

ACC 10000143 | a753 645/12 SECURITY WORK IN NORTHERN ITALY

-Δρ. - Aug. 1945

SECURITY DIVISION
FILE
MINUTE SHEET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

185016

No. of sheet	Date	File No. of A need list.	To whom	Subject
1.	16 April	-	-	Capt. G-EACH "A" interview Camp.
2	23 April	-	-	Security - Northern Italy
3.	26 April	-	-	Capt. G-EACH "A" interview Camp.
4	27 April	-	-	introduce executives
5.	27 April	-	-	Screening of officials
6	18 June	-	-	War criminals
7	29 June	-	-	Security officer
8	29 June	-	-	" "
9	9 July	-	-	Visit in Northern Regions
10	12 July	-	-	" "
11	15 July	-	-	" "
12	19 "	-	-	" "

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5. 27 April - Screening of officials
 6. 1st June - War criminals
 7. 29 June - Security officers
 8. 29 June - " "
 9. 9 July - Unrest in Northern Regions
 10. 12 July - " "
 11. 15 July - " "
 12. 19 " - Unrest in N. Italy
 13. 18 " - " "
 14. 21 " - " "
 15. 25 " - " "
 16. 26 " - Unrest in Northern Regions
 17. 9 Aug. - " "
 18. 11 " - Severity North Italy
 19. ~~12~~ ~~Aug.~~ - INTERNAZIONALE COMMUNIST Party
 20. ~~13~~ ~~Aug.~~ - Literature. -

SEE, 199, 13.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

REF : SD/645.12

11 August 1945

SUBJECT : Security North Italy

TO : Maj. HEATH, Regional Security Officer

1. Reference your S/1100 of 9th August.
2. There seems to be some doubt as to the existence or functions of an AC Adv. Hq., and I think the official position is that there is no Advance Headquarters, but that Col. FISKE is the Chief Commissioner's representative in Milan, and that he has certain officers to assist him. In addition there are certain Sub Commissions who have sent up representatives to work in Milan. *O.J.J. 1*
3. No request has been made to this Division for an officer or CR to assist in screening employees, but Captain FARBER has been sent from Public Safety Sub Commission to assist Colonel FISKE in Public Safety matters.
4. The future of AMG in the North is still under discussion and no plans can be made until such decisions have been taken, but no doubt any Security officers designated to remain in the North of Italy would be glad of the services of Messrs. SARETTA and DE THOMASIS.
5. In connection with the screening of the employees of Colonel FISKE, I think it is a matter that his Hq., Commandant could take up with Captain FARBER, and I think they would both appreciate any assistance that you could give them from your indexes, and by putting them in touch with any other sources of information. They would also, no doubt, be only too pleased to accept your advice on any difficult case which may arise.



S.J. HARVEY,
Major,
Security Division.

S.J.H/nb

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9/10/68

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
LOMBARDY REGION
APO 394
Regional Security Officer

Ref. S/ 1100

August 9th, 1945.

SUBJECT:- AC Adv. HQ. - Security

TO:- AC HQ., Security Division
(Attn. Maj. HARVEY)

1. The HQ. Commandant of AC Adv. HQ. has requested assistance from this R.S.O. in connection with the screening of civilian personnel engaged by that HQ. and already exceeding 100 persons. It is understood that the number will be considerably increased within the course of the next week or so.

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2. This R.S.O. was specifically asked to arrange for at least one OR/EM or, correspondingly, one officer to be temporarily attached to AC Adv. HQ. for Security purposes. It was pointed out in the first place that any such request should be submitted to AC HQ., altho' that apart from the u/s officer, the only two male members of the staff are Messrs. SABETTA and DE THOMASIS, both Italian Army Officers.

3. It is assumed that provision has been made by your HQ. for a Security Officer and staff to be assigned or attached to AC Adv. HQ. If, however, it is felt that either this R.S.O. and/or present members of his staff can be of assistance, assuming that these HQ. will cease to operate from or about 1st September 1945, it is suggested that you might care to consider for further employment the a/m Italian Officers (both of whom are known to you), as it is obvious that their general Security and Intelligence experience of a period of more than one year both in the Lazio-Umbria and Lombardia regions - and more particularly during the past three months in the Milano area-, would be of considerable value to any Security Officer who may be appointed to AC Adv. HQ.

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4. In connection with the above, the u/s officer desires to record his appreciation and opinion of both SABETTA and DE THOMASIS, who have performed their several duties with intelligence, loyalty and personal devotion. It is considered that they are fully qualified to deal with any normal Security problem which may arise, under the direction and supervision of a trained Security Officer.

5. It is submitted that, far from decreasing, there is a potential danger in engaging Italians or other nationals for civilian employment with AC or similar organizations which may remain in Italian territory for some time to come. In this connection, it is pointed out that, from experience, such Allied Agencies as UNRRA are recruiting their civilian personnel amongst several nationalities including Cze~~ch~~, Yugoslav, Polish, French and Dutch nationals, whose former activities and present sympathies are difficult to ascertain as in many cases their last known residences were in their respective countries, thus obviating to a very great extent a thorough Security check on their political background and present civilian status.

6. It will be noted that in submitting the above^{3.9} this R.S.O. has no official knowledge whether or not it has been decided a) when AMG, as such, will cease to operate in Northern Italy and b) whether and for how long it is intended that AC or a similar Allied organization shall remain in Italy. In addition to the a/m officers, there are two other civilian employees who have worked with this R.S.O. for some considerable time and whose services have been greatly appreciated. If it is felt that their continued employment in a similar capacity is of interest, their names and particulars will be forwarded on request.

7. It should also be pointed out that this R.S.O. has no knowledge of any directives which may have been issued by you in respect to the above and therefore trusts that any suggestions or observations made will be taken in the spirit with which they are intended.



A.E. HEATH
Major I.C.

Regional Security and Intell. Office

10 AGO. 1945.

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HEADQUARTERS
 ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
 LOMBARDIA REGION
 Regional Public Safety Office

PS/37

SUBJECT : Unrest on Northern Regions

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission
 HQ Allied Commission

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Security	Division
10/8	9428
Book No.	695.01
Date	645.12.846
Action	

9 August 1945

1. With reference to your letter SI/645.01 of the 9 July 1945, cases of shootings, armed robberies, extortions etc., have been studied with a view to ascertaining if they have been instigated by any parent body.

2. The general conclusion is that they have not. It is true that most of the offenders detected have been members of the Communist Party. One would not expect them to be in any other party.

3. Some of the earlier cases of shooting were done by partisan rousps who were mainl: political groups but they were under local control.

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4. Some of the loot, in fact a considerable quantity, found its way into political treasuries - mostly Communist and Socialist. Here again it seems to have been according to local inspiration.

5. Armed robberies and murders now committed appear to be by young and irresponsible criminals and are not the work of gangs working under any leadership.

6. Doubtless in some cases young criminals perform crimes for their own gain but leave the idea that they were Communists, probably to cover their former Fascist backgrounds.

7. On the other hand crimes against Carabinieri have suggested a definite Communist policy not to accept the CC.RR as a Police agency.

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3. There is, too, much indication that the Communist Party are determined to make a bid for control at the first favourable opportunity and are prepared to resort to violence if necessary to achieve their end. It is, of course, possible that the main controlling committee do not approve violence and that it is the less responsible and undisciplined members who have adopted this policy.

For the Regional Commissioner.



H.W.F. FOWLER

Major

Regional Public Safety Officer.

NWFP/jb

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REBELLIONES ALLIED COMMISSION
PUBLIC SECURITY SUB COMMISSION
REF : 80/645.12
SUBJECT : Unrest in Northern Regions

26 July 1945
1003-6

TO : V.P. Civil Affairs Section

1. After the liberation of Northern Italy and the capitulation of the German armies, killing on a large scale were reported, particularly from industrial centres, such as Milan. In the early days the greater proportion of those killed were well known fascists and it can be said that in most cases the action taken was inspired by patricide motives, and the number of murders for gain was proportionately small.

2. After the first month, the number of "executions" decreased very considerably, but continued throughout the North on this diminished scale. These murders were usually accompanied by robbery and diminished patricide motives. These persons are communists in so far as they hold the party card and wear red scarves and other emblems. Their knowledge of communism is very small and they are for the most part composed of undesirable elements of the population, who have found a mostly proletarian base of violence, thievery or pilferage, etc., etc.,

robbery within themselves or violence of others, which includes blackmail.

3. It is the unanimous opinion of the Security Officers in the North, that the perpetrators of these offences, which include blackmail, are mostly communists. These persons are communists in so far as they hold the party card and wear red scarves and other emblems. Their knowledge of communism is very small and they are for the most part composed of undesirable elements of the population, who have found a mostly proletarian base of violence, thievery or pilferage, etc., etc.,

robbery within themselves or violence of others, which includes blackmail. This priority over non party members, and a party card gives separated districts will tend to show that there may be a certain amount of co-operation arranged by the leaders of the communist party, but there is at present no evidence to show that the offences are committed at the order of the party's chief party leaders.

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by patriotic motives, and the number of murders for gain was proportionately small.

2. After the first month, the number of "executions" decreased very considerably, but continued throughout the North on a diminished scale. These no longer were usually accompanied by robbery and looting.

3. It is the unanimous opinion of the security officers in the North, that the perpetrators of these offenses, which include blackmail, robbery with threats of violence, threatening of witnesses, etc., etc., are mostly communists. These persons are conducted in so far as they hold the Party official rank and sources and other embassies. Their knowledge of communism is very small and they are for the most part composed of undiscernible elements of the population, who have gained their red scarves through their assertion immunity, and a party card gives them priority over non-party members.

4. The similar methods adopted by these persons in mainly separated districts would tend to show that there may be a certain amount of coordination among the leaders of the communist party, but there is at present no evidence to show that the offenses are committed at the order of the party, or that they form part of a concerted scheme with some political not so small groups or individually, on their own responsibility.

5. While it cannot be said with certainty that the communist party leaders have ordered these illegal acts, security officers are agreed that the party makes no effort to put a stop to these practices, and exposes its members to them.

6. It is known that the communist party is spending very large sums on propaganda, the salaries of its members, etc., and it is suggested that many local party offices are financed through the proceeds of robbery and extortion.

7. It is also stated that persons attached to the Russian Delegation to the Advisory Council have been contacting communist leaders and supplying them with large sums of money drawn through the allied Financial Agency.

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1. After the liberation of Northern Italy and the capture of the German warships, killing on a large scale were reported, particularly from individual citizens, such as Hitler. In the early days the greater proportion of those killed were innocent by nature, and it soon became clear that the action taken was intended by Hitler to settle scores for his own purposes.

2. After the first month, the number of executions increased very considerably, but continued throughout the north on the diminished scale. These numbers were usually accompanied by robbery and looting.

3. It is the intention of the Security Officers in the North, that the perpetrators of these offences, which include blackmail, robbery with threat of violence, threatening of witness, etc., etc., are morally condemned. These persons are criminals in so far as they hold the party card and they are for this reason held responsible of undermining Loyalty and morale, and they have gained knowledge of communists in Loyalty and morale, and they are for this reason held responsible of certain immorality, and a party and those whom primarily over non party members.

4. The smaller numbers engaged by these persons in widely separated districts would tend to show that there may be a certain amount of ordinary criminality or robbery, etc., etc., but this is to be expected in the course of the party's policy of some persons who have been compelled to the order of the party, or that they form part of a community or organization or the like, to do the same offences are separated from the party in so far as they are no longer members.

5. While it cannot be said with certainty that the command party leaders have ordered these illegal acts, it is suggested that the party make no effort to put a stop to these persons, and especially to ordinary persons.

6. It is known that the communist party is spending very large sums on propaganda, to develop country clubs, and it is suggested that many local party offices are financed through the proceeds of robbery and extortion.

7. It is also stated that persons attached to the British Embassy to the Ally Council have been contacted to the British Finance Agency.

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6. The conclusions to be drawn are -

- (1) The Communist Party leaders are probably not, at the moment, ordering the commission of these acts of violence.
- (2) They are almost certainly condoning them.
- (3) There is no evidence to show that, at the appropriate time, they will not order a general outbreak involving the destruction of public order.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.C.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

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SECURITY
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*so 6*ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JB/JJJr

G-5: 000.5

6 August 1945

SUBJECT: Massacre at Schio Jail.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. Reference your SD/645.12 of 25 July.

2. It is understood that you are making a final consolidated report covering this matter and it is desired to know when it may be expected.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

Securi	118
Divisi	
Rec'd	9372
Book	
File N	645.12
Action	

Julius Byles
JULIUS BYLES
Major, G.S.C.

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VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

WRH/bc

30 July 45.

TO : R.P.S.O., Venezie Region.
SUBJECT : Massacre at Schio.
FILE No. : RXII/PS/11.4

1. With further reference to my report of 20 July 45 respecting subject.
2. Every possible enquiry has been made in an effort to apprehend the murderers but to date our efforts have not met with much success.
3. On the 29th July 45 a mass raid was made on Schio and the surrounding villages by American military with the result that 66 suspects were arrested and are now incarcerated in one of the jails in Vicenza.
4. Enquiries that have been made in this matter, have definitely established the identity of two of the murderers, but they have completely disappeared from the district. I feel that they appreciate that they are the only two who appeared un-masked at the jail and, realising the probability of having been identified, are now hiding in the mountains.
5. It was hoped that the raid on the 29th would have caught one or both of these men in the net, but such was not the case.
6. Our efforts will now be concentrated on interrogating the 66 prisoners and it is hoped that the effect of these mass arrests will be that people, who have been hitherto afraid to speak, will now come forward with information ⁰⁰⁰⁰³ that will help in the enquiry.
7. The arrangements for the American troops to assist in this matter were made by Lieut. Col. Lollar, P.C. Vicenza, through 5th Army. The troops were under the command of Lieut. Col. Castile and the whole operation was conducted without incident.

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8. The military used 17 trucks, each under the command of a junior officer or a senior N.C.O. and the instructions to each truck were to arrest an average of four people. In some cases the name and address of the wanted person was supplied; in other cases, only the name. In fact, the information supplied to the Americans was in a number of cases very scanty. The success of the operation is due, in no small measure, to the initiative and enterprise shown by the American Officers, N.C.Os and men who composed the crews of the trucks.

9. A further report will be submitted when the interrogation of the 66 prisoners is completed.

W.R. Hare
W.R. HARE, Major,
Regional Security Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

REF : SD/645.12

25 July 1945

SUBJECT : Massacre at Schio Jail

TO : G-5 AFHQ

(15)

1. Please find attached two copies of a report from the Regional Security Officer on the recent massacre at Schio Jail.



JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
(Colonel J.A.G.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

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ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
HEADQUARTERS
REGION XII

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 185016

July 20th, 1945.

TO: Regional Commissioner (thro' R.P.S.O.).

SUBJECT: Massacre at Schio Jail.

1. At approximately midnight during the night of the 6/7th. July, 1945, a number of armed masked men, actual number not known but believed about 15, entered the fundamentalist prison at Schio in the province of Vicenza, and killed and wounded a number of political prisoners by automatic weapon fire. The deaths to date are 53, and the wounded are 13. There were one or two slightly wounded who are included in the remaining 25 political prisoners, some of whom were uninjured.
2. In addition to the 91 political prisoners in the jail there were eight communal prisoners in custody for various civil offenses. All of these were deliberately saved from the massacre by the murderers.
3. Since the 12th. July, 1945, this enquiry has been conducted by C.I.D. Agent Valentino, C.I.D. Agent Anyer both of 5 Army, and myself, assisted by Captain Baker, PPSO Vicenza.
4. Local carabinieri and questura are assisting but they do not appear to be able to co-operate among themselves, and to-date, as a result of either their inefficiency or the fact that they are afraid of being associated with the case, four important suspects have disappeared.
5. Bearing in mind that this case is primarily an Italian Government matter, the C.C.HR and Questore are being kept in the picture making routine inquiries.
6. From enquiries that have been made there is no doubt that the commune of Schio is a hot-bed of Communism of which there are two types. There is the Italian Communist Party, the

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2. In addition to the 91 political prisoners in the jail there were eight communal prisoners in custody for various civil offences. All of these were deliberately saved from the massacre by the murderers.

3. Since the 12th July, 1945, this enquiry has been conducted by C.I.D. Agent Valentine, C.I.D. Agent Snyder both of 5 Army, and myself, assisted by Captain Baker, FPOO Vicenza.

