings in certain circumstances and was an outspoken indication of the way left-wing opinion is moving."

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Movimento Comunista d'Italia

"This dissident Communist organisation has as its programme the organisation of ITALY "for revolutionary action on a Marxist basis" with a view to class revolution and to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Movimento is distinct from the official Partito Comunista and is engaged in active independent propaganda. It has its own organisation of sections, consisting of Secretariat, Administration, Propaganda, Assistance and Discipline Cells. A Military cell is also reported to exist but is at present secret and never mentioned in writing. Circular letters addressed to all "Commissari Straordinari di Sezioni" by the HQ of the Movement and dated 18 July contained instructions to start a "Centre of Marxist Culture" and to take particular care in choosing the members of the propaganda cell. The Movement is reported to number 24 Sections in ROME and district with a membership of about 4,000. Its executive committee is said to consist of POCE, [redacted], PERRO, [redacted] and MENDINO. POCE Antonio, who is the chief organiser is a personal friend of [redacted] Carlo of the Movimento Partigiano, the absorption of which into the Movimento Comunista is stated to be now the subject of negotiation. The Movimento Comunista d'Italia is reported recently to have absorbed the "Sinistra Proletaria" and the "Comunisti Libertari". The latter is a fanatical anarchist group of Trotskyist tendencies which aims at the destruction of the "bourgeoisie" and the established order of things by Robin Hood tactics which provide for the "elimination" of rich landowners, provided that their wealth is put at the disposal of the proletariat".

Communist Youth Groups

"Investigation has been made into the organisation known as "K" or "Kappa" Squads which operated in ROME during the German occupation and which are still in existence. These squads are composed of young men between the ages of 18 and 24, recruited from the various Communist groups, and are led by a man named "[redacted]". Members of the "K" Squads were trained in the use of arms and explosives and the commission of sabotage. Their activities are stated to have been a source of considerable trouble to the Germans and the Fascists. At the present time, the "K" Squads, though not active, are reported to have grown in strength and to have accumulated large supplies of arms and ammunition left behind by the enemy. It is reported that the organisation is not anti-Allied and that meetings are now held less frequently than in the past. The aim of the movement is said to be action against the opponents of Communism and preparation for the Communist revolution which is being planned for ITALY."

6. OTHER ITEMS OF GENERAL SECURITY INTEREST

Civilian Road Movement by Night

The last reports have now been received on the special weeks drive organised during the second half of November against illicit civilian movement by night. The results were reasonably satisfactory in that they showed that there is not in fact a widespread disregard of movement regulations in the operational zone. In general, the proportion of infringements was approximately five per-cent of persons checked, the majority of these cases being in the rear Army, district or L of C Section areas. Illegal movement in the Corps areas was almost negligible; in Polish Corps area, for example, over ten thousand persons were checked on

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Forged Passes

A certain number of forged movement permits have been encountered during the past few weeks. Those discovered have been clumsy efforts, readily detectible as forgeries. One case, however, now under investigation, is suspective of a serious attempt to produce effectively forged MP documents, possibly for wider use than a purely personal one; where circumstances permit, nothing more than a cursory examination of documents is therefore advocated at check-posts etc.

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Attacks on Allied Military Personnel

On 7 Dec the naked body of a Polish L/Cpl who had been sent as IR from DOMADOLA M 3906 to PIEVE SALUTARE M 3409 on a motor cycle at 2100 hrs on 1 Dec was discovered in the river near the former town. He had been in the water for at least three or four days, having been beaten to death by blows on the head. No trace was to be found of his motorcycle, clothing or documents, including an unimportant despatch which he was carrying.

On 9 Dec another body was found in the same locality, death having been caused by the same means. The victim was a soldier of a Cyprus Mule Coy who had been stripped of his trousers but who was otherwise clothed.

Local investigations at DOMADOLA have produced a number of suspects, including former members of the BRIGATA NERA who may possibly have carried out the murders as part of some stay-behind subversive or sabotage plan. Interrogations and enquiries are proceeding with a view to confirming the truth of this tentative theory, or to discovering any alternative culprits.

Trends of enemy propaganda to Allied troops

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Since the Allied invasion in the West, GOEBBELS has repeatedly sought to rally his public with the assertion that, provided military defeat could be staved off by new mobilisations, sacrifices and secret weapons, a decisive political victory, which was already taking shape, would see the Allies disintegrated into mutually conflicting blocks and sap their determination to achieve GERMANY's isolation and utter defeat. This disruptive theme is reflected in enemy radio and leaflet propaganda to Allied fighting troops in ITALY. Thus the British soldier is told that he is shedding his blood in order to strengthen STALIN's hold in EUROPE, and that RUSSIA gains influence in ROUMANIA, BULGARIA the BALKANS and the Near East whilst ENGLAND, exhausted morally and economically under CHURCHILL's sinister leadership, is powerless to prevent the Empire from dissolving into impotency and decay. A typical leaflet recently depicted British and German soldiers locked in a death struggle on a pile of grinning skulls in a wilderness, whilst an evil-looking carrion crow representing STALIN perched watching on the limb of a blasted tree : the accompanying text here, as also in the broadcast version, is to the effect that every blow to-day against GERMANY is helping to destroy the Power in EUROPE for whose assistance ENGLAND will cry out when STALIN turns on the latter. Complementary to the argument that BERLIN's position vis à vis RUSSIA is deteriorating, is the tale that American enrichment and domination is something else that the British soldier should be fighting against instead of for : And of course this is spiced with lurid accounts of the amorous adventures of US troops in the United Kingdom.

American troops are also fed with stories of Bolshevic intrigue, as well as of British bad faith and opportunism. They are urged not to fight to create a Bolshevic EUROPE or SOUTH AMERICA nor to bolster up a rotten and reactionary British Empire. A frequent argument is that the war in EUROPE, especially against GERMANY is not AMERICA's affair and that at best the men on the Italian front, who should by rights be at home, have been forced into fighting by President ROOSEVELT [illegible]

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Since the Allied invasion in the West, GOEBBELS has repeatedly sought to rally his public with the assertion that, provided military defeat could be staved off by new mobilisations, sacrifices and secret weapons, a decisive political victory, which was already taking shape, would see the Allies disintegrated into mutually conflicting blocks and sap their determination to achieve GERMANY's isolation and utter defeat. This disruptive theme is reflected in enemy radio and leaflet propaganda to Allied fighting troops in ITALY. Thus the British soldier is told that he is shedding his blood in order to strengthen STALIN's hold in EUROPE, and that RUSSIA gains influence in ROUMANIA, BULGARIA the BALKANS and the Near East whilst ENGLAND, exhausted morally and economically under CHURCHILL's sinister leadership, is powerless to prevent the Empire from dissolving into impotency and decay. A typical leaflet recently depicted British and German soldiers locked in a death struggle on a pile of grinning skulls in a wilderness, whilst an evil-looking carrion crow representing STALIN perched watching on the limb of a blasted tree : the accompanying text here, as also in the broadcast version, is to the effect that every blow to-day against GERMANY is helping to destroy the Power in EUROPE for whose assistance ENGLAND will cry out when STALIN turns on the latter. Complementary to the argument that BRITAIN's position vis à vis RUSSIA is deteriorating, is the tale that American enrichment and domination is something else that the British soldier should be fighting against instead of for : And of course this is spiced with lurid accounts of the amorous adventures of US troops in the United Kingdom.

American troops are also fed with stories of Bolshevic intrigue, as well as of British bad faith and opportunism. They are urged not to fight to create a Bolshevic EUROPE or SOUTH AMERICA nor to bolster up a rotten and reactionary British Empire. A frequent argument is that the war in EUROPE, especially against GERMANY is not AMERICA's affair and that at best the men on the Italian front, who should by rights be at home, have been forced into fighting by President ROOSEVELT, who, it appears, is led by one ear by the Jews of Wall Street and by the other by the Reds of the Kremlin.

The crisis in GREECE, as treated by the German radio for the consumption by Allied troops, also provides a good example of these anti-Russian and separatist tactics. British troops are told that the resistance to ELAS, in which their comrades' lives are being sacrificed, is a farce because CHURCHILL has secretly sold out to MOSCOW, which already dominates the Western Mediterranean whilst the American statement on "non-intervention" is represented as both a stab in BRITAIN's back, and as a sign of the State Department's subservience to MOSCOW, in a vain attempt to gain Russian support against JAPAN.

Race and colour also receive their full measure of attention: for example, coloured troops are told that they are fighting the White Man's war. Polish-Russian relations also provide obvious material, though the results achieved in this direction cannot be very gratifying to the enemy propaganda agencies concerned. Finally there is an attempt to create or aggravate dissension within individual Allied nations. An example of this is the question of conscription in CANADA, over which enemy propaganda seeks to stir up or aggravate resentment among Canadian troops overseas against the "Zombies"

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(troops serving in the Dominion who have not volunteered for duty abroad), by putting out stories of the selfishness and political "pull" of the troops at home.

It would seem that the Germans have used this type of propaganda for so long that they are beginning to believe it themselves. At least, a recent broadcast to their own troops in Italy announced that the moment is approaching when "the Allied' perception of the dangers inherent in Bolshevism will be linked with their necessity to draw conclusions from unbearable German resistance", and a different talk to German soldiers on the "Canadian crisis" concluded optimistically "....more than ever we have reason to hold out - the others will stop first."

Apart from the anti-enemy propaganda effort directed towards creating dissension within the Allied ranks on the principle of "divide and destroy", a number of subsidiary themes are to be noted, some of them no less insidious in their nature, but none of them characterised by any appeal to reason or logic. There is, for instance, the type of leaflet depicting either the joys and comforts of home life (often complete with "pin-up" girl), or the tragic repercussions at home of a soldier's death at the front, and reminding the soldier of the desirability of returning home safe and sound, of the stupidity of getting killed in the last round or eleventh hour, and of the wisdom of using the "attached safe-conduct pass" into the German lines. German PW Camps in the heart of beautiful GERMANY, are described as havens of rest and recreation where prisoners receive frequent and regular mail from their families and apparently do nothing but sunbathe, study, play football, enjoy camp "shows" and even innumerable Red Cross parcels whilst awaiting a speedy return home. This type of leaflet is usually abundantly illustrated with photographs of war graves, casualty lists, home fire-sales, PW Camp amenities, etc in an effort to render it the more convincing. It has been much in evidence during the Christmas period in an attempt to take advantage of the pangs of homesickness induced by that festival and its associations.

The Jewish bogey, an ever popular favourite, is put across with typical Teutonic heavy-handedness, the Jew being indicted variously for his financial machinations, his war-mongering activity, or the unwelcome attentions he is alleged to pay to his (Aryan) stenographer.

In connection with this and other themes, a pornographic element is sometimes involved in pictorial leaflets, presumably with the aim of ensuring that they will produce at least some initial interest even though their reading matter may be dull.

Finally there is the type of propaganda designed to arouse fear, particularly for the safety of families at home. Extravagant accounts of the allegedly devastating effects of V1 and V2, coupled with the threats of bigger and more diabolical horrors to come, have been given considerable publicity by the enemy and there is little doubt that, until the true facts were fully and widely known among troops, these tactics did indeed cause a considerable measure of anxiety.

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On the whole, all reports tend to indicate that enemy radio and leaflet propaganda directed against Allied troops in N.W.E. has proved almost wholly ineffective. This lack of success is probably due to the fact that such propaganda, in easily recognisable for what it is - a product of the enemy, and as such it is almost invariably regarded as either false or amusing. If more subtle methods of propaganda were developed so that the source or inspiration were concealed, the results might well prove more significant. And security services should bear in mind the importance of following any indications of enemy subversive propaganda.

W. D. Gibson Lt-Col
for Brigadier
DCS(I)

ENCLOSURE:

DISTRIBUTION:

As for "Notes on Counter Intelligence in Italy" dated 28 Nov 44,
Less: DCS- Plus: GC (Sy) and HQ Corps

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CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

10 JAN 1945

GBI-389.514 (ITALY)

6 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence in Italy.

TO : G.S.I. (b) H.Q. 15 Army Group.
H.Q. Allied Commission.
G.S.I. (b) H.Q. No. 1 District.
G.S.I. (b) H.Q. No. 2 District.
G.S.I. (b) H.Q. No. 3 District.
A.C. of S., G-2, H.Q. R.A.A.C.
A.C. of S., G-2, H.Q. P.B.S.
A.C. of S., G-2, H.Q. P.B.S. (Southern District).
A.C. of S., A-2 AAF/MTO.
Securite Militaire ROME(Commandant PARISOT)
No. 1 S.C.I. Unit.
S.C.I. 'Z' Unit.
C.O. 2677 Regt.

1. GENERAL.

a. The responsibility for I(b)/CI in the area of No. 1 District and in that part of PB3 in the former Operational Zone passed to AFHQ at 0001 hours, 1 January 1945. Similarly No. 2 District came under command of AFHQ at the same date.

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b. Thus Allied Commission, No. 1 District, No. 2 District, No. 3 District, R.A.A.C. and P.B.S. are now responsible to G-2, (CI) AFHQ for all I(b)/CI matters.

c. H.Q. 15 Army Group is authorised to distribute direct to Nos.1 and 2 Districts and P.B.S. I(b)/CI information of immediate interest or importance, and in other respects to maintain liaison and cooperation with those Headquarters.

d. The departments of A.C. dealing with security matters (i.e. Security Branch, Public Safety Commission and Legal Sub-Commission) are authorized to consult H.Q. 15 Army Group regarding security matters in the Army areas.

2. ORGANIZATIONS.

AFHQ is the H.Q. responsible for, and the main channel for dealing with, the following I(b)/CI organizations, the responsibilities of which extend over the whole

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Securite Militaire [illegible]
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AFHQ is the H.Q. responsible for, and the main channel for dealing with, the following I(b)/CI organizations, the responsibilities of which extend over the whole of Italy:

a. SIM(CS)HQ.

The responsibilities of the AFHQ I(b)/CI Liaison officer have been laid down separately.

b. CSDIC(CI Section).

H.Q. 15 Army Group will continue to have the right to refer cases of agents captured in the Army areas direct to CSDIC(CI Section) for detailed interrogation.

c. S.C.I. Units.

The above units will remain under control of AFHQ. No. 1 S.C.I. Unit will co-ordinate the work of Nos.

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... 2, 3 and 'Z' Units and all will continue to work in close collaboration with H. Q. 15 Army Group and their subordinate formations as hitherto.

d. French Sécurite Militaire.

The officers of Sécurité Militaire remaining in Italy will collaborate with security agencies as heretofore under the overall control of AFHQ.

3. INTERNEE CAMPS.

a. This Headquarters is responsible for security policy at "A" and "B" Civilian Internee Camps (formerly No. 1 and No. 2 Internee Camps) at PADULA and TERNI respectively.

b. The existing directives containing the procedure to be followed at each camp regarding releases will continue to apply. These are to be found in para. 7 of AG 383. 7/057 GEG-O of 1 December, 1944, in respect of "A" Internee Camp and A.A.I. letter 1401/7/GSI(b) of 7 December, 1944 in respect of "B" Internee Camp.

c. In future, recommendations for release of those internees at "B" Internee Camp described in para. 6b of the above mentioned letter of 7 December, 1944 will be submitted to the A.C. of S., G-2(CI) this Headquarters instead of to GSI(b) 15th Army Group.

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d. All relevant information held by Districts and Base Sections regarding internees whether favourable or not should be forwarded to the Commandant of the Camp at which the internee is held for appropriate action by the Reviewing Officer in accordance with the instructions contained in AGMF/1401/7/G (IB) dated 3 March 1944.

4. CONTROL OF CIVIL MOVEMENT.

AFHQ is responsible for defining the Restricted Line (between Restricted Zone and Free Zone) and also, in consultation with H. Q. 15 Army Group, for defining the Rear Army Security Control Line as the future dictates. No change in the existing boundary between the Restricted Zone and Free Zone is at present contemplated, but when such a change is found necessary AC will make recommendations to AFHQ for consideration of the question from a security standpoint.

5. REPORTS.

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5. REPORTS.

a. No. 1 District, No. 3 District, R.A.A.C., P.B.S. and AAF/MTO will render one monthly security report, in quadruplicate, to AFHQ, forwarding copies to H. Q. 15 Army Group. These reports will cover the calendar month and will be forwarded in time to reach AFHQ not later than the 7th of the following month.

b. Separate instructions will be issued at a later date to No. 2 District.

c. C.S.D.I.C. will continue to send copies of all interrogation reports to AFHQ and H. Q. 15 Army Group who will each extract relevant information therefrom and circulate it to its subordinate headquarters.

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INFO Div.

6. AFHQ letter B-389.514(ITALY) dated 15 September 1944, subject: Counter Intelligence in Southern ITALY is hereby cancelled.

S.S. Hill-Dillon.

S.S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

Copy to: A.C. of S., G-5, AFHQ.
G-2 (PW), AFHQ.
SIM/CS Liaison.
'A' Internee Camp.
'B' Internee Camp.

0:000

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Copy to: A.G. of S., G-5, AFHQ.
G-2 (PW), AFHQ.
SIM/CS Liaison.
'A' Internee Camp.
'B' Internee Camp.

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SECURITY DIV

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) OB-S-B-M

FM/cc 2B-939 Pentagon

13 November 1944

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SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps.

TO : * * * * *
Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations.
* * * * *

1. This letter sets forth the basic policies and principles which govern the organization, training, supply, and operation of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

2. The counter Intelligence Corps was authorized by letter, AG 320.2 (12 Dec 41) M-M-B, 13 December 1944, subject: "Redesignation of the Corps of Intelligence Police".

3. The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps is to contribute to the successful operations of the Army of the United States through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage.

4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, establishes War Department policies concerning the Counter Intelligence Corps.

5. The Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Director of Intelligence) exercises supervision of administration and operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps throughout the military establishment under policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. The principal functions of the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, in this connection, include:

a. To supervise procurement and assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel and to pass upon qualifications of applicants.

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b. To supervise specialized training of personnel procured in the continental United States for Counter Intelligence Corps duty.

c. To determine and arrange for supply of specialized investigative equipment that cannot be handled through normal supply channels.

d. To supervise administration and operation of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

e. To arrange undercover status for agents when requested by using agencies.

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6. ORGANIZATION.--Counter Intelligence Corps detachments are organized in accordance with T/O & E 30-500, 24 January 1944.

7. PROCUREMENT.

a. The procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is in accordance with Section I, War Department Circular 379, 19 September 1944.

b. Personnel will not be released from the Counter Intelligence Corps except for a specific reason, and such releases will be reported promptly through channels to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Director of Intelligence.

c. Surplus Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be reported, for assignment elsewhere, to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Director of Intelligence.

8. TRAINING.

a. The training of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is in accordance with War Department Memorandum Number 350-44, 7 September 1944.

b. Each using organization will give Counter Intelligence Corps personnel such additional training as may be required to qualify them for Counter Intelligence Corps work with that organization. The detachment commander is responsible to insure that each Counter Intelligence Corps officer and enlisted man maintains a high standard of physical condition and a high state of training as a soldier, that each secures and maintains proficiency in the use of technical equipment and firearms, and that each gains a useful knowledge of a foreign language required in the area of operation.

9. ASSIGNMENT.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are assigned to Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, Theaters of Operations, Caribbean Defense Command, Alaskan Department, and Base Commands.

b. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel on duty with the Air Transport Command are assigned to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and are subject to the provisions of current War Department policies pertaining to the Air Transport Command.

10. UNIFORM.--Authorization for the wearing by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel of such military and civilian clothing as is required for accomplishment of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission is a comman responsibility. The appropriate command will issue directives from time to time concerning the type of clothing to be worn by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

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11. CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS.

a. The administration of confidential funds will be in accordance with letter, AG 123 (8 May 1944)OB-S-B-M, 10 May 1944, subject: Use of Military Intelligence Funds, to the Commanding Generals Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area; the Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations, Defense Commands, Alaskan Department, First thru Ninth Service Commands, Northwest Service Command, Military District of Washington, and Independent Base Commands.

b. The missions to which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are assigned are often exceptional in character, requiring unusual and unforeseen activities and expenditures. The G-2, A-2, or the S-2 of any command to which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are assigned or attached, is authorized to furnish to Counter Intelligence Corps detachments Military Intelligence funds necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. Supervision over the expenditure of the Military Intelligence funds will be maintained to the end that expenditures are justified by expected results.

c. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be reimbursed from confidential funds in accordance with existing War Department regulations and directives.

d. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel operating privately owned vehicles on government business will be reimbursed for mileage in accordance with existing War Department directives.