4. Local carabinieri and Questura are assisting but they do not appear to be able to co-operate among themselves, and to-date, as a result of either their inefficiency or the fact that they are afraid of being associated with the case, four important suspects have disappeared.
5. Bearing in mind that this case is primarily an Italian government matter, the CC.MR and Questore are being kept in the picture making routine enquiries.
6. From enquiries that have been made there is no doubt that the commune of Schio is a hot-bed of Communism of which there are two types. There is the Italian Communist party, and the International Communist Party. Pamphlets issued by the latter have been widely distributed in the district. Copies of as many of these pamphlets as have come to hand are attached.
7. There has been great hatred openly displayed against the political prisoners in Schio ever since the liberation of the commune by the Allies and it has been with some difficulty that acts of violence have been prevented from being taken against them. 000
8. The situation appears to have reached its climax on the 28th June, 1945, when Perdicchi William returned to Schio from forced labour in Germany.
9. Perdicchi was one of 11 men who were deported from Schio to Mauthausen, Germany, on the 8th, January, 1945, and he was the only one to return alive, the remainder having died as a result of their ill-treatment by the Germans. A list of the prisoners and their particulars is attached.

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... news so incensed the population that an immediate strike was called and a crowd of people variously estimated as between 3,000 and 5,000 demonstrated in the main square of the town demanding justice and death to the fascist prisoners.

11. This demonstration without any incident of violence and the people dispersed after the C.A.O., Captain Chambers, had spoken to them.

12. As far as can be ascertained there were no further outward signs that there was to be another demonstration or any acts of boldness until the evening of the 6th, July 1945.

13. At approximately 2015 hours on the 6th, July, 1945, the chief jailer at the mandamentale prison, Schio, left the premises and visited a wine shop immediately opposite. He remained in the wine-shop a few moments and then left with the intention of returning to the mandamentale. As he crossed the road he was approached by two civilians who asked questions about the political prisoners incarcerated in the mandamentale. Having answered the questions, the chief jailer was about to leave the two men when one of them pointed a revolver at him and told him to walk along with them.

14. The two men took the chief jailer to an open space known as Valletta dei Fratti some half a mile away on the outskirts of the town. There they detained him until it was dark; when they were joined by three men wearing masks. The two unarmed men left the party, and shortly afterwards the three masked men and the chief jailer went to the mandamentale.

15. It was approximately 2215 hours when the party arrived at the prison. They found the door open as the wife of the chief jailer had become anxious about her husband's prolonged absence, and had sent her brother-in-law to look for him. The brother-in law had at the moment returned to the prison and the wife of the chief jailer had just opened the prison gate. They had barely spoken to each other when the chief jailer and the three masked men arrived and took them all inside the prison, locking the gate after them.

16. Inquiries up to this moment threw grave suspicion on the story as told by the chief jailer and his wife. The former is at present in custody, but despite repeated interrogations has not been able to give any definite information.

Having answered the questions, the chief jailer left the room and told him to walk alone with them.

14. The two men took the chief jailer to an open space known as Valletta dei Fratelli some half a mile away on the outskirts of the town. There they detained him until it was dark; when they were joined by three men wearing masks. The two unmasked men left the party, and shortly afterwards the three masked men and the chief jailer went to the mandamente.

15. It was approximately 2215 hours when the party arrived at the prison. They found the door open as the wife of the chief jailor had become anxious about her husband's prolonged absence, and had sent her brother-in-law to look for him. The brother-in-law had at the moment returned to the prison and the wife of the chief jailor had just opened the prison gate. They had barely spoken to each other when the chief jailor and the three masked men arrived and took them all inside the prison, locking the gate after them.

16. Enquiries up to the moment threw grave suspicion on the story as told by the chief jailer and his wife. The former is at present in custody, but despite repeated interrogations, insists on basically the same story. Q.J. 9

17. When the party arrived inside the prison there is a divergence of my evidence as to what happened then. The chief jailor and his wife always tell substantially the same story which is to the effect that they are unable to identify any of the three men because they were wearing masks the whole time. The brother-in-law who was standing at the prison gate says that when the chief jailer and the three men arrived they were not wearing masks, but handkerchiefs tied around their necks which they pulled up over the lower part of their faces a few seconds after entering the prison.

18. Just inside the prison gate were two female political prisoners who had been employed cleaning the steps of the jailers' quarters. They state that the first man to enter the jail was not wearing a mask and they have identified him by name. Every effort is being made to effect the arrest of this man, but to date without success.

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20. The three intruders then took the chief jailer and the remainder of the prison staff, the brother-in-law of the chief jailer and the two female political prisoners into the private quarters of the second jailer, when they found in bed. This party was locked in this apartment and one of the intruders was left there to guard them.
21. After about half an hour the chief jailer was called out to unlock the cells, but he refused. He did, however, show the intruders where the keys were and they tore a list of the names of the person from a wall in the jailer's office.
22. About half an hour later another effort was made by the intruders to get the chief jailer and the second jailer to open the cells but again with no success.
23. The cells in the jail are numbered 1 to 4 inclusive. No. 1 is a single cell on the ground floor. No. 2 is an apartment of cells consisting of one large and two smaller cells, also on the ground floor. No. 3 cell is an apartment cell consisting of two small cells on the first floor, and No. 4 cell is a single large cell on the second floor. All the women prisoners, both political and communal, were in cell No. 4. The men, both political and communal, were distributed in the remaining cells. The retarding party appears to have divided into three parties. One party dealt with the women, the second party dealt with the men, and the third appears to have remained in the courtyard and also assisted in re-loading the weapons.
24. All the communal prisoners, 6 men and 2 women, were taken to a small cell that forms part of No. 2 cell. In addition to the 6 communal prisoners the raiders singled out 4 of the male political prisoners to be saved from the massacre and put them in the same cell with the 8 communal prisoners.
25. By this time the masked raiders had separated the prisoners into 3 groups; the 12 mentioned in the last paragraph; 56 men in the large cell of cell No. 2; 23 women and 6 men in cell No. 4. About 5 or 6 of the masked raiders all armed with automatic weapons were in each of the cells Nos. 2 and 4, and commenced firing at their helpless victims almost simultaneously.

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cells, also on the ground floor, and No. 4 cell is a single large cell on the second floor. All the women prisoners, both political and communal, were in cell No. 4. The men, both political and communal, were distributed in the remaining cells. The raiding party appears to have divided into three parties. One party dealt with the women, the second party dealt with the men, and the third appears to have remained in the compound and also assisted in re-loading the weapons.

24. All the communal prisoners, 6 men and 2 women, were taken to a small cell that forms part of No. 2 cell. In addition to the 8 communal prisoners the raiders singled out 4 of the male political prisoners to be saved from the massacre and put them in the same cell with the 8 communal prisoners.

25. By this time the masked raiders had separated the prisoners into 3 groups; the 12 mentioned in the last paragraph; 56 men in the large cell of cell No. 2; 23 women and 6 men in cell No. 4. About 5 or 6 of the masked raiders all armed with automatic weapons were in each of the cells Nos. 2 and 4, and commenced firing at their helpless victims almost simultaneously.

26. The two large cells in which the executions took place are about 13 ft. by 25 ft. by 8 ft. high, and are lined with wood approximately six inches thick.

27. As far as can be ascertained the massacre commenced at 0015 hours on July 7th, 1945. The murderers stood their victims at one end of each of the cells, about 3 or 4 deep, and then fired their automatic weapons at them. The length of time the firing continued is not definitely known, but varies from 5 to 10 minutes.

28. When the assassins decided their work had been done, they left the prison, but fortunately some of them would-be victims had not been wounded and after some minutes they managed to call help. The jailer and his party were released by the prisoners from their quarters, and using the telephone at the wine-shop opposite the prison, the CC.RR., hospital

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29. The wounded were taken to Kohio hospital, and the dead to the local cemetery. The deceased were buried in the Kohio cemetery on the 8th. July without incident, and no further demonstration have been made.

30. The case presents many difficulties, and not least of these is the lack of co-operation of the inhabitants of the district. One gets the impression that half of them are pleased with what happened and the other half are afraid to speak.

31. To date only one person has been definitely identified as wanted, as mentioned in paragraph 19. One person is in custody alleged to have been identified by voice, but there is no further evidence against him at the moment.

32. A further report will be submitted when something more definite is known as to the prospects of a prosecution or otherwise.



R. HARE.

Major.

Regional Security Officer,

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32. A further report will be submitted when something more definite is known as to the prospects of a prosecution or otherwise.



R. HARRIS.
Major.
Regional Security Officer.

000.7

THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF THE PROLETARY STRUGGLE

LABOURERS = COMPANIONS:

Seeing the convulsive agitation of the political world of perpetual peace, seeing the economical crisis, which surpasses the first illusions of the end of the war, will tell to the lot of the working class and on all those who work, our Party confirms:

- 1) Fascism, which the working class wants definitely destroyed, so as not to recompence the horrors of these 22 years of nightmare, can only be also be destroyed: epuration can only sweep off the face of the earth a few individuals, but cannot sweep away definitively a system which is rooted in the interests of conservation of the middle-class. This last task, the only effective one, can only be realized by a proletary revolution.
- 2) Real Peace cannot have birth on the green table of diplomacy of middle-class countries: it would always be a false peace founded on the exploitation of one people by part of another one, that is to say of proletariat by part of capitalism. Peace can only be the result of the international victory of the communist revolution.
- 3) No elective constitution, no constitution can ever free the labourer from the exploitation to which he is subject to on the part of his employer, equals: only the revolutionary conquest of the government on the part of the agricultural and industrial proletariat supported by the minor classes exploited by capitalism, and done in the name of collective interests of the working class, can cure the males from which humanity is suffering, which have said can drag her into a new war.
- 4) Reconstruction accomplished under capitalism flag and under the national solidarity is a good profitable affair for the national and international middle-class, not for you: to reconstruct one must first destroy a monstrous state and economical apparatus, that is fed on the blood and fatigues of the labourer. In the same way the crisis can be momentarily ter-

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- 3) No elective consultation, no constitution can ever free the labourer from the exploitation to which he is subject to on the part of his employer, it will never assure him the power for the construction of a society of equals: only the revolutionary conquest of the government on the part of the agricultural and industrial proletariat supported by the minor classes exploited by capitalism, and done in the name of collective interests of the working class, can cure the maladies from which humanity is suffering, which have and can drag her into a new war.
- 4) Reconstruction accomplished under capitalism flag and under the national solidarity is a good profitable affair for the national and international middle-class, not for you : to reconstruct one must first destroy a monstrous state and economical apparatus, that is fed on the blood and fatigues of the labourer. In the same way the crisis can be momentarily resolved by capitalism, but its spectre will continue to weigh on proletarian as long as the economical system which has for object the realization and consolidation of profits will abide. Just like the war, so the crisis will be won only by the proletariat revolution.

How will you labourers prepare yourself for this revolutionary result? How will you prepare the conditions for a definitive assault and not an illusory one of the Government?

You will prepare them, first of all, fighting for the defence of your vital interests against the ruling class, whenever these interests are in danger, and in all the organisms which traditionally defend them. You will defend them in the Syndicates, fighting for them so that they will be the voluntary expression of your class and the free expression of all the political currents, asserting that they become one of the many stepping-stones of the middle-classes, demanding in them entire freedom of expression and speech. You will defend them in the internal factory commissions, ensuring yourselves that the same have not been p.t.o.

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elected by superior powers, but by you yourselves, so as not to become instruments of collaboration of the ruling class, and when these classes will result to your understanding unable to defend truly your immediate and future interests and will be unable to unite in an only lot your class you will defend them in new organs, exquisitely classicistic, genuine expression of your will and aspirations, instruments of your struggle revolutionairy against the exploiters - the factory counsels:

You will prepare them carrying out thoroughly on your working place and out of it the fight of class against capitalism exploitation against oppression of holders of capital and against those who live on your daily fatigues, against war profiteers, and the destruction and reconstruction for the bettering of your living conditions.

You will prepare them fighting against the drugging suggested by one of the national solidarity, of the collaboration between middle classes people and proletaries, of the political compromise, confusing and restraining thoroughly amongst yourselves the fundamental ideas of communism and of its revolutionary tactics, supporting the party that, availing of losing itself in the sands of parliament and of participation with the government, will aim with you decisively, towards the revolution.

You will prepare them finally expressing in facts your concrete and active solidarity with your brothers of other countries who fight against the same enemy and for the same cause, refusing to support new policies, uniting your revolutionary struggle to that of the proletariats all over the world.

This is your war route, labourers, under this sign you

will win!

The International Communist Party.

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thoroughly amongst yourselves the fundamental ideas of communism and of its revolutionary tactics, supporting the party that, averted of losing itself in the sands of parliament and of participation with the government, will go with you decisively, towards the revolution.

You will prepare them finally expressing in facts your concrete and active solidarity with your brothers or other countries who fight against the same enemy and for the same cause, refusing to support new politics, uniting your revolutionary struggle to that of the proletariat all over the world.

This is your main route, labourers, under this sign you will win!

The International Communist Party.

003-3

We and Peace:

Proletariat which has done the war against its will, must exert that peace, with the economical crisis which projects itself on the spirit of the large crowds, become the tool of international capitalism, and represent the beginning of a new period of middle-class life that no economical and ideological speech can historically justify.

Real peace, lasting peace, is only possible by the elimination of the war regimen: Capitalism, which will disappear on the only condition that proletariat gives its good-will, ideas and strength to sweep it away from the face of the earth, on which it has dominated tyrannical and exploiter for over a century.

Real peace, lasting peace is solidly tied to the victorious outcome of the proletarian struggle. The Federation of the Communist countries of Europe is the first step towards the new order in the world: the International is the guarantee against any return of the barbarities of imperial capitalism.

We and the internal situation:

Now it is evident that the elimination of nazi-fascism, glorious and heroic page of our working people, has not signified in no way modifications of social, political and economical conditions that make proletariat at the eternal force subject from which the middle-class can and will attain boundless riches to alliment a life of idleness and of dissipation, and from which it will recruit means and fighters for its new adventures and wars.

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The International Communists that have been against the war and have fought against the responsible political forces, have now a clear conscience regarding the way to follow.
While the parties of the Democratic Block march towards the

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The International Communists that have been against the war and have fought against the responsible political forces, have now a clear conscience regarding the way to follow.

While the parties of the Democratic Block march towards the legal solution and middle-class of the crisis opened by the war, the International Communists that interpret the crisis according to the marxism logic, operate the mobilization of proletariat on the class-plan for the revolutionary attack of the middleclass power, even if at its top the levers of the political direction were in the hands of the most progressive of the democratic forces.

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We are not by far tender towards the reign of Savoia, as for no other monarchy and we attend its elimination from the national complex with the same passionate urgency and interest that we would have for the extirpation of a cancer from the body of a beloved one, but we denounce the effort to make this the basis of a fundamental problem so as to lull in the crowds the real and fundamental objects of its struggle.

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The Progressive Democracy is in theory the greatest mysticism -
 given to the proletariat after fascism : in politics it is the most re-
 cent and subtle tactic device of middle-class to oblige proletariat to
 pay by cash the tribute of peace, after having paid with its blood
 those of the war.

We and Insurrection:

Insurrection done by proletariat for ends not proletariat, has
 created a very strange situation. Certain political parties with vague
 aspirations revolutionary cleverly masked with progressive think, or
 rather they illude themselves to be the arbiters of the new situation,
 to have the power in their hands, and they don't see that they have their
 heads and feet tied together, and to be briefly at the mercy of the capi-
 talist boss. The awakening will be sad. Will the sacrifice of the proletari-
 at fighters in Greece serve for nothing?

Also many labourers are victims of this illusion. They have be-
 lieved that the factory was to be controlled directly by them, that tec-
 cs and employees would obey them, that the employers had been sent away
 from the factories, as by a miracle by the patriotic insurrection.
 Afterwards stark reality followed under the dress of good sense,
 of responsibility, of the civism of the new social-center bosses, who
 have made clear to the insubordinates that labourers must be labourers
 and that the bosses are in definitive always the bosses. Hurrah!

We and the tasks of Proletariat:

It's up to you, labourer, to not fall in new negative experience:
 you can avert them only if you will not abandon the class-plan of your
 struggle.

Fascism is not dead, not only because the class which has given
 it birth is still alive, but because, by a successful camouflage, too many
 fascist elements have slipped themselves to political military organs of
 the new regimen. Labourer, this is one of the good reasons for you to be
 vigilant so that the new movement continues on the plan of class, and
 above all to urge the preparation of the political cadres of a party
 that has for object not the conservation of the middle-class society.