12. RATIONS AND QUARTERS.--When required, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be authorized separate rations or monetary allowance in lieu of rations and/or quarters in accordance with Army regulations.

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13. CIVILIAN CLOTHING.--The purchase of civilian clothing for, and the use of civilian clothing by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is in accordance with letter, AG 420 (26 Aug 44)OB-S-B-M, 29 August 1944, subject: Civilian Clothing for Counter Intelligence Corps Personnel as amended to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area; the Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations, Defense Commands, Alaskan Department, First thru Ninth Service Commands, Northwest Service Command, Military District of Washington, Ports of Embarkation, Independent Base Commands, the Commanding Officers, Ports of Embarkation. The purchase of articles of the civilian uniform will be handled in the same manner as civilian clothing.

14. CREDENTIALS.--The preparation, issue and accounting of badges and credentials for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is in accordance with letter, AG 200.2 (10 Aug 44)OB-S-B-M, 12 August 1944, subject: Issuance of Credentials and Badges to Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area; the Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations, Caribbean Defense Command, Alaskan Department, Independent Base Commands; Chief of Engineers.

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15. SUPPLY.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments are equipped in accordance with the following War Department publications:

(1) Table of Organization and Equipment 30-500, 24 January 1944.

(2) Letter, AG 400 (27 Nov 43)OB-S-SPDDL-M, 29 November 1943, subject: Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for the Counter Intelligence Corps.

(3) War Department Circular Number 203, 23 May 1944, subject: Supply of Overseas Commands. (paragraph 9b).

b. All organizational equipment listed in T/O & E 30-500 will be requisitioned through the regular supply channels of the unit to which the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment concerned is assigned or attached.

c. Items in the Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies will be requisitioned through channels from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Director of Intelligence. The transmission of requests for investigative equipment to the above address from overseas Counter Intelligence Corps units is authorized by War Department Circular Number 203, cited above.

d. Items in the Special List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies are for the use of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel only.

e. Responsibility and accountability for Counter Intelligence Corps property whether organizational or investigative is in accordance with existing Army Regulations.

f. If damaged technical investigative equipment cannot be repaired by existing army facilities available to the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment such unserviceable equipment should be returned to the following address:

Transportation Officer,
Camp Ritchie, Maryland.
Attention: CIC Depot.

A covering letter explaining the circumstances should accompany the equipment. If any item of investigative equipment is damaged beyond repair, lost, or destroyed, it will be salvaged or surveyed in accordance with existing Army regulations.

g. Firing with weapons authorized for the Counter Intelligence Corps is carried out in accordance with provisions of AR 775-10. If .38 caliber special ammunition, including steel jacket ammunition for overseas use, cannot be secured from a local supply unit it may be requisitioned as set forth in paragraph 15c above.

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h. Supplementary gasoline and tire purchase permits for the use of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel operating privately owned automobiles on official business will be made available in the Zone of the Interior. The procurement and distribution of rationed items will be governed by appropriate directives issued by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to the headquarters of the interested commands.

16. CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION.

a. In all cases where the time element is vital, direct communication between Counter Intelligence Corps detachments is authorized, such communication being reported promptly to the G-2, A-2, or S-2 involved.

b. All communications relating to the Counter Intelligence Corps and intended for the War Department will be dispatched through Channels to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D.C., Attention: Director of Intelligence.

17. ADMINISTRATION.--Administration of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments will be the responsibility of the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area; Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations, Caribbean Defense Command, Alaskan Department, and Base Commands. The detachment commander is responsible to the appropriate commander through the G-2, A-2, or S-2, concerned, for the internal administration of the detachment.

18. PUBLICITY.

a. When operating in civilian clothing or the civilian uniform Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be addressed as "Mister" and rank will not be revealed in orders.

b. With the exception of Identification Card, WD, AGO 65, identification cards issued to Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not bear a military title.

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19. REPORTS.

a. Monthly Reports will be submitted to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Director of Intelligence, in accordance with War Department Memorandum Number 380-44, 5 October 1944.

b. The counter Intelligence Corps detachment commander will accomplish such other reports as may be required by the appropriate G-2, A-2, or S-2.

c. All records and reports which tend to establish the identities, locations, or activities of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, will be given a classification sufficiently high to insure adequate safeguarding of the information contained therein.

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20. POWER OF ARREST.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel on duty in the United States has only that power of arrest which all citizens of the United States possess and those powers of arrest granted to military personnel by the Articles of War and existing Army Regulations.

b. Subject to policies established by the appropriate overseas command, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel on duty overseas have full power and authority to arrest or detain any person who violates military security or whose detention is otherwise deemed necessary for the accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission.

21. JURISDICTION.

a. The jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment is limited by the counterintelligence jurisdiction of the command with which it is serving. The extent of this jurisdiction in the Zone of Interior is determined by current War Department directives.

b. In overseas commands, jurisdiction is limited by the counter-intelligence responsibility of the command and by existing international agreements.

22. OPERATIONS.

a. In commands with which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are ordered to duty, the G-2, A-2, or S-2, assisted by his counterintelligence staff officers, is responsible to his commander for general supervision of, and advice pertaining to, the employment of such personnel. Actural employment, however, is a function of command to be exercised through the commanding officer of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment.

b. The commanding officer of the detachment is responsible for detailed planning regarding the employment of his detachment personnel. Necessary counterintelligence information upon which such planning is to be based will be provided by the G-2 or A-2 counterintelligence staff concerned.

c. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be encouraged to exercise initiative to the fullest extent, and, in the performance of their duties they will be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions of movement When consistent with the policies of the appropriate Commander, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observance of standard military customs or prohibitions nor by the Military Police or other military agencies. Counter Intelligence Corps badges and credentials will be honored at all times.

d. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will be employed only on tasks involving a counterintelligence interest. They will not be employed on combat intelligence missions, routine Prisoner of War interrogations,

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black market investigations, criminal investigations, investigations of cases involving only moral turpitude, irregularities not concerned with subversion, counterintelligence, sedition and similar matters, nor other work which is properly the function of another agency and which may retard or interfere with the performance of counterintelligence duties. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will not be assigned to kitchen police, fatigue, guard, or other duties of comparable nature.

23. DUTIES IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel assigned to units of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces in the Zone of Interior will perform the following duties as directed by command authority:

(1) Investigate and prepare reports upon the following within the investigative jurisdiction of the unit with which the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel are ordered to duty, and in accordance with TM 30-218 and other appropriate War Department directives:

(a) Military and civilian personnel gravely suspected of disaffection, of engaging in subversive activity, of espionage, sabotage, treason, or sedition.

(b) Incidents and activities in which violations of security regulations are apparent or suspected.

(c) Certain civilian personnel to be employed by the War Department.

(2) Conduct surveys to determine the security of military installations and offices, and make recommendations to prevent leakage of information.

(3) Conduct surveys and make recommendations regarding the security of contemplated movements of troops and material. 70036

(4) Deliver lectures to troops and present demonstrations on the security of military information and activities.

(5) Conduct surveys to determine compliance with and assist in the enforcement of the provisions of AR 380-5 "Safeguarding Military Information". Investigate to determine the responsibility for violations of those regulations.

(6) Participate in a continuous Counter Intelligence Corps training program and in the parent organization's training program. The appropriate Commander will determine the extent to which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will participate in the organization's training program if such training conflicts with Counter Intelligence Corps duties or training.

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(7) Perform such other duties as command authority shall determine are within the Counter Intelligence Corps mission.

b. In addition to the duties listed above, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments assigned to Army Air Forces units in the Zone of Interior will investigate incidents involving aircraft or aircraft material under the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces to determine the presence or absence of sabotage.

24. OPERATIONS IN OVERSEAS COMMANDS.

a. It is of the utmost importance that effective counterintelligence coverage be maintained continuously in large or important towns and areas where United States military forces are in operation or occupation. Counterintelligence coverage for such locations by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel will include developing informant systems outside the United States military establishment, making investigations of suspected persons and becoming acquainted with and gaining confidence of influential local persons whose cooperation will be helpful. It is highly desirable that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel who inaugurate this counterintelligence coverage continue to maintain it until relieving Counter Intelligence Corps personnel has become sufficiently acquainted with the local situation to permit efficient assumption of control. Only when it becomes apparent that control can be relinquished without jeopardy to the counterintelligence coverage should the original group depart.

(1) The above will be considered in planning, and when necessary, request may be made for the temporary attachment of one or more Counter Intelligence Corps personnel from a higher headquarters, to be left in charge of a specific town or area.

(2) Whenever practicable Communications Zone and Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, specially trained in port and airport counterintelligence duties, will be made available to tactical commands required to establish initial count rintelligence coverage for ports and airports.

b. When the situation demands, detachment commanders by oral orders may place personnel under their command on temporary duty with other detachments upon approval in each case by the appropriate G-2, A-2, or S-2.

c. The appropriate commander is authorized to direct members of his command to lend such assitance to Counter Intelligence Corps personnel as may be required for the accomplishment of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission.

d. Liaison between counterintelligence personnel and all other allied intelligence agencies is the responsibility of counterintelligence staffs. However, members of the Counter Intelligence Corps will work in closest cooperation with:

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(1) Allied Civil Affairs Organizations.

(2) Naval, Air Force, and Communications Zone counter-intelligence personnel.

(3) Military Police and Provost Marshal personnel

(4) Document collection and evaluation teams.

(5) Prisoner of War personnel.

(6) Allied counterintelligence staffs and personnel.

(7) Other United States counterintelligence agencies.

25. DUTIES IN THEATERS OF OPERATIONS.--Pursuant to the general plan of the theater commander the operational duties of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel include:

a. Primary Duty in Forward Combat Areas. The primary duty of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel is to secure counterintelligence targets in the area of the objective. Foremost among these targets are:

(1) Known and suspect enemy agents.

(2) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of the allied forces.

(3) Offices formerly occupied by the enemy intelligence services or enemy police organizations and any documents they contain.

(4) Offices of local semi-military organizations and collaborationist bodies and their records.

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(5) Centers of communications.

(6) Buildings, billets, and installations known or suspected to contain documents of counterintelligence value.

b. Secondary Duties in Forward Combat Areas.

(1) Making security checks in cooperation with the Military Police who are marshalling refugees and other civilians arriving from enemy occupied territory.

(2) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the allied cause in order to secure all possible counter-intelligence information.

(3) Advising upon and assisting in securing against sabotage all public and private installations, the continued operation of which is essential to the allied forces.

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CONFIDENTIAL CIC (31 Oct 44)CB-S-D-M
13 November 1944 (Cont'd)

(4) Checking upon the observance by civilian population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by Civil Affairs detachments.

(5) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with ordnances.

(6) The seizure of civil communications and arranging for their portection against sabotage until taken over by authorized Signal Communications personnel as provided in operational orders. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, guarded, and turned over to the proper authorities.

(7) Seizing and impounding all civilian and captured enemy mail.

(8) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.

(9) Stopping publication of newspapers and other periodicals.

(10) Taking measures necessary to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and material by our own troops.

(11) Transmitting to Civil Affairs, Provost Marshal and Military Police personnel all information on matters within their purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperationof civil police, and the extent of disorder, looting, and sabotage.

c. Investigative Duties. The Counter Intelligence Corps will be employed in investigations of:

(1) Espionage.

(2) Sabotage.

(3) Subversive activity, including rumor mongering and surreptitious issue of enemy propaganda.

(4) Disaffection, treason, and sedition within the United States Forces.

(5) Violations of security regulations.

(6) Personnel of governments of occupied territory who are retained in their official capacities. (In certain instances involving a counterintelligence interest.)

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(7) Certain civilian personnel to be employed by the United States Government.

d. Miscellaneous Duties.

(1) Cooperating with the Corps of Military Police and other military and civil authorities in exercising control at frontiers of territory under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States. This action will include the recommending of the establishment and the assisting in the maintenance of controls and control systems over the entrance of persons, goods, and information into territory occupied by this command.

(2) Assisting port counterintelligence officers in the discharge of their duties.

(3) Performance of security surveys to determine the safety of communications, transportation lines, storage and supply facilities, and other United States installations and offices.

(4) Delivery of security lectures to the troops and other provisions for general indoctrination of all United States military personnel in security principles.

(5) Surveillance of establishments frequented by United States military personnel, and located within or near the area occupied by United States troops to determine the security of military information therein.

(6) Establishing informant networks outside the United States military establishment.

(7) Keeping the G-2, A-2, or S-2, of the respective commands informed of internal politics, political parties, or subversive groups.

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e. Duties in the Event of Evacuation or Withdrawal.

(1) Searching evacuated headquarters, bivouac areas, supply depots, and other installations to insure that documents or any material that might be of intelligence value to the enemy have been completely destroyed or removed.

(2) Checking the control of refugees along the routes used by troops to prevent the possibility of enemy infiltration.

f. Duties of Special Groups. Duties of special groups will be, in accordance with the needs of their particular assignment in addition to the duties enumerated above.

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26. War Department Technical Manual 30-215, 22 September 1943, subject: Counter Intelligence Corps, is hereby rescinded.

27. The addressees hereof will reproduce and distribute this letter to each Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in their respective commands.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ Edward F. Witsell
/t/ EDWARD F. WITSELL
Brigadier General
Acting The Adjutant General

REPRODUCED BY HEADQUARTERS MTOUSA, 7 December 1944

A. W. K.

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1404/20/GSI(b).

28 Nov 44

10

NOTES ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY

1. MILITARY SECURITY

The recent spate of enemy agents let loose across the lines has demonstrated the necessity of ensuring the effective deployment of all our mutually-supporting security weapons, if our counter-intelligence is to deal adequately with such a heavy scale of attack.

In our efforts to round up these agents and to neutralise their activities, great emphasis has been laid during the past months on the organisation and application of civil security measures. And quite rightly so. The strict security control of the civil population facilitates the discovery and restricts the activities of dangerous elements.

Although civil security measures can go far towards neutralising enemy espionage and sabotage activities, however, they do not constitute our only weapon. Military security discipline, if maintained at a high standard, can be almost equally effective not only in preventing an agent from performing his mission, but also in facilitating his detection. Civil and military security are complementary. Each one, alone, presents a considerable obstacle to the agent; but both together, and if both are good, they can make the obstacle virtually insuperable.

Military security is the concern of our own troops. Insofar as it refers to information (as opposed to material), it covers those precautions which should be taken by all Allied military personnel, whether as individuals or units, to prevent their own actions or words from providing the enemy with intelligence. Although the enemy obtains his information by many means, including W/T interception, interrogation of prisoners, air recce and espionage agents, it is proposed to refer here only to the latter method, since this is the one with which FSS/CIC are primarily concerned.

In this respect, therefore, the object of military security is to ensure that no information is given away gratuitously to the enemy agent, that nothing is handed out to him "on a plate" : he must be made to "come and get it", i.e. to emerge from his obscurity and to risk making himself conspicuous.

The force of this distinction can be seen by comparing the chances of survival of agents A and B, operating respectively among troops or in an area where military security [illegible]

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The force of this distinction can be seen by comparing the chances of survival of agents A and B, operating respectively among troops or in an area where military security discipline is weak, and in one where it is good. A can sit and listen; B has to ask questions. A can find documents in rubbish heaps or cloak-rooms; B has to steal them from offices. A can enter a military HQ or installation through the main gate unmolested; B has to climb over a wall. A gets driven past road-checks in a military truck; B has to make detours on foot. In short, A is helped on his way and remains inconspicuous, whereas B is forced into the open if he is to achieve his task.

This may be old and well-known doctrine, but this aspect of security is liable to be taken for granted by FSS/CIC, amid the welter of their civil security duties, arrests, interrogations etc. It remains the responsibility of security/C.I. agencies to do all in their power to improve or maintain the standard of military security discipline among the Allied forces. Without it, our counter-intelligence defences are seriously weakened and will be only half effective.

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2. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

During the past month we have seen a virtual flooding of our forward area with line-crossers. More than fifty were apprehended in the operational zone, the majority of whom were engaged on espionage missions.

In spite of this mass production, however, there are indications that the enemy intelligence effort is undergoing a transition from a state of merely coping with circumstances in an extempore fashion, towards a more settled aggressive policy, which a comparitively stable front should make worthwhile. This policy is clearly based on the despatch of large numbers of short-term line-crossers, interspersed with long range agents.

An interesting feature of the recent long-range agents is that they have been deep-roving line-crossers, i.e. their missions embraced rear areas, from which they were to return across the lines. Formerly, such long range agents tended to be provided with a W/T set and to be introduced behind our lines by parachute or small boat. Such operations have been very few and far between in recent months : the absence of parachutists may be due to lack of aircraft, and the absence of small boat parties may be due to past failures in this direction : or it may be that the Abwehr has decided that W/T missions do not, as a rule, pay a dividend and that the new modification in technique is an improvement. In any case, it is of interest that the only W/T agent known to have been despatched in the course of the last month was one parachuted into SARDINIA, an area beyond the scope of mortal Frontkaufer. In this connection, it may be noted that the enemy has only once insulted us by despatching an agent across the lines on foot with a W/T set.

The Fifth Army area bore the brunt of the line-crossing activity, due no doubt to the fact that their Western sector, in particular that area lying between PISTOIA and the coast, is thinly held and mountainous, and therefore the enemy considers it the most suitable area in which to pass agents through the lines. The route of the ABETONE pass seems to be the favourite entry point into our territory. This is further evidenced by the fact that certain agents having missions in the Eighth Army and Adriatic Coastal areas have been despatched through the ABETONE Pass, and were instructed to move behind the Eighth Army lines to their destination. They were also instructed to return via the same crossing route.

Of the total number of agents captured during the period, approximately forty were espionage agents and an even eleven sabotage agents.

Espionage

ABWEHR KOMMANDO 150, Army (I-Ai), is represented in the forward areas by

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Espionage

ABWEHR KOMMANDO 150, Army (I-H), is represented in the forward areas by TRUPPS 150 and 152, which are primarily interested in passing agents through the lines for the purpose of obtaining military information of immediate tactical value. During the month, such agents were sent on missions to FLORENCE, AREZZO, PISA, LEGHORN, RIMINI and various smaller towns in the forward areas. Their missions in the main consisted of locating or observing concentrations of troops, gun positions, HQ's, vehicle and uniform insignia, numbers, types and location of tanks, position of fuel and ammunition dumps, etc. The identification of units was usually concerned, naturally enough, with those not actually in the line. One agent had the mission of making a reconnaissance to determine the location of civilian control posts in the forward areas.

ABWEHR KOMMANDO 190 (I-L), using the despatching facilities of the aforementioned Trupps, is still primarily interested in securing air intelligence, though they very often brief their agents to obtain military and naval information while passing to and from air installations, thus benefitting all three services.

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There have recently been indications that Trupps 150 and 152 may be operating under the direction of Kdo 190 rather than of 150; in any case, 190 appears to be acting to a great extent as a sort of general service Kdo, while 150 is believed to be devoting considerable attention to the preparation of stay-behind agents for the North.

During the month three agents of Kdo 190 were despatched on various dates to visit the ports of RIMINI and ANCONA and the airfields of JESI and FALCONARA. At ANCONA they were to obtain shipping information and then proceed to the airfields where they were to ascertain the identity of the units stationed at the field, the type of aircraft used and the various insignia painted on the planes. Another Kdo 190 agent was to proceed to NAPLES and SALERNO to observe shipping activities at these ports and to attempt to locate a certain Allied Airborne unit. Still another was to go to LIVORNO to observe shipping and any air installations seen en route. Two others were to proceed to ROME on long term missions.

The majority of agents of this Kommando are equipped with a handkerchief containing secret ink writing in the form of a pass, which identifies the bearer, thus assisting him while in EOT, (and assisting us while in ACT!)

The ABWEHR MARINE KOMMANDO (I-M) does not appear to have been very active during this period insofar as the despatch of agents is concerned, though no doubt its interests in respect of Naval matters are being taken care of by KOMMANDO 190. However, one stay-behind agent of this Kommando was arrested. He had been operating a W/T set in a port town and had been transmitting his observations.

It is fair to assume that this Marine Kommando is probably busily engaged in preparing stay-behind agents for Northern ITALY, especially in port areas. These agents for the most part will no doubt have long term missions and be equipped with W/T sets.

The SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD) showed some recrudescence of interest in straight military intelligence, and a disinclination to confine itself to its proper sphere, that of a political instrument.

One agent was instructed to attempt to penetrate our Intelligence Service after surrendering to a forward unit. His activities are outlined in section 3 below.