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We and the tasks of Proletariat:

It's up to you, labourer, to not fall in new negative experiences: you can exert them only if you will not abandon the class-peopled of your struggle.

Proletariat is not dead, not only because the classes which has given its birth is still alive, but because, by a successful camouflage, too many fascist elements have slipped themselves in political military organs of the new regime. Labourer, this is one of the good reasons for you to be vigilant so that the movement continue on the plain of class, and above all to urge the preparation of the three categories of a party that has for object not the conservation of the middle-class society, but the proletarian revolution. No "reputation is worth anything if it's not pulled out by the roots."

Reconstruct your sindicates, but remember that the increase in salaries is transient and winning class if you lose sight of the historical problem your complete economical and Marxist political emancipation which isrotten is not pulled out by the roots.

This is the hour for the Theory-commune. Only through advice

you labourer, can guarantee the duration of your struggle. If the industrialists will become, as it will become, monopoly of the parties non-revolutionary; only through advice you will become poliitically and technically worthy tomorrow to conduct the factory in which you work. Let the factory council be the banner of your war battle, the premise of your revolutionary attack against power.

PEOPLES!

The governing of certain classes imposed by the middle-class regiments to charge you with all the consequences of war, and therefore to pile more & berries, more mourtains and sufferings on the back of the labouters, who were all againt the war itself.

As you yourself can see the prices keep on rising up, the arrogance of the employers is always the same, work does not stir up, and the spontaneous voice of the crowds has not as yet found the way to make itself heard. Nothing better could be expected and no improvements can be had until society will undergo that transformation which undoubtedly this state of disorder and bad conditions. It is evident that the capitalist regimen finds itself to-day in front of economical and social problems of such vast interest that it doesn't know to what means to recur to supersede the crisis. Only the revolution and the writers of all productive systems impell, transformation which if not done will prolong the capitalist regimen with success the abyss in which we were thrown by the ferocious evolution of castes by world capitalism.

Capitalism is to-day powerless before the interrogrations set before him, and it doesn't see any other way of getting away except through compromises to(supervate) overcome this moment and to settle afterwards to proceed volently for the liquidation of proletary vindications. Your duty is therefore to refuse any support to governments who maintain Capitalism will decide you to-day by force if it still will have in its burden the Government power, moreover by itself capitalist cannot proceed to post-war construction, therefore no support to middle-class governments, support which cannot be justified by the valour abuse of the word -Standerland! Our native country is not a lie and does not slightly only the interests of the fat owner to which proletariat must oppose its own flag of the union of all people of all countries after the liberation from middle-class slavery their own destinies decided from above, and without their intervention but they hast to enter also into the political field, and ask for this purpose special or/and which one guarantees them against any treachery or decouerance. The proletary crowds have been tried by the fire of war in

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set before him, and it doesn't see any other way of getting away except through compromises to (superate) overcome this moment and be able afterwards to proceed violently for the liquidation of proletary vassalage.

Your duty is therefore to refuse any support to governments who maintain interested social reports, even if the same will be marked by a hypocritical dress of progress, since no progress is possible for proletariat until proletariat itself will not be at the head of the government. What which capital is will concede you to-day by force of circumstances, it will take away from you tomorrow with forces if it still will have its hands taken.

The proletary outcome cannot resist themselves to use their own means of self-government, moreover by itself cannot proceed to proletarian government power, moreover by itself cannot proceed to middle-class slavery all people of all countries after the liberation from middle-class slavery must oppose its own flag of the union of native country to which proletariat must oppose only the interests of the native country to the world-federation! Our

No. 2

TranslationCOMUNE DI SCHIOLIST OF SCHIO citizens deported to Mauthausen on the 9th January 1945

- = ZANICH Andrea, son of late Andrea and late Santona Teresa, born at Schio
August 5th 1991 - Address: 10 Via del Castello, Schio;
died at Gusen on 16.11.1945 of dysentery and blisters
- = BOZZO Andrea, son of late Giuseppe and of Tolicato Candida, born at Schio
June 23. th 1925 - married - Address: 25 Via Berretto, Schio; died at Gusen
on 1.11 April 1945 of dysentery and hepatitis
- = VITALI Giuseppe, son of late G. Vitali and of Nighezzo Celestina, born
at San Paolo (Brazil) February 13 th 1907 - married - Address: 157 Via Paubio, Schio
died at Mauthausen on 10 th February 1945;
- = MUSOLA Alessandro, son of late Giovanni and of Marcella Cesira, born at
San Paolo (Brazil) February 13 th 1907 - married - Address: 19 Via Pia-
subito, Schio; died at Gusen on 12.11 April 1945 of cholera;
- = GAIANI Italo, son of late Giuseppe and late Rosal Irene, born at Schio
February 19. th 1905 - bachelor - Address: 37 Viale Trento-Trieste Schio;
died at Gusen 14.11.1945 - dysentery;
- = BORTOLASSO Giovanni, son of late Giacomo e della Guarda Merla, born at Schio
May 29 th 1912 - married - Address: 37 Viale Trento-Trieste Schio;
died by gas on 15.11 April 1945;
- = GRACCO Lavorio, son of late Giovanni and of Zaltroza Bassi, born at Schio
November 14.11.1921 - bachelor - Address: 2 Vals Milesbro, Schio; died at
Mauthausen of dysentery;
- = FRANCIO Vittorio Merello, son of late Luigi and of De Marchi Costantino, born
at Bassano del Grappa on 3.11 August 1917 - bachelor - Address: Viale P. Verreschini,
Schio; died at Mauthausen on 3.11 August 1945 of dysentery.
- = ZODDANI Bruno, son of Giuseppe e Maria Benelli, born at Sesto Octo-
ber 10.11.1920 - bachelor - Address: 2 Vals Corzone, Schio; killed by gas
- = POLIZZI Piero, Mario, son of Giuseppe and Donato Bellini, born at Burgo Jan-
uary 10.11.1923 - Address: 33 Vals Vicino, Schio;
- = POGGIO Vito, Mario, son of Giuseppe and Donato Bellini, born at Burgo Jan-

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- San Paolo (Verona) February 19, th April 1945 or b/w;
- Schlo, Schlo : died at Queen on 12. th April 1945 or b/w;
- = GATTI AN Itale, son of late Giuseppi and late Rosalba Irene, born at Soldo
Vigoreggio, died at Verona - Address: 22 Delle Sardine Maria, born at Schio
February 19. th 1905 - Bachelor - address: 126 Via Pasubio, Sezione; died
at Queen in April 1945 of dysentery;
- = BORTOLASSO Giovanni, son of Vincenzo and Delle Sardine Maria, born at Schio
May 29. th 1912 - married - Address: 31 Viale Trento-Trieste Schio ;
killed by gas on 25. th April 1945;
- = CRACCO Mario, son of late Giovanni and od Saltironi Anna, born at Schio
November 14. th 1911 - Bachelor - Address: 2 Via Tilsitro, Schio; died at
Mauthausen of dysentery;
- = FRATTO Vittorio Tiepolo, son of late Luigi and of De Marzo Caterina, born
at Desenzano August 25. th 1917 - Bachelor - Address: Via P. Mazzoni,
Schio; died at Mauthausen on 2. th March 1945 of dysentery.
- = GORDAL Bruno, son of Massimo and Beniamino Cartierac, born at Soldo Octo-
ber 20. th 1920 - Bachelor - Address: 2 Via Cognone, Schio; killed by gas
on 15. th April 1945;
- = POZZA Pier Francesco, son of Giuseppe and Domenico Pozzani, born at Soldo Jan-
uary 16. th 1923 - Bachelor - Address: 33 Via Pasini, Schio;
was left at Mauthausen hospital with pleury on 5. th February 1945;
- The news was brought to Schio by an ex-interred young man returned on
27. th June 1945 from Mauthausen - William Parricchi, living at Senio Via
Porta di Sotto - and communicated to the Arch-priest of Schio. This lat-
ter informed the Municipio on 28. th June 1945.

Signed: The Justice
for Domenco 00] - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

EGG/bc

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIA REGION
Allied Military Government
APC 394

11

TO : 1. Public Safety Sub-Commission, (Security Div.), ✓

Headquarters, Allied Commission, A.E.O. 394.

2. Regional Commissioner, A.M.G., Region XII.

SUBJECT : Unrest in Northern Regions.

FILE NO. : RXII/PS/7

21 July 45.

22/1
GCO: G.H.
BDR: FILE NO. 6712
ACT: 1

1. Reference your letter S.D. 645.01 of 9 July and a telegram subsequent thereto.

2. Attached herewith is a report by Major Hare, Regional Security Officer, dealing with the massacre at SONIO Mandamentale Prison.

3. Both Major Hare, who has been investigating this incident, and Captain Baker, the Provincial Public Safety Officer, are of opinion that this occurrence was an organised scheme originating with the International Communist Party (as distinct from the Italian Communist Party).

4. Elsewhere in this Region there have been no incidents of any magnitude though in the area of Portogruaro and the Tagliamento area, (Province of Venice), there have been general complaints of lawlessness, robbery and violence. This area is receiving attention. It is difficult to ascribe any political significance to this situation or to other like condition in the Region. They are in many cases the work of disbanded partisans of the worst type who may or may not be politically attached. Undoubtedly also many criminals (Portogruaro and the Tagliamento area both have had an unsavoury reputation for many years) take advantage of the partisan movements to use them for their own ends, or pose as

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5. Should any evidence to the contrary come to light a report will be submitted forthwith.



0030

P.G. GREEN, Major,
Regional Public
Safety Officer.

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ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
HEADQUARTERS
REGION XII

July 20th. 1945.

TO: Regional Commissioner (thro' R.P.S.O.).

SUBJECT: Massacre at Schio Jail.

1. At approximately midnight during the night of the 6/7th. July, 1945, a number of armed masked men, actual number not known but believed about 15, entered the mandamento prison at Schio in the province of Vicenza, and killed and wounded a number of political prisoners by automatic weapon fire. The deaths to date are 53, and the wounded are 13. There were one or two slightly wounded who are included in the remaining 25 political prisoners, some of whom were uninjured.

2. In addition to the 91 political prisoners in the jail there were eight communal prisoners in custody for various civil offences. All of these were deliberately saved from the massacre by the murderers.

3. Since the 12th. July, 1945, this enquiry has been conducted by C.I.D. Agent Valentino, C.I.D. Agent Snyder both of S.A.M.Y., and myself, assisted by Captain Baker, PPSO Vicenza.

4. Local carabinieri and Questura are assisting but they do not appear to be able to co-operate among themselves, and to-date, as a result of either their inefficiency or the fact that they are afraid of being associated with the case, four important suspects have disappeared.

5. Bearing in mind that this case is primarily an Italian Government matter, the C.C.R.R. and Qu store are being kept in J.J. 9 the picture making routine enquiries.

6. From enquiries that have been made there is no doubt that the commune of Schio is a hot-bed of Communism of which there are two types. There is the Italian Communist Party, and the International Communist Party. Pamphlets issued by

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6. From enquiries that have been made there is no doubt that the commune of Schio is a hot-bed of Communism of which there are two types. There is the Italian Communist Party, and the International Communist Party. Pamphlets issued by the latter have been widely distributed in the district. Copies of as many of these pamphlets as have come to hand are attached.

7. There has been great hatred openly displayed against the political prisoners in Schio ever since the liberation of the commune by the Allies and it has been with some difficulty that acts of violence have been prevented from being taken against them.

8. The situation appears to have reached its climax on the 28th June, 1945, when Perdicchi William returned to Schio from forced labour in Germany.

9. Perdicchi was one of 11 men who were deported from Schio to Mauthausen, Germany, on the 8th January, 1945, and he was the only one to return alive, the remainder having died as a result of their illtreatment by the Germans. A list of the prisoners and their particulars is attached.

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10. This news so incensed the population that an immediate strike was called and a crowd of people variously estimated as between 3,000 and 5,000 demonstrated in the main square of the town demanding justice and death to the fascist prisoners.

boswell

11. This demonstration without any incident of violence dispersed after the C.A.O., Captain Chambers, had spoken to them.

12. As far as can be ascertained there were no further outward signs that there was to be another demonstration or any acts of violence until the evening of the 6th. July 1945.

13. At approximately 2015 hours on the 6th. July, 1945, the chief jailer at the mandamentale prison, Schio, left the premises and visited a wine shop immediately opposite. He remained in the wine-shop a few moments and then left with the intention of returning to the mandamentale. As he crossed the road he was approached by two civilians who asked questions about the political prisoners incarcerated in the mandamentale. Having answered the questions, the chief jailer was about to leave the two men when one of them pointed a revolver at him and told him to walk along with them.

14. The two men took the chief jailer to an open space known as Villetta dei Fratti some half a mile away on the outskirts of the town. There they detained him until it was dark; when they were joined by three men wearing masks. The two unmasked men left the party, and shortly afterwards the three masked men and the chief jailer went to the mandamentale.

15. It was approximately 2215 hours when the party arrived at the prison. They found the door open as the wife of the chief jailer had become anxious about her husband's prolonged absence, and had sent her brother-in-law to look for him. The brother in law had at the moment returned to the prison and the wife of the chief jailer had just opened the prison gate. They had barely spoken to each other when the chief jailer and the three masked men arrived and took them all inside the prison, locking the gate after them.

16. Enquiries up to the moment throw grave suspicion on the story as told by the chief jailer and his wife. The former is at present in custody, but despite repeated interrogations, insists on basically the same story. D.J.U.S.

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16. Enquiries up to the moment threw grave suspicion on the story as told by the chief jailer and his wife. The former is at present in custody, but despite repeated interrogations, insists on basically the same story. 0 J U S
17. When the party arrived inside the prison there is a divergence of ~~my~~ evidence as to what happened then. The chief jailer and his wife always telling substantially the same story which is to the effect that they are unable to identify any of the three men because they were wearing masks the whole time a few seconds after entering the prison.
18. The brother-in-law who was standing at the prison gate says that when the chief jailer and the three men arrived they were not wearing masks, but handkerchiefs tied around their necks which they pulled up over the lower part of their faces a few seconds after entering the prison.
19. Just inside the prison gate were two female political prisoners who had been employed cleaning the stairs of the jailers quarters. They state that the first man to enter the jail was not wearing a mask and they have identified him by name. Every effort is being made to effect the arrest of this man, but to date without success.

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20. The three intruders then took the chief jailer and the remainder of the prison staff, the brother-in-law of the chief jailer and the two female political prisoners into the private quarters of the second jailer, whom they found in bed. This party was locked in this apartment and one of the intruders was left there to guard them.
21. After about half an hour the chief jailer was called out to unlock the cells, but he refused. He did, however, show the intruders where the keys were and they tore a list of the inmates of the prison from a wall in the jailer's office.
22. About half an hour later another effort was made by the intruders to get the chief jailer and the second jailer to open the cells but again with no success.
23. The cells in the jail are numbered 1 to 4 inclusive. No. 1 is a single cell on the ground floor. No. 2 is an apartment of cells consisting of one large and two smaller cells, also on the ground floor. No. 3 cell is an apartment cell consisting of two small cells on the first floor, and No. 4 cell is a single large cell on the second floor. All the women prisoners, both political and communal, were in cell No. 4. The men, both political and communal, were distributed in the remaining cells. The raiding party appears to have divided into three parties. One party dealt with the women, the second party dealt with the men, and the third appears to have remained in the courtyard and also assisted in re-loading the weapons.
24. All the communal prisoners, 6 men and 2 women, were taken to a small cell that forms part of No. 2 cell. In addition to the 3 communal prisoners the raiders singled out 4 of the male political prisoners to be saved from the massacre and put them in the same cell with the 8 communal prisoners.
25. By this time the masked raiders had separated the prisoners into 3 groups, the 12 mentioned in the last paragraph; 56 men in the large cell of cell No. 2; 23 women and 6 men in cell No. 4. About 5 or 6 of the masked raiders all armed with automatic weapons were in each of the cells Nos. 2 and 4, and commenced firing at their helpless victims almost simultaneously.

No. 4

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4 cell is a single large cell on the second floor. All the women prisoners, both political and communal, were in cell No. 4. The men, both political and communal, were distributed in the remaining cells. The raiding party appears to have divided into three parties. One party dealt with the women, the second party dealt with the men, and the third appears to have remained in the courtyard and also assisted in re-loading the weapons.

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25. By this time the masked raiders had separated the prisoners into 3 groups; the 12 mentioned in the last paragraph; 56 men in the large cell of cell No. 2; 23 women and 6 men in cell No. 4. About 5 or 6 of the masked raiders all armed with automatic weapons were in each of the cells Nos. 2 and 4, and commenced firing at their helpless victims almost simultaneously.

26. The two large cells in which the executions took place are about 18 ft. by 25 ft. by 8 ft. high, and are lined with wood approximately six inches thick.

27. As far as can be ascertained the massacre commenced at 0015 hours on July 7th. 1945. The murderers stood their victims at one end of each of the cells, about 3 or 4 deep, and then fired their automatic weapons at them. The length of time the firing continued is not definitely known, but times given vary from 5 to 10 minutes.

28. When the assassins decided their work had been done, they left the prison, but fortunately some of their would-be victims had not been wounded and after some minutes they managed to call help. The jailer and his party were released by the prisoners from their quarters, and using the telephone at the wine-shop opposite the prison, the CC.RR, hospital authorities, and an Italian military unit stationed locally, were soon informed and on the spot.

29. The wounded were taken to Schio hospital, and the dead to the local cemetery. The deceased were buried in the Schio cemetery on the 8th. July without incident, and no further demonstration have been made.

30. This case presents many difficulties, and not least of these is the lack of co-operation of the inhabitants of the district. One gets the impression that half of them are pleased with what happened and the other half are afraid to speak.

31. To date only one person has been definitely identified as wanted, as mentioned in paragraph 19. One person is in custody alleged to have been identified by voice, but there is no further evidence against him at the moment.

32. A further report will be submitted when something more definite is known as to the prospects of a prosecution or otherwise.



R. HARE.

Major.
Regional Security Officer.

0006

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THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE

LABOURERS = COMPARISON:

Seeing the convulsive agitation of the political struggle in Italy, seeing the continual talk that is done throughout the world of perpetual peace, seeing the economical crisis, which surpassed the first illusions of the end of the war, will fall to the lot of the working class and on all those who work, our Party confirms:

- 1) Fascism, which the working class wants definitely destroyed, so as not to reconnounce the horrors of these 22 years of nightmare, can only be destroyed if the economical and political regimes of the middle class also be destroyed: epuration can only sweep off the face of the earth a few individuals, but cannot sweep away definitively a system which is rooted in the interests of conservation of the middle-class. This last task, the only effective one, can only be realized by a proletarian revolution.
- 2) Real Peace cannot have birth on the green table of diplomacy of middle-class countries: it would always be a false peace founded on the exploitation of one people by yet another one, that is to say of proletariat by part of capitalism. Peace can only be the result of the international victory of the communist revolution.
- 3) No elective constitution, no constitution can ever free the labourer from the exploitation to which he is subject to on the part of his employer, it will never assure him the power for the construction of a society of equals: only the revolutionary conquest of the government on the part of the cultural and industrial proletariat supported by the minor classes exploited by capitalism, and done in the name of collective interests of the working class, can cure the woes from which humanity is suffering, which have and can drag her into a new war.
- 4) Reconstruction accomplished under capitalism flag and under the national solidarity is a good profitable affair for the national and international middle-class, not for you: to reconstruct one must first destroy a monstrous state and economic apparatus, that is fed on the blood and fatigues of the labourer. In the same way the crisis can be momentarily relieved by capitalism, but its spectre will continue to weigh on proletariat as long as the economical system which has for object the realization and consolidation of profits will abide, just like the war so the

2) Real peace cannot have birth on the green table of diplomats of one class countries: it would always be a false peace founded on the exploitation of one people by part of another one, that is to say of proletarian by part of capitalism. Peace can only be the result of the international victory of the communist revolution.

- 3) No elective constitution, no constitution can ever free the labourer from the exploitation to which he is subject to on the part of his employer, it will never assure him the power for the construction of a society of equals; only the revolutionary consciousness of the government on the part of the agricultural and industrial proletariat supported by the minor classes employed by capitalists, and done in the name of collective interests of the working classes, can care the workers from which humanity is suffering, which have and can drag her into a new war.
- 4) Reconstruction accomplished under capitalist flag and under the national solidarity is a good profitable affair for the national and international middle-classes, not for you : to reconstruct one must first destroy a monstrous state and economical apparatus, that is fed on the blood and tortures of the labourer. In the same way the crisis can be momentarily resolved by capitalism, but its spectre will continue to weigh on proletarian as long as the economical system which has for object the realization and conservation of profits will abide. Just like the war, so the crisis will be won only by the proletarian revolution.

How will you labourers prepare yourself for this revolutionary result? How will you prepare the conditions for a definitive assault and not an illusory one of the government?

You will prepared them, first of all, fighting for the defence of your vital interests against the ruling class, whenever these interests are in danger, and in all the organisms which traditionally defend them. You will defend them in the Syndicates, fighting for the free so that they will be the voluntary expression of your class and the free expression of all the political currents, asserting that they become one of the many stepping-stones of the middle-class, demanding in them entire freedom of expression and speech. You will defend them in the industrial factory commissions, assuring yourselves that the same have not been p.t.o.

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elected by superior powers, but by yourselves, so & a lot to become instruments of collaboration of the ruling class, and when these class will result to your understanding unable to defend truly your immediate and future interests and will be unable to unite to so only let your class you will defend them in new organs, exclusively classistic, genuine expression of your will and aspirations, instruments of your struggle revolution ary against the exploiters -The Factory Comusse:

You will prepare them carrying out thoroughly on your working place and out of it the fight of class against capitalism exploitation against oppression of holders of capital and against those who live on your daily fatigue, against war profiteers, and the destruction and reconstruction for the bettering of your living conditions.

You will prepare them fighting against the growing suggestions of the national solidarity, of the collaboration between middleclass people and proletaries, of the political bourgeoisie, diffusing and examining thoroughly amongst yourselves the fundamental ideas of communism and of its revolutionary tactics, supporting the party that, avowing of losing itself in the sands of parliament and of participation with the government, will aim with you decidedly, towards the revolution.

You will prepare them finally expressing in facts your concrete and active solidarity with your brothers of other countries who fight against the same enemy and for the same cause, refusing to support new politics, uniting your revolutionary struggle to that of the proletariats all over the world.

This is your road route, labourers, under this sign you

will win!

The International Communist Party.

in the seeds of pernicious and/or vacuous
aim with you decidedly, towards the revolution.

You will prepare them finally expressing in facts your
concrete and active solidarity with your brothers of other countries who
fight against the same enemy and for the same cause, refusing to support
new politics, uniting your revolutionary struggle to that of the proletariat
all over the world.

This is your main route, labourers, under this sign you
will win!

The International Communist Party.

FOURTEEN POINTS OF PROGRAMME OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY

We and Peace:

Proletariat which has done the war against its will, must exert that peace, with the economical crisis which projects itself on the spirit of the large crowds, become the tool of international capitalism, and represent the beginning of a new period of middle-class dictatorship on no economical and ideological speech can historically justify.

Real peace, lasting peace, is only possible by the elimination of the war regimen: capitalism, which will disappear on the only condition that proletariat gives its good-will, ideas and strength to sweep it away from the face of the earth, on which it has dominated tyrannical and exploiter for over a century.

Real peace, lasting peace is solidly tied to the victorious outcome of the proletarian struggle. The Federation of the Communist countries of Europe is the first step towards the new order in the World: the International guarantee against any return of the barbarities of imperial capitalism.

We see the internal situation:

Now it is evident that the elimination of nazi-fascism, glorious and heroic page of our working people, has not signified in no way modifications of social, political and economical conditions that make proletariat the eternal force subject from which the middle-class can and will attain boundless riches to aliment a life of idleness and of dissipation, and from which it will recruit new and fighters for its new adventures and wars.

The International Communists that have been against the war and have fought against the responsible political forces, have now a clear conscience regarding the way to follow.

While the parties of the Democratic Block march towards the legal solution and middle-class of the crisis opened by the crisis according to the International Communists that International

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countries of Europe is the first step towards the new order in the world: the Internationale against any return of the barbarities of imperial capitalism.

We end the internal situation:

Now it is evident that the elimination of nazi-fascism, glorious and heroic cause of our working people, has not signified in no way modifications of social, political and economical conditions that make proletariat the eternal force subject from which the middle-class can and will attain boundless riches to eliminate a life of idleness and dissipation, and from which it will recruit means and fighters for its new adventures and wars.

The International Communists that have been against the war and have fought against the responsible political forces, have now a clear conscience regarding the way to follow.

While the parties of the democratic block march towards the legal solution and middle-class of the crisis opened by the war, the International Communists that interpret the crisis according to the marxist logic, operate the mobilization of proletariat on the class-plan for the revolutionary attack of the middle-class power, even if at its top the levers of the political direction were in the hands of the most progressive of the democratic forces.

000,3

We are not by far tender towards the reign of Savoie, as for another monarchy and we attend its elimination from the national complex with the same passionate urgency and interest that we would have for the extirpation of a cancer from the body of a beloved one, but we denounce the effort to make this the basis of a fundamental problem so as to lull in the crowds the real and fundamental objects of struggle.

*Savoie
is
over*

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2
The progressive Democracy is in theory the greatest mystification done to the proletariat after fascism: no politics it is the most recent and subtle tactic a service of middle-class to oblige proletariat to pay by cash the tributes of peace, after having paid with its blood those of the war.

The end insurrection:

In insurrection zone by proletariat for ends not proletariat, has created a very strange situation. Certain political parties with vague aspirations revolutionaries cleverly masked with progressivism think, or rather they illude themselves to be the arbiters of the new situation, to have the power in their hands, and they don't see that they have their hands and feet tied together, and to be briefly at the mercy of the capitalist boss. The awakening will be sad. Will the sacrifice of the proletarian fighters in Greece serve for nothing?

Also many labourers are victims of this illusion. They have believed that the factory was to be controlled directly by them, that technicians and employees would obey them, that the employers had been sent away from the factories, as by a miracle by the patriotic insurrection. Afterwards stark reality followed under the dress of good sense, of responsibility, of the civism of the new social-center bonzes, who have made clear to the insubordinates that labourers must be labourers and that the bosses are in definitive always the bosses. Hurrah!

We and the tasks of proletariat:

It's up to you, labourer, to not fall in new negative experiences: you can avert them only if you will not abandon the ceaseless-plan of your struggle.

Fascism is not dead, not only because the class which was given at birth is still alive, but because, by a successful camouflage, too many fascist elements have slipped themselves in political military organs of the new regimen. Labourer, this is one of the good reasons for you to be vigilant so that the new movement continues on the plan of class, and

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Also many factories are victims of this illusion. They have believed that the factory was to be controlled directly by them, that technicians and employees would obey them, that the employers had been sent away from the factories, as by a miracle by the patriotic insurrection.

Afterwards stark reality followed under the dress of good cause, of responsibility, of the citizens of the new social-center bolzes, who have made clear to the bourgeoisie that labourers must be labourers and that the bosses are always the bosses. Hurrah!

We send the classes of proletarians:

It's up to you, labourer, to not fall in new negative experiences: you can exert them only if you will not abandon the class-plan of your struggle.

Mascine is not dead, not only because the class which has given it birth is still alive, but because, by a successful camouflage, too many fascist elements have slipped themselves in political military organs of the new regimen. Labourer, this is one of the good reasons for you to be vigilant to that the new movement continues on the road of class, and above all to urge the preparation of the political categories of a party that has for object not the conservation of the middle-class society, but the proletarian revolution. Revolution is worth anything if that which is rotten is not pulled out by the roots.

002

Reconstruct your sindicates, but remember that the increasing in salaries is transcient and against class if you lose sight of the historic problem of your complete economical and ~~political~~ political emancipation you have experienced for more than twenty years the stupid and tyrannical dictatorship of the ~~first~~ sindicates; avoid creating another one under the leadership of the three parties of democracy. The sindicate must be a free camp of interests, of ideas and of methods, otherwise it will transform itself in a fortress against the revolution.

This is the hour for the factory-coonseils. Only through advice you labourer, can guarantee the duration of your struggle if the sindicates will become, monopoly of the parties non-revolutionary; only through advice you will become politically and technically worthy tomorrow to conduct the factory in which you work. Let the factory coonseil be the leader of your next battle the premise of your revolutionary attack against power.

May 1st 1945

and a moment they can do more pretended than right to make, control and
decide nations. The Proletariat crowds before trampled by the tyre of war in
pose special organizations which can concentrate these against any treasury or
they insist to enter also into the political field, and seek for titles pur-

pose you yourself can see the price keep on going up,
the arrogance of the employer is always the same, work does not stir up,
and the spontaneous voice of the crowd has not as yet found the way to
make itself heard. Nothing better could be expected and no improvements
definitely this state of disorder and bad conditions. It is evident that
the capitalist regime stands itself to-day to what it was to recent
years and allow to eligible to-day to eligible again with success the abyss in which we
set before him, and it doesn't see any other way of getting away except
through communists (proletarians) overcome this moment and be able after
we're to proceed violently for the liquidation of governments who maintain
themselves with no progress in possible for proletariat until
proletariat itself will not be at the head of the government. That which
every from you tomorrow with force if it still have in its hands the
address of progression, since no progress in possible for proletariat until
capitalists will concede you to-day by force of circumstances, it will take
governing power, moreover by itself capitalism cannot proceed to post-war
construction. Therefore as support to middle-class government of the
middle country lie not a life and does not equality only the interests of the
pet owner to which proletariat must oppose its own flag of the union of
all people of all countries after the liberation from middle-class slavery

PROLETARIAT!

The governing of certain classes imposed by the middle-class
therefore to rise more miserly, more scurries and sufferings on the back
of the labourers, who were all against the war itself.

Capitalism is to-day powerless before the interrogations
set before him, and it doesn't see any other way of getting away except
through communists (proletarians) overcome this moment and be able after
we're thrown by the forcible action of centre by world capitalism.
Only the revolution and the uniting of all groups
to support the crisis. Only the revolution and the uniting of all groups
can be had until Society will undergo that transformation which pro-
ductively systems impel, transformation which is not done will prolong the
period of such a violent transition. It is evident that
the employer is always the same, work does not stir up,

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Capitalism is to-day powerless before the interrogations set before him, and it doesn't see any other way of getting away except through compromises to(s uperate) overcome this moment and be able afterwards to proceed violently for the liquidation of proletary vindications. Your duty is therefore to refuse any support to governments who maintain isolated social reports, even if the same will be asked by a hypercritical press of progression, since no progress is possible for proletariat until capitalism itself will no longer be at the head of the government. That which proletariat itself will concede you to-day by force of circumstances, it will take away from you tomorrow with force if it still will have in its hands the overwhelming power, moreover by itself capitalism cannot proceed to post-war construction. Therefore no support to middle-class governments, support right in every country is not a lie and goes not aligntly only the interests of the fat owner to which proletariat must oppose its own privilege of the union of all people of all countries after the liberation from middle-class slavery

The proletary crowds cannot resign themselves to see their own destinies decided from above, and without their intervention; but they insist to enter also into the political field, and ask for the pure-rose special organs which can guarantee them against any treachery or aggressions. The proletary crowds have been tried by the fire of war in such a way that they can by no pretend to rights to judge, control and decide by themselves society. enough with educators and conductors, march! for the proletary independence and for the constant revolution!

000.1

able. Your
L.P.