Three other SD agents were despatched through the lines with the assistance of a forward ABWEHR Trupp. Under interrogation they confessed that they were to proceed to NAPLES on a 30-day mission and there spread anti-Allied propaganda. They were also to look for incidents indicating bad relations between Allied troops and Italians, and for any difficulties or weaknesses in Allied administration. In addition they were to determine the extent and needs of present and potential Fascist groups. After about a month, one was to return to EOT by recrossing the lines to report the progress made.

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An unidentified [illegible]

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An unidentified service, thought to be the ABWEHR mounted a different type of operation during the month. This operation appears to have been fairly well handled from a security angle. It was brought to our attention through the arrest of two Poles both recruited in POLAND. They were to obtain information about the Polish forces, troop strength, morale, relations with Allies, etc. Both were to attempt to join these forces and, after a period of two months, to desert to the enemy. Strange as it may seem, neither could speak Italian.

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Sabotage Agents

The Abwehr sabotage effort, believed to be an undertaking of Kommando 212, led to the arrest of ten agents, all with missions in the forward areas. They were despatched in teams of two each, and they were to sabotage vehicles, dumps, bridges, railroad rolling stock and equipment. Upon the completion of their missions they were to return to EGT.

Sabotage material for their use was to be found in dumps that had been prepared previously by the enemy before their withdrawal. Each dump thus far uncovered consists of one small metal box containing sabotage material. Examination of three different boxes at three different dumps revealed the fact that the contents of the boxes were identical. In addition to sabotage material, each box had a list of the material contained therein. The list was numbered and the number written thereon was to be reported upon the agent's return.

Precise instructions as to the location of the dumps had been given, and they were located without difficulty.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE METHODS

Variations on an old theme

There can be no doubt that one of the greatest problems of the GIS in despatching an agent is how to conceal on him the necessary items of his stock-in-trade such as money and passes for his return into EGT. Hardly a month goes by without news of some fresh manifestation of ingenuity in this direction.

One agent captured during the month applied the principle of dispersion and distributed the tell-tale notes on various parts of his person such as in the tops of his socks, under his shirt and attached to his underwear.

Two other agents who have not so far fallen into our hands, are reported to have had identity documents which would identify them to the Germans on their return sewn into the shoulders of their coats.

Yet another agent who was captured this month when he was about to return to EGT had been advised to conceal his return pass in the linings of his shoes.

Spy in sheep's clothing

An enemy PW captured recently gave some interesting news of Lt. FRANKENSTEIN, who has long been known to us as the Commander of a forward Abwehr II HQ, and who was friendly with the PW's C.O.

It is alleged that sometime in Oct, Lt. FRANKENSTEIN made an excursion

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Spy in sheep's clothing

An enemy PW captured recently gave some interesting news of Lt. PFANNENSTIEL, who has long been known to us as the Commander of a forward Abwehr II HQ, and who was friendly with the PW's C.O.

It is alleged that sometime in Oct, Lt. PFANNENSTIEL made an excursion into our lines to do a little espionage on his own. He was clad in the tattered cloak of an Italian shepherd and the disguise was carried to the length of his being accompanied by a herd of twenty sheep who are reported to have completed the round trip with him. For this exploit Lt. PFANNENSTIEL was awarded the Knight's Cross by the Fuehrer.

Stop. Look. Listen.

Much as the dangers of careless talk have been emphasised and real as they undoubtedly are, it is interesting to note that the GIS has not laid much stress on this aspect of gaining information when briefing agents for military espionage tasks.

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That valuable information can be obtained by a good agent who depends on his powers of observation alone was strikingly demonstrated by the interrogation of a W/T agent recently captured in an important port. He admitted that he had transmitted a large number of messages, and he himself emphasised that, although he had obtained casual employment with two military units, he obtained the majority of his information by riding about on a bicycle.

Security measures cannot prevent an agent from using his eyes, but they can prevent him from going too near the places where he would most like to use them.

Emergency rations

It would be possible by now to write a book on the many little things that characterise an enemy agent; but few of which singly constitute proof that he is one.

To the many items which we already know he may be carrying can be added emergency rations of a kind described by an agent captured last month. This agent, who was in fact a girl, was supplied with the following : German Candy Squares resembling caramels; three packs of ENERGEN - DEXTRO (dextrose tablets); two discs of German chocolate and some Italian wafers of the VENCHI Unica brand, made in TURIN.

Another small point which should at least arouse suspicion is the possession of quantities of newspapers and pamphlets. Several agents have been instructed to bring these back with them and at least one has been arrested in possession of a considerable number, mostly of the Left Wing variety.

Double-bluff

Reference was made in the last issue of these notes to the growing tendency for enemy agents to be provided by the GIS with some plausible cover-story with which to disarm suspicion on first being interrogated. Such stories have usually been to the effect that the agent has been taken by the Germans for forced labour (the TODT Organisation is frequently mentioned), and that he had escaped either to join his family in ACT or to avoid deportation to GERMANY. The object in such cases is, of course, to be allowed to proceed unhindered and to carry out the mission assigned.

A cover story with a different object, that of penetrating our own organisations, was told to a forward security agency during the month by an enemy agent who admitted immediately that he had been recruited by the GIS and had been sent on an espionage mission. The information which he gave about the GIS organisation which had despatched him was sufficiently accurate to make it credible, for the Germans plainly allow us a fair

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Sabotage without explosives

There is a surprising variety of acts of sabotage which can be carried out without any special materials. On his course of instruction an agent captured during the month was taught the following: to put sand in the brake-systems of trains, to change railway signals so as to cause accidents, to unhook railroad cars, to put sugar in the fuel tanks of vehicles and to place wooden matches in their ignition key-holes.

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Mute confession

To round off an eventful month of counter-espionage activity comes the first report of an enemy agent having executed himself. Captured with a companion in Eighth Army area, he stubbornly refused to talk at his first interrogation, and made his mute and only confession of his guilt by hanging himself in his cell.

Tail-piece

DO YOU KNOW:

In what CC.RR station is the lavatory bunged-up with secret ink handkerchiefs disposed of by three different agents after capture?

Which FS NCO made an enemy agent stand in the corner until he confessed?

4. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE METHODS

The prevalent use by enemy agents of cover stories, as already mentioned above, calls for continual alertness on the part of Security agencies in detecting either in the cover stories themselves or in the agent's possessions or actions minor inconsistencies which may be the means of breaking him down.

This point was well illustrated in a case handled by IV Corps CIC during the month. An individual was apprehended while making his way South and told a fairly plausible story. He was however placed under immediate arrest because of the following observations:

His identity card was dated 8 Apr 44; the photograph pasted on it bore on the back the date 31 Oct.
All the entries on the identity card appeared to have been made with the same pen and ink.
The identity card showed no signs whatever of age or wear, although it purported to be 7 months old.
He was carrying a full package of Italian cigarettes which he said he had bought in PARMA 15 days previously. They showed no signs of having been carried by him for that length of time, which was doubly suspicious in view of the shortage of Italian cigarettes.
He was also in possession of a considerable amount of money.

No single one of the above points was damning in itself and a reasonable explanation could have been produced for all of them; all together, however, provided grounds for considerable suspicion.

In fact, it was when he was confronted with the discrepancy between the [illegible] on the photograph that the

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agents after capture?

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No single one of the above points was damning in itself and a reasonable explanation could have been produced for all of them; all together, however, provided grounds for considerable suspicion.

In fact, it was when he was confronted with the discrepancy between the date of issue of his identity card and the date on the photograph that the agent confessed.

In another case handled recently by an FSP, an enemy agent was broken down in a similar manner. He stated that he had been taken prisoner by the Germans in Sep 44, and had remained a prisoner for two months, when he had escaped and made his way through the lines. He mentioned the point at which he had crossed and the last town in ECT in which he had been before crossing. The fact that enemy agents previously caught had followed the same route aroused suspicion, which was strengthened when it was learned that the suspect had been a student pilot officer at TRAPANI which also struck a note familiar from previous interrogations. Examination of the suspect's money produced a 1000 Lire note with a number in the same series as a note found in the possession of an agent captured earlier in the month.

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These facts were pointed out to the suspect, but he stubbornly maintained his innocence. He only confessed when his interrogators led him to realise the extent of their background information about the G.I.S. In face of this apparent omniscience, he felt unable to sustain his denial of what they apparently regarded as an obvious fact.

5. SABOTAGE

Further attempt at Sabotage in the RIMINI Area

The last edition of these Notes described a sabotage attempt directed against MT on the coast near RIMINI. This attempt was repeated during the night 18/19 Oct on almost exactly the same lines, the unit concerned being a Searchlight Battery located at VISERBELLA M.3202.

The first intimation of sabotage was an explosion at 0630 hrs on 19 Oct. Investigations revealed that two 3 kg charges had been roughly attached to the front axle of each of two vehicles parked on the beach. Each charge was fitted with an acetone delay action igniter and detonator which had exploded, breaking the charge but failing to detonate it. Three "S" mines and three Tellermines were also discovered in plain view at various places in the unit area and these were promptly rendered harmless. Between 0630 and 0730 hrs however, a further three explosions took place on the beach, having apparently been caused by mines of some description buried in the sand. No damage was done. Two more charges were found attached to the tracks of an abandoned Italian SP gun which was lying nearby. These were left untouched and the detonators eventually exploded, but again the main charge was not set off.

No trace has been found of the perpetrators, but, as in the previous case, a seaborne mission is suspected. The selection of targets was again poor, the mines were clumsily sited and little or no attempt was made at concealment. The fact that in every case the explosion of the detonator failed to set off the main charge is a further indication that the saboteurs were by no means skilled at their job.

MK Operations

Reference has already been made in these Notes to German swimming saboteurs trained to demolish important locks, bridge piers, harbour installations etc, as well as ships. Twelve NCO's of these specialist personnel recently succeeded in attaching six charges to a railway bridge and road bridge on the River MAAS in the vicinity of NIJMEGEN. The party was later captured, and the following information was obtained as a result of their interrogation.

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The men concerned were of exceptional physique, were excellent swimmers (one was a German champion and another an Olympic Games contestant), and had undergone a three months training course at VENICE as members of MK (Meereskampfer) 700. Here they had practised sinking and placing dummy-charges,

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a Searchlight Battery located at VISSERMA M.6302.

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The men concerned were of exceptional physique, were excellent swimmers (one was a German champion and another an Olympic Games contestant), and had undergone a three months training course at VENICE as members of MK (Meereskampfer) 700. Here they had practised sinking and placing dummy-charges, though no technical instruction was given them. Before starting on their mission in HOLLAND the twelve were equipped with light diving suits consisting of woollen undergarments and a tightly fitting rubber suit which covered the body from neck to toe. Attached to their shoes were large rubber fins extending about 12 inches forward from the toe and about 9 - 10 inches wide at the end. (These fins were said to double the speed of the swimmer). On their heads were tight fitting caps covered with camouflage nets or veils. Each swimmer carried a breathing apparatus strapped to his chest from which oxygen was fed through a corrugated tube to a rubber grip held between the teeth. PW stated that in future they were to be armed with watertight pistols for use on land.

The charges used were a little under 8 feet long and 16 - 18 inches in diameter. At each end, buoyancy chambers were attached giving an overall length of nearly 16 feet. The charges were fitted with clockwork

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delay devices set in this case for 3 - 4 hours. Each charge contained approximately 1600 lbs of Hexanite explosive. The intention was to sling each pair of mines round a pier, one on either side, sink them, and then to surface dive after them in order to adjust their position and to start off the delay mechanism.

Two parties were formed. Party "A" consisting of eight men was detailed to attack the road bridge, and was allotted four mines strapped together in pairs. Party "B" (four men) was to attack the railway bridge with two mines, also strapped together. When the swimmers reached the MAAS at a point 6 km upstream of the targets, the charges were already in the water, having previously been armed by technical experts. The men entered the river, four to each main charge, and started downstream. The buoyancy chambers had been trimmed to float the mine with about 2 inches out of the water, and in this way the charges were towed by ropes attached to a handrail running lengthwise around the mine. Both parties negotiated a wire boom short of the bridge with comparative ease, passing beneath it. On reaching their respective objectives, the swimmers floated the mines to the side of the piers and pulled the wires protruding from each end, thus admitting water into the buoyancy chambers and sinking the apparatus. At the road bridge, Party "A" encountered some difficulty due to the current and the shallowness of the water near the piers, and were unable to place their charges effectively. As a result the pier was not destroyed, though the roadway was considerably damaged. Party "B", however, was completely successful with the railway bridge. Once the placing of the charges had been carried out, the swimmers were to continue down-stream to ROTTERDAM, to which they were to be guided by flares. Unfortunately for them the Germans had recently been driven out of this town. Shortly after they landed, British machine guns opened fire on them and they hastily reverted to the water in an attempt to reach ROTTERDAM. As they continued downstream they were fired on from all sides and two of the party were killed. The survivors eventually surrendered.

In view of the possibility that attempts of this nature may be made in this theatre, it is of interest to examine the effectiveness of various anti-sabotage measures against this type of activity. PW stated that they had no difficulty whatsoever in negotiating boom defences, since it is virtually impossible to anchor a boom defence net down to the river bed so tightly as to prevent a mine 16 inches in diameter from being passed under it. All prisoners were agreed that the most effective precaution is the placing of barbed-wire coils under water round bridge piers and other vulnerable targets. They dread tearing their suits as this makes it almost impossible for them to continue in the water, due to the cold and the difficulty of swimming in a torn suit. Hand grenades or small depth charges dropped at irregular intervals also act as a healthy deterrent. According to PW, tests carried out by the Germans showed that it was impossible to detect either swimmers or mines in the water when looking down at them from above, due to the effectiveness of the camouflage employed. Guards posted on a level with the

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In view of the possibility that attempts of this nature may be made in this theatre, it is of interest to examine the effectiveness of various anti-sabotage measures against this type of activity. EW stated that they had no difficulty whatsoever in negotiating boom defences, since it is virtually impossible to anchor a boom defence net down to the river bed so tightly as to prevent a mine 18 inches in diameter from being passed under it. All prisoners were agreed that the most effective precaution is the placing of barbed-wire coils under water round bridge piers and other vulnerable targets. They dread tearing their suits as this makes it almost impossible for them to continue in the water, due to the cold and the difficulty of swimming in a torn suit. Hand grenades or small depth charges dropped at irregular intervals also act as a healthy deterrent. According to EW, tests carried out by the Germans showed that it was impossible to detect either swimmers or mines in the water when looking down at them from above, due to the effectiveness of the camouflage employed. Guards posted on a level with the water and looking across it, however, stand a good chance of picking out the silhouette of the swimmer's head.

6. CONTROL OF MOVEMENT

By Rail

A FS NCO recently made a series of railway journeys starting at AREZZO and travelling southwards to TERNI via ORTE, thence Northeast to the coast via PERUGIA and JESI, Northwards along the coast from ANCONA to RIMINI, and then returning to AREZZO over the same route. His trip took him across the Security Control line on several occasions, and his aim was to note at these and between times any points of interest to security agencies and to attempt a judgement, admittedly on short acquaintance, of how far it is feasible for movement on the railways and access to vital installations to be controlled. As it is believed that enemy agents are turning their attention to the military operated railway system as an alternative means

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of travel, it is felt that his observations may be of interest to those with railway lines in their territory.

It would seem a fairly simple matter for the determined civilian without documents to travel along most parts of these lines, at any rate between stops, in spite of the security measures already in force. Many cases were observed of civilians waiting for trains at stations or at regular stopping places along the line, and the prohibition of access of unauthorised persons to station premises would undoubtedly reduce illicit travel to a substantial degree. At one point, FS had to intervene to prevent a truck load of thirty-seven men, women and children, sponsored by an Italian railway official, from being transferred to a train on the authorisation of the local SINDACO. In support of this action the information was volunteered that eighty persons, also "refugees", carrying similar authorisations from the same Comune had proceeded to ROME the week before by the same means. Organised refugee parties with AMG documents appear to be adequately supervised, though it was assumed in every case that the camp from which they were moved had carried out searches of luggage etc.

Much appears to depend on the awareness of the Italian railway employees of the existing regulations and even more on their willingness to enforce them. Several cases were noted of such employees openly accepting letters for delivery on or at the end of the route, (indeed it was questionable if some of these receivers knew they were at fault). In general the Italian railway officials appear perfectly willing to cooperate and it is felt that the control of movement by rail, admittedly patchy at the moment, could be appreciably improved by drawing on the assistance of these officials to the fullest possible extent, and by ensuring that they fully understand current security regulations. A few well publicised convictions for illicit movement by rail would also act as a very salutary deterrent.

Arrangements have been made for the issue by the Military Railway Service of a standard form of pass to all Italian railway employees working on Allied operated railways. Train guards have also been briefed in control of movement regulations insofar as their particular job is concerned.

By Road

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A Fifth Army report tells of three soldiers of the "ENTRA" Bn, MONTEROSA ALPINE Div, who deserted on 1st November, changed into civilian clothes and succeeded in crossing the Lines unhindered south of LEVIGLIANI (V 0199), though they were robbed several times by front line troops. Following the route LUCCA - PESCIA - PRATO - FIORENZA, they were stopped at only one control point where an Italian Carabinieri allowed them to proceed. On the 5th November, the party arrived in FLORENCE and applied at the Municipal Hall for ration cards. When asked for their previous address they somewhat ingenuously replied "MONTEROSA Division" and were promptly arrested.

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Unimportant though this incident may be in itself, it nevertheless brings out two significant points. The first is that all kinds of "wanted" persons are likely at some time to apply for ration cards. Most agents with long term missions are forced to do so sooner or later (they are, of course usually provided with false identity documents for the purpose). One agent was in fact caught entirely as a result of a routine scrutiny of lists of such applicants.

The second point is that many troops are still prone to ignore line-crossers rather than to round them up for evacuation to the SIB. Experience has shown that during relatively static periods "spy-consciousness" among forward units is usually very much in evidence, bringing with it the inevitable crop of reports on flashing lights, clandestine wireless transmitters etc. At such times troops are likely to be especially receptive to ideas for the improvement of security; an excellent opportunity thus presents

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itself for directing their suspicions along the proper lines and driving home those basic security principles which really matter.

Better

Extract from a letter recently written by a civilian:-

"Here the population is disappointed for they had pinned great hopes on the Allies and they now feel they have been deceived. For instance, the Germans did not have many cars and yet they never refused to allow us to travel on their trucks whenever we asked them. With the Allies there is nothing doing. They simply won't dream of giving us a lift."

7. ITEMS OF GENERAL SECURITY INTEREST

Wire Tapping

On the nights 7/8 and 8/9 Oct a Regimental HQ of 2 NZ Div experienced difficulty in maintaining signal communications with a forward squadron. No definite break in communication occurred but signal strength would either fall perceptibly or fade out altogether, for periods varying between a few seconds and about five minutes. An examination of the line affected led to the discovery of three incomplete listening-in devices of an improvised nature, each consisting of a pair of wires attached to a darning needle stuck through the line. In a fourth case a needle had been pushed through the line and fixed in position with insulation tape but no wires were attached. All four needles had been pushed into the ground thus earthing the line fairly effectively. No headphone was left behind.

It is thought that these efforts were the work of enemy patrols and not of agents, especially as a patrol was in fact reported in the area during one of the nights in question.

Strategic Withdrawal.

A translation has been received of a German document dated mid-October which lays down that, in the event of a general withdrawal, arrangements will be made by the German military authorities to ensure the safe passage to the REICH, "if they wish it", of all Italians who, "owing to their fidelity to the German-Italian alliance, would be endangered were they to remain behind." Such Italians would travel with their families, each member of which, over fifteen years, would receive a special permit enabling him or her to leave the main assembly centres at BERGAMO, VERONA and PADUA for GERMANY. The military authorities in these towns were to ensure that the necessary travel facilities were granted once the code-word "WANDERGLEFT" was received. Lists of candidates for this trip were to be compiled without delay by Prefects, Questors, Mayors and Fascist Party Officials of equivalent rank. These lists would be of great interest to our counter-intelligence, should any be

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Rake's Progress

Following is a condensed version, published by SHAEF, of a U.K. police report. It has reached this office via 5 Army, VI Corps, IV Corps and II Corps; it is possible therefore that many CIC personnel in Fifth Army may have read it, but it is too good to be excluded from these Notes. It is a fine illustration of the theme expounded in Para 1 on Military Security.

"A boy, aged 19, escaped from a Borstal institution (Reform School) on 22 Jan 44 wearing shorts and a singlet. The same evening he told a soldier (US) he had escaped, was given a suit of green fatigues, and later stole a helmet from an empty guardroom and a car from a military car-park. He drove that night 140 miles to LONDON, abandoned the car at a military garage and drove out in a naval car early next day.

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At a service club he was given a ticket for a Services billeting establishment, where he stole a US Army shirt, trousers and forage cap. He then bought an Eighth Army Air Force shoulder-patch, sergeant's chevrons and Air Corps buttons, which he sewed on.

Next he went to Grosvenor Square car-park where he stole a jeep and drove it to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, entering the camp by means of a 'trip ticket' which he found in the car. Once inside the camp he entered an unattended room where he stole more military clothing. After dark he drove back to LONDON in the same jeep and parked it outside "Rainbow Corner" where he had a meal and stayed the night. The following day (the unattended jeep having been removed by the MP) he went to the Field Director of Finance, American Red Cross Headquarters, where, having given a false name and number he borrowed one pound from an employee. Still in the guise of a US sergeant he went to the Strand Palace Hotel where he shared a room with an American officer, paying for it with this borrowed money. While there he stole some officers' clothing and emerged as an officer, completing his outfit by a further theft from the Princess Garden, American Officers Club. For a week he lived in different officers billeting places. He then went to CREWE, getting past ticket-collectors by claiming to be an RTO. From there he flew in a military plane to EDINBURGH.

At a military airfield, which he entered without being challenged, a pilot gave him a ride to PRESTWICK. The next day in EDINBURGH he went into a Red Cross club where he stole a wallet containing money and identity papers of a US Officer. He then got another flight to PRESTWICK; enroute they landed at a Royal Air Force airfield where he had his photo taken by an official photographer. He stuck this photo on to the stolen AGO card and continued by air to PRESTWICK where he went to Air Force Headquarters. There he produced the stolen Pay Card plus a chit which he had typed himself and signed with the name of a known Colonel; with these he obtained an advance of pay. Next day, having slept the night at Headquarters, he phoned "Operations" at the airfield and inquired if there was transport for LONDON. He was told there was; he contacted the pilot who accepted him as co-pilot. Enroute to LONDON, at an intermediate landing station, the Officer of the Day delivered to him an official mail-bag, which he handed in at Headquarters on arrival in LONDON. After buying some items of clothing at the Officers' PX he returned by official transport to NORTHOLT, where he discovered some high-ranking officers were passing through by air. He decided to attach himself to them, and did so, representing himself as a Public Relations Officer. After eating together in the Officer's Mess they flew to FRANCE. On arrival a conference was held; he did not try to attend but had himself driven back to the landing-strip whence he returned to NORTHOLT in the same plane which had brought the party over.

The next day he called at the RTO's office of a LONDON Railway station and asked for the Sergeant; the latter was out but the caller was allowed to enter and await him. He took advantage of the opportunity to make out free travel warrants for himself, one of which he then used to travel to NOTTINGHAM, where he stayed at the Red Cross Club.

Next morning, he went to an airfield where, on the strength of the

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Next morning, he went to an airfield where, on the strength of the stolen AGO pass, he was flown to HENDON. Calling at the Mail Distribution Center he represented himself as an officer-courier carrying official papers and asked for a jeep. None was available, but it was suggested that he apply to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, which he did, and successfully. While awaiting the jeep, alone in the office, he took a sheet of official paper and typed thereon a permit for himself, representing the bearer to be an officer engaged on confidential duty, and forging a signature on behalf of General EISENHOWER.

On the arrival of the jeep he was driven to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force where he instructed the Motor Pool dispatcher to dismiss the driver in order that he might drive the car himself. On the strength of the forged paper this was done and he drove back to the Mail Centre in LONDON.

From there he phoned New Scotland Yard, representing himself in his assumed role, and inquired into the record of his real self, adding some points in the latter's favour. He obtained no information and the matter

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It takes the Yank to do it!

was postponed for personal discussion the next day. The following morning he phoned the Mail Centre who told him there was a message from the Police awaiting him. He went there to receive it and was arrested on 25 Jul 44."

The Borstal boy to the War is gone;
With a bogus pass you will find him:
A sergeant's stripes he has girded on,
With his stolen Jeeps behind him.

Shall Ada.

Good designs for security posters are required for reproduction and distribution within the theatre. FSS/CIC are invited to submit such designs, through channels, to AAI. No payment or reward is offered to the winner(s), beyond the satisfaction felt by any artist at seeing his work publicly exhibited.

8. OPERA VIGILANZA PER REPRESSIONE ANTI-FASCISMO - O.V.R.A.

Introduction

Following the examination of documents and the interrogation of several persons previously holding major and minor positions in the O.V.R.A., including an important Zone Inspector and a civil servant who dealt with the provision of its funds, it is now possible to give a more accurate picture of the development and function of this organisation. The account which follows is believed to be substantially correct though sources have differed occasionally in detail and emphasis.

Birth and Growth.

In 1926 MUSSOLINI formed a secret political police, the Ufficio Politico Investigativo (UPI) from the ranks of the MVSN to investigate an attempt on his life and regime. Two years later this amateurish organisation set the seed of its incompetence by failing to deal effectively with a serious outbreak of "Red" agitators in the northern cities. It was therefore decided that a new party-inspired body should be created by the Ministry of the Interior and placed under DE STEFANO, Director of the Political Police Division of the General Directorate, Public Security. DE STEFANO, who already controlled both the Questure Political Agents and the CC.RR Investigation Squads (both plain clothes organisations which carried out political investigations), was to form this force from drafts of his professional policemen, officers and other ranks of the Pubblica Sicurezza organisation, supplemented by likely recruits from the Party and the Armed Forces. The work to be undertaken was exclusively the investigation, penetration and unmasking of communist or any other political activity held by the state to be subversive, and the new organisation was called OVRA.

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A start was made by setting up a Headquarters in MILAN which controlled a zone covering Northern Italy. At MUSSOLINI's instigation, special state funds were placed by the Ministry at the disposal of DE STEFANO for OVRA work, as each public security servant transferred was to receive an additional monthly stipend amounting initially to 1000 lire for "funzionari" (officers) and 500 lire for "agenti" (OR/RM) ; a wide system of informants was also to be subsidized. Other zones, each under its Inspector General (Ispettore Generale di Zona) were founded, largely as political necessity dictated in the following years. A zone for EMILIA and MARCHE for example, was set up under a Headquarters in BOLOGNA in 1931 and others followed as the OVRA spread its net southwards. SICILY at one time had two zones, SARDINIA was also included, and after the fall of YUGOSLAVIA in 1941, a special centre for the new Italian inspired SLOVENE-CROAT State was started in LJUBLJANA. By 1943 about 1800 OVRA Funzionari were operating, though the peak of efficiency, if not in number, had been reached in 1936 when Guido LETO took over the Political Police Division from DE STEFANO and gave the OVRA his special attention.

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The OVRA at Work

Provincial OVRA men worked in close collaboration with local Questura agents, assisting them with arrests and searches of a political nature, but themselves concentrating almost exclusively on the anti-State activities of Italians. Movements of foreigners as such did not interest them; these were the concern of SIM/CS, and information of this nature gathered by OVRA would be duly handed over. Collaboration of a kind also existed with the plain clothes CC.RR (Reparti Investigative CC.RR), to whom OVRA gave information on normal criminal cases. Relations with the UPI were uniformly bad, the professionals regarding the latter (justifiably no doubt) as "clumsy dabblers" in counter-subversive work. Unlike the usual Public Security investigator, OVRA members were empowered to pursue their investigations freely from one province to another. Their numbers would alter in each zone as subversive activity was thought to wax and wane, and in times of stress reinforcements were frequently borrowed from amongst the personnel of the Ufficio Politico of the Questura, these additions being known as "aggregati".

Generally speaking the key position in OVRA was that of Zone Inspector. Each of these developed his own territory quite independently of the Questore, receiving indirectly all the findings of Funzionari, agenti and aggregati and their various informers through his officers commanding sub-regions (sotto-zone), and sending them forward in OVRA code to the head of the Political Police Division in ROME. LETO was expected to keep the Chief of Police Services in the Ministry of the Interior informed, but more important still to report directly to MUSSOLINI himself, if urgency so demanded. Another important duty of the Zone Inspector was to recommend suitable candidates from the Public Security for permanent OVRA employment, and it seems that a strong feeling soon developed within the force against the admission of "non-professionals" to this, the more lucrative side of police work. Party influence, however, ensured that nepotism effected entry and patronage advancement and also opened the way to the appointment of officers and men in the Armed Forces who had shown themselves particularly loyal to the Fascist cause.

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OVRA men were encouraged to spend a good deal of their time out of the office "making contacts", their principal hunting grounds being cafes and places of entertainment. Drawings on the Ministry for secret funds appear to have been heavy and frequent. From these monies the Inspectors paid the additional stipend mentioned above and used the residue (roughly 50%) to pay "expenses" and informers. One Zone Inspector, ENGRASSIA (OVRA Chief for TUSCANY) spent 60,000 lire a month in the spring of 1944 before the Allies took over his FLORENCE HQ, though his cars were at the time operating on Black Market petrol, an expedient which probably increased his overheads. The seamy side of OVRA is reflected most obviously in its notorious development of the informer system. Originally it was intended to have a number of informers in every social and political milieu acting voluntarily out of

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It has been asserted by an OVRA Inspector recently interrogated that all reports made by his officers were written in clear, that the writer's full name was added and that such reports were generally sent through the post. Further that third degree methods of interrogation were never used, nor were false documents issued to agents and informers. His explanation of the sinister reputation of OVRA was that unscrupulous members of other police and security services would often commit atrocities in OVRA's name. It must be remembered, however, that this source was no doubt using a certain amount of whitewash in an effort to save himself from internment. The truth probably lies somewhere between the lurid picture drawn by the anti-Fascist and this "civil servant" pose of the trapped OVRA official.

Specialist Activities

It is not known exactly at what date OVRA started to function abroad but details of payments abroad suggest that work was afoot in LONDON, for example, as early as 1932. It appears that by degrees certain of the main Italian OVRA Centres acquired territorial responsibilities overseas. MILAN dealt with Western and North Western Europe, ROME with the Mediterranean countries, and also with RUSSIA, the Western Hemisphere and the Far East. Agents sent abroad were usually given cover by the Italian Embassy, Consulate or Legation concerned, from which they were paid by cheques forwarded by the Ministry of the Interior at home. They were assigned an identity number, the significance of which was known only to DE STEFANO or LETO, to whom they reported on the political tendencies of Italians living abroad, and - a departure from their original function - also collected items on the state of military preparedness of the country concerned. These reports reached ROME in the diplomatic bag, a favour which was sometimes reciprocated by the inclusion of some of the diplomatic staff on the lists of undesirables thus despatched. Records show that three regular OVRA agents operating in LONDON from 1937 onwards received monthly cheques, evidently on a graded scale, for about £100, £75 and £50 respectively, some of the money undoubtedly being used for maintaining some sort of informer system. In Sep 39, these regulars migrated to NEW YORK, where they stayed till the entry of ITALY into the War. Another point of interest is that QUEIPO de LLANO, one of FRANCO's leading generals during the Spanish Civil War, was "on the books" of an admitted OVRA agent operating in SEVILLA in 1941-42.

Those who travelled on the International Express Trains crossing ITALY before the War may be interested in the OVRA trick of examining foreign mail in special vans. Letters were secretly opened and photographed, thus thoughtfully avoiding any delay in the delivery of correspondence. Centres for this activity existed in COMO for North and Northwest European mail, BARI for Balkan mail and ROME for Egyptian, Western Mediterranean and Tunisian Mail.

OVRA and the Fall of Fascism

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OVRA and the Fall of Fascism

MUSSOLINI had called the OVRA into being and had sponsored its activities throughout. Some trepidation must therefore have been felt in this body at the time of his forced resignation. When BADOGLIO took over the Government, the OVRA's name and political orientation were changed, but it continued to exist as an organization and its purpose remained the same, viz the protection of the régime (not now Fascist) against subversion. OVRA Zones were renamed ISPETTORATI SPECIALI. SENISE, a former Chief of Police at ROME, assumed duty as BADOGLIO's Chief of Italian Police Services, and one of the few things he was able to accomplish before he was disposed of by the Germans was to summon together LETO and all Zone Inspectors and to order an enquiry into the illegally amassed Fascist fortunes. Little work seems to have been undertaken, however, due to the generally chaotic condition of all State and Party institutions, and to the lack of resolve of many of the ex-OVRA officials.

After the armistice, the OVRA reverted to its former political orientation, under TAMBURINI, who succeeded SENISE. By the end of the year

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TAMBURINI moved with the Ministry of the Interior to MADERNA. The OVRA Headquarters, which was by now no longer smelling out the fortunes of Fascist millionaires but had the role of protecting the new Republican regime, remained in ROME until March 44 when LETO moved the entire Political Police Division to VALDAGNO.

Meanwhile the Ministry at MADERNA was loud in its complaints about the dearth of reports. The Zone Inspectors (all zones, that is, not occupied by the Allies) had had a hard winter looking for informers and were often unable to produce anything but "routine reports" on the reactions of the local populace to the RPI, the SS, rationing and the like. Stress was also felt at the centre of the organisation, as the Germans had peremptorily ordered the evacuation of both MADERNA and VALDAGNO at short notice. (It is not clear why this order was given or if it was in fact carried out). By this time, many of the OVRA personnel had become as elusive as the informers and were not appearing for duty. Further, as liaison between centres had not been developed by radio, the poor state of road and rail communications made it difficult to keep touch. A few diehards continued to work, assisted at times by SID which was permitted to exist, as described in a previous issue of these Notes, very much under German control in practice if not in spirit. Just as they have shown little confidence in SID, so the Germans seem also to have distrusted OVRA agents as intriguers and opportunists, though the latter, as supporting pillars of a sagging Republican regime, should ostensibly have been numbered amongst their most valuable Italian allies.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, in view of their intimate association with the repressive (and corrupt) elements in the Fascist creed, OVRA officials wherever encountered should be regarded as potentially dangerous elements, well trained in police methods, almost universally disliked by the populace, with a flair for trickery and subterfuge. In some cases, doubtless, OVRA officials and men merely "followed their trade" without much conviction or undue malice, but most ranks, and of course especially those who have continued to operate loyally for the Republic, are highly promising candidates for internment. Their informers, however, who so frequently find their way into Black Lists under such high-sounding titles as "OVRA spy" etc are in general of meagre security significance.

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Brigadier
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Brigadier
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As for "Notes on Counter Intelligence in Italy" dated 27 Oct 44. plus G(Ops)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBI-389.701-H. 25 Nov 44.

9

SUBJECT : Counter-Intelligence Reports.

TO : See Distribution.

Security Division
Rec'd
Book No. 329
File No. 643.
Action

1. Difficulty is frequently experienced in evaluating counter-intelligence reports owing to the source of information or allegations not being specified. This is particularly the case when an enquiry is initiated on the basis of an allegation by one individual against another. It is essential that in all cases sources should be specified - i.e. if a document, its title, date, location or origin; if a person, his full name, address, age and occupation.

2. If the source is a regular informant, whose name it is not desirable to spread wider than necessary, the first report submitted which includes information from him should give the details requested above, and also indicate a pseudonym by which he will be referred to in future reports. If a report is of such a nature that it will require wide circulation in its original form, and it is consequently desirable to conceal the source, the source's name should be put in a separate communication and this fact noted.

MAJOR RONNIE
CAPT GALE
FILE - 3.

3. In any case where an enquiry is based on allegations of anti-Allied activity etc., the allegations should be specified in detail where possible, and the report of the investigation should conclude by stating clearly whether these allegations have been substantiated or not.

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4. If an enquiry based on allegations against an individual reveals information of counter-intelligence interest about other individuals or organisations, this latter material should be arranged under separate headings whenever possible.

5. In all cases distribution of original reports should be clearly indicated to avoid unnecessary duplication.

6. It is appreciated that these rules may appear elementary, but it has been frequently noticed that recent reports do not pay sufficient attention to them. It is requested therefore that these notes be brought to the attention of all counter-intelligence personnel under command.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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CAPT GALE
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For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Colonel, G.S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

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V.P. Civil Affs. Section. Secret

In view of the forthcoming meeting at Siena, Col. Young has suggested you might like to see the attached report.

Will you return please in due course.

S/Sgt Haven/plj
Security Div.
Public Safety.

4 5 46

A very interesting document.

Cpl.

Rec'd & P.S. ✓

Rec'd by VP & CSO

R. R. Wright

6 Nov. 44

Security 1965
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SUBJECT: Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY

TO:- G-2 Distribution.

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The attached Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY are forwarded for distribution down to Divisions, FSS Sections and Detachments.

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HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

NOTES ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
IN ITALY

27 Oct 44

1. WHAT CIVIL SECURITY MEASURES MEAN TO THE AGENT

It is sometimes suggested by critical observers that many of our security measures are ineffective or even worthless, because any enemy agent of average intelligence and initiative can circumvent them. Sometimes, perhaps, doubts of this nature may be entertained by security officers themselves.

The following are typical of the comments made in this connection :
"Anyone can evade security road checks by using bye-paths: an agent would obviously be provided with proper papers, forged if necessary: anyone can obtain a pass by making up some specious story: vetting is a purely negative check: an agent wouldn't enter his real name in a hotel register: an agent only has to dress up in Allied uniform and he could get into any HQ: what is the use of prohibiting or censoring civil mail, when letters can be carried by travellers? It is no use making security regulations, unless they can be completely enforced."

Such are the taunts of the Unbeliever, and such may sometimes represent the unspoken thoughts of the CI officer, bored by the continual supervision or application of routine security measures. Doubts of this nature will, however, be dispelled by a proper appreciation of the objects of these measures, and of the ways in which they are expected to achieve results.

Routine security measures, such as control of civilian movement, are not designed solely as a means of effecting the direct detection of an enemy agent. Sometimes they do lead directly to such detection, e.g., an agent whose photo and description have been circulated may be stopped and recognised at a road check; but they have two other objects and results of almost equal importance.

Firstly, they tend to make the agent (a man with a guilty conscience) adjust his movements and actions in such a way as to evade the security measures which he knows to be in force, or which he believes may be in force. In this way he is liable to make himself conspicuous: his evasive actions, his use of round-about routes, his cautious manner, his uncertain behaviour - these will tend to pick him out from the crowd and it will be to his detection. If he has no security measures to fear, none to complicate his normal way of life, he will behave more lazily and merge into the mass.

Secondly, his first contacts with our security measures, his ignorance of exactly what measures are in force and where he will encounter them, may well make him lose his nerve and abandon his mission: he may give himself up or he may simply go to ground: whichever he does, he will no longer be a danger to our security. We have luckily met with many such cases, cases of agents who accepted an espionage mission in good faith, who crossed the lines with the firm intention of carrying it out, and who then threw in their hand on realising the unforeseen difficulties which they were up against, and the various pitfalls which might entrap them. We can well appreciate such action on the part of an agent if we imagine ourselves in a

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Thus, civil security measures may achieve their effect in one of three ways: either by causing the direct detection of the agent, or by tending to make him act carelessly, thus facilitating his detection, or by influencing him to abandon his mission.

If this three-fold object is borne in mind, it becomes clear that over the partial enforcement of security regulations and the partial application of security measures are well worth while and will have a most valuable effect. They should naturally be made as complete and thorough as our resources in manpower and other considerations permit, but the existence of unavoidable gaps in our security force does not render the force by any means useless. 100% controls are necessary if really good results are to be achieved in respect of the direct detection of agents, but a wide-spread system of "spot-checks" will achieve much in spite of the other two objects. Fear of what may happen, if based on reasonable evidence

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that such things do happen, can have a considerable influence on one's actions. How many officers, for instance, are scrupulously discreet in their private mail, because they know that the Base Censor may open the letter they are now writing, although they know that only about one in fifty is examined?

All control measures, whether applied on a 100% or spot-check basis, will help to keep the agent guessing, so that he can never feel safe: he will not know what he may meet round the next corner or when he can safely spend the night: if he goes to a house he may be questioned as to his identity; if he spends it in the open, he may get arrested for being out after curfew: if he moves without a pass, he may be detained at a road check: if he applies for a pass he will be questioned; if he is questioned he may make a slip, or he may be searched (and that wad of money may be discovered), or his identity card may be recognised as false: ("I wonder if the Germans gave us the right type, or if a different type has recently been introduced"). Above all he will try to avoid being questioned.

If he encounters or notices no security measures, no dangers or hazards, he will quickly gain confidence and behave just like the next man. But if he finds evidence of such measures and pitfalls, he will do all he can to avoid them, and the chances are then that he will either stand out or "pack in".

Imagine yourself an agent in enemy territory ; consider your reactions to SS Police checks, to applying for a pass at the Kommandantur, and to the possibility of being interrogated by the SD. Then reconsider the value of our own routine civil security measures.

2. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

Since the last issue of these Notes, the front line has not advanced to any great extent. In consequence, the enemy has had little opportunity for planting agents with stay-behind missions and appears to have confined his activities to dispatching them through the lines. The great majority have been given short-term missions and ordered to return at the end of a comparatively brief period, and it is plain that agents of this type are more likely to satisfy the immediate need of the German Army for tactical intelligence, than are agents equipped with W/T sets and mostly installed by means of parachute or small boat. In spite of the considerable numbers of line-crossers who fall into our hands, the GIS continues to employ them, and there is no doubt that we must concede them a considerable measure of success.

A survey of the agents captured during the month shows that almost all were trained before Jun 44, which suggests that the enemy has a reserve of agents which he is using up even though their training is not specifically adapted to the military situation of the moment. Furthermore, it appears that there has been a general tendency for GIS establishments to move towards the North-East of TOUR, and even out of FRANCE altogether, which no doubt prejudices to some extent the making of fresh plans, the content of training, and the launching of more ambitious operations. We may conclude therefore that although the SD is now largely responsible for the direction of the Abwehr, as was mentioned in the last issue of these Notes, it has still not been found possible to make its influence

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In the overall picture of intelligence operations during the month, the enterprise shown by Kina Marina and the higher quality of the agents used by this section stand out from the otherwise familiar and somewhat drab background. As evidence of this, we have the uncovering in ROME of a complete W/T reporting group, the detection of which was due more to the loss of its leader's nerve than to any lack of precaution on the part of Kina Marina. Again, there is the case of the two agents who were dispatched to obtain information on shipping and troop movements in the port of SPEZIA. This operation was a joint enterprise on the part of Kina Marina and Ufficio I, and was remarkable in that one of the two agents was of unusually high standard, having been previously in Italian Naval Intelligence as well as a Vice Consul in SWITZERLAND; in this operation again, the one as well as a Vice Consul in SWITZERLAND; in this operation again, the weakness lay in the other of the two agents, a woman, who denounced her partner in a fit of jealousy over his fickle attentions.

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During this month also, abortive sabotage operations were directed against shipping in the port of ANCONA, involving the use of midget submarines and swimmer-saboteurs. While this was strictly Naval operation in that it was executed by German naval personnel of the Kommando der Kleinen Kampfverbände, there is no doubt that this latter organisation has close associations with Abteilung III of the Abwehr, and largely derives its intelligence from Fins Marine.

In the war independent sphere, the SD appeared to be confining its activities during the month to the acquisition of political rather than purely military intelligence. Two of its agents were dispatched on a somewhat amorphous mission to organise rebel bands in Southern ITALY: two others gave us a further example of the co-operation, already observed, between the SD and the Republican Fascist Party.

If earlier paragraphs may have given the impression that we are underestimating or unduly disparaging the enemy's long term efforts, this is in fact far from being the case. Though there may be considerations which are dictating the present notions and policy of the SIS, there is no reason to suppose that this policy is unchangeable. In consequence, we may at any time expect a new crop of agents whose task it will be to cover areas beyond the ranges of line-crossers and for which photography would normally be used. Even at the present rate of approximately RM-2000 per agent (a normal encouragement given by the Abwehr), it is still cheaper to sacrifice four Italian agents with the hope that a fifth may succeed, than it is to lose one 30,000 aeroplane and a highly-trained Herrenvolk pilot into the bargain.

Recent Operations

The number of agents captured during the month in the operational zone was just under twenty, of which nearly 70% were dispatched through the lines, the balance having been given stay-behind missions.

Three agents had missions to report on shipping movements, the ports of LEGHORN and ANCONA being their targets; two were instructed to obtain information of a political and economic nature in ROME and FLORENCE, while two had a somewhat vague mission to organise rebel bands and saboteur groups in Southern ITALY. These latter four were the only SD agents captured during the period. The remainder, with the exception of one who was to note numbers of aircraft on airfields in Central ITALY, were to collect information of a purely military nature, mostly concerned with troop concentrations in the Army areas. Four agents were equipped with W/T sets, all the others being expected to take the information back personally.

Excluding those agents who surrendered voluntarily, FSS/CIC were directly responsible for the arrest of eleven agents during the month.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE METHODS

00024

The writing on the wall of Goebbels.

It is interesting to note that at this advanced stage in his espionage campaign the enemy is turning more and more to the use of devices more commonly connected with propaganda.

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photo-cameo could normally be used. Even at the present rate of [illegible] £1-2000 per agent (a normal encouragement given by the Abwehr), it is still cheaper to sacrifice four Italian agents with the hope that a fifth may succeed, than it is to lose a £20,000 aeroplane and a highly-trained Sperrverk pilot into the bargain.

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Three agents had missions to report on shipping movements, the ports of [illegible] being their targets; two were instructed to obtain information [illegible] of a political and economic nature in Spain and Lisbon, while two had a somewhat vague mission to organise rebel bands and sabotage groups in Southern Italy. These latter four were the only [illegible] captured during the period. The remainder, with the exception of one who was to note numbers of aircraft on airfields in Central Italy, were to collect information of a purely military nature, mostly concerned with troop identifications in the Army zones. Four agents were equipped with W/T sets, all the others being expected to take the information back personally.

Excluding those agents who surrendered voluntarily, PWE/SIC were directly responsible for the arrest of eleven agents during the month.

00024

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE METHODS

The writing on the handkerchief.

It is interesting to note that at this late stage in his espionage curriculum the enemy is naturally more and more to the use of devices more commonly associated with pulp fiction.

For example, several agents arriving the lines recently in possession of handkerchiefs impregnated with secret ink writing in the form of a pass to be shown on their arrival to enemy authority. One agent is instructed that on passing through the German lines on his return journey he should get himself taken to the nearest officer and have the handkerchief ironed with a hot iron or held [illegible] ; the writing thereon then appears and on the strength of it, the agent is sent back by the quickest means to which it is a word of warning is added, however, that, if the [illegible] writing refuses to appear, the handkerchief is a fake.

One agent on being [illegible] the matter evidently took this latter instruction to heart, and he effectively removed the incriminating evidence from his handkerchief by accidentally dropping it into [illegible].

Another modification of this type which has come to light [illegible], when two agents were apprehended in possession of a cigarette, the tobacco of which was found to enclose a ship of paper [illegible] a message [illegible] written on [illegible] with [illegible].

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Another cover-story

It has been noted of late that the SIS is paying increasing attention to providing its agents with credible "Cover" to facilitate their acceptance by us as persons of integrity. A case in point is that of an agent who was interrogated early in the month. He stated that before his departure on his mission, he was put among Allied prisoners in a PW Camp on a fictitious charge of espionage. His instructions were to gain the confidence of an Allied prisoner, and, after telling him that he expected to be released shortly as the charge against him was unfounded, and that he intended to cross the lines into NOE, to obtain a letter from him (the prisoner) to be delivered to the Allied authorities.

This he actually succeeded in doing: and the prisoner who fell for it was a Sergeant.

Pelmanism for agents

A kind of Pelmanism to enable agents to remember the information they collect without carrying obviously incriminating notes in their pockets was described by an agent interrogated during the month.

The system was suggested to him during his espionage training, and works as follows: At the beginning of his mission the agent buys some small article from a shop and obtains a bill for it: on the bill he then enters bogus sales, the quantities of which indicate numbers of troops, tanks, aeroplanes etc seen in the course of his mission. The agent in question stated that one of the "School" examples given to him - a typical example of Teutonic thoroughness and lack of imagination - was "100 tooth brushes" to represent 100 aeroplanes!

One could hardly hope to find in a suspect's pockets anything more calculated to stimulate suspicion than a bill for 100 toothbrushes. The story, nevertheless, illustrates the importance of closely examining the documents in a suspect's possession.

Refugee Escapes

An agent, recently arrested in ROME, was found to have travelled from BLEIBURG with a D/T set in his suit-case and considerable funds on his person. He had been repatriated from FLORENCE to ROME under arrangements made by the official Allied Refugee organisation.

He had not actually crossed the lines, but had awaited the arrival of the Allies in BLOEIBURG and started his journey Southwards when the tide of battle had passed him by: nevertheless this case illustrates only too dramatically the importance of refugees' baggage being thoroughly searched, and demonstrates the need for the closest possible supervision by CIC/FSS of all refugee centres and travel arrangements.

How to conceal 100,000 lire in the back of a watch.

Persons found in possession of large sums of money have long been regarded

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How to conceal 100,000 lire in the back of a watch.

Persons found in possession of large sums of money have long been regarded with suspicion, and quite rightly so, as experience has shown. It is evident, however, that in order to remove this cause of suspicion the CIS has considered a device which has been mentioned by a captured agent, although it has not been encountered in practice. This agent recounts that a fellow agent was to be dispatched carrying valuable stamps concealed in the back of his watch. No doubt it was envisaged that the stamps would eventually find a willing buyer among the refugees in search of the pluto-democracies.

Abwehr sign

When a vacated Abwehr HQ was recently searched, the following sign was observed on the door.

Kommando [redacted]



"[redacted]" refers to Capt. [redacted], known as "[redacted]", who was in charge of the Kommando. The sign represents an "over-open eye".

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4. CASE OF THE MONTH

Starting with the ingredients of a routine security check, a finer suspicion, and a liberal dose of healthy curiosity, CIC this month built up one of the most interesting cases of the period.

In the course of routine investigations into the former locations of German HQ's in their area, CIC encountered a woman who had previously worked as interpreter for a German transport officer. Among other things, she mentioned to them an occasion when she had been dining with this officer at his hotel, and the theft of a considerable sum of money from the room of one of the guests had been discussed. She had mentioned to the German officer that the culprit might possibly be a man who was also staying in the hotel and who was remarkable for the amount of money he was spending: her host had laughed off her suggestion and told her that after the war he would tell her why she was wrong.

Their interest aroused by this story, CIC set about finding out more about the suggested culprit. They found that he was known to a man in the town who, when traced, at first that he had moved to the hotel not one man but two, who were friends and who had gone away; they had however promised to visit him on their return. CIC then arranged matters so that when the two men returned to the town, they were found to be in the notice of the Carabinieri, who were given instructions to hold them.

Shortly afterwards, one of the men returned and was interviewed by CIC. In the main, his story was satisfactory except that it indicated that when the German had been in occupation, he had enjoyed notable freedom to travel about the country. Among other things, he stated that while he had been away, he had been living in rooms at Town X. CIC then decided to visit X and to make a few enquiries as well as to search the man's rooms; the latter produced a considerable sum of money all in new notes. Suspicion rapidly hardening into certainty; CIC turned again to their card index which previously had yielded nothing. A further search now revealed a name similar in sound but different in spelling to that of a known enemy agent, who had a stay-behind ring. and who was believed to be operating with a companion.

Armed with this information and the money, CIC returned to confront their suspect who then admitted his identity and his mission. He further admitted that his companion had gone to Town Y, although they had both arranged to meet in X the following day. He did not know his companion's address in Y but thought he would locate him through a mutual friend.

00021

CIC were then confronted with the problem that if the second agent returned to X the following day, he might learn of his companion's arrest from CIC's visit to his room, and might escape. A signal to the security authorities at Y might also arrive after his departure, particularly as his exact address was unknown. They therefore decided to take the agent they had already caught in X with a view to catching the second one. This meant a seven hour drive through the night in order to reach Y by day-light. Arriving at Y at 0600 hrs, they located the mutual friend who unsuspectingly gave the address where the second agent could be found. [illegible] the doorbell in his pyjamas.

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5. SABOTAGE

Attempted Sabotage on KILKIS Coast

In the early morning of 14 October, a driver of an Army Q.M.T.C. Workshop was inspecting his 30-cwt truck, when he discovered that an explosive charge with a time delay firing device attached had been placed on the front axle during the night. A search amongst the other vehicles in the vicinity revealed a second set of primed explosives on a truck thirty feet from the first. A technical examination later showed that whilst the plastic high explosive was very probably British in origin, the detonator and delay pencils were certainly of German or Italian manufacture.

The workshops are sited very close to the sea-front from each of the two vehicles involved, tracks ran down the beach to the water's edge. Appropriately attached to anchors six Teller mines were found under service lorries, also believed to be German or Italian, containing fuses, detonators and primers. The mines were placed in a ring with the lorry-jack nearby, and they exploded shortly after their discovery, completely destroying the lorry-jack and its contents. There were indications that some heavy object had been dragged either from or to

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the water.

The fact that the area concerned abounds in important targets far more accessible by land than the one chosen tends to the belief that the attempt was made from the sea. It is possible that the arrival of a transporter vehicle at 0530 hours on 14 Oct may have scared the party into beating a hasty retreat before their mission had been accomplished.

Bridges and L.C.

A report from FRANCE tells of expert German swimmers KU (Meerenkampfer), manned with the standard rubber suits and oxygen breathing apparatus, making their way down rivers towing explosive charges of considerable size. These were contained in a torpedo-shaped shell of an over-all length of 16 feet, a diameter of over 2 feet and a half and containing a H.E. charge of 1600 lbs. The objects of such attacks are solid structures in the water such as permanent bridges and lock gates. On reaching the target the swimmer submerges and clamps the torpedo to the target, setting the igniter mechanism to a delay of one to six hours. (With regard to the size of this latest device, it should be mentioned that the German underwater bomb designed for use against shipping weighs altogether 20-24 lbs, and is only about 1½ feet in length.)

As to the possible use of such devices in this Theatre, they might be left behind, during an enemy withdrawal, hidden with their operator near to a river, as they could not be man-handled for any distance; or they could be employed against a target on rivers which flow across the lines through both enemy territory and our own.

6. MILITARY AND CIVIL SECURITY

Security Work in neutral territory

290 FS Section had the unusual experience of working in neutral territory when the SAN MARINO Republic, which has proudly asserted its independence for the last 1600 years, became again the scene of fighting in late September. In spite of the population's unpreparedness for the inconveniences of war on their doorstep, Allied troops were generally well received, and FS diplomacy overcame the early difficulties which were experienced in imposing on this toy country essential security regulations, which the local Milizia Cittadina then helped to enforce.

At the time of the Allied arrival the native population of SAN MARINO numbered about 14,000, but many thousands of refugees from Italian territory had crowded into the "sanctuary". Although, after the Armistice, Fascist elements in the Republic and its Consul, CUCCHINI, for many years the Italian Fascist Consul, had energetically sought to stem the tide, and the powerful GOZI family, thirteen in number, who had long ruled the administration of the pocket state, had lent their influence to perpetuate a line of Fascist Regents either bearing their name or following their will. If, therefore, the neutrality of SAN MARINO had been respected by the Germans, and consequently by the Allies, doubtful elements among the "fellowsi" would have enjoyed a measure of immunity. To the refugees, therefore, FS turned their first attention.

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Early agreement was reached with the Regents that none of the lodgers would be allowed to leave the State until authorised, and arrangements were made to control the borders with the aid of the local Militia Gittadina and of CC.RR. Carefully laid schemes were, however, upset by the late arrival of fifty CC.RR who were to man the check-posts on the Italian side of the frontier, but fortunately quick action by the SAP IO prevented a general exodus, and though security failed it did not fail.

At first an Allied request for power to arrest and remove Italian subjects was refused by the Republic, albeit in a half-hearted fashion, but after negotiations this objection was modified and then withdrawn altogether. The Government of the Republic seems to have been influenced to some extent by its reluctance to break the record of its own small jail, which has received no clients for sixteen years. Leading Fascist personalities were subjected to investigation, some to arrest and removal, and critical examination was made of all German and non-residents.

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Another evasion of the exit regulations came to light in early October when two Italian soldiers from the [redacted] Naval Base, SARDINIA, were stopped at an advanced check post some miles north of FLORENCE and quite close to the front line. This pair was based at LIVORNO, and, under the direction of a Naval Captain, was visiting repeatedly liberated territory to gather information about friends and relatives of the crews of MAS-ELCO, to deliver letters from SARDINIA and to collect messages which they were to carry back. These missions were officially sponsored by the Italian Naval authorities in SARDINIA.

ACC has been requested to put a stop to this practice.

7. SERVIZIO INFORMAZIONE DIFESA.

From CIC and SIB/CMPIC interrogation reports of officers latterly belonging to the above organisation, it is possible to give a general picture of the Italian Fascist Republic's Intelligence organisation, the Servizio Informazione Difesa, and to amplify the paragraph on this subject contained in the August issue of these Notes.

Late in September '43 the Ministry of National Defence of the MUSSOLINI Government proceeded to the creation of a new Intelligence organisation embodying the members of SIM in its territory, personnel of the Naval SIS, Air Force SIS, together with selected members of the MVSN and of the CC.RR who did not care to serve in the SIM. The moving spirit behind this reorganisation was Marshal GRAZIANI, by this time a staunch Republican. The officers of the new service which was to abandon the Royalist and Conservative policy of SIM, were required to sign a declaration of allegiance to the new Republic and to guarantee their willingness to continue the fight alongside their German comrades. It should be said that this declaration in many cases not taken, or was given in bad faith, as many of the SIM officers concerned, although apparently anxious to continue their specialised Police and Intelligence duties, could scarcely approve the character and aims of the new regime.

GRAZIANI appointed Dr. Vittorio MUTTONI as head of the new organisation. MUTTONI had a varied career-cavalry officer, military observer in ESTONIA, and journalist known for his articles in the Italian press on the Russian preparations in the BALTIC states; he had also acquired something of a reputation for dishonesty. Unlike SIM which was directed by the "Stato Maggiore", SIFAR was to be directly responsible to GRAZIANI. A headquarters was set up at VOLTA MANTOVANA (F 3743) and there is housed the Deputy Chief Lt. Col. MARINI, the General Secretary of SIFAR, Colonel de CARLINI, and the main offices of most of the departments, comprising in all at least 70 officers working in civilian clothes, and a number of [redacted], in addition to a company of carabinieri on guard duties. This Headquarters was in touch with various sub-offices in the principal towns [redacted] Besides the main office at MANTOVANA, an

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GRAZIANI first appointed Dr. Vittorio FOSCHINI as head of the new organisation. FOSCHINI was a 44 year old career-army officer, military observer in ESTONIA, and journalist known for his articles in the Italian press on the Russian occupations in the BALTIC states; he had also acquired something of a reputation for dishonesty. Unlike SIM which was directed by the "Stato Maggiore", SID was to be directly responsible to GRAZIANI. A headquarters was set up at VOLTA MANTOVANA (P 3743) and were to be housed the Deputy Chief Lt. Col. MARELLI, the General Secretary of SID, Colonel GARELLIS, and the main offices of most of the departments, comprising in all at least 70 officers working in civilian clothes, and a number of CCRR, in addition to a company of Carabinieri on guard duties. This Headquarters was in touch with various sub-offices in the principal towns and cities of German occupied ITALY. Besides the main office at VOLTA MANTOVANA, an important centre, directed by Lt. Col. CARELLI, was situated in ROME in the Via Gaeta. In the same building worked the CHIEFTAIN of the CIS who undoubtedly had been directed by his superiors in that body to keep a careful eye - and if necessary a string hold - on FOSCHINI's organisation, which did not enjoy the trust of the Germans.

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When the Consul GUGLIELMI claimed diplomatic privilege (despite his reported resignation on 21st September), the SAN MARINO authorities showed signs of discomfort, but it was fairly pointed out to them that he either represented the BONOMI Government, in which case the FS were there to offer him transport facilities to ROME; or else he was the servant of a group which did not enjoy Allied recognition, and therefore the question of his diplomatic status was of little consequence. He was thereupon arrested and removed, without detriment to relations between SAN MARINO and the UNITED NATIONS.

An election of new Regents has recently taken place and at least one of the newly elected pair is described as a strong anti-Fascist. A movement nasty and hysterical CNL is attempting to arouse public enthusiasm for its schemes of a general purge. But the battle is moving on, and SAN MARINO will soon become an episode of the past, embodying somewhat of comic opera: meanwhile, however, PWB continue their work, as even comic opera must be taken seriously when enacted in a forward operational zone.

Security Arrest Statistics

From 1 January to the end of August 44, that is a fortnight before ...I territory was substantially reduced, the number of security arrests reported to this HQ totalled almost 4,000. This total included 12[illegible] members of the Italian Armed Forces, 306 civilian officials, 43 Fascist Party officials and 417 members of the CVRR, the remainder being miscellaneous civilians. Of the above, 604 were detained for further investigation, 1616 were tried for specific security offences, (mostly for offences against movement control regulations), and 2362 were interned. The figures for JULY and AUGUST, which covered the security exploitation of the territory gained in the major advances of MAY and JUNE, accounted for approximately 5% of all arrests and 5% of all internments carried out since the beginning of the year. The peak month was JULY, when the figures reflect the security results of the capture of ROME, and when internments numbered 895.