Translation

COMUNE DI SCHIO

LIST OF SCHIO citizens deported to Mauthausen on the 8. th January 1945

- = ZANON Andrea, son of late Andrez and late Sandona Teresa, born at Schio
August 5. th 1891 - Address: 10 Via del Castello, Schio;
died at Gusen on 14. th March 1945 of dysentery and blows
- = DOZZO Andrea, son of late Giuseppe and of Dolcato Cardida, born at Schio
June 23. th 1886 - married - Address: 26 Via Baratte, Schio; died at Gusen
on 1. st April 1945 of dysentery and nephritis
- = VIDALE Giuseppe, son of late G. Battista and of Mighazzolo Celestina, born
at Schio December 12. th 1901 - married - Address: 157 Via Pasubio, Schio
died at Mauthausen on 10 th February 1945;
- = THILLA Anselmo, son of late Giovanni and of Munaretto Cesira, born at
San Paolo (Brazil) February 13. th 1907 - married - Address: 19 Via Pa-
subio, Schio : died at Gusen on 12. th April 1945 of blows;
- = CAELIANI Italo, son of late Giuseppa and late Rossi Irene, born at Schio
February 29. th 1912 - married - Address: 31 Viale Trento-riate Schio ;
killed by gas on 15. th April 1945;
- = BOHOLLO Giovanni, son of Pietro and Della Guarda Maria, born at Schio
May 29. th 1912 - married - Address: 31 Viale Trento-riate Schio ;
killed by gas on 15. th April 1945;
- = CRACCO Ladio, son of late Giovanni and of Zaltron Zone, born at Schio
November 14. th 1911 - bachelor - Address: 2 Via Pilastro, Schio; died at
Mauthausen of dysentery;
- = TRADIGO Vittorio Pietro, son of late Luigi and of De Marco Caterina, born
at Dueville August 28 th 1917 - bachelor - Address: Via P. Marascini,
Schio; Died at Mauthausen on 3. th March 1945 of dysentery.
- = ZGRADA Bruno, son of Giuseppa and Menghini Caterina, born at Schio Octo-
ber 10. th 1920 - bachelor - Address: 2 Via Borgone, Schio; killed by gas
on 15. th April 1945;
- = POZZER Pier Francesco, son of Giuseppe and Bonomi Leopoldo, born at Schio Jan-
uary 16. th 1925 - bachelor - Address: 83 Via Pasini, Schio;

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February 19. th 1905 - Bachelor - Address: 126 Via Busibio, Schio; died at home in Peril, 1945 of dysentery;

= BORTOLASO Giovanni, son of Pietro an Dalle Guarda Maria, born at Schio May 29 th 1912 - married - Address: 31 Viale Trento-Trieste Schio ; killed by gas on 15. th April 1945;

= CRACCO Livio, son of late Giovanni and ed Zaltroen Zona, born at Schio November 14 th 1911 - bachelor - Address: 2 Via Pilastro, Schio; Died at Mauthausen of dysentery;

= FRADDO Vittorio Pietro, son of late Lui di and of De Marco Caterina, born at Dueville August 28 th 1917 - bachelor - Address: Via P. Maraschin, Schio; Died at Mauthausen on 3. th March 1945 of dysentery.

= GORDANI Bruno, son of Giuseppe and Meneghini Caterina, born at Schio October 10. th 1920 - bachelor - Address: 2 Via Corzone, Schio; killed by gas on 15. th April 1945;

= POZZER Pier Franco, son of Giuseppe and Benouli Regine, born at Schio January 16. th 1925 - bachelor - Address: 33 Via Pasini, Schio; was left at Mauthausen hospital with pleurisy on 5. th February 1945;


The news was brought to Schio by an ex-interned young-man returned on 27 th June 1945 from Mauthausen: William FERDIOCHI, living at Schio via Forte di Sotto - and communicated to the Arch-priest of Schio. This latter informed the Municipio on 26. th June 1945.-

Signed: The Sindaco
Baron Domenico
Ugo Ugo

785016

HEADQUARTERS
PIEMONTE REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

(B)

Office of the Regional Public Safety Officer

REF : PR/PS/

SUBJECT: Unrest in N. Italy

TO : HQ A.C. APO 394 (Attn. Director Public Safety Sub-Comm.)

Reference your SD/645.01 dated 9/7/45.

1. There is no reason to believe that shootings and other illegal acts have been instigated or committed in the name of any particular political organisation.

2. It cannot be said that there has been any definite concerted scheme.

3. Individuals have committed serious crimes on their own responsibility particularly when entry to the Region was made and everybody wanted to kill Facists.

4. Groups have acted together under the guise of partisans and committed crimes which invariably have a profit basis.

5. One case came to notice of a rich man being shot because some months previously he refused to contribute to Partisan funds. No other reason for the killing is known.

6. Many cases on the surface have appeared to be political, but enquiries suggest personal vengeance.

7. In and around Turin the motive is mainly theft. The full facts of killings are not yet to hand and a further report will be submitted in due course.

For the Regional Commissioner.

OJSS

[Signature]
C.R. BRIGGS
Lt Col
Regional Public Safety Officer

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

HEADQUARTERS.
Lombardia Region.
(Public Safety)

PS/37

SUBJECT :— Unrest in Northern Regions.

TO : Public Safety S/C, HQ. A.C. (Security Division)

I. With reference to the letter; SD/645.01, dated 9th July; 1945, received from the Director of Public Safety, HQ. A.C., regarding the above subject, there is no evidence to show that the shootings; blackmailing and other illegal acts, are the work of large organised bands or part of any concerted scheme.

2. These crimes appear to be the work of small groups of men, each group acting on its own initiative. Unfortunately the name of the C.I.N. is often used when money is extorted, and the excuse usually given is that the victim made his money with the help of fascism.

3. The acts of violence seem to be committed much more by Communists and Socialists than by members of the Right and Centre Parties. I know of no real evidence that the Communist Party is responsible, but no effort appears to be made by the Communist Party to stop it in this Region.

4. The Communists are spending very large sums of money. Where it comes from it is not known, but certainly some of it could very well come from the blackmailing of wealthy people. There is every indication that the Communists are spending far more money than any other Party.

5. The complete lack of a really strong; efficient, and non-political Police Force is the chief cause, in my opinion, of the various Police

2. These crimes appear to be committed on its own initiative. Unfortunately of men, each group acting on its own initiative. Unfortunat-
ely the name of the C.I.N. is often used when money is extorted, and the excuse usually given is that the victim made his money with the help of fascism.

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4. The Communists are spending very large sums of money. Where it comes from it is not known, but certainly some of it could very well come from the blackmailing of wealthy people. There is every indication that the Communists are spending far more money than any other Party.
5. The complete lack of a really strong; efficient, and non-political Police Force is the chief cause, in my opinion, of the present situation. The various Police Forces are a little timid in dealing with the extremists; while the Questura Agents of Public Security contain so many members of the Communist Party, that they are unlikely to do very much to upset the Party. The purely criminal elements of the population realise the position, and posing as partisans or communists, take the opportunity of / taking committing crime. Also the Communist Party appears to be into its ranks, criminals and former members of the various fascist organisations, such as the G.N.R and Brigade Nere.

Ahmed Sezayi
Major.
Mhamud Ali Dogus
R.P.S.C.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS LIGURIA REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

LIG/SAF/680

SUBJECT : Unrest in Northern Regions.

TO : Director, Public Safety Sub-Commission, Security Division.
(Thru' R.P.S.O.)

15 July 45

11

1. With reference to letter SD/645.01, dated 9 July 45.

2. The many cases of shooting which occurred immediately before and after the arrival of the Allies in this Region can be regarded, in almost every case, as the action of partisans directed against former members of the Fascist and Republican Fascist regimes. The vast majority of partisans are "so called Communists", and although it cannot be definitely stated that their Party organisation directly dictated the policy which they followed it can be reliably said that local Communist leaders were responsible for the enthusiastic manner in which the "purge" against Fascists and German collaborators was carried out.

3. To-day these "political murders" can generally be regarded as finished but unless the Italian legal machinery for the trial of the many persons now in custody is greatly speeded up and the time taken to consider the appeals of those already convicted and sentenced to death is considerably reduced, it is thought that those elements responsible in the past will again come into prominence and take the law into their own hands. The few cases of shooting which come to notice at the present time cannot be said to have any political angle, they are the result of personal vendettas and can only be viewed as cold-blooded murder.

4. Regarding other illegal acts, reports are received from time to time alleging that one or more men, sometimes armed, have entered houses generally at night and successfully demanded or taken away money and/or jewellery. It cannot be said that any political significance is attached to this type of crime but usually those responsible are described as being dressed in partisan uniform and are recorded as ordinary cases of larceny.

5. Cases of demanding money or goods with menaces are reported but many do not come to the notice of the authorities as the victims fear reprisals and feel it is useless to make complaint to the various Questuras as the investigating agents are in all cases ex-partisans.

so-called Communists, and although it cannot be definitely stated that their Party organisation directly dictated the policy which they followed it can be reliably said that local Communist leaders were responsible for the enthusiastic manner in which the "purge" against Fascists and German collaborators was carried out.

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5. Cases of demanding money or goods with menaces are reported but many do not come to the notice of the authorities as the victims fear reprisals and feel it is useless to make complaint to the various questures as the investigating agents are in all cases ex-partisans.
6. Wealthy ex-Fascists, manufacturers, business men, etc., are known to be approached and invited to subscribe to some organisation. If questioned they will admit giving a donation which may be anything up to L.1,000,000, in one case I am informed it was L.4,000,000.
7. Although complaints are made about the extortion of money they are never properly investigated owing to the lack of an efficient public safety organisation. If it were possible to enquire into the circumstances under which "donations" are collected, it is felt that sufficient evidence would be forthcoming to support charges of demanding property etc., with menaces. Arrests by the Italian authorities for this type of crime or for murder are unheard of. It is said that many of the wealthier ex-Fascists still enjoy their liberty this maybe due to the fact that it is not considered prudent in all cases to "kill the goose that lays the golden egg".

- 2 -

7. Communists are undoubtedly responsible for the vast majority of shootings, demanding property and money with menaces etc., but definite evidence to support such a statement naturally is not forthcoming, neither can it be stated that any particular political party or organisation is responsible for forming any concerted scheme, but it can be said that small groups of Communists acting more or less on their own can be regarded as the culprits in practically all cases.

A.H.Ellis

A.H.ELLIS. Capt.
Regional Security Officer.

Forwarded for information as requested.

B.J. Stefford

B.J. STEFFORD. Major.
Regional Public Safety Officer.

AHE/

Forwarded for information as requested.



B.J. JEFFORD. Major.
Regional Public Safety Officer.

0006

AHE/

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EMILIA REGION
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
Public Safety Division
APO 394

FILE : R.IX/PS/29/40.

SUBJECT : Unrest in Northern Regions.

TO : The Director,
Security Division,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
HQ. AC.

5/1
8839
645.01

1. Reference your SD/645.01 dated 9 July 45.
2. In the absence of the Regional Security Officer now on duty in Rome, the following report has been compiled from facts supplied by Public Safety Officers.
3. It is not easy to determine, with any degree of proof, the political significance of the present state of unrest. Many factors however, have combined to create the impression that much of it is due to the actions of the Communist party.
4. It is well known that this party has attracted to its ranks, by all sorts of specious promises, the very worst type of person. Ex Fascists, so called partisans, many of whom have no patriotic notions of any kind and probably never fired a shot or did any action in defence of their country, anyone in fact, who is prepared to be unscrupulous, especially if he is between the ages of 17 and 25. Its very propaganda is designed to attract all and sundry.
5. It is not surprising therefore, that this party, or at least its adherents, should be credited with being responsible for a good deal of the present lawlessness and illegal acts. The mere warning of a good fight on some front is enough to

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5. It is not surprising therefore, that this party, or at least its adherents, should be credited with being responsible for a good deal of the present lawlessness and illegal acts. The mere wearing of a red shirt or scarf is sufficient to dub the wearer a Communist. It is extremely doubtful whether 50% of these persons have the vaguest idea of the meaning of Communism. It is sufficient for them that membership of the party secures certain privileges. Production of the Communist 'Tessera' will procure priority over others. It has even been said that certain types of goods in short supply or unobtainable by ordinary methods, can be obtained by production of this 'Tessera'. A subtle form of propaganda this.

6. I have been told that part of Emilia Region ~~has~~ j-5 always been regarded as the hot bed of left wing sentiments. This again may be responsible for the popular beliefs already referred to. The Communist party has the largest membership of all. Many of the leading civil and administrative posts are held by people claiming to be Communist. The Local C.I.N. contains a good proportion. There are strong rumours of Communist cells being established in all parts of the Region. It is confidently stated that just prior to the occupation, Communist and

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partisan identity cards ~~are~~ sold to scists for very large sums of money. All these factors can only sum up to one conclusion, namely that the Communist party is endeavouring to secure as complete a hold as it can on all forms of control with some of the worst, most unruly and undesirable types of people.

7. That many of these types are responsible for most of the violent crimes now being committed, is borne out by the fact that, when arrested, many are found to be in possession of Communist membership cards and openly boast of belonging to that party.

8. On the other hand, it would be wrong merely to accuse from this that the Communist party is responsible for, or instigates these offences. However, popular feeling must be known to leaders of this party and yet, they seem to do nothing to alter or deny this opinion. In fact, I suggest they connive at or are wilfully blind to what is going on. They are content to let this opinion grow in the hope and belief that the party will be strengthened thereby and be able to enforce its views simply because it would be considered, by the great majority, unwise to do anything else.

9. As yet, there is nothing of value to show that shootings or other serious crimes, can be ascribed to the Communist or any other party either as a concerted scheme or even as a part of their policy. However change remarks attributed to minor leaders (which, of course, cannot be substantiated), the similarity of the crimes and methods used, even in widely dispersed parts of the country, together with the known types of persons involved, leave no doubt at all in the minds of most sane and law abiding people that the present state of unrest can, very largely, be laid to the account of the Communist Party.

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For the Regional Commissioner:

H. S. Gould
H. S. GOULD, Major,
A/Res. Pub. Saf. Off.
HSG/LP

Copy to : File R.IX/PS/76.

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MEMORANDUM
TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
IN NORTHERN INDIA

RE: 64612

9 May 1945

MESSAGE : Northern India.

TO : Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington
Lorraine
Lima
Madras
Mumbai
Victoria
(444a, 750)

1. The Vice President, Mr. A. P. Venkateswara requests
on behalf of the Government of the Andhra Pradesh and other Indian states
that on the organization of pro-Soviet and democratic movements in
various provinces which have occurred in your regions,

2. It is requested that the facts referred to have been furnished
to the Government in the name of each political organization for
presentation to you so that such acts have been the result of
some concerted scheme or due to individuals or groups acting largely
on their own responsibility.

3. Please treat the matter as urgent, relying upon information
you have at hand. Please also immediately available

Walter Mohrly
for J. E. Clegg

Public Safety Information
Commission
Government of Ontario

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To The Vice President, Civil Rights Section for wants a report on the political influence of the Aborigines and other Indian acts such as the organizations of property and examining many or goods with Indians, which have occurred in your regions.

2. It is to be considered that the acts referred to have been instigated by or committed in the name of these political organizations. The formation is to consider as to whether such acts have been the result of some extorted advice or due to individuals or groups acting largely on their own responsibility.

3. Please grant the writer an urgent replying with an interim report if the full facts are not immediately available.

*Walter Anthony
Co*

for
J. E. R. C. S. J.
Director
Public Safety Information
Security Division

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

8

Ref : SD/645-12
AC/14174/P3
29 June 1945

Subject : Security Officer

To : Regional Commissioner, Piemonte Region
(Attention Lt. Col. Briggs, R.P.S.O.)

1. Capt. S.J. Mason, 256376, Int. Corps (B) who has recently reported to this Headquarters from S.O.M. has been posted to Piemonte Region as Public Safety and Security Officer.
2. Captain Mason has had no public safety or security experience with AOC in this country but has worked with the partisans in E.O.T.
3. Since the above posting IV Corps have been persuaded to release Major Ronnie (B) to take up his assignment to Piemonte Region as Security Officer immediately.
4. It may be considered advantageous to allow Capt. Mason to work under Major Ronnie so as to utilize his knowledge of partisans and at the same time he will absorb some knowledge of Public Safety duties.
5. Major Harvey of Security Division, this Headquarters, will be visiting Northern Regions early in July and will be able to discuss the matter further.

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JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.C.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

S.M./bd

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

Ref : SD/645.12
AC/242P4/PB

Subject : Security Officer

To : Regional Commissioner, Liguria Region
(Attention Major Hafford, R.P.S.O.)

29 June 1945

1. It has been decided to attach Capt. A.H. Ellis (B) from this Headquarters to Liguria Region for temporary duty for a period of six weeks to assist and advise the Regional Commissioner on Security matters.
2. You will recall the letter of 26th April 1945 from this Headquarters under the above reference wherein Capt. Geach was posted to you for this purpose, but owing to shortage of officers he had to perform other duties. Capt. Ellis has much more experience in security matters and will be more suitable.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

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Colonel J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.F.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

6

RDF : SD/645.12 ←

18 June 1945

SUBJECT : War Criminals

TO : See Distribution

1. A Section of S.I.B. charged with the investigation of War Crimes is now located at Florence and their enquiries take them over the whole of Northern Italy.