It will be realised that these figures cannot be regarded as complete, since they do not cover the many unrecorded cases of persons arrested, detained for a very brief period and then released.

Firearms and the civil population

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Some difficulty is being experienced in persuading Partisans to give up their arms when their sphere of activity is overrun by the Allied Forces, and it is apparent that large numbers of such arms are concealed in our territory. The more unscrupulous elements appear to be continuing their warlike acts in the form of banditry against their neighbours, and in TERAMO Province early in September a possee organised by AMG, CS and CC.RR was necessary to curb their activities. Anti-Fascism still is usually the excuse put forward for acts of violence. At TERNI (1 District), for example, an ex-SPECIAL was shot in late September: Communists were believed locally to be responsible, and fear of anarchy spread amongst the population as a result.

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From 1 January to the end of August 44, that is a fortnight before all territory was substantially reduced, the number of security arrests reported to this HQ totalled almost 4,000. This total included 12[illegible] members of the Italian Armed Forces, 206 civilian officials, 432 Fascist Party officials and 417 members of the MVSN, the remainder being miscellaneous civilians. Of the above, 604 were detained for further investigation, 1616 were tried for specific security offences, (mostly for offences against movement control regulations), and 2362 were interned. The figures for JULY and AUGUST, which covered the security exploitation of the territory gained in the major advances of MAY and JUNE, accounted for approximately 50% of all arrests and 55% of all internments carried out since the beginning of the year. The peak month was JULY, when the figures reflect the security results of the capture of ROME, and when internments numbered 895.

It will be realised that these figures cannot be regarded as complete, since they do not cover the many unrecorded cases of persons arrested, detained for a very brief period and then released.

00020

Firearms and the civil population

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In order to limit the numbers of arms at the disposal of Italian civilians, ACC have been requested to issue a reminder to their officers to limit as strictly as possible the number of rifles or shotguns, sporting guns etc previously surrendered by their owners to the CC.RR.

Although at present there is no indication that such firearms as are held by the civilian population are designed or destined for use against Allied troops, every effort should be made to discover and rectify their unauthorised possession, since they must always present a potential threat to our security and, if the general situation were to deteriorate, they might prove a very real danger.

Control of Movement of Italian Service Personnel

CMC Fifth Army has reported a new evasion of the Movement regulations by members of the Italian Army. Interrogation of Italian soldiers travelling illegally in the Army area has revealed that certain Italian units, knowing the soldier's residence to be within the forbidden zone, have issued leave passes to a town just south of the Security Control Line: the soldier then carries on to his home as best he may. At least a score of such units are noted.

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Another example of the same regulations came to light in early October when two Italian officers from the [redacted] Naval Base, SARDINIA, were stopped at an advanced check-post some miles north of FLORENCE and quite close to the front line. This pair was based at FLORENCE, and, under the direction of a Naval Captain, was visiting recently liberated territory to gather information about friends and relatives of [redacted] Class of MARSEILLE, to deliver letters from SARDINIA and to collect messages which they were to carry back. These missions were officially sponsored by the Italian Naval authorities in SARDINIA.

ACC has been requested to put a stop to this practice.

7. SERVIZIO INFORMAZIONI DIFESA.

From CIC and SIB/CSDIC interrogation reports of officers latterly belonging to the above organisation, it is possible to give a general picture of the Italian Fascist Republic's Intelligence organisation, the Servizio Informazione Difesa, and to amplify the paragraph on this subject contained in the August issue of these Notes.

Late in September 43 the Ministry of National Defence of the PUBBLICA Government proceeded to the creation of a new Intelligence organisation embodying the members of SIM in its territory, personnel of the Naval SIS, Air Force SIA, together with [redacted] members of the MVSN and of the CC.RR who did not cease to serve in the SIM. The moving spirit behind this reorganisation was Marshal GRAZIANI, by this time Minister of the Republican. The officers of the new service which was to abandon the Royalist and Conservative policy of SIM, were required to sign a declaration of allegiance to the new Republic and to guarantee their willingness to continue the fight alongside their German comrades. It should be said that this [redacted] was in many cases not taken, or was given in bad faith, many of the SIM officers concerned, although apparently anxious to continue their specialised police and Intelligence duties, could scarcely approve the character and aims of the new regime.

GRAZIANI placed [redacted] Dr. Vittorio ZINCONI at head of the new organisation. ZINCONI [redacted] a retired career-naval officer, military observer in ESTONIA, and journalist known for his articles in the Italian press on the Russian preparations in the Baltic states; he had also acquired something of a reputation for dishonesty. Unlike SIM which was directed by the "Stato Maggiore", SIS was to be directly responsible to GRAZIANI. Headquarters was set up at VERONA (F 3743) and [redacted] housed the Deputy Chief Lt. Col. [redacted], the General Secretary of SIS, Commander [redacted], and the main offices of most of the departments, comprising in all at least 70 officers working in civilian clothes, and a number of NCOs, in addition to a company of Carabinieri on guard duties. This Headquarters was in touch with various sub-offices in the principal towns and cities of Central occupied ITALY. Besides the main office at VERONA, an important centre, directed by Lt. Col. [redacted], was situated in ROME in the Via Goito. In the same building [redacted] of the SIS who undoubtedly had been directed by [redacted] superiors in that body to keep a careful eye - and if

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GRAZIANI had appointed Dr. Vittorio FOSCHINI as head of the new organisation. FOSCHINI was a retired cavalry officer, military observer in ESTONIA, and journalist known for his articles in the Italian press on the Russian preparations in the BALTIC states; he had also acquired something of a reputation for dishonesty. Unlike SIM which was directed by the "Stato Maggiore", SIS was to be directly responsible to GRAZIANI. A headquarters was set up at VOLTA MANTOVANA (F 374) and there he housed the Deputy Chief Lt. Col. MANFREDI, the General Secretary of SIS, Commandante CARLINO, and the main offices of most of the departments, comprising in all at least 70 officers working in civilian clothes, and a number of WACs, in addition to a company of Carabinieri on guard duties. This Headquarters was in touch with various sub-offices in the principal towns and cities of German occupied ITALY. Besides the main office at MANTOVANO, an important centre, allocated to Lt. Col. CANALI, was situated in ROME in the Via Cesta. In the same building worked Col. CHIERICI of the CIS who undoubtedly had been directed by his superiors in that body to keep a careful eye - and if necessary a strong hand - on FOSCHINI's organisation, which did not enjoy the trust of the Germans.

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FIELPOT JUV 79

1404/20/G3I(b)

25 Aug 44

To: See Distribution

The attached Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY are forwarded for distribution down to Divisions, FS Sections, and CIC Detachments.

W.D. Gibson B.G.
for Brigadier
DCS(I)

HEADQUARTERS
27 AUG 1944
A.C.C.

GS

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CI Section CSDIC CMF
Security Branch ACC
No 1 ICU
Tac HQ "A" Force
16 FS Section
DCCS

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POSCHIAVI, however, had ambitions and plans of his own (he aimed at 20,000 personnel for OS duties alone), and was anxious to keep SID totally independent in policy and in action. But he soon found himself in difficulties. His O[illegible] branch (Offensive Intelligence) which expected to take over the SID role of gathering information abroad in FRANCE, SPANISH N. AFRICA and the BALKANS, and in addition to send its agents into ALLIED-occupied ITALY, found that the Germans disapproved of SID personnel working in areas outside immediate German control and that in reality this branch was allowed to exist in name only. The Germans demonstrated their lack of confidence in other ways: for instance, SID HQ found itself starved of communication facilities, and all telephonic calls outside HQ numbers had to go on German lines. One of our sources, Capt. [illegible], who had been assigned to SID HQ at the request of POSCHIAVI and whose services were used in the preparation of the SID Daily Bulletin, was also employed by his Chief, whose confidence he obviously enjoyed, to carry messages of a confidential nature to the ROME Office. It may be fairly assumed that this private courier service was part of POSCHIAVI's endeavours to keep certain of SID activities concealed from the SIS. In late January, however, POSCHIAVI's anti-German attitude, and his freedom of expression of it, led him to disaster; he was kidnapped by the SS as he left CHIGIANI's Villa on L.go G.RIA and is now - if alive - interned in GERMANY.

His successor was Lt-Col. GIUSEPPE [illegible] who was at th[illegible] time the head of the "B" or CE branch. Col LEO was a capable and enthusiastic gentleman, although curiously enough one of his early acts was to sign passes for Captain [illegible] and our second source, a Lt-Col. CALVI, Deputy Head of the important CE/[illegible] Branch, so that they might go on "indefinite leave", apparently in order to avoid taking the oath to the Republic which had been decreed essential three months before. Lt-Col LEO evidently modified POSCHIAVI's expansionist plans and whilst undoubtedly less anti-German than his predecessor, continued to carry within the organisation many senior officers of doubtful loyalty to MUSSOLINI and his supporters.

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In March his departments were very briefly as follows:-

(a) "[illegible]" (Offensive Intelligence). Abortive for reasons stated above. Sinecure held by Lt-Col. [illegible].

(b) "[illegible]" (Defensive Intelligence). This corresponded to the CE Section of SID and was by far the most important branch of SID. It had retained virtually all the old SID personnel and maintained sections and sub-sections as far as possible in the same geographical locations as before. The majority of its officers had been seconded from the CC.RR. A CC.RR Capt. [illegible], probably one of the few fervent Republican Fascists in SID, was head of the ROME CE office. The above branches were moved at one stage from VILLA MARTORANA to VERONA, since in March this year it was reported at the latter location.

(c) "SICUREZZA" (Internal Political Intelligence)
Prince Sforza [illegible] of the MVSN controlled this branch which collected information on civilian morale and the reactions of the of the various classes to the Republican regime of MUSSOLINI and to the Germans. In March it became subsidiary to "D.E.T." and was later located at MARTORANA. The SIS naturally severed its relations with a lively regret.

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It may be fairly assumed that this prior to current service was part of PUGLIESE's endeavours to keep most in of the activities concealed from the OVRA. In late January, however, PUGLIESE's anti-German attitude, and his freedom of expression of the same, led him to disaster; he was kidnapped by the SS outside DR. LAVI's Villa on Lake Garda and is now - if alive - interned in GERMANY.

His successor was Lt-Col. [redacted] who was at this time the Head of the "I" or CS Branch. Lt-Col was a capable and enthusiastic replacement, although curiously enough one of his early acts was to sign passes for Captain [redacted] and our second source, Lt-Col. SALVO, Deputy Head of the important Counter-Espionage Branch, so that they might go on "indefinite leave", apparently in order to avoid taking the oath to the Republic which had been decreed essential three months before. Lt-Col evidently modified PUGLIESE's expansionist plans and without doubt displayed anti-German views but continued to carry within the organisation many senior officers of doubtful loyalty to MUSSOLINI and his supporters.

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In March his departments were very briefly as follows:-

(a) "CRIMA" (Offensive Intelligence). Abortive for reasons stated above. Sinecure held by Lt-Col. [redacted].

(b) "DELTA" (Defensive Intelligence). This corresponded to the CS Section of SID and was by far the most important branch of SID. It had retained virtually all the old SID personnel and maintained sections and sub-sections as far as possible in the same geographical locations as before. The majority of the officers had been seconded from the CC.RR. A CC.RR Capt. [redacted], probably one of the few fervent Republican Fascists in SID, was head of the DELTA CS Office. The above branches were moved at one stage from VOLT. MANTOVA to MUSSOLINI, since in March this year it was reported at the latter location.

(c) "CIRCE" (Internal Political Intelligence)
Prince Signora [redacted] of the MVSN controlled this branch which collated information on civilian morale and the reactions of the of the various classes to the Republican Regime of MUSSOLINI and to the Germans. In [illegible] it became subsidiary to "DELTA" and was later located at MANTOVA. The CIS naturally examined its findings with a lively interest.

(d) The "Centro Decodifica e Elaborazione Notizie" comprising "E", "I" and "S" Sections. As the name suggests, this department, which was purely a headquarters section at VOLT. MANTOVA., was organised for the reception, evaluation and distribution of information from all sources. "E" & "I" Section, for example, scrutinised all Axis and Allied broadcasts and made an extensive study of the home and foreign press. "I" and "S" Sections under Capitano Angelo [redacted], a very fervent Republican, were concerned with the breaking down of Allied codes and cypher. This branch enjoyed consistent and absolute German supervision from the senior officer downwards. [redacted] had an English wife, and was also further supervised by the GESTAPO.
The Centro was responsible for the preparation of the SID Daily Bulletin of which it is said only 14 copies were made; this limited distribution included one for MUSSOLINI, one for the DUCE and one for [redacted].

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(c) "KOPF" (Communications), under Capitano Corvetta DI BONACO, originally of SIS. This officer succeeded the Lt.Col. S.I.S.I.D mentioned above, when the latter disappeared on his "indefinite leave". The branch installed W/T sets, manned by Regia Marina operators, at VILLA FALTONELLI in GRADISCO to enable the Duce to keep in touch with SID HQ, and also organised similar facilities between the HQ and the ROCCA Office, the Prefettura at FLORENCE and other important centres. Codes supplied by the Cryptographic branch were employed. In view of the German stranglehold on land communications, these sets might have been of significant importance, but in March at latest there was a sad deficiency in both their number and quality.

(d) "ZETA" (Censorship). Headed by Colonel BONACO, and located at GOITO (P 9935). In small towns throughout Republican ITALY, local Fascist censors censored the mails, whilst in the large towns and cities trained Army officers were employed. In the case of serious violations of a political or military nature, "Z" SID centres in the provinces were informed by these censors.

Other branches included the "Air Force Section" under Colonel SCOTTI of SIS, which was really a sub-section of "ZETA"; the "T.U" or Technical branch, under Lt.Col. [illegible] of the Marines, which produced plans and prototypes, and carried out laboratory and maintenance work, and an administrative Section, under Prima Sottoco SCOGLIGLIO, a former F.V.S. enthusiast, who was responsible for selection and control of personnel.

In dealing with members of SID, it should be remembered that many of them will be classed in territory under Allied control in the early stages of the campaign in ITALY. They might well be working now on SIM Co-belligerents alongside PB/CIC. Another point is that SIS/CS on this side have a considerable amount of background information on SID members, either having served in many cases with them in the past or knowing of their department's records, political traditions and worth. It must be appreciated that the majority of SID is of dubious loyalty to the Republican cause, and that the determinate lean by now decidedly towards: Disposal of such SID members should therefore be treated very much on its own merits.

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NOTES ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY

SECRET

1404/20/CSI(b)

25 Aug 44

1. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY : A YEAR's SURVEY

It is now almost a year since Allied forces landed on the Italian mainland, and it is therefore perhaps appropriate that we should take stock of the general development and results of counter-intelligence during this period.

The campaign has contained certain Ib/CI features of particular interest, and in at least two respects the security situation has been without precedent. Having gained some experience in SICILY of operating in enemy territory, and elsewhere of operating in Allied or neutral territory, we have been faced in ITALY with the problem of adjusting our methods and procedure to meet the requirements of co-belligerancy - a hitherto unknown mongrel which had to be approached with caution, and with which satisfactory relations could be developed only through improvisation, trial and error, and flexibility of approach.

In the second phase, the enemy has made use of agents on a scale far exceeding that experienced in any other theatre either in this war or in the last. Starting in December last year, and reaching a peak in June this year, the number of agents coming into our hands now averages slightly over one per day. It is fortunate that this flood did not start to flow until three months after the start of the campaign, as this period of grace enabled us to establish firmly the frame-work of our security system, so that it was ready to meet the shock when it came.

Thirdly, the campaign has been varied by four phases of alternately two extremes, rapid advances on the one hand, and comparatively static periods on the other. In the latter periods it was possible to organise our security measures and controls very much "according to the book"; time could be devoted to the finer points of security doctrine, and the smaller gaps or leaks could be plugged. During the rapid advances, many security measures, including all refinements, became of necessity inoperative, or had to be subordinated to other more urgent operational considerations : rapid improvisation and constant attention to priorities were required if even the most indispensible security principles were to be implemented.

In an attempt to estimate the degree of success obtained over the past year in the sphere of counter-intelligence it is as well to recall briefly what our main objects have been. First and foremost, our aim has been to keep the enemy in ignorance of our operational intentions : secondly, to ensure that covert action by the enemy or his Italian sympathisers does not lead to the destruction or damage of our stores and equipment, or to the

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without precedent. Having gained some experience in counter-espionage in enemy territory, and elsewhere of operating in Allied or neutral territory, we have been faced in ITALY with the problem of adjusting our methods and procedure to meet the requirements of co-belligerency - a hitherto unknown mongrel which had to be approached with caution, and with which satisfactory relations could be developed only through improvisation, trial and error, and flexibility of approach.

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These objects have, in the main essentials, been fulfilled. Since our initial landings in ITALY, three major operations have been mounted in this country. The first was the ANZIO landing ; this achieved complete surprise and the enemy was totally unprepared for the landing which was consequently virtually unopposed in its initial stage. The second was our May offensive against the GUSTAV Line ; in this case the enemy did not know where the main weight of our attack was to fall; in fact, he made a positively false appreciation of our intentions - more profitable to us than his mere ignorance - with the result that the faulty disposition of his forces made a strong contribution to the success of the Allied attack and break-through. The third operation mounted in ITALY was the recent landing by Seventh in the South of FRANCE ; although it cannot be claimed in this instance that strategical

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surprise was achieved, since it is almost certain that the enemy appreciated the imminence of an attack on Southern FRANCE, yet tactical surprise was obtained, in that he knew in advance neither the sector of the coast chosen for the landings, nor the date on which they were to be made. The security of this operation was of particular interest, in that there were many grave breaches of military security discipline, especially in respect of indiscreet talk and of widespread knowledge of the plan, but the over-all security measures in force in Southern ITALY prevented the vital details from reaching the enemy.

Thus, though leakages have occurred, and some of them were serious, the success of our most important operations has not been prejudiced by security weaknesses.

In the sphere of sabotage, a good deal of inconvenience has been caused by wilful damage to our signal communications, and our ammunition dumps have suffered considerable losses through theft. There has, however, been very little wilful sabotage with intent to harm the Allied cause, and though the damage and loss referred to above have obviously led to a certain limited loss of efficiency, it can be said that the scale on which sabotage or wilful damage have been carried out has not been such as to have any appreciable effect on the conduct of our operations. Ships, railways, bridges, utilities and supplies have all been virtually unaffected by covert enemy activity of this nature.

As far as subversion is concerned, numerous Fascist groups and conspiracies have been discovered, and doubtless there are many more which have not yet been detected. They have all, however, shown themselves to consist of plans and intentions rather than of action. It is certainly a remarkable feature of the Allied occupation of ITALY, which less than a year ago was an enemy country, that we have encountered no organised resistance or disturbances behind our lines, no guerilla or partisan activities. It has been said that security will have failed, if the C-in-C is ever compelled to divert a Brigade or Regiment from the front to the rear, from fighting the German Army to quelling Italian hostile activity. So far no such diversion has been necessary.

It appears, then, that our main security objects in ITALY have been achieved throughout the past year. This degree of success is due to many causes, which it is not proposed to mention in detail, but reference may perhaps be made here to three particularly important aspects of counter-intelligence work in ITALY.

The first is concerned with the multiplicity of counter-intelligence agencies which make up our security organisation and the consequent importance of co-operation and co-ordination : the FSS and CIC which form the back-bone of this organisation and the framework into which the other more specialised agencies are fitted to complete the structure ; the co-ordinating

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[illegible] have suffered considerable losses through theft. There has, however, been very little wilful sabotage with intent to harm the Allied cause, and though the damage and loss referred to above have obviously led to a certain limited loss of efficiency, it can be said that the scale on which sabotage or wilful damage have been carried out has not been such as to have any appreciable effect on the conduct of our operations. Ships, railways, bridges, utilities and supplies have all been virtually unaffected by covert enemy activity of this nature.