2. An index of war criminal who are "wanted" is held at AFHQ, and any information concerning them can be obtained through:-

Capt. SLOWE
78 Section (S.I.B.)
c/o Prevost Marshall
Florence (Tel. Florence 1326)
or Lt. FOX (Florence 1278)

CH

J. J. HARVEY,
Major,
Security Division.

Distributions:

RSO, Emilia Region.
RSO, Liguria Region
RSO, Piemonte Region
RSO, Lombardia Region
RSO, Venezia Region
File SD/266.01

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REAGANITES ALIATED COMMISSION
PUBLIC SECURITY SUBCOMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION
4-2-0, 394

REF # : 385/645-12

27 April 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NHD No. 785016

SUBJECT : Screening of officials

TO : Regional Commissioner,
(Attn. Regional Security Officer)
Region

1. In order that prospective officials, and key personnel employed by AC/AUC in the North are thoroughly screened; it is essential that, in addition to those inquiries which are made locally by the Regional Security Officer, particulars are immediately forwarded to this headquarters for clearance at all security agencies.
2. This is particularly necessary in the case of those appointments made by parties before the arrival of allies. Where possible a schedule of persons should be forwarded; otherwise the following information, submitted in triplicate, will be sufficient:

FULL NAME W
PLACE OF BIRTH
DATE OF BIRTH
PARENTS IN THE POSTION
PARENTS IN THE POSTION

PROMOTION
DRAFTING
PLACES OF BIRTH
DATE OF BIRTH
PARENTS IN THE POSTION
PARENTS IN THE POSTION

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1. In order that protective officials, and key personnel employed by SC/AG in the North are thoroughly screened, it is essential that, in addition to the inquiries which are made locally by the Regional Security Officer, particulars are immediately forwarded to this Headquarters for clearance at all Security agencies.

2. This is particularly necessary in the case of those appointments made by parties before the arrival of Allies. Where possible a Schedule of personnel should be forwarded; otherwise the following information, submitted in triplicate, will be sufficient:

FULL NAME	DI	PLATE OF BIRTH	DATE OF BIRTH
PU		PERMANENT RESIDENCE	
ADDRESS		PRESENT POSITION	
PROFESSION		WHETHER MEMBER OF PARTISAN BAND	
ANY RESISTANCE WORK PERFORMED		POST FOR WHICH UNDER CONSIDERATION	
POST FOR WHICH UNDER CONSIDERATION		000000	

3. The information collected from local sources and checks with military security agencies in the North, together with the information supplied by this Headquarters, will tend to eliminate any person left behind by the Nazis to work secretly for their cause after their military defeat.

*John E. Chappell
Maj
Colonel J.A.W.D.
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.*

E.M./mb

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

(A)

REF : AG/14174/PS

27 April 1945

SUBJECT : INSURANCE EXECUTIVES
TO : Finance Sub Commission

1. With reference to your 13174/T of 6th April 1945 respecting the above.

2. It has been decided that a Regional Security Officer will be appointed to each of the Northern Regions of Venezia, Lombardia, Piemonte and Liguria to advise Regional Commissioners on Security matters.

3. It is therefore suggested that your Regional Finance Officers contact the Regional Security Officers for Security clearance. Owing to the amount of work involved their advice will be restricted to the security angle, and the general life history of the individuals concerned will be a matter for the Regional Finance Officers to ascertain from sources which are available to them.

SCM
JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.C.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

SJM/nb

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.C. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

3

REF : AC/14174/PS

26 April 1945

SUBJECT : Captain F.G. Geach, "A" Civilian Internee
Camp.

TO : A.C. or S. G-2, AFHQ.

1. With further reference to our letter of
16th April 45 on this subject and your GS 1 389.
450/2 of 19 April 45, in reply thereto.

2. The shortage of officers in this Commission
is so acute, and the advance of the armies so
rapid that it is essential that Captain Geach re-
ports immediately to this Headquarters. The posi-
tion at the camp is fully appreciated and it is
with great regret that agreement cannot be given
for Captain Geach to remain even a short time longer.
His travel orders have been sent to him, and a copy
is attached hereto.

3. The liberation of the North has also raised
additional problems for our Security Division, who
have provided assistance to AFHQ and AAI in regard to
British Renegades, preparing cases of enemy agents for
trial etc, and it is regretted that these functions,
although capable of being performed by the investiga-
tors in Allied Commission, will have to be referred in
the future to other military formations, to enable the
officers to concentrate solely on Allied Commission
duties.

4. This is viewed with regret, but in view of
the ceiling of officers placed upon the Commission,

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there seems to be no alternative.

5. If it will be of assistance it could be arranged for Major Harvey or Captain Ellis to visit the camp for one week each month to help with urgent reviews.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub Commission

Copy to: SD/125

SJH/af

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394.

(2)

AO/14174/PS.

Tel. 489061 - 560.

23rd April, 1945.

SUBJECT : Security - Northern Italy.

TO : Rehabilitation Branch.

1. In planning for Northern Italy it has become evident that security control from an A.A.C. viewpoint will be of the utmost importance.
2. It is requested that the ceiling of Public Safety Officers be increased in each of the Regions of Emilia, Lombardia, Liguria, Piemonte and Venezia by one officer in order that a Security Officer can be designated for each Region.
3. It is considered that exclusive of the Public Safety Officers assigned to the Regions of Emilia, Lombardia, Liguria, Piemonte and Venezia, an additional Public Safety Officer, specially trained in security duties should be assigned for that specialised work in each Region.
4. The reason for that the port control in Liguria and the frontier situation in the other four Regions, coupled with the known factional trouble that may be expected, will call for full time work for such an officer and be of inestimable value to the Regional Commissioner.
5. These additional officers could be found from the Public Safety Officers assigned to the five Northern Regions and in their stead the surplus Public Safety Officers presently assigned as CAOs could be utilized in their proper sphere as CAROs.

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G. R. O'DONNELL, Brig.
V.P. CA Sec.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMINT
A.P.O. 324,
PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION
SECURITY DIVISION

Ref: AC/14174/PB

16th April, 1945

Subject: Captain P.G. Geach, "A" Civilian Internee Camp, C.M.P.

To : G.2 (CI) A.P.H.Q.

1. For the past twelve months Captain H.G. Geach of this Comintion has been lent to "A" Civilian Internee Camp to assist in the reviewing of the cases of internees.

2. At this time it was felt that his previous experience as a British Police Officer and his knowledge of special Public Safety Duties in India had fitted him for such specialized duties, and it was in agreement with Lt. Col. Gibson G.I. (b) 15 Army Group, that his services were placed at the disposal of the authority responsible for Internees.

3. The call for Public Safety Officers for Northern Regions has now become so great, that it is felt that Captain Geach can no longer be spared. It was hoped that it would have been possible for him to continue a little longer, but the renewed advances of Armies has raised an immediate problem which can only be solved by his physical presence in a forward area.

4. In anticipation of this, it was arranged some months ago for the documentation of internees at the camp to be done by an Intelligence officer and for the Comendant to be present with Captain Geach during this interview and decisions concerning release. It is therefore anticipated that the reviewing and recommendations can now be continued without any loss of efficiency in the absence of Captain Geach.

5. The position at "H" Camp is not affected as it will still be possible for either Major Harvey or Captain Ellis to continue their work as an present, and should occasion arise when either of these officers could advise in addition to "A" Camp, his tenure will readily be afforded.

2. At the time it was felt that his previous experience as a British Police Officer and his knowledge of special Public Safety Duties in Italy, had fitted him for such specialised duties, and it was in agreement with Lt. Col. Gibson G.I. (b) 15 Army Group, that his services were placed at the disposal of the authority responsible for internment.

3. The call for Public Safety Officers for Northern regions has now become so great, that it is felt that Captain Geach can no longer be spared. It was hoped that it would have been possible for him to continue a little longer, but the renewed advances of Ardies has raised an immediate problem which can only be solved by his physical presence in a forward area.

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5. "The position at "Y" Camp is not affected as it will still be possible for either Major Harvey or Captain Ellis to continue their work as at present, and should occasion arise when either of these officers could advise in relation to # case, assistance will readily be afforded.

6. Would you please therefore, signify your approval to releasing Captain Geach from his duties at "Y" Civilian Internment Camp. It will be appreciated if this can be done immediately.

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J.W.C.

JAMES V. GILFREAN,
COLONEL, J.A.G.D.,
DEPUTOR, PUBLIC
SAFETY AND COMMISSION

10/14

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DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF SECURITY DIVISION.

MAJOR HARVEY. Has been responsible for the efficiency of the Division, under the Director of Public Safety, since October, 1944 and previously as a separate Branch.

With AFHQ has laid down policies for reviews of civilian internees, and acts as President of review board at No. 2 Internee Camp.

Has supervised the investigation of enemy agent cases for trial by AMG Courts, in forward areas and in Rome.

Is appointed joint investigator - on the British side - to work with an American officer in matters requiring combined action in the investigative field, in all territory and headquarters of AC/AMG.

Is in constant touch with all Military security agencies on security problems.

Undertakes important enquiries of a confidential nature personally.

CAPTAIN ELLIS.

In the absence of Major Harvey, acts as President of Review Board at Terri Civilian Internee Camp.

Compiles confidential reports on important personalities for all Sub Commissions of this Headquarters.

Maintains contact with numerous Italian officials on the Italian political situation, on which he has rendered reports of inestimable value.

Has established a system of informants which has been responsible for arrests and recovery of property for the Allied Commission in addition to securing information on normal security matters.

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CAPTAIN GALE.

Has been the officer responsible for preparing enemy agents for trial in Rome.

Is undertaking enquiries in regard to British Renegades for their trial in U.K. Has completed the case of Lt. Col. ROCKE and John SPERNI. Has now in hand separate cases of Phona ROBB-SPERNI, Gerald SPERNI, Emanuel WEISS and Jim BARNES, all of which will require considerable investigation, and should result in charges of TREASON.

He is also investigating the contact of the British Union of Fascists with Fascist Italy.

When these cases are completed he will undoubtedly have to go to UK when the trials take place.

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CAPTAIN HAYES.

Is responsible for running the clerical, filing and card index systems. These are most important as they are constantly being referred to for screening purposes.

Conducts correspondence with AFHQ on civilian internees, their appeals from the Vatican, Royal Household, Italian Ministries, allied military units, all sub Commissions in this Headquarters, and private appeals.

Investigates suspicious firms, clandestine organizations, political matters and subversive movements of interest to Allied Commission.

CAPTAIN GEACH.

Is engaged solely at No. 1 Civilian Internee Camp, reviewing the cases of some 2,000 civilian internees. His release from these duties has been asked for but has been opposed by AFHQ as they have no officer suitable to undertake his duties.

LIEUTENANT FEHR.

Is engaged on screening Government Officials, and important personal ties.

Maintains contact with the American and Swiss Embassies, and the Vatican.

Is engaged on confidential enquiries at Ministry of the Interior.

Has recently returned, and is still engaged on matters relating thereto, from a neutral country.

Has a case of forgery of Allied Commission travel order in hand. A former employee of this Commission received £7,000 lire for his work. Man arrested by Lt. Fehr.

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The duties mentioned above are merely cursory. Each officer is a mine of information concerning security and general knowledge. Each is a fully trained investigator, and as such has been selected for this work. The assistance which has been rendered to AFHQ and AAI by these officers is fully appreciated, because their experience and training have fitted them for the work, in a manner which other officers in the theatre do not possess. Although not mentioned above, for twelve months officers previously attached to Security Division have prepared cases for trial in Army areas of enemy agents engaged in espionage. They were being acquitted almost every time because of a legal technicality, until officers from Security Division took over the investigations. These officers were transferred from this Headquarters to cut down our manpower ceiling, but the good name and respect they have earned has done a lot of good for the Allied Commission.

Security work is not automatic. Screening or vetting involves a lot of practical and personal work. To write a letter to the eight official contacts we have would produce stilted, formal replies. It is necessary to do this personally, by an officer who can assess the value of information he ~~contains~~ finds. In addition these enquiries often mean personal investigation, when it depends upon the skill and experience of the officer concerned. To summarise, it is very easy to ask for a security clearance, but it cannot be done by looking at a name and saying "yes" or "no". Before an opinion is given enquiries are necessary, and so is the officer to do them. The number of cases received each week is round about 60.


Continuity and a long term policy ~~are~~ necessary. It is months before a new officer, even fully trained, achieves his full utility, because you will not get information until people trust you, and so by changing or removing officers unless for very good reason is not good policy. Informants are useful but difficult to handle, and what they tell one man they whom they know, they may never pass on to someone else.

The Security Division has lost the services in the last six months of Majors Hare, McKay, Fielders and Honnie. In replacement, Captain Hayes has been attached temporarily. To lose other officers would be to take the level beyond the functionally beneficial line. It could be done, but either security screening would become merely "yes" and "no" without any thorough investigation, or the sub commissions and regions seeking the information would have to be told to find out for themselves. Security matters will increase and not, like many other things, cease to be of interest as the Allies move out of the territory. Unless the proper support is given in the North of Italy to security matters, the position will become chaotic, as the enemy is certain to try to infiltrate our organization on a long term scale. When the war is over, Allied Governments will still want to keep a finger on the potential danger spots to avoid a further war. I can foresee a growing demand for officers of the calibre of those investigators in security division in the immediate future, with war criminals, political trouble, renegades, partisan friction, unsuitable administrative appointments all to be enquired into.

In all these circumstances, I feel that any reduction in strength in Security Division, after the four officers we have lost, will not be practicable. Just as surely, the necessity for a Security officer in each of the Northern regions is immediate, in order that Regional Commissioners are suitably advised.

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Major.



785016

Heading
SECURITY DIVISION.

Subject: Regional Security Officers for Northern Italy.

To: Director, Public Safety Sub Commission.

1. In accordance with Minute 3, direct# a draft letter to Regional Commissioners, and a directive on the duties of Regional Security Officers are attached hereto.

2. The officers recommended are:-

VENEZIE - Major HARE, who is assigned to that Region.

LOMBARDIA - Captain EDWARDS, who is assigned to that Region, but is at the moment Public Safety Officer with 2 Corps, 5 Army. (The movements of Major Heath who no doubt would have been employed are uncertain and it is not known whether he will be available)

PIEMONTE - Major RONNIE, who is assigned to that Region. At the moment he is preparing enemy agent cases for trial, but will move forward with 4 Corps. 00010

LIGURIA - Captain GEACH, who is assigned to this H.Q. but I suggest he be assigned to Liguria, and Captain Hayes be assigned to this HQ.

PLANNING FOR NORTHERN ITALY.

It has been agreed that Regional Commissioners will have a Security officer working under the Regional Public Safety Officer to advise and assist him with Security problems. A separate directive will be issued shortly on their functions.

Briefly, these will consist of screening local officials and Allied Commission civilian employees, liaison with other Military and Civil Security agencies, enquiries in regard to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities, liaison between Patriot officers and intelligence agencies etc.

It is most important that all local government officials and persons appointed by Patriots, or important personalities who claim association with the patriots, should be carefully screened through the Regional Security Officer before appointment where practicable, or as soon as possible afterwards. In all cases it is essential that their particulars be forwarded to Security Division, this Headquarters, to be checked with indexes relating to their recent activities.

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Col. Cripps.

When convenient to you will you please ring me (506) on this matter, as it affects Local Government, Patriots and Security.

S. J. Hawes.
Major.

Rec'd & Mkd
G. May
L.G.W.C. 21 Apr.

785016

GOVERNO MILITARE ALLEATO

DATA

PROVINCE 4

N. B. — PENALITÀ SEVERISSIME, DI PRIGIONE E DI AMMENDA, SONO PREVISTE PER CHI NIQUE FACESSE DELLE DICHIARAZIONI FALSE NELL'A PRESENTE SCHIEDA.

SCIEDA PERSONAL

SI DEVE RISPONDERE AD OGNI DOMANDA SECONDE LE INDICAZIONI

Every question must be answered

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2. - Luogo di nascita *place of birth*

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- Eravate inscritto

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Did you at any time b

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- Indicate in brackets

Indicate if you were cre

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b) Se siete stato ufficiale della Milizia, siete stato prima ufficiale dell'Esercito? In caso affermativo indicare le date e le ragioni del trasferimento, anche se queste ultime furono temporanee.

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2. - Luogo di nascita
Place of birth _____ Data di nascita
Date of birth _____

3. - Indirizzo
Address _____ Residenza permanente
Permanent residence _____

4. - Professione
Profession _____ Posizione attuale
Present position _____

5. - Eravate iscritto al P. N. F.? _____ Da quando?
Were you a member of P. N. F.? _____ Since when?

6. - Eravate iscritto al P. F. R.? _____ Da quando?
Were you a member of P. F. R.? _____ Since when?

7. - Appartenevate ad uno dei seguenti gruppi? (SI o NO)
Did you at any time belong to any of the following groups? (Answer YES or NO)

Sansepoltristi _____ Autemarcia _____ Sciarpa Littorio _____ Squadrista _____

Moschettiere del Duce _____

Battaglione "M." _____ M. V. S. N. _____

Sciarpa Littorio _____ Autemarcia _____ Sciarpa Littorio _____ Squadrista _____

Moschettiere del Duce _____

Battaglione "M." _____ M. V. S. N. _____

Sciarpa Littorio _____ Autemarcia _____ Sciarpa Littorio _____ Squadrista _____

Moschettiere del Duce _____

Battaglione "M." _____ M. V. S. N. _____

Sciarpa Littorio _____ Autemarcia _____ Sciarpa Littorio _____ Squadrista _____

Moschettiere del Duce _____

Battaglione "M." _____ M. V. S. N. _____

Sciarpa Littorio _____ Autemarcia _____ Sciarpa Littorio _____ Squadrista _____

Moschettiere del Duce _____

Battaglione "M." _____ M. V. S. N. _____

Sciarpa Littorio _____ Autemarcia _____ Sciarpa Littorio _____ Squadrista _____

Moschettiere del Duce _____

Battaglione "M." _____ M. V. S. N. _____

8. - Indicare se eravate nella Milizia ordinaria, in qualche una delle sue specialità o fuori quadro:
Indicate if you were ever in the M. V. S. N., in one of its special groups or a reserve officer:

a) Periodo di servizio, indicando altresì se volontario o in seguito a regolare chiamata;
Length of service, indicating also if you volunteered or were called for service:

b) Se siete stato ufficiale della Milizia, siete stato prima ufficiale dell'Esercito? In caso affermativo
indicare le date e le ragioni del trasferimento, anche se queste ultime furono temporaneo.
If you were an officer in the M. V. S. N., were you first an officer in the Army? If so state the dates and reasons for
the transfer, even in cases of temporary transfers:

9. - Avete ricoperto una delle seguenti cariche nel P. N. F. o P. F. R.? (Rispondere SI o NO e indicare
il periodo di servizio di ciascuna carica negli spazi corrispondenti);
Did you at any time hold any of the following positions in the P. N. F. or P. F. R.? (Answer YES or NO giving
the dates of service in each position):

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO
Length of Service _____

a) Tribunale speciale?
Special Tribunal?

b) Corpo diplomatico? (Indicare anche se diplomatico di carriera, o in seguito a nomina
speciale)
Diplomatic corps (indicate whether you are a career
diplomat or were otherwise appointed)

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO
Length of service

c) Segretario del P.N.F.
Secretary of the P.N.F.?

d) Segretario del P.F.R.
Secretary of the P.F.R.?

e) Membro del Direttorio Nazionale?
Member of the National Council?

f) Segretario Federale?
Federal Secretary?

g) Membro del Direttorio Federale?
Member of the Federal Council?

h) Ispettore del Partito?
Inspector of the Party?

i) Ispettore Federale?
Federal Inspector?

j) Segretario Politico di un Fascio?
Political Secretary of a Fascio?

k) Fiduciario di un Gruppo Rionale?
Fiduciary of a sectional Group?

l) Membro di un Gruppo Rionale?
Member of a sectional Group?

m) Capo Settore?
Chief of a Sector?

n) Capo nucleo?
Chief of a Group?

o) Una posizione nella G.I.L.? _____ Quale?
A position in the G.I.L.? _____ Which?

p) Una posizione nel G.U.F.? _____ Quale?
A position in the G.U.F.? _____ Which?

q) Una posizione nei Fasci Femminili? _____ Quale?
A position in the Women's Fasci? _____ Which?

r) Qualche altra carica nel P.N.F.? _____ Quale?
Some other position in the P.N.F.? _____ Which?

s) Qualche altra carica nel P.F.R.? _____ Quale?
Some other position in the P.F.R.? _____ Which?

10. - Siete mai stato membro dell'O.V.R.A.? _____ Quando?
Were you at any time a member of the O.V.R.A.? _____ When?

k) Fiduciario di un Gruppo Rionale?
Fiduciary of a sectional Group?

l) Membro di un Gruppo Rionale?
Member of a sectional Group?

m) Capo Settore?

Chief of a Sector?

n) Capo nucleo?

Chief of a Group?

o) Una posizione nella G. I. L.? _____ Quale? _____
A position in the G. I. L.? _____ Which? _____

p) Una posizione nel G. U. F.? _____ Quale? _____
A position in the G. U. F.? _____ Which? _____

q) Una posizione nei Fasci Femminili? _____ Quale? _____
A position in the Women's Fasci? _____ Which? _____

r) Qualche altra carica nel P.N.F.? _____ Quale? _____
Some other position in the P.N.F.? _____ Which? _____

s) Qualche altra carica nel P. F. R.? _____ Quale? _____
Some other position in the P. F. R.? _____ Which? _____

10. - Siete mai stato membro dell'O. V. R. A.? _____ Quando? _____
Were you at any time a member of the O. V. R. A.? _____ When? _____

11. - Avete fatto mai parte dell'Ufficio Politico dei CC. RR.? _____ Quando? _____
Were you ever a member of the Political Office of the CC. RR.? _____ When? _____

12. - Avete fatto mai parte dell'Ufficio Politico della P. S.? _____ Quando? _____
Were you ever a member of the Political Office of the P. S.? _____ When? _____

13. - Avete mai fatto parte della P. A. I.? _____ Quando? _____ E con quale grado? _____
Were you ever a member of the P. A. I.? _____ When? _____ What rank did you hold? _____

14. - Tutti, e specialmente il personale d.l'esercito, debbono specificare se furono mai addetti a personalità fasciste o governative (menzionando i nomi) come segretari, capi ufficio ecc., se prestarono mai servizio all'estero, per quale ragione, presso quale ente, ed in che data:
Every one, and especially army personnel, must specify if they were ever attached as secretaries of departments chiefs or Government personalities, stating the names of such personalities. They must further indicate if they ever had any foreign appointment; for what reason; for what office or firm; when?

15. - Avete mai prestato la vostra opera in una delle seguenti organizzazioni?
Have you ever served in any of the following organizations?

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO
Length of service

a) In una Corporazione ?
In a Corporation?

Quale?
Which?

Denominazione della carica
Title of position

b) In una Unione Sindacale ?
In a Syndical Union?

Quale?
Which?

Denominazione della carica
Title of position

c) In un Consorzio Agrario o di Bonifica?
In a "Consorzio Agrario" or a "Bonifica"?

Quale?
Which?

Denominazione della carica
Title of position

d) In qualsiasi altra organizzazione corporativa
o sindacale?
In any other Syndical Organization or Corporation?

Quale?
Which?

Denominazione della carica
Title of position

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16. - Indicate la carica nazionale, provinciale o comunale, governativa o parastatale, ricoperta da voi dal 1921,
come segue:

*Give the national, provincial or communal, governmental or parastatal position held by you since 1921:
Show the principal sources of income during the Fascist Regime*

NOME DELL'ISTITUTO
Name of Institute

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO
Length of service

MODO DI ASSUNZIONE
How acquired

17. - Indicate le principali fonti dei vostri introiti durante il Regime Fascista
Show the principal sources of income during the Fascist Regime

FONTI
Source of income

INTROITO ALLA FINE DEL PRIMO ANNO
BY IMPLEGO

INTROITO ALLA FINE DEL 1942
*(Stipendio, indennità, gratifiche,
eventuali straordinari, etc.)*

*Income for 1942
(showing salaries, indemnities, allowances,
overtime, etc.)*

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Denominazione della carica

- d) In qualsiasi altra organizzazione corporativa

O sindacale?

In any other Syndical Organisation or Corporation?

Denominazione della carica *Title of position*

16. — Indicate la carica nazionale, provinciale o comunale, governativa o puramente ricoperta da voi dal 1921, come segue:

—*or any other position held by you since 1921;*

NAME OF INSTITUTE
Name of Institute

PERIODO DI SERVIZIO *Length of service*

7. — Indicate le principali fonti dei vostri introiti durante il Regime Fascista
Show the principal sources of income during the Fascist Regime

PONTI <i>Source of income</i>	INTROITI ALLA FINE DEL PRIMO ANNO <i>Earnings of first year of employment</i>	INTROITO ALLA FINE DEL 1942 <i>Income for 1942</i>
(Stipendio, indennità, gratifiche, eventuali straordinari, etc.) <i>Earnings of first year of employment</i> (showing salaries, indemnities, allowances, overtime, etc.)	(Stipendio, indennità, gratifiche, eventuali straordinari, etc.) <i>Earnings for 1942</i> (showing salaries, indemnities, allowances, overtime, etc.)	(Stipendio, indennità, gratifiche, eventuali straordinari, etc.) <i>Income for 1942</i> (showing salaries, indemnities, allowances, overtime, etc.)

(Nelle fonti specificare anche tutte le altre entrate, derivanti dal reddito di terreni, fabbricati, titoli di rendita, mutui ed altri investimenti in genere, notificando le relative somme nelle altre due colonne).
(In the « Source of income » column, specify also all other income, such as income from rents of land, buildings, shares, mortgages, and other investments, showing the relative totals in the other two columns)

18. — Avete prestato servizio militare? ————— In quale arma?
Have you rendered military service? ————— *What branch?*
 Quando? ————— Quale grado rivestivate ultimamente?
When? ————— *Last rank held*

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19. - Siete stato « volontario » nella guerra civile spagnola?
Were you a "volunteer" in the Spanish civil war?
20. - Siete stato « volontario » nella campagna dell'Africa Orientale? a) del Nord Africa?
Were you a "volunteer" in the Ethiopian campaign?
 b) Della campagna di Russia?
Russian campaign?
- c) Avete goduto di qualcheesonero dal servizio militare?
Were you deferred from military service?
- d) Per quale motivo?
Why?
21. - Quale era la vostra posizione all'atto dell'arrivo degli Alleati? (presente al reparto, in licenza di convalescenza, ammalato, a riposo etc.)
What position did you hold at the time of the arrival of the Allies? (present on duty, on sick leave, sick, etc.)
22. - Siete stato membro di organizzazioni di polizia, politiche, economiche, militari, etc. create dal P. F. R.?
 (In caso affermativo specificare incarico e periodo)
- (*Were you a member of any police, political, economic, military, etc. organizations created by the P. F. R.? (If so, indicate position held and length of service)*)
23. - Avete prestato forma di giuramento al P. F. R.?
Have you sworn allegiance to the P. F. R.?
24. - Avete percepito il premio di fedeltà in denaro? Quale somma?
Did you receive any amount of money as an allegiance award? If so, how much?
25. - Avete prestato servizio nella organizzazione T. O. D. T. tedesca?
Did you in any way aid or serve the German Todt organization?
26. - Avete ufficialmente od ufficiosamente collaborato in qualsiasi altro modo con il P. F. R. o con i tedeschi?
 (In caso affermativo specificare dettagliatamente il genere di collaborazione, il periodo e la eventuale retribuzione percepita):
- Did you in any way officially or unofficially collaborate with the P. F. R. or with the Germans? (in the case of an affirmative answer, show, in detail, the type of collaboration, the length of time, and the compensation received)*
27. - Siete stato in qualche periodo giornalista del regime? Dove? Where?
Were you ever, for any length of time, journalist of the regime?
- Quando?
When?
- Con quale giornale?
With what newspaper?
28. - Avete scritto libri, articoli, ed altri generi di stampa fascista? (Specificare dettagliatamente che genere di edizione e in che data avete scritto)
- Have you ever written any books, articles or any other sort of fascist publication? (specify in detail the type of edition and when written)*
29. - Avete fatto parte dal 1922 in poi di organizzazioni politiche diverse dal P. F. R. o dal P. N. F.
Have you ever belonged to any political party other than P. F. R. or the P. N. F. since 1922?

Have you given allegiance to the P. F. R.?

24. - Avete percepito il premio di fedeltà in denaro? Quale somma?
Did you receive any amount of money as an allegiance award? If so, how much?
25. - Avete prestato servizio nella organizzazione T. O. D. T. tedesca?
Did you in any way aid or serve the German Total organization?
26. - Avete ufficialmente od ufficiosamente collaborato in qualsiasi altro modo con il P. F. R. o con i tedeschi?
(In caso affermativo specificare dettagliatamente il genere di collaborazione, il periodo e la eventuale retribuzione percepita):

Did you in any way officially or unofficially collaborate with the P. F. R. or with the Germans? (in the case of an affirmative answer, show, in detail, the type of collaboration, the length of time, and the compensation received)

27. - Siete stato in qualche periodo giornalista del regime? Dove?
Were you ever, for any length of time, journalist of the regime? Where?

- Quando? Con quale giornale?
When? With what newspaper?
28. - Avete scritto libri, articoli, ed altri generi di stampa fascista? (Specificare dettagliatamente che genere di edizione e in che data avete scritto)

Have you ever written any books, articles or any other sort of fascist publication? (specify in detail the type of edition and when written)

29. - Avete fatto parte dal 1922 in poi di organizzazioni politiche diverse dal P. F. R. o dal P. N. F.
Have you ever belonged to any political party other than P. F. R. or the P. N. F. since 1922?

Nome dell'organizzazione

Name of the party or organization

Periodo di appartenenza

Length of membership

*Io dichiaro sinceramente e solennemente che tutto quanto ho affermato è vero.
I solemnly swear that all I have written is true.*

FIRMA _____
Signed _____
DATA _____
Date _____
RESPONSIONE _____
Witness _____

SPAZIO RISERVATO ALLE ANNOTAZIONI DELL'UFFICIALE COMPETENTE ALLIEVATO

This space reserved for notations by an authorized allied officer

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HEADQUARTERS
 281 MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
 UNITED STATES ARMY
 AFHQ 612

7761 AF 567

AG 350.09/530 B-0

14 April 1946

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps

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TO: All Concerned

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1. AFHQ letters, both file AG 350.09-2 GSI-ADM, subject as above, dates 21 February 1944, and 23 April 1944, have been rescinded and the following substituted therefor.

2. The following instructions pertaining to the organization and function of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, this theater, are based upon policies set forth in War Department letter, file AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 43) WD-S-5-1, dated 13 November 1943, subject as above, together with experiences gained in overseas counter intelligence corps operations.

3. ORGANIZATION

a. CIC personnel within the jurisdiction of this headquarters are assigned to CIC detachments, organized in accordance with I/O and A 30-500 and are under the operational control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this headquarters. Detachments are assigned to Headquarters AFHQ., and attached to tactical units, base sections and other commands as required.

b. The procurement, transfer and promotion of personnel in CIC, subject to theater policy and the limitations set forth in this letter, will be handled by the Office of the Chief, CIC, this headquarters (28th CIC Detachment) which functions as the administrative headquarters for all CIC Detachments in this theater.

c. CIC detachment commanders may place their personnel on temporary duty with other detachments for limited periods of time. The approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 or G-3, of the organization concerned, is necessary in each case. Personnel thus temporarily transferred will be returned to their permanent detachments immediately upon completion of their missions.

d. The employment of CIC detachments is a basic function of command and is an operational rather than a staff intelligence activity. Immediate directional authority of CIC activities consistent with the general policies established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this headquarters, is delegated to the commanding officers of the organizations to which CIC detachments are attached. The detailed planning, and execution of CIC duties are the responsibilities of the detachment commanders.

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Ltr, HQ MIUSA, AG 360.09/530 B-0
dtd 14 April 1945 (cont'd)

e. In the case of a command served by more than one individual CIC detachment, the senior detachment commander will assume operational command and administrative supervision of all personnel of the detachments.

- f. (1) Recommendations for the promotions of CIC enlisted personnel will be made by detachment commanders to the commanders of the organizations to which the detachments are attached.
- (2) Recommendations for the commissioning of enlisted personnel will be made by detachment commanders to the commanders of the organizations to which the detachments are attached. All such recommendations must be approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this headquarters, prior to the issuance of appointment orders.
- (3) Promotions of CIC officers will be initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this headquarters.

4. MISSION

a. The mission of the CIC is to furnish appropriate commanders with personnel carefully selected and trained for investigative functions incident to the prevention or neutralization of the activities of enemy agents.

b. These trained specialists will be used only for counter intelligence purposes including activities connected with counter espionage, counter sabotage and counter subversion.

c. CIC personnel will not be used for combat intelligence missions, staff functions, traffic checks, routine PW interrogations, or for work which is properly a function of the Adjutant Marshal or Headquarters Commandant. Investigations of the black market and traffic in blue seal currency will not be undertaken by the CIC unless there is definite reason to believe counter intelligence implications exist.