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The first is concerned with the multiplicity of counter-intelligence agencies which make up our security organisation and the consequent importance of co-operation and co-ordination : the FSS and CIC which form the back-bone of this organisation and the framework into which the other more specialised agencies are fitted to complete the structure ; the SCI units, including the late OSS X2 Detachment, which supply the counter-espionage specialists, and which have proved an indispensible part of our organisation during the last nine months ; the SIM(CS), which required careful nursing in the early days of its co-belligerent existence and which has been entrusted with gradually increasing responsibility and confidence until it was, since the fall of ROME, almost attained the status of an Ally ; the RIP's, which were improvised last autumn and soon recognised as indispensible, and which have been imitated in other theatres ; the French Securite Militaire, which has lent expert assistance in NAPLES and ROME, in addition to performing its normal duties with the French Expeditionary Corps ; the CI Section of CSDIC, which handles the detailed interrogation of the interminable queue of enemy agents ; the Security Branch of ACC which handles politico-security cases and assists our military security agencies in the preparation of trials and in other spheres; SILO and his team, which is responsible for screening the thousands of refugees reaching IT.LY from the BALKANS ; No 1 ICU which deals with the counter-intelligence exploitation of newly captured cities ; the CD.RT who read cheque-books, the questori, whose records can be used to good effect, and the

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AOC Public Safety officers who ensure the co-operation of these Police Forces; the officers at 371 PW Camp, who are responsible for reviewing the cases of some 2000 internees ; the Fleet Base Security Officers, who cover the Naval aspects of Port and Coastal security work. Such are the principle security agencies operating in ITALY, though the list is not exhaustive and many others are concerned in one way or another with our counter-intelligence activities. Individually, these agencies could achieve only meagre results, but collectively they can, and do, present a formidable and effective security network. With so many independent organisations engaged on the same kind of work, the potential danger of gaps and overlaps must be apparent. In actual fact, however, the functions of all these agencies are complimentary and not conflicting : it is therefore possible for them to co-operate in forming a co-ordinated whole, provided that each understands the functions of the other and recognises the proper scope of its own.

The second main feature of counter-intelligence work in ITALY on which emphasis has been and must be placed, is the attention paid to the preventive and routine aspects of such work. It is, above all, the effective security control of the civil population, coupled with the strict enforcement of normal military security precautions within units, which make for the neutralisation of the efforts of enemy intelligence. The control of civilian movement and communications, the enforcement of the restrictions imposed by AMG Proclamations, the supervision of hotel registration, the internment of doubtful elements, the "vetting" of applicants for Allied employment, the compilation of records, the training of our own forces in military security discipline - these are the measures, routine and humdrum though they are, which are the strength of our security system. If they are backed by thorough investigation of every suspicious incident and person reported and by a meticulous follow-up of all "leads" - and only one in twenty cases turns out to be of any real interest - the result is a counter-intelligence system which should be able to stand up to the worst that KAPPLER or HELFRICH can contrive against it.

Thirdly, mention should be made of certain aspects involved in the handling of enemy agents. Not only has every effort to be made to apprehend enemy agents despatched to Allied territory, and to extract from them all possible intelligence, but it is also of the utmost importance that as many as possible should, when appropriate, be brought to trial. In the course of this year much time and effort has been devoted to the preparation of cases for trial, and the feeling has sometimes been expressed that such work, apart from being onerous, is unproductive and does not properly fall within the province of counter-intelligence circles. There is no doubt, however, that time spent on trials is far from wasted, as they can and do contribute in a very positive degree to our security. Fear of a death sentence is the strongest possible deterrent to persons considering whether to accept or carry out espionage and sabotage missions on behalf of the enemy, and the publication of executions is probably the most effective security measure which can be applied. This is not mere theory. We have had many examples of the actual [illegible] impression which has been created by the publicity

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In conclusion we can feel pleased, but not satisfied, with the counter-intelligence results so far achieved in ITALY : much has been learnt, and it is believed that our Allied security organisation, principles and methods are sound ; but much remains to be learnt, and we must be prepared to meet a more difficult situation in the Industrial North of ITALY, and a far more complex but no less vital task in AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

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2. GERMAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

Since our last summary on this subject (dated 16 Jul 44), the consequences ensuing from the occupation of ROME, from the advance of the Allied Armies through central ITALY and from the failure of the majority of the enemy's intelligence projects, have become yet more plain. The expectation that the German Intelligence Service in ITALY would, as a consequence of its reverses, undergo fundamental changes appears to have been borne out, though it is too early to attempt to define these changes with precision.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Abwehr is now disorganized to a degree where nothing short of a root and branch re-organisation will be called for. It may safely be predicted that the comparative independence which it has hitherto enjoyed in ITALY will be drastically curtailed. In comparison, the Sicherheitsdienst, though its post-occupational plans for ROME met with virtual disaster, has probably suffered a less serious blow to its prestige which, unlike the Abwehr's does not depend exclusively or even mainly on espionage and sabotage. Moreover, the fortunes of the SD are so closely linked with those of the NAZI Party that, as the latter is forced by the pressure of events to assume ever greater control both within GERMANY and outside, so will the SD tend to take on enlarged responsibilities. We must therefore expect that, as the Allied advance continues, we shall have to deal more and more with the SD, reorganised and re-oriented to meet the changed situation. Geographically, the general movement of HQs and other centres will presumably be to the North-East, and, though the main body of the SD in ITALY remains for the present at VERONA, it is likely that when the Allied Armies reach the PO Valley the SD's Italian operations will be controlled from beyond the ALPS.

Recent Operations

In the period under review, more than fifty enemy agents were face our hands. These show a new pleid preponderance of SD agents over those of the Abwehr in the proportion of 3 to 2. All the SD agents and post-occupational candidates in ROME or FLORENCE, while of the Abwehr agents arrested in the same period only a third were found in ROME, the remainder being apprehended in widely separated parts of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA. The apparent absence of any appreciable stay-behind effort by the Abwehr in FLORENCE is particularly significant in view of the fact that it had been their principal Headquarters and training centre for nearly six months. They had ample time and opportunity to form post-occupational plans for this city, and their failure, so far as is known, to take advantage of these factors may be regarded as a measure of the failures and troubles which have recently befallen the Abwehr in ROME and elsewhere.

Of the agents arrested, approximately 45 per cent had been left behind

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Agent Operations

In the period under review, more than fifty enemy agents came into our hands. These show a numerical preponderance of SD agents over those of the ABWEHR in the proportion of 3 to 2. All the SD agents had post-occupational commitments in ROME or FLORENCE, while of the ABWEHR agents arrested in the same period only a third were found in ROME, the remainder being apprehended in widely separated parts of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA. The apparent absence of any considerable stay-behind effort by the ABWEHR in FLORENCE is particularly significant in view of the fact that it had been their principal Headquarters and training centre for nearly six months. They had ample time and opportunity to form post-occupational plans for this city, and their failure, so far as is known, to take advantage of these factors may be regarded as a measure of the failures and troubles which have recently befallen the ABWEHR in ROME and elsewhere.

Of the agents arrested, approximately 45 per cent had been left behind in ROME or in other parts of Central ITALY to be overrun by our forces; an almost equal number had crossed the lines into Allied-occupied territory. The rest had been dropped by parachute. It is noteworthy that during the past few months no agents have arrived by sea, due no doubt to a healthy respect for our coastal security controls which have cut short the careers of many evil previous espionage and sabotage parties.

Only a small minority of the agents captured were equipped with W/T sets. This may be partly explained by the fact that a number belonged to groups whose W/T operator had already been arrested. No regard has been noted to the indications contained in the last report that the enemy were trying to establish communications by means of secret ink.

Long distance reception in S. ITALY and SICILY was a prime feature of the period, and SARDINIA continued to be no objective for parachutists.

The espionage miscellaneous as usual concerned for the most part with the gathering of long or short term military information, though in ROME a minority of the agents employed were charged with political intelligence

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missions. All of the latter were, as was to be expected, stay-behind agents of the SD. There was again a conspicuous absence of to activity, although one or two agents of this type were encountered. In general, the briefing received was vague and casual. An exception was the case of an agent who was sent a long distance for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether or not a particular airfield was being used by the Allies.

Although in this period saboteurs have fallen into our hands at about the same rate as before, there is still no evidence of the actual commission of sabotage. Our continued immunity in this respect is particularly remarkable in view of the large quantities of sabotage material which has been discovered. The majority of the saboteurs were caught in FLORENCE and were employed by the SD. Abwehr II was but poorly represented.

The Italian partisans continued to play a useful part in counter-intelligence operations, and in FLORENCE they were instrumental in the capture of several important agents. It was found that the Partito d'Azione group of Partisans in that city had organised an efficient counter-intelligence service, with contacts in other towns of Northern ITALY. It appears likely that we shall in future receive some really valuable and well-organised assistance from this quarter, and it is proposed to take full advantage of this co-operation which is readily forthcoming.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE METHODS

Recruitment

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German methods of recruiting agents for their service continue on the usual lines. In the main Italians who undertake to carry out missions for the enemy do so not from motives of patriotism or sense of duty, but for one of three reasons: either as a means of escape from service in GERMANY or in the discredited Italian Republican Army, or to alleviate straitened financial circumstances, or to return to their homes in the South. Hence their generally poor quality as agents. There is one recent instance of a new method by which an agent was inveigled into the SIS. A certain LANCELOTTI had been making a fairly profitable living by his Black Market activities; he met a pretty woman, struck up a rapid and intimate acquaintance with her, and in one of his less discreet moments betrayed to her his means of livelihood. Next day he was arrested by the Questura and the woman's husband appeared offering service in the SIS as an alternative to the penalties of the Black Market Laws. LANCELOTTI recognised that he was cornered and accepted. It is difficult, however, to imagine how the Germans can expect faithful service from an agent recruited by this method.

Routes

Southeast ITALY is the area generally chosen for parachuting agents. When agents are despatched by air the plane sets off from a near the lines

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Routes

Southeast ITALY is the area generally chosen for parachuting agents. When agents are despatched by air the plane takes off from as near the Lines as possible and the course leads well out to sea, the object being to run as little risk as possible of interception by Allied aircraft. One agent recently dropped in APULIA, was first taken by car from BERGAMO to MILANO and thence to TURIN (TORINO) before finally making landfall in South ITALY. However, although the plane kept low over the water, at a height of about 600 ft, it was attacked three times on the way by Allied night-fighters, apparently without success.

Methods of obtaining information

There is no evidence of any particular ingenuity or originality on the part of the enemy intelligence services in discovering new ways and means of penetrating our counter-intelligence defences. The following are typical of the instructions received by agents for the fulfilment of their mission.

A group of three agents were instructed, when briefed, to obtain jobs in Allied Military Headquarters as cooks, and one agent recently arrested was found to have been working at an Allied Forces Club in ROME.

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-6- its still rely on "careless talk" as one of their sources of information. At one period, when the enemy was anxious to know whether there were Russian troops in the Theatre, a female agent exercised her charms on an Allied NCO who - whether gratuitously or not is not known - supplied the answer.

It was suggested to one agent of a certain journalistic bent that he should start a Review in English and Italian. This work would bring him in contact with useful people and gain him entrance to Allied Headquarters. Another agent was to be used as translator on the staff of the Review.

Sabotage Equipment and Training

Among the numerous dumps of material left behind by the Germans to be used by their post-occupational saboteurs no new device has come to light. It is obvious, too, that members of the LEGOLO and GREEN groups of the 10th MAS received but scanty instruction on the use of the sabotage devices entrusted to them. Students of the SCUOLA MARE school, although more thoroughly and more widely trained in such matters as traction, explosives, arms, ju-jitsu and self-defence, driving, W/T etc, were not in the first instance selected with any greater degree of discrimination and have in many cases shown considerable distaste or lack of enthusiasm for their missions.

Clerk and Doctor

One group of these saboteurs recently arrested in ROME was in possession of five phials and card boxes (size not yet known) of potassium cyanide, which is the first instance revealed in ITALY of saboteurs carrying poison with them. The purpose to which the poison was to be put in this case is not yet known, but evidence is available that poison was to be used in one of the assignments of the FLORENCE post-occupational group of saboteurs. It is alleged, fantastic though it seems, that the aim of these saboteurs was to poison the King and Crown Prince of ITALY. This may not appear so absurd when one considers that at the period of the PIZZO beachhead no less a person than KAPPLER himself toyed with the idea of objectively rats infected with some pestilential disease into the Allied area. (This latter scheme is said to have been vetoed by KESSELRING himself).

Another mission of the FLORENCE group consisted in concealing bombs in bouquets which were to be thrown at Allied troops as "greetings" when they entered the city. The saboteurs were apprehended and the "bouquets" nipped in the bud.

4. MILITARY AND CIVIL SECURITY

Security of Operations

In large centres like ROME and NAPLES many instances were reported of careless talk, [illegible]

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and more widely trained in such matters as wireless, explosives, [illegible] and self-defence, driving, W/T etc, were not in the first instance selected with any greater degree of discrimination and have in many cases shown considerable distaste or lack of enthusiasm for their missions.

Black and Decoy

One group of three saboteurs recently arrested in ROME was in possession of five phials and five boxes (size not yet known) of potassium cyanide, which is the first instance revealed in ITALY of saboteurs carrying poison with them. The purpose to which the poison was to be put in this case is not yet known, but evidence is available that poison was to be used in one of the assignments of the FLORENCE post-occupational group of saboteurs. It is alleged, fantastic though it seems, that the aim of these saboteurs was to poison the King and Crown Prince of ITALY. This may not appear so absurd when one considers that at the period of the MUSSOLINI bunchhood no less a person than GOEBBELS himself toyed with the idea of dispatching rats infected with some pestilential disease into the Allied area. (This latter scheme is said to have been vetoed by MUSSOLINI himself).

Another mission of the FLORENCE group consisted in concealing bombs in bidets which were to be thrown at Allied troops as "presents" when they entered the city. The saboteurs were apprehended and the "bombets" nipped in the bud.

4. MILITARY AND CIVIL SECURITY

Security of Operations

In large centres like ROME and NAPLES many instances are reported of careless talk, indiscreet speculation and rumour-mongering among troops in circles talk, leave, sight-seeing etc., the favourite topic being the projected offensive against Southern FRANCE. Incidents like the two following served only to set further tongues wagging. The first was the large scale distribution of French dictionaries to the inmates of a Military Hospital; the second concerned a storeman NCO who showed another soldier a couple of invasion boards bearing the US and French flags, with the remark "This is what you are going to be issued for the invasion".

Security Discipline

A tendency has been noted for units and formations moving out of the country to clam up a little on security in certain directions, and the number of indiscretions in the private mail of such units has usually risen steeply. Since the enemy is obviously just as keen to know what is brewing in the country as to know what is coming in, this is a point to which FSP/CIC and sorting divisions might well give special thought.

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Unpublished Testimonial

A document recently captured from a German division on the Italian front commends highly on our wireless and telephone security, which was stated to have shown a "degree of discipline never before achieved."

General Movement and Residence

A brief survey of the spies who have so far fallen into our hands tends to disprove the theory that the female of the species is so beautiful in fact as she is painted in fiction. But the Allied soldier is no less susceptible to her charms. Witness the case of the lady spy who was recently captured in NAPLES. In the course of her peregrinations in Allied territory, she journeyed as far as SALERNO, thumbing her way in a miscellany of military and civilian vehicles, and by the time she was apprehended she had "graduated" to a "policeo". She then started on her return journey, spending several interesting days on the point of embarking on an Italian military truck to take her way back to the enemy lines with a wealth of information when she was apprehended.

In spite of repeated similar instances, many military personnel still seem to think that the order forbidding civilians to be carried in MT vehicles is no more than an unwarranted interference with their legitimate amusement.

On the other hand, that existing Allied controls can be effective when strictly applied is shown by the case of the crafty Greek PAPOLIDI Savio, whose movements might well have gone undetected had it not been for the application and proper use of the regulation governing the employment of civilians in hotels and boarding houses : PAPOLIDI is to be employed this week.

Rear Army Security Control Line

The Rear Army Security Control line has recently been moved forward and now runs, by the main roads, from PORTO CIVITANOVA (S 7913) on the Adriatic Coast through MOLLEPIANO, VISSO, SCHEGGIO, MACERATA, TOLENTINO, ONFELTO, S. LORENZO and thence along route 74 to the Sea.

No doubt civilians who have had to seek to attempt to evade the controls will say that they passed the line unwittingly. Such excuses should not be accepted with some suspicion as every effort has been made to bring the line clearly to the notice of civilians by means of large posters.

Subversive Movements

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The most important subversive movement which has come to notice during the past six weeks, was a Fascist Group centred in RIMINI, whose activities included that of facilitating the travel of unauthorised persons to enemy-occupied ITALY. Many Fascist groups were discovered and liquidated in SICILY.

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ing on an Italian military truck to make her way back to the enemy lines with a wealth of information when she was apprehended.

In spite of repeated similar instances, many military personnel still seem to think that the order forbidding civilians to be carried in AMG vehicles is no more than an unwarranted interference with their legitimate amusement.

On the other hand, that existing Allied controls are effective when strictly applied is shown by the case of the spy agent Ruffo CLENI Sergio, whose presence might well have gone undetected had it not been for the application and proper use of the regulation governing compulsory registration of guests in hotels and boarding houses : RUFFONI is to be executed this week.

Rear Army Security Control Line

The Rear Army Security Control line has recently been moved forward and now runs, in its close range, from PORTO CIVITANOVA (S 7815) on the Adriatic Coast through COLMENO, VISSO, SCHEGGIO, NORCIA, LEONESSA, ORVIETO, S. LORENZO and thence along route 74 to the Sea.

No doubt civilians who have been seen to attempt to cross the controls will state that they passed the line unwittingly. Security Officers should regard this excuse with some suspicion as every effort has been made to bring the line clearly to the notice of legitimate travellers by means of large posters.

00014

Subversive Movements

The most important subversive movement which has come to notice during the past six weeks, was a Fascist Group centred in ROME, whose activities included that of facilitating the travel of unauthorised persons to enemy-occupied ITALY. Minor Fascist groups were discovered and liquidated in SICILY.

The growing influence of Communism has been noted in several quarters, but only one report has been received indicating the likelihood of Communist elements provoking disorders and thereby presenting a danger to our Security.

5. ITALIAN REORGANISATION

SIM/CS Organisation

The splitting down of SIM/CS with the various Allied security and counter-espionage agencies in action in ITALY, though slow & cumbersome, has proved to be of considerable value to Allied Intelligence, it has been gradually expanded and entrusted with progressively increasing responsibility.

During the past month certain reductions have been effected in the strength of the Italian Army generally and of the Carabinieri Group in particular.

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In order that the SIM/CS should not be confused, and also in order to place it on a proper setting of its own, steps have been taken to organize it as a corps to entirely free the Command Structure of which it has hitherto formed an integral part; it is now to become the Italian CS Battalion, with a separate M/O and its own Corps of Officers which is to be 1000 all ranks. It is proposed to open new Centres at the following places, as and when these are liberated: NAPLES, BARI, LECCE, TARANTO. Major DeTTI is still Head of this organization, and in view of the full and efficient cooperation which he has afforded, it is intended that he should continue to hold this appointment.

Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID).

The following information on the SID has been supplied by SIM/CS.

The SID, which is the Fascist Republican equivalent of the pre-Badoglio/present SIM with special emphasis on counter-intelligence, has expanded its organization and continues to collaborate closely with the CIS. Its Headquarters, which was previously in BRESCIA, has now set up at VOLTA MANTOVANA (18 miles from MANTUA), and the present head of the organization is Lt.Col.Candeloro DE LEO, a capable and conscientious officer of the CC.RR. who replaced the incompetent Dr. PISCHEDDA.

It is interesting to note that this is the same Col. De LEO, well-known to many PWB/CIC and other security agencies, as former head of the Italian CS in SICILY at the time of the Allied invasion of that island.

The Head of the organization is assisted by two Staff Marshals known as the Generale Generale and the Segretario Particolare, the former being responsible for matters relating to personnel, while the latter handles the intelligence side of the business. At the head of the Segretario Generale is Naval Capt.da Corvetta [illegible], a notorious pro-German and fanatic Fascist. Capt. PUCCI (CC.RR) is stated to be the present head of the Segretario Particolare.

The organization is represented by a section with each of the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force). Their work is co-ordinated by a Command known as the SIFAR Network (Ufficio SIFAR), which covers both offensive and defensive intelligence and counter-espionage. In addition there are the following sections organized on a territorial basis: the Political Section (Ufficio SIGIL) which handles political propaganda and counter-espionage, the Communications and Cipher Section, and the Cryptographic and Censorship Section.

Following are brief details concerning the principal officials of SID.

Head of SID - Col L.O, a very capable person. He was head of CS in Sicily, during which time he obtained about 2,000,000 lire taken from a box sent over by the Allies, prior to and after the Allied landing. For fear of being accused of misappropriation he later turned this sum over to the SID. He organized centres in NAPLES, PADUA, FLORENCE, ROME, GENOA (?) [illegible] and PALERMO. These centres were or consist

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and continues to collaborate closely with the CIC. It is responsible, under the previously [illegible], and now set up at [illegible] (18 miles from [illegible]), and the present head of the organisation is Lt.Col.Candeloro ED 1.20, a capable and unscrupulous officer of the CC.RR who replaced the incompetent Dr. TOSCHERI.