5. OPERATIONS

a. All CIC detachments normally have the following duties and responsibilities:

- (1) Investigation of reports of enemy espionage, sabotage and subversive activity
- (2) Investigation of harmful rumors and suspected enemy propaganda
- (3) Investigation of disaffection and subversive cases and security violations within the armed forces
- (4) Arrest of known enemy agents and dangerous enemy sympathizers

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Ltr, HQ MTOUSA, AG 350.09/530 P-0
dtd 14 April 1945 (cont'd)

- (5) Performance of security surveys of military headquarters and installations and recommendation of proper security measures. However, CIC personnel will not be used to accomplish the actual protection of such installations or the implementation of the recommendations made. The function of the Corps in this connection is advisory.
- (6) Maintenance of contact with Allied and local military and civil security officials.
- (7) Establishment of informant nets through all levels of society and endeavor.
- (8) Observation of civilian moral and relations between civilians and military personnel.
- (9) Observation of local political and economic conditions. In this connection, it is emphasized that while the CIC must be aware at all times of local political and economic conditions, it will confine its role to that of observer. Key personages in the civil and economic life of an occupied area will not be arrested by the CIC without the concurrence of local Allied Military Government or Allied Control Commission representatives, except in emergency cases requiring immediate action.
- (10) Delivery of security lectures to troop units.

b. CIC detachments serving with commands whose jurisdiction includes seaports will undertake such investigative security duties and functions in respect thereto as are assigned them by the commanders of the responsible organizations. In this connection, care will be exercised that the responsibilities of existing United States or allied security agencies do not overlap, and that the demarcation is clearly established.

c. CIC personnel serving with the Air Forces will normally confine their activities to the security of Air Force personnel and installations, and will not concern themselves directly with territorial security matters. An exception to this is when no other CIC detachment or allied security agency has been delegated territorial security responsibility, in which event the Air Force detachment will expand its usual activities as deemed necessary. In areas where neither CIC detachment nor an allied security agency exercises territorial control, close liaison will be maintained and counter intelligence information freely exchanged through direct channels of communication.

d. In addition to the duties and functions of all CIC detachments enumerated above, tactical detachments serving with field armies, corps and divisions will perform special tactical functions:

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Ltr, HQ ATOMA, AG 350.00/530 B-0
dtd 14 April 45 (cont'd)

- (1) Tactical CIC detachments will:
 - (a) Search evacuated enemy headquarters and seize significant documents
 - (b) Inspect public utilities, enemy supply dumps and all other installations requiring protection and arrange for an adequate guard
 - (c) Seize the telephone exchanges and/or radio stations and arrange for their protection against sabotage until they are turned over to authorized signal or communications personnel as provided in operational orders. Personnel from the nearest Signal Corps unit should be called in to assist and to perform such rehabilitation as may be needed without delay. The records of such installations are of prime importance and should be secured, carefully guarded and turned over to the Signal Corps personnel.
 - (d) Stop all civil communications by mail, radio, telegraph and telephone except those of a local, emergency nature, such as calls for medical assistance. In halting civil communications, no damage should be done to any telephone, telegraph or radio equipment.
 - (e) Insure that all mail in civilian post boxes and drop boxes is impounded and returned as soon as practicable to field censor teams for examination.
 - (f) Transmit to the Provost Marshal or Military Police Commander all information coming within his purview, such as civilian controls, adequacy and extent of cooperation of civilian police, and the extent of disorder, looting and sabotage.
 - (g) Advise concerning the seizure of all civilian arms
 - (h) Stop publication of newspapers and other periodicals
 - (i) Take necessary measures to prevent looting and destruction of enemy documents and material by our own troops
- (2) Commanding officers of tactical CIC detachments attached to higher echelons will coordinate the activities of detachments serving with lower echelons to the end that proper CIC coverage is maintained at all times throughout the area.
- (3) When establishing offices in towns and cities, tactical CIC detachments will clearly identify them by posting signs bearing the letters "CIC".

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Ltr, HQ AFUSA, AG 350.09/550 B-0
dtg 14 April 45 (cont'd)

(4) Tactical detachments will take steps to inform all troops, especially the Military Police, of the existence, purpose and functions of the detachments to the end that full and immediate cooperation will be forthcoming from all when needed.

c. Specialized CIC detachments will be formed from time to time whose duties and functions will be enumerated by the commands with which they are serving.

c. GENERAL

a. Freedom of Action. It is essential to the effective accomplishment of the CIC mission that the personnel of the Corps be encouraged to exercise their initiative to the fullest extent and that they be permitted to operate with minimum restrictions upon their movements or channels of communication. In the accomplishment of their missions, CIC personnel will not be delayed by the observance of standard customs and prohibitions. The freedom of movement of this personnel when on assigned missions will not be hindered at any time of day or night by the Military Police or other military agency. CIC credentials and badges will be honored at all times.

b. Assistance to CIC. Members of the CIC are authorized to call on all military and civilian personnel within this command for any assistance they may require in the performance of their assigned duties.

c. Civilian Clothes. CIC personnel are authorized to wear civilian clothes or the uniform appropriate to their actual officer or enlisted status prescribed for civilians serving with the armed forces, upon written approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this headquarters. At all other times the appropriate prescribed service uniform will be worn.

d. Protection of Identities. It is deemed essential that CIC personnel wearing civilian clothes or the civilian uniform be addressed and referred to as "Mister" or "Special Agent", as the case may be, and not by military title, except for necessary administrative purposes. CIC personnel, while wearing civilian clothes or the civilian uniform, will be extended the same facilities and afforded the same treatment as civilians of the appropriate assimilated officer or enlisted status who are serving with the armed forces. Unless unavoidable under combat conditions, such personnel, while wearing civilian clothes or the civilian uniform, will be billeted, messed, hospitalized, and will draw post exchange supplies under the same conditions prescribed for civilians of the corresponding assimilated officer or enlisted status. **0000**

e. Office Space. In order to facilitate the closest possible contact with informants, it is essential that CIC detachments have office space apart from the headquarters to which they are attached.

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Ltr, HQ AFHQUSA, AG 350.09/530 3-0
dtd 14 April 45 (cont'd)

f. Coordination. Successful operations of the CIC frequently depend upon the rapid and concerted action of several detachments or elements thereof. Such teamwork can only be properly developed by close and constant liaison between the commanding officers of detachments and individual contacts, where feasible, between other personnel of such detachments. To accomplish this coordination, the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, will maintain close contact with the officers in charge of detachments of his command and will require those officers to maintain close liaison among themselves at all times.

g. Channels of Communication and Reports

- (1) CIC intelligence and operational reports will be forwarded through G-2 channels. Information copies of such reports will be forwarded directly to the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, as required.
- (2) CIC monthly Information Reports, as required by War Department Memorandum No. 350-44, will be prepared by each CIC detachment.
- (3) A consolidated CIC monthly Administrative Report, as required by War Department Memorandum No. 350-44, will be prepared by the Office of the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, and is not required from individual detachments.
- (4) Weekly strength reports will be submitted by each detachment to the Chief, CIC, this headquarters, as of 2400 hours on Saturday of each week. The weekly strength report will reflect all changes in assignment or attachment and all promotions or demotions. Copies of all promotion or appointment orders will accompany the weekly strength report.

h. Confidential Expenses. CIC detachment commanders will draw from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 or A-2, of the unit to which attached, funds necessary for the defrayment of confidential expenses. The following are examples of confidential expenditures, payable from G-2 funds: purchase of information; hire of informants; purchase of civilian clothes when necessary beyond the amounts provided for in paragraph 13, War Department letter, file AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) Q-2-B-2, subject as this letter, dated 13 November 1944; hire of automobiles; travel expenses on confidential missions; expenses of investigations; expenses incident to protection of identities of agents; etc.

i. Computation of Rations and Quarters. In all cases where CIC enlisted personnel are on official duty of a nature that requires expenditures of personal funds for meals and/or billets, computation of rations and/or quarters is authorized in accordance with provisions of Table 1B, AR 60-1520, dated 24 February 1943, as amended. Appropriate orders to accomplish this purpose will be issued by the commands to which CIC detachments are attached. This will not be construed

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Ltr HQ AFHQ, AG 350.00/530 E-O

dtd 14 April 1945 (cont'd)

as authority for commutation of rations and/or quarters where requisitioned billets or regularly organized messes are available, and which may be utilized without interference with the performance of official duties.

j. Per Diem. CIC personnel may be placed on per diem status when necessary in the performance of assigned duties or to avoid compromising them. The determination of such necessity will be made by the commanding officer of the headquarters concerned.

k. Civilian Clothing Allowance. Payment of civilian clothing allowances to CIC enlisted personnel is provided for in paragraph 13, War Department letter, file AG 322 CIC (31 Oct 44) OB-S-S-L, dated 13 November 1944, subject as this letter.

l. The standard form of CIC reports will not be altered except on authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or the Chief, CIC, this headquarters.

7. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

a. Equipment and supplies for CIC detachments, other than investigative, will be requisitioned by them on authority of, and in accordance with, War Department T/O and R 30-530, CIC Detachments, dated 24 January 1944.

b. Requests from CIC detachments for investigative equipment and supplies coming within the terms of War Department letter, file AG 400 (27 Nov 43) OB-S-SPDII-L, dated 29 November 1943, subject: "Sociol List of Investigative Equipment and Supplies for Counter Intelligence Corps", will be forwarded to the Chief, CIC, this headquarters.

c. The Chief, CIC, this headquarters, will be the issuing authority for CIC credentials and badges.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MONROE:

Burchfield
C. W. CHRISTENBERG
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

1 Incl
Ltr, AFHQ, AG 350.00/157 G-1-O,
dtd 14 April 1945, subj: "CIC
Corps"

DISTRIBUTION:

WWD	2 - C-4	2 - Fis Dir
5 - on Corps	25 - CIC, AFHQ	2 - AG Records MTO
5 - on Division	2 - FMG	1 - AG M & D
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2 - G-1	2 - SIG	
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ABK:sl

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFHQ 512

AG 350.09/157 CBI-O

14 April 1945

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Corps

TO: All Concerned

AFHQ letters, both fil. AG 350.09-2 CBI-AGM, dated 24 February and 23 April 1944, respectively, subject as above, are rescinded.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

John Chidiock Ede
 J. Chidiock Ede
 Colonel, AGC
 Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5 - on Corps
- 5 - on Division
- 3 - on CIC Detachment
- 2 - G-1
- 2 - G-2
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- 2 - PMG
- 2 - AES
- 2 - SIG
- 2 - O&D
- 2 - RIC Dir
- 2 - AG Records AF
- 1 - AG M & D

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(Incl #1 to ltr, HQ AFUSA, dtd 14 Apr 45)

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION.
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION.
SECURITY DIVISION.

10th April 1945.

Ref: S.D. 115.
SUBJECT: Security work in Northern Italy.
To: Director, Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1. A request has been made by Finance Sub Commission for a series of screenings on Insurance Executives in Northern Italy, on the lined of reports submitted until the present moment by this Division. It is estimated that there will be needed investigations and reports on some 300 individuals.
2. Other Sub Commissions will no doubt raise similar matters, in accordance with the work we have done for them in the past. It has been comparatively easy in Palermo, Naples and Rome to run the Security Division from Headquarters, with Field trips as necessary to keep in touch with what is happening in the Regions.
3. As it is not proposed to establish a forward Headquarters in the North, I cannot help feeling that the Security Division stationed in Rome will be too remote to be of any use in the Northern Regions. The requests for screening officials will have to be done on the spot, and I think the time has come when we must consider whether a more useful purpose could not be served by having one Security officer attached to each of the Northern Regions to work under the Regional Public Safety Officer, and to advise and assist the Regional Commissioner and his staff officers on matters of Security.
4. The screening of employees, internal cases of bribery etc by civilian personnel, subversive activities, liaison with Army Security agencies and with Italian Police, political enquiries etc. can all be performed by an officer on the spot much more speedily and accurately than from so far away as Rome. There will of necessity be a great amount of travelling and contact.

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is estimated that there will be needed investigations and reports on some 800 individuals.

2. Other Sub Commissions will no doubt raise similar matters, in accordance with the work we have done for them in the past. It has been comparatively easy in Palermo, Naples and Rome to run the Security Division from Headquarters, with Field trips as necessary to keep in touch with what is happening in the regions.
3. As it is not proposed to establish a forward Headquarters in the North, I cannot help feeling that the Security Division stationed in Rome will be too remote to be of any use in the Northern Regions. The requests for screening officials will have to be done on the spot, and I think the time has come when we must consider whether a more useful purpose could not be served by having one Security officer attached to each of the Northern Regions to work under the Regional Public Safety Officer, and to advise and assist the Regional Commissioner and his staff officers on matters of Security.
4. The screening of employees, internal cases of bribery etc by civilian personnel, subversive activities, liaison with Army Security agencies and with Italian Police, political inquiries etc. can all be performed by an officer on the spot much more speedily and accurately than from so far away as Rome. There will of necessity be a great deal of work connected with movement of civilians and frontier control, and the Security officer could be responsible for the A&D side of this.
5. At the moment the following officers who have been assigned to Security Division are now assigned as shown:-
- | | | |
|-----------|---|----------------|
| VENZIE | - | Major HARE. |
| LOMBARDIA | - | Major FIELDERS |
| PIEDMONT | - | Major BONNIE |
| LIGURIA | - | Captain HAYES. |
- Captain Hayes is attached to this Headquarters, where he is responsible for conducting correspondence with AFHQ and with Italian Government Departments concerning the reviews and releases of civilian internees, and their appearances as witnesses or defendants in separation proceedings. He has such a grasp on this work, and on the other hand has had no practical experience of outside security work, that I would suggest that he be assigned to this Headquarters to carry on the work

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10. - review of Army Group in Security from Regions. Division
Reviews of civilian in matters of the Allied Commission.
In detail on the Internes of the Italian Security Commission
he is doing good work in the interest of the Allied Commission.
Captain GALE, who is continuing the espionage cases in the Rome
Area, or Captain GEACH, and 49th Army Region responsible
for the use of internees at Pecula, be assigned to Liguria Region,
the proposed can be worked out.

11. Major FIELDERS is on detachment No. 1 Special Branch from the moment
and in his absence Capt. P.A. EDWARD (who is assigned to Headquarters
(temporarily) Army) could temporarily deputise, as he has the
necessary training and experience for the work.

12. May you views be placed before the V.P. please?

13. I feel that in this way much greater use will be made of the
experience which has so far been gained, and a great weight will
be taken from the shoulders of the Regional Public Safety Officer,
who would in any case have to make the necessary enquiries in his
area, as it would be impracticable to send an officer from this
Headquarters. At the moment, the alternatives are: HARVEY,
S.JH/ a) to refer all security matters to the person in responsibility
with his other work, or
b) to ask the appropriate sub commissions to do their own
enquiries.

Neither of these courses seem satisfactory.

14. It will still be necessary to retain a Security Division at
Headquarters to collate the information from Regions, to be answerable
to the Chief Commissioner for the Security of the Allied Commission,
to assist AFHQ and 15 Army Group in matters of Security, to maintain
the contact between the above and the Italian Government, to assist
in the reviews of civilian internees etc.

15. The duties of the Regional Security officers can be worked out
in detail on the lines of paragraph 5 if the procedures contained
in this report are approved in principle.

16. May your views be placed before the V.P. please?

O.U.J.

S.J. HARVEY,
Security Division.

S.JH/

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experience which has so far been gained, and a great weight will be taken from the shoulders of the Regional Public Safety Officer, who would in any case have to make the necessary enquiries in his area, as it would be impracticable to send an officer from this Headquarters. At the moment, the alternatives are: HARVEY,
S.J.H/ a) to refer all security matters to the Security Division
with his other work, or

- b) to ask the appropriate sub commissions to do their own enquiries.

Neither of these courses seem satisfactory.

9. It will still be necessary to retain a Security Division at Headquarters to collate the information from Regions, to be answerable to the Chief Commissioner for the Security of the Allied Commission, to assist AFHQ and 15 Army Group in matters of Security, to maintain the contact between the above and the Italian Government, to assist in the reviews of civilian internees etc.

10. The duties of the Regional Security Officers can be worked out in detail on the lines of paragraph 5 if the proposals contained in this report are approved in principle.

11. May your views be placed before the V.P. please?

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S.J. HARVEY,
Security Division:

S.J.H/

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