It is interesting to note that this is the same Col. E. [illegible], well-known to many PWB/CIC and other security sections, as former head of the Italian CS in SICILY at the time of the Allied invasion of that island.

The head of the organisation is assisted by two Staff Branches known as the [illegible] and the Segretaria Particolare, the former being responsible for matters relating to personnel, while the latter handles the financial side of the business. At the head of the Segretaria Particolare is Major Capt. [illegible], a dangerous pro-Fascist and ex-Ufficio Politico. Capt. PICCOL. (CC.RR) is attached to the present head of the Segretaria Particolare.

The organisation is represented by a section with each of the Services (Army, Navy and Air Force). This work is coordinated by a branch known as the [illegible] (Ufficio CC.RR.), which covers both offensive and defensive intelligence and counter-espionage. In addition, there are the following sections of this branch dealing with : the Political Section (Ufficio SIFAR) which handles political propaganda and counter-espionage, the Communications and Cipher Section, and the Cryptographic and Documents Section.

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General Secretary - [illegible] (Naval Captain). Fascist.

Operations Secretary - [illegible] (Captain CC.RR) His assistant is Ten. [illegible] (NAV). Resided in ROME.

Political Branch - (Ufficio Affari) - Major [illegible], born in Tuscany, Major CORTI [illegible], Capt. [illegible], Capt. [illegible], Capt. [illegible] and one other Capt. in, name unknown. These were formerly members of the Servizio Politico (ex-Fascist government).
This branch has been successfully developed and has regional headquarters in [illegible], PADUA and [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] were also headquarters of this branch.

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[redacted] Branch - Lt. Col. [redacted] Lt. Col. [redacted] with an assistant, Lt. Col. [redacted]

[redacted] Section - Col. CLOSETTI who replaced Lt. Col. [redacted]

[redacted] Section - Col. [redacted]

[redacted] Section - Naval Capt. [redacted] assisted by personnel drawing from the C.I.C., who are not responsible for their intelligence training or experience as for their I/C ability.

[redacted] Section - Lt. Col. [redacted] assisted by Lt. Col. [redacted] and Lt. [redacted]. The section control about nine [redacted] stations.

[redacted] Section - Col. [redacted]

[redacted] Section -

[redacted] Section - Col. [redacted]

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Security Br

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Subject:- Collection of Ib/CI Intelligence.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

SECRET.

AAI/1401/15/GSI(b)

15 Aug 44.

G-2, Fifth Army
G.S.I., Eighth Army
G.S.I., 2 District
G.S.I., 3 District
G-2, P.B.S.
G-2, ROME Allied Area Command
G-2, Allied Garrison SARDINIA
S.C.I. Unit Z.

1. The time has now come when greater attention should be paid to certain wider aspects of counter-intelligence, and when there should be a shift of emphasis in the collection and collation of Ib/CI intelligence.

2. Hitherto the information which has been collected about the enemy intelligence services has referred of necessity more to the agents employed than to the officers or officials employing them.

3. It is now desired to concentrate to a greater degree on these officials, and to obtain urgently such information concerning them as will assist us to track them down in their own country, into which they may be expected to withdraw as the Allies close in. (The term "officials" is used to cover all officers or N.C.Os. who are staff members of the ABWEHR or SICHERHEITSDIENST).

4. The information required will be obtained mainly through the interrogation of arrested agents by CSDIC or SCI. It will not therefore be necessary for FSP, CIC, RIP's etc., to attempt to extract such information from agents whom they propose to pass on for detailed interrogation by SCI or CSDIC. In the case of arrested agents whom it is not proposed to pass to one of the latter agencies, or in the case of any other persons who may be encountered, and who have some knowledge of the subject in question, all counter-intelligence personnel should bear in mind the nature of our requirements in this direction, and extract all such information in the possession of the person concerned: this should be passed through the usual channels to this HQ.

0001

5. Following is the type of information on which it is desired to concentrate from now onwards:-

(a) Exact locations, with map references and plans if possible, of any HQs connected with the enemy's intelligence organisations, particularly in AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

(b) Any details of the organisation, such as chain of command and responsibilities

Security Branch

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00014

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(b) Any details of the organisation, such as chain of command and responsibilities

(c) Location of archives, particularly of HQ administrative records.

(d) Personal particulars of officials, eg.,

(i) Full name

(ii) Aliases

(iii) Nationality

(iv) Place and date of birth

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File No. 143
Section Hdq.

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(v) Home address

(vi) Address of near relatives

(vii) Pre-war occupation

(viii) Languages

(ix) Passport or identification card number

(x) Description.

(e) Indications or expressions of intention as to future (particularly post-defeat) organisation or activity.

6. It is appreciated that in many cases some of the above particulars under 5(d) have already been obtained. A list will shortly be provided, for your guidance, of those officials concerning whom no further physical descriptions are required, and at the same time attention will be drawn to the points concerning them which require amplification.

7. It is requested that the above be treated as a matter of urgency.

W. D. Gibson. Lt-Col

Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

Copy to:- G-2 (C.I.), A.F.H.Q.
A.2 AAF/MTO
G.S.I., 1 District
Information Section, A.C.C.
Security Branch, A.C.C.
1 S.C.I. Unit.
CSDIC C.I. Section
G.I.L.O.
16 F.S. Section
300 F.S. Section
H.Q., A.A.I.
G(Ops) B.
G.S.I.(a)
P.W.B.

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HEADQUARTERS
PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
A. P. O. 782

HEADQUARTERS
20 JUN 1944
A. C. C.

SECRET
:Auth: CG, P.B.S. :
:Initials: :
:Date: 15 June 1944:

EPGBI

15 June 1944

FROM: 1 June 44
TO :15 June 44

SUBJECT: SEMI-MONTHLY COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE REPORT.

TO : A. C. OF S., G-2, S. O. S., CASERTA, APO 750, U.S. ARMY

PART I

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN THE PENINSULAR BASE SECTION

Routine security activities and investigations conducted during the period covered by this report have resulted in no cases of especial interest or importance.

The liberation of Rome and the Allied landings in France have to a certain extent distracted the attention of the civilian population from their personal problems and enhanced the prestige of the Allied armies.

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PART II

(Specific incidents)

1. SUBVERSION

a. Nothing to report.

2. SABOTAGE

a. Investigation by C.I.C. personnel was made in connection with the cutting of a control cable, on 4 June at approximately 1420 hours, located in a tunnel leading from the Garibaldi Railway Station, Naples. Approximately 10 feet of five-strand copper, insulated cable used to operate an electric switch had been completely severed at both ends. An Italian soldier found in the tunnel a few minutes after the sounding of the alarm bell which indicated that the switch was out of order, was suspected of tampering with the cable. The soldier's explanation of his presence in the tunnel and the fact that he had in his possession when apprehended no instrument capable of having severed the cable led to the conclusion that the act had been committed by a person who had fled upon seeing the soldier enter the tunnel. The fact that the cable had been severed at both ends led to the conclusion that theft rather than sabotage was the motive.

A complete report of this case, in which it was recommended that a guard be placed at both ends of the tunnel and at each of the sub-stations along the way, was forwarded to the Intelligence Officer of the 707th Railway Battalion.

3. ESPIONAGE

a. Nothing to report.

4. SECURITY

a. Security of Information and Material.

(1) Investigation was requested by AAI of statements made in an Axis controlled Italian broadcast on 8 April, to the effect that supplies dropped by parachute from American planes

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were marked "Fourth Division". An interview with the Commanding Officer of the Aerial Re-supply Company, which was in charge of packaging the supplies in question, and an examination of packaged supplies in stock indicated that no unit identification marks had been or were being used, and that no breach of security had occurred.

b. Security of Ports and Installations.

(1) The withdrawal of the 808rd M. P. Battalion plus 11 M. P. Detachments of approximately 30 men each from the Port of Naples, and the replacement of these units by 2 M. P. Companies has created a dangerous situation from the point of view of Port Security.

(2) A survey is being made to determine the number of security personnel which should be assigned to the ports to the North of Naples which are being operated or will shortly be operated by P.B.S. An arrangement has been made with G2 of Number 5 District, whereby Number 5 District will take over the Ports of Torre Annunziata and Castellammare thus releasing the two C.I.C. Agents now on duty at these ports.

c. Suspects, Arrests and Personnel Investigations.

(1) Reference is made to Para. 4 c (1), of Part II, Report of 31 May. G-2, CAS, 5th Army has advised that Belgni is not considered valuable to that organization and that they will not ask that he be turned over to them. This individual, therefore, will be handed over to AMG for trial.

(2) Di Paolo, Camillo, reported to this Office by CAI as an escapee from Italian Headquarters at Vomero, was arrested by members of the Transient Control Squad of C.I.C. as a result of the examination of the list of ticket holders for the Naples-Bari train of 31 May. Interrogation revealed that Subject was not of counter intelligence interest and he was handed over to the Italian Military Authorities for whatever disciplinary action they might desire to take.

(3) Buckley, N., alias "George Reginald", was arrested by C.I.C. personnel on 5 June 1944 and confessed that he was a Private in the British Army who had been impersonating an F.B.I. Agent. He was turned over to the British Military Police.

(4) Ferra, Antonio, was investigated at the request of the Regional Security Officer, ACC. It was determined that he had been a Squadrista and a Non-commissioned Officer in the Fascist Militia. It was recommended that he be removed from

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his position as Chief of a labor gang in the Royal Navy dockyard and that he be listed as undesirable for employment with any Allied organization.

(5) At the request of AAI, internment of Tomassetti, Virgilio and Vilani, Ennio, for the duration of the war in Italy has been authorized. These individuals were formerly associated with OSS and their knowledge of the operational methods of and personalities connected with that organization makes it advisable that they be interned for security reasons.

(6) During the period covered by this report, one hundred and eight (108) investigations were made of individuals proposed for employment by the Allied Forces, or in civil or governmental positions under Allied control. Of these, eighty-eight (88) were approved.

d. Control of the Movements of the Civilian Population.

(1) The increased numbers of refugees passing through this area as a result of operations at the front, have created a difficult security problem. Efforts have been made to check the names of all refugees against the suspect lists in the possession of C.I.C. and to interrogate those individuals who appear to be suspect. Security Officers of AAI have been requested to make every effort possible to see that sufficient guard personnel is made available to prevent the escape of refugees prior to examination.

(2) While it has been impossible to keep pace with the speed with which P.B.S. boundaries have been expanding during the past several days, arrangements have been made whereby Carabinieri are being used to pay especial attention to unauthorized crossing of the Garigliano. Other activities of the Transient Control Squad are being continued to the extent possible with the decreased personnel available.

5. PROPAGANDA

a. Nothing to report.

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6. RUMORS

a. The German Army has escaped due to the slow progress of the Allies. (Italian Civilians - Naples)

b. An attempt on Kesselring's life was unsuccessful. (Ital. Civ. - Naples)

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c. The Germans will not be able to stop on the Leghorn-Rimini line due to Partisan activities. (Ital. Civ. - Naples)

d. The Allies are consulting the Pope as to the reshuffling of the Italian Government. (Ital. Civ. - Naples)

e. Rome was saved, thanks to the Pope's intervention with the German High Command. (Ital. Civ. - Naples)

f. The Republican Fascist authorities are worse than the Germans. (Ital. Civ. - Bari)

g. Rome will be declared an "open" city and no troops will be allowed to remain in Rome. (Ital. Civ. - Naples)

V. ATTITUDE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

The people generally appear to be somewhat better satisfied with the food situation, and state that it has shown some improvement. Food outside the black market, however, is still insufficient to satisfy the civilian needs. The people realize that efforts are being made to insure a proper distribution at fair prices and these efforts are appreciated.

The lower classes do not seem to attach too much importance to the changes in the government, although the fact that the leadership of the government has passed to a civilian has aroused favorable comment. The spreading rumor that the Allies intend on retaining Badoglio is accepted as an indication of a tendency to support reactionary elements.

In their attitude towards Allied troops, the lower classes are becoming increasingly less tolerant.

Allied victories and the occupation of Rome had an exhilarating effect on popular feeling, somewhat reduced, however, by reports of atrocities committed by Moroccan troops against Italian refugees in the battle area.

The middle and upper classes have been considerably more articulate and spontaneous than the lower classes in manifesting their enthusiasm for Allied victories and the liberation of Rome. Lack of positive reaction on the part of the lower classes may be in part attributable to the fact that so far, no definite social program has been endorsed by the Allies or the Italian government.

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Middle class political opinion includes a combination of fear and admiration for Russia, mistrust and respect for Great Britain, and enthusiasm for the United States, tempered by uneasiness that we may disinterest ourselves in the political future of Italy.

All classes recognized the inevitability of the reshuffling of the Italian government, since Rome and the North have always been the politically significant areas of Italy. A certain amount of criticism is expressed as to the choice of political personalities, but such criticism is motivated rather by personal and party reasons than by realistic considerations.

[redacted]
Lt. Colonel, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

00004

Copies to:
[redacted], AFHQ
A. C. of S., G-2, Fifth Army
CMI, 2nd. District
CMI, 3rd. District
Director, Security Branch, ACC.

[redacted]

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section HP/jw

3

MGS: 337-5 17 March 1944

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Conference at Naples, 20 April, 1944.

TO : HQ ACC
Attention: Colonel Albright.

1. We are advised by G-2 (CI) that a two days' conference on counter intelligence for U. S. Army officers will be held at Naples on 20 April 1944. It will be attended by counter intelligence officers representing the air forces, ground forces and base sections.

2. G-2 has requested that the U. S. contingent of A.C.C. provide an officer as speaker for one of the sessions, in order to inform those present of AMG and ACC activities as bearing upon counter intelligence methods and procedures. We have informed G-2 that without doubt you would be glad to provide such an officer and perhaps would like to have one of your officers attend all sessions of the conference.

3. All arrangements should be made with Major Vincent J. Thill, Ass't A.C. of S., G-2 Hqs,AAI, who will have been informed by Captain Kuehnert of G-2, AFHQ, with whom the matter has been discussed here. The agenda will be prepared by Major Thill, and the place on the agenda of the ACC speaker will be settled with him. It is suggested that you get in touch with Major Thill to settle the details.

Henry Parkman Jr.

HENRY PARKMAN, JR.,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chief of Section.

00005

Lieut John
Please see Ro
27 Mar. 44

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RESTRICTED

File (2)

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ROUND TABLE

CONDUCTED AT

PENINSULAR BASE SECTION

20-21 April 1944

Directed By

Lt. Col. Jack Crowley
Asst. G-2, AFHQ

THURSDAY- 20 April 1944

HOURS		
0900 - 0915	Introduction.	Lt. Col. Jack Crowley, Asst. G-2, AFHQ
0915 - 1015	Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps.	Major E. L. Ray, CO, CIC, AFHQ
1015 - 1030	BREAK	
1030 - 1130	Military Government, the Allied Control Commission, and Counter Intelligence in the Forward Areas.	Representative of AMG and ACC
1200 - 1330	LUNCH	
1330 - 1430	Top Secret and Security Control.	Major Wm. H. Witt, Asst. G-2, AFHQ
1430 - 1530	Italian Police Organizations and Methods.	Major M. J. Papurt, CO, CIC, PBS
1530 - 1600	Incendiary Grenade Demonstration.	Lt. Col. Sikes, CWS Section, AFHQ

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FRIDAY- 21 April 1944

0900 - 0930	Review of the Enemy Situation.	Capt. Draper, Asst. G-2, AFHQ
0930 - 1030	American Military Personnel Security.	Capt. M.L. Kuehnert, Asst. G-2, AFHQ
1030 - 1130	Travel Control	Major Nick Stepanovich Asst. G-2, AFHQ

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CIVILIAN INTERNEES AT P.O.W. CAMP. Two officers have been sent to 371 P.O.W. Camp, Padula, to review the cases of civilians who have been interned as dangers to military security. This is a matter which needs constant reviewal, because, although a man may very rightly be regarded as a danger when the Army is passing through a locality, there may not be the slightest danger from such a man after he has been interned for six months or more. The Armies have passed on, in some cases the territory has been handed back to the Italian Government, and the Allies are interested only to a very small degree in a military sense. It is therefore essential that all these cases should be reviewed, and the evidence tested to see if it is really strong enough now to justify the continued internment of such people. This was set up by A.A.I. Headquarters Intelligence, who make the final decision as to release.

BEACH HEAD REFUGEES. Over ten thousand refugees have been sent from the Anzio-Nettuno Beachhead, and the services of an officer was provided from Security Branch to work with C.I.C. to get them screened. A staff of Italian Army officers and Carabinieri worked under the supervision of CIC agents, the Security Branch officer assisting with general running of the arrangements and keeping an eye on the Refugee Section of Allied Control Commission to see that their arrangements for disposing of the refugees did not interfere with the screening. This was quite likely to happen as the Refugees section was more concerned with getting rid of them than with the Security angle.

INDIVIDUAL INVESTIGATIONS IN SPECIAL CASES. These cannot be mentioned in too great detail because of their diversity. The services of the Security Branch are available to any portion of the Allied Control Commission for work which is perhaps out of their sphere, or is too complicated, or needs a detailed investigation which the Security Branch can tackle but which they cannot. That is the reason why each man is carefully chosen for his previous wide investigative experience.

SCHEDA PERSONALE. This form was conceived in the Security Branch and is widely in used throughout all the territory occupied by the Allies as being a guide of a person's Political history and sentiments. All officials employed by the present Italian Government has to complete one, and this is retained for scutiny atany time by Allied Control Commission. Incidentally that is yet another of the duties of the Security Branch, checking proposed Italian Government officials before they are appointed.

CONCLUSION. This, of necessity,is a very brief account of the duties of the Security Branch, but it may be said that either on behalf ~~of the Allied Control Commission or~~ of the Allied Armies in Italy or of the Allied Control Commission, it is prepared to undertake any investigation or assignment which the controlling officers of these bodies need assistance.

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ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

The Allied Control Commission has recently started tonfunction in the greater part of Italy occupied by the Allies. It differs from Allied Military Government in that the latter directly controls the Italian people, but in Allied Control Commission its functions are merely advisory to an Italian Government, thus establishing a system of indirect control.

The Allied Control Commission is divided into compartments designed to conform to the set up of the Italian Government, so that each section of the latter such as Legal, Finance, Public Health, Public Safety, has its counterpart in our organization.

It is the policy of the Allied Control Commission to put into effect the wishes of the Allied Governments and of the Military Commander as regards the Italian Government. The normal channel of communication between the Armies and the Italian Government should be through Allied Control Commission.

In each Region and Province there is a Commissioner, who is advised by specialists in various sub-commissions. For instance in every large town there is a Public Safety officer, who keeps closely in touch with Public Safety matters in his area, and is in a position to keep the Provincial Commissioner informed. On a higher level we have the Regional Commissioner, and, of course, Headquarters. The Public Safety officer should be contacted for everyday information on minor matters, or higher levels as may be necessary.

SECURITY BRANCH.

The work of this branch is closely allied to the duties of Public Safety Sub Commission, but consists solely of a Headquarters staff, with no officers attached to Regions or Provinces. There is a small nucleus of specialized officers whose job it is to undertake any special type of investigation which might be allotted to them.

The principal responsibility is the Security of our own organization, and we act largely in the capacity of a buffer between our the Allied Armed Forces and the Italian Government. The question of Army Military Security is already in the good hands of the CIC and FSS and we only come into contact with this incidentally. Some examples of our work are as follow:-

PREPARATION OF CASES. The Security Branch has been of great assistance to A.A.I. in connection with the preparation of cases for trial of ENEMY AGENTS who have passed through our lines. Practically all the evidence is in the possession of military personnel, and the courts trying such cases were set up by A.M.G. legal department. In practice it was found that prisoners were being acquitted because of some technicality or because all the available evidence was not being placed before the Court. There were many reasons for this, but the thing was to put a stop to what amounted to almost wholesale acquittals. Two officers were sent from Security Branch, one to 8th. Army and one to 5th. Army. Each of these officers was a man with many years experience of criminal investigation and presenting cases from Scotland Yard. The whole process has been speeded up, witnesses traced, stronger evidence presented, closer collaboration with the Courts has been established, with the result that (90% of the men brought before the Courts on espionage charges in the last two months have been convicted.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section HP/jw

(1)

MIS: 337-5 17 March 1944

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HENRY PARKMAN, JR.,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chief of Section.

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Copy to Lt. Zeh.

